THE GENERAL MANAGER, PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY

(PPA) and RAMON ANINO, petitioners, vs. JULIETA

MONSERATE, respondent.

REQUIRED CS ELIG.: CS PROF / RA 1080

CANDIDATES ELIGIBILITY xxx TOTAL

DECISION

1. MONSERATE, JULIETA CS Prof. xxx 79.5

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

2. ANINO, RAMON 1st grade xxx 70

This petition for review on certiorari[1] seeks to set aside the

Decision dated June 20, 1997 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No.
39670,[2] declaring null and void the Resolution No. 952043 dated
March 21, 1995 and Resolution No. 956640 dated October 24, 1995
of the Civil Service Commission (CSC), and ordering the
reinstatement of Julieta G. Monserate as Division Manager II of the
Resources Management Division, Ports Management Office,
Philippine Ports Authority (PPA), Iloilo City.

3. TEODOSIO, APRIL PD 907 (CPA) xxx 67

The facts are:

Julieta Monserate, respondent, started her government service
in 1977 as Bookkeeper II in the Port Management Office, PPA, Iloilo
City. Barely a year later, she was promoted to the position of
Cashier II and then as Finance Officer (SG-16) in 1980.[3]
In the early part of 1988, when the PPA underwent a
reorganization, respondent applied for the permanent position of
Manager II (SG-19) of the Resource Management Division, same
office. The Comparative Data Sheet[4] accomplished by the PPA
Reorganization Task Force shows the ranking of the six (6) aspirants
to the said position, thus:
COMPARATIVE DATA SHEET
OFFICE: PMO ILOILO
DIVISION: RES. MANAGEMENT DIVISION
POSITION: DIVISION MANAGER

4. MORTOLA, DARIO CS Prof. xxx 67

5. ESPINOSA, AMALIK Bar xxx 63.5
6. PERFECTO, BASCOS RA 1080 xxx 59.5
On February 1, 1988, Maximo Dumlao, Jr., then General
Manager of the PPA, appointed[5] respondent to the position of
Manager II (Resource Management Division). On even date,
respondent assumed office and discharged the functions
thereof. On July 8, 1988, the CSC, through Guillermo R. Silva
(Assistant Director of the Civil Service Field Office-PPA) approved
her appointment.
Meanwhile, on April 18, 1988, petitioner Ramon Anino, who
ranked second to respondent per the Comparative Data Sheet
earlier quoted, filed an appeal/petition with the PPA Appeals Board,
protesting against respondents appointment. The PPA Appeals
Board, in a Resolution[6] dated August 11, 1988, sustained the
protest and rendered ineffective respondents appointment based
on (1) CSC MC No. 5, s. 1988, Par. 3; [7] (2) CSC MC NO. 10, s. 1986,
Par. A, 1.2 and Par. B;[8] and (3) Civil Service Eligibility. These
grounds were not explained or discussed in the Resolution, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Board upholds the
appointment of Ramon A. Anino as Resources Management Division
Manager of the Port Management Office of Iloilo.

On October 24, 1988, respondent was furnished a copy of PPA

Special Order No. 479-88[9] (entitled Creation of the PPA Managers
Pool), dated September 28, 1988, issued by the new PPA General
Manager, Mr. Rogelio A. Dayan. That Special Order excluded the
name of respondent from the pool-list and placed instead the name
of petitioner as Manager II, Resource Management Division. In
effect, the Special Order implemented the August 11, 1988
Resolution of the PPA Appeals Board.
Aggrieved, respondent filed with the PPA General Manager an
appeal/request for clarification dated November 2, 1988. [10] She
questioned her replacement under PPA Special Order No. 479-88,
claiming that the proceedings before the PPA Appeals Board were
irregular because (1) she was not notified of the hearing before
it; (2) she was not furnished a copy of the August 11, 1988 PPA
Appeals Board Resolution or a copy of the protest filed by petitioner
Anino;[11] (3) she was not informed of the reasons behind her
replacement; and (4) their Port Manager (in Iloilo City), who was
then an official member of the Board, was not included in the said
proceedings.
On November 8, 1988, pending resolution of her
appeal/request for clarification, respondent received a copy of PPA
Special Order No. 492-88[12] dated October 21, 1988, also issued by
General Manager Dayan. This PPA Order officially reassigned her to
the position of Administrative Officer (SG-15) which was petitioner
Anino's former position and was lower than her previous position as
Finance Officer (SG 16) before she was appointed as Division
Manager.
Apparently at a loss with the turn of events, coupled by the
inaction of PPA General Manager Dayan on her earlier
appeal/request for clarification, respondent filed on November 25,
1988 a precautionary appeal[13] with the CSC. She manifested that
as of said date (November 25), she has not yet been furnished a
certified copy of the PPA Appeals Board Resolution.
On January 2, 1989, respondent received a copy of her new
appointment as Administrative Officer dated October 1, 1988.[14] It
was also during this time when she learned that PPA General

Manager Dayan had just issued petitioners appointment dated

October 21, 1988 as Manager II in the Resource Management
Division effective February 1, 1988.
On January 16, 1989, respondent filed with the CSC an appeal
formally protesting against petitioner Aninos appointment and at
the same time questioning the propriety of the August 11, 1988
Resolution of the PPA Appeals Board. This appeal remained pending
with the CSC for more than six (6) years despite respondent's
requests for early resolution. In the meantime, she assumed the
position of Administrative Officer.
Eventually, the CSC, in its Resolution No. 95-2043 [15] dated
March 21, 1995, dismissed respondents appeal, thus:
It is well-established rule that an appointment, although approved
by this Commission, does not become final until the protest filed
against it is decided by the agency or by the Commission. Although
Monserate had already assumed the position of RMD Manager II,
the appointing authority may still withdraw the same if a protest is
seasonably filed. This is covered by Section 19, Rule VI of the
Omnibus Rules implementing EO 292 x x x.
Monserates claim that she is more qualified than Anino is not
relevant to the issue before this Commission. In cases of protest
filed or appealed to the Commission, the main question to be
resolved is whether or not the appointee meets the qualification
standard. x x x. The Commission will not disturb the choice of the
appointing authority as long as the appointee meets the
qualification prescribed for the position in question.
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration but the same
was denied by the CSC in its Resolution No. 95-6640 dated October
24, 1995.
In due time, respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a
petition for review impleading as respondents the PPA General
Manager and petitioner Anino.

On June 20, 1997, the Court of Appeals rendered a

Decision[16] nullifying the twin Resolutions of the CSC. It ruled that
the August 11, 1988 Resolution of the PPA Appeals Board was not
supported by evidence and that the same was irregularly issued
due to lack of proper notice to respondent with respect to the
Boards proceedings. It concluded that her reassignment from the
position of Manager II, Resource Management Division (SG-19), to
the position of Administrative Officer (SG-15) was a demotion
violative of her constitutional right to security of tenure and due
process. The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals' Decision
reads:
THE FOREGOING CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered
declaring as null and void Resolution Nos. 952043 and 95640
(should be 956640) dated March 21 and October 21, 1988 (should
be October 24, 1995), of the Civil service Commission; and
directing the reinstatement of the petitioner to the position of
Resource Management Division Manager II.
SO ORDERED.
Thereupon, Ramon Anino and the PPA General Manager filed on
August 14, 1997 the present petition. On November 30, 1997,
petitioner Anino retired from the government service.[17]
Petitioners ascribe to the Court of Appeals the following errors:
I THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUISLY ERRED IN FINDING
THAT RESPONDENT MONSERATE WAS DEMOTED FROM
RESOURCES MANAGEMENT DIVISION MANAGER TO
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER, THUS VIOLATING HER RIGHT
TO SECURITY OF TENURE.
II THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT
ALIGNING ITSELF WITH THE WELL-NIGH RULE THAT
RESPONDENT
MONSERATES
APPOINTMENT
AS
RESOURCE
MANAGEMENT
DIVISION
MANAGER,
ALTHOUGH APPROVED BY CSC, DOES NOT BECOME
FINAL UNTIL THE PROTEST FILED AGAINST HER IS

FAVORABLY DECIDED IN HER FAVOR BY THE AGENCY OR

THE CSC.
III THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A SERIOUS ERROR
OF JUDGMENT IN IGNORING THAT IN CASES OF PROTEST
FILED OR APPEALED TO THE CSC, THE MAIN QUESTION
TO BE RESOLVED IS WHETHER OR NOT THE APPOINTEE
MEETS THE QUALIFICATION STANDARD.[18]
The pivotal issue in this case is whether or not there was due
process when respondent was replaced by petitioner Anino from
her position as Manager II, Resource Management Division, and
demoted as Administrative Officer.
Petitioners vehemently aver that respondent was never
demoted since demotion, being in the nature of administrative
penalty, presupposes a conviction in an administrative case. Here,
respondent was not charged of any administrative case. Rather,
she was displaced from her position as an aftermath of the PPA
reorganization, authorized by law, the implementation of which
having been carried out with utmost good faith.
Furthermore, the said displacement was just the necessary
effect of the August 11, 1988 Resolution of the PPA Appeals Board
which sustained petitioner Aninos timely protest against
respondents
appointment.
Petitioners
theorize
that
the
appointment of respondent as Resource Management Division
Manager did not become final until the protest filed against her was
favorably decided in her favor by the CSC. In support of this
contention, they cited Section 19, Rule VI of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 (otherwise known
as the Administrative Code of 1987), which provides inter alia:
SEC 19. An appointment, though contested, shall take effect
immediately upon its issuance if the appointee assumes the duties
of the position and the appointee is entitled to receive the salary
attached to the position. However, the appointment, together with
the decision of the department head, shall be submitted to the
Commission for appropriate action within 30 days from the date of
its issuance, otherwise the appointment becomes ineffective

thereafter. Likewise,
such
appointment
shall
become
ineffective in case the protest is finally resolved against the
protestee, in which case, he shall be reverted to his former
position.
Petitioners also contend that the head of an agency, being the
appointing authority, is the one most knowledgeable to decide who
can best perform the functions of the office. The appointing
authority has a wide latitude of choice subject only to the condition
that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by
law. Consequently, the CSC acted rightly when it did not interfere in
the exercise of discretion by the PPA appointing authority, there
being no evidence of grave abuse of discretion thereof or violation
of the Civil Service Law and Rules.
The petition is unmeritorious.
In the first place, the PPA reorganization in 1988 has nothing to
do with respondents demotion from the contested position of
Manager II, Resource Management Office (SG-19), to the lower
position of Administrative Officer (SG-15). Antithetically, it was
precisely because of the said reorganization that respondent
applied to the higher position of Division Manager II. In fact, the
Comparative Data Sheet accomplished by the PPA Reorganization
Task Force itself shows that respondent ranked No. 1, while
petitioner Anino ranked No. 2, from among the six (6) contenders to
the said post. Respondent was eventually issued a permanent
appointment as such Division Manager on February 1, 1988 by then
PPA General Maximo Dumlao, Jr., during which time she actually
assumed office and discharged its functions. This appointment was
later approved on July 8, 1988 by the CSC, through Assistant
Director Guillermo R. Silva of the Civil Service Field Office-PPA.
Clearly, it was only after the reorganization and upon the
issuance of the August 11, 1988 Resolution of the PPA Appeals
Board when respondent was demoted to the lower position of
Administrative Officer. This is further shown by the following orders
and appointments subsequently issued by then PPA General
Manager Rogelio Dayan:

1. PPA Special Order No. 479-88 dated September 28, 1988

which excluded respondent Monserate from the PPA
Managers pool-list;
2. Appointment of respondent, dated October 1, 1988, to
the position of Administrative Officer;
3. PPA Special Order No. 492-88 dated October 21, 1988
which officially reassigned respondent to the position of
Administrative Officer; and
4. Appointment of petitioner Anino, dated October 21,
1988, to the position of Manager II, Resource
Management Division, effective February 1, 1988.
Therefore, contrary to petitioners claim, respondent was
demoted, not by reason of the PPA reorganization in 1988, but due
to the PPA Appeals Board Resolution dated August 11, 1988
sustaining petitioner Aninos protest against respondents
appointment.
Unfortunately for petitioners, this Court cannot accord validity
to the August 11, 1988 Resolution of the PPA Appeals Board
which upholds the appointment of Ramon A. Anino as
Resource Management Division Manager. But how can it
uphold his appointment when he was not yet appointed then? It
bears stressing that he was appointed on a much later date October 21, 1988, or more than two (2) months after August
11, 1998 when the PPA Appeals Board Resolution was
issued. Stated differently, the PPA Appeals Board could not uphold
an appointment which was not yet existing.
Equally questionable are the grounds for respondents demotion
stated in the August 11, 1998 Resolution: (1) CSC MC No. 5, s.
1988, Par. 3; (2) CSC MC NO. 10, s. 1986, Par. A, 1.2 and Par. B;
and (3) Civil Service Eligibility. These grounds are incomprehensible
for lack of discussion or explanation by the Board to enable
respondent to know the reason for her demotion.

We uphold the Court of Appeals finding that the August 11,

1998 PPA Appeals Board Resolution was void for lack of evidence
and proper notice to respondent. As aptly held by the Appellate
Court:
In the August 11, 1988 Resolution by the PPA Appeals Board (Ibid.,
p. 46) upholding the appointment of the private respondent
(Ramon Anino) as Division Manager, the grounds against
petitioner's (Julieta Monserate) appointment were: a) the CSC MC
No. 5, s. 1988, Par 3; b) the CSC MC No. 10, 2. 1986, Par. A, 1.2 and
Par. B; and c) Civil service eligibility.
"x x x
To us, the August 11, 1988 Resolution by the PPA Appeals Board
was not supported by evidence. Of the CSC MC No. 5, the petitioner
had no pending administrative or criminal case at the time of her
appointment as Manager. x x x.
With respect to the CSC MC No. 10, Par. A (1.2) and Par. B, the
processing, review, evaluation and recommendation of her
appointment as Manager II, passed several committees created by
the PPA. x x x.Moreover, she had a 1.9 average performance rating
compared to the private respondent who only got 2.03. x x x.
On eligibility, she has a Career Service Professional eligibility while
the private respondent only has a First Grade Civil Service
Eligibility.
She added that she was not aware of any proceeding on her
demotion as a Division Manager. As a matter of fact, it was only
upon her iniative sometime during the latter part of November,
1988 that she was able to obtain a copy of the August 11, 1988
Resolution of the Appeals Board. The resolution sustained the
private respondents appointment as Division Manager even if on
August 11, 1988, he was not yet extended any appointment. As a
matter of fact, he was appointed only on October 1, 1988 (should
be October 21, 1988).

Furthermore, she said that the resolution of the PPA Appeals Board
appears irregular, if not null and void. She was never notified of any
proceeding; she was not furnished either a copy of the
resolution.What she received instead was a Special Order dated
September 29, 1988 already ordering her demotion. She was not at
all given the oppurtunity of defending herself before the Appeals
Board.
x x x.
In the case now before us, the petitioner did not receive or was not
given a copy of the August 11, 1988 Resolution of the Appeals
Board. She did not even know that she was demoted until after she
received a copy of the of the Special Order No. 479-88. [19]
From all indications, it is indubitable that substantial and
procedural irregularities attended respondents demotion from the
position of Manager II, Resource Management Division, to the lower
position
of
Administrative
Officer. Indeed,
her
demotion,
tantamount to a revocation of her appointment as Manager II, is a
patent violation of her constitutional rights to security of tenure and
due process. In Aquino vs. Civil Service Commission,[20] this Court
emphasized that once an appointment is issued and the moment
the appointee assumes a position in the civil service under a
completed appointment, he acquires a legal, not merely equitable,
right (to the position) which is protected not only by statute, but
also by the constitution, and cannot be taken away from him either
by revocation of the appointment, or by removal, except for cause,
and with previous notice and hearing.
Concededly, the appointing authority has a wide latitude of
discretion in the selection and appointment of qualified persons to
vacant positions in the civil service. [21] However, the moment the
discretionary power of appointment is exercised and the appointee
assumed the duties and functions of the position, such
appointment cannot anymore be revoked by the appointing
authority and appoint another in his stead, except for cause. Here,
no iota of evidence was ever established to justify the revocation of
respondent's appointment by demoting her. Respondents security
of tenure guaranteed under the 1987 Constitution [Article IX-B,

Section 2, par. (3)] should not be placed at the mercy of abusive

exercise of the appointing power.[22]
Parenthetically, when the Court of Appeals reinstated
respondent to her legitimate post as Manager II in the Resource
Management Division, it merely restored her appointment to the
said position to which her right to security of tenure had already
attached. To be sure, her position as Manager II never became
vacant since her demotion was void. In this jurisdiction, "an
appointment to a non-vacant position in the civil service is null and
void ab initio."[23]
We now delve on the backwages in favor of respondent.
The challenged Court of Appeals Decision ordered the
reinstatement of respondent without awarding backwages. This
matter becomes controversial because respondent assumed the
lower position of Administrative Officer during the pendency of her
protest against petitioner Aninos appointment to the contested
position. Also, petitioner Anino retired from the service on
November 30, 1997.
In this respect, while petitioner Aninos appointment to the
contested position is void, as earlier discussed, he is nonetheless
considered a de facto officer during the period of his incumbency.
[24]
A de facto officer is one who is in possession of an office and
who openly exercises its functions under color of an appointment or
election, even though such appointment or election may be
irregular.[25] InMonroy vs. Court of Appeals,[26] this Court ruled that a
rightful incumbent of a public office may recover from a de
facto officer the salary received by the latter during the time of his
wrongful tenure, even though he (the de facto officer) occupied the
office in good faith and under color of title. A de facto officer, not
having a good title, takes the salaries at his risk and must,
therefore, account to the de jureofficer for whatever salary he
received during the period of his wrongful tenure. In the later case
of Civil Liberties Union vs. Executive Secretary,[27] this Court
allowed a de facto officer to receive emoluments for actual services
rendered but only when there is no de jure officer, thus:

x x x in cases where there is no de jure officer, a de facto

officer who, in good faith, has had possession of the office and has
discharged the duties pertaining thereto, is legally entitled to the
emoluments of the office, and may in appropriate action recover
the salary, fees and other compensations attached to the office.
In fine, the rule is that where there is a de jure officer, a de
facto officer, during his wrongful incumbency, is not entitled to the
emoluments attached to the office, even if he occupied the office in
good faith.This rule, however, cannot be applied squarely on the
present case in view of its peculiar circumstances. Respondent had
assumed under protest the position of Administrative Officer
sometime in the latter part of 1988, which position she currently
holds. Since then, she has been receiving the emoluments, salary
and other compensation attached to such office. While her
assumption to said lower position and her acceptance of the
corresponding emoluments cannot be considered as an
abandonment of her claim to her rightful office (Division Manager),
she cannot recover full backwages for the period when she was
unlawfully deprived thereof. She is entitled only to backpay
differentials for the period starting from her assumption as
Administrative Officer up to the time of her actual reinstatement to
her rightful position as Division Manager. Such backpay differentials
pertain to the difference between the salary rates for the positions
of Manager II and Administrative Officer. The same must be paid by
petitioner Anino corresponding from the time he wrongfully
assumed the contested position up to the time of his retirement on
November 30, 1997.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The challenged Decision
of the Court of Appeals dated June 20, 1997 is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION in the sense that petitioner Ramon A. Anino is
ordered to pay respondent Julieta Monserate backpay differentials
pertaining to the period from the time he wrongfully assumed the
contested position of Manager II up to his retirement on November
30, 1997.
SO ORDERED.
Vitug (Acting Chairman), Panganiban, and Carpio, JJ., concur.

Melo, J. (Chairman), on official leave.

G.R. No. L-23258

ROBERTO
vs.
HON.
COURT
OF
ROSARIO, respondent.

July 1, 1967
R.
APPEALS

filing a motion to reconsider. Hence, this petition for certiorari to

review the ruling of the Court of Appeals.
MONROY, petitioner,
and

FELIPE

DEL

E. M. Fernando, E. Quisumbing-Fernando and Norberto Quisumbing

for
petitioner.
Sycip, Salazar, Luna and Associates for respondents.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
Petitioner Roberto Monroy was the incumbent Mayor of Navotas,
Rizal, when on September 15, 1961, his certificate of candidacy as
representative of the first district of Rizal in the forthcoming
elections was filed with the Commission on Elections. Three days
later, or on September 18, 1961, petitioner filed a letter
withdrawing said certificate of candidacy. The Commission on
Elections, per resolution,1 approved the withdrawal. But on
September 21, 1961, respondent Felipe del Rosario, then the vicemayor of Navotas, took his oath of office as municipal mayor on the
theory that petitioner had forfeited the said office upon his filing of
the certificate of candidacy in question.
Upon these facts, the Court of First Instance of Rizal, held in the suit
for injunction instituted by petitioner against respondents that (a)
the former had ceased to be mayor of Navotas, Rizal, after his
certificate of candidacy was filed on September 15, 1961; (b)
respondent del Rosario became municipal mayor upon his having
assumed office as such on September 21, 1961; (c) petitioner must
reimburse, as actual damages, the salaries to which respondent
was entitled as Mayor from September 21, 1961 up to the time he
can reassume said office; and (d) petitioner must pay respondent
P1,000.00 as moral damages.1wph1.t
This judgment was, on appeal by petitioner to the Court of Appeals,
affirmed in toto except for the award of moral damages which was
eliminated. The same Court reaffirmed its stand upon petitioner's

Petitioner first argues that both the lower court and the Court of
Appeals had done what they had no jurisdiction to do review a
resolution of the Commission on Elections. The submission is
without merit.
The Constitution empowers the Commission on Elections to
x x x decide, save those involving the right to vote,
all administrative questions affecting elections, including the
determination of the number and location of polling places,
and the appointment of election inspectors and of other
election officials x x x . 2 (Emphasis supplied)
And the decisions, orders and rulings of the Commission on these
administrative questions are reviewable only by the Supreme
Court.3 Since the powers of the Commission are limited to matters
connected with the "conduct of elections," necessarily its
adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers are likewise limited to
controversies connected with the "conduct of elections." This
phrase covers all the administrative process of preparing and
operating the election machinery so that the people could exercise
their right to vote at the given time. 4 All questions and
controversies that may arise therefrom are to be resolved
exclusively by the Commission, subject to review only by the
Supreme Court.
However, in this case there appears to be no decision, order or
ruling of the Commission on any administrative question or
controversy. There was no dispute before the Commission.
Respondent never contested the filing of petitioner's certificate of
candidacy. Neither has he disputed before that body the withdrawal
thereof. And even if there was a controversy before the
Commission, the same did not and could not possibly have
anything to do with the conduct of elections. What the parties are
actually controverting is whether or not petitioner was still the
municipal mayor after September 15, 1961. This purely legal
dispute has absolutely no bearing or effect on the conduct of the

elections for the seat of Congressman for the first district of Rizal.
The election can go on irrespective of whether petitioner is
considered resigned from his position of municipal mayor or not.
The only interest and for that matter, jurisdiction, of the
Commission on Elections in this regard is to know who are the
running candidates for the forthcoming elections, for that affects
the conduct of election. So when petitioner withdrew the certificate
announcing his candidacy for Congressman, as far as the
Commission could be concerned, petitioner was no longer
interested in running for that seat. The matter of his having
forfeited his present position and the possible legal effect thereon
by the withdrawal of his certificate was completely out of the
picture. Hence, that purely legal question properly fell within the
cognizance of the courts.

Petitioner's contention that the certificate of candidacy was filed

without his knowledge and consent and, hence, the Commission's
approval of its withdrawal invalidated such certificate for all legal
purposes, is untenable. It nowhere appears that the Commission's
resolution expressly invalidated the certificate. The withdrawal of a
certificate of candidacy does not necessarily render the certificate
void ab initio. Once filed, the permanent legal effects produced
thereby remain even if the certificate itself be subsequently
withdrawn. Moreover, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals
expressly found as a fact that the certificate in question was
filed with petitioner's knowledge and consent. And since the nature
of the remedy taken by petitioner before Us would allow a
discussion of purely legal questions only, such fact is deemed
conceded.5

Now the withdrawal of his certificate of candidacy did not restore

petitioner to his former position. Sec. 27 of the Rev. Election Code
providing that

Petitioner would next maintain that respondent Court of Appeals

likewise erred in affirming a lower court judgment requiring
petitioner to pay respondent Del Rosario by way of actual damages
the salaries he was allegedly entitled to receive from September
21, 1961, to the date of petitioner's vacation of his office as mayor.
In support of this he relies solely upon Rodriguez v. Tan, 91 Phil.
724, holding that a senator who had been proclaimed and had
assumed office but was later on ousted in an election protest, is
a de facto officer during the time he held the office of senator, and
can retain the emoluments received even as against the successful
protestant. Petitioner's factual premise is the appellate court's
finding that he was a de facto officer when he continued occupying
the office of mayor after September 15, 1961.

Any elective provincial, municipal or city official running for

an office, other then the one which he is actually holding,
shall be considered resigned from his office from the
moment of the filing of his certificate of candidacy,"
makes the forfeiture automatic and permanently effective upon the
filing
of
the
certificate
of
for
another
office.
Only
the moment and act of filing are considered. Once the certificate is
filed, the seat is forfeited forever and nothing save a new election
or appointment can restore the ousted official. Thus, as We had
occasion to remark, through Justice J.B.L. Reyes, in Castro v.
Gatuslao, 98 Phil, 94, 196:
x x x The wording of the law plainly indicates that only the
date of filing of the certificate of candidacy should be taken
into account. The law does not make the forfeiture
dependent upon future contingencies, unforeseen and
unforeseeable since the vacating is expressly made as of
the moment of the filing of the certificate of candidacy x x
x . (Emphasis supplied)

However, We agree with the Court of Appeals that the Rodriguez

case is not applicable here for absence of factual and legal
similarities. The Rodriguez case involved a senator who had been
proclaimed as duly elected, assumed the office and was
subsequently ousted as a result of an election contest. These
peculiar facts called for the application of an established precedent
in this jurisdiction that the candidate duly proclaimed must assume
office notwithstanding a protest filed against him and can retain the
compensation paid during his incumbency. But the case at bar does
not
involve
a proclaimed elective
official
who
will
be ousted because of an election contest. The present case for

injunction and quo warranto involves the forfeiture of the office of

municipal mayor by the incumbent occupant thereof and the claim
to that office by the vice-mayor because of the operation of Sec. 27
of the Rev. Election Code. The established precedent invoked in the
Rodriguez case can not therefore be applied in this case.
It is the general rule then, i.e., "that the rightful incumbent of a
public office may recover from an officer de factothe salary
received by the latter during the time of his wrongful tenure, even
though he entered into the office in good faith and under color of
title"6 that applies in the present case. The resulting hardship
occasioned by the operation of this rule to the de facto officer who
did actual work is recognized; but it is far more cogently
acknowledged that the de facto doctrine has been formulated, not
for the protection of the de facto officer principally, but rather for
the protection of the public and individuals who get involved in the
official acts of persons discharging the duties of an office without
being lawful officers.7 The question of compensation involves
different principles and concepts however. Here, it is possession of
title, not of the office, that is decisive. A de facto officer, not having
good title, takes the salaries at his risk and must therefore account
to the de jure officer for whatever amount of salary he received
during the period of his wrongful retention of the public office. 8
Wherefore, finding no error in the judgment appealed from, the
same is, as it is hereby, affirmed in toto. Costs against petitioner.
So ordered.

CIVIL
SERVICE
COMMISSION, Petitioner,
vs.
ENGR. ALI P. DARANGINA, Respondent.

modification in the sense that respondent should be paid his

backwages from the time his employment was terminated on
October 11, 2000 until September 24, 2001, the expiration of
his one year temporary appointment.

DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

On April 3, 2002, respondent filed a motion for partial

reconsideration, praying for his reinstatement as director III and
payment of backwages up to the time he shall be reinstated.

For our resolution is the instant Petition for Review

on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, seeking to reverse the Resolutions of the Court of
Appeals dated October 7, 2004 1 and March 18, 20052 in CA-G.R. SP
No. 71353.

On June 5, 2002, the CSC issued Resolution No. 02-782 denying

respondents motion for partial reconsideration being a second
motion for reconsideration which is prohibited.

The undisputed facts are:

Engr. Ali P. Darangina, respondent, was a development
management officer V in the Office of Muslim Affairs (OMA). On
September 25, 2000, he was extended a temporary promotional
appointment as director III, Plans and Policy Services, in the same
office. On October 11, 2000, the Civil Service Commission (CSC),
petitioner, approved this temporary appointment effective for one
(1) year from the date of its issuance unless sooner terminated.

Respondent then filed a petition for review with the Court of

Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 71353. But in its Resolution of
February 27, 2004, the petition was dismissed for his failure to
implead the OMA Executive Director and the incumbent of the
disputed position.
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration.
In a Resolution dated October 7, 2004, the Court of Appeals
reconsidered its Decision of February 27, 2004, thus:

On October 31, 2000, newly appointed OMA Executive Director

Acmad Tomawis terminated the temporary appointment of
respondent on the ground that he is not a career executive service
eligible. Tomawis then appointed Alongan Sani as director III. But he
is not also a career executive service eligible. Thus, the CSC
disapproved his appointment, stating that respondent could only be
replaced by an eligible.

ACCORDINGLY,
our Decision of
February 27,
2004
is
RECONSIDERED and the assailed CSC resolutions are hereby
MODIFIED in that the petitioner is reinstated to his post to
finish his 12-month term with backwages from the date of
his removal until reinstatement.

On appeal by respondent, the CSC issued Resolution No. 01-1543

dated September 18, 2001 sustaining the termination of his
temporary appointment but ordering the payment of his salaries
from the time he was appointed on September 25, 2000 until his
separation on October 31, 2000.

The CSC filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the
Court of Appeals in a Resolution dated March 28, 2005.

Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration. On March 20, 2002,

the CSC issued Resolution No. 02-439 granting the same with

SO ORDERED.

Section 27, Chapter 5, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the

Administrative Code of 1987, as amended, classifying the
appointment status of public officers and employees in the career
service, reads:

SEC. 27. Employment Status. Appointment in the career service

shall be permanent or temporary.
(1) Permanent status. A permanent appointment shall be
issued to a person who meets all the requirements for the
position to which he is being appointed, including
appropriate eligibility prescribed, in accordance with the
provisions of law, rules and standards promulgated in
pursuance thereof.
(2) Temporary appointment. In the absence of appropriate
eligibles and it becomes necessary in the public interest to
fill a vacancy, a temporary appointment shall be issued to a
person who meets all the requirements for the position to
which he is being appointed except the appropriate civil
service
eligibility:Provided,
That
such
temporary
appointment shall not exceed twelve months, but the
appointee may be replaced sooner if a qualified civil service
eligible becomes available.
It is clear that a permanent appointment can issue only to a person
who possesses all the requirements for the position to which he is
being appointed, including the appropriate eligibility. 3 Differently
stated, as a rule, no person may be appointed to a public office
unless he or she possesses the requisite qualifications. The
exception to the rule is where, in the absence of appropriate
eligibles, he or she may be appointed to it merely in a temporary
capacity. Such a temporary appointment is not made for the benefit
of the appointee. Rather, an acting or temporary appointment
seeks to prevent a hiatus in the discharge of official functions by
authorizing a person to discharge the same pending the selection
of a permanent appointee.4 In Cuadra v. Cordova,5 this Court
defined a temporary appointment as "one made in an acting
capacity, the essence of which lies in its temporary character and
its terminability at pleasure by the appointing power." Thus, the
temporary appointee accepts the position with the condition that
he shall surrender the office when called upon to do so by the
appointing authority. Under Section 27 (2), Chapter 5, Subtitle A,
Title I, Book V of the same Code, the term of a temporary
appointment shall be 12 months, unless sooner terminated by the

appointing authority. Such pre-termination of a temporary

appointment may be with or without cause as the appointee serves
merely at the pleasure of the appointing power. 6
Under the Revised Qualifications Standards prescribed by the CSC,
career executive service eligibility is a necessary qualification for
the position of director III in Plans and Policy Services, OMA. It is not
disputed that on September 25, 2000, when respondent was
extended an appointment, he was not eligible to the position, not
being a holder of such eligibility. Hence, his appointment was
properly designated as "temporary." Then on October 31, 2000,
newly-appointed OMA Executive Director Tomawis recalled
respondents temporary appointment and replaced him by
appointing Alongan Sani. It turned out, however, that Sani is not
likewise qualified for the post. A game of musical chairs then
followed. Sani was subsequently replaced by Tapa Umal, who in
turn, was succeeded by Camad Edres, and later, was replaced by
Ismael Amod. All these appointees were also disqualified for lack of
the required eligibility.
The Court of Appeals ruled that such replacements are not valid as
the persons who replaced respondent are not also eligible. Also,
since he was replaced without just cause, he is entitled to serve the
remaining term of his 12-month term with salaries.
This Court has ruled that where a non-eligible holds a temporary
appointment, his replacement by another non-eligible is not
prohibited.7
Moreover, in Achacoso8 cited earlier, this Court held that when a
temporary appointee is required to relinquish his office, he is being
separated precisely because his term has expired. Thus,
reinstatement will not lie in favor of respondent. Starkly put, with
the expiration of his term upon his replacement, there is no
longer any remaining term to be served. Consequently, he can
no longer be reinstated.
As to whether respondent is entitled to back salaries, it is not
disputed that he was paid his salary during the entire twelve-month
period in spite of the fact that he served only from September 25,

2000 to October 31, 2000, or for only one month and six days.
Clearly, he was overpaid.
WHEREFORE, this Court GRANTS the petition and REVERSES the
assailed Resolutions of the Court of Appeals. Considering that
respondents employment was validly terminated on October 31,
2000, he is ordered to refund the salaries he received from that
date up to September 24, 2001.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

LIGHT
RAIL
TRANSIT
AUTHORITY, Petitioner,
vs.
PERFECTO H. VENUS, JR., BIENVENIDO P. SANTOS, JR.,
RAFAEL C. ROY, NANCY C. RAMOS, SALVADOR A. ALFON,
NOEL R. SANTOS, MANUEL A. FERRER, SALVADOR G.
ALINAS, RAMON D. LOFRANCO, AMADOR H.POLICARPIO,
REYNALDO
B.
GENER,
and
BIENVENIDO
G.
ARPILLEDA, Respondents.
x-----------------------------x
G.R. No. 163881

March 24, 2006

METRO
TRANSIT
ORGANIZATION,
INC., Petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, PERFECTO H. VENUS, JR., BIENVENIDO
P. SANTOS, JR., RAFAEL C. ROY, NANCY C. RAMOS,
SALVADOR A. ALFON, NOEL R. SANTOS, MANUEL A. FERRER,
SALVADOR G. ALINAS, RAMON D. LOFRANCO, AMADOR H.
POLICARPIO, and REYNALDO B. GENER, Respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
Before us are the consolidated petitions of Light Rail Transit
Authority (LRTA) and Metro Transit Organization, Inc. (METRO),
seeking the reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals
directing them to reinstate private respondent workers to their
former positions without loss of seniority and other rights and
privileges, and ordering them to jointly and severally pay the latter
their full back wages, benefits, and moral damages. The LRTA and
METRO were also ordered to jointly and severally pay attorneys
fees equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the total money judgment.
Petitioner LRTA is a government-owned and controlled corporation
created by Executive Order No. 603, Series of 1980, as amended, to
construct and maintain a light rail transit system and provide the
commuting public with an efficient, economical, dependable and
safe transportation. Petitioner METRO, formerly Meralco Transit
Organization, Inc., was a qualified transportation corporation duly
organized in accordance with the provisions of the Corporation

Code, registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission,

and existing under Philippine laws.
It appears that petitioner LRTA constructed a light rail transit
system from Monumento in Kalookan City to Baclaran in Paraaque,
Metro Manila. To provide the commuting public with an efficient and
dependable light rail transit system, petitioner LRTA, after a bidding
process, entered into a ten (10)-year Agreement for the
Management and Operation of the Metro Manila Light Rail Transit
System from June 8, 1984 until June 8, 1994 with petitioner
METRO.1The Agreement provided, among others, that
1. Effective on the COMMENCEMENT DATE, METRO shall
accept and take over from the AUTHORITY [LRTA] the
management,
maintenance
and
operation
of
the
commissioned and tested portion of the [Light Rail Transit]
System x x x [par. 2.02];
2. The AUTHORITY [LRTA] shall pay METRO
MANAGEMENT FEE as follows x x x [par. 5.01];

the

3. In rendering these services, METRO shall apply its best

skills and judgment, in attaining the objectives of the [Light
Rail Transit] System in accordance with accepted
professional standards. It shall exercise the required care,
diligence and efficiency in the discharge of its duties and
responsibilities and shall work for the best interest of the
[Light Rail Transit] System and the AUTHORITY [LRTA] [par.
2.03];
4. METRO shall be free to employ such employees and
officers as it shall deem necessary in order to carry out the
requirements of [the] Agreement. Such employees and
officers shall be the employees of METRO and not of the
AUTHORITY [LRTA]. METRO shall prepare a compensation
schedule and the corresponding salaries and fringe benefits
of [its] personnel in consultation with the AUTHORITY [LRTA]
[par. 3.05];
5. METRO shall likewise hold the AUTHORITY [LRTA] free and
harmless from any and all fines, penalties, losses and
liabilities and litigation expenses incurred or suffered on
account of and by reason of death, injury, loss or damage to

passengers and third persons, including the employees and

representatives of the AUTHORITY [LRTA], except where
such death, injury, loss or damage is attributable to a defect
or deficiency in the design of the system or its equipment
[par. 3.06].
Pursuant to the above Agreement, petitioner METRO hired its own
employees, including herein private respondents. Petitioner METRO
thereafter entered into a collective bargaining agreement
with Pinag-isang Lakas ng Manggagawa sa METRO, Inc. National
Federation of Labor, otherwise known as PIGLAS-METRO, INC. NFL
KMU (Union), the certified exclusive collective bargaining
representative of the rank-and-file employees of petitioner METRO.
Meanwhile, on June 9, 1989, petitioners LRTA and METRO executed
a Deed of Sale where petitioner LRTA purchased the shares of
stocks in petitioner METRO.2However, petitioners LRTA and METRO
continued with their distinct and separate juridical personalities.
Hence, when the above ten (10)-year Agreement expired on June 8,
1994, they renewed the same, initially on a yearly basis, and
subsequently on a monthly basis.
On July 25, 2000, the Union filed a Notice of Strike with the National
Conciliation and Mediation Board National Capital Region against
petitioner METRO on account of a deadlock in the collective
bargaining negotiation. On the same day, the Union struck. The
power supply switches in the different light rail transit substations
were turned off. The members of the Union picketed the various
substations. They completely paralyzed the operations of the entire
light rail transit system. As the strike adversely affected the
mobility of the commuting public, then Secretary of Labor
Bienvenido E. Laguesma issued on that same day an assumption of
jurisdiction order3directing all the striking employees "to return to
work immediately upon receipt of this Order and for the Company
to accept them back under the same terms and conditions of
employment prevailing prior to the strike."4
In their memorandum,5Department of Labor and Employment
Sheriffs Feliciano R. Orihuela, Jr., and Romeo P. Lemi reported to
Sec. Laguesma that they tried to personally serve the Order of
assumption of jurisdiction to the Union through its officials and
members on July 26, 2000, but the latter refused to receive the
same. The sheriffs thus posted the Order in the different
stations/terminals of the light rail transit system. Further, the Order

of assumption of jurisdiction was published on the July 27, 2000

issues of the Philippine Daily Inquirer6and thePhilippine Star.7
Despite the issuance, posting, and publication of the assumption of
jurisdiction and return to work order, the Union officers and
members, including herein private respondent workers, failed to
return to work. Thus, effective July 27, 2000, private respondents,
Perfecto Venus, Jr., Bienvenido P. Santos, Jr., Rafael C. Roy, Nancy C.
Ramos, Salvador A. Alfon, Noel R. Santos, Manuel A. Ferrer,
Salvador G. Alinas, Ramon D. Lofranco, Amador H. Policarpio,
Reynaldo B. Gener, and Bienvenido G. Arpilleda, were considered
dismissed from employment.
In the meantime, on July 31, 2000, the Agreement for the
Management and Operation of the Metro Manila Light Rail Transit
System between petitioners LRTA and METRO expired. The Board of
Directors of petitioner LRTA decided not to renew the contract with
petitioner METRO and directed the LRTA management instead to
immediately take over the management and operation of the light
rail transit system to avert the mass transportation crisis.
On October 10, 2000, private respondents Venus, Jr., Santos, Jr.,
and Roy filed a complaint for illegal dismissal before the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) and impleaded both petitioners
LRTA and METRO. Private respondents Ramos, Alfon, Santos, Ferrer,
Alinas, Lofranco, Policarpio, Gener, and Arpilleda follwed suit on
December 1, 2000.
On October 1, 2001, Labor Arbiter Luis D. Flores rendered a
consolidated judgment in favor of the private respondent workers 8
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
complainants and against the respondents, as follows:
1. Declaring that the complainants were illegally dismissed
from employment and ordering their reinstatement to their
former positions without loss of seniority and other rights
and privileges.
2. Ordering respondents Metro Transit Organization, Inc. and
Light Rail Transit Authority to jointly and severally pay the
complainants their other benefits and full backwages, which
as of June 30, 2001 are as follows:

1. Perfecto H. Venus, Jr.

P247,724.36

2. Bienvenido P. Santos, Jr.

247,724.36

3. Rafael C. Roy

247,724.36

4. Nancy [C.] Ramos

254,282.62

5. Salvador A. Alfon

257,764.62

6. Noel R. Santos

221,897.58

7. Manuel A. Ferrer

250,534.78

8. Salvador G. [Alinas]

253,454.88

9. Ramon D. Lofranco

253,642.18

10. Amador H. Policarpio

256,609.22

11. Reynaldo B. Gener

255,094.56

TOTAL

P2,746,453.52

3. Ordering respondents Metro Transit Organization, Inc. and

Light Rail Transit Authority to jointly and severally pay each
of the complainants the amount of P50,000.00 as moral
damages.
4. Ordering respondents Metro Transit Organization, Inc. and
Light Rail Transit Authority to jointly and severally pay the
complainants attorneys fees equivalent to ten percent
(10%) of the total money judgment.
SO ORDERED.
The complaint filed by Bienvenido G. Arpilleda, although initially
consolidated with the main case, was eventually dropped for his
failure to appear and submit any document and position paper. 9
On May 29, 2002, on appeal, the NLRC found that the striking
workers failed to heed the return to work order and reversed and
set aside the decision of the labor arbiter. The suit against LRTA
was dismissed since "LRTA is a government-owned and controlled
corporation created by virtue of Executive Order No. 603 with an
original charter"10and "it ha[d] no participation whatsoever with the
termination of complainants employment."11In fine, the cases

against the LRTA and METRO were dismissed, respectively, for lack
of jurisdiction and for lack of merit.
On December 3, 2002, the NLRC denied the workers Motion for
Reconsideration "[t]here being no showing that the Commission
committed, (and that) the Motion for Reconsideration was based
on, palpable or patent errors, and the fact that (the) said motion is
not under oath."
On a petition for certiorari however, the Court of Appeals reversed
the NLRC and reinstated the Decision rendered by the Labor
Arbiter. Public respondent appellate court declared the workers
dismissal as illegal, pierced the veil of separate corporate
personality and held the LRTA and METRO as jointly liable for back
wages.
Hence, these twin petitions for review on certiorari of the decision
of public respondent appellate court filed by LRTA and METRO
which this Court eventually consolidated.
In the main, petitioner LRTA argues that it has no employeremployee relationship with private respondent workers as they
were hired by petitioner METRO alone pursuant to its ten (10)-year
Agreement for the Management and Operation of the Metro Manila
Light Rail Transit System with petitioner METRO. Private respondent
workers recognized that their employer was not petitioner LRTA
when their certified exclusive collective bargaining representative,
the Pinag-isang Lakas ng Manggagawa sa METRO, Inc. National
Federation of Labor, otherwise known as PIGLAS-METRO, INC. NFL
KMU, entered into a collective bargaining agreement with
petitioner METRO. Piercing the corporate veil of METRO was
unwarranted, as there was no competent and convincing evidence
of any wrongful, fraudulent or unlawful act on the part of METRO,
and, more so, on the part of LRTA.
Petitioner LRTA further contends that it is a government-owned and
controlled corporation with an original charter, Executive Order No.
603, Series of 1980, as amended, and thus under the exclusive
jurisdiction only of the Civil Service Commission, not the NLRC.
Private respondent workers, however, submit that petitioner METRO
was not only fully-owned by petitioner LRTA, but all aspects of its
operations and administration were also strictly controlled,
conducted and directed by petitioner LRTA. And since petitioner
METRO is a mere adjunct, business conduit, and alter ego of

petitioner LRTA, their respective corporate veils must be pierced to

satisfy the money claims of the illegally dismissed private
respondent employees.
We agree with petitioner LRTA. Section 2 (1), Article IX B, 1987
Constitution, expressly provides that "[t]he civil service embraces
all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the
Government,
including
government-owned
or
controlled
corporations with original charters." Corporations with original
charters are those which have been created by special law and not
through the general corporation law. Thus, in Philippine National
Oil Company Energy Development Corporation v. Hon.
Leogrado, we held that "under the present state of the law, the
test in determining whether a government-owned or controlled
corporation is subject to the Civil Service Law is the manner of its
creation such that government corporations created by special
charter are subject to its provisions while those incorporated under
the general Corporation Law are not within its coverage." 12There
should be no dispute then that employment in petitioner LRTA
should be governed only by civil service rules, and not the Labor
Code and beyond the reach of the Department of Labor and
Employment, since petitioner LRTA is a government-owned and
controlled corporation with an original charter, Executive Order No.
603, Series of 1980, as amended.
In contrast, petitioner METRO is covered by the Labor Code despite
its later acquisition by petitioner LRTA. InLumanta v. National
Labor Relations Commission,13this Court ruled that labor law
claims against government-owned and controlled corporations
without original charter fall within the jurisdiction of the
Department of Labor and Employment and not the Civil Service
Commission. Petitioner METRO was originally organized under the
Corporation Code, and only became a government-owned and
controlled corporation after it was acquired by petitioner LRTA. Even
then, petitioner METRO has no original charter, hence, it is the
Department of Labor and Employment, and not the Civil Service
Commission, which has jurisdiction over disputes arising from the
employment of its workers. Consequently, the terms and conditions
of such employment are governed by the Labor Code and not by
the Civil Service Rules and Regulations.
We therefore hold that the employees of petitioner METRO cannot
be considered as employees of petitioner LRTA. The employees
hired by METRO are covered by the Labor Code and are under the
jurisdiction of the Department of Labor and Employment, whereas

the employees of petitioner LRTA, a government-owned and

controlled corporation with original charter, are covered by civil
service rules. Herein private respondent workers cannot have the
best of two worlds, e.g., be considered government employees of
petitioner LRTA, yet allowed to strike as private employees under
our labor laws. Department of Justice Opinion No. 108, Series of
1999, issued by then Secretary of Justice Serafin R. Cuevas on
whether or not employees of petitioner METRO could go on strike is
persuasive
We believe that METRO employees are not covered by the
prohibition against strikes applicable to employees embraced in the
Civil Service. It is not disputed, but in fact conceded, that METRO
employees are not covered by the Civil Service. This being so,
METRO employees are not covered by the Civil Service law, rules
and regulations but are covered by the Labor Code and, therefore,
the rights and prerogatives granted to private employees
thereunder, including the right to strike, are available to them.
Moreover, as noted by Secretary Benjamin E. Diokno, of the
Department of Budget and Management, in his letter dated
February 22, 1999, the employees of METRO are not entitled to the
government amelioration assistance authorized by the President
pursuant to Administrative Order No. 37 for government
employees, because the employees of METRO are not government
employees since Metro, Inc. "could not be considered as GOCC as
defined under Section 3 (b) of E.O. 518 x x x x" 14
Indeed, there was never an intention to consider the employees of
petitioner METRO as government employees of petitioner LRTA as
well neither from the beginning, nor until the end. Otherwise, they
could have been easily converted from being employees in the
private sector and absorbed as government employees covered by
the civil service when petitioner LRTA acquired petitioner METRO in
1989. The stubborn fact is that they remained private employees
with rights and prerogatives granted to them under the Labor Code,
including the right to strike, which they exercised and from which
the instant dispute arose.
We likewise hold that it is inappropriate to pierce the corporate veil
of petitioner METRO. In Del Rosario v. National Labor Relations
Commission, we ruled that "[u]nder the law a corporation is
bestowed juridical personality, separate and distinct from its
stockholders. But when the juridical personality of the corporation
is used to defeat public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud or

defend crime, the corporation shall be considered as a mere

association of persons, and its responsible officers and/or
stockholders shall be held individually liable. For the same reasons,
a corporation shall be liable for the obligations of a stockholder, or
a corporation and its successor-in-interest shall be considered as
one and the liability of the former shall attach to the latter. But for
the separate juridical personality of a corporation to be
disregarded, the wrongdoing must be clearly and convincingly
established. It cannot be presumed." 15In Del Rosario, we also held
that the "substantial identity of the incorporators of the two
corporations does not necessarily imply fraud."16
In the instant case, petitioner METRO, formerly Meralco Transit
Organization, Inc., was originally owned by the Manila Electric
Company and registered with the Securities and Exchange
Commission more than a decade before the labor dispute. It then
entered into a ten-year agreement with petitioner LRTA in 1984.
And, even if petitioner LRTA eventually purchased METRO in 1989,
both parties maintained their separate and distinct juridical
personality and allowed the agreement to proceed. In 1990, this
Court, in Light Rail Transit Authority v. Commission on Audit,
even upheld the validity of the said agreement. 17Consequently, the
agreement was extended beyond its ten-year period. In 1995,
METROs separate juridical identity was again recognized when it
entered into a collective bargaining agreement with the workers
union. All these years, METROs distinct corporate personality
continued quiescently, separate and apart from the juridical
personality of petitioner LRTA.
The labor dispute only arose in 2000, after a deadlock occurred
during the collective bargaining between petitioner METRO and the
workers union. This alone is not a justification to pierce the
corporate veil of petitioner METRO and make petitioner LRTA liable
to private respondent workers. There are no badges of fraud or any
wrongdoing to pierce the corporate veil of petitioner METRO.
On this point, the Department of Justice Opinion No. 108, Series of
1999, issued by then Secretary of Justice Serafin R. Cuevas is once
again apropos:
Anent the issue of piercing the corporate veil, it was held
in Concept Builders, Inc. v. NLRC (G.R. No. 108734, May 29, 1996,
257 SCRA 149, 159) that the test in determining the applicability of
the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate fiction is as follows:

"1. Control, not mere majority or complete stock control, but

complete domination, not only of finances but of policy and
business practice in respect to the transaction attacked so
that the corporate entity as to this transaction had at the
time no separate mind, will or existence of its own;
2. Such control must have been used by the defendant to
commit fraud or wrong, to perpetuate the violation of a
statutory or other positive legal duty, or dishonest and
unjust act in contravention of plaintiffs legal rights; and
3. The aforesaid control and breach of duty must
proximately cause the injury or unjust loss complained of.
The absence of any one of these elements prevents piercing the
corporate veil. In applying the instrumentality or alter ego
doctrine, the courts are concerned with reality and not form, with
how the corporation operated and the individual defendants
relationship to that operation."
Here, the records do not show that control was used to commit a
fraud or wrong. In fact, it appears that piercing the corporate veil
for the purpose of delivery of public service, would lead to a
confusing situation since the outcome would be that Metro will be
treated as a mere alter ego of LRTA, not having a separate
corporate personality from LRTA, when dealing with the issue of
strike, and a separate juridical entity not covered by the Civil
Service when it comes to other matters. Under the Constitution, a
government corporation is either one with original charter or one
without original charter, but never both.18
In sum, petitioner LRTA cannot be held liable to the employees of
petitioner METRO.
With regard the issue of illegal dismissal, petitioner METRO
maintains that private respondent workers were not illegally
dismissed but should be deemed to have abandoned their jobs
after defying the assumption of jurisdiction and return-to-work
order issued by the Labor Secretary. Private respondent workers, on
the other hand, submit that they could not immediately return to
work as the light rail transit system had ceased its operations.
We find for the private respondent workers. In Batangas Laguna
Tayabas Bus Co. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 19 we said

that the five-day period for the strikers to obey the Order of the
Secretary of Justice and return to work was not sufficient as "some
of them may have left Metro Manila and did not have enough time
to return during the period given by petitioner, which was only five
days."20 In Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Co.,21we further held
The contention of the petitioner that the private respondents
abandoned their position is also not acceptable. An employee who
forthwith takes steps to protest his lay-off cannot by any logic be
said to have abandoned his work.
For abandonment to constitute a valid cause for termination of
employment, there must be a deliberate, unjustified refusal of the
employee to resume his employment. This refusal must be clearly
established. As we stressed in a recent case, mere absence is not
sufficient; it must be accompanied by overt acts unerringly pointing
to the fact that the employee simply does not want to work
anymore.
In the instant case, private respondent workers could not have
defied the return-to-work order of the Secretary of Labor simply
because they were dismissed immediately, even before they could
obey the said order. The records show that the assumption of
jurisdiction and return-to-work order was issued by Secretary of
Labor Bienvenido E. Laguesma on July 25, 2000. The said order was
served and posted by the sheriffs of the Department of Labor and
Employment the following day, on July 26, 2000. Further, the said
order of assumption of jurisdiction was duly published on July 27,
2000, in the Philippine Daily Inquirer and the Philippine Star.
On the same day also, on July 27, 2000, private respondent workers
were dismissed. Neither could they be considered as having
abandoned their work. If petitioner METRO did not dismiss the
strikers right away, and instead accepted them back to work, the
management agreement between petitioners LRTA and METRO
could still have been extended and the workers would still have had
work to return to.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision of public respondent Court of
Appeals is AFFIRMED insofar as it holds Metro Transit Organization,
Inc. liable for the illegal dismissal of private respondents and orders
it to pay them their benefits and full back wages and moral
damages. Further, Metro Transit Organization, Inc. is ordered to pay
attorneys fees equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the total money
judgment. The petition of the Light Rail Transit Authority is

GRANTED, and the complaint filed against it for illegal dismissal is

DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

ALEX
A.
vs.
CIVIL
SERVICE
COMMISSION
ELERIA, respondents.
G.R. No. 92867

ABILA, petitioner,
and

FLORENTINA

E.

June 3, 1991

QUEZON CITY, represented by the Honorable Brigido R.

Simon,
Jr., petitioner,
vs.
CIVIL
SERVICE
COMMISSION
and
FLORENTINA
E.
ELERIA, respondents.
Z.P.
Reyes
Law
Office
for
petitioner
The
City
Attorney
for
petitioner
Quezon
Pedro F. Martinez for private respondent.

Abila.
City.

RESOLUTION

FELICIANO, J.:
On 1 September 1987, Amado Villafuerte retired from his position
as Administrative Officer IV in the Health Department of the City
Government of Quezon City. Then Quezon City Officer-in-Charge
Brigido Simon, Jr. appointed petitioner Alex Abila as Villafuerte's
successor. Petitioner Abila who had theretofore been the Acting
Assistant Civil Security Officer, Civil Intelligence and Security
Department of the Quezon City Government, assumed the
Administrative Officer IV position on 2 December 1987.
A day earlier, private respondent Florentina Eleria, Administrative
Officer III of the Health Department, Quezon City Government, filed
a protest with the Merit System Protection Board ("Board") in
respect of Abila's appointment. The Board indorsed the protest to
the Quezon City Officer-in-Charge, Reynaldo Bernardo, who
rendered a decision dismissing the protest.

Private respondent Eleria appealed to the Board. On 27 October

1988, the Board promulgated a decision revoking petitioner Abila's
appointment and directing the Quezon City Officer-in-Charge or
Mayor to appoint private respondent Eleria in lieu of petitioner
Abila. The Board found that both petitioner Abila and private
respondent Eleria met the minimum eligibility and education
requirements for Administrative Officer IV, but ruled that
respondent Eleria had the edge in terms of rank and experience as
an Administrative Officer. The Board also held that respondent
Eleria was holding a position next in rank to that of the vacancy,
which circumstance, according to the Board, under Section 4 of the
Civil Service Commission Resolution No. 83-343, gave her
"promotional priority" over petitioner.
Petitioner Abila appealed to the Civil Service Commission
("Commission"). The Commission affirmed in toto the Board's
decision and resolution dated 21 November 1989. Petitioner moved
for reconsideration, without success.
Petitioner is now before this Court on certiorari. He contends that
the respondent Commission, having verified that both petitioner
and private respondent were legally qualified to fill the vacancy,
should not have proceeded to comparing the parties' qualifications
and choosing the person that it believed to be the appropriate
appointee. Those functions, petitioner urges, belong to the City
Mayor as part of his appointing power and cannot be appropriated
for itself by the respondent Commission.
In a Resolution dated 19 April 1990, the Court granted a temporary
restraining order enjoining respondent Commission from
implementing its resolutions.
The Quezon City Government, represented by its elected Mayor,
Brigido Simon, Jr., filed an identical Petition with this Court,
docketed as G.R. No. 92867, seeking annulment of respondent
Commission's resolution and upholding the validity of the
appointment of petitioner Abila on substantially the same grounds
pleaded by the latter.
In a resolution dated 26 July 1990, the Court ordered consolidation
of the two (2) cases for their more convenient disposition.

The recurring issue posed in this case is whether the respondent

Commission has authority to substitute its own judgment for that of
the official authorized by law to make an appointment to the
government service, in the matter of weighing an appointee's
qualifications and fitness for a position, after it has been shown that
the appointee possesses the minimum qualifications prescribed for
the position.
In a long line of cases,1 the Court has held that respondent
Commission has no such authority, the power of appointment,
which is essentially discretionary, being vested by law in the head
of the office concerned. The head of the office is the person on the
spot. He occupies the ideal vantage point from which to identify
and designate the individual who can best fill the post and
discharge its functions in the government agency he heads. The
choice of an appointee from among those who possess the required
qualifications is a political and administrative decision calling for
considerations of wisdom, convenience, utility and the interests of
service which can best be made by the head of the office
concerned, the person most familiar with the organizational
structure and environmental circumstances within which the
appointee must function.
In Lapinid vs. Civil Service Commission (supra), the Court through
Mr. Justice Cruz, stressed:
We declare once again, and let us hope for the last time,
that the Civil Service Commission has no power of
appointment except over its own personnel. Neither does it
have the authority to review the appointments made by
other offices except only to ascertain if the appointee
possesses the required qualifications. The determination of
who among aspirants with the minimum statutory
qualifications should be preferred belongs to the appointing
authority and not the Civil Service Commission. It cannot
disallow an appointment because it believes another person
is better qualified and much less can it direct the
appointment of its own choice.
Appointment is a highly discretionary act that even this
Court cannot compel. While the act of appointment may in
proper cases be the subject of mandamus, the selection
itself of the appointee taking into account the totality of
his qualifications, including those abstract qualities that
define his personality is the prerogative of the appointing

authority. This is a matter addressed only to the discretion of

the appointing authority. It is a political question that the
Civil Service Commission has no power to review under the
Constitution and the applicable laws.2
The Commission, the Court said in Chang v. Civil Service
Commission,3 "is not a co-manager or surrogate administrator of
government offices and agencies."
In the case at bar, the respondent Commission itself acknowledged
that both petitioner Abila and respondent Eleria are legally qualified
for the position in question.4 Having made the determination, the
Commission had exhausted its powers and may not act any further
except to affirm the validity of petitioner's appointment. More
specifically, the Commission had no authority to revoke petitioner's
appointment because the Commission believed that private
respondent Eleria was better qualified for the position involved; the
Commission's acts in this respect constituted an encroachment
upon a discretionary authority vested by law in the Quezon City
Mayor and not in the Commission.
The Court notes that a vacant position in the Civil Service may be
filled by promotion, transfer of present employees, reinstatement
and re-employment or appointment of outsiders who have the
necessary eligibility.5The next-in-rank rule invoked by respondent
Commission to justify its choice of respondent Eleria over petitioner
Abila, applies only where a vacancy is filled by promotion, a process
which denotes a scalar ascent of an officer to another position
higher either in rank or salary. A promotion involves a situation
quite different from the situation in the case at bar where the
appointment of petitioner Abila was effected through lateral
transfer from a position in one department of the city government
to a position of greater responsibility in another department of the
same government.6 In Medenilla v. Civil Service Commission,7 the
Court very recently stressed that:
. . . We have already held in cases subsequent to Millares
that the next-in-rank rule is not absolute; it only applies in
cases of promotion (see Pineda v. Claudio, 28 SCRA 34
[1969]). And even in promotions, it can be disregarded for
sound reasons made known to the next-in-rank. The
appointing authority, under the Civil Service Law, is allowed
to fill vacancies by promotion, transfer of present
employees, reinstatement, reemployment, and appointment
of
outsiders
who
have
appropriate
civil
service

eligibility, not necessarily in that order (see Pineda v.

Claudio, supra; Luego v. Civil Service Commission, 143 SCRA
327 [1986]). There is no legal fiat that a vacancy must be
filled only by promotion; the appointing authority is given
wide discretion to fill a vacancy from among the several
alternatives provided for by law. (Emphasis supplied)
The Court further notes that even if the vacancy here had been
filled by promotion rather than by lateral transfer, the concept of
"next in rank" does not import any mandatory or peremptory
requirement that the person next in rank must be appointed to the
vacancy. What Section 19 (3) of P.D. No. 807, the Civil Service Law,
provides is that if a vacancy is filled by a promotion, the person
holding the position next in rank thereto "shall be considered for
promotion."8
In Taduran v. Civil Service Commission,9 the Court construed that
phrase to mean that the person next in rank "would be among the
first to be considered for the vacancy, if qualified. 10 In Santiago, Jr.
v. Civil Service Commission,11 the Court elaborated the import of
the rule in the following manner:
One who is next-in-rank is entitled to preferential
consideration for promotion to the higher vacancy but it
does not necessarily follow that he and no one else can be
appointed. The rule neither grants a vested right to the
holder nor imposes a ministerial duty on the appointing
authority to promote such person to the next higher
position. . . .12
It appears to the Court that Section 4 of respondent Commission's
Resolution No. 83-343 which provided that:
Rule on Promotion
xxx

xxx

xxx

Section 4. An employee who holds a next in rank position

who is competent and qualified, possesses an appropriate
civil service eligibility and meets the other conditions for
promotion shall be promoted to the higher position, when it
becomes vacant. (Emphasis supplied)

has been superseded by Section 2 of Rule 3 of the respondent

Commission's subsequent Resolution No. 89-779 which reads as
follows:
B. Rules on Protest Cases
xxx

xxx

xxx

Rule III. Procedure in Filling Vacancies

xxx

xxx

xxx

Section 2. Positions in the Second Level. When a vacancy

occurs in the second level of the career service as herein
defined, the employees in the department who occupy the
next lower positions in the occupational group under which
the vacant position is classified, and in other functionally
related occupational groups, who are competent and
qualified and with appropriate civil service eligibility shall be
considered for appointment to the vacancy. (Emphasis
supplied)
When, in the exercise of its rule-making power, it promulgated
Section 4 of its earlier Resolution No. 83-343, the Commission
clearly exceeded the scope of its statutory authority since the Civil
Service law itself, in Section 19 (3) of P.D. No. 807, had simply
provided that persons next in rank who are qualified "shall be
considered for promotion." The current regulation found in Section
2 of Rule III of the Commission's Resolution No. 89-779 is,
fortunately, more consistent with the Commission's enabling
statute.
Finally, respondent Commission will find no comfort in Meram v.
Edralin13 which it cites. In that case, the Court affirmed the
appointment of the next in rank "because the original appointee's
appointment was made in consideration of the political, ethnic,
religious or blood ties totally against the very purpose behind the
establishment of professionalism in the civil service." 14 In the case
at bar, respondents have not asserted the existence of any
circumstances, such as those in Meram, which would have
warranted intervention by the Commission to correct an arbitrary
and merely capricious exercise of power by the appointing
authority.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to TREAT respondents'

Comments as their Answers, to GRANT due course to the Petition
for Certiorari and to ANNUL and SET ASIDE the Resolutions of the
respondent Civil Service Commission Nos. 89-869 (21 November
1989) and 90-240 (5 March 1990), respectively. The Temporary
Restraining Order dated 19 April 1990 is hereby MADE PERMANENT.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras,
Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea,
Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.

BRICCIO Ricky A. POLLO,

Petitioner,

- versus -

G.R. No. 181881

Present:
CORONA, C.J.,
CARPIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,*
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ,
MENDOZA,
SERENO,
REYES, and
PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ.

CHAIRPERSON KARINA CONSTANTINODAVID,

DIRECTOR IV RACQUEL DE GUZMAN
BUENSALIDA,
DIRECTOR IV LYDIA A.
CASTILLO, DIRECTOR III
ENGELBERT ANTHONY D. UNITE AND Promulgated:
THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION,
Respondents.
October 18, 2011
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

This case involves a search of office computer assigned to a

government employee who was charged administratively and
eventually dismissed from the service. The employees personal
files stored in the computer were used by the government
employer as evidence of misconduct.
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 which
seeks
to
reverse
and
set
aside
the
Decision[1] dated October 11, 2007 and Resolution[2] dated February
29, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA dismissed the
petition for certiorari (CA-G.R. SP No. 98224) filed by petitioner

Briccio Ricky A. Pollo to nullify the proceedings conducted by the

Civil Service Commission (CSC) which found him guilty
of dishonesty, grave misconduct, conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service, and violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713
and penalized him with dismissal.
The factual antecedents:
Petitioner is a former Supervising Personnel Specialist of the
CSC Regional Office No. IV and also the Officer-in-Charge of the
Public
Assistance
and
Liaison
Division
(PALD)
under
the Mamamayan Muna Hindi Mamaya Na program of the CSC.
On January 3, 2007 at around 2:30 p.m., an unsigned lettercomplaint addressed to respondent CSC Chairperson Karina
Constantino-David which was marked Confidential and sent through
a courier service (LBC) from a certain Alan San Pascual of Bagong
Silang, Caloocan City, was received by the Integrated Records
Management Office (IRMO) at the CSC Central Office. Following
office practice in which documents marked Confidential are left
unopened and instead sent to the addressee, the aforesaid letter
was given directly to Chairperson David.
The letter-complaint reads:
The Chairwoman
Civil Service Commission
Batasan Hills, Quezon City
Dear Madam Chairwoman,
Belated Merry Christmas and Advance Happy
New Year!
As a concerned citizen of my beloved country, I
would like to ask from you personally if it is just
alright for an employee of your agency to be a

lawyer of an accused govt employee having a

pending case in the csc. I honestly think this is a
violation of law and unfair to others and your office.
I have known that a person have been lawyered by
one of your attorny in the region 4 office. He is the
chief of the Mamamayan muna hindi mamaya na
division. He have been helping many who have
pending cases in the Csc. The justice in our govt
system will not be served if this will continue. Please
investigate this anomaly because our perception of
your clean and good office is being tainted.
Concerned Govt employee[3]

Chairperson David immediately formed a team of four personnel

with background in information technology (IT), and issued a memo
directing them to conduct an investigation and specifically to back
up all the files in the computers found in the Mamamayan Muna
(PALD) and Legal divisions.[4] After some briefing, the team
proceeded at once to the CSC-ROIV office at Panay Avenue, Quezon
City. Upon their arrival thereat around 5:30 p.m., the team informed
the officials of the CSC-ROIV, respondents Director IV Lydia Castillo
(Director Castillo) and Director III Engelbert Unite (Director Unite) of
Chairperson Davids directive.
The backing-up of all files in the hard disk of computers at the PALD
and Legal Services Division (LSD) was witnessed by several
employees, together with Directors Castillo and Unite who closely
monitored said activity. At around 6:00 p.m., Director Unite sent
text messages to petitioner and the head of LSD, who were both
out of the office at the time, informing them of the ongoing copying
of computer files in their divisions upon orders of the CSC Chair.
The text messages received by petitioner read:
Gud p.m. This is Atty. Unite FYI: Co people are going
over the PCs of PALD and LSD per instruction of the
Chairman. If you can make it here now it would be
better.

All PCs Of PALD and LSD are being backed up per

memo of the chair.
CO IT people arrived just now for this purpose. We
were not also informed about this.
We cant do anything about it its a directive from
chair.
Memo of the chair was referring to an anonymous
complaint; ill send a copy of the memo via mms[5]

Petitioner replied also thru text message that he was leaving the
matter to Director Unite and that he will just get a lawyer. Another
text message received by petitioner from PALD staff also reported
the presence of the team from CSC main office: Sir may mga taga
C.O. daw sa kuarto natin.[6] At around 10:00 p.m. of the same day,
the investigating team finished their task. The next day, all the
computers in the PALD were sealed and secured for the purpose of
preserving all the files stored therein. Several diskettes containing
the back-up files sourced from the hard disk of PALD and LSD
computers were turned over to Chairperson David. The contents of
the diskettes were examined by the CSCs Office for Legal Affairs
(OLA). It was found that most of the files in the 17 diskettes
containing files copied from the computer assigned to and being
used by the petitioner, numbering about 40 to 42 documents, were
draft pleadings or letters[7] in connection with administrative cases
in the CSC and other tribunals. On the basis of this finding,
Chairperson David issued the Show-Cause Order[8] dated January
11, 2007, requiring the petitioner, who had gone on extended
leave, to submit his explanation or counter-affidavit within five days
from notice.
Evaluating the subject documents obtained from petitioners
personal files, Chairperson David made the following observations:
Most of the foregoing files are drafts of legal
pleadings or documents that are related to or

connected with administrative cases that may

broadly be lumped as pending either in the CSCRO
No. IV, the CSC-NCR, the CSC-Central Office or other
tribunals. It is also of note that most of these draft
pleadings are for and on behalves of parties, who are
facing charges as respondents in administrative
cases. This gives rise to the inference that the one
who prepared them was knowingly, deliberately and
willfully aiding and advancing interests adverse and
inimical to the interest of the CSC as the central
personnel agency of the government tasked to
discipline misfeasance and malfeasance in the
government service. The number of pleadings so
prepared further demonstrates that such person is
not merely engaged in an isolated practice but
pursues it with seeming regularity. It would also be
the height of naivete or credulity, and certainly
against common human experience, to believe that
the person concerned had engaged in this customary
practice without any consideration, and in fact, one
of the retrieved files (item 13 above) appears to
insinuate the collection of fees. That these draft
pleadings were obtained from the computer assigned
to Pollo invariably raises the presumption that he was
the one responsible or had a hand in their drafting or
preparation since the computer of origin was within
his direct control and disposition.[9]

Petitioner filed his Comment, denying that he is the person referred

to in the anonymous letter-complaint which had no attachments to
it, because he is not a lawyer and neither is he lawyering for people
with cases in the CSC. He accused CSC officials of conducting a
fishing expedition when they unlawfully copied and printed
personal files in his computer, and subsequently asking him to
submit his comment which violated his right against selfincrimination. He asserted that he had protested the unlawful
taking of his computer done while he was on leave, citing the letter
dated January 8, 2007 in which he informed Director Castillo that
the files in his computer were his personal files and those of his
sister, relatives, friends and some associates and that he is not
authorizing their sealing, copying, duplicating and printing as these

would violate his constitutional right to privacy and protection

against self-incrimination and warrantless search and seizure. He
pointed out that though government property, the temporary use
and ownership of the computer issued under a Memorandum of
Receipt (MR) is ceded to the employee who may exercise all
attributes of ownership, including its use for personal purposes. As
to the anonymous letter, petitioner argued that it is not actionable
as it failed to comply with the requirements of a formal complaint
under the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service (URACC). In view of the illegal search, the files/documents
copied from his computer without his consent is thus inadmissible
as evidence, being fruits of a poisonous tree.[10]

On February 26, 2007, the CSC issued Resolution No.

070382[11] finding prima facie case against the petitioner and
charging him with Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, Conduct
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service and Violation of R.A.
No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees). Petitioner was directed to submit his
answer under oath within five days from notice and indicate
whether he elects a formal investigation. Since the charges fall
under Section 19 of the URACC, petitioner was likewise placed
under 90 days preventive suspension effective immediately upon
receipt of the resolution. Petitioner received a copy of Resolution
No. 070382 on March 1, 2007.

Petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion (For Reconsideration, to Dismiss

and/or to Defer) assailing the formal charge as without basis having
proceeded from an illegal search which is beyond the authority of
the CSC Chairman, such power pertaining solely to the
court. Petitioner reiterated that he never aided any people with
pending cases at the CSC and alleged that those files found in his
computer were prepared not by him but by certain persons whom
he permitted, at one time or another, to make use of his computer

out of close association or friendship. Attached to the motion were

the affidavit of Atty. Ponciano R. Solosa who entrusted his own files
to be kept at petitioners CPU and Atty. Eric N. Estrellado, the latter
being Atty. Solosas client who attested that petitioner had nothing
to do with the pleadings or bill for legal fees because in truth he
owed legal fees to Atty. Solosa and not to petitioner. Petitioner
contended that the case should be deferred in view of the
prejudicial question raised in the criminal complaint he filed before
the Ombudsman against Director Buensalida, whom petitioner
believes had instigated this administrative case. He also prayed for
the lifting of the preventive suspension imposed on him. In its
Resolution No. 070519[12] dated March 19, 2007, the CSC denied
the omnibus motion. The CSC resolved to treat the said motion as
petitioners answer.
On March 14, 2007, petitioner filed an Urgent
Petition[13] under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, docketed as CA-G.R.
SP No. 98224, assailing both the January 11, 2007 Show-Cause
Order and Resolution No. 070382 dated February 26, 2007 as
having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
excess or total absence of jurisdiction. Prior to this, however,
petitioner lodged an administrative/criminal complaint against
respondents Directors Racquel D.G. Buensalida (Chief of Staff,
Office of the CSC Chairman) and Lydia A. Castillo (CSC-RO IV)
before the Office of the Ombudsman, and a separate complaint for
disbarment against Director Buensalida.[14]
On April 17, 2007, petitioner received a notice of hearing from the
CSC setting the formal investigation of the case on April 30, 2007.
On April 25, 2007, he filed in the CA an Urgent Motion for the
issuance of TRO and preliminary injunction. [15] Since he failed to
attend the pre-hearing conference scheduled on April 30, 2007, the
CSC reset the same to May 17, 2007 with warning that the failure of
petitioner and/or his counsel to appear in the said pre-hearing
conference shall entitle the prosecution to proceed with the formal

investigation ex-parte.[16] Petitioner moved to defer or to reset the

pre-hearing conference, claiming that the investigation proceedings
should be held in abeyance pending the resolution of his petition by
the CA. The CSC denied his request and again scheduled the prehearing conference on May 18, 2007 with similar warning on the
consequences of petitioner and/or his counsels non-appearance.
[17]
This prompted petitioner to file another motion in the CA, to cite
the respondents, including the hearing officer, in indirect contempt.
[18]

On June 12, 2007, the CSC issued Resolution No. 071134 [19] denying
petitioners motion to set aside the denial of his motion to defer the
proceedings and to inhibit the designated hearing officer, Atty.
Bernard G. Jimenez. The hearing officer was directed to proceed
with the investigation proper with dispatch.
In view of the absence of petitioner and his counsel, and upon the
motion of the prosecution, petitioner was deemed to have waived
his right to the formal investigation which then proceeded ex parte.
On July 24, 2007, the CSC issued Resolution No. 071420, [20] the
dispositive part of which reads:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered,
the Commission hereby finds Briccio A. Pollo, a.k.a.
Ricky A. Pollo GUILTY of Dishonesty, Grave
Misconduct, Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest
of the Service and Violation of Republic Act 6713. He
is meted the penalty of DISMISSAL FROM THE
SERVICE with all its accessory penalties, namely,
disqualification to hold public office, forfeiture of
retirement benefits, cancellation of civil service
eligibilities and bar from taking future civil service
examinations.[21]

On the paramount issue of the legality of the search conducted on

petitioners computer, the CSC noted the dearth of jurisprudence

relevant to the factual milieu of this case where the government as

employer invades the private files of an employee stored in the
computer assigned to him for his official use, in the course of initial
investigation of possible misconduct committed by said employee
and without the latters consent or participation. The CSC thus
turned to relevant rulings of the United States Supreme Court, and
cited the leading case of OConnor v. Ortega[22] as authority for the
view that government agencies, in their capacity as employers,
rather than law enforcers, could validly conduct search and seizure
in the governmental workplace without meeting the probable cause
or warrant requirement for search and seizure. Another ruling cited
by the CSC is the more recent case of United States v. Mark L.
Simons[23] which declared that the federal agencys computer use
policy foreclosed any inference of reasonable expectation of
privacy on the part of its employees. Though the Court therein
recognized that such policy did not, at the same time, erode the
respondents legitimate expectation of privacy in the office in which
the computer was installed, still, the warrantless search of the
employees office was upheld as valid because a government
employer is entitled to conduct a warrantless search pursuant to an
investigation of work-related misconduct provided the search is
reasonable in its inception and scope.
With the foregoing American jurisprudence as benchmark, the CSC
held that petitioner has no reasonable expectation of privacy with
regard to the computer he was using in the regional office in view
of the CSC computer use policy which unequivocally declared that a
CSC employee cannot assert any privacy right to a computer
assigned to him. Even assuming that there was no such
administrative policy, the CSC was of the view that the search of
petitioners
computer
successfully
passed
the
test
of
reasonableness for warrantless searches in the workplace as
enunciated in the aforecited authorities. The CSC stressed that it
pursued the search in its capacity as government employer and
that it was undertaken in connection with an investigation involving

work-related misconduct, which exempts it from the warrant

requirement under the Constitution. With the matter of
admissibility of the evidence having been resolved, the CSC then
ruled that the totality of evidence adequately supports the charges
of grave misconduct, dishonesty, conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service and violation of R.A. No. 6713 against the
petitioner. These grave infractions justified petitioners dismissal
from the service with all its accessory penalties.
In his Memorandum[24] filed in the CA, petitioner moved to
incorporate the above resolution dismissing him from the service in
his main petition, in lieu of the filing of an appeal via a Rule
43 petition. In a subsequent motion, he likewise prayed for the
inclusion of Resolution No. 071800 [25] which denied his motion for
reconsideration.
By Decision dated October 11, 2007, the CA dismissed the
petition for certiorari after finding no grave abuse of discretion
committed by respondents CSC officials. The CA held that: (1)
petitioner was not charged on the basis of the anonymous letter
but from the initiative of the CSC after a fact-finding investigation
was conducted and the results thereof yielded a prima facie case
against him; (2) it could not be said that in ordering the back-up of
files in petitioners computer and later confiscating the same,
Chairperson David had encroached on the authority of a judge in
view of the CSC computer policy declaring the computers as
government property and that employee-users thereof have no
reasonable expectation of privacy in anything they create, store,
send, or receive on the computer system; and (3) there is nothing
contemptuous in CSCs act of proceeding with the formal
investigation as there was no restraining order or injunction issued
by the CA.
His motion for reconsideration having been denied by the
CA, petitioner brought this appeal arguing that

I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVOUSLY
ERRED AND COMMITTED SERIOUS IRREGULARITY
AND BLATANT ERRORS IN LAW AMOUNTING TO
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT RULED THAT
ANONYMOUS COMPLAINT IS ACTIONABLE UNDER E.O.
292 WHEN IN TRUTH AND IN FACT THE CONTRARY IS
EXPLICITLY PROVIDED UNDER 2nd PARAGRAPH OF
SECTION 8 OF CSC RESOLUTION NO. 99-1936, WHICH
IS AN [AMENDMENT] TO THE ORIGINAL RULES PER
CSC RESOLUTION NO. 94-0521;
II
THE HONORABLE COURT GRIEVOUSLY ERRED AND
COMMITTED PALPABLE ERRORS IN LAW AMOUNTING
TO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT RULED
THAT PETITIONER CANNOT INVOKE HIS RIGHT TO
PRIVACY, TO UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURE,
AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION, BY VIRTUE OF OFFICE
MEMORANDUM NO. 10 S. 2002, A MERE INTERNAL
MEMORANDUM SIGNED SOLELY AND EXCLUSIVELY BY
RESPONDENT DAVID AND NOT BY THE COLLEGIAL
COMMISSION CONSIDERING THAT POLICY MATTERS
INVOLVING SUB[S]TANTIAL RIGHTS CANNOT BE
COVERED BY AN OFFICE MEMORANDUM WHICH IS
LIMITED
TO
PROCEDURAL
AND
ROUTINARY
INSTRUCTION;
III
THE HONORABLE COURT GRAVELY ERRED AND
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT
RULED THAT MEMO SEARCH DATED JANUARY 3, 2007
AND THE TAKING OF DOCUMENTS IN THE EVENING
THEREOF FROM 7:00 TO 10:00 P.M. IS NOT GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION LIMITING THE DEFINITION
[OF] GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION TO ONE
INVOLVING
AND
TAINTED
WITH
PERSONAL
HOSTILITY. IT
LIKEWISE ERRED IN
HOLDING
THAT DATA
STORED
IN
THE
GOVERNMENT
COMPUTERS
ARE
GOVERNMENT
PROPERTIES
INCLUDING THE PERSONAL FILES WHEN THE
CONTRARY IS PROVIDED UNDER SECTION 14 OF OM.
10 s. 2002. AND GRIEVOUSLY ERRED STILL WHEN IT

RULED THAT RESPONDENT DAVID BY VIRTUE OF O.M.

10 DID NOT ENCROACH ON THE DUTIES AND
FUNCTIONS OF A JUDGE PURSUANT TO ARTICLE III,
SECTION 2 OF THE 1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION;
IV
THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO
CONSIDER
ALL
OTHER
NEW
ARGUMENTS,
ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE HEREUNTO SUBMITTED AS
WELL AS ITS FAILURE TO EVALUATE AND TAKE
ACTION ON THE 2 MOTIONS TO ADMIT AND
INCORPORATE CSC RESOLUTION NOS. 07-1420
DATED JULY 24, 2007 AND CSC RESOLUTION 07-1800
DATED SEPTEMBER 10, 2007. IT DID NOT RULE
LIKEWISE ON THE FOUR URGENT MOTION TO
RESOLVE ANCILLARY PRAYER FOR TRO.[26]
Squarely raised by the petitioner is the legality of the search
conducted on his office computer and the copying of his personal
files without his knowledge and consent, alleged as a transgression
on his constitutional right to privacy.
The right to privacy has been accorded recognition in this
jurisdiction as a facet of the right protected by the guarantee
against unreasonable search and seizure under Section 2, Article III
of the 1987 Constitution,[27] which provides:
SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and
no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath
or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce, and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized.

The constitutional guarantee is not a prohibition of all searches and

seizures but only of unreasonable searches and seizures. [28] But to
fully understand this concept and application for the purpose of
resolving the issue at hand, it is essential that we examine the
doctrine in the light of pronouncements in another jurisdiction. As
the Court declared in People v. Marti[29]:
Our present constitutional provision on the
guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure
had its origin in the 1935 Charter which, worded as
follows:
The right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures shall not be
violated, and no warrants shall issue
but
upon probable cause,
to
be
determined
by the
judge after
examination under oath or affirmation
of the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched,
and the persons or things to be seized.
(Sec. 1[3], Article III)
was in turn derived almost verbatim from the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. As
such, the Court may turn to the pronouncements of
the United States Federal Supreme Court and State
Appellate Courts which are considered doctrinal in
this jurisdiction.[30]

In the 1967 case of Katz v. United States,[31] the US Supreme Court

held that the act of FBI agents in electronically recording a
conversation made by petitioner in an enclosed public telephone
booth violated his right to privacy and constituted a search and
seizure. Because the petitioner had a reasonable expectation of
privacy in using the enclosed booth to make a personal telephone
call, the protection of the Fourth Amendment extends to such area.
In the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan, it was further noted

that the existence of privacy right under prior decisions involved a

two-fold requirement: first, that a person has exhibited an actual
(subjective) expectation of privacy; and second, that the
expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as
reasonable (objective).[32]
In Mancusi v. DeForte[33] which addressed the reasonable
expectations of private employees in the workplace, the US
Supreme Court held that a union employee had Fourth Amendment
rights with regard to an office at union headquarters that he shared
with other union officials, even as the latter or their guests could
enter the office. The Court thus recognized that employees may
have a reasonable expectation of privacy against intrusions by
police.
That the Fourth Amendment equally applies to a government
workplace was addressed in the 1987 case of OConnor v.
Ortega[34] where a physician, Dr. Magno Ortega, who was employed
by a state hospital, claimed a violation of his Fourth Amendment
rights
when
hospital
officials
investigating
charges
of
mismanagement of the psychiatric residency program, sexual
harassment of female hospital employees and other irregularities
involving his private patients under the state medical aid
program, searched his office and seized personal items from his
desk and filing cabinets. In that case, the Court categorically
declared that [i]ndividuals do not lose Fourth Amendment rights
merely because they work for the government instead of a private
employer.[35] A plurality of four Justices concurred that the correct
analysis has two steps: first, because some government offices
may be so open to fellow employees or the public that no
expectation of privacy is reasonable, a court must consider [t]he
operational realities of the workplace in order to determine whether
an employees Fourth Amendment rights are implicated; and next,
where an employee has a legitimate privacy expectation, an
employers intrusion on that expectation for noninvestigatory, work-

related purposes, as well as for investigations of work-related

misconduct, should be judged by the standard of reasonableness
under all the circumstances.[36]
On the matter of government employees reasonable expectations
of privacy in their workplace, OConnor teaches:
x x x Public employees expectations of
privacy in their offices, desks, and file cabinets, like
similar expectations of employees in the private
sector, may be reduced by virtue of actual office
practices and procedures, or by legitimate regulation.
x x x The employees expectation of privacy must be
assessed in the context of the employment
relation. An office is seldom a private enclave free
from entry by supervisors, other employees, and
business and personal invitees. Instead, in many
cases offices are continually entered by fellow
employees and other visitors during the workday for
conferences, consultations, and other work-related
visits. Simply put, it is the nature of government
offices that others such as fellow employees,
supervisors, consensual visitors, and the general
public may have frequent access to an individuals
office. We
agree
with
JUSTICE
SCALIA
that
[c]onstitutional protection against unreasonable
searches by the government does not disappear
merely because the government has the right to
make reasonable intrusions in its capacity as
employer, x x x but some government offices may
be so open to fellow employees or the public
that no expectation of privacy is reasonable. x
x
x Given
the
great
variety
of
work
environments in the public sector, the question
of whether an employee has a reasonable
expectation of privacy must be addressed on a
case-by-case
basis.[37] (Citations
omitted;
emphasis supplied.)

On the basis of the established rule in previous cases, the US

Supreme Court declared that Dr. Ortegas Fourth Amendment rights
are implicated only if the conduct of the hospital officials infringed

an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to consider as

reasonable. Given the undisputed evidence that respondent Dr.
Ortega did not share his desk or file cabinets with any other
employees, kept personal correspondence and other private
items in his own office while those work-related files (on physicians
in residency training) were stored outside his office, and there
being no evidence that the hospital had established any reasonable
regulation or policy discouraging employees from storing personal
papers and effects in their desks or file cabinets (although the
absence of such a policy does not create any expectation of privacy
where it would not otherwise exist), the Court concluded that Dr.
Ortega has a reasonable expectation of privacy at least in his desk
and file cabinets.[38]
Proceeding to the next inquiry as to whether the search conducted
by hospital officials was reasonable, the OConnor plurality decision
discussed the following principles:
Having determined that Dr. Ortega had a
reasonable expectation of privacy in his office, the
Court of Appeals simply concluded without discussion
that the searchwas not a reasonable search under
the fourth amendment. x x x [t]o hold that the Fourth
Amendment applies to searches conducted by [public
employers] is only to begin the inquiry into the
standards
governing
such
searches[W]hat
is
reasonable depends on the context within which a
search takes place. x x x Thus, we must determine
the
appropriate
standard
of
reasonableness
applicable to the search.A determination of the
standard of reasonableness applicable to a particular
class of searches requires balanc[ing] the nature and
quality of the intrusion on the individuals Fourth
Amendment interests against the importance of the
governmental
interests alleged
to justify the
intrusion. x x x In the case of searches
conducted by a public employer, we must
balance the invasion of the employees
legitimate expectations of privacy against the
governments need for supervision, control, and
the efficient operation of the workplace.

xxxx
In our view, requiring an employer to obtain a
warrant whenever the employer wished to enter an
employees office, desk, or file cabinets for a workrelated purpose would seriously disrupt the routine
conduct of business and would be unduly
burdensome. Imposing unwieldy warrant procedures
in such cases upon supervisors, who would otherwise
have no reason to be familiar with such procedures,
is simply unreasonable. In contrast to other
circumstances in which we have required warrants,
supervisors in offices such as at the Hospital are
hardly in the business of investigating the violation of
criminal laws. Rather, work-related searches are
merely incident to the primary business of the
agency. Under these circumstances, the imposition of
a warrant requirement would conflict with the
common-sense realization that government offices
could not function if every employment decision
became a constitutional matter. x x x
xxxx
The governmental interest justifying workrelated intrusions by public employers is the efficient
and proper operation of the workplace. Government
agencies provide myriad services to the public, and
the work of these agencies would suffer if employers
were required to have probable cause before they
entered an employees desk for the purpose of finding
a file or piece of office correspondence. Indeed, it is
difficult to give the concept of probable cause, rooted
as it is in the criminal investigatory context, much
meaning when the purpose of a search is to retrieve
a file for work-related reasons. Similarly, the concept
of probable cause has little meaning for a routine
inventory conducted by public employers for the
purpose of securing state property. x x x To ensure
the efficient and proper operation of the agency,
therefore, public employers must be given wide
latitude to enter employee offices for work-related,
noninvestigatory reasons.
We come to a similar conclusion for searches
conducted pursuant to an investigation of work-

related employee misconduct. Even when employers

conduct an investigation, they have an interest
substantially different from the normal need for law
enforcement. x x x Public employers have an interest
in ensuring that their agencies operate in an
effective and efficient manner, and the work of these
agencies inevitably suffers from the inefficiency,
incompetence, mismanagement, or other workrelated misfeasance of its employees. Indeed, in
many cases, public employees are entrusted with
tremendous responsibility, and the consequences of
their misconduct or incompetence to both the
agency and the public interest can be severe. In
contrast to law enforcement officials, therefore,
public employers are not enforcers of the criminal
law; instead, public employers have a direct and
overriding interest in ensuring that the work of the
agency is conducted in a proper and efficient
manner. In our view, therefore, a probable cause
requirement for searches of the type at issue
here would impose intolerable burdens on
public employers. The delay in correcting the
employee misconduct caused by the need for
probable
cause
rather
than
reasonable
suspicion will be translated into tangible and
often irreparable damage to the agencys
work, and ultimately to the public interest. x x
x
xxxx
In sum, we conclude that the special
needs, beyond the normal need for law
enforcement
make
theprobable-cause
requirement impracticable, x x x for legitimate,
work-related noninvestigatory intrusions as
well
as
investigations
of
work-related
misconduct. A standard of reasonableness will
neither unduly burden the efforts of government
employers to ensure the efficient and proper
operation of the workplace, nor authorize arbitrary
intrusions upon the privacy of public employees. We
hold, therefore, that public employer intrusions
on the constitutionally protected privacy
interests
of
government
employees
for
noninvestigatory, work-related purposes, as

well as for investigations of work-related

misconduct, should be judged by the standard
of
reasonableness under
all
the
circumstances. Under
this
reasonableness
standard, both the inception and the scope of
the intrusion must be reasonable:
Determining the reasonableness of any
search involves a twofold inquiry: first,
one must consider whether theaction
was justified at its inception, x x
x ; second, one must determine
whether the search as actually
conducted was reasonably related in
scope to the circumstances which
justified the interference in the first
place, x x x
Ordinarily, a search of an employees office
by a supervisor will be justified at its inception
when there are reasonable grounds for
suspecting that the search will turn up
evidence that the employee is guilty of workrelated misconduct, or that the search is
necessary for a noninvestigatory work-related
purpose such as to retrieve a needed file. x x x The
search will be permissible in its scope when
the measures adopted are reasonably related
to the objectives of the search and not
excessively intrusive in light of the nature of
the [misconduct]. x x x[39] (Citations omitted;
emphasis supplied.)

Since the District Court granted summary judgment without a

hearing on the factual dispute as to the character of the search and
neither was there any finding made as to the scope of the search
that was undertaken, the case was remanded to said court for the
determination of the justification for the search and seizure, and
evaluation of the reasonableness of both the inception of the
search and its scope.

In OConnor the Court recognized that special needs

authorize warrantless searches involving public employees for
work-related reasons. The Court thus laid down a balancing test
under which government interests are weighed against the
employees reasonable expectation of privacy. This reasonableness
test implicates neither probable cause nor the warrant requirement,
which are related to law enforcement. [40]
OConnor was applied in subsequent cases raising issues on
employees privacy rights in the workplace. One of these cases
involved a government employers search of an office
computer, United States v. Mark L. Simons[41] where the defendant
Simons, an employee of a division of the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA), was convicted of receiving and possessing materials
containing child pornography. Simons was provided with an office
which he did not share with anyone, and a computer with Internet
access.The agency had instituted a policy on computer use stating
that employees were to use the Internet for official government
business only and that accessing unlawful material was specifically
prohibited. The policy also stated that users shall understand that
the agency will periodically audit, inspect, and/or monitor the users
Internet access as deemed appropriate. CIA agents instructed its
contractor for the management of the agencys computer network,
upon initial discovery of prohibited internet activity originating from
Simons computer, to conduct a remote monitoring and examination
of Simons computer. After confirming that Simons had indeed
downloaded pictures that were pornographic in nature, all the files
on the hard drive of Simons computer were copied from a remote
work station. Days later, the contractors representative finally
entered Simons office, removed the original hard drive on Simons
computer, replaced it with a copy, and gave the original to the
agency security officer. Thereafter, the agency secured warrants
and searched Simons office in the evening when Simons was not
around. The search team copied the contents of Simons computer;
computer diskettes found in Simons desk drawer; computer files

stored on the zip drive or on zip drive diskettes; videotapes; and

various documents, including personal correspondence. At his trial,
Simons moved to suppress these evidence, arguing that the
searches of his office and computer violated his Fourth Amendment
rights. After a hearing, the district court denied the motion and
Simons was found guilty as charged.
Simons appealed his convictions. The US Supreme Court
ruled that the searches of Simons computer and office did not
violate his Fourth Amendment rights and the first search warrant
was valid. It held that the search remains valid under
the OConnor exception to the warrant requirement because
evidence of the crime was discovered in the course of an otherwise
proper administrative inspection. Simons violation of the agencys
Internet policy happened also to be a violation of criminal law; this
does not mean that said employer lost the capacity and interests of
an employer. The warrantless entry into Simons office was
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment standard announced
inOConnor because at the inception of the search, the employer
had reasonable grounds for suspecting that the hard drive would
yield evidence of misconduct, as the employer was already aware
that Simons had misused his Internet access to download over a
thousand pornographic images. The retrieval of the hard drive was
reasonably related to the objective of the search, and the search
was not excessively intrusive. Thus, while Simons had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in his office, he did not have such legitimate
expectation of privacy with regard to the files in his computer.
x x x To establish a violation of his rights
under the Fourth Amendment, Simons must first
prove that he had a legitimate expectation of privacy
in the place searched or the item seized. x x x And,
in order to prove a legitimate expectation of privacy,
Simons must show that his subjective expectation of
privacy is one that society is prepared to accept as
objectively reasonable. x x x
xxxx

x x x We conclude that the remote searches of

Simons computer did not violate his Fourth
Amendment rights because, in light of the Internet
policy, Simons lacked a legitimate expectation of
privacy in the files downloaded from the
Internet. Additionally, we conclude that Simons
Fourth Amendment rights were not violated by FBIS
retrieval of Simons hard drive from his office.
Simons did not have a legitimate
expectation of privacy with regard to the
record or fruits of his Internet use in light of
the FBIS Internet policy. The policy clearly
stated that FBIS would audit, inspect, and/or
monitor employees use of the Internet,
including all file transfers, all websites visited,
and
all
e-mail
messages,
as
deemed
appropriate. x x x This policy placed employees on
notice that they could not reasonably expect that
their Internet activity would be private. Therefore,
regardless of whether Simons subjectively believed
that the files he transferred from the Internet were
private, such a belief was not objectively reasonable
after FBIS notified him that it would be overseeing his
Internet use. x x x Accordingly, FBIS actions in
remotely searching and seizing the computer files
Simons downloaded from the Internet did not violate
the Fourth Amendment.
xxxx
The burden is on Simons to prove that
he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in
his office. x x x Here, Simons has shown that he had
an office that he did not share. As noted above, the
operational realities of Simons workplace may have
diminished
his
legitimate
privacy
expectations. However, there is no evidence in the
record of any workplace practices, procedures, or
regulations that had such an effect. We therefore
conclude that, on this record, Simons possessed a
legitimate expectation of privacy in his office.
xxxx

In the final analysis, this case involves an

employees supervisor entering the employees
government office and retrieving a piece of
government equipment in which the employee had
absolutely no expectation of privacy equipment that
the employer knew contained evidence of crimes
committed by the employee in the employees office.
This situation may be contrasted with one in which
the criminal acts of a government employee were
unrelated to his employment. Here, there was a
conjunction of the conduct that violated the
employers policy and the conduct that violated the
criminal law. We consider that FBIS intrusion into
Simons office to retrieve the hard drive is one in
which a reasonable employer might engage. x x
x[42] (Citations omitted; emphasis supplied.)

This Court, in Social Justice Society (SJS) v. Dangerous Drugs

Board[43] which involved the constitutionality of a provision in R.A.
No. 9165 requiring mandatory drug testing of candidates for public
office, students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers and
employees of public and private offices, and persons charged
before the prosecutors office with certain offenses, have also
recognized the fact that there may be such legitimate intrusion of
privacy in the workplace.
The first factor to consider in the matter of
reasonableness is the nature of the privacy interest
upon which the drug testing, which effects a search
within the meaning of Sec. 2, Art. III of the
Constitution, intrudes. In this case, the office or
workplace serves as the backdrop for the analysis of
the privacy expectation of the employees and the
reasonableness of drug testing requirement. The
employees privacy interest in an office is to a
large extent circumscribed by the companys
work
policies,
the
collective
bargaining
agreement,
if
any,
entered
into
by
management and the bargaining unit, and the
inherent right of the employer to maintain
discipline and efficiency in the workplace. Their
privacy expectation in a regulated office environment

is, in fine, reduced; and a degree of impingement

upon such privacy has been upheld. (Emphasis
supplied.)

Applying
the
analysis
and
principles
announced
in OConnor and Simons to the case at bar, we now address the
following questions: (1) Did petitioner have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in his office and computer files?; and (2) Was
the search authorized by the CSC Chair, the copying of the contents
of the hard drive on petitioners computer reasonable in its
inception and scope?
In this inquiry, the relevant surrounding circumstances to consider
include (1) the employees relationship to the item seized; (2)
whether the item was in the immediate control of the employee
when it was seized; and (3) whether the employee took actions to
maintain his privacy in the item. These factors are relevant to both
the subjective and objective prongs of the reasonableness inquiry,
and we consider the two questions together. [44] Thus, where the
employee used a password on his computer, did not share his office
with co-workers and kept the same locked, he had a legitimate
expectation of privacy and any search of that space and items
located therein must comply with the Fourth Amendment.[45]
We answer the first in the negative. Petitioner failed to prove
that he had an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy either in
his office or government-issued computer which contained his
personal files. Petitioner did not allege that he had a separate
enclosed office which he did not share with anyone, or that his
office was always locked and not open to other employees or
visitors. Neither did he allege that he used passwords or adopted
any means to prevent other employees from accessing his
computer files. On the contrary, he submits that being in the public
assistance office of the CSC-ROIV, he normally would have visitors
in his office like friends, associates and even unknown people,

whom he even allowed to use his computer which to him seemed a

trivial request. He described his office as full of people, his friends,
unknown people and that in the past 22 years he had been
discharging his functions at the PALD, he is personally assisting
incoming clients, receiving documents, drafting cases on appeals,
in charge of accomplishment report, Mamamayan Muna Program,
Public Sector Unionism, Correction of name, accreditation of
service, and hardly had anytime for himself alone, that in fact he
stays in the office as a paying customer. [46] Under this scenario, it
can hardly be deduced that petitioner had such expectation of
privacy that society would recognize as reasonable.

Moreover, even assuming arguendo, in the absence of allegation or

proof of the aforementioned factual circumstances, that petitioner
had at least a subjective expectation of privacy in his computer as
he claims, such is negated by the presence of policy regulating the
use of office computers, as in Simons.
Office Memorandum No.
(CUP) explicitly provides:

10,

S.

2002 Computer

Use

POLICY
1.

The Computer Resources are the property of

the Civil Service Commission and may be used
only for legitimate business purposes.

2.

Users shall be permitted access to Computer

Resources to assist them in the performance of
their respective jobs.

3.

Use of the Computer Resources is a privilege

that may be revoked at any given time.

xxxx

Policy

No Expectation of Privacy
4. No

expectation of privacy. Users except the

Members of the Commission shall not have an
expectation of privacy in anything they create,
store, send, or receive on the computer system.

The Head of the Office for Recruitment, Examination

and Placement shall select and assign Users to
handle the confidential examination data and
processes.
5. Waiver of privacy rights. Users expressly waive
any right to privacy in anything they create,
store, send, or receive on the computer through
the
Internet
or
any
other
computer
network.Users understand that the CSC may
use human or automated means to
monitor
the
use
of
its Computer
Resources.
6. Non-exclusivity
of
Computer
Resources. A
computer resource is not a personal property or
for the exclusive use of a User to whom a
memorandum of receipt (MR) has been
issued. It can be shared or operated by other
users. However, he is accountable therefor and
must insure its care and maintenance.
xxxx
Passwords
12. Responsibility for passwords. Users shall be
responsible for safeguarding their passwords for
access to the computer system. Individual
passwords shall not be printed, stored online, or
given to others. Users shall be responsible for
all transactions made using their passwords. No
User may access the computer system with
another Users password or account.
13. Passwords do not imply privacy. Use of
passwords to gain access to the computer
system or to encode particular files or
messages does not imply that Users have an

expectation of privacy in the material they

create or receive on the computer system. The
Civil Service Commission has global passwords
that permit access to all materials stored on its
networked computer system regardless of
whether those materials have been encoded
with
a
particular Users password.
Only
members of the Commission shall authorize the
application of the said global passwords.
x x x x[47] (Emphasis supplied.)

The CSC in this case had implemented a policy that put its
employees on notice that they have no expectation of privacy
in anything they create, store, send or receive on the office
computers, and that the CSC may monitor the use of the computer
resources using both automated or human means. This implies that
on-the-spot inspections may be done to ensure that the computer
resources were used only for such legitimate business purposes.
One of the factors stated in OConnor which are relevant in
determining whether an employees expectation of privacy in the
workplace is reasonable is the existence of a workplace privacy
policy.[48] In one case, the US Court of Appeals Eighth Circuit held
that a state university employee has not shown that he had a
reasonable expectation of privacy in his computer files where the
universitys computer policy, the computer user is informed not to
expect privacy if the university has a legitimate reason to conduct
a search. The user is specifically told that computer files, including
e-mail, can be searched when the university is responding to a
discovery request in the course of litigation.Petitioner employee
thus cannot claim a violation of Fourth Amendment rights when
university officials conducted a warrantless search of his computer
for work-related materials.[49]

As to the second point of inquiry on the reasonableness of the

search conducted on petitioners computer, we answer in the
affirmative.
The search of petitioners computer files was conducted in
connection with investigation of work-related misconduct prompted
by an anonymous letter-complaint addressed to Chairperson David
regarding anomalies in the CSC-ROIV where the head of
the Mamamayan Muna Hindi Mamaya Na division is supposedly
lawyering
for
individuals
with
pending
cases
in
the
CSC. Chairperson David stated in her sworn affidavit:
8. That prior to this, as early as 2006, the
undersigned
has
received
several
text
messages from unknown sources adverting to
certain anomalies in Civil Service Commission
Regional Office IV (CSCRO IV) such as, staff
working in another government agency, selling
cases and aiding parties with pending cases, all
done during office hours and involved the use
of government properties;
9. That said text messages were not investigated for
lack of any verifiable leads and details
sufficient to warrant an investigation;
10. That the anonymous letter provided the lead and
details as it pinpointed the persons and
divisions involved in the alleged irregularities
happening in CSCRO IV;
11. That in view of the seriousness of the allegations
of irregularities happening in CSCRO IV and its
effect on the integrity of the Commission, I
decided to form a team of Central Office staff to
back up the files in the computers of the Public
Assistance and Liaison Division (PALD) and
Legal Division;
x x x x[50]

A search by a government employer of an employees office is

justified at inception when there are reasonable grounds for
suspecting that it will turn up evidence that the employee is guilty
of work-related misconduct.[51] Thus, in the 2004 case decided by
the US Court of Appeals Eighth Circuit, it was held that where a
government agencys computer use policy prohibited electronic
messages with pornographic content and in addition expressly
provided that employees do not have any personal privacy rights
regarding their use of the agency information systems and
technology, the government employee had no legitimate
expectation of privacy as to the use and contents of his office
computer, and therefore evidence found during warrantless search
of the computer was admissible in prosecution for child
pornography. In that case, the defendant employees computer hard
drive was first remotely examined by a computer information
technician after his supervisor received complaints that he was
inaccessible and had copied and distributed non-work-related email messages throughout the office. When the supervisor
confirmed that defendant had used his computer to access the
prohibited websites, in contravention of the express policy of the
agency, his computer tower and floppy disks were taken and
examined. A formal administrative investigation ensued and later
search warrants were secured by the police department. The initial
remote search of the hard drive of petitioners computer, as well as
the subsequent warrantless searches was held as valid under
the OConnor ruling that a public employer can investigate workrelated misconduct so long as any search is justified at inception
and is reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that
justified it in the first place.[52]
Under the facts obtaining, the search conducted on petitioners
computer was justified at its inception and scope. We quote with
approval the CSCs discussion on the reasonableness of its actions,
consistent as it were with the guidelines established by OConnor:

Even conceding for a moment that there is no

such administrative policy, there is no doubt in the
mind of the Commission that the search of Pollos
computer has successfully passed the test of
reasonableness for warrantless searches in the
workplace as enunciated in the above-discussed
American authorities. It bears emphasis that the
Commission pursued the search in its capacity
as a government employer and that it was
undertaken in connection with an investigation
involving a work-related misconduct, one of the
circumstances
exempted
from
the
warrant
requirement. At the inception of the search, a
complaint was received recounting that a certain
division chief in the CSCRO No. IV was lawyering for
parties having pending cases with the said regional
office or in the Commission. The nature of the
imputation was serious, as it was grievously
disturbing. If, indeed, a CSC employee was found to
be furtively engaged in the practice of lawyering for
parties with pending cases before the Commission
would be a highly repugnant scenario, then such a
case would have shattering repercussions. It would
undeniably cast clouds of doubt upon the
institutional integrity of the Commission as a quasijudicial agency, and in the process, render it less
effective in fulfilling its mandate as an impartial and
objective dispenser of administrative justice. It is
settled that a court or an administrative tribunal
must not only be actually impartial but must be seen
to be so, otherwise the general public would not have
any trust and confidence in it.
Considering the damaging nature of the
accusation, the Commission had to act fast, if
only to arrest or limit any possible adverse
consequence or fall-out. Thus, on the same date that
the complaint was received, a search was forthwith
conducted involving the computer resources in the
concerned regional office. That it was the
computers that were subjected to the search
was justified since these furnished the easiest
means for an employee to encode and store
documents. Indeed, the computers would be a
likely
starting
point
in
ferreting
out
incriminating evidence. Concomitantly, the

ephemeral nature of computer files, that is,

they could easily be destroyed at a click of a
button, necessitated drastic and immediate
action. Pointedly, to impose the need to comply with
the probable cause requirement would invariably
defeat the purpose of the wok-related investigation.
Worthy to mention, too, is the fact that the
Commission effected the warrantless search in an
open and transparent manner. Officials and some
employees of the regional office, who happened to
be in the vicinity, were on hand to observe the
process until its completion. In addition, the
respondent himself was duly notified, through text
messaging, of the search and the concomitant
retrieval of files from his computer.
All in all, the Commission is convinced that
the warrantless search done on computer assigned
to Pollo was not, in any way, vitiated with
unconstitutionality. It was a reasonable exercise of
the managerial prerogative of the Commission as an
employer aimed at ensuring its operational
effectiveness and efficiency by going after the workrelated misfeasance of its employees. Consequently,
the evidence derived from the questioned search are
deemed admissible.[53]

Petitioners claim of violation of his constitutional right to

privacy must necessarily fail. His other argument invoking the
privacy of communication and correspondence under Section 3(1),
Article III of the 1987 Constitution is also untenable considering the
recognition accorded to certain legitimate intrusions into the
privacy of employees in the government workplace under the
aforecited authorities. We likewise find no merit in his contention
that OConnor and Simons are not relevant because the present
case does not involve a criminal offense like child pornography. As
already mentioned, the search of petitioners computer was justified
there being reasonable ground for suspecting that the files stored
therein would yield incriminating evidence relevant to the
investigation being conducted by CSC as government employer of

such misconduct subject of the anonymous complaint. This

situation clearly falls under the exception to the warrantless
requirement in administrative searches defined in OConnor.
The Court is not unaware of our decision in Anonymous
Letter-Complaint against Atty. Miguel Morales, Clerk of Court,
Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila[54] involving a branch clerk (Atty.
Morales) who was investigated on the basis of an anonymous letter
alleging that he was consuming his working hours filing and
attending to personal cases, using office supplies, equipment and
utilities. The OCA conducted a spot investigation aided by NBI
agents. The team was able to access Atty. Morales personal
computer and print two documents stored in its hard drive, which
turned out to be two pleadings, one filed in the CA and another in
the RTC of Manila, both in the name of another lawyer. Atty. Morales
computer was seized and taken in custody of the OCA but was later
ordered released on his motion, but with order to the MISO to first
retrieve the files stored therein. The OCA disagreed with the report
of the Investigating Judge that there was no evidence to support
the charge against Atty. Morales as no one from the OCC personnel
who were interviewed would give a categorical and positive
statement affirming the charges against Atty. Morales, along with
other court personnel also charged in the same case. The OCA
recommended that Atty. Morales should be found guilty of gross
misconduct. The Court En Banc held that while Atty. Morales may
have fallen short of the exacting standards required of every court
employee, the Court cannot use the evidence obtained from
his personal computer against him for it violated his constitutional
right against unreasonable searches and seizures. The Court found
no evidence to support the claim of OCA that they were able to
obtain the subject pleadings with the consent of Atty. Morales, as in
fact the latter immediately filed an administrative case against the
persons who conducted the spot investigation, questioning the
validity of the investigation and specifically invoking his
constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure. And

as there is no other evidence, apart from the pleadings, retrieved

from the unduly confiscated personal computer of Atty. Morales, to
hold him administratively liable, the Court had no choice but to
dismiss the charges against him for insufficiency of evidence.
The above case is to be distinguished from the case at bar
because, unlike the former which involved a personal computer of a
court employee, the computer from which the personal files
of herein petitioner were retrieved is a government-issued
computer, hence government property the use of which the CSC
has absolute right to regulate and monitor. Such relationship of the
petitioner with the item seized (office computer) and other relevant
factors and circumstances under American Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence, notably the existence of CSC MO 10, S. 2007 on
Computer Use Policy, failed to establish that petitioner had a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the office computer assigned
to him.
Having determined that the personal files copied from the
office computer of petitioner are admissible in the administrative
case against him, we now proceed to the issue of whether the CSC
was correct in finding the petitioner guilty of the charges and
dismissing him from the service.
Well-settled is the rule that the findings of fact of quasijudicial agencies, like the CSC, are accorded not only respect but
even finality if such findings are supported by substantial evidence.
Substantial evidence is such amount of relevant evidence which a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion,
even if other equally reasonable minds might conceivably opine
otherwise.[55]
The CSC based its findings on evidence consisting of a
substantial number of drafts of legal pleadings and documents
stored in his office computer, as well as the sworn affidavits and

testimonies of the witnesses it presented during the formal

investigation. According to the CSC, these documents were
confirmed to be similar or exactly the same content-wise with those
on the case records of some cases pending either with CSCRO No.
IV, CSC-NCR or the Commission Proper. There were also
substantially similar copies of those pleadings filed with the CA and
duly furnished the Commission. Further, the CSC found the
explanation given by petitioner, to the effect that those files
retrieved from his computer hard drive actually belonged to his
lawyer friends Estrellado and Solosa whom he allowed the use of
his computer for drafting their pleadings in the cases they handle,
as implausible and doubtful under the circumstances. We hold that
the CSCs factual finding regarding the authorship of the subject
pleadings and misuse of the office computer is well-supported by
the evidence on record, thus:
It is also striking to note that some of these
documents were in the nature of pleadings
responding to the orders, decisions or resolutions of
these offices or directly in opposition to them such as
a petition for certiorari or a motion for
reconsideration of CSC Resolution. This indicates that
the author thereof knowingly and willingly
participated in the promotion or advancement of the
interests of parties contrary or antagonistic to the
Commission. Worse, the appearance in one of the
retrieved documents the phrase, Eric N. Estr[e]llado,
Epal kulang ang bayad mo,lends plausibility to an
inference that the preparation or drafting of the legal
pleadings was pursued with less than a laudable
motivation. Whoever was responsible for these
documents was simply doing the same for the money
a legal mercenary selling or purveying his expertise
to the highest bidder, so to speak.
Inevitably, the fact that these documents
were retrieved from the computer of Pollo
raises the presumption that he was the author
thereof. This is because he had a control of the
said computer. More significantly, one of the
witnesses,
Margarita
Reyes,
categorically

testified seeing a written copy of one of the

pleadings found in the case records lying on the table
of the respondent. This was the Petition for Review in
the case of Estrellado addressed to the Court of
Appeals. The
said
circumstances
indubitably
demonstrate that Pollo was secretly undermining the
interest of the Commission, his very own employer.
To deflect any culpability, Pollo would,
however, want the Commission to believe that the
documents were the personal files of some of his
friends, including one Attorney Ponciano Solosa, who
incidentally served as his counsel of record during
the formal investigation of this case. In fact, Atty.
Solosa himself executed a sworn affidavit to this
effect. Unfortunately,
this
contention
of
the
respondent was directly rebutted by the prosecution
witness, Reyes, who testified that during her entire
stay in the PALD, she never saw Atty. Solosa using
the computer assigned to the respondent. Reyes
more particularly stated that she worked in close
proximity with Pollo and would have known if Atty.
Solosa, whom she personally knows, was using the
computer in question. Further, Atty. Solosa himself
was never presented during the formal investigation
to confirm his sworn statement such that the same
constitutes self-serving evidence unworthy of weight
and credence. The same is true with the other
supporting affidavits, which Pollo submitted.
At any rate, even admitting for a moment the
said contention of the respondent, it evinces the fact
that he was unlawfully authorizing private persons to
use the computer assigned to him for official
purpose, not only once but several times gauging by
the number of pleadings, for ends not in conformity
with the interests of the Commission. He was, in
effect, acting as a principal by indispensable
cooperationOr at the very least, he should be
responsible for serious misconduct for repeatedly
allowing CSC resources, that is, the computer and
the electricity, to be utilized for purposes other than
what they were officially intended.
Further,
the
Commission
cannot
lend
credence to the posturing of the appellant that the

line appearing in one of the documents, Eric N.

Estrellado, Epal kulang ang bayad mo, was a private
joke between the person alluded to therein, Eric N.
Estrellado, and his counsel, Atty. Solosa, and not
indicative of anything more sinister. The same is too
preposterous to be believed.Why would such a
statement appear in a legal pleading stored in the
computer assigned to the respondent, unless he had
something to do with it?[56]

Petitioner assails the CA in not ruling that the CSC should

not have entertained an anonymous complaint since Section 8 of
CSC Resolution No. 99-1936 (URACC) requires a verified complaint:
Rule II Disciplinary Cases
SEC. 8. Complaint. - A complaint against a civil
service official or employee shall not be given due
course unless it is in writing and subscribed and
sworn to by the complainant. However, in cases
initiated by the proper disciplining authority,
the complaint need not be under oath.
No anonymous complaint shall be entertained
unless there is obvious truth or merit to the
allegation therein or supported by documentary or
direct evidence, in which case the person complained
of may be required to comment.
xxxx

We need not belabor this point raised by petitioner. The

administrative complaint is deemed to have been initiated by the
CSC itself when Chairperson David, after a spot inspection and
search of the files stored in the hard drive of computers in the two
divisions adverted to in the anonymous letter -- as part of the
disciplining authoritys own fact-finding investigation and
information-gathering -- found a prima facie case against the
petitioner who was then directed to file his comment. As this Court
held in Civil Service Commission v. Court of Appeals[57] --

Under Sections 46 and 48 (1), Chapter 6,

Subtitle A, Book V of E.O. No. 292 and Section 8, Rule
II of Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the
Civil Service, a complaint may be initiated
against a civil service officer or employee by
the appropriate disciplining authority, even
without
being
subscribed
and
sworn
to. Considering that the CSC, as the disciplining
authority for Dumlao, filed the complaint, jurisdiction
over Dumlao was validly acquired. (Emphasis
supplied.)

penalty of dismissal with all its accessory penalties, pursuant to

existing rules and regulations.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED.
The Decision dated October 11, 2007 and Resolution dated February
29, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 98224
are AFFIRMED.
With costs against the petitioner.

As to petitioners challenge on the validity of CSC OM 10, S. 2002

(CUP), the same deserves scant consideration. The alleged infirmity
due to the said memorandum order having been issued solely by
the CSC Chair and not the Commission as a collegial body, upon
which the dissent of Commissioner Buenaflor is partly anchored,
was already explained by Chairperson David in her Reply to the
Addendum to Commissioner Buenaflors previous memo expressing
his dissent to the actions and disposition of the Commission in this
case. According to Chairperson David, said memorandum order was
in fact exhaustively discussed, provision by provision in the January
23, 2002 Commission Meeting, attended by her and former
Commissioners
Erestain,
Jr.
and
Valmores. Hence,
the
Commission En Banc at the time saw no need to issue a Resolution
for the purpose and further because the CUP being for internal use
of the Commission, the practice had been to issue a memorandum
order.[58] Moreover, being an administrative rule that is merely
internal in nature, or which regulates only the personnel of the CSC
and not the public, the CUP need not be published prior to its
effectivity.[59]
In fine, no error or grave abuse of discretion was committed by the
CA in affirming the CSCs ruling that petitioner is guilty of grave
misconduct, dishonesty, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
the service, and violation of R.A. No. 6713. The gravity of these
offenses justified the imposition on petitioner of the ultimate

SO ORDERED.

HON. RICARDO T. GLORIA, in his capacity as Secretary of the

Department
of
Education,
Culture,
and
Sports, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, AMPARO
A. ABAD, VIRGILIA M. BANDIGAS, ELIZABETH A.
SOMEBANG and NICANOR MARGALLO, respondents.

Respondent Margallo appealed to the Merit Systems and

Protection Board (MSPB) which found him guilty of conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service and imposed on him a
six-month suspension.[3] The other respondents also appealed to
the MSPB, but their appeal was dismissed because of their failure to
file their appeal memorandum on time.[4]

DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This case arose out of the unfortunate strikes and walk-outs
staged by public school teachers on different dates in September
and October 1990. The illegality of the strikes was declared in our
1991 decision in Manila Public School Teachers Association v.
Laguio, Jr.,[1] but many incidents of those strikes are still to be
resolved. At issue in this case is the right to back salaries of
teachers who were either dismissed or suspended because they did
not report for work but who were eventually ordered reinstated
because they had not been shown to have taken part in the strike,
although reprimanded for being absent without leave.
The facts are as follows:
Private respondents are public school teachers. On various
dates in September and October 1990, during the teachers strikes,
they did not report for work. For this reason, they were
administratively charged with (1) grave misconduct, (2) gross
neglect of duty, (3) gross violation of Civil Service Law Rules and
Regulations and reasonable office regulations, (4) refusal to
perform official duty, (5) gross insubordination, (6) conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and (7) absence
without leave (AWOL), and placed under preventive suspension.
The investigation was concluded before the lapse of their 90-day
suspension and private respondents were found guilty as
charged. Respondent Nicanor Margallo was ordered dismissed from
the service effective October 29, 1990, while respondents Amparo
Abad, Virgilia Bandigas, and Elizabeth Somebang were ordered
suspended for six months effective December 4, 1990.[2]

On appeal, the Civil Service Commission (CSC) affirmed the

decision of the MSPB with respect to Margallo, but found the other
three (Abad, Bandigas, and Somebang) guilty only of violation of
reasonable office rules and regulations by failing to file applications
for leave of absence and, therefore, reduced the penalty imposed
on them to reprimand and ordered them reinstated to their former
positions.
Respondents filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 in this
Court. Pursuant to Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95, the
case was referred to the Court of Appeals which, on September 3,
1996, rendered a decision (1) affirming the decision of the CSC with
respect to Amparo Abad, Virgilia Bandigas, and Elizabeth
Somebang but (2) reversing it insofar as the CSC ordered the
suspension of Nicanor Margallo. The appellate court found him
guilty of violation of reasonable office rules and regulations only
and imposed on him the penalty of reprimand.[5]
Private respondents moved for a reconsideration, contending
that they should be exonerated of all charges against them and
that they be paid salaries during their suspension. In its resolution,
dated July 15, 1997, the Court of Appeals, while maintaining its
finding that private respondents were guilty of violation of
reasonable office rules and regulations for which they should be
reprimanded, ruled that private respondents were entitled to the
payment of salaries during their suspension beyond ninety (90)
days. Accordingly, the appellate court amended the dispositive
portion of its decision to read as follows:
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, petition is hereby
DENIED. CSC Resolution Nos. 93-2302 dated June 24, 1993 and 933124 dated August 10, 1993 (In re: Amparo Abad), CSC Resolution

Nos. 93-2304 dated June 24, 1993 and 93-3227 dated August 17,
1993 (In re: Virgilia Bandigas) and CSC Resolution Nos. 93-2301
undated and 93-3125 dated August 10, 1993 (In re: Elizabeth
Somebang) are hereby AFFIRMED while CSC Resolution Nos. 932211 dated June 21, 1993 are hereby MODIFIED finding petitioner
Nicanor Margallo guilty of a lesser offense of violation of reasonable
office rules and regulations and meting upon him the penalty of
reprimand. Respondent DECS is ordered to pay petitioners Amparo
Abad, Virgilia Bandigas, Elizabeth Somebang and Nicanor Margallo
their salaries, allowances and other benefits during the period of
their suspension/dismissal beyond the ninety (90) day preventive
suspension. No pronouncement as to costs.[6]
Petitioner Ricardo T. Gloria, then Secretary of Education,
Culture, and Sports, moved for a reconsideration insofar as the
resolution of the Court of Appeals ordered the payment of private
respondents salaries during the period of their appeal. [7] His motion
was, however, denied by the appellate court in its resolution of
October 6, 1997.[8] Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
Petitioner contends that the administrative investigation of
respondents was concluded within the 90-day period of preventive
suspension, implying that the continued suspension of private
respondents is due to their appeal, hence, the government should
not be held answerable for payment of their salaries. Moreover,
petitioner lays so much store by the fact that, under the law,
private respondents are considered under preventive suspension
during the period of their appeal and, for this reason, are not
entitled to the payment of their salaries during their suspension. [9]
Petitioners contentions have no merit.
I. Preventive Suspension and the Right to Compensation in Case of Exoneration

The present Civil Service Law is found in Book V, Title I, Subtitle

A of the Administrative Code of 1987 (E.O. 292). So far as pertinent
to the questions in this case, the law provides:
SEC. 47. Disciplinary Jurisdiction. -

....
(2) The Secretaries and heads of agencies and instrumentalities,
provinces, cities and municipalities shall have jurisdiction to
investigate and decide matters involving disciplinary action against
officers and employees under their jurisdiction. Their decisions shall
be final in case the penalty imposed is suspension for not more
than thirty days or fine in an amount not exceeding thirty days
salary. In case the decision rendered by a bureau or office head is
appealable to the Commission, the same may be initially appealed
to the department and finally to the Commission and pending
appeal, the same shall be executory except when the penalty is
removal, in which case the same shall be executory only after
confirmation by the Secretary concerned.
....
(4) An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory, and
in case the penalty is suspension or removal, the respondent shall
be considered as having been under preventive suspension during
the pendency of the appeal in the event he wins an appeal.
SEC. 51. Preventive Suspension. - The proper disciplining authority
may preventively suspend any subordinate officer or employee
under his authority pending an investigation, if the charge against
such officer or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave
misconduct, or neglect in the performance of duty, or if there are
reasons to believe that the respondent is guilty of charges which
would warrant his removal from the service.
SEC. 52. Lifting of Preventive Suspension. Pending Administrative
Investigation. - When the administrative case against the officer or
employee under preventive suspension is not finally decided by the
disciplining authority within the period of ninety (90) days after the
date of suspension of the respondent who is not a presidential
appointee, the respondent shall be automatically reinstated in the
service: Provided, That when the delay in the disposition of the
case is due to the fault, negligence or petition of the respondent,
the period of delay shall not be counted in computing the period of
suspension herein provided.

There are thus two kinds of preventive suspension of civil

service employees who are charged with offenses punishable by
removal or suspension: (1) preventive suspension pending
investigation (51) and (2) preventive suspension pending appeal if
the penalty imposed by the disciplining authority is suspension or
dismissal and, after review, the respondent is exonerated (47(4)).
Preventive suspension pending investigation is not a penalty.
It is a measure intended to enable the disciplining authority to
investigate charges against respondent by preventing the latter
from intimidating or in any way influencing witnesses against
him. If the investigation is not finished and a decision is not
rendered within that period, the suspension will be lifted and the
respondent will automatically be reinstated. If after investigation
respondent is found innocent of the charges and is exonerated, he
should be reinstated.

after the date of suspension of the respondent, the respondent

shall be reinstated in the service. If the respondent officer or
employee is exonerated, he shall be restored to his position with
full pay for the period of suspension.[11]
However, the law was revised in 1975 and the provision on the
payment of salaries during suspension was deleted. Sec. 42 of the
Civil Service Decree (P.D. No. 807) read:

[10]

A. No Right to Compensation for Preventive Suspension Pending Investigation Even if Employee is

Exonerated

Is he entitled to the payment of salaries during the period of

suspension? As already stated, the Court of Appeals ordered the
DECS to pay private respondents their salaries, allowances, and
other benefits beyond the ninety (90) day preventive suspension. In
other words, no compensation was due for the period of the
preventive suspension pending investigation but only for the period
of preventive suspension pending appeal in the event the
employee is exonerated.
The separate opinion of Justice Panganiban argues that the
employee concerned should be paid his salaries after his
suspension.
The Civil Service Act of 1959 (R.A. No. 2260) provided for the
payment of such salaries in case of exoneration. Sec. 35 read:
Sec. 35. Lifting of Preventive Suspension Pending Administrative
Investigation. - When the administrative case against the officer or
employee under preventive suspension is not finally decided by the
Commissioner of Civil Service within the period of sixty (60) days

Sec. 42. Lifting of Preventive Suspension Pending Administrative

Investigation. - When the administrative case against the officer or
employee under preventive suspension is not finally decided by the
disciplining authority within the period of ninety (90) days after the
date of suspension of the respondent who is not a presidential
appointee, the respondent shall be automatically reinstated in the
service; Provided, That when the delay in the disposition of the
case is due to the fault, negligence or petition of the respondent,
the period of delay shall not be counted in computing the period of
suspension herein provided.
This provision was reproduced in 52 of the present Civil Service
Law. It is noteworthy that the Ombudsman Act of 1989 (R.A. No.
6770) categorically provides that preventive suspension shall be
without pay. Sec. 24 reads:
Sec. 24. Preventive Suspension. The Ombudsman or his Deputy
may preventively suspend any officer or employee under his
authority pending an investigation, if in his judgment the evidence
of guilt is strong, and (a) the charge against such officer or
employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or
neglect in the performance of duty; (b) the charges would warrant
removal from the service; or (c) the respondents continued stay in
office may prejudice the case filed against him.
The preventive suspension shall continue until the case is
terminated by the Office of the Ombudsman but not more than six
months, without pay, except when the delay in the disposition of
the case by the Office of the Ombudsman is due to the fault,
negligence or petition of the respondent, in which case the period

of such delay shall not be counted in computing the period of

suspension herein provided.
It is clear that the purpose of the amendment is to disallow the
payment of salaries for the period of suspension. This conclusion is
in accord with the rule of statutory construction that As a rule, the amendment by deletion of certain words or phrases
in a statute indicates that the legislature intended to change the
meaning of the statute, for the presumption is that the legislature
would not have made the deletion had the intention been not in
effect a change in its meaning. The amended statute should
accordingly be given a construction different from that previous to
its amendment.[12]
The separate opinion of Justice Panganiban pays no heed to the
evident legislative intent to deny payment of salaries for the
preventive suspension pending investigation.
First, it says that to deny compensation for the period of
preventive suspension would be to reverse the course of decisions
ordering the payment of salaries for such period. However, the
cases[13] cited are based either on the former rule which expressly
provided that if the respondent officer or employee is exonerated,
he shall be restored to his position with full pay for the period of
suspension[14] or that upon subsequent reinstatement of the
suspended person or upon his exoneration, if death should render
reinstatement impossible, any salary so withheld shall be paid, [15] or
on cases which do not really support the proposition advanced.
Second, it is contended that the exoneration of employees who
have been preventively suspended is proof that there was no
reason at all to suspend them and thus makes their preventive
suspension a penalty.
The principle governing entitlement to salary during
suspension is cogently stated in Floyd R. Mechems A Treatise on
the Law of Public Offices and Officers as follows:

864. Officer not entitled to Salary during Suspension from

Office. - An officer who has been lawfully suspended from his office
is not entitled to compensation for the period during which he was
so suspended, even though it be subsequently determined that the
cause for which he was suspended was insufficient. The reason
given is that salary and perquisites are the reward of express or
implied services, and therefore cannot belong to one who could not
lawfully perform such services.[16]
Thus, it is not enough that an employee is exonerated of the
charges against him. In addition, his suspension must be
unjustified. The case of Bangalisan v. Court of Appeals itself
similarly states that payment of salaries corresponding to the
period [1] when an employee is not allowed to work may be
decreed if he is found innocent of the charges which caused his
suspension and [2] when the suspension is unjustified.[17]
The preventive suspension of civil service employees charged
with dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct, or neglect of duty
is authorized by the Civil Service Law. It cannot, therefore, be
considered unjustified, even if later the charges are dismissed so as
to justify the payment of salaries to the employee concerned. It is
one of those sacrifices which holding a public office requires for the
public good. For this reason, it is limited to ninety (90) days unless
the delay in the conclusion of the investigation is due to the
employee concerned. After that period, even if the investigation is
not finished, the law provides that the employee shall be
automatically reinstated.
Third, it is argued in the separate opinion that to deny
employees salaries on the frivolous ground that the law does not
provide for their payment would be to provide a tool for the
oppression of civil servants who, though innocent, may be falsely
charged of grave or less grave administrative offenses. Indeed, the
possibility of abuse is not an argument against the recognition of
the existence of power. As Justice Story aptly put it, It is always a
doubtful course, to argue against the use or existence of a power,
from the possibility of its abuse. . . . [For] from the very nature of
things, the absolute right of decision, in the last resort, must rest
somewhere - wherever it may be vested it is susceptible of abuse.

[18]

It may be added that if and when such abuse occurs, that would
be the time for the courts to exercise their nay-saying
function. Until then, however, the public interest in an upright civil
service must be upheld.
Finally, it is argued that even in the private sector, the law
provides that employees who are unjustly dismissed are entitled to
reinstatement with full pay. But that is because R.A. No. 6715
expressly provides for the payment to such employees of full
backwages, inclusive of allowances, and . . . other benefits or their
monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation
was withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement.
[19]
In the case of the public sector, as has been noted, the provision
for payment of salaries during the preventive suspension pending
investigation has been deleted.
B. Right to Compensation for Preventive Suspension Pending Appeal if Employee is Exonerated

But although we hold that employees who are preventively

suspended pending investigation are not entitled to the payment of
their salaries even if they are exonerated, we do not agree with the
government that they are not entitled to compensation for the
period of their suspension pending appeal if eventually they are
found innocent.
Preventive suspension pending investigation, as already
discussed, is not a penalty but only a means of enabling the
disciplining authority to conduct an unhampered investigation. On
the other hand, preventive suspension pending appeal is actually
punitive although it is in effect subsequently considered illegal if
respondent is exonerated and the administrative decision finding
him guilty is reversed. Hence, he should be reinstated with full pay
for the period of the suspension. Thus, 47(4) states that respondent
shall be considered as under preventive suspension during the
pendency of the appeal in the event he wins. On the other hand, if
his conviction is affirmed, i.e., if he is not exonerated, the period of
his suspension becomes part of the final penalty of suspension or
dismissal.

It is precisely because respondent is penalized before his

sentence is confirmed that he should be paid his salaries in the
event he is exonerated. It would be unjust to deprive him of his pay
as a result of the immediate execution of the decision against him
and continue to do so even after it is shown that he is innocent of
the charges for which he was suspended. Indeed, to sustain the
governments theory would be to make the administrative decision
not only executory but final and executory. The fact is that 47(2)
and (4) are similar to the execution of judgment pending appeal
under Rule 39, 2 of the Rules of Court. Rule 39, 5 provides that in
the event the executed judgment is reversed, there shall be
restitution or reparation of damages as equity and justice may
require.
Sec. 47 of the present law providing that an administrative
decision meting out the penalty of suspension or dismissal shall be
immediately executory and that if the respondent appeals he shall
be considered as being merely under preventive suspension if
eventually he prevails is taken from 37 of the Civil Service Decree
of 1975 (P.D. No. 807). There was no similar provision in the Civil
Service Act of 1959 (R.A. No. 2260), although under it the
Commissioner of Civil Service could order the immediate execution
of an administrative decision in the interest of the public service.
[20]
Nor was there provision for immediate execution of
administrative decisions ordering dismissal or suspension in 695 of
the Administrative Code of 1917, as amended by C.A. No. 598, 1.
[21]
Nonetheless, under R.A. No. 2260 the payment of salaries was
ordered in cases in which employees were found to be innocent of
the charges[22] or their suspension was held to be unjustified,
because the penalty of suspension or dismissal was executed
without a finding by the Civil Service Commissioner that it was
necessary in the interest of the public service. [23] On the other
hand, payment of back salaries was denied where it was shown
that the employee concerned was guilty as charged and the
immediate execution of the decision was ordered by the Civil
Service Commissioner in the interest of the public service. [24]
Nothing in what has thus far been said is inconsistent with the
reason for denying salaries for the period of preventive
suspension. We have said that an employee who is exonerated is

not entitled to the payment of his salaries because his suspension,

being authorized by law, cannot be unjustified. To be entitled to
such compensation, the employee must not only be found innocent
of the charges but his suspension must likewise be unjustified. But
though an employee is considered under preventive suspension
during the pendency of his appeal in the event he wins, his
suspension
is
unjustified
because what the law authorizes is
preventive suspension for a period not exceeding 90 days. Beyond
that period the suspension is illegal.Hence, the employee
concerned is entitled to reinstatement with full pay. Under existing
jurisprudence, such award should not exceed the equivalent of five
years pay at the rate last received before the suspension was
imposed.[25]
II. Private Respondents Entitled to Back Salaries Although Found Guilty of Violation of Office Rules and
Regulations and Reprimanded

Private respondents were exonerated of all charges against

them for acts connected with the teachers strike of September and
October 1990. Although they were absent from work, it was not
because of the strike. For being absent without leave, they were
held liable for violation of reasonable office rules and regulations
for which the penalty is a reprimand. Their case thus falls squarely
within ruling in Bangalisan, which likewise involved a teacher found
guilty of having violated reasonable office rules and
regulations. Explaining the grant of salaries during their suspension
despite the fact that they were meted out reprimand, this Court
stated:
With respect to petitioner Rodolfo Mariano, payment of his
backwages is in order. A reading of the resolution of the Civil
Service Commission will show that he was exonerated of the
charges which formed the basis for his suspension. The Secretary
of the DECS charged him with and he was later found guilty of
grave misconduct, gross neglect of duty, gross violation of the Civil
Service Law, rules and regulations and reasonable office
regulations, refusal to perform official duty, gross insubordination,
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and absence
without official leave, for his participation in the mass actions on
September 18, 20 and 21, 1990. It was his alleged participation in

the mass actions that was the basis of his preventive suspension
and, later, his dismissal from the service.
However, the Civil Service Commission, in the questioned
resolution, made a finding that Mariano was not involved in the
mass actions but was absent because he was in Ilocos Sur to attend
the wake and interment of his grandmother. Although the CSC
imposed upon him the penalty of reprimand, the same was for his
violation of reasonable office rules and regulations because he
failed to inform the school of his intended absence and neither did
he file an application for leave covering such absences.
Under Section 23 of the Rules Implementing Book V of Executive
Order No. 292 and other pertinent civil service laws, in violations of
reasonable office rules and regulations, the first offense is
punishable by reprimand. To deny petitioner Mariano his back
wages during his suspension would be tantamount to punishing
him after his exoneration from the charges which caused his
dismissal from the service.[26]
In Jacinto v. Court of Appeals,[27] a public school teacher who
was found guilty of violation of reasonable office rules and
regulations for having been absent without leave and reprimanded
was given back salaries after she was exonerated of the charge of
having taken part in the strikes.
Petitioner Secretary of Education contends, however, that
respondents Abad, Bandigas, and Somebang signed a letter in
which they admitted having taken part in the mass action. This
question cannot be raised now. The Civil Service Commission gave
no weight to this letter in view of individual letters written by the
three citing reasons for their absences, to wit: Abad, because she
decided to stay home to correct student papers; Bandigas, because
she had to accompany her brother to the Commission on
Immigration, and Somebang because of economic reasons.
Petitioner did not appeal from this ruling. Hence, he is bound by the
factual findings of the CSC and the appellate court.
WHEREFORE, the decision, dated September 3, 1996, as
amended by the resolutions, dated July 15, 1997 and October 6,

1997, of the Court of Appeals, is hereby AFFIRMED with the

MODIFICATION that the award of salaries to private respondents
shall be computed from the time of their dismissal/suspension by
the Department of Education, Culture, and Sports until their actual
reinstatement, for a period not exceeding five years.
SO ORDERED.

HON. KARINA CONSTANTINO-DAVID, HON. JOSE F. ERESTAIN,

JR., and HON. WALDEMAR V. VALMORES, in their
capacities
as
Chairman
and
Commissioners,
respectively,
of
the
CIVIL
SERVICE
COMMISSION, petitioners,
vs. ZENAIDA
D.
PANGANDAMAN-GANIA, respondent.

Respondent immediately brought the matter to the CSC for a

ruling on the validity of the termination of her employment.
[1]
In Resolution No. 00-1265 dated 24 May 2000 the CSC upheld
her dismissal for lack of attestation and prolonged absence without
official leave from the time she was removed from her post in
September 1998 as a result of Special Order No. 477-P.

DECISION

Respondent moved for reconsideration. In Resolution No. 010558 dated 8 March 2001 the CSC found merit in her motion,
declared her removal from office as illegal, exonerated her from the
charge of being on absence without official leave and ordered her
reinstatement as Director II and Manila Information and Liaisoning
Officer of MSU but disallowed the payment of back salaries for the
period she was not working as a result of the illegal dismissal. The
CSC explained the non-payment of her back wages -

BELLOSILLO, J.:
A system of procedure is perverted from its proper function
when it multiplies impediments to justice without the warrant of
clear necessity, so says Cardozo - an observation especially apt in
the instant case involving the payment of back wages and other
benefits resulting from the illegal dismissal of an employee due to
improper personnel and non-disciplinary action.The disquieting
procedural steps risked by respondent before the Court of Appeals,
the tendency of the appellate court to overlook most of them, the
doggedness of the Solicitor General to venture others, when neither
the court a quo nor the parties to the case appear perturbed that
elementary rules of procedure were either indulgently brushed
aside or subtly exploited one after the other, do not leave us
ensnared in borderline technical maneuvers, or so it is said, being
too impotent to address the pith of this controversy.
Respondent Zenaida D. Pangandaman-Gania is a Director II and
Manila Information and Liaisoning Officer of the Mindanao State
University (MSU). She has been holding this position after the
confirmation of her appointment by the MSU Board of Regents on 1
June 1995.
On 2 October 1998 respondent received a copy of Special
Order No. 477-P dated 28 September 1998 designating a certain
Agnes Mangondato as Acting Director in her place in view of the
alleged expiration of her term and was no longer allowed to report
for work. She verified the status of her appointment and found out
that her appointment was not submitted to the Civil Service
Commission for attestation.

Be that as it may, the incumbency of Dr. Gania is governed by the

principle of quantum meruit (as you work so shall you earn). In
other words, her entitlement to compensation depends on her
actual performance of work. Short of approval by the Commission,
the appointment while already effective, by itself is not a basis for
payment of salary but the assumption of duties of her office x x x x
Such being the case, Dr. Gania is not entitled to compensation for
the period that she was not reporting to work.[2]
MSU moved for reconsideration of CSC Resolution No. 01-0558
dated 8 March 2001, while respondent moved for its early
execution. In Resolution No. 01-1225 dated 19 July 2001, the CSC
denied MSUs motion for reconsideration and ordered its President
to allow respondent to assume and exercise the functions of Manila
Information and Liaisoning Officer.
MSU appealed from the denial of its motion for reconsideration
under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, docketed as CAG.R. No. SP-66188, to the Court of Appeals, but the appellate court
did not issue any restraining order or injunction to prevent the
execution of the resolution on appeal.

Respondent did not seek a review of any of the resolutions of

the CSC including the order denying back salaries and other
benefits for the period she was out of work. She instead pursued
her prayer for reinstatement but MSU refused to employ her
back. Hence, she was compelled to file a second motion for the
execution of CSC Resolution No. 01-0558 dated 8 March
2001, citing Sec. 82 of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative
Cases in the Civil Service, which states that [t]he filing and
pendency of petition for review with the Court of Appeals or
certiorari with the Supreme Court shall not stop the execution of
the final decision of the Commission unless the Court issues a
restraining order or an injunction.
In Resolution No. 01-1616 dated 4 October 2001 the CSC
granted respondents motion and held that CSC Resolution No. 010558 dated 8 March 2001 has attained finality and must be
immediately implemented, as it again ordered the MSU President to
reinstate respondent.
On 8 October 2001 respondent for the first time questioned the
portion of CSC Resolution No. 01-0558 dated 8 March
2001 prohibiting the payment of back wages and other benefits to
her for the period that her employment was terminated, and moved
for the modification of the resolution by granting her the relief
prayed for.
On 29 October 2001 the Court of Appeals dismissed MSUs
petition for review on the ground that the certificate of non-forum
shopping was not personally signed by pertinent officers of the
university but by its counsel of record. [3] MSU moved for
reconsideration of the dismissal.
On 12 December 2001, there being still no action on her
request to be paid her back salaries and other benefits, respondent
moved for an immediate ruling thereon.
On 21 February 2002 the Court of Appeals denied MSUs motion
for reconsideration of the dismissal of its petition for review for lack
of merit.

On 28 February 2002 the CSC in Resolution No. 02-0321 denied

respondents motion Since nowhere in the records does it show that [respondent Gania]
actually assumed and performed the duties of her position, it
logically follows that there can be no basis for the grant of back
salaries in her favor.[4]
Without the aid of an attorney, respondent appealed CSC
Resolution No. 02-0321 dated 28 February 2002 to the Court of
Appeals under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 69668. In her petition for review, she
did not mention that she did not seek a review of CSC Resolution
No. 01-0558 dated 8 March 2001 which was the real object of her
appeal.[5] In addition, she impleaded only the petitioners herein,
Chairperson Karina Constantino-David and Commissioners Jose F.
Erestain Jr. and Waldemar V. Valmores of the CSC, but did not name
as party-respondent the Mindanao State University or any of its
officers.
In its Comment before the Court of Appeals, the CSC through
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) rebuffed respondents claim
for back wages since she allegedly failed to actually assume the
position of Director II and Manila Information and Liaisoning Officer
of MSU. But the CSC did not assail the procedural infirmities of
respondents petition and appeared contented to refute just the
substantial arguments thereof.
On 28 October 2002 the Court of Appeals partially found merit
in respondents petition for review. [6] Apparently failing to note that
respondent did not appeal from the denial of her claim for payment
of back salaries in CSC Resolution No. 01-0558 dated 8 March
2001, which she found objectionable, the Court of Appeals
concluded that x x x petitioner had assumed and had been exercising the functions
[at MSU] as early as June 1995, after the MSU Board of Regents
approved her permanent appointment which was issued earlier x x
x on April 10, 1995. It was only in September 1998, when she was
terminated from service on the alleged ground of expiration of

term, that she was prevented from performing the functions of her
position.[7]
The Court of Appeals ruled that back wages should be paid to
respondent from the time of her illegal dismissal until she was
ordered reinstated by the CSC as Director II of MSU on 8 March
2001, but excluded the period after the CSC had ordered MSU to
admit respondent back to work since the damages she suffered for
that period were chargeable in the proper forum against the MSU
President who in bad faith refused to abide by the relevant CSC
resolutions.
On 3 January 2003 the OSG filed the instant petition for review
under Rule 45, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, allegedly in behalf of
the petitioners named herein, and also signed for them the
verification and certification of non-forum shopping. The OSG
asserted as grounds for review the principle recognizing finality to
factual findings of quasi-judicial agencies as well as its puzzling
statement that [w]hile the dismissal of herein respondent was
declared illegal, she was, however, not exonerated from the
charges. Hence, respondent is not entitled to back wages. [8] Once
again the OSG did not call attention to procedural defects in the
petition of respondent before the Court of Appeals.
Respondent filed in her own behalf a Comment claiming that
the CSC cannot be a party-petitioner in a case where its decision is
the subject of review, citing Civil Service Commission v. Court of
Appeals.[9] As to whether respondent actually assumed the duties of
Director II, she referred not only to the finding of the Court of
Appeals that she had assumed office and worked for MSU as early
as June 1995 but also to the voluminous records of MSU showing
that she reported for work until her illegal dismissal in September
1998.[10] She also manifested that she was reinstated to her job on
18 September 2002 while the proceedings before the Court of
Appeals were ongoing although she was not paid her salary and
other benefits. In another Manifestation before this Court, she
affirmed that her salary as well as RATA and other benefits for the
month of September 2002 were paid on 23 April 2003.

We deny the instant petition for review. It is true that

respondent had lost the right to ask for the modification of CSC
Resolution No. 01-0558 dated 8 March 2001 and to demand
compensation for her back salaries and other benefits. She did not
move for the reconsideration of this resolution within fifteen (15)
days from receipt thereof[11] nor did she file a petition for its review
within the same period under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.[12] To be sure, both the CSC and respondent herself
admitted the finality of the Resolution and acted upon it when she
was granted an order for its execution.
Meanwhile, MSU filed its petition for review with the Court of
Appeals (CA-G.R. No. SP-66188) assailing CSC Resolution No. 010558 dated 8 March 2001 and CSC Resolution No. 01-1225 dated
19 July 2001 denying MSUs motion for reconsideration.
Ordinarily, under the foregoing circumstances, neither the Civil
Service Commission nor the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to
direct the substantial amendment of CSCs relevant resolutions
upon the behest of respondent.[13] The principle governing ordinary
appeal from the Regional Trial Court to the Court of Appeals applies
suppletorily[14] mutatis mutandis x x x where all the parties have either thus perfected their appeals
by filing their notices of appeal in due time and the period to file
such notice of appeal has lapsed for those who did not do so, then
the trial court loses jurisdiction over the case as of the filing of the
last notice of appeal or the expiration of the period to do so for all
the parties.[15]
This rule is also articulated in Associated Bank v.
Gonong[16] where we held that only after all the parties respective
periods to appeal shall have lapsed that the court loses its
jurisdiction over the case. What is left as residual jurisdiction of the
Civil Service Commission pertains only to matters for the protection
and preservation of the rights of the parties which do not involve
any matter litigated by the appeal or the immediate execution of its
resolutions under the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative
Cases in the Civil Service. This is to ensure the orderly disposition
of the case at both the levels of the CSC and the appellate court. [17]

Nonetheless, we cannot inflexibly dwell on the defect of a

belated appeal and coldly thwart a review of the instant case. For it
cannot be denied that even after acknowledging the finality
of Resolution No. 01-0558 dated 8 March 2001, the CSC still
entertained the twin motions of respondent on 8 October 2001 and
12 December 2001 to modify the same resolution and insert
therein an order for the payment of back wages. The CSC in fact
promulgated Resolution
No.
02-0321
dated
28
February
2002 denying respondents importunate motions for the reason that
she allegedly did not report for work but not because they were
already time-barred.
No doubt, the Civil Service Commission was in the legitimate
exercise of its mandate under Sec. 3, Rule I, of the Revised Uniform
Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Servicethat
[a]dministrative investigations shall be conducted without
necessarily adhering strictly to the technical rules of procedure and
evidence applicable to judicial proceedings. This authority is
consistent with its powers and functions to [p]rescribe, amend and
enforce rules and regulations for carrying into effect the provisions
of the Civil Service Law and other pertinent laws being the central
personnel agency of the Government.[18]
Furthermore, there are special circumstances in accordance
with the tenets of justice and fair play that warrant such liberal
attitude on the part of the CSC and a compassionate like-minded
discernment by this Court.[19] To begin with, respondent was
consistently denied reinstatement by the responsible officers of
MSU and vehemently barred from resuming her previous
position. The first order for her return to work was issued on 8
March 2001 which was followed by repeated personal appeals for
the immediate execution of the CSC resolution.[20]Thereafter, when
respondent was still forced out of work, the CSC issued its second
and third orders on 19 July 2001 and 4 October 2001, respectively,
for the President of MSU to restore her to the item from which she
was illegally dismissed. As these private requests and official
directives were cruelly rejected by her employer and the period of
her unemployment was unduly prolonged, respondent had no
choice and was compelled to ask for back salaries and other
benefits to offset the callous repudiation of what was due her.

To prevent respondent from claiming back wages would leave

incomplete the redress of the illegal dismissal that had been done
to her and amount to endorsing the wrongful refusal of her
employer or whoever was accountable to reinstate her. A too-rigid
application of the pertinent provisions of the Revised Uniform Rules
on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service as well as the Rules of
Court will not be given premium where it would obstruct rather
than serve the broader interests of justice in the light of the
prevailing circumstances in the case under consideration.
As commented in Obut v. Court of Appeals,[21] we cannot look
with favor on a course of action which would place the
administration of justice in a straightjacket for then the result would
be a poor kind of justice, if there would be justice at all. Verily,
judicial orders x x x are issued to be obeyed, nonetheless a noncompliance is to be dealt with as the circumstances attending the
case may warrant. What should guide judicial action is the principle
that a party-litigant is to be given the fullest opportunity to
establish the merits of his complaint or defense rather than for him
to lose life, liberty, honor or property on technicalities.
The same principle of liberality may also be drawn upon to
gloss over the failure of respondent to implead MSU as partyrespondent in the petition before the Court of Appeals while joining
only herein petitioners as Chairman and Commissioners of the CSC
to answer her petition. While as a rule it would have been
necessary to adhere to this practice, [22] in the instant case no one
among the Court of Appeals, the CSC and the Office of the Solicitor
General saw it fit to name or cause to be included MSU as partyrespondent. Indeed, the Comment of the OSG argued on the merits
as if it was acting in unison with respondents employer, stressing
all possible claims that may be alleged to defeat respondents
petition. Ultimately, what is crucial is that both CSC and MSU are
part of the same bureaucracy that manages and supervises
government personnel, and as such, represent a common interest
on the question raised in the petition to be defended by the same
core of lawyers from the OSG or the Office of the Government
Corporate Counsel (OGCC).[23]

Justifiably, where no injury has been done as probably all lines

of reasoning to oppose the petition have been asserted by parties
of the same principal and brought to the fore in the proceedings a
quo, and considering further that the underlying principle in the
administration of justice and application of the rules is substance
rather than form, reasonableness and fair play in place of
formalities, we deem it apposite to except this particular case from
the rigid operation of the procedure for the joinder of parties.
In any event, none of these procedural defects were raised as
an issue on appeal and are now deemed waived. Of course we are
not surprised that the OSG did not touch on these procedural issues
and would seemingly prefer a ruling squarely on the issue of
respondents entitlement to back wages. As its services are paid for
by taxpayers money, the OSG ought to be the foremost officers of
the court who in suitable cases must delve into the real concerns.
Unfortunately, the OSG also treaded upon technically
precarious grounds when it filed the petition in the name of the CSC
and signed the verification and certificate of non-forum shopping in
behalf of its client. Sure enough, respondent vigorously objects to
the standing of the CSC as party-petitioner in the instant petition,
citing our ruling in Civil Service Commission v. Court of Appeals.[24]
That the CSC may appeal from an adverse decision of the Court
of Appeals reversing or modifying its resolutions which may
seriously prejudice the civil service system is beyond doubt. In Civil
Service Commission v. Dacoycoy[25] this Court held that the CSC
may become the party adversely affected by such ruling and the
aggrieved party who may appeal the decision to this Court.
The situation where the CSCs participation is beneficial and
indispensable often involves complaints for administrative offenses,
such as neglect of duty, being notoriously undesirable, inefficiency
and incompetence in the performance of official duties, and the
like, where the complainant is more often than not acting merely as
a witness for the government which is the real party injured by the
illicit act. In cases of this nature, a ruling of the Court of Appeals
favorable to the respondent employee is understandably adverse to
the government, and unavoidably the CSC as representative of the

government may appeal the decision to this Court to protect the

integrity of the civil service system.
The CSC may also seek a review of the decisions of the Court of
Appeals that are detrimental to its constitutional mandate as the
central personnel agency of the government tasked to establish a
career service, adopt measures to promote morale, efficiency,
integrity, responsiveness, progressiveness and courtesy in the civil
service, strengthen the merit and rewards system, integrate all
human resources development programs for all levels and ranks,
and institutionalize a management climate conducive to public
accountability. Nonetheless, the right of the CSC to appeal the
adverse decision does not preclude the private complainant in
appropriate cases from similarly elevating the decision for review.
[26]

The ruling in Civil Service Commission v. Dacoycoy was further

explained in Civil Service Commission v. Court of Appeals [27] where
we held that the real party-in-interest in a case involving the nonrenewal of the appointments of contractual employees would be
the person who was allegedly dismissed from work and not the
CSC, for it is he who would be benefited or injured by his
reinstatement or non-reinstatement and who is present, available
and competent to bring the matter on appeal. Like a judge whose
order or decision is being assailed, the CSC should not be joined in
the petition as it is not a combatant in a proceeding where
opposing parties may contend their respective positions without
the active participation of the CSC.[28]
In the instant case, the CSC is not the real party-in-interest as
this suit confronts the Decision of the Court of Appeals to award
back wages for respondent arising from an illegitimate personnel
and non-disciplinary action of MSU, which is different from an
administrative disciplinary proceeding where the injured party is
the government. We fail to see how the assailedDecision can impair
the effectiveness of government, damage the civil service system
or weaken the constitutional authority of the CSC so as to authorize
the latter to prosecute this case.As a rule, the material interest for
this purpose belongs to MSU since it instigated the illegal dismissal
and the execution of the Decision devolves upon it.[29]

Regrettably, however, respondent cannot insist that MSU be

the indispensable party in the instant petition since the latter was
not designated as respondent in the petition before the Court of
Appeals. It would truly be a case of having her cake and eating it
too for respondent to require MSU to undertake the present appeal
from the assailed Decision when it was deprived of standing in the
appellate court proceedings and unilaterally booted out as a
prospective litigant herein. Hence, by force of circumstances, the
CSC has the standing to initiate the instant petition for review.
Moreover, the OSG executed the verification and certificate of
non-forum shopping in behalf of the CSC, citing as bases
therefor City Warden of the Manila City Jail v. Estrella,
[30]
andCommissioner of Internal Revenue v. S.C. Johnson and Son,
Inc.[31] Some clarification is in order to avoid perpetuating a
misconception.
City Warden of the Manila City Jail v. Estrella is not an authority
for the OSG to execute verification and certification of non-forum
shopping on its own as legal representative of client
agencies. The reason is that the OSG was in that case acting as a
Peoples Tribune regardless of the official opinion of the relevant
government agencies therein That the City Warden appears to have acquiesced in the release
order of the trial court by his compliance therewith does not
preclude the Solicitor General from taking a contrary position and
appealing the same. The Solicitor General's duty is to present what
he considers would legally uphold the best interest of the
Government[32] (underscoring added).
Hence, there was no necessity for the verification and
certificate of non-forum shopping to be executed by the City
Warden himself. To be sure, it would have been awkward and
irregular for the City Warden to do so given that his position was
not the same as those reflected in the petition of the OSG. No
doubt, the real party-in-interest is the OSG itself as representative
of the State.[33] In Pimentel v. Commission on Elections[34] we held

x x x the Solicitor General may, as it has in instances take a

position adverse and contrary to that of the Government on the
reasoning that it is incumbent upon him to present to the court
what he considers would legally uphold the best interest of the
government although it may run counter to a client's position x x x
x As we commented on the role of the Solicitor General in cases
pending before this Court, This Court does not expect the Solicitor
General to waver in the performance of his duty. As a matter of
fact, the Court appreciates the participation of the Solicitor General
in many proceedings and his continued fealty to his assigned
task. He should not therefore desist from appearing before this
Court even in those cases he finds his opinion inconsistent with the
Government or any of its agents he is expected to represent. The
Court must be advised of his position just as well.[35]
But the rule is different where the OSG is acting as counsel of
record for a government agency. For in such a case it becomes
necessary to determine whether the petitioning government body
has authorized the filing of the petition and is espousing the same
stand propounded by the OSG. Verily, it is not improbable for
government agencies to adopt a stand different from the position of
the OSG since they weigh not just legal considerations but policy
repercussions as well. They have their respective mandates for
which they are to be held accountable, and the prerogative to
determine whether further resort to a higher court is desirable and
indispensable under the circumstances.
The verification of a pleading, if signed by the proper officials
of the client agency itself, would fittingly serve the purpose of
attesting that the allegations in the pleading are true and correct
and not the product of the imagination or a matter of speculation,
and that the pleading is filed in good faith. Of course, the OSG may
opt to file its own petition as a Peoples Tribune but the
representation would not be for a client office but for its own
perceived best interest of the State.
The case of Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. S.C. Johnson
and Son, Inc., is not also a precedent that may be invoked at all
times to allow the OSG to sign the certificate of non-forum
shopping in place of the real party-in-interest. The ruling therein

mentions merely that the certification of non-forum shopping

executed by the OSG constitutes substantial compliance with
the rule since the OSG is the only lawyer for the petitioner, which is
a government agency mandated under Section 35, Chapter 12,
Title III, Book IV, of the 1987 Administrative Code (Reiterated under
Memorandum Circular No. 152 dated May 17, 1992) to be
represented only by the Solicitor General.[36]
By its very nature, substantial compliance is actually
inadequate observance of the requirements of a rule or regulation
which are waived under equitable circumstances[37] to facilitate
the administration of justice[38] there being no damage or injury
caused by such flawed compliance.[39] This concept is expressed
in the statement the rigidity of a previous doctrine was thus
subjected to an inroad under the concept of substantial
compliance.[40] In every inquiry on whether to accept substantial
compliance, the focus is always on the presence of equitable
conditions to administer justice effectively and efficiently without
damage or injury to the spirit of the legal obligation.
We have ruled previously[41] that substantial compliance with
the certificate of non-forum shopping is sufficient. The equitable
circumstances pleaded to show substantial compliance include the
proximity of the filing of the complaint to the date of the effectivity
of the circular requiring the certificate and the belated filing
thereof, but the mere submission thereof after the filing of a motion
to dismiss does not ipso facto operate as a substantial compliance.
[42]
As summarized in Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Court of
Appeals,[43] [w]hen a strict and literal application of the rules on
non-forum shopping and verification will result in a patent denial of
substantial justice, they may be liberally construed. This guideline
is especially true when the petitioner has satisfactorily explained
the lapse and fulfilled the requirements in its motion for
reconsideration.
The fact that the OSG under the 1987 Administrative Code is
the only lawyer for a government agency wanting to file a petition,
or complaint for that matter, does not operate per se to vest the
OSG with the authority to execute in its name the certificate of nonforum shopping for a client office. For, in many instances, client

agencies of the OSG have legal departments which at times

inadvertently take legal matters requiring court representation into
their own hands without the intervention of the OSG.
[44]
Consequently, the OSG would have no personal knowledge of
the history of a particular case so as to adequately execute the
certificate of non-forum shopping; and even if the OSG does have
the relevant information, the courts on the other hand would have
no way of ascertaining the accuracy of the OSGs assertion without
precise references in the record of the case. Thus, unless
equitable circumstances which are manifest from the record
of a case prevail, it becomes necessary for the concerned
government agency or its authorized representatives to certify for
non-forum shopping if only to be sure that no other similar case or
incident is pending before any other court.
We recognize the occasions when the OSG has difficulty in
securing the attention and signatures of officials in charge of
government offices for the verification and certificate of non-forum
shopping of an initiatory pleading. This predicament is especially
true where the period for filing such pleading is non-extendible or
can no longer be further extended for reasons of public interest
such as in applications for the writ of habeas corpus, in election
cases or where sensitive issues are involved. This quandary is more
pronounced where public officials have stations outside Metro
Manila.
But this difficult fact of life within the OSG, equitable as it may
seem, does not excuse it from wantonly executing by itself the
verification and certificate of non-forum shopping. If the OSG is
compelled by circumstances to verify and certify the pleading in
behalf of a client agency, the OSG should at least endeavor to
inform the courts of its reasons for doing so, beyond
instinctively citing City Warden of the Manila City Jail v.
Estrella and Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. S.C. Johnson and
Son, Inc.
Henceforth, to be able to verify and certify an initiatory
pleading for non-forum shopping when acting as counsel of record
for a client agency, the OSG must (a) allege under oath the
circumstances that make signatures of the concerned officials

impossible to obtain within the period for filing the initiatory

pleading; (b) append to the petition or complaint such authentic
document to prove that the party-petitioner or complainant
authorized the filing of the petition or complaint and understood
and adopted the allegations set forth therein, and an affirmation
that no action or claim involving the same issues has been filed or
commenced in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency; and, (c)
undertake to inform the court promptly and reasonably of any
change in the stance of the client agency.
Anent the document that may be annexed to a petition or
complaint under letter (b) hereof, the letter-endorsement of the
client agency to the OSG, or other correspondence to prove that
the subject-matter of the initiatory pleading had been previously
discussed between the OSG and its client, is satisfactory evidence
of the facts under letter (b) above. In this exceptional situation
where the OSG signs the verification and certificate of non-forum
shopping, the court reserves the authority to determine the
sufficiency of the OSGs action as measured by the equitable
considerations discussed herein.
Finally, after our lengthy discourse on the technical
imperfections afflicting the instant case, we resolve the substantive
issue of whether respondent is entitled to receive back salaries and
other benefits for the period that she was illegally
dismissed. Obviously, the answer is in the affirmative.

There is more than substantial evidence in the record

consisting of the general payroll and attendance sheets to prove
that petitioner assumed and exercised the functions of Director II
and Manila Information and Liaisoning Officer at MSU as early as
June 1995 after the MSU Board of Regents approved her permanent
appointment which was issued earlier on 10 April 1995. [45] It cannot
be refuted that in September 1998 she was terminated from the
service on the alleged ground of expiration of her term and stopped
from performing the functions of her position, and subsequently
reinstated to her job upon the declaration of the CSC that her
dismissal from the service was illegal. Clearly, the CSC gravely
erred when thereafter it ruled that respondent did not actually
assume and perform the duties of her position so as to deprive her
of back wages and other benefits.
In Gabriel v. Domingo[46] this Court held that an illegally
dismissed government employee who is later ordered reinstated is
entitled to back wages and other monetary benefits from the time
of his illegal dismissal up to his reinstatement. This is only fair and
sensible because an employee who is reinstated after having been
illegally dismissed is considered as not having left his office and
should be given a comparable compensation at the time of his
reinstatement.
Respondent cannot be faulted for her inability to work or to
render any service from the time she was illegally dismissed up to
the time of her reinstatement. The policy of no work, no pay cannot
be applied to her, for such distressing state of affairs was not of her
own making or liking even as her family suffered tremendously as a
consequence of her removal and while she was jobless. Verily, to
withhold her back salaries and other benefits during her illegal
dismissal would put to naught the constitutional guarantee of
security of tenure for those in the civil service.
We also agree with the Court of Appeals that MSU cannot be
made to pay all accruing back salaries and other benefits in favor
of respondent. There are allegations to the effect that officials of
MSU disobeyed in bad faith the writ of execution issued by the
CSC. In Gabriel v. Domingo[47] we held that if the illegal dismissal,
including the refusal to reinstate an employee after a finding of

unlawful termination, is found to have been made in bad faith or

due to personal malice of the superior officers then they will be
held personally accountable for the employees back salaries;
otherwise, the government disburses funds to answer for such
arbitrary dismissal.[48] This rule is also enunciated in Secs. 38[49] and
39[50] of Book I, E.O. 292, and in Secs. 53,[51] 55,[52] 56[53] and 58[54] of
Rule XIV of the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations.

proper forum wherein the assertions of malice and ill will in the
failure to reinstate respondent to her post are threshed out and the
concerned parties given the full opportunity to be heard. Until such
separate proceeding has been instituted and decided, it is
premature to fix the liability for this portion of respondents back
wages and other benefits upon either the government as
represented by MSU or the accountable officers thereof.

Accordingly, MSU as a government institution must

compensate
respondent
with
back
salaries
and
other
benefits only from the time of her illegal dismissal, which according
to the case record began sometime in October 1998, until the
motion for reconsideration of the MSU was denied and a writ of
execution for respondents reinstatement as Director II and Manila
Information and Liaisoning Officer was issued. The reckoning period
is not 8 March 2001 as determined by the appellate court but 19
July 2001 when CSC Resolution No. 01-1225 was promulgated
wherein the motion for reconsideration of the MSU was denied with
finality and the latter was explicitly commanded to allow
respondent to assume and exercise the functions of Director II and
Manila Information and Liaisoning Officer. For, a final decision of the
CSC is immediately executory unless a motion for reconsideration
is filed in the meantime.[55]

WHEREFORE,
the
instant Petition
for
Review is
DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 28 October
2002 is AFFIRMED except that the cut-off date for the payment of
back salaries to respondent should be adjusted from the date of her
illegal dismissal to 19 July 2001, instead of 8 March 2001, since it
was only on 19 July 2001 that MSUs motion for reconsideration was
denied and the order of execution finally issued by the Civil Service
Commission specifically directing MSU to reinstate respondent
Pangandaman-Gania and exercise the functions of her position with
the promulgation of CSC Resolution No. 01-1225.

The back wages and other benefits accruing after 19 July 2001
are to be treated separately since they must be collected in the

This is without prejudice to respondents claim for back salaries

and other benefits in the appropriate forum corresponding to the
period after 19 July 2001 until she is actually reinstated as Director
II and Manila Information and Liaisoning Officer.
SO ORDERED.