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DOROMAL V. CA
FACTS: A parcel of land in Iloilo were co-owned by 7 siblings all surnamed Horilleno.
5 of the siblings gave a SPA to their niece Mary Jimenez, who succeeded her father
as a co-owner, for the sale of the land to father and son Doromal. One of the coowner, herein petitioner, Filomena Javellana however did not gave her consent to
the sale even though her siblings executed a SPA for her signature. The co-owners
went on with the sale of 6/7 part of the land and a new title for the Doromals were
issued.
Respondent offered to repurchase the land for 30K as stated in the deed of sale but
petitioners declined invoking lapse in time for the right of repurchase. Petitioner
also contend that the 30K price was only placed in the deed of sale to minimize
payment of fees and taxes and as such, respondent should pay the real price paid
which was P115, 250.
ISSUE: WON the period to repurchase of petitioner has already lapsed.
HELD: Period of repurchase has not yet lapsed because the respondent was not
notified of the sale. The 30-day period for the right of repurchase starts only after
actual notice not only of a perfected sale but of actual execution and delivery of the
deed of sale.
The letter sent to the respondent by the other co-owners cannot be considered as
actual notice because the letter was only to inform her of the intention to sell the
property but not its actual sale. As such, the 30-day period has not yet commenced
and the respondent can still exercise his right to repurchase.
The respondent should also pay only the 30K stipulated in the deed of sale because
a redemptioners right is to be subrogated by the same terms and conditions
stipulated in the contract.

GOLDENROD V CA G.R. NO. 126812

Facts:
Barretto owned parcels of land which were mortgaged to UCPB. Barretto failed to
pay; the properties were foreclosed. Goldenrod made an offer to Barretto that it
would buy the properties and pay off the remaining balance of Barrettos loan with
UCPB. It paid Barretto 1 million pesos as part of the purchase price. The remaining
balance would be paid once Barretto had consolidated the titles. On the date that
Goldenrod was supposed to pay, Goldenrod asked for an extension. UCPB agreed.
When the extension date arrived, Goldenrod asked for another extension. UCPB
refused. Barretto successfully consolidated the titles. Goldenrod informed Barretto
that it would not be able to push through with their agreement. It asked Barretto to
return the 1 million pesos. Barretto did not give in to Goldenrods
rescission. Instead, it sold the property that was part of their agreement to
Asiaworld.
Issue: Should Goldenrod be paid back the 1 million pesos?

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Held: Yes. Rescission creates the obligation to return the things which were the
object of the contract together with the fruits and interest. Barretto is obliged to pay
Goldenrod back because 1) Goldenrod decided to rescind the sale; 2) the
transaction was called off and; 3) the property was sold to a third person. By virtue
of the extrajudicial rescission of the contract to sell by Goldenrod, without
opposition from Barretto, who in turn sold it to a third person, Barretto had the
obligation to return the 1 million pesos plus legal interest from the date it received
the notice of rescission.

EDRADA v RAMOS
Ramos (respondents) are the owners of two (2) fishing vessels, the "Lady Lalaine"
and the "Lady Theresa." On 1 April 1996, respondents and petitioners executed an
untitled handwritten document which lies a tthe center of the present controversy.
full text is reproduced below:
1st April 1996This is to acknowledge that Fishing Vessels 'Lady Lalaine' and 'Lady
Theresa' owned by Eduardo O. Ramos are now in my possession and received in
good running and serviceable order. As such, the vessels are now my responsibility.
Documents pertaining to the sale and agreement of payments between me and the
owner of the vessel to follow. The agreed price for the vessel is Nine Hundred
Thousand Only (P900,000.00).(SGD.)(SGD.)EDUARDO O. RAMOSALFREDO R.
EDRADA(Seller)(Purchaser)CONFORME:CONFORME:(SGD.)(SGD.)CARMENCITA
RAMOSROSIE ENDRADA

Petitioners delivered to respondents four (4) postdated FEBTC checks payable to

cash drawn by petitioner Rosella Edrada, in various amounts totaling One Hundred
Forty Thousand Pesos (P140,000.00). The first three (3) checks were honored upon
presentment to the drawee bank while the fourth check for One Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P100,000.00) was dishonored because of a "stop payment" order.

On 3 June 1996, respondents filed an action against petitioners for specific

performance with damages before the RTC, praying that petitioners be obliged to
execute the necessary deed of sale of the two fishing vessels and to pay the
balance of the purchase price (as evidenced by the agreement cited above).

However, despite delivery of said vessels and repeated oral demands, petitioners
failed to pay the balance. They averred that that the document sued upon merely
embodies an agreement brought about by the loans they extended to respondents.
According to petitioners, respondents allowed them to manage or administer the
fishing vessels as a business on the understanding that should they find the
business profitable, the vessels would be sold to them for Nine Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P900,000.00).But petitioners "decided to call it quits" after spending a hefty
sum for the repair and maintenance of the vessels which were already in dilapidated
condition.

RTC in favour of Sps. Ramos and ordered Sps. Edrada to pay 860k. This court
treated the action as one for collection of a sum of money and for damages and
considered the document as a perfected contract of sale. MR filed after but was
denied. CA affirmed.
ISSUE: WON the document is a perfected contract of sale
HELD: SC disagree with the RTC and the Court of Appeals that the document is a
perfected contract of sale.
a. A contract of sale is defined as an agreement whereby one of the contracting
parties obligates himself totransfer the ownership of and to deliver a
determinate thing, and the other to pay therefore a pricecertain in money or
its equivalent.
It must evince the consent on the part of the seller to transfer anddeliver and on the
part of the buyer to pay.
b. The agreement may confirm the receipt by respondents of the two vessels
and their purchase price.However, there is no equivocal agreement to
transfer ownership of the vessel, but a mere commitmentthat "documents
pertaining to the sale and agreement of payments . . . [are] to follow."
Evidently, thedocument or documents which would formalize the transfer of
ownership and contain the terms of payment of the purchase price, or the
period when such would become due and demandable, have yet tobe
executed. But no such document was executed and no such terms were
stipulated upon.

Philippines Free Press, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals

(473 SCRA 639)
FACTS: Petitioner, thru Teodoro Locsin, Sr., filed a case of Annulment of Sale of its
building, lot and printing machineries during the regime of Martial Law to private
respondent then represented by late B/Gen. Menzi on February 26, 1987. Petitioner
contends that there was vitiated consent and gross inadequacy of purchase price
during its sale on October 23, 1973. The trial court dismissed petitioners complaint
and granted private respondents counterclaim. It was elevated to the Court of
Appeals but was also dismissed for lack of merit.
ISSUE: Whether or not the action for annulment has already prescribed.
RULING: YES. Article 391 of the Civil Code pertinently reads The action for
annulment shall be brought within four years. This period shall begin: In cases of
intimidation, violence or undue influence, from the time the defect of consent
ceases x x x.
[The Supreme Court] can not accept the petitioners contention that the period
during which authoritarian rule was in force had interrupted prescription and that

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the same began to run only on February 25, 1986, when the Aquino government
took power. It is true that under Article 1154 [of the Civil Code] xxx fortuitous
events have the effect of tolling the period of prescription. However, [the Supreme
Court] can not say, as a universal rule, that the period from September 21, 1972
through February 25, 1986 involves a force majeure. Plainly, [the Supreme Court]
can not box in the dictatorial period within the term without distinction, and
without, by necessity, suspending all liabilities, however demandable, incurred
during that period, including perhaps those ordered by this Court to be paid.

Cruz v Fernando
In 1983, Cruz executed a Kasunduan with the Gloriosos for the consideration of the
rear portion of a 223 sq m lot. The Kasunduan provides that the lot will be sold at a
P40 per sq m. That the portion of the lot to be sold is the rear portion of it. That
upon selling, the Cruz will transfer their house from the front portion to the rear
portion of the land once it is bought. That they will have a right of way from the
front portion going to the back end of the lot. The Cruz never gave anything to the
Gloriosos for there was an alleged failure to have the land surveyed. Due to non
payment, the Gloriosos instead sold the whole lot (back and rear portion) to the
Fernandos.
In 1994, after repeated demands, the Fernandos filed a case in court for accion
publiciana demanding the Cruz to vacate the lot and to pay a rental of P500.00. The
RTC ruled in favor of the Fernandos. The CA affirmed the RTC ruling.
ISSUE: Whether or not what transpired between the Cruzes and the Gloriosos was a
contract of sale.
HELD: No. The absence of a specific manner of payment in the terms and
conditions of the contract makes it a contract to sell. Ownership was never
transferred to the Cruzes. This is because the manner of payment of the purchase
price is an essential element before a valid and binding contract of sale can exist.
Although the Civil Code does not expressly state that the minds of the parties must
also meet on the terms or manner of payment of the price, the same is needed,
otherwise there is no sale. Also, the Cruzes never transferred their house from the
front portion to the rear portion of the lot. It was evident in the contract that they
will transfer the house to the rear portion once they were able to buy it.
The SC also ruled that the Fernandos were not buyers in bad faith. There was no
consummated sale between the Cruzes and the Gloriosos. In a contract to sell, there
being no previous sale of the property, a third person buying such property despite
the fulfillment of the suspensive condition such as the full payment of the purchase
price, for instance, cannot be deemed a buyer in bad faith and the prospective
buyer cannot seek the relief of reconveyance of the property. There is no double
sale in such case. Title to the property will transfer to the buyer after registration
because there is no defect in the owner-sellers title per se, but the latter, of course,
may be sued for damages by the intending buyer.

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Walang morales devt co vs CA

Laperal vs. Rogers

Roberto Laperal sold his property to the Japanese Military Controlled Republic of the
Philippines for the sum of P.500,000 in Japanese Military War notes. When Japanese
occupation was over, Laperal filed an action for recovery of hisproperty with the
alien property custodian alleging that the sale took place during the Japanese
regime amd was madeunder duress and the consideration was grossly inadequate.
The trial court ruled in favor of Laperal.
Laperals contention:
The main allegations of the complaint were that appellee executed the deed of sale
of April 12, 1944 in favor of theoccupation Republic of the Philippines under duress
and due to the threats employed by the representatives of theJapanese Military
Administration, and that the consideration of P500,000.00 in Japanese Military notes
wasgrossly inadequate.
Respondents contention:
The Philippine Alien Property Administrator denied, for lack of knowledge and
information, plaintiffs allegationsconcerning the circumstances under which the
sale of the property was allegedly made. The Register of Deeds of Manila was
declared in default due to his failure to answer the complaint within the
reglementary period.
Issue: Was the deed of sale executed under duress that the contract can be
nullified?
Held: With respect to the first issue, the lower court found on the basis of the
evidence before it, that the sale was executedunder duress.(1) It is of common
knowledge that, during the second world war, the Japanese army of occupation in
the Philippines, didoccupy and take private properties in the City of Manila and
elsewhere in the country without the consent of their respective owners, for their
use in the prosecution of the war, resorting in some cases to the expedient of
making the owners execute deeds of sale or contracts of lease;(2) It is not denied
that appellee, before the war and at the time of the execution of the questioned
sale, was a very rich man with extensive real state holdings principally in Manila.
The record discloses in this connection, that from 1914 up to the date of the sale, he
had not disposed of a single property by sale. The record further shows that at the
time of the sale,he was in possession of a considerable amount of money, both in
genuine Philippine currency and in Japanese military notes. Highly solvent as he was
at the time, it was improbable to say the least that he would dispose of such
valuable property as the one in question. If he had been in need of money at all, he
would probably have sold some other much less desirable property. One may
believe that the sale in question was voluntary only by assuming that Laperal sold
the property involved to collaborate in the attainment of the ends pursued by the
Japanese army of occupation an assumption completely unjustified in this case in
view of the absolute absence of evidence, direct or indirect, that Laperal
collaborated or had ever intended to collaborate with the enemy.(3)

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The consideration paid for the property, namely the sum of P500,000.00 in Japanese
military notes, was grossly inadequate.
It has been agreed, for the purpose of this case, that at the time of the sale (April
1944), a pre- war Philippine peso was worth fourteen Japanese military pesos. On
the other hand, the evidence of record shows that thepre-war assessed value of the
property in question was P92,995.00 which, if reduced to its equivalent value in
terms of Japanese military notes as of April 1944, would have amounted to around
P1,300.000.00 (Japanese military notes). Wemust also consider the fact that the
pre-war assessed value of the property did not represent its real or actual value
whichcould easily be around P200,000.00.
Reduced to its equivalent in Japanese military notes, this would havemeant around
P2,800,000.00. Instead, he was merely paid P500,000.00 in Japanese military notes,
orthe equivalent of something around P35,000.00, Philippine currency, at the time.

AURORA P. DE LEON vs. HONORABLE JUDGE

FERNANDO CRUZ
of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Caloocan City, Branch XII
Facts: The Court herein reiterates the rule that in the absence of overriding
considerations, the judgment debtor will not be granted preliminary injunction to
enjoin execution of a final judgment or implementation of an already executed
judgment simply because of the filing by the judgment debtor of a new action for
annulment of the executed judgment on bare allegations of fraud, because the
presumption is that such judgment was legally and validly rendered.
On December 28, 1970, this Court rendered its joint decision in Cases L-30871 1
and L-31603 2 involving the same protagonists at bar, wherein the decisive issue of
conflict of jurisdiction between two branches of the Caloocan City court of first
instance was stated thus:
The Court sustained the exclusive jurisdiction of Judge Cruzs court, holding that
(I)t is patent that such exclusive jurisdiction was vested in Judge Cruz court.
This Court thus upheld the validity of the execution sale held on February 14, 1967
of respondent Bernabes two real properties (registered under T.C.T. Nos. 94985 and
94986 of Caloocan City) wherein petitioner Aurora de Leon (sister of the judgment
creditor Enrique de Leon) was the highest bidder and of Judge Cruz orders of
September 5, 1969 and January 5, 1970 in the first case (No. C-189) consolidating
ownership of the properties in petitioner de Leon with the expiration of the
redemption period and ordering respondent to surrender his owners duplicate
certificates of title to the properties thus sold to petitioner since said orders were
within the exclusive competence and jurisdiction of Judge Cruz court.
By the same token, this Court held that Judge Salvador had no jurisdiction to take
cognizance of respondent Bernabes second action (Case No. C-1217) against his
judgment creditor Enrique de Leon and herein petitioner Aurora P. de Leon as

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purchaser to set aside or annul the execution on February 14, 1967 for being
anomalous and irregular and to order the holding of a new auction sale.
Pursuant to this Courts said decision, petitioner assumed control of the properties
and collection of the rentals therefrom, while under the Courts resolution of March
15, 1971, Bernabes motion for the return of the redemption amount of P33,817.28
accepted by the sheriff under Judge Salvadors order of May 20, 1969 which this
Court set aside and declared null and void, was granted as a matter of equity.
It now turns out that respondent Bernabe filed under the same date of March 15,
1971 still another action against petitioner Aurora P. de Leon, et al. (docketed as
Case No. C-2048) for annulment or declaration of nullity of the judgment rendered
against him in the first case (No. C-189) at the execution sale of which petitioner de
Leon had acquired his properties in question on the ground that the judgment
rendered in Civil Case No. C-189 which led to the execution and sale of his
properties, was null and void because the same was secured by Enrique de Leon, Jr.,
petitioners brother and the plaintiff named in Civil Case No. C-189, through fraud,
deceit and misrepresentation in that his (Enrique de Leon, Jr.) signatures appearing
in the document (lease contract) on which his complaint in Civil Case No. C-189 was
founded, and in the verification of said complaint, were both falsified by his father,
Enrique de Leon, Jr. is not entitled to the judgment he obtained in Civil Case No. C189 because the complaint which gave rise to it was not instituted by him but by his
father, Enrique de Leon, Sr. the person who signed the verification thereof
declaring that he is the plaintiff named therein.
When petitioner asked respondent judge to finally enforce his previous orders of
September 5, 1969 and January 5, 1970 for the surrender and cancellation of
respondent Bernabes certificates of title and the issuance of new certificates in
petitioners favor (as upheld by this Courts previous decision above referred to),
respondent judge denied petitioners motions to this effect per his orders of June 11,
1971 and September 8, 1971 on the ground of pendency of respondents new action
for annulment of judgment (Case No.
C-2048).
Hence, the present petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. 12 The Court,
in giving due course, issued on January 15, 1972 its writ of preliminary injunction
enjoining respondents from further restraining this Courts final decision in Cases L30871 and L-31603 above referred to and respondent judge from further taking
cognizance of and proceeding with the annulment case (No. C-2048).
Issue: The crucial issue thus presented at bar is whether respondent judge acted
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction in issuing his
challenged orders restraining in effect implementation of this Courts final decision
of December 28, 1970 which sustained his own orders of September 5, 1969 and
January 5, 1970 in the original case (No. C-189) confirming Auroras acquisition of
title to the properties by virtue of the execution sale and ordering Bernabe to
transfer possession to her 13 simply from the bare fact that respondent Bernabe
has filed on March 15, 1971 a second action for annulment of the executed
judgment for alleged fraud (Case No. C-2048) after his first action for annulment of
the execution sale in favor of petitioner Aurora (Case No. C-1217) had failed and this

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Court had sustained by final judgment the very orders implementing the execution
sale which respondent judge would now enjoin?
Ruling:
The Court holds that respondent judge did so act with grave abuse of discretion. In
the absence of overriding considerations and none has been shown here the
implementation of execution proceedings already performed in satisfaction of a
judgment and sustained by final judgment of this Court (for consolidation of title of
the properties acquired in the execution sale by petitioner Aurora and her exercise
of the rights of ownership and possession the same) will not be enjoined, simply
because of the filing by the judgment debtor of a new action for annulment of the
executed judgment on the ground of fraud, because the presumption is that such
judgment was legally and validly rendered. This is doubly true where as in this case
respondent judgment debtor has already failed in a previous action to annul the
execution sale and this Court sustained the validity of such sale in a final judgment
rendered over three years ago on December 28, 1970.
Equally pertinent is the established doctrine that where there is no question about
the jurisdiction of the court over the parties and subject matter and the proceedings
were free from extrinsic fraud, the judgment cannot be declared null and void even
if it were assumed that the court committed an error of judgment or reached an
erroneous conclusion in deciding the case, since such errors of judgment not of
jurisdiction are correctible and reviewable only by appeal and if no appeal is taken,
the decision, erroneous or not, becomes final and executory, and is valid and
binding between the parties. 16
Thus, when respondent judge in obedience to this Courts preliminary injunction
subsequently ordered respondent Bernabe to surrender his titles under pain of
cancellation and authorized petitioner Aurora to resume collecting rentals from the
properties per his orders of April 7, 1972, July 1, 1972 and September 11, 1972 and
Bernabe sought to impugn such orders in a petition for certiorari filed with this
Court on September 28, 1972 (docketed as Case L-35559 17) the Court dismissed
the petition for lack of merit per its resolutions of October 31, 1972 and November
28, 1972.
Here, respondent Bernabe admittedly had his day in Court in the original case (No.
C-189) where judgment was obtained and executed against him, his appeal from
the judgment failed, and his special civil action for certiorari again Judge Cruz
orders confirming petitioner Auroras acquisition of title to the properties by virtue
of the execution sale was decided adversely against him in this Courts decision of
December 28, 1970.
He now alleges fraud in his new complaint only in the judgment creditors father
(Enrique de Leon, Sr.) allegedly falsified his (the sons) signatures in the lease
contract and in the complaint supra. 18 In respondent Bernabes belated
supplementary memorandum of May 19, 1973, however, realizing perhaps that his
bare allegations as to the father having falsified the signatures of his son, the
judgment creditor, in the lease contract and the complaint do not make out a case
of extrinsic fraud since he was no way deprived of his day in court, he now makes

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for the first time allegations not made below of a second fraud alleged collusion
between his lawyer in the first case (C-189) and the de Leons and indicates that he
would correspondingly seek an amendment of pleading if necessary to serve the
ends of justice.
The best-case view for respondent then is that while he could file such action or
amended action for annulment of the executed judgment (on the assumption that
his first action to annul the execution sale in Case No. 1217 is not res judicata) such
filing per se does not invalidate the judgment nor entitle him to a preliminary
injunction suspending effects and consequences of the executed judgment to
prejudice of petitioner Aurora, whose rights as purchaser of the properties at the
execution sale have been recognized by this Courts final judgment of December 28,
1970, until and unless he shall have obtained a final judgment for annulment.
The worst-case view for respondent is that respondent judge may take a second
look at petitioners motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action on the ground that
the fraud alleged in respondents new complaint does not constitute extrinsic fraud
which alone warrants annulment of a judgment and then resolve after hearing
the parties that indeed no extrinsic fraud is alleged in respondents second
complaint for annulment or such amendments thereof as shall have been permitted
and that the same should therefore be dismissed without need of trial for failure to
state a cause of action.
The question of extrinsic fraud has been extensively discussed in the Courts ample
jurisprudence on the matter. In the latest case of Cruz vs. Navarro, 19 Mr. Justice
Castro succinctly defined fraud as extrinsic when it is employed to deprive a party
of his day in court, thereby preventing him from asserting his right to the property.
ACCORDINGLY, the writ of certiorari is granted and respondent judges questioned
orders of June 11, 1971 and September 8, 1971 in Case No. C-189 denying
implementation of his previous orders confirming petitioners acquisition of title to
the properties (as set aside by respondent judge in his subsequent orders of April 7,
July 1, and September 11, 1972) are hereby set aside and annulled. The preliminary
injunction heretofore issued on January 15, 1972 by the Court is set aside insofar as
it enjoined respondent judge from further taking cognizance of and proceeding with
the annulment case (No. C-2048) with instructions to dispose of the same,
particularly as to the unresolved question raised in petitioners pending motion to
dismiss of whether the allegations of respondents complaint therein make out a
case of extrinsic fraud so as to state a cause of action, in consonance with the
controlling principles and jurisprudence thereon as set forth in the Courts opinion.
No pronouncement as to costs.

Velasco v. CA
Facts: A suit for specific performance filed by Lorenzo Velasco against the
Magdalena Estate (Civil Case
7761) on the allegation that on 29 November 1962, Velasco and the Magdalena
Estate had entered into a contract of sale by virtue of which Magdalena Estate
offered to sell Velasco, to which the latter agreed to buy, a parcel of land with an
area of 2,059 sq.ms. (Lot 15, Block 7, Psd-6129,) located at No. 39 corner 6th Street

10
and Pacific Avenue, New Manila, Quezon City, for the total purchase price of
P100,000.00. Velasco alleged that he was to give a down payment of P10,000.00 to
be followed by P20,000.00 and the balance of P70,000.00 would be paid in
installments, the equal monthly amortization of which was to be determined as soon
as the P30,000.00 down payment had been completed.
He further alleged that he paid the downpayment on 29 November 1962 (Receipt
207848) and that when on 8 January 1964 he tendered to the payment of the
additional P20,000.00 to complete the P30,000.00, Magdalena Estate refused to
accept and that eventually it likewise refused to execute a formal deed of sale
obviously agreed upon. Velasco demanded P25,000.00 exemplary damages,
P2,000.00 actual damages and P7,000.00 attorneys fees. Magdalena Estate denied
that it has had any direct-dealings, much less, contractual relations with the Lorenzo
Velasco regarding the property in question, and contends
that the alleged contract described in the document attached to the complaint is
entirely unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds;
that the truth of the matter is that a portion of the property in question was being
leased by a certain Socorro Velasco who, on 29 November 1962, went to the office
of Magdalena Estate indicated her desire to purchase the lot;
that the latter indicated its willingness to sell the property to her at the price of
P100,000.00 under the condition that a down payment of P30,000.00 be made,
P20,000.00 of which was to be paid on 31 November 1962, and that the balance of
P70,000.00 including interest at 9% per annum was to be paid on installments for a
period of 10 years at the rate of P5,381.32 on June 30 and December of every year
until the same shall have been fully paid;
that on 29 November 1962, Socorro Velasco offered to pay P10,000.00 as initial
payment instead of the agreed P20,000.00 but because the amount was short of
the alleged P20,000.00 the same was accepted merely as deposit and upon request
of Socorro Velasco the receipt was made in the name of her brother-in-law ,Lorenzo
Velasco;
that Socorro Velasco failed to complete the down payment of P30,000.00 and
neither has she paid any installments on the balance of P70,000.00 up to the
present time;
that it was only on 8 January 1964 that Socorro Velasco tendered payment of
P20,000.00, which offer Magdalena Estate refused to accept because it had
considered the offer to sell rescinded on account of her failure to complete the down
payment on or before 31 December 1962.
On 3 November 1968, the CFI Quezon City rendered a decision, dismissing the
complaint filed by Lorenzo and Socorro Velasco against the Magdalena Estate, Inc.
for the purpose of compelling specific performance by Magdalena Estate of an
alleged deed of sale of a parcel of residential land in favor of the Velascos. The basis
for the dismissal of the complaint was that the alleged purchase and sale
agreement was not perfected.

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On 18 November 1968, after the perfection of their appeal to the Court of Appeals,
the Velascos received a notice from the said court requiring them to file their
printed record on appeal within 60 days from receipt of said notice. This 60-day
term was to expire on 17 January 1969. Allegedly on 15 January 1969, the Velascos
allegedly sent to the CA and to counsel for Magdalena Estate, by registered mail
allegedly deposited personally by its mailing clerk, one Juanito D. Quiachon, at the
Makati Post Office, a Motion For Extension of Time To File Printed Record on
Appeal. The extension of time was sought on the ground of mechanical failures of
the printing machines, and the voluminous printing job now pending with the Vera
Printing Press.
On 10 February 1969, the Velascos filed their printed record on appeal in the CA.
Thereafter, the Velascos received from Magdalena Estate a motion filed on 8
February 1969 praying for the dismissal of the appeal on the ground that the
Velascos had failed to file their printed record on appeal on time. The CA, on 25
February 1969, denied the Magdalena Estates motion to dismiss, granted the
Velascos motion for 30-day extension from 15 January 1969, and admitted the
latters printed record on appeal. On 11 March 1969, Magdalena Estate prayed for a
reconsideration of said resolution. The Velascos opposed the motion for
reconsideration and submitted to the CA the registry receipts (0215 and 0216), both
stamped 15 January 1969, which were issued by the receiving clerk of the registry
section of the Makati Post Office covering the mails for the disputed motion for
extension of time to file their printed record on appeal and the affidavit of its
mailing clerk.
After several other pleadings and manifestations relative to the motion for
reconsideration and on 28
June 1969, the CA promulgated a resolution granting the motion for reconsideration
and ordered Atty.
Patrocinio Corpuz (Velascos counsel) to show cause within 10 days from notice why
he should not be suspended from the practice of his profession for deceit, falsehood
and violation of his sworn duty to the Court, and directed the Provincial Fiscal of
Rizal to conduct the necessary investigation against Juanito D. Quiachon of the
Salonga, Ordoez, Yap, Sicat & Associates Law Office and Flaviano O. Malindog, a
letter carrier at the Makati Post Office, and to file the appropriate criminal action
against them (it appears that Malindog postmark the letters 15 January 1969 on 7
February 1969 at the request of Quiachon). \
On 5 September 1969, the CA promulgated another resolution, denying the motion
for reconsideration of the Velascos but, at the same time, accepting as satisfactory
the explanation of Atty. Corpuz why he should not be suspended from the practice
of the legal profession.
On 20 September 1969, the First Assistant Fiscal of Rizal notified the Court of
Appeals that he had found a prima facie case against Malindog and would file the
corresponding information for falsification of public documents against him, but
dismissed the complaint against Quiachon for lack of sufficient evidence. A petition
for certiorari and mandamus was filed by the Velascos against the resolution of the
Court of Appeals dated 28 June 1969 in CA-GR 42376, which ordered the dismissal

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of the appeal interposed by them from a decision of the CFI Quezon City on the
ground that they had failed seasonably to file their printed record on appeal.
The Supreme Court denied the instant petition; without pronouncement as to costs.
1. Issues raised by Velascos; Some issues are subject of appeal on certiorari under
Rule 45 rather
than that of certiorari under Rule 65 The Velascos contend that the Court of Appeals
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with such whimsical and grave abuse of
discretion as to amount to lack of jurisdiction, because
(a) it declared that the motion for extension of time to file the printed record on
appeal was not mailed on 15 January 1969, when, in fact, it was mailed on the said
date as evidenced by the registry receipts and the post office stamp of the Makati
Post Office;
(b) it declared that the record on appeal was filed only on 10 February 1969, beyond
the time authorized by the appellate court, when the truth is that the said date of
filing was within the 30-day
extension granted by it;
(c) the adverse conclusions of the appellate court were not supported by the
records of the case, because the said court ignored the affidavit of the mailing clerk
of the petitioners counsel, the
registry receipts and postmarked envelopes and, instead, chose to rely upon the
affidavit of the mail carrier Malindog, which affidavit was prepared by counsel for
Magdalena Estate at the affiant himself so declared at the preliminary investigation
at the Fiscals office which absolved the Velascos counsel mailing clerk Quiachon
from any criminal liability;
(d) section 1, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court, which enumerates the grounds upon
which the Court of Appeals may dismiss an appeal, does not include as a ground the
failure to file a printed record on appeal;
(e) the said section does not state either that the mismailing of a motion to extend
the time to file the printed record on appeal, assuming this to be the case, may be a
basis for the dismissal of the appeal;
(f) the Court of Appeals has no jurisdiction to revoke the extension of time to file the
printed record on appeal it had granted to the petitioners based on a ground not
specified in section 1, Rule 50
of the Rules of Court; and
(g) the objection to an appeal may be waived as when the appellee has allowed the
record on appeal to be printed and approved. Some of the objections raised by the
Velascos to the questioned resolution of the Court of Appeals are obviously matters
involving the correct construction of our rules of procedure and, consequently, are
proper subjects of an appeal by way of certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court, rather than a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65. The
petitioners, however, have

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correctly appreciated the nature of its objections and have asked this Court to treat
the instant petition as an appeal by way of certiorari under Rule 45 in the event
that the Supreme Court should deem that an appeal is an adequate remedy The
nature of the present case permits a disquisition of both types of assignments.
2. Date stamped on receipts and envelopes; Henning and Caltex cases do not apply
While it is true that stamped on the registry receipts 0215 and 0216 as well as on
the envelopes covering the mails in question is the date 15 January 1969, this, by
itself, does not establish an unrebuttable presumption of the fact or date of mailing.
The Henning and Caltex cases are not in point because the specific
adjective issue resolved in those cases was whether or not the date of mailing a
pleading is to be considered as
the date of its filing, The issue in the present case is whether or not the motion of
the petitioners for extension
of time to file the printed record on appeal was, in point of fact, mailed (and,
therefore, filed) on 15 January
1969.
3. Certification of postmasters and Malindogs sworn declaration believable;
Malindog induced to
issue false registry receipts for the Velascos counsel
The certifications issued by the two postmasters of Makati, Rizal and the sworn
declaration of the
mail carrier Malindog describing how the said registry receipts came to be issued,
are worthy of belief. It will
be observed that the said certifications explain clearly and in detail how it was
improbable that the registry
receipts in question could have been issued to Velascos counsel in the ordinary
course of official business,while Malindogs sworn statement, which constitutes a
very grave admission against his own interest,
provides ample basis for a finding that where official duty was not performed it was
at the behest of a person
interested in the Velascos side of the action below. That at the preliminary
investigation at the Fiscals office,
Malindog failed to identify Quiachon as the person who induced him to issue
falsified receipts, contrary to
what he declared in his affidavit, is of no moment since the findings of the inquest
fiscal as reflected in the
information for falsification filed against Malindog indicate that someone did induce
Malindog to make and
issue false registry receipts to the counsel for the Velascos.
4. Right to appeal a statutory privilege and not a natural right nor a part of due
process
In Bello vs. Fernando, it was held that the right to appeal is not a natural right nor a
part of due
process; it is merely a statutory privilege. and may he exercised only in the manner
provided by law.
5. Duty of appellant to file printed record on appeal with CA within 60 days from
receipt of notice
The Rules of Court expressly makes it the duty of an appellant to file a printed
record on appeal with

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the Court of Appeals within 60 days from receipt of notice from the clerk of that
court that the record on
appeal approved by the trial court has already been received by the said court.
Section 5 of Rule 46 (Duty of
appellant upon receipt of notice) states that It shall be the duty of the appellant
within 15 days from the date
of the notice referred to in the preceding section, to pay the clerk of the Court of
Appeals the fee for the
docketing of the appeal, and within 60 days from such notice to submit to the court
40 printed copies of the
record on appeal, together with proof of service of 15 printed copies thereof upon
the appellee.
6. Appellate court did not abuse its discretion
After a careful study and appraisal of the pleadings, admissions and denials
respectively adduced and
made by the parties, it is clear that the Court of Appeals did not gravely abuse its
discretion and did not act
without or in excess of its jurisdiction. As the Velascos failed to comply with the duty
to file the printed record
on appeal within 60 days from receipt of notice which the Rules of Court enjoins,
and considering that there
was a deliberate effort on their part to mislead the said Court in granting them an
extension of time within
which to file their printed record on appeal, it stands to reason that the appellate
court cannot be said to have
abused its discretion or to have acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in
ordering the dismissal of their
appeal.
7. Jurisprudence replete with cases where Court dismissed appeal on grounds not
mentioned
specifically in Rule 50, Section 1
Jurisprudence is replete with cases in which this Court dismissed an appeal on
grounds not mentioned
specifically in Section 1, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court. (See, for example, De la Cruz
vs. Blanco, 73 Phil.
596 (1942); Government of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals. 108 Phil. 86 (1960);
Ferinion vs. Sta.
Romana, L-25521, February 28, 66, 16 SCRA 370, 375).
8. Motion for extension of period must be made before the expiration of the period
to be extended
Inasmuch as the motion for extension of the period to file the printed record on
appeal was belatedly
filed, then, it is as though the same were non-existent. In Baquiran vs. Court of
Appeals, it was stated that
the motion for extension of the period for filing pleadings and papers in court must
be made before the
expiration of the period to be extended. The soundness of this dictum in matters of
procedure is self-evident.
For, were the doctrine otherwise, the uncertainties that would follow when litigants
are left to determine and

15
redetermine for themselves whether to seek further redress in court forthwith or
take their own sweet time
will result in litigations becoming more unbearable than the very grievances they
are intended to redress.
9. Objection to appeal not waived
Magdalena Estate did file a motion in the Court of Appeals on 8 February 1969
praying for the
dismissal of the appeal on the ground that up to the said date the Velascos had not
yet filed their record on
appeal and, therefore, must be considered to have abandoned their appeal. The
objection to an appeal was thus not waived, contrary to Velascos argument that it
was waived when the appellee allows the record on appeal
to be printed and approved/
10. No contract of sale perfected because the minds of the parties did not meet in
regard to the
manner of payment
No contract of sale was perfected because the minds of the parties did not meet in
regard to the
manner of payment. The material averments contained in Velascos complaint
themselves disclose a lack of
complete agreement in regard to the manner of payment of the lot in question.
The complaint states
pertinently that plaintiff and defendant further agreed that the total down payment
shall be P30,000.00,
including the P10,000.00 partial payment mentioned in paragraph 3 hereof, and
that upon completion of the
said down payment of P30,000.00, the balance of P70,000.00 shall be paid by the
plaintiff to the defendant in
10 years from November 29, 1962; and that the time within which the full down
payment of the P30,000.00
was to be completed was not specified by the parties but the defendant was duly
compensated during the said
time prior to completion of the down payment of P30,000.00 by way of lease rentals
on the house existing
thereon which was earlier leased by defendant to the plaintiffs sister-in-law, Socorro
J. Velasco, and which
were duly paid to the defendant by checks drawn by plaintiff. The Velascos
themselves admit that they and
Magdalena Estate still had to meet and agree on how and when the down payment
and the installment
payments were to be paid. Such being the situation, it cannot be said that a definite
and firm sales agreement
between the parties had been perfected over the lot in question.
11. Definite agreement on the matter of payment of purchase price an essential
element to form
binding and enforceable contract of sale
A definite agreement on the manner of payment of the purchase price is an
essential element in the
formation of a binding and enforceable contract of sale. In the present case, the
Velascos delivered to

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Magdalena Estate the sum of P10,000 as part of the downpayment that they had to
pay cannot be considered
as sufficient proof of the perfection of any purchase and sale agreement between
the parties under article 1482
of the new Civil Code, as the Velascos themselves admit that some essential matter
(the terms of payment)
still had to be mutually covenanted.