SOLIVIO v.

CA (1990)
J. Medialdea
FACTS: Estate of the late novelist, Esteban Javellana, Jr., author of the first post-war Filipino novel "Without Seeing the Dawn," who died a
bachelor, without descendants, ascendants, brothers, sisters, nephews or nieces.

Only
surviving
relatives:
(1)
maternal
aunt,
petitioner
Celedonia
Solivio,
half-sister
of
his
mother,
(2) private respondent, Concordia Javellana-Villanueva, sister of his father, Esteban Javellana, Sr.

Salustia

Solivio;

and

Salustia brought to her marriage paraphernal properties (various parcels of land in Calinog, Iloilo covered by 24 titles) which she had inherited
from her mother, but no conjugal property was acquired during her short-lived marriage to Esteban, Sr.
On October 11, 1959, Salustia died, leaving all her properties to her only child, Esteban, Jr., including a house and lot in La Paz, Iloilo City,
where she, her son, and her sister lived. In due time, the titles of all these properties were transferred in the name of Esteban, Jr.
During his lifetime, Esteban, Jr. had, more than once, expressed to his aunt Celedonia and some close friends his plan to place his estate in a
foundation to honor his mother and to help poor but deserving students obtain a college education. Unfortunately, he died of a heart attack
without having set up the foundation.
Two weeks after his funeral, Concordia and Celedonia talked about what to do with Esteban's properties. Concordia agreed to carry out the
plan of the deceased.
Pursuant to their agreement that Celedonia would take care of the proceedings leading to the formation of the foundation, Celedonia in good
faith and upon the advice of her counsel, filed:

Special Proceeding for her appointment as special administratrix of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr.

Amended petition praying that letters of administration be issued to her; that she be declared sole heir of the deceased; and that after
payment of all claims and rendition of inventory and accounting, the estate be adjudicated to her

CFI declared Celedonia the sole heir of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr.

the properties of the estate had come from her sister, Salustia Solivio

she is the decedent's nearest relative on his mother's side;

with her as sole heir, the disposition of the properties of the estate to fund the foundation would be facilitated.

Thereafter, she sold properties of the estate to pay the taxes and other obligations of the deceased and proceeded to set up the
Foundation which she caused to be registered in the SEC.
4 months later, Concordia filed an MR of the court's order declaring Celedonia as "sole heir" of Esteban, Jr., because she too was an heir of the
deceased. Denied.
Instead of appealing the denial, Concordia filed 1 year and 2 months later a Civil Case in the RTC for partition, recovery of possession,
ownership and damages.
RTC ruled in favor of Concordia.
On Concordia's motion, RTC ordered the execution of its judgment pending appeal and required Celedonia to submit an inventory and
accounting of the estate. Celedonia filed MR Denied.
CA affirmed in toto. Hence, this petition for review.
ISSUE/HELD: WON the RTC had jurisdiction to entertain Concordias action for partition and recovery of her share of the estate of
Esteban Javellana, Jr. while the probate proceedings are still pending NO
The Probate proceedings were still pending in Branch 23 of the same court, there being as yet no orders for the submission and approval of the
administratix's inventory and accounting, distributing the residue of the estate to the heir, and terminating the proceedings.

Order
of
distribution
terminates
the
intestate
proceedings
It is the order of distribution directing the delivery of the residue of the estate to the persons entitled thereto that brings to a close the intestate
proceedings, puts an end to the administration and thus far relieves the administrator from his duties.
The assailed order declaring Celedonia as the sole heir of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. did not toll the end of the proceedings. As a
matter of fact, the last paragraph of the order directed the administratrix to "hurry up the settlement of the estate so it can be terminated.
In view of the pendency of the probate proceedings in Branch 11 of the CFI, Concordia's motion to set aside the order declaring Celedonia as
sole heir of Esteban, and to have herself (Concordia) declared as co-heir and recover her share of the properties of the deceased, was properly
filed by her in Spl. Proc. No. 2540.

Remedy when the court denied her motion was to elevate the denial to the CA for review on certiorari.

Instead of availing of that remedy, she filed more than 1 year later, a separate action for the same purpose in Branch 26 of the court.

We hold that the separate action was improperly filed for it is the probate court that has exclusive jurisdiction to make a just and legal
distribution of the estate.
In the interest of orderly procedure and to avoid confusing and conflicting dispositions of a decedent's estate, a court should not interfere with
probate proceedings pending in a co-equal court.
The power to determine the legality or illegality of the testamentary provision is inherent in the jurisdiction of the court making a just and legal
distribution of the inheritance. ... To hold that a separate and independent action is necessary to that effect, would be contrary to the general
tendency of the jurisprudence of avoiding multiplicity of suits; and is further, expensive, dilatory, and impractical.
The orders of the RTC setting aside the probate proceedings in Branch 23 (formerly Branch 11) on the ground of extrinsic fraud, and declaring
Concordia Villanueva to be a co-heir of Celedonia to the estate of Esteban, Jr., ordering the partition of the estate, and requiring the
administratrix, Celedonia, to submit an inventory and accounting of the estate, were improper and officious, to say the least, for these matters
he within the exclusive competence of the probate court.

G.R. No. L-81147 June 20, 1989

VICTORIA BRINGAS PEREIRA, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and RITA PEREIRA NAGAC, respondents.
Benjamin J. Quitoriano for petitioner.
Linzag-Arcilla & Associates Law Offices for private respondent.

GANCAYCO, J.:
Is a judicial administration proceeding necessary when the decedent dies intestate without leaving any debts? May the probate court appoint
the surviving sister of the deceased as the administratrix of the estate of the deceased instead of the surviving spouse? These are the main
questions which need to be resolved in this case.
Andres de Guzman Pereira, an employee of the Philippine Air Lines, passed away on January 3, 1983 at Bacoor, Cavite without a will. He was
survived by his legitimate spouse of ten months, the herein petitioner Victoria Bringas Pereira, and his sister Rita Pereira Nagac, the herein
private respondent.
On March 1, 1983, private respondent instituted before Branch 19 of the Regional Trial Court of Bacoor, Cavite, Special Proceeding No. RTCBSP-83-4 for the issuance of letters of administration in her favor pertaining to the estate of the deceased Andres de Guzman Pereira. 1 In her
verified petition, private respondent alleged the following: that she and Victoria Bringas Pereira are the only surviving heirs of the deceased; that
the deceased left no will; that there are no creditors of the deceased; that the deceased left several properties, namely: death benefits from the
Philippine Air Lines (PAL), the PAL Employees Association (PALEA), the PAL Employees Savings and Loan Association, Inc. (PESALA) and the
Social Security System (SSS), as well as savings deposits with the Philippine National Bank (PNB) and the Philippine Commercial and
Industrial Bank (PCIB), and a 300 square meter lot located at Barangay Pamplona, Las Pinas, Rizal and finally, that the spouse of the
deceased (herein petitioner) had been working in London as an auxiliary nurse and as such one-half of her salary forms part of the estate of the
deceased.
On March 23,1983, petitioner filed her opposition and motion to dismiss the petition of private respondent 2alleging that there exists no estate of
the deceased for purposes of administration and praying in the alternative, that if an estate does exist, the letters of administration relating to
the said estate be issued in her favor as the surviving spouse.
In its resolution dated March 28, 1985, the Regional Trial Court, appointed private respondent Rita Pereira Nagac administratrix of the intestate
estate of Andres de Guzman Pereira upon a bond posted by her in the amount of Pl,000.00. The trial court ordered her to take custody of all the
real and personal properties of the deceased and to file an inventory thereof within three months after receipt of the order. 3
Not satisfied with the resolution of the lower court, petitioner brought the case to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court affirmed the
appointment of private respondent as administratrix in its decision dated December 15, 1987. 4
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari where petitioner raises the following issues: (1) Whether or not there exists an estate of the
deceased Andres de Guzman Pereira for purposes of administration; (2) Whether or not a judicial administration proceeding is necessary where
there are no debts left by the decedent; and, (3) Who has the better right to be appointed as administratrix of the estate of the deceased, the
surviving spouse Victoria Bringas Pereira or the surviving sister Rita Pereira Nagac?
Anent the first issue, petitioner contends that there exists no estate of the deceased for purposes of administration for the following reasons:
firstly, the death benefits from PAL, PALEA, PESALA and the SSS belong exclusively to her, being the sole beneficiary and in support of this
claim she submitted letter-replies from these institutions showing that she is the exclusive beneficiary of said death benefits; secondly, the
savings deposits in the name of her deceased husband with the PNB and the PCIB had been used to defray the funeral expenses as supported
by several receipts; and, finally, the only real property of the deceased has been extrajudicially settled between the petitioner and the private
respondent as the only surviving heirs of the deceased.
Private respondent, on the other hand, argues that it is not for petitioner to decide what properties form part of the estate of the deceased and
to appropriate them for herself. She points out that this function is vested in the court in charge of the intestate proceedings.
Petitioner asks this Court to declare that the properties specified do not belong to the estate of the deceased on the basis of her bare
allegations as aforestated and a handful of documents. Inasmuch as this Court is not a trier of facts, We cannot order an unqualified and final
exclusion or non-exclusion of the property involved from the estate of the deceased. 5
The resolution of this issue is better left to the probate court before which the administration proceedings are pending. The trial court is in the
best position to receive evidence on the discordant contentions of the parties as to the assets of the decedent's estate, the valuations thereof
and the rights of the transferees of some of the assets, if any. 6 The function of resolving whether or not a certain property should be included in
the inventory or list of properties to be administered by the administrator is one clearly within the competence of the probate court. However, the
court's determination is only provisional in character, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate action which may be
instituted by the parties. 7

Assuming, however, that there exist assets of the deceased Andres de Guzman Pereira for purposes of administration, We nonetheless find the
administration proceedings instituted by private respondent to be unnecessary as contended by petitioner for the reasons herein below
discussed.
The general rule is that when a person dies leaving property, the same should be judicially administered and the competent court should
appoint a qualified administrator, in the order established in Section 6, Rule 78, in case the deceased left no will, or in case he had left one,
should he fail to name an executor therein. 8 An exception to this rule is established in Section 1 of Rule 74. 9 Under this exception, when all the
heirs are of lawful age and there are no debts due from the estate, they may agree in writing to partition the property without instituting the
judicial administration or applying for the appointment of an administrator.
Section 1, Rule 74 of the Revised Rules of Court, however, does not preclude the heirs from instituting administration proceedings, even if the
estate has no debts or obligations, if they do not desire to resort for good reasons to an ordinary action for partition. While Section 1 allows the
heirs to divide the estate among themselves as they may see fit, or to resort to an ordinary action for partition, the said provision does not
compel them to do so if they have good reasons to take a different course of action. 10 It should be noted that recourse to an administration
proceeding even if the estate has no debts is sanctioned only if the heirs have good reasons for not resorting to an action for partition. Where
partition is possible, either in or out of court, the estate should not be burdened with an administration proceeding without good and compelling
reasons. 11
Thus, it has been repeatedly held that when a person dies without leaving pending obligations to be paid, his heirs, whether of age or not, are
not bound to submit the property to a judicial administration, which is always long and costly, or to apply for the appointment of an administrator
by the Court. It has been uniformly held that in such case the judicial administration and the appointment of an administrator are superfluous
and unnecessary proceedings . 12
Now, what constitutes "good reason" to warrant a judicial administration of the estate of a deceased when the heirs are all of legal age and
there are no creditors will depend on the circumstances of each case.
In one case, 13 We said:
Again the petitioner argues that only when the heirs do not have any dispute as to the bulk of the hereditary estate but only
in the manner of partition does section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court apply and that in this case the parties are at
loggerheads as to the corpus of the hereditary estate because respondents succeeded in sequestering some assets of the
intestate. The argument is unconvincing, because, as the respondent judge has indicated, questions as to what property
belonged to the deceased (and therefore to the heirs) may properly be ventilated in the partition proceedings, especially
where such property is in the hands of one heir.
In another case, We held that if the reason for seeking an appointment as administrator is merely to avoid a multiplicity of suits since the heir
seeking such appointment wants to ask for the annulment of certain transfers of property, that same objective could be achieved in an action for
partition and the trial court is not justified in issuing letters of administration. 14 In still another case, We did not find so powerful a reason the
argument that the appointment of the husband, a usufructuary forced heir of his deceased wife, as judicial administrator is necessary in order
for him to have legal capacity to appear in the intestate proceedings of his wife's deceased mother, since he may just adduce proof of his being
a forced heir in the intestate proceedings of the latter. 15
We see no reason not to apply this doctrine to the case at bar. There are only two surviving heirs, a wife of ten months and a sister, both of age.
The parties admit that there are no debts of the deceased to be paid. What is at once apparent is that these two heirs are not in good terms.
The only conceivable reason why private respondent seeks appointment as administratrix is for her to obtain possession of the alleged
properties of the deceased for her own purposes, since these properties are presently in the hands of petitioner who supposedly disposed of
them fraudulently. We are of the opinion that this is not a compelling reason which will necessitate a judicial administration of the estate of the
deceased. To subject the estate of Andres de Guzman Pereira, which does not appear to be substantial especially since the only real property
left has been extrajudicially settled, to an administration proceeding for no useful purpose would only unnecessarily expose it to the risk of being
wasted or squandered. In most instances of a similar nature, 16 the claims of both parties as to the properties left by the deceased may be
properly ventilated in simple partition proceedings where the creditors, should there be any, are protected in any event.
We, therefore, hold that the court below before which the administration proceedings are pending was not justified in issuing letters of
administration, there being no good reason for burdening the estate of the deceased Andres de Guzman Pereira with the costs and expenses of
an administration proceeding.
With the foregoing ruling, it is unnecessary for us to delve into the issue of who, as between the surviving spouse Victoria Bringas Pereira and
the sister Rita Pereira Nagac, should be preferred to be appointed as administratrix.
WHEREFORE, the letters of administration issued by the Regional Trial Court of Bacoor to Rita Pereira Nagac are hereby revoked and the
administration proceeding dismissed without prejudice to the right of private respondent to commence a new action for partition of the property
left by Andres de Guzman Pereira. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

ISABEL P. PORTUGAL and JOSE DOUGLAS PORTUGAL JR., petitioners, vs. LEONILA PORTUGAL-BELTRAN, respondent.
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Petitioners Isabel P. Portugal and her son, Jose Douglas Portugal Jr., assail the September 24, 2002 [1] Decision of the Court of Appeals
affirming that of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City, Branch 124 [2] which dismissed, after trial, their complaint for annulment of
title for failure to state a cause of action and lack of jurisdiction.
From the records of the case are gathered the following material allegations claims of the parties which they sought to prove
by testimonial and documentary evidence during the trial of the case:
On November 25, 1942, Jose Q. Portugal (Portugal) married Paz Lazo. [3]
On May 22, 1948, Portugal married petitioner Isabel de la Puerta.[4]
On September 13, 1949, petitioner Isabel gave birth to a boy whom she named Jose Douglas Portugal Jr., her herein co-petitioner.[5]
On April 11, 1950, Paz gave birth to a girl, Aleli,[6] later baptized as Leonila Perpetua Aleli Portugal, herein respondent. [7]
On May 16, 1968, Portugal and his four (4) siblings executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition and Waiver of Rights [8] over the estate of
their father, Mariano Portugal, who died intestate on November 2, 1964. [9] In the deed, Portugals siblings waived their rights, interests, and
participation over a 155 sq. m. parcel of land located in Caloocan in his favor.[10]
On January 2, 1970, the Registry of Deeds for Caloocan City issued Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 34292 covering the Caloocan
parcel of land in the name of Jose Q. Portugal,married to Paz C. Lazo.[11]
On February 18, 1984, Paz died.
On April 21, 1985, Portugal died intestate.
On February 15, 1988, respondent executed an Affidavit of Adjudication by Sole Heir of Estate of Deceased Person [12] adjudicating to
herself the Caloocan parcel of land. TCT No. 34292/T-172 [13] in Portugals name was subsequently cancelled and in its stead TCT No.
159813[14] was issued by the Registry of Deeds for Caloocan City on March 9, 1988 in the name of respondent, Leonila Portugal-Beltran,
married to Merardo M. Beltran, Jr.
Later getting wind of the death in 1985 of Portugal and still later of the 1988 transfer by respondent of the title to the Caloocan property in
her name, petitioners filed before the RTC of Caloocan City on July 23, 1996 a complaint [15] against respondent for annulment of the Affidavit of
Adjudication executed by her and the transfer certificate of title issued in her name.
In their complaint, petitioners alleged that respondent is not related whatsoever to the deceased Portugal, hence, not entitled to inherit the
Caloocan parcel of land and that she perjured herself when she made false representations in her Affidavit of Adjudication.
Petitioners accordingly prayed that respondents Affidavit of Adjudication and the TCT in her name be declared void and that the Registry
of Deeds for Caloocan be ordered to cancel the TCT in respondents name and to issue in its stead a new one in their (petitioners) name, and
that actual, moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees and litigation expenses be awarded to them.
Following respondents filing of her answer, the trial court issued a Pre-Trial Order chronicling, among other things, the issues as follows:
a. Which of the two (2) marriages contracted by the deceased Jose Q. Portugal Sr., is valid?
b. Which of the plaintiff . . . Jose Portugal Jr. and defendant Leonila P. Beltran is the legal heir of the deceased Jose Q. Portugal Sr.?
c. Whether or not TCT No. 159813 was issued in due course and can still be contested by plaintiffs.
d. Whether or not plaintiffs are entitled to their claims under the complaint. [16] (Underscoring supplied)
After trial, the trial court, by Decision of January 18, 2001, [17] after giving an account of the testimonies of the parties and their witnesses
and of their documentary evidence, without resolving the issues defined during pre-trial, dismissed the case for lack of cause of action on the
ground that petitioners status and right as putative heirs had not been established before a probate ( sic) court, and lack of jurisdiction over
the case, citing Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay v. Del Rosario.[18]
In relying on Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay, the trial court held:

The Heirs of Yaptinchay case arose from facts not dissimilar to the case at bar.
xxx
In the instant case, plaintiffs presented a Marriage Contract, a Certificate of Live Birth, pictures (sic) and testimonial evidence to establish their
right as heirs of the decedent. Thus, the preliminary act of having a status and right to the estate of the decedent, was sought to be determined
herein. However, the establishment of a status, a right, or a particular fact is remedied through a special proceeding (Sec. 3(c), Rule 1,
1997 Rules of Court), not an ordinary civil action whereby a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the protection or
redress of a wrong (ibid, a). The operative term in the former is to establish, while in the latter, it is to enforce, a right. Their status and right as
putative heirs of the decedent not having been established, as yet, the Complaint failed to state a cause of action.
The court, not being a probate (sic) court, is without jurisdiction to rule on plaintiffs cause to establish their status and right herein. Plaintiffs do
not have the personality to sue (Secs. 1 and 2, Rule 3, in relation to Secs. 1 and 2, Rule 2, supra).[19] (Italics in the original; emphasis and
underscoring supplied).
Petitioners thereupon appealed to the Court of Appeals, questioning the trial courts ratio decedendi in dismissing the case as diametrically
opposed to this Courts following ruling inCario v. Cario,[20] viz:
Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely
of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked
for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a
final judgment declaring the previous void. (Domingo v. Court of Appeals, 226 SCRA 572, 579 [1993]) However, for purposes other than
remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity . For other purposes, such as but not limited to the
determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that
matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even after the death of the parties thereto, and even in a suit not directly instituted to
question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. (Nial, et al. v. Bayadog, GR No. 13378,
March 14, 2000). In such cases, evidence must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a
previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage
void. (Domingo v. Court of Appeals, supra) (Emphasis and underscoring supplied).
Conceding that the ruling in Cario was promulgated (in 2001) subsequent to that of Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay (in 1999), the
appellate court found Cario to be inapplicable, however, to the case in this wise:
To be borne in mind is the fact that the main issue in the Cario case was the validity of the two marriages contracted by the deceased SPO4
Santiago Cario, whose death benefits was the bone of contention between the two women both named Susan ( viz., Susan Nicdao Cario and
Susan Yee Cario) both of whom he married. It is not disputed in said case that SPO4 S. Cario contracted two marriages with said two women
during his lifetime, and the only question was: which of these two marriages was validly celebrated? The award of the death benefits of the
deceased Cario was thus, merely an incident to the question of which of the two marriages was valid. Upon the other hand, the case at bench
is of a different milieu. The main issue here is the annulment of title to property. The only undisputed fact in this case is that the deceased
Jose Portugal, during his lifetime, owned a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-34292. However, here come two
contending parties, herein plaintiffs-appellants and defendant-appellee, both now insisting to be the legal heir(s) of the decedent. x x x. The
status and rights of the parties herein have not, therefore, been definitively established, as yet. x x x. Necessarily and naturally, such questions
as to such status or right must be properly ventilated in an appropriate special proceeding, not in an ordinary civil action, whereunder a party
sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the protection or redress of a wrong. The institution of an ordinary civil suit for that
purpose in the present case is thus impermissible. For it is axiomatic that what the law prohibits or forbids directly, it cannot permit or allow
indirectly. To permit, or allow, a declaration of heirship, or the establishment of the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child to be determined in an
ordinary civil action, not in an appropriate special proceeding brought for that purpose, is thus to impinge upon this axiom. x x x [21] (Emphasis in
the original, underscoring supplied).
The appellate court, by Decision of September 24, 2002,[22] thus affirmed the trial courts dismissal of the case.
Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari,[23] faulting the appellate court to have erred when
I.
. . . it affirmed the RTC decision dismissing the initiatory complaint as it failed to state a cause of action.
II.
. . . (i) it applied the ruling in Heirs of Guido [and Isabel] Yaptingchay despite the existence of a later and contrary ruling in Cario, and (ii)
when the Honorable CA and the lower court failed to render judgment based on the evidence presented relative to
the issues raised during pre-trial, . . .[24] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied).
Petitioners thus prayed as follows:

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Supreme Court that the questioned CA decision be reversed, and a new one entered
in accordance with the prayers set forth in the instant complaint based on the above disquisition and evidence adduced by petitioners in the
court a quo.
IN THE ALTERNATIVE, should the Honorable Supreme Court find that the pronouncements in Cario apply, a decision be entered remanding to
the court a quo the determination of the issues of which of the two marriages is valid, and the determination of heirship and legitimacy of Jose
Jr. and Leonila preparatory to the determination of the annulment of title issued in the name of Leonila.
Other relief and remedy just and equitable in the premises are likewise prayed for.[25] (Underscoring supplied).
Petitioners, in the main, argue that the appellate court misapplied Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay and in effect encouraged
multiplicity of suits which is discouraged by this Court as a reading of Cario shows; that Cario allows courts to pass on the determination of
heirship and the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child so long as it is necessary to the determination of the case; and that contrary to the appellate
courts ruling, they had established their status as compulsory heirs.
In the main, the issue in the present petition is whether petitioners have to institute a special proceeding to determine their status as heirs
before they can pursue the case for annulment of respondents Affidavit of Adjudication and of the TCT issued in her name.
In the above-cited case of Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay,[26] the therein petitioners executed on March 17, 1994 an extrajudicial
settlement of the estate of the deceased Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay, owners-claimants of the two lots mentioned therein. They later
discovered on August 26, 1994 that a portion, if not all, of the two lots had been titled in the name of the therein respondent Golden Bay Realty
and Development Corporation which in turn sold portions thereof to the therein individual respondents. The therein petitioners Heirs thus filed a
complaint for annulment of titles. The therein respondents moved to dismiss the case for failure of the therein petitioners to, inter alia, state a
cause of action and prove their status as heirs. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss in this wise:
But the plaintiffs who claimed to be the legal heirs of the said Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay have not shown any proof or even a semblance of
itexcept the allegations that they are the legal heirs of the aforementioned Yaptinchays that they have been declared the legal heirs of the
deceased couple. Now, the determination of who are the legal heirs of the deceased couple must be made in the proper special proceedings in
court, and not in an ordinary suit for reconveyance of property. This must take precedence over the action for reconveyance . . . [27] (Italics in the
original; underscoring supplied).
On petition for certiorari by the Heirs, this Court, albeit holding that the petition was an improper recourse, found that the trial court did not
commit grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the case. Citing Litam et al. v. Rivera[28] and Solivio v. Court of Appeals,[29] this Court held that the
declaration of heirship can be made only in a special proceeding inasmuch as the petitioners here are seeking the establishment of a status or
right.
In the above-cited case of Litam,[30] Gregorio Dy Tam instituted a special proceeding for issuance of letters of administration before the
then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal, alleging in his petition that he is the son of Rafael Litam who died in Manila on January 10, 1951 and
is survived by him and his therein named seven (7) siblings who are children of the decedent by his marriage to Sia Khin celebrated in China in
1911; that the decedent contracted in 1922 in the Philippines another marriage with Marcosa Rivera; and that the decedent left neither a will nor
debt. Dy Tam thus prayed for the issuance of letters of administration to Marcosa Rivera, the surviving spouse of the decedent. The CFI granted
the petition and issued letters of administration to, on Marcosas request, her nephew Arminio Rivera.
While the special proceeding was pending, Dy Tam and his purported siblings filed a civil case before the same court, against the estate
of Rafael Litam administrator Arminio Rivera and Remedios R. Espiritu, duly appointed guardian of Marcosa. In their complaint, Dy Tam and his
purported siblings substantially reproduced the allegations made in his petition in the special proceeding, with the addition of a list of properties
allegedly acquired during the marriage of the decedent and Marcosa.
Finding the issue raised in the civil case to be identical to some unresolved incidents in the special proceeding, both were jointly heard by
the trial court, following which it rendered a decision in the civil case dismissing it, declaring, inter alia, that the plaintiffs Dy Tam et al. are not
the children of the decedent whose only surviving heir is Marcosa.
On appeal to this Court by Dy Tam et al., one of the two issues raised for determination was whether they are the legitimate children of
Rafael Litam.
This Court, holding that the issue hinged on whether Rafael Litam and Sia Khin were married in 1911, and whether Rafael Litam is the
father of appellants Dy Tam et al., found substantially correct the trial courts findings of fact and its conclusion that, among other things, the birth
certificates of Dy Tam et al. do not establish the identity of the deceased Rafael Litam and the persons named therein as father [and] it does not
appear in the said certificates of birth that Rafael Litam had in any manner intervened in the preparation and filing thereof; and that [t]he other
documentary evidence presented by [them] [is] entirely immaterial and highly insufficient to prove the alleged marriage between the deceased
Rafael Litam and Sia Khin and [their] alleged status . . . as children of said decedent.
This Court went on to opine in Litam, however, that the lower court should not have declared, in the decision appealed from, that Marcosa
is the only heir of the decedent, for such declaration is improper in the [civil case], it being within the exclusive competence of the court in [the]
[s]pecial [p]roceeding.

In Solivio,[31] also cited in Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay, there was a special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the
deceased, who was a soltero, filed before the RTC of Iloilo. In the special proceeding, Branch 23 of said court declared as sole heir Celedonia
Solivio, the decedents maternal aunt-half sister of his mother. Concordia Javellana-Villanueva, the decedents paternal aunt-sister of his father,
moved to reconsider the courts order declaring Celedonia Solivio as sole heir of the decedent, she claiming that she too was an heir. The court
denied the motion on the ground of tardiness. Instead of appealing the denial of her motion, Concordia filed a civil case against Celedonia
before the same RTC, for partition, recovery of possession, ownership and damages. The civil case was raffled to Branch 26 of the RTC, which
rendered judgment in favor of Concordia. On appeal by Celedonia, the appellate court affirmed the said judgment.
On petition for review filed before this Court by Celedonia who posed, among other issues, whether Branch 26 of the RTC of Iloilo had
jurisdiction to entertain [the civil action] for partition and recovery of Concordia Villanuevas share of the estate of [the deceased] while the
[estate] proceedings . . . were still pending . . . in Branch 23 of the same court, this Court held that [i]n the interest of orderly procedure and
to avoid confusing and conflicting dispositions of a decedents estate, a court should not interfere with [estate]
proceedingspending in a co-equal court, citing Guilas v. CFI Judge of Pampanga.[32]
This Court, however, in Solivio, upon [c]onsidering that the estate proceedings are still pending, but nonetheless [therein private
respondent-Concordia Villanueva] had lost her right to have herself declared as co-heir in said proceedings, opted to proceed to discuss the
merits of her claim in the interest of justice, and declared her an heir of the decedent.
In Guilas[33] cited in Solivio, a project of partition between an adopted daughter, the therein petitioner Juanita Lopez Guilas (Juanita), and
her adoptive father was approved in theproceedings for the settlement of the testate estate of the decedent-adoptive mother, following which
the probate court directed that the records of the case be archived.
Juanita subsequently filed a civil action against her adoptive father to annul the project of partition on the ground of lesion, preterition and
fraud, and prayed that her adoptive father immediately deliver to her the two lots allocated to her in the project of partition . She
subsequently filed a motion in the testate estate proceedings for her adoptive father to deliver to her, among other things, the same two lots
allotted to her.
After conducting pre-trial in the civil case, the trial court, noting the parties agreement to suspend action or resolution on Juanitas motion
in the testate estate proceedings for the delivery to her of the two lots alloted to her until after her complaint in the civil case had been decided,
set said case for trial.
Juanita later filed in the civil case a motion to set aside the order setting it for trial on the ground that in the amended complaint she, in the
meantime, filed, she acknowledged the partial legality and validity of the project of partition insofar as she was allotted the two lots, the delivery
of which she was seeking. She thus posited in her motion to set aside the April 27, 1966 order setting the civil case for hearing that there was
no longer a prejudicial question to her motion in the testate estate proceedings for the delivery to her of the actual possession of the two lots.
The trial court, by order of April 27, 1966, denied the motion.
Juanita thereupon assailed the April 27, 1966 order before this Court.
The probate courts approval of the project of partition and directive that the records of the case be sent to the archives notwithstanding,
this Court held that the testate estate proceedings had not been legally terminated as Juanitas share under the project of partition had not been
delivered to her. Explained this Court:
As long as the order of the distribution of the estate has not been complied with, the probate proceedings cannot be deemed closed and
terminated (Siguiong vs. Tecson, supra.); because a judicial partition is not final and conclusive and does not prevent the heir from bringing an
action to obtain his share, provided the prescriptive period therefor has not elapse (Mari vs. Bonilla, 83 Phil., 137). The better practice, however,
for the heir who has not received his share, is to demand his share through a proper motion in the same probate or administration
proceedings, or for re-opening of the probate or administrative proceedings if it had already been closed, and not through an independent
action, which would be tried by another court or Judge which may thus reverse a decision or order of the probate o[r] intestate
court already final and executed and re-shuffle properties long ago distributed and disposed of (Ramos vs. Ortuzar, 89 Phil. 730, 741-742;
Timbol vs. Cano, supra,; Jingco vs. Daluz, L-5107, April 24, 1953, 92 Phil. 1082; Roman Catholic vs. Agustines, L-14710, March 29, 1960, 107
Phil., 455, 460-461).[34] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied).
This Court thus set aside the assailed April 27, 1966 order of the trial court setting the civil case for hearing, but allowed the civil case to
continue because it involves no longer the two lotsadjudicated to Juanita.
The common doctrine in Litam, Solivio and Guilas in which the adverse parties are putative heirs to the estate of a decedent or parties to
the special proceedings for its settlement is that if the special proceedings are pending, or if there are no special proceedings filed but there is,
under the circumstances of the case, a need to file one, then the determination of, among other issues, heirship should be raised and settled in
said special proceedings. Where special proceedings had been instituted but had been finally closed and terminated, however, or if a putative
heir has lost the right to have himself declared in the special proceedings as co-heir and he can no longer ask for its re-opening, then an
ordinary civil action can be filed for his declaration as heir in order to bring about the annulment of the partition or distribution or adjudication of
a property or properties belonging to the estate of the deceased.
In the case at bar, respondent, believing rightly or wrongly that she was the sole heir to Portugals estate, executed on February 15,
1988[35] the questioned Affidavit of Adjudication under the second sentence of Rule 74, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Court. [36] Said rule is
an exception to the general rule that when a person dies leaving a property, it should be judicially administered and the competent court should

appoint a qualified administrator, in the order established in Sec. 6, Rule 78 in case the deceased left no will, or in case he did, he failed to
name an executor therein.[37]
Petitioners claim, however, to be the exclusive heirs of Portugal. A probate or intestate court, no doubt, has jurisdiction to declare who are
the heirs of a deceased.
It appearing, however, that in the present case the only property of the intestate estate of Portugal is the Caloocan parcel of land, [38] to still
subject it, under the circumstances of the case, to a special proceeding which could be long, hence, not expeditious, just to establish the status
of petitioners as heirs is not only impractical; it is burdensome to the estate with the costs and expenses of an administration proceeding. And it
is superfluous in light of the fact that the parties to the civil case subject of the present case, could and had already in fact presented evidence
before the trial court which assumed jurisdiction over the case upon the issues it defined during pre-trial.
In fine, under the circumstances of the present case, there being no compelling reason to still subject Portugals estate to administration
proceedings since a determination of petitioners status as heirs could be achieved in the civil case filed by petitioners, [39] the trial court should
proceed to evaluate the evidence presented by the parties during the trial and render a decision thereon upon the issues it defined during pretrial, which bear repeating, to wit:
1. Which of the two (2) marriages contracted by the deceased Jose Q. Portugal, is valid;
2. Which of the plaintiff, Jose Portugal Jr. and defendant Leonila P. Beltran is the legal heir of the deceased Jose Q. Portugal (Sr.);
3. Whether or not TCT No. 159813 was issued in due course and can still be contested by plaintiffs;
4. Whether or not plaintiffs are entitled to their claim under the complaint. [40]
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed September 24, 2002 Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby SET
ASIDE.
Let the records of the case be REMANDED to the trial court, Branch 124 of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, for it to evaluate the
evidence presented by the parties and render a decision on the above-enumerated issues defined during the pre-trial.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

MARIA SOCORRO AVELINO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ANGELINA AVELINO, SHARON AVELINO, ANTONIO AVELINO, JR.,
TRACY AVELINO, PATRICK MICHAEL AVELINO and MARK ANTHONY AVELINO, respondents. Sdaa miso
QUISUMBING, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 16, 1994 in CA-G.R. SP No. 31574 as well
as its Resolution dated April 28, 1994 denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration. The assailed Decision affirmed the Order of the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 78, in Sp. Proc. No. Q-91-10441 converting petitioner's petition for the issuance of letters of administration to
an action for judicial partition.
Petitioner Maria Socorro Avelino is a daughter and compulsory heir of the late Antonio Avelino, Sr., and his first wife private respondent
Angelina Avelino.
The other private respondents, Sharon, Antonio Jr., Tracy, Patrick and Mark Anthony all surnamed Avelino are likewise compulsory heirs of
Avelino, Sr. Sharon, an American, is the second wife of Avelino, Sr. The other private respondents are siblings of petitioner Ma. Socorro.
The records reveal that on October 24, 1991, Ma. Socorro filed before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 78, docketed as SP
Proc. No. Q-91-10441, a petition for the issuance of letters of administration of the estate of Antonio Avelino, Sr., who died intestate on April 10,
1989. She asked that she be appointed the administrator of the estate.
On December 3, 1992, Angelina, and the siblings filed their opposition by filing a motion to convert the said judicial proceedings to an action for
judicial partition which petitioner duly opposed.
On February 16, 1993, public respondent judge issued the assailed Order which reads:

"Acting on the Motion to Convert Proceedings to Action for Judicial Partition, considering that the petitioner is the only heir
not amenable to a simple partition, and all the other compulsory heirs manifested their desire for an expeditious settlement
of the estate of the deceased Antonio Avelino, Sr., the same is granted.
"WHEREFORE, the petition is converted into judicial partition of the estate of deceased Antonio Avelino, Sr. The parties are
directed to submit a complete inventory of all the real and personal properties left by the deceased. Set the hearing of the
judicial partition on APRIL 13, 1993, at 8:30 o'clock in the morning. Notify all the parties and their counsel of this assignment.
"SO ORDERED."[1]
On March 17, 1993, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied in an Order dated June 16, 1993.
On July 23, 1993, Ma. Socorro filed before the Court of Appeals, a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus alleging grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court, in granting private respondents' motion to convert the judicial
proceeding for the issuance of letters of administration to an action for judicial partition. Her petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
31574. Sdaad
On February 18, 1994, the respondent appellate court rendered the assailed decision, stating that the "petition is DENIED DUE COURSE" and
accordingly dismissed."[2]
On March 1, 1994, petitioner duly moved for reconsideration, but it was denied on April 28, 1994.
Hence, this petition. Petitioner assigns the following errors:
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE LOWER COURT'S FINDING THAT PARTITION IS PROPER
UNDER THE PREMISES.
ADMINISTRATION SHOULD BE THE PROPER REMEDY PENDING THE DETERMINATION OF THE CHARACTER AND
EXTENT OF THE DECEDENT'S ESTATE.[3]
For resolution, we find that given the circumstances in this case, the sole issue here is whether respondent appellate court committed an error
of law and gravely abused its discretion in upholding the trial court's finding that a partition is proper.
Petitioner submits that: First, no partition of the estate is possible in the instant case as no determination has yet been made of the character
and extent of the decedent's estate. She points to the Court's ruling in Arcilles v. Montejo, 26 SCRA 197 (1969), where we held that when the
existence of other properties of the decedent is a matter still to be reckoned with, administration proceedings are the proper mode of resolving
the same.[4] In addition, petitioner contends that the estate is in danger of being depleted for want of an administrator to manage and attend to it.
Second, petitioner insists that the Rules of Court does not provide for conversion of a motion for the issuance of letters of administration to an
action for judicial partition. The conversion of the motion was, thus, procedurally inappropriate and should be struck down for lack of legal basis.
When a person dies intestate, or, if testate, failed to name an executor in his will or the executor so named is incompetent, or refuses the trust,
or fails to furnish the bond required by the Rules of Court, then the decedent's estate shall be judicially administered and the competent court
shall appoint a qualified administrator in the order established in Section 6 of Rule 78. [5]The exceptions to this rule are found in Sections 1 and 2
of Rule 74[6] which provide:
"SECTION 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs. - If the decedent left no will and no debts and the heirs
are all of age or the minors are represented by their judicial or legal representatives duly authorized for the purpose, the
parties may, without securing letters of administration, divide the estate among themselves as they see fit by means of a
public instrument filed in the office of the register of deeds, and should they disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action of
partition.. Scs daad
"SEC. 2. Summary settlement of estates of small value.- Whenever the gross value of the estate of a deceased person,
whether he died testate or intestate, does not exceed ten thousand pesos, and that fact if made to appear to the Regional
Trial Court having jurisdiction of the estate by the petition of an interested person and upon hearing, which shall be held not
less than one (1) month nor more than three (3) months from the date of the last publication of a notice which shall be
published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province, and after such
other notice to interested persons as the court may direct, the court may proceed summarily, without the appointment of an
executor or administrator, and without delay, to grant, if proper, allowance of the will, if any there be, to determine who are
the persons legally entitled to participate in the estate and to apportion and divide it among them after the payment of such
debts of the estate as the court shall then find to be due; and such persons, in their own right, if they are lawful age and legal
capacity, or by their guardians or trustees legally appointed and qualified, if otherwise, shall thereupon be entitled to receive
and enter into the possession of the portions of the estate so awarded to them respectively. The court shall make such order
as may be just respecting the costs of the proceedings, and all orders and judgments made or rendered in the course
thereof shall be recorded in the office of the clerk, and the order of partition or award, if it involves real estate, shall be
recorded in the proper register's office."

The heirs succeed immediately to all of the rights and properties of the deceased at the moment of the latter's death. [7] Section 1, Rule 74 of the
Rules of Court, allows heirs to divide the estate among themselves without need of delay and risks of being dissipated. When a person dies
without leaving pending obligations, his heirs, are not required to submit the property for judicial administration, nor apply for the appointment of
an administrator by the court.[8]
We note that the Court of Appeals found that in this case "the decedent left no debts and the heirs and legatees are all of age." [9] With this
finding, it is our view that Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court should apply.
In a last-ditch effort to justify the need for an administrator, petitioner insists that there is nothing to partition yet, as the nature and character of
the estate have yet to be determined. We find, however, that a complete inventory of the estate may be done during the partition proceedings,
especially since the estate has no debts. Hence, the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error when it ruled that the lower court did not err
in converting petitioner's action for letters of administration into an action for judicial partition. Sup rema
Nor can we sustain petitioner's argument that the order of the trial court converting an action for letters of administration to one for judicial
partition has no basis in the Rules of Court, hence procedurally infirm. The basis for the trial court's order is Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of
Court. It provides that in cases where the heirs disagree as to the partition of the estate and no extrajudicial settlement is possible, then an
ordinary action for partition may be resorted to, as in this case. We have held that where the more expeditious remedy of partition is available to
the heirs, then the heirs or the majority of them may not be compelled to submit to administration proceedings. [10] The trial court appropriately
converted petitioner's action for letters of administration into a suit for judicial partition, upon motion of the private respondents. No reversible
error may be attributed to the Court of Appeals when it found the trial court's action procedurally in order.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit, and the assailed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals is CA-G.R. SP No.
31574 are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

EMILIA FIGURACION-GERILLA, petitioner, -v- CAROLINA VDA. DE FIGURACION,ELENA FIGURACION-ANCHETA, HILARIA A.

FIGURACION, FELIPA FIGURACION-MANUEL, QUINTIN FIGURACION and MARY FIGURACION-GINEZ, Respondents.
[G.R. No. 154322, August 22, 2006, CORONA, J.:]
FACTS:
1
Spouses Leandro and respondent Carolina Figuracion had 6 children
a
Leandro executed a deed of quitclaim over his real properties in favor of his six children.
b
When he died in 1958, he left behind two parcels of land: (1) Lot 2299 and (2) Lot 705
2
Leandro sold a portion of Lot 1 to Lazaro Adviento
3
A dispute between 2 of the children Emilia and Mary rose over the eastern half of Lot 707
a
Lot 707 belonged to Eulalio Adviento
i When he died his 2 daughters Agripina and Carolina succeeded him
ii Agripina executed a quitclaim in favor of Emilia over the one-half eastern portion of Lot 707.
iii Agripina died single and without any issue
1
Before her death Carolina adjudicated unto herself, via affidavit under Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, the
entire lot which she later sold to Felipa and Jilaria
4
Emilia and her family stayed in the US for 10 years
a
Upon return she built a house made of strong materials on the eastern half-portion of Lot 707
b
She continued paying her share of the realty taxes thereon
5
Emilia sought the extrajudicial partition of all properties held in common by her and respondents
6
Emilia filed a complaint in the RTC of Urdaneta City for partition, annulment of documents, reconveyance, quieting of title and
damages against respondents, praying, among others, for:
a
the partition of Lots 2299 and 705;
b
the nullification of the affidavit of self-adjudication executed by respondent Carolina over Lot 707, the deed of absolute sale
in favor of respondents Felipa and Hilaria, and TCT No. 42244;
c
a declaration that petitioner was the owner of one-half of Lot 707 and
d
damages
7
Respondents contended that Leandros estate should first undergo settlement proceedings before partition among the heirs could
take place.
a
Also claimed that an accounting of expenses chargeable to the estate was necessary for such settlement.
b
RTc nullified Carolinas affidavit of self-adjudication and deed of absolute sale of Lot 707
i Also declared Lots 2299 and 705 as exclusive properties of Leandro Figuracion and therefore part of his estate.
ii Dismissed the complaint for partition, reconveyance and damages
1
REASON: it could not grant the reliefs prayed for by petitioner without any (prior) settlement proceedings
wherein the transfer of title of the properties should first be effected
8
CA upheld the dismissal of petitioners action for partition for being premature.
a
Reversed decision with respect to the nullification of the self-adjudication and the deed of sale
ISSUE: W/N there needs to be a prior settlement of Leandros intestate estate before the properties can be partitioned or distributed.
HELD:
1
2

3
4

partition is premature when ownership of the lot 705 is still in dispute

a
theres a pending case in the CA where issues cannot be deciphered.
two ways by which partition can take place under Rule 69:
a
by agreement under Section 2
b
through commissioners when such agreement cannot be reached, under Sections 3 to 6.

Neither method specifies a procedure for determining expenses chargeable to the decedents estate.
Section 8 of Rule 69 provides that there shall be an accounting of the real propertys income (rentals and profits) in the course of an
action for partition,[13] there is no provision for the accounting of expenses for which property belonging to the decedents estate may
be answerable, such as funeral expenses, inheritance taxes and similar expenses enumerated under Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules
of Court.
the heirs (petitioner and respondents) have to submit their fathers estate to settlement because the determination of these expenses
cannot be done in an action for partition.
a
To settle the medical burial expense of their father
If it is any consolation at all to petitioner, the heirs or distributees of the properties may take possession thereof even before the
settlement of accounts, as long as they first file a bond conditioned on the payment of the estates obligations.

VOLTAIRE ARBOLARIO, LUCENA ARBOLARIO TA-ALA, FE ARBOLARIO, EXALTACION ARBOLARIO, CARLOS ARBOLARIO, and
Spouses ROSALITA RODRIGUEZ and CARLITO SALHAY, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, IRENE COLINCO, RUTH
COLINCO, ORPHA COLINCO and GOLDELINA COLINCO, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Once a valid marriage is established, it is deemed to continue until proof that it has been legally ended is presented. Thus, the mere
cohabitation of the husband with another woman will not give rise to a presumption of legitimacy in favor of the children born of the second
union, until and unless there be convincing proof that the first marriage had been lawfully terminated; and the second, lawfully entered into.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review [1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, challenging the February 28, 1995 Decision [2] and the March 5,
1997 Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR No. 38583. The assailed Decision disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the judgment appealed from is hereby REVERSED and a new one is accordingly entered
(a) in Civil Case No. 385, DISMISSING the complaint and [counter-claim];
(b) in Civil Case No. 367, ORDERING the defendant spouses to vacate the premises occupied within Lot 323, Ilog Cadastre, registered under
T.C.T. No. 140081 in favor of Irene Colinco, Ruth Colinco, Orpha Colinco and Goldelina Colinco. [4]
On the other hand, the assailed Resolution denied reconsideration:[5]

The Facts

The facts of the case are summarized by the CA as follows:

The original owners of the controverted lot, spouses Anselmo Baloyo and Macaria Lirazan had five (5) children, namely: (1) Agueda Colinco, (2)
Catalina Baloyo, (3) Eduardo Baloyo, (4) Gaudencia Baloyo, and (5) Julian Baloyo. All of the above-named persons are now dead.
The first child, Agueda Colinco, was survived by her two children, namely, Antonio Colinco and [respondent] Irene Colinco. Antonio Colinco
predeceased his three daughters, herein [respondents], Ruth, Orpha, and Goldelina, all surnamed Colinco.
The second child, Catalina Baloyo, was married to Juan Arbolario. Their union was blessed with the birth of only one child, Purificacion
Arbolario, who, in 1985, died a spinster and without issue.
Records disclose moreover that decedent Purificacions father, Juan Arbolario, consorted with another woman by the name of Francisca
Malvas. From this cohabitation was born the [petitioners], viz, Voltaire Arbolario, Lucena Arbolario Taala, Fe Arbolario, Exaltacion Arbolario, and
Carlos Arbolario (referred to hereinafter as Arbolarios). It is significant to note, at this juncture, that all the foregoing [petitioners] were born well
before the year 1951.
In 1946, it appears that the third child, Eduardo Baloyo, sold his entire interest in Lot 323 to his sister, Agueda Baloyo Colinco, by virtue of a
notarized document acknowledged before Notary Public Deogracias Riego.
In 1951, a notarized declaration of heirship was executed by and between Agueda, Catalina, Gaudencia, and their brothers Eduardo and Julian,
who extrajudicially declared themselves to be the only heirs of the late spouses Anselmo Baloyo and Macaria Lirazan. The fourth child,
Gaudencia Baloyo, conveyed her interest in the said lot in favor of her two nieces, Irene Colinco to one-half (1/2) and Purificacion Arbolario to
the other half.
And as far as Julian Baloyo -- the fifth and last child --was concerned, records could only show that he was married to a certain Margarita
Palma; and that he died, presumably after 1951 without any issue.
Purificacion Arbolario was then allowed to take possession of a portion of the disputed parcel until her death sometime in 1984 or 1985.
It was under the foregoing set of facts that [respondents] Irene Colinco, Ruth Colinco, Orpha Colinco, and Goldelina Colinco, believing
themselves to be the only surviving heirs of Anselmo Baloyo and Macaria Lirazan, executed a Declaration of Heirship and Partition Agreement,
dated May 8, 1987 where they adjudicated upon themselves their proportionate or ideal shares in O.C.T. No. 16361, viz: Irene Colinco, to one-

half (1/2); while the surviving daughters of her (Irenes) late brother Antonio, namely Ruth, Orpha, and Goldelina Colinco, to share in equal, ideal
proportions to the remaining half (1/2). This forthwith brought about the cancellation of O.C.T. No. 16361, and the issuance of T.C.T. No. T140018 in their names and conformably with the aforesaid distribution.
On October 2, 1987, the Colincos filed Civil Case No. 367 against Spouses Rosalita Rodriguez Salhay and Carlito Salhay, seeking to recover
possession of a portion of the aforesaid lot occupied by [respondent] spouses (Salhays hereinafter) since 1970.
The Salhays alleged in their defense that they have been the lawful lessees of the late Purificacion Arbolario since 1971 up to 1978; and that
said spouses allegedly purchased the disputed portion of Lot No. 323 from the deceased lessor sometime in [September] 1978.
Meanwhile, or on May 9, 1988 -- before Civil Case No. 367 was heard and tried on the merits -- Voltaire M. Arbolario, Fe Arbolario, Lucena
Arbolario Ta-ala, Exaltacion Arbolario, Carlos Arbolario (Arbolarios, collectively) and spouses Carlito Salhay and Rosalita Rodriguez Salhay (the
same defendants in Civil Case No. 367), filed Civil Case No. 385 [f]or Cancellation of Title with Damages, against the plaintiffs in Civil Case No.
367. The Arbolarios, joined by the Salhays, contend that the Declaration of Heirship and Partition Agreement executed by the Colincos was
defective and thus voidable as they (Arbolarios) were excluded therein. The Arbolarios claim that they succeeded intestate to the inheritance of
their alleged half-sister, Purificacion Arbolario; and, as forced heirs, they should be included in the distribution of the aforesaid lot. [6]

Ruling of the Trial Court

[7]

After a full-blown trial on the consolidated cases, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Kabankalan, Negros Occidental (Branch 61)
rendered its judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the [Arbolarios] and against the [Colincos] in Civil Case No.
385 -1) Declaring that the Declaration of Heirship and Partition Agreement, dated May 8, 1987, executed by Irene, Ruth, Orpha and Goldelina, all
surnamed Colinco, as null and void and of no effect insofar as the share of Purificacion Arbolario in Lot No. 323 is concerned[;]
2) Ordering the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental to cancel Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-140018 and issue a new one in the names
of Voltaire Arbolario, Lucena Arbolario Ta-ala, Carlos Arbolario, Fe Arbolario and Exaltacion Arbolario, 3/8 share or One thousand Six Hundred
Forty Three Point Five (1,643.5) square meters, and the remaining 5/8 share or One Thousand Seventy Two Point Five (1,072.5) square meters
in the names of Irene Colinco, Ruth Colinco, Orpha Colinco and Goldelina Colingco or other heirs, if any[;]
3) Ordering the [Respondents] Irene, Ruth, Orpha and Goldelina, all surnamed Colinco, to pay jointly and severally to [Petitioners] Voltaire M.
Arbolario, et al., the sum of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) as moral damages, Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) as attorneys fees and the
x x x sum of One Thousand Pesos (P1,500.00) as appearance fees; and
in Civil Case No. 367 -1) Ordering the dismissal of [respondents] complaint and the [petitioners] counter-claim for lack of legal basis.
In both cases -1) Ordering the Colincos to pay costs.[8]
The trial court held that the Arbolarios were the brothers and the sisters of the deceased Purificacion Arbolario, while the Colincos were
her cousins and nieces. Pursuant to Article 1009 of the Civil Code, the Colincos could not inherit from her, because she had half-brothers and
half-sisters. Their 1987 Declaration of Heirship and Partition Agreement was made in bad faith, because they knew all along the existence of,
and their relationship with, the Arbolarios. The Salhays, on the other hand, had no document to prove their acquisition and possession of a
portion of the disputed lot.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

On appeal, the CA rejected the contention of petitioners that the cohabitation of their father with their natural mother, Francisca Malvas,
was by virtue of a valid marriage. The appellate court observed that the Arbolarios had all been born before the death of Catalina Baloyo, as
shown by the Deed of Declaration of Heirship, which she had executed in 1951. No evidence was ever presented showing that her conjugal
union with Juan Arbolario had been judicially annulled or lawfully ended before that year. Because it was also in 1951 when Juan Arbolario
cohabited with Francisca Malvas, their union was presumably extramarital. Consequently, their children are illegitimate half-brothers and halfsisters of Purificacion, the daughter of Juan and Catalina.
Illegitimate children are barred by Article 992 of the Civil Code from inheriting intestate from the legitimate children and relatives of their
father or mother. As the illegitimate siblings of the late Purificacion Arbolario, petitioners cannot conveniently undermine the legal limitations by
insisting that they were treated as half-brothers and half-sisters by the deceased.

On the other hand, there is no impediment for respondents to declare themselves as the sole and forced heirs of Anselmo Baloyo and
Macaria Lirazan. Moreover, there is no clear and reliable evidence to support the allegation of the Salhays that they purchased from the
decedent, Purificacion Arbolario, the lot that they have been occupying since 1970.
Hence, this Petition.[9]
Issues
In their Memorandum, petitioners raise the following issues for our consideration:
I
The Honorable Court of Appeals committed grave and serious error in considering the Arbolarios illegitimate children and not entitled to inherit
from their half-sister Purificacion Arbolario.
II
The Honorable Court of Appeals committed grave and serious error in considering the purchase of the property by Rosela Rodriguez and
subsequent acquisition by Petitioners Rosalita Rodriguez and Carlito Salhay improper.
III
The Honorable Court of Appeals committed grave and serious error in deciding that the court a quo had no right to distribute the said property.
[10]

In other words, petitioners are questioning the CA pronouncements on (1) the illegitimacy of their relationship with Purificacion; (2) the
validity of the Salhays purchase of a portion of the disputed lot; and (3) the impropriety of the RTC Order partitioning that lot.

This Courts Ruling

The Petition has no merit.

First Issue:
Illegitimacy of Petitioners

Petitioners contend that their illegitimacy is a far-fetched and scurrilous claim that is not supported by the evidence on record. They
maintain that the CA declared them illegitimate on the unproven allegation that Catalina Baloyo had signed the Declaration of Heirship in
1951. They aver that this 1951 Declaration does not contain her signature, and that she died in 1903:
Que Agueda Baloyo, Catalina Baloyo y Eduardo Baloyo murieron ab intestate en Ilog, Negros Occ.; la primera fallecio en 11 de Noviembre de
1940, la segunda murio el ano 1903 y el ultimo en 28 de Marzo de 1947 x x x.[11]
We are not persuaded.
We begin our ruling with the general principle that the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. [12] However, where the trial court and the CA
arrived at different factual findings, a review of the evidence on record may become necessary.[13]
Petitioners, in effect, are asking us to evaluate the 1951 Declaration of Heirship, deduce that Catalina Baloyo had long been dead before
it was ever executed, and conclude that the Arbolarios are legitimate half-brothers and half-sisters of Juan and Catalinas only daughter,
Purificacion. What we see, on the other hand, is a series of non sequiturs.
First, a review of the 1951 Declaration reveals that the year of Catalinas death was intercalated. The first two numbers (1 and 9) and the
last digit (3) are legible; but the third digit has been written over to make it look like a 0. Further, the paragraph quoted by petitioners should
show a chronological progression in the heirs years of death: Agueda died in 1940 and Eduardo in 1947. Hence, if Catalina had indeed died in
1903, why then was her name written after Aguedas and not before it? Moreover, the document, being in Spanish, requires an official
translation. We cannot readily accept the English translation proffered by petitioners, since respondents did not agree to its
correctness. Besides, it consisted of only a paragraph of the whole document.
Second, there is no solid basis for the argument of petitioners that Juan Arbolarios marriage to Francisca Malvas was valid, supposedly
because Catalina Baloyo was already dead when they were born. It does not follow that just because his first wife has died, a man is already
conclusively married to the woman who bore his children. A marriage certificate or other generally accepted proof is necessary to establish the
marriage as an undisputable fact.
Third, clear and substantial evidence is required to support the claim of petitioners that they were preterited from the 1951 Declaration of
Heirship. The RTC Decision merely declared that they were half-brothers and half-sisters of Purificacion, while respondents were her cousins
and nieces (collateral relatives). It made no pronouncement as to whether they were her legitimate or illegitimate siblings. We quote the
appellate court:
x x x. Therefore, in the absence of any fact that would show that conjugal union of Juan Arbolario and Catalina Baloyo had been judicially
annulled before 1951, or before Juan Arbolario cohabited with Francisca Malvas, it would only be reasonable to conclude that the foregoing
union which resulted in the birth of the [Arbolarios] was extra-marital. And consequently, x x x Voltaire Arbolario, et al., are illegitimate children
of Juan Arbolario.
There is no presumption of legitimacy or illegitimacy in this jurisdiction (Article 261, New Civil Code); and whoever alleges the legitimacy or
illegitimacy of a child born after the dissolution of a prior marriage or the separation of the spouses must introduce such evidence to prove his or

her allegation (Ibid.; Sec. 4, Rule 131, New Rules on Evidence). It is the x x x Arbolarios, claiming to be born under a validly contracted
subsequent marriage, who must show proof of their legitimacy. But this, they have miserably failed to do. [14]
Paternity or filiation, or the lack of it, is a relationship that must be judicially established. [15] It stands to reason that children born within
wedlock are legitimate.[16] Petitioners, however, failed to prove the fact (or even the presumption) of marriage between their parents, Juan
Arbolario and Francisca Malvas; hence, they cannot invoke a presumption of legitimacy in their favor.
As it is, we have to follow the settled rule that the CAs factual findings cannot be set aside, because they are supported by the evidence
on record.[17] As held by the appellate court, without proof that Catalina died in 1903, her marriage to Juan is presumed to have continued. Even
where there is actual severance of the filial companionship between spouses, their marriage subsists, and either spouses cohabitation with any
third party cannot be presumed to be between husband and wife.[18]

Second Issue:
Evidence of Purchase

Petitioners contend that the CA committed a serious error when it disregarded the testimony that the Salhays had purchased the portion
of the lot they had been occupying since 1970.This issue, according to them, was not even raised by respondents in the latters appeal to the
CA.
We disagree. Although the sale was not expressly assigned as an error in their Brief, respondents (as petitioners in the CA) still assailed
the existence of the sale when they argued thus:
As to the spouses Carlito Salhay and Rosalita R. Salhay, they could not present any written contract to support their claim to having purchased
a portion of Lot 323 where their house stands. Rosalita R. Salhay on the witness stand testified under oath that she has no contract of sale in
her favor because it was her mother, Rosela Rodriguez who had purchased the land, but she was not able to produce any evidence of such
sale in favor of her mother. She declared that she has never paid land taxes for the land.[19]
Hence, they prayed for the reversal of the appealed RTC Decision in toto. The CA, on the other hand, categorically ruled that no clear and
reliable evidence had been introduced to prove such bare [allegation] that a portion of the disputed lot had ever been purchased by the
Salhays. Besides, no favorable supporting evidence was cited by petitioners in their Memorandum. Thus, we find no reason to overturn the CAs
factual finding on this point.

Third Issue:
Partition

Petitioners also contend that the Court of Appeals overstepped its bounds when it ruled that since respondents did not raise the issue of
partition on appeal, the RTC had no jurisdiction to divide the disputed lot. The CA held, however, that the partition of the property had not been
contemplated by the parties, because respondents merely sought recovery of possession of the parcel held by the Salhays, while petitioners
sought the annulment of the Deed of Partition respondents had entered into.
We agree with the appellate court. The purpose of partition is to put an end to co-ownership. It seeks a severance of the individual
interests of co-owners, vesting in each of them a sole estate in a specific property and a right to enjoy the allotted estate without supervision or
interference.[20]
Petitioners in this case were unable to establish any right to partition, because they had failed to establish that they were legitimate halfbrothers and half-sisters of the deceased Purificacion. Questions as to the determination of the heirs of a decedent, the proof of filiation, and the
determination of the estate of a decedent and claims thereto should be brought up before the proper probate court or in special proceedings
instituted for the purpose. Such issues cannot be adjudicated in an ordinary civil action for the recovery of ownership and possession. [21]
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED, and the appealed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

CYNTHIA C. ALABAN, et al. Petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and FRANCISCO H. PROVIDO, Respondents.
[G.R. No. 156021, September 23, 2005, TINGA, J.:]
FACTS:
1
respondent Francisco Provido filed a petition for the probate of the Last Will and Testament of the late Soledad Provido Elevencionado
A ALLEGATION: he was the heir of the decedent and the executor of her will.
b
RTCs RULING: allowed the probate of the will and directed the issuance of letters testamentary to respondent
2
Petitioners after 4 months filed a motion for the reopening of the probate proceedings
a
CLAIMs:
1 they are the intestate heirs of the decedent.
2 RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the petition due to non-payment of the correct docket fees, defective
publication, and lack of notice to the other heirs.
3 will could not have been probated because:
a
the signature of the decedent was forged;
b
the will was not executed in accordance with law, that is, the witnesses failed to sign below the
attestation clause;
c
the decedent lacked testamentary capacity to execute and publish a will;
d
the will was executed by force and under duress and improper pressure;
e
the decedent had no intention to make a will at the time of affixing of her signature; and
f
she did not know the properties to be disposed of, having included in the will properties which no longer
belonged to her.
b
RTCs Ruling: denied motion
1 petitioners were deemed notified of the hearing by publication and that the deficiency in the payment of docket
fees is not a ground for the outright dismissal of the petition.
2 RTCs Decision was already final and executory even before petitioners filing of the motion to reopen
3
Petitioners filed a petition to annule RTCs decision
a
CLAIM: there was a compromise agreement between petitioners and respondents and they learnt the probate proceeding
only in July 2001
b
CAs RULING: petition dismissed
1 no showing that petitioners failed to avail of or resort to the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief
from judgment, or other appropriate remedies through no fault of their own
ISSUE: W/N the allowance of the will to probate should be annulled for failure to mention the petitioners as parties
HELD: No
1
Probate of a will is considered action in rem
a
Under the Rules of Court, any executor, devisee, or legatee named in a will, or any other person interested in the estate
may, at any time after the death of the testator, petition the court having jurisdiction to have the will allowed. [36] Notice of the
time and place for proving the will must be published for three (3) consecutive weeks, in a newspaper of general circulation
in the province,[37] as well as furnished to the designated or other known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator
b
Petitioners became parties due to the publication of the notice of hearing
2
The filing of motion to reopen is similar to a motion for new trial
a
The ruling became final and executor because the motion was filed out of time
b
Given that they knew of the decision 4 months after they could have filed a petition for relief from judgment after the denial of
their motion to reopen.
3
petition for annulment of judgment must still fail for failure to comply with the substantive requisites,
a
An action for annulment of judgment is a remedy in law independent of the case where the judgment sought to be annulled
was rendered
b
PURPOSE: to have the final and executory judgment set aside so that there will be a renewal of litigation.
c
2 Grounds: extrinsic fraud, and lack of jurisdiction or denial of due process
d
An action to annul a final judgment on the ground of fraud lies only if the fraud is extrinsic or collateral in character
i Extrinsic if it prevents a party from having a trial or from presenting his entire case to the court, or where it operates
upon matters pertaining not to the judgment itself but to the manner in which it is procured.
4
notice is required to be personally given to known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator
a
the will states that the respondent was instituted as the sole heir of the decedent thus he has no legal obligation to mention
petitioners in the petition for probate or personally notify them.

G.R. No. L-32636

March 17, 1930
In the matter Estate of Edward Randolph Hix, deceased.
A.W. FLUEMER, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
ANNIE COUSHING HIX, oppositor-appellee.
C.A. Sobral for appellant.
Harvey & O' Brien and Gibbs & McDonough for appellee.
MALCOLM, J.:
The special administrator of the estate of Edward Randolph Hix appeals from a decision of Judge of First Instance Tuason denying the probate
of the document alleged to by the last will and testament of the deceased. Appellee is not authorized to carry on this appeal. We think, however,
that the appellant, who appears to have been the moving party in these proceedings, was a "person interested in the allowance or disallowance
of a will by a Court of First Instance," and so should be permitted to appeal to the Supreme Court from the disallowance of the will (Code of Civil
Procedure, sec. 781, as amended; Villanueva vs. De Leon [1925], 42 Phil., 780).
It is theory of the petitioner that the alleged will was executed in Elkins, West Virginia, on November 3, 1925, by Hix who had his residence in
that jurisdiction, and that the laws of West Verginia Code, Annotated, by Hogg, Charles E., vol. 2, 1914, p. 1690, and as certified to by the
Director of the National Library. But this was far from a compliance with the law. The laws of a foreign jurisdiction do not prove themselves in
our courts. the courts of the Philippine Islands are not authorized to take American Union. Such laws must be proved as facts. (In re Estate of
Johnson [1918], 39 Phil., 156.) Here the requirements of the law were not met. There was no was printed or published under the authority of the
State of West Virginia, as provided in section 300 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Nor was the extract from the law attested by the certificate of
the officer having charge of the original, under the sale of the State of West Virginia, as provided in section 301 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
No evidence was introduced to show that the extract from the laws of West Virginia was in force at the time the alleged will was executed.
In addition, the due execution of the will was not established. The only evidence on this point is to be found in the testimony of the petitioner.
Aside from this, there was nothing to indicate that the will was acknowledged by the testator in the presence of two competent witnesses, of that
these witnesses subscribed the will in the presence of the testator and of each other as the law of West Virginia seems to require. On the
supposition that the witnesses to the will reside without the Philippine Islands, it would then the duty of the petitioner to prove execution by
some other means (Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 633.)
It was also necessary for the petitioner to prove that the testator had his domicile in West Virginia and not establish this fact consisted of the
recitals in the CATHY will and the testimony of the petitioner. Also in beginning administration proceedings orginally in the Philippine Islands,
the petitioner violated his own theory by attempting to have the principal administration in the Philippine Islands.
While the appeal pending submission in this court, the attorney for the appellant presented an unverified petition asking the court to accept as
part of the evidence the documents attached to the petition. One of these documents discloses that a paper writing purporting to be the was
presented for probate on June 8, 1929, to the clerk of Randolph Country, State of West Virginia, in vacation, and was duly proven by the oaths
of Dana Wamsley and Joseph L. MAdden, the subscribing witnesses thereto , and ordered to be recorded and filed. It was shown by another
document that, in vacation, on June 8, 1929, the clerk of court of Randolph Country, West Virginia, appointed Claude W. Maxwell as
administrator, cum testamento annexo, of the estate of Edward Randolph Hix, deceased. In this connection, it is to be noted that the application
for the probate of the will in the Philippines was filed on February 20, 1929, while the proceedings in West Virginia appear to have been initiated
on June 8, 1929. These facts are strongly indicative of an intention to make the Philippines the principal administration and West Virginia the
ancillary administration. However this may be, no attempt has been made to comply with Civil Procedure, for no hearing on the question of the
allowance of a will said to have been proved and allowed in West Virginia has been requested. There is no showing that the deceased left any
property at any place other than the Philippine Islands and no contention that he left any in West Virginia.
Reference has been made by the parties to a divorce purported to have been awarded Edward Randolph Hix from Annie Cousins Hix on
October 8, 1925, in the State of West specific pronouncements on the validity or validity of this alleged divorce.
For all of the foregoing, the judgment appealed from will be affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the appellant.

ANCHETA V. GUERSEY-DALAYGON (Succession)

Binding Effect of Judgments
490 SCRA 140
June 8, 2006
Facts: Spouses Audrey ONeill (Audrey) and W. Richard Guersey (Richard) were American citizens who have resided in the Philippines for 30
years. They have an adopted daughter, Kyle Guersey Hill (Kyle). Audrey died in 1979. She left a will wherein she bequeathed her entire estate
to Richard consisting of Audreys conjugal share in real estate improvements at Forbes Park, current account with cash balance and shares of
stock in A/G Interiors. Two years after her death, Richard married Candelaria Guersey-Dalaygon. Four years thereafter, Richard died and left a
will wherein he bequeathed his entire estate to respondent, except for his shares in A/G, which he left to his adopted daughter.
Petitioner, as ancillary administrator in the court where Audreys will was admitted to probate, filed a motion to declare Richard and Kyle as
heirs of Audrey and a project of partition of Audreys estate. The motion and project of partition were granted. Meanwhile, the ancillary
administrator with regards to Richards will also filed a project of partition, leaving 2/5 of Richards undivided interest in the Forbes property was
allocated to respondent Candelaria, while 3/5 thereof was allocated to their three children. Respondent opposed on the ground that under the
law of the State of Maryland, where Richard was a native of, a legacy passes to the legatee the entire interest of the testator in the property
subject to the legacy.
Issue: Whether or not the decree of distribution may still be annulled under the circumstances.
Held: A decree of distribution of the estate of a deceased person vests the title to the land of the estate in the distributees, which, if erroneous
may be corrected by a timely appeal. Once it becomes final, its binding effect is like any other judgment in rem.
However, in exceptional cases, a final decree of distribution of the estate may be set aside for lack of jurisdiction or fraud. Further, in Ramon vs.
Ortuzar, the Court ruled that a party interested in a probate proceeding may have a final liquidation set aside when he is left out by reason of
circumstances beyond his control or through mistake or inadvertence not imputable to negligence.
Petitioners failure to proficiently manage the distribution of Audreys estate according to the terms of her will and as dictated by the applicable
law amounted to extrinsic fraud. Hence the CA Decision annulling the RTC Orders dated February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988, must be upheld.

G.R. No. L-26306 April 27, 1988

TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE GREGORIO VENTURA MARIA VENTURA, executrix- appellant, MIGUEL VENTURA and JUANA
CARDONA, heirs-appellants,
vs.
GREGORIA VENTURA and HER HUSBAND, EXEQUIEL VICTORIO, MERCEDES VENTURA and HER HUSBAND, PEDRO D.
CORPUZ, oppositors-appellees.
This is an appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, Guimba, Branch V in Special Proceedings No. 812, Testate of the
late Gregorio Venture, dated October 5, 1965, removing the appellant Maria Ventura as executrix and administratrix of the estate of the late
Gregorio Ventura, and in her place appointing the appellees Mercedes Ventura and Gregoria Ventura as joint administratrices of the estate.
(Record on Appeal, pp. 120-131.)
Appellant Maria Ventura is the illegitimate daughter of the deceased Gregorio Ventura while Miguel Ventura and Juana Cardona are his son and
saving spouse who are also the brother and mother of Maria Ventura. On the other hand, appellees Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura are the
deceased's legitimate children with his former wife, the late Paulina Simpliciano (Record on Appeal, p. 122) but the paternity of appellees was
denied by the deceased in his will (Record on Appeal, p. 4).
On December 14,1953, Gregorio Ventura filed a petition for the probate of his will which did not include the appellees and the petition was
docketed as Special Proceedings No. 812 (Record on Appeal, pp. 1-3). In the said will, the appellant Maria Ventura, although an illegitimate
child, was named and appointed by the testator to be the executrix of his will and the administratrix of his estate (Record on Appeal, p. 7).
In due course, said will was admitted to probate on January 14,1954 (Record on Appeal, pp. 8-10). Gregorio Ventura died on September
26,1955. On October 10, 1955, the appellant Maria Ventura filed a motion for her appointment as executrix and for the issuance of letters
testamentary in her favor (Record on Appeal, pp. 10-11). On October 17, 1955, Maria Ventura was appointed executrix and the corresponding
letters testamentary was issued in her favor (Record on Appeal, pp. 11-12).
On or about July 26, 1956, Maria Ventura submitted an inventory of the estate of Gregorio Ventura (Record on Appeal, pp. 12-20).
On June 17,1960, she filed her accounts of administration for the years 1955 to 1960, inclusive. (Record on Appeal, pp. 20-27). Said account of
administration was opposed by the spouses Mercedes Ventura and Pedro Corpuz on July 25, 1960 (Record on Appeal, pp. 27-33) and by
Exequiel Victorio and Gregoria Ventura on August 5,1963 (Record on Appeal, pp. 46-50). Both oppositions assailed the veracity of the report as
not reflecting the true income of the estate and the expenses which allegedly are not administration expenses. But on January 25, 1961, Maria
Ventura filed a motion to hold in abeyance the approval of the accounts of administration or to have their approval without the opposition of the
spouses Mercedes Ventura and Pedro Corpuz and Gregoria Ventura and Exequiel Victorio on the ground that the question of the paternity of
Mercedes Ventura and Gregoria Ventura is still pending final determination before the Supreme Court and that should they be adjudged the
adulterous children of testator, as claimed, they are not entitled to inherit nor to oppose the approval of the counts of administration (Record on
Appeals, pp. 33-36). Spouses Mercedes Ventura and Pedro Corpuz filed on February 2, 1961 their opposition to the motion to hold in abeyance
the approval of the accounts of administration on the ground that Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura had already been declared by the Court of
First Instance in Civil Cases No. 1064 and 1476, which cases are supposed to be pending before the Supreme Court, as the legitimate children
of Gregorio Ventura, hence, they have reason to protect their interest (Record on Appeal, pp. 36-39). On February 9,1961, the motion to hold in
abeyance the approval of the accounts was denied (Record on Appeal, pp. 39-40).
It appears that on July 12, 1963, the Court set the case for pre-trial on August 7, 1963 in connection with the accounts of the executrix Maria
Ventura dated June 17, 1960 and the Motion to Annul Provision of Will dated July 14,1962 of Mercedes Ventura (Record on Appeal, p. 45).
On October 22, 1963, four motions were filed by Mercedes Ventura and Gregoria Ventura, namely: (1) motion to remove the executrix Maria
Ventura which was supplemented on April 27, 1965; (2) motion to require her to deposit the harvest of palay of the property under
administration in a bonded warehouse; (3) motion to render an accounting of the proceeds and expenses of Administration; and (4) motion to
require her to include in the inventory of the estate certain excluded properties (Record on Appeal, pp. 50-53; 71). An opposition to said motions
was filed by the heirs Juana Cardona and Miguel Ventura and by the executrix Maria Ventura herself (Record on Appeal, pp. 56-61; 61-70 and
71).
On motion of counsel for Exequiel Victorio and Gregoria Ventura the joint motions to require an Up-to-date Accounting and to Require Executrix
Ventura to Include Excluded Properties in Her Inventory were ordered withdrawn (Order dated February 2, 1965, Record on Appeal, p. 73). The
other two motions were however set for hearing.
The grounds of aforesaid joint motions to remove the executrix Maria Ventura are: (1) that she is grossly incompetent; (2) that she has
maliciously and purposely concealed certain properties of the estate in the inventory; (3) that she is merely an illegitimate daughter who can
have no harmonious relations with the appellees; (4) that the executrix has neglected to render her accounts and failed to comply with the
Order of the Court of December 12, 1963, requiring her to file her accounts of administration for the years 1961 to 1963 (Record on Appeal, pp.
70 and 75-76) and the Order of June 11, 1964, reiterating aforesaid Order of December 12, 1963 (Record on Appeal, p. 76); and (5) that she is
with permanent physical defect hindering her from efficiently performing her duties as an executrix (Record on Appeal, pp. 50-53 and 74-79).
On May 17, 1965, the executrix Maria Ventura finally submitted her accounts of administration covering the period 1961 to 1965 (Record on
Appeal, pp. 79-84) which were again opposed by the spouses Exequiel Victorio and Gregoria Ventura on September 21, 1965 and by the
spouses Mercedes Ventura and Pedro Corpuz on September 29, 1965 (Record on Appeal, pp. 106-120). On June 2, 1965, the executrix filed

her supplemental opposition to the aforesaid four motions, and prayed that the joint supplemental motion to remove the executrix be denied or
held in abeyance until after the status of Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura as heirs of the testator is finally decided (Record on Appeal, pp. 85-1
01). On June 3, 1965, the Court, finding that the estate taxes have not been paid, ordered the administratrix to pay the same within thirty (30)
days. On September 13, 1965, the lower court denied the suspension of the proceedings and deferred the resolution of the joint motion to
remove executrix Maria Ventura until after the examination of the physical fitness of said executrix to undertake her duties as such. Also, it
ordered the deposit of all palay to be harvested in the next agricultural year and subsequent years to be deposited in a bonded warehouse to be
selected by the Court and the palay so deposited shall not be withdrawn without the express permission of the Court (Record on Appeal, pp.
103-105). On September 21, 1965, spouses Exequiel Victorio and Gregoria Ventura filed their opposition to the accounts of administration of
Maria Ventura dated May 17, 1965, while that of spouses Mercedes Ventura and Pedro Corpuz was filed on September 29, 1965, both
oppositions alleging among others that said accounts do not reflect the true and actual income of the estate and that the expenses reported
thereunder are fake, exhorbitant and speculative (Record on Appeal, pp. 106-120).
On October 5, 1965, the court a quo, finding that the executrix Maria Ventura has squandered the funds of the estate, was inefficient and
incompetent, has failed to comply with the orders of the Court in the matter of presenting up-to-date statements of accounts and neglected to
pay the real estate taxes of the estate, rendered the questioned decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, Maria Ventura is hereby removed as executrix and administratrix of the estate and in her place Mercedes
Ventura and Gregoria Ventura are hereby appointed joint a tratrices of the estate upon filing by each of them of a bond of P
7,000.00. Let letters of administration be issued to Mercedes Ventura and Gregoria Ventura upon their qualification.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Hence, this appeal.
In their brief, appellants Maria Ventura and spouses Juana Cardona and Miguel Ventura assign the following errors allegedly committed by the
probate court:
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
I
The lower court erred in ordering the removal of Maria Ventura as executrix and administratrix of the will and estate of the
deceased Gregorio Ventura without giving her full opportunity to be heard and to present all her evidence.
II
The lower court erred in finding that the executrix Maria Ventura had squandered and dissipated the funds of the estate
under her administration.
III
The lower court erred in finding that the executrix Maria Ventura was inefficient and incompetent.
IV
That, considering the circumtances surrounding the case, the lower court erred in finding that the failure of Maria Ventura to
submit her periodical account had justified her removal as executrix.
V
The lower court erred in considering as an established fact that the appellees Mercedes Ventura and Gregoria Ventura are
the legitimate daughters of the deceased Gregorio Ventura.
VI
The lower court erred in finding that the devises and bequests in favor of Maria Ventura and Miguel Ventura as specified in
paragraph 8 of the last Will and Testament of the late Gregorio Ventura have ipso facto been annulled.
VII
The lower court erred in allowing the appellees Mercedes Ventura and Gregoria Ventura to intervene in the hearing of the
accounts of administration submitted by the executrix Maria Ventura and/or in not suspending the hearing of the said
accounts until the said appellees have finally established their status as legitimate children of the deceased Gregorio
Ventura.
VIII
The lower court erred in appointing (even without a proper petition for appointment and much less a hearing on the
appointment of) the appellees Mercedes Ventura and Gregoria Ventura who have an adverse interest as joint
administratrices of the estate of the deceased Gregorio Ventura.
IX
The lower court erred in not appointing the surviving widow, Juana Cardona, or Miguel Ventura, as administratrix of the
estate of Gregorio Ventura in case the removal of Maria Ventura as executrix and administratrix thereof is legally justified.
X
Considering that there are in fact two (2) factions representing opposite interests in the estate, the lower court erred in not
appointing Juana Cardona, or Miguel Ventura, as one of the two (2) administratrices.' (Joint Brief for the Appellants, pp. 1-4)
On July 19,1967, Atty. Arturo Tolentino (representing appellees Mercedes Ventura and Pedro Corpuz) and Atty. Jose J. Francisco (representing
Gregoria and Exequiel Victoria), having failed to submit their respective briefs within the period for the purpose, which expired on July 2 and
May 29,1967, respectively, the Supreme Court Resolved to consider this case submitted for decision WITHOUT SAID APPELLEES' BRIEF
(Rollo, p. 152).
The crucial issue in this case is whether or not the removal of Maria Ventura as executrix is legally justified. This issue has, however, become
moot and academic in view of the decision of this Court in related cases.

At the outset, it is worthy to note that aside from the instant special proceedings, there are two other civil cases involving the estate of the
deceased Gregoria Ventura, namely, Civil Cases Nos. 1064 and 1476. Civil Case No. 1064 was filed on December 2, 1952 by herein appellee
Gregoria Ventura in the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, Branch I, against the other appellees herein Mercedes Ventura and their father,
Gregorio Ventura. Later Mercedes Ventura joined cause with Gregoria Ventura. (Record on Appeal, p. 95). Gregoria and Mercedes Ventura
claimed that they are the legitimate children of Gregorio Ventura and his wife Paulina Simpliciano, who died in 1943, and asked that one-half of
the properties described in the complaint be declared as the share of their mother in the conjugal partnership, with them as the only forced heirs
of their mother Paulina (Joint Brief for the Appellants, pp. 53-68).
Subsequently, Civil Case No. 1476 was filed by Alipio, Eufracia and Juliana, all surnamed Simpliciano, against Gregorio Ventura and the two
sisters, Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura, before the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, Branch I. They alleged that as the only children of
Modesto Simpliciano, sole brother of Paulina Simpliciano, they, instead of Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura, whom they claimed are adulterous
children of Paulina with another man, Teodoro Ventura and as such are not entitled to inherit from her, are the ones who should inherit the
share of Paulina Simpliciano in the conjugal Partnership with Gregorio Ventura (Joint Brief For The Appealant,pp.69-79)
It appears that on November 4, 1959, after a joint hearing of Civil Cases Nos. 1064 and 1476, the lower court rendered its judgment, the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring Mercedes Ventura and Gregoria Ventura to be the ligitimate
daughters of Paulina Simpliciano and Gregorio Ventura; declaring that as such ligitimate daughters of Paulina Simpliciano
they are entitled to 1/2 of the properties described in paragraph six of the complaint; ordering the defendant Maria Ventura,
as administratrix of the estate of Gregorio Ventura to pay to Mercedes Ventura and Gregorio Ventura the amount of P
19,074.09 which shall be divided equally between Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura declaring Mercedes Ventura and Pedro
Corpuz are the exclusive owners of the property describe in the certificate of Title Nos. T-1102, 212, T-1213, T-1214, Exhibits
32, 33, 34 and 35, respectively; ordering Mercedes Ventura and Pedro D. Corpuz to pay to the conjugal partnership of
Gregorio Ventura and Paulina Simpliciano the sum of P100,000.00, one-half of which shall pertain to the estate of Gregorio
Ventura and the other half to the estate of Paulina Simpliciano to whom Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura have succeeded, to
be divided between Mercedes and Gregoria in equal parts; and dismissing Civil Case No. 1476. The parties are urged to
arrive at an amicable partition of the properties herein adjudicated within twenty days from receipt of this decision. Upon
their failure to do so, the Court shall appoint commissioners to divide the properties in accordance with the terms of the
decision. Without pronouncements as to costs. (Emphasis supplied). (Joint Brief for the Appellants, pp. 3738.)
Thereafter, on July 14, 1962, Mercedes Ventura filed a motion to annul the provisions of the will of the deceased Gregorio Ventura in Special
Proceedings No. 812, which motion was opposed by Miguel Ventura and Juana Cardona and later by Maria Ventura. They claimed that the
decision dated November 4,1959 in Civil Cases Nos. 1064 and 1476 was not yet final.
On February 26,1964, the court annulled the institution of the heirs in the probated will of Gregorio Ventura. The motion for reconsideration of
the aforesaid order filed by executrix Maria Ventura was denied on June 11, 1964.
Accordingly, Maria Ventura appealed the February 26, 1964 and June 11, 1964 orders of the probate court in Special Proceedings No. 812
before the Supreme Court and was docketed as G.R. No. L-23878. On May 27,1977, this Court, through then Associate Justice Antonio P.
Barredo, ruled, as follows:
And so, acting on appellees' motion to dismiss appeal, it is Our considered opinion that the decision in Civil Cases Nos.1064
and 1476 declaring that appellees Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura are the ligimate children of the deceased Gregorio
Ventura and his wife, Paulina Simpliciano, and as such are entitled to the annulment of the institution of heirs made in the
probated will of said deceased became final and executory upon the finality of the order, approving ther partition directed in
the decision in question. We need not indulge in any discussion as to whether or not, as of the time the orders here in
question were issued by the trial court said decision had the nature of an interlocutory order only. To be sure, in the case of
Miranda, aforementioned, the opinion of the majority of the Court may well be invoked against appellant's pose. In any
event, even if the Court were minded to modify again Miranda and go back to Fuentebella and Zaldariaga and it is not, as
of now there can be no question that the approval by the trial court in Civil Cases Nos. 1064 and 1476 of the partition
report of the commissioners appointed for the purpose, one of whom, Emmanuel Mariano, is the husband of appellant, put a
definite end to those cases, leaving nothing else to be done in the trial court. That order of approval is an appealable one,
and inasmuch as no appeal has been taken from the same, it is beyond dispute that the decision in controversy has already
become final and executory in all respects. Hence, the case at bar has become moot and academic. (Ventura vs. Ventura,
77 SCRA 159, May 27,1977)
Under Article 854 of the Civil Code, "the pretention or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at
the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be
valid insofar as they are not inofficious," and as a result, intestacy follows, thereby rendering the previous appointment of Maria Ventura as
executrix moot and academic. This would now necessitate the appointment of another administrator, under the following provision:
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court:
When and to whom letters of administration granted.-If no executor is named in the will, or the executor or executors are
incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate, a petition shall be granted:

(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such
person as such surviving husband or wife, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving
husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;"
xxx xxx xxx
In the case at bar, the surviving spouse of the deceased Gregorio Ventura is Juana Cardona while the next of kin are: Mercedes and Gregoria
Ventura and Maria and Miguel Ventura. The "next of kin" has been defined as those persons who are entitled under the statute of distribution to
the decedent's property (Cooper vs. Cooper, 43 Ind. A. 620, 88 NE 341). It is generally said that "the nearest of kin, whose interest in the estate
is more preponderant, is preferred in the choice of administrator. 'Among members of a class the strongest ground for preference is the amount
or preponderance of interest. As between next of kin, the nearest of kin is to be preferred." (Cabanas, et al. vs. Enage et al., 40 Off. Gaz. 12
Suppl. 227; citing 12 Am. Jur. Sec. 77, p. 416, cited in Francisco Vicente J., The Revised Rules of Court in the Philippines, Vol. V-B 1970 Ed., p.
23).
As decided by the lower court and sustained by the Supreme Court, Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura are the legitimate children of Gregorio
Ventura and his wife, the late Paulina Simpliciano. Therefore, as the nearest of kin of Gregorio Ventura they are entitled to preference over the
illegitimate children of Gregorio Ventura, namely: Maria and Miguel Ventura. Hence, under the aforestated preference provided in Section 6 of
Rule 78, the person or persons to be appointed administrator are Juana Cardona, as the surviving spouse, or Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura
as nearest of kin, or Juana Cardona and Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura in the discretion of the Court, in order to represent both interests.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the appeal interposed by appellants Maria Ventura, Juana Cardona and Miguel Ventura is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-21917

November 29, 1966

TESTATE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED CARLOS GURREA Y MONASTERIO. MARCELO PIJUAN, special administrator-appellee,
vs.
MANUELA RUIZ VDA. DE GURREA, movant-appellant.
Marcos S. Gomez for petitioner and appellee.
Ricardo B. Teruel for respondent and appellant.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
This is an appeal, taken by Manuela Ruiz Vda. de Gurrea, from two (2) orders of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental.
In 1932, appellant Manuela Ruiz hereinafter referred to as Mrs. Gurrea and Carlos Gurrea were married in Spain, where they lived
together until 1945, when he abandoned her and came, with their son Teodoro, to the Philippines. Here he lived maritally with Rizalina Perez by
whom he had two (2) children. Having been informed by her son Teodoro, years later, that his father was residing in Pontevedra, Negros
Occidental, Manuela came to the Philippines, in June, 1960; but, Carlos Gurrea refused to admit her to his residence in said municipality.
Hence, she stayed with their son, Teodoro, in Bacolod City.
Presently, or on July 29, 1960, she instituted, against Carlos Gurrea, Civil Case No. 5820 of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental,
for support and the annulment of some alleged donations of conjugal property, in favor of his common-law wife, Rizalina. In due course, said
court issued an order granting Mrs. Gurrea a monthly alimony, pendente lite, of P2,000.00 which, on May 17, 1961, was reduced by the Court
of Appeals to P1,000.00.
Carlos Gurrea died on March 7, 1962, leaving a document purporting to be his last will and testament, in which he named Marcelo Pijuan as
executor thereof and disinherited Mrs. Gurrea and their son, Teodoro. Soon thereafter, or on April 24, 1962, Pijuan instituted Special
Proceedings No. 6582 of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, for the probate of said will. Thereafter Pijuan was, upon his ex
parte motion, appointed special administrator of the estate, without bond. Oppositions to the probate of the will were filed by Mrs. Gurrea, her
son, Teodoro, and one Pilar Gurrea, as an alleged illegitimate daughter of the deceased.
On July 16, 1962, Mrs. Gurrea filed in said Special Proceedings No. 6582, a motion alleging that the aforementioned alimony, pendente lite, of
P1,000 a month, had been suspended upon the death of Carlos Gurrea, and praying that the Special Administrator be ordered to continue
paying it pending the final determination of the case. This motion having been denied in an order dated February 2, 1963, Mrs. Gurrea moved
for a reconsideration thereof. Moreover, on February 27, 1963, she moved for her appointment as administratrix of the estate of the deceased.
In an order dated April 20, 1963, said motion for reconsideration was denied. The lower court, likewise, denied, for the time being, the motion of
Mrs. Gurrea for her appointment as administratrix, in view of the provision of the will of the deceased designating another person as executor
thereof. Hence this appeal from said orders of February 2 and April 20, 1963.
Mrs. Gurrea assails as erroneous the order of the lower court denying her petition for support, as well as that denying its reconsideration. Both
were predicated upon the theory that, pursuant to Article 188 of our Civil Code (Article 1430 of the Spanish Civil Code) the support of a
surviving spouse constitutes, not an encumbrance upon the estate of the decedent, but merely an advance from her share of said estate, and
that Mrs. Gurrea is not entitled to such advance, there being neither allegation nor proof that she had contributed any paraphernal property to
said estate or that the same includes properties forming part of the conjugal partnership between her and the deceased. In support of this view,
His Honor, the trial Judge cited the opinion of Manresa to the effect that
. . . Probado que ni en concepto de capital propio, ni como gananciales corresponde haber alguno al conjuge sobreviviente o a los
herederos del premuerto, no cabe la concesion de alimentos, pues estos, en efecto, con arreglo el articulo 1430, son solo un anticipo
del respectivo haber de cada participe.
This has, however, been misconstrued by the lower court. The foregoing view of Manresa is predicated upon the premise that it has been
proven that none of the properties under administration belongs to the surviving spouse either as paraphernal property or as part of the
conjugal partnership. Upon the other hand, the lower court denied support to Mrs. Gurrea because of absence of proof as regards the status,
nature or character of the property now under the custody of the Special Administrator. Precisely, however, on account of such lack of proof
thereon, we are bound by law1 to assume that the estate of the deceased consists of property belonging to the conjugal partnership, 2 one-half
of which belongs presumptively to Mrs. Gurrea,3 aside from such part of the share of the deceased in said partnership as may belong to her as
one of the compulsory heirs,4 if his alleged will were not allowed to probate, or, even if probated, if the provision therein disinheriting her were
nullified. Inasmuch as the aforementioned estate is worth P205,397.64, according to the inventory submitted by the special administrator, it is
clear to us that the continuation of the monthly alimony, pendente lite, of P1,000, authorized in said Civil Case No. 5820, is fairly justified.
It is next urged by Mrs. Gurrea that the lower court erred in denying her petition for appointment as administratrix, for, as widow of the
deceased, she claims a right of preference under Section 6 of Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court. In the language of this provision, said
preference exists "if no executor is named in the will or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a
person dies intestate." None of these conditions obtains, however, in the case at bar. The deceased Carlos Gurrea has left a document
purporting to be his will, seemingly, is still pending probate. So, it cannot be said, as yet, that he has died intestate. Again, said document
names Marcelo Pijuan as executor thereof, and it is not claimed that he is incompetent therefor. What is more, he has not only not refused the
trust, but, has, also, expressly accepted it, by applying for his appointment as executor, and, upon his appointment as special administrator, has
assumed the duties thereof. It may not be amiss to note that the preference accorded by the aforementioned provision of the Rules of Court to

the surviving spouse refers to the appoint of a regular administrator or administratrix, not to that of a special administrator, and that the order
appointing the latter lies within the discretion of the probate court, 5and is not appealable.6
WHEREFORE, the orders appealed from are hereby modified, in the sense that Manuela Ruiz Vda. de Gurrea shall receive from the estate of
the deceased a monthly allowance of P1,000.00, by way of support, from March 7, 1962, and that, in all other respects, said orders are hereby
affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.

G.R. No. L-40517 January 31, 1984

LUZON SURETY COMPANY, INC., plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
PASTOR T. QUEBRAR and FRANCISCO KILAYKO, defendants-appellants.
Tolentino & Garcia & D. R. Cruz for plaintiff-appellee.
Zoilo V. dela Cruz, Jr. for defendants-appellants.
This is an appeal from the judgement of the Court of First Instance of Manila in Civil Case No. 52790 dated November 3, 1964 which was
certified to this Court by the Court of Appeals in its resolution dated March 20, 1975.
On August 9, 1954, plaintiff-appellee issued two administrator's bond in the amount of P15,000.00 each, in behalf of the defendant-appellant
Pastor T. Quebrar, as administrator in Special Proceedings Nos. 3075 and 3076 of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, entitled "
Re Testate Estate of A. B. Chinsuy," and Re Testate Estate of Cresenciana Lipa," respectively, (pp. 8-12, 17-21, ROA; p. 9 rec.). In
consideration of the suretyship wherein the plaintiff-appellee Luzon Surety Company, Inc. was bound jointly and severally with the defendant
appellant Pastor T. Quebrar, the latter, together with Francisco Kilayko, executed two indemnity agreements, where among other things, they
agreed jointly and severally to pay the plaintiff-appellee "the sum of Three Hundred Pesos (P300.00) in advance as premium thereof for every
12 months or fraction thereof, this ... or any renewal or substitution thereof is in effect" and to indemnify plaintiff-appellee against any and all
damages, losses, costs, stamps taxes, penalties, charges and expenses, whatsoever, including the 15% of the amount involved in any
litigation, for attomey's fees (pp. 12-16, 21-25. ROA; p. 9, rec.).
For the first year, from August 9, 1954 to August 9, 1955, the defendants-appellants paid P304.50 under each indemnity agreement or a total of
P609.00 for premiums and documentary stamps.
On June 6, 1957, the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental approved the amended Project of Partition and Accounts of defendantappellant (p. 87, ROA; p. 9, rec.).
On May 8, 1962, the plaintiff-appellee demanded from the defendants-appellants the payment of the premiums and documentary stamps from
August 9,1955.
On October 17, 1962, the defendants-appellants ordered a motion for cancellation and/or reduction of executor's bonds on the ground that "the
heirs of these testate estates have already received their respective shares" (pp. 69-70, ROA, p. 9, rec.).
On October 20, 1962, the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental acting on the motions filed by the defendants-appellants ordered the
bonds cancelled.
Plaintiff-appellee's demand amounted to P2,436.00 in each case, hence, a total of P4,872.00 for the period of August 9, 1955 to October 20,
1962. The defendants-appellants to pay the said amount of P4,872.00.
On January 8, 1963, the plaintiff-appellee filed the case with the Court of First Instance of Manila During the pre-trial the parties presented their
documentary evidences and agreed on the ultimate issue - "whether or not the administrator's bonds were in force and effect from and after the
year that they were filed and approved by the court up to 1962, when they were cancelled." The defendants-appellants offered P1,800.00 by
way of amicable settlement which the plaintiff-appellee refused.
The lower court allowed the plaintiff to recover from the defendants-appellants, holding that:
We find for the plaintiff it is clear from the terms of the Order of the Court in which these bond were filed, that the same were
in force and effect from and after filling thereof up to and including 20 October, 1962, when the same werecancelled. It
follows that the defendants are liable under the terms of the Indemnity Agreements, notwithstanding that they have not
expressly sought the renewal of these bonds bemuse the same were in force and effect until they were cancelled by order of
the Court. The renewal of said bonds is presumed from the fact that the defendants did not ask for the cancellation of the
same; and their liability springs from the fact that defendant Administrator Pastor Quebrar, benefited from the bonds during
their lifetime.
We find no merit in defendants' claim that the Administrator's bonds in question are not judicial bonds but legal or
conventional bonds only, since they were constituted by virtue of Rule 82, Sec. 1 of the Old Rule of Court. Neither is there
merit in defendants, claim that payments of premiums and documentary stamps were conditions precedent to the effectivity
of the bonds, since it was the defendants' duty to pay for the premiums as long as the bonds were in force and effect. Finally,
defendants' claim that they are not liable under the Indemnity Agreements is also without merit since the under of
defendants under said Indemnity Agreements; includes the payment of yearly pre for the bonds.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants, ordering the tsn the
defendant to pay the plaintiff, jointly and severally, the amount of P6,649.36 plus interest at the legal rate from 27 July 1964

until fully paid and the sum equivalent to 10% of the total amount due as and or attorney's fees, and costs (pp. 92-94, ROA;
p. 9, rec.).
Defendants-appellants appealed to the Court of Appeals. On March 20, 1975, the Court of Appeals in a resolution certified the herein case to
this Court after finding that this case involves only errors or questions of law.
1. The proper determination of the liability of the surety and of the principal on the bond must depend primarily upon the language of the bond
itself. The bonds herein were required by Section 1 of Rule 81 of the Rules of Court. While a bond is nonetheless a contract because it is
required by statute (Midland Co. vs. Broat 52 NW 972), said statutory bonds are construed in the light of the statute creating the obligation
secured and the purposes for which the bond is required, as expressed in the statute (Michael vs. Logan, 52 NW 972; Squires vs. Miller, 138
NW 1062). The statute which requires the giving of a bond becomes a part of the bond and imparts into the bond any conditions prescribed by
the statute (Scott vs. United States Fidelity Co., 252 Ala 373, 41 So 2d 298; Employer's Liability Assurance Corp. vs. Lunt, 82 Ariz 320, 313 P2d
393).
The bonds in question herein contain practically the very same conditions in Sec. 1, Rule 81 of the Rules of Court. Pertinent provision of the
administrator's bonds is as follows:
Therefore, if the said Pastor T. Quebrar faithfully prepares and presents to the Court, within three months from the date of
his appointment, a correct inventory of all the property of the deceased which may have come into his possession or into the
possession of any other person representing him according to law, if he administers all the property of the deceased which
at any time comes into his possession or into the possession of any other person representing him; faithfully pays all the
debts, legacies, and bequests which encumber said estate, pays whatever dividends which the Court may decide should be
paid, and renders a just and true account of his administrations to the Court within a year or at any other date that he may
be required so to do, and faithfully executes all orders and decrees of said Court, then in this case this obligation shall be
void, otherwise it shall remain full force and effect (p. 9, 18, ROA p. 9, rec.).
Section 1 of Rule 81 of the Rules of Court requires the administrator/executor to put up a bond for the purpose of indemnifying the creditors,
heirs, legatees and the estate. It is conditioned upon the faithful performance of the administrator's trust (Mendoza vs. Pacheco, 64 Phil. 134).
Having in mind the purpose and intent of the law, the surety is then liable under the administrator's bond, for as long as the administrator has
duties to do as such administrator/executor. Since the liability of the sureties is co-extensive with that of the administrator and embraces the
performance of every duty he is called upon to perform in the course of administration (Deobold vs. Oppermann, 111 NY 531, 19 NE 94), it
follows that the administrator is still duty bound to respect the indemnity agreements entered into by him in consideration of the suretyship
It is shown that the defendant-appellant Pastor T. Quebrar, still had something to do as an administrator/executor even after the approval of the
amended project of partition and accounts on June 6, 1957.
The contention of the defendants-appellants that the administrator's bond ceased to be of legal force and effect with the approval of the project
of partition and statement of accounts on June 6, 1957 is without merit. The defendant-appellant Pastor T. Quebrar did not cease as
administrator after June 6, 1957, for administration is for the purpose of liquidation of the estate and distribution of the residue among the heirs
and legatees. And liquidation means the determination of all the assets of the estate and payment of all the debts and expenses(Flores vs.
Flores, 48 Phil. 982). It appears that there were still debts and expenses to be paid after June 6, 1957.
And in the case of Montemayor vs. Gutierrez (114 Phil. 95), an estate may be partitioned even before the termination of the administration
proceedings. Hence, the approval of the project of partition did not necessarily terminate the administration proceedings. Notwithstanding the
approval of the partition, the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental still had jurisdiction over the administration proceedings of the estate
of A.B. Chinsuy and Cresenciana Lipa.
2. The sureties of an administration bond are liable only as a rule, for matters occurring during the term covered by the bond. And the term of a
bond does not usually expire until the administration has been closed and terminated in the manner directed by law (Hartford Accident and
Indemnity Co. vs. White, 115 SW 2d 249). Thus, as long as the probate court retains jurisdiction of the estate, the bond contemplates a
continuing liability (Deobold vs. Oppermann, supra) notwithstanding the non-renewal of the bond by the defendants-appellants.
It must be remembered that the probate court possesses an all-embracing power over the administrator's bond and over the administration
proceedings and it cannot be devoid of legal authority to execute and make that bond answerable for the every purpose for which it was
filed (Mendoza vs. Pacheco, 64 Phil. 1-05). It is the duty of the courts of probate jurisdiction to guard jealously the estate of the deceased
persons by intervening in the administration thereof in order to remedy or repair any injury that may be done thereto (Dariano vs. Fernandez
Fidalgo, 14 Phil. 62, 67; Sison vs. Azarraga, 30 Phil. 129, 134).
3. In cases like these where the pivotal point is the interpretation of the contracts entered into, it is essential to scrutinize the very language
used in the contracts. The two Indemnity Agreements provided that:
The undersigned, Pastor T. Quebrar and Dr. Francisco Kilayko, jointly and severally, bind ourselves unto the Luzon Surety
Co., Inc. ... in consideration of it having become SURETY upon Civil Bond in the sum of Fifteen Thousand Pesos
(P15,000.00) ... in favor of the Republic of the Philippines in Special Proceeding ... dated August 9, 1954, a copy of which is
hereto attached and made an integral part hereof (emphasis supplied; pp. 12-13, 21, ROA p. 9, rec.),

To separately consider these two agreements would then be contrary to the intent of the parties in making them integrated as a whole.
The contention then of the defendants-appellants that both the Administrator's Bonds and the Indemnity Agreements ceased to have any force
and effect, the former since June 6, 1957 with the approval of the project of partition and the latter since August 9, 1955 with the non-payment
of the stated premiums, is without merit. Such construction of the said contracts entered into would render futile the purpose for which they
were made.
To allow the defendants-appellants to evade their liability under the Indemnity Agreements by non-payment of the premiums would ultimately
lead to giving the administrator the power to diminish or reduce and altogether nullify his liability under the Administrator's Bonds. As already
stated, this is contrary to the intent and purpose of the law in providing for the administrator's bonds for the protection of the creditors, heirs,
legatees, and the estate.
4. Moreover, the lower court was correct in holding that there is no merit in the defendants' claim that payments of premiums and documentary
stamps are conditions precedent to the effectivity of the bonds.
It is worthy to note that there is no provision or condition in the bond to the effect that it will terminate at the end of the first year if the premium
for continuation thereafter is not paid. And there is no clause by which its obligation is avoided or even suspended by the failure of the obligee
to pay an annual premium (U.S. vs. Maryland Casualty Co. DCMD 129 F. Supp; Dale vs. Continental Insurance Co., 31 SW 266; Equitable
Insurance C. vs. Harvey, 40 SW 1092).
It was held in the case of Fourth and First Bank and Trust Co. vs. Fidelity and Deposit Co. (281 SW 785), that "at the end of the first year, the
bond went on, whether or not the premium was paid or not ... Even on a failure to pay an annual premium, the contract ran on until affirmative
action was taken to avoid it. The obligation of the bond was therefore continuous." And in United States vs. American Surety Co. of New York
(172 F2d 135), it was held that "under a surety bond securing faithful performance of duties by postal employee, liability for default of employee
occurring in any one year would continue, whether or not a renewal premium was paid for a later year."
The payment of the annual premium is to be enforced as part of the consideration, and not as a condition Woodfin vs. Asheville Mutual
Insurance Co., 51 N.C. 558); for the payment was not made a condition to the attaching or continuing of the contract (National Bank vs.
National Surety Co., 144 A 576). The premium is the consideration for furnishing the bonds and the obligation to pay the same subsists for as
long as the liability of the surety shall exist (Reparations Commission vs. Universal Deep-Sea Fishing Corp., L-21996, 83 SCRA 764, June 27,
1978). And in Arranz vs. Manila Fidelity and Surety Co., Inc. (101 Phil. 272), the "premium is the consideration for furnishing the bond or the
guaranty. While the liability of the surety subsists the premium is collectible from the principal. Lastly, in Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. vs.
Villarama (107 Phil. 891), it was held that "the one-year period mentioned therein refers not to the duration or lifetime of the bond, but merely to
the payment of premiums, and, consequently, does not affect at all the effectivity or efficacy of such bond. But such non- payment alone of the
premiums for the succeeding years ... does not necessarily extinguish or terminate the effectivity of the counter-bond in the absence of an
express stipulation in the contract making such non-payment of premiums a cause for the extinguishment or termination of the undertaking.
...There is no necessity for an extension or renewal of the agreement because by specific provision thereof, the duration of the counter-bond
was made dependent upon the existence of the original bond."
5. It is true that in construing the liability of sureties, the principle of strictissimi juris applies (Asiatic Petroleum Co. vs, De Pio, 46 Phil. 167;
Standard Oil Co. of N.Y. vs. Cho Siong, 53 Phil. 205); but with the advent of corporate surety, suretyship became regarded as insurance where,
usually, provisions are interpreted most favorably to the insured and against the insurer because ordinarily the bond is prepared by the insurer
who then has the opportunity to state plainly the term of its obligation (Surety Co. vs. Pauly, 170 US 133, 18 S. Ct. 552.,42 L. Ed. 972).
This rule of construction is not applicable in the herein case because there is no ambiguity in the language of the bond and more so when the
bond is read in connection with the statutory provision referred to.
With the payment of the premium for the first year, the surety already assumed the risk involved, that is, in case defendant-appellant Pastor T.
Quebrar defaults in his administrative duties. The surety became liable under the bond for the faithful administration of the estate by the
administrator/executor. Hence, for as long as defendant-appellant Pastor T. Quebrar was administrator of the estates, the bond was held liable
and inevitably, the plaintiff-appellee's liability subsists since the liability of the sureties is co-extensive with that of the administrator.
WHEREFORE, THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA DATED NOVEMBER 3, 1964 IS HEREBY AFFIRMED.
WITH COSTS AGAINST DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS.

THE ESTATE OF HILARIO M. RUIZ, EDMOND RUIZ, Executor, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS (Former Special Sixth
Division), MARIA PILAR RUIZ-MONTES, MARIA CATHRYN RUIZ, CANDICE ALBERTINE RUIZ, MARIA ANGELINE RUIZ and
THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASIG, BRANCH 156, respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to annul and set aside the decision dated November 10, 1994 and the resolution dated January
5, 1995 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 33045.
The facts show that on June 27, 1987, Hilario M. Ruiz1 executed a holographic will naming as his heirs his only son, Edmond Ruiz, his
adopted daughter, private respondent Maria Pilar Ruiz Montes, and his three granddaughters, private respondents Maria Cathryn, Candice
Albertine and Maria Angeline, all children of Edmond Ruiz. The testator bequeathed to his heirs substantial cash, personal and real properties
and named Edmond Ruiz executor of his estate.2
On April 12, 1988, Hilario Ruiz died. Immediately thereafter, the cash component of his estate was distributed among Edmond Ruiz and
private respondents in accordance with the decedents will. For unbeknown reasons, Edmond, the named executor, did not take any action for
the probate of his fathers holographic will.
On June 29, 1992, four years after the testators death, it was private respondent Maria Pilar Ruiz Montes who filed before the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 156, Pasig, a petition for the probate and approval of Hilario Ruizs will and for the issuance of letters testamentary to
Edmond Ruiz.3 Surprisingly, Edmond opposed the petition on the ground that the will was executed under undue influence.
On November 2, 1992, one of the properties of the estate - the house and lot at No. 2 Oliva Street, Valle Verde IV, Pasig which the
testator bequeathed to Maria Cathryn, Candice Albertine and Maria Angeline4 - was leased out by Edmond Ruiz to third persons.
On January 19, 1993, the probate court ordered Edmond to deposit with the Branch Clerk of Court the rental deposit and payments
totalling P540,000.00 representing the one-year lease of the Valle Verde property. In compliance, on January 25, 1993, Edmond turned over the
amount of P348,583.56, representing the balance of the rent after deducting P191,416.14 for repair and maintenance expenses on the estate. 5
In March 1993, Edmond moved for the release of P50,000.00 to pay the real estate taxes on the real properties of the estate. The probate
court approved the release of P7,722.006
On May 14, 1993, Edmond withdrew his opposition to the probate of the will. Consequently, the probate court, on May 18, 1993, admitted
the will to probate and ordered the issuance of letters testamentary to Edmond conditioned upon the filing of a bond in the amount of
P50,000.00. The letters testamentary were issued on June 23, 1993.
On July 28, 1993, petitioner Testate Estate of Hilario Ruiz as executor, filed an Ex-Parte Motion for Release of Funds. It prayed for the
release of the rent payments deposited with the Branch Clerk of Court. Respondent Montes opposed the motion and concurrently filed a Motion
for Release of Funds to Certain Heirs and Motion for Issuance of Certificate of Allowance of Probate Will. Montes prayed for the release of the
said rent payments to Maria Cathryn, Candice Albertine and Maria Angeline and for the distribution of the testators properties, specifically the
Valle Verde property and the Blue Ridge apartments, in accordance with the provisions of the holographic will.
On August 26, 1993, the probate court denied petitioners motion for release of funds but granted respondent Montes motion in view of
petitioners lack of opposition. It thus ordered the release of the rent payments to the decedents three granddaughters. It further ordered the
delivery of the titleds to and possession of the properties bequeathed to the three granddaughters and respondent Montes upon the filing of a
bond of P50,000.00.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration alleging that he actually filed his opposition to respondent Montes motion for release of rent
payments which opposition the court failed to consider.Petitioner likewise reiterated his previous motion for release of funds.
On November 23, 1993, petitioner, through counsel, manifested that he was withdrawing his motion for release of funds in view of the fact
that the lease contract over Valle Verde property had been renewed for another year.7
Despite petitioners manifestation, the probate court, on December 22, 1993, ordered the release of the funds to Edmond but only such
amount as may be necessary to cover the espenses of administration and allowanceas for support of the testators three granddaughters
subject to collation and deductible from their share in the inheritance. The court, however, held in abeyance the release of the titles to
respondent Montes and the three granddaughters until the lapse of six months from the date of firast publication of the notice to creditors. 8 The
Court stated thus:
xxx xxx xxx
After consideration of the arguments set forth thereon by the parties, the court resolves to allow Administrator Edmond M. Ruiz to take
possession of the rental payments deposited with the Clerk of Court, Pasig Regional Trial Court, but only such amount as may be necessary to
cover the expenses of administration and allowances for support of Maria Cathryn Veronique, Candice Albertine and Maria Angeli, which are
subject to collation and deductible from the share in the inheritance of said heirs and insofar as they exceed the fruits or rents pertaining to
them.
As to the release of the titles bequeathed to petitioner Maria Pilar Ruiz-Montes and the above-named heirs, the same is hereby reconsidered
and held in abeyance until the lapse of six (6) months from the date of first publication of Notice to Creditors.

WHEREFORE, Administrator Edmond M. Ruiz is hereby ordered to submit an accounting of the expenses necessary for administration
including provisions for the support Of Maria Cathryn Veronique Ruiz, Candice Albertine Ruiz and Maria Angeli Ruiz before the amount required
can be withdrawn and cause the publication of the notice to creditors with reasonable dispatch.9
Petitioner assailed this order before the Court of Appeals. Finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent judge, the appellate
court dismissed the petition and sustained the probate courts order in a decision dated November 10, 199410 and a resolution
dated January 5, 1995.11
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner claims that:
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS
OF JURISDICTION IN AFFIRMING AND CONFIRMING THE ORDER OF RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASIG, BRANCH
156, DATED DECEMBER 22, 1993, WHICH WHEN GIVEN DUE COURSE AND IS EFFECTED WOULD: (1) DISALLOW THE
EXECUTOR/ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF THE LATE HILARIO M. RUIZ TO TAKE POSSESSION OF ALL THE REAL AND
PERSONAL PROPERTIES OF THE ESTATE; (2) GRANT SUPPORT, DURING THE PENDENCY OF THE SETTLEMENT OF AN ESTATE, TO
CERTAIN PERSONS NOT ENTITLED THERETO; AND (3) PREMATURELY PARTITION AND DISTRIBUTE THE ESTATE PURSUANT TO
THE PROVISIONS OF THE HOLOGRAPHIC WILL EVEN BEFORE ITS INTRINSIC VALIDITY HAS BEEN DETERMINED, AND DESPITE THE
EXISTENCE OF UNPAID DEBTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF THE ESTATE.12
The issue for resolution is whether the probate court, after admitting the will to probate but before payment of the estates debts and
obligations, has the authority: (1) to grant an allowance from the funds of the estate for the support of the testators grandchildren; (2) to order
the release of the titles to certain heirs; and (3) to grant possession of all properties of the estate to the executor of the will.
On the matter of allowance, Section 3 of Rule 83 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 3. Allowance to widow and family. - The widow and minor or incapacitated children of a deceased person, during the settlement of the
estate, shall receive therefrom under the direction of the court, such allowance as are provided by law.
Petitioner alleges that this provision only gives the widow and the minor or incapacitated children of the deceased the right to receive
allowances for support during the settlement of estate proceedings. He contends that the testators three granddaughters do not qualify for an
allowance because they are not incapacitated and are no longer minors but of legal age, married and gainfully employed. In addition, the
provision expressly states children of the deceased which excludes the latters grandchildren.
It is settled that allowances for support under Section 3 of Rule 83 should not be limited to the minor or incapacitated children of the
deceased. Article 18813 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the substantive law in force at the time of the testators death, provides that during
the liquidation of the conjugal partnership, the deceaseds legitimate spouse and children, regardless of their age, civil status or gainful
employment, are entitled to provisional support from the funds of the estate. 14 The law is rooted on the fact that the right and duty to support,
especially the right to education, subsist even beyond the age of majority.15
Be that as it may, grandchildren are not entitled to provisional support from the funds of the decedents estate. The law clearly limits the
allowance to widow and children and does not extend it to the deceaseds grandchildren, regardless of their minority or incapacity. 16 It was error,
therefore, for the appellate court to sustain the probate courts order granting an allowance to the grandchildren of the testator pending
settlement of his estate.
Respondent courts also erred when they ordered the release of the titles of the bequeathed properties to private respondents six months
after the date of first publication of notice to creditors. An order releasing titles to properties of the estate amounts to an advance distribution of
the estate which is allowed only under the following conditions:
Sec. 2. Advance distribution in special proceedings. - Nothwithstanding a pending controversy or appeal in proceedings to settle the estate of a
decedent, the court may, in its discretion and upon such terms as it may deem proper and just, permit that such part of the estate as may not be
affected by the controversy or appeal be distributed among the heirs or legatees, upon compliance with the conditions set forth in Rule 90 of
these Rules.17
And Rule 90 provides that:
Sec. 1. When order for distribution of residue made. - When the debts, funeral charges, and expenses of administration, the allowance to the
widow, and inheritance tax, if any, chargeable to the estate in accordance with law, have been paid, the court, on the application of the executor
or administrator, or of a person interested in the estate, and after hearing upon notice, shall assign the residue of the estate to the persons
entitled to the same, naming them and the proportions, or parts, to which each is entitled, and such persons may demand and recover their
respective shares from the executor or administrator, or any other person having the same in his possession. If there is a controversy before the
court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the
controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.
No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations above-mentioned has been made or provided for, unless the
distributees, or any of them, give a bond, in a sum to be fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment of said obligations within
such time as the court directs.18

In settlement of estate proceedings, the distribution of the estate properties can only be made: (1) after all the debts, funeral charges, expenses
of administration, allowance to the widow, and estate tax have been paid; or (2) before payment of said obligations only if the distributees or any
of them gives a bond in a sum fixed by the court conditioned upon the payment of said obligations within such time as the court directs, or when
provision is made to meet those obligations.19
In the case at bar, the probate court ordered the release of the titles to the Valle Verde property and the Blue Ridge apartments to the
private respondents after the lapse of six months from the date of first publication of the notice to creditors. The questioned order speaks of
notice to creditors, not payment of debts and obligations. Hilario Ruiz allegedly left no debts when he died but the taxes on his estate had not
hitherto been paid, much less ascertained. The estate tax is one of those obligations that must be paid before distribution of the estate. If not
yet paid, the rule requires that the distributees post a bond or make such provisions as to meet the said tax obligation in proportion to their
respective shares in the inheritance.20 Notably, at the time the order was issued the properties of the estate had not yet been inventoried and
appraised.
It was also too early in the day for the probate court to order the release of the titles six months after admitting the will to probate. The
probate of a will is conclusive as to its due execution and extrinsic validity 21 and settles only the question of whether the testator, being of sound
mind, freely executed it in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law. 22Questions as to the intrinsic validity and efficacy of the provisions
of the will, the legality of any devise or legacy may be raised even after the will has been authenticated. 23
The intrinsic validity of Hilarios holographic will was controverted by petitioner before the probate court in his Reply to Montes Opposition
to his motion for release of funds 24 and his motion for reconsideration of the August 26, 1993 order of the said court. 25 Therein, petitioner
assailed the distributive shares of the devisees and legatees inasmuch as his fathers will included the estate of his mother and allegedly
impaired his legitime as an intestate heir of his mother. The Rules provide that if there is a controversy as to who are the lawful heirs of the
decedent and their distributive shares in his estate, the probate court shall proceed to hear and decide the same as in ordinary cases. 26
Still and all, petitioner cannot correctly claim that the assailed order deprived him of his right to take possession of all the real and
personal properties of the estate. The right of an executor or administrator to the possession and management of the real and personal
properties of the deceased is not absolute and can only be exercised so long as it is necessary for the payment of the debts and expenses of
administration,27 Section 3 of Rule 84 of the Revised Rules of Court explicitly provides:
Sec. 3. Executor or administrator to retain whole estate to pay debts, and to administer estate not willed. - An executor or administrator shall
have the right to the possession and management of the real as well as the personal estate of the deceased so long as it is necessary for the
payment of the debts and expenses for administration.28
When petitioner moved for further release of the funds deposited with the clerk of court, he had been previously granted by the probate court
certain amounts for repair and maintenance expenses on the properties of the estate, and payment of the real estate taxes thereon. But
petitioner moved again for the release of additional funds for the same reasons he previously cited. It was correct for the probate court to
require him to submit an accounting of the necessary expenses for administration before releasing any further money in his favor.
It was relevantly noted by the probate court that petitioner had deposited with it only a portion of the one-year rental income from the Valle
Verde property. Petitioner did not deposit its succeeding rents after renewal of the lease. 29 Neither did he render an accounting of such funds.
Petitioner must be reminded that his right of ownership over the properties of his father is merely inchoate as long as the estate has not
been fully settled and partitioned. 30 As executor, he is a mere trustee of his fathers estate. The funds of the estate in his hands are trust funds
and he is held to the duties and responsibilities of a trustee of the highest order.31 He cannot unilaterally assign to himself and possess all his
parents properties and the fruits thereof without first submitting an inventory and appraisal of all real and personal properties of the deceased,
rendering a true account of his administration, the expenses of administration, the amount of the obligations and estate tax, all of which are
subject to a determination by the court as to their veracity, propriety and justness. 32
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 33045 affirming the order dated December
22, 1993 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 156, Pasig in SP Proc. No. 10259 are affirmed with the modification that those portions of the order
granting an allowance to the testators grandchildren and ordering the release of the titles to the private respondents upon notice to creditors are
annulled and set aside.
Respondent judge is ordered to proceed with dispatch in the proceedings below.
SO ORDERED.