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ANTONIO Y. CO, petitioner, vs.


The petitioners come to this Court asking for the setting aside and reversal of a
decision of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET).
The HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born Filipino citizen
and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar for voting purposes.
On May 11, 1987, the congressional election for the second district of Northern
Samar was held.
Among the candidates who vied for the position of representative in the second
legislative district of Northern Samar are the petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and
Antonio Co and the private respondent, Jose Ong, Jr.
Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected representative of the second
district of Northern Samar.
The petitioners filed election protests against the private respondent premised on
the following grounds:
1)Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of the Philippines; and
2)Jose Ong, Jr. is not a resident of the second district of Northern Samar.
The HRET in its decision dated November 6, 1989, found for the private
A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioners on November 12, 1989.
This was, however, denied by the HRET in its resolution dated February 22, 1989.
Hence, these petitions for certiorari.
WON Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born citizen of the Philippines.
Held: Yes. Petitions are dismissed.
The records show that in the year 1895, Ong Te (Jose Ong's grandfather), arrived
in the Philippines from China. Ong Te established his residence in the municipality
of Laoang, Samar on land which he bought from the fruits of hard work.
As a resident of Laoang, Ong Te was able to obtain a certificate of residence from
the then Spanish colonial administration.
The father of the private respondent, Jose Ong Chuan was born in China in 1905.
He was brought by Ong Te to Samar in the year 1915. Jose Ong Chuan spent his
childhood in the province of Samar.
As Jose Ong Chuan grew older in the rural and seaside community of Laoang, he
absorbed Filipino cultural values and practices. He was baptized into Christianity.
As the years passed, Jose Ong Chuan met a natural born-Filipino, Agripina Lao.
The two fell in love and, thereafter, got married in 1932 according to Catholic
faith and practice.

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The couple bore eight children, one of whom is the Jose Ong who was born in
Jose Ong Chuan never emigrated from this country. He decided to put up a
hardware store and shared and survived the vicissitudes of life in Samar.
The business prospered. Expansion became inevitable. As a result, a branch was
set-up in Binondo, Manila. In the meantime, Jose Ong Chuan, unsure of his legal
status and in an unequivocal affirmation of where he cast his life and family, filed
with the Court of First Instance of Samar an application for naturalization on
February 15, 1954.
On April 28, 1955, the CFI of Samar, after trial, declared Jose Ong Chuan a Filipino
citizen. On May 15, 1957, the Court of First Instance of Samar issued an order
declaring the decision of April 28, 1955 as final and executory and that Jose Ong
Chuan may already take his Oath of Allegiance.
Pursuant to said order, Jose Ong Chuan took his Oath of Allegiance;
correspondingly, a certificate of naturalization was issued to him. During this
time, Jose Ong (private respondent) was 9 years old, finishing his elementary
education in the province of Samar.
There is nothing in the records to differentiate him from other Filipinos insofar as
the customs and practices of the local populace were concerned.
After completing his elementary education, the private respondent, in search for
better education, went to Manila in order to acquire his secondary and college
Jose Ong graduated from college, and thereafter took and passed the CPA Board
Examinations. Since employment opportunities were better in Manila, the
respondent looked for work here. He found a job in the Central Bank of the
Philippines as an examiner. Later, however, he worked in the hardware business
of his family in Manila.
In 1971, his elder brother, Emil, was elected as a delegate to the 1971
Constitutional Convention. His status as a natural born citizen was challenged.
Parenthetically, the Convention which in drafting the Constitution removed the
unequal treatment given to derived citizenship on the basis of the mother's
citizenship formally and solemnly declared Emil Ong, respondent's full brother, as
a natural born Filipino. The Constitutional Convention had to be aware of the
meaning of natural born citizenship since it was precisely amending the article on
this subject.
The pertinent portions of the Constitution found in Article IV read:
SECTION 1, the following are citizens of the Philippines:
Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of
the Constitution;
Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and
Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

SECTION 2, Natural-born Citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines
from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their
citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph 3
hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens.
The Court interprets Section 1, Paragraph 3 above as applying not only to those
who elect Philippine citizenship after February 2, 1987 but also to those who,
having been born of Filipino mothers, elected citizenship before that date. The
provision in question was enacted to correct the anomalous situation where one
born of a Filipino father and an alien mother was automatically granted the status
of a natural-born citizen while one born of a Filipino mother and an alien father
would still have to elect Philippine citizenship. If one so elected, he was not, under
earlier laws, conferred the status of a natural-born
Election becomes material because Section 2 of Article IV of the Constitution
accords natural born status to children born of Filipino mothers before January 17,
1973, if they elect citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.
To expect the respondent to have formally or in writing elected citizenship when
he came of age is to ask for the unnatural and unnecessary. He was already a
citizen. Not only was his mother a natural born citizen but his father had been
naturalized when the respondent was only nine (9) years old.
He could not have divined when he came of age that in 1973 and 1987 the
Constitution would be amended to require him to have filed a sworn statement in
1969 electing citizenship inspite of his already having been a citizen since 1957.
In 1969, election through a sworn statement would have been an unusual and
unnecessary procedure for one who had been a citizen since he was nine years
In Re: Florencio Mallare: the Court held that the exercise of the right of suffrage
and the participation in election exercises constitute a positive act of election of
Philippine citizenship
The private respondent did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage. He
has established his life here in the Philippines.
Petitioners alleged that Jose Ong Chuan was not validly a naturalized citizen
because of his premature taking of the oath of citizenship.
SC: The Court cannot go into the collateral procedure of stripping respondents
father of his citizenship after his death. An attack on a persons citizenship may
only be done through a direct action for its nullity, therefore, to ask the Court to
declare the grant of Philippine citizenship to respondents father as null and void
would run against the principle of due process because he has already been laid
to rest

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FACTS: In the case at bar, petitioner challenged respondents right to hold public
office on the ground that the latter was an alien. Respondent maintains that he is
a son of a Filipino, was a holder of a valid subsisting passport, a continuous
resident of the Philippines and a registered voter since 1965. He was, however,
also a holder of an alien registration certificate.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent is an alien.
HELD: No, because by virtue of his being a son of a Filipino, it is presumed that he
was a Filipino and remained Filipino until proof could be shown that he had
renounced or lost his Philippine citizenship. In addition, possession of an alien
registration certificate unaccompanied by proof of performance of acts whereby
Philippine citizenship had been lost is not adequate proof of loss of citizenship.

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Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a passport visa to enter the Philippines as a nonimmigrant on 8 February 1961. In the interrogation made in connection with her
application for a temporary visitor's visa to enter the Philippines, she stated that
she was a Chinese residing at Kowloon, Hongkong, and that she desired to take a
pleasure trip to the Philippines to visit her great grand uncle, Lau Ching Ping. She
was permitted to come into the Philippines on 13 March 1961 for a period of one
On the date of her arrival, Asher Y. Cheng filed a bond in the amount of P1,000.00
to undertake, among others, that said Lau Yuen Yeung would actually depart from
the Philippines on or before the expiration of her authorized period of stay in this
country or within the period as in his discretion the Commissioner of Immigration
or his authorized representative might properly allow.
After repeated extensions, Lau Yuen Yeung was allowed to stay in the Philippines
up to 13 February 1962. On 25 January 1962, she contracted marriage with Moy
Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim an alleged Filipino citizen. Because of the
contemplated action of the Commissioner of Immigration to confiscate her bond
and order her arrest and immediate deportation, after the expiration of her
authorized stay, she brought an action for injunction. At the hearing which took
place one and a half years after her arrival, it was admitted that Lau Yuen Yeung
could not write and speak either English or Tagalog, except for a few words. She
could not name any Filipino neighbor, with a Filipino name except one, Rosa. She
did not know the names of her brothers-in-law, or sisters-in-law. As a result, the
Court of First Instance of Manila denied the prayer for preliminary injunction.
Moya Lim Yao and Lau Yuen Yeung appealed.
Whether or not Lau Yuen Yeung ipso facto became a Filipino citizen upon her
marriage to a Filipino citizen.

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Under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying a Filipino,
native born or naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not
disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines under Section 4 of the same law.
Likewise, an alien woman married to an alien who is subsequently naturalized
here follows the Philippine citizenship of her husband the moment he takes his
oath as Filipino citizen, provided that she does not suffer from any of the
disqualifications under said Section 4. Whether the alien woman requires to
undergo the naturalization proceedings, Section 15 is a parallel provision to
Section 16. Thus, if the widow of an applicant for naturalization as Filipino, who
dies during the proceedings, is not required to go through a naturalization
proceedings, in order to be considered as a Filipino citizen hereof, it should follow
that the wife of a living Filipino cannot be denied the same privilege.
This is plain common sense and there is absolutely no evidence that the
Legislature intended to treat them differently. As the laws of our country, both
substantive and procedural, stand today, there is no such procedure (a substitute
for naturalization proceeding to enable the alien wife of a Philippine citizen to
have the matter of her own citizenship settled and established so that she may
not have to be called upon to prove it everytime she has to perform an act or
enter into a transaction or business or exercise a right reserved only to Filipinos),
but such is no proof that the citizenship is not vested as of the date of marriage or
the husband's acquisition of citizenship, as the case may be, for the truth is that
the situation obtains even as to native-born Filipinos. Everytime the citizenship of
a person is material or indispensible in a judicial or administrative case. Whatever
the corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as to such
citizenship is generally not considered as res adjudicata, hence it has to be
threshed out again and again as the occasion may demand. Lau Yuen Yeung, was
declared to have become a Filipino citizen from and by virtue of her marriage to
Moy Ya Lim Yao al as Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim, a Filipino citizen of 25 January 1962.

Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor of the province of Sorsogon and
assumed office in due time. The League of Municipalities filed with the COMELEC
a petition for the annulment of Frivaldo on the ground that he was not a Filipino
citizen, having been naturalized in the United States.
Frivaldo admitted the allegations but pleaded the special and affirmative defenses
that he was naturalized as American citizen only to protect himself against
President Marcos during the Martial Law era.
Whether or not Frivaldo is a Filipino citizen.
No. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a qualified voter
must be, among other qualifications, a citizen of the Philippines, this being an
indispensable requirement for suffrage under Article V, Section 1, of the
He claims that he has reacquired Philippine citizenship by virtue of valid
repatriation. He claims that by actively participating in the local elections, he
automatically forfeited American citizenship under the laws of the United States
of America. The Court stated that that the alleged forfeiture was between him and
the US. If he really wanted to drop his American citizenship, he could do so in
accordance with CA No. 63 as amended by CA No. 473 and PD 725. Philippine
citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by

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Labo, Jr. vs COMELEC, [176 SCRA 1; GR 86564, August 1, 1989]

Facts: Petitioner and Respondent were candidates for the office of the Mayor of
Baguio City during Elections. Having garnered the highest number of votes,
Petitioner was elected and proclaimed winner while Respondent garnered the
second highest number of votes. Subsequently Respondent filed a petition for quo
warranto contesting the election of the Petitioner on the ground that the latter is
a naturalized Australian citizen and was divested of his Philippine citizenship
having sworn allegiance to the Queen of Australia. Petitioner opposes to the
Section 42 of the Local Government Code provides for the qualifications that an
elective official must be a citizen of the Philippines.
From the evidence adduced, it was found out that citizenship requirements were
not possessed by the petitioner during elections. He was disqualified from running
as mayor and, although elected, is not now qualified to serve as such.
Issue: WON private respondent, having garnered the 2nd highest number of
votes, can replace the petitioner as mayor.
Held: No. The simple reason is that he obtained only the second highest number
of votes in the election, he was obviously not the choice of the people of Baguio
The fact that the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is later
declared to be disqualified or not eligible for the office to which he was elected
does not necessarily entitle the candidate who obtained the second highest
number of votes to be declared the winner of the elective office.

Ramon Labo, Jr. vs COMELEC

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Facts: For the second time around, believing that he is a Filipino ctizen, Ramon
Labo, Jr filed his COC for mayor of Baguio City on March 23, 1992 for the May 11,
1992 elections. Petitioner Roberto Ortega on other hand, also filed his COC for the
same office on March 25, 1992.
On March 26, 1992, petitioner Ortega filed a disqualification proceeding against
Labo before the COMELEC on the ground that Labo is not a Filipino citizen.
On May 9, 1992, respondent Comelec issued the assailed resolution denying
Labos COC.
On May 10, 1992, respondent Comelec issued an Order which reads: Acting on
the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Clarification, filed by respondent (Labo) on May
9, 1992, the Commission resolves that the decision promulgated on May 9, 1992
disqualifying respondent Ramon L. Labo, Jr., shall become final and executory only
after five (5) days from promulgation pursuant to Rule 18, Section 13, Paragraph
(b) of the Comelec Rules of Procedure.
Accordingly, respondent (Labo) may still continue to be voted upon as candidate
for City Mayor of Baguio City on May 11, 1992 subject to the final outcome of this
case in the event the issue is elevated to the Supreme Court either on appeal or
On May 13, 1992, respondent Comelec resolved, motu proprio to suspend the
proclamation of Labo in the event he wins in the elections for the City Mayor of
On May 15, 1992, petitioner Labo filed the instant petition for review with prayer,
among others, for the issuance of a temporary restraining order to set aside the
May 9, 1992 resolution of respondent Comelec; to render judgment declaring him
as a Filipino citizen; and to direct respondent Comelec to proceed with his
proclamation in the event he wins in the contested elections.
Petitioner Ortega argues that respondent Comelec committed grave abuse of
discretion when it refused to implement its May 9, 1992 resolution
notwithstanding the fact that said resolution disqualifying Labo has already
become final and executory.
Petitioner Ortega submits that since this Court did not issue a temporary
restraining order as regards the May 9, 1992 resolution of respondent Comelec
cancelling Labos certificate of candidacy, said resolution has already become
final and executory. Ortega further posits the view that as a result of such finality,

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the candidate receiving the next highest number of votes should be declared
Mayor of Baguio City.
Sec. 78 of the Omnibus Election Code provides: Petition to deny due course or to
cancel a certificate of candidacy
(e) The decision, order, or ruling of the Commission shall, after five (5) days from
receipt of a copy thereof by the parties, be final and executory unless stayed by
the Supreme Court.
WON Petitioner Labo who had the highest number of votes is qualified to assume
as Mayor of Baguio City.
WON disqualification of petitioner Labo entitles the candidate (Ortega) receiving
the next highest number of votes to be proclaimed as the winning candidate for
mayor of Baguio City.
First Issue:
No. At the time petitioner Labo filed his petition on May 15, 1992, the May 9, 1992
resolution of respondent Comelec cancelling his (Labos) certificate of candidacy
had already become final and executory a day earlier, or on May 14, 1992, said
resolution having been received by petitioner Labo on the same day it was
promulgated, i.e., May 9, 1992 and in the interim no restraining order was issued
by this Court.
The resolution cancelling Labos certificate of candidacy on the ground that he is
not a Filipino citizen having acquired finality on May 14, 1992 constrains the SC to
rule against his proclamation as Mayor of Baguio City.
Sec. 39 of the LGC provides that an elective local official must be a citizen of the
Philippines. Undoubtedly, petitioner Labo, not being a Filipino citizen, lacks the
fundamental qualification for the contested office. Philippine citizenship is an
indispensable requirement for holding an elective office. The fact that he was
elected by the majority of the electorate is of no moment.
Second Issue:
No. The disqualification of petitioner Labo does not necessarily entitle petitioner
Ortega as the candidate with the next highest number of votes to proclamation as
the Mayor of Baguio City.

While Ortega may have garnered the second highest number of votes for the
office of city mayor, the fact remains that he was not the choice of the sovereign
will. Petitioner Labo was overwhelmingly voted by the electorate for the office of
mayor in the belief that he was then qualified to serve the people of Baguio City
and his subsequent disqualification does not make respondent Ortega the mayorelect.
Petitioner Ortega lost in the election. He was repudiated by the electorate. He was
obviously not the choice of the people of Baguio City.
Thus, while respondent Ortega (GR No. 105111) originally filed a disqualification
case with the Comelec (docketed as SPA-92-029) seeking to deny due course to
petitioners (Labos) candidacy, the same did not deter the people of Baguio City
from voting for petitioner Labo, who, by then, was allowed by the respondent
Comelec to be voted upon, the resolution for his disqualification having yet to
attain the degree of finality (Sec. 78. Omnibus Election Code).
The rule, therefore, is: the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes
does not entitle the eligible candidate receiving the next highest number of votes
to be declared elected. A minority or defeated candidate cannot be deemed
elected to the office.

Note: Its useless to file for disqualification when the decision comes out after the

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William Li Yao was naturalized as a Filipino citizen pursuant to the C.A. No. 473
and R.A. No. 530. 15 years later, the Solicitor General filed a petition to cancel his
naturalization because he obtained such through fraud and tax evasion. Li Yao
denied the allegations.
Whether or not the cancellation of Li Yao's naturalization is valid.
Yes. The cancellation of the naturalization certificate of Li Yao was on the ground
that it was "fraudulently and illegally obtained" based on the Section 18(a) of CA
473, also known as the Revised Naturalization Law.
A certificate of naturalization may be cancelled if it is subsequently discovered
that the applicant obtained it by misleading the court upon any material fact. Law
and jurisprudence even authorize the cancellation of a certificate of naturalization
upon ground had conditions arising subsequent to the granting of the certificate.
Moreover, a naturalization proceeding is not a judicial adversary proceeding, the
decision rendered therein, not constituting res judicata as to any matter that
would support a judgment cancelling a certificate of naturalization on the ground
of illegal or fraudulent procurement thereof.

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Petitioner Oh Hek How having been granted naturalization through his petition
filed a motion alleging that he had complied with the requirements of Republic
Act No. 530 and praying that he be allowed to take his oath of allegiance as such
citizen and issued the corresponding certificate of naturalization. The Court of
First Instance of Zamboanga del Norte issued forthwith an order authorizing the
taking of said oath. On that same date, petitioner took it and the certificate of
naturalization was issued to him. The Government seasonably gave notice of its
intention to appeal from said order of February9, 1966 and filed its record on
appeal among the grounds that the oath was taken prior to judgment having been
final and executory.
- Is the oath valid
- Whether or not a permission to renounce citizenship is necessary from the
Minister of the Interior of Nationalist China.

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Petitioner Ernesto Mercado and respondent Eduardo Manzano were

candidates for vice-mayor in Makati City in the May 11, 1998

Manzano got the most number of votes but his proclamation was
suspended in view of the pending petition for disqualification filed by a certain
Ernesto Mamaril who alleged that private respondent was not a citizen of the PH
but of the US


Failure of COMELEC en banc to address the petitioners Motion to Intervene

justifies petitioner to file this case



On May 7 1998, COMELEC Second Division ordered the cancellation of the

CoC of the respondent on the ground that he is a dual citizen and, under Section
40(d) of the Local Government Code, persons with dual citizenship are
disqualified from running for any elective position

DUAL CITIZENSHIP: arises when, as a result of the concurrent application

of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered
a national by the said states

Manzano was born to his Filipino parents in San Francisco California on

September 14, 1955 and is considered an American citizen under US laws

DUAL ALLEGIANCE: person owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or

more states; result of an individuals own volition

31August: COMELEC en banc reversed decision of the Second Division and

declared Manzano qualified to run for vice-mayor stating that Manzano is also a
Filipino citizen by operation of the 1935 constitution and he has effectively
renounced his US citizenship when he registered himself as a voter and voted in
the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998

Section 5 Art 4 of the Constitution concerns naturalized citizens who

maintain their allegiance to their country of origin

In view of this, Manzano was proclaimed as vice-mayor of Makati

Ernesto Mercado who ranked next to Manzano in the elections filed this

Whether petitioner Mercado has personality to bring this suit
Whether respondent Manzano possesses dual citizenship and, if so, whether he is
disqualified from being a candidate for vice mayor of Makati City
Ruling: Petition DISMISSED.

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Disqualification based on dual citizenship contemplates dual allegiance

For candidates with dual citizenship, it would be suffice if they elect

Philippine citizenship upon filing their CoC to terminate their status as persons
with dual citizenship

Valles v. Comelec
FACTS: Respondent was born in Australia to a Filipino father and an Australian
mother. Australia follows jus soli. She ran for governor. Opponent filed petition
to disqualify her on the ground of dual citizenship.
HELD: Dual citizenship as a disqualification refers to citizens with dual allegiance.
The fact that she has dual citizenship does not automatically disqualify her from
running for public office. Filing a certificate of candidacy suffices to renounce
foreign citizenship because in the certificate, the candidate declares himself to be
a Filipino citizen and that he will support the Philippine Constitution. Such
declaration operates as an effective renunciation of foreign citizenship.

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Tecson vs. COMELEC

FACTS: Petitioners questioned the jurisdiction of the COMELEC in taking
cognizance of and deciding the citizenship issue affecting Fernando Poe Jr. They
asserted that under Section 4(7) , Article VII of the 1987 Constituition, only the
Supreme Court had original and exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the basic issue of
the case.
ISSUE: As the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) , does the Supreme Court have
jurisdiction over the qualifications of presidential candidates?
RULING: No. An examination of the phraseology in Rule 12, 13, and Rule 14 of the
"Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal," promulgated by the Supreme Court
on April 1992 categorically speak of the jurisdiction of the tribunal over contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the "President" or "VicePresident", of the Philippines, and not of "candidates" for President or VicePresident. A quo warranto proceeding is generally defined as being an action
against a person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a
public office. In such context, the election contest can only contemplate a postelection scenario. In Rule 14, only a registered candidate who would have
received either the second or third highest number of votes could file an election
protest. This rule again presupposes a post-election scenario.
It is fair to conclude that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, defined by Section
4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, would not include cases directly brought
before it, questioning the qualifications of a candidate for the presidency or vicepresidency before the elections are held.

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The petitioner is a natural-born Filipino citizen having been born of Filipino parents
on August 8, 1944. On December 13, 1984, she became a naturalized Australian
citizen owing to her marriage to a certain Kevin Thomas Condon.
On December 2, 2005, she filed an application to re-acquire Philippine citizenship
before the Philippine Embassy in Canberra, Australia pursuant to Section 3 of R.A.
No. 9225 otherwise known as the "Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of
2003."5 The application was approved and the petitioner took her oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on December 5, 2005.
On September 18, 2006, the petitioner filed an unsworn Declaration of
Renunciation of Australian Citizenship before the Department of Immigration and
Indigenous Affairs, Canberra, Australia, which in turn issued the Order dated
September 27, 2006 certifying that she has ceased to be an Australian citizen.6
The petitioner ran for Mayor in her hometown of Caba, La Union in the 2007
elections. She lost in her bid. She again sought elective office during the May 10,
2010 elections this time for the position of Vice-Mayor. She obtained the highest
numbers of votes and was proclaimed as the winning candidate. She took her
oath of office on May 13, 2010.
Soon thereafter, private respondents Robelito V. Picar, Wilma P. Pagaduan7 and
Luis M. Bautista,8 (private respondents) all registered voters of Caba, La Union,
filed separate petitions for quo warranto questioning the petitioners eligibility
before the RTC. The petitions similarly sought the petitioners disqualification from
holding her elective post on the ground that she is a dual citizen and that she
failed to execute a "personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath" as imposed
by Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225.
The petitioner denied being a dual citizen and averred that since September 27,
2006, she ceased to be an Australian citizen. She claimed that the Declaration of
Renunciation of Australian Citizenship she executed in Australia sufficiently
complied with Section 5(2), R.A. No. 9225 and that her act of running for public
office is a clear abandonment of her Australian citizenship.
The trial decision ordered by the trial court declaring Condon disqualified and
ineligible to hold office of vice mayor of Caba La union and nullified her
proclamation as the winning candidate.

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After that the decision was appealed to the comelec, but the appeal was
dismissed y the second division and affirmed the decision of the trial court.
The petitioner contends that since she ceased to be an Australian citizen on
September 27, 2006, she no longer held dual citizenship and was only a Filipino
citizen when she filed her certificate of candidacy as early as the 2007 elections.
Hence, the "personal and sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship" imposed by
Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 to dual citizens seeking elective office does not
apply to her.
Issue: W/N petitioner disqualified from running for elective office due to failure to
renounce her Australian Citizenship in accordance with Sec. 5 (2) of R.A 9225
R.A. No. 9225 allows the retention and re-acquisition of Filipino citizenship for
natural-born citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship18 by taking an
oath of allegiance to the Republic.
Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act,
become citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon
taking the aforesaid oath.
The oath is an abbreviated repatriation process that restores ones Filipino
citizenship and all civil and political rights and obligations concomitant therewith,
subject to certain conditions imposed in Section 5.
Section 5, paragraph 2 provides:
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the
qualification for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and
existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a
personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any
public officer authorized to administer an oath.
On September 18, 2006, or a year before she initially sought elective public
office, she filed a renunciation of Australian citizenship in Canberra, Australia.
Admittedly, however, the same was not under oath contrary to the exact
mandate of Section 5(2) that the renunciation of foreign citizenship must be
sworn before an officer authorized to administer oath.
The supreme court said that, the renunciation of her Australian citizenship was
invalid due to it was not oath before any public officer authorized to administer it
rendering the act of Condon void.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. The
Resolution dated September 6, 2011 of the Commission on Elections en bane in