TORTS AND DAMAGES

ASSOC. DEAN JLC

SUMMER
1. ART. 19-21
2. ART. 2176-2194 AND 2195-2235
3. RULE 111
4. ART. 30-31
CASES:

1. HERMOSISIMA VS. CA, 109 PHIL 629

2. GASHEM SHOOKAT VS. CA, 219 SCRA 115
3. WASMER VS. VELEZ, 211 SCRA 440
4. QUIMIGUING VS. ICAO, 34 SCRA 132
5. TANJANCO VS. CA, 18 SCRA 894
6. PEOPLE VS. BINDOY, 222 SCRA 216
7. PEOPLE VS. FONTANILLA, 23 SCRA 127
8. LBC EXPRESS INC. VS. CA, 236 SCRA 602
9. PILIPINAS BANK VS. CA, 234 SCRA 45
10. CITY TRUST BANKING VS. IAC, 232 SCRA 559
11. NAPOCOR VS. CA, 223 SCRA 649
12. JAPAN AIRLINES VS. CA, 294 SCRA 19
13. PAL VS. CA, 188 SCRA 465
14. PAL VS. CA, 185 SCRA 111
15. PAL VS. CA, 226 SCRA 423
16. ZULUETA VS. PAN-AM, 43 SCRA 497
17. PAN-AM VS. IAC, 186 SCRA 687
18. LOPEZ VS. PAN-AM, 16 SCRA 431
19. AIR FRANCE VS. CARRASCOSO, 18 SCRA 155
20. CATHAY PACIFIC VS. CA, 219 SCRA 520

FRANCISCO HERMOSISIMA vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.

G.R. No. L-14628, September 30, 1960, EN BANC
An appeal by certiorari, taken by petitioner Francisco Hermosisima, from a decision of Court of Appeals modifying
that of the Court of First Instance of Cebu.
On October 4, 1954, Soledad Cagigas, hereinafter referred to as complaint, filed with said of her child, Chris
Hermosisima, as natural child and moral damages for alleged breach of promise. Petitioner admitted the paternity
of child and expressed willingness to support the latter, but denied having ever promised to marry the
complainant. Upon her motion, said court ordered petitioner, on October 27, 1954, to pay, by way of alimony
pendente lite, P50.00 a month, which was, on February 16, 1955, reduced to P30.00 a month. In due course, later
on, said court rendered a decision the dispositive part of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, declaring the child, Chris Hermosisima, as the natural
daughter of defendant, and confirming the order pendente lite, ordering defendant to pay to the said child,
through plaintiff, the sum of thirty pesos (P30.00), payable on or before the fifth day of every month
sentencing defendant to pay to plaintiff the sum of FOUR THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS
(P4,500.00) for actual and compensatory damages; the sum of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) as
moral damages; and the further sum of FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P500.00) as attorney's fees for plaintiff,
with costs against defendant.
On appeal taken by petitioner, the Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, except as to the actual and
compensatory damages and the moral damages, which were increased to P5,614.25 and P7,000.00,
respectively.
The main issue before us is whether moral damages are recoverable, under our laws, for breach of
promise to marry. The pertinent facts are:
Complainant Soledad Cagigas, was born in July 1917. Since 1950, Soledad then a teacher in the Sibonga
Provincial High School in Cebu, and petitioner, who was almost ten (10) years younger than she, used to go
around together and were regarded as engaged, although he had made no promise of marriage prior thereto. In
1951, she gave up teaching and became a life insurance underwriter in the City of Cebu, where intimacy
developed among her and the petitioner, since one evening in 1953, when after coming from the movies, they had
sexual intercourse in his cabin on board M/V "Escao," to which he was then attached as apprentice pilot. In
February 1954, Soledad advised petitioner that she was in the family way, whereupon he promised to marry her.
Their child, Chris Hermosisima, was born on June 17, 1954, in a private maternity and clinic. However,
subsequently, or on July 24, 1954, defendant married one Romanita Perez. Hence, the present action, which was
commenced on or about October 4, 1954.
Referring now to the issue above referred to, it will be noted that the Civil Code of Spain permitted the
recovery of damages for breach to marry. Article 43 and 44 of said Code provides:
ART. 43. A mutual promise of marriage shall not give rise to an obligation to contract marriage. No court
shall entertain any complaint by which the enforcement of such promise is sought.
ART. 44. If the promise has been in a public or private instrument by an adult, or by a minor with the
concurrence of the person whose consent is necessary for the celebration of the marriage, or if the banns
have been published, the one who without just cause refuses to marry shall be obliged to reimburse the
other for the expenses which he or she may have incurred by reason of the promised marriage.
The action for reimbursement of expenses to which the foregoing article refers must be brought within
one year, computed from the day of the refusal to celebrate the marriage.
Inasmuch as these articles were never in force in the Philippines, this Court ruled in De Jesus vs. Syquia (58
Phil., 866), that "the action for breach of promises to marry has no standing in the civil law, apart from the
right to recover money or property advanced . . . upon the faith of such promise". The Code Commission
charged with the drafting of the Proposed Civil Code of the Philippines deem it best, however, to change the law
thereon. We quote from the report of the Code Commission on said Proposed Civil Code:

Articles 43 and 44 the Civil Code of 1889 refer to the promise of marriage. But these articles are not
enforced in the Philippines. The subject is regulated in the Proposed Civil Code not only as to the aspect
treated of in said articles but also in other particulars. It is advisable to furnish legislative solutions to
some questions that might arise relative to betrothal. Among the provisions proposed are: That
authorizing the adjudication of moral damages, in case of breach of promise of marriage, and that
creating liability for causing a marriage engagement to be broken.1awphl.nt
Accordingly, the following provisions were inserted in said Proposed Civil Code, under Chapter I, Title III, Book I
thereof:
Art. 56. A mutual promise to marry may be made expressly or impliedly.
Art. 57. An engagement to be married must be agreed directly by the future spouses.
Art. 58. A contract for a future marriage cannot, without the consent of the parent or guardian, be entered
into by a male between the ages of sixteen and twenty years or by a female between the ages of sixteen
and eighteen years. Without such consent of the parents or guardian, the engagement to marry cannot be
the basis of a civil action for damages in case of breach of the promise.
Art. 59. A promise to marry when made by a female under the age of fourteen years is not civilly
actionable, even though approved by the parent or guardian.
Art. 60. In cases referred to in the proceeding articles, the criminal and civil responsibility of a male for
seduction shall not be affected.
Art. 61. No action for specific performance of a mutual promise to marry may be brought.
Art. 62. An action for breach of promise to marry may be brought by the aggrieved party even though a
minor without the assistance of his parent or guardian. Should the minor refuse to bring suit, the parent or
guardian may institute the action.
Art. 63. Damages for breach of promise to marry shall include not only material and pecuniary losses but
also compensation for mental and moral suffering.
Art. 64. Any person, other than a rival, the parents, guardians and grandparents, of the affianced parties,
who cause a marriage engagement to be broken shall be liable for damages, both material and moral, to
the engaged person who is rejected.
Art. 65. In case of breach of promise to marry, the party breaking the engagement shall be obliged to
return what he or she has received from the other as gift on account of the promise of the marriage.
These article were, however, eliminated in Congress. The reason therefor are set forth in the report of the
corresponding Senate Committee, from which we quote:
The elimination of this Chapter is proposed. That breach of promise to marry is not actionable has been
definitely decide in the case of De Jesus vs. Syquia, 58 Phil., 866. The history of breach of promise suit in the
United States and in England has shown that no other action lends itself more readily to abuse by designing
women and unscrupulous men. It is this experience which has led to the abolition of the rights of action in the socalled Balm suit in many of the American States.
See statutes of:
Florida 1945 pp. 1342 1344
Maryland 1945 pp. 1759 1762
Nevada 1943 p. 75
Maine 1941 pp. 140 141
New Hampshire 1941 p. 223
California 1939 p. 1245
Massachusetts 1938 p. 326

Indiana 1936 p. 1009

Michigan 1935 p. 201
New York 1935
Pennsylvania p. 450
The Commission perhaps though that it has followed the more progression trend in legislation when it
provided for breach of promise to marry suits. But it is clear that the creation of such causes of action at a
time when so many States, in consequence of years of experience are doing away with them, may well
prove to be a step in the wrong direction. (Congressional Record, Vol. IV, No. 79, Thursday, May 19,
1949, p. 2352.)
The views thus expressed were accepted by both houses of Congress. In the light of the clear and manifest
intent of our law making body not to sanction actions for breach of promise to marry, the award of moral
damages made by the lower courts is, accordingly, untenable. The Court of Appeals said award:
Moreover, it appearing that because of defendant-appellant's seduction power, plaintiff-appellee,
overwhelmed by her love for him finally yielded to his sexual desires in spite of her age and self-control,
she being a woman after all, we hold that said defendant-appellant is liable for seduction and, therefore,
moral damages may be recovered from him under the provision of Article 2219, paragraph 3, of
the new Civil Code.
Apart from the fact that the general tenor of said Article 2219, particularly the paragraphs preceding and those
following the one cited by the Court of Appeals, and the language used in said paragraph strongly indicates that
the "seduction" therein contemplated is the crime punished as such in Article as such in Article 337 and 338 of the
Revised Penal Code, which admittedly does not exist in the present case, we find ourselves unable to say that
petitioner is morally guilty of seduction, not only because he is approximately ten (10) years younger than the
complainant who around thirty-six (36) years of age, and as highly enlightened as a former high school teacher
and a life insurance agent are supposed to be when she became intimate with petitioner, then a mere
apprentice pilot, but, also, because, the court of first instance found that, complainant "surrendered herself" to
petitioner because, "overwhelmed by her love" for him, she "wanted to bind" "by having a fruit of their
engagement even before they had the benefit of clergy."
The court of first instance sentenced petitioner to pay the following: (1) a monthly pension of P30.00 for the
support of the child: (2) P4,500, representing the income that complainant had allegedly failed to earn during her
pregnancy and shortly after the birth of the child, as actual and compensation damages; (3) P5,000, as moral
damages; and (4) P500.00, as attorney's fees. The Court of Appeals added to the second item the sum of
P1,114.25 consisting of P144.20, for hospitalization and medical attendance, in connection with the
parturiation, and the balance representing expenses incurred to support the child and increased the moral
damages to P7,000.00.
With the elimination of this award for damages, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed,
therefore, in all other respects, without special pronouncement as to cost in this instance. It is so ordered.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Gutierrez David, Paredes and
Dizon, JJ., concur.

GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MARILOU T. GONZALES
G.R. No. 97336, February 19, 1993, THIRD DIVISION
This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to review and set aside the
Decision 1of the respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 24256 which affirmed in toto the 16 October
1939 Decision of Branch 38 (Lingayen) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pangasinan in Civil Case No. 16503.
Presented is the issue of whether or not damages may be recovered for a breach of promise to marry on
the basis of Article 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
The antecedents of this case are not complicated:
On 27 October 1987, private respondent, without the assistance of counsel, filed with the aforesaid trial court a
complaint 2 for damages against the petitioner for the alleged violation of their agreement to get married. She
alleges in said complaint that: she is twenty-two (22) years old, single, Filipino and a pretty lass of good moral
character and reputation duly respected in her community; petitioner, on the other hand, is an Iranian citizen
residing at the Lozano Apartments, Guilig, Dagupan City, and is an exchange student taking a medical course at
the Lyceum Northwestern Colleges in Dagupan City; before 20 August 1987, the latter courted and proposed to
marry her; she accepted his love on the condition that they would get married; they therefore agreed to get
married after the end of the school semester, which was in October of that year; petitioner then visited the private
respondent's parents in Baaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan to secure their approval to the marriage; sometime in 20
August 1987, the petitioner forced her to live with him in the Lozano Apartments; she was a virgin before she
began living with him; a week before the filing of the complaint, petitioner's attitude towards her started to change;
he maltreated and threatened to kill her; as a result of such maltreatment, she sustained injuries; during a
confrontation with a representative of the barangay captain of Guilig a day before the filing of the complaint,
petitioner repudiated their marriage agreement and asked her not to live with him anymore and; the petitioner is
already married to someone living in Bacolod City. Private respondent then prayed for judgment ordering the
petitioner to pay her damages in the amount of not less than P45,000.00, reimbursement for actual expenses
amounting to P600.00, attorney's fees and costs, and granting her such other relief and remedies as may be just
and equitable. The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 16503.
In his Answer with Counterclaim, 3 petitioner admitted only the personal circumstances of the parties as averred in
the complaint and denied the rest of the allegations either for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a
belief as to the truth thereof or because the true facts are those alleged as his Special and Affirmative Defenses.
He thus claimed that he never proposed marriage to or agreed to be married with the private respondent; he
neither sought the consent and approval of her parents nor forced her to live in his apartment; he did not maltreat
her, but only told her to stop coming to his place because he discovered that she had deceived him by stealing his
money and passport; and finally, no confrontation took place with a representative of the barangay captain.
Insisting, in his Counterclaim, that the complaint is baseless and unfounded and that as a result thereof, he was
unnecessarily dragged into court and compelled to incur expenses, and has suffered mental anxiety and a
besmirched reputation, he prayed for an award of P5,000.00 for miscellaneous expenses and P25,000.00 as
moral damages.
After conducting a pre-trial on 25 January 1988, the trial court issued a Pre-Trial Order 4 embodying the stipulated
facts which the parties had agreed upon, to wit:
1. That the plaintiff is single and resident (sic) of Baaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan, while the
defendant is single, Iranian citizen and resident (sic) of Lozano Apartment, Guilig, Dagupan City
since September 1, 1987 up to the present;
2. That the defendant is presently studying at Lyceum Northwestern, Dagupan City, College of
Medicine, second year medicine proper;
3. That the plaintiff is (sic) an employee at Mabuhay Luncheonette , Fernandez Avenue, Dagupan
City since July, 1986 up to the present and a (sic) high school graduate;
4. That the parties happened to know each other when the manager of the Mabuhay
Luncheonette, Johhny Rabino introduced the defendant to the plaintiff on August 3, 1986.

After trial on the merits, the lower court, applying Article 21 of the Civil Code, rendered on 16 October 1989
a decision 5 favoring the private respondent. The petitioner was thus ordered to pay the latter damages and
attorney's fees; the dispositive portion of the decision reads:
IN THE LIGHT of the foregoing consideration, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff
and against the defendant.
1. Condemning (sic) the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of twenty thousand (P20,000.00)
pesos as moral damages.
2. Condemning further the defendant to play the plaintiff the sum of three thousand (P3,000.00)
pesos as atty's fees and two thousand (P2,000.00) pesos at (sic) litigation expenses and to pay
the costs.
3. All other claims are denied. 6
The decision is anchored on the trial court's findings and conclusions that (a) petitioner and private
respondent were lovers, (b) private respondent is not a woman of loose morals or questionable virtue who readily
submits to sexual advances, (c) petitioner, through machinations, deceit and false pretenses, promised to marry
private respondent, d) because of his persuasive promise to marry her, she allowed herself to be deflowered by
him, (e) by reason of that deceitful promise, private respondent and her parents in accordance with Filipino
customs and traditions made some preparations for the wedding that was to be held at the end of October
1987 by looking for pigs and chickens, inviting friends and relatives and contracting sponsors, (f) petitioner did not
fulfill his promise to marry her and (g) such acts of the petitioner, who is a foreigner and who has abused
Philippine hospitality, have offended our sense of morality, good customs, culture and traditions. The trial court
gave full credit to the private respondent's testimony because, inter alia, she would not have had the temerity and
courage to come to court and expose her honor and reputation to public scrutiny and ridicule if her claim was
false. 7
The above findings and conclusions were culled from the detailed summary of the evidence for the private
respondent in the foregoing decision, digested by the respondent Court as follows:
According to plaintiff, who claimed that she was a virgin at the time and that she never had a
boyfriend before, defendant started courting her just a few days after they first met. He later
proposed marriage to her several times and she accepted his love as well as his proposal of
marriage on August 20, 1987, on which same day he went with her to her hometown of Baaga,
Bugallon, Pangasinan, as he wanted to meet her parents and inform them of their relationship
and their intention to get married. The photographs Exhs. "A" to "E" (and their submarkings) of
defendant with members of plaintiff's family or with plaintiff, were taken that day. Also on that
occasion, defendant told plaintiffs parents and brothers and sisters that he intended to marry her
during the semestral break in October, 1987, and because plaintiff's parents thought he was good
and trusted him, they agreed to his proposal for him to marry their daughter, and they likewise
allowed him to stay in their house and sleep with plaintiff during the few days that they were in
Bugallon. When plaintiff and defendant later returned to Dagupan City, they continued to live
together in defendant's apartment. However, in the early days of October, 1987, defendant would
tie plaintiff's hands and feet while he went to school, and he even gave her medicine at 4 o'clock
in the morning that made her sleep the whole day and night until the following day. As a result of
this live-in relationship, plaintiff became pregnant, but defendant gave her some medicine to abort
the fetus. Still plaintiff continued to live with defendant and kept reminding him of his promise to
marry her until he told her that he could not do so because he was already married to a girl in
Bacolod City. That was the time plaintiff left defendant, went home to her parents, and thereafter
consulted a lawyer who accompanied her to the barangay captain in Dagupan City. Plaintiff, her
lawyer, her godmother, and a barangay tanod sent by the barangay captain went to talk to
defendant to still convince him to marry plaintiff, but defendant insisted that he could not do so
because he was already married to a girl in Bacolod City, although the truth, as stipulated by the
parties at the pre-trial, is that defendant is still single.
Plaintiff's father, a tricycle driver, also claimed that after defendant had informed them of his
desire to marry Marilou, he already looked for sponsors for the wedding, started preparing for the

reception by looking for pigs and chickens, and even already invited many relatives and friends to
the forthcoming wedding. 8
Petitioner appealed the trial court's decision to the respondent Court of Appeals which docketed the case as CAG.R. CV No. 24256. In his Brief, 9 he contended that the trial court erred (a) in not dismissing the case for lack of
factual and legal basis and (b) in ordering him to pay moral damages, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and
costs.
On 18 February 1991, respondent Court promulgated the challenged decision 10 affirming in toto the trial
court's ruling of 16 October 1989. In sustaining the trial court's findings of fact, respondent Court made the
following analysis:
First of all, plaintiff, then only 21 years old when she met defendant who was already 29 years old
at the time, does not appear to be a girl of loose morals. It is uncontradicted that she was a virgin
prior to her unfortunate experience with defendant and never had boyfriend. She is, as described
by the lower court, a barrio lass "not used and accustomed to trend of modern urban life", and
certainly would (sic) not have allowed
"herself to be deflowered by the defendant if there was no persuasive promise made by the
defendant to marry her." In fact, we agree with the lower court that plaintiff and defendant must
have been sweethearts or so the plaintiff must have thought because of the deception of
defendant, for otherwise, she would not have allowed herself to be photographed with defendant
in public in so (sic) loving and tender poses as those depicted in the pictures Exhs. "D" and "E".
We cannot believe, therefore, defendant's pretense that plaintiff was a nobody to him except a
waitress at the restaurant where he usually ate. Defendant in fact admitted that he went to
plaintiff's hometown of Baaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan, at least thrice; at (sic) the town fiesta on
February 27, 1987 (p. 54, tsn May 18, 1988), at (sic) a beach party together with the manager
and employees of the Mabuhay Luncheonette on March 3, 1987 (p. 50, tsn id.), and on April 1,
1987 when he allegedly talked to plaintiff's mother who told him to marry her daughter (pp. 55-56,
tsn id.). Would defendant have left Dagupan City where he was involved in the serious study of
medicine to go to plaintiff's hometown in Baaga, Bugallon, unless there was (sic) some kind of
special relationship between them? And this special relationship must indeed have led to
defendant's insincere proposal of marriage to plaintiff, communicated not only to her but also to
her parents, and (sic) Marites Rabino, the owner of the restaurant where plaintiff was working and
where defendant first proposed marriage to her, also knew of this love affair and defendant's
proposal of marriage to plaintiff, which she declared was the reason why plaintiff resigned from
her job at the restaurant after she had accepted defendant's proposal (pp. 6-7, tsn March 7,
1988).
Upon the other hand, appellant does not appear to be a man of good moral character and must
think so low and have so little respect and regard for Filipino women that he openly admitted that
when he studied in Bacolod City for several years where he finished his B.S. Biology before he
came to Dagupan City to study medicine, he had a common-law wife in Bacolod City. In other
words, he also lived with another woman in Bacolod City but did not marry that woman, just like
what he did to plaintiff. It is not surprising, then, that he felt so little compunction or remorse in
pretending to love and promising to marry plaintiff, a young, innocent, trustful country girl, in order
to satisfy his lust on her. 11
and then concluded:
In sum, we are strongly convinced and so hold that it was defendant-appellant's fraudulent and
deceptive protestations of love for and promise to marry plaintiff that made her surrender her
virtue and womanhood to him and to live with him on the honest and sincere belief that he would
keep said promise, and it was likewise these (sic) fraud and deception on appellant's part that
made plaintiff's parents agree to their daughter's living-in with him preparatory to their supposed
marriage. And as these acts of appellant are palpably and undoubtedly against morals, good
customs, and public policy, and are even gravely and deeply derogatory and insulting to our
women, coming as they do from a foreigner who has been enjoying the hospitality of our people
and taking advantage of the opportunity to study in one of our institutions of learning, defendantappellant should indeed be made, under Art. 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, to
compensate for the moral damages and injury that he had caused plaintiff, as the lower court
ordered him to do in its decision in this case. 12

Unfazed by his second defeat, petitioner filed the instant petition on 26 March 1991; he raises therein the single
issue of whether or not Article 21 of the Civil Code applies to the case at bar. 13
It is petitioner's thesis that said Article 21 is not applicable because he had not committed any moral wrong or
injury or violated any good custom or public policy; he has not professed love or proposed marriage to the private
respondent; and he has never maltreated her. He criticizes the trial court for liberally invoking Filipino customs,
traditions and culture, and ignoring the fact that since he is a foreigner, he is not conversant with such Filipino
customs, traditions and culture. As an Iranian Moslem, he is not familiar with Catholic and Christian ways. He
stresses that even if he had made a promise to marry, the subsequent failure to fulfill the same is excusable or
tolerable because of his Moslem upbringing; he then alludes to the Muslim Code which purportedly allows a
Muslim to take four (4) wives and concludes that on the basis thereof, the trial court erred in ruling that he does
not posses good moral character. Moreover, his controversial "common law life" is now his legal wife as their
marriage had been solemnized in civil ceremonies in the Iranian Embassy. As to his unlawful cohabitation with the
private respondent, petitioner claims that even if responsibility could be pinned on him for the live-in relationship,
the private respondent should also be faulted for consenting to an illicit arrangement. Finally, petitioner
asseverates that even if it was to be assumed arguendo that he had professed his love to the private respondent
and had also promised to marry her, such acts would not be actionable in view of the special circumstances of the
case. The mere breach of promise is not actionable. 14
On 26 August 1991, after the private respondent had filed her Comment to the petition and the petitioner had filed
his Reply thereto, this Court gave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective
Memoranda, which they subsequently complied with.
As may be gleaned from the foregoing summation of the petitioner's arguments in support of his thesis, it is clear
that questions of fact, which boil down to the issue of the credibility of witnesses, are also raised. It is the rule in
this jurisdiction that appellate courts will not disturb the trial court's findings as to the credibility of witnesses, the
latter court having heard the witnesses and having had the opportunity to observe closely their deportment and
manner of testifying, unless the trial court had plainly overlooked facts of substance or value which, if considered,
might affect the result of the case. 15
Petitioner has miserably failed to convince Us that both the appellate and trial courts had overlooked any fact of
substance or values which could alter the result of the case.
Equally settled is the rule that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court. It is not the function of this Court to analyze or weigh all over again the evidence
introduced by the parties before the lower court. There are, however, recognized exceptions to this rule. Thus,
in Medina vs. Asistio, Jr., 16 this Court took the time, again, to enumerate these exceptions:
xxx xxx xxx
(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures
(Joaquin v. Navarro, 93 Phil. 257 [1953]); (2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken,
absurb or impossible (Luna v. Linatok, 74 Phil. 15 [1942]); (3) Where there is a grave abuse of
discretion (Buyco v. People, 95 Phil. 453 [1955]); (4) When the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts (Cruz v. Sosing,
L-4875, Nov. 27, 1953); (5) When the findings of fact are conflicting (Casica v. Villaseca, L-9590
Ap. 30, 1957; unrep.) (6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the
issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellate and appellee
(Evangelista v. Alto Surety and Insurance Co., 103 Phil. 401 [1958]);
(7) The findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court (Garcia v. Court of
Appeals, 33 SCRA 622 [1970]; Sacay v. Sandiganbayan, 142 SCRA 593 [1986]); (8) When the
findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based
(Ibid.,); (9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main and reply
briefs are not disputed by the respondents (Ibid.,); and (10) The finding of fact of the Court of
Appeals is premised on the supposed absence of evidence and is contradicted by the evidence
on record (Salazar v. Gutierrez, 33 SCRA 242 [1970]).
Petitioner has not endeavored to joint out to Us the existence of any of the above quoted exceptions in this case.
Consequently, the factual findings of the trial and appellate courts must be respected.

And now to the legal issue.

The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. 17 Congress
deliberately eliminated from the draft of the New Civil Code the provisions that would have made it so. The reason
therefor is set forth in the report of the Senate Committees on the Proposed Civil Code, from which We quote:
The elimination of this chapter is proposed. That breach of promise to marry is not actionable has
been definitely decided in the case of De Jesus vs. Syquia. 18 The history of breach of promise
suits in the United States and in England has shown that no other action lends itself more readily
to abuse by designing women and unscrupulous men. It is this experience which has led to the
abolition of rights of action in the so-called Heart Balm suits in many of the American states. . . . 19
This notwithstanding, the said Code contains a provision, Article 21, which is designed to expand the concept of
torts or quasi-delict in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs
which is impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the statute books. 20
As the Code Commission itself stated in its Report:
But the Code Commission had gone farther than the sphere of wrongs defined or determined by
positive law. Fully sensible that there are countless gaps in the statutes, which leave so many
victims of moral wrongs helpless, even though they have actually suffered material and moral
injury, the Commission has deemed it necessary, in the interest of justice, to incorporate in the
proposed Civil Code the following rule:
Art. 23. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage.
An example will illustrate the purview of the foregoing norm: "A" seduces the nineteen-year old
daughter of "X". A promise of marriage either has not been made, or can not be proved. The girl
becomes pregnant. Under the present laws, there is no crime, as the girl is above nineteen years
of age. Neither can any civil action for breach of promise of marriage be filed. Therefore, though
the grievous moral wrong has been committed, and though the girl and family have suffered
incalculable moral damage, she and her parents cannot bring action for damages. But under the
proposed article, she and her parents would have such a right of action.
Thus at one stroke, the legislator, if the forgoing rule is approved, would vouchsafe adequate
legal remedy for that untold number of moral wrongs which it is impossible for human foresight to
provide for specifically in the statutes. 21
Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which defines a quasi-delict thus:
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter.
is limited to negligent acts or omissions and excludes the notion of willfulness or intent. Quasi-delict,
known in Spanish legal treatises as culpa aquiliana, is a civil law concept while torts is an Anglo-American
or common law concept. Torts is much broader than culpa aquiliana because it includes not only
negligence, but international criminal acts as well such as assault and battery, false imprisonment and
deceit. In the general scheme of the Philippine legal system envisioned by the Commission responsible
for drafting the New Civil Code, intentional and malicious acts, with certain exceptions, are to be
governed by the Revised Penal Code while negligent acts or omissions are to be covered by Article 2176
of the Civil Code. 22 In between these opposite spectrums are injurious acts which, in the absence of
Article 21, would have been beyond redress. Thus, Article 21 fills that vacuum. It is even postulated that
together with Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code, Article 21 has greatly broadened the scope of the law
on civil wrongs; it has become much more supple and adaptable than the Anglo-American law on torts. 23

In the light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21, We are of the opinion, and so hold, that where a man's
promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation
to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual
congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme
or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify
the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to marry but because of the fraud and
deceit behind it and the willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential, however,
that such injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.
In the instant case, respondent Court found that it was the petitioner's "fraudulent and deceptive
protestations of love for and promise to marry plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue and
womanhood to him and to live with him on the honest and sincere belief that he would keep said promise,
and it was likewise these fraud and deception on appellant's part that made plaintiff's parents agree to
their daughter's living-in with him preparatory to their supposed marriage." 24 In short, the private
respondent surrendered her virginity, the cherished possession of every single Filipina, not because of lust but
because of moral seduction the kind illustrated by the Code Commission in its example earlier adverted to. The
petitioner could not be held liable for criminal seduction punished under either Article 337 or Article 338 of the
Revised Penal Code because the private respondent was above eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the
seduction.
Prior decisions of this Court clearly suggest that Article 21 may be applied in a breach of promise to marry
where the woman is a victim of moral seduction. Thus, in Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals, 25 this Court
denied recovery of damages to the woman because:
. . . we find ourselves unable to say that petitioner is morally guilty of seduction, not only because
he is approximately ten (10) years younger than the complainant who was around thirty-six
(36) years of age, and as highly enlightened as a former high school teacher and a life insurance
agent are supposed to be when she became intimate with petitioner, then a mere apprentice
pilot, but, also, because the court of first instance found that, complainant "surrendered herself" to
petitioner because, "overwhelmed by her love" for him, she "wanted to bind" him by having a fruit
of their engagement even before they had the benefit of clergy.
In Tanjanco vs. Court of Appeals, 26 while this Court likewise hinted at possible recovery if there had been moral
seduction, recovery was eventually denied because We were not convinced that such seduction existed. The
following enlightening disquisition and conclusion were made in the said case:
The Court of Appeals seem to have overlooked that the example set forth in the Code
Commission's memorandum refers to a tort upon a minor who had been seduced. The essential
feature is seduction, that in law is more than mere sexual intercourse, or a breach of a promise of
marriage; it connotes essentially the idea of deceit, enticement, superior power or abuse of
confidence on the part of the seducer to which the woman has yielded (U.S. vs. Buenaventura,
27 Phil. 121; U.S. vs. Arlante, 9 Phil. 595).
It has been ruled in the Buenaventura case (supra) that
To constitute seduction there must in all cases be some sufficient promise or
inducement and the woman must yield because of the promise or other
inducement. If she consents merely from carnal lust and the intercourse is from
mutual desire, there is no seduction (43 Cent. Dig. tit. Seduction, par. 56) She
must be induced to depart from the path of virtue by the use of some species of
arts, persuasions and wiles, which are calculated to have and do have that effect,
and which result in her person to ultimately submitting her person to the sexual
embraces of her seducer (27 Phil. 123).
And in American Jurisprudence we find:
On the other hand, in an action by the woman, the enticement, persuasion or
deception is the essence of the injury; and a mere proof of intercourse is
insufficient to warrant a recovery.

Accordingly it is not seduction where the willingness arises out of sexual desire of
curiosity of the female, and the defendant merely affords her the needed
opportunity for the commission of the act. It has been emphasized that to allow a
recovery in all such cases would tend to the demoralization of the female sex,
and would be a reward for unchastity by which a class of adventuresses would
be swift to profit. (47 Am. Jur. 662)
xxx xxx xxx
Over and above the partisan allegations, the fact stand out that for one whole year, from 1958 to
1959, the plaintiff-appellee, a woman of adult age, maintain intimate sexual relations with
appellant, with repeated acts of intercourse. Such conduct is incompatible with the idea of
seduction. Plainly there is here voluntariness and mutual passion; for had the appellant been
deceived, had she surrendered exclusively because of the deceit, artful persuasions and wiles of
the defendant, she would not have again yielded to his embraces, much less for one year, without
exacting early fulfillment of the alleged promises of marriage, and would have cut short all sexual
relations upon finding that defendant did not intend to fulfill his defendant did not intend to fulfill
his promise. Hence, we conclude that no case is made under article 21 of the Civil Code, and no
other cause of action being alleged, no error was committed by the Court of First Instance in
dismissing the complaint. 27
In his annotations on the Civil Code, 28 Associate Justice Edgardo L. Paras, who recently retired from this Court,
opined that in a breach of promise to marry where there had been carnal knowledge, moral damages may be
recovered:
. . . if there be criminal or moral seduction, but not if the intercourse was due to mutual lust.
(Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals,
L-14628, Sept. 30, 1960; Estopa vs. Piansay, Jr., L-14733, Sept. 30, 1960; Batarra vs. Marcos, 7
Phil. 56 (sic); Beatriz Galang vs. Court of Appeals, et al., L-17248, Jan. 29, 1962). (In other
words, if the CAUSE be the promise to marry, and the EFFECT be the carnal knowledge, there is
a chance that there was criminal or moral seduction, hence recovery of moral damages will
prosper. If it be the other way around, there can be no recovery of moral damages, because here
mutual lust has intervened). . . .
together with "ACTUAL damages, should there be any, such as the expenses for the wedding
presentations (See Domalagon v. Bolifer, 33 Phil. 471).
Senator Arturo M. Tolentino 29 is also of the same persuasion:
It is submitted that the rule in Batarra vs. Marcos, 30 still subsists, notwithstanding the
incorporation of the present article 31 in the Code. The example given by the Code Commission is
correct, if there wasseduction, not necessarily in the legal sense, but in the vulgar sense of
deception. But when the sexual act is accomplished without any deceit or qualifying circumstance
of abuse of authority or influence, but the woman, already of age, has knowingly given herself to
a man, it cannot be said that there is an injury which can be the basis for indemnity.
But so long as there is fraud, which is characterized by willfulness (sic), the action lies. The court,
however, must weigh the degree of fraud, if it is sufficient to deceive the woman under the
circumstances, because an act which would deceive a girl sixteen years of age may not
constitute deceit as to an experienced woman thirty years of age. But so long as there is a
wrongful act and a resulting injury, there should be civil liability, even if the act is not punishable
under the criminal law and there should have been an acquittal or dismissal of the criminal case
for that reason.
We are unable to agree with the petitioner's alternative proposition to the effect that granting, for argument's sake,
that he did promise to marry the private respondent, the latter is nevertheless also at fault. According to him, both
parties are in pari delicto; hence, pursuant to Article 1412(1) of the Civil Code and the doctrine laid down
in Batarra vs. Marcos, 32 the private respondent cannot recover damages from the petitioner. The latter even goes
as far as stating that if the private respondent had "sustained any injury or damage in their relationship, it is
primarily because of her own doing, 33 for:

. . . She is also interested in the petitioner as the latter will become a doctor sooner or later. Take
notice that she is a plain high school graduate and a mere employee . . . (Annex "C") or a
waitress (TSN, p. 51, January 25, 1988) in a luncheonette and without doubt, is in need of a man
who can give her economic security. Her family is in dire need of financial assistance. (TSN, pp.
51-53, May 18, 1988). And this predicament prompted her to accept a proposition that may have
been offered by the petitioner. 34
These statements reveal the true character and motive of the petitioner. It is clear that he harbors a
condescending, if not sarcastic, regard for the private respondent on account of the latter's ignoble birth, inferior
educational background, poverty and, as perceived by him, dishonorable employment. Obviously then, from the
very beginning, he was not at all moved by good faith and an honest motive. Marrying with a woman so
circumstances could not have even remotely occurred to him. Thus, his profession of love and promise to marry
were empty words directly intended to fool, dupe, entice, beguile and deceive the poor woman into believing that
indeed, he loved her and would want her to be his life's partner. His was nothing but pure lust which he wanted
satisfied by a Filipina who honestly believed that by accepting his proffer of love and proposal of marriage, she
would be able to enjoy a life of ease and security. Petitioner clearly violated the Filipino's concept of morality and
brazenly defied the traditional respect Filipinos have for their women. It can even be said that the petitioner
committed such deplorable acts in blatant disregard of Article 19 of the Civil Code which directs every person to
act with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his obligations.
No foreigner must be allowed to make a mockery of our laws, customs and traditions.
The pari delicto rule does not apply in this case for while indeed, the private respondent may not have been
impelled by the purest of intentions, she eventually submitted to the petitioner in sexual congress not out of lust,
but because of moral seduction. In fact, it is apparent that she had qualms of conscience about the entire episode
for as soon as she found out that the petitioner was not going to marry her after all, she left him. She is not,
therefore, in pari delicto with the petitioner. Pari delicto means "in equal fault; in a similar offense or crime; equal
in guilt or in legal fault." 35 At most, it could be conceded that she is merely in delicto.
Equity often interferes for the relief of the less guilty of the parties, where his transgression has
been brought about by the imposition of undue influence of the party on whom the burden of the
original wrong principally rests, or where his consent to the transaction was itself procured by
fraud. 36
In Mangayao vs. Lasud, 37 We declared:
Appellants likewise stress that both parties being at fault, there should be no action by one
against the other (Art. 1412, New Civil Code). This rule, however, has been interpreted as
applicable only where the fault on both sides is, more or less, equivalent. It does not apply where
one party is literate or intelligent and the other one is not. (c.f. Bough vs. Cantiveros, 40 Phil.
209).
We should stress, however, that while We find for the private respondent, let it not be said that this Court
condones the deplorable behavior of her parents in letting her and the petitioner stay together in the same room in
their house after giving approval to their marriage. It is the solemn duty of parents to protect the honor of their
daughters and infuse upon them the higher values of morality and dignity.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the challenged decision, the instant petition is hereby DENIED, with
costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

BEATRIZ P. WASSMER vs. FRANCISCO X. VELEZ

G.R. No. L-20089, December 26, 1964, EN BANC
The facts that culminated in this case started with dreams and hopes, followed by appropriate planning and
serious endeavors, but terminated in frustration and, what is worse, complete public humiliation.
Francisco X. Velez and Beatriz P. Wassmer, following their mutual promise of love, decided to get married and
set September 4, 1954 as the big day. On September 2, 1954 Velez left this note for his bride-to-be:
Dear Bet
Will have to postpone wedding My mother opposes it. Am leaving on the Convair today.
Please do not ask too many people about the reason why That would only create a scandal.
Paquing
But the next day, September 3, he sent her the following telegram:
NOTHING CHANGED REST ASSURED RETURNING VERY SOON APOLOGIZE MAMA PAPA
LOVE .
PAKING
Thereafter Velez did not appear nor was he heard from again.
Sued by Beatriz for damages, Velez filed no answer and was declared in default. Plaintiff adduced evidence
before the clerk of court as commissioner, and on April 29, 1955, judgment was rendered ordering defendant to
pay plaintiff P2,000.00 as actual damages; P25,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages; P2,500.00 as
attorney's fees; and the costs.
On June 21, 1955 defendant filed a "petition for relief from orders, judgment and proceedings and motion for new
trial and reconsideration." Plaintiff moved to strike it cut. But the court, on August 2, 1955, ordered the parties and
their attorneys to appear before it on August 23, 1955 "to explore at this stage of the proceedings the possibility of
arriving at an amicable settlement." It added that should any of them fail to appear "the petition for relief and the
opposition thereto will be deemed submitted for resolution."
On August 23, 1955 defendant failed to appear before court. Instead, on the following day his counsel filed a
motion to defer for two weeks the resolution on defendants petition for relief. The counsel stated that he would
confer with defendant in Cagayan de Oro City the latter's residence on the possibility of an amicable
element. The court granted two weeks counted from August 25, 1955.
Plaintiff manifested on June 15, 1956 that the two weeks given by the court had expired on September 8, 1955
but that defendant and his counsel had failed to appear.
Another chance for amicable settlement was given by the court in its order of July 6, 1956 calling the parties and
their attorneys to appear on July 13, 1956. This time. however, defendant's counsel informed the court that
chances of settling the case amicably were nil.
On July 20, 1956 the court issued an order denying defendant's aforesaid petition. Defendant has appealed to this
Court. In his petition of June 21, 1955 in the court a quo defendant alleged excusable negligence as ground to set
aside the judgment by default. Specifically, it was stated that defendant filed no answer in the belief that an
amicable settlement was being negotiated.
A petition for relief from judgment on grounds of fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence, must be duly
supported by an affidavit of merits stating facts constituting a valid defense. (Sec. 3, Rule 38, Rules of Court.)
Defendant's affidavit of merits attached to his petition of June 21, 1955 stated: "That he has a good and valid

defense against plaintiff's cause of action, his failure to marry the plaintiff as scheduled having been due to
fortuitous event and/or circumstances beyond his control." An affidavit of merits like this stating mere conclusions
or opinions instead of facts is not valid. (Cortes vs. Co Bun Kim, L-3926, Oct. 10, 1951; Vaswani vs. P.
Tarrachand Bros., L-15800, December 29, 1960.)
Defendant, however, would contend that the affidavit of merits was in fact unnecessary, or a mere surplusage,
because the judgment sought to be set aside was null and void, it having been based on evidence adduced
before the clerk of court. In Province of Pangasinan vs. Palisoc, L-16519, October 30, 1962, this Court pointed out
that the procedure of designating the clerk of court as commissioner to receive evidence is sanctioned by Rule 34
(now Rule 33) of the Rules of Court. Now as to defendant's consent to said procedure, the same did not have to
be obtained for he was declared in default and thus had no standing in court (Velez vs. Ramas, 40 Phil. 787;
Alano vs. Court of First Instance, L-14557, October 30, 1959).
In support of his "motion for new trial and reconsideration," defendant asserts that the judgment is contrary to law.
The reason given is that "there is no provision of the Civil Code authorizing" an action for breach of promise to
marry. Indeed, our ruling in Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals (L-14628, Sept. 30, 1960), as reiterated in Estopa
vs. Biansay (L-14733, Sept. 30, 1960), is that "mere breach of a promise to marry" is not an actionable wrong. We
pointed out that Congress deliberately eliminated from the draft of the new Civil Code the provisions that would
have it so.
It must not be overlooked, however, that the extent to which acts not contrary to law may be perpetrated with
impunity, is not limitless for Article 21 of said Code provides that "any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to
another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage."
The record reveals that on August 23, 1954 plaintiff and defendant applied for a license to contract marriage,
which was subsequently issued (Exhs. A, A-1). Their wedding was set for September 4, 1954. Invitations were
printed and distributed to relatives, friends and acquaintances (Tsn., 5; Exh. C). The bride-to-be's trousseau, party
drsrses and other apparel for the important occasion were purchased (Tsn., 7-8). Dresses for the maid of honor
and the flower girl were prepared. A matrimonial bed, with accessories, was bought. Bridal showers were given
and gifts received (Tsn., 6; Exh. E). And then, with but two days before the wedding, defendant, who was then 28
years old,: simply left a note for plaintiff stating: "Will have to postpone wedding My mother opposes it ... " He
enplaned to his home city in Mindanao, and the next day, the day before the wedding, he wired plaintiff: "Nothing
changed rest assured returning soon." But he never returned and was never heard from again.
Surely this is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. As stated, mere breach of promise to marry is not an
actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go through all the above-described preparation and publicity,
only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and
unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which defendant must be held answerable in damages in accordance
with Article 21 aforesaid.
Defendant urges in his afore-stated petition that the damages awarded were excessive. No question is raised as
to the award of actual damages. What defendant would really assert hereunder is that the award of moral and
exemplary damages, in the amount of P25,000.00, should be totally eliminated.
Per express provision of Article 2219 (10) of the New Civil Code, moral damages are recoverable in the cases
mentioned in Article 21 of said Code. As to exemplary damages, defendant contends that the same could not be
adjudged against him because under Article 2232 of the New Civil Code the condition precedent is that "the
defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner." The argument is devoid of
merit as under the above-narrated circumstances of this case defendant clearly acted in a "wanton ... , reckless
[and] oppressive manner." This Court's opinion, however, is that considering the particular circumstances of this
case, P15,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages is deemed to be a reasonable award.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, with the above-indicated modification, the lower court's judgment is hereby affirmed,
with costs.

CARMEN QUIMIGUING, Suing through her parents, ANTONIO QUIMIGUING and JACOBA CABILIN vs.
FELIX ICAO
G.R. No. 26795 July 31, 1970, EN BANC
Appeal on points of law from an order of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Norte (Judge Onofre Sison
Abalos, presiding), in its Civil Case No. 1590, dismissing a complaint for support and damages, and another order
denying amendment of the same pleading.
The events in the court of origin can be summarized as follows:
Appellant, Carmen Quimiguing, assisted by her parents, sued Felix Icao in the court below. In her complaint it
was averred that the parties were neighbors in Dapitan City, and had close and confidential relations; that
defendant Icao, although married, succeeded in having carnal intercourse with plaintiff several times by force and
intimidation, and without her consent; that as a result she became pregnant, despite efforts and drugs supplied by
defendant, and plaintiff had to stop studying. Hence, she claimed support at P120.00 per month, damages and
attorney's fees.
Duly summoned, defendant Icao moved to dismiss for lack of cause of action since the complaint did not allege
that the child had been born; and after hearing arguments, the trial judge sustained defendant's motion and
dismissed the complaint.
Thereafter, plaintiff moved to amend the complaint to allege that as a result of the intercourse, plaintiff had later
given birth to a baby girl; but the court, sustaining defendant's objection, ruled that no amendment was allowable,
since the original complaint averred no cause of action. Wherefore, the plaintiff appealed directly to this Court.
We find the appealed orders of the court below to be untenable. A conceived child, although as yet unborn, is
given by law a provisional personality of its own for all purposes favorable to it, as explicitly provided in Article 40
of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The unborn child, therefore, has a right to support from its progenitors,
particularly of the defendant-appellee (whose paternity is deemed admitted for the purpose of the motion to
dismiss), even if the said child is only "en ventre de sa mere;" just as a conceived child, even if as yet unborn,
may receive donations as prescribed by Article 742 of the same Code, and its being ignored by the parent in his
testament may result in preterition of a forced heir that annuls the institution of the testamentary heir, even if such
child should be born after the death of the testator Article 854, Civil Code).
ART. 742. Donations made to conceived and unborn children may be accepted by those persons
who would legally represent them if they were already born.
ART. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct
line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator,
shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are
not inofficious.
If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the testator, the institution shall be effectual,
without prejudice to the right of 'representation.
It is thus clear that the lower court's theory that Article 291 of the Civil Code declaring that support is an obligation
of parents and illegitimate children "does not contemplate support to children as yet unborn," violates Article 40
aforesaid, besides imposing a condition that nowhere appears in the text of Article 291. It is true that Article 40
prescribing that "the conceived child shall be considered born for all purposes that are favorable to it" adds further
"provided it be born later with the conditions specified in the following article" (i.e., that the foetus be alive at the
time it is completely delivered from the mother's womb). This proviso, however, is not a condition precedent to the
right of the conceived child; for if it were, the first part of Article 40 would become entirely useless and ineffective.
Manresa, in his Commentaries (5th Ed.) to the corresponding Article 29 of the Spanish Civil Code, clearly points
this out:
Los derechos atribuidos al nasciturus no son simples expectativas, ni aun en el sentido tecnico
que la moderna doctrina da a esta figura juridica sino que constituyen un caso de los
propiamente Ilamados 'derechos en estado de pendenci'; el nacimiento del sujeto en las
condiciones previstas por el art. 30, no determina el nacimiento de aquellos derechos (que ya

existian de antemano), sino que se trata de un hecho que tiene efectos declarativos. (1 Manresa,
Op. cit., page 271)
A second reason for reversing the orders appealed from is that for a married man to force a woman not his wife to
yield to his lust (as averred in the original complaint in this case) constitutes a clear violation of the rights of his
victim that entitles her to claim compensation for the damage caused. Says Article 21 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines:
ART. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
The rule of Article 21 is supported by Article 2219 of the same Code:
ART 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:
(3) Seduction, abduction, rape or other lascivious acts:
xxx xxx xxx
(10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28 ....
Thus, independently of the right to Support of the child she was carrying, plaintiff herself had a cause of action for
damages under the terms of the complaint; and the order dismissing it for failure to state a cause of action was
doubly in error.
WHEREFORE, the orders under appeal are reversed and set aside. Let the case be remanded to the court of
origin for further proceedings conformable to this decision. Costs against appellee Felix Icao. So ordered.

APOLONIO TANJANCO vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ARACELI SANTOS

G.R. No. L-18630, December 17, 1966, EN BANC
Appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeals (in its Case No. 27210-R) revoking an order of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal (in Civil Case No. Q-4797) dismissing appellant's action for support and damages.
The essential allegations of the complaint are to the effect that, from December, 1957, the defendant (appellee
herein), Apolonio Tanjanco, courted the plaintiff, Araceli Santos, both being of adult age; that "defendant
expressed and professed his undying love and affection for plaintiff who also in due time reciprocated the tender
feelings"; that in consideration of defendant's promise of marriage plaintiff consented and acceded to defendant's
pleas for carnal knowledge; that regularly until December 1959, through his protestations of love and promises of
marriage, defendant succeeded in having carnal access to plaintiff, as a result of which the latter conceived a
child; that due to her pregnant condition, to avoid embarrassment and social humiliation, plaintiff had to resign her
job as secretary in IBM Philippines, Inc., where she was receiving P230.00 a month; that thereby plaintiff became
unable to support herself and her baby; that due to defendant's refusal to marry plaintiff, as promised, the latter
suffered mental anguish, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, and social humiliation. The
prayer was for a decree compelling the defendant to recognize the unborn child that plaintiff was bearing; to pay
her not less than P430.00 a month for her support and that of her baby, plus P100,000.00 in moral and exemplary
damages, plus P10,000.00 attorney's fees.
Upon defendant's motion to dismiss, the court of first instance dismissed the complaint for failure to state a cause
of action.
Plaintiff Santos duly appealed to the Court of Appeals, and the latter ultimately decided the case, holding with the
lower court that no cause of action was shown to compel recognition of a child as yet unborn, nor for its support,
but decreed that the complaint did state a cause of action for damages, premised on Article 21 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines, prescribing as follows:
ART. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
The Court of Appeals, therefore, entered judgment setting aside the dismissal and directing the court of origin to
proceed with the case.
Defendant, in turn, appealed to this Court, pleading that actions for breach of a promise to marry are not
permissible in this jurisdiction, and invoking the rulings of this Court in Estopa vs. Piansay, L-14733, September
30, 1960; Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals, L-14628, January 29, 1962; and De Jesus vs. SyQuia, 58 Phil. 886.
We find this appeal meritorious.
In holding that the complaint stated a cause of action for damages, under Article 21 above mentioned, the Court
of Appeals relied upon and quoted from the memorandum submitted by the Code Commission to the Legislature
in 1949 to support the original draft of the Civil Code. Referring to Article 23 of the draft (now Article 21 of the
Code), the Commission stated:
But the Code Commission has gone farther than the sphere of wrongs defined or determined by positive
law. Fully sensible that there are countless gaps in the statutes, which leave so many victims of moral
wrongs helpless, even though they have actually suffered material and moral injury, the Commission has
deemed it necessary, in the interest of justice, to incorporate in the proposed Civil Code the following rule:
"ART. 23. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage."
An example will illustrate the purview of the foregoing norm: "A" seduces the nineteen-year old daughter
of "X". A promise of marriage either has not been made, or can not be proved. The girl becomes
pregnant. Under the present laws, there is no crime, as the girl is above eighteen years of age. Neither
can any civil action for breach of promise of marriage be filed. Therefore, though the grievous moral
wrong has been committed, and though the girl and her family have suffered incalculable moral damage,

she and her parents cannot bring any action for damages. But under the proposed article, she and her
parents would have such a right of action.
The Court of Appeals seems to have overlooked that the example set forth in the Code Commission's
memorandum refers to a tort upon a minor who has been seduced. The essential feature is seduction, that in law
is more than mere sexual intercourse, or a breach of a promise of marriage; it connotes essentially the idea of
deceit, enticement, superior power or abuse of confidence on the part of the seducer to which the woman has
yielded (U.S. vs. Buenaventura, 27 Phil. 121; U.S. vs. Arlante, 9 Phil. 595).
It has been ruled in the Buenaventura case (supra) that
To constitute seduction there must in all cases be some sufficient promise or inducement and the woman
must yield because of the promise or other inducement. If she consents merely from carnal lust and the
intercourse is from mutual desire, there is no seduction (43 Cent. Dig. tit. Seduction, par. 56). She must
be induced to depart from the path of virtue by the use of some species of arts, persuasions and wiles,
which are calculated to have and do have that effect, and which result in her ultimately submitting her
person to the sexual embraces of her seducer (27 Phil. 123).
And in American Jurisprudence we find:
On the other hand, in an action by the woman, the enticement, persuasion or deception is the essence of
the injury; and a mere proof of intercourse is insufficient to warrant a recover.
Accordingly it is not seduction where the willingness arises out of sexual desire or curiosity of the female,
and the defendant merely affords her the needed opportunity for the commission of the act. It has been
emphasized that to allow a recovery in all such cases would tend to the demoralization of the female sex,
and would be a reward for unchastity by which a class of adventuresses would be swift to profit." (47 Am.
Jur. 662)
Bearing these principles in mind, let us examine the complaint. The material allegations there are as follows:
I. That the plaintiff is of legal age, single, and residing at 56 South E. Diliman, Quezon City, while
defendant is also of legal age, single and residing at 525 Padre Faura, Manila, where he may be served
with summons;
II. That the plaintiff and the defendant became acquainted with each other sometime in December, 1957
and soon thereafter, the defendant started visiting and courting the plaintiff;
III. That the defendant's visits were regular and frequent and in due time the defendant expressed and
professed his undying love and affection for the plaintiff who also in due time reciprocated the tender
feelings;
IV. That in the course of their engagement, the plaintiff and the defendant as are wont of young people in
love had frequent outings and dates, became very close and intimate to each other and sometime in July,
1958, in consideration of the defendant's promises of marriage, the plaintiff consented and acceded to the
former's earnest and repeated pleas to have carnal knowledge with him;
V. That subsequent thereto and regularly until about July, 1959 except for a short period in December,
1958 when the defendant was out of the country, the defendant through his protestations of love and
promises of marriage succeeded in having carnal knowledge with the plaintiff;
VI. That as a result of their intimate relationship, the plaintiff started conceiving which was confirmed by a
doctor sometime in July, 1959;
VII. That upon being certain of her pregnant condition, the plaintiff informed the defendant and pleaded
with him to make good his promises of marriage, but instead of honoring his promises and righting his
wrong, the defendant stopped and refrained from seeing the plaintiff since about July, 1959 has not
visited the plaintiff and to all intents and purposes has broken their engagement and his promises.

Over and above the partisan allegations, the facts stand out that for one whole year, from 1958 to 1959, the
plaintiff-appellee, a woman of adult age, maintained intimate sexual relations with appellant, with repeated acts of
intercourse. Such conduct is incompatible with the idea of seduction. Plainly there is here voluntariness and
mutual passion; for had the appellant been deceived, had she surrendered exclusively because of the deceit,
artful persuasions and wiles of the defendant, she would not have again yielded to his embraces, much less for
one year, without exacting early fulfillment of the alleged promises of marriage, and would have cut chart all
sexual relations upon finding that defendant did not intend to fulfill his promises. Hence, we conclude that no case
is made under Article 21 of the Civil Code, and no other cause of action being alleged, no error was committed by
the Court of First Instance in dismissing the complaint.
Of course, the dismissal must be understood as without prejudice to whatever actions may correspond to the child
of the plaintiff against the defendant-appellant, if any. On that point, this Court makes no pronouncement, since
the child's own rights are not here involved.
FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and that of the Court of
First Instance is affirmed. No costs.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs. DONATO BINDOY

G.R. No. L-34665, August 28, 1931, EN BANC
The appellant was sentenced by the Court of First Instance of Occidental Misamis to the penalty of twelve years
and one day of reclusion temporal, with the accessories of law, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the
amount of P1,000, and to pay the costs. The crime charged against the accused is homicide, according to the
following information:
That on or about the 6th of May, 1930, in the barrio of Calunod, municipality of Baliangao, Province of
Occidental Misamis, the accused Donato Bindoy willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attacked and with his
bolo wounded Emigdio Omamdam, inflicting upon the latter a serious wound in the chest which caused
his instant death, in violation of article 404 of the Penal Code.
The accused appealed from the judgment of the trial court, and his counsel in this instance contends that the
court erred in finding him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and in convicting him of the crime of homicide.
The record shows that in the afternoon of May 6, 1930, a disturbance arose in a tuba wineshop in the barrio
market of Calunod, municipality of Baliangao, Province of Occidental Misamis, started by some of
the tubadrinkers. There were Faustino Pacas (alias Agaton), and his wife called Tibay. One Donato Bindoy, who
was also there, offered some tuba to Pacas' wife; and as she refused to drink having already done so, Bindoy
threatened to injure her if she did not accept. There ensued an interchange of words between Tibay and Bindoy,
and Pacas stepped in to defend his wife, attempting to take away from Bindoy the bolo he carried. This
occasioned a disturbance which attracted the attention of Emigdio Omamdam, who, with his family, lived near the
market. Emigdio left his house to see what was happening, while Bindoy and Pacas were struggling for the bolo.
In the course of this struggle, Bindoy succeeded in disengaging himself from Pacas, wrenching the bolo from the
latter's hand towards the left behind the accused, with such violence that the point of the bolo reached Emigdio
Omamdam's chest, who was then behind Bindoy.
There is no evidence that Emigdio took part in the fight between Bindoy and Pacas. Neither is there any indication
that the accused was aware of Emigdio Omamdam's presence in the place, for, according to the testimony of the
witnesses, the latter passed behind the combatants when he left his house to satisfy his curiosity. There was no
disagreement or ill feeling between Bindoy and Omamdam, on the contrary, it appears they were nephew and
uncle, respectively, and were on good terms with each other. Bindoy did not try to wound Pacas, and instead of
wounding him, he hit Omamdam; he was only defending his possession of the bolo, which Pacas was trying to
wrench away from him, and his conduct was perfectly lawful.
The wound which Omamdam received in the chest, judging by the description given by the sanitary inspector who
attended him as he lay dying, tallies with the size of the point of Bindoy's bolo.
There is no doubt that the latter caused the wound which produced Emigdio Omamdam's death, but the
defendant alleges that it was caused accidentally and without malicious intent.
Pacas and the widow of the deceased, Carmen Angot, testified having seen the accused stab Omamdam with his
bolo. Such testimony is not incompatible with that of the accused, to the effect that he wounded Omamdam by
accident. The widow testified that she knew of her husband's wound being caused by Bindoy from his statement
to her before his death.
The testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution tends to show that the accused stabbed Omamdam in the
chest with his bolo on that occasion. The defendant, indeed, in his effort to free himself of Pacas, who was
endeavoring to wrench his bolo from him, hit Omamdam in the chest; but, as we have stated, there is no evidence
to show that he did so deliberately and with the intention of committing a crime. If, in his struggle with Pacas, the
defendant had attempted to wound his opponent, and instead of doing so, had wounded Omamdam, he would
have had to answer for his act, since whoever willfully commits a felony or a misdemeanor incurs criminal liability,
although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended. (Art. 1 of the Penal Code.) But, as we
have said, this is not the case.
The witness for the defense, Gaudencio Cenas, corroborates the defendant to the effect that Pacas and Bindoy
were actually struggling for the possession of the bolo, and that when the latter let go, the former had pulled so
violently that it flew towards his left side, at the very moment when Emigdio Omamdam came up, who was

therefore hit in the chest, without Donato's seeing him, because Emigdio had passed behind him. The same
witness adds that he went to see Omamdam at his home later, and asked him about his wound when he replied:
"I think I shall die of this wound." And then continued: "Please look after my wife when I die: See that she doesn't
starve," adding further: "This wound was an accident. Donato did not aim at me, nor I at him: It was a mishap."
The testimony of this witness was not contradicted by any rebuttal evidence adduced by the fiscal.
We have searched the record in vain for the motive of this kind, which, had it existed, would have greatly
facilitated the solution of this case. And we deem it well to repeat what this court said in United States vs. Carlos
(15 Phil., 47), to wit:
The attention of prosecuting officers, and especially of provincial fiscals, directed to the importance of
definitely ascertaining and proving, when possible, the motives which actuated the commission of a crime
under investigation.
In many criminal cases one of the most important aids in completing the proof of the commission of the
crime by the accused is the introduction of evidence disclosing the motives which tempted the mind of the
guilty person to indulge the criminal act.
In view of the evidence before us, we are of opinion and so hold, that the appellant is entitled to acquittal
according to article 8, No. 8, Penal Code. Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is reversed, and the accused
Donato Bindoy is hereby acquitted with costs de oficio. So ordered.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MARIANO FONTANILLA

G.R. No. L-25354, June 28, 1968, EN BANC
The appellant Mariano Fontanilla was prosecuted in the justice of the peace court (now municipal court) of San
Fernando, La Union for qualified seduction. The criminal complaint, signed by the offended woman Fe Castro and
filed on February 28, 1961, charged.
That on or about the month of September, 1960, and for sometime subsequent thereto, in the Municipality
of San Juan, Province of La Union, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with grave abuse of
confidence and authority, seduce and have sexual intercourse with the offended party Fe Castro, a
domestic in the house of the said accused, located at Allangigan, San Juan, La Union, the offended party
being then a virgin over 12 years but under 18 years of age.
After trial, the court, on November 27, 1962, found that "the guilt of the accused has been proved beyond
reasonable doubt," and accordingly sentenced him to "an indeterminate prison term from four (4) months
ofarresto mayor as maximum to two (2) years and four (4) months of prison correccional and to pay the costs."
The accused was further ordered "to pay the sum of Five Hundred Pesos (P500.00) as moral damages to the
offended party or to her parents."
Fontanilla forthwith appealed to the Court of Appeals which subsequently certified the case to us in a resolution
dated September 25, 1965, on the ground that the jurisdiction of the court a quo, inter alia, is in issue.
The following, in paraphrase, are the assigned errors:
1. The justice of the peace court of San Fernando, La Union had no jurisdiction to try and decide this case
because the alleged offense was committed outside its territorial jurisdiction and at the same time does
not fall within the compass of its original jurisdiction;
2. The lower court erred in finding that the accused had sexual intercourse with Fe Castro repeatedly and
that he had told her a number of times that he will separate from his wife Magdalena Copio and will marry
her, which was the reason why Fe Castro consented to the sexual intercourse;
3. The lower court erred in relying heavily on the testimony of Fe Castro, considering that her testimony is
hazy and self-contradictory;
4. The lower court erred in totally disregarding the evidence adduced by the appellant;
5. The lower court erred in failing to consider in favor of the accused the delay in the filing of the
complaint, which delay is not convincingly explained and which renders the accusation suspicious; and
6. The lower court erred in ordering the appellant to pay the sum of P500 in moral damages to the
offended party or to her parents.
The evidence for the prosecution discloses that in September, 1960 Fe Castro, a fifteen-year old virgin, was
brought by her mother to the house of the appellant and his second wife, Magdalena Copio, a sister of the
complaining witness' mother, to serve as a helper. The Fontanilla spouses had been married for two years but
were childless, although the appellant had grown-up children by his first marriage who were domiciled elsewhere.
Fe Castro testified that during her stay in the house of Fontanilla for about three months from September to
shortly before Christmas of December, 1960, the accused succeeded in having carnal knowledge of her
repeatedly, the total number of times she could not recall. She was certain, however, that the accused
consummated the first sexual intercourse with her one night in September, about a week after her arrival, when
the accused intruded into her bedroom, placed himself on top of her and fondled her nipples. She added that he
was able to gain access to her room because the wooden bar used to lock the door did not prevent the said door
from being opened when pushed from the outside. She also declared that prior to this incident, the accused had
made amorous overtures and advances toward her. Aside from giving her money, the accused repeatedly
promised to abandon his wife to live with her.

Q. You told us that Mariano Fontanilla had been giving you money. Are there other circumstances that
led you to the sexual intercourse?
A. He told me, "Come now let us play. I am going to separate your aunt because I love you more than
my wife."
Q. For how many times had Mariano Fontanilla been promising you this?
A. He was telling me all the time.
Fe Castro further testified that she subsequently repeatedly yielded to the carnal desires of the accused, as she
was induced by his promises of marriage and frightened by his acts of intimidation. The accused made love to her
during the day when his wife was away and at night when the latter was already asleep. Their intimacies lasted
for almost three months until her aunt, the wife of the accused, caught them in flagrante on the kitchen floor. The
following day she returned to her parents, and revealed everything to her mother two days later.
Mariano Fontanilla, testifying in his defense, admitted that Fe Castro actually lived in his house from September to
December, 1960, not as a helper, however, but in consideration of her being a niece of his wife, and was treated
as their own child. He vehemently denied having had carnal knowledge of her, as there was never an occasion
during which he could have taken advantage of the chastity of his ward, because at night her room was locked
and during the day he was out in the farm.
Q. When the offended party testified before the Court she stated that the first time you had sexual
intercourse with her was a certain night in September and you said to her, "You are very beautiful. Come
let us play." What do you say to this allegation?
A. I did not do that, sir.
Q. How is it possible or will circumstances afford you of getting inside her room and take advantage of
her being a woman?
A. No, sir. It cannot be.
Q. Why could it not be that you could enter the room and take advantage of her womanhood?
A. Because the room is locked.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Q. The offended party further testified in Court that you did the sexual intercourse daily, one in the day
time and one in the nighttime. Will you mention before this Honorable Court if you can commit sexual
intercourse in the day time?
A. That cannot be, sir.
Q. Why could you not possibly do the sexual intercourse in the day time?
A. Because I am in the farm, sir.
Q. Sometimes when you are in the farm, during lunch time Fe Castro would bring your food in the
farm?
A. No, sir.
Q. And when you go home to your house in the day time for example you take your lunch. So it is
possible for you to have sexual intercourse with the offended party?
A. No, sir. It is not possible during day time.

Q. Who are your companions in your house in the day time?

A. My wife and also our neighbor who used to come.
Fontanilla declared that another reason why it was not possible for him to seduce Fe Castro was that his sexual
capabilities had waned considerably because of old age, as he was already 52 years old at the time of the
supposed commission of the crime charged. He admitted that despite the fact that he had been married for only
two years to his second wife, he made love to her only once a week. Under these circumstances, it was
impossible for him to have indulged in sexual intercourse with Fe Castro twice daily.
The accused advances the theory that the instant case was filed against him upon the malevolent instigation of
one Avelino Gapasin, an uncle of Fe Castro, who wielded strong influence over her, adding that the complainant
herself was envious of his (Fontanilla's) children of the first marriage who received some salary from their
employment. This allegation was indirectly corroborated by a witness for the defense, Mayor Antonio Aquino of
San Juan, La Union, who testified that he endeavored to settle the case by proposing that the accused pay P50
which was due to Fe Castro as her share in the cultivation of tobacco, but the complaining witness through
Avelino Gapasin refused the offer and the latter then insinuated that the amount of P2,000 should be paid, which
sum he believed would be sufficient reparation for "the honor destroyed."
Magdalena Copio 51-year old wife of the accuse, corroborated her husband's statement that they indulged in
sexual intercourse only once a week. She also stated that during the three months that Fe Castro stayed with
them, there was no unusual incident or sexual relation between her husband and her niece. She denied having
caught the accused in a compromising situation with the offended party. She also testified that she slept regularly
from 7:00 p.m. to 12:00 midnight, after which she seldom could go back to sleep, and that she was easily
awakened by the slightest noise. She categorically declared that her husband slept with her in the same bed
every night.
For the first time on appeal, Fontanilla challenges the jurisdiction of the court a quo the justice of the peace
court of San Fernando, the capital of La Union - alleging that it had no jurisdiction to try and decide this case, for
two reasons: (1) the crime charged according to the indictment was committed in San Juan, a municipality outside
the territorial jurisdiction of the court a quo; and (2) original jurisdiction over the crime of qualified seduction
belongs exclusively to the court of first instance, and not to the justice of the peace court of the provincial capital.
The appellant's theory finds no basis in the then governing provisions of the Judiciary Act when the instant action
was commenced on February 28, 1961. It is a settled rule that the jurisdiction of a court is determined by the
statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action.1 The pertinent statutory provision then in force
was section 87(c), paragraph 3, of Republic Act 296, as amended by Republic Act 2613, which unequivocably
provided that "Justices of the peace in the capitals of provinces and Judges of Municipal Courts shall have like
jurisdiction as the Court of First Instance to try parties charged with an offense committed within the province in
which the penalty provided by law do not exceed prision correccional or imprisonment for not more than six years
or fine not exceeding three thousand pesos or both ..." (Emphasis supplied.) It is therefore beyond dispute that
under the then existing law all offenses committed within the province, provided that the penalty prescribed did
not exceed prision correccional or a fine not exceeding P3,000 or both, were triable by the justice of the peace
courts of provincial capitals. Since the penalty prescribed for qualified seduction under article 337 of the Revised
Penal Code is prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, the instant case was clearly within the
periphery of the concurrent jurisdiction of the court a quo.
It was only on June 22, 1963, more than two years after the institution of the case at bar, that the above-cited
provision of the Judiciary Act was amended by Republic Act 3828. The pertinent provision is now section 87(c),
paragraph 4, which, as amended, reads:
Municipal judges in the capitals of provinces and subprovinces and judges of city courts shall have like
jurisdiction as the Court of First Instance to try parties charged with an offense committed within their
respective jurisdictions, in which the penalty provided by law does not exceed prision correcional or
imprisonment for not more than six years or fine not exceeding six thousand pesos or both....
Republic Act 3828 introduced two significant changes: (1) the concurrent jurisdiction of municipal courts in the
capitals of provinces and sub-provinces and of city courts with the courts of first instance has been territorially
localized and limited to the proper offenses committed "within their respective jurisdictions," while previously said
courts could take cognizance of the proper offense committed "within the province;" and (2) the proper offenses

cognizable include those where the pecuniary penalty (fine) does not exceed P6,000, an increase over the
previous P3,000 limit.
The first of the above-mentioned changes unmasks the fallacy of the appellant's theory that even under the then
existing provision, the concurrent jurisdiction of the justice of the peace courts of provincial capitals with the courts
of first instance was already confined to their respective territorial limits. If this were true, then Congress would
have had no reason to enact the foregoing amendment which eliminated the phrase "within the province" and in
its place substituted the delimiting phrase "within their respective jurisdictions."
The foregoing notwithstanding, the appellant insists that justice of the peace courts of provincial capitals, like the
court a quo, have no jurisdiction over the crime of qualified seduction because of the provisions of article 345 of
the Revised Penal Code by virtue of which the court must, in addition to the imposition of a prison term ( prision
correccional minimum to medium in case of qualified seduction) which the accused must suffer, require him to
indemnify the offended woman, to acknowledge the offspring unless the law should prevent him from so doing,
and in every case to support the offspring. The theory of the appellant is that the imposition of the enumerated
civil liabilities increases the punishment, thereby divesting the justice of the peace courts of the capitals of
provinces of jurisdiction and consequently confining original and exclusive jurisdiction over the offense to courts of
first instance.
This contention is obviously untenable because section 37(c), paragraph 3 [now sec. 87(c), paragraph 4] of the
Judiciary Act grants the justice of the peace courts (now municipal courts) of provincial capitals concurrent
jurisdiction with courts of first instance over offenses for which the penalty provided by law does not exceedprision
correccional or imprisonment for not more than six years or fine not exceeding P3,000 (now P6,000). This
concurrence of jurisdiction is based upon the duration of the imprisonment and/or the amount of the fine
imposable, irrespective of the civil incidents or obligations which may attach to the offense charged. So that any
civil liability attaching to the offense concurrently cognizable by the courts of first instance and the justice of the
peace courts of provincial capitals can also be imposed by the latter because these have been conferred
jurisdictional parity.
The appellant cites as authority for his theory the case of U.S. vs. Bernardo, 2 a seduction case in which this Court,
with a slim majority of four justices (three justices dissented), said:
These obligations imposed upon the culprit ordinarily exceed the amount of the penalty fixed by the law
as being within the jurisdiction of the justice of the peace court and compromise, moreover, by virtue of
the forced recognition imposed by article 135 of the Civil Code, the special determination of offspring
which resulted from the crime, consequently, although the said crime of seduction is only punished by the
penalty of arresto mayor, a judgement of conviction cannot be pronounced by a justice of the peace, on
account of his lack of jurisdiction..
But disregarding the amount of the indemnity, whatever it be, according to the conditions and
circumstances of the offended party and of the one obliged to furnish the same, which amount might be
greater than that fixed by law as within the jurisdiction of justice of the peace courts, the
acknowledgement of the resulting offspring, one of the findings which the sentence must contain,
establishes by force of law the civil status of the child whose acknowledgment is necessarily upon the
guilty party; so with much less reason could the crime fall within the jurisdiction of the justice of the peace
court, inasmuch as, in accordance with specific legal provisions, only the judge of the Court of First
Instance can make such pronouncements.
As correctly contended by the Solicitor General, however, "there is a big difference between the case of U.S. vs.
Bernardo, supra, and the present case, in that while the Bernardo case involved the original exclusive jurisdiction
of the justice of the peace courts, the present case touches a concurrent jurisdiction of the justice of the peace
courts in the capitals of the provinces and Courts of First Instance." Furthermore, "It would be going a long way to
say that an indemnification or a restitution or a reparation is a fine or an imprisonment under any definition found
in the criminal law of any country. The jurisdiction of the court is determined by the amount of the fine and
imprisonment. An indemnification or a reparation or a restitution is merely an incident of the crime. The jurisdiction
of the court is not fixed by the incident but by the nature of the crime itself. Legally speaking, the nature of the
crime is determined by the punishment imposed... The jurisdiction of courts of justice of the peace over crimes
being determined exclusively by the amount of the fine and imprisonment imposed by law, that is by the legal
nature of the crime, and in no manner and to no extent whatever by the civil incidents which accrue to the person
injured by the commission of said crime, such courts have jurisdiction of the crime presented in the case at bar,
the punishment prescribed by law for such crime being (then) simply arresto mayor."3

We now proceed to the merits of the case.

The atmosphere of secrecy and privacy which pervades the commission of crimes against chastity, coupled with
the consequent dearth or even absence of witnesses, constrains the courts to rely in no small measure upon the
uncorroborated testimony of the complaining woman whose testimonial and personal credibility assumes pivotal
importance. It is against this situational backdrop that we proceed to discuss the issues of fact posed by the
appellant.
Fontanilla contends, among others, that the court a quo erred in finding there that there is evidence to show that
he had sexual intercourse many times with the complainant Fe Castro. We disagree. After a thorough study of the
record, we find that the complainant's testimony, in direct as well as in cross-examination, is entitled to essential
credence. She declared that Fontanilla had carnal knowledge of her one night in September, 1960 in the house of
the former where she was staying as a maid, and that since then up to December of the same year, Fontanilla
had sexual intercourse with her repeatedly, sometimes at night. sometimes in the daytime, but always when his
wife was asleep or away. Significantly, convincing proof of the first sexual intercourse would suffice to affirm the
conviction of the appellant without necessity of proving the subsequent instances of carnal liaison. The following
frank and revealing testimony of the offended woman appears on record:
Q. When you were with the Fontanillas, do you know if there was anything unusual that took place?
A. He fooled me.
Q. Who fooled you?
A. Mariano Fontanilla.
Q. What do you mean by fooled you?
A. He had sexual intercourse with me.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Q. When did Mariano Fontanilla start having sexual intercourse with you?
A. One week after my arrival in their house.
Q. For how many times did Mariano Fontanilla have sexual intercourse with you?
A. Very often when I was in their house.
xxx

xxx

xxx

xxx

xxx

Q. For how many times after September?

A. I could not count anymore, sir.
xxx

Q. Do you mean to tell us that he had been having sexual intercourse with you during the three (3)
months you stayed with them?
A. Always.
COURT:
Q. Now, usually what time did you have that sexual intercourse?

A. Day and night.

Q. And where did you do sexual intercourse during the day time?
A. When I iron their clothes in their house.
Q. Was there no other person in that house during the day when you have been ironing clothes?
A. The wife is not there.
Q. Do they have any children?
A. They have no children.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Q. When you left the house of Mariano Fontanilla and returned to your house in barrio Allangigan, was
it with the consent of Mr. and Mrs. Mariano Fontanilla?
A. They allowed me to go home.
Q. Why did you go home?
A. I left sir, because the wife of Mariano Fontanilla discovered what we have been doing.
When asked upon cross-examination to narrate the circumstances surrounding the first intercourse, Fe Castro
testified thus:
Q. Now, what were you doing in your room when Mariano Fontanilla first came in?
A. I was already sleeping.
Q. And how were you awakened from your sleep?
A. When I woke up, he was on top of me holding my nipples.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Q. Can you remember the date of the week when Mariano Fontanilla consummated his first sexual
intercourse with you?
A. I don't remember the date.
Q. Do you remember what time? In the morning or afternoon?
A. Night time.
Q. Do you remember what were the actual words of Mariano Fontanilla when he consummated his first
sexual intercourse with you?
A. "How beautiful you are, my daughter! I wish I could marry one as beautiful as you. Come let us play.
Q. After he uttered those words, what did he do to you?
A. He was placing his private parts in mine.

Q. Do you mean to say he did not remove your panties first?

A. He removed it.
Q. Did you offer any objection when he made those acts to you?
A. He told that "If you are going to move, I am going to club you."
Q. And you never uttered a word of what he is doing?
A. I did not complain anymore because I was afraid."
xxx

xxx

xxx

Q. Now, it was in the evening of that day when he started caressing you in the kitchen when he had
that first sexual intercourse with you, is that right?
A. Yes, sir, the same night he came to the room.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Q. This room where you had your intercourse with the accused was there a lock in the door?
A. There is a piece of wood that is used as a bar but if you push it, it will be opened.
The foregoing testimony of the aggrieved woman belies the contention of Fontanilla that there is no evidence
showing that he had carnal knowledge of Fe Castro. Of course no other witness was presented by the
prosecution to corroborate the testimony of the victim with respect to the actual act of seduction, nor to the
amorous overtures of the accused before the first sexual intercourse, nor to their subsequent carnal acts. But this
is quite understandable because aside from Fontanilla and Fe Castro, there was only one other person in the
house of the accused his wife, who was either asleep or away when the two indulged in their illicit love-making.
As previously intimated, the final verdict would principally hinge on the testimonial and personal credibility of the
complaining witness.
Assailing the credibility of the complainant, Fontanilla contends that Fe Castro has malevolent and ulterior
motives for filing this case against him. He alleged that Fe Castro was envious of his children by his first marriage
who had some income. In our view, this is a flimsy rationalization which the accused, significantly, did not even
attempt to substantiate.
Fontanilla also argues that Fe Castro was induced and pressured by her uncle Avelino Gapasin to file the criminal
complaint. Testifying on this point, Mayor Antonio Aquino of San Juan, La Union, stated that he tried to settle the
case by proposing that the accused pay the complainant P50 as the latter's alleged share in the tobacco harvest;
and that this proposal was refused, however, by Fe Castro, thru Gapasin, on the ground that the amount offered
would not even be sufficient to defray the expenses for the delivery of the child which the victim mistakenly
thought she was conceiving as a result of Fontanilla's carnal knowledge of her. Aquino also claimed that Gapasin
insinuated that any compromise amount must be equal to the "honor destroyed" and he, Gapasin, suggested
P2,000.
The foregoing testimony was presented by the defense to prove its allegation that Fe Castro was pressured into
filing the case at bar. Standing alone, Gapasin's objection to the proposed compromise does not prove that he
induced the victim to denounce Fontanilla in court. On the contrary, from the actuations of Gapasin it can be
inferred that he was just trying to protect the interest of his niece who was offered so meager an amount as
settlement for an offense which caused the latter the irredeemable loss of her virginity. Furthermore, it is on
record that prior to the overtures at settlement, the complaining witness had already gone to the office of the
provincial fiscal of La Union to file charges against Fontanilla. Aquino himself admitted upon cross-examination
that he had requested Fiscal Crisogono Bautista to postpone the filing of the complaint to enable him to settle the
case, and that the proposed compromise was his idea and made upon his own initiative. This admission shows
that the filing of the instant case preceded, and was not due to, the failure of the alleged proposed compromise.

The appellant further contends that the complainant's testimony does not merit credence because it is hazy and
self-contradictory. He argues that if it is true that he repeatedly promised to marry Fe Castro in order to deceive
her into submitting to his carnal designs, why did the latter allegedly consent to the continuance of their illicit
liaison even after it was evident that he would not fulfill his promise to marry her? A situation like this, says the
appellant, borders on the incredible and suggests that there was actually no promise of marriage and
consequently there was no resultant carnal relation between him and the complaining woman.
This "unthinkable" situation pointed out by the appellant was quite reasonably explained by the complainant in a
frank, albeit embarrassing, reply contained in her sworn statement (exh. A-1) taken in the office of the provincial
fiscal of La Union on January 31, 1961. Upon interrogation, Fe Castro declared:
Q. Despite his many promises which he never fulfilled, why did you still continue to have relationship
with him?
A. Because I was beginning to like him and enjoy this sexual intercourse.
Underscoring the above statement of Fe Castro, Fontanilla claims that it exposes in fact the fabricated nature of
the case against him, because for a woman to continue having sexual relations with a man even after a patent
breach of the latter's promise of marriage, is unthinkable and alien to human experience. We believe, on the
contrary, however, that the said statement of the aggrieved woman does not make her testimony incredible for it
evinces basic honesty and sincerity on her part, even to the extent of admitting something which could
conceivably put her to shame and ridicule.
Anent the said marital promise, Fontanilla also claims that there is no evidence on record supporting its veracity.
Granting this to be correct, it is nevertheless settled that deceit, although an essential element of ordinary or
simple seduction, does not need to be proved or established in a charge of qualified seduction. It is replaced by
abuse of confidence. When the offender is a public officer, a priest or minister, a servant, domestic, tutor, teacher,
or under any title is in charge of the education or keeping of the offended woman, as in the present case, the act
is punishable although fraud or deceit may not have been used or, if employed, has not been proved. 4 The
seduction of a virgin over twelve and under eighteen years of age, committed by any of the persons enumerated
in art. 337 "is constitutive of the crime of qualified seduction ... even though no deceit intervenes or even when
such carnal knowledge were voluntary on the part of the virgin, because in such a case, the law takes for granted
the existence of the deceit as an integral element of the said crime and punishes it with greater severity than it
does the simple seduction ... taking into account the abuse of confidence on the part of the agent (culprit), an
abuse of confidence which implies deceit or fraud."5
It is likewise contended for the appellant that the testimony of the complainant is unbelievable because while she
denounced the perverse and criminal conduct of the accused, in the same breath she described the relation
between the accused and his wife as harmonious and cordial. The alleged inconsistency in this regard is more
apparent than real. A man could hide his evil motives and immoral conduct behind a deceptive facade. And it
stands to reason that a husband who has illicit relations with a woman who resides in the same house where he
dwells with his wife would even be over-solicitous with the latter to camouflage his infidelity.
Fontanilla also challenges the credibility of Fe Castro's account regarding his having been discovered by his wife
in the act of sexual intercourse with the complainant on the kitchen floor. He argues that had such a discovery
actually been made, the natural reaction of his wife would have been to lay hands on both of them (Fe Castro and
himself), with the complainant taking the most punishment since women are inherently possessive and are
merciless upon those who attempt to take away their loved ones. Fe Castro did not testify on such a hostile
reaction.
We are inclined to believe, however, that women are bound to react differently to the same or similar situations.
There is no sufficient reason to discredit Fe Castro's testimony that when they were discovered in flagrante by
Magdalena Copio, the appellant's wife and her aunt, the latter verbally chastised Fontanilla for having "fool(ed)
this little girl."
The appellant's wife, then 51 years old and twice married, most probably knew that it was her 52-year old second
husband, the herein appellant, who was at fault and thus spared her 15-year old niece from any punishment.
It is conceded that the testimony of Fe Castro suffers from some inconsistencies; these, however, could be
attributed to her minority (she was barely 16 years old at the time of the trial), lack of education (she had reached

only grade III), perceptibly low intelligence, and to the understandable partiality of a litigant to her cause. On the
whole, we find that the complainant's testimony is credible and convincing. Furthermore, we believe that no other
reason impelled Fe Castro in instituting this case against her very kin, and exposing thereby her sordid
experience to public scrutiny and suffering as a consequence the travail of trial, than to seek justice for herself.
The appellant further claims that the court a quo erred in failing to consider the unexplained delay in the filing of
the complaint, which delay renders the accusation suspicious. It is relevant to note that the accused did not raise
this issue before the court a quo. Anent the alleged delay, the Solicitor General states that it can easily be
explained "by the fact that the complainant was not accusing a person who was a total stranger to her but the
husband of her mother's sister. The attempt of the older people to thresh out their differences and to settle the
case amicably had brought about the said delay." It appears on record that Fe Castro left the house of Fontanilla
on December 18, 1960, and two days thereafter she informed her parents of what Fontanilla had done. Forthwith
she and her parents decided to bring the case to court, and on January 13, 1961 Fe Castro had herself examined
in the La Union Provincial Hospital, with the name of Fiscal Bautista appearing in the medical certificate as the
requesting officer, which means that prior to January 13, 1961 Fe Castro had already gone to the office of the
provincial fiscal presumably to complain against Fontanilla. The criminal complaint was filed only on February 28,
1961 because as previously stated, Mayor Aquino had requested Fiscal Bautista to postpone the filing of the
indictment to give the former sufficient time to attempt at an amicable settlement of the case.
We now come to the basic defense set up by Fontanilla, which is a denial of his having had carnal knowledge of
Fe Castro whom he admits was once his ward. His denial is anchored on two grounds: (1) there was no occasion
during which he could have violated the chastity of the complainant because during the night the room of the latter
was locked and during the day he was always out in the fields; and (2) at the age of 52, his sexual potency had
considerably waned as proved by the fact that he had sexual intercourse with his own wife only once a week. The
court a quo did not accord credence to this defense, and we are of the view that in this regard the court did not
err.
The complainant testified that the wooden bar which she used to lock the door of her room did not prevent the
said door from being opened when pushed from the outside. Thus, Fontanilla had easy access at night to Fe
Castro's sleeping quarters. Considering the general make-up of residential houses in the barrios, we believe that
the complainant's statement is essentially true.
With respect to the appellant's argument that during the day he had no opportunity of being alone with the
complainant, he himself admitted upon cross-examination that there were times when he would be home earlier
than his wife and would ask Fe Castro to serve him food. As there was no other person in the house during such
occasions Fe Castro and Fontanilla naturally would be alone together. The appellant also admitted that whenever
his wife went to market she would be away for two or three hours. He hastened to add, however, that each time
his wife left for the market she advised Fe Castro to stay with their neighbor. Granting that Fe Castro would really
go to their neighbor's place which was only five meters away from their house, it is not improbable that Fontanilla
would call her back once his wife had left. Thus, the very record of the case belies the defense of the appellant
that there was no occasion when he could have violated the chastity of his ward.
The appellant also contends that it was impossible for him to have indulged in sexual intercourse with the
complainant twice a day, because even with his wife he made love only once a week. Fontanilla attributed his
diminished virility to old age as he was already 52 years old at the time of the commission of the alleged crime.
This declaration was corroborated by his wife, Magdalena Copio who went to the extent of vouching that two
years after their marriage they did not indulge anymore in sexual relations. We believe, nonetheless, that the
appellant's claim is untenable. In the first place, the complainant did not say that Fontanilla had her twice a day
during the three months that she stayed with him and his wife. When asked what time they indulged in sexual
intercourse, she replied "Day and night." (t.s.n., p. 6) This answer of the complainant cannot be interpreted to
mean that they had sexual intercourse twice daily (one in the daytime and another at night), for said statement
was in reply to a question with respect to the time when they engaged in carnal intercourse and not
the frequencyof their illicit love making. In the second place, there is a presumption that an adult male has normal
powers of virility and the burden of proving the contrary rests on the party asserting it. 6 We believe that the
declarations of Fontanilla and his wife on the former's alleged weakening potency are not sufficient to rebut this
presumption. Alfred W. Herzog has cautioned that "one must be very careful not to express the opinion that a
man on account of his age is either sterile or impotent."7 Hence, a party who claims loss of virility, or waning
potency for that matter, must bolster his assertion clinically with the aid of a competent and expert witness.
On the other hand, the prosecution presented Dr. Magno K. Guerrero, the physician at the La Union Provincial
Hospital who examined the victim. Dr. Guerrero testified that the hymen of Fe Castro showed "incomplete

healedlacerations at 9 & 3 o'clock positions on the face of a watch, edges of which are sharp and easily
coaptable." He explained that healed lacerations would suggest that the injury happened six months, more or
less, prior to the date of examination. In the case at bar, since per medical findings the hymen of the complainant
showed "incomplete healed lacerations," then this fact would indicate that the injury occurred less than six months
before February 12, 1961, the date of the medical examination of Fe Castro. Significantly, said period
corresponds to the time when Fe Castro stayed as a helper in the house of the Fontanilla spouses. Upon crossexamination, Dr. Guerrero testified:
Q. Dr. Guerrero, you stated that it (the laceration) should last less than six (6) months counting from?
A. From the time I examined.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Q. Disregarding the history of the patient, from your observation of the patient, how many sexual
intercourses could have caused the lacerations taking into consideration the condition of the hymen?
A. Several intercourse because of the laxity of the vaginal canal and it admits three (3), fingers.
Q. How many intercourses could have caused that?
A. Several. More than ten (10) times.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Q. And those lacerations could be caused ten (10) times or more?

A. Ten times or more.
Q. How many more?
A. Another ten (10) times more.
It is clear from the above testimony that Fe Castro had experienced numerous distinct acts of sexual intercourse,
a fact which affirms her claim that the appellant had carnal knowledge of her repeatedly during her three-month
stay in his house. There is no evidence on record that Fe Castro, then a 15-year old single girl, was unchaste
prior to her living with the Fontanilla spouses. Such being the case, her virginity before she was seduced by the
appellant must be presumed. Presumption of a woman's virginity arises whenever it is shown that she is single,
and continues until overthrown by proof to the contrary. 8 This is in accord with the presumption of innocence
which "includes, also, that of morality and decency, and, as a consequence, of chastity." 9
We are of the considered opinion that the findings of fact reached by the court a quo are substantially correct.
This, apart from the rule that "as far as credibility and veracity of witnesses are concerned, the conclusions of the
lower court command great weight and respect, on the ground that the trustworthiness of witnesses and the merit
of the defenses by the accused, are in the peculiar domain of the trial court." 10 In the case at bar, we see no
reason for departing from this doctrine, there being no showing that "some fact or circumstance of great
importance to the case has been overlooked in the records or misapplied or its significance misunderstood by the
lower court."11
The appellant finally contends that the lower court erred in ordering him to pay P500 in moral damages to the
offended party or to her parents. Ironically, this contention is correct in two respects. The first is that the award of
P500 in moral damages is inadequate. We have heretofore stated that the complainant was a virgin, there being
no proof to the contrary, and that she was deflowered by the appellant. The loss of her virginity, at the hands of
the appellant, together with the attendant shame and scandal, entitles her, in the view of this Court, to the sum of
P2,500 in moral damages. Her future as a woman is definitely impaired, and the resultant prejudice against her
engendered in the male population of the barrio where she resides cannot be blinked away. The second error of
the lower court is in making the award payable to the offended party or to her parents, which award is, by the very
wording of the judgment, in the alternative. Article 2219 of the New Civil Code provides that moral damages are
recoverable by the offended party in the cases of "seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts" and that

the "parents of the female seduced, abducted, raped, or abused ... may also recover moral damages." (Emphasis
supplied). The conviction of the accused suffices as a basis to adjudge him, in the same action, liable for an
award of moral damages, without independent proof thereof, to the victim and her parents, because the law
presumes that not only the woman who was seduced, abducted, raped or abused, but as well her parents,
naturally suffer besmirched reputation, social humiliation, mental anguish, and wounded feelings. In the case at
bar, moral damages must be awarded to the offended woman and her parents, not to either of them, as ordered
by the court a quo.
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with the modification that the appellant is ordered to
pay the sum of P2,500 in moral damages to the offended party and her parents. Costs against the appellant.

LBC EXPRESS, INC. vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, ADOLFO M. CARLOTO, and RURAL BANK OF
LABASON, INC.,
G.R. No. 108670, September 21, 1994, SECOND DIVISION
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari, petitioner LBC questions the decision 1 of respondent Court of Appeals
affirming the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City, Branch 8, awarding moral and exemplary
damages, reimbursement of P32,000.00, and costs of suit; but deleting the amount of attorney's fees.
Private respondent Adolfo Carloto, incumbent President-Manager of private respondent Rural Bank of Labason,
alleged that on November 12, 1984, he was in Cebu City transacting business with the Central Bank Regional
Office. He was instructed to proceed to Manila on or before November 21, 1984 to follow-up the Rural Bank's plan
of payment of rediscounting obligations with Central Bank's main office in Manila. 2 He then purchased a round
trip plane ticket to Manila. He also phoned his sister Elsie Carloto-Concha to send him ONE THOUSAND PESOS
(P1,000.00) for his pocket money in going to Manila and some rediscounting papers thru petitioner's LBC Office at
Dipolog City. 3
On November 16, 1984, Mrs. Concha thru her clerk, Adelina Antigo consigned thru LBC Dipolog Branch the
pertinent documents and the sum of ONE THOUSAND PESOS (P1,000.00) to respondent Carloto at No. 2
Greyhound Subdivision, Kinasangan, Pardo, Cebu City. This was evidenced by LBC Air Cargo, Inc., Cashpack
Delivery Receipt No. 34805.
On November 17, 1984, the documents arrived without the cashpack. Respondent Carloto made personal followups on that same day, and also on November 19 and 20, 1984 at LBC's office in Cebu but petitioner failed to
deliver to him the cashpack.
Consequently, respondent Carloto said he was compelled to go to Dipolog City on November 24, 1984 to claim
the money at LBC's office. His effort was once more in vain. On November 27, 1984, he went back to Cebu City
at LBC's office. He was, however, advised that the money has been returned to LBC's office in Dipolog City upon
shipper's request. Again, he demanded for the ONE THOUSAND PESOS (P1,000.00) and refund of FORTYNINE PESOS (P49.00) LBC revenue charges. He received the money only on December 15, 1984 less the
revenue charges.
Respondent Carloto claimed that because of the delay in the transmittal of the cashpack, he failed to submit the
rediscounting documents to Central Bank on time. As a consequence, his rural bank was made to pay the Central
Bank THIRTY-TWO THOUSAND PESOS (P32,000.00) as penalty interest. 4 He allegedly suffered
embarrassment and humiliation.
Petitioner LBC, on the other hand, alleged that the cashpack was forwarded via PAL to LBC Cebu City branch on
November 22, 1984. 5 On the same day, it was delivered at respondent Carloto's residence at No. 2 Greyhound
Subdivision, Kinasangan, Pardo, Cebu City. However, he was not around to receive it. The delivery man served
instead a claim notice to insure he would personally receive the money. This was annotated on Cashpack
Delivery Receipt No. 342805. Notwithstanding the said notice, respondent Carloto did not claim the cashpack at
LBC Cebu. On November 23, 1984, it was returned to the shipper, Elsie Carloto-Concha at Dipolog City.
Claiming that petitioner LBC wantonly and recklessly disregarded its obligation, respondent Carloto instituted an
action for Damages Arising from Non-performance of Obligation docketed as Civil Case No. 3679 before the
Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City on January 4, 1985. On June 25, 1988, an amended complaint was filed
where respondent rural bank joined as one of the plaintiffs and prayed for the reimbursement of THIRTY-TWO
THOUSAND PESOS (P32,000.00).
After hearing, the trial court rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Ordering the defendant LBC Air Cargo, Inc. to pay unto plaintiff Adolfo M. Carloto and Rural
Bank of Labason, Inc., moral damages in the amount of P10,000.00; exemplary damages in the
amount of P5,000.00; attorney's fees in the amount of P3,000.00 and litigation expenses of
P1,000.00;

2. Sentencing defendant LBC Air Cargo, Inc., to reimburse plaintiff Rural Bank of Labason, Inc.
the sum of P32,000.00 which the latter paid as penalty interest to the Central Bank of the
Philippines as penalty interest for failure to rediscount its due bills on time arising from the
defendant's failure to deliver the cashpack, with legal interest computed from the date of filing of
this case; and
3. Ordering defendant to pay the costs of these proceedings.
SO ORDERED. 6
On appeal, respondent court modified the judgment by deleting the award of attorney's fees. Petitioner's Motion
for Reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated January 11, 1993.
Hence, this petition raising the following questions, to wit:
1. Whether or not respondent Rural Bank of Labason Inc., being an artificial person should be awarded moral
damages.
2. Whether or not the award of THIRTY-TWO THOUSAND PESOS (P32,000.00) was made with grave abuse of
discretion.
3. Whether or not the respondent Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in affirming the trial court's
decision ordering petitioner LBC to pay moral and exemplary damages despite performance of its obligation.
We find merit in the petition.
The respondent court erred in awarding moral damages to the Rural Bank of Labason, Inc., an artificial person.
Moral damages are granted in recompense for physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. 7 A corporation,
being an artificial person and having existence only in legal contemplation, has no feelings, no emotions, no
senses; therefore, it cannot experience physical suffering and mental anguish. 8 Mental suffering can be
experienced only by one having a nervous system and it flows from real ills, sorrows, and griefs of life 9 all of
which cannot be suffered by respondent bank as an artificial person.
We can neither sustain the award of moral damages in favor of the private respondents. The right to recover
moral damages is based on equity. Moral damages are recoverable only if the case falls under Article 2219 of the
Civil Code in relation to Article 21. 10 Part of conventional wisdom is that he who comes to court to demand equity,
must come with clean hands.
In the case at bench, respondent Carloto is not without fault. He was fully aware that his rural bank's obligation
would mature on November 21, 1984 and his bank has set aside cash for these bills payable. 11 He was all set to
go to Manila to settle this obligation. He has received the documents necessary for the approval of their
rediscounting application with the Central Bank. He has also received the plane ticket to go to Manila.
Nevertheless, he did not immediately proceed to Manila but instead tarried for days allegedly claiming his ONE
THOUSAND PESOS (P1,000.00) pocket money. Due to his delayed trip, he failed to submit the rediscounting
papers to the Central Bank on time and his bank was penalized THIRTY-TWO THOUSAND PESOS (P32,000.00)
for failure to pay its obligation on its due date. The undue importance given by respondent Carloto to his ONE
THOUSAND PESOS (P1,000.00) pocket money is inexplicable for it was not indispensable for him to follow up
his bank's rediscounting application with Central Bank. According to said respondent, he needed the money to
"invite people for a snack or dinner." 12 The attitude of said respondent speaks ill of his ways of business dealings
and cannot be countenanced by this Court. Verily, it will be revolting to our sense of ethics to use it as basis for
awarding damages in favor of private respondent Carloto and the Rural Bank of Labason, Inc.
We also hold that respondents failed to show that petitioner LBC's late delivery of the cashpack was motivated by
personal malice or bad faith, whether intentional or thru gross negligence. In fact, it was proved during the trial
that the cashpack was consigned on November 16, 1984, a Friday. It was sent to Cebu on November 19, 1984,
the next business day. Considering this circumstance, petitioner cannot be charged with gross neglect of duty.
Bad faith under the law can not be presumed; it must be established by clearer and convincing evidence. 13Again,

the unbroken jurisprudence is that in breach of contract cases where the defendant is not shown to have acted
fraudulently or in bad faith, liability for damages is limited to the natural and probable consequences of the branch
of the obligation which the parties had foreseen or could reasonable have foreseen. The damages, however, will
not include liability for moral damages. 14
Prescinding from these premises, the award of exemplary damages made by the respondent court would have no
legal leg to support itself. Under Article 2232 of the Civil Code, in a contractual or quasi-contractual relationship,
exemplary damages may be awarded only if the defendant had acted in "a wanton, fraudulent, reckless,
oppressive, or malevolent manner." The established facts of not so warrant the characterization of the action of
petitioner LBC.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision of the respondent court dated September 30, 1992 is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE; and the Complaint in Civil Case No. 3679 is ordered DISMISSED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

PILIPINAS BANK vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND FLORENCIO REYES

G.R. No. 105410 July 25, 1994, SECOND DIVISION
This is a petition for review of the Decision of the respondent court 1 in CA-G.R. CV No. 29524 dated May 13,
1992 which ordered petitioner to pay the private respondent the sum of P50,000.00 as moral damages,
P25,000.00 as attorney's fees and cost of suit.
The facts as found both by the trial court 2 and the respondent court are:
As payments for the purchased shoe materials and rubber shoes, Florencio Reyes issued
postdated checks to Winner Industrial Corporation for P20,927.00 and Vicente Tui, for
P11,419.50, with due dates on October 10 and 12, 1979, respectively.
To cover the face value of the checks, plaintiff, on October 10, 1979, requested PCIB Money
Shop's manager Mike Potenciano to effect the withdrawal of P32,000.00 from his savings
account therein and have it deposited with his current account with Pilipinas Bank (then Filman
Bank), Bian Branch. Roberto Santos was requested to make the deposit.
In depositing in the name of FLORENCIO REYES, he inquired from the teller the current account
number of Florencio Reyes to complete the deposit slip he was accomplishing. He was informed
that it was "815" and so this was the same current account number he placed on the deposit slip
below the depositor's name FLORENCIO REYES.
Nothing that the account number coincided with the name Florencio, Efren Alagasi, then Current
Account Bookkeeper of Pilipinas Bank, thought it was for Florencio Amador who owned the listed
account number. He, thus, posted the deposted in the latter's account not noticing that the
depositor's surname in the deposit slip was REYES.
On October 11, 1979, the October 10, check in favor of Winner Industrial Corporation was
presented for payment. Since the ledger of Florencio Reyes indicated that his account had only a
balance of P4,078.43, it was dishonored and the payee was advised to try it for next clearing.
On October 15, 1979, the October 10, 1979 check was redeposited but was again dishonored.
Likewise, the October 12, 1979 check in favor of Vicente Tui when presented for payment on that
same date met the same fate but was advised to try the next clearing. Two days after the October
10 check was again dishonored, the payee returned the same to Florencio Reyes and demanded
a cash payment of its face value which he did if only to save his name. The October 12, 1979
check was redeposited on October 18, 1979, but again dishonored for the reason that the check
was drawn against insufficient fund.
Furious over the incident, he immediately proceeded to the bank and urged an immediate
verification of his account.
Upon verification, the bank noticed the error. The P32,000.00 deposit posted in the account of
Florencio Amador was immediately transferred to the account of Reyes upon being cleared by
Florencio Amador that he did not effect a deposit in the amount of P32,000.00. The transfer
having been effected, the bank then honored the October 12, 1979, check (Exh. "C").
On the basis of these facts, the trial court ordered petitioner to pay to the private respondent: (1) P200,000.00 as
compensatory damages; (2) P100,000.00 as moral damages; (3) P25,000.00 as attorney's fees, and (4) the costs
of suit. On appeal to the respondent court, the judgment was modified as aforestated.
In this petition for review, petitioner argues:
I. Respondent Court of Appeals erred on a matter of law, in not applying the first sentence of
Article 2179, New Civil Code, in view of its own finding that respondent Reyes' own
representative committed the mistake in writing down the correct account number;

II. Respondent Court of Appeals erred, on a matter of law, in holding that respondent Reyes has
the right to recover moral damages and in awarding the amount of P50,000.00, when there is no
legal nor factual basis for it;
III. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred, on a matter of law, in holding petitioner liable for
attorney's fees in the amount of P20,000.00, when there is no legal nor factual basis for it.
We find no merit in the petition.
First. For Article 2179 3 of the Civil Code to apply, it must be established that private respondent's own negligence
was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury. The concept of proximate cause is well defined in our
corpus of jurisprudence as "any cause which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produces the result complained of and without which would not have occurred and from which
it ought to have been forseen or reasonably anticipated by a person of ordinary case that the injury complained of
or some similar injury, would result therefrom as a natural and probable consequence." 4 In the case at bench, the
proximate cause of the injury is the negligence of petitioner's employee in erroneously posting the cash deposit of
private respondent in the name of another depositor who had a similar first name. As held by the trial court:
xxx xxx xxx
Applying the test, the bank employee is, on that basis, deemed to have failed to exercise the
degree of care required in the performance of his duties. As earlier stated, the bank employee
posted the cash deposit in the account of Florencio Amador from his assumption that the name
Florencio appearing on the ledger without, however, going through the full name, is the same
Florencio stated in the deposit slip. He should have continuously gone beyond mere assumption,
which was proven to be erroneous, and proceeded with clear certainty, considering the amount
involved and the repercussions it would create on the totality of the person notable of which is the
credit standing of the person involved should a mistake happen. The checks issued by the
plaintiff in the course of his business were dishonored by the bank because the ledger of
Florencio Reyes indicated a balance insufficient to cover the face value of checks.
Second. In light of this negligence, the liability of petitioner for moral damages cannot be impugned. So we held
inBank of the Philippine Islands vs. IAC, et al. 5
The bank is not expected to be infallible but, as correctly observed by respondent Appellate
Court, in this instance, it must bear the blame for not discovering the mistake of its teller despite
the established procedure requiring the papers and bank books to pass through a battery of bank
personnel whose duty it is to check and countercheck them for possible errors. Apparently, the
officials and employees tasked to do that did not perform their duties with due care, as may be
gathered from the testimony of the bank's lone witness, Antonio Enciso, who casually declared
that "the approving officer does not have to see the account numbers and all those things. Those
are very petty things for the approving manager to look into" (p. 78, Record on Appeal).
Unfortunately, it was a "petty thing," like the incorrect account number that the bank teller wrote
on the initial deposit slip for the newly-opened joint current account of the Canlas spouses, that
sparked this half-a-million-peso damage suit against the bank.
While the bank's negligence may not have been attended with malice and bad faith, nevertheless,
it caused serious anxiety, embarrassment and humiliation to the private respondents for which
they are entitled to recover reasonable moral damages (American Express International, Inc. IAC,
167 SCRA 209). The award of reasonable attorney's fees is proper for the private respondent's
were compelled to litigate to protect their interest (Art. 2208, Civil Code). However, the absence
of malice and bad faith renders the award of exemplary damages improper (Globe Mackay Cable
and Radio Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, 176 SCRA 778).
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is denied there being no reversible error in the Decision of the respondent court.
Cost against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

CITYTRUST BANKING CORPORATION vs. THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and EMME
HERRERO
G.R. No. 84281 May 27, 1994, THIRD DIVISION
This case emanated from a complaint filed by private respondent Emme Herrero for damages against petitioner
Citytrust Banking Corporation. In her complaint, private respondent averred that she, a businesswoman, made
regular deposits, starting September of 1979, with petitioner Citytrust Banking Corporation at its Burgos branch in
Calamba, Laguna. On 15 May 1980, she deposited with petitioner the amount of Thirty One Thousand Five
Hundred Pesos (P31,500.00), in cash, in order to amply cover six (6) postdated checks she issued, viz:
Check No. Amount
007383 P1,507.00
007384 1,262.00
007387 4,299.00
007387 2,204.00
007492 6,281.00
007400 4,716.00
When presented for encashment upon maturity, all the checks were dishonored due to "insufficient
funds." The last check No. 007400, however, was personally redeemed by private respondent in cash
before it could be redeposited.
Petitioner, in its answer, asserted that it was due to private respondent's fault that her checks were dishonored. It
averred that instead of stating her correct account number, i.e., 29000823, in her deposit slip, she inaccurately
wrote 2900823.
The Regional Trial Court (Branch XXXIV) of Calamba, Laguna, on
27 February 1984, dismissed the complaint for lack of merit; thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the defendant and against the plaintiff,
DISMISSING the complaint for lack of merit, plaintiff is hereby adjudged to pay the defendant
reasonable attorney's fee in the amount of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) plus cost of
suit.
Private respondent went to the Court of Appeals, which found the appeal meritorious. Hence, it rendered
judgment, on 15 July 1988, reversing the trial court's decision. The appellate court ruled:
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is REVERSED and a new one entered thereby
ordering defendant to pay plaintiff nominal damages of P2,000.00, temperate and moderate
damages of P5,000.00, and attorney's fees of P4,000.00.
The counterclaim of defendant is dismissed for lack of merit, with costs against him.
Petitioner Citytrust Banking Corporation is now before us in this petition for review on certiorari.
Petitioner bank concedes that it is its obligation to honor checks issued by private respondent which are
sufficiently funded, but, it contends, private respondent has also the duty to use her account in accordance with
the rules of petitioner bank to which she has contractually acceded. Among such rules, contained in its
"brochures" governing current account deposits, is the following printed provision:
In making a deposit . . . kindly insure accuracy in filing said deposit slip forms as we hold
ourselves free of any liability for loss due to an incorrect account number indicated in the deposit
slip although the name of the depositor is correctly written.
Exactly the same issue was addressed by the appellate court, which, after its deliberations, made the following
findings and conclusions: 1

We cannot uphold the position of defendant. For, even if it be true that there was error on the part
of the plaintiff in omitting a "zero" in her account number, yet, it is a fact that her name, "Emme E.
Herrero", is clearly written on said deposit slip (Exh. "B"). This is controlling in determining in
whose account the deposit is made or should be posted. This is so because it is not likely to
commit an error in one's name than merely relying on numbers which are difficult to remember,
especially a number with eight (8) digits as the account numbers of defendant's depositors. We
view the use of numbers as simply for the convenience of the bank but was never intended to
disregard the real name of its depositors. The bank is engaged in business impressed with public
interest, and it is its duty to protect in return its many clients and depositors who transact
business with it. It should not be a matter of the bank alone receiving deposits, lending out money
and collecting interests. It is also its obligation to see to it that all funds invested with it are
properly accounted for and duly posted in its ledgers.
In the case before Us, We are not persuaded that defendant bank was not free from blame for the
fiasco. In the first place, the teller should not have accepted plaintiff's deposit without correcting
the account number on the deposit slip which, obviously, was erroneous because, as pointed out
by defendant, it contained only seven (7) digits instead of eight (8). Second, the complete name
of plaintiff depositor appears in bold letters on the deposit slip (Exh. "B"). There could be no
mistaking in her name, and that the deposit was made in her name, "Emma E. Herrero." In fact,
defendant's teller should not have fed her deposit slip to the computer knowing that her account
number written thereon was wrong as it contained only seven (7) digits. As it happened,
according to defendant, plaintiff's deposit had to be consigned to the suspense accounts pending
verification. This, indeed, could have been avoided at the first instance had the teller of defendant
bank performed her duties efficiently and well. For then she could have readily detected that the
account number in the name of "Emma E. Herrero" was erroneous and would be rejected by the
computer. That is, or should be, part of the training and standard operating procedure of the
bank's employees. On the other hand, the depositors are not concerned with banking procedure.
That is the responsibility of the bank and its employees. Depositors are only concerned with the
facility of depositing their money, earning interest thereon, if any, and withdrawing therefrom,
particularly businessmen, like plaintiff, who are supposed to be always "on-the-go". Plaintiff's
account is a "current account" which should immediately be posted. After all, it does not earn
interest. At least, the forbearance should be commensurated with prompt, efficient and
satisfactory service.
Bank clients are supposed to rely on the services extended by the bank, including the assurance
that their deposits will be duly credited them as soon as they are made. For, any delay in crediting
their account can be embarrassing to them as in the case of plaintiff.
We agree with plaintiff that
. . . even in computerized systems of accounts, ways and means are available
whereby deposits with erroneous account numbers are properly credited
depositor's correct account numbers. They add that failure on the part of the
defendant to do so is negligence for which they are liable. As proof thereof
plaintiff alludes to five particular incidents where plaintiff admittedly wrongly
indicated her account number in her deposit slips
(Exhs. "J", "L", "N", "O" and "P"), but were nevertheless properly credited her
deposit (pp. 4-5, Decision).
We have already ruled in Mundin v. Far East Bank & Trust Co., AC-G.R. CV No. 03639, prom.
Nov. 2, 1985, quoting the court a quo in an almost identical set of facts, that
Having accepted a deposit in the course of its business transactions, it behooved
upon defendant bank to see to it and without recklessness that the depositor
was accurately credited therefor. To post a deposit in somebody else's name
despite the name of the depositor clearly written on the deposit slip is indeed
sheer negligence which could have easily been avoided if defendant bank
exercised due diligence and circumspection in the acceptance and posting of
plaintiff's deposit.

We subscribe to the above disquisitions of the appellate court. In Simex International (Manila), Inc. vs. Court of
Appeals, 183 SCRA 360, reiterated in Bank of Philippine Islands vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 206 SCRA
408, we similarly said, in cautioning depository banks on their fiduciary responsibility, that
In every case, the depositor expects the bank to treat his account with utmost fidelity, whether
such account consists only of a few hundred pesos or of millions. The bank must record every
single transaction accurately, down to the last centavo, and as promptly as possible. This has to
be done if the account is to reflect at any given time the amount of money the depositor can
dispose of as he sees fit, confident that the bank will deliver it as and to whomever he directs. A
blunder on the part of the bank, such as the dishonor of a check without good reason, can cause
the depositor not a little embarrassment if not also financial loss and perhaps even civil and
criminal litigation.
The point is that as a business affected with public interest and because of the nature of its
functions, the bank is under obligation to treat the accounts of its depositors with meticulous care,
always having in mind the fiduciary nature of their relationship.
We agree with petitioner, however, that it is wrong to award, along with nominal damages, temperate or moderate
damages. The two awards are incompatible and cannot be granted concurrently. Nominal damages are given in
order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or
recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him (Art. 2221, New Civil
Code; Manila Banking Corp. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 131 SCRA 271). Temperate or moderate damages,
which are more than nominal but less than compensatory damages, on the other hand, may be recovered when
the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be
proved with reasonable certainty (Art. 2224, New Civil Code).
In the instant case, we also find need for vindicating the wrong done on private respondent, and we accordingly
agree with the Court of Appeals in granting to her nominal damages but not in similarly awarding temperate or
moderate damages.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is MODIFIED by deleting the award of temperate or moderate damages. In
all other respects, the appellate court's decision is AFFIRMED. No costs in this instance.
SO ORDERED.

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, ET AL., vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, GAUDENCIO C. RAYO, ET AL.
G.R. Nos. 103442-45 May 21, 1993
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court urging this Court to set aside
the 19 August 1991 consolidated Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA.-G.R. CV Nos. 27290-93 1 which
reversed the Decision of Branch 5 of the then Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Bulacan, and
held petitioners National Power Corporation (NPC) and Benjamin Chavez jointly and severally liable to the private
respondents for actual and moral damages, litigation expenses and attorney's fees.
This present controversy traces its beginnings to four (4) separate complaints 2 for damages filed against the NPC
and Benjamin Chavez before the trial court. The plaintiffs therein, now private respondents, sought to recover
actual and other damages for the loss of lives and the destruction to property caused by the inundation of the
town of Norzagaray, Bulacan on 26-27 October 1978. The flooding was purportedly caused by the negligent
release by the defendants of water through the spillways of the Angat Dam (Hydroelectric Plant). In said
complaints, the plaintiffs alleged, inter alia, that: 1) defendant NPC operated and maintained a multi-purpose
hydroelectric plant in the Angat River at Hilltop, Norzagaray, Bulacan; 2) defendant Benjamin Chavez was the
plant supervisor at the time of the incident in question; 3) despite the defendants' knowledge, as early as 24
October 1978, of the impending entry of typhoon "Kading," they failed to exercise due diligence in monitoring the
water level at the dam; 4) when the said water level went beyond the maximum allowable limit at the height of the
typhoon, the defendants suddenly, negligently and recklessly opened three (3) of the dam's spillways, thereby
releasing a large amount of water which inundated the banks of the Angat River; and 5) as a consequence,
members of the household of the plaintiffs, together with their animals, drowned, and their properties were
washed away in the evening of 26 October and the early hours of 27 October 1978. 3
In their Answers, the defendants, now petitioners, alleged that: 1) the NPC exercised due care, diligence and
prudence in the operation and maintenance of the hydroelectric plant; 2) the NPC exercised the diligence of a
good father in the selection of its employees; 3) written notices were sent to the different municipalities of Bulacan
warning the residents therein about the impending release of a large volume of water with the onset of typhoon
"Kading" and advise them to take the necessary precautions; 4) the water released during the typhoon was
needed to prevent the collapse of the dam and avoid greater damage to people and property; 5) in spite of the
precautions undertaken and the diligence exercised, they could still not contain or control the flood that resulted
and; 6) the damages incurred by the private respondents were caused by a fortuitous event or force majeure and
are in the nature and character of damnum absque injuria. By way of special affirmative defense, the defendants
averred that the NPC cannot be sued because it performs a purely governmental function. 4
Upon motion of the defendants, a preliminary hearing on the special defense was conducted. As a result thereof,
the trial court dismissed the complaints as against the NPC on the ground that the provision of its charter allowing
it to sue and be sued does not contemplate actions based on tort. The parties do not, however, dispute the fact
that this Court overruled the trial court and ordered the reinstatement of the complaints as against the NPC. 5
Being closely interrelated, the cases were consolidated and trial thereafter ensued.
The lower court rendered its decision on 30 April 1990 dismissing the complaints "for lack of sufficient and
credible evidence." 6 Consequently, the private respondents seasonably appealed therefrom to the respondent
Court which then docketed the cases as CA-G.R. CV Nos. 27290-93.
In its joint decision promulgated on 19 August 1991, the Court of Appeals reversed the appealed decision and
awarded damages in favor of the private respondents. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
CONFORMABLY TO THE FOREGOING, the joint decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE, and a new one is hereby rendered:
1. In Civil Case No. SM-950, ordering defendants-appellees to pay, jointly and severally,
plaintiffs-appellants, with legal interest from the date when this decision shall become final and
executory, the following:
A. Actual damages, to wit:

1) Gaudencio C. Rayo, Two Hundred Thirty One Thousand Two Hundred Sixty
Pesos (P231,260.00);
2) Bienvenido P. Pascual, Two Hundred Four Thousand Five Hundred Pesos
(P204.500.00);
3) Tomas Manuel, One Hundred Fifty Five Thousand Pesos (P155,000.00);
4) Pedro C. Bartolome, One Hundred Forty Seven Thousand Pesos
(P147,000.00);.
5) Bernardino Cruz, One Hundred Forty Three Thousand Five Hundred Fifty Two
Pesos and Fifty Centavos (P143,552.50);
6) Jose Palad, Fifty Seven Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P57,500.00);
7) Mariano S. Cruz, Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00);
8) Lucio Fajardo, Twenty nine Thousand Eighty Pesos (P29,080.00); and
B. Litigation expenses of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00);
2. In Civil case No. SM-951, ordering defendants-appellees to pay jointly and severally, plaintiffappellant, with legal interest from the date when this decision shall have become final and
executory, the following :
A. Actual damages of Five Hundred Twenty Thousand Pesos (P520,000.00);.
B. Moral damages of five hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00); and.
C. Litigation expenses of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00);.
3. In Civil Case No. SM-953, ordering defendants-appellees to pay, jointly and severally, with
legal interest from the date when this decision shall have become final and executory;
A. Plaintiff-appellant Angel C. Torres:
1) Actual damages of One Hundred Ninety Nine Thousand One Hundred Twenty Pesos
(P199,120.00);
2) Moral Damages of One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P150,000.00);
B. Plaintiff-appellant Norberto Torres:
1) Actual damages of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00);
2) Moral damages of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00);
C. Plaintiff-appellant Rodelio Joaquin:
1) Actual damages of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00);
2) Moral damages of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00); and
D. Plaintifsf-appellants litigation expenses of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00);

4. In Civil case No. SM-1247, ordering defendants-appellees to pay, jointly and severally, with
legal interest from the date when this decision shall have become final and executory :
A. Plaintiffs-appellants Presentacion Lorenzo and Clodualdo Lorenzo:
1) Actual damages of Two Hundred Fifty Six Thousand Six Hundred Pesos
(P256,600.00);
2) Moral damages of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00);
B. Plaintiff-appellant Consolacion Guzman :
1) Actual damages of One Hundred forty Thousand Pesos (P140,000.00);
2) Moral damages of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00);
C. Plaintiff-appellant Virginia Guzman :
1) Actual damages of Two Hundred Five Hundred Twenty Pesos (205,520.00);
and
D. Plaintiffs-appellants litigation expenses of Ten Thousand Pesos (10,000.00).
In addition, in all the four (4) instant cases, ordering defendants-appellees to pay, jointly and
severally, plaintiffs-appellants attorney fees in an amount equivalent to 15% of the total amount
awarded.
No pronouncement as to costs. 7
The foregoing judgment is based on the public respondent's conclusion that the petitioners were guilty of:
. . . a patent gross and evident lack of foresight, imprudence and negligence . . . in the
management and operation of Angat Dam. The unholiness of the hour, the extent of the opening
of the spillways, And the magnitude of the water released, are all but products of defendantsappellees' headlessness, slovenliness, and carelessness. The resulting flash flood and
inundation of even areas (sic) one (1) kilometer away from the Angat River bank would have
been avoided had defendants-appellees prepared the Angat Dam by maintaining in the first
place, a water elevation which would allow room for the expected torrential rains. 8
This conclusion, in turn, is anchored on its findings of fact, to wit:
As early as October 21, 1978, defendants-appellees knew of the impending onslaught of and
imminent danger posed by typhoon "Kading". For as alleged by defendants-appellees
themselves, the coming of said super typhoon was bannered by Bulletin Today, a newspaper of
national circulation, on October 25, 1978, as "Super Howler to hit R.P." The next day, October 26,
1978, said typhoon once again merited a headline in said newspaper as "Kading's Big Blow
expected this afternoon" (Appellee's Brief, p. 6). Apart from the newspapers, defendantsappellees learned of typhoon "Kading' through radio announcements (Civil Case No. SM-950,
TSN, Benjamin Chavez, December 4, 1984, pp. 7-9).
Defendants-appellees doubly knew that the Angat Dam can safely hold a normal maximum
headwater elevation of 217 meters (Appellee's brief, p. 12; Civil Case No. SM-951, Exhibit "I-6";
Civil Case No. SM-953, Exhibit "J-6"; Civil Case No. SM-1247, Exhibit "G-6").
Yet, despite such knowledge, defendants-appellees maintained a reservoir water elevation even
beyond its maximum and safe level, thereby giving no sufficient allowance for the reservoir to
contain the rain water that will inevitably be brought by the coming typhoon.

On October 24, 1978, before typhoon "Kading" entered the Philippine area of responsibility, water
elevation ranged from 217.61 to 217.53, with very little opening of the spillways, ranging from 1/2
to 1 meter. On October 25, 1978, when typhoon "Kading" entered the Philippine area of
responsibility, and public storm signal number one was hoisted over Bulacan at 10:45 a.m., later
raised to number two at 4:45 p.m., and then to number three at 10:45 p.m., water elevation
ranged from 217.47 to 217.57, with very little opening of the spillways, ranging from 1/2 to 1
meter. On October 26, 1978, when public storm signal number three remained hoisted over
Bulacan, the water elevation still remained at its maximum level of 217.00 to 218.00 with very
little opening of the spillways ranging from 1/2 to 2 meters, until at or about midnight, the
spillways were suddenly opened at 5 meters, then increasing swiftly to 8, 10, 12, 12.5, 13, 13.5,
14, 14.5 in the early morning hours of October 27, 1978, releasing water at the rate of 4,500 cubic
meters per second, more or less. On October 27, 1978, water elevation remained at a range of
218.30 to 217.05 (Civil Case No. SM-950, Exhibits "D" and series, "L", "M", "N", and "O" and
Exhibits "3" and "4"; Civil Case No. SM-951, Exhibits "H" and "H-1"; Civil Case No. SM-953,
Exhibits "I" and "I-1"; Civil Case No. SM 1247, Exhibits "F" and "F-1").
xxx xxx xxx
From the mass of evidence extant in the record, We are convinced, and so hold that the flash
flood on October 27, 1978, was caused not by rain waters (sic), but by stored waters (sic)
suddenly and simultaneously released from the Angat Dam by defendants-appellees, particularly
from midnight of October 26, 1978 up to the morning hours of October 27,
1978. 9
The appellate court rejected the petitioners' defense that they had sent "early warning written notices" to the
towns of Norzagaray, Angat, Bustos, Plaridel, Baliwag and Calumpit dated 24 October 1978 which read:
TO ALL CONCERN (sic):
Please be informed that at present our reservoir (dam) is full and that we have been releasing
water intermittently for the past several days.
With the coming of typhoon "Rita" (Kading) we expect to release greater (sic) volume of water, if it
pass (sic) over our place.
In view of this kindly advise people residing along Angat River to keep alert and stay in safe
places.
BENJAMIN L. CHAVEZ
Power Plant
Superintendent 10
because:
Said notice was delivered to the "towns of Bulacan" on October 26, 1978 by defendantsappellees driver, Leonardo Nepomuceno (Civil Case No. SM-950, TSN, Benjamin Chavez,
December 4, 1984, pp. 7-11 and TSN, Leonardo Nepomuceno, March 7, 1985, pp. 10-12).
Said notice is ineffectual, insufficient and inadequate for purposes of the opening of the spillway
gates at midnight of October 26, 1978 and on October 27, 1978. It did not prepare or warn the
persons so served, for the volume of water to be released, which turned out to be of such
magnitude, that residents near or along the Angat River, even those one (1) kilometer away,
should have been advised to evacuate. Said notice, addressed "TO ALL CONCERN (sic)," was
delivered to a policeman (Civil Case No. SM-950, pp. 10-12 and Exhibit "2-A") for the municipality
of Norzagaray. Said notice was not thus addressed and delivered to the proper and responsible
officials who could have disseminated the warning to the residents directly affected. As for the
municipality of Sta. Maria, where plaintiffs-appellants in Civil Case No. SM-1246 reside, said
notice does not appear to have been served. 11

Relying on Juan F. Nakpil & Sons vs. Court of Appeals, 12 public respondent rejected the petitioners' plea that the
incident in question was caused by force majeure and that they are, therefore, not liable to the private
respondents for any kind of damage such damage being in the nature of damnum absque injuria.
The motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioners, as well as the motion to modify judgment filed by the public
respondents, 13 were denied by the public respondent in its Resolution of 27 December 1991. 14
Petitioners thus filed the instant petition on 21 February 1992.
After the Comment to the petition was filed by the private respondents and the Reply thereto was filed by the
petitioners, We gave due course to the petition on 17 June 1992 and directed the parties to submit their
respective Memoranda, 15 which they subsequently complied with.
The petitioners raised the following errors allegedly committed by the respondent Court :
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN APPLYING THE RULING OF NAKPIL & SONS V.
COURT OF APPEALS AND HOLDING THAT PETITIONERS WERE GUILTY OF NEGLIGENCE.
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE WRITTEN NOTICES OF
WARNING ISSUED BY PETITIONERS WERE INSUFFICIENT.
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE DAMAGE SUFFERED BY
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS WAS NOT DAMNUM ABSQUE INJURIA.
IV. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT AWARDING THE COUNTERCLAIM OF
PETITIONERS FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES AND EXPENSES OF LITIGATION. 16
These same errors were raised by herein petitioners in G.R. No. 96410, entitled National Power Corporation, et
al., vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 17 which this Court decided on 3 July 1992. The said case involved the very same
incident subject of the instant petition. In no uncertain terms, We declared therein that the proximate cause of the
loss and damage sustained by the plaintiffs therein who were similarly situated as the private respondents
herein was the negligence of the petitioners, and that the 24 October 1978 "early warning notice" supposedly
sent to the affected municipalities, the same notice involved in the case at bar, was insufficient. We thus cannot
now rule otherwise not only because such a decision binds this Court with respect to the cause of the inundation
of the town of Norzagaray, Bulacan on 26-27 October 1978 which resulted in the loss of lives and the destruction
to property in both cases, but also because of the fact that on the basis of its meticulous analysis and evaluation
of the evidence adduced by the parties in the cases subject of CA-G.R. CV Nos. 27290-93, public respondent
found as conclusively established that indeed, the petitioners were guilty of "patent gross and evident lack of
foresight, imprudence and negligence in the management and operation of Angat Dam," and that "the extent of
the opening of the spillways, and the magnitude of the water released, are all but products of defendantsappellees' headlessness, slovenliness, and carelessness." 18 Its findings and conclusions are biding upon Us,
there being no showing of the existence of any of the exceptions to the general rule that findings of fact of the
Court of Appeals are conclusive upon this Court. 19 Elsewise stated, the challenged decision can stand on its own
merits independently of Our decision in G.R. No. 96410. In any event, We reiterate here in Our pronouncement in
the latter case that Juan F. Nakpil & Sons vs. Court of Appeals 20 is still good law as far as the concurrent liability
of an obligor in the case of force majeure is concerned. In the Nakpil case, We held:
To exempt the obligor from liability under Article 1174 of the Civil Code, for a breach of an
obligation due to an "act of God," the following must concur: (a) the cause of the breach of the
obligation must be independent of the will of the debtor; (b) the event must be either unforseeable
or unavoidable; (c) the event must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his
obligation in a moral manner; and (d) the debtor must be free from any participation in, or
aggravation of the injury to the creditor. (Vasquez v. Court of Appeals, 138 SCRA 553; Estrada v.
Consolacion, 71 SCRA 423; Austria v. Court of Appeals, 39 SCRA 527; Republic of the Phil. v.
Luzon Stevedoring Corp., 21 SCRA 279; Lasam v. Smith, 45 Phil. 657).
Thus, if upon the happening of a fortuitous event or an act of God, there concurs a corresponding
fraud, negligence, delay or violation or contravention in any manner of the tenor of the obligation
as provided for in Article 1170 of the Civil Code, which results in loss or damage, the obligor
cannot escape liability.

The principle embodied in the act of God doctrine strictly requires that the act must be one
occasioned exclusively by the violence of nature and all human agencies are to be excluded from
creating or entering into the cause of the mischief. When the effect, the cause of which is to be
considered, is found to be in part the result of the participation of man, whether it be from active
intervention or neglect, or failure to act, the whole occurrence is thereby humanized, as it were,
and removed from the rules applicable to the acts of God. (1 Corpus Juris, pp. 1174-1175).
Thus it has been held that when the negligence of a person concurs with an act of God in
producing a loss, such person is not exempt from liability by showing that the immediate cause of
the damage was the act of God. To be exempt from liability for loss because of an act of God, he
must be free from any previous negligence or misconduct by which that loss or damage may
have been occasioned. (Fish & Elective Co. v. Phil. Motors, 55 Phil. 129; Tucker v. Milan, 49 O.G.
4379; Limpangco & Sons v. Yangco Steamship Co., 34 Phil. 594, 604; Lasam v. Smith, 45 Phil.
657). 21
Accordingly, petitioners cannot be heard to invoke the act of God or force majeure to escape liability for the loss
or damage sustained by private respondents since they, the petitioners, were guilty of negligence. The event then
was not occasioned exclusively by an act of God or force majeure; a human factor negligence or imprudence
had intervened. The effect then of the force majeure in question may be deemed to have, even if only partly,
resulted from the participation of man. Thus, the whole occurrence was thereby humanized, as it were, and
removed from the laws applicable to acts of God.
WHEREFORE, for want of merit, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED and the Consolidated Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV Nos. 27290-93 is AFFIRMED, with costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

JAPAN AIRLINES vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, ENRIQUE AGANA., MARIA ANGELA NINA AGANA,
ADALIA B. FRANCISCO and JOSE MIRANDA
G.R. No. 118664, August 7, 1998, THIRD DIVISION
Before us is an appeal by certiorari filed by petitioner Japan Airlines, Inc. (JAL) seeking the reversal of the
decision of the Court of Appeals, 1 which affirmed with modification the award of damages made by the trial court
in favor of herein private respondents Enrique Agana, Maria Angela Nina Agana, Adelia Francisco and Jose
Miranda.
On June 13, 1991, private respondent Jose Miranda boarded JAL flight No. JL 001 in San Francisco, California
bound for Manila. Likewise, on the same day private respondents Enrique Agana, Maria Angela Nina Agana and
Adelia Francisco left Los Angeles, California for Manila via JAL flight No. JL 061. As an incentive for travelling on
the said airline, both flights were to make an overnight stopover at Narita, Japan, at the airlines' expense,
thereafter proceeding to Manila the following day.
Upon arrival at Narita, Japan on June 14, 1991, private respondents were billeted at Hotel Nikko Narita for the
night. The next day, private respondents, on the final leg of their journey, went to the airport to take their flight to
Manila. However, due to the Mt. Pinatubo eruption, unrelenting ashfall blanketed Ninoy Aquino International
Airport (NAIA), rendering it inaccessible to airline traffic. Hence, private respondents' trip to Manila was cancelled
indefinitely.
To accommodate the needs of its stranded passengers, JAL rebooked all the Manila-bound passengers on flight
No. 741 due to depart on June 16, 1991 and also paid for the hotel expenses for their unexpected overnight stay.
On June 16, 1991, much to the dismay of the private respondents, their long anticipated flight to Manila was again
cancelled due to NAIA's indefinite closure. At this point, JAL informed the private respondents that it would no
longer defray their hotel and accommodation expense during their stay in Narita.
Since NAIA was only reopened to airline traffic on June 22, 1991, private respondents were forced to pay for their
accommodations and meal expenses from their personal funds from June 16 to June 21, 1991. Their unexpected
stay in Narita ended on June 22, 1991 when they arrived in Manila on board JL flight No. 741.
Obviously, still reeling from the experience, private respondents, on July 25, 1991, commenced an action for
damages against JAL before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 104. 2 To support their claim,
private respondents asserted that JAL failed to live up to its duty to provide care and comfort to its stranded
passengers when it refused to pay for their hotel and accommodation expenses from June 16 to 21, 1991 at
Narita, Japan. In other words, they insisted that JAL was obligated to shoulder their expenses as long as they
were still stranded in Narita. On the other hand, JAL denied this allegation and averred that airline passengers
have no vested right to these amenities in case a flight is cancelled due to "force majeure."
On June 18, 1992, the trial court rendered its judgment in favor of private respondents holding JAL liable for
damages, viz.:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered in favor of plaintiffs ordering the defendant Japan Airlines to
pay the plaintiffs Enrique Agana, Adalia B. Francisco and Maria Angela Nina Agana the sum of
One million Two Hundred forty-six Thousand Nine Hundred Thirty-Six Pesos (P1,246,936.00) and
Jose Miranda the sum of Three Hundred Twenty Thousand Six Hundred sixteen and 31/100
(P320,616.31) as actual, moral and exemplary damages and pay attorney's fees in the amount of
Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00), and to pay the costs of suit.
Undaunted, JAL appealed the decision before the Court of Appeals, which, however, with the exception of
lowering the damages awarded affirmed the trial court's finding, 3 thus:
Thus, the award of moral damages should be as it is hereby reduced to P200,000.00 for each of
the plaintiffs, the exemplary damages to P300,000.00 and the attorney's fees to P100,000.00 plus
the costs.
WHEREFORE, with the foregoing Modification, the judgment appealed from is hereby
AFFIRMED in all other respects.

JAL filed a motion for reconsideration which proved futile and unavailing. 4
Failing in its bid to reconsider the decision, JAL has now filed this instant petition.
The issue to be resolved is whether JAL, as a common carrier has the obligation to shoulder the hotel and meal
expenses of its stranded passengers until they have reached their final destination, even if the delay were caused
by "force majeure."
To begin with, there is no dispute that the Mt. Pinatubo eruption prevented JAL from proceeding to Manila on
schedule. Likewise, private respondents concede that such event can be considered as "force majeure" since
their delayed arrival in Manila was not imputable to JAL. 5
However, private respondents contend that while JAL cannot be held responsible for the delayed arrival in Manila,
it was nevertheless liable for their living expenses during their unexpected stay in Narita since airlines have the
obligation to ensure the comfort and convenience of its passengers. While we sympathize with the private
respondents' plight, we are unable to accept this contention.
We are not unmindful of the fact that in a plethora of cases we have consistently ruled that a contract to transport
passengers is quite different in kind, and degree from any other contractual relation. It is safe to conclude that it is
a relationship imbued with public interest. Failure on the part of the common carrier to live up to the exacting
standards of care and diligence renders it liable for any damages that may be sustained by its passengers.
However, this is not to say that common carriers are absolutely responsible for all injuries or damages even if the
same were caused by a fortuitous event. To rule otherwise would render the defense of "force majeure," as an
exception from any liability, illusory and ineffective.
Accordingly, there is no question that when a party is unable to fulfill his obligation because of "force majeure,"
the general rule is that he cannot be held liable for damages for non-performance. 6 Corollarily, when JAL was
prevented from resuming its flight to Manila due to the effects of Mt. Pinatubo eruption, whatever losses or
damages in the form of hotel and meal expenses the stranded passengers incurred, cannot be charged to JAL.
Yet it is undeniable that JAL assumed the hotel expenses of respondents for their unexpected overnight stay on
June 15, 1991.
Admittedly, to be stranded for almost a week in a foreign land was an exasperating experience for the private
respondents. To be sure, they underwent distress and anxiety during their unanticipated stay in Narita, but their
predicament was not due to the fault or negligence of JAL but the closure of NAIA to international flights. Indeed,
to hold JAL, in the absence of bad faith or negligence, liable for the amenities of its stranded passengers by
reason of a fortuitous event is too much of a burden to assume.
Furthermore, it has been held that airline passengers must take such risks incident to the mode of travel. 7 In this
regard, adverse weather conditions or extreme climatic changes are some of the perils involved in air travel, the
consequences of which the passenger must assume or expect. After all, common carriers are not the insurer of all
risks. 8
Paradoxically, the Court of Appeals, despite the presence of "force majeure," still ruled against JAL relying in our
decision inPAL v. Court of Appeals, 9 thus:
The position taken by PAL in this case clearly illustrates its failure to grasp the exacting standard
required by law. Undisputably, PAL's diversion of its flight due to inclement weather was a
fortuitous event. Nonetheless, such occurrence did not terminate PAL's contract with its
passengers. Being in the business of air carriage and the sole one to operate in the country, PAL
is deemed equipped to deal with situations as in the case at bar. What we said in one case once
again must be stressed,i.e., the relation of carrier and passenger continues until the latter has
been landed at the port of destination and has left the carrier's premises. Hence, PAL necessarily
would still have to exercise extraordinary diligence in safeguarding the comfort, convenience and
safety of its stranded passengers until they have reached their final destination. On this score,
PAL grossly failed considering the then ongoing battle between government forces and Muslim
rebels in Cotabato City and the fact that the private respondent was a stranger to the place.
The reliance is misplaced. The factual background of the PAL case is different from the instant petition. In that
case there was indeed a fortuitous event resulting in the diversion of the PAL flight. However, the unforeseen

diversion was worsened when "private respondents (passenger) was left at the airport and could not even hitch a
ride in a Ford Fiera loaded with PAL personnel," 10 not to mention the apparent apathy of the PAL station
manager as to the predicament of the stranded passengers. 11 In light of these circumstances, we held that if the
fortuitous event was accompanied by neglect and malfeasance by the carrier's employees, an action for damages
against the carrier is permissible. Unfortunately, for private respondents, none of these conditions are present in
the instant petition.
We are not prepared, however, to completely absolve petitioner JAL from any liability. It must be noted that
private respondents bought tickets from the United States with Manila as their final destination. While JAL was no
longer required to defray private respondents' living expenses during their stay in Narita on account of the
fortuitous event, JAL had the duty to make the necessary arrangements to transport private respondents on the
first available connecting flight to Manila. Petitioner JAL reneged on its obligation to look after the comfort and
convenience of its passengers when it declassified private respondents from "transit passengers" to "new
passengers" as a result of which private respondents were obliged to make the necessary arrangements
themselves for the next flight to Manila. Private respondents were placed on the waiting list from June 20 to June
24. To assure themselves of a seat on an available flight, they were compelled to stay in the airport the whole day
of June 22, 1991 and it was only at 8:00 p.m. of the aforesaid date that they were advised that they could be
accommodated in said flight which flew at about 9:00 a.m. the next day.
We are not oblivious to the fact that the cancellation of JAL flights to Manila from June 15 to June 21, 1991
caused considerable disruption in passenger booking and reservation. In fact, it would be unreasonable to expect,
considering NAIA's closure, that JAL flight operations would be normal on the days affected. Nevertheless, this
does not excuse JAL from its obligation to make the necessary arrangements to transport private respondents on
its first available flight to Manila. After all, it had a contract to transport private respondents from the United States
to Manila as their final destination.
Consequently, the award of nominal damages is in order. Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right
of a plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized and not for
the purpose of indemnifying any loss suffered by him. 12 The court may award nominal damages in every
obligation arising from any source enumerated in article 1157, or in every case where any property right has been
invaded. 13
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated December 22, 1993 is hereby
MODIFIED. The award of actual, moral and exemplary damages is hereby DELETED. Petitioner JAL is ordered to
pay each of the private respondents nominal damages in the sum of P100,000.00 each including attorney' s fees
of P50,000.00 plus costs.

Footnotes:
12 Art. 2221, Civil Code.
13 Art. 2222, Civil Code.

PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ADELINA BAGADIONG and ROSARIO STO. TOMAS
G.R. No. 50504-05, August 13, 1990, SECOND DIVISION
Petitioner seeks the review of the decision of the Court of Appeals, 1 promulgated on April 25, 1979 in CA-G.R.
Nos. 58345-46-R, affirming with modifications the decision of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur,
Branch 1, under the following decretal portion:
WHEREFORE, the dispositive part of the decision appealed from is modified as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
(A) Defendant Philippine Airlines, Inc. in Civil Case No. 7047, is ordered to pay the plaintiffs,
Adelina Bagadiong and Rosario Sto. Tomas, the sum of P30,000.00, Philippine Currency, each,
as moral damages and exemplary damages; and the sum of P6,000.00, Philippine Currency, as
attorney's fees;
(B) Defendant Philippine Airlines, Inc. in Civil Case No. 7307 is ordered to pay the plaintiff
Ladislao Santos the sum of P30,000.00, Philippine Currency, as moral damages and exemplary
damages; and the sum of P6,000.00, Philippine Currency, as attorney's fees;
(C) To pay the plaintiffs the interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum on moral and exemplary
damages aforestated, from the date of this amended decision until said damages are fully paid;
(D) Defendants are further ordered to pay the costs of these suits. The counter-claim(s) of
defendant in both cases are dismissed.
SO ORDERED 2
On December 11, 1970, private respondents Adelina Bagadiong and Rosario Sto. Tomas, filed an action for
damages against petitioner in the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, docketed therein as Civil Case No.
7047. On May 18, 1972, a similar action, Civil Case No. 7307, was filed in the same court by the other private
respondent, Ladislao Santos. On February 9, 1973, considering that these two cases arose from the same
incident and involved the same defendant and counsel for plaintiffs in both cases, a joint hearing of these cases
was ordered and conducted by the lower court upon motion of both parties. 3
Considering the significant role of evidentially-supported factual findings of the lower courts in the decisional
processes of appellate courts, we find it necessary to reproduce the same, as reported in these cases by
respondent court, together with the proceedings in the court a quo:
The amended complaint in Civil Case No. 7047 alleges, inter alia, that on November 16, 1970,
plaintiffs Adelina Bagadiong and Rosario Sto. Tomas, now appellees, made reservations with,
and bought two plane tickets from, defendant (Naga City branch station), now appellant, a
common carrier engaged in the business of transporting passengers by air for compensation, for
Naga-Manila flight on November 26, 1970; that on November 24, 1970, plaintiffs went back to
defendant Naga City branch station and paid the fare for two round trip tickets; that plaintiffs were
not only issued their round trips tickets, but also their reservation in defendant's 3:40 o'clock
afternoon Naga-Manila flight on November 26, 1970 were expressly confirmed by the Naga City
branch station; that at three o'clock in the afternoon of November 26, 1970, or forty-five minutes
before the scheduled departure time of the Naga-Manila flight, plaintiffs checked in at the Pili
airport counter of defendant and there the latter's agent or employees got the tickets of the
plaintiffs allegedly for the purpose of issuing to them a boarding pass; that few minutes before
departure time, plaintiffs' luggage was loaded to (sic) the plane, but plaintiffs were not given back
their tickets and were not allowed by defendant's agent or employees to board the plane; and that
after the plane had taken off from the Pili airport with the luggage of plaintiffs, in spite of their
complaint, all that defendant's agent or employees did at the Naga City branch station was to
refined plaintiffs' fares.

Contending that defendant common carrier acted in bad faith in the breach of its contract with
them, plaintiffs claimed for moral damages "in the amount of no less than P10,000.00 each,"
exemplary damages and actual damages. It is prayed that defendant be ordered to pay plaintiffs,
among others, "the sum of P20,000.00 for moral damages" and P6,000.00 by way of expenses of
litigation including attorney's fees.
In Civil Case No. 7307, the complaint alleges, among others, that on November 24, 1970, when
plaintiff Ladislao Santos, now appellee, bought a plane ticket at the branch station of defendant in
Naga City for Flight 296 from Naga to Manila scheduled on the afternoon of November 26, 1970,
he was assured by the employees of defendant that his reservation for the flight was confirmed;
that at two o'clock in the afternoon of November 29, 1970, one hour and forty minutes before the
scheduled departure time of Fligth 296, plaintiff checked in at the Pili airport counter and then and
there the employees of defendant asked for his ticket, allegedly for the purpose of issuing to him
a boarding pass; that about three minutes before departure of Flight 296, the ticket was returned
to plaintiff by defendants employee, informing him that there was no more seat available and he
could not ride on that flight to Manila; that the employees of the defendant acted rudely and
discourteously to his embarrassment in the presence of so many people who were at the airport
at that time; that it was very important and urgent for plaintiff to be in Manila on the afternoon of
November 26, 1970, because he had an appointment with an eye specialist for medical treatment
of his eye and he and his brother were "to close a contract they entered into to supply shrimps to
some restaurants and market vendors in Manila; and that he and his brother failed to close the
contract to supply shrimps, as it was on December 1, 1970, that he was finally able to reach
Manila by train.
Likewise, claiming that defendant acted in bad faith in the breach of its contract with him, plaintiff
Ladislao Santos has claimed for moral damages "in the amount of no less than P70,000.00,"
exemplary damages and actual damages in "the sum of P20,000.00 . . . which include(s)
attorney's fees and expenses of litigation."
In its answer to the amended complaint, as well as to the complaint of other plaintiff-appellee,
defendant-appellant common carrier interposed, among others, the following common special
and affirmative defenses: that the aircraft used for Flight 296R/26 November 1970 (Virac-NagaManila) is a 44-seater; that due to the cancellation of its morning flight from Virac, some of its
passengers for said flight took Flight 296R; that on the representations of Governor Alberto of
Catanduanes, one of those manifested in the cancelled morning flight, its (defendant's)
employees at its Virac station were constrained "to allow the Governor to take Flight 296R
together with several companions" with the assurance of the Governor that two (2) of his
companions would deplane in Naga; that on arrival in Naga, the two companions of the Governor
refused to deplane despite repeated pleas and entreaties of its employees; that unable to
persuade the two Virac passengers to deplane in Naga and "compelled by a reasonable and wellgrounded fear that an untoward incident may ensue should the two (2) be forced to leave the
aircraft," its employee "had to act in a manner dictated by the circumstances and by reasons of
safety both of the passenger and the aircraft and crew;" that its failure to carry plaintiffs on board
the plane "was necessitated by reason of safety and/or compliance with applicable
lawsregulations, or orders, and the same are valid grounds for refusal to carry plaintiffs in
accordance with its Domestic Passenger Tariff No. 2 (Section A, Rule 8[a]) which is incorporated
by reference into the conditions of carriage as expressly provided for in plaintiffs" plane tickets;
and that the error of its employees was an honest mistake or constitutes excusable negligence.
After trial on the merits, specifically on June 25, 1975, the lower court rendered a decision which,
in part, is herein reproduced as follows:
From the foregoing, the Court is of the opinion that:
(a) There was a contract of carriage to furnish plaintiffs passage from Naga (Pili airport) to Manila
on Flight 296R on the afternoon of November 26, 1970.
(b) The said contract was breached when defendant failed to accommodate plaintiffs in Flight
296R.

(c) The breach of contract of carriage was in bad faith even granting the mistakes advanced by
the defendant the same would still amount to negligence so gross and reckless as to amount to
malice and/or bad faith.
(d) Due to the acts of the employees of the defendant in "bumping off the plaintiffs, the latter
suffered embarrassment and humiliations, thereby causing them mental anguish, serious anxiety,
wounded feeling and social humiliation, resulting in moral damages.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby entered:
(a) Ordering the defendant in Civil Case No. 7047 to pay plaintiff Adelina Bagadiong the sum of
P10,000.00, as moral damages; to pay plaintiff Rosario Sto. Tomas the sum of P10,000.00 as
moral damages; to pay each plaintiff the sum of P10,000.00 by way of exemplary damages, and
the sum of P6,000.00 as attorney's fees;
(b) Ordering the defendant in Civil Case No. 7307 to pay plaintiff Ladislao Santos the sum of
P60,000.00 for moral damages; P20,000.00 by way of actual damages; the sum of P10,000.00 as
exemplary damages and P6,000.00 for attorney's fees;
(c) Interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum on the moral and exemplary damages aforestated,
from the date of this decision until said damages are fully paid;
(d) Ordering the defendant to pay the costs of these suits. Counterclaim of the defendant in both
cases are hereby dismissed.
SO ORDERED.
Under date of July 19, 1975, plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 7047 filed a Motion for Reconsideration of
the decision, . . .
xxx xxx xxx
On July 30, 1975, the lower court granted the motion for reconsideration in its order which, in part
states:
In the case of Ortigas vs. Lufthansa (Case Digest of the Bulletin issue of July 19, 1975), the
Supreme Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Antonio P. Barredo, increased the moral damages
awarded to Ortigas by the CFI of Manila from P100,000.00 to P150,000.00 and the exemplary
damages from P30,000.00 to P100,000.00. The ground of the Supreme Court in ordering the
increase of the exemplary damages from P30,000.00 to P100,000.00, was that, "the airline
should be made to pay an amount that can really serve as a deterrent against a seeming pattern
of indifference and unconcern, and what is worse, of discrimination for racial reasons, discernible
in the treatment of air passengers."
In the present case, this Court found clear evidence of discrimination by employees of the
Philippine Airlines (PAL) when for unexplained and unwarranted reasons evidently the desire
to cater to the good graces of a "politico" they unceremoniously "bumped off herein plaintiffs
from the flight.
xxx xxx xxx
The dispositive part of the decision of this Court on these Civil Cases Nos. 7047 and 7304 dated
July 1, 1975 is hereby amended and to read as follows, to wit:
Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered:
(A) Defendant Philippine Airlines, Inc., in Civil Case No. 7047, is ordered to pay the plaintiffs,
Adelina Bagadiong and Rosario Sto. Tomas, the sum of P60,000.00, Philippine Currency, each

as moral damages; the sum of P60,000.00, Philippine Currency, each, by way of exemplary
damages, and the sum of P10,000.00, Philippine Currency, as attorney's fees;
(B) Defendant Philippine Airlines, Inc., in Civil Case No. 7307 is ordered to pay the plaintiff
Ladislao Santos the sum of P60,000.00, Philippine Currency, as moral damages; the sum of
P20,000.00, Philippine Currency, by way of actual damages; the sum of P60,000.00, Philippine
Currency, as exemplary damages, and the sum of P10,000.00, Philippine Currency, as attorney's
fees;
(C) To pay the plaintiffs the interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum on moral and exemplary
damages aforestated, from the date of this amended decision until said damages are fully paid.
(D) Defendants are further ordered to pay the coasts of these suits. The counter-claims of
defendant in both cases are dismissed.
SO ORDERED 4
As earlier stated, on appeal respondent court affirmed with modifications said decision of the lower court. Hence,
this petition raising the following questions:
1. Is a passenger in a contract of air transportation entitled to moral damages when the failure of the carrier to
accommodate the passenger resulted from unlawful acts of third parties against the carrie's personnel?
2. Are respondents entitled to exemplary damages when there is no sufficient evidence to show, and neither the
appellate court nor the trial court found facts showing reckless, oppressive or malevolent conduct by the carrier?
3. Can a passenger in a contract of air transportation validly claim damages when she could have taken the flight
had she not instead opted, of her own volition, to give her confirmed seat to another passenger who was
accommodated by the carrier in her place?
4. May a trial court, in a motion for reconsideration, increase the damages it awarded in the original decision to an
amount drastically over that it initially found to be warranted and significantly more than claimed by plaintiffs
themselves? 5
We have constantly ruled in a number of cases that moral damages are recoverable in a breach of contract of
carriage where the air carrier through its agents acted fraudulently or in bad faith. 6 In the case at bar, the trial
court and the Court of Appeals are in agreement that petitioner through its agents acted in bad faith in "bumping
off" private respondents. As aptly found by the Court of Appeals, the failure of petitioner to accommodate private
respondents was not the result of an honest mistake, because its employees knew and were aware that what they
were doing was wrong. Hence, respondent court held that there was a "dishonest purpose" and "conscious doing
of wrong" on the part of petitioner's employees in "bumping off" private respondents from the flight; and that the
lower court did not err in holding that the failure of petitioner to accommodate private respondents on Flight 296R
was attended by bad faith. 7
The said pronouncement was based on the following findings in the decision of the trial court, which we are not
inclined to disturb, the same having evidentiary foundation:
The employees of the defendant knew that there was a heavy booking of passengers on
November 26, 1970 because of the coming of the Pope. Why did the Virac station overbooked
(sic) two passengers, Gov. Alberto and Mayor Antonio, on Flight 296R, knowing all the time that
these two passengers could not possibly obtain confirmed reservations in Naga? Knowing further
the political stature of Gov. Alberto, Mr. Borjal, the branch supervisor of Virac, should had (sic)
foreseen that should Gov. Alberto and Mayor Antonio refuse to deplane in Naga, should they
failed to obtain confirmed reservations he, (Borjal) would create a situation wherein the defendant
would be placed in a position to violate its contract of carriage with passengers with confirmed
reservations who would not be accommodated because of Gov. Alberto and Mayor Antonio. This
whole incident could have been avoided had Borjal not recklessly took (sic) a chance on the two
overbooked passengers in getting confirmed reservation in Naga.

The situation was, however, aggravated by the employees of the defendant at Pili airport,
particularly Mr. Azuela who seemed to be the one who was making decisions at the airport.
Knowing already that Flight 296R was overbooked by two passengers and the allocations in
Legaspi and Naga were also fully booked of passengers with confirmed reservations and plaintiffs
were begging and pleading to be allowed to take Flight 296R as they had confirmed reservations
and the luggage of Mrs. Bagadiong and Miss Sto. Tomas were already loaded in the plane, Mr.
Azuela and his co- employees still allowed and gave preference to the two passengers (Fr. Laban
and Miss Franca) to board and take Flight 296R notwithstanding the fact that Mr. Azuela and his
co-employees at the airport knew and was (sic) aware at that time that the Sorsogon branch had
no allocation in Flight 296R and that the flight of the Sorsogon passengers was already cancelled
earlier. The employees of the defendant knowingly and deliberately disregarded the rights of the
plaintiffs to board the plane and took (sic) Flight 296R by virtue of their being holders of tickets
duly issued and paid for with confirmed reservations on Flight 296R. The employees of the
defendant knew that by not allowing the plaintiffs to take Flight 296R they were violating the
contract of carriage the defendant had with the plaintiffs. Even granting all the mistakes advanced
by the defendant, still there would at least be negligence so gross and reckless that it amounts to
malice or bad faith in its breach of contract with the plaintiffs (Lopez, et al. versus Pan American
World Airways, No. L-22415, March 30, 1966, citing Fores vs. Miranda L-12163, March 4, 1959;
Necesito vs. Paras, L-10605, June 30, 1958 16 SCRA 431).
The argument that the Sorsogon passengers arrived first and checked in earlier than the plaintiffs
at the airport ticket counter of the defendant is not a valid reason to give them preference over the
plaintiffs considering that the latter had confirmed reservations and they arrived on time at the
airport and checked in at the defendant's ticket counter. If issuance of tickets duly paid for and
with confirmed reservations is no guarantee that the passengers to whom it is (sic) issued would
be accommodated, then air passengers would be placed in the hollow of the hands of the airlines
and its employees. What security then can a passenger have? . . . 8
In the case of Korean Airlines, Co., Ltd. vs. Hon. Court of Appeals, et al., 9 with a similar factual setting, we held:
We are satisfied from the findings of the respondent court (and of the trial court) that the private
respondent was, in the language of the airline industry, "bumped off". She had a confirmed ticket.
She arrived at the airport on time. However, she was not allowed to board because her seat had
already been given to another passenger. As a result, she suffered damages for which the
petitioner should be held liable.
A contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind and degree from any other contractual relation. And
this, because of the relation which an air-carrier with the public. Its business is mainly with the travelling public. It
invites people to avail of the comforts and advantages it offers. The contract of air carriage, therefore, generates a
relation attended with a public duty. Neglect or malfeasance of the carrier's employees naturally could give ground
for an action for damages. 10
The operation of a common carrier is a business affected with public interest and must be directed to serve the
comfort and convenience of the passengers. In case of breach in bad faith of a contract of carriage, award of
damages is in order. We have ruled that bad faith which would justify an award of moral and exemplary damages
for breach of contract of carriage means a breach of a known duty through some motive of interest or illwill. 11That
pronouncement is applicable to these cases.
The contention of petitioner that its failure to accommodate private respondents was due to the unlawful acts of
third persons and, constitutes caso fortuito, is untenable. To constitute a caso fortuito that would exempt a person
from responsibility, it is essential that (a) the event must be independent of the will of the obligor; (b) it must be
either unforseeable or inevitable; (c) its occurrence renders it impossible for the obligor to fulfill his obligation in a
normal manner; and (d) the obligor must be free from any participation in the aggravation of the injury resulting to
the obligee or creditor. 12
One essential characteristic of a fortuitous event is that it was independent of the will of the obligor or of his
employees, which fact is lacking in this case. The alleged fortuitous event, supposedly consisting of the unlawful
acts of Governor Alberto and Mayor Antonio, is not independent of the will of herein petitioner as the obligor but
was caused by the very act of its agents in allowing the governor and the mayor to board Flight 296R in excess of
the number of passengers allotted to them and with full knowledge that the said flight for Manila was fully booked.
The impossibility of their being accommodated was necessarily forseeable. The claim of petitioner that there was

a prior arrangement between its agent in Virac and the governor and the mayor that the latter would be
accommodated only up to Naga is belied by the passengers' manifest wherein it is stated that the place of
destination of both the governor and the mayor was Manila . 13
Again, we quote respondent Court of Appeals:
The fear spoken of by witness Azuela is speculative, fanciful and remote. The statement
attributed to Governor Alberto and/or the mayors, that "if we cannot board the plane there will be
something that will happen," is vague. The threat, if ever it was, was not of such a serious
character and imminence as to create in the mind of defendant-appellant's employees fear of
greater injury if they would not allow Governor Alberto and the mayors to remain in the plane
which was then scheduled to fly to Manila. It is difficult to believe that Governor Alberto and the
mayors would make any threat or intimidation to keep their seats in the plane. They were
provincial and municipal executives with a common duty to maintain peace and order and to
prevent the commission of crimes. The cited cases involving Hukbalahaps and robbers are
misplaced, because they are known to be ruthless killers, whose intimidation or the violence they
employed is sufficient to produce in the mind of their victims real, imminent or reasonable fear. As
correctly observed by the lower court from the evidence of record, defendant-appellant's
employees "bumped off plaintiffs from the flight in their desire" "to cater to the good graces of a
politico" (Governor Alberto). 14
Petitioner's agents, by giving permission to board Flight 296R to persons who were not among those with valid
confirmations and who consequently had no right to be given preference in taking said flight, deliberately created
a situation that would place, as it did place, petitioner in arrant violation of its contract with private respondents
who were "bumped off" by reason thereof. Petitioner, having unlawfully deprived private respondents of their
seats, without any regard at all to their feelings and convenience just so it could accommodate other persons who
had no better right thereto, cannot now relieve itself from liability by invoking a fortuitous event, a defense as
erroneous as it is contrived.
As we stressed in Ortigas, Jr. vs. Lufthansa German Airlines. 15
. . . Nobody, much less a common carrier who is under constant special obligation to give utmost
consideration to the convenience of its customers, may be permitted to relieve itself from any
difficult situation created by its own lack of diligence in the conduct of its affairs in a manner
prejudicial to such customers. It is Our considered view that when it comes to contracts of
common carriage, inattention and lack of care on the part of the carrier resulting in the failure of
the passengers to be accommodated in the class contracted for amounts to bad faith or fraud
which entitles the passengers to the award of moral damages in accordance with Article 2220 of
the Civil Code. . . .
We, therefore, find no error on the part of respondent Court of Appeals in awarding moral and exemplary
damages as well as attorney's fees. The findings that petitioner had breached its contract of carriage in bad faith
and in wanton disregard of private respondents' rights as passengers lay the basis and justification for such
awards. The imposition of exemplary damages is necessary to deter petitioner or other airlines from committing
similar breaches of contract in the future, although there are still reported instances thereof.
With respect to the third issue, we also find the same to be without merit for being based on specious and
strained reasoning. The fact that respondent Bagadiong relinquished her seat in favor of her son is of no moment,
considering that her son was also a confirmed passenger who had a right to demand accommodation from
petitioner. As noted by respondent court, the act of respondent Bagadiong was motivated solely by her concern
for her son who also risked being denied accommodation but who was then returning to school in Manila. Such
sacrifice was not voluntary on her part, and her inability to take the fligth was the consequence of the wrongful act
of petitioner's employees for which it has to answer. 16
On the last issue regarding the propriety of the lower court's increasing the award of damages it awarded in the
original decision, petitioner's allegation that respondent court passed upon the matter sub silentio is not correct.
Respondent court precisely resolved said issue by modifying the decision of the lower court, awarding each
respondent instead an aggregate amount of P30,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages, plus P6,000.00 as
attorney's fees. The award of moral and exemplary damages in an aggregate amount may not be the usual way

of awarding said damages. However, there can be no question that the entitlement to moral damages having
been established, exemplary damages may be awarded; and exemplary damages may be awarded even though
not so expressly pleaded in the complaint nor proved . 17
Nor can petitioner accurately claim that the award made by respondent court exceeded the amounts prayed for by
respondents Bagadiong and Sto. Tomas in their complaint. A reading of said complaint shows that only their
claims for moral damages and attorney's fees were limited to P20,000.00 and P6,000.00, respectively; the award
of exemplary damages was left to the discretion of the lower court. 18
The amount of exemplary damages need not be pleaded in the complaint because the same cannot be
predetermined. 19 One can merely ask that it be determined by the court as the evidence may warrant and be
awarded at its discretion. This is exactly what private respondents did. Awards for moral and exemplary damages,
as well as attorney's fees are left to the sound discretion of the court. 20 Such discretion, if wen exercised, will not
be disturbed on appeal. 21
Parenthetically, in a special appearance "only for the purpose of the filing of this notice of death of party' received
by the Court on May 22, 1990, 22 Atty. Romeo M. Gumba submitted a certified true copy of the death certificate
of private respondent Rosario Sto. Tomas, attesting to her death on January 20, 1988, with said counsel
informing the Court that decedent's surviving heirs are Salvacion Sto. Tomas Gerona and Cecilia Sto. Tomas
Pardo, both with addresses at Monterey Subdivision, Naga City. This matter should be taken into account in the
executory processes consequent to this decision.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of respondent Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED in toto, with costs
against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC. vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and NATIVIDAD VDA. DE PADILLA,
substituted by her legal heirs, namely: AUGUSTO A. PADILLA, ALBERTO A. PADILLA, CRESENCIO R.
ABES (representing the deceased Isabel Padilla Abes) MIGUEL A. PADILLA and RAMON A. PADILLA
G.R. No. L-54470, May 8, 1990, FIRST DIVISION
The only legal issue raised by the petitioner in this thirty-year-old case is whether the indemnity for the death of
private respondent's son, the late Nicanor A. Padilla should be computed on the basis of his life expectancy, as
the trial court and the Court of Appeals did, rather than the life expectancy of private respondent, his only legal
heir, as the petitioner contends.
On November 23, 1960, at 5:30 P.M., Starlight Flight No. 26 of the Philippine Air Lines (hereafter PAL) took off
from the Manduriao Airport in Iloilo, on its way to Manila, with 33 persons on board, including the plane's
complement. The plane did not reach its destination but crashed on Mt. Baco, Mindoro, one hour and fifteen
minutes after takeoff .The plane was Identified as PI-C133, a DC-3 type aircraft manufactured in 1942 and
acquired by PAL in 1948. It had flown almost 18,000 hours at the time of its illfated flight. It had been certified as
airworthy by the Civil Aeronautics Administration.
Among the fatalities was Nicanor Padilla who was a passenger on the star crossed flight. He was 29 years old,
single. His mother, Natividad A. Vda. de Padilla, was his only legal heir.
As a result of her son's death, Mrs. Padilla filed a complaint (which was amended twice) against PAL, demanding
payment of P600,000 as actual and compensatory damages, plus exemplary damages and P60,000 as attorney's
fees.
In its answer, PAL denied that the accident was caused by its negligence or that of any of the plane's flight crew,
and that, moreover, the damages sought were excessive and speculative.
On November 23, 1964, the trial court issued a pre-trial order requiring the parties to file on or before January 30,
1965 a stipulation of facts, or a negative manifestation in case they failed to submit a stipulation.
On June 8, 1965, the parties submitted a partial stipulation of facts providing as follows:
1.
Plaintiff is the widow of the late Alberto R. Padilla Filipino, of legal age, and a resident of and with
postal address at No. 970 (formerly No. 247) Gral. Solano St., San Miguel, Manila, while
defendant Philippine Air Lines, Inc. is a corporation duly organized, registered and existing under
and by virtue of the laws of the Philippines, engaged, as a common carrier in the business of
carrying or transporting by air passengers and goods, offering its services to the public as such
for compensation, with offices at Makati Bldg., Makati, Rizal.
2.
Nicanor A. Padilla was born on January 10, 1931. He was a son by lawful marriage of plaintiff and
Alberto R. Padilla, who died on September 2, 1948.
3.
Nicanor A. Padilla finished the elementary grades in 1943, high school in 1947, graduated the
Reserve Officer's Course (Infantry Basic Course) Armed Forces of the Philippines in 1949, and
graduated with the degree of Bachelor of Literature in 1951 and the degree of Bachelor of Laws
in 1954, all in Ateneo de Manila.
4.
He was admitted by the Supreme Court of the Philippines to practice law on January 28, 1955,
and from January 1958, to the time of his death on November 23, 1960, he was associated with
the law offices of Senator Ambrosio Padilla, brother of his father, Alberto R. Padilla.

5.
At the time of his death, he was the President and General Manager of the Padilla Shipping Co.,
Inc. He was also Vice-President and Treasurer of the Allied Overseas Trading Co., Inc.
6.
He was a member of the Board of Directors of the Junior Chamber of Commerce (Jaycees)
International and Chairman of its Committee on Governmental Affairs for the term 1960-1961.
This Committee on Governmental Affairs published a pamphlet entitled "Good Government is our
Business," for which the deceased was named "Jaycee of the Month of January 1960."
7.
Nicanor A. Padilla, while travelling and being transported and flown as a paid passenger on one
[of] defendant's aircraft, a DC-3 with registry No. PI-C133, on "Star Light Flight" No. 26 bound for
Manila from the City of Iloilo on November 23, 1960, was killed when said plane crashed in the
area of Mount Baco, Oriental Mindoro
8.
Nicanor A. Padilla died single, leaving as his nearest of kin and sole heiress to his estate his
mother the plaintiff herein with whom he was residing at the time of his death at 970 Gral. Solano
St., Manila.
9.
The aircraft (PI-C133) that crashed on Mt. Baco, Oriental Mindoro on November 23, 1960, was a
twin-engine passenger plane of the Philippine Air Lines of the DC-3 type. It was manufactured by
Douglas Aircraft Corporation of the United States for the U.S. Army and was purchased from the
latter by the Commercial Air lines, Inc., on September 25, 1946. The defendant Philippine Air
Lines acquired the plane from the Commercial Air Lines, Inc., on October 15, 1948. The aircraft
was registered by Philippine Air Lines with the Civil Aeronautics Administration as PI-C142 on
May 10, 1949. On October 15, 1953, PI-C142 met with a non-fatal accident at Piat, Tuguegarao,
Cagayan. PAL requested the Civil Aeronautics Administration for a change in the identification
mark. Said request was granted and the registration number was changed from PI-C142 to PIC133 on July 29, 1954. As [ofl November 22, 1960, the day before the fatal crash on Mt. Baco,
PI-C133 had a total flying time of 17,996:33 hours.
10.
PI-C133 was issued a certificate of airworthiness by the Civil Aeronautics Administration on
September 13, 1960 which was to expire on September 12, 1961; a copy of which is attached
hereto as Exhibit "I" and made a part of this stipulation.
11.
Other facts on which the parties cannot agree will be subject to proof at the trial. (pp. 34-39,
Record on Appeal; p. 11 7, Rollo.)
On January 15, 1966, the parties submitted another partial stipulation of facts:
1.
That in the book written by Salvador B. Salvosa, M.S. University of Michigan and member of the
Actuarial Society of the Philippine, entitled; "Filipino Experience Mortality Table," the complete life
expectancy of Filipinos appear on page 3 thereof, a photostat of which is attached hereto as
Exhibit "A."

2.
That in said Exhibit "A", the columns under the heading "Age x," refers to the age of the
individual, and the columns "oe x" refers to the corresponding number of years the individuals
expected to live. Thus, under the column "Age x," a person aged 29, the corresponding life
expectancy of said person under column "oex" is "42.60" years; and under said column "Age x" a
person aged 60, corresponding life expec tancy of said person under column 'oex' is "17.90"
years;
3.
That Salvador B. Salvosa's "Filipino Experience Mortality Table," including the table of life
expectancy are used by the Philippine International life Insurance Co., the Sterling Life Insurance
Co., the Cardinal Life Insurance Co., and Star life Insurance Co., and that the same has been
approved by the Insurance Commissioner for the use of life insurance companies doing business
in the Philippines as shown by a certificate issued by said Commissioner which is attached hereto
as Exhibit "B";
4.
That the book of Nelson and Warren, Consulting Actuaries of St. Luis and Kansas cities,
Missouri, entitled: "Principal Mortality Tables", contains a table of comparison of complete life
expectancy based on principal mortality tables used by life insurance companies, a photostat of
which is likewise attached hereto as Exhibits "C", "C-l", "C-2", and "C-3";
5.
That of the life expectancy based on the different systems mentioned in said Exhibits "C", "C-1",
"C-2" and "C-3", the following are also used in the Philippines for life insurance purposes: (a) the
American Experience appearing in Exhibit "B", 'fifth columns on both pages, the first column
corresponding to the age of the individual (pages 12 and 13 of the book); (b) the Standard
Industrial, appearing in the same Exhibit "B", "sixth column on both pages (pages 12 and 13 of
the book); and (c) the 1941 Commissioner Standard Ordinary, or CSO 1941 for short, appearing
in Exhibit "B-1", third column, on both pages (pages 14 and 15 of the book).
6.
That the materiality and applicability [sic] of the life expectancy tables shown in Exhibit A or
Exhibits "C", "C-1", "C-2" and "C-3" are left to the judgment of the Honorable Court. (pp. 39-42,
Record on Appeal; p. 117, Rollo.)
On March 19, 1970, a third joint partial stipulation of facts was submitted by the parties to the trial court which
reads, thus:
JOINT FIRST PARTIAL STIPULATION OF FACTS
Plaintiff and defendant through their respective counsel, respectfully submit the following partial
stipulation of facts:
1. Defendant in November, 1960 and even before was authorized and rated to repair aircrafts of
U.S. and foreign registries and as such holds the following:
Description Exhibit
a) US FAA Air Agency 1
Certificate

b) US FAA Repair Station

Operations Specifications
(2 pages) PI- 2 and 2-A
c) CAA Rating Grant to operate
Repair Station with ratings on
[sic] (i) Aircraft Metal
propeller Hubs Overhaul Shop,
(ii) Aircraft Engine Overhaul Shop. 3
d) PI.-CAA Rating Grant to operate
a repair station with ratings on
(i) Aircraft of Composite Construction;
(ii) Aircraft of all Metal Construction;
(iii) Aircraft Instrument. 4
2. Defendant maintained and repaired aircrafts of the U.S. Air Force, U.S. Navy
and commercial carriers like PANAM Northwest Airways, KLM and other foreign
airlines.
3. Also in 1960 defendant was maintaining and following a CAA approved system
of aircraft maintenance control using worksheets and work card which record the
specific job on any particular aircraft. They are:
a) Preflight inspections consisting of the
(i) Through Check: the visual inspection of an aircraft prior to
flight and performed in stations where maintenance men are
assigned.
(ii) Terminating Check: the visual inspection of the aircraft
performed in stations were aircraft terminated a flight and where
maintenance men are assigned.
(iii) After Maintenance Check: the visual inspection of an
aircraft preparatory to any flight following the completion of any
check from Check No. 1 to Cheek No. 6, to wit:
(a) Check No. 1 known as daily inspection
check;
(b) Check No. 2 which is accomplished every
125 hours;
(c) Check No. 3 which is accomplished every
250 flying hours;

(d) Check No. 4 which is accomplished every

500 flying hours;
(e) Check No. 5 which is accomplished every
1,250 flying hours;
(f) Check No. 6 which is a series broken down
into 6- A, 6-B, 6-C, 6-D, 6-E and 6-F;
4. The Quality Control Division is the custodian of all worksheets for the checks
performed and under PI-CAA regulations, is required to keep the records for at
least 90 days.
5. The forms used and accomplished for the various checks were:
Description Exhibit
a) Preflight check sheet,
including DC-3C Daily
Airplane and Engine
Routine and Cleaning Routine; 5,6 & 6-A
b) Check No. 2, consisting of
37 work control cards; 7-A to 7-KK
c) Check No. 3 consisting of
49 work control cards; 8, 8-A to 8-XX
d) Check No. 4 consisting of
a work control card; 9, 9-A to 9-F
e) Check No. 5 consisting of 00, 10-A to
9 work control cards; 10-H
f) Check No. 6-A consisting of 11, 11-A to
112 work control cards; 11-(G)
g) Check No. 6-B consisting of 12, 12-A to
114 work control cards; 12-(J)
h) Check No. 6-C consisting of 13, 13-A to
117 work control cards 13-(I)
i) Check No. 6-D consisting of 14,14-A to
110 work control cards; 14-(E)

j) Check No. 6-E consisting of 15,15-A to

120 work control cards; 15-(E)
k) Check No. 6-F consisting of 16,16-A to
118 work control cards 16-(M)
The parties reserve their right to agree to additional stipulation of facts and/or to adduce evidence
on other matters not covered by this stipulation.
All exhibits mentioned and identified are attached to this stipulation. (pp. 42-46, Record on
Appeal; p. 117, Rollo.)
During the hearing on September 4, 1972, the parties stipulated that they were reproducing the testimonial and
documentary evidence presented in Civil Cases Nos. 5728 and 2790 of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, arising
out of the same accident. Certified copy of said transcript of stenographic notes were then submitted to the trial
court.
A fourth partial stipulation of facts was submitted by the parties, reading as follows:
PARTIAL STIPULATION OF FACTS
Plaintiff and defendant respectfully submit the following partial stipulation of facts:
1. For the convenience and brevity of these proceedings, considering that defendant's evidence
on the basic issues of fortuitous event and extraordinary diligence of the carrier consists of the
witnesses and documents presented in Civil Case No. 5720 of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo
entitled "Pedro R. Davila vs. Preciosa C. Tirol," now pending appeal before the Supreme Court in
G.R. No. L-28512, defendant has proposed to reproduce in this case the testimonies of same
witnesses and documentary evidence Identified and marked in the course of the same
proceedings, as reflected in the corresponding transcript of stenographic notes, to wit:
Transcript of
Witnesses Stenographic Notes At Pages Exhibit
a Mario Rodriguez October 30, 1962 1 - 67 37
October 31, 1962 67 - 153 38
January 7, 1963 17 - 74 39
October 14, 1963 6 - 11 40
b. Pedro N. Mallari March 19, 1963 17 - 39)
c. Arturo Camatoy March 19, 1963 39 - 75) 41
d. Ponciano Saldaa March 19, 1963 75 - 88)
e. Melecio Joson March 20, 1963 91 - 161) 42
f. Alfredo Subesa March 20, 1963 162 - 166)
g. Eduardo Estrella October 14, 1963 11 - 27)

h. Vicente Sison October 14, 1963 27 - 74)

i. Felipe Paculaba October 15, 1963 4 - 15
j. Antonio Lopez October 15, 1963 15 - 25) 43
k. Isaac Lamela October 15, 1963 26 - 55)
l. Ramon Pedrosa December 19, 1963 6 - 83 44
m. Cesar Mijares December 20, 1963 15 - 89 45
n. Jaime Manzano February 6, 1964 3 - 15) 46
o. Offer of documentary evidence February 6, 1964 18 - 76)
2. The transcript of stenographic notes are attached hereto and marked as above
set forth.
3. If aforenamed witnesses were called to testify in this case, they would give the
same testimony as shown in the afore-mentioned transcript of stenographic
notes on direct examination, cross-examination and re-direct examination, as the
case may be plaintiffs counsel hereby adopting the manifestations, objections,
cross and recross examination by the plaintiff's counsels in Davila vs.
PAL, supra and so far as the joint hearings held on December 20, 1963 and
February 6, 1964, also of plaintiff's counsels in Abeto, et al. vs. PAL, Civil Case
No. 5790, also of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo.
4. All the documentary evidence marked in the course of the hearings shown in
the transcripts of stenographic notes attached hereto have already been marked
correspondingly before the Commissioner of this Honorable Court on a hearing
held on May 24, 1968 with the same exhibit identification.
5. Defendant reserves its right to present evidence on the question of damages.
6. Plaintiff reserves her right to present such further evidence as she may deem
proper in rebuttal. (pp. 47-50, Record on Appeal; p. 117, Rollo.)
In addition to the stipulations of facts, private respondent Padilla testified that her son, Nicanor Padilla, prior to his
death, was 29 years old, single, in good health, President and General Manager of Padilla Shipping Company at
Iloilo City, and a legal assistant of the Padilla Law Office; that upon learning of the death of her son in the plane
crash, she suffered shock and mental anguish, because her son who was still single was living with her; and that
Nicanor had a life insurance of P20,000, the proceeds of which were paid to his sister.
Eduardo Mate, manager of the Allied Overseas Trading Company, testified that the deceased, Nicanor Padilla,
was one of the incorporators of the company and also its vice-president and treasurer, receiving a monthly salary
of P455.
Isaac M. Reyes, auditor of the Padilla Shipping Company, declared that the deceased was the President and
General of the firm and received a salary of P1,500 monthly.
The trial court in its decision stated that on March 19, 1970, it was manifested in court that "the parties agreed that
they will abide with whatever decision the Supreme Court may have in similar cases involving the same airplane
crash accident then pending before other courts pending decision in Supreme Court" (p. 51, Rec. on Appeal; p.
117, Rollo)

On August 31, 1973, the trial court promulgated a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendant Philippine Air Lines, Inc. to
pay the plaintiff Natividad A. Vda. de Padilla the sum of P477,000.00 as award for the expected
income of the deceased Nicanor; P10,000.00 as moral damages; P10,000.00 as attorney's fees;
and to pay the costs. (pp. 59-60, Record on Appeal; p. 117, Rollo.)
On Appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 56079-R) dated July 17, 1980, the decision of the trial court was
affirmed in toto.
As pointed out at the outset, the lone issue is whether or not the respondent court erred in computing the awarded
indemnity on the basis of the life expectancy of the late Nicanor A. Padilla rather than on the life expectancy of
private respondent, and thus erred in awarding what appears to the petitioner as the excessive sum of P477,000
as indemnity for loss of earnings.
Petitioner relies on "the principle of law generally recognized and applied by the courts in the United States" that
"the controlling element in determining loss of earnings arising from death is, as established by authorities, the life
expectancy of the deceased or of the beneficiary, whichever is shorter (p. 19, Brief for the Defendant-Appellant; p.
119, Rollo).
However, resort to foreign jurisprudence would be proper only if no law or jurisprudence is available locally to
settle a controversy. Even in the absence of local statute and case law, foreign jurisprudence is only persuasive.
For the settlement of the issue at hand, there are enough applicable local laws and jurisprudence. Under Article
1764 and Article 2206(1) of the Civil Code, the award of damages for death is computed on the basis of the life
expectancy of the deceased, not of his beneficiary. The articles provide:
Art. 1764. Damages in cases comprised in this Section shall be awarded in accordance with Title
XVIII of this Book, concerning Damages. Article 2206 shall also apply to the death of a passenger
caused by the breach of contract by a common carrier.
Art. 2206. The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi- delict shall be at least
three thousand pesos, even though there may have been mitigating circumstances. In addition:
(1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the
deceased, and the indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the latter; such
indemnity shall in every case be assessed and awarded by the court, unless the
deceased on account of permanent physical disability not caused by the
defendant, had no earning capacity at the time of his death; . . . (Emphasis
supplied.)
In the case of Davila vs. PAL, 49 SCRA 497 which involved the same tragic plane crash, this Court determined
not only PALs liability for negligence or breach of contract, but also the manner of computing the damages due
the plaintiff therein which it based on the life expectancy of the deceased, Pedro Davila, Jr. This Court held thus:
The deceased, Pedro Davila, Jr., was single and 30 years of age when he died. At that age one's
normal life expectancy is 33-1/3 years, according to the formula (2/3 x [80-30]) adopted by this
Court in the case of Villa Rey Transit, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals on the basis of the American
Expectancy Table of Mortality or the Actuarial of Combined Experience Table of Mortality.
However, although the deceased was in relatively good health, his medical history shows that he
had complained of and been treated for such ailments as backaches, chest pains and occasional
feelings of tiredness. It is reasonable to make an allowance for these circumstances and
consider, for purposes of this case, a reduction of his life expectancy to 25 years.
xxx xxx xxx
Considering the fact that the deceased was getting his income from three (3) different sources,
namely, from managing a radio station, from law practice and from farming, the expenses
incidental to the generation of such income were necessarily more than if he had only one

source. Together with his living expenses, a deduction of P600.00 a month, or P7,200.00 a year,
seems to Us reasonable, leaving a net yearly income of P7,800.00. This amount, multiplied by 25
years, or P195,000.00 is the amount which should be awarded to the plaintiffs in this particular
respect. (pp. 504-505, Rollo.)
The petitioner's recourse to our decision in Alcantara vs. Surro, 93 Phil. 472, undermines instead of supporting its
stand here, for the indemnity in that case was also based on the life expectancy of the deceased and not of his
beneficiaries.
The petitioner's contention that actual damages under Article 2206 of the Civil Code must be proven by clear and
satisfactory evidence is correct, but its perception that such evidence was not presented in this case, is error.
The witnesses Mate and Reyes, who were respectively the manager and auditor of Allied Overseas Trading
Company and Padilla Shipping Company, were competent to testify on matters within their personal knowledge
because of their positions, such as the income and salary of the deceased, Nicanor A. Padilla (Sec. 30, Rule 130,
Rules of Court). As observed by the Court of Appeals, since they were cross-examined by petitioner's counsel,
any objections to their competence and the admissibility of their testimonies, were deemed waived. The payrolls
of the companies and the decedent's income tax returns could, it is true, have constituted the best evidence of his
salaries, but there is no rule disqualifying competent officers of the corporation from testifying on the
compensation of the deceased as an officer of the same corporation, and in any event, no timely objection was
made to their testimonies.
Following the procedure used by the Supreme Court in the case of Davila vs. PAL, 49 SCRA 497, the trial court
determined the victims gross annual income to be P23,100 based on his yearly salaries of P18,000 from the
Padilla Shipping Company and P5,100 from the Allied Overseas Trading Corporation. Considering that he was
single, the court deducted P9,200 as yearly living expenses, resulting in a net income of P13,900 (not P15,900 as
erroneously stated in the decision). Since Nicanor Padilla was only 29 years old and in good health, the trial court
allowed him a life expectancy of 30 years. Multiplying his annual net income of P13,900 by his life expectancy of
30 years, the product is P417,000 (not P477,000) which is the amount of death indemnity due his mother and only
forced heir (p. 58, Record on Appeal; p. 117, Rollo).
While as a general rule, an appellee who has not appealed is not entitled to affirmative relief other than the ones
granted in the decision of the court below (Aparri vs. CA, 13 SCRA 611; Dy vs. Kuizon, 113 Phil. 592; Borromeo
vs. Zaballero, 109 Phil. 332), we nevertheless find merit in the private respondent's plea for relief for the long
delay this case has suffered on account of the petitioner's multiple appeals. Indeed, because of the 16 year delay
in the disposition of this case, the private respondent herself has already joined her son in the Great Beyond
without being able to receive the indemnity she well deserved. Considering how inflation has depleted the value of
the judgment in her favor, in the interest of justice, the petitioner should pay legal rate of interest on the indemnity
due her. The failure of the trial court to award such interest amounts to a "plain error" which we may rectify on
appeal although it was not specified in the appellee's brief (Sec. 7, Rule 51, Rules of Court).
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed. The decision of the trial court is affirmed with modification. The petitioner
is ordered to pay the private respondent or her heirs death indemnity in the sum of P417,000 (not P477,000), with
legal rate of interest of 6% per annum from the date of the judgment on August 31, 1973, until it is fully paid.
Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC. vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEDRO ZAPATOS

G.R. No. L-82619 September 15, 1993
This petition for review in certiorari seeks to annul and set aside the decision of the then Intermediate Appellant
Court, 1 now Court of Appeals, dated 28 February 1985, in AC-G.R. CV No. 69327 ("Pedro Zapatos v. Philippine
Airlines, Inc.") affirming the decision of the then Court of first Instance, now Regional Trial Court, declaring
Philippine Airlines, Inc., liable in damages for breach of contract.
On 25 November 1976, private respondent filed a complaint for damages for breach of contract of
carriage 2against Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL), before the then Court of First Instance, now Regional Trial Court,
of Misamis Occidental, at Ozamiz City. According to him, on 2 August 1976, he was among the twenty-one (21)
passengers of PAL Flight 477 that took off from Cebu bound for Ozamiz City. The routing of this flight was CebuOzamiz-Cotabato. While on flight and just about fifteen (15) minutes before landing at Ozamiz City, the pilot
received a radio message that the airport was closed due to heavy rains and inclement weather and that he
should proceed to Cotabato City instead.
Upon arrival at Cotabato City, the PAL Station Agent informed the passengers of their options to return to Cebu
on flight 560 of the same day and thence to Ozamiz City on 4 August 1975, or take the next flight to Cebu the
following day, or remain at Cotabato and take the next available flight to Ozamiz City on 5 August 1975. 3 The
Station Agent likewise informed them that Flight 560 bound for Manila would make a stop-over at Cebu to bring
some of the diverted passengers; that there were only six (6) seats available as there were already confirmed
passengers for Manila; and, that the basis for priority would be the check-in sequence at Cebu.
Private respondent chose to return to Cebu but was not accommodated because he checked-in as passenger No.
9 on Flight 477. He insisted on being given priority over the confirmed passengers in the accommodation, but the
Station Agent refused private respondent's demand explaining that the latter's predicament was not due to PAL's
own doing but to be a force majeure. 4
Private respondent tried to stop the departure of Flight 560 as his personal belongings, including a package
containing a camera which a certain Miwa from Japan asked him to deliver to Mrs. Fe Obid of Gingoog City, were
still on board. His plea fell on deaf ears. PAL then issued to private respondent a free ticket to Iligan city, which
the latter received under protest. 5 Private respondent was left at the airport and could not even hitch a ride in the
Ford Fiera loaded with PAL personnel. 6 PAL neither provided private respondent with transportation from the
airport to the city proper nor food and accommodation for his stay in Cotabato City.
The following day, private respondent purchased a PAL ticket to Iligan City. He informed PAL personnel that he
would not use the free ticket because he was filing a case against PAL. 7 In Iligan City, private respondent hired a
car from the airport to Kolambugan, Lanao del Norte, reaching Ozamiz City by crossing the bay in a launch. 8 His
personal effects including the camera, which were valued at P2,000.00 were no longer recovered.
On 13 January 1977, PAL filed its answer denying that it unjustifiably refused to accommodate private
respondent. 9 It alleged that there was simply no more seat for private respondent on Flight 560 since there were
only six (6) seats available and the priority of accommodation on Flight 560 was based on the check-in sequence
in Cebu; that the first six (6) priority passengers on Flight 477 chose to take Flight 560; that its Station Agent
explained in a courteous and polite manner to all passengers the reason for PAL's inability to transport all of them
back to Cebu; that the stranded passengers agreed to avail of the options and had their respective tickets
exchanged for their onward trips; that it was
only the private respondent who insisted on being given priority in the accommodation; that pieces of checked-in
baggage and had carried items of the Ozamiz City passengers were removed from the aircraft; that the reason for
their pilot's inability to land at Ozamis City airport was because the runway was wet due to rains thus posing a
threat to the safety of both passengers and aircraft; and, that such reason of force majeure was a valid
justification for the pilot to bypass Ozamiz City and proceed directly to Cotabato City.
On 4 June 1981, the trial court rendered its decision 10 the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant
Philippine AirLines, Inc. ordering the latter to pay:

(1) As actual damages, the sum of Two Hundred Pesos (P200.00) representing plaintiff's
expenses for transportation, food and accommodation during his stranded stay at Cotabato City;
the sum of Forty-Eight Pesos (P48.00) representing his flight fare from Cotabato City to Iligan
city; the sum of Five Hundred Pesos (P500.00) representing plaintiff's transportation expenses
from Iligan City to Ozamiz City; and the sum of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) as loss of
business opportunities during his stranded stay in Cotabato City;
(2) As moral damages, the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) for plaintiff's hurt feelings,
serious anxiety, mental anguish and unkind and discourteous treatment perpetrated by
defendant's employees during his stay as stranded passenger in Cotabato City;
(3) As exemplary damages, the sum of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) to set a precedent to
the defendant airline that it shall provide means to give comfort and convenience to stranded
passengers;
(4) The sum of Three Thousand Pesos (P3,000.00) as attorney's fees;
(5) To pay the costs of this suit.
PAL appealed to the Court of Appeals which on 28 February 1985, finding no reversible error, affirmed the
judgment of the court a quo. 11
PAL then sought recourse to this Court by way of a petition for review on certiorari 12 upon the following issues:
(1) Can the Court of Appeals render a decision finding petitioner (then defendant-appellant in the court below)
negligent and, consequently, liable for damages on a question of substance which was neither raised on a
question nor proved at the trial? (2) Can the Court of Appeals award actual and moral damages contrary to the
evidence and established jurisprudence? 13
An assiduous examination of the records yields no valid reason for reversal of the judgment on appeal; only a
modification of its disposition.
In its petition, PAL vigorously maintains that private respondent's principal cause of action was its alleged denial
of private respondent's demand for priority over the confirmed passengers on Flight 560. Likewise, PAL points out
that the complaint did not impute to PAL neglect in failing to attend to the needs of the diverted passengers; and,
that the question of negligence was not and never put in issue by the pleadings or proved at the trial.
Contrary to the above arguments, private respondent's amended complaint touched on PAL's indifference and
inattention to his predicament. The pertinent portion of the amended complaint 14 reads:
10. That by virtue of the refusal of the defendant through its agent in Cotabato to accommodate
(sic) and allow the plaintiff to take and board the plane back to Cebu, and by accomodating
(sic) and allowing passengers from Cotabato for Cebu in his stead and place, thus forcing the
plaintiff against his will, to be left and stranded in Cotabato, exposed to the peril and danger of
muslim rebels plundering at the time, the plaintiff, as a consequence, (have) suffered mental
anguish, mental torture, social humiliation, bismirched reputation and wounded feeling, all
amounting to a conservative amount of thirty thousand (P30,000.00) Pesos.
To substantiate this aspect of apathy, private respondent testified

15

A I did not even notice that I was I think the last passenger or the last person out
of the PAL employees and army personnel that were left there. I did not notice
that when I was already outside of the building after our conversation.
Q What did you do next?
A I banished (sic) because it seems that there was a war not far from the airport.
The sound of guns and the soldiers were plenty.
Q After that what did you do?

A I tried to look for a transportation that could bring me down to the City of
Cotabato.
Q Were you able to go there?
A I was at about 7:00 o'clock in the evening more or less and it was a private
jeep that I boarded. I was even questioned why I and who am (sic) I then. Then I
explained my side that I am (sic) stranded passenger. Then they brought me
downtown at Cotabato.
Q During your conversation with the Manager were you not offered any vehicle or
transportation to Cotabato airport downtown?
A In fact I told him (Manager) now I am by-passed passenger here which is not
my destination what can you offer me. Then they answered, "it is not my fault. Let
us forget that."
Q In other words when the Manager told you that offer was there a vehicle
ready?
A Not yet. Not long after that the Ford Fiera loaded with PAL personnel was
passing by going to the City of Cotabato and I stopped it to take me a ride
because there was no more available transportation but I was not
accommodated.
Significantly, PAL did not seem to mind the introduction of evidence which focused on its alleged negligence in
caring for its stranded passengers. Well-settled is the rule in evidence that the protest or objection against the
admission of evidence should be presented at the time the evidence is offered, and that the proper time to make
protest or objection to the admissibility of evidence is when the question is presented to the witness or at the time
the answer thereto is given. 16 There being no objection, such evidence becomes property of the case and all the
parties are amenable to any favorable or unfavorable effects resulting from the evidence. 17
PAL instead attempted to rebut the aforequoted testimony. In the process, it failed to substantiate its counter
allegation for want of concrete proof 18
Atty. Rubin O. Rivera PAL's counsel:
Q You said PAL refused to help you when you were in Cotabato, is that right?
Private respondent:
A Yes.
Q Did you ask them to help you regarding any offer of transportation or of any
other matter asked of them?
A Yes, he (PAL PERSONNEL) said what is? It is not our fault.
Q Are you not aware that one fellow passenger even claimed that he was given
Hotel accommodation because they have no money?
xxx xxx xxx
A No, sir, that was never offered to me. I said, I tried to stop them but they were
already riding that PAL pick-up jeep, and I was not accommodated.
Having joined in the issue over the alleged lack of care it exhibited towards its passengers, PAL cannot now turn
around and feign surprise at the outcome of the case. When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by

express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the
pleadings. 19
With regard to the award of damages affirmed by the appellate court, PAL argues that the same is unfounded. It
asserts that it should not be charged with the task of looking after the passengers' comfort and convenience
because the diversion of the flight was due to a fortuitous event, and that if made liable, an added burden is given
to PAL which is over and beyond its duties under the contract of carriage. It submits that granting arguendo that
negligence exists, PAL cannot be liable in damages in the absence of fraud or bad faith; that private respondent
failed to apprise PAL of the nature of his trip and possible business losses; and, that private respondent himself is
to be blamed for unreasonably refusing to use the free ticket which PAL issued.
The contract of air carriage is a peculiar one. Being imbued with public interest, the law requires common carriers
to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very
cautious persons, with due regard for all the circumstances. 20 In Air France v. Carrascoso, 21 we held that
A contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind and degree from any other contractual
relation. And this, because of the relation which an air carrier sustains with the public. Its
business is mainly with the travelling public. It invites people to avail of the comforts and
advantages it offers. The contract of air carriage, therefore, generates a relation attended with a
public duty . . . . ( emphasis supplied).
The position taken by PAL in this case clearly illustrates its failure to grasp the exacting standard required by law.
Undisputably, PAL's diversion of its flight due to inclement weather was a fortuitous event. Nonetheless, such
occurrence did not terminate PAL's contract with its passengers. Being in the business of air carriage and the sole
one to operate in the country, PAL is deemed equipped to deal with situations as in the case at bar. What we said
in one case once again must be stressed, i.e., the relation of carrier and passenger continues until the latter has
been landed at the port of destination and has left the carrier's premises. 22 Hence, PAL necessarily would still
have to exercise extraordinary diligence in safeguarding the comfort, convenience and safety of its stranded
passengers until they have reached their final destination. On this score, PAL grossly failed considering the then
ongoing battle between government forces and Muslim rebels in Cotabato City and the fact that the private
respondent was a stranger to the place. As the appellate court correctly ruled
While the failure of plaintiff in the first instance to reach his destination at Ozamis City in
accordance with the contract of carriage was due to the closure of the airport on account of rain
and inclement weather which was radioed to defendant 15 minutes before landing, it has not
been disputed by defendant airline that Ozamis City has no all-weather airport and has to cancel
its flight to Ozamis City or by-pass it in the event of inclement weather. Knowing this fact, it
becomes the duty of defendant to provide all means of comfort and convenience to its
passengers when they would have to be left in a strange place in case of such by-passing. The
steps taken by defendant airline company towards this end has not been put in evidence,
especially for those 7 others who were not accommodated in the return trip to Cebu, only 6 of the
21 having been so accommodated. It appears that plaintiff had to leave on the next flight 2 days
later. If the cause of non-fulfillment of the contract is due to a fortuitous event, it has to be the sole
and only cause (Art. 1755 CC., Art. 1733 C.C.) Since part of the failure to comply with the
obligation of common carrier to deliver its passengers safely to their destination lay in the
defendant's failure to provide comfort and convenience to its stranded passengers using extraordinary diligence, the cause of non-fulfillment is not solely and exclusively due to fortuitous
event, but due to something which defendant airline could have prevented, defendant becomes
liable to plaintiff. 23
While we find PAL remiss in its duty of extending utmost care to private respondent while being stranded in
Cotabato City, there is no sufficient basis to conclude that PAL failed to inform him about his non-accommodation
on Flight 560, or that it was inattentive to his queries relative thereto.
On 3 August 1975, the Station Agent reported to his Branch Manager in Cotabato City that
3. Of the fifteen stranded passengers two pax elected to take F478 on August 05, three pax opted
to take F442 August 03. The remaining ten (10) including subject requested that they be instead
accommodated (sic) on F446 CBO-IGN the following day where they intended to take the surface
transportation to OZC. Mr. Pedro Zapatos had by then been very vocal and boiceterous (sic) at

the counter and we tactfully managed to steer him inside the Station Agent's office. Mr. Pedro
Zapatos then adamantly insisted that all the diverted passengers should have been given priority
over the originating passengers of F560 whether confirmed or otherwise. We explained our
policies and after awhile he seemed pacified and thereafter took his ticket (in-lieued (sic) to CBOIGN, COCON basis), at the counter in the presence of five other passengers who were waiting for
their tickets too. The rest of the diverted pax had left earlier after being assured their tickets will
be ready the following day. 24
Aforesaid Report being an entry in the course of business is prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.
Private respondent, apart from his testimony, did not offer any controverting evidence. If indeed PAL omitted to
give information about the options available to its diverted passengers, it would have been deluged with
complaints. But, only private respondent complained
Atty. Rivera (for PAL)
Q I understand from you Mr. Zapatos that at the time you were waiting at
Cotabato Airport for the decision of PAL, you were not informed of the decision
until after the airplane left is that correct?
A Yes.
COURT:
Q What do you mean by "yes"? You meant you were not informed?
A Yes, I was not informed of their decision, that they will only accommodate few
passengers.
Q Aside from you there were many other stranded passengers?
A I believed, yes.
Q And you want us to believe that PAL did not explain (to) any of these
passengers about the decision regarding those who will board the aircraft back to
Cebu?
A No, Sir.
Q Despite these facts Mr. Zapatos did any of the other passengers complained
(sic) regarding that incident?
xxx xxx xxx
A There were plenty of argument and I was one of those talking about my case.
Q Did you hear anybody complained (sic) that he has not been informed of the
decision before the plane left for Cebu?
A No. 25
Admittedly, private respondent's insistence on being given priority in accommodation was unreasonable
considering the fortuitous event and that there was a sequence to be observed in the booking, i.e., in the order
the passengers checked-in at their port of origin. His intransigence in fact was the main cause for his having to
stay at the airport longer than was necessary.
Atty. Rivera:

Q And, you were saying that despite the fact that according to your testimony
there were at least 16 passengers who were stranded there in Cotabato airport
according to your testimony, and later you said that there were no other people
left there at that time, is that correct?
A Yes, I did not see anyone there around. I think I was the only civilian who was
left there.
Q Why is it that it took you long time to leave that place?
A Because I was arguing with the PAL personnel. 26
Anent the plaint that PAL employees were disrespectful and inattentive toward private respondent, the records
are bereft of evidence to support the same. Thus, the ruling of respondent Court of Appeals in this regard is
without basis. 27 On the contrary, private respondent was attended to not only by the personnel of PAL but also by
its Manager." 28
In the light of these findings, we find the award of moral damages of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00)
unreasonably excessive; hence, we reduce the same to Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00). Conformably
herewith, the award of exemplary damages is also reduced to five Thousand Pesos (5,000.00). Moral damages
are not intended to enrich the private respondent. They are awarded only to enable the injured party to obtain
means, diversion or amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he has undergone by reason of
the defendant's culpable action. 29
With regard to the award of actual damages in the amount of P5,000.00 representing private respondent's alleged
business losses occasioned by his stay at Cotabato City, we find the same unwarranted. Private respondent's
testimony that he had a scheduled business "transaction of shark liver oil supposedly to have been consummated
on August 3, 1975 in the morning" and that "since (private respondent) was out for nearly two weeks I missed to
buy about 10 barrels of shark liver oil," 30 are purely speculative. Actual or compensatory damages cannot be
presumed but must be duly proved with reasonable degree of certainty. A court cannot rely on speculation,
conjecture or guesswork as to the fact and amount of damages, but must depend upon competent proof that they
have suffered and on evidence of the actual amount thereof. 31
WHEREFORE the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with modification however that the award of moral
damages of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) is reduced to Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) while the
exemplary damages of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) is also reduced to Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00).
The award of actual damages in the amount Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) representing business losses
occasioned by private respondent's being stranded in Cotabato City is deleted.
SO ORDERED.

RAFAEL ZULUETA, ET AL. vs. PAN AMERICAN WORLD AIRWAYS, INC.,

G.R. No. L-28589, February 29, 1972, EN BANC
Appeal, taken by defendant Pan American World Airways, Inc., from a decision of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, sentencing said defendant to pay herein plaintiffs Rafael Zulueta, Telly Albert Zulueta and Carolinda
Zulueta "the sum of P5,502.85, as actual damages; plus the further sum of P1,000,000.00 as moral damages;
the further sum of P400,000.00 as exemplary damages; and attorney's fees in the sum of P100,000.00" with the
costs against said defendant, hereinafter referred to as PANAM for the sake of brevity.
It is not disputed that, on October 23, 1964, the spouse Rafael Zulueta and Telly Albert Zulueta hereinafter
referred to as plaintiff and Mrs. Zulueta, respectively as well as their daughter, Carolinda Zulueta hereinafter
referred to as Miss Zulueta were passengers aboard a PANAM plane, on Flight No. 841-23, from Honolulu to
Manila, the first leg of which was Wake Island. As the plane landed on said Island, the passengers were advised
that they could disembark for a stopover of about 30 minutes. Shortly before reaching that place, the flight was,
according to the plaintiffs, "very rough." Testifying for PANAM its purser, Miss Schmitz, asserted, however, that it
was "very calm"; but her notes, Exhibit 7 prepared upon the request of Captain Zentner, on account of the
incident involved in this case state that there was "unusually small amount of roughness," which His Honor, the
Trial Judge, considered properly as "an admission that there was roughness, only the degree thereof is in
dispute." In any event, plaintiff testified that, having found the need to relieve himself, he went to the men's
comfort room at the terminal building, but found it full of soldiers, in view of which he walked down the beach
some 100 yards away.
Meanwhile, the flight was called and when the passengers had boarded the plane, plaintiff's absence was noticed.
The take-off was, accordingly, delayed and a search for him was conducted by Mrs. Zulueta, Miss Zulueta and
other persons. Minutes later, plaintiff was seen walking back from the beach towards the terminal. Heading
towards the ramp of the plane, plaintiff remarked, "You people almost made me miss your flight. You have a
defective announcing system and I was not paged." At this point, the decision appealed from has the following to
say:
(1) Plaintiffs were on their way to the plane in order to board it, but defendant's employees
Kenneth Sitton, defendants airport manager, according to plaintiffs; Wayne Pendleton,
defendant's airport customer service supervisor, according to defendant stopped them at the
gate. This is what the report of Wayne Pendleton the airport customer service supervisor, says:
...I made no comment to the passenger but turned and led the group toward the ramp. Just as we
reached the boarding gate, Mr. Zulueta spoke to me for the first time saying, `You people almost
made me miss your flight. You have a defective announcing system and I was not paged."
I was about to make some reply when I noticed the captain of the flight standing on the ramp,
midway between the gate and the aircraft, and talking with the senior maintenance supervisor
and several other persons. The captain motioned for me to join him which I did, indicating to the
Zulueta family that they should wait for a moment at the gate.
-- Exh. 5 .
(2) Thereafter, one of defendant's employees Mr. Sitton, according to plaintiffs; Mr. Pendleton
according to defendants asked plaintiffs to turn over their baggage claim checks. Plaintiffs did
so, handing him four (4) claim checks.
(3) However, only three (3) bags were located and segregated from the rest of the passenger's
luggage. The items hand-carried by plaintiffs, except for plaintiff's overcoat, were also brought
down. These hand-carried items, however, were not opened or inspected; later, plaintiffs Mrs.
Zulueta and Miss Zulueta were permitted to reboard the plane with their hand-carried luggage;
and when the plane took off, about two and a half hours later, it carried plaintiff's fourth bag, his
overcoat and the hand-carried luggage.
(4) Once three bags had been identified, and while the search was going on for the fourth bag,
Mr. Sitton, defendant's airport manager, demanded that plaintiffs open the bags (actually, they
were closed, but not locked) and allow defendant's employees to inspect them. Plaintiff Rafael

Zulueta refused and warned that defendant could open the bags only by force and at its peril of a
law suit.
(5) Mr. Sitton, defendant's manager, then told plaintiff that he would not be allowed to proceed to
Manila on board the plane and handed Zulueta the following letters:
"'24 October 1964
Wake Island
"Mr. Zulueta:
Passenger aboard flight 84123
Honolulu/Manila .
Sir:
We are forced to off-load you from flight 84123 due to the fact that you have
refused to open your checked baggage for Inspection as requested.
During your stay on Wake Island, which will be for a minimum of one week, you
will be charged $13.30 per day for each member of your party.
K. Sitton
Airport Manager, Wake Island
Pan American World Airways, Inc."
Exh. D
(6) All this happened in plain view and within earshot of the other passengers on the plane, many
of whom were Filipinos who knew plaintiffs;
The departure of the plane was delayed for about two hours
(7) Though originally all three plaintiffs had been off loaded, plaintiff requested that his wife and
daughter be permitted to continue with the flight. This was allowed but they were required to
leave the three bags behind. Nevertheless, the plane did fly with the Plaintiff's fourth bag; it was
found among all other passengers' luggage flown to Manila upon the plane's arrival here.
(8) Upon arrival at Manila, Mrs. Zulueta demanded of defendant's Manila office that it re-route
plaintiff Rafael Zulueta to Manila at the earliest possible time, by the fastest route, and at its
expense; defendant refused; so plaintiffs were forced to pay for his ticket and to send him money
as he was without funds.
(9) On October 27, 1964, plaintiff Zulueta finally arrived at Manila, after spending two nights at
Wake, going back to Honolulu, and from Honolulu flying thru Tokyo to Manila.
(10) On December 21, 1964, plaintiffs demanded that defendant reimburse them in the sum of
P1,505,502.85 for damages but defendants refused to do so; hence this action.
In its brief, PANAM maintains that the trial court erred: (1) "in not granting defendant additional hearing dates (not
a postponement) for the presentation of its other witnesses"; (2) "in assuming it to be true that the reason plaintiff
Rafael Zulueta did not come aboard when the passengers were reboarded was that he had gone to the beach to
relieve himself"; (3) "in not holding that the real reason why plaintiff Rafael Zulueta did not reboard the plane,
when the announcement to do so was made, was that he had a quarrel with his wife and after he was found at the
beach and his intention to be left behind at Wake was temporarily thwarted he did everything calculated to compel
Pan American personnel to leave him behind"; (4) "in accepting as true plaintiff Rafael Zulueta's claim of what
occurred when; he arrived at the terminal after he was found at the beach"; (5) "in not holding that the captain was
entitled to an explanation for Zulueta's failure to reboard and not having received a reasonable explanation and
because of Zulueta's irrational behavior and refusal to have his bags examined, the captain had the right and duty
to leave Zulueta behind"; (6) "in condemning the defendant to pay plaintiffs P5,502.85 as actual damages plus the

further sum of P1,000,000.00 as moral damages, and the further sum of P400,000.00 as exemplary damages,
and attorneys' fees in the sum of P100,000.00"; and (7) "in not granting defendant's counterclaim of attorney's
fees and expenses of litigation." .
PANAM's first assignment of error refers to the denial of its motion, dated October 20, 1966, that it "be granted
other hearing dates about two months from today so as to be able to present defendant's other witnesses or their
depositions."
It appears that the complaint in this case was filed on September 30, 1965. It was amended on December 1,
1965, and again on April 14, 1966. PANAM answered the second amended complaint on May 6, 1966. After a
pre-trial conference, held on May 28, 1966, the case was set for hearing on June 1, 2 and 3, 1966. By subsequent
agreement of the parties, the hearing was, on June 3, 1966, reset for August 1, 2 and 3, 1966. Plaintiffs rested
their case on August 2, 1966, whereupon it was agreed that PANAM's witnesses would be presented "at a later
date," months later, because they would "come from far-flung places like Wake Island, San Francisco, Seattle and
it will take time to arrange for their coming here." Accordingly the case was reset for October 17, 18 and 19, 1966,
at 8:30 a.m. On motion of the plaintiffs, the trial scheduled for October 17 was cancelled, without any objection on
the part of PANAM but, to offset said action, additional hearings were set for October 18 and 19, in the afternoon,
apart from those originally set in the morning of these dates. Before the presentation of PANAM's evidence, in the
morning of October 18, 1966, plaintiffs' counsel asked for the names of the former's witnesses, so that those not
on the witness stand could be excluded from the courtroom. PANAM's counsel announced that his witnesses
were Marshall Stanley Ho, Kenneth Sitton, Michael Thomas, Wayne S. Pendleton, Capt. Robert Zentner and Miss
Carol Schmitz.
The defense then proceeded to introduce the testimony of said witnesses, and consumed therefor the morning
and afternoon of October 18 and the morning of October 19. Upon the conclusion, that morning, of the testimony
of the last witness for the defense, its counsel asked that it "be given an opportunity to present our other
witnesses who are not present today, at the convenience of the Court." The motion was denied, but, said counsel
sought a reconsideration and the court gave PANAM a last chance to present its "other witnesses" the next day,
October 20. Instead of doing so, PANAM filed a written motion reiterating its prayer for "other hearing dates about
two months from today so as to be able to present defendant's other witnesses or their depositions." Upon denial
of this motion, PANAM made an offer of the testimony it expected from one Edgardo Gavino, an unnamed
meteorologist, either Sue Welby and/or Helga Schley, and John C. Craig, Ida V. Pomeroy, Herman Jaffe, Gerry
Cowles and Col. Nilo de Guia.
His Honor, the Trial Judge, did not commit a reversible error in denying said motion of October 20, 1966. PANAM
knew, as early as August 2, 1966, that its turn to present evidence would take place, as agreed upon, about two
(2) months and a half later, or on October 17, 18 and 19, 1966. PANAM has not offered any valid excuse for its
failure to bring to court the witnesses mentioned in said motion, despite the assurance given by its counsel, on
August 2, 1966, that the defense would "spare no effort to bring them here," or, if they could not be brought due to
circumstances beyond PANAM's control, to "submit their deposition." The records do not show that any such
effort to bring the aforementioned witnesses had been exerted. The defense has not even tried to explain why the
deposition of said witnesses was not taken. What is worse, the proffered explanation that the six (6) persons
who testified for the defense 1 were believed, by defense counsel, to be enough for the three (3) days of October
set for the reception of his evidence 2 indicates that no effort whatsoever had been made either to bring the
"other witnesses" 3or to take and submit their depositions.
Besides, the testimony allegedly expected of said other witnesses for the defense namely: (1) that there was,
according to official records, no turbulence in the flight from San Francisco to Honolulu, on which the testimony of
Carol Schmitz had touched; (2) that Ida V. Pomeroy and John C. Craig would say that the passengers were
advised not to go beyond the terminal and that the stopover would be for about 30 minutes only, on which
duration of the stopover Miss Schmitz had, also testified, as she could have similarly testified on said advice, had
it been given; (3) that either Helga Schley or Sue Welby would narrate the sympathy with which Mrs. Zulueta was
allegedly treated during the flight from Wake Island to Manila, which is not particularly relevant or material in the
case at bar; (4) that Herman Jaffe, Gerry Cowles and Nilo de Guia were, also, expected to corroborate the
testimony of Capt. Zentner; and (5) that Edgardo Gavino was expected to corroborate Michael Thomas regarding
the remarks made by the plaintiff to Mrs. Zulueta and Miss Zulueta when they and other members of the
searching party found him in the early morning of October 23, 1964 -- were merely cumulative in nature
Then, again, PANAM did not comply with section 4 of Rule 22 of the Rules of Court, reading:

SEC. 4. Requisites of motion to postpone trial for absence of evidence. A motion to postpone a
trial on the ground of absence can be granted only upon affidavit showing the materiality of
evidence expected to be obtained, and that due diligence has been used to procure it. But if the
adverse party admits the facts to be given in evidence, even if he objects or reserves the right to
object to their admissibility, the trial must not be postponed." .
Although this provision refers to motions "to postpone trial," it applies with equal force to motions like the one
under consideration, there being no plausible reason to distinguish between the same and a motion for
postponement owing to the "absence of evidence."
The second, third and fourth assignments of error are interrelated. They refer to the question whether the reason
why plaintiff went to the beach was to relieve himself, as testified to by him, or to remain in Wake Island because
he had quarreled with his wife, as contended by PANAM's counsel.
The latter contention however, is utterly devoid of merit. To begin with, plaintiff's testimony about what he did
upon reaching the beach is uncontradicted. Secondly, other portions of his testimony such as, for instance, that
the flight was somewhat rough, shortly before reaching Wake Island; that there were quite a number of soldiers in
the plane and, later, in the terminal building; that he did not voluntarily remain in Wake Island, but was "offloaded" by PANAM's agent therein are borne out by the very evidence for the defense. Thirdly, PANAM's
efforts to show that plaintiff had decided to remain in the Island because he had quarreled with Mrs. Zulueta
which is ridiculous merely underscores the artificious nature of PANAM's contention.
Fourthly, there is absolutely no direct evidence about said alleged quarrel. Nobody testified about it. Counsel for
the defense has, in effect, merely concluded that there must have been such quarrel because, when the
searching party located plaintiff, he according to Stanley Ho was "shouting in a loud tone of voice"
not athis wife, but "towards his wife and daughter," who headed said party and to which the words spoken
were addressed, according to plaintiff. Capt. Zentner said that plaintiff was "angry with them" Mrs. Zulueta
and Miss Zulueta who Michael Thomas affirmed were saying "I am sorry, I am sorry"; whereas, Wayne S.
Pendleton declared that Gavino told him that this "seems to stem from a domestic issue" between Mr. and Mrs.
Zulueta. Surely, this alleged surmise, not even by Pendleton but by Gavino who was not placed on the witness
stand cannot be taken as competent evidence that plaintiff had quarreled with his wife, apart from the
circumstance that such quarrel if it took place and there is absolutely no evidence or offer to prove that
anything had transpired between husband and wife before reaching Wake Island which may suggest a
misunderstanding between them does not warrant jumping at the conclusion that plaintiff had decided to
remain in the Island, for he would gain nothing thereby.
Needless to say, if plaintiff's purpose in going to the beach was to hide from Mrs. and Miss Zulueta and PANAM's
personnel, so that he may be left in the Island, he, surely, would not have walked back from the beach to the
terminal, before the plane had resumed its flight to Manila, thereby exposing his presence to the full view of those
who were looking for him.
Then, again, the words uttered by him as he saw the search party and approached the plane "You people
almost made me miss your flight. You have a defective announcing system and I was not paged" and the
"belligerent" manner according to Captain Zentner in which he said it revealed his feeling of distress at the
thought that the plane could have left without him. 4
The second, third and fourth assignments of error are thus clearly untenable.
In connection with the fifth assignment of error, PANAM's witness, Captain Zentner, testified that, while he was
outside the plane, waiting for the result of the search, a "man" approached him and expressed concern over the
situation; that the "man" said he was with the State Department; that he, his wife and their children, who were on
board the aircraft, would not want to continue the flight unless the missing person was found; that the "man"
expressed fear of a "bomb," a word he used reluctantly, because he knew it is violative of a Federal law when
said at the wrong time; that when plaintiff came, Zentner asked him: "why did you not want to get on the
airplane?"; that plaintiff then became "very angry" and spoke to him "in a way I have not been spoken to in my
whole adult life"; that the witness explained: "I am Captain of the aircraft and it is my duty to see to the flight's
safety"; that he (Zentner) then told Wayne Pendleton PANAM's Customer Service Supervisor to get
plaintiff's "bags off the plane to verify ... about the bomb"; that PANAM's airport manager (K. Sitton) "got three
bags of Mr. Zulueta"; that his fourth bag could not be located despite a thorough search; that believing that it must

have been left behind, in Honolulu, "we took off"; and that he (Zentner) would not have done so had he thought it
was still aboard.
The lower court did not err in giving no credence to this testimony.
Indeed, Captain Zentner did not explain why he seemingly assumed that the alleged apprehension of his
informant was justified. He did not ask the latter whether he knew anything in particular about plaintiff herein,
although some members of the crew would appear to have a notion that plaintiff is an impresario. Plaintiff himself
intimated to them that he was well known to the U.S. State Department. Apparently, Captain Zentner did not even
know the informant's name. Neither did the captain know whether the informant was really working for or in the
State Department. In other words, there was nothing absolutely nothing to justify the belief that the luggage
of the missing person should be searched, in order to ascertain whether there was a bomb in it; that, otherwise,
his presence in the aircraft would be inimical to its safety; and that, consequently, he should be off-loaded.
In fact, PANAM has not given the name of that "man" of the State Department. Neither has the defense tried to
explain such omission. Surely, PANAM's records would have disclosed the identity of said "man," if he were not a
mere figment of the imagination. The list of passengers has been marked as Exh. A, and yet PANAM has not
pointed out who among them is the aforementioned "man".
The trial court did not believe the testimony of Captain Zentner and rejected the theory of the defense, for the
following reasons:
(1) The defendant had contracted to transport plaintiff from Honolulu to Manila. It was its legal
obligation to do so, and it could be excused from complying with the obligation only, if the
passenger had refused to continue with the trip or it had become legally or physically impossible
without the carrier's fault, to transport him.
(2) In this case, it is plain that Zulueta was desirous of continuing with the trip. Although
defendant's witnesses claim that Zulueta refused to board the plane, its own evidence belies this
claim. The letter, Exh. "D", shows that it was defendant who off-loaded Zulueta; not Zulueta who
resisted from continuing the trip. In his testimony before the Court, Capt. Zentner, defendant's
pilot, said that if a passenger voluntarily left the plane, the term used would be `desistance' but
the term "off-load" means that it is the decision of the Captain not to allow the passenger or
luggage to continue the flight. However, Capt. Zentner admitted on his testimony that "his
drunkenness... was of no consequence in my report; (it) ... had nothing to do with his being
belligerent and unfriendly in his attitude towards me and the rest of the members of the crew."
The written report of Capt. Zentner made in transit from Wake to Manila "intimated he might
possibly continue;" but "due to drinking, belligerent attitude, he was off-loaded along with his
locked bags." (Exh. 10). In a later report, Zentner admitted, "The decision to leave Mr. Zulueta
and his locked luggage in Wake was mine and alone." (Exh. 9). Defendant's airport customer
service supervisor, W.S. Pendleton, reported that:
"After the search for Mr. Zulueta had continued almost 20 minutes and it was apparent that he
was not be found in the terminal building or immediate vicinity, I proceeded to the parking lot and
picked up my jeep continue the search in more remote areas. Just as I was getting underway, a
small group of persons approach from the direction of the beach and a voice called out the
passenger had been found. Having parked the jeep again, I walked toward the group and was
met by PAA fleet-serviceman E. Gavino who was walking somewhere ahead of the others. Mr.
Gavino remarked to me privately that the trouble seemed to have stemmed from some domestic
difference between the Passenger and his wife who was not at his side and returning with him to
the gate.
"On hearing Mr. Gavino's remark, I made no comment to the passenger but turned and led the
group toward the ramp. Just as we reached the boarding gate, Mr. Zulueta spoke to me for the
first time saying, "You people almost made me miss your flight. You have a defective announcing
system and I was not paged."
Exh. 5
Evidently, these could not have been the words of a man who refused to board the plane.

(3) There was no legal or physical impossibility for defendant to transport plaintiff Zulueta from
Wake to Manila as it had contracted to do. Defendant claims that the safety of its craft and of the
other passengers demanded that it inspect Zulueta's luggage and when he refused to allow
inspection that it had no recourse but to leave him behind. The truth that, knowing that of
plaintiff's four pieces of luggage, one could still have been as it was aboard, defendant's
plane still flew on to Manila. Surely, if the defendant's pilot and employees really believed that
Zulueta had planted a bomb in one of the bags they would not have flown on until they had made
sure that the fourth bag had been left behind at Honolulu until enough time had lapsed for the
bomb to have been exploded, since presumably it had to have been set to go off before they
reached Manila.
"At any rate, it was quite evident that Zulueta had nothing to hide; for the report of defendant's
witness, Mr. Stanley E. Ho, U.S. Marshall on Wake, has this to say: "
"About twenty minutes later while an attempt was being made to locate another piece of Mr.
Zulueta's luggage his daughter, Carolinda approached her father and wanted to get some clothes
from one of the suitcases. Mr. Zulueta asked the undersigned if it was alright if he opened the
suitcases and get the necessary clothes. To this I stated he was free to open his luggage and
obtain whatever he needed. Mr. Zulueta opened a suitcase and took the dress for her then
boarded the aircraft."
Exh. 2B .
(4) What is evident to the Court is that defendant acted in a manner deliberately calculated to
humiliate and shame plaintiffs. Although the plane was held up to wait for plaintiff for, as the
Captain admitted in his testimony, he did so because he knew that it would be a week before
another plane would come in for Manila (t.s.n., 18 Oct. 1966, pp. 59-62) when plaintiff did come,
he was met and treated roughly by defendant's manager Sitton. Here is what Zulueta testified to:
"Q. When you saw your wife and daughter what happened? A. Then I
started going towards the airplane. At the ramp, I do not know what they call it,
as soon as they arrived there, there was a man who subsequently identified
himself as Kenneth Sitton. He identified himself as the Airport Manager of Wake
Island. He did not ask me what happened, was I sick, he looked at me and said,
what in the hell do you think you are? Get on that plane. Then I said, what right
have you to talk to me that way, I am a paying passenger. Do not treat me this
way. And this started the altercation, and then he said, do you know you held up
the plane? And I answered, this is not my fault, I was sick. Did it not occur to you
to ask me how I feel; then he said get on that plane.
"Q. What happened? A. we started discussing kept saying, "You get on that
plane" and then I said, "I don't have to get on that plane." After a prolonged
discussion, he said, give me your baggage tags and I gave him four baggage
tickets or tags. I did not realize what he was up to until finally, I saw people
coming down the airplane and police cars arrived and people were coming down
the ramp. I gave him the four baggage tags and a few minutes late, he brought
three baggages and said, open them up. I said, to begin with, there is one
baggage missing and that missing bag is my bag. Then I said you cannot make
me open these baggages unless you are United States customs authorities and
when I arrive in the Philippines they can be opened by the Philippine Customs
authorities. But an Airport Manager cannot make me open my bags unless you
do exactly the same thing to all the passengers. Open the bags of all the other
passengers and I will open my bag.
"Q. What did he say: A. He just kept on saying open your bag, and I drew
up my hands and said, you want, you open yourself or give me a search warrant
I shall open this bag but give me a search warrant and then I asked, who is the
Chief of Police, and he said, "I am Chief of Police," then I said how can you be
the Chief Police and Airport Manager and then he started to talk about double
compensation and by this time we were both quarreling and he was shouting and
so with me. Then there was a man who came around and said `open the bag'

and I said, show the warrant of arrest and do all the checking and the discussion
kept on going, and finally I said look, my fourth bag is missing and he said, "I
don't give damn." People at the time were surrounding us and staring at us and
also the passengers. My wife and daughter all along had been made to sit on a
railing and this man screaming and looking at my wife and daughter. Then he
said, will you pull these three monkeys out of here? then I said, will you send my
wife and daughter up the plane which he did. However, they have come down in
their slippers and when they were allowed to return to the plane none of the
defendant's personnel who had brought down the overcoats, shoes and
handcarried items of my wife and daughter ever offered to bring back the items to
the plane, until I demanded that one of the defendants should help my wife and
daughter which he did. And then one man told me, because you refused to open
your bag, "we shall hold you here in Wake Island." then I asked, are we under
arrest? and the man answered, no. And further stated, your wife and daughter
can continue their flight but you will not go to this flight an we will charge you
$13.30 a day. Then I said, who are you to tell all these things, and he answered, I
am the manager. I said, put it in writing, then left and in few minutes he came
back and handed me this letter (witness referring to Exhibit D)." .
t.s.n., August 1, 1966, pp. 15-21
Anyone in Zulueta's position would have reached the same way if he had had a sense of dignity.
Evidently, angered by Zulueta's reaction, irked by the delay he had caused them, defendant's
employees decided to teach him a lesson by forcing him to open his bags when there was no
justifiable reason to do so:
(a) Defendant did not make any attempt to inquire from any passenger or even the crew who
knew Mr. Zulueta what his character and reputation are, before demanding that he open the
bags; if it had done so, Miss Schmitz, the purser, and Col. Villamor would have vouched for
plaintiffs; for Miss Schmitz believed she had flown before with the Zulueta's and they had been
very nice people.
(b) Worse, defendant's manager Sitton admits that Zulueta had told him who he was and his
social position in Manila; still he insisted that the bags be opened. Moreover, some passengers
had informed the supervisor that Zulueta was "the impresario"; but they persisted in their
demands.
(c) Defendant never identified the alleged State Department men who reportedly approached the
Captain and expressed fear about a bomb, nor did they confront him if he existed with Mr.
Zulueta despite Mr. Zulueta's request.
(d) Defendant did not take any steps to put the luggage off-loaded far from its passengers and
plane, a strange procedure if it really believed the luggage contained a bomb;
(e) Defendant continued with the flight knowing one bag -- Zulueta's bag himself had not been
located and without verifying from Honolulu if the bag had been found there, nor even advising
Honolulu that a bag possibly containing a bomb had been left there, again an inexplicable
procedure if they sincerely believed that Zulueta had planted a bomb;
(f) Defendant's manager himself took Zulueta and his off-loaded bags, in his own car, from the
terminal building to the hotel, which is also inconsistent with a serious belief that the luggages
contained a bomb;
(g) Defendant knew that while Zulueta's bags were on the ground, he had opened one of them
with the permission and in the presence of the U. S. Marshall in order to enable his daughter to
get a dress from the bag; nothing suspicious was seen; still, defendant insisted on refusing to
allow Zulueta to continue unless he opened and allowed inspection of the bags by them; .

(h) Defendant completely changed his tone and behavior towards the Zulueta's after the plane
had arrived at Manila and the Captain learned that its Manila manager, Mr. Oppenheimer, was a
friend of Zulueta;
(i) Meantime, the attitude of Pan American towards the Zulueta's caused other passengers to
resent Zulueta (See reports of Stewardesses and of Captain Zentner, Exhs. 7, 8, 9 and 10).
"Many passengers were angry towards the `missing passenger," says Miss Schmitz's report. "A
few inquisitive PA (passengers) one woman quite rudely stared once we were airborne and left
Mr. Zulueta behind ... anyway I told the woman to sit down so did Helga so did the man
near her," say Miss Schmitz's personal notes. This confirms the testimony of plain plaintiffs that,
all the while the search and discussions were going on, they were the subject of stares, remarks
and whisper comments from the passengers and other persons around the plane.
(j) Defendant did not allow plaintiff Zulueta to board the plane at all, even though it was aware
that some of his personal belongings, such as his overcoat were on the plane. Plaintiffs so
testified; and though defendant's witness Mr. Sitton denied it, claiming that plaintiff was always
free to board the plane, this denial is belied by the report of defendant's own witness, U.S.
Marshall Ho, who said that:
"Ten minutes later, Mr. Zulueta asked if he could talk to his wife who was aboard the aircraft. I
then accompanied him and as we got to the ramp, we met Mr. Sitton who stated he would
summon Mrs. Zulueta from the aircraft. Mr. Sitton summoned Mrs. Zulueta and she met her
husband at the foot of the ramp. Mr. Zulueta then asked his wife and himself to which I replied I
was not concerned what he had to say."
Exh. 2-B
(k) Finally, to add further humiliation and heap indignity on plaintiffs, when Mrs. Zulueta arrived at
Manila and appealed to defendant's Manila manager, Mr. Oppenheimer, to see to it that her
husband got back as soon as possible and was made as comfortable as possible, at defendant's
expense, Mr. Oppenheimer refused to acknowledge any obligation to transport Mr. Zulueta back
to Manila and forcing Mrs. Zulueta to send her husband $100.00 for pocket money and pay for his
fare from Wake to Manila, thru Honolulu and Tokyo.
Upon a review of the record, We are satisfied that the foregoing findings of His Honor, the Trial Judge, are
supported by a preponderance of the evidence.
The last two (2) assignments of error are mere consequences of those already disposed of, and, hence, need no
extended discussion.
It is urged, however, that plaintiff is, at most, entitled to actual damages only, because he was the first to commit a
breach of contract, for having gone over 200 yards away from the terminal, where he could not expect to be
paged. But, PANAM has not pointed out what part of the contract has been violated thereby, apart from the fact
that the award for damages made in the decision appealed from was due, not to PANAM's failure to so page the
plaintiff, but to the former's deliberate act of leaving him at Wake Island, and the embarrassment and humiliation
caused to him and his family in the presence of many other persons. Then, also, considering the flat nature of the
terrain in Wake Island, and the absence of buildings and structures, other than the terminal and a modest "hotel,"
as well as plaintiff's need of relieving himself, he had to find a place beyond the view of the people and near
enough the sea to wash himself up before going back to the plane.
It is next argued that plaintiff was, also, guilty of contributory negligence for failure to reboard the plane within the
30 minutes announced before the passengers debarked therefrom. This might have justified a reduction of the
damages, had plaintiff been unwittingly left by the plane, owing to the negligence of PANAM personnel, or even,
perhaps, wittingly, if he could not be found before the plane's departure. It does not, and cannot have such
justification in the case at bar, plaintiff having shown up before the plane had taken off, and he having been offloaded intentionally and with malice aforethought, for his "belligerent" attitude, according to Captain Zentner; for
having dared despite his being one of "three monkeys," the term used by Captain Zentner to refer to the
Zulueta family to answer him back when he (Captain Zentner) 5 said: "what in the hell do you think you are
?" in a way he had "not been spoken to" in his "whole adult life," in the presence of the passengers and other
PANAM employees; for having responded to a command of either Zentner or Sitton to open his (plaintiff's) bags,

with a categorical refusal and a challenge for Zentner or Sitton to open the bags without a search warrant
therefor, thereby making manifest the lack of authority of the aforementioned representative of PANAM to issue
said command and exposing him to ridicule before said passengers and employees. Besides, PANAM's own
witness and employee, Wayne Pendleton, testified the plane could not take off at 4:30, as scheduled, because
"we were still waiting for two (2) local passengers."
Article 2201 of our Civil Code reads:
In contracts and quasi-contracts, the damages for which the obligor who acted in good faith is
liable shall be those that are the natural and probable consequences of the breach of the
obligation, and which the parties have foreseen or could reasonably foreseen at the time the
obligation was constituted.
In case of fraud, bad faith, malice or wanton attitude, the obligor shall be responsible for all
damages which may be reasonably attributed to the non-performance of the obligation.
This responsibility applies to common carriers. Pursuant to Article 1759 of the same Code:
ART. 1759. Common carriers are liable for the death or injuries to passengers through the
negligence or wilful acts of the former's employees, although such employees may have acted
beyond the scope of their authority or in violation of the orders of the common carriers.
This liability of the common carriers does not cease proof that they exercised all the diligence of a
good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employees.
Referring now to the specific amounts to damages due to plaintiffs herein, We note that the sum of P5,502.85
awarded to them as actual damages is not seriously disputed by PANAM.
As regards the moral and exemplary damages claimed by the plaintiffs, our Civil Code provides:
ART. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
ART. 2217. Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury.
Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the
proximate result of defendant's wrongful act or omission.
ART. 2229. Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by way of example or correction for
the public good, in addition to the moral, temperate liquidated or compensatory damages.
ART. 2232. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the court may award exemplary damages if the
defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner.
The records amply establish plaintiffs' right to recover both moral and exemplary damages. Indeed, the rude and
rough reception plaintiff received at the hands of Sitton or Captain Zentner when the latter met him at the ramp
("what in the hell do you think you are? Get on that plane"); the menacing attitude of Zentner or Sitton and the
supercilious manner in which he had asked plaintiff to open his bags ("open your bag," and when told that a fourth
bag was missing, "I don't give a damn"); the abusive language and highly scornful reference to plaintiffs as
monkeys by one of PANAM's employees (who turning to Mrs. Zulueta and Miss Zulueta remarked, "will you pull
these three monkeys out of here?"); the unfriendly attitude, the ugly stares and unkind remarks to which plaintiffs
were subjected, and their being cordoned by men in uniform as if they were criminals, while plaintiff was arguing
with Sitton; the airline officials' refusal to allow plaintiff to board the plane on the pretext that he was hiding a bomb
in his luggage and their arbitrary and high-handed decision to leave him in Wake; Mrs. Zulueta's having suffered a
nervous breakdown for which she was hospitalized as a result of the embarrassment, insults and humiliations to
which plaintiffs were exposed by the conduct of PANAM's employees; Miss Zulueta's having suffered shame,
humiliation and embarrassment for the treatment received by her parents at the airport 6 all these justify an
award for moral damages resulting from mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings, moral shock, and
social humiliation thereby suffered by plaintiffs.

The relation between carrier and passenger involves special and peculiar obligations and duties,
differing in kind and degree, from those of almost every other legal or contractual relation. On
account of the peculiar situation of the parties the law implies a promise and imposes upon the
carrier the corresponding duty of protection and courteous treatment. Therefore, the carrier is
under the absolute duty of protecting his passengers from assault or insult by himself or his
servants. 7
A contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind and degree from any other contractual
relation. And this, because of the relation which an air-carrier sustains with the public. Its
business is mainly with the travelling public. It invites people to avail of the comforts and
advantages it offers. The contract of air carriage, therefore, generates a relation tended with a
public duty. Neglect or malfeasance of the carrier's employees naturally could give ground for an
action for damages.
Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They have a right to be treated by the
carrier's employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration. They are titled to be
protected against personal misconduct, injurious language, indignities and abuses from such
employees. So it is, that any rude or discourteous conduct on the part of employees towards a
passenger gives the latter an action for damages against the carrier. 8
A carrier of passengers is as much bound to protect them from humiliation and insult as from
physical injury .. It is held in nearly all jurisdictions, if not universally, that a carrier is liable to a
passenger for humiliation and mental suffering caused by abusive or insulting language directed
at such passenger by an employee of the carrier. 9
Where a conductor uses language to a passenger which is calculated to insult, humiliate, or
wound the feelings of a person of ordinary feelings and sensibilities, the carrier is liable, because
the contract of carriage impliedly stipulates for decent, courteous, and respectful treatment, at
hands of the carrier's employees. 10
The general rule that a carrier owes to a passenger highest degree of care has been held to
include the duty to protect the passenger from abusive language by the carrier's agents, or by
others if under such circumstances that the carrier's agents should have known about it and
prevented it. Some of the courts have mentioned the implied duty of the carrier, arising out of the
contract of carriage, not to insult the passenger, or permit him to be insulted, and even where no
mention is made of this basis for liability, it is apparent that it is the ground upon which recovery is
allowed. 11
The question is whether the award of P1,000,000 as moral damages was proper and justified by the
circumstances. It has been held that the discretion in fixing moral damages lies in the trial court. 12 Among the
factors courts take into account in assessing moral damages are the professional, social, political and financial
standing of the offended parties on one hand, and the business and financial position of the offender on the
other. 13
In comparatively recent cases in this jurisdiction, also involving breach of contract of air carriage, this Court
awarded the amount of P25,000, where plaintiff, a first-class passenger in an Air France plane from Manila to
Rome was, in Bangkok, forced by the manager of the airline company to leave his first class accommodation after
he was already seated because there was a white man who, the manager alleged, had a "better right" to the
seat14 ;the amount of P200,000, where plaintiffs, upon confirmation of their reservation in defendant airline's flight
from Tokyo to San Francisco were issued first class tickets, but upon arrival in Tokyo were informed that there
was no accommodation for them in the first class compartment and told they could not go unless they took the
tourist class 15 in both of which cases the Court found the airline companies to have acted in bad faith, or in a
wanton, reckless and oppressive manner, justifying likewise the award of exemplary damages.
None of the passengers involved in said cases was, however, off-loaded, much less in a place as barren and
isolated as Wake Island, with the prospect of being stranded there for a week. The aforementioned passengers
were merely constrained to take a tourist or third class accommodation in lieu of the first class passage they were
entitled to. Then, also, in none of said cases had the agents of the carrier acted with the degree of malice or bad
faith of those of PANAM in the case at bar, or caused to the offended passengers a mental suffering arising from
injuries to feelings, fright and shock due to abusive, rude and insulting language used by the carrier's employees

in the presence and within the hearing of others, comparable to that caused by PANAM's employees to plaintiffs
herein
To some extent, however, plaintiff had contributed to the gravity of the situation because of the extreme
belligerence with which he had reacted on the occasion. We do not over-look the fact that he justly believed he
should uphold and defend his dignity and that of the people of this country that the discomfort, the difficulties, and,
perhaps, the ordeal through which he had gone to relieve himself which were unknown to PANAM's agents
were such as to put him in no mood to be understanding of the shortcoming of others; and that said PANAM
agents should have first inquired, with an open mind, about the cause of his delay instead of assuming that he
was at fault and of taking an arrogant and overbearing attitude, as if they were dealing with an inferior. Just the
same, there is every reason to believe that, in all probability, things would not have turned out as bad as they
became had he not allowed himself, in a way, to be dragged to the level or plane on which PANAM's personnel
had placed themselves.
In view of this circumstance, We feel that the moral and exemplary damages collectible by the plaintiffs should be
reduced to one-half of the amounts awarded by the lower court, that is, to P500,000 for moral damages, and
P200,000 for exemplary damages, aside from the attorney's fees which should, likewise, be reduced to P75,000.
On April 22, 1971, Mrs. Zulueta filed a motion alleging that she had, for more than two (2) years, been actually
living separately from her husband, plaintiff Rafael Zulueta, and that she had decided to settle separately with
PANAM and had reached a full and complete settlement of all her differences with said defendant, and praying
accordingly, that this case be dismissed insofar as she is concerned, Required to comment on said motion,
PANAM expressed no objection thereto.
Upon the other hand, plaintiff prayed that the motion be denied, upon the ground that the case at bar is one for
damages for breach of a contract of carriage, owing to the off-loading of plaintiff Rafael Zulueta, the husband and
administrator of the conjugal partnership, with the funds of which the PANAM had been paid under said contract;
that the action was filed by the plaintiffs as a family and the lower court had awarded damages to them as such
family; that, although PANAM had questioned the award of damages, it had not raised the question whether the
lower court should have specified what portion of the award should go to each plaintiff; that although Mr. and Mrs.
Zulueta had, for sometime, been living separately, this has been without judicial approval; that Mrs. Zulueta may
not, therefore, bind the conjugal partnership or settle this case separately; and that the sum given by PANAM to
Mrs. Zulueta is believed to be P50,000, which is less than 3-1/2% of the award appealed from, thereby indicating
the advisability of denying her motion to dismiss, for her own protection.
Pursuant to a resolution, dated June 10, 1971, deferring action on said motion to dismiss until the case is
considered on the merits. We now hold that the motion should be, as it is hereby denied. Indeed, "(t)he wife
cannot bind the conjugal partnership without the husband's consent, except in cases provided by law," 16 and it
has not been shown that this is one of the cases so provided. Article 113 of our Civil Code, pursuant to which
"(t)he husband must be joined in all suits by or against the wife, except: ... (2) If they have in fact been separated
for at least one year ..." relied upon by PANAM does not warrant the conclusion drawn therefrom by the
latter. Obviously the suit contemplated in subdivision (2) of said Article 113 is one in which the wife is the real
party either plaintiff or defendant in interest, and, in which, without being so, the hush must be joined as a
party, by reason only of his relation of affinity with her. Said provision cannot possibly apply to a case, like the one
at bar, in which the husband is the main party in interest, both as the person principally grieved and as
administrator of the conjugal partnership. Moreover, he having acted in this capacity in entering into the contract
of carriage with PANAM and paid the amount due to the latter, under the contract, with funds of conjugal
partnership, the damages recoverable for breach of such contract belongs to said partnership.
Modified, as above stated, in the sense that plaintiffs shall recover from defendant, Pan American World Airways,
Inc., the sums of P500,000 as moral damages, P200,000 as exemplary damages, and P75,000 as attorney's
fees, apart from P5,502.85 as actual damages, and without prejudice to deducting the aforementioned sum of
P50,000 already paid Mrs. Zulueta, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed in all other respects, with the
costs against said defendant.

PAN AMERICAN WORLD AIRWAYS, INC., vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, and EDMUNDO P.
ONGSIAKO
G.R. No. L-68988, June 21, 1990, FIRST DIVISION
Upon the following facts, found to have been satisfactorily established by the evidence, to wit:
1) that Edmundo P. Ongsiako, "with one piece of checked-in luggage, was a paying passenger on the ... PAN AM
Flight 842 that left Manila for Honolulu, Hawaii, U.S.A., at about 12:30 p.m. on June 8, 1978, with Los Angeles,
California, as his ultimate destination:" 1
2) that at Honolulu, Ongsiako "discovered that his luggage was not carried on board ...; (i)t was left at ... PAN
AM's airport office in Manila where it was found a week later;" 2
3) "a PAN AM employee in Honolulu, instead of helping him search for his bag, arrogantly threatened to "bump
him off in Honolulu should he persist in looking for his bag;" 3
4) that "(o)ffers to forward the luggage to .. (Ongsiako) in Los Angeles or San Francisco were refused, f s
because, by the time it was found, ... (Ongsiako) was about to leave Los Angeles, and secondly, ... (Ongsiako)
was not sure where he would be staying in San Francisco;
5) that "(v)erbal complaint was made first at PAN AM's Honolulu airport office, then at Los Angeles, but written
complaint was made on July 20, 1978; and
6) that "(o)vertures towards settlement were rejected for being too inconsequential,"

PAN AM (Pan American World Airways, Inc.) was sentenced by the Court of First Instance of Rizal 6 on complaint
of Ongsiako, to pay to the latter:
1. P9,629.50 representing cost of plaintiffs plane ticket as actual damages;
2. The equivalent in pesos of $400 at the current exchange rate as temperate or moderate
damages;
3. P350,000.00 as moral damages;
4. P100,000.00 as exemplary damages;
5. P26,000.00 as attorney's fees;
6. Costs.
On appeal taken by PAN AM, 7 the Trial Court's judgment was affirmed by the Intermediate Appellate Court, with
the sole modification that the award of actual damages was reduced to P4,814.75 and that of exemplary
damages, eliminated. 8
From this judgment of the appellate tribunal, in turn, PAN AM has taken an appeal on certiorari to this Court. After
receiving the private respondent's comment on the appeal petition, the reply thereto and the rejoinder to the reply,
the Court resolved on March 4, 1985 to give limited due course to the petition as regards the sole issue of moral
damages and required simultaneous memoranda from the parties, 9 which have since been submitted.
Article 2220 of the Civil Code says that moral damages may be awarded in "breaches of contract where the
defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith." So, proof of infringement of an agreement by a party, standing alone,
will not justify an award of moral damages. 10 There must, in addition, as the law points out, be competent
evidence of fraud of bad faith by that party. 11 If the plaintiff, for instance, fails to take the witness stand and testify
as to his social humiliation, wounded feelings, anxiety, etc., moral damages cannot be recovered. 12 The rule
applies, of course, to common carriers. 13

This Court finds that these basic legal principles have been correctly applied by both the Trial Court and the
Intermediate Appellate Court, in light of the proven facts. Said the latter, on this precise matter: 14
In the present case, men of reasonable perceptions will not disagree with the conclusion that
plaintiff suffered mental anguish, anxiety and shock when he found that his luggage did not travel
with him. What traveller would not suffer from such feelings if he found himself in a foreign land
without any article of clothing other than what he had on? The injury thus suffered by plaintiff is
one that would arise generally, in the special circumstances of this case; it follows as a matter of
course. PAN AM breach of the contract was the substantial cause in bringing about the harm or
injury to the plaintiff. We adopt here the ruling of the court a quo:
"The Court believes and so holds that there is sufficient evidence of gross and reckless
negligence amounting to bad faith on the part of defendant. If defendant was not sure that it could
transport plaintiff and his luggage to Los Angeles, it should not have accepted plaintiff who was a
waitlisted passenger. It is not a valid excuse on its part to claim that plaintiff checked in at the last
minute and that there was insufficient time to load his bag in the plane. In fact, that makes the
position of defendant even more untenable, because in accepting and holding on to plaintiff as its
passenger, probably to fill in cancelled bookings, although it knew or must have known that the
bag of plaintiff might not be loaded on time, it was guilty of conduct amounting to bad faith. ...
Accepting last minute passengers and their baggage with no definite assurance that the carrier
can comply with its obligation due to lack of time amounts to "negligence so gross and reckless
as to amount to malice or bad faith (Fores vs. Miranda, L-12163, March 4,1959; Necesito vs.
Paras, L-1060606, June 30, 1958, cited in Lopez, et al. vs. PAN AM, supra) (Record on Appeal,
pp. 23-25)
Also a propos and also not otherwise shown to be erroneous are the observations of the Trial Court on this
precise point:
... (A) PAN AM employee in Honolulu, instead of helping him (Ongsiako) search for his bag,
arrogantly threatened to "bump him off" in Honolulu should he persist in looking for his bag. This
happened in the presence of several people, thereby subjecting plaintiff to indignity,
embarrassment and humiliation, which aggravated his health-his blood pressure, in this case. It is
difficult enough to be in a foreign country, worse if one's belongings are missing, and worst, if
instead of being helped, he is shouted at and threatened to be "bumped off" as in this case. This
must have been a very distressing and painful experience to plaintiff which justifies a finding of
bad faith and an award for moral damages in his favor. Considering the financial standing of
plaintiff who heads a corporation with a paid-up capital of 2-1/2 Millon Pesos and the anguish,
anxiety, wounded feelings, shame and humiliation which he suffered as heretofore discussed, the
Court assesses moral damages in his favor in the amount of P350,000.00.
PAN AM assails this award of moral damages as without evidentiary foundation, or at the very least, excessive. It
argues that no such arrogance or boorishness was displayed by the PAN AM people at the Honolulu Airport, that
what simply happened was, citing Ongsiako's own testimony, that when Ongsiako could not find his luggage and
asked for help, showing them his baggage tag and ticket, one of the PAN AM employees there, "instead of
helping ... (him) looked at their watch and said, you better get up or you will be late on your flight, I am sorry I
cannot help you, there are so many people waiting for their turn. ..." 15 It claims, too, that even the Court of
Appeals itself declared that it was "not satisfied with the adequacy of the evidence related to the ill-treatment
suffered by the plaintiff at the hands of PAN AM Honolulu airport office employees. ..." 16 The quotations from the
transcript and judgment of the Appellate Court are out of context. The record of Ongsiako's testimony reveals that
he did say that "the PAN AM employee embarrassed ... (him) in Honolulu by shouting at x x (him)," a statement
that he reaffirmed twice, 17 and that employee even refused to look at his baggage tag. 18 As regards the
Intermediate Appellate Court, it also did say that it was sustaining "the fun award of moral damages,' but that it did
not find that the evidence was adequate to establish that the conduct of PAN AM was so "wanton, reckless,
oppressive or malevolent" as to justify an award of exemplary damages, a ruling that is not essentially
inconsistent with Ongsiako's version of the occurrence. In any event, even accepting PAN AM's version of the
occurrence at face value, it is clear that none of the PAN AM employees exerted the least effort to assist
Ongsiako in his predicament, despite his appeal for help; that not one of them even deigned to look at Ongsiako's
baggage tag, or listen to his problem, or give assurances that something would be done about his difficulties, or
otherwise show any sign of sympathy or commiseration; that instead, they looked at their watches-an impolite and
dismaying gesture of impatience, to be sure, considering the circumstances-and told him he could not be helped
because there were other people waiting for their turn-to be served, of course, like Ongsiako, as they had a right

to expect as paying passengers-and that it was best if he just went to his plane so as not to miss his flight. Surely,
these acts of callous indifference to the plight of a person in a foreign land could not be less distressing,
depressing or disheartening to the latter, or judged less harshly, simply because not attended by any shouted
remarks.
All things considered, the Court is satisfied that moral damages have been correctly granted.
WHEREFORE, the petitioner's appeal is DISMISSED, and the judgment of the Intermediate Appellate Court,
AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against the petitioner.

FERNANDO LOPEZ, ET AL. vs. PAN AMERICAN WORLD AIRWAYS

G.R. No. L-22415, March 30, 1966, EN BANC
Plaintiffs and defendant appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal. Since the value in
controversy exceeds P200,000 the appeals were taken directly to this Court upon all questions involved (Sec. 17,
par. 3[5], Judiciary Act).
Stated briefly the facts not in dispute are as follows: Reservations for first class accommodations in Flight No. 2 of
Pan American World Airways hereinafter otherwise called PAN-AM from Tokyo to San Francisco on May
24, 1960 were made with
PAN-AM on March 29, 1960, by "Your Travel Guide" agency, specifically, by Delfin Faustino, for then Senator
Fernando Lopez, his wife Maria J. Lopez, his son-in-law Alfredo Montelibano, Jr., and his daughter, Mrs. Alfredo
Montelibano, Jr., (Milagros Lopez Montelibano). PAN-AM's San Francisco head office confirmed the reservations
on March 31, 1960.
First class tickets for the abovementioned flight were subsequently issued by
PAN-AM on May 21 and 23, 1960, in favor of Senator Lopez and his party. The total fare of P9,444 for all of them
was fully paid before the tickets were issued.
As scheduled Senator Lopez and party left Manila by Northwest Airlines on May 24, 1960, arriving in Tokyo at
5:30 P.M. of that day. As soon as they arrived Senator Lopez requested Minister Busuego of the Philippine
Embassy to contact PAN-AM's Tokyo office regarding their first class accommodations for that evening's flight.
For the given reason that the first class seats therein were all booked up, however, PAN-AM's Tokyo office
informed Minister Busuego that PAN-AM could not accommodate Senator Lopez and party in that trip as first
class passengers. Senator Lopez thereupon gave their first class tickets to Minister Busuego for him to show the
same to PAN-AM's Tokyo office, but the latter firmly reiterated that there was no accommodation for them in the
first class, stating that they could not go in that flight unless they took the tourist class therein.
Due to pressing engagements awaiting Senator Lopez and his wife, in the United States he had to attend a
business conference in San Francisco the next day and she had to undergo a medical check-up in Mayo Clinic,
Rochester, Minnesota, on May 28, 1960 and needed three days rest before that in San Francisco Senator
Lopez and party were constrained to take PAN-AM's flight from Tokyo to San Francisco as tourist passengers.
Senator Lopez however made it clear, as indicated in his letter to PAN-AM's Tokyo office on that date (Exh. A),
that they did so "under protest" and without prejudice to further action against the airline.1wph1.t
Suit for damages was thereafter filed by Senator Lopez and party against PAN-AM on June 2, 1960 in the Court
of First Instance of Rizal. Alleging breach of contracts in bad faith by defendant, plaintiffs asked for P500,000
actual and moral damages, P100,000 exemplary damages, P25,000 attorney's fees plus costs. PAN-AM filed its
answer on June 22, 1960, asserting that its failure to provide first class accommodations to plaintiffs was due to
honest error of its employees. It also interposed a counterclaim for attorney's fees of P25,000.
Subsequently, further pleadings were filed, thus: plaintiffs' answer to the counterclaim, on July 25, 1960; plaintiffs'
reply attached to motion for its admittance, on December 2, 1961; defendant's supplemental answer, on March 8,
1962; plaintiffs' reply to supplemental answer, on March 10, 1962; and defendant's amended supplemental
answer, on July 10, 1962.
After trial which took twenty-two (22) days ranging from November 25, 1960 to January 5, 1963 the Court of
First Instance rendered its decision on November 13, 1963, the dispositive portion stating:
In view of the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against
the defendant, which is accordingly ordered to pay the plaintiffs the following: (a) P100,000.00 as moral
damages; (b) P20,000.00 as exemplary damages; (c) P25,000.00 as attorney's fees, and the costs of this
action.
So ordered.

Plaintiffs, however, on November 21, 1963, moved for reconsideration of said judgment, asking that moral
damages be increased to P400,000 and that six per cent (6%) interest per annum on the amount of the award be
granted. And defendant opposed the same. Acting thereon the trial court issued an order on December 14, 1963,
reconsidering the dispositive part of its decision to read as follows:
In view of the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against
the defendant, which is accordingly ordered to pay the plaintiffs the following: (a) P150,000.00 as moral
damages; (b) P25,000.00 as exemplary damages; with legal interest on both from the date of the filing of
the complaint until paid; and (c) P25,000.00 as attorney's fees; and the costs of this action.
So ordered.
It is from said judgment, as thus reconsidered, that both parties have appealed.
Defendant, as stated, has from the start admitted that it breached its contracts with plaintiffs to provide them with
first class accommodations in its Tokyo-San Francisco flight of May 24, 1960. In its appeal, however, it takes
issue with the finding of the court a quo that it acted in bad faith in the branch of said contracts. Plaintiffs, on the
other hand, raise questions on the amount of damages awarded in their favor, seeking that the same be
increased to a total of P650,000.
Anent the issue of bad faith the records show the respective contentions of the parties as follows.
According to plaintiffs, defendant acted in bad faith because it deliberately refused to comply with its contract to
provide first class accommodations to plaintiffs, out of racial prejudice against Orientals. And in support of its
contention that what was done to plaintiffs is an oftrepeated practice of defendant, evidence was adduced relating
to two previous instances of alleged racial discrimination by defendant against Filipinos in favor of "white"
passengers. Said previous occasions are what allegedly happened to (1) Benito Jalbuena and (2) Cenon S.
Cervantes and his wife.
And from plaintiffs' evidence this is what allegedly happened; Jalbuena bought a first class ticket from PAN-AM on
April 13, 1960; he confirmed it on April 15, 1960 as to the Tokyo-Hongkong flight of April 20, 1960; PAN-AM
similarly confirmed it on April 20, 1960. At the airport he and another Oriental Mr. Tung were asked to step
aside while other passengers - including "white" passengers boarded PAN-AM's plane. Then PAN-AM officials
told them that one of them had to stay behind. Since Mr. Tung was going all the way to London, Jalbuena was
chosen to be left behind. PAN-AM's officials could only explain by saying there was "some mistake". Jalbuena
thereafter wrote PAN-AM to protest the incident (Exh. B).
As to Cenon S. Cervantes it would appear that in Flight No. 6 of PAN-AM on September 29, 1958 from Bangkok
to Hongkong, he and his wife had to take tourist class, although they had first class tickets, which they had
previously confirmed, because their seats in first class were given to "passengers from London."
Against the foregoing, however, defendant's evidence would seek to establish its theory of honest mistake, thus:
The first class reservations of Senator Lopez and party were made on March 29, 1960 together with those of four
members of the Rufino family, for a total of eight (8) seats, as shown in their joint reservation card (Exh. 1).
Subsequently on March 30, 1960, two other Rufinos secured reservations and were given a separate reservation
card (Exh. 2). A new reservation card consisting of two pages (Exhs. 3 and 4) was then made for the original of
eight passengers, namely, Senator Lopez and party and four members of the Rufino family, the first page (Exh. 3)
referring to 2 Lopezes, 2 Montelibanos and 1 Rufino and the second page (Exh. 4) referring to 3 Rufinos. On April
18, 1960 "Your Travel Guide" agency cancelled the reservations of the Rufinos. A telex message was thereupon
sent on that date to PAN-AM's head office at San Francisco by Mariano Herranz, PAN-AM's reservations
employee at its office in Escolta, Manila. (Annex A-Acker's to Exh. 6.) In said message, however, Herranz
mistakenly cancelled all the seats that had been reserved, that is, including those of Senator Lopez and party.
The next day April 1960 Herranz discovered his mistake, upon seeing the reservation card newly prepared
by his co-employee Pedro Asensi for Sen. Lopez and party to the exclusion of the Rufinos (Exh. 5). It was then
that Herranz sent another telex wire to the San Francisco head office, stating his error and asking for the
reinstatement of the four (4) first class seats reserved for Senator Lopez and party (Annex A-Velasco's to Exh. 6).
San Francisco head office replied on April 22, 1960 that Senator Lopez and party are waitlisted and that said
office is unable to reinstate them (Annex B-Velasco's to Exh. 6).

Since the flight involved was still more than a month away and confident that reinstatement would be made,
Herranz forgot the matter and told no one about it except his co-employee, either Armando Davila or Pedro
Asensi or both of them (Tsn., 123-124, 127, Nov. 17, 1961).
Subsequently, on April 27, 1960, Armando Davila, PAN-AM's reservations employee working in the same Escolta
office as Herranz, phoned PAN-AM's ticket sellers at its other office in the Manila Hotel, and confirmed the
reservations of Senator Lopez and party.
PAN-AM's reservations supervisor Alberto Jose, discovered Herranz's mistake after "Your Travel Guide" phone
on May 18, 1960 to state that Senator Lopez and party were going to depart as scheduled. Accordingly, Jose sent
a telex wire on that date to PAN-AM's head office at San Francisco to report the error and asked said office to
continue holding the reservations of Senator Lopez and party (Annex B-Acker's to Exh. 6). Said message was
reiterated by Jose in his telex wire of May 19, 1960 (Annex C-Acker's to Exh. 6). San Francisco head office
replied on May 19, 1960 that it regrets being unable to confirm Senator Lopez and party for the reason that the
flight was solidly booked (Exh. 7). Jose sent a third telex wire on May 20, 1960 addressed to PAN-AM's offices at
San Francisco, New York (Idlewild Airport), Tokyo and Hongkong, asking all-out assistance towards restoring the
cancelled spaces and for report of cancellations at their end (Annex D-Acker's to Exh. 6). San Francisco head
office reiterated on May 20, 1960 that it could not reinstate the spaces and referred Jose to the Tokyo and
Hongkong offices (Exh. 8). Also on May 20, the Tokyo office of PAN-AM wired Jose stating it will do everything
possible (Exh. 9).
Expecting that some cancellations of bookings would be made before the flight time, Jose decided to withhold
from Senator Lopez and party, or their agent, the information that their reservations had been cancelled.
Armando Davila having previously confirmed Senator Lopez and party's first class reservations to PAN-AM's
ticket sellers at its Manila Hotel office, the latter sold and issued in their favor the corresponding first class tickets
on the 21st and 23rd of May, 1960.
From the foregoing evidence of defendant it is in effect admitted that defendant through its agents first
cancelled plaintiffs, reservations by mistake and thereafter deliberately and intentionally withheld from plaintiffs or
their travel agent the fact of said cancellation, letting them go on believing that their first class reservations stood
valid and confirmed. In so misleading plaintiffs into purchasing first class tickets in the conviction that they had
confirmed reservations for the same, when in fact they had none, defendant wilfully and knowingly placed itself
into the position of having to breach its a foresaid contracts with plaintiffs should there be no last-minute
cancellation by other passengers before flight time, as it turned out in this case. Such actuation of defendant may
indeed have been prompted by nothing more than the promotion of its self-interest in holding on to Senator Lopez
and party as passengers in its flight and foreclosing on their chances to seek the services of other airlines that
may have been able to afford them first class accommodations. All the time, in legal contemplation such conduct
already amounts to action in bad faith. For bad faith means a breach of a known duty through some motive
ofinterest or ill-will (Spiegel vs. Beacon Participations, 8 NE 2d 895, 907). As stated in Kamm v. Flink, 113 N.J.L.
582, 175 A. 62, 99 A.L.R. 1, 7: "Self-enrichment or fraternal interest, and not personal ill-will, may well have been
the motive; but it is malice nevertheless."
As of May 18, 1960 defendant's reservations supervisor, Alberto Jose knew that plaintiffs' reservations had been
cancelled. As of May 20 he knew that the San Francisco head office stated with finality that it could not reinstate
plaintiffs' cancelled reservations. And yet said reservations supervisor made the "decision" to use his own,
word to withhold the information from the plaintiffs. Said Alberto Jose in his testimony:
Q Why did you not notify them?
A Well, you see, sir, in my fifteen (15) years of service with the air lines business my experience is that
even if the flights are solidly booked months in advance, usually the flight departs with plenty of empty
seats both on the first class and tourist class. This is due to late cancellation of passengers, or because
passengers do not show up in the airport, and it was our hope others come in from another flight and,
therefore, are delayed and, therefore, missed their connections. This experience of mine, coupled with
that wire from Tokyo that they would do everything possible prompted me to withhold the information, but
unfortunately, instead of the first class seat that I was hoping for and which I anticipated only the tourists
class was open on which Senator and Mrs. Lopez, Mr. and Mrs. Montelibano were accommodated. Well, I
fully realize now the gravity of my decision in not advising Senator and Mrs. Lopez, Mr. and Mrs.

Montelibano nor their agents about the erroneous cancellation and for which I would like them to know
that I am very sorry.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Q So it was not your duty to notify Sen. Lopez and parties that their reservations had been cancelled
since May 18, 1960?
A As I said before it was my duty. It was my duty but as I said again with respect to that duty I have the
power to make a decision or use my discretion and judgment whether I should go ahead and tell the
passenger about the cancellation. (Tsn., pp. 17-19, 28-29, March 15, 1962.)
At the time plaintiffs bought their tickets, defendant, therefore, in breach of its known duty, made plaintiffs believe
that their reservation had not been cancelled. An additional indication of this is the fact that upon the face of the
two tickets of record, namely, the ticket issued to Alfredo Montelibano, Jr. on May 21, 1960 (Exh. 22) and that
issued to Mrs. Alfredo Montelibano, Jr., on May 23, 1960 (Exh. 23), the reservation status is stated as "OK". Such
willful-non-disclosure of the cancellation or pretense that the reservations for plaintiffs stood and not simply the
erroneous cancellation itself is the factor to which is attributable the breach of the resulting contracts. And, as
above-stated, in this respect defendant clearly acted in bad faith.
As if to further emphasize its bad faith on the matter, defendant subsequently promoted the employee who
cancelled plaintiffs' reservations and told them nothing about it. The record shows that said employee Mariano
Herranz was not subjected to investigation and suspension by defendant but instead was given a reward in the
form of an increase of salary in June of the following year (Tsn., 86-88, Nov. 20, 1961).
At any rate, granting all the mistakes advanced by the defendant, there would at least be negligence so gross and
reckless as to amount to malice or bad faith (Fores vs. Miranda, L-12163, March 4, 1959; Necesito v. Paras, L10605-06, June 30, 1958). Firstly, notwithstanding the entries in the reservation cards (Exhs. 1 & 3) that the
reservations cancelled are those of the Rufinos only, Herranz made the mistake, after reading said entries, of
sending a wire cancelling all the reservations, including those of Senator Lopez and party (Tsn., pp. 108-109,
Nov. 17, 1961). Secondly, after sending a wire to San Francisco head office on April 19, 1960 stating his error
and asking for reinstatement, Herranz simply forgot about the matter. Notwithstanding the reply of San Francisco
head Office on April 22, 1960 that it cannot reinstate Senator Lopez and party (Annex B-Velasco's to Exh. 6), it
was assumed and taken for granted that reinstatement would be made. Thirdly, Armando Davila confirmed
plaintiff's reservations in a phone call on April 27, 1960 to defendant's ticket sellers, when at the time it appeared
in plaintiffs' reservation card (Exh. 5) that they were only waitlisted passengers. Fourthly, defendant's ticket sellers
issued plaintiffs' tickets on May 21 and 23, 1960, without first checking their reservations just before issuing said
tickets. And, finally, no one among defendant's agents notified Senator Lopez and party that their reservations
had been cancelled, a precaution that could have averted their entering with defendant into contracts that the
latter had already placed beyond its power to perform.
Accordingly, there being a clear admission in defendant's evidence of facts amounting to a bad faith on its part in
regard to the breach of its contracts with plaintiffs, it becomes unnecessary to further discuss the evidence
adduced by plaintiffs to establish defendant's bad faith. For what is admitted in the course of the trial does not
need to be proved (Sec. 2, Rule 129, Rules of Court).
Addressing ourselves now to the question of damages, it is well to state at the outset those rules and principles.
First, moral damages are recoverable in breach of contracts where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith
(Art. 2220, New Civil Code). Second, in addition to moral damages, exemplary or corrective damages may be
imposed by way of example or correction for the public good, in breach of contract where the defendant acted in a
wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner (Articles 2229, 2232, New Civil Code). And, third,
a written contract for an attorney's services shall control the amount to be paid therefor unless found by the court
to be unconscionable or unreasonable (Sec. 24, Rule 138, Rules of Court).
First, then, as to moral damages. As a proximate result of defendant's breach in bad faith of its contracts with
plaintiffs, the latter suffered social humiliation, wounded feelings, serious anxiety and mental anguish. For
plaintiffs were travelling with first class tickets issued by defendant and yet they were given only the tourist class.
At stop-overs, they were expected to be among the first-class passengers by those awaiting to welcome them,
only to be found among the tourist passengers. It may not be humiliating to travel as tourist passengers; it is

humiliating to be compelled to travel as such, contrary to what is rightfully to be expected from the contractual
undertaking.
Senator Lopez was then Senate President Pro Tempore. International carriers like defendant know the prestige of
such an office. For the Senate is not only the Upper Chamber of the Philippine Congress, but the nation's treatyratifying body. It may also be mentioned that in his aforesaid office Senator Lopez was in a position to preside in
impeachment cases should the Senate sit as Impeachment Tribunal. And he was former Vice-President of the
Philippines. Senator Lopez was going to the United States to attend a private business conference of the
Binalbagan-Isabela Sugar Company; but his aforesaid rank and position were by no means left behind, and in fact
he had a second engagement awaiting him in the United States: a banquet tendered by Filipino friends in his
honor as Senate President Pro Tempore (Tsn., pp. 14-15, Nov. 25, 1960). For the moral damages sustained by
him, therefore, an award of P100,000.00 is appropriate.
Mrs. Maria J. Lopez, as wife of Senator Lopez, shared his prestige and therefore his humiliation. In addition she
suffered physical discomfort during the 13-hour trip,(5 hours from Tokyo to Honolulu and 8 hours from Honolulu to
San Francisco). Although Senator Lopez stated that "she was quite well" (Tsn., p. 22, Nov. 25, 1960) he
obviously meant relatively well, since the rest of his statement is that two months before, she was attackedby
severe flu and lost 10 pounds of weight and that she was advised by Dr. Sison to go to the United States as soon
as possible for medical check-up and relaxation, (Ibid). In fact, Senator Lopez stated, as shown a few pages after
in the transcript of his testimony, that Mrs. Lopez was sick when she left the Philippines:
A. Well, my wife really felt very bad during the entire trip from Tokyo to San Francisco. In the first place,
she was sick when we left the Philippines, and then with that discomfort which she [experienced] or
suffered during that evening, it was her worst experience. I myself, who was not sick, could not sleep
because of the discomfort. (Tsn., pp. 27-28, Nov. 25, 1960).
It is not hard to see that in her condition then a physical discomfort sustained for thirteen hours may well be
considered a physical suffering. And even without regard to the noise and trepidation inside the plane which
defendant contends, upon the strengh of expert testimony, to be practically the same in first class and tourist
class the fact that the seating spaces in the tourist class are quite narrower than in first class, there beingsix
seats to a row in the former as against four to a row in the latter, and that in tourist class there is very little space
for reclining in view of the closer distance between rows (Tsn., p. 24, Nov. 25, 1960), will suffice to show that the
aforesaid passenger indeed experienced physical suffering during the trip. Added to this, of course, was the
painfull thought that she was deprived by defendant after having paid for and expected the same of the
most suitable, place for her, the first class, where evidently the best of everything would have been given her, the
best seat, service, food and treatment. Such difference in comfort between first class and tourist class is too
obvious to be recounted, is in fact the reason for the former's existence, and is recognized by the airline in
charging a higher fare for it and by the passengers in paying said higher rate Accordingly, considering the totality
of her suffering and humiliation, an award to Mrs. Maria J. Lopez of P50,000.00 for moral damages will be
reasonable.
Mr. and Mrs. Alfredo Montelibano, Jr., were travelling as immediate members of the family of Senator Lopez.
They formed part of the Senator's party as shown also by the reservation cards of PAN-AM. As such they likewise
shared his prestige and humiliation. Although defendant contends that a few weeks before the flight they had
asked their reservations to be charged from first class to tourist class which did not materialize due to alleged
full booking in the tourist class the same does not mean they suffered no shared in having to take tourist class
during the flight. For by that time they had already been made to pay for first class seats and therefore to expect
first class accommodations. As stated, it is one thing to take the tourist class by free choice; a far different thing to
be compelled to take it notwithstanding having paid for first class seats. Plaintiffs-appellants now ask P37,500.00
each for the two but we note that in their motion for reconsideration filed in the court a quo, they were satisfied
with P25,000.00 each for said persons. (Record on Appeal, p. 102). For their social humiliation, therefore, the
award to them of P25,000.00 each is reasonable.
The rationale behind exemplary or corrective damages is, as the name implies, to provide an example or
correction for public good. Defendant having breached its contracts in bad faith, the court, as stated earlier, may
award exemplary damages in addition to moral damages (Articles 2229, 2232, New Civil Code).
In view of its nature, it should be imposed in such an amount as to sufficiently and effectively deter similar breach
of contracts in the future by defendant or other airlines. In this light, we find it just to award P75,000.00 as
exemplary or corrective damages.

Now, as to attorney's fees, the record shows a written contract of services executed on June 1, 1960 (Exh. F)
whereunder plaintiffs-appellants engaged the services of their counsel Atty. Vicente J. Francisco and
agreedto pay the sum of P25,000.00 as attorney's fees upon the termination of the case in the Court of First
Instance, and an additional sum of P25,000.00 in the event the case is appealed to the Supreme Court. As said
earlier, a written contract for attorney's services shall control the amount to be paid therefor unless found by the
court to be unconscionable or unreasonable. A consideration of the subject matter of the present controversy, of
the professional standing of the attorney for plaintiffs-appellants, and of the extent of the service rendered by him,
shows that said amount provided for in the written agreement is reasonable. Said lawyer whose prominence in
the legal profession is well known studied the case, prepared and filed the complaint, conferred with witnesses,
analyzed documentary evidence, personally appeared at the trial of the case in twenty-two days, during a period
of three years, prepared four sets of cross-interrogatories for deposition taking, prepared several memoranda and
the motion for reconsideration, filed a joint record on appeal with defendant, filed a brief for plaintiffs as appellants
consisting of 45 printed pages and a brief for plaintiffs as appellees consisting of 265 printed pages. And we are
further convinced of its reasonableness because defendant's counsel likewise valued at P50,000.00 the proper
compensation for his services rendered to defendant in the trial court and on appeal.
In concluding, let it be stressed that the amount of damages awarded in this appeal has been determined by
adequately considering the official, political, social, and financial standing of the offended parties on one hand,
and the business and financial position of the offender on the other (Domingding v. Ng, 55 O.G. 10). And further
considering the present rate of exchange and the terms at which the amount of damages awarded would
approximately be in U.S. dollars, this Court is all the more of the view that said award is proper and reasonable.
Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is hereby modified so as to award in favor of plaintiffs and against
defendant, the following: (1) P200,000.00 as moral damages, divided among plaintiffs, thus: P100,000.00 for
Senate President Pro Tempore Fernando Lopez; P50,000.00 for his wife Maria J. Lopez; P25,000.00 for his sonin-law Alfredo Montelibano, Jr.; and P25,000.00 for his daughter Mrs. Alfredo Montelibano, Jr.; (2) P75,000.00 as
exemplary or corrective damages; (3) interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum on the moral and exemplary
damages aforestated, from December 14, 1963, the date of the amended decision of the court a quo, until said
damages are fully paid; (4) P50,000.00 as attorney's fees; and (5) the costs. Counterclaim dismissed. So ordered.

AIR FRANCE vs. RAFAEL CARRASCOSO and the HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-21438, September 28, 1966, EN BANC
The Court of First Instance of Manila 1 sentenced petitioner to pay respondent Rafael Carrascoso P25,000.00 by
way of moral damages; P10,000.00 as exemplary damages; P393.20 representing the difference in fare between
first class and tourist class for the portion of the trip Bangkok-Rome, these various amounts with interest at the
legal rate, from the date of the filing of the complaint until paid; plus P3,000.00 for attorneys' fees; and the costs of
suit.
On appeal,2 the Court of Appeals slightly reduced the amount of refund on Carrascoso's plane ticket from
P393.20 to P383.10, and voted to affirm the appealed decision "in all other respects", with costs against
petitioner.
The case is now before us for review on certiorari.
The facts declared by the Court of Appeals as " fully supported by the evidence of record", are:
Plaintiff, a civil engineer, was a member of a group of 48 Filipino pilgrims that left Manila for Lourdes on
March 30, 1958.
On March 28, 1958, the defendant, Air France, through its authorized agent, Philippine Air Lines, Inc.,
issued to plaintiff a "first class" round trip airplane ticket from Manila to Rome. From Manila to Bangkok,
plaintiff travelled in "first class", but at Bangkok, the Manager of the defendant airline forced plaintiff to
vacate the "first class" seat that he was occupying because, in the words of the witness Ernesto G.
Cuento, there was a "white man", who, the Manager alleged, had a "better right" to the seat. When asked
to vacate his "first class" seat, the plaintiff, as was to be expected, refused, and told defendant's Manager
that his seat would be taken over his dead body; a commotion ensued, and, according to said Ernesto G.
Cuento, "many of the Filipino passengers got nervous in the tourist class; when they found out that Mr.
Carrascoso was having a hot discussion with the white man [manager], they came all across to Mr.
Carrascoso and pacified Mr. Carrascoso to give his seat to the white man" (Transcript, p. 12, Hearing of
May 26, 1959); and plaintiff reluctantly gave his "first class" seat in the plane. 3
1. The trust of the relief petitioner now seeks is that we review "all the findings" 4 of respondent Court of Appeals.
Petitioner charges that respondent court failed to make complete findings of fact on all the issues properly laid
before it. We are asked to consider facts favorable to petitioner, and then, to overturn the appellate court's
decision.
Coming into focus is the constitutional mandate that "No decision shall be rendered by any court of record without
expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based". 5 This is echoed in the
statutory demand that a judgment determining the merits of the case shall state "clearly and distinctly the facts
and the law on which it is based"; 6 and that "Every decision of the Court of Appeals shall contain complete
findings of fact on all issues properly raised before it". 7
A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity. It is open to direct attack. 8 The law, however, solely
insists that a decision state the "essential ultimate facts" upon which the court's conclusion is drawn. 9 A court of
justice is not hidebound to write in its decision every bit and piece of evidence 10 presented by one party and the
other upon the issues raised. Neither is it to be burdened with the obligation "to specify in the sentence the
facts"which a party "considered as proved". 11 This is but a part of the mental process from which the Court draws
the essential ultimate facts. A decision is not to be so clogged with details such that prolixity, if not confusion, may
result. So long as the decision of the Court of Appeals contains the necessary facts to warrant its conclusions, it is
no error for said court to withhold therefrom "any specific finding of facts with respect to the evidence for the
defense". Because as this Court well observed, "There is no law that so requires". 12 Indeed, "the mere failure to
specify (in the decision) the contentions of the appellant and the reasons for refusing to believe them is not
sufficient to hold the same contrary to the requirements of the provisions of law and the Constitution". It is in this
setting that in Manigque, it was held that the mere fact that the findings "were based entirely on the evidence for
the prosecution without taking into consideration or even mentioning the appellant's side in the controversy as
shown by his own testimony", would not vitiate the judgment. 13 If the court did not recite in the decision the
testimony of each witness for, or each item of evidence presented by, the defeated party, it does not mean that
the court has overlooked such testimony or such item of evidence. 14 At any rate, the legal presumptions are that

official duty has been regularly performed, and that all the matters within an issue in a case were laid before the
court and passed upon by it. 15
Findings of fact, which the Court of Appeals is required to make, maybe defined as "the written statement of the
ultimate facts as found by the court ... and essential to support the decision and judgment rendered
thereon". 16They consist of the court's "conclusions" with respect to the determinative facts in issue". 17 A question
of law, upon the other hand, has been declared as "one which does not call for an examination of the probative
value of the evidence presented by the parties." 18
2. By statute, "only questions of law may be raised" in an appeal by certiorari from a judgment of the Court of
Appeals. 19 That judgment is conclusive as to the facts. It is not appropriately the business of this Court to alter
the facts or to review the questions of fact. 20
With these guideposts, we now face the problem of whether the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals support its
judgment.
3. Was Carrascoso entitled to the first class seat he claims?
It is conceded in all quarters that on March 28, 1958 he paid to and received from petitioner a first class ticket. But
petitioner asserts that said ticket did not represent the true and complete intent and agreement of the parties; that
said respondent knew that he did not have confirmed reservations for first class on any specific flight, although he
had tourist class protection; that, accordingly, the issuance of a first class ticket was no guarantee that he would
have a first class ride, but that such would depend upon the availability of first class seats.
These are matters which petitioner has thoroughly presented and discussed in its brief before the Court of
Appeals under its third assignment of error, which reads: "The trial court erred in finding that plaintiff had
confirmed reservations for, and a right to, first class seats on the "definite" segments of his journey, particularly
that from Saigon to Beirut". 21
And, the Court of Appeals disposed of this contention thus:
Defendant seems to capitalize on the argument that the issuance of a first-class ticket was no guarantee
that the passenger to whom the same had been issued, would be accommodated in the first-class
compartment, for as in the case of plaintiff he had yet to make arrangements upon arrival at every station
for the necessary first-class reservation. We are not impressed by such a reasoning. We cannot
understand how a reputable firm like defendant airplane company could have the indiscretion to give out
tickets it never meant to honor at all. It received the corresponding amount in payment of first-class tickets
and yet it allowed the passenger to be at the mercy of its employees. It is more in keeping with the
ordinary course of business that the company should know whether or riot the tickets it issues are to be
honored or not.22
Not that the Court of Appeals is alone. The trial court similarly disposed of petitioner's contention, thus:
On the fact that plaintiff paid for, and was issued a "First class" ticket, there can be no question. Apart from his
testimony, see plaintiff's Exhibits "A", "A-1", "B", "B-1," "B-2", "C" and "C-1", and defendant's own witness, Rafael
Altonaga, confirmed plaintiff's testimony and testified as follows:
Q. In these tickets there are marks "O.K." From what you know, what does this OK mean?
A. That the space is confirmed.
Q. Confirmed for first class?
A. Yes, "first class". (Transcript, p. 169)
xxx

xxx

xxx

Defendant tried to prove by the testimony of its witnesses Luis Zaldariaga and Rafael Altonaga that although
plaintiff paid for, and was issued a "first class" airplane ticket, the ticket was subject to confirmation in Hongkong.

The court cannot give credit to the testimony of said witnesses. Oral evidence cannot prevail over written
evidence, and plaintiff's Exhibits "A", "A-l", "B", "B-l", "C" and "C-1" belie the testimony of said witnesses, and
clearly show that the plaintiff was issued, and paid for, a first class ticket without any reservation whatever.
Furthermore, as hereinabove shown, defendant's own witness Rafael Altonaga testified that the reservation for a
"first class" accommodation for the plaintiff was confirmed. The court cannot believe that after such confirmation
defendant had a verbal understanding with plaintiff that the "first class" ticket issued to him by defendant would be
subject to confirmation in Hongkong. 23
We have heretofore adverted to the fact that except for a slight difference of a few pesos in the amount refunded
on Carrascoso's ticket, the decision of the Court of First Instance was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in all other
respects. We hold the view that such a judgment of affirmance has merged the judgment of the lower
court. 24Implicit in that affirmance is a determination by the Court of Appeals that the proceeding in the Court of
First Instance was free from prejudicial error and "all questions raised by the assignments of error and all
questions that might have been raised are to be regarded as finally adjudicated against the appellant". So also,
the judgment affirmed "must be regarded as free from all error". 25 We reached this policy construction because
nothing in the decision of the Court of Appeals on this point would suggest that its findings of fact are in any way
at war with those of the trial court. Nor was said affirmance by the Court of Appeals upon a ground or grounds
different from those which were made the basis of the conclusions of the trial court. 26
If, as petitioner underscores, a first-class-ticket holder is not entitled to a first class seat, notwithstanding the fact
that seat availability in specific flights is therein confirmed, then an air passenger is placed in the hollow of the
hands of an airline. What security then can a passenger have? It will always be an easy matter for an airline aided
by its employees, to strike out the very stipulations in the ticket, and say that there was a verbal agreement to the
contrary. What if the passenger had a schedule to fulfill? We have long learned that, as a rule, a written document
speaks a uniform language; that spoken word could be notoriously unreliable. If only to achieve stability in the
relations between passenger and air carrier, adherence to the ticket so issued is desirable. Such is the case here.
The lower courts refused to believe the oral evidence intended to defeat the covenants in the ticket.
The foregoing are the considerations which point to the conclusion that there are facts upon which the Court of
Appeals predicated the finding that respondent Carrascoso had a first class ticket and was entitled to a first class
seat at Bangkok, which is a stopover in the Saigon to Beirut leg of the flight. 27 We perceive no "welter of
distortions by the Court of Appeals of petitioner's statement of its position", as charged by petitioner. 28 Nor do we
subscribe to petitioner's accusation that respondent Carrascoso "surreptitiously took a first class seat to provoke
an issue". 29 And this because, as petitioner states, Carrascoso went to see the Manager at his office in Bangkok
"to confirm my seat and because from Saigon I was told again to see the Manager". 30 Why, then, was he allowed
to take a first class seat in the plane at Bangkok, if he had no seat? Or, if another had a better right to the seat?
4. Petitioner assails respondent court's award of moral damages. Petitioner's trenchant claim is that Carrascoso's
action is planted upon breach of contract; that to authorize an award for moral damages there must be an
averment of fraud or bad faith;31 and that the decision of the Court of Appeals fails to make a finding of bad faith.
The pivotal allegations in the complaint bearing on this issue are:
3. That ... plaintiff entered into a contract of air carriage with the Philippine Air Lines for a valuable
consideration, the latter acting as general agents for and in behalf of the defendant, under which said
contract, plaintiff was entitled to, as defendant agreed to furnish plaintiff, First Class passage on
defendant's plane during the entire duration of plaintiff's tour of Europe with Hongkong as starting point up
to and until plaintiff's return trip to Manila, ... .
4. That, during the first two legs of the trip from Hongkong to Saigon and from Saigon to Bangkok,
defendant furnished to the plaintiff First Class accommodation but only after protestations, arguments
and/or insistence were made by the plaintiff with defendant's employees.
5. That finally, defendant failed to provide First Class passage, but instead furnished plaintiff
only TouristClass accommodations from Bangkok to Teheran and/or Casablanca, ... the plaintiff has
been compelledby defendant's employees to leave the First Class accommodation berths at
Bangkok after he was already seated.

6. That consequently, the plaintiff, desiring no repetition of the inconvenience and embarrassments
brought by defendant's breach of contract was forced to take a Pan American World Airways plane on his
return trip from Madrid to Manila.32
xxx

xxx

xxx

2. That likewise, as a result of defendant's failure to furnish First Class accommodations aforesaid, plaintiff
suffered inconveniences, embarrassments, and humiliations, thereby causing plaintiff mental anguish, serious
anxiety, wounded feelings, social humiliation, and the like injury, resulting in moral damages in the amount of
P30,000.00. 33
xxx

xxx

xxx

The foregoing, in our opinion, substantially aver: First, That there was a contract to furnish plaintiff a first class
passage covering, amongst others, the Bangkok-Teheran leg; Second, That said contract was breached when
petitioner failed to furnish first class transportation at Bangkok; and Third, that there was bad faith when
petitioner's employee compelled Carrascoso to leave his first class accommodation berth "after he was already,
seated" and to take a seat in the tourist class, by reason of which he suffered inconvenience, embarrassments
and humiliations, thereby causing him mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and social humiliation,
resulting in moral damages. It is true that there is no specific mention of the term bad faith in the complaint. But,
the inference of bad faith is there, it may be drawn from the facts and circumstances set forth therein. 34 The
contract was averred to establish the relation between the parties. But the stress of the action is put on wrongful
expulsion.
Quite apart from the foregoing is that (a) right the start of the trial, respondent's counsel placed petitioner on guard
on what Carrascoso intended to prove: That while sitting in the plane in Bangkok, Carrascoso was oustedby
petitioner's manager who gave his seat to a white man; 35 and (b) evidence of bad faith in the fulfillment of the
contract was presented without objection on the part of the petitioner. It is, therefore, unnecessary to inquire as to
whether or not there is sufficient averment in the complaint to justify an award for moral damages. Deficiency in
the complaint, if any, was cured by the evidence. An amendment thereof to conform to the evidence is not even
required. 36 On the question of bad faith, the Court of Appeals declared:
That the plaintiff was forced out of his seat in the first class compartment of the plane belonging to the
defendant Air France while at Bangkok, and was transferred to the tourist class not only without his
consent but against his will, has been sufficiently established by plaintiff in his testimony before the court,
corroborated by the corresponding entry made by the purser of the plane in his notebook which notation
reads as follows:
"First-class passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against his will, and that the captain
refused to intervene",
and by the testimony of an eye-witness, Ernesto G. Cuento, who was a co-passenger. The captain of the
plane who was asked by the manager of defendant company at Bangkok to intervene even refused to do
so. It is noteworthy that no one on behalf of defendant ever contradicted or denied this evidence for the
plaintiff. It could have been easy for defendant to present its manager at Bangkok to testify at the trial of
the case, or yet to secure his disposition; but defendant did neither. 37
The Court of appeals further stated
Neither is there evidence as to whether or not a prior reservation was made by the white man. Hence, if
the employees of the defendant at Bangkok sold a first-class ticket to him when all the seats had already
been taken, surely the plaintiff should not have been picked out as the one to suffer the consequences
and to be subjected to the humiliation and indignity of being ejected from his seat in the presence of
others. Instead of explaining to the white man the improvidence committed by defendant's employees, the
manager adopted the more drastic step of ousting the plaintiff who was then safely ensconsced in his
rightful seat. We are strengthened in our belief that this probably was what happened there, by the
testimony of defendant's witness Rafael Altonaga who, when asked to explain the meaning of the letters
"O.K." appearing on the tickets of plaintiff, said "that the space is confirmed for first class. Likewise,
Zenaida Faustino, another witness for defendant, who was the chief of the Reservation Office of
defendant, testified as follows:

"Q How does the person in the ticket-issuing office know what reservation the passenger has
arranged with you?
A They call us up by phone and ask for the confirmation." (t.s.n., p. 247, June 19, 1959)
In this connection, we quote with approval what the trial Judge has said on this point:
Why did the, using the words of witness Ernesto G. Cuento, "white man" have a "better right" to
the seat occupied by Mr. Carrascoso? The record is silent. The defendant airline did not prove
"any better", nay, any right on the part of the "white man" to the "First class" seat that the plaintiff
was occupying and for which he paid and was issued a corresponding "first class" ticket.
If there was a justified reason for the action of the defendant's Manager in Bangkok, the
defendant could have easily proven it by having taken the testimony of the said Manager by
deposition, but defendant did not do so; the presumption is that evidence willfully suppressed
would be adverse if produced [Sec. 69, par (e), Rules of Court]; and, under the circumstances,
the Court is constrained to find, as it does find, that the Manager of the defendant airline in
Bangkok not merely asked but threatened the plaintiff to throw him out of the plane if he did not
give up his "first class" seat because the said Manager wanted to accommodate, using the words
of the witness Ernesto G. Cuento, the "white man".38
It is really correct to say that the Court of Appeals in the quoted portion first transcribed did not use the
term "bad faith". But can it be doubted that the recital of facts therein points to bad faith? The manager
not only prevented Carrascoso from enjoying his right to a first class seat; worse, he imposed his arbitrary
will; he forcibly ejected him from his seat, made him suffer the humiliation of having to go to the tourist
class compartment - just to give way to another passenger whose right thereto has not been established.
Certainly, this is bad faith. Unless, of course, bad faith has assumed a meaning different from what is
understood in law. For, "bad faith" contemplates a "state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design
or with some motive of self-interest or will or for ulterior purpose." 39
And if the foregoing were not yet sufficient, there is the express finding of bad faith in the judgment of the
Court of First Instance, thus:
The evidence shows that the defendant violated its contract of transportation with plaintiff in bad
faith, with the aggravating circumstances that defendant's Manager in Bangkok went to the extent
of threatening the plaintiff in the presence of many passengers to have him thrown out of the
airplane to give the "first class" seat that he was occupying to, again using the words of the
witness Ernesto G. Cuento, a "white man" whom he (defendant's Manager) wished to
accommodate, and the defendant has not proven that this "white man" had any "better right" to
occupy the "first class" seat that the plaintiff was occupying, duly paid for, and for which the
corresponding "first class" ticket was issued by the defendant to him. 40
5. The responsibility of an employer for the tortious act of its employees need not be essayed. It is well settled in
law. 41 For the willful malevolent act of petitioner's manager, petitioner, his employer, must answer. Article 21 of
the Civil Code says:
ART. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
In parallel circumstances, we applied the foregoing legal precept; and, we held that upon the provisions of Article
2219 (10), Civil Code, moral damages are recoverable. 42
6. A contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind and degree from any other contractual
relation. 43And this, because of the relation which an air-carrier sustains with the public. Its business is mainly with
the travelling public. It invites people to avail of the comforts and advantages it offers. The contract of air carriage,
therefore, generates a relation attended with a public duty. Neglect or malfeasance of the carrier's employees,
naturally, could give ground for an action for damages.
Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They have a right to be treated by the carrier's employees
with kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration. They are entitled to be protected against personal

misconduct, injurious language, indignities and abuses from such employees. So it is, that any rule or
discourteous conduct on the part of employees towards a passenger gives the latter an action for damages
against the carrier. 44
Thus, "Where a steamship company 45 had accepted a passenger's check, it was a breach of contract and a tort,
giving a right of action for its agent in the presence of third persons to falsely notify her that the check was
worthless and demand payment under threat of ejection, though the language used was not insulting and she was
not ejected." 46 And this, because, although the relation of passenger and carrier is "contractual both in origin and
nature" nevertheless "the act that breaks the contract may be also a tort". 47 And in another case, "Where a
passenger on a railroad train, when the conductor came to collect his fare tendered him the cash fare to a point
where the train was scheduled not to stop, and told him that as soon as the train reached such point he would pay
the cash fare from that point to destination, there was nothing in the conduct of the passenger which justified the
conductor in using insulting language to him, as by calling him a lunatic," 48 and the Supreme Court of South
Carolina there held the carrier liable for the mental suffering of said passenger.1awphl.nt
Petitioner's contract with Carrascoso is one attended with public duty. The stress of Carrascoso's action as we
have said, is placed upon his wrongful expulsion. This is a violation of public duty by the petitioner air carrier a
case of quasi-delict. Damages are proper.
7. Petitioner draws our attention to respondent Carrascoso's testimony, thus
Q You mentioned about an attendant. Who is that attendant and purser?
A When we left already that was already in the trip I could not help it. So one of the flight attendants
approached me and requested from me my ticket and I said, What for? and she said, "We will note that
you transferred to the tourist class". I said, "Nothing of that kind. That is tantamount to accepting my
transfer." And I also said, "You are not going to note anything there because I am protesting to this
transfer".
Q Was she able to note it?
A No, because I did not give my ticket.
Q About that purser?
A Well, the seats there are so close that you feel uncomfortable and you don't have enough leg room, I
stood up and I went to the pantry that was next to me and the purser was there. He told me, "I have
recorded the incident in my notebook." He read it and translated it to me because it was recorded in
French "First class passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against his will, and that the captain
refused to intervene."
Mr. VALTE
I move to strike out the last part of the testimony of the witness because the best evidence would be the
notes. Your Honor.
COURT
I will allow that as part of his testimony. 49
Petitioner charges that the finding of the Court of Appeals that the purser made an entry in his notebook reading
"First class passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against his will, and that the captain refused to
intervene" is predicated upon evidence [Carrascoso's testimony above] which is incompetent. We do not think so.
The subject of inquiry is not the entry, but the ouster incident. Testimony on the entry does not come within the
proscription of the best evidence rule. Such testimony is admissible. 49a
Besides, from a reading of the transcript just quoted, when the dialogue happened, the impact of the startling
occurrence was still fresh and continued to be felt. The excitement had not as yet died down. Statements then, in
this environment, are admissible as part of the res gestae. 50 For, they grow "out of the nervous excitement and

mental and physical condition of the declarant". 51 The utterance of the purser regarding his entry in the notebook
was spontaneous, and related to the circumstances of the ouster incident. Its trustworthiness has been
guaranteed. 52 It thus escapes the operation of the hearsay rule. It forms part of the res gestae.
At all events, the entry was made outside the Philippines. And, by an employee of petitioner. It would have been
an easy matter for petitioner to have contradicted Carrascoso's testimony. If it were really true that no such entry
was made, the deposition of the purser could have cleared up the matter.
We, therefore, hold that the transcribed testimony of Carrascoso is admissible in evidence.
8. Exemplary damages are well awarded. The Civil Code gives the court ample power to grant exemplary
damages in contracts and quasi- contracts. The only condition is that defendant should have "acted in a
wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner." 53 The manner of ejectment of respondent
Carrascoso from his first class seat fits into this legal precept. And this, in addition to moral damages.54
9. The right to attorney's fees is fully established. The grant of exemplary damages justifies a similar judgment for
attorneys' fees. The least that can be said is that the courts below felt that it is but just and equitable that
attorneys' fees be given. 55 We do not intend to break faith with the tradition that discretion well exercised as it
was here should not be disturbed.
10. Questioned as excessive are the amounts decreed by both the trial court and the Court of Appeals, thus:
P25,000.00 as moral damages; P10,000.00, by way of exemplary damages, and P3,000.00 as attorneys' fees.
The task of fixing these amounts is primarily with the trial court. 56 The Court of Appeals did not interfere with the
same. The dictates of good sense suggest that we give our imprimatur thereto. Because, the facts and
circumstances point to the reasonableness thereof.57
On balance, we say that the judgment of the Court of Appeals does not suffer from reversible error. We
accordingly vote to affirm the same. Costs against petitioner. So ordered.

CATHAY PACIFIC AIRWAYS, LTD vs. COURT OF APPEALS and TOMAS L. ALCANTARA
G.R. No. 60501. March 5, 1993, FIRST DIVISION
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; CONTRACT OF CARRIAGE; BREACH THEREOF; PETITIONER BREACHED ITS CONTRACT
OF CARRIAGE WITH PRIVATE RESPONDENT WHEN IT FAILED TO DELIVER HIS LUGGAGE AT THE
DESIGNATED PLACE AND TIME. Petitioner breached its contract of carriage with private respondent when it
failed to deliver his luggage at the designated place and time, it being the obligation of a common carrier to carry
its passengers and their luggage safely to their destination, which includes the duty not to delay their
transportation, and the evidence shows that petitioner acted fraudulently or in bad faith.
2. DAMAGES; MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES PREDICATED UPON A BREACH OF CONTRACT OF
CARRIAGE; RECOVERABLE ONLY IN INSTANCES WHERE THE MISHAP RESULTS IN DEATH OF A
PASSENGER, OR WHERE THE CARRIER IS GUILTY OF FRAUD OR BAD FAITH; THE CONDUCT OF
PETITIONER'S REPRESENTATIVE TOWARDS RESPONDENT JUSTIFIES THE GRANT OF MORAL AND
EXEMPLARY DAMAGES IN CASE AT BAR. Moral damages predicated upon a breach of contract of carriage
may only be recoverable in instances where the mishap results in death of a passenger, or where the carrier is
guilty of fraud or bad faith. The language and conduct of petitioner's representative towards respondent Alcantara
was discourteous or arbitrary to justify the grant of moral damages. The CATHAY representative was not only
indifferent and impatient; he was also rude and insulting. He simply advised Alcantara to buy anything he wanted.
But even that was not sincere because the representative knew that the passenger was limited only to $20.00
which, certainly, was not enough to purchase comfortable clothings appropriate for an executive conference.
Considering that Alcantara was not only a revenue passenger but even paid for a first class airline
accommodation and accompanied at the time by the Commercial Attache of the Philippine Embassy who was
assisting him in his problem, petitioner or its agents should have been more courteous and accommodating to
private respondent, instead of giving him a curt reply, "What can we do, the baggage is missing. I cannot do
anything . . . Anyhow, you can buy anything you need, charged to Cathay Pacific." Where in breaching the
contract of carriage the defendant airline is not shown to have acted fraudulently or in bad faith, liability for
damages is limited to the natural and probable consequences of the breach of obligation which the parties had
foreseen or could have reasonably foreseen. In that case, such liability does not include moral and exemplary
damages. Conversely, if the defendant airline is shown to have acted fraudulently or in bad faith, the award of
moral and exemplary damages is proper.
3. TEMPERATE DAMAGES; RECOVERABLE ONLY UPON PROOF THAT THE CLAIMANT SUSTAINED SOME
PECUNIARY LOSS. However, respondent Alcantara is not entitled to temperate damages, contrary to the
ruling of the court a quo, in the absence of any showing that he sustained some pecuniary loss. It cannot be
gainsaid that respondent's luggage was ultimately delivered to him without serious or appreciable damage.
4. WARSAW CONVENTION; DOES NOT OPERATE AS AN EXCLUSIVE ENUMERATION OF THE INSTANCES
FOR DECLARING A CARRIER LIABLE FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT OF CARRIAGE OR AS AN ABSOLUTE
LIMIT OF THE EXTENT OF THAT LIABILITY; DOES NOT PRECLUDE THE OPERATION OF THE CIVIL CODE
AND OTHER PERTINENT LAWS. As We have repeatedly held, although the Warsaw Convention has the
force and effect of law in this country, being a treaty commitment assumed by the Philippine government, said
convention does not operate as an exclusive enumeration of the instances for declaring a carrier liable for breach
of contract of carriage or as an absolute limit of the extent of that liability. The Warsaw Convention declares the
carrier liable for damages in the enumerated cases and under certain limitations. However, it must not be
construed to preclude the operation of the Civil Code and other pertinent laws. It does not regulate, much less
exempt, the carrier from liability for damages for violating the rights of its passengers under the contract of
carriage, especially if wilfull misconduct on the part of the carrier's employees is found or established, which is
clearly the case before Us.
DECISION
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed with modification
that of the trial court by increasing the award of damages in favor of private respondent Tomas L. Alcantara.
The facts are undisputed: On 19 October 1975, respondent Tomas L. Alcantara was a first class passenger of
petitioner Cathay Pacific Airways, Ltd. (CATHAY for brevity) on its Flight No. CX-900 from Manila to Hongkong

and onward from Hongkong to Jakarta on Flight No. CX-711. The purpose of his trip was to attend the following
day, 20 October 1975, a conference with the Director General of Trade of Indonesia, Alcantara being the
Executive Vice-President and General Manager of Iligan Cement Corporation, Chairman of the Export Committee
of the Philippine Cement Corporation, and representative of the Cement Industry Authority and the Philippine
Cement Corporation. He checked in his luggage which contained not only his clothing and articles for personal
use but also papers and documents he needed for the conference.
Upon his arrival in Jakarta, respondent discovered that his luggage was missing. When he inquired about his
luggage from CATHAY's representative in Jakarta, private respondent was told that his luggage was left behind in
Hongkong. For this, respondent Alcantara was offered $20.00 as "inconvenience money" to buy his immediate
personal needs until the luggage could be delivered to him.
His luggage finally reached Jakarta more than twenty four (24) hours after his arrival. However, it was not
delivered to him at his hotel but was required by petitioner to be picked up by an official of the Philippine
Embassy.
On 1 March 1976, respondent filed his complaint against petitioner with the Court of First Instance (now Regional
Trial Court) of Lanao del Norte praying for temperate, moral and exemplary damages, plus attorney's fees.
On 18 April 1976, the trial court rendered its decision ordering CATHAY to pay Plaintiff P20,000.00 for moral
damages, P5,000.00 for temperate damages, P10,000.00 for exemplary damages, and P25,000.00 for attorney's
fees, and the costs.
Both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals. CATHAY assailed the conclusion of the trial court that it was
accountable for breach of contract and questioned the non-application by the court of the Warsaw Convention as
well as the excessive damages awarded on the basis of its finding that respondent Alcantara was rudely treated
by petitioner's employees during the time that his luggage could not be found. For his part, respondent Alcantara
assigned as error the failure of the trial court to grant the full amount of damages sought in his complaint.
On 11 November 1981, respondent Court of Appeals rendered its decision affirming the findings of fact of the trial
court but modifying its award by increasing the moral damages to P80,000.00, exemplary damages to P20,000.00
and temperate or moderate damages to P10,000.00. The award of P25,000.00 for attorney's fees was
maintained.
The same grounds raised by petitioner in the Court of Appeals are reiterated before Us. CATHAY contends that:
(1) the Court of Appeals erred in holding petitioner liable to respondent Alcantara for moral, exemplary and
temperate damages as well as attorney's fees; and, (2) the Court of Appeals erred in failing to apply the Warsaw
Convention on the liability of a carrier to its passengers.
On its first assigned error, CATHAY argues that although it failed to transport respondent Alcantara's luggage on
time, the one-day delay was not made in bad faith so as to justify moral, exemplary and temperate damages. It
submits that the conclusion of respondent appellate court that private respondent was treated rudely and
arrogantly when he sought assistance from CATHAY's employees has no factual basis, hence, the award of
moral damages has no leg to stand on.
Petitioner's first assigned error involves findings of fact which are not reviewable by this Court. At any rate, it is
not impressed with merit. Petitioner breached its contract of carriage with private respondent when it failed to
deliver his luggage at the designated place and time, it being the obligation of a common carrier to carry its
passengers and their luggage safely to their destination, which includes the duty not to delay their transportation,
and the evidence shows that petitioner acted fraudulently or in bad faith.
Moral damages predicated upon a breach of contract of carriage may only be recoverable in instances where the
mishap results in death of a passenger, or where the carrier is guilty of fraud or bad faith.
In the case at bar, both the trial court and the appellate court found that CATHAY was grossly negligent and
reckless when it failed to deliver the luggage of petitioner at the appointed place and time. We agree. CATHAY
alleges that as a result of mechanical trouble, all pieces of luggage on board the first aircraft bound for Jakarta
were unloaded and transferred to the second aircraft which departed an hour and a half later. Yet, as the Court of
Appeals noted, petitioner was not even aware that it left behind private respondent's luggage until its attention
was called by the Hongkong Customs authorities. More, bad faith or otherwise improper conduct may be

attributed to the employees of petitioner. While the mere failure of CATHAY to deliver respondent's luggage at the
agreed place and time did not ipso facto amount to willful misconduct since the luggage was eventually delivered
to private respondent, albeit belatedly, we are persuaded that the employees of CATHAY acted in bad faith. We
refer to the deposition of Romulo Palma, Commercial Attache of the Philippine Embassy at Jakarta, who was with
respondent Alcantara when the latter sought assistance from the employees of CATHAY. This deposition was the
basis of the findings of the lower courts when both awarded moral damages to private respondent. Hereunder is
part of Palma's testimony
"Q: What did Mr. Alcantara say, if any?
A. Mr. Alcantara was of course . . . . I could understand his position. He was furious for the experience because
probably he was thinking he was going to meet the Director-General the following day and, well, he was with no
change of proper clothes and so, I would say, he was not happy about the situation.
Q: What did Mr. Alcantara say?
A: He was trying to press the fellow to make the report and if possible make the delivery of his baggage as soon
as possible.
Q: And what did the agent or duty officer say, if any?
A: The duty officer, of course, answered back saying 'What can we do, the baggage is missing. I cannot do
anything.' something like it. 'Anyhow you can buy anything you need, charged to Cathay Pacific.'
Q: What was the demeanor or comportment of the duty officer of Cathay Pacific when he said to Mr. Alcantara
'You can buy anything chargeable to Cathay Pacific'?
A: If I had to look at it objectively, the duty officer would like to dismiss the affair as soon as possible by saying
indifferently 'Don't worry. It can be found.'"
Indeed, the aforequoted testimony shows that the language and conduct of petitioner's representative towards
respondent Alcantara was discourteous or arbitrary to justify the grant of moral damages. The CATHAY
representative was not only indifferent and impatient; he was also rude and insulting. He simply advised Alcantara
to buy anything he wanted. But even that was not sincere because the representative knew that the passenger
was limited only to $20.00 which, certainly, was not enough to purchase comfortable clothings appropriate for an
executive conference. Considering that Alcantara was not only a revenue passenger but even paid for a first class
airline accommodation and accompanied at the time by the Commercial Attache of the Philippine Embassy who
was assisting him in his problem, petitioner or its agents should have been more courteous and accommodating
to private respondent, instead of giving him a curt reply, "What can we do, the baggage is missing. I cannot do
anything . . . Anyhow, you can buy anything you need, charged to Cathay Pacific." CATHAY's employees should
have been more solicitous to a passenger in distress and assuaged his anxieties and apprehensions. To
compound matters, CATHAY refused to have the luggage of Alcantara delivered to him at his hotel; instead, he
was required to pick it up himself and an official of the Philippine Embassy. Under the circumstances, it is evident
that petitioner was remiss in its duty to provide proper and adequate assistance to a paying passenger, more so
one with first class accommodation.
Where in breaching the contract of carriage the defendant airline is not shown to have acted fraudulently or in bad
faith, liability for damages is limited to the natural and probable consequences of the breach of obligation which
the parties had foreseen or could have reasonably foreseen. In that case, such liability does not include moral and
exemplary damages. Conversely, if the defendant airline is shown to have acted fraudulently or in bad faith, the
award of moral and exemplary damages is proper.
However, respondent Alcantara is not entitled to temperate damages, contrary to the ruling of the court a quo, in
the absence of any showing that he sustained some pecuniary loss. It cannot be gainsaid that respondent's
luggage was ultimately delivered to him without serious or appreciable damage.
As regards its second assigned error, petitioner airline contends that the extent of its liability for breach of contract
should be limited absolutely to that set forth in the Warsaw Convention. We do not agree. As We have repeatedly
held, although the Warsaw Convention has the force and effect of law in this country, being a treaty commitment
assumed by the Philippine government, said convention does not operate as an exclusive enumeration of the

instances for declaring a carrier liable for breach of contract of carriage or as an absolute limit of the extent of that
liability. The Warsaw Convention declares the carrier liable for damages in the enumerated cases and under
certain limitations. However, it must not be construed to preclude the operation of the Civil Code and other
pertinent laws. It does not regulate, much less exempt, the carrier from liability for damages for violating the rights
of its passengers under the contract of carriage, especially if wilfull misconduct on the part of the carrier's
employees is found or established, which is clearly the case before Us. For, the Warsaw Convention itself
provides in Art. 25 that
"(1) The carrier shall not be entitled to avail himself of the provisions of this convention which exclude or limit his
liability, if the damage is caused by his wilfull misconduct or by such default on his part as, in accordance with the
law of the court to which the case is submitted, is considered to be equivalent to wilfull misconduct."
(2) Similarly the carrier shall not be entitled to avail himself of the said provisions, if the damage is caused under
the same circumstances by any agent of the carrier acting within the scope of his employment."
When petitioner airline misplaced respondent's luggage and failed to deliver it to its passenger at the appointed
place and time, some special species of injury must have been caused to him. For sure, the latter underwent
profound distress and anxiety, and the fear of losing the opportunity to fulfill the purpose of his trip. In fact, for
want of appropriate clothings for the occasion brought about by the delay of the arrival of his luggage, to his
embarrassment and consternation respondent Alcantara had to seek postponement of his pre-arranged
conference with the Director General of Trade of the host country.
In one case, this Court observed that a traveller would naturally suffer mental anguish, anxiety and shock when
he finds that his luggage did not travel with him and he finds himself in a foreign land without any article of
clothing other than what he has on.
Thus, respondent is entitled to moral and exemplary damages. We however find the award by the Court of
Appeals of P80,000.00 for moral damages excessive, hence, We reduce the amount to P30,000.00. The
exemplary damages of P20,000.00 being reasonable is maintained, as well as the attorney's fees of P25,000.00
considering that petitioner's act or omission has compelled Alcantara to litigate with third persons or to incur
expenses to protect his interest.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of respondent Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with the exception of the
award of temperate damages of P10,000.00 which is deleted, while the award of moral damages of P80,000.00 is
reduced to P30,000.00. The award of P20,000.00 for exemplary damages is maintained as reasonable together
with the attorney's fees of P25,000.00. The moral and exemplary damages shall earn interest at the legal rate
from 1 March 1976 when the complaint was filed until full payment.
SO ORDERED.