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National Sugar Refineries Corp v. NLRC

Facts:
Petitioner National Sugar Refineries Corporation (NASUREFCO), a corporation which is fully
owned and controlled by the Government, operates three (3) sugar refineries located at
Bukidnon, Iloilo and Batangas. Private respondent union represents the former supervisors of the
NASUREFCO Batangas Sugar Refinery.
In 1988, petitioner implemented a Job Evaluation (JE) Program affecting all employees, from rankand-file to department heads. We glean from the records that for about ten years prior to the JE
Program, the members of respondent union were treated in the same manner as rank-and file
employees. As such, they used to be paid overtime, rest day and holiday pay pursuant to the
provisions of Articles 87, 93 and 94 of the Labor Code as amended.
With the implementation of the JE Program, members of respondent union were re-classified
under levels S-5 to S-8 which are considered managerial staff for purposes of compensation and
benefits.
In May 1990, petitioner NASUREFCO recognized herein respondent union, which was organized
pursuant to Republic Act NO. 6715 allowing supervisory employees to form their own unions, as
the bargaining representative of all the supervisory employees at the NASUREFCO Batangas
Sugar Refinery.
In June 1990, the members of herein respondent union filed a complainant with the executive
labor arbiter for non-payment of overtime, rest day and holiday pay allegedly in violation of
Article 100 of the Labor Code.
In 1991, Executive Labor Arbiter Pido directed NASUREFCO to pay for the wages complained of.
On appeal, in a decision promulgated on July 1991, respondent National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) affirmed the decision of the labor arbiter on the ground that the members of
respondent union are not managerial employees, and, therefore, they are entitled to overtime,
rest day and holiday pay. Respondent NLRC declared that these supervisory employees are
merely exercising recommendatory powers subject to the evaluation, review and final action by
their department heads.
Issue: W/N the Supervisors are considered Managerial Employees and should no longer receive
overtime, rest day and holiday pay.
Ruling: Yes
Ratio: "Art. 82 Coverage. The provisions of this title shall apply to employees in all
establishments and undertakings whether for profit or not, but not to government employees,
managerial employees, field personnel, members of the family of the employer who are
dependent on him for support, domestic helpers, persons in the personal service of another, and
workers who are paid by results as determined by the Secretary of Labor in Appropriate
regulations.
"As used herein, 'managerial employees' refer to those whose primary duty consists of the
management of the establishment in which they are employed or of a department or subdivision
thereof, and to other officers or members of the managerial staff." (Emphasis supplied.)

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It is the submission of petitioner that while the members of respondent union, as supervisors,
may not be occupying managerial positions, they are clearly officers or members of the
managerial staff because they meet all the conditions prescribed by law and, hence, they are not
entitled to overtime, rest day.
Quintessentially, with the promotion of the union members, they are no longer entitled to the
benefits which attach and pertain exclusively to their positions. Entitlement to the benefits
provided for by law requires prior compliance with the conditions set forth therein. With the
promotion of the members of respondent union, they occupied positions which no longer met the
requirements imposed by law. Their assumption of these positions removed them from the
coverage of the law, ergo, their exemption therefrom.
As correctly pointed out by petitioner, if the union members really wanted to continue receiving
the benefits which attach to their former positions, there was nothing to prevent them from
refusing to accept their promotions and their corresponding benefits. As the saying goes by, they
could not, as a simple matter of law and fairness, get the best of both worlds at the expense of
NASUREFCO.
Promotion of its employees is one of the jurisprudentially-recognized exclusive prerogatives of
management, provided it is done in good faith. In the case at bar, private respondent union has
miserably failed to convince this Court that the petitioner acted implementing the JE Program.
There is no showing that the JE Program was intended to circumvent the law and deprive the
members of respondent union of the benefits they used to receive.

APEX MINING CO., INC. versus NLRC

FACTS:
Private respondent Sinclita Candida was employed by petitioner Apex Mining Company, Inc to perform laundry
services at its staff house.
On December 18, 1987, while she was attending to her assigned task and she was hanging her laundry, she
accidentally slipped and hit her back on a stone. As a result of the accident she was not able to continue with her
work. She was permitted to go on leave for medication.
De la Rosa offered her the amount of P 2,000.00 which was eventually increased to P5,000.00 to persuade her to
quit her job, but she refused the offer and preferred to return to work.
Petitioner did not allow her to return to work and dismissed her on February 4, 1988.
Private respondent filed a request for assistance with the Department of Labor and Employment, which the latter
rendered its Decision by ordering the Apex Mining Co. to pay Candida the total amount of P55,161.42 for salary
differential, emergency living allowance, 13th month pay differential and separation pay.
Petitioner appealed the case before the NLRC, which was subsequently dismissed for lack of merit.
ISSUE: Whether or not the private respondent should be treated as househelper or domestic servant or a regular employee.
HELD:
Under Rule XIII, Section l(b), Book 3 of the Labor Code, as amended, the term "househelper" as used herein is
synonymous to the term "domestic servant" and shall refer to any person, whether male or female, who renders
services in and about the employer's home and which services are usually necessary or desirable for the
maintenance and enjoyment thereof, and ministers exclusively to the personal comfort and enjoyment of the
employer's family.

The definition cannot be interpreted to include househelper or laundrywomen working in staffhouses of a company,
like private respondent who attends to the needs of the company's guest and other persons availing of said
facilities.
The mere fact that the househelper or domestic servant is working within the premises of the business of the
employer and in relation to or in connection with its business, as in its staffhouses for its guest or even for its
officers and employees, warrants the conclusion that such househelper or domestic servant is and should be
considered as a regular employee.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the appealed decision and resolution of public respondent NLRC are hereby
AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs

SMB v democratic labor

Prologue (Principle)
: The Eight-Hour Labor Law only applies to employees who are paid on a monthly or daily
basis.Employees who are paid on a piece-work basis are EXCLUDED.
FACTS:Respondent Democratic Labor Assoc. filed a manifestation claiming for the following against
petitioner SMB: overtime pay,night-shift differential pay, attorneys fees. Separation pay, and
sick and vacation leave compensation.- Judge Bautista ruled that those working outside the
companys premises are entitled to overtime compensation, hence, theEight-Hour Labor Law
applies to them.- Petitioner filed for an M.R. before the CIR. It was deniedHENCE THE
PETITIONIssue: Whether the Eight-Hour Labor Law applies to respondent workers.
Held: No. Ratio Decidendi:
The Eight-Hour Labor Law only applies to an employee who is paid on a monthly or daily basis.
This lawhas no application to employees paid on a piece-work basis. CIR is wrong to apply the
law to the piece-work employees.According to a ruling by DOLE on Dec. 9, 1957, field sales
personnel receiving monthly salaries (such as the respondents inthis case) are not subject to the
Eight-Hour Labor Law (although they are paid on a monthly basis, their commission shall
beconsidered as payment for extra time he renders in excess of 8 hours).Additional Issue: Are
the claimants who are watchmen and security guards entitled to extra pay for work done on
Sundaysand Holidays?COURT: They are entitled to such pay as per Comm. Act No. 444. They
shall be entitled to + 25% of their regular salary.
PETITION: GRANTED: Decision of the CIR, SET ASIDE.[Prepared by: Emil Angelo C. Martinez for
exclusive use of Block 3, Labor Standards

Rada v nlrc
In 1977, Hilario Rada was contracted by Philnor Consultants and Planners, Inc as a driver. He was
assigned to a specific project in Manila. The contract he signed was for 2.3 years. His task was to
drive employees to the project from 7am to 4pm. He was allowed to bring home the company
vehicle in order to provide a timely transportation service to the other project workers. The
project he was assigned to was not completed as scheduled hence, since he has a satisfactory
record, he was re-contracted for an additional 10 months. After 10 months the project was not
yet completed. Several contracts thereafter were made until the project was finished in 1985.

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At the completion of the project, Rada was terminated as his employment was co-terminous with
the project. He later sued Philnor for non payment of separation pay and overtime pay. He said
he is entitled to be paid OT pay because he uses extra time to get to the project site from his
home and from the project site to his home everyday in total, he spends an average of 3 hours
OT every day.
ISSUE: Whether or not Rada is entitled to separation pay and OT pay.
HELD: Separation pay NO. Overtime pay Yes.
Separation Pay
The SC ruled that Rada was a project employee whose work was coterminous with the project for
which he was hired. Project employees, as distinguished from regular or non-project employees,
are mentioned in Section 281 of the Labor Code as those where the employment has been fixed
for a specific project or undertaking the completion or termination of which has been determined
at the time of the engagement of the employee.
Project employees are not entitled to termination pay if they are terminated as a result of the
completion of the project or any phase thereof in which they are employed, regardless of the
number of projects in which they have been employed by a particular construction company.
Moreover, the company is not required to obtain clearance from the Secretary of Labor in
connection with such termination.
OT Pay
Rada is entitled to OT pay. The fact that he picks up employees of Philnor at certain specified
points along EDSA in going to the project site and drops them off at the same points on his way
back from the field office going home to Marikina, Metro Manila is not merely incidental to Radas
job as a driver. On the contrary, said transportation arrangement had been adopted, not so much
for the convenience of the employees, but primarily for the benefit of Philnor. As embodied in
Philnors memorandum, they allowed their drivers to bring home their transport vehicles in order
for them to provide a timely transport service and to avoid delay not really so that the drivers
could enjoy the benefits of the company vehicles nor for them to save on fair.

Caltex Regular Employees vs. Caltex

FACTS:

1. The Union called Caltexs attention to alleged violations by Caltex of the 1985 CBA,
e.g., non-payment of night-shift differential, non-payment of overtime pay and nonpayment at first day-off rates for work performed on a Saturday.
2. Caltexs industrial relations manager informed petitioner union that differential
payments would be timely implemented. In the implementation of the re-computed
claims, however, no differential payment was made with respect to work
performed on the first 2 hours on a Saturday.
3. The Union instituted a complaint for unfair labor practice against Caltex alleging
violation of the provisions of the 1985 CBA. Petitioner union charged Caltex with
shortchanging its employees when Caltex compensated work performed on the

first 2 hours of Saturday an employees day of rest, at regular rates, when it

should be paying at day of rest or day off rates.
4. Petitioner union also contended that private respondent Caltex in the instant
petition was violating the statutory prohibition against off-setting undertime for
overtime work on another day. Union counsel attempts to establish his charge by
asserting that the employees had been required to render overtime work on a
Saturday but compensated only at regular rates of pay, because they had not
completed the eight (8) hours work period daily from Monday thru Friday.
5. The labor Arbiter ruled in favor of petitioner Union, while finding at the same time
that private respondent Caltex was not guilty of unfair labor practice. Labor arbiter
concluded that Caltexs employees had been given two (2) days instead of one (1)
day of rest, with the result that work performed on the employees first day of rest
which is Saturday, should be compensated at First day-off rates. According to
Labor Arbiter, when Annex B referred to First Day-off Rates and Second Day-off
Rates, these were meant to express an agreement that the parties intended to
provide employees two (2) days if rest.
6. Caltex appealed to NLRC. NLRC set aside the decision of labor arbiter Guanio. The
NLRC found that the conclusions of the Labor Arbiter were not supported by the
evidence on record. The NLRC, interpreting the provisions of the 1985 CBA,
concluded that CBA granted only one (1) day of rest e.g., Sunday. The unions
motion for reconsideration was denied on 9 June 1993.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Caltex is guilty of Unfair Labor Practice.

RULING:

1. The Court agreed with the NLRC that the intention of the parties to the 1985 CBA
was to provide the employees with only one (1) day of rest. The previous CBAs
executed between private respondent Caltex and petitioner Union in 1973, 1976,
1979 and 1982 contained provisions parallel if not identical to those set out in
Article III of the 1985 CBA here before us. In all these CBAs petitioner Union had
never suggested that more than 1 day of rest had been agreed upon, and certainly
Caltex had never treated Article III or any other portion of the CBAs as providing
two (2) days of rest. It is well settled that the contemporaneous and subsequent
conduct of the parties may be taken into account by the court called upon to
interpret and apply a contract entered into by them.
2. The mathematical formulae contained in Annex B are not all applicable to all
classes of employees, there being some formulae applicable only to a particular
groups or classes of employees.
Thus, First Day-off rates and Second Day-off rates are applicable only to
employees which must be in constant 24-hours a day, seven days a week,
operation, hence necessitating the continuous presence of operations
personnel. The work of such operations personnel required them to be on
duty for six (6) consecutive days. Upon the other hand, First Day-off rates
and Second Day-off rates are not applicable to personnel of the Manila
office which consisted of other groups or categories of employees since the

nature of their work did not require them to be on duty for six consecutive
days.
3. Thecompanypracticeofallowingemployeestoleavethirty(30)minutesearlierthanthescheduledoff
timehadbeenestablishedprimarilyfortheconvenienceoftheemployeesmostofwhomhavehadto
commutefromworkplacetohomeandinorderthattheymayavoidtheheavyrushhourvehicular
traffic.ThereisnoallegationherebypetitionerUnionthatsuchpracticewasresortedtobyCaltexin
order toescape its contractual obligations.This practice,while iteffectivelyreducedto371/2 the
numberofhoursactuallyworkedbyemployeeswhohadoptedtoleaveaheadofofftime,isnotbe
construed as modifying the other terms of the 1985 CBA. As correctly pointed out by private
respondent, the shortened work period did not result in likewise shortening the work required for
purposesofdeterminingovertimepay,aswellasforpurposesofdeterminingpremiumpayforwork
beyondforty(40)hourswithinthecalendarweek.Itfollowsthatanemployeeisentitledtobepaid
premiumrates,whetherforworkinexcessof(8)hoursonanygivenday,orforworkbeyondtheforty
(40)hourrequirementforthecalendarweek,onlywhentheemployeehad,infact,alreadyrenderedthe
requisitenumberofhours8or40prescribedinthe1985CBA.
Inrecapitulation,theparties1985CBAstipulatedthatemployeesattheManilaOffice,aswellasthose
similarlysituatedattheLegazpiandMarinduqueBulkDepots,shallbeprovidedonlyone(1)dayof
rest;Sunday,andnotSaturday,wasdesignatedasthisdayofrest.WorkperformedonaSaturdayis
accordinglytobepaidatregularratesofpay,asarule,unlesstheemployeeshallhavebeenrequiredto
renderworkinexcessofforty(40)hoursinacalendarweek.Theemployeemust,however,haveinfact
renderedworkinexcessofforty(40)hoursbeforehourssubsequentlyworkedbecomepayableat
premiumrates.WeconcludethattheNLRCcorrectlysetasidethepalpableerrorcommittedbyLabor
ArbiterGuanio,whenthelatterimposedupononeofthepartiestothe1985CBA,anobligationwhichit
hadneverassumed.

Cagampan v nlrc
BRIEF: Presented before the SC for review is the decision of public respondent National Labor
Relations Commission handed down on March 16, 1988 reversing the decision of the Philippine
Oversees Employment Administration and correspondingly dismissing the cases for lack of merit.
The POEA decision granted overtime pay to petitioners equivalent to 30% of their basic pay.
FACTS: On April 17 and 18,1985, petitioners, all seamen, entered into separate contra
cts of employment with the Golden Light Ocean Transport, Ltd., through its local agency, private
respondent ACE MARITIME AGENCIES, INC. with their respective ratings and monthly salary rates.
Petitioners were deployed on May 7, 1985, and discharged on July 12, 1986. Thereafter,
petitioners collectively and/or individually filed complaints for non-payment of overtime pay,
vacation pay and terminal pay against private respondent. In addition, they claimed that they
were made to sign their contracts in blank; that although they agreed to render services on
board the vessel Rio Colorado managed by Golden Light Ocean Transport, Ltd., the vessel they
actually boarded was MV "SOIC I" managed by Columbus Navigation; and more so, petitioners de
Castro and de Jesus charged that although they were employed as ordinary seamen, they
actually performed the work and duties of Able Seamen.
Private respondent was furnished with copies of petitioners' complaints and summons, but it
failed to file its answer within the reglementary period. Thus, on January 12, 1987, an Order was
issued declaring that private respondent has waived its right to present evidence in its behalf
and that the cases are submitted for decision.

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On August 5, 1987, the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) rendered a
Decision DISMISSING petitioners' claim for terminal pay but GRANTED their prayer for leave pay
and overtime pay. Private respondent appealed from the POEA's Decision to the NLRC on August
24, 1987.
On March 16, 1988, the NLRC promulgated a Decision, REVERSING and SETTING ASIDE and
another one entered dismissing the cases for lack of merit. On May 8, 1988, petitioners filed an
Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of the NLRC's Decision but the same was denied by the NLRC
for lack of merit in its Resolution dated September 12, 1988.
Hence, this appeal from the decision and resolution of the respondent NLRC. Petitioners allege
that respondent Commission, NLRC, gravely abused its discretion or erred in reversing and
setting aside the POEA decision and correspondingly dismissing the appeal of petitioners,
allegedly in contravention of law and jurisprudence. Private respondent maritime company
disclaims the aforesaid allegations of petitioners.
The Solicitor General, arguing for public respondent NLRC, contends that: The NLRC did not
abuse its discretion in the rendition of subject decision because the evidence presented by
petitioners in support of their complaint is by itself sufficient to back up the decision. The issue of
the disallowance of overtime pay stems from an interpretation of particular provisions of the
employment contract.
ISSUE: WON respondent Commission NLRC gravely abused its discretion or erred in REVERSING
the decision of POEA (in granting overtime pay to petitioners equivalent to 30% of their basic
pay).
HELD: No.
RATIO DECIDENDI: The NLRC cannot be faulted for disallowing the payment of overtime pay
because it merely straightened out the distorted interpretation asserted by petitioners and
defined the correct interpretation of the provision on overtime pay embodied in the contract
conformably with settled doctrines on the matter. Notably, the NLRC ruling on the disallowance of
overtime pay is ably supported by the fact that petitioners never produced any proof of actual
performance of overtime work.
Petitioners have conveniently adopted the view that the "guaranteed or fixed overtime pay of
30% of the basic salary per month" embodied in their employment contract should be awarded
to them as part of a "package benefit." They have theorized that even without sufficient
evidence of actual rendition of overtime work, they would automatically be entitled to overtime
pay. Their theory is erroneous for being illogical and unrealistic. Their thinking even runs counter
to the intention behind the provision. The contract provision means that the fixed overtime pay
of 30% would be the basis for computing the overtime pay if and when overtime work would be
rendered. Simply, stated, the rendition of overtime work and the submission of sufficient proof
that said work was actually performed are conditions to be satisfied before a seaman could be
entitled to overtime pay which should be computed on the basis of 30% of the basic monthly
salary. In short, the contract provision guarantees the right to overtime pay but the entitlement
to such benefit must first be established. Realistically speaking, a seaman, by the very nature of
his job, stays on board a ship or vessel beyond the regular eight-hour work schedule. For the
employer to give him overtime pay for the extra hours when he might be sleeping or attending
to his personal chores or even just lulling away his time would be extremely unfair and
unreasonable.
Reiterated in the case of National Shipyards and Steel Corporation v. CIR (3 SCRA 890), the SC
ruled: We cannot agree with the Court below that respondent Malondras should be paid overtime
compensation for every hour in excess of the regular working hours that he was on board his
vessel or barge each day, irrespective of whether or not he actually put in work during those

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hours. Seamen are required to stay on board their vessels by the very nature of their duties, and
it is for this reason that, in addition to their regular compensation, they are given free living
quarters and subsistence allowances when required to be on board. It could not have been the
purpose of our law to require their employers to pay them overtime even when they are not
actually working; otherwise, every sailor on board a vessel would be entitled to overtime for
sixteen hours each day, even if he spent all those hours resting or sleeping in his bunk, after his
regular tour of duty. The correct criterion in determining whether or not sailors are entitled to
overtime pay is not, therefore, whether they were on board and cannot leave ship beyond the
regular eight working hours a day, but whether they actually rendered service in excess of said
number of hours.

Lagatic v NLRC
RIGHT TO PRESCRIBE RULES
Facts:
Petitioner Romeo Lagatic was employed in May 1986 by Cityland, first as a probationary sales
agent, and later on as a marketing specialist. He was tasked with soliciting sales for the
company, with the corresponding duties of accepting call-ins, referrals, and making client calls
and cold calls. Cold calls refer to the practice of prospecting for clients through the telephone
directory. Cityland, believing that the same is an effective and cost-efficient method of finding
clients, requires all its marketing specialists to make cold calls. The number of cold calls depends
on the sales generated by each: more sales mean less cold calls. Likewise, in order to assess cold
calls made by the sales staff, as well as to determine the results thereof, Cityland requires the
submission of daily progress reports on the same.
On October 22, 1991, Cityland issued a written reprimand to petitioner for his failure to submit
cold call reports for September 10, October 1 and 10, 1991. This notwithstanding, petitioner
again failed to submit cold call reports for September 2, 5, 8, 10, 11, 12, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, 22,
and 28, as well as for October 6, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13 and 14, 1992. Petitioner was required to explain
his inaction, with a warning that further non-compliance would result in his termination from the
company. In a reply dated October 18, 1992, petitioner claimed that the same was an honest
omission brought about by his concentration on other aspects of his job. Cityland found said
excuse inadequate and, on November 9, 1992, suspended him for three days, with a similar
warning.
Notwithstanding the aforesaid suspension and warning, petitioner again failed to submit cold call
reports for February 5, 6, 8, 10 and 12, 1993. He was verbally reminded to submit the same and
was even given up to February 17, 1993 to do so. Instead of complying with said directive,
petitioner, on February 16, 1993, wrote a note, "TO HELL WITH COLD CALLS! WHO CARES?" and
exhibited the same to his co-employees. To worsen matters, he left the same lying on his desk
where everyone could see it.
On February 23, 1993, petitioner received a memorandum requiring him to explain why Cityland
should not make good its previous warning for his failure to submit cold call reports, as well as
for issuing the written statement aforementioned. On February 24, 1993, he sent a letter-reply
alleging that his failure to submit cold call reports should trot be deemed as gross
insubordination. He denied any knowledge of the damaging statement, "TO HELL WITH COLD
CALLS!"
Finding petitioner guilty of gross insubordination, Cityland served a notice of dismissal upon him
on February 26, 1993. Aggrieved by such dismissal, petitioner filed a complaint against Cityland

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for illegal dismissal, illegal deduction, underpayment, overtime and rest day pay, damages and
attorney's fees. The labor arbiter dismissed the petition for lack of merit. On appeal, the same
was affirmed by the NLRC; hence the present recourse.
Issue:
W/N NLRC gravely abused its discretion in not finding that petitioner was illegally dismissed?
Held:
The petition lacks merit.
To constitute a valid dismissal from employment, two requisites must be met, namely: (1) the
employee must be afforded due process, and (2) the dismissal must be for a valid cause.
Employers may, thus, make reasonable rules and regulations for the government of their
employees, and when employees, with knowledge of an established rule, enter the service, the
rule becomes a part of the contract of employment. It is also generally recognized that company
policies and regulations, unless shown to be grossly oppressive or contrary to law, are generally
valid and binding on the parties and must be complied with. Corollarily, an employee may be
validly dismissed for violation of a reasonable company rule or regulation adopted for the
conduct of the company business. An employer cannot rationally be expected to retain the
employment of a person whose . . . lack of regard for his employer's rules . . . has so plainly and
completely been bared." 5 Petitioner's continued infraction of company policy requiring cold call
reports, as evidenced by the 28 instances of non-submission of aforesaid reports, justifies his
dismissal.
With the finding that petitioner's dismissal was for a just and valid cause, his claims for moral
and exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fees, must fail.
Resolution is AFFIRMED and this petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs against
petitioner.