1. Nial v. Bayadog, G.R. No. 133778, Mar.

14, 2000
FACTS: Pepito Ninal was married with Teodulfa Bellones on
September 26, 1974. They had 3 children namely Babyline, Ingrid and
Archie, petitioners. Due to the shot inflicted by Pepito to Teodulfa, the
latter died on April 24, 1985 leaving the children under the
guardianship of Engrace Ninal. 1 year and 8 months later, Pepito and
Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license. They
instituted an affidavit stating that they had lived together for at least 5
years exempting from securing the marriage license. Pepito died in a
car accident on February 19, 1977. After his death, petitioners filed a
petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito and Norma
alleging that said marriage was void for lack of marriage license.
ISSUES:1. Whether or not the second marriage of Pepito was void?
2. Whether or not the heirs of the deceased may file for the declaration
of the nullity of Pepitos marriage after his death?
HELD: The marriage of Pepito and Norma is void for absence of the
marriage license. They cannot be exempted even though they
instituted an affidavit and claimed that they cohabit for at least 5 years
because from the time of Pepitos first marriage was dissolved to the
time of his marriage with Norma, only about 20 months had elapsed.
Albeit, Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact, and thereafter
both Pepito and Norma had started living with each other that has
already lasted for five years, the fact remains that their five-year period
cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by law. Hence, his
marriage to Norma is still void.
Void marriages are deemed to have not taken place and cannot be the
source of rights. It can be questioned even after the death of one of the
parties and any proper interested party may attack a void marriage.

2. Van Dorn v. Romillo, 139 SCRA 139

FACTS: Petitioner, a Filipino citizen was married in Hongkong in
1972 with Richard Upton, a US citizen. Parties were divorced in
Nevada, US, in 1982; and petitioner has re-married to Theodore Van
Dorn. Richard filed a suit against petitioner and asking that the latter
be ordered to render accounting of their business (Galleon Shop in
Manila) and that the former be declared with right to manage the
property. Petitioner claimed that respondent is stopped from laying
claim on the alleged conjugal property because that they were already
divorced before the Nevada Court and both acknowledged that they
had no community property as of June 11, 1982. Respondent averred
that the Divorce Decree issued by the Nevada Court cannot prevail
over the prohibitive laws of the Philippines.
ISSUE: Whether the Divorce Decree issued by the Nevada Court can
prevail over the prohibitive laws of the Philippines?
HELD: Yes. The Philippines may recognize the divorced obtained by
an alien, provided they are valid according to their national law. In this
case, the divorce in Nevada released respondent Richard from the
marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce
dissolves the marriage. Thus, pursuant to his national law, Richard is
no longer the husband of petitioner Alice Van Dorn. As he is bound by
the Decision of his own countrys Court, which validly exercised
jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is
stopped by his own his representation before said Court from asserting
his right over the alleged conjugal property.
3. Republic v. Orbecido III, G.R. No. 154380, October 5, 2005
FACTS: Cipriano Orbecido III was married with Lady Myros
Villanueva on May 24, 1981 at the United Church of Christ in the
Philippines in Ozamis City. They had a son and a daughter named
Kristoffer and Kimberly, respectively. In 1986, the wife left for US
bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years later, Orbecido

discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen

and learned from his son that his wife sometime in 2000 had obtained
a divorce decree and married a certain Stanley. He thereafter filed
with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code.
ISSUE: Whether or not Orbecido can remarry under Article 26 of the
Family Code.
HELD: The court ruled that taking into consideration the legislative
intent and applying the rule of reason, Article 26 Par.2 should be
interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the
celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of
them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce
decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as
if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of
the marriage.
Hence, the courts unanimous decision in holding Article 26 Par 2 be
interpreted as allowing a Filipino citizen who has been divorced by a
spouse who had acquired a citizenship and remarried, also to remarry
under Philippine law.
4. Cario v. Cario, 351 SCRA 127
FACTS: SPO4 Santiago CArio married petitioner Susan Nicdao on
June 20, 1969, with whom he had two children, Sahlee and Sandee.
On November 10, 1982, SPO4 Cario also married respondent Susan
Yee. In 1988, SPO4 Cario became bedridden due to diabetes and
tuberculosis, and died on November 23, 1992, under the care of Susan
Yee who spent for his medical and burial expenses. Both Susans filed
claims for monetary benefits and financial assistance from various
government agencies pertaining to the deceased. Nicdao was able to
collect P146,000 from MBAI, PCCVI, commutation, NAPOLCOM
and Pag-ibig, while Yee received a total of P21,000 from GSIS burial
and SSS burial insurance.

On December 14, 1993, Yee filed for collection of money

against NIcdao, praying that Nicdao be ordered to return to her at least
one-half of the P146,000 NIcdao had collected. For failing to file her
answer, NIcdao was declared in default.
Yee admitted that her marriage to the deceased took place
during the subsistence of and without first obtaining a judicial
declaration of nullity of the marriage between Nicdao and Cario. But
she claimed good faith, having no knowledge of the previous marriage
until at the funeral where she met Nicdao who introduced herself as
the wife of the deceased. Yee submitted that Carios marriage to
Nicdao was void because it was solemnized without the required
marriage license.
ISSUE: Whether or not Yee can claim half the amount acquired by
Nicdao.
HELD: No. SC held that the marriage between Yee and Cario falls
under the Article 148 of the Family Code, which refers to the property
regime of bigamous or polygamous marriages, adulterous or
concubinage relationships.
Yee cannot claim the benefits earned by the SPO4 as a police officer as
her marriage to the deceased is void due to bigamy. She is only entitled
to the properties acquired with the deceased through their actual joint
contribution. Wages and salaries earned by each party belong to him or
her exclusively. Hence, they are not owned in common by Yee and the
deceased, but belong to the deceased alone and Yee has no right
whatsoever to claim the same. By intestate succession, the said death
benefits of the deceased shall pass to his legal heirs. And, Yee, not
being the legal wife, is not one of them.
As regards to the first marriage, the marriage between Nicdao and
SPO4 is null and void due to absence of a valid marriage license.
Nicdao can claim the death benefits by the deceased even if she did not
contribute thereto. Article 147 creates a co-ownership in respect

thereto, entitling Nicdao to share one-half of the benefits. As there is

no allegation of bad faith in the first marriage, she can claim one-half
of the disputed death benefits and the other half to the deceased' to his
legal heirs, by intestate succession.
The marriage between Yee and SPO4 is likewise null and void for the
same has been solemnized without the judicial declaration of the
nullity of the marriage between Nicdao and SPO4. Under Article 40, if
a party who is previously married wishes to contract a second
marriage, he or she has to obtain first a judicial decree declaring the
first marriage void, before he or she could contract said second
marriage, otherwise the second marriage would be void. However, for
purposes other than to remarry, no prior and separate judicial
declaration of nullity is necessary.
5. Santos v. CA, 240 SCRA 20
FACTS: Leouel, a member of the Army, met Julia in Iloilo City. In
September 1986, they got married. The couple latter lived with Julias
parents. Julia gave birth to a son in 1987. Their marriage, however,
was marred by the frequent interference of Julias parent as averred by
Leouel. The couple also occasionally quarrels about as to, among other
things, when should they start living independently from Julias
parents. In 1988, Julia went to the US to work as a nurse despite
Leouels opposition. 7 months later, she and Leouel got to talk and she
promised to return home in 1989. She never went home that year. In
1990, Leouel got the chance to be in the US due to a military training.
During his stay, he desperately tried to locate his wife but to no avail.
Leouel, in an effort to at least have his wife come home, filed to
nullify their marriage due to Julias psychological incapacity. Leouel
asserted that due to Julias failure to return home or at least
communicate with him even with all his effort constitutes
psychological incapacity. Julia attacked the complaint and she said that
it is Leouel who is incompetent. The prosecutor ascertained that there

is no collusion between the two. Leouels petition is however denied

by the lower and appellate court.
ISSUE: Whether or not psychological incapacity is attendant to the
case at bar.
HELD: Before deciding on the case, the SC noted that the Family
Code did not define the term psychological incapacity, which is
adopted from the Catholic Canon Law. But basing it on the
deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee, the provision in
PI, adopted with less specificity than expected, has been designed to
allow some resiliency in its application. The FCRC did not give any
examples of PI for fear that the giving of examples would limit the
applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis.
Rather, the FCRC would like the judge to interpret the provision on a
case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and
researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church
tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given
persuasive effect since the provision was taken from Canon Law. The
term psychological incapacity defies any precise definition since
psychological causes can be of an infinite variety.
Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed
independently of but must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts
in our law on marriage. PI should refer to no less than a mental (not
physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the
basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage which (Art. 68), include their
mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity
and render help and support. The intendment of the law has been to
confine the meaning of PI to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to
give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychological
condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The SC also
notes that PI must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical

antecedence, and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or

serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the
ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of
the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations
may emerge only after the marriage; and it must be incurable or, even
if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party
involved.
In the case at bar, although Leouel stands aggrieved, his petition must
be dismissed because the alleged PI of his wife is not clearly shown by
the factual settings presented. The factual settings do not come close to
to the standard required to decree a nullity of marriage.
6. Republic v. Molina, G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997
FACTS: Roridel & Reynaldo Molina were married on April 14, 1985
at the San Agustin Church. They had a son, Andre Molina. A year after
the marriage, Reynaldo started manifesting signs of immaturity and
irresponsibility: (1) spent more time with his friends (2) depended on
his parents for aid & assistance (3) not honest with the finances (4)
relieved of his job making Roridel the breadwinner of the family.
Roridel went to live with his parents and afterwards, Reynaldo
abandoned her and the child. Roridel filed a case for the declaration of
nullity of their marriage by virtue of her husbands psychological
incapacity. Reynaldo claims that Roridels strange behavior, refusal to
perform marital duties & failure to run the household & handle
finances caused their quarrels. Roridel on the other hand claims that
her husband is immature, irresponsible, dependent, disrespectful,
arrogant, chronic liar & infidel. He now lives with a mistress with
whom he has a child.
ISSUE: WON Reynaldo is psychologically incapacitated?
HELD: NO. Marriage is valid.

RATIO: 1. They seem to have a difficulty or outright refusal or neglect

in performing their obligations. Theyre not incapable of doing them.
2. Failure of their expectations is not tantamount to psychological
incapacity.
3. Guidelines for Art. 36
a. Burden of proof to show nullity of marriage: plaintiff. Presumption
of existence of marriage over its dissolution & nullity.
b. Root cause of incapacity should be: medically/clinically defined,
alleged in complaint, proven by experts, clearly explained in decision.
c. Existing at time of celebration of marriage.
d. Medically/clinically permanent or incurable, whether absolute or
relative. Incapacity directly related to assumption of marital
obligations, doesnt include incapacity in profession, etc.
e. Grave to render them incapable. Not mere refusal, neglect or
difficulty or ill will.
f. Essential obligations outlined in FC Art. 68-71 and 220, 221, 225.
State non-compliance in petition with evidence, include in decision.
g. Consider National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines interpretations. Not binding should be given
respect since this law originated from Canon law. Harmonize civil law
w/religious faith.
h. Prosecuting attorney/fiscal and Sol. Gen. will appear as counsels for
the state. They should submit certification within 15 days from
submission of case for resolution.
7. Antonio v. Reyes, G.R. No. 155800, Mar. 10,2005
Facts: Leonilo Antonio and Marie Ivonne Reyes met in August
1989.Antonio was 26 yrs old while Reyes was 36. They married

almost a year after before a minister of the Gospel at the Manila City
Hall. They also had a church wedding at Sta. Rosa de Lima Parish,
Bagong Ilog, Pasig on 6 December 1990. A child was born but it died
5mos after.
Antonio filed a petition to have their marriage be declared null and
void under Art. 36 of the Family Code. This is because of the
subsequent lies said by the petitioner. These lies are:

She gave birth to an illegitimate son (She did not tell because
she does not want her husband to leave her)

She fabricated that Edwin David, her brother-in-law, tried to

rape her. (But David only touched her at the back and ogled
her from head to toe)

Held: Yes, their marriage can be declared null and void under Art. 36.
Reyess psychological incapacity was shown by medical means. There
is proof from experts that, indeed, Reyes is suffering a
mental/personality disorder. That is why their marriage was declared
null and void.
8.Marcos v. Marcos, 343 SCRA 755, October 19, 2000
Facts: Plaintiff Brenda B. Marcos married Wilson Marcos in 1982 and
they had five children. Alleging that the husband failed to provide
material support to the family and have resorted to physical abuse and
abandonment, Brenda filed a case for the nullity of the marriage for
psychological incapacity. The RTC declared the marriage null and void
under Art. 36 which was however reversed by CA.

Said that she is a psychiatrist. (She graduated BS Banking and

Finance Management)

Issues: Whether personal medical or psychological examination of the

respondent by a physician is a requirement for a declaration of
psychological incapacity.

She claimed to be a singer (She is only a free lance voice

talent)

-Whether the totality of evidence presented in this case show

psychological incapacity.

She invented friends under different names

Held: Psychological incapacity as a ground for declaring the nullity of

a marriage may be established by the totality of evidence presented.
There is no requirement, however that the respondent be examined by
a physician or a psychologist as a condition sine qua non for such
declaration. Although this Court is sufficiently convinced that
respondent failed to provide material support to the family and may
have resorted to physical abuse and abandonment, the totality of his
acts does not lead to a conclusion of psychological incapacity on his
part. There is absolutely no showing that his defects were already
present at the inception of the marriage or that they are incurable.
Verily, the behavior of respondent can be attributed to the fact that he
had lost his job and was not gainfully employed for a period of more
than six years. It was during this period that he became intermittently
drunk, failed to give material and moral support, and even left the

She was also really insecure and always jealous. She always call the
office of her husband to know what he is doing.
Based on the tests of Dr. Dante Herrera Abcede (psychiatrist) and Dr.
Arnulfo Lopez (clinical psychologist), Reyes is essentially normal,
introspective, shy and conservative. But her constant lying and
extreme jealousy is already pathological; it already impedes her
marital obligations.
The RTC sided with Antonio but CA reversed its decision.
Issue: Whether Antonio and Reyess marriage can be declared null and
void under Art. 36?

family home. Thus, his alleged psychological illness was traced only
to said period and not to the inception of the marriage. Equally
important, there is no evidence showing that his condition is incurable,
especially now that he is gainfully employed as a taxi driver. In sum,
this Court cannot declare the dissolution of the marriage for failure of
the petitioner to show that the alleged psychological incapacity is
characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurabilty and for
her failure to observe the guidelines as outline in Republic v. CA and
Molina.

There are two (2) reasons, according to the defendant , why

the plaintiff filed this case against him:

that she is afraid that she will be forced to return the pieces
of jewelry of his mother,

that her husband, the defendant, will consummate their

marriage.

Statement of the Wife:

9. Chi Ming Tsoi v. CA, G.R. No. 119190, Jan. 16, 1997

Issue on homosexuality

FACTS:

No sexual intercourse happened

Married for 10 mos.

That her husband is impotent

Judgment is hereby rendered declaring as VOID the marriage

entered into by the plaintiff with the defendant on May 22,
1988 at the Manila Cathedral, Basilica of the Immaculate
Conception, Intramuros, Manila, before the Rt. Rev. Msgr.
Melencio de Vera.

ISSUE: WON the marriage should be declared VOID?

HELD: Marriage is declared NULL and VOID.

Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations under the

Family Code is "To procreate children based on the
universal principle that procreation of children through
sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage."

Constant non- fulfillment of this obligation will finally

destroy the integrity or wholeness of the marriage. In the
case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of one of
the parties to fulfill the above marital obligation is
equivalent to psychological incapacity.

Statement of the husband:

1

That he loves her very much

That he has no defect on his part and he is physically and

psychologically capable

Since the relationship is still very young and if there is any

differences between the two of them, it can still be reconciled
and that, according to him, if either one of them has some
incapabilities, there is no certainty that this will not be cured.
He further claims, that if there is any defect, it can be cured by
the intervention of medical technology or science.

10. Republic v. Dagdag, 351 SCRA 425

FACTS: On September 7, 1975, Erlinda Matias, 16 years old, married
Avelino Parangan Dagdag, 20 years old, at the Iglesia Filipina
Independent Church in Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija. The marriage certificate
was issued by the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of the

Municipality of on October 20, 1988. They were begotten two

children. A week after the wedding, Avelino started leaving his family
without explanation. He would disappear for months, suddenly reappear for a few months, and then disappear again. During the times
when he was with his family, he indulged in drinking sprees with
friends and would return home drunk. He would force his wife to
submit to sexual intercourse and if she refused, he would inflict
physical injuries to her.
In October 1993, he left his family again and that was the last that they
heard from him. Erlinda learned that Avelino was imprisoned for some
crime, and that he escaped from jail and remains at large to-date. In
July 1990, Erlinda filed with the RTC of Olongapo City a petition for
judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity. Since Avelino could not be located,
summons was served by publication in the Olongapo News, a
newspaper of general circulation. On the date set for presentation of
evidence, only Erlinda and her counsel appeared. Erlinda testified and
presented her sister-in-law as her only witness.
The trial court declared the marriage of Erlinda and Avelino void under
Article 36. The investigating prosecutor filed a Motion to Set Aside
Judgment on the ground that the decision was prematurely rendered
since he was given until January 2, 1991 to manifest whether he was
presenting controverting evidence. The Office of the Solicitor General
likewise filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the decision on the
ground that the same is not in accordance with the evidence and the
law. Since the trial court denied the Motion for Reconsideration, the
Solicitor General appealed to the CA. The CA affirmed the decision of
the trial court holding that Avelino Dagdag is psychologically
incapacitated not only because he failed to perform the duties and
obligations of a married person but because he is emotionally
immature and irresponsible, an alcoholic, and a criminal.

ISSUE:Whether CA correctly declared the marriage as null and void

under Article 36 of the Family Code?
HELD: The Court laid down the GUIDELINES in the interpretation of
Article 36 of the Family Code as cited in REPUBLIC VS. MOLINA
(268 SCRA 198):
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs
to the plaintiff.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a)
medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint,
(c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in
the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the
incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although its
manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the
celebration of the marriage.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be
absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability
of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by
Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband
and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code
in regard to parents and their children
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our
courts.

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and
the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state.
Taking into consideration these guidelines, it is evident that Erlinda
failed to comply with the above-mentioned evidentiary requirements.
Erlinda failed to comply with guideline number 2 which requires that
the root cause of psychological incapacity must be medically or
clinically proven by experts, since no psychiatrist or medical doctor
testified as to the alleged psychological incapacity of her husband.
Further, the allegation that the husband is a fugitive from justice was
not sufficiently proven. In fact, the crime for which he was arrested
was not even alleged. The investigating prosecutor was likewise not
given an opportunity to present controverting evidence since the trial
courts decision was prematurely rendered.
11. Pesca v. Pesca (G.R. No. 136921, April 17, 2001)
FACTS: The petitioner and respondent were married and had four
children. Lorna Pesca filed a petition for declaration of nullity of their
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of her
husband. She alleged that he is emotionally immature and
irresponsible. He was cruel and violent. He was a habitual drinker.
Whenever she tells him to stop or at least minimize his drinking, her
husband would hurt her. There was even a time when she was chased
by a loaded shotgun and threatened to kill her in the presence of their
children. The children also suffered physical violence. Petitioner and
their children left the home. Two months later, they returned upon the
promise of respondent to change. But he did not. She was battered
again. Her husband was imprisoned for 11 days for slight physical
injuries. RTC declared their marriage null and void. CA reversed
RTCs ruling. Hence, CAs ruling lead to this petition.
ISSUE: W/N the guidelines for psychological incapacity in the case of
Republic vs CA & Molina should be taken in consideration in deciding
in this case.

HELD: Yes. In the Molina case, guidelines were laid down by the SC
before a case would fall under the category of psychological incapacity
to declare a marriage null and void. This decision has force and effect
of a law. These guidelines are mandatory in nature. Petition denied.
The "doctrine of stare decisis," ordained in Article 8 of the Civil
Code, expresses that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the
law shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines. The rule
follows the settled legal maxim legis interpretado legis vim obtinet
that the interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent
court has the force of law.
12. Bobis v. Bobis, G.R. No. 139509, July 31, 2000
FACTS: On October 21, 1985, respondent contracted a first marriage
with one Maria Dulce B. Javier. Without said marriage having been
annulled, nullified or terminated, the same respondent contracted a
second marriage with petitioner Imelda Marbella-Bobis on January 25,
1996 and allegedly a third marriage with a certain Julia Sally
Hernandez.
Based on petitioners complaint affidavit, an information for bigamy
was filed against respondent on February 25, 1998, which was
docketed as Criminal Case No. Q98-75611 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 226, Quezon City.
Sometime thereafter, respondent initiated a civil action for the judicial
declaration of absolute nullity of his first marriage on the ground that it
was celebrated without a marriage license.
Respondent then filed a motion to suspend the proceedings in the
criminal case for bigamy invoking the pending civil case for nullity of
the first marriage as a prejudicial question to the criminal case. The
trial judge granted the motion to suspend the criminal case in an Order
dated December 29, 1998. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration, but the same was denied.

The first marriage in the case before us was void for lack of a marriage
license. Petitioner, on the other hand, argues that her marriage to
respondent was exempt from the requirement of a marriage license.
More specifically, petitioner claims that prior to their marriage, they
had already attained the age of majority and had been living together
as husband and wife for at least five years.

1983, Nolasco received a letter from his mother informing him that his
son had been born but 15 days after, Janet left. Nolasco went home
and cut short his contract to find Janets whereabouts. He did so by
securing another seamans contract going to London. He wrote several
letters to the bar where they first met but it was all returned. Gregorio
petitioned in 1988 for a declaration of presumptive death of Janet.

ISSUE: Whether the subsequent filing of a civil action for declaration

of nullity of a previous marriage constitutes a prejudicial question to a
criminal case for bigamy.

ISSUE: Whether or not Nolasco had a well-founded belief that his

wife, Janet, is already dead?

HELD: Hence, parties should not be permitted to judge for themselves

the nullity of their marriage, for the same must be submitted to the
determination of competent courts. Only when the nullity of the
marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is
no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists. No
matter how obvious, manifest or patent the absence of an element is,
the intervention of the courts must always be resorted to. That is why
Article 40 of the Family Code requires a "final judgment," which only
the courts can render.
In the light of Article 40 of the Family Code, respondent, without first
having obtained the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage,
cannot be said to have validly entered into the second marriage. Per
current jurisprudence, a marriage though void still needs a judicial
declaration of such fact before any party can marry again; otherwise
the second marriage will also be void.Liable for BIGAMY: Petition
GRANTED

HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that Nolascos efforts to locate Janet
were not persistent to show that he has a well-founded belief that his
wife was already dead because instead of seeking assistance of local
authorities and the British Embassy, he even secured another contract.
More so, while he was in London, he did not even try to solicit help of
the authorities to find his wife.
14. Suntay v. Cojuangco-Suntay (G.R. No. 183053, Oct. 10, 2012)
Facts: Upon the death of Cristina Suntay, two of her grandchildren
(Isabel, a legitimate grandchild, and Emilio III, an illegitimate
grandchild) both sought for the issuance of Letters of Administration
in their favor with respect to the settlement of the estate of Cristina.
The trial court granted the same in favor of Emilio III. The appellate
court reversed the trial court and appointed Isabel as the administration
of the estate. On appeal by certiorari to the Supreme Court, Isabel and
Emilio III were both appointed to the position, the two of them being
co- administrators. Isabel filed a Motion for reconsideration of this
decision.

13. Republic v. Nolasco, 220 SCRA 20, March 17, 1993

Issue: WON the Letters of Administration should be issued to both of

them, or to only one of them.

FACTS: Gregorio Nolasco is a seaman. He met Janet Parker, a British,

in bar in England. After that, Janet started living with Nolasco in his
ship for six months. It lasted until the contract of Nolasco expired then
he brought her to his hometown in Antique. They got married in
January 1982. Due to another contract, Nolasco left the province. In

Held: Isabel should be appointed as the sole administration of the

estate. In the appointment of an administrator, the principal
consideration reckoned with is the interest in the estate of the one to be
appointed as administrator. Thus, Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of
Court provides for an order of preference to be followed with respect

to whom letters of administration shall be granted. This

notwithstanding, the court in certain circumstances has upheld the
appointment of co-administrators.
In the case at bar, the appointment of both Isabel and Emilio III as coadministrators will not redound to the benefit of the estate, for the two
have a deep aversion for each other. Although the two of them have an
interest in the estate, being grandchildren of Cristina, the mere
demonstration of such an interest does not ipso facto entitle an
interested person to co- administration thereof. The seeming
impossibility of Isabel and Emilio III working harmoniously as coadministrators may result in prejudice to the decedents estate,
ultimately delaying the settlement thereof. Moreover, it was shown
that Emilio III was remiss in his duties as administrator. He failed to
faithfully discharge the duties of settling the decedents estate with the
end in view of distribution to the heirs.
15. DE OCAMPO v. FLORENCIANO (1960) husband filed case
for legal separation on ground of wifes adultery; wife admitted to
fiscal during collusion hearing that she is indeed guilty of adultery; not
indication of collusion or confession of judgment.
1938 marriage.1951 - plaintiff discovered on several occasions that
his wife maintaining illicit relations with Jose Arcalas . June 1951 sent her to Manila study beauty culture, where she stayed for one year;
1952 - defendant had finished studying her course, she left plaintiff
and since then they had lived separately. June 18, 1955 - wife in the act
of having illicit relations with another man by the name of Nelson
Orzame; signified his intention of filing a petition for legal separation,
to which defendant manifested her conformity provided she is not
charged with adultery in a criminal action. July 5, 1955 - the complaint
for legal separation was filed
O

ISSUE: WON husband can file for legal separation based on adultery
when (1) wife confessed to the adultery (2) did not actively search for
wife when she left conjugal home HELD: YES on both instances
1. what is prohibited is using ONLY the confession as grounds for

legal separation since this may be evidence of collusion between the

two. However in this case, there is strong evidence other than the
confession to prove the adultery of the wife
-

def of collusion: the agreement between husband and wife for

one of them to commit, or to appear to commit, or to be
represented in court as having committed, a matrimonial
offense, or to suppress evidence of a valid defense, for the
purpose of enabling the other to obtain a divorce. This
agreement, if not express, may be implied from the acts of the
parties. It is a ground for denying the divorce,merely prohibits
a decree of separation upon a confession of judgment.
Confession of judgment usually happens when the defendant
appears in court and confesses the right of plaintiff to judgment
or files a pleading expressly agreeing to the plaintiff's demand

2. not his duty to search for her to bring her home. Hers was the
obligation to return. o Wife was the one who left the husband.
- Agreed with CA - his action was not filed within one year from
March 1951 when plaintiff discovered her infidelity. But still pushed
through with proceedings and reversed CAs decision.
16. Joaquino vs Reyes
Facts: Rodolfo A. Reyes and Lourdes P. Reyes were married on
January 3, 1947 but since 1962, Rodolfo had been living with his
paramour, Milagros B. Joaquino.- As Vice President and Comptroller
of Warner Barnes & Company, - Rodolfo obtained a loan of P140k
from Commonwealth Insurance Corporation in order to purchase a
house and lot in BF Homes, Paraaque. He also mortgaged the same
(through a Special Power of Attorney) to pay the balance of the
purchase price and secured a life insurance policy from Philam Life
Insurance Corporation to guaranty the payment where he paid monthly
amortizations. The property was registered under the name of Milagros
Joaquino only even though it was purchased with the earnings, and
hence conjugal funds, of Rodolfo.
- When Rodolfo died on September 12, 1981, Milagros and their

natural children claimed that Milagros was unaware of Rodolfos

marriage, that the house and lot as Milagros exclusive which she
allegedly obtained with her own funds, that she only authorized
Rodolfo to mortgage the house and lot as a matter of convenience but
she personally provided funds for the amortization, and that she did
not benefit from Rodolfos emoluments and other pecuniary benefits.
On the other hand, Lourdes and their children claimed that the
properties were conjugal properties because they were paid for by the
earnings of Rodolfo during the marriage.
Issue: WON house and lot are conjugal propertiesHeld: YESThe
presumption in favour of the conjugal partnership operates in the case
at bar because the properties were acquired during coverture (NCC
160).
- Even though Rodolfo was already living with Milagros when the
properties were bought, the rules of co-ownership between persons
cohabiting as husband and wife (under NCC 148) only applies to
properties acquired by both through their actual joint contribution of
money, property or industry. Ownership then is proportional to their
respective contributions, which are considered equal absent proof to
the contrary.

purchased the property by his own funds. And where his salaries are
considered cp, the loan and the purchased properties were also cp. On
the other hand, Milagros only showed Affidavits and undated
Certifications to prove that she purchased the properties by her own
money, borrowing from her siblings, selling jewellery and selling a
drugstore four years prior. The registration of the properties under
Milagros name can thus be considered only as a donation that is void
under NCC 739 (1) especially where Rodolfo intended to deprive
Lourdes of ownership over the properties. In terms of the illegitimate
childrens right to Rodolfos estate, their rights must be determined in
a special proceeding instituted for that purpose. The issue was not
raised or presented in the original and supplemental complaints for
reconveyance of property and damages, in the answers of Milagros and
her memorandum. Hence, the illegitimate filiation of her children
could not have been duly established in the case at bar.
o Art 153 what are conjugal properties
o Art 144 DOESNT APPLY common law marriages are entitled to
co-ownership (50/50) laws IF COUPLES ARE NOT
INCAPACITATED TO MARRY EACH OTHER WHICH IN THIS
CASE

THEY CLEARLY ARE THUS CANT APPLY.

17. Valdes v. QC-RTC, G.R. No. 122749, July 31, 1996

X) applied to adultery/concubinage

FACTS: Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married in 1971

and begotten 5 children. Valdez filed a petition in 1992 for a
declaration of nullity of their marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the
Family Code, which was granted hence, marriage is null and void on
the ground of their mutual psychological incapacity. Stella and
Joaquin are placed under the custody of their mother while the other 3
siblings are free to choose which they prefer.

o ART 148 does when common-law couple have a legal impediment,

only property acquired by them through ACTUAL, JOINT
CONTRIBUTION OF MONEY, PROEPRTY OR INDUSTRY, shall
be owned by them in common and in proportion to their respective
properties
This also wasnt proven by petitioner since she had no job or money to
gain the properties in question. Thus they are conjugal.
The financial capacity of Rodolfo as VP and Comptroller of WBC, his
retirement package, his application for the mortgage loan intended of
housing and his monthly amortizations and semi-annual premiums
payable to Commonwealth by Philam sufficiently prove that Rodolfo

Gomez sought a clarification of that portion in the decision regarding

the procedure for the liquidation of common property in unions
without marriage. During the hearing on the motion, the children
filed a joint affidavit expressing desire to stay with their father.

ISSUE: Whether or not the property regime should be based on coownership.

HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that in a void marriage, regardless of
the cause thereof, the property relations of the parties are governed by
the rules on co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union is
prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint
efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the
property shall be considered as having contributed thereto jointly if
said partys efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the
family.
18. Agapay vs Palang
Facts: Miguel Palang married Carlina (or Cornelia) Vallesterol on July
16, 1949 October 1949, he left to work in Hawaii
as early as 1957, Miguel had attempted to divorce Carlina in Hawaii
July 15, 1973 Miguel married with nineteen-year-old Erlinda Agapay
May 17, 1973, Miguel and Erlinda, jointly purchased a parcel of rice
land. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 101736 issued in their names
September 23, 1975 Erlinda allegedly purchased a house and lot and
title was issued in her name
October 30, 1975, Miguel and Cornelia Palang executed a Deed of
Donation as a form of compromise agreement to settle and end a case
filed by the latter. The parties therein agreed to donate their conjugal
property consisting of six parcels of land to their only child, Herminia
Palang
1979, Miguel and Erlinda were convicted of Concubinage upon
Carlinas complaint. Two years later, on February 15, 1981, Miguel
died July 11, 1981, Carlina Palang and her daughter Herminia Palang
de la Cruz, herein private respondents, instituted the case at bar, an
action for recovery of ownership and possession with damages of the
house and lot together with the riceland

Issue:Who is the owner of the two pieces of property

Held: Carlina, the first wife
Under FC Article 148, only the properties acquired by both of the
parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property or
industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their
respective contributions. It must be stressed that actual contribution is
required by this provision since it for relationships that have legal
impediments
- Art 147 is the law that recognizes relationships without legal
impediment and proof of care and maintenance of family and
household equates to joint effort.
Erlinda failed to persuade the court that she actually contributed
money to buy the subject Riceland hence the riceland reverts to the
first marriage With respect to the house and lot, Erlinda allegedly
bought the same for P20,000.00 on September 23, 1975 when she was
only 22 years old- however the notary testified that the property was
purchased by Miguel but put in the name of Erlinda- the transaction
was essentially a void donation
Article 87 of the Family Code expressly provides that the prohibition
against donations between spouses now applies to donations between
persons living together as husband and wife without a valid marriage
Compromise agreement entered into by Carliana and late Miguel is not
a separation of property and should not be inferred as such. NO
LIQUIDATION WAS MADE.
19. Mallilin Jr. v. Castillo
Facts: Eustaquio Mallilin, Jr. filed a complaint for "Partition and/or
Payment of Co-Ownership Share, Accounting and Damages" against
respondent Ma. Elvira Castillo, petitioner and respondent, both
married and with children, but separated from their respective spouses,
cohabited after a brief courtship sometime in 1979 while their
respective marriages still subsisted. During their union, they set up the
Superfreight Customs brokerage corporation and also acquired

properties which were registered solely in Elviras name. In 1992, due

to irreconcilable differences, the couple separated. Petitioner
demanded from respondent his share in the subject properties, but
respondent refused alleging that said properties had been registered
solely in her name. She denied that she and petitioner lived as husband
and wife because the fact was that they were still legally married to
their respective spouses. She claimed to be the exclusive owner of all
real and personal properties involved in petitioners action for partition
on the ground that they were acquired entirely out of her own money
and registered solely in her name.
-RTC dismissed case. It also ruled that it is immaterial whether the
parties actually lived together as husband and wife because Art. 144 of
the Civil Code can not be made to apply to them as they were both
incapacitated to marry each other. Hence, it was impossible for a coownership to exist between them.
-CA granted respondents motion. It said in its decision that the desired
declaration of co-ownership and eventual partition will utterly be an
indirect or collateral attack on the subject titles in this suit. Verily,
plaintiff-appellant should have first pursued such remedy or any other
relief directly attacking the subject titles before instituting the present
partition suit.
ISSUE: Can plaintiff validly claim the partition and/or payment of coownership share, accounting and damages, considering that plaintiff
and defendant are admittedly both married to their respective spouses
under still valid and subsisting marriages, even assuming as claimed
by plaintiff, that they lived together as husband and wife without
benefit of marriage? In other words, can the parties be considered as
co- owners of the properties, under the law, considering the present
status of the parties as both married and incapable of marrying each
other, even assuming that they lived together as husband and wife (?)
HELD: Yes -Article 148 shall apply in this case. If the parties are
incapacitated to marry each other, properties acquired by them through
their joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned
by them in common in proportion to their contributions which, in the
absence of proof to the contrary, is presumed to be equal. There is thus

co-ownership even though the couple are not capacitated to marry each
other.
-Petitioner sought partition of real properties and a substantial amount
of personal properties consisting of motor vehicles and several pieces
of jewelry. By dismissing petitioners complaint for partition on
grounds of due process and equity, the appellate court unwittingly
denied petitioner his right to prove ownership over the claimed real
and personal properties. The amended decision of the Court of
Appeals, dated May 7, 1998, is REVERSED and the case is
REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 59, Makati City for
further proceedings on the merits.
20. Atienza v. De Castro
Facts:Atienza, visiting his house in Makati wherein he has two
children with De Castro, saw the respondent Judge Brillantes sleeping
in his bed. The houseboy claimed that the judge had been cohabiting
with De Castro. Atienza files charges on the judge on the ground that
the respondent is already married and has five children. Judge denies
the claim of being married stating that the alleged union wasnt valid
because it lacked a marriage license. Although upon the request of the
womans parents they held another marriage ceremony later that year,
they still didnt apply for a marriage license. The woman abandoned
the Judge nineteen years ago leaving their children to his care. He
claims that Article 40 of the Family Code does not apply to him
considering that his first marriage took place in 1965 and was thus
governed by the Civil Code of the Philippines; while the second
marriage on 1991, governed by the Family Code.
Issue:
WON the judge can contract a second marriage without a judicial
declaration of nullity.
Held/Ratio:
No. Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the
effectivity of the Family Code in 1988 regardless of the date of the
first marriage. Besides, under Article 256 of the FC, said Article is

given retroactive effect since it does not prejudice or impair any

vested right. His failure to secure a marriage license on two possible
occasions betrays his sinister motives and bad faith as a lawyer and
judge.
Dismissed from service.
21. Go-Bangayan v. Bangayan ( G.R. No. 201061, Jul. 3, 2013)
Facts: Benjamin Bangayan, Jr. (Benjamin) alleged that he was married
to Azucena Alegre (Azucena), where they had three children.
However, Benjamin developed a romantic relationship with Sally GoBangayan (Sally) who was a customer in the business owned by
Benjamins family. Sometime after Azucena left for America,
Benjamin and Sally lived together as husband and wife. They sign a
purported marriage contract even though Sally knew of Benjamins
marital status. Sally assured him that the marriage contract would not
be registered. Benjamin and Sallys cohabitation produced two
children.
When the relationship ended, Sally went to Canada bringing with her
their 2 children. She then filed criminal actions for bigamy and
falsification of public documents against Benjamin, using their
simulated marriage contract as evidence. Benjamin, in turn, filed a
petition for declaration of a non-existent marriage and/or declaration of
nullity of marriage before the trial court.
Issue: WON the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was valid
Held: No. At the time Benjamin and Sally entered into the purported
marriage, the marriage between Benjamin and Azucena was still valid
and subsisting. Benjamins marriage to Azucena was duly established
before the trial court, evidenced by a certified true copy of their
marriage contract.
Furthermore, the purported marriage of Benjamin and Sally had no
valid marriage license because the Local Civil Registrar confirmed that
the Marriage License of Benjamin and Sally did not match the
Marriage License series issued for the month of February 1982. The
Civil Registrar also said that it did not issue Marriage License No. N-

07568 (the alleged Marriage License of Benjamin and Sally) to the

couple. Such certification from the local civil registrar is adequate to
prove the non-issuance of a marriage license and absent any suspicious
circumstance, the certification enjoys probative value, being issued by
the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to
the issuance of a marriage license.
Under Article 35 of the Family Code, a marriage solemnized without a
license, except those covered by Article 34 where no license is
necessary, "shall be void from the beginning." In this case, the
marriage between Benjamin and Sally was solemnized without a
license. Therefore, it is clear that the marriage between Benjamin and
Sally was null and void ab initio and non-existent.
22. Lim Lua v. Lua (G.R. No. 175279-80, Jun. 5, 2013)
Facts: Petitioner Susan Lim-Lua filed an action for the declaration of
nullity of her marriage with respondent Danilo Y. Lua, and for support
pendent lite amounting to P500,000.
Respondent on the other hand, refused and manifested that he is only
willing to give as much as 75,000 as support.
RTC ruled that the amount of 250,000 support per month is sufficient,
notwithstanding the separate medical support for susan when the need
arises. However this amount was eventually reduced by the CA, citing
the fact that there was no evidence adduced to show the alleged
millions of income of respondent, and that based on the evidence
presented the proper amount to paid should be 115,000. This was not
assailed by any party does it became final and executory.
Issues once again arised, when respondent in complying with its
obligation paid only the amount of P162,651.90 to petitioner.
Respondent explained that, as decreed in the CA decision, he deducted
from the amount of support in arrears (September 3, 2003 to March
2005) ordered by the CA -- P2,185,000.00 -- plus P460,000.00 (April,
May, June and July 2005), totalingP2,645,000.00, the advances given
by him to his children and petitioner in the sumof P2,482,348.16 (with
attached photocopies of receipts/billings). On the other hand petitioner

contends that respondent shouldnt be allowed the deductions he made

arguing that under Article 194, support comprises everything
indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance,
education and transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of
the family, that in this case the cars and credit card charges are not part
of support.
Once again RTC, ruled in favor of petitioner granting a writ of
execution, however upon appeal such was decision was reversed and
the CA allowed the deductions made by respondent. Hence the case at
bar.
Issue: WON the deductions made by respondent including the two
automobile and credit card charges are valid deductions and
considered as advances.
Held:should not have allowed all the expenses incurred by respondent
to be.
The Supreme Court reversed the CA, and stated that CA credited
against the accrued support pendent lite.
The amount of support which those related by marriage and family
relationship is generally obliged to give each other shall be in
proportion to the resources or means of the giver and to the needs of
the recipient. Such support comprises everything indispensable for
sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and
transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the family.
Here, the monthly support pendente lite granted by the trial court was
intended primarily for food, household expenses such as salaries of
drivers and house helpers, and also petitioners scoliosis therapy
sessions. Hence, the value of two expensive cars bought by respondent
for his children plus their maintenance cost, travel expenses of
petitioner and Angelli, purchases through credit card of items other
than groceries and dry goods (clothing) should have been disallowed,
as these bear no relation to the judgment awarding support pendente
lite. Any amount respondent seeks to be credited as monthly support
should only cover those incurred for sustenance and household

expenses
23. Abbas v. Abbas (G.R. No. 183896, Jan. 30, 2013)
Facts: The case stems from a supposed marriage ceremony between
Pakistani SyedAzhar Abbas and Filipina Gloria Goo on January 9,
1993. The marriage contract stated that the couple was issued a
marriage license from Carmona, Cavite on January 8, 1993. The copy
of marriage license was apparently presented to the solemnizing
officer during the marriage ceremony.
In July 2003, Syed went to the Office of the Civil Registrar to secure a
copy of the marriage license in relation to a bigamy case filed by
Gloria. However, the Municipal Civil Registrar issued a certification
declaring that the office has not issued a marriage license to Syed and
Gloria. It further verified that the marriage license indicated in Syed
and Glorias marriage contract was issued to a different couple.
Syed filed a petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage to Gloria.
He argued that there was no actual marriage license issued to them
prior to the supposed marriage in January 1993. Gloria maintained, on
the other hand, that a valid marriage license existed. She presented
their marriage contract, photographs and testimonies of people present
during the marriage ceremony to negate the certification from the
municipal civil registrar. She countered that a certain Qualin
secured the marriage license for her and Syed. But she was not able to
present a copy of the actual marriage license.
RTC ruled that there was no valid marriage license issued by the
Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona. CA ruled that there was a valid
marriage license because the certification of the Municipal Civil
Registrar failed to categorically state that a diligent search for the
marriage license of Gloria and Syed was conducted, and thus held that
said certification could not be accorded probative value
Issue: WON a valid marriage license was issued to Syed and Gloria
Held: No. Contrary to the ruling of the CA, proof does exist of a
diligent search having been conducted, as Marriage License No.
996967 was indeed located and submitted to the court. The fact that

the names in said license do not correspond to those of Gloria and

Syed does not overturn the presumption that the registrar conducted a
diligent search of the records of her office.
In the case of Cario v. Cario, it was held that the certification of the
Local Civil Registrar that their office had no record of a marriage
license was adequate to prove the non-issuance of said license.
No marriage license was proven to have been issued to Gloria and
Syed, based on the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar of
Carmona, Cavite and Glorias failure to produce a copy of the alleged
marriage license.
All the evidence cited by the CA to show that a wedding ceremony
was conducted and a marriage contract was signed, does not operate to
cure the absence of a valid marriage license.
Article 4 of the Family Code is clear when it says, "The absence of any
of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab
initio, except as stated in Article 35(2)." This marriage cannot be
characterized as among the exemptions, and thus, having been
solemnized without a marriage license, is void ab initio.

24. Beumer v. Amores (G.R. No. 195670, Dec. 3, 2012)

Facts: Beumer, a Dutch National, and Amores, a Filipina, was married
on March 29, 1980. After several years, the RTC of Negros Oriental
declared the nullity of their marriage on the basis of the formers
psychological incapacity. Consequently, petitioner filed a Petition for
Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership and prayed for the distribution of
several properties claimed to have been acquired during the
subsistence of their marriage.
Amores averred that, with the exception of their 2 residential houses,
she and petitioner did not acquire any conjugal properties during their
marriage, and that she was able to acquire 4 other lots out of her
personal funds and 2 others by way of inheritance.On the other hand,
Beumer testified that while the 4 other lots were registered in the name
of respondent, these properties were acquired with the money he
received from the Dutch government as his disability benefit.

Issue:WON Beumer has the right to claim reimbursement from the

purchase of the real properties subject to the dissolution proceedings?
Held: NO. In the case of Muller v. Muller, the Court held that one
cannot seek reimbursement on the ground of equity where it is clear
that he willingly and knowingly bought the property despite the
prohibition against foreign ownership of Philippine land enshrined
under Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.
Undeniably, petitioner openly admitted that he "is well aware of the
above-cited constitutional prohibition" and even asseverated that,
because of such prohibition, he and respondent registered the subject
properties in the latters name.
The time-honored principle is that he who seeks equity must do equity,
and he who comes into equity must come with clean hands.
Conversely stated, he who has done inequity shall not be accorded
equity. Thus, a litigant may be denied relief by a court of equity on the
ground that his conduct has been inequitable, unfair and dishonest, or
fraudulent, or deceitful.
The Court cannot grant reimbursement to petitioner given that he
acquired no right whatsoever over the subject properties by virtue of
its unconstitutional purchase. Surely, a contract that violates the
Constitution and the law is null and void, vests no rights, creates no
obligations and produces no legal effect at all.
This case provides the exception to Art. 117, which provides that,
the following are conjugal partnership properties:
1) Those acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the expense
of the common fund, whether the acquisition be for the partnership, or
for only one of the spouses; XXX

25. Montanez v. Cipriano (G.R. No. 181089, Oct. 22, 2012)

Facts: On April 8, 1976, Lourdes married Socrates. On January 24,
1983, while the first marriage has not yet been judicially dissolved,

Lourdes married Silverio. Lourdes filed a petition in 2001 to annul her

marriage with Socrates for psychological incapacity. The first marriage
was declared null and void on 2003
On May 14, 2004, Merlinda Cipriano Montaez, the petitioner and
Silverios daughter from the first marriage, filed a bigamy complaint
against Lourse. Attached to the complaint was a marked and signed
affidavit of Silverio stating that Lourdes concealed her marriage to
Socrates.
On July 24, 2007, Lourdes alleged that since her marriage was
declared void ab initio in 2003, there can be no bigamy in the absence
of two valid marriage, is therefore wanting. RTC ruled that bigamy
was not committed by the respondent. The subsequent marriage was
solemnized in 1983 prior to the effectivity of the Family Code; hence,
the existing law at that time did not require judicial declaration of
nullity as a condition to remarry. Due to the unsettled state of
Jurisprudence, RTC interpreted the law liberally in favor of the
accused.
Issue: WON the declaration of nullity of respondent's first marriage
justifies the dismissal of the on for bigamy filed against her.
Held: No, the declaration of nullity of the first marriage does not
justify the dismissal of the bigamy case.
In Jarillov. People, the Court ruled that when an accused contracted a
subsequent marriage without the prior marriage having been judicially
declared null and void, the crime of bigamy was already
consummated. This is so because the first marriage which had not yet
been declared null and void by a court of competent jurisdiction was
deemed valid and subsisting.
The subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage
would not change the fact that she contracted the second marriage
during the subsistence of the first marriage. As long as there is no
judicial declaration of nullity, the marriage is presumed to be existing.
Therefore, he/she who contracts a subsequent marriage before the
judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage can be prosecuted

for bigamy. Yes, what makes a person criminally liable for bigamy is
when he contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the
subsistence of a valid marriage. Parties to the marriage should not be
permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be
submitted to the judgment of competent courts and only when the
nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long
as there is no declaration, the presumption is that the marriage exists.
Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial
declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being
prosecuted for bigamy.
26. Charles Gotardo v. Divina Buling G.R. No. 165166 August 15,
2012
FACTS: 1.On September 6, 1995, respondent Divina Buling filed a
complaint with the RTC of Maasin, Southern Leyte, for compulsory
recognition and support pendente lite, claiming that the Charles
Gotardo is the father of her child Gliffze. (answer) Petitioner denied
the paternity.
2. Parties failed to amicably settle the dispute, the RTC terminated the
pre-trial proceedings. Trial on the merits ensued.
3.Evidence for Divina (casual employee) showed that she met Charles
(accounting supervisor) on December 1, 1992 at the Philippine
Commercial and Industrial Bank, Maasin, Southern Leyte branch.
4. Charles courted Divina in the third week of December 1992 and
they became sweethearts in the last week of January 1993. Charles
gave the respondent greeting cards on special occasions, (Valentines
Day and her birthday); she reciprocated his love and took care of him
when he was ill.
5. In September 1993, Charles started intimate sexual relations with
the respondent in the formers rented room in the boarding house
managed by Rodulfo (Divinas uncle). Rented the room from March 1,
1993 to August 30, 1994.
6. The sexual encounters occurred twice a month and became more
frequent in June 1994;
eventually, on August 8, 1994, she got pregnant. Charles was happy
and made plans to marry
Divina. BUT, Charles backed out of the wedding plan. (Divina filed
for damages for breach of promise to marry but was amicably settled).
7. Divina gave birth to Gliffze on March 9, 1995. (When Charles did

not show up and failed to provide support to Gliffze, Divina sent him a
demand letter on July 24, 1995 for recognition and support of their
son)
8.Due to unanswered demand, Divina took her demands in Court.
9.Charles denied being Gliffzes father in Court.
RTC approved monthly child support.
RTC (appeal) reversed former decision
CA ordered Charles to recognize Gliffze and give monthly child
support
ISSUE: WON Gliffze is entitled to receive child support and to be
recognized as Charles son.
HELD: YES. One can prove filiation, either legitimate or illegitimate,
through the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final
judgment, an admission of filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned, or the
open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate or
illegitimate child, or any other means allowed by the Rules of Court
and special laws.
We explained that a prima facie case exists if a woman declaressupported by corroborative proof- that she had sexual relationship with
the putative father; at this point, the burden of evidence shifts to the
putative father. We explained further that two affirmative defenses

available to the putative father are: 1. Incapability of sexual

relationship with the mother due to either physical absence or
impotency or 2. That the mother had sexual relations with other man at
the time of conception.
In this case, the respondent established a prima facie case that the
petitioner is the putative father of Gliffze through testimony that she
had been sexually involved only with one man, the petitioner, at the
time of her conception. Rodulfo corroborated the testimony that the
petitioner and the respondent had intimate relationship. On the other
hand, the petitioner did not deny that he had sexual relation with the
respondent.
Since filiation is proved, the petitioner is obliged to support his child,
indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance,
education and transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of
the family. Thus, the amount of support is variable and, for the reason,
no final judgment on the amount of support is made as the amount
shall be in proportion to the resources or means of the giver and the
necessities of the recipient. It may be reduced or increased
proportionally according to the reduction or increase of the necessities
of the recipient and the resources or means of the person obliged to
support.