Battle of Kursk

The Battle of Kursk was a Second World War engagement between German and Soviet forces on the Eastern
Front near Kursk (450 kilometres or 280 miles southwest of Moscow) in the Soviet Union during July and August 1943. The German oensive was code-named Operation Citadel (German: Unternehmen Zitadelle) and
led to one of the largest armoured clashes in history,
the Battle of Prokhorovka. The German oensive was
countered by two Soviet counter-oensives, Operation
Polkovodets Rumyantsev (Russian: ) and Operation Kutuzov (Russian: ). For the
Germans, the battle represented the nal strategic oensive they were able to mount in the east. For the Soviets,
the victory gave the Red Army the strategic initiative for
the rest of the war.

World War that a German strategic oensive was halted

before it could break through enemy defences and penetrate to its strategic depths.[33][34] The maximum depth of
the German advance was 812 kilometres (5.07.5 mi)
in the north and 35 kilometres (22 mi) in the south.[35]
Though the Soviet Army had succeeded in winter offensives previously, their counter-oensives following the
German attack at Kursk were their rst successful strategic summer oensives of the war.[36]

1 Background

The Germans hoped to weaken the Soviet oensive potential for the summer of 1943 by cutting o a large number of forces that they anticipated would be in the Kursk
salient.[22] The Kursk salient or bulge was 250 kilometres
(160 mi) long from north to south and 160 kilometres
(99 mi) from east to west.[23] By eliminating the Kursk
salient, the Germans would also shorten their lines of defence, nullifying Soviet numerical superiority in critical
sectors.[24] The plan envisioned an envelopment by a pair
of pincers breaking through the northern and southern
anks of the salient.[25] German dictator Adolf Hitler believed that a victory here would reassert German strength
and improve his prestige with his allies, who were considering withdrawing from the war.[26] It was also hoped
that large numbers of Soviet prisoners would be captured to be used as slave labour in the German armaments
industry.[24]

German soldiers in Orel pass by the Church of the Intercession,

early 1943.

As the Battle of Stalingrad slowly ground to its conclusion the Soviet army moved to a general oensive in
the south, pressuring the exhausted German forces who
had survived the winter. By January 1943, a 160 to
300 km (99 to 186 mi) wide gap had opened between
Army Group B and Army Group Don, and the advancing Soviet armies threatened to cut o all German forces
south of the Don River, including Army Group A operating in the Caucasus.[37][38] Army Group Center came
under signicant pressure as well. Kursk fell to the Soviets on 8 February 1943, and Rostov on 14 February.[39]
The Soviet Bryansk, Western, and newly created Central
Fronts prepared for an oensive which envisioned the encirclement of Army Group Center between Bryansk and
Smolensk.[37][40] By February 1943 the Wehrmacht was
in danger of a general collapse.

The Soviets had intelligence of the German intentions,

provided in part by the British intelligence service and
Tunny intercepts. Aware months in advance that the attack would fall on the neck of the Kursk salient, the Soviets built a defence in depth designed to wear down the
German panzer spearheads.[27] The Germans delayed the
oensive, while they tried to build up their forces and
waited for new weapons, mainly the new Panther tank
but also larger numbers of the Tiger heavy tank.[28][29][30]
This gave the Red Army time to construct a series of
deep defensive belts. The defensive preparations included
mineelds, fortications, artillery re zones and antitank strong points, which extended approximately 300
km (190 mi) in depth.[31] Soviet mobile formations were Hitlers belief in his own iron will as the deciding factor in
moved out of the salient and a large reserve force was the conict resulted in German forces being left tied down
in a rigid defence that did not permit them the liberty to
formed for strategic counter-oensives.[32]
move.[41][42] Since December 1942 Field Marshal Erich
The Battle of Kursk was the rst time in the Second von Manstein had been strongly requesting unrestricted
1

BACKGROUND

operational freedom to allow him to use his forces in

a uid manner.[43] Hitlers policy of holding at all costs
may have averted a general collapse in the winter of 194142, but thereafter it consistently resulted in forces holding
ground until their position became cut o, resulting in
their inevitable destruction.[44] The 6th Army isolated in
the Stalingrad pocket surrendered 2 February.

tacking formations to disengage and redeploy to the south

to counter the threat of the advancing German forces under Manstein.[52][53] Exhaustion of both the Wehrmacht
and the Red Army coupled with the loss of mobility due
to the onset of the spring rasputitsa resulted in the cessation of operations for both sides by mid-March.[54] The
counteroensive left a salient extending into the German
[54]
On 12 February 1943, the remaining German forces were area of control, centered around the city of Kursk.
reorganised. To the south, Army Group Don was renamed as Army Group South and placed under the command of Manstein. Directly to the north, Army Group 1.1 German plans and preparation
B was dissolved, with its forces and areas of responsibility divided between Army Group South and Army Group
Center. Manstein inherited responsibility for the massive
breach in the German lines.[45] On 18 February, Hitler arrived at Army Group South headquarters, at Zaporizhia,
hours before the Soviets liberated Kharkov. Hitlers distrust of the General Sta and traditional ocer corps,
and of Manstein in particular, put him at odds with the
high command of the Wehrmacht.[43][46] Though Hitler
desired to relieve Manstein and blame him for the failure at Stalingrad,[47] he concluded he could ill aord to
lose the man called Hitlers most able general by the
American media.[48][42] Instead, Hitler grudgingly gave
him the freedom he had requested.[43] The II SS Panzer
Corps had arrived from France in January 1943, retted
and up to near full strength.[49] Armoured units from the
1st Panzer Army of Army Group A had pulled out of the
Caucasus and further strengthened Mansteins forces.[50]
Once given freedom of action, Manstein explained how
he intended to utilize these forces in making a series of
counterstrokes into the anks of the Soviet armoured formations, with the goal of destroying them while retaking
Kharkov and Kursk.[45][51]

German plan of attack

Waen-SS soldiers aboard a Panzer IV in Kharkov, March 1943

The Third Battle of Kharkov commenced on 19 February,

spearheaded by the three SS divisions of the II SS Panzer
Corps. Mansteins oensive cut o the Soviet spearheads, and then encircled and destroyed the main force.
The Germans retook Kharkov on 15 March and Belgorod
on 18 March.[51] The German oensive wrested the initiative from the Soviets. A Soviet oensive launched on
25 February by the Central Front against Army Group
Center had to be abandoned by 7 March to allow the at-

The heavy losses sustained by the Heer since the opening of Barbarossa had resulted in a shortage in infantry
and artillery.[55] Units were in total 470,000 men understrength. For the Germans to undertake an oensive in
1943, the burden would have to be carried by the panzer
divisions. In view of the exposed position of Army Group
South, Manstein proposed that his forces should take the
strategic defensive. He anticipated that a Soviet oensive
would attempt to cut o and destroy Army Group South
by a move across the Donets River toward the Dnieper.
In February, he proposed waiting for this oensive to
develop and then delivering a series of counterattacks
into the exposed Soviet anks.[56] Hitler, concerned about
the political implications of taking a defensive stance,
and preoccupied with holding the Donbass, rejected this
plan.[57] On 10 March, Manstein presented an alternative plan whereby the German forces would pinch o the
Kursk salient with a rapid oensive commencing as soon
as the spring rasputitsa had subsided.[58][59]

1.1

German plans and preparation

On 13 March, Hitler signed Operational Order No. 5,

which authorised several oensives, including one against
the Kursk salient.[60][61] As the last Soviet resistance in
Kharkov petered out, Manstein attempted to persuade
Gnther von Kluge, commander of Army Group Centre,
to immediately attack the Central Front, which was defending the northern face of the salient. Kluge refused,
believing that his forces were too weak to launch such an
attack.[59] Further Axis advances were blocked by Soviet
forces that had been shifted down from the Central Front
to the area north of Belgorod.[59][51] By mid-April, amid
poor weather and with the German forces exhausted and
in need of retting, the oensives of Operational Order
No. 5 were postponed.[50][62]
Ernst-Georg Buchterkirch (left) in discussion with General Model
On 15 April, Hitler issued Operational Order No. 6,
which called for the Kursk oensive operation to begin on 3 May or shortly thereafter. The talented, resourceful Kurt Zeitzler, the OKH Chief of Sta, provided
the logistical planning for the operation.[63] The oensive was codenamed Zitadelle (Citadel).[64] For the offensive to succeed it was deemed essential to attack before the Soviets had a chance to prepare extensive defences or to launch an oensive of their own.[65][66] According to some military historians, the operation envisioned a blitzkrieg attack;[lower-alpha 10] other military historians and the German participants who wrote about it
after the war, including Manstein, make no mention of
blitzkrieg in their accounts of the operation.[lower-alpha 11]
Historian Pier Battistelli asserts that the operational planning marked a change in German oensive thinking away
from blitzkrieg.[67]

pletely abandoning Citadel, allowing the army to await

and defeat the coming Soviet oensive, or radically revising the plan for Citadel.[75][76] Though in mid-April
Manstein had considered the Citadel oensive protable,
by May he shared Models misgivings.[76][65] He asserted
that the best course of action would be for the German
forces to take the strategic defensive, ceding ground to
allow the anticipated Soviet forces to extend themselves
and allow the German panzer forces to counterattack in
the type of uid mobile battle they excelled at.[77] Convinced that the Red Army would deliver its main eort
against Army Group South, he proposed to keep the left
wing of the army group strong while moving the right
wing back in stages to the Dnieper River, followed by
a counterattack against the ank of the Red Army adOperation Citadel called for a double envelopment, di- vance. The counteroensive would continue until the Sea
rected at Kursk, to surround the Soviet defenders and seal of Azov was reached and the Soviet forces were cut o.
o the salient. Army Group Centre would provide Gen- Hitler rejected this idea; he did not want to give up so
[77]
eral Walter Model's 9th Army to form the northern pin- much terrain, even temporarily.
cer. It would cut through the northern face of the salient, In early May, Hitler called his senior ocers and advidriving south to the hills east of Kursk, securing the rail sors to Munich for a meeting. Hitler spoke for about 45
line from Soviet attack.[68] Army Group South would minutes on the current situation and the plans for the ofcommit the 4th Panzer Army, under Hermann Hoth, fensive. Model then spoke, and produced reconnaissance
and Army Detachment Kempf, under Werner Kempf, to photos revealing some of the extensive preparations the
pierce the southern face of the salient. This force would Soviets had made in preparation for the attack.[78] A numdrive north to meet the 9th Army east of Kursk.[69][70][71] ber of options were put forth for comment: going on the
Von Mainsteins main attack was to be delivered by oensive immediately with the forces at hand, delaying
Hoths 4th Panzer Army, spearheaded by the II SS Panzer the oensive further to await the arrival of new and betCorps under Paul Hausser. The XLVIII Panzer Corps, ter tanks, radically revising the operation or cancelling
commanded by Otto von Knobelsdor, would advance on it all together. Manstein spoke against the oensive,
the left while Army Detachment Kempf would advance but not forcefully. Albert Speer, the minister of Armaon the right.[72] The 2nd Army, under the command of ments and War Production, spoke about the diculties of
Walter Weiss, would contain the western portion of the rebuilding the armoured formations and the limitations
salient.[73][71]
of German industry to replace losses. General Heinz
On 27 April Model met with Hitler to review and express his concern for reconnaissance information which
showed the Soviets constructing very strong positions at
the shoulders of the salient and having withdrawn their
mobile forces from the area west of Kursk.[74] He argued
that the longer the preparation phase continued, the less
the operation could be justied. He recommended com-

Guderian argued strongly against the operation, stating

the attack was pointless.[79] The conference ended without Hitler coming to a decision, but Citadel was not
aborted.[76][80][81] Three days later, OKW, Hitlers conduit for controlling the military, postponed the launch
date for Citadel to 12 June.[81][82][83]
Following this meeting, Guderian continued to voice his

BACKGROUND

oensive.[76][60] On 1718 June, following a discussion

in which the OKW Operations Sta suggested abandoning the oensive, Hitler further postponed the operation
until 3 July.[90][87][91] Finally, on 1 July, Hitler announced
5 July as the launch date of the oensive.[90][91][92]

Guderian being transported to the Eastern Front, 1943

concerns over an operation that would likely degrade the

panzer forces that he had been attempting to rebuild. He
considered the oensive, as planned, to be a misuse of the
panzer forces, as it violated two of the three tenets he had
laid out as the essential elements for a successful panzer
attack.[lower-alpha 12] In his opinion, the limited German resources in men and materiel should be conserved, as they
would be needed for the pending defence of western Europe. In a meeting with Hitler on 10 May he asked,
Is it really necessary to attack Kursk, and
indeed in the east this year at all? Do you think
anyone even knows where Kursk is? The entire
world doesn't care if we capture Kursk or not.
What is the reason that is forcing us to attack
this year on Kursk, or even more, on the Eastern Front?
Hitler replied, I know. The thought of it turns my
stomach. Guderian concluded, In that case your reaction to the problem is the correct one. Leave it
alone.[84][lower-alpha 13]
Despite reservations, Hitler remained committed to the
oensive. He and the OKW, early in the preparatory
phase, were hopeful that the oensive would revitalise
German strategic fortunes in the east. As the challenges
oered by Citadel increased, he focused more and more
on the expected new weapons that he believed were the
key to victory: principally the Panther tank, but also the
Elefant tank destroyer and greater numbers of the Tiger
heavy tank.[28] He postponed the operation in order to
await their arrival.[75][85] Receiving reports of powerful
Soviet concentrations behind the Kursk area, Hitler further delayed the oensive to allow for more equipment to
reach the front.[86] With pessimism for Citadel increasing with each delay, in June, Alfred Jodl, the Chief of
Sta at the OKW, instructed the armed forces propaganda oce to portray the upcoming operation as a limited counteroensive.[87][81][88] Due to concerns of an Allied landing in the south of France or in Italy and delays
in deliveries of the new tanks, Hitler postponed again,
this time to 20 June.[lower-alpha 14] Zeitzler was profoundly
concerned with the delays,[89] but he still supported the

A Raupenschlepper Ost, designed in response to the poor roads

of Russia, moves material up shortly before the Kursk oensive.

A three-month quiet period descended upon the Eastern

Front as the Soviets prepared their defences and the Germans attempted to build up their forces. The Germans
used this period for specialised training of their assault
troops.[93] All units underwent training and combat rehearsals. The Waen-SS had built a full-scale duplicate
Soviet strong point that was used to practice the techniques for neutralizing such positions. The panzer divisions received replacement men and equipment and attempted to get back up to strength. The German forces
to be used in the oensive included 12 panzer divisions
and 5 panzergrenadier divisions, four of which had tank
strengths greater than their neighboring panzer divisions.
However, the force was markedly decient in infantry divisions, which were essential to hold ground and to secure the anks.[94] By the time the Germans initiated the
oensive, their force amounted to around 777,000 men,
2,451 tanks and assault guns (70 percent of the German
armour on the Eastern Front) and 7,417 guns and mortars.[73][95][lower-alpha 15]

1.2 Soviet plans and preparation

In 1943 an oensive by the Soviet Central, Bryansk and
Western Fronts against Army Group Centre was abandoned shortly after it began in early March, when the
southern ank of the Central Front was threatened by
Army Group South.[37][53] Soviet intelligence received
information about German troop concentrations spotted
at Orel and Kharkov, as well as details of an intended
German oensive in the Kursk sector through the Lucy
spy ring in Switzerland. The Soviets veried the intelligence via their spy in Britain, John Cairncross, at
the Government Code and Cypher School at Bletchley
Park, who clandestinely forwarded raw decrypts directly
to Moscow.[96][97][98] Soviet politician Anastas Mikoyan
wrote that on 27 March 1943, Soviet dictator Joseph

1.2

Soviet plans and preparation

Stalin notied him of a possible German attack in the

Kursk sector.[99] Stalin and some senior ocers were eager to strike rst once the rasputitsa ended,[100][101] but a
number of key ocers, including Deputy Supreme Commander Georgiy Zhukov, recommended a strategic defensive before going on the oensive. In a letter to the
Stavka and Stalin, on 8 April, Zhukov wrote:

General Nikolai Vatutin

Marshal of the Soviet Union Georgi Zhukov, 1941.

In the rst phase the enemy, collecting

their best forcesincluding 1315 tank divisions and with the support of a large number of aircraftwill strike Kursk with their
Kromskom-Orel grouping from the north-east
and their Belgorod-Kharkov grouping from the
south-east... I consider it inadvisable for our
forces to go over to an oensive in the near future in order to forestall the enemy. It would
be better to make the enemy exhaust himself
against our defences, and knock out his tanks
and then, bringing up fresh reserves, to go over
to the general oensive which would nally nish o his main force.[102][103]
Stalin consulted with his frontine commanders and senior ocers of the General Sta from 12 to 15 April
1943. In the end he and the Stavka agreed that the Germans would probably target Kursk.[104] Stalin believed
the decision to defend would give the Germans the initiative, but Zhukov countered that the Germans would
be drawn into a trap where their armoured power would
be destroyed, thus creating the conditions for a major
Soviet counteroensive.[105] They decided to meet the
enemy attack by preparing defensive positions to wear
out the German groupings before launching their own
oensive.[103][106] Preparation of defences and fortications began by the end of April, and continued until the
German attack in early July.[107][104] The two-month delay between the German decision to attack the Kursk
salient and its implementation allowed the Red Army ample time to thoroughly prepare.[82][83]

The Voronezh Front, commanded by Nikolai Vatutin,

was tasked with defending the southern face of the
salient. The Central Front, commanded by Konstantin
Rokossovsky, defended the northern face. Waiting
in reserve was the Steppe Front, commanded by Ivan
Konev.[108][109] In February 1943, the Central Front had
been reconstructed from the Don Front, which had been
part of the northern pincer of Operation Uranus and had
been responsible for the destruction of the 6th Army at
Stalingrad.[110][111]
The Central and Voronezh Fronts each constructed three
main defensive belts in their sectors, with each subdivided into several zones of fortication.[112] [113][114]
The Soviets employed the labour of over 300,000
civilians.[lower-alpha 16] Fortifying each belt was an interconnected web of mineelds, barbed-wire fences, antitank ditches, deep entrenchments for infantry, anti-tank
obstacles, dug-in armoured vehicles, and machine-gun
bunkers.[115] Behind the three main defensive belts were
three more belts prepared as fallback positions; the rst
was not fully occupied or heavily fortied, and the last
two, though suciently fortied, were unoccupied with
the exception of a small area in the immediate environs
of Kursk.[116][117] The combined depth of the three main
defensive zones was about 40 kilometres (25 mi). The
six defensive belts on either side of Kursk were 130150
kilometres (8193 mi) deep.[117] If the Germans managed to break through these defences they would still
be confronted by additional defensive belts to the east,
manned by the Steppe Front. These brought the total depth of the defences to nearly 300 kilometres (190
mi).[116]
The Voronezh and Central Fronts dug 4,200 kilometres (2,600 mi) and 5,000 kilometres (3,100 mi) of
trenches respectively,[118] laid out in criss-cross pattern
for ease of movement.[115] The Soviets built more than
686 bridges and about 2,000 kilometres (1,200 mi) of
roads in the salient.[118] Red Army combat engineers
laid 503,663 anti-tank mines and 439,348 anti-personnel
mines, with the highest concentration in the rst main
defensive belt.[113][115] The mineelds at Kursk achieved
densities of 1,700 anti-personnel and 1,500 anti-tank
mines per kilometre, about four times the density used

BACKGROUND

tank and self-propelled gun brigades and regiments

were tasked with cooperating with the infantry during
counterattacks.[126]

If the 4,200 km of trenches dug by the Voronezh Front had been

dug in a straight line, they would have stretched from Moscow to
Madrid.
A Soviet machine gun in action during the Battle of Kursk.

in the defence of Moscow.[119][120][121] For example, the

6th Guards Army of the Voronezh Front, was spread
out over nearly 64 kilometres (40 mi) of front and was
protected by 69,688 anti-tank and 64,430 anti-personnel
mines in its rst defensive belt with a further 20,200 antitank and 9,097 anti-personnel mines in its second defensive belt.[112][122][123] Furthermore, mobile obstacle detachments were tasked with laying more mines directly in
the path of advancing enemy armoured formations.[124]
These units, consisting of two platoons of combat engineers with mines at division level and one company
of combat engineers normally equipped with 500700
mines at corps level, functioned as anti-tank reserves at
every level of command.[125]

Soviet preparations also included increased activity of

partisans, who attacked German communications and
supply lines.[127] The attacks were mostly behind Army
Group North and Army Group Centre.[28] In June 1943,
partisans operating in the occupied area behind Army
Group Centre destroyed 298 locomotives, 1,222 railway
wagons and 44 bridges, and in the Kursk sector there were
1,092 partisan attacks on railways.[113][128][129] These attacks delayed the build-up of German supplies and equipment, and required the diversion of German troops to
suppress the partisans, delaying their training for the
oensive.[28] Central Partisan Headquarters coordinated
many of these attacks. In June Soviet Air Forces (VVS)
ew over 800 sorties at night to resupply the partisan
In a letter dated 8 April, Zhukov warned that the Germans groups operating behind Army Group Centre.[130] The
VVS also provided communication and sometimes even
would attack the salient with a strong armoured force:
daylight air-support for major partisan operations.[127]
We can expect the enemy to put [the] greatest reliance in this years oensive operations
on his tank divisions and air force, since his infantry appears to be far less prepared for oensive operations than last year ... In view of this
threat, we should strengthen the anti-tank defences of the Central and Voronezh fronts, and
assemble as soon as possible.[103]

Special training was provided to the Soviet infantry manning the defences to help them overcome the tank phobia that had been evident since the start of the German
invasion.[131][132] Soldiers were packed into trenches and
tanks were driven overhead until all signs of fear were
gone.[lower-alpha 17][132] This training exercise was referred
to by the soldiers as ironing.[118] In combat, the soldiers would spring up in the midst of the attacking infantry to separate them from the spearheading armoured
vehicles. The separated armoured vehicles now vulnerable to infantry armed with anti-tank ries, demolition
charges and Molotov cocktails could then be disabled
or destroyed at point-blank range.[133] These types of attacks were mostly eective against the massive Ferdinand
tank destroyers, which lacked machine guns as secondary
armament.[133] The soldiers were also promised nancial
rewards for each tank destroyed, with the Peoples Commisariat of Defence providing 1,000 rubles for destroyed
tanks.[134]

Nearly all artillery, including howitzers, guns, antiaircraft and rockets, were tasked with anti-tank
defence.[125] Dug-in tanks and self-propelled guns
further strengthened the anti-tank defences.[115][125]
Anti-tank forces were incorporated into every level
of command, mostly as anti-tank strong points with
the majority concentrated on likely attack routes and
the remainder amply spread out elsewhere.[125] Each
anti-tank strong-point typically consisted of four to
six anti-tank guns, six to nine anti-tank ries, and ve
to seven heavy and light machine guns. They were The Soviets employed maskirovka (deception techniques)
supported by mobile obstacle detachments as well as to mask defensive positions and troop dispositions and
by infantry with automatic rearms.[126] Independent to conceal the movement of men and materiel.[135][136]

1.3

Contest for air superiority and air support of the ground forces

These included camouaging gun emplacements, constructing dummy airelds and depots, generating false
radio-trac, and spreading rumours among the Soviet frontline troops and the civilian population in the
German-held areas.[137] Movement of forces and supplies
to and from the salient took place at night only. Ammunition caches were carefully concealed to blend in with
the landscape. Radio transmission was restricted and res
were forbidden. Command posts were hidden and motor
transport in and around them forbidden.[138][139]
According to a Soviet General Sta report, 29 of the 35
major Luftwae raids on Soviet airelds in the Kursk sector in June 1943 were against dummy airelds.[137] The
Soviet deception eorts were so successful that German
estimates issued in mid-June placed the total Soviet armoured strength at 1,500 tanks.[140][141] The result was
not only a vast underestimation of Soviet strength, but a
misperception of Soviet strategic intentions.[138] According to historian Antony Beevor, in contrast, Soviet aviation apparently succeeded in destroying more than 500
Luftwae aircraft on the ground.[142]

war with the Soviet Union the Luftwae had achieved

complete air superiority, inicting huge losses upon the
Soviet Air Force. The Luftwaes extensive air support
to the German ground forces was checked only when the
advance pushed beyond the range of their forward-most
airelds.[145] However, by 1943 the Luftwaes strength
in the east had started to weaken. Resupply by air of forward panzer units had been a Luftwae role since the
start of the war, but the demand placed upon the Luftwae to resupply large isolated formations during the severe winter of 194142 and then again over Stalingrad
the following winter cost the Luftwae a great deal in
equipment and pilots.[146] The Luftwae forces in the east
were further depleted with squadrons being shifted back
to Germany to defend against the increasing Allied bombing campaign.[147] By the end of June, only 38.7 percent
of the Luftwaes total aircraft remained in the east, with
most of them concentrated in the Kursk area.[148]

M3 Lee lend-lease tanks at Kursk. Unpopular with its crews, the

M3 was nicknamed a con for seven brothers.

The main tank of the Soviet tank arm was the T34, on which the Red Army attempted to concentrate
production. The tank arm also contained large numbers of the T-70 light tank. For example, the 5th
Guards Tank Army roughly contained 270 T-70s and
500 T-34s. In the salient itself the Soviets assembled
a large number of lend-lease tanks. These included
U.S.-manufactured M3 Lees and British-built Churchills,
Matildas and Valentines. However, the T-34 made up
the bulk of the Soviet armour.[143] Without including
the deeper reserves organised under the Steppe Front,
the Soviets massed about 1,300,000 men, 3,600 tanks,
20,000 artillery pieces and 2,792 aircraft to defend the
salient.[102][144] This amounted to 26 percent of the total
manpower of the Red Army, 26 percent of its mortars
and artillery, 35 percent of its aircraft and 46 percent of
its tanks.[102]

1.3

Contest for air superiority and air support of the ground forces

Both the Luftwae and the VVS were air forces designed with the primary mission of supporting their respective ground forces. Though the VVS was always
much larger than the Luftwae, in the early stages of the

Soviet Ilyushin Il-2 ground-attack aircraft

In 1943 the Luftwae could still achieve local air superiority by concentrating its forces. The majority of Luftwae aircraft left available on the Eastern Front were
slated for Citadel.[142] The changing strengths between
the two opponents prompted the Luftwae to make operational changes for the battle. Previous oensive campaigns had been initiated with Luftwae raids against opposing airelds to achieve air superiority. By this point in
the war Soviet equipment reserves were extensive. The
Luftwae commanders realised that whatever aircraft
they could destroy on the ground could be replaced by
the Soviets within days, making such raids futile. Therefore, this mission was abandoned.[149] In addition, previous campaigns had made use of medium bombers ying well behind the frontline to block the arrival of reinforcements. This mission, however, was rarely attempted
during Citadel.[149] For Citadel, the Luftwae conned
its operations to the direct support of the forces on the
ground.[150] In this mission the Luftwae continued to
make use of the Junkers Ju 87 Stuka dive-bombers. A
new development to this aircraft was the Bordkanone
3,7 cm calibre cannon, one of which could be slung under each wing of the Stuka in a gun pod. Half of the

8
Stuka groups assigned to support Citadel were equipped
with these.[151] The air groups were also buttressed by the
recent arrival of the Henschel Hs 129, with its 30 mm MK
103 cannon, and the ground attack (jabo) version of the
Focke-Wulf Fw 190.[152]

OPPOSING FORCES

troduction of the Yakovlev Yak-9 and Lavochkin La-5

ghters gave the Soviet pilots near parity with the Luftwae in terms of equipment. Furthermore, large numbers of ground-attack aircraft, such as the Ilyushin Il-2
Shturmovik and the Pe-2, had become available as well.
The Soviet Air Force also elded large quantities of aircraft supplied via lend-lease. Huge stockpiles of supplies
and ample reserves of replacement aircraft meant the Soviets would be able to conduct an extended campaign
without slackening in the intensity of their eort.[149]

2 Opposing forces
See also: Battle of Kursk order of battle

2.1 Germans
For the operation, the Germans used four armies along
with a large proportion of their total tank strength on the
Eastern Front. On 1 July, the 9th Army of Army Group
Centre based in the northern side of the salient contained
335,000 men (223,000 combat soldiers); in the south,
the 4th Panzer Army and Army Detachment Kempf,
of Army Group South, had 223,907 men (149,271 combat soldiers) and 100,000108,000 men (66,000 combat
soldiers) respectively. The 2nd Army, that held the western side of the salient contained an estimated 110,000. In
total, the German forces had a total strength of 777,000
779,000 men, and the three attacking armies contained
438,271 combat soldiers.[157][95] Army Group South was
Luftwae ak units
equipped with more armoured vehicles, infantry and artillery than the 9th Army of Army Group Center.[158][95]
The Luftwae command understood that their support The 4th Panzer Army and Army Detachment Kempf
would be crucial for the success of Operation Citadel, but had 1,377 tanks and assault guns, while the 9th Army
problems with supply shortfalls hampered their prepara- possessed 988 tanks and assault guns.[157]
tions. Partisan activity, particularly behind Army Group The two new Panther battalions the 51st and 52nd
Center, slowed the rate of re-supply and cut short the together equipped with 200 Panthers, for which
Luftwaes ability to build up essential stockpiles of the oensive had been delayed, were attached to the
petrol, oil, lubricants, engines, munitions, and, unlike Grodeutschland Division in the XLVIII Panzer Corps of
the Soviets, there were no reserves of aircraft that could Army Group South. With the 51st and 52nd Battalions
be used to replace damaged aircraft over the course of arriving on 30 June and 1 July, the two units had little time
the operation.[153] Fuel was the most signicant limiting to perform reconnaissance or to orient themselves to the
factor.[154] To help build up supplies for the support of terrain they found themselves in. This was a breach of the
Citadel, the Luftwae greatly curtailed its operations dur- methods of the panzerwae, considered essential for the
ing the last week of June.[152] Despite this conservation of successful use of armour.[159][160][49] Though led by exresources, the Luftwae did not have the resources to sus- perienced panzer commanders, many of the tank crews
tain an intensive air eort for more than a few days after were new recruits and had little time to become familiar
the operation began.[155]
with their new tanks, let alone train together to function as
In the months preceding the battle, Luftotte 6 supporting Army Group Center noted a marked increase in the
strength of the opposing VVS formations. The Soviet
forces encountered displayed better training, and were
ying improved equipment with greater aggressiveness
and skill than the Luftwae had seen earlier.[156] The in-

a unit. The two battalions came direct from the training

ground and lacked combat experience.[161][162] In addition, the requirement to maintain radio silence until the
start of the attack meant that the Panther units had little
training in battalion-level radio procedures.[161][159] Furthermore, the new Panthers were still experiencing prob-

2.4

Preliminary actions

lems with their transmissions, and proved mechanically

unreliable. By the morning of 5 July, the units had lost
16 Panthers due to mechanical breakdown, leaving only
184 available for the launching of the oensive.[163]

2.2

Soviets

The Red Army used two Fronts for the defence of Kursk,
and created a third front behind the battle area which
was held as a reserve. The Central and Voronezh Fronts
elded 12 armies, with 711,575 men (510,983 combat
soldiers) and 625,591 men (446,236 combat soldiers) respectively. In reserve, the Steppe Front had an additional
573,195 men (449,133). Thus the total size of the Soviet
force was 1,910,361 men, with 1,426,352 actual combat
soldiers.

2.3

Comparison of strength

2.3.1

Operation Citadel

2.3.2

Soviet oensive phase

2.4

Preliminary actions

9
attacks to seize high ground for artillery observation posts
prior to the main assault.[170] During these attacks, a number of Soviet command and observation posts along the
rst main belt of defence were captured. By 16:00, elements of the Panzergrenadier Division Grodeutschland, 3rd and 11th Panzer Divisions had seized the village of Butovo and proceeded to capture Gertsovka before midnight.[171][172][170] At around 22:30, Vatutin ordered 600 guns, mortars and Katyusha rocket launchers,
of the Voronezh Front, to bombard the forward German positions, particularly those of the II SS Panzer
Corps.[173][171][174]
To the north, at Central Front headquarters, reports of
the anticipated German oensive came in. At around
02:00 5 July, Zhukov ordered his preemptive artillery
bombardment to begin. The hope was to disrupt German
forces concentrating for the attack, but the outcome was
less than hoped for. The bombardment delayed the German formations, but failed in the goal of disrupting their
schedule or inicting substantial losses. The Germans
began their own artillery bombardment at about 05:00,
which lasted 80 minutes in the northern face and 50 minutes in the southern face. After the barrage, the ground
forces attacked, aided by close air support provided by
the Luftwae.[175][171][176][177]

German motorised troops prepare to move out.

In the early morning of 5 July, the Soviet Air Force

launched a large raid against German airelds, hoping to destroy the Luftwae on the ground. This
eort failed, and the Soviets suered considerable
losses.[lower-alpha 19][178][171] The Soviets lost 176 aircraft
in 5 July, compared to the 26 aircraft lost by the
Luftwae.[179][178] The losses of the Soviet 16th Air
Army operating in the northern face were lighter than
those suered by the 2nd Air Army.[180] The Luftwae
was able to gain and maintained air superiority over the
southern face until 1011 July when it began shifting in
Soviets favor,[178][181] but the control of the skies over
German penetration during the Battle of Kursk
the northern face was evenly contested until the Soviet
Fighting started on the southern face of the salient on the Air Force began to gain air superiority on 7 July, which
evening of 4 July 1943, when German infantry launched it maintained for the rest of the operation.[182][183]

10

3 OPERATION ALONG THE NORTHERN FACE

Operation along the northern

face

Models main attack was delivered by XLVII Panzer

Corps, supported by 45 Tigers of the attached 505th
Heavy Tank Battalion.[184] Covering their left ank was
XLI Panzer Corps, with an attached regiment of 83
Ferdinand tank destroyers. On the right ank, XLVI
Panzer Corps consisted at this time of four infantry divisions with just 9 tanks and 31 assault guns.[184] To the
left of XLI Panzer Corps was XXIII Army Corps, which
consisted of the reinforced 78th Assault Infantry Division and two regular infantry divisions. While the corps
contained no tanks, it did have 62 assault guns.[184] Opposing the 9th Army was the Central Front, deployed in
three heavily fortied defensive belts.[112]

the remaining two panzer divisions followed, ready to

exploit any breakthrough.[187] The heavily mined terrain
and fortied positions of the Soviet 15th Rie Division
slowed the advance. By 08:00 safe lanes had been cleared
through the mineeld.[187] That morning information obtained from prisoner interrogation identied a weakness
at the boundary of the 15th and 81st Rie Divisions
caused by the German preliminary bombardment.[188]
The Tigers were redeployed and struck towards this area.
The Soviets countered with a force of around 90 T-34s.
In the resulting three-hour battle, the Soviets lost 42 tanks
while the Germans lost two Tigers and a further ve
more immobilized with track damage.[188] While the Soviet counter-attack was defeated and the rst defensive
belt breached, the ghting had delayed the Germans long
enough for the rest of 29th Rie Corps of the 13th Army
initially deployed behind the rst belt to move forward and seal the breach.[189] Soviet mineelds were covered by artillery re, making eorts to clear paths through
the elds dicult and costly. Goliath and Borgward IV
remote-controlled engineer mine-clearing vehicles met
with limited success. Of the 653rd Heavy Panzerjger
Battalion's 45 Ferdinands sent into battle, all but 12 of
them were immobilized by mine damage before 17:00.
Most of these were later repaired and returned to service, but the recovery of these very large vehicles was
dicult.[190]

Model chose to make his initial attacks using infantry

divisions reinforced with assault guns and heavy tanks,
and supported by artillery and the Luftwae. In doing
so he sought to maintain the armoured strength of his
panzer divisions to be used for exploitation once the Soviet defences were breached. Once a breakthrough had
been achieved the panzer forces would move through and
advance towards Kursk.[184] Jan Mschen, a major in
Models sta, later commented that Model expected a
breakthrough on the second day. If a breakthrough did
occur the briefest delay in bringing up the panzer divi- On the rst day, the XLVII Panzer Corps penetrated 6 mi
sions would give the Soviets time to react. His corps com- (9.7 km) into the Soviet defences before stalling,[191] and
manders thought a breakthrough extremely unlikely.[185] the XLI Panzer Corps reached the heavily fortied small
town Ponyri, in the second defensive belt, which controlled the roads and railways leading south to Kursk.[192]
In the rst day, the Germans penetrated 5 to 6 mi (8.0
to 9.7 km) into the Soviet lines for the loss of 1,287 men
killed and missing and a further 5,921 wounded.[193][191]

Tiger I tanks spearhead the assault in the northern sector.

Following a preliminary bombardment and Soviet

counter bombardments, the 9th Army opened its attack
at 05:30 on 5 July. [186] Nine infantry divisions and one
panzer division, with attached assault guns, heavy tanks,
and tank destroyers, pushed forward.[185] Two companies
of Tiger tanks were attached to the 6th Infantry Division, and were the largest single grouping of Tigers employed that day.[187] Opposing them were the 13th and
70th Armies of the Central Front.[185]

Soviet KV-1 heavy tanks prepare to counter-attack.

The 20th Panzer and 6th Infantry Divisions of the XLVII

Panzer Corps, working in close cooperation, spearheaded Rokossovsky ordered the 17th Guards and 18th Guards
the advance of the XLVII Panzer Corps. Behind them Rie Corps with the 2nd Tank Army and 19th Tank Corp,

11
backed up by close air support, to counterattack the German 9th Army the following day on 6 July. However,
due to poor coordination, only the 16th Tank Corps of
the 2nd Tank Army commenced the counterattack on the
dawn of 6 July after the preparatory Soviet artillery barrage. The 16th Tank Corps, elding about 200 tanks, attacked the XLVII Panzer Corps and ran into the Tiger
tanks of the 505th Heavy Tank Battalion, which knocked
out 69 Soviet tanks and forced the rest to withdraw to the
17th Guards Rie Corps of the 13th Army.[194] Later that
morning, the XLVII Panzer Corps responded with its own
attack against the 17th Guards Rie Corps entrenched
around the village Olkhovatka in the second defensive
belt. The attack commenced with an artillery barrage and
was spearheaded by the 24 serviceable Tigers of the 505th
Heavy Tank Battalion,[195] but it failed to break the Soviet
defence at Olkhovatka, and the German suered heavy
casualties.[196][197] Olkhovatka was on a high ground that
provided a clear view of much of the frontline.[198] At
18:30, the 19th Tank Corps joined the 17th Guards
Rie Corps further bolstering Soviet resistance.[196][197]
Rokossovsky also decided to dig in most of his remaining
tanks to minimize their exposure.[199] Ponyri, defended
by the Soviet 307th Rie Division of the 29th Rie Corps,
was also concertedly attacked on 6 July by the German
292nd and 86th Infantry, 78th Assault Infantry and 9th
Panzer Divisions, but the Germans were unable to dislodge the defenders from the heavily fortied village.[200]

terparts had also realized this, but Kluge wished to maintain the pressure on the Soviets in order to aid the southern oensive.[210]

Over the next three days from 7 to 10 July, Model

concentrated the eort of the 9th Army at Ponyri
and Olkhovatka, which both sides considered as vital
positions.[201][202] In response, Rokossovsky pulled forces
from other parts of the front to these sectors.[203] [204][205]
The Germans attacked Ponyri on 7 July, and captured half
of the town after intense house-to-house ghting. A Soviet counterattack the following morning forced the Germans to withdraw, and a series of counterattacks ensued
by both sides with control of the town being exchanged
several times over the next few days. By 10 July, the
Germans had secured most of the town, but Soviet counterattacks continued.[206] The back and forth battles for
Ponyri and the nearby Hill 253.5 were battles of attrition, with heavy casualties on both sides. It became referred to by the troops as mini-Stalingrad.[192] The war
diary of the 9th Army described the heavy ghting as a
new type of mobile attrition battle.[207] German attacks
on Olkhovatka and the nearby village of Teploe failed to
penetrate the Soviet defences; including a powerful concerted attack on 10 July by about 300 Germans tanks and
assault guns from the 2nd, 4th, and 20th Panzer Divisions, supported by every available Luftwae air power
in the northern face.[208][209]

At around 04:00 on 5 July, the German attack commenced with a preliminary bombardment. Mansteins
main attack was delivered by Hoths 4th Panzer
Army, which was organized into densely concentrated
spearheads.[157] Opposing the 4th Panzer Army was
the Soviet 6th Guards Army, which was composed of
the 22nd Guards Rie Corps and 23rd Guards Rie
Corps.[159] The Soviets had constructed three heavily fortied defensive belts to slow and weaken the attacking armoured forces.[112] Though they had been provided superb intelligence, the Voronezh Front headquarters had
still not been able to pinpoint the exact location where
the Germans would place their oensive weight.[112]

While the operation on the northern side of the salient began with a 45-kilometre-wide (28 mi) attack front, by 6
July it had been reduced to 40-kilometre-wide (25 mi).
The following day the attack frontage dropped to 15kilometre-wide (9.3 mi), and on both the 8 and 9 July
penetrations of only 2-kilometre-wide (1.2 mi) occurred.
By 10 July, the Soviets had completely halted the German
advance.[211]
On 12 July the Soviets launched Operation Kutuzov, their
counter-oensive upon the Orel salient, which threatened the ank and rear of Models 9th Army. The 12th
Panzer Division, thus far held in reserve and slated to be
committed to the northern side of the Kursk salient,[212]
along with the 36th Motorized Infantry, 18th Panzer and
20th Panzer Divisions were redeployed to face the Soviet
spearheads.[213]

4 Operation along the southern

face

On 9 July a meeting between Kluge, Model, Joachim

Lemelsen and Josef Harpe was held at the headquarters
of the XLVII Panzer Corps.[192] It had become clear to Wespe self-propelled artillery battery in position to provide re
the German commanders that the 9th Army lacked the support
strength to obtain a breakthrough, and their Soviet coun-

12

4.1

4 OPERATION ALONG THE SOUTHERN FACE

XLVIII Panzer Corps

The panzergrenadier division Grodeutschland, commanded by Walter Hrnlein, was the strongest single
division in the 4th Panzer Army. It was supported
on its anks by the 3rd and 11th Panzer Divisions.[159]
Grodeutschlands Panzer IIIs and IVs had been supplemented by a company of 15 Tigers, which were used to
spearhead the attack. At dawn on 5 July, Grossdeutschland, backed by heavy artillery support, advanced on a
three-kilometre front upon the 67th Guards Rie Division of the 22nd Guards Rie Corps.[159] The Panzerfsilier Regiment, advancing on the left wing, stalled in
a mineeld and subsequently 36 Panthers were immobilized. The stranded regiment was subjected to a barrage
of Soviet anti-tank and artillery re, which inicted numerous casualties. Engineers were moved up and cleared
paths through the mineeld, but suered casualties in the
process. The combination of erce resistance, mineelds,
thick mud and mechanical breakdowns took its toll. With
paths cleared, the regiment resumed its advance towards
Gertsovka. In the ensuing battle, heavy casualties were
sustained including the regimental commander Colonel
Kassnitz. Due to the ghting, and the marshy terrain
south of the village, surrounding the Berezovyy stream,
the regiment once more bogged down.[214][215][160]

Panzer IIIs and IVs advance against the southern face of the
salient.

The panzergrenadier regiment of Grodeutschland, advancing on the right wing, pushed through to the village
of Butovo.[216] The tanks were deployed in a classic arrow
formation to minimise the eects of the Soviet Pakfront
defence, with the Tigers leading and the Panzer IIIs, IVs
and assault guns fanning out to the anks and rear. They
were followed by infantry and combat engineers.[216] Attempts by the VVS to impede the advance were repulsed
by the Luftwae.[217]
The 3rd Panzer Division, advancing on the left ank
of Grodeutschland, made good progress and by the
end of the day had captured Gertsovka[72] and reached
Mikhailovka.[218] The 167th Infantry Division, on the
right ank of the 11th Panzer Division, also made sucient progress, reaching Tirechnoe by the end of the day.
By the end of 5 July, a wedge had been created in the rst

belt of the Soviet defences.[219]

4.2 II SS Panzer Corps

The commander of a Tiger I attached to 2nd SS Panzer Division

Das Reich

To the east, during the night of 45 July, SS combat engineers had inltrated no-mans land and cleared
lanes through the Soviet mineelds.[220] At dawn, 5 July,
the three divisions of II SS Panzer Corps SS Panzergrenadier Division Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler, 2nd SS
Panzergrenadier Division Das Reich and the 3rd SS Panzergrenadier Division Totenkopf attacked the 6th Guards
Armys 52nd Guards Rie Division. The main assault
was led by a spearhead of 42 Tigers, but in total 494
tanks and assault guns attacked across a twelve-kilometre
front.[220] Totenkopf, the strongest of the three divisions, advanced towards Gremuchhi and screened the
right ank. The 1st SS Panzergrenadier Division advanced on the left ank towards Bykovka. The 2nd
SS Panzer Division advanced between the two formations in the center.[220] Following closely behind the tanks
were the infantry and combat engineers, coming forward
to demolish obstacles and clear trenches. In addition,
the advance was well supported by the Luftwae, which
greatly aided in breaking Soviet strong points and artillery
positions.[221]
By 09:00 hours, the II SS Panzer Corps had broken
through the Soviet rst belt of defence along its entire
front.[222][223] While probing positions between the rst
and second Soviet defensive belts, at 13:00, the 2nd SS
Panzer Divisions vanguard came under re from two T34 tanks, which were quickly dispatched. Forty more
Soviet tanks soon engaged the division. The 1st Guards
Tank Army clashed with the 2nd SS Panzer Division in a
four-hour battle, resulting in the Soviet tanks withdrawing. However, the battle had bought enough time for
units of the 23rd Soviet Guards Rie Corps, lodged in
the Soviet second belt, to prepare itself and be reinforced
with additional anti-tank guns.[224] By the early evening,
2nd SS Panzer Division had reached the mineelds that
marked the outer perimeter of the Soviet second belt of
defence.[225] The 1st SS Division had secured Bykovka by

4.3

Army Detachment Kempf

13

16:10. It then pushed forward towards the second belt of

defence at Yakovlevo, but its attempts to break through
were rebued. By the end of the day, the 1st SS Division
had sustained 97 dead, 522 wounded, and 17 missing and
lost about 30 tanks.[225] Together with the 2nd SS Panzer
Division, it had forced a wedge far into the defences of
the 6th Guards Army.

German soldiers move along an anti-tank ditch, while pioneers

prepare charges to breach it.

through the 7th Guards Army and cover the right ank
of the 4th Panzer Army.[228] The 503rd Heavy Tank Battalion equipped with 45 Tigers was also attached to
the III Panzer Corps, split up so that one company of 15
Two Tiger tanks of Totenkopf and a StuG assault gun carrying Tigers was attached to each of the three panzer divisions
infantry
of the corps.[228] Although the river was bridged during
the night of 4 July, the crossing points were bombarded
The 3rd SS Panzer Division was making slow progress. by Soviet artillery.[228]
They had managed to isolate the 155th Guards Regiment,
of the 52nd Guards Rie Division (of the 23rd Guards At the Milkhailovka bridgehead, just south of Belgorod,
Rie Corps), from the rest of its parent division, but its eight infantry battalions of the 6th Panzer Division assemattempts to sweep the regiment eastward into the ank bled to make a crossing. They were subjected to heavy
of the neighbouring 375th Rie Division (of the 23rd artillery re during the Soviet defensive bombardment,
Guards Rie Corps) had failed when the regiment was but most of the infantry got across to the eastern bank.
reinforced by the 96th Tank Brigade. Hausser, the com- An eort was made to cross a company of Tigers from
mander of II SS Panzer Corps, requested aid from the III the 503rd Heavy Tank Battalion, but the bridge was bomPanzer Corps to his right, but the panzer corps had no barded and destroyed before the entire company could get
units to spare. By the end of the day, the 3rd SS Division across. The remainder of the 6th Panzer Division was
[228]
Clemens Graf Kagehad made very limited progress due in part to a tributary forced to cross further south.
a
battalion
commander,
described
it thus:
neck,
of the Donets river. The lack of progress undermined the
advance made by its sister divisions and exposed the right
Suddenly, a red sunrise arose on the far
ank of the corps to Soviet forces.[226] German crews,
side
as hundreds of Stalins organs hurled their
working in boiling tanks in sweltering weather condi[227]
rockets
exactly onto the crossing site. The
tions, frequently suered from heat exhaustion.
bridge was totally demolished and the engiThe 6th Guards Army, which confronted the attack by
neers, unfortunately, suered heavy losses.
the XLVIII Panzer Korps and II SS Panzer Korps, was reNever have I hugged the dirt so tightly as when
inforced with tanks from the 1st Tank Army, the 2nd
these terrible shells sprayed their thin fragGuards Tank Corps and the 5th Guards Tank Corps. The
ments just above the ground.[228]
51st and 90th Guards Rie divisions were moved up to
the vicinity of Pokrovka (not Prokhorovka, 40 kilome- The diversion to the south pushed the 6th Panzer Divitres (25 mi) to the north-east), in the path of the 1st sion behind schedule, and the problem was aggravated
SS Panzer Division.[219] The 93rd Guards Rie Division when the new crossing became clogged with trac. Failwas deployed further back, along the road leading from ing to nd another crossing, the rest of the division rePokrovka to Prokhorovka.[185]
mained on the western bank of the river throughout the
day.[228] Those units of the division that had crossed the
river launched an attack led by Tigers on Stary Gorod,
4.3 Army Detachment Kempf
which was repulsed due to poorly cleared mineelds and
[229]
Facing Army Detachment Kempf, consisting of III Panzer strong resistance.
Corps and Corps Raus (commanded by Erhard Raus), To the south of the 6th Panzer Division, the 19th Panzer
were the 7th Guards Army, dug in on the high ground on Division crossed the river but was delayed by mines that
the eastern bank of the Northern Donets. The two Ger- damaged some of the Tigers spearheading the advance
man corps were tasked with crossing the river, smashing and division had moved forward 8 kilometres (5.0 mi)

14

4 OPERATION ALONG THE SOUTHERN FACE

deep zone of the battle positions prepared in
the preceding months, they had to make extensive use of hand grenades in order to mop
up [a] maze of densely dug-in trenches and
bunkers, some of which were a dozen or more
feet deep. At the same time, artillery and ak
red counter-battery missions against the enemy heavy weapons that had resumed re from
rear positions. They also red on reserves inltrating through the trench system, as well as
against [Soviet] medium artillery.[232]

Soviet PTRD anti-tank rie team, during the ghting

by the end of the day.[229] Luftwae He 111s bombed

the bridgehead in error, wounding 6th Panzer Division
commander Walther von Hnersdor and Hermann von
Oppeln-Bronikowski of the 19th Panzer Division.[230]
Further south, infantry and tanks of 7th Panzer Division
managed to cross the bridges but these bridges were not
heavy enough to support the weight of the Tiger tanks attached to the 7th Panzer Division. Eventually, engineers
constructed a heavy bridge enabling the Tigers to cross,
where they joined the force on the far side.[231] Despite a
poor start, the 7th Panzer Division eventually broke into
the rst belt of the Soviet defence and pushed on between
Razumnoe and Krutoi Log, advancing about 10 kilometres (6.2 mi) during the day, the furthest advance by Army
Detachment Kempf of the day.[232]

A Tiger I during a lull in the battle

Operating to the south of 7th Panzer Division, were the

106th Infantry Division and the 320th Infantry Division
of Corps Raus. The two formations attacked across a
32 kilometres (20 mi) front without armour support and
made little progress. The advance began well, with the
crossing of the river and a swift advance against the 72nd
Guards Rie Division. The Soviet defenders were taken
by surprise with the speed of the advance.[232] Raus later
wrote:
The advancing infantry surprised them and
had no diculty ferreting them out. But when
the infantry reached the two to ve-kilometre

After a erce battle, involving some hand-to-hand ghting, Corps Raus took the village of Maslovo Pristani,
penetrating the rst Soviet belt of defence. A Soviet
counter-attack supported by about 40 tanks was beaten
o, with the assistance from artillery and ak batteries.
Having suered 2,000 casualties since the morning and
still facing considerable resistance, the corps dug in for
the night.[233]
The thrust of Army Detachment Kempf had been slowed,
allowing the Soviets time to prepare their second belt of
defence to meet the German attack on 6 July.[233] The
7th Guards Army, which had absorbed the attack of III
Panzer Corps and Corps Raus, was reinforced with two
rie divisions from the reserve. The 15th Guards Rie
Division was moved up to the second belt of defence, in
the path of the III Panzer Corps.[233]

4.4 Further German progress

Thunderclouds over the battleground. Intermittent heavy rains

created mud and marsh that made movement dicult.

By the evening of 6 July, the Voronezh Front had committed all of its reserves, except for three rie divisions
under the 69th Army; yet it could not decisively contain the 4th Panzer Army.[233][234] The XLVIII Panzer
Corps along the Oboyan axis, where the third defensive
belt was mostly unoccupied, now had only the Soviet second defensive belt blocking it from breakthrough into
the free Soviet rear.[235][236] This forced the Stavka to
commit their strategic reserves to reinforce the Voronezh
Front: the 5th Guards and 5th Guards Tank Armies, both
from the Steppe Front, as well as the 2nd Tank Corps
from the Southwestern Front.[237][236] Ivan Konev objected to this premature piecemeal commitment of the

4.5

Battle of Prokhorovka

strategic reserve, but a personal call from Stalin silenced

his complaints.[238] In addition, on 7 July Zhukov ordered
the 17th Air Army the air eet serving the Southwestern Front to support the 2nd Air Army in serving the
Voronezh Front.[236][239][240] On July 7, the 5th Guards
Tank Army began advancing to Prokhorovka. 5th Guards
Tank Army commander, Lieutenant General Pavel Rotmistrov, described the journey:
By midday, the dust rose in thick clouds,
settling in a solid layer on roadside bushes,
grain elds, tanks and trucks. The dark red
disc of the sun was hardly visible. Tanks, selfpropelled guns, artillery tractors, armoured
personnel carriers and trucks were advancing
in an unending ow. The faces of the soldiers
were dark with dust and exhaust fumes. It was
intolerably hot. Soldiers were tortured by thirst
and their shirts, wet with sweat, stuck to their
bodies.[199]

15
sive belts.[248][249][250][251] However, slow progress by the
XLVIII Panzer Corps caused Hoth to shift elements of
the II SS-Panzer Corps to the west to help the XLVIII
Panzer Corps regain its momentum. On 10 July the full
eort of the corps was shifted back to its own forward
progress. The direction of their advance now shifted from
Oboyan due north to the northeast, toward Prokhorovka.
Hoth had discussed this move with Manstein since early
May, and it was a part of the 4th Panzer Armys plan since
the outset of the oensive.[252][253] By this time, however,
the Soviets had shifted reserve formations into its path.
The defensive positions were manned by the 2nd Tank
Corps, reinforced by the 9th Guards Airborne Division
and 301st Anti-tank Artillery Regiment, both from the
33rd Guards Rie Corps.[254][255]
Though the German advance in the south was slower than
desired, it was much faster than the Soviets expected.
On 9 July, the rst German units reached the Psel River.
The next day, the rst German infantry crossed the river.
Despite the deep defensive system and mineelds, German tank losses were low.[256] At this point, Hoth turned
the II SS Panzer Corps from a northward heading directed toward Oboyan to a northeast heading towards
Prokhorovka.[257][258] The main concern of Manstein and
Hausser was the inability of Army Detachment Kempf
to advance and protect the eastern ank of the II SS
Panzer Corps. On 11 July, Army Detachment Kempf
nally achieved a breakthrough. In a surprise night attack, the 6th Panzer Division seized a bridge across the
Donets.[259] Once across, Breith made every eort to
push troops and vehicles across the river for an advance
on Prokhorovka from the south. A linkup with the II SS
Panzer Corps would result with the Soviet 69th Army
becoming encircled. It appeared the hoped for breakthrough was at hand.[260]

The 10th Tank Corps, then still subordinate to the 5th

Guards Army, was rushed ahead of the rest of the army,
arriving at Prokhorovka on the night of 7 July, and 2nd
Tank Corps arrived at Korocha, 25 miles (40 km) southeast of Prokhorovka, by morning of 8 July.[241] Vatutin
ordered a powerful counterattack by the 5th Guards, 2nd
Guards, 2nd and 10th Tank Corps, in all elding about
593 tanks and self-propelled guns and supported by most
of the Fronts available air power, which aimed to defeat the II SS Panzer Corps and therefore expose the
right ank of XLVIII Panzer Corps. Simultaneously, the
6th Tank Corps was to attack the XLVIII Panzer Corps
and prevent it from breaking through to the free Soviet
rear. Although intended to be concerted, the counterattack turned out to be a series of piecemeal attacks due
to poor coordination.[242] The 10th Tank Corps attack
began on the dawn of 8 July but they ran straight into 4.5 Battle of Prokhorovka
the antitank re of the 2nd and 3rd SS Divisions, losing
most of its forces. Later that morning, the 5th Guards Main article: Battle of Prokhorovka
Tank Corps attack was repelled by the 3rd SS Division.
Hausser had expected to continue his advance on
The 2nd Tank Corp joined in the afternoon and was also
repelled.[242] The 2nd Guards Tank Corps, masked by the
forest around the village Gostishchevo, 10 miles (16 km)
north of Belgorod, with its presence unknown to the II SS
Panzer Corps, advanced towards the 167th Infantry Division. But it was detected by German air reconnaissance
just before the attack had materialized, and was subsequently decimated by German ground-attack aircraft
armed with MK 103 anti-tank cannons and at least 50
tanks were destroyed.[243][244] This marked the rst time
in military history an attacking tank formation had been
defeated by air power alone.[245][246] Although a asco,
the Soviet counterattack succeeded in stalling the advance
of the II SS Panzer Corps throughout the day.[247][246]
German Panzer IV and Sdkfz 251 halftrack
By the end of 8 July, II SS-Panzer Corps had advanced about 29 kilometres (18 mi) since the start of Prokhorovka, and late on the evening of 11 July issued
Citadel and broken through the rst and second defen- orders for a classic manoeuvre battle for the attack the

16

5 ALLIED INVASION OF SICILY AND TERMINATION OF OPERATION CITADEL

next day. The attack would begin north of the Psel River,
with the 3rd SS Panzer Division driving northeast until reaching the Karteschewka-Prokhorovka road. Once
there, they were to strike southeast to attack the Soviet
positions at Prokhorovka from the rear. The 1st and 2nd
SS Panzer divisions were to wait until Totenkopfs attack had destabilised the Soviet positions at Prokhorovka.
Once the Soviet position at Prokhorovka was under attack
from the rear, the Leibstandarte was to move forward, advancing through the main Soviet defences dug in on the
west slope before Prokhorovka. To the Leibstandartes
right, the 2nd SS was to advance eastward to the high
ground south of Prokhorovka, then turn south to roll up
the Soviet line and open a gap.[261] Unknown to Hausser,
on the night of 11-12 July Rotmistrov had moved his
5th Guards Tank Army to an assembly area just behind
Prokhorovka in preparation for a massive attack the following day.[262][263] At 5:45 Leibstandarte headquarters
started receiving reports of the ominous sound of tank engines as the Soviets moved into their assembly areas.[264]
Soviet artillery and Katyusha regiments were redeployed
in preparation for the counterattack.[265]

A Waen-SS Tiger I in action

At around 08:00, a Soviet artillery barrage began. At

08:30, Rotmistrov radioed his tankers: Steel, Steel,
Steel!", the order to commence the attack.[266][267][268]
Down o the west slopes, before Prokhorovka, came the
massed armour of ve tank brigades from the two Soviet tank corps. The 1st SS had just started to advance,
when it was taken largely by surprise.[269] As the Soviet
tanks aggressively advanced down the corridor, they carried the infantrymen of the 9th Guards Airborne Division
into battle mounted on the tanks with the paratroopers
holding onto rails.[270] Amid the swirls of dust, a highly
confused tank battle began. To the north and east, the
3rd SS was engaged by the Soviet 33rd Guards Rie
Corps. Tasked with destabilising the Soviet defences before Prokhorovka, the unit rst had to beat o a number
of attacks before they could go over onto the oensive.
Most of the divisions tank losses occurred late in the afternoon as they advanced through mine elds against wellhidden Soviet anti-tank guns. Although the 3rd SS succeeded in reaching the Karteschewka-Prokhorovka road,
their hold was tenuous and it cost the division half of its

armour. The majority of German tank losses suered at

Prokhorovka occurred here. To the south, the Soviet 18th
and 29th Tank Corps, of the 5th Guards Tank Army, had
been thrown back by the 1st SS acting alone. Meanwhile,
the 2nd SS was holding a line to the south against the 2nd
Tank Corps and the 2nd Guards Tank Corps.[271]

Exhausted German soldiers pause during the ghting.

By early afternoon, it was clear that Rotmistrovs attack

had failed.[272] Luftwae local air superiority over the
battleeld also contributed to the Soviet losses, partly due
to the VVS being directed against the German units on the
anks of II SS Panzer Corps.[273] By the end of the day,
the Soviets had fallen back to their starting positions.[274]
The battle is considered a tactical defeat for the Red
Army due to the heavy tank losses, but operationally was
a draw or a Soviet victory.[253][275] Neither the 5th Guards
Tank Army nor the II SS Panzer Corps accomplished
their objectives. Though the Soviet counterattack failed
and they were thrown back onto the defensive, they did
enough to stop a German breakthrough.[276] Tank losses
during the battle have been a contentious subject. Soviet
tank losses have been estimated from 200 to 822, but Soviet records show about 300 complete losses and as many
damaged. The Soviets claimed enormous German losses,
stating they had destroyed at least 400 tanks, including
100 Tiger tanks and inicting 3,500 deaths.[277] German
records indicate 3 to 5 of their own tanks destroyed, and
between 40 and 70 damaged. Their manpower losses are
estimated at 500 killed.[278][253][279][280]

5 Allied invasion of Sicily and termination of Operation Citadel

On the evening of 12 July, Hitler summoned Kluge
and Manstein to his headquarters at Rastenburg in East
Prussia.[281] Two days prior, the Western Allies had
invaded Sicily. The threat of further Allied landings in
Italy or along southern France made Hitler believe it was
essential to move forces from Kursk to Italy and to discontinue the oensive. Kluge welcomed the news, as
he was aware that the Soviets were initiating a massive
oensive against his sector, but Manstein was less wel-

6.1

In the north: Operation Kutuzov

17

coming. Mansteins forces had just spent a week ghting 6.1 In the north: Operation Kutuzov
through a maze of defensive works and he believed they
were on the verge of breaking through to more open ter- Main article: Operation Kutuzov
rain, which would allow him to engage and destroy the Soviet oensive operations for the summer of 1943 were
Soviet armoured reserves in a mobile battle. Manstein
stated, On no account should we let go of the enemy until
the mobile reserves he [has] committed [are] completely
beaten.[282] Hitler agreed to temporarily allow the continuance of the oensive in the south part of the salient,
but the following day he ordered Mansteins reserve the
XXIV Panzer Corps to move south to support the 1st
Panzer Army. This removed the force Manstein believed
was needed to succeed.[283]
On 16 July, German forces withdrew to their start line.
The following day, OKH ordered the II SS Panzer Corps
to be withdrawn and transferred to Italy.[284][285] The
strength of the Soviet reserve formations had been greatly
underestimated by German intelligence, and the Soviets Soviet soldiers in Orel pass by the Church of the Intercession, 5
soon went onto the oensive.[283]
August 1943.

5.1

Controversy

Following the war, a number of German generals were

highly critical of Hitlers decision to call o the operation at the height of the tactical battle.[286] This criticism has been echoed by ocers in the post-war German
Army,[287][288] and by a number of historians.[289] Anticipating that the Western Allies would conduct some form
of operation in Western Europe, both Manstein and Guderian had argued prior to the battle for forces to be conserved and redeployed as a reserve. Once committed to
the operation, it made little sense to pull them out at the
climax, especially since they could not reach Italy in time
to impact events there. Manstein argued pulling forces
out of Army Group South in the midst of the battle, shifting away Luftwae support, and transferring his reserve
force deprived his Army of its striking power at what he
believed was the decisive point of the battle.[290] The accuracy of Mansteins assertion is debatable. The extent of
Soviet reserves was far greater than he realised. These reserves were used to re-equip the mauled 5th Guards Tank
Army, which launched Operation Rumyantsev a couple
of weeks later. However, rebuilding this formation did
take time. The essential thing was to concentrate the
available force for a decisive action; Hitlers unwillingness to accept risk resulted in his commanders being unable to do so. Further, he restricted them from ghting
the type of mobile battle they wanted, despite Mansteins
success in this type of action only a few months before at
the Third Battle of Kharkov.[291][292] The result was a battle of attrition they were ill prepared for and which they
had little chance of winning.[293]

Soviet counteroensives

planned to begin after the strength of the German forces

had been dissipated by their Kursk oensive. As the German momentum in the north slowed, the Soviets launched
Operation Kutusov on 12 July against Army Group Centre
in the Orel salient, directly north of the Kursk salient. The
Bryansk Front, under the command of Markian Popov,
attacked the eastern face of the Orel salient while the
Western Front, commanded by Vasily Sokolovsky, attacked from the north. The Western Fronts assault was
led by the 11th Guards Army, under Lieutenant General Hovhannes Bagramyan, and was supported by the
1st and 5th Tank Corps. The Soviet spearheads sustained
heavy casualties, but pushed through and in some areas
achieved signicant penetrations. These thrusts endangered German supply routes and threatened the 9th Army
with encirclement.[294][295] With this threat, 9th Army
was compelled to go over fully to the defensive.[296][213]
The thinly stretched 2nd Panzer Army stood in the way
of this Soviet force. The German commanders had been
wary of such an attack and forces were quickly withdrawn
from the Kursk oensive to meet the Soviet oensive.
Operation Kutuzov reduced the Orel salient and inicted
substantial losses on the German military, paving the way
for the liberation of Smolensk.[297] Soviet losses were
heavy, but were replaced.[298] The oensive allowed the
Soviets to seize the strategic initiative, which they retained for the remainder of the war.

6.2 In the south: Operation Polkovodets

Rumyantsev
Main article: Operation Polkovodets Rumyantsev
Operation Polkovodets Rumyantsev was intended as the
main Soviet oensive for 1943. Its aim was to degrade
the 4th Panzer Army and cut o the extended southern portion of Army Group South.[299] After the heavy

18

RESULTS

Soviet troops follow their T-34 tanks during a counterattack.

losses sustained by the Voronezh Front, during Operation Citadel, the Soviets needed time to regroup and ret,
delaying the start of the oensive until 3 August. Diversionary attacks, launched two weeks earlier across the
Donets and Mius Rivers into the Donbass, drew the attention of German reserves and thinned the defending forces
that would face the main blow.[300] The oensive was initiated by the Voronezh Front and Steppe Fronts against
the northern wing of Army Group South. They drove
through the German positions, making broad and deep
penetrations. By 5 August, the Soviets had liberated Belgorod.
By 12 August, the outskirts of Kharkov had been reached. Prokhorovka Cathedral, on the former battleeld, commemoThe Soviet advance was nally halted by a counter-attack rates the Red Army losses and victory.
by the 2nd and 3rd SS Panzer Divisions. In the ensuing
tank battles, the Soviet armies suered heavy losses in
much eort, had lost heavily in both men and
armour.[301][302] After this setback, the Soviets focused
equipment and would now be unemployable
on Kharkov. After heavy ghting the city was liberated
for a long time to come. It was problemon 23 August. This battle is referred to by the Germans
atical whether they could be rehabilitated in
as the Fourth Battle of Kharkov, while the Soviets refer
time to defend the Eastern Front ... Needless
to it as the BelgorodKharkov oensive operation.[303]
to say the [Soviets] exploited their victory to
the full. There were to be no more periods
of quiet on the Eastern Front. From now on,
7 Results
the enemy was in undisputed possession of the
initiative.[304]
The campaign was a strategic Soviet success. For the rst
time, a major German oensive had been stopped before With victory, the initiative rmly passed to the Red
achieving a breakthrough. The Germans, despite using Army. For the remainder of the war the Germans were
more technologically advanced armour than in previous limited to reacting to Soviet advances, and were never
years, were unable to break through the in-depth Soviet able to regain the initiative or launch a major oensive
[305]
The Western Allied landings in
defences and were caught o guard by the signicant op- on the Eastern Front.
erational reserves of the Red Army. This result changed Italy opened up a new front, further diverting German re[306]
the pattern of operations on the Eastern Front, with the sources and attention.
Soviet Union gaining the operational initiative. The So- Though the location, plan of attack, and timing were deviet victory, however, was costly, with the Red Army los- termined by Hitler, he blamed the defeat on his General
ing considerably more men and material than the German Sta. Unlike Stalin, who gave his commanding generArmy. However, the Soviet Unions larger industrial po- als the liberty to make important command decisions,
tential and pool of manpower allowed them to absorb and Hitlers interference in German military matters progresreplenish these losses, with their overall strategic strength sively increased while his attention to the political asunaected. Guderian wrote:
pects of the war decreased.[307] The opposite was true
With the failure of Zitadelle we have suffered a decisive defeat. The armoured formations, reformed and re-equipped with so

for Stalin; throughout the Kursk campaign, he trusted the

judgment of his commanders, and as their decisions led
to battleeld success it increased his trust in their military
judgment. Stalin stepped back from operational plan-

8.2

German losses

19

ning, only rarely overruling military decisions, resulting sualties. The Bryansk Front suered 39,173 irrecovin the Red Army gaining more freedom of action during erable casualties and 123,234 medical casualties. The
the course of the war.
Central Front lost 47,771 irrecoverable casualties and
117,271 medical casualties.[312] Soviet losses during Operation Polkovodets Rumyantsev totaled 255,566 men,
with 71,611 listed as irrecoverable casualties and 183,955
8 Casualties and losses
as medical casualties. The Voronezh Front lost 48,339
irrecoverable casualties and 108,954 medical casualties,
The casualties suered by the two combatants are dif- for a total of 157,293. The Steppe Front lost 23,272 ircult to determine, due to several factors. In regard to recoverable casualties and 75,001 medical casualties, for
the Germans, equipment losses were complicated by the a total of 98,273.[313]
fact that they made determined eorts to recover and repair tanks. For example, tanks disabled one day often
appeared a day or two later repaired.[308] German personnel losses are clouded by the lack of access to German unit records, which were seized at the end of the
war. Many were transferred to the United States national
archives and were not made available until 1978, while
others were taken by the Soviet Union, which declined to
conrm their existence.[309]

8.1

Soviet losses

Memorial Teplovskys Hills in Ponyri region in honour of the

memory of the fallen on the northern face of the Battle of Kursk

A German soldier inspects a knocked out T-34 during the Battle

of Kursk.

Soviet equipment losses during the German oensive

came to 1,614 tanks and self-propelled guns destroyed
or damaged[18] of the 3,925 vehicles committed to the
battle. The Soviet losses were roughly three times larger
than the German losses.[314][315] During Operation Kutuzov, 2,349 tanks and self-propelled guns were lost out
of an initial strength of 2,308; a loss of over 100 percent. During Polkovodets Rumyantsev 1,864 tanks and
self-propelled guns were lost out of the 2,439 employed.
The loss ratio suered by the Soviets was roughly 5:1 in
favour of the German military.[316] However, large Soviet
reserves of equipment and their high rate of tank production enabled the Soviet tank armies to soon replace lost
equipment and maintain their ghting strength.[314] The
Red Army repaired many of its damaged tanks; many Soviet tanks were rebuilt up to four times to keep them in the
ght. Soviet tank strength went back up to 2,750 tanks by
3 August due to the repair of damaged vehicles.[317]

Russian military historian Grigoriy Krivosheyev, who

based his gures on the Soviet archives, is considered by historian David Glantz as the most reliable
source for Soviet casualty gures.[310] His gures are supported by historian Karl-Heinz Frieser.[311] Krivosheyev
calculated total Soviet losses during the German offensive as 177,877 casualties.[310] The Central Front
suered 15,336 irrecoverable casualties and 18,561
medical casualties, for a total of 33,897 casualties. The
Voronezh Front suered 27,542 irrecoverable casualties
and 46,350 medical casualties, for a total of 73,892. The
Steppe Front suered 27,452 irrecoverable casualties and
42,606 medical casualties, for a total of 70,085.[280]
According to historian Christer Bergstrm, Soviet Air
During the two Soviet oensives, total casualties Forces losses during the German oensive amounted to
amounted to 685,456 men. During Operation Kutu- 677 aircraft on the northern ank and 439 on the southzov, Soviet losses amounted to 112,529 irrecoverable ern ank. Total casualties are uncertain. Bergstrms recasualties and 317,361 medical casualties, for a total search indicates total Soviet air losses between 12 July
loss of 429,890 men.[312] The Western Front reported and 18 August, during the German oensive and the Op25,585 irrecoverable casualties and 76,856 medical ca- eration Kutuzov counteroensive, were 1,104.[318]

20

8 CASUALTIES AND LOSSES

July there were only 10 operational Panthers in
the frontline. 25 Panthers had been lost as total
writeos (23 were hit and burnt and two had
caught re during the approach march). 100
Panthers were in need of repair (56 were damaged by hits and mines and 44 by mechanical breakdown). 60 percent of the mechanical
breakdowns could be easily repaired. Approximately 40 Panthers had already been repaired
and were on the way to the front. About 25
still had not been recovered by the repair service... On the evening of 11 July, 38 Panthers
were operational, 31 were total writeos and
131 were in need of repair. A slow increase in
the combat strength is observable. The large
number of losses by hits (81 Panthers up to 10
July) attests to the heavy ghting.[320]

The grave of Heinz Khl (1915-43), a German soldier killed at

Kursk

8.2

German losses

Karl-Heinz Frieser, who reviewed the German archive

record, calculated that during Operation Citadel 54,182
casualties were suered. Of these, 9,036 were killed,
1,960 were reported missing and 43,159 were wounded.
The 9th Army suered 23,345 casualties, while Army
Group South suered 30,837 casualties.[9] Throughout the Soviet oensives, 86,064 casualties were suffered. In facing Operation Kutuzov, 14,215 men were
killed, 11,300 were reported missing (presumed killed
or captured) and 60,549 were wounded.[319] During
Polkovodets Rumyantsev, 25,068 casualties were incurred, including 8,933 killed and missing. Total casualties for the three battles were about 170,000 men.

By 16 July, Army Group South claimed 161 tanks and

14 assault guns lost. Up to 14 July, 9th Army reported
they had lost as total writeos 41 tanks and 17 assault
guns. These losses break down as 109 Panzer IVs, 42
Panthers, 38 Panzer IIIs, 31 assault guns, 19 Elefants,
10 Tigers and three ame tanks.[321] Before the Germans
ended their oensive at Kursk, the Soviets began their
counteroensive and succeeded in pushing the Germans
back into a steady retreat. Thus, a report on 11 August
1943 showed that the numbers of total writeos in Panthers swelled to 156, with only 9 operational. The German Army was forced into a ghting retreat and increasingly lost tanks in combat as well as from abandoning and
destroying damaged vehicles.[322] Across the entire Eastern Front 50 Tiger tanks were lost during July and August,
with some 240 damaged. Most of these occurred during
their oensive at Kursk.[323] Some 600 tanks sustained
damage in the period from 5 July to 18 July.[12]

The total number of German tanks and assault guns destroyed during July and August along the entire Eastern Front amount to 1,331. Of these, Frieser estimates
that 760 were destroyed during the Battle of Kursk.[319]
Beevor writes that the Red Army had lost ve armoured
During Operation Citadel, 252 to 323 tanks and assault vehicles for every German panzer destroyed.[10]
guns were destroyed. By 5 July, when the Battle of Kursk Frieser reports Luftwae losses at 524 planes, with 159
started, there were only 184 operational Panthers. Within lost during the German oensive, 218 destroyed durtwo days, this had dropped to 40.[320] On 17 July 1943 ing Operation Kutuzov, and a further 147 lost durafter Hitler had ordered a stop to the German oensive, ing Operation Polkovodets Rumyantsev.[324] In reviewGuderian sent in the following preliminary assessment of ing the reports of the quartermaster of the Luftwae,
the Panthers:
Bergstrm presents dierent gures. Between 5 and 31
Due to enemy action and mechanical
breakdowns, the combat strength sank rapidly
during the rst few days. By the evening of 10

July, Bergstrm reports 681 aircraft lost or damaged (335

for Fliegerkorps VIII and 346 for Luftotte 6) with a total
of 420 being written o (192 from Fliegerkorps VIII and
229 from Luftotte 6).[16]

21

Notes

[1] After Kursk, Germany could not even pretend to hold the
strategic initiative in the East. (Glantz & House 1995, p.
175).
[2] With the nal destruction of German forces at Kharkov,
the Battle of Kursk came to an end. Having won the strategic initiative, the Red Army advanced along a 2,000 kilometres (1,200 mi) front. (Taylor & Kulish 1974, p. 171).
[3] The breakdown as shown in Bergstrm (2007, pp. 127
128) is as follows: 1,030 aircraft of 2nd Air Army
and 611 of 17th Air Army on the southern sector
(Voronezh Front), and 1,151 on the northern sector (Central Front).(Bergstrm 2007, p. 21).
[4] The breakdown as shown in Zetterling & Frankson (2000,
p. 20) is as follows: 1,050 aircraft of 16th Air Army
(Central Front), 881 of 2nd Air Army (Voronezh Front),
735 of 17th Air Army (only as a secondary support for
Voronezh Front), 563 of the 5th Air Army (Steppe Front)
and 320 of Long Range Bomber Command.
[5] Operation Citadel refers to the German oensive from 4
to 16 July, but Soviet losses are for the period of 523
July.
[6] The breakdown as shown in Frieser (2007, p. 154) is as
follows: 9,063 KIA, 43,159 WIA and 1,960 MIA.
[7] The whole Battle of Kursk refers to the period of the German oensive (Operation Citadel) and the subsequent Soviet counteroensives, from 4 July to 23 August.
[8] The breakdown as shown in Krivosheev (1997, pp. 132
134) is as follows: Kursk-defence: 177,847; Orel-counter:
429,890; Belgorod-counter: 255,566.
[9] The breakdown as shown in Krivosheev (1997, p. 262)
is as follows: Kursk-defence; 1,614. Orel-counter; 2,586.
Belgorod-counter; 1,864.
[10] Some military historians consider Operation Citadel, or
at least the southern pincer, as envisioning a blitzkrieg attack or state it was intended as such. Some of the historians taking this view are: Lloyd Clark (Clark 2012, p.
187), Roger Moorhouse (Moorhouse 2011, p. 342), Mary
Kathryn Barbier (Barbier 2002, p. 10), David Glantz
(Glantz 1986, p. 24; Glantz & House 2004, pp. 63, 78,
149, 269, 272, 280), Jonathan House (Glantz & House
2004, pp. 63, 78, 149, 269, 272, 280), Hedley Paul Willmott (Willmott 1990, p. 300), and others. Also, Niklas
Zetterling and Anders Frankson specically considered
only the southern pincer as a classical blitzkrieg attack
(Zetterling & Frankson 2000, p. 137).
[11] Many of the German participants of Operation Citadel
make no mention of blitzkrieg in their characterization
of the operation. Several German ocers and commanders involved in the operation wrote their account of the
battle after the war, and some of these postwar accounts
were collected by the U.S. Army. Some of these ocers are: Theodor Busse (Newton 2002, pp. 327), Erhard Raus (Newton 2002, pp. 2964), Friedrich Fangohr (Newton 2002, pp. 6596), Peter von der Groeben

(Newton 2002, pp. 97144), Friedrich Wilhelm von

Mellenthin (Mellenthin 1956, pp. 212234), Erich von
Manstein (Manstein 1958, pp. 443449), and others.
Mellenthin stated: The German command was committing exactly the same error as in the previous year. Then
we attacked the city of Stalingrad, now we were to attack the fortress of Kursk. In both cases the German
Army threw away all its advantages in mobile tactics,
and met the Russians (sic - Soviets) on ground of their
own choosing. (Mellenthin 1956, p. 217) Some of the
military historians that make no mention of blitzkrieg in
their characterization of the operation are: Mark Healy
(Healy 2008), George Nipe (Nipe 2010), Steven Newton
(Newton 2002), Dieter Brand (Brand 2000), Bruno Kasdorf (Kasdorf 2000), and others.
[12] Guderian developed and advocated the strategy of concentrating armoured formations at the point of attack
(schwerpunkt) and deep penetration. In Achtung Panzer!"
he described what he believed were essential elements for
a successful panzer attack. He listed three elements: surprise, deployment in mass, and suitable terrain. Of these,
surprise was by far the most important.(Guderian 1937, p.
205)
[13] I urged him earnestly to give up the plan of attack. The
great commitment certainly would not bring us equivalent
gains."(Guderian 1952, p. 308)
[14] Source includes: German Nation Archive microlm publication T78, Records of the German High Command
(Oberkommando der Wehrmacht) Roll 343, Frames
6301178180, which conrms Hitlers teleprinter messages to Rommel about reinforcing southern Italy with armoured forces that were already destined to be used for
Citadel.
[15] According to Zetterling & Frankson (2000, p. 18) these
gures are for 1 July 1943 and accounts for only units that
eventually fought in Operation Citadel (4th Panzer Army,
part of Army Detachment Kempf, 2nd Army and 9th
Army). The gure for German manpower refers to ration
strength (which includes non-combatants and wounded
soldiers still in medical installations). The gures for guns
and mortars are estimates based on the strength and number of units slated for the operation; the gure for tanks
and assault guns include those in workshops.
[16] Over 105,000 in April and as much as 300,000 in June,
according to Zetterling & Frankson (2000, p. 22).
[17] Nikolai Litvin, a Soviet anti-tank gunner present at the
battle of Kursk, recalls his experience during the special
training to overcome tank phobia. The tanks continued
to advance closer and closer. Some comrades became
frightened, leaped out of the trenches, and began to run
away. The commander saw who was running and quickly
forced them back into the trenches, making it sternly clear
that they had to stay put. The tanks reached the trench line
and, with a terrible roar, clattered overhead ... it was possible to conceal oneself in a trench from a tank, let it pass
right over you, and remain alive. (Litvin & Britton 2007,
pp. 1213).
[18] This order of battle does not show the complete composition of the Steppe Front. In addition to the units listed

22

10

below, there are also the 4th Guards, 27th, 47th and 53rd
Armies. (Clark 2012, p. 204). Perhaps the order of battle
below represents only the formations relevant to Operation Citadel.
[19] The air operation is misunderstood in most accounts. The
German Freya radar stations at Belgorod and Kharkov in
1943 had only picked up Soviet air formations approaching Belgorod and were not responsible for the failure of
the entire Soviet preemptive air strike on the eve of Operation Citadel. (Bergstrm 2007, pp. 2627).

REFERENCES

[19] Frieser 2007, p. 150.

[20] Krivosheev 1997, pp. 132134.
[21] Krivosheev 1997, p. 262.
[22] Glantz & Orenstein 1999, p. 1.
[23] Glantz & House 1995, pp. 157.
[24] Healy 2008, p. 90.
[25] Nipe 2010, p. 6.
[26] Healy 2008, p. 42.

10

References

[1] Beevor 2012, p. 485, The German army had received

a severe battering... the Germans had no choice but to
withdraw to the line of the River Dnepr, and start to pull
their remaining forces out from the bridgehead left on the
Taman peninsula".

[27] Healy 2008, p. 65.

[28] Newton 2002, p. 12.
[29] Dunn 1997, p. 94.
[30] Kasdorf 2000, p. 16.
[31] Glantz & House 2004, pp. 6467.

[2] Glantz & House 2004, p. 338.

[3] Glantz & House 1995, p. 165.
[4] Frieser 2007, p. 100.
[5] Bergstrm 2007, pp. 123125. Figures are from German
archives. Bundesarchiv-Militararchiv, Freiburg; Luftfahrtmuseum, Hannover-Laatzen; WASt Deutsche Dienststelle, Berlin.
[6] Glantz & House 2004, p. 337.
[7] Bergstrm 2007, p. 127128, gures are from Russian
archives; Russian aviation trust; Russian Central Military
Archive TsAMO, Podolsk; Russian State Military Archive
RGVA, Moscow; Monino Air Force Museum, Moscow..

[32] Glantz 1989, pp. 149159.

[33] Glantz & House 1995, p. 167.
[34] Glantz 2013, p. 184.
[35] Glantz & House 1995, pp. 166.
[36] Glantz 1986, p. 66.
[37] Kasdorf 2000, p. 7.
[38] Clark 2012, p. 167.
[39] Clark 2012, p. 176.
[40] Glantz & House 2004, p. 11.

[8] Zetterling & Frankson 2000, p. 20.

[41] Liddell Hart 1948, p. 189.

[9] Frieser 2007, p. 154.

[42] Healy 2010, p. 26.

[10] Beevor 2012, p. 485.

[43] Healy 2010, p. 27.

[11] Glantz & House 2004, p. 276.

[44] Liddell Hart 1948, p. 210.

[12] U.S. Army Concepts Analysis Agency, Kursk Operation

Simulation and Validation Exercise Phase III (KOSAVE
II), p. 5-14 through 515.

[45] Kasdorf 2000, p. 8.

[13] Clark 2012, p. 408.

[14] Heeresarzt 10-Day Casualty Reports per Army/Army
Group, 1943. World War II Stats. Retrieved 4 July 2015.

[46] Liddell Hart 1948, p. 198.

[47] Clark 2012, p. 177, according to Joseph Goebbels's diary.
[48] Liddell Hart 1948, p. 63.
[49] Dunn 1997, p. 61.

[15] Frieser 2007, p. 201. Exact numbers are unknown; the

entire German eastern front lost 1,331 tanks and assault
guns for July and August, so the number of 760 is an estimate.

[50] Glantz & House 2004, p. 13.

[16] Bergstrm 2008, p. 120. Figures for 531 July, as given

by the Luftwae logistics sta (Generalquartiermeister der
Luftwae).

[53] Glantz & House 2004, pp. 11, 13.

[17] Krivosheev 2001, Kursk.

[55] Healy 2008, p. 43.

[18] Krivosheev 2001, Kursk equipment

[56] Manstein 1983, p. 445.

[51] Clark 2012, p. 177.

[52] Kasdorf 2000, p. 10.

[54] Clark 2012, p. 178.

23

[57] Manstein 1983, p. 446.

[89] Healy 2008, p. 83.

[58] Clark 2012, p. 184.

[90] Taylor & Kulish 1974, p. 170.

[59] Glantz & House 2004, p. 14.

[91] Mulligan 1987, p. 329.

[60] Clark 2012, p. 186.

[92] Clark 2012, p. 223.

[61] Glantz & House 2004, p. 354.

[93] Healy 2008, p. 132.

[62] Clark 2012, pp. 178, 186.

[94] Newton 2002, p. 25.

[63] Liddell Hart 1948, p. 57.

[95] Zetterling & Frankson 2000, p. 18.

[64] Glantz & House 2004, p. 23-25.

[96] Innovation News 2011.

[65] Clark 2012, p. 187.

[97] Copeland, Colossus.

[66] Glantz & House 2004, p. 25.

[98] Clark 2012, pp. 188, 190191.

[67] Battistelli 2008, pp. 46, The main purpose of this [99] " []
new oensive was to regain the initiative, and unlike the
.. ". Militera.lib.ru. Archived from the origtwo previous summers, no one was thinking any longer
inal on 4 July 2010. Retrieved 6 August 2010.
of blitzkrieg.... Facing its own shortcomings and the
growing capabilities of the enemy the notion of blitzkrieg [100] Glantz & House 2004, pp. 2829, mentions Nikolai
died. Firepower prevailed over speed and manoeuverabilVatutin and Mikhail Malinin.
ity with the result being that Operation Citadel would be
based on a concept inconceivable a year earlier: attacking [101] Clark 2012, p. 189, mentions Stalin.
the enemy where it was strongest..
[102] Taylor & Kulish 1974, p. 168.
[68] Newton 2002, p. 13.
[103] Clark 2012, p. 189.
[69] von Mellenthin 1956, p. 218.
[104]

,
. .: , 1988 (in
[70] Clark 2012, pp. 194,196.
Russian). Militera.lib.ru. Retrieved 17 June 2013.
[71] Glantz & House 2004, pp. 5153.
[105] Clark 2012, p. 190.
[72] Clark 2012, p. 197.
[106] Glantz & Orenstein 1999, p. 28.
[73] Clark 2012, p. 194.
[107] Glantz & House 2004, pp. 2829.
[74] Healy 2010, p. 79.
[108] Clark 2012, p. 204.
[75] Clark 2012, p. 193.
[109] Glantz 2013, p. 195.
[76] Glantz & House 2004, p. 13.
[110] Clark 2012, p. 202.
[77] Manstein 1983, pp. 480482.
[111] The Fronts history.
[78] von Mellenthin 1956, p. 216.
[112] Clark 2012, p. 203.
[79] Guderian 1952, p. 307.
[80] Zetterling & Frankson 2000, p. 10.
[81] Glantz 2013, p. 183.
[82] Clark 2012, p. 192.

[113] Zetterling & Frankson 2000, p. 22.

[114] Glantz & House 1999, pp. 6465.
[115] Clark 2012, p. 211.

[83] Barbier 2002, p. 39.

[116] Glantz & House 2004, pp. 6465.

[84] Guderian 1952, p. 308.

[117] Glantz & Orenstein 1999, pp. 41, 49.

[85] Healy 2010, p. 86.

[118] Soviet Storm: Operation Barbarossa 2011.

[86] Clark 1966, p. 327.

[119] Glantz 1986, p. 19, Glantz states 1,500 anti-tank mines

per kilometre and 1,700 anti-personnel mines per kilometre..

[87] Glantz & House 2004, p. 55.

[88] Kursk Press releases July 1943. Dial Pixpex News. Re- [120] Glantz & House 2004, p. 65, Glantz states there were
trieved 2 June 2013
2,400 anti-tank and 2,700 anti-personnel mines per mile..

24

10

[121] Healy 1992, p. 31, Healy states there were 2,400 anti-tank [157]
and 2,700 anti-personnel mines per mile..
[158]
[122] Glantz & Orenstein 1999, p. 39.
[159]
[123] Glantz & House 2004, p. 67.
[160]
[124] Glantz & Orenstein 1999, p. 290.
[161]
[125] Glantz 1986, p. 20.
[162]
[126] Glantz 1986, p. 24.
[163]
[127] Healy 2010, p. 74.
[164]
[128] Barbier 2002, p. 58.
[129] Clark 2012, p. 208, Clark states 300 locomotives instead
of 298..
[130] Newton 2002, p. 151.
[131] Glantz & House 1995, p. 90.

Frieser 2007, p. 112.

Clark 2012, p. 196.
Clark 2012, p. 237.
Healy 1992, p. 41.
Healy 2008, p. 201.
Nipe 2010, p. 143.
Healy 2008, p. 205.
Clark 2012, pp. 475477, The 2nd Panzer Army and
2nd Army are not included in the order of battle in the
source. The 2nd Panzer Army did not take part in Operation Citadel, but played a signicant part in Operation
Kutuzov. The 2nd Army was tasked with pushing the
western face of the salient once the encirclement was completed, but never got do so since the northern and southern
pincers failed to meet at Kursk..

[132] Clark 2012, p. 267.

[165] Clark 2012, pp. 475477.

[133] Clark 2012, p. 267-268.

[166] Clark 2012, pp. 478484.

[134] Healy 2008, p. 113.

[167] Frieser 2007, p. 91.

[135] Clark 2012, p. 210.

[168] Glantz & House 2004, p. 346.

[136] Gerwehr & Glenn 2000, p. 33.

[169] Glantz & House 2004, p. 345.

[137] Glantz & Orenstein 1999, p. 241.

[170] Glantz & House 2004, p. 81.

[138] Healy 2010, p. 78.

[171] Barbier 2002, p. 59.

[139] Glantz & Orenstein 1999, p. 135.

[172] Clark 2012, p. 224.

[140] Healy 2010, p. 77.

[141] Clark 2012, p. 222.
[142] Beevor 2012, p. 472.

REFERENCES

[173] Clark 2012, p. 226.

[174] Clark 1966, p. 329.
[175] Clark 2012, pp. 227, 233.

[143] Healy 2008, p. 172.

[176] Glantz & House 2004, pp. 8486.

[144] Clark 2012, p. 204, provides similar but more specic
[177] Newton 2002, p. 77.
gures.
[145] Liddell Hart 1948, pp. 176177.

[178] Clark 2012, p. 236.

[146] Liddell Hart 1948, p. 192.

[179] Zetterling & Frankson 2000, p. 77-78.

[147] Beevor 2012, p. 471-472.

[180] Clark 2012, pp. 263.

[148] Murray 1983, p. 158.

[181] Glantz & House 2004, pp. 137.

[149] Newton 2002, p. 186.

[182] Clark 2012, pp. 263,314.

[150] Healy 2008, p. 105.

[183] Glantz & House 2004, pp. 118.

[151] Bergstrm 2007, pp. 7981, 102, 106, 114, 118.

[184] Clark 2012, p. 195.

[152] Healy 2008, p. 104.

[185] Clark 2012, p. 261.

[153] Newton 2002, p. 160.

[186] Glantz & House 2004, p. 86.

[154] Newton 2002, p. 159.

[187] Clark 2012, p. 264.

[155] Healy 2008, p. 103.

[188] Clark 2012, p. 265.

[156] Newton 2002, p. 155.

[189] Clark 2012, p. 266.

25

[190] Mnch 1997, pp. 5052.

[228] Clark 2012, p. 256.

[191] Clark 2012, pp. 120, 266.

[229] Clark 2012, p. 257.

[192] Clark 2012, pp. 309.

[230] Beevor 2012, p. 481.

[193] Frieser 2007, p. 108.

[231] Clark 2012, p. 258.

[194] Glantz & House 2004, p. 93, 117.

[232] Clark 2012, p. 259.

[195] Clark 2012, pp. 120, 306.

[233] Clark 2012, p. 260.

[196] Glantz & House 2004, p. 93.

[234] Zetterling & Frankson 2000, p. 101.

[197] Clark 2012, pp. 308.

[235] Glantz & House 2004, p. 113,133.

[198] Glantz & House 2004, p. 117.

[236] Zamulin 2011, p. 159.

[199] Beevor 2012, p. 478.

[237] Glantz & House 2004, p. 113.

[200] Clark 2012, pp. 309-311.

[238] Clark 2012, p. 287288.

[201] Glantz & House 2004, p. 115.

[239] Clark 2012, p. 478484, The Soviet order of battle.

[202] Clark 2012, pp. 313.

[240] Nipe 2012, p. 72.

[203] Glantz & House 2004, p. 121.

[204] Zetterling & Frankson 2000, p. 91.
[205] Clark 2012, pp. 312.
[206] Glantz & House 2004, p. 115, 120-121.

[241] Glantz & House 2004, p. 114.

[242] Glantz & House 2004, p. 114, 133135.
[243] Glantz & House 2004, p. 135, tank losses are given as 50.

[207] Frieser 2007, p. 110.

[244] Clark 2012, p. 299, tank losses are given as 50 in the rst
air raid and another 30 in subsequent air raids.

[208] Glantz & House 2004, p. 118,121.

[245] Glantz & House 2004, p. 135.

[209] Zetterling & Frankson 2000, p. 94.

[246] Clark 2012, p. 298299.

[210] Healy 2008, p. 286-287.

[247] Bauman 1998, p. 8-4 to 8-5.

[211] Overy 1995, p. 204.

[248] Clark 2012, pp. 68, 279, map on page 68 shows 1820
miles.

[212] Healy 2008, p. 287.

[213] Zetterling & Frankson 2000, p. 9596.
[214] Clark 2012, p. 238.

[249] Glantz & House 2004, p. 130, the map shows 1820
miles.

[215] Clark 2012, p. 240.

[250] Zetterling & Frankson 2000, p. 90, this places it at 28 km

at the end of 7 July.

[216] Clark 2012, p. 242.

[251] Bauman 1998, pp. 85 to 86, this places it at 23 km.

[217] Clark 2012, p. 241.

[252] Newton 2002, p. 6.

[218] Clark 2012, p. 68.

[253] Brand 2003.

[219] Clark 2012, p. 246.

[254] Clark 2012, pp. 350353.

[220] Clark 2012, p. 247.

[255] Glantz & House 2004, pp. 169, 171.

[221] Clark 2012, p. 248.

[256] Yeide 2014, p. 178.

[222] Clark 2012, p. 250.

[257] Healy 2008, pp. 301302.

[223] Healy 2008, p. 210.

[258] Newton 2002, p. 7.

[224] Clark 2012, pp. 252253.

[259] Nipe 2010, p. 311.

[225] Clark 2012, p. 254.

[260] Nipe 2010, p. 324.

[226] Clark 2012, p. 255.

[261] Nipe 2010, p. 310.

[227] Beevor 2012, p. 476.

[262] Nipe 2010, p. 309.

26

[263] Bergstrm 2007, p. 77.

[264] Clark 2012, p. 363.

10

REFERENCES

[299] Glantz & House 2004, p. 241.

[300] Glantz & House 2004, p. 245.

[265] Beevor 2012, p. 482.

[301] Frieser 2007, p. 196.
[266] Glantz & House 2004, p. 187, in Moscow time.
[267] Barbier 2002, p. 139.

[302] Glantz & House 2004, p. 249.

[268] Zamulin & Britton 2011, p. 349.

[303] Glantz & House 1995, p. 70.

[269] Nipe 2010, p. 304.

[304] Bergstrm 2007, p. 121.

[270] Brand 2003, p. 7.

[271] Nipe 2010, p. 341.

[305] Jacobsen p. 251

[272] Brand 2003, p. 11.

[306] Taylor & Kulish 1974, p. 171.

[273] Bergstrm 2007, pp. 7980.

[307] Liddell Hart 1948, p. 216.

[274] Brand 2003, p. 12.

[308] Healy 2010, p. 366.

[275] Showalter 2013, p. 269.

[276] Brand 2003, p. 1.

[309] Nipe 2010, p. vi.

[277] " [ ] [310] Glantz & Orenstein 1999, p. 274.

..

19391945. Militera.lib.ru. Retrieved 6 [311] Frieser 2007, pp. 150, 200, and the pages onward.
August 2010.
[312] Glantz & Orenstein 1999, p. 276.
[278] Bergstrm 2007, p. 81.
[279] Frieser 2007, pp. 130, 132.
[280] Glantz & Orenstein 1999, p. 275.
[281] Healy 2008, p. 353.

[313] G.F. Krivosheyev (1993) Soviet Armed Forces Losses in

Wars, Combat Operations and Military Conicts: A Statistical Study. Military Publishing House Moscow. Retrieved 4 July 2015.

[282] Healy 2008, p. 354.

[314] Healy 2010, p. 367.

[283] Healy 2008, p. 355.

[315] Glantz & House 1999, p. 345.

[284] Clark 1966, pp. 337338.

[316] Glantz & Orenstein 1999, pp. 276277.

[285] Glantz & House 2004, p. 218.

[286] Manstein 1983, p. 504.
[287] Brand 1983, p. 16.
[288] Kasdorf & 2000 31.
[289] Engelmann, Zitadelle p. 5.

[317] Peter Strassner, European Volunteers: 5 SS Panzer Division Wiking, p. 119; U.S. Army Concepts Analysis
Agency, Kursk Operation Simulation and Validation Exercise Phase III (KOSAVE II), p. 5-12; Healy, Kursk,
pp. 8588; Steve Zaloga and Peter Sarson, T-34/76
Medium Tank 194145, p. 34

[290] Manstein & 1983 p.449.

[318] Bergstrm 2008, p. 121.

[291] Kasdorf 2000, p. 22.

[319] Frieser 2007, p. 202.

[292] Healy 2008, p. 109.

[320] Jentz 1995, p. 130132

[293] Kasdorf 2000, p. 32.

[294] Frieser 2007, p. 111, 185.

[321] Frieser 2007, p. 151.

[295] Overy 1995, p. 205.

[322] Jentz 1995, p. 134

[296] Overy 1995, pp. 204205.

[323] Tiger 1 Heavy Tank 194245. Tom Jentz, Hilary Doyle.

Osprey Publishing, P. 41

[297] Frieser 2007, p. 188.

[298] Glantz & House 1995, p. 297.

[324] Frieser 2007, p. 204.

27

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of Adolf Hitler. Jeerson, N.C.: McFarland. ISBN
9780786420544.
Zamulin, Valeriy (2011). Demolishing the Myth:
The Tank Battle at Prokhorovka, Kursk, July 1943:
An Operational Narrative. Solihull: Helion & Company. ISBN 1-906033-89-7.

12

External links

Licari, Michael J. The Battle of Kursk: Myths and

Reality. Archived from the original on 2014-09-12.
Retrieved 2014-11-01.
Licari, Michael J. A Review Essay: Books on the
Battle of Kursk. Archived from the original on
2014-09-11. Retrieved 2014-11-01.
Wilson, Alan. Kursk Raw Data to Download, 6
February 1999. Information from the US Army
KOSAVE II study on the southern face battle
Wilson, Alan. The Kursk Region, July 1943 (maps),
27 October 1999
Armor and Blood: The Battle of Kursk: The Turning Point of World War II By Dennis E. Showalter
By Dennis E. Showalter Google Books

30

13

13
13.1

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Text and image sources, contributors, and licenses

Text

Battle of Kursk Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Kursk?oldid=677400134 Contributors: TwoOneTwo, Kpjas, The Epopt,

Bryan Derksen, BlckKnght, Gsl, XJaM, Maury Markowitz, FlorianMarquardt, Hephaestos, Leandrod, Tim Starling, Liftarn, Tannin, Bobby
D. Bryant, Sannse, Pde, Alo, Williamv1138, Stan Shebs, William M. Connolley, Susan Mason, Darkwind, RadRafe, Kimiko, Nikai, Med,
Evercat, Ineuw, Bob O'Bob, Pladask, Andrewman327, Peregrine981, Pedant17, Tpbradbury, Morwen, Stormie, Raul654, Adam Carr, Finlay McWalter, Dimadick, PBS, Altenmann, Halibutt, Caknuck, Kamakura, Demerzel~enwiki, Danceswithzerglings, SoLando, Xanzzibar,
Mattaschen, Carnildo, Marc Venot, Andries, Oberiko, Zigger, Marcika, Wwoods, ChessPlayer, Itpastorn, DO'Neil, Ezhiki, Mboverload,
Grant65, Bobblewik, OldakQuill, Utcursch, Sca, Calm, Gdr, GeneralPatton, Albrecht, ShakataGaNai, SimonArlott, 1297, Mzajac, Bodnotbod, Sam Hocevar, Irpen, Kevin Rector, Lacrimosus, D6, Jayjg, N328KF, Ularsen, Rindis, Lectiodicilior, Richardelainechambers,
Rich Farmbrough, Avriette, Guanabot, Kostja, SpookyMulder, ESkog, Darkone, Skorpionas, The King Of Gondor, El C, Shanes, Hurricane111, Robotje, Nyenyec, Shenme, Cmdrjameson, Giraedata, SpeedyGonsales, La goutte de pluie, SecretAgentMan00, King nothing,
John Fader, Uncle.bungle, Vslashg, LtNOWIS, Trainik, Andrew Gray, Denniss, Hohum, ElJayDee, Lumberjack steve, Cmapm, Skyring,
Ghirlandajo, Redvers, Halberdier, A D Monroe III, Pierre Aronax, Weyes, Nuno Tavares, Sars~enwiki, Woohookitty, Igny, PoccilScript,
Rocastelo, PatGallacher, Catalan, Pol098, Miss Madeline, GregorB, Eilthireach, Stefanomione, Palica, Mekong Bluesman, Dysepsion, MrSomeone, Graham87, Predius, Rjwilmsi, Tim!, Koavf, , Missmarple, Dcheng, Oblivious, Ligulem, Ghepeu, Mikem,
Durin, Kazak, DuKot, Ansbachdragoner, Tswold, Ground Zero, Goudzovski, Mimithebrain, Sennaista, Russavia, JoseFrancis, Chobot,
Beanbatch, Ahpook, Shervinafshar, YurikBot, Noclador, Oldwindybear, TSO1D, Jimp, RussBot, Fabartus, Junky, Swarshaw, Kurt Leyman, Chaser, Kirill Lokshin, Gaius Cornelius, Alex Bakharev, Wimt, David R. Ingham, Lowe4091, Welsh, Saeryn, Gillis, Patrick Neylan, SCZenz, Nick, Elektrocrow, Dbrs, Cinik, Dna-webmaster, Raistlin8r, Maphisto86, Manticore126, Josh3580, BorgQueen, Barbatus, Tyrenius, Curpsbot-unicodify, Nixer, Guinness man, DisambigBot, Otto ter Haar, Nick-D, Mhardcastle, SmackBot, Historian932,
Herostratus, KnowledgeOfSelf, Deathlibrarian, Deon Steyn, DMorpheus, Jblister, Wegesrand, Sue Anne, Eskimbot, Edgar181, Gilliam,
RobertBurrellDonkin, Hmains, Squiddy, Chris the speller, GoldDragon, Iskander32, Rex Germanus, Ksenon, Rshu, EncMstr, Jayanta
Sen, Basalisk, Nbarth, Farry, Hongooi, Rcbutcher, Constanz, Felixkrull, Trekphiler, Can't sleep, clown will eat me, Tswold@msn.com,
Ajaxkroon, MadameArsenic, Chulk90, DRahier, SuperDeng, FsSnowboard, Lazar Taxon, General Grievous, Greenshed, Brainhell,
Fuhghettaboutit, X-Flare-x, Thomascpre, Angrymutant, Nakon, Andreas1968, Hgilbert, PokeTIJeremy, Gbinal, The PIPE, Bradenripple, Vina-iwbot~enwiki, Igilli, Ohconfucius, Roatti, RASAM, Kuru, John, 3Jane, Peterlewis, Aleenf1, CBrown82633, Volker89, Notwist,
Clq, AdultSwim, Magere Hein, Gamahler, Andrwsc, Pisceanmars, Yev900, J.Matherly, Dl2000, Hu12, Keith-264, Krupkaa2, Clamum, Iridescent, Clarityend, JoeBot, Tmangray, Twas Now, Phoenixrod, FairuseBot, Tawkerbot2, Valoem, Plasma Twa 2, Fdssdf, Ehistory, HDCase, Adam Keller, Anubis-SG, ThreeBlindMice, AshLin, WeggeBot, Hi There, NE Ent, MikeWren, AndrewHowse, Danrok, Wikipedia
crusader, Gatoclass, AtTheAbyss, Travelbird, R-41, Checkmate123, Dreddnott, TheCheeseManCan, Thijs!bot, HappyInGeneral, Zickzack, Rickyyeo2503, Deschreiber, JustAGal, Carlinhos1976, Nirvana77, Nick Number, DPdH, RabbitHead, Mousebelt, Jj137, Mahhag,
Chill doubt, Dimawik, Omeganian, Wanderer602, CosineKitty, Ericoides, Igodard, Kirrages, Ironplay, Acroterion, Maxfurie, Diegovh,
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Papercrab, Xaliber, Eschnett, Bryson109, Yoyoyoma, RNELSON4, Jsamans, Dapi89, R'n'B, ONandy, Ericando, Markewew, J.delanoy,
MITBeaverRocks, Mew Lp, Wa3frp, Aleksandr Grigoryev, Yonidebot, Steve.beech, Thebuisnessman, Mathglot, Bad Night, Trumpet
marietta 45750, Ash sul, Mrg3105, Toadfootre, Chiswick Chap, Loohcsnuf, NewEnglandYankee, Bignra, Ko Soi IX, Je F F, Student7, MisterBee1966, Avial334, KylieTastic, Bogdan~enwiki, Daniel Wolf~enwiki, Jamesofur, Cvaltnm, Jevansen, Matej1234, Rocketlauncherman, Hugo999, DWPittelli, VolkovBot, Je G., Harfarhs, Fences and windows, Ilya1166, Tenacious D Fan, Toddy1, Ktalon,
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Maxim, Gwayne82, Jpeeling, Tttom, Koalorka, Sardaka, Busaccsb, Kobalt64, HansHermans, Aednichols, EmxBot, JamesSheep, Pdfpdf,
AbeTheFro, RogerInPDX, SieBot, Jewish-wargamer, Tiddly Tom, Work permit, WereSpielChequers, Soz101, Cwkmail, Kobalt65, Selerian, Flyer22, Avoidupper, Thannad, Steveshelokhonov, Tigertank18, Afernand74, StationNT5Bmedia, Jaan, Loanfordebt, SallyForth123,
ClueBot, C xong, MonkeyMensch, Phoenix-wiki, Binksternet, B1atv, Newzild, Rateblind, Irbergui, Lard Valdamart, Laudak, Mogtheforgetfulcat, Masterblooregard, Auntof6, Mspraveen, Excirial, EriFr, Uponneeds~enwiki, Socrates2008, Jusdafax, Sun Creator, Arjayay, Peter.C, Central Data Bank, Sturmvogel 66, Doprendek, SchreiberBike, Staygyro, Sholokhov, Mikidee27, XLinkBot, Keptbrief44, Deineka,
Addbot, Caer Idris, Caden, DOI bot, Keepback99, Peter558, AkhtaBot, Yelizandpaul, Leszek Jaczuk, Spartansoccer, Perseus71, LinkFABot, Brufnus, , Numbo3-bot, Minortooth55, Damwiki1, Lightbot, Joincomesfor, Zorrobot, Legobot, Luckas-bot, Yobot,
Crashmany00, Dodgerblue777, MTWEmperor, Amirobot, Reenem, Paul Siebert, Mike1975, AnomieBOT, Tryptosh, Jim1138, Tavrian,
StevenWT, Flewis, 90 Auto, Citation bot, Wikaholic, Xqbot, J G Campbell, Jerey Mall, Nasnema, DustFormsWords, Almabot, Anotherclown, Casurfer25, Kobalt08, HROThomas, Kebeta, Dan6hell66, Krasilschic, Nixn, Knispel, StoneProphet, FrescoBot, Recognizance, Jake V, Citation bot 1, Diwas, Redrose64, DrilBot, Simple Bob, HRoestBot, Nashu2k, Filz Patrick Dureza, Jandalhandler, Footwarrior, Full-date unlinking bot, Blckmgc, Caligulaspalace, White Shadows, DocYako, TwoNineFour, Tb311rdbrds, Trappist the monk,
Tpyvvikky, FlameHorse, Lotje, Dinamik-bot, TFTD, Diannaa, Stephen MUFC, Steel2009, TjBot, BearAllen, Kozation, DASHBot, Mukogodo, EmausBot, John of Reading, D2306, WikitanvirBot, IstrV, Shiva16, Dewritech, Blablaaa, Wikipelli, Djembayz, Bravo Foxtrot,
The Madras, Josve05a, Muta112, Emily Jensen, St.themill, Roadsteps, HammerFilmFan, CharlesACE, Igor Piryazev, Brandmeister,
ChuispastonBot, Cstough22, TheDarkBatman, BabbaQ, Davey2010, Gunbirddriver, ClueBot NG, Observerq, Southernelms, Hannibalcaesar, Ralph X. Williams III, Frietjes, Corusant, Alphasinus, Ninja Diannaa, Helpful Pixie Bot, Karen.stepanyan, DBigXray, Nwze344,
BG19bot, D-DAYFAN, 1942 Porsche, MiG29VN, Frze, MSandt, Tommy2215, Yowanvista, Pkkao2, Glevum, Hamish59, RGloucester,
Jtorba, Makasaurus, Choy4311, ChrisGualtieri, Valio subaru, Khazar2, Alexander Pastukh, Billyshiverstick, Dexbot, Irondome, Br'er Rabbit, Mogism, Cerabot~enwiki, Athomeinkobe, Solarislv, Scout1Treia, JaviP96, HarveyHenkelmann, DMorpheus2, EyeTruth, PillarOfHate,
Kap 7, StoryEpic, Literalman, Sylvainber, RaBOTnik, Yura2404, JaconaFrere, Yolotheyolo, Jonas Vinther, Monkbot, Vitek232, Golf,
Monopoly31121993, Tn hy, Zstewart40, Snorvege, Dixon1123, VexorAbVikipdia, Starrynuit, GeneralizationsAreBad, Green547, Harrisj20, Prinsgezinde, KasparBot, Ericheiker, Thientu1 and Anonymous: 638

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File:091220_guderian.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/e/e5/091220_guderian.jpg License: CC BY-SA

3.0 Contributors: Oberst Ludwig v. Eimannsberger Original artist: Oberst Ludwig v. Eimannsberger

13.2

Images

31

File:Battle_of_Kursk_(map).jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/e/e0/Battle_of_Kursk_%28map%29.jpg

License: Public domain Contributors: ? Original artist: ?
File:Bundesarchiv_Bild_101I-022-2925-17,_Russland,_motorisierte_Truppen.jpg
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wikipedia/commons/f/fe/Bundesarchiv_Bild_101I-022-2925-17%2C_Russland%2C_motorisierte_Truppen.jpg License: CC BY-SA
3.0 de Contributors: This image was provided to Wikimedia Commons by the German Federal Archive (Deutsches Bundesarchiv) as part
of a cooperation project. The German Federal Archive guarantees an authentic representation only using the originals (negative and/or
positive), resp. the digitalization of the originals as provided by the Digital Image Archive. Original artist: Wol/Altvater
File:Bundesarchiv_Bild_101I-022-2926-37,_Russland,_Vierlingsflak.jpg Source:
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commons/c/c3/Bundesarchiv_Bild_101I-022-2926-37%2C_Russland%2C_Vierlingsflak.jpg License: CC BY-SA 3.0 de Contributors:
This image was provided to Wikimedia Commons by the German Federal Archive (Deutsches Bundesarchiv) as part of a cooperation
project. The German Federal Archive guarantees an authentic representation only using the originals (negative and/or positive), resp. the
digitalization of the originals as provided by the Digital Image Archive. Original artist: Wol/Altvater
File:Bundesarchiv_Bild_101I-022-2948-19,_Russland,_Unternehmen_\char"0022\relax{}Zitadelle._Soldatengrab.jpg Source:
https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/c/c5/Bundesarchiv_Bild_101I-022-2948-19%2C_Russland%2C_Unternehmen_
%22Zitadelle%22._Soldatengrab.jpg License: CC BY-SA 3.0 de Contributors: This image was provided to Wikimedia Commons by the
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Archive. Original artist: Wol, Paul Dr.
File:Bundesarchiv_Bild_101I-022-2949-05,_Russland,_Soldaten_auf_Panzer_VI_\char"0022\relax{}Tiger_I.jpg
Source:
https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/e/ee/Bundesarchiv_Bild_101I-022-2949-05%2C_Russland%2C_Soldaten_auf_
Panzer_VI_%22Tiger_I%22.jpg License: CC BY-SA 3.0 de Contributors: This image was provided to Wikimedia Commons by the
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wikipedia/commons/e/ec/Bundesarchiv_Bild_101I-022-2950-22A%2C_Russland%2C_Panzer_im_Gel%C3%A4nde.2.jpg License: CC
BY-SA 3.0 de Contributors: This image was provided to Wikimedia Commons by the German Federal Archive (Deutsches Bundesarchiv)
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File:Bundesarchiv_Bild_101I-219-0553A-07,_Russland,_bei_Pokrowka,_erschpfte_Soldaten.jpg
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//upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/a/aa/Bundesarchiv_Bild_101I-219-0553A-07%2C_Russland%2C_bei_Pokrowka%
2C_ersch%C3%B6pfte_Soldaten.jpg License: CC BY-SA 3.0 de Contributors: This image was provided to Wikimedia Commons by the
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File:Bundesarchiv_Bild_101I-219-0553A-15,_Russland,_bei_Pokrowka,_Panzerhaubitze_'Wespe'.jpg
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2C_Panzerhaubitze_%27Wespe%27.jpg License: CC BY-SA 3.0 de Contributors: This image was provided to Wikimedia Commons
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File:Bundesarchiv_Bild_101I-219-0553A-16,_Russland,_bei_Pokrowka,_Kradschtzen.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.
org/wikipedia/commons/e/e3/Bundesarchiv_Bild_101I-219-0553A-16%2C_Russland%2C_bei_Pokrowka%2C_Kradsch%C3%
BCtzen.jpg License: CC BY-SA 3.0 de Contributors: This image was provided to Wikimedia Commons by the German Federal Archive
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Koch
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2C_russischer_Panzer_T34.jpg License: CC BY-SA 3.0 de Contributors: This image was provided to Wikimedia Commons by the
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Archive. Original artist: Koch
File:Bundesarchiv_Bild_101I-219-0596-12,_Russland,_Panzer_IV_und_Schtzenpanzer_in_Fahrt.jpg
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Sch%C3%BCtzenpanzer_in_Fahrt.jpg License: CC BY-SA 3.0 de Contributors: This image was provided to Wikimedia Commons by the
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wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/7/7f/Bundesarchiv_Bild_101III-Cantzler-077-24%2C_Russland%2C_Vormarsch_deutscher_
Panzer.jpg License: CC BY-SA 3.0 de Contributors: This image was provided to Wikimedia Commons by the German Federal Archive
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Cantzler
File:Bundesarchiv_Bild_101III-Cantzler-077-39,_Russland,_Angehrige_der_Waffen-SS_in_einer_Stellung.jpg
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https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/b/b5/Bundesarchiv_Bild_101III-Cantzler-077-39%2C_Russland%2C_Angeh%C3%
B6rige_der_Waffen-SS_in_einer_Stellung.jpg License: CC BY-SA 3.0 de Contributors: This image was provided to Wikimedia Commons
by the German Federal Archive (Deutsches Bundesarchiv) as part of a cooperation project. The German Federal Archive guarantees

32

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TEXT AND IMAGE SOURCES, CONTRIBUTORS, AND LICENSES

an authentic representation only using the originals (negative and/or positive), resp. the digitalization of the originals as provided by the
Digital Image Archive. Original artist: Cantzler
File:Bundesarchiv_Bild_101III-Groenert-019-23A,_Schlacht_um_Kursk,_Panzer_VI_(Tiger_I).jpg
Source:
https:
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Panzer_VI_%28Tiger_I%29.jpg License: CC BY-SA 3.0 de Contributors: This image was provided to Wikimedia Commons by the
German Federal Archive (Deutsches Bundesarchiv) as part of a cooperation project. The German Federal Archive guarantees an authentic
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Archive. Original artist: Grnert
File:Bundesarchiv_Bild_101III-Merz-014-12A,_Russland,_Beginn_Unternehmen_Zitadelle,_Panzer.jpg
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Unternehmen_Zitadelle%2C_Panzer.jpg License: CC BY-SA 3.0 de Contributors: This image was provided to Wikimedia Commons
by the German Federal Archive (Deutsches Bundesarchiv) as part of a cooperation project. The German Federal Archive guarantees
an authentic representation only using the originals (negative and/or positive), resp. the digitalization of the originals as provided by the
Digital Image Archive. Original artist: Merz
File:Bundesarchiv_Bild_101III-Neumann-111-31,_Russland,_bei_Charkow,_Panzer.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/
wikipedia/commons/8/81/Bundesarchiv_Bild_101III-Neumann-111-31%2C_Russland%2C_bei_Charkow%2C_Panzer.jpg
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(negative and/or positive), resp. the digitalization of the originals as provided by the Digital Image Archive. Original artist: Neumann
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Panzer_VI_%28Tiger_I%29.jpg License: CC BY-SA 3.0 de Contributors: This image was provided to Wikimedia Commons by the
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representation only using the originals (negative and/or positive), resp. the digitalization of the originals as provided by the Digital Image
Archive. Original artist: Zschckel, Friedrich
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Panzer_VI_%28Tiger_I%29.jpg License: CC BY-SA 3.0 de Contributors: This image was provided to Wikimedia Commons by the
German Federal Archive (Deutsches Bundesarchiv) as part of a cooperation project. The German Federal Archive guarantees an authentic
representation only using the originals (negative and/or positive), resp. the digitalization of the originals as provided by the Digital Image
Archive. Original artist: Zschckel, Friedrich
File:Bundesarchiv_Bild_183-2005-1017-519,_Russland,_Generaloberst_Model_vor_Sluzk.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.
org/wikipedia/commons/e/e8/Bundesarchiv_Bild_183-2005-1017-519%2C_Russland%2C_Generaloberst_Model_vor_Sluzk.jpg
License: CC BY-SA 3.0 de Contributors: This image was provided to Wikimedia Commons by the German Federal Archive (Deutsches
Bundesarchiv) as part of a cooperation project. The German Federal Archive guarantees an authentic representation only using the originals
(negative and/or positive), resp. the digitalization of the originals as provided by the Digital Image Archive. Original artist: Lucke, Fritz
File:Bundesarchiv_Bild_183-J14813,_Bei_Orel,_Panzer_VI_(Tiger_I).jpg Source:
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commons/7/71/Bundesarchiv_Bild_183-J14813%2C_Bei_Orel%2C_Panzer_VI_%28Tiger_I%29.jpg License: CC BY-SA 3.0 de
Contributors: This image was provided to Wikimedia Commons by the German Federal Archive (Deutsches Bundesarchiv) as part of
a cooperation project. The German Federal Archive guarantees an authentic representation only using the originals (negative and/or
positive), resp. the digitalization of the originals as provided by the Digital Image Archive. Original artist: Henisch
File:Carri_armati_KV1.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/0/05/Carri_armati_KV1.jpg License: Public domain Contributors: scan da 'Il Terzo Reich -Verso l'epilogo' di AA.VV.,Hobby &Work 1993 Original artist: fotoreporter sovietico sconosciuto
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File:Flag_of_German_Reich_(19351945).svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/9/99/Flag_of_German_
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Soviet_Union_%281923-1955%29.svg License: CC-BY-SA-3.0 Contributors: ? Original artist: created by rotemliss from Image:Flag of
the Soviet Union.svg.
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Kurska_%C4%8Dervenec_1943.jpg License: Public domain Contributors: http://bronesite.narod.ru/Other/Lee.htm Original artist: Unknown
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He_111_during_the_Battle_of_Britain.jpg License: Public domain Contributors: This is photograph MH6547 from the collections of the
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