Full Text - The Philippines As A State

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########G.R. No. 160453 November 12, 2012REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES,Petitioner,#vs.#ARCADIO IVAN A. SANTOS III, and ARCADIO C. SANTOS,
JR.,Respondents.D E C I S I O NBERSAMIN,J.:By law, accretion - the gradual and
imperceptible deposit made through the effects of the current of the water- belongs
to the owner of the land adjacent to the banks of rivers where it forms. The drying
up of the river is not accretion. Hence, the dried-up river bed belongs to the
State as property of public dominion, not to the riparian owner, unless a law vests
the ownership in some other person.AntecedentsAlleging continuous and adverse
possession of more than ten years, respondent Arcadio Ivan A. Santos III (Arcadio
Ivan) applied on March 7, 1997 for the registration of Lot 4998-B (the property) in
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Parafiaque City. The property, which had an area
of 1,045 square meters, more or less, was located in Barangay San Dionisio,
Paraaque City, and was bounded in the Northeast by Lot 4079 belonging to
respondent Arcadio C. Santos, Jr. (Arcadio, Jr.), in the Southeast by the Paraaque
River, in the Southwest by an abandoned road, and in the Northwest by Lot 4998-A
also owned by Arcadio Ivan.# HYPERLINK
"http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/nov2012/gr_160453_2012.html" \l "fnt1"
#1#On May 21, 1998, Arcadio Ivan amended his application for land registration to
include Arcadio, Jr. as his co-applicant because of the latters co-ownership of
the property. He alleged that the property had been formed through accretion and
had been in their joint open, notorious, public, continuous and adverse possession
for more than 30 years.# HYPERLINK
#2#The City of Paraaque (the City) opposed the application for land registration,
stating that it needed the property for its flood control program; that the
property was within the legal easement of 20 meters from the river bank; and that
assuming that the property was not covered by the legal easement, title to the
property could not be registered in favor of the applicants for the reason that the
property was an orchard that had dried up and had not resulted from accretion.#
HYPERLINK "http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/nov2012/gr_160453_2012.html" \l
"fnt3" #3#Ruling of the RTCOn May 10, 2000,# HYPERLINK
#4#the RTC granted the application for land registration, disposing:WHEREFORE, the
Court hereby declares the applicants, ARCADIO IVAN A. SANTOS, III and ARCADIO C.
SANTOS, JR., both Filipinos and of legal age, as the TRUE and ABSOLUTE OWNERS of
the land being applied for which is situated in the Barangay of San Dionisio, City
of Paraaque with an area of one thousand forty five (1045) square meters more or
less and covered by Subdivision Plan Csd-00-000343, being a portion of Lot 4998,
Cad. 299, Case 4, Paraaque Cadastre, LRC Rec. No. and orders the registration of
Lot 4998-B in their names with the following technical description, to wit:x x x x
Once this Decision became (sic) final and executory, let the corresponding Order
for the Issuance of the Decree be issued.SO ORDERED.The Republic, through the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), appealed.Ruling of the CAIn its appeal, the
Republic ascribed the following errors to the RTC,# HYPERLINK
#5#to wit:ITHE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE PROPERTY SOUGHT TO BE
REGISTERED IS AN ACCRETION TO THE ADJOINING PROPERTY OWNED BY APPELLEES DESPITE THE
ADMISSION OF APPELLEE ARCADIO C. SANTOS JR. THAT THE SAID PROPERTY WAS NOT FORMED
AS A RESULT OF THE GRADUAL FILLING UP OF SOIL THROUGH THE CURRENT OF THE RIVER.II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE APPLICATION FOR LAND REGISTRATION DESPITE
APPELLEES FAILURE TO FORMALLY OFFER IN EVIDENCE AN OFFICIAL CERTIFICATION THAT THE
SUBJECT PARCEL OF LAND IS ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE.IIITHE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
RULING THAT APPELLEES HAD SUFFICIENTLY ESTABLISHED THEIR CONTINUOUS, OPEN, PUBLIC
AND ADVERSE OCCUPATION OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY FOR A PERIOD OF MORE THAN THIRTY
(30) YEARS.On May 27, 2003, the CA affirmed the RTC.# HYPERLINK
#6#The Republic filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CA denied the motion on
October 20, 2003.# HYPERLINK
#7#IssuesHence, this appeal, in which the Republic urges that:# HYPERLINK
#8#IRESPONDENTS CLAIM THAT THE SUBJECT PROPERTY IS AN ACCRETION TO THEIR ADJOINING
LAND THAT WOULD ENTITLE THEM TO REGISTER IT UNDER ARTICLE 457 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE
IS CONTRADICTED BY THEIR OWN EVIDENCE.IIASSUMING THAT THE LAND SOUGHT TO BE
REGISTERED WAS "PREVIOUSLY A PART OF THE PARAAQUE RIVER WHICH BECAME AN ORCHARD
AFTER IT DRIED UP," THE REGISTRATION OF SAID PROPERTY IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENTS
CANNOT BE ALTERNATIVELY JUSTIFIED UNDER ARTICLE 461 OF THE CIVIL CODE.IIITHE COURT
OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT RULING THAT THE FAILURE OF RESPONDENTS
TO FORMALLY OFFER IN EVIDENCE AN OFFICIAL CERTIFICATION THAT THE SUBJECT PROPERTY
IS ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE IS FATAL TO THEIR APPLICATION FOR LAND REGISTRATION.IV
THE FINDING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS THAT RESPONDENTS HAVE CONTINUOUSLY, OPENLY,
PUBLICLY AND ADVERSELY OCCUPIED THE SUBJECT PROPERTY FOR MORE THAN THIRTY (30)
YEARS IS NOT SUPPORTED BY WELL-NIGH INCONTROVERTIBLE EVIDENCE.To be resolved are
whether or not Article 457 of the Civil Code was applicable herein; and whether or
not respondents could claim the property by virtue of acquisitive prescription
pursuant to Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration
Decree).RulingThe appeal is meritorious.I.The CA grossly erred in applying Article
457 of the Civil Code to respondents benefitArticle 457 of the Civil Code provides
that "(t)o the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion
which they gradually receive from the effects of the currents of the waters."In
ruling for respondents, the RTC pronounced as follows:On the basis of the evidence
presented by the applicants, the Court finds that Arcadio Ivan A. Santos III and
Arcadio C. Santos, Jr., are the owners of the land subject of this application
which was previously a part of the Paraaque River which became an orchard after it
dried up and further considering that Lot 4 which adjoins the same property is
owned by applicant, Arcadio C. Santos, Jr., after it was obtained by him through
inheritance from his mother, Concepcion Cruz, now deceased. Conformably with Art.
457 of the New Civil Code, it is provided that:"Article 457. To the owners of the
lands adjoining the bank of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually
receive from the effects of the current of the waters."# HYPERLINK
#9#The CA upheld the RTCs pronouncement, holding:It could not be denied that "to
the owners of the lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which
they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters" (Article 457
New Civil Code) as in this case, Arcadio Ivan Santos III and Arcadio Santos, Jr.,
are the owners of the land which was previously part of the Paraaque River which
became an orchard after it dried up and considering that Lot 4 which adjoins the
same property is owned by the applicant which was obtained by the latter from his
mother (Decision, p. 3; p. 38 Rollo).# HYPERLINK
#10#The Republic submits, however, that the application by both lower courts of
Article 457 of the Civil Code was erroneous in the face of the fact that
respondents evidence did not establish accretion, but instead the drying up of the
Paraaque River.The Republics submission is correct.Respondents as the applicants
for land registration carried the burden of proof to establish the merits of their
application by a preponderance of evidence, by which is meant such evidence that is
of greater weight, or more convincing than that offered in opposition to it.#
"fnt11" #11#They would be held entitled to claim the property as their own and
apply for its registration under the Torrens system only if they established that,
indeed, the property was an accretion to their land.Accretion is the process
whereby the soil is deposited along the banks of rivers.# HYPERLINK

#12#The deposit of soil, to be considered accretion, must be: (a) gradual and
imperceptible; (b) made through the effects of the current of the water; and (c)
taking place on land adjacent to the banks of rivers.# HYPERLINK
#13#Accordingly, respondents should establish the concurrence of the elements of
accretion to warrant the grant of their application for land registration.However,
respondents did not discharge their burden of
proof. They did not show that the gradual and imperceptible deposition of soil
through the effects of the current of the river had formed Lot 4998-B. Instead,
their evidence revealed that the property was the dried-up river bed of the
Paraaque River, leading both the RTC and the CA to themselves hold that Lot 4998-B
was "the land which was previously part of the Paraaque River xxx (and) became an
orchard after it dried up."Still, respondents argue that considering that Lot 4998B did not yet exist when the original title of Lot 4 was issued in their mothers
name in 1920, and that Lot 4998-B came about only thereafter as the land formed
between Lot 4 and the Paraaque River, the unavoidable conclusion should then be
that soil and sediments had meanwhile been deposited near Lot 4 by the current of
the Paraaque River, resulting in the formation of Lot 4998-B.The argument is
legally and factually groundless. For one, respondents thereby ignore that the
effects of the current of the river are not the only cause of the formation of land
along a river bank. There are several other causes, including the drying up of the
river bed. The drying up of the river bed was, in fact, the uniform conclusion of
both lower courts herein. In other words, respondents did not establish at all that
the increment of land had formed from the gradual and imperceptible deposit of soil
by the effects of the current. Also, it seems to be highly improbable that the
large volume of soil that ultimately comprised the dry land with an area of 1,045
square meters had been deposited in a gradual and imperceptible manner by the
current of the river in the span of about 20 to 30 years the span of time
intervening between 1920, when Lot 4 was registered in the name of their deceased
parent (at which time Lot 4998-B was not yet in existence) and the early 1950s
(which respondents witness Rufino Allanigue alleged to be the time when he knew
them to have occupied Lot 4988-B). The only plausible explanation for the
substantial increment was that Lot 4988-B was the dried-up bed of the Paraaque
River. Confirming this explanation was Arcadio, Jr.s own testimony to the effect
that the property was previously a part of the Paraaque River that had dried up
and become an orchard.We observe in this connection that even Arcadio, Jr.s own
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 44687 confirmed the uniform conclusion of the RTC
and the CA that Lot 4998-B had been formed by the drying up of the Paraaque River.
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 44687 recited that Lot 4 of the consolidated
subdivision plan Pcs-13-002563, the lot therein described, was bounded "on the SW
along line 5-1 by Dried River Bed."# HYPERLINK
#14#That boundary line of "SW along line 5-1" corresponded with the location of Lot
4998-B, which was described as "bounded by Lot 4079 Cad. 299, (Lot 1, Psu-10676),
in the name of respondent Arcadio Santos, Jr. (Now Lot 4, Psd-13-002563) in the
Northeast."# HYPERLINK
#15#The RTC and the CA grossly erred in treating the dried-up river bed as an
accretion that became respondents property pursuant to Article 457 of the Civil
Code. That land was definitely not an accretion. The process of drying up of a
river to form dry land involved the recession of the water level from the river
banks, and the dried-up land did not equate to accretion, which was the gradual and
imperceptible deposition of soil on the river banks through the effects of the
current. In accretion, the water level did not recede and was more or less
maintained. Hence, respondents as the riparian owners had no legal right to claim
ownership of Lot 4998-B. Considering that the clear and categorical language of
Article 457 of the Civil Code has confined the provision only to accretion, we
should apply the provision as its clear and categorical language tells us to.
Axiomatic it is, indeed, that where the language of the law is clear and
categorical, there is no room for interpretation; there is only room for
application.# HYPERLINK
#16#The first and fundamental duty of courts is then to apply the law.# HYPERLINK
#17#The State exclusively owned Lot 4998-B and may not be divested of its right of
ownership. Article 502 of the Civil Code expressly declares that rivers and their
natural beds are public dominion of the State.# HYPERLINK
#18#It follows that the river beds that dry up, like Lot 4998-B, continue to
belong to theState as its property of public dominion, unless there is an express
law that provides that the dried-up river beds should belong to some other person.#
"fnt19" #19#IIAcquisitive prescription wasnot applicable in favor of respondentsThe
RTC favored respondents application for land registration covering Lot 4998-B also
because they had taken possession of the property continuously, openly, publicly
and adversely for more than 30 years based on their predecessor-in-interest being
the adjoining owner of the parcel of land along the river bank. It rendered the
following ratiocination, viz:# HYPERLINK
#20#In this regard, the Court found that from the time the applicants became the
owners thereof, they took possession of the same property continuously, openly,
publicly and adversely for more than thirty (30) years because their predecessorsin-interest are the adjoining owners of the subject parcel of land along the river
bank. Furthermore, the fact that applicants paid its realty taxes, had it surveyed
per subdivision plan Csd-00-000343 (Exh. "L") which was duly approved by the Land
Management Services and the fact that Engr. Chito B. Cainglet, OICChief, Surveys
Division Land Registration Authority, made a Report that the subject property is
not a portion of the Paraaque River and that it does not fall nor overlap with Lot
5000, thus, the Court opts to grant the application.Finally, in the light of the
evidence adduced by the applicants in this case and in view of the foregoing
reports of the Department of Agrarian Reforms, Land Registration Authority and the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources, the Court finds and so holds that
the applicants have satisfied all the requirements of law which are essential to a
government grant and is, therefore, entitled to the issuance of a certificate of
title in their favor. So also, oppositor failed to prove that the applicants are
not entitled thereto, not having presented any witness.In fine, the application is
GRANTED.As already mentioned, the CA affirmed the RTC.Both lower courts erred.The
relevant legal provision is Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property
Registration Decree), which pertinently states:Section 14. Who may apply. The
following persons may file in the proper [Regional Trial Court] an application for
registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-ininterest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide
claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.x x x xUnder Section 14(1),
then, applicants for confirmation of imperfect title must prove the following,
namely: (a) that the land forms part of the disposable and alienable agricultural
lands of the public domain; and (b) that they have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the land under a bona fide
claim of ownership either since time immemorial or since June 12, 1945.# HYPERLINK
#21#The Republic assails the findings by the lower courts that respondents "took
possession of the same property continuously, openly, publicly and adversely for
more than thirty (30) years."# HYPERLINK
#22#Although it is well settled that the findings of fact of the trial court,
especially when affirmed by the CA, are accorded the highest degree of respect, and
generally will not be disturbed on appeal, with such findings being binding and
conclusive on the Court,# HYPERLINK
#23#the Court has consistently recognized exceptions to this rule, including the
following, to wit: (a) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation,
surmises, or conjectures; (b) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken,
absurd, or impossible; (c) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (d) when the
judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (e) when the findings of fact are
conflicting; (f) when in making its findings the CA went beyond the issues of the
case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the
appellee; (g) when the findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (h) when
the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they
are based; (i) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the
petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed by respondent; and (j) when the
findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted
by the evidence on record.# HYPERLINK
"http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/nov2012/gr_160453_2012.html"
\l "fnt24" #24#Here, the findings of the RTC were obviously grounded on
speculation, surmises, or conjectures; and that the inference made by the RTC and
the CA was manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible. Hence, the Court should now
review the findings.In finding that respondents had been in continuous, open,
public and adverse possession of the land for more than 30 years, the RTC declared:
In this regard, the Court found that from the time the applicant became the owners
thereof, they took possession of the same property continuously, openly, publicly
and adversely for more than thirty years because their predecessor in interest are
the adjoining owners of the subject parcel of land along the river banks.
Furthermore, the fact that the applicant paid its realty taxes, had it surveyed per
subdivision plan Csd-00-000343 (Exh. "L") which was duly approved by the Land
Management Services and the fact that Engr. Chito B. Cainglet, OIC Chief, Surveys
Division Land Registration Authority, made a Report that the subject property is
not a portion of the Paraaque River and that it does not fall nor overlap with Lot
5000, thus, the Court opts to grant the application.The RTC apparently reckoned
respondents period of supposed possession to be "more than thirty years" from the
fact that "their predecessors in interest are the adjoining owners of the subject
parcel of land." Yet, its decision nowhere indicated what acts respondents had
performed showing their possession of the property "continuously, openly, publicly
and adversely" in that length of time. The decision mentioned only that they had
paid realty taxes and had caused the survey of the property to be made. That, to
us, was not enough to justify the foregoing findings, because, firstly, the payment
of realty taxes did not conclusively prove the payors ownership of the land the
taxes were paid for,# HYPERLINK
#25#the tax declarations and payments being mere indicia of a claim of ownership;#
"fnt26" #26#and, secondly, the causing of surveys of the property involved was not
itself an of continuous, open, public and adverse possession.The principle that the
riparian owner whose land receives the gradual deposits of soil does not need to
make an express act of possession, and that no acts of possession are necessary in
that instance because it is the law itself that pronounces the alluvium to belong
to the riparian owner from the time that the deposit created by the current of the
water becomes manifest# HYPERLINK
#27#has no applicability herein. This is simply because Lot 4998-B was not formed
through accretion. Hence, the ownership of the land adjacent to the river bank by
respondents predecessor-in-interest did not translate to possession of Lot 4998-B
that would ripen to acquisitive prescription in relation to Lot 4998-B.On the other
hand, the claim of thirty years of continuous, open, public and adverse possession
of Lot 4998-B was not even validated or preponderantly established. The admission
of respondents themselves that they declared the property for taxation purposes
only in 1997 and paid realty taxes only from 1999# HYPERLINK
#28#signified that their alleged possession would at most be for only nine years
as of the filing of their application for land registration on March 7, 1997.Yet,
even conceding, for the sake of argument, that respondents possessed Lot 4998-B for
more than thirty years in the character they claimed, they did not thereby acquire
the land by prescription or by other means without any competent proof that the
land was already declared as alienable and disposable by the Government. Absent
that declaration, the land still belonged to the State as part of its public
dominion.Article 419 of the Civil Code distinguishes property as being either of
public dominion or of private ownership. Article 420 of the Civil Code lists the
properties considered as part of public dominion, namely: (a) those intended for
public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed
by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character; and (b)
those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for
some public service or for the development of the national wealth. As earlier
mentioned, Article 502 of the Civil Code declares that rivers and their natural
beds are of public dominion.Whether the dried-up river bed may be susceptible to
acquisitive prescription or not was a question that the Court resolved in favor of
the State in Celestial v. Cachopero,# HYPERLINK
#29#a case involving the registration of land found to be part of a dried-up
portion of the natural bed of a creek. There the Court held:As for petitioners
claim of ownership over the subject land, admittedly a dried-up bed of the
Salunayan Creek, based on (1) her alleged long term adverse possession and that of
her predecessor-in-interest, Marcelina Basadre, even prior to October 22, 1966,
when she purchased the adjoining property from the latter, and (2) the right of
accession under Art. 370 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 and/or Article 461 of
the Civil Code, the same must fail.Since property of public dominion is outside the
commerce of man and not susceptible to private appropriation and acquisitive
prescription, the adverse possession which may be the basis of a grant of title in
the confirmation of an imperfect title refers only to alienable or disposable
portions of the public domain. It is only after the Government has declared the
land to be alienable and disposable agricultural land that the year of entry,
cultivation and exclusive and adverse possession can be counted for purposes of an
imperfect title.A creek, like the Salunayan Creek, is a recess or arm extending
from a river and participating in the ebb and flow of the sea. As such, under
Articles 420(1) and 502(1) of the Civil Code, the Salunayan Creek, including its
natural bed, is property of the public domain which is not susceptible to private
appropriation and acquisitive prescription. And, absent any declaration by the
government, that a portion of the creek has dried-up does not, by itself, alter its
inalienable character.x x x xHad the disputed portion of the Salunayan Creek dried
up after the present Civil Code took effect, the subject land would clearly not
belong to petitioner or her predecessor-in-interest since under the aforementioned
provision of Article 461, "river beds which are abandoned through the natural
change in the course of the waters ipso facto belong to the owners of the land
occupied by the new course," and the owners of the adjoining lots have the right to
acquire them only after paying their value.And both Article 370 of the Old Code and
Article 461 of the present Civil Code are applicable only when "river beds are
abandoned through the natural change in the course of the waters." It is
uncontroverted, however, that, as found by both the Bureau of Lands and the DENR
Regional Executive Director, the subject land became dry as a result of the
construction an irrigation canal by the National Irrigation Administration. Thus,
in Ronquillo v. Court of Appeals, this Court held:The law is clear and unambiguous.
It leaves no room for interpretation. Article 370 applies only if there is a
natural change in the course of the waters. The rules on alluvion do not apply to
man-made or artificial accretions nor to accretions to lands that adjoin canals or
esteros or artificial drainage systems. Considering our earlier finding that the
dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub was actually caused by the active intervention
of man, it follows that Article 370 does not apply to the case at bar and, hence,
the Del Rosarios cannot be entitled thereto supposedly as riparian owners.The
dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub should thus be considered as forming part of
the land of the public domain which cannot be subject to acquisition by private
ownership. xxx (Emphasis supplied)Furthermore, both provisions pertain to
situations where there has been a change in the course of a river, not where the
river simply dries up. In the instant Petition, it is not even alleged that the
Salunayan Creek changed its course. In such a situation, commentators are of the
opinion that the dry river bed remains property of public dominion. (Bold emphases
supplied)Indeed, under the Regalian doctrine, all lands not otherwise appearing to
be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State.# HYPERLINK
#30#No public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant, express
or implied, from the Government. It is indispensable, therefore, that there is a
showing of a title from the State.# HYPERLINK
#31#Occupation of public land in the concept of owner, no matter how long, cannot
ripen into ownership and be registered as a title.# HYPERLINK
#32#Subject to the exceptions defined in Article 461 of the Civil Code (which
declares river beds that are abandoned through the natural change in the course of
the waters as ipso facto belonging to the owners of the land occupied by the new
course, and which gives to the owners of the adjoining lots the right to acquire
only the abandoned river
beds not ipso facto belonging to the owners of the land affected by the natural
change of course of the waters only after paying their value), all river beds
remain property of public dominion and cannot be acquired by acquisitive
prescription unless previously declared by the Government to be alienable and
disposable. Considering that Lot 4998-B was not shown to be already declared to be
alienable and disposable, respondents could not be deemed to have acquired the
property through prescription.Nonetheless, respondents insist that the property was
already classified as alienable and disposable by the Government. They cite as
proof of the classification as alienable and disposable the following notation
found on the survey plan, to wit:# HYPERLINK
#33#NOTEALL CORNERS NOT OTHERWISE DESCRIBED ARE OLD BL CYL. CONC. MONS 15 X 60CMAll
corners marked PS are cyl. conc. mons 15 x 60 cmSurveyed in accordance with Survey
Authority NO. 007604-48 of the Regional Executive Director issued by the CENROFFICER dated Dec. 2, 1996.This survey is inside L.C. Map No. 2623, Proj. No. 25
classified as alienable/disposable by the Bureau of Forest Devt. on Jan. 3, 1968.
Lot 4998-A = Lot 5883} Cad 299Lot 4998-B = Lot 5884} Paranaque Cadastre.Was the
notation on the survey plan to the effect that Lot 4998-B was "inside" the map
"classified as alienable/disposable by the Bureau of Forest Development on 03 Jan.
1968" sufficient proof of the propertys nature as alienable and disposable public
land? To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is
alienable, an applicant must conclusively establish the existence of a positive act
of the Government, such as a presidential proclamation, executive order,
administrative action, investigation reports of the Bureau of Lands investigator,
or a legislative act or statute. Until then, the rules on confirmation of imperfect
title do not apply.As to the proofs that are admissible to establish the
alienability and disposability of public land, we said in Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources v. Yap# HYPERLINK
#34#that:The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of
the lands of the public domain is on the person applying for registration (or
claiming ownership), who must prove that the land subject of the application is
alienable or disposable. To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence
must be established that the land subject of the application (or claim) is
alienable or disposable.There must still be a positive act declaring land of the

public domain as alienable and disposable. To prove that the land subject of an
application for registration is alienable, the applicant must establish the
existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation
or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of
Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute. The applicant may also
secure a certification from the government that the land claimed to have been
possessed for the required number of years is alienable and disposable.In the case
at bar, no such proclamation, executive order, administrative action, report,
statute, or certification was presented to the Court. The records are bereft of
evidence showing that, prior to 2006, the portions of Boracay occupied by private
claimants were subject of a government proclamation that the land is alienable and
disposable. Absent such well-nigh incontrovertible evidence, the Court cannot
accept the submission that lands occupied by private claimants were already open to
disposition before 2006. Matters of land classification or reclassification cannot
be assumed. They call for proof." (Emphasis supplied)In Menguito v. Republic,#
"fnt35" #35#which we reiterated in Republic v. Sarmiento,# HYPERLINK
#36#we specifically resolved the issue of whether the notation on the survey plan
was sufficient evidence to establish the alienability and disposability of public
land, to wit:To prove that the land in question formed part of the alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain, petitioners relied on the printed words
which read: "This survey plan is inside Alienable and Disposable Land Area, Project
No. 27-B as per L.C. Map No. 2623, certified by the Bureau of Forestry on January
3, 1968," appearing on Exhibit "E" (Survey Plan No. Swo-13-000227).This proof is
not sufficient. Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, provides: "All
lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral
oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora
and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. x x x."For the
original registration of title, the applicant (petitioners in this case) must
overcome the presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of the
public domain. Unless public land is shown to have been reclassified or alienated
to a private person by the State, it remains part of the inalienable public domain.
Indeed, "occupation thereof in the concept of owner, no matter how long, cannot
ripen into ownership and be registered as a title." To overcome such presumption,
incontrovertible evidence must be shown by the applicant. Absent such evidence, the
land sought to be registered remains inalienable.In the present case, petitioners
cite a surveyor-geodetic engineers notation in Exhibit "E" indicating that the
survey was inside alienable and disposable land. Such notation does not constitute
a positive government act validly changing the classification of the land in
question. Verily, a mere surveyor has no authority to reclassify lands of the
public domain. By relying solely on the said surveyors assertion, petitioners have
not sufficiently proven that the land in question has been declared alienable.
(Emphasis supplied)In Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.,# HYPERLINK
#37#we dealt with the sufficiency of the certification by the Provincial
Environmental Officer (PENRO) or Community Environmental Officer (CENRO) to the
effect that a piece of public land was alienable and disposable in the following
manner, viz:x x x it is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is
alienable and disposable. The applicant for land registration must prove that the
DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land of the
public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the
application for registration falls within the approved area per verification
through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the applicant for land
registration must present a copy of the original classification approved by the
DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official
records. These facts must be established to prove that the land is alienable and
disposable. Respondent failed to do so because the certifications presented by
respondent do not, by themselves, prove that the land is alienable and disposable.
Only Torres, respondents Operations Manager, identified the certifications
submitted by respondent.1wphi1The government officials who issued the
certifications were not presented before the trial court to testify on their
contents. The trial court should not have accepted the contents of the
certifications as proof of the facts stated therein. Even if the certifications are
presumed duly issued and admissible in evidence, they have no probative value in
establishing that the land is alienable and disposable.x x x xThe CENRO and
Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, certifications do not prove that Lot 10705-B
falls within the alienable and disposable land as proclaimed by the DENR Secretary.
Such government certifications do not, by their mere issuance, prove the facts
stated therein. Such government certifications may fall under the class of
documents contemplated in the second sentence of Section 23 of Rule 132. As such,
the certifications are prima facie evidence of their due execution and date of
issuance but they do not constitute prima facie evidence of the facts stated
therein. (Emphasis supplied)These rulings of the Court indicate that the notation
on the survey plan of Lot 4998-B, Cad-00-000343 to the effect that the "survey is
inside a map classified as alienable/disposable by the Bureau of Forest Devt" did
not prove that Lot 4998-B was already classified as alienable and disposable.
Accordingly, respondents could not validly assert acquisitive prescription of Lot
4988-B.WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of
Appeals promulgated on May 27, 2003; DISMISSES the application for registration of
Arcadio C. Santos, Jr. and Arcadio Ivan S. Santos III respecting Lot 4998-B with a
total area of 1,045 square meters, more or less, situated in Barangay San Dionisio,
Paraaque City, Metro Manila; and DECLARES Lot 4998-B as exclusively belonging to
the State for being part of the dried--up bed of the Parat1aque River.Respondents
shall pay the costs of suit.G.R. No. L-13250 October 29, 1971THE COLLECTOR OF
INTERNAL REVENUE,petitioner,#vs.#ANTONIO CAMPOS RUEDA,respondent..Assistant
Solicitor General Jose P. Alejandro and Special Attorney Jose G. Azurin, (O.S.G.)
for petitioner.Ramirez and Ortigas for respondent.FERNANDO,J.:The basic issue
posed by petitioner Collector of Internal Revenue in this appeal
from a decision of the Court of Tax Appeals as to whether or not the requisites of
statehood, or at least so much thereof as may be necessary for the acquisition of
an international personality, must be satisfied for a "foreign country" to fall
within the exemption of Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code1is now
ripe for adjudication. The Court of Tax Appeals answered the question in the
negative, and thus reversed the action taken by petitioner Collector, who would
hold respondent Antonio Campos Rueda, as administrator of the estate of the late
Estrella Soriano Vda. de Cerdeira, liable for the sum of P161,874.95 as deficiency
estate and inheritance taxes for the transfer of intangible personal properties in
the Philippines, the deceased, a Spanish national having been a resident of
Tangier, Morocco from 1931 up to the time of her death in 1955. In an earlier
resolution promulgated May 30, 1962, this Court on the assumption that the need for
resolving the principal question would be obviated, referred the matter back to the
Court of Tax Appeals to determine whether the alleged law of Tangier did grant the
reciprocal tax exemption required by the aforesaid Section 122. Then came an order
from the Court of Tax Appeals submitting copies of legislation of Tangier that
would manifest that the element of reciprocity was not lacking. It was not until
July 29, 1969 that the case was deemed submitted for decision. When the petition
for review was filed on January 2, 1958, the basic issue raised was impressed with
an element of novelty. Four days thereafter, however, on January 6, 1958, it was
held by this Court that the aforesaid provision does not require that the "foreign
country" possess an international personality to come within its
terms.2Accordingly, we have to affirm.The decision of the Court of Tax Appeals,
now under review, sets forth the background facts as follows: "This is an appeal
interposed by petitioner Antonio Campos Rueda as administrator of the estate of the
deceased Doa Maria de la Estrella Soriano Vda. de Cerdeira, from the decision of
the respondent Collector of Internal Revenue, assessing against and demanding from
the former the sum P161,874.95 as deficiency estate and inheritance taxes,
including interest and penalties, on the transfer of intangible personal properties

situated in the Philippines and belonging to said Maria de la Estrella Soriano Vda.
de Cerdeira. Maria de la Estrella Soriano Vda. de Cerdeira (Maria Cerdeira for
short) is a Spanish national, by reason of her marriage to a Spanish citizen and
was a resident of Tangier, Morocco from 1931 up to her death on January 2, 1955. At
the time of her demise she left, among others, intangible personal properties in
the Philippines."3Then came this portion: "On September 29, 1955, petitioner
filed a provisional estate and inheritance tax return on all the properties of the
late Maria Cerdeira. On the same date, respondent, pending investigation, issued an
assessment for state and inheritance taxes in the respective amounts of P111,592.48
and P157,791.48, or a total of P369,383.96 which tax liabilities were paid by
petitioner ... . On November 17, 1955, an amended return was filed ... wherein
intangible personal properties with the value of P396,308.90 were claimed as
exempted from taxes. On November 23, 1955, respondent, pending investigation,
issued another assessment for estate and inheritance taxes in the amounts of
P202,262.40 and P267,402.84, respectively, or a total of P469,665.24 ... . In a
letter dated January 11, 1956, respondent denied the request for exemption on the
ground that the law of Tangier is not reciprocal to Section 122 of the National
Internal Revenue Code. Hence, respondent demanded the payment of the sums of
P239,439.49 representing deficiency estate and inheritance taxes includingad
valorempenalties, surcharges, interests and compromise penalties ... . In a letter
dated February 8, 1956, and received by respondent on the following day, petitioner
requested for the reconsideration of the decision denying the claim for tax
exemption of the intangible personal properties and the imposition of the 25% and
5%ad valorempenalties ... . However, respondent denied request, in his letter
dated May 5, 1956 ... and received by petitioner on May 21, 1956. Respondent
premised the denial on the grounds that there was no reciprocity [with Tangier,
which was moreover] a mere principality, not a foreign country. Consequently,
respondent demanded the payment of the sums of P73,851.21 and P88,023.74
respectively, or a total of P161,874.95 as deficiency estate and inheritance taxes
including surcharges, interests and compromise penalties."4The matter was then
elevated to the Court of Tax Appeals. As there was no dispute between the parties
regarding the values of the properties and the mathematical correctness of the
deficiency assessments, the principal question as noted dealt with the reciprocity
aspect as well as the insisting by the Collector of Internal Revenue that Tangier
was not a foreign country within the meaning of Section 122. In ruling against the
contention of the Collector of Internal Revenue, the appealed decision states: "In
fine, we believe, and so hold, that the expression "foreign country", used in the
last proviso of Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code, refers to a
government of that foreign power which, although not an international person in the
sense of international law, does not impose transfer or death upon intangible
person properties of our citizens not residing therein, or whose law allows a
similar exemption from such taxes. It is, therefore, not necessary that Tangier
should have been recognized by our Government order to entitle the petitioner to
the exemption benefits of the proviso of Section 122 of our Tax. Code."5Hence
appeal to this court by petitioner. The respective briefs of the parties duly
submitted, but as above indicated, instead of ruling definitely on the question,
this Court, on May 30, 1962, resolve to inquire further into the question of
reciprocity and sent back the case to the Court of Tax Appeals for the motion of
evidence thereon. The dispositive portion of such resolution reads as follows:
"While section 122 of the Philippine Tax Code aforequoted speaks of 'intangible
personal property' in both subdivisions (a) and (b); the alleged laws of Tangier
refer to 'bienes muebles situados en Tanger', 'bienes muebles radicantes en
Tanger', 'movables' and 'movable property'. In order that this Court may be able to
determine whether the alleged laws of Tangier grant the reciprocal tax exemptions
required by Section 122 of the Tax Code, and without, for the time being, going
into the merits of the issues raised by the petitioner-appellant, the case is
[remanded] to the Court of Tax Appeals for the reception of evidence or proof on
whether or not the words `bienes muebles', 'movables' and 'movable properties as
used in the Tangier laws, include or embrace 'intangible person property', as used
in the Tax Code."6In line with the above resolution, the Court of Tax Appeals
admitted evidence submitted by the administrator petitioner Antonio Campos Rueda,
consisting of exhibits of laws of Tangier to the effect that "the transfers by
reason of death of movable properties, corporeal or incorporeal, including
furniture and personal effects as well as of securities, bonds, shares, ..., were
not subject, on that date and in said zone, to the payment of any death tax,
whatever might have been the nationality of the deceased or his heirs and
legatees." It was further noted in an order of such Court referring the matter back
to us that such were duly admitted in evidence during the hearing of the case on
September 9, 1963. Respondent presented no evidence."7The controlling legal
provision as noted is a proviso in Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue
Code. It reads thus: "That no tax shall be collected under this Title in respect of
intangible personal property (a) if the decedent at the time of his death was a
resident of a foreign country which at the time of his death did not impose a
transfer tax or death tax of any character in respect of intangible person property
of the Philippines not residing in that foreign country, or (b) if the laws of the
foreign country of which the decedent was a resident at the time of his death allow
a similar exemption from transfer taxes or death taxes of every character in
respect of intangible personal property owned by citizens of the Philippines not
residing in that foreign country."8The only obstacle therefore to a definitive
ruling is whether or not as vigorously insisted upon by petitioner the acquisition
of internal personality is a conditionsine qua nonto Tangier being considered a
"foreign country". Deference to the De Lara ruling, as was made clear in the
opening paragraph of this opinion, calls for an affirmance of the decision of the
Court of Tax Appeals.It does not admit of doubt that if a foreign country is to be
identified with a state, it is required in line with Pound's formulation that it be
a politically organized sovereign community independent of outside control bound by
penalties of nationhood, legally supreme within its territory, acting through a
government functioning under a regime of#law.9It is thus a sovereign person with
the people composing it viewed as an organized corporate society under a government
with the legal competence to exact obedience to its commands.10It has been
referred to as a body-politic organized by common consent for mutual defense and
mutual safety and to promote the general welfare.11Correctly has it been
described by Esmein as "the juridical personification of the nation."12This is to
view it in the light of its historical development. The stress is on its
being a nation, its people occupying a definite territory, politically organized,
exercising by means of its government its sovereign will over the individuals
within it and maintaining its separate international personality. Laski could speak
of it then as a territorial society divided into government and subjects, claiming
within its allotted area a supremacy over all other institutions.13McIver
similarly would point to the power entrusted to its government to maintain within
its territory the conditions of a legal order and to enter into international
relations.14With the latter requisite satisfied, international law do not exact
independence as a condition of statehood. So Hyde did opine.15Even on the
assumption then that Tangier is bereft of international personality, petitioner has
not successfully made out a case. It bears repeating that four days after the
filing of this petition on January 6, 1958 inCollector of Internal Revenue v. De
Lara,16it was specifically held by us: "Considering the State of California as a
foreign country in relation to section 122 of our Tax Code we believe and hold, as
did the Tax Court, that the Ancilliary Administrator is entitled the exemption from
the inheritance tax on the intangible personal property found in the
Philippines."17There can be no doubt that California as a state in the American
Union was in the alleged requisite of international personality. Nonetheless, it
was held to be a foreign country within the meaning of Section 122 of the National
Internal Revenue Code.18What is undeniable is that even prior to the De Lara
ruling, this Court did commit itself to the doctrine that even a tiny principality,
that of Liechtenstein, hardly an international personality in the sense, did fall
under this exempt category. So it appears in an opinion of the Court by the then
Acting Chief Justicem Bengson who thereafter assumed that position in a permanent
capacity, inKiene v. Collector of Internal Revenue.19As was therein noted: 'The
Board found from the documents submitted to it proof of the laws of Liechtenstein
that said country does not impose estate, inheritance and gift taxes on
intangible property of Filipino citizens not residing in that country. Wherefore,
the Board declared that pursuant to the exemption above established, no estate or
inheritance taxes were collectible, Ludwig Kiene being a resident of Liechtestein
when he passed away."20Then came this definitive ruling: "The Collector
hereafter named the respondent cites decisions of the United States Supreme Court
and of this Court, holding that intangible personal property in the Philippines
belonging to a non-resident foreigner, who died outside of this country is subject
to the estate tax, in disregard of the principle 'mobilia sequuntur personam'. Such
property is admittedly taxable here. Without the proviso above quoted, the shares
of stock owned here by the Ludwig Kiene would be concededly subject to estate and
inheritance taxes. Nevertheless our Congress chose to make an exemption where
conditions are such that demand reciprocity as in this case. And the exemption
must be honored."21WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent Court of Tax Appeals
of October 30, 1957 is affirmed. Without pronouncement as to costs.G.R. No.
143377February 20, 2001SHIPSIDE INCORPORATED,petitioner,#vs.#THE HON. COURT
OF APPEALS [Special Former Twelfth Division], HON. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 26
(San Fernando City, La Union) & The REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,respondents.
MELO,J.:Before the Court is a petition for certiorari filed by Shipside
Incorporated under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure against the
resolutions of the Court of Appeals promulgated on November 4, 1999 and May 23,
2000, which respectively, dismissed a petition for certiorari and prohibition and
thereafter denied a motion for reconsideration.The antecedent facts are,
undisputed:On October 29, 1958, Original Certificate of Title No. 0-381 was issued
in favor of Rafael Galvez, over four parcels of land - Lot 1 with 6,571 square
meters; Lot 2, with 16,777 square meters; Lot 3 with 1,583 square meters; and Lot
4, with 508 square meters.On April 11, 1960, Lots No. 1 and 4 were conveyed by
Rafael Galvez in favor of Filipina Mamaril, Cleopatra Llana, Regina Bustos, and
Erlinda Balatbat in a deed of sale which was inscribed as Entry No. 9115 OCT No.0381 on August 10, 1960. Consequently, Transfer Certificate No. T-4304 was issued in
favor of the buyers covering Lots No. 1 and 4.Lot No. 1 is described as:A parcel of
land (Lot 1, Plan PSU-159621, L.R. Case No. N-361; L.R.C. Record No. N-14012,
situated in the Barrio of Poro, Municipality of San Fernando, Province of La Union,
bounded on the NE, by the Foreshore; on the SE, by Public Land and property of the
Benguet Consolidated Mining Company; on the SW, by properties of Rafael Galvez (US
Military Reservation Camp Wallace) and Policarpio Munar; and on the NW, by an old
Barrio Road. Beginning at a point marked "1" on plan, being S. 74 deg. 11'W.,
2670.36 from B.L.L.M. 1,San Fernando, thenceS. 66 deg. 19'E., 134.95 m. to point
2; S.14 deg. 57'W., 11.79 m. to point 3;S. 12 deg. 45'W., 27.00 m. to point 4; S.
12 deg. 45'W, 6.90 m. to point 5;N. 69 deg., 32'W., 106.00 m. to point 6; N. 52
deg., 21'W., 36.85 m. to point 7;N. 21 deg. 31'E., 42.01 m. to the point of
beginning; containing an area of SIX THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED AND SEVENTY - ONE
(6,571) SQUARE METERS, more or less. All points referred to are indicated on the
plan; and marked on the ground; bearings true, date of survey, February 4-21, 1957.
Lot No. 4 has the following technical description:A parcel of land (Lot 4, Plan
PSU-159621, L.R. Case No. N-361 L.R.C. Record No. N-14012), situated in the Barrio
of Poro, Municipality of San Fernando, La Union. Bounded on the SE by the property
of the Benguet Consolidated Mining Company; on the S. by property of Pelagia
Carino; and on the NW by the property of Rafael Galvez (US Military Reservation,
Camp Wallace). Beginning at a point marked "1" on plan, being S. deg. 24'W. 2591.69
m. from B.L.L.M. 1, San Fernando, thence S. 12 deg. 45'W., 73.03 m. to point 2; N.
79 deg. 59'W., 13.92 m. to point 3; N. 23 deg. 26'E., 75.00 m. to the point of
beginning; containing an area of FIVE HUNDED AND EIGHT (508) SQUARE METERS, more or
less. All points referred to are indicated in the plan and marked on the ground;
bearings true, date of survey, February 4-21, 1957.On August 16, 1960, Mamaril, et
al. sold Lots No. 1 and 4 to Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company. The deed of sale
covering the aforesaid property was inscribed as Entry No. 9173 on TCT No. T-4304.
Subsequently, Transfer Certificate No. T-4314 was issued in the name of Lepanto
Consolidated Mining Company as owner of Lots No. 1 and 4.On February 1, 1963,
unknown to Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company, the Court of First Instance of La
Union, Second Judicial District, issued an Order in Land Registration Case No. N361 (LRC Record No. N-14012) entitled "Rafael Galvez, Applicant, Eliza Bustos, et
al., Parties-In-Interest; Republic of the Philippines, Movant" declaring OCT No. 0381 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of La Union issued in the name of
Rafael Galvez, null and void, and ordered the cancellation thereof.The Order
pertinently provided: Accordingly, with the foregoing, and without prejudice on the
rights of incidental parties concerned herein to institute their respective
appropriate actions compatible with whatever cause they may have, it is hereby
declared and this court so holds that both proceedings in Land Registration Case
No. N-361 and Original Certificate No. 0-381 of the Registry of Deeds for the
province of La Union issued in virtue thereof and registered in the name of Rafael
Galvez, are null and void; the Register of Deeds for the Province of La Union is
hereby ordered to cancel the said original certificate and/or such other
certificates of title issued subsequent thereto having reference to the same
parcels of land; without pronouncement as to costs.On October 28, 1963, Lepanto
Consolidated Mining Company sold to herein petitioner Lots No. 1 and 4, with the
deed being entered in TCT No. 4314 as entry No. 12381. Transfer Certificate of
Title No. T-5710 was thus issued in favor of the petitioner which starting since
then exercised proprietary rights over Lots No. 1 and 4.In the meantime, Rafael
Galvez filed his motion for reconsideration against the order issued by the trial
court declaring OCT No. 0-381 null and void. The motion was denied on January 25,
1965. On appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the Republic of the
Philippines in a Resolution promulgated on August 14, 1973 in CA-G.R. No. 36061R.1wphi1.ntThereafter, the Court of Appeals issued an Entry of Judgment,
certifying that its decision dated August 14, 1973 became final and executory on
October 23, 1973.On April 22, 1974, the trial court in L.R.C. Case No. N-361 issued
a writ of execution of the judgment which was served on the Register of Deeds, San
Fernando, La Union on April 29, 1974.Twenty four long years, thereafter, on January
14, 1999, the Office of the Solicitor General received a letter dated January 11,
1999 from Mr. Victor G. Floresca, Vice-President, John Hay Poro Point Development
Corporation, stating that the aforementioned orders and decision of the trial court
in L.R.C. No. N-361 have not been executed by the Register of Deeds, San Fernando,
La Union despite receipt of the writ of execution.On April 21, 1999, the Office of
the Solicitor General filed a complaint for revival of judgment and cancellation of
titles before the Regional Trial Court of the First Judicial Region (Branch 26, San
Fernando, La Union) docketed therein as Civil Case No. 6346 entitled, "Republic of
the Philippines,
Plaintiff, versus Heirs of Rafael Galvez, represented by Teresita Tan, Reynaldo
Mamaril, Elisa Bustos, Erlinda Balatbat, Regina Bustos, Shipside Incorporated and
the Register of Deeds of La Union, Defendants."The evidence shows that the
impleaded defendants (except the Register of Deeds of the province of La Union) are
the successors-ininterest of Rafael Galvez (not Reynaldo Galvez as alleged by the
Solicitor General) over the property covered by OCT No. 0-381, namely: (a) Shipside
Inc. which is presently the registered owner in fee simple of Lots No. 1 and 4
covered by TCT No. T -5710, with a total area of 7,079 square meters; (b) Elisa
Bustos, Jesusito Galvez, and Teresita Tan who are the registered owners of Lot No.
2 of OCT No. 0-381; and (c) Elisa Bustos, Filipina Mamaril, Regina Bustos and
Erlinda Balatbat who are the registered owners of Lot No. 3 of OCT No. 0-381, now
covered by TCT No. T-4916, with an area of 1,583 square meters.In its complaint in
Civil Case No.6346, the Solicitor General argued that since the trial court in LRC
Case No. 361 had ruled and declared OCT No. 0-381 to be null and void, which ruling
was subsequently affirmed by the Court of Appeals, the defendants-successors-ininterest of Rafael Galvez have no valid title over the property covered by OCT No.
0-381, and the subsequent Torrens titles issued in their names should be
consequently cancelled.On July 22, 1999, petitioner Shipside, Inc. filed its Motion
to Dismiss, based on the following grounds: (1) the complaint stated no cause of
action because only final and executory judgments may be subject of an action for
revival of judgment; (2) .the plaintiff is not the real party-in-interest because
the real property covered by the Torrens titles sought to be cancelled, allegedly
part of Camp Wallace (Wallace Air Station), were under the ownership and
administration of the Bases Conversion Development Authority (BCDA) under Republic
Act No. 7227; (3) plaintiff's cause of action is barred by prescription; {4)
twenty-five years having lapsed since the issuance of the writ of execution, no
action for revival of judgment may be instituted because under Paragraph 3 of
Article 1144 of the Civil Code, such action may be brought only within ten (10)
years from the time the judgment had been rendered.An opposition to the motion to
dismiss was filed by the Solicitor General on August 23, 1999, alleging among
others, that: (1) the real party-in-interest is the Republic of the Philippines;
and (2) prescription does not run against the State.On August 31, 1999, the trial
court denied petitioner's motion to dismiss and on October 14, 1999, its motion for
reconsideration was likewise turned down.On October 21, 1999, petitioner instituted
a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals, docketed
therein as CA-G.R. SP No. 55535, on the ground that the orders of the trial court
denying its motion to dismiss and its subsequent motion for reconsideration were
issued in excess of jurisdiction.On November 4, 1999, the Court of Appeals
dismissed the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 55535 on the ground that the verification
and certification in the petition, tinder the signature of Lorenzo Balbin, Jr., was
made without authority, there being no proof therein that Balbin was authorized to
institute the petition for and in behalf and of petitioner.On May 23, 2000, the
Court of Appeals denied petitioner's, motion for reconsideration on the grounds
that: (1) a complaint filed on behalf of a corporation can be made only if
authorized by its Board of Directors, and in the absence thereof, the petition
cannot prosper and be granted due course; and (2) petitioner was unable to show
that it had substantially complied with the rule requiring proof of authority to
institute an action or proceeding.Hence, the instant petition.In support of its
petition, Shipside, Inc. asseverates that:1. The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely
abused its discretion in dismissing the petition when it made a conclusive legal
presumption that Mr. Balbin had no authority to sign the petition despite the
clarity of laws, jurisprudence and Secretary's certificate to the contrary;2. The
Honorable Court of Appeals abused its discretion when it dismissed the petition, in
effect affirming the grave abuse of discretion committed by the lower court when it
refused to dismiss the 1999 Complaint for Revival of a 1973 judgment, in violation
of clear laws and jurisprudence.Petitioner likewise adopted the arguments it raised
in the petition' and comment/reply it filed with the Court of Appeals, attached to
its petition as Exhibit "L"and "N", respectively.In his Comment, the Solicitor
General moved for the dismissal of the instant petition based on the following
considerations: (1) Lorenzo Balbin, who signed for and in behalf of petitioner in
the verification and certification of non-forum shopping portion of the petition,
failed to show proof of his authorization to institute the petition for certiorari
and prohibition with the Court of Appeals, thus the latter court acted correctly in
dismissing the same; (2) the real party-in-interest in the case at bar being the
Republic of the Philippines, its claims are imprescriptible.In order to preserve
the rights of herein parties, the Court issued a temporary restraining order on
June 26, 2000 enjoining the trial court from conducting further proceedings in
Civil Case No. 6346.The issues posited in this case are: (1) whether or not an
authorization from petitioner's Board of Directors is still required in order for
its resident manager to institute or commence a legal action for and in behalf of
the corporation; and (2) whether or not the Republic of the Philippines can
maintain the action for revival of judgment herein.We find for petitioner.Anent the
first issue:The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for certiorari on the
ground that Lorenzo Balbin, the resident manager for petitioner, who was the
signatory in the verification and certification on non-forum shopping, failed to
show proof that he was authorized by petitioner's board of directors to file such a
petition.A corporation, such as petitioner, has no power except those expressly
conferred on it by the Corporation Code and those that are implied or incidental to
its existence. In turn, a corporation exercises said powers through its board of
directors and/or its duly authorized officers and agents. Thus, it has been
observed that the power of a corporation to sue and be sued in any court is lodged
with the board of directors that exercises its corporate powers(Premium Marble
Resources, Inc. v. CA,264 SCRA 11 [1996]). In turn, physical acts of the
corporation, like the signing of documents, can be performed only by natural
persons duly authorized for the purpose by corporate by-laws or by a specific act
of the board of directors.It is undisputed that on October 21, 1999, the time
petitioner's Resident Manager Balbin filed the petition, there was no proof
attached thereto that Balbin was authorized to sign the verification and non-forum
shopping certification therein, as a consequence of which the petition was
dismissed by the Court of Appeals. However, subsequent to such dismissal,
petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, attaching to said motion a
certificate issued by its "board secretary stating that on October 11, 1999, or ten
days prior to the filing of the petition, Balbin had been authorized by
petitioner's board of directors to file said petition.The Court has consistently
held that the requirement regarding verification of a pleading is formal, not
jurisdictional(Uy v. LandBank,G.R. No. 136100, July 24, 2000). Such requirement
is simply a condition affecting the form of the pleading, non-compliance with which
does not necessarily render the pleading fatally defective. Verification is simply
intended to secure an assurance that the allegations in the pleading are true and
correct and not the product of the imagination or a matter of speculation, and that
the pleading is filed in good faith. The court may order the correction of the
pleading if verification is lacking or act on the pleading although it is not
verified, if the attending circumstances are such that strict compliance with the
rules may be dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may thereby be
served.On the other hand, the lack of certification, against forum shopping is
generally not curable by the submission thereof after the filing of the petition.
Section 5, Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of civil Procedure provides that the failure
of the petitioner to submit the required documents that should accompany the
petition, including the certification against forum shopping, shall be sufficient
ground for the dismissal thereof. The same rule applies to certifications against
forum shopping signed by a person on behalf of a corporation which are
unaccompanied by proof that said signatory is authorized to file a petition on
behalf of the corporation.In certain exceptional circumstances, however, the Court
has allowed the belated filing of the certification. InLoyola v. Court of Appeals,
et. al.(245 SCRA 477 [1995]), the Court considered the filing of the certification
one day after the filing of an election protest as substantial compliance with the
requirement. InRoadway Express, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, et. al.(264 SCRA 696
[1996]), the Court allowed the filing of the certification 14 days before the
dismissal of the petition. In"Uy v. LandBank, supra,the Court had dismissed Uy's
petition for lack of verification and certification against non-forum shopping.
However, it subsequently reinstated the petition after Uy submitted a motion to
admit certification and non-forum shopping certification. In all these cases, there
were special circumstances or compelling "reasons that
justified the relaxation of the rule requiring verification and certification on
non-forum shopping.In the instant case, the merits of petitioner' case should be
considered special circumstances or compelling reasons that justify tempering the
requirement in regard to the certificate of non-forum shopping. Moreover, inLoyola,
Roadway,andUy,the Court excusednon-compliancewith the requirement as to the
certificate of non-forum shopping. With more reason should we allow the instant
petition since petitioner hereindid submit a certification on non-forum
shopping,failing only to show proof that the signatory was authorized to do so.
That petitioner subsequently submitted a secretary's certificate attesting that
Balbin was authorized to file an action on behalf of petitioner likewise, mitigates
this oversight.It must also be kept in mind that while the requirement of the
certificate of non-forum shopping is mandatory, nonetheless the requirements must
not be interpreted too literally and thus defeat the objective of preventing the
undesirable practice of forum-shopping(Bernardo v. NLRC,.255 SCRA 108 [1996]).

Lastly, technical rules of procedure should be used to promote, not frustrate
justice. While the swift unclogging of court dockets is a laudable objective, the
granting of substantial justice is an even more urgent ideal.Now to the second
issue:The action instituted by the Solicitor General in the trial court is one for
revival of judgment which is governed by Article 1144(3) of the Civil Code and
Section 6, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure. Article 1144(3) provides
that anactionupon a judgment "must be brought within 10 years from the time the
right of action accrues."On the other hand, Section 6, Rule 39 provides that a
final and executory judgment or order may be executed onmotionwithin five (5)
years from the date of its entry, but that after the lapse of such time, and before
it is barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action.
Taking these two provisions into consideration, it is plain that an action for
revival of judgment must be brought within ten years from the time said judgment
becomes final.From the records of this, case, it is clear that the judgment sought
to be revived became final onOctober 23, 1973. On the other hand, the action for
revival of judgment was instituted only in 1999, or more than twenty-five (25)
years after the judgment had become final. Hence, the action is barred by
extinctive prescription considering that 'such an action can be instituted only
within ten (10) years from the time the cause of action accrues.The Solicitor
General, nonetheless, argues that the State's cause , of action in the cancellation
of the land title issued to petitioner's predecessor-in-interest is imprescriptible
because it is included in Camp Wallace, which belongs to the government.The
argument is misleading.While it is true that prescription does not run against the
State, the same may not be invoked by the government in this case since it is no
longer interested in the subject matter. While Camp Wallace may have belonged to
the government at the time Rafael Galvez's title was ordered cancelled in Land
Registration Case No. N-361, the same no longer holds true today.Republic Act No.
7227, otherwise known as the Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992, created
the Bases Conversion and Development Authority Section 4 pertinently provides:
Section 4.Purposes of the Conversion Authority. -The Conversion Authority shall
have the following purposes:(a)To own, hold and/or administerthe military
reservations of John Hay Air Station,Wallace Air Station,O'Donnell Transmitter
Station, San Miguel Naval Communications Station, Mt. Sta. Rita Station (Hermosa,
Bataan) and those portions of Metro Manila military camps which may be transferred
to it by the President;Section 2 of Proclamation No. 216, issued on July 27, 1993,
also provides:Section 2.Transfer of Wallace Air Station Areas to the Bases
Conversion and Development Authority. - All areas covered by the Wallace Air
Station as embraced and defined by the 1947 Military Bases Agreement between the
Philippines and the United States of America, as amended, excluding those covered
by Presidential Proclamations and some 25-hectare area for the radar and
communication station of the Philippine Air Force, are hereby transferred to the
Bases Conversion Development Authority ...With the transfer of Camp Wallace to the
BCDA, the government no longer has a right or interest to protect. Consequently,
the Republic is not a real party in interest and it may not institute the instant
action. Nor may it raise the defense of imprescriptibility, the same being
applicable only in cases where the government is a party in interest. Under Section
2 of Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, "every action must be prosecuted
or defended in the name of the real party in interest." To qualify a person to be a
real party in interest in whose name an action must be prosecuted, he must appear
to be the present real owner of the right sought to enforced (Pioneer Insurance
v.CA, 175 SCRA 668 [1989]). A real party in interest is the party who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the
avails of the suit. And by real interest is meant a present substantial interest,
as distinguished from a mere expectancy, or a future, contingent, subordinate or
consequential interest (Ibonilla v. Province of Cebu,210 SCRA 526 [1992]). Being
the owner of the areas covered by Camp Wallace, it is the Bases Conversion and
Development Authority, not the Government, which stands to be benefited if the land
covered by TCT No. T-5710 issued in the name of petitioner is cancelled.
Nonetheless, it has been posited that the transfer of military reservations and
their extensions to the BCDA is basically for the purpose of accelerating the sound
and balanced conversion of these military reservations into alternative productive
uses and to enhance the benefits to be derived from such property as a measure of
promoting the economic and social development, particularly of Central Luzon and,
in general, the country's goal for enhancement (Section 2, Republic Act No. 7227).
It is contended that the transfer of these military reservations to the Conversion
Authority does not amount to an abdication on the part of the Republic of its
interests, but simply a recognition of the need to create a body corporate which
will act as its agent for the realization of its program. It is consequently
asserted that the Republic remains to be the real party in interest and the
Conversion Authority merely its agent.We, however, must not lose sight of the fact
that the BCDA is an entity invested with a personality separate and distinct from
the government. Section 3 of Republic Act No. 7227 reads:Section 3.Creation of the
Bases Conversion and Development Authority.- There is hereby created a body
corporate to be known as the Conversion Authority which shall have the attribute of
perpetual succession and shall be vested with the powers of a corporation.It may
not be amiss to state at this point that the functions of government have been
classified into governmental or constituent and proprietary or ministrant. While
public benefit and public welfare, particularly, the promotion of the economic and
social development of Central Luzon, may be attributable to the operation of the
BCDA, yet it is certain that the functions performed by the BCDA are basically
proprietary in nature. The promotion of economic and social development of Central
Luzon, in particular, and the country's goal for enhancement, in general, do not
make the BCDA equivalent to the Government. Other corporations have been created by
government to act as its agents for the realization of its programs, the SSS, GSIS,
NAWASA arid the NIA, to count a few, and yet, the Court has ruled that these
entities, although performing functions aimed at promoting public interest and
public welfare, are not government-function corporations invested with governmental
attributes. It may thus be said that the BCDA is not a mere agency of the
Government but a corporate body performing proprietary functions.Moreover, Section
5 of Republic Act No. 7227 provides:Section 5.Powers of the Conversion
Authority.- To carry out its objectives under this Act, the Conversion Authority
is hereby vested with the following powers:(a) To succeed in its corporate name,to
sue and be suedin such corporate name and to adopt, alter and use a corporate seal
which shall be judicially noticed;Having the capacity to sue or be sued, it should
thus be the BCDA which may file an action to cancel petitioner's title, not the
Republic, the former being the real party in interest. One having no right or
interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as a party
plaintiff in an action (Ralla v. Ralla,199 SCRA 495 [1991]). A suit may be
dismissed if the plaintiff or the defendant is not a real party in interest. If the
suit is not brought in the name of the real party in interest, a motion to dismiss
may be filed, as was done by petitioner in this case, on the ground that the
complaint states no cause of action (Tanpingco v. IAC,207 SCRA 652 [1992]).
However,E.B. Marcha Transport Co., Inc. v. IAC(147 SCRA 276 [1987]) is cited as
authority that the Republic is the proper party to sue for the recovery of
possession of property which at the time of the institution of the suit was no
longer held by the national government but by the Philippine Ports Authority
.InE.B. Marcha,the Court ruled:It can be said that in suing for the recovery of
the rentals, the Republic of the Philippines, acted as principal of the Philippine
Ports Authority, directly exercising the commission
it had earlier conferred on the latter as its agent. We may presume that, by doing
so, the Republic of the Philippines did not intend .to retain the said rentals for
its own use, considering that by its voluntary act it had transferred the land in
question to the Philippine Ports Authority effective July 11, 1974. The Republic of
the Philippines had simply sought to assist, not supplant, the Philippine Ports
Authority, whose title to the disputed property it continues to recognize, We may
expect then that the said rentals, once collected by the Republic of the
Philippines, shall be turned over by it to the Philippine Ports Authority
conformably to the purposes of P.D. No. 857.E.B. Marchais, however, not on all
fours with the case at bar. In the former, the Court considered the Republic a
proper party to sue since the claims of the Republic and the Philippine Ports
Authority against the petitioner therein were the same. To dismiss the complaint
inE.B. Marchawould have brought needless delay in the settlement of the matter
since the PPA would have to refile the case on the same claim already litigated
upon. Such is not the case here since to allow the government to sue herein enables
it to raise the issue of imprescriptibility, a claim which is not available to the
BCDA. The rule that prescription does not run against the State does not apply to
corporations or artificial bodies created by the State for special purposes, it
being said that when the title of the Republic has been divested, its grantees,
although artificial bodies of its own creation, are in the same category as
ordinary persons(Kingston v.LeHigh Valley Coal Co.,241 Pa 469). By raising the
claim of imprescriptibility, a claim which cannot be raised by the BCDA, the
Government not only assists the BCDA, as it did inE.B. Marcha,it even supplants
the latter, a course of action proscribed by said case.Moreover, to recognize the
Government as a proper party to sue in this case would set a bad precedent as it
would allow the Republic to prosecute, on behalf of government-owned or controlled
corporations, causes of action which have already prescribed, on the pretext that
the Government is the real party in interest against whom prescription does not
run, said corporations having been created merely as agents for the realization of
government programs.Parenthetically, petitioner was not a party to the original
suit for cancellation of title commenced by the Republic twenty-seven years for
which it is now being made to answer, nay, being made to suffer financial losses.It
should also be noted that petitioner is unquestionably a buyer in good faith and
for value, having acquired the property in 1963, or 5 years after the issuance of
the original certificate of title, as a third transferee. If only not to do
violence and to give some measure of respect to the Torrens System, petitioner must
be afforded some measure of protection.One more point.Since the portion in dispute
now forms part of the property owned and administered by the Bases Conversion and
Development Authority, it is alienable and registerable real property.We find it
unnecessary to rule on the other matters raised by the herein parties.WHEREFORE,
the petition is hereby granted and the orders dated August 31, 1999 and October 4,
1999 of the Regional Trial, Court of the First National Judicial Region (Branch 26,
San Fernando, La Union) in Civil Case No. 6346 entitled "Republic of the
Philippines, Plaintiff, versus Heirs of Rafael Galvez, et. al., Defendants" as well
as the resolutions promulgated on November 4, 1999 and May 23, 2000 by the Court of
Appeals (Twelfth Division) inCA-G.R. SP No. 55535 entitled "Shipside, Inc.,
Petitioner versus Ron. Alfredo Cajigal, as Judge, RTC, San Fernando, La Union,
Branch 26, and the Republic of the Philippines, Respondents" are hereby reversed
and set aside. The complaint in Civil Case No. 6346, Regional Trial Court, Branch
26, San Fernando City, La Union entitled "Republic of the Philippines, Plaintiff,
versus Heirs of Rafael Galvez, et al." is ordered dismissed, without prejudice to
the filing of an appropriate action by the Bases Development and Conversion
Authority.SO ORDERED.Vitug, Panganiban, Gonzaga-Reyes, and Sandoval-Gutierrez,
JJ.,concur.#G.R. No. 143377 February 20, 2001(Shipside Incorporatedvs.Court of
Appeals and Republic of the Philippines)SEPARATE OPINIONVITUG,J.:I find no
doctrinal difficulty in adhering to the draftponenciawritten by our esteemed
Chairman, Mr. Justice JARM, insofar as it declares that an action for revival of
judgment is barred by extinctive prescription, if not brought within ten (10) years
from the time the right of action accrues, pursuant to Article 1144(3) of the New
Civil Code. It appears that the judgment in the instant case has become final on 23
October 1973 or well more than two decades prior to the action for its revival
instituted only in 1999.1wphi1.ntWith due respect, however, I still am unable to
subscribe to the idea that prescription' may not be invoked by the government in
this case upon the thesis that the transfer of Camp Wallace to the Bases Conversion
Development Authority renders the Republic with no right or interest to protect and
thus unqualified under the rules of procedure to be the real party-in-interest.
While it is true that Republic Act 7227, otherwise known as the Bases Conversion
and Development Act of 1992, authorizes the transfer of the military reservations
and their extensions to the Conversion Authority, the same, however, is basically
for the purpose of accelerating the sound and balanced conversion of these military
reservations into alternative productive uses and to enhance the benefits to be
derived from such property as a measure of promoting the economic and social
development, particularly, of Central Luzon and, In general, the country's goal for
enhancement.1The transfer of these military reservations to the Conversion
Authority does not amount to an abdication on the part of the Republic of its
interests but simply a recognition of the need to create a body corporate which
will act as its agent for the realization of its program specified in the Act. It
ought to follow that the Republic remains to be the real party-in-interest and the
Conversion Authority being merely its agent.In E.B. Marcha Transport Co., Inc. vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court,2the Court succinctly resolved the issue of whether
or not the Republic of the Philippines would be a proper party to sue for the
recovery of possession of property which at the time of the institution of the suit
was no longer being held by the national government but by the Philippine Ports
Authority. The Court ruled:"More importantly, as we see it, dismissing the
complaint on the ground that the Republic of the Philippines is not the proper
party would result in needless delay in the settlement of this matter and also in
derogation of the policy against multiplicity of suits. Such a decision would
require the Philippine Ports Authority to refile the very same complaint already
proved by the Republic of the Philippines and bring back the parties as it were to
square one."It can be said that in suing for the recovery of the rentals, the
Republic of the Philippines, acted as principal of the Philippine Ports Authority,
directly exercising the commission it had earlier conferred on the latter as its
agent. We may presume that, by doing so, the Republic of the Philippines did not
intend to retain the said rentals for its own use, considering that by its
voluntary act it had transferred the land in question to the Philippine Ports
Authority effective July 11, 1974. The Republic of the Philippines had simply
sought to assist, not supplant, the Philippine Ports Authority, whose title to the
disputed property it continues to recognize. We may exact then that the said
rentals, once collected by the Republic of the Philippines, shall be turned over by
it to the Philippine Ports Authority conformably to the purposes of P.D. No. 857."
There would seem to be no cogent reason for ignoring that rationale specially when
taken in light of the fact that the original suit for cancellation of title of
petitioner's predecessor-in-interest was commenced by the Republic itself, and it
was only in 1992 that the subject military camp was transferred to the Conversion
Authority.G.R. No. L-25843 July 25, 1974MELCHORA CABANAS,plaintiffappellee,#vs.#FRANCISCO PILAPIL,defendant-appellant.Seno, Mendoza & Associates
for plaintiff-appellee.Emilio Benitez, Jr. for defendant-appellant.FERNANDO,J.:p
The disputants in this appeal from a question of law from a lower court decision
are the mother and the uncle of a minor beneficiary of the proceeds of an insurance
policy issued on the life of her deceased father. The dispute centers as to who of
them should be entitled to act as trustee thereof. The lower court applying the
appropriate Civil Code provisions decided in favor of the mother, the plaintiff in
this case. Defendant uncle appealed. As noted, the lower court acted the way it did
following the specific mandate of the law. In addition, it must have taken into
account the principle that in cases of this nature the welfare of the child is the
paramount consideration. It is not an unreasonable assumption that between a mother
and an uncle, the former is likely to lavish more care on and pay greater attention
to her. This is all the more likely considering that the child is with the mother.
There are no circumstances then that did militate against what conforms to the
natural order of things, even if the language of the law were not as clear. It is
not to be lost sight of either that the judiciary pursuant to its role as an agency
of the State asparens patriae, with an even greater stress on family unity under
the present
Constitution, did weigh in the balance the opposing claims and did come to the
conclusion that the welfare of the child called for the mother to be entrusted with
such responsibility. We have to affirm.The appealed decision made clear: "There is
no controversy as to the facts. "1The insured, Florentino Pilapil had a child,

Millian Pilapil, with a married woman, the plaintiff, Melchora Cabanas. She was ten
years old at the time the complaint was filed on October 10, 1964. The defendant,
Francisco Pilapil, is the brother of the deceased. The deceased insured himself and
instituted as beneficiary, his child, with his brother to act as trustee during her
minority. Upon his death, the proceeds were paid to him. Hence this complaint by
the mother, with whom the child is living, seeking the delivery of such sum. She
filed the bond required by the Civil Code. Defendant would justify his claim to the
retention of the amount in question by invoking the terms of the insurance
policy.2After trial duly had, the lower court in a decision of May 10, 1965,
rendered judgment ordering the defendant to deliver the proceeds of the policy in
question to plaintiff. Its main reliance was on Articles 320 and 321 of the Civil
Code. The former provides: "The father, or in his absence the mother, is the legal
administrator of the property pertaining to the child under parental authority. If
the property is worth more than two thousand pesos, the father or mother shall give
a bond subject to the approval of the Court of First Instance."3The latter
states: "The property which the unemancipated child has acquired or may acquire
with his work or industry, or by any lucrative title, belongs to the child in
ownership, and in usufruct to the father or mother under whom he is under parental
authority and whose company he lives; ...4Conformity to such explicit codal norm
is apparent in this portion of the appealed decision: "The insurance proceeds
belong to the beneficiary. The beneficiary is a minor under the custody and
parental authority of the plaintiff, her mother. The said minor lives with
plaintiff or lives in the company of the plaintiff. The said minor acquired this
property by lucrative title. Said property, therefore, belongs to the minor child
in ownership, and in usufruct to the plaintiff, her mother. Since under our law the
usufructuary is entitled to possession, the plaintiff is entitled to possession of
the insurance proceeds. The trust, insofar as it is in conflict with the above
quoted provision of law, ispro tantonull and void. In order, however, to protect
the rights of the minor, Millian Pilapil, the plaintiff should file an additional
bond in the guardianship proceedings, Sp. Proc. No. 2418-R of this Court to raise
her bond therein to the total amount of P5,000.00."5It is very clear, therefore,
considering the above, that unless the applicability of the two cited Civil Code
provisions can be disputed, the decision must stand. There is no ambiguity in the
language employed. The words are rather clear. Their meaning is unequivocal. Time
and time again, this Court has left no doubt that where codal or statutory norms
are cast in categorical language, the task before it is not one of interpretation
but of application.6So it must be in this case. So it was in the appealed
decision.1. It would take more than just two paragraphs as found in the brief for
the defendant-appellant7to blunt the force of legal commands that speak so
plainly and so unqualifiedly. Even if it were a question of policy, the conclusion
will remain unaltered. What is paramount, as mentioned at the outset, is the
welfare of the child. It is in consonance with such primordial end that Articles
320 and 321 have been worded. There is recognition in the law of the deep ties that
bind parent and child. In the event that there is less than full measure of concern
for the offspring, the protection is supplied by the bond required. With the added
circumstance that the child stays with the mother, not the uncle, without any
evidence of lack of maternal care, the decision arrived at can stand the test of
the strictest scrutiny. It is further fortified by the assumption, both logical and
natural, that infidelity to the trust imposed by the deceased is much less in the
case of a mother than in the case of an uncle. Manresa, commenting on Article 159
of the Civil Code of Spain, the source of Article 320 of the Civil Code, was of
that view: Thus "El derecho y la obligacion de administrar el Patrimonio de los
hijos es una consecuencia natural y lgica de la patria potestad y de la presuncin
de que nadie cuidar de los bienes de acqullos con mas cario y solicitude que los
padres. En nuestro Derecho antiguo puede decirse que se hallaba reconocida de una
manera indirecta aquelia doctrina, y asi se desprende de la sentencia del Tribunal
Supremeo de 30 de diciembre de 1864, que se refiere a la ley 24, tit. XIII de la
Partida 5. De la propia suerte aceptan en general dicho principio los Codigos
extranjeros, con las limitaciones y requisitos de que trataremos mis adelante."82.

The appealed decision is supported by another cogent consideration. It is
buttressed by its adherence to the concept that the judiciary, as an agency of the
State acting asparenspatriae, is called upon whenever a pending suit of
litigation affects one who is a minor to accord priority to his best interest. It
may happen, as it did occur here, that family relations may press their respective
claims. It would be more in consonance not only with the natural order of things
but the tradition of the country for a parent to be preferred. it could have been
different if the conflict were between father and mother. Such is not the case at
all. It is a mother asserting priority. Certainly the judiciary as the
instrumentality of the State in its role ofparens patriae, cannot remain
insensible to the validity of her plea. In a recent case,9there is this quotation
from an opinion of the United States Supreme Court: "This prerogative ofparens
patriaeis inherent in the supreme power of every State, whether that power is
lodged in a royal person or in the legislature, and has no affinity to those
arbitrary powers which are sometimes exerted by irresponsible monarchs to the great
detriment of the people and the destruction of their liberties." What is more,
there is this constitutional provision vitalizing this concept. It reads: "The
State shall strengthen the family as a basic social institution."10If, as the
Constitution so wisely dictates, it is the family as a unit that has to be
strengthened, it does not admit of doubt that even if a stronger case were
presented for the uncle, still deference to a constitutional mandate would have led
the lower court to decide as it did.WHEREFORE, the decision of May 10, 1965 is
affirmed. Costs against defendant-appellant.G.R. No. L-409 January 30,
1947ANASTACIO LAUREL,petitioner,#vs.#ERIBERTO MISA,respondent.Claro M. Recto and
Querube C. Makalintal for petitioner.#First Assistant Solicitor General Reyes and
Solicitor Hernandez, Jr., for respondent.R E S O L U T I O NIn G.R. No. L409,Anastacio Laurel vs. Eriberto Misa, etc.,the Court, acting on the petition
forhabeas corpusfiled by Anastacio Laurel and based on a theory that a Filipino
citizen who adhered to the enemy giving the latter aid and comfort during the
Japanese occupation cannot be prosecuted for the crime of treason defined and
penalized by article 114 of the Revised Penal Code, for the reason (1) that the
sovereignty of the legitimate government in the Philippines and, consequently, the
correlative allegiance of Filipino citizens thereto was then suspended; and (2)
that there was a change of sovereignty over these Islands upon the proclamation of
the Philippine Republic:(1) Considering that a citizen or subject owes, not a
qualified and temporary, but an absolute and permanent allegiance, which consists
in the obligation of fidelity and obedience to his government or sovereign; and
that this absolute and permanent allegiance should not be confused with the
qualified and temporary allegiance which a foreigner owes to the government or
sovereign of the territory wherein he resides, so long as he remains there, in
return for the protection he receives, and which consists in the obedience to the
laws of the government or sovereign. (Carlislevs.Unite States, 21 Law. ed., 429;
Secretary of State Webster Report to the President of the United States in the case
of Thraser, 6 Web. Works, 526);Considering that the absolute and permanent
allegiance of the inhabitants of a territory occupied by the enemy of their
legitimate government or sovereign is not abrogated or severed by the enemy
occupation, because the sovereignty of the government or sovereignde jureis not
transferred thereby to the occupier, as we have held in the cases ofCo Kim Cham
vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon(75 Phil., 113) and ofPeralta vs. Director of
Prisons(75 Phil., 285), and if it is not transferred to the occupant it must
necessarily remain vested in the legitimate government; that the sovereignty vested
in the titular government (which is the supreme power which governs a body politic
or society which constitute the state) must be distinguished from the exercise of
the rights inherent thereto, and may be destroyed, or severed and transferred to
another, but it cannot be suspended because the existence of sovereignty cannot be
suspended without putting it out of existence or divesting the possessor thereof at
least during the so-called period of suspension; that what may be suspended is the
exercise of the rights of sovereignty with the control and government of the
territory occupied by the enemy passes temporarily to the occupant; that the
subsistence of the sovereignty of the legitimate government
in a territory occupied by the military forces of the enemy during the war,
"although the former is in fact prevented from exercising the supremacy over them"
is one of the "rules of international law of our times"; (II Oppenheim, 6th
Lauterpacht ed., 1944, p. 482), recognized, by necessary implication, in articles
23, 44, 45, and 52 of Hague Regulation; and that, as a corollary of the conclusion
that the sovereignty itself is not suspended and subsists during the enemy
occupation, the allegiance of the inhabitants to their legitimate government or
sovereign subsists, and therefore there is no such thing as suspended allegiance,
the basic theory on which the whole fabric of the petitioner's contention rests;
Considering that the conclusion that the sovereignty of the United State was
suspended in Castine, set forth in the decision in the case of United
Statesvs.Rice, 4 Wheaton, 246, 253, decided in 1819, and quoted in our decision
in the cases ofCo Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and DizonandPeralta vs. Director
of Prisons, supra,in connection with the question, not of sovereignty, but of the
existence of a governmentde factotherein and its power to promulgate rules and
laws in the occupied territory, must have been based, either on the theory adopted
subsequently in the Hague Convention of 1907, that the military occupation of an
enemy territory does not transfer the sovereignty to the occupant; that, in the
first case, the word "sovereignty" used therein should be construed to mean the
exercise of the rights of sovereignty, because as this remains vested in the
legitimate government and is not transferred to the occupier, it cannot be
suspended without putting it out of existence or divesting said government thereof;
and that in the second case, that is, if the said conclusion or doctrine refers to
the suspension of the sovereignty itself, it has become obsolete after the adoption
of the Hague Regulations in 1907, and therefore it can not be applied to the
present case;Considering that even adopting the words "temporarily allegiance,"
repudiated by Oppenheim and other publicists, as descriptive of the relations borne
by the inhabitants of the territory occupied by the enemy toward the military
government established over them, such allegiance may, at most, be considered
similar to the temporary allegiance which a foreigner owes to the government or
sovereign of the territory wherein he resides in return for the protection he
receives as above described, and does not do away with the absolute and permanent
allegiance which the citizen residing in a foreign country owes to his own
government or sovereign; that just as a citizen or subject of a government or
sovereign may be prosecuted for and convicted of treason committed in a foreign
country, in the same way an inhabitant of a territory occupied by the military
forces of the enemy may commit treason against his own legitimate government or
sovereign if he adheres to the enemies of the latter by giving them aid and
comfort; and that if the allegiance of a citizen or subject to his government or
sovereign is nothing more than obedience to its laws in return for the protection
he receives, it would necessarily follow that a citizen who resides in a foreign
country or state would, on one hand,ipso factoacquire the citizenship thereof
since he has enforce public order and regulate the social and commercial life, in
return for the protection he receives, and would, on the other hand, lose his
original citizenship, because he would not be bound to obey most of the laws of his
own government or sovereign, and would not receive, while in a foreign country, the
protection he is entitled to in his own;Considering that, as a corollary of the
suspension of the exercise of the rights of sovereignty by the legitimate
government in the territory occupied by the enemy military forces, because the
authority of the legitimate power to govern has passed into the hands of the
occupant (Article 43, Hague Regulations), the political laws which prescribe the
reciprocal rights, duties and obligation of government and citizens, are suspended
or in abeyance during military occupation (Co Kim chamvs.Valdez Tan Keh and
dizon,supra), for the only reason that as they exclusively bear relation to the
ousted legitimate government, they are inoperative or not applicable to the
government established by the occupant; that the crimes against national security,
such as treason and espionage; inciting to war, correspondence with hostile
country, flight to enemy's country, as well as those against public order, such as
rebellion, sedition, and disloyalty, illegal possession of firearms, which are of
political complexion because they bear relation to, and are penalized by our
Revised Penal Code as crimes against the legitimate government, are also suspended
or become inapplicable as against the occupant, because they can not be committed
against the latter (Peraltavs.Director of Prisons,supra); and that, while the
offenses against public order to be preserved by the legitimate government were
inapplicable as offenses against the invader for the reason above stated, unless
adopted by him, were also inoperative as against the ousted government for the
latter was not responsible for the preservation of the public order in the occupied
territory, yet article 114 of the said Revised Penal Code, was applicable to
treason committed against the national security of the legitimate government,
because the inhabitants of the occupied territory were still bound by their
allegiance to the latter during the enemy occupation;Considering that, although the
military occupant is enjoined to respect or continue in force, unless absolutely
prevented by the circumstances, those laws that enforce public order and regulate
the social and commercial life of the country, he has, nevertheless, all the powers
ofde factogovernment and may, at his pleasure, either change the existing laws or
make new ones when the exigencies of the military service demand such action, that
is, when it is necessary for the occupier to do so for the control of the country
and the protection of his army, subject to the restrictions or limitations imposed
by the Hague Regulations, the usages established by civilized nations, the laws of
humanity and the requirements of public conscience (Peraltavs.Director of
Prisons,supra; 1940 United States Rules of Land Warfare 76, 77); and that,
consequently, all acts of the military occupant dictated within these limitations
are obligatory upon the inhabitants of the territory, who are bound to obey them,
and the laws of the legitimate government which have not been adopted, as well and
those which, though continued in force, are in conflict with such laws and orders
of the occupier, shall be considered as suspended or not in force and binding upon
said inhabitants;Considering that, since the preservation of the allegiance or the
obligation of fidelity and obedience of a citizen or subject to his government or
sovereign does not demand from him a positive action, but only passive attitude or
forbearance from adhering to the enemy by giving the latter aid and comfort, the
occupant has no power, as a corollary of the preceding consideration, to repeal or
suspend the operation of the law of treason, essential for the preservation of the
allegiance owed by the inhabitants to their legitimate government, or compel them
to adhere and give aid and comfort to him; because it is evident that such action
is not demanded by the exigencies of the military service or not necessary for the
control of the inhabitants and the safety and protection of his army, and because
it is tantamount to practically transfer temporarily to the occupant their
allegiance to the titular government or sovereign; and that, therefore, if an
inhabitant of the occupied territory were compelled illegally by the military
occupant, through force, threat or intimidation, to give him aid and comfort, the
former may lawfully resist and die if necessary as a hero, or submit thereto
without becoming a traitor;Considering that adoption of the petitioner's theory of
suspended allegiance would lead to disastrous consequences for small and weak
nations or states, and would be repugnant to the laws of humanity and requirements
of public conscience, for it would allow invaders to legally recruit or enlist the
Quisling inhabitants of the occupied territory to fight against their own
government without the latter incurring the risk of being prosecuted for treason,
and even compel those who are not aid them in their military operation against the
resisting enemy forces in order to completely subdue and conquer the whole nation,
and thus deprive them all of their own independence or sovereignty such theory
would sanction the action of invaders in forcing the people of a free and sovereign
country to be a party in the nefarious task of depriving themselves of their own
freedom and independence and repressing the exercise by them of their own
sovereignty; in other words, to commit a political suicide;(2) Considering that the
crime of treason against the government of the Philippines defined and penalized in
article 114 of the Penal Code, though originally intended to be a crime against
said government as then organized by authority of the sovereign people of the

United States, exercised through their authorized representative, the Congress and
the President of the United States, was made, upon the establishment of the
Commonwealth Government in 1935, a crime against the Government of the Philippines
established by authority of the people of the Philippines, in whom the sovereignty
resides according to section 1, Article II, of the Constitution of the Philippines,
by virtue of the provision of section 2, Article XVI thereof, which provides that
"All laws of the Philippine Islands . . . shall remain operative, unless
inconsistent with this Constitution . . . and all references in such laws to the
Government or officials of the Philippine Islands, shall be construed, in so far as
applicable, to refer to the Government and corresponding officials under this
constitution;Considering that the Commonwealth of the Philippines was a sovereign
government, though not absolute but subject to certain limitations imposed in the
Independence Act and incorporated as Ordinance appended to our Constitution, was
recognized not only by the Legislative Department or Congress of the United States
in approving the Independence Law above quoted and the Constitution of the
Philippines, which contains the declaration that "Sovereignty resides in the people
and all government authority emanates from them" (section 1, Article II), but also
by the Executive Department of the United States; that the late President Roosevelt
in one of his messages to Congress said, among others, "As I stated on August 12,
1943, the United States in practice regards the Philippines as having now the
status as a government of other independent nations in fact all the attributes of
complete and respected nationhood" (Congressional Record, Vol. 29, part 6, page
8173); and that it is a principle upheld by the Supreme Court of the United States
in many cases, among them in the case of Jonesvs.United States (137 U.S., 202; 34
Law. ed., 691, 696) that the question of sovereignty is "a purely political
question, the determination of which by the legislative and executive departments
of any government conclusively binds the judges, as well as all other officers,
citizens and subjects of the country.Considering that section I (1) of the
Ordinance appended to the Constitution which provides that pending the final and
complete withdrawal of the sovereignty of the United States "All citizens of the
Philippines shall owe allegiance to the United States", was one of the few
limitations of the sovereignty of the Filipino people retained by the United
States, but these limitations do not away or are not inconsistent with said
sovereignty, in the same way that the people of each State of the Union preserves
its own sovereignty although limited by that of the United States conferred upon
the latter by the States; that just as to reason may be committed against the
Federal as well as against the State Government, in the same way treason may have
been committed during the Japanese occupation against the sovereignty of the United
States as well as against the sovereignty of the Philippine Commonwealth; and that
the change of our form of government from Commonwealth to Republic does not affect
the prosecution of those charged with the crime of treason committed during the
Commonwealth, because it is an offense against the same government and the same
sovereign people, for Article XVIII of our Constitution provides that "The
government established by this constitution shall be known as the Commonwealth of
the Philippines. Upon the final and complete withdrawal of the sovereignty of the
United States and the proclamation of Philippine independence, the Commonwealth of
the Philippines shall thenceforth be known as the Republic of the Philippines";This
Court resolves, without prejudice to write later on a more extended opinion, to
deny the petitioner's petition, as it is hereby denied, for the reasons above set
forth and for others to be stated in the said opinion, without prejudice to
concurring opinion therein, if any. Messrs. Justices Paras and Hontiveros dissent
in a separate opinion. Mr. justice Perfecto concurs in a separate opinion.#Separate
OpinionsPERFECTO,J.,concurring:Treason is a war crime. It is not an all-time
offense. It cannot be committed in peace time. While there is peace, there are no
traitors. Treason may be incubated when peace reigns. Treasonable acts may actually
be perpetrated during peace, but there are no traitors until war has started.As
treason is basically a war crime, it is punished by the state as a measure of selfdefense and self-preservation. The law of treason is an emergency measure. It
remains dormant until the emergency arises. But as soon as war starts, it is
relentlessly put into effect. Any lukewarm attitude in its enforcement will only be
consistent with nationalharakiri. All war efforts would be of no avail if they
should be allowed to be sabotaged by fifth columnists, by citizens who have sold
their country out to the enemy, or any other kind of traitors, and this would
certainly be the case if he law cannot be enforced under the theory of suspension.
Petitioner's thesis that allegiance to our government was suspended during enemy
occupation is advanced in support of the proposition that, since allegiance is
identical with obedience to law, during the enemy occupation, the laws of the
Commonwealth were suspended. Article 114 of the Revised Penal Code, the law
punishing treason, under the theory, was one of the laws obedience to which was
also suspended.Allegiance has been defined as the obligation for fidelity and
obedience which the individual owes to his government or his sovereign in return
for the protection which he receives."Allegiance", as the return is generally used,
means fealty or fidelity to the government of which the person is either a citizen
or subject. Murrayvs.The Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch), 64, 120; 2 Law. ed.,
208."Allegiance" was said by Mr. Justice Story to be "nothing more than the tie or
duty of obedience of a subject to the sovereign, under whose protection he is."
United Statesvs.Wong Kim Ark, 18 S. Ct., 461; 169 U.S., 649; 42 Law. ed., 890.
Allegiance is that duty which is due from every citizen to the state, a political
duty binding on him who enjoys the protection of the Commonwealth, to render
service and fealty to the federal government. It is that duty which is reciprocal
to the right of protection, arising from the political relations between the
government and the citizen. Wallacevs.Harmstad, 44 Pa. (8 Wright), 492, 501.By
"allegiance" is meant the obligation to fidelity and obedience which the individual
owes to the government under which he lives, or to his sovereign, in return for the
protection which he receives. It may be an absolute and permanent obligation, or it
may be a qualified and temporary one. A citizen or subject owes an absolute and
permanent allegiance to his government or sovereign, or at least until, by some
open and distinct act, he renounces it and becomes a citizen or subject of another
government or sovereign, and an alien while domiciled in a country owes it a
temporary allegiance, which is continuous during his residence. Carlislevs.United
States, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.), 147, 154; 21 Law ed., 426."Allegiance," as defined by
Blackstone, "is the tie or ligament which binds the subject to the King, in return
for that protection which the King affords the subject. Allegiance, both expressed
and implied, is of two sorts, the one natural, the other local, the former being
perpetual, the latter temporary. Natural allegiance is such as is due from all men
born within the King's dominions immediately upon their birth, for immediately upon
their birth they are under the King's protection. Natural allegiance is perpetual,
and for this reason, evidently founded on the nature of government. Allegiance is a
debt due from the subject upon an implied contract with the prince that so long as
the one affords protection the other will demean himself faithfully. Natural-born
subjects have a great variety of rights which they acquire by being born within the
King's liegance, which can never be forfeited but by their own misbehaviour; but
the rights of aliens are much more circumscribed, being acquired only by residence,
and lost whenever they remove. If an alien could acquire a permanent property in
lands, he must owe an allegiance equally permanent to the King, which would
probably be inconsistent with that which he owes his natural liege lord; besides,
that thereby the nation might, in time, be subject to foreign influence and feel
many other inconveniences." Indians within the state are not aliens, but citizens
owing allegiance to the government of a state, for they receive protection from the
government and are subject to its laws. They are born in allegiance to the
government of the state. Jacksonvs.Goodell, 20 Johns., 188, 911. (3 Words and
Phrases, Permanent ed., 226-227.)Allegiance. Fealty or fidelity to the government
of which the person is either a citizen or subject; the duty which is due from
every citizen to the state; a political duty, binding on him who enjoys the
protection of the commonwealth, to render service and fealty to the federal
government; the obligation of fidelity and obedience which the individual owes to
the government or to the sovereign under which he lives in return for the
protection he receives; that duty is reciprocal to the right of protection he

receives; that duty which is reciprocal to the right of protection, arising from
the political relations between the government and the citizen.Classification.
Allegiance is of four kinds, namely: (1) Natural allegiance that which arises by
nature and birth; (2) acquired allegiance that arising through some circumstance
or act other than birth, namely, by denization or naturalization; (3) local
allegiance-- that arising from residence simply within the country, for however
short a time; and (4) legal allegiance that arising from oath, taken usually at
the town or leet, for, by the common law, the oath of allegiance might be tendered
to every one upon attaining the age of twelve years. (3 C.J.S., p.885.)Allegiance.
the obligation of fidelity and obedience which the individual owes to the
government under which he lives,
or to his sovereign in return for the protection he receives. 15 R.C.L., 140.
(Ballentine Law Dictionary, p. 68.)."Allegiance," as its etymology indicates, is
the name for the tie which binds the citizen to his state the obligation of
obedience and support which he owes to it. The state is the political person to
whom this liege fealty is due. Its substance is the aggregate of persons owing this
allegiance. The machinery through which it operates is its government. The persons
who operate this machinery constitute its magistracy. The rules of conduct which
the state utters or enforces are its law, and manifest its will. This will, viewed
as legally supreme, is its sovereignty. (W.W. Willoughby, Citizenship and
Allegiance in Constitutional and International Law, 1 American Journal of
International Law, p. 915.).The obligations flowing from the relation of a state
and its nationals are reciprocal in character. This principle had been aptly stated
by the Supreme Court of the United States in its opinion in the case of
Luriavs.United States:Citizenship is membership in a political society and implies
a duty of allegiance on the part of the member and a duty protection on the part of
the society. These are reciprocal obligations, one being a compensation for the
other. (3 Hackworth, Digest of International Law, 1942 ed., p.6.)Allegiance. The
tie which binds the citizen to the government, in return for the protection which
the government affords him. The duty which the subject owes to the sovereign,
correlative with the protection received.It is a comparatively modern corruption of
ligeance (ligeantia), which is derived from liege (ligius), meaning absolute or
unqualified. It signified originally liege fealty, i. e., absolute and qualified
fealty. 18 L. Q. Rev., 47.x x x x x x x x xAllegiance may be an
absolute and permanent obligation, or it may be a qualified and temporary one; the
citizen or subject owes the former to his government or sovereign, until by some
act he distinctly renounces it, whilst the alien domiciled in the country owes a
temporary and local allegiance continuing during such residence.
(Carlislevs.United States, 16 Wall. [U.S.], 154; 21 Law. ed., 426. (1 Bouvier's
Law Dictionary, p. 179.).The above quotations express ideas that do not fit exactly
into the Philippine pattern in view of the revolutionary insertion in our
Constitution of the fundamental principle that "sovereignty resides in the people
and all government authority emanates from them." (Section 1, Article II.) The
authorities above quoted, judges and juridical publicists define allegiance with
the idea that sovereignty resides somewhere else, on symbols or subjects other than
the people themselves. Although it is possible that they had already discovered
that the people and only the people are the true sovereign, their minds were not
yet free from the shackles of the tradition that the powers of sovereignty have
been exercised by princes and monarchs, by sultans and emperors, by absolute and
tyrannical rules whose ideology was best expressed in the famous words of one of
the kings of France: "L'etat c'est moi," or such other persons or group of persons
posing as the government, as an entity different and in opposition to the people
themselves. Although democracy has been known ever since old Greece, and modern
democracies in the people, nowhere is such principle more imperative than in the
pronouncement embodied in the fundamental law of our people.To those who think that
sovereignty is an attribute of government, and not of the people, there may be some
plausibility in the proposition that sovereignty was suspended during the enemy
occupation, with the consequence that allegiance must also have been suspended,
because our government stopped to function in the country. But the idea cannot have
any place under our Constitution. If sovereignty is an essential attribute of our
people, according to the basic philosophy of Philippine democracy, it could not
have been suspended during the enemy occupation. Sovereignty is the very life of
our people, and there is no such thing as "suspended life." There is no possible
middle situation between life and death. Sovereignty is the very essence of the
personality and existence of our people. Can anyone imagine the possibility of
"suspended personality" or "suspended existence" of a people? In no time during
enemy occupation have the Filipino people ceased to be what they are.The idea of
suspended sovereignty or suspended allegiance is incompatible with our
Constitution.There is similarity in characteristics between allegiance to the
sovereign and a wife's loyalty to her husband. Because some external and
insurmountable force precludes the husband from exercising his marital powers,
functions, and duties and the wife is thereby deprived of the benefits of his
protection, may the wife invoke the theory of suspended loyalty and may she freely
share her bed with the assailant of their home? After giving aid and comfort to the
assailant and allowing him to enjoy her charms during the former's stay in the
invaded home, may the wife allege as defense for her adultery the principle of
suspended conjugal fidelity? Petitioner's thesis on change of sovereignty at the
advent of independence on July 4, 1946, is unacceptable. We have already decided in
Brodettvs.De la Rosa and Vda. de Escaler (p. 752,ante) that the Constitution of
the Republic is the same as that of the Commonwealth. The advent of independence
had the effect of changing the name of our Government and the withdrawal by the
United States of her power to exercise functions of sovereignty in the Philippines.
Such facts did not change the sovereignty of the Filipino people. That sovereignty,
following our constitutional philosophy, has existed ever since our people began to
exist. It has been recognized by the United States of America, at least since 1935,
when President Roosevelt approved our Constitution. By such act, President
Roosevelt, as spokesman of the American people, accepted and recognized the
principle that sovereignty resides in the people that is, that Philippine
sovereignty resides in the Filipino people.The same sovereignty had been
internationally recognized long before the proclamation of independence on July 4,
1946. Since the early part of the Pacific war, President Quezon had been sitting as
representative of a sovereign people in the Allied War Council, and in June, 1945,
the same Filipino people took part outstanding and brilliant, it may be added
in the drafting and adoption of the charter of the United Nations, the unmistakable
forerunner of the future democratic federal constitution of the world government
envisioned by all those who adhere to the principle of unity of all mankind, the
early realization of which is anxiously desired by all who want to be spared the
sufferings, misery and disaster of another war.Under our Constitution, the power to
suspend laws is of legislative nature and is lodged in Congress. Sometimes it is
delegated to the Chief Executive, such as the power granted by the Election Code to
the President to suspend the election in certain districts and areas for strong
reasons, such as when there is rebellion, or a public calamity, but it has never
been exercised by tribunals. The Supreme Court has the power to declare null and
void all laws violative of the Constitution, but it has no power, authority, or
jurisdiction to suspend or declare suspended any valid law, such as the one on
treason which petitioner wants to be included among the laws of the Commonwealth
which, by his theory of suspended allegiance and suspended sovereignty, he claims
have been suspended during the Japanese occupation.Suppose President Quezon and his
government, instead of going from Corregidor to Australia, and later to Washington,
had fled to the mountains of Luzon, and a group of Filipino renegades should have
killed them to serve the interests of the Japanese imperial forces. By petitioner's
theory, those renegades cannot be prosecuted for treason or for rebellion or
sedition, as the laws punishing them were suspended. Such absurd result betrays the
untenability of the theory."The defense of the State is a prime duty of Government,
and in the fulfillment of that duty all citizens may be required by law to render
personal, military or civil service." Thus, section 2 of Article II of the
Constitution provides: That duty of defense becomes more imperative in time of war
and when the country is invaded by an aggressor nation. How can it be fulfilled if
the allegiance of the citizens to the sovereign people is suspended during enemy
occupation? The framers of the Constitution surely did not entertain even for the
moment the absurdity that when the allegiance of the citizens to the sovereign
people is more needed in the defense of the survival of the state, the same should
be suspended, and that upon such suspension those who may be required to render
personal, military or civil service may claim exemption from the indispensable duty
of serving their country in distress.Petitioner advances the theory that protection
in the consideration of allegiance. He argues that the Commonwealth Government
having been incapacitated during enemy occupation to protect the citizens, the
latter were relieved of their allegiance to said government. The proposition is
untenable. Allegiance to the sovereign is an indispensable bond for the existence
of society. If that bond is dissolved, society has to disintegrate. Whether or not
the existence of the latter is the result of the social compact mentioned by
Roseau, there can be no question that organized society would be dissolved if it is
not united by the cohesive power of the citizen's allegiance. Of course, the
citizens are entitled to the protection
of their government, but whether or not that government fulfills that duty, is
immaterial to the need of maintaning the loyalty and fidelity of allegiance, in the
same way that the physical forces of attraction should be kept unhampered if the
life of an individual should continue, irrespective of the ability or inability of
his mind to choose the most effective measures of personal protection.After
declaring that all legislative, executive, and judicial processes had during and
under the Japanese regime, whether executed by the Japanese themselves or by
Filipino officers of the puppet government they had set up, are null and void, as
we have done in our opinions inCo Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon(75 Phil.,
113), inPeralta vs. Director of Prison(75, Phil., 285), and in several other
cases where the same question has been mentioned, we cannot consistently accept
petitioner's theory.If all laws or legislative acts of the enemy during the
occupation were null and void, and as we cannot imagine the existence of organized
society, such as the one constituted by the Filipino people, without laws of the
Commonwealth were the ones in effect during the occupation and the only ones that
could claim obedience from our citizens.Petitioner would want us to accept the
thesis that during the occupation we owed allegiance to the enemy. To give way to
that paradoxical and disconcerting allegiance, it is suggested that we accept that
our allegiance to our legitimate government was suspended. Petitioner's proposition
has to fall by its own weight, because of its glaring absurdities. Allegiance, like
its synonyms, loyalty and fidelity, is based on feelings of attraction, love,
sympathy, admiration, respect, veneration, gratitude, amity, understanding,
friendliness. These are the feelings or some of the feelings that bind us to our
own people, and are the natural roots of the duty of allegiance we owe them. The
enemy only provokes repelling and repulsive feelings hate, anger, vexation,
chagrin, mortification, resentment, contempt, spitefulness. The natural
incompatibility of political, social and ethical ideologies between our people and
the Japanese, making impossible the existence of any feeling of attraction between
them, aside from the initial fact that the Japanese invaded our country as our
enemy, was aggravated by the morbid complexities of haughtiness, braggadocio and
beastly brutality of the Nippon soldiers and officers in their dealings with even
the most inoffensive of our citizens.Giving bread to our enemy, and, after slapping
one side of our face, offer him the other to be further slapped, may appear to be
divinely charitable, but to make them a reality, it is necessary to change human
nature. Political actions, legal rules and judicial decisions deal with human
relations, taking man as he is, not as he should be. To love the enemy is not
natural. As long as human pyschology remains as it is, the enemy shall always be
hated. Is it possible to conceive an allegiance based on hatred? The Japanese,
having waged against us an illegal war condemned by prevailing principles of
international law, could not have established in our country any government that
can be legally recognized asde facto. They came as bandits and ruffians, and it is
inconceivable that banditry and ruffianism can claim any duty of allegiance even
a temporary one from a decent people.One of the implications of petitioner's

theory, as intimated somewhere, is that the citizens, in case of invasion, are free
to do anything not forbidden by the Hague Conventions. Anybody will notice
immediately that the result will be the doom of small nations and peoples, by
whetting the covetousness of strong powers prone on imperialistic practices. In the
imminence of invasion, weak-hearted soldiers of the smaller nations will readily
throw away their arms to rally behind the paladium of the invaders.Two of the three
great departments of our Government have already rejected petitioner's theory since
September 25, 1945, the day when Commonwealth Act No. 682 took effect. By said act,
creating the People's Court to try and decide all cases of crime against national
security "committed between December 8, 1941 and September 2, 1945," (section 2),
the legislative and executive departments have jointly declared that during the
period above mentioned, including the time of Japanese occupation, all laws
punishing crimes against national security, including article 114 of the Revised
Penal Code, punishing treason, had remained in full effect and should be enforced.
That no one raised a voice in protest against the enactment of said act and that no
one, at the time the act was being considered by the Senate and the House of
Representatives, ever dared to expose the uselessness of creating a People's Court
to try crime which, as claimed by petitioner, could not have been committed as the
laws punishing them have been suspended, is a historical fact of which the Supreme
Court may take judicial notice. This fact shows universal and unanimous agreement
of our people that the laws of the Commonwealth were not suspended and that the
theory of suspended allegiance is just an afterthought provoked by a desperate
effort to help quash the pending treason cases at any cost.Among the arguments
adduced in favor of petitioner's theory is that it is based on generally accepted
principles of international law, although this argument becomes futile by
petitioner's admission that the theory is advantageous to strong powers but harmful
to small and weak nations, thus hinting that the latter cannot accept it by heart.
Suppose we accept at face value the premise that the theories, urged by petitioner,
of suspended allegiance and suspended sovereignty are based on generally accepted
principles of international law. As the latter forms part of our laws by virtue of
the provisions of section 3 of Article II of the Constitution, it seems that there
is no alternative but to accept the theory. But the theory has the effect of
suspending the laws, especially those political in nature. There is no law more
political in nature than the Constitution of the Philippines. The result is an
inverted reproduction of the Greek myth of Saturn devouring his own children. Here,
under petitioner's theory, the offspring devours its parent.Can we conceive of an
instance in which the Constitution was suspended even for a moment? There is
conclusive evidence that the legislature, as policy-determining agency of
government, even since the Pacific war started on December 7, 1941, intimated that
it would not accept the idea that our laws should be suspended during enemy
occupation. It must be remembered that in the middle of December, 1941, when Manila
and other parts of the archipelago were under constant bombing by Japanese aircraft
and enemy forces had already set foot somewhere in the Philippines, the Second
National Assembly passed Commonwealth Act No. 671, which came into effect on
December 16, 1941. When we approved said act, we started from the premise that all
our laws shall continue in effect during the emergency, and in said act we even
went to the extent of authorizing the President "to continue in force laws and
appropriations which would lapse or otherwise become inoperative," (section 2,
[d]), and also to "promulgate such rules and regulations as he may deem necessary
to carry out the national policy," (section 2), that "the existence of war between
the United States and other countries of Europe and Asia, which involves the
Philippines, makes it necessary to invest the President with extraordinary powers
in order to meet the resulting emergency." (Section 1.) To give emphasis to the
intimation, we provided that the rules and regulations provided "shall be in force
and effect until the Congress of the Philippines shall otherwise provide,"
foreseeing the possibility that Congress may not meet as scheduled as a result of
the emergency, including invasion and occupation by the enemy. Everybody was then
convinced that we did not have available the necessary means of repelling
effectivity the enemy invasion.Maybe it is not out of place to consider that the
acceptance of petitioner's theory of suspended allegiance will cause a great
injustice to those who, although innocent, are now under indictment for treason and
other crimes involving disloyalty to their country, because their cases will be
dismissed without the opportunity for them to revindicate themselves. Having been
acquitted upon a mere legal technicality which appears to us to be wrong, history
will indiscriminality classify them with the other accused who were really traitors
to their country. Our conscience revolts against the idea of allowing the innocent
ones to go down in the memory of future generations with the infamous stigma of
having betrayed their own people. They should not be deprived of the opportunity to
show through the due process of law that they are free from all blame and that, if
they were really patriots, they acted as such during the critical period of test.#
HILADO,J.,concurring:I concur in the result reached in the majority opinion to
the effect that during the so-called Japanese occupation of the Philippines (which
was nothing more than the occupation of Manila and certain other specific regions
of the Islands which constituted the minor area of the Archipelago) the allegiance
of the citizens of this country to their legitimate government and to the United
States was not suspended, as well as the ruling that during the same period there
was no change of sovereignty here; but my reasons are different and I proceed to
set them forth:I. SUSPENDED ALLEGIANCE.(a) Before the horror and atrocities of
World War I, which were multiplied more than a hundred-fold in World War II, the
nations had evolved certain rules
and principles which came to be known as International Law, governing their
conduct with each other and toward their respective citizens and inhabitants, in
the armed forces or civilian life, in time of peace or in time of war. During the
ages which preceded that first world conflict the civilized governments had no
realization of the potential excesses of which "men's inhumanity to man" could be
capable. Up to that time war was, at least under certain conditions, considered as
sufficiently justified, and the nations had not on that account, proscribed nor
renounced it as an instrument of national policy, or as a means of settling
international disputes. It is not for us now to dwell upon the reasons accounting
for this historical fact. Suffice it to recognize its existence in history.But when
in World War I civilized humanity saw that war could be, as it actually was,
employed for entirely different reasons and from entirely different motives,
compared to previous wars, and the instruments and methods of warfare had been so
materially changed as not only to involve the contending armed forces on well
defined battlefields or areas, on land, in the sea, and in the air, but to spread
death and destruction to the innocent civilian populations and to their properties,
not only in the countries engaged in the conflict but also in neutral ones, no less
than 61 civilized nations and governments, among them Japan, had to formulate and
solemnly subscribe to the now famous Briand-Kellogg Pact in the year 1928. As said
by Justice Jackson of the United States Supreme Court, as chief counsel for the
United States in the prosecution of "Axis war criminals," in his report to
President Truman of June 7, 1945:International law is not capable of development by
legislation, for there is no continuously sitting international legislature.
Innovations and revisions in international law are brought about by the action of
governments designed to meet a change circumstances. It grows, as did the common
law, through decisions reached from time to time in adopting settled principles to
new situations.x x x x x x x x xAfter the shock to civilization
of the war of 1914-1918, however, a marked reversion to the earlier and sounder
doctrines of international law took place. By the time the Nazis came to power it
was thoroughly established that launching an aggressive war or the institution of
war by treachery was illegal and that the defense of legitimate warfare was no
longer available to those who engaged in such an enterprise. It is high time that
we act on the juridical principle that aggressive war-making is illegal and
criminal.The re-establishment of the principle of justifiable war is traceable in
many steps. One of the most significant is the Briand-Kellogg Pact of 1928 by which
Germany, Italy, andJapan, in common with the United States and practically all the
nations of the world, renounced war as an instrument of national policy, bound
themselves to seek the settlement of disputes only by pacific means, and condemned
recourse to war for the solution of international controversies.Unless this
Pactalteredthe legal status of wars of aggression, it has no meaning at all and
comes close to being an act of deception. In 1932 Mr. Henry L. Stimson, as United
States Secretary of State, gave voice to the American concept of its effect. He
said, "war between nations was renounced by the signatories of the Briand-Kellogg
Treaty. This means that it has becomeillegalthroughout practically the entire
world.It is no longer to be the source and subject of rights. It is no longer to
be the principle around which the duties, the conduct, and the rights of nations
revolve. It is anillegal thing. . . . By that very act we have made obsolete many
legal precedents and have given the legal profession the task of re-examining many
of its Codes and treaties.This Pact constitutes only onereversalof the viewpoint
that all war is legal and has brought international law into harmony with the
common sense of mankind thatunjustifiable war is a crime.Without attempting an
exhaustive catalogue, we may mention the Geneva Protocol of 1924 for the Pacific
Settlement of International Disputes, signed by the representatives of forty-eight
governments, which declared that "a war of aggression constitutes .. an
International crime. . . .The Eight Assembly of the League of Nations in 1927, on
unanimous resolution of the representatives of forty-eight member-nations,
including Germany, declared that a war of aggression constitutes aninternational
crime. At the Sixth Pan-American Conference of 1928, the twenty-one American
Republics unanimously adopted a resolution stating that "war of aggression
constitutes aninternational crimeagainst the human species."x x x x x x
x x xWe therefore propose to change that a war of aggression is acrime,
and thatmodern internationallaw has abolished the defense that those who incite
or wage it are engaged in legitimate business. Thus may the forces of the law be
mobilized on the side of peace. ("U.S.A. An American Review," published by the
United States Office of War Information, Vol. 2, No. 10; emphasis supplied.).When
Justice Jackson speaks of "a marked reversion to the earlier and sounder doctrines
of international law" and "the re-establishment of the principle of justifiable
war," he has in mind no other than "the doctrine taught by Grotius, the father of
international law, that there is a distinction between the just and the unjust war
the war of defense and the war of aggression" to which he alludes in an earlier
paragraph of the same report.In the paragraph of said report immediately preceding
the one last above mentioned Justice Jackson says that "international law as taught
in the 19th and the early part of the 20th century generally declared that warmaking was not illegal and no crime at law." But, as he says in one of the
paragraphs hereinabove quoted from that report, the Briand-Kellogg Pact constitutes
a reversal of the view-point that all war is legal and has brought international
law into harmony with the common sense of mankind that unjustifiable war is a
crime. Then he mentions as other reversals of the same viewpoint, the Geneva
Protocol of 1924 for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, declaring
that a war of aggression constitutes an international crime; the 8th assembly of
the League of Nations in 1927, declaring that a war of aggression constitutes an
international crime; and the 6th Pan-American conference of 1928, which unanimously
adopted a resolution stating that war of aggression constitutes an international
crime against the human species: which enumeration, he says, is not an attempt at
an exhaustive catalogue.It is not disputed that the war started by Japan in the
Pacific, first, against the United States, and later, in rapid succession, against
other allied nations, was a war of aggression and utterly unjustifiable. More
aggressive still, and more unjustifiable, as admitted on all sides, was its attack
against the Philippines and its consequent invasion and occupation of certain areas
thereof.Some of the rules and principles of international law which have been cited
for petitioner herein in support of his theory of suspended allegiance, have been
evolved and accepted during those periods of the history of nations when all war
was considered legal, as stated by Justice Jackson, and the others have reference
to military occupation in the course of really justifiable war.Japan in subscribing
the Briand-Kellogg Pact thirteen years before she started the aggressive war which
threw the entire Pacific area into a seething cauldron from the last month of 1941
of the first week of September, 1945, expressly agreed to outlaw, proscribe and
renounce war as an instrument of national policy, and bound herself to seek the
settlement of her disputes with other nations only by pacific means. Thus she
expressly gave her consent to that modification of the then existing rules and
principles of international law governing the matter. With the modification, all
the signatories to the pact necessarily accepted and bound themselves to abide by
all its implications, among them the outlawing, prescription and renunciation of
military occupation of another nation's territory in the course of a war thus
outlawed, proscribed and renounced. This is only one way of saving that the rules
and principles of international law therefore existing on the subject of military
occupation were automatically abrogated and rendered ineffective in all future
cases of war coming under the ban and condemnation of the pact.If an unjustifiable
war is a crime; if a war of aggression constitutes an international crime; if such
a war is an international crime against the human species: a nation which occupies
a foreign territory in the course of such a war cannot possibly, under any
principle of natural or positive law, acquire or posses any legitimate power or
right growing out or incident to such occupation. Concretely, Japan in criminally
invading the Philippines and occupying certain portions of its territory during the
Pacific war, could not have nor exercise, in the legal sense and only this sense
should we speak here with respect to this country and its citizens, any more than
could a burglar breaking through a man's house pretends to have or to exercise any
legal power or right within that house with respect either to the person of the
owner or to his property. To recognize in the first instance any legal power or
right on the part of the invader, and in the second any legal power or right on the
part of the burglar, the same as in case of a military occupant in the course of a
justifiable war, would be nothing short of legalizing the crime itself. It would
be the most monstrous and unpardonable contradiction to prosecute, condemn and
hang the appropriately called war criminals of Germany, Italy, and Japan, and at
the same time recognize any lawfulness in their occupation invaded. And let it not
be forgotten that the Philippines is a member of the United Nations who have
instituted and conducted the so-called war crimes trials. Neither should we lose
sight of the further fact that this government has a representative in the
international commission currently trying the Japanese war criminals in Tokyo.
These facts leave no room for doubt that this government is in entire accord with
the other United Nations in considering the Pacific war started by Japan as a
crime. Not only this, but this country had six years before the outbreak of the
Pacific war already renounced war as an instrument of national policy
(Constitution, Article II, section 2), thus in consequence adopting the doctrine of
the Briand-Kellogg Pact.Consequently, it is submitted that it would be absolutely
wrong and improper for this Court to apply to the occupation by Japan of certain
areas of the Philippines during that war the rules and principles of international
law which might be applicable to a military occupation occurring in the course of a
justifiable war. How can this Court recognize any lawfulness or validity in that
occupation when our own government has sent a representative to said international
commission in Tokyo trying the Japanese "war criminals" precisely for the "crimes
against humanity and peace" committed by them during World War II of which said
occupation was but part and parcel? In such circumstances how could such occupation
produce noless an effect than the suspension of the allegiance of our people to
their country and government? (b) But even in the hypothesis and notmorethan a
mere hypothesis that when Japan occupied the City of Manila and certain other
areas of the Philippines she was engaged in a justifiable war, still the theory of
suspended allegiance would not hold good. The continuance of the allegiance owed to
a notion by its citizens is one of those high privileges of citizenship which the
law of nations denies to the occupant the power to interfere with.. . . His (of
occupant) rights are not, however, commensurate with his power. He is thus
forbidden to take certain measures which he may be able to apply, and that
irrespective of their efficacy. The restrictions imposed upon him are in theory
designed to protect the individual in the enjoyment of some highly important
privileges.These concern his allegiance to the de jure sovereign, his family honor
and domestic relations, religious convictions, personal service, and connection

with or residence in the occupied territory.The Hague Regulations declare that the
occupant is forbidden to compel the inhabitants to swear allegiance to the hostile
power. . . . (III Hyde, International Law, 2d revised ed., pp. 1898-1899.). . . Nor
may he (occupant) compel them (inhabitants) to take an oath of allegiance. Since
the authority of the occupant is not sovereignty, the inhabitants owe no temporary
allegiance to him. . . . (II Oppenheim, International Law, pp. 341-344.)The
occupant's lack of the authority to exact an oath of allegiance from the
inhabitants of the occupied territory is but a corollary of the continuance of
their allegiance to their own lawful sovereign. This allegiance does not consist
merely in obedience to the laws of the lawful sovereign, but more essentially
consists in loyalty or fealty to him. In the same volume and pages of Oppenheim's
work above cited, after the passage to the effect that the inhabitants of the
occupied territory owe no temporary allegiance to the occupant it is said that "On
the other hand, he may compel them to take an oath sometimes called an 'oath of
neutrality' . . . willingly to submit to his 'legitimate commands.' Since,
naturally, such "legitimate commands" include the occupant's laws, it follows that
said occupant, where the rule is applicable, has the right to compel the
inhabitants to take an oath of obedience to his laws; and since according to the
same rule, he cannot exact from the inhabitants an oath of obedience to his laws;
and since, according to the same rule, he cannot exact from the inhabitants an oath
of allegiance, it follows that obedience to his laws, which he can exact from them,
does not constitute allegiance.(c) The theory of suspended allegiance is
unpatriotic to the last degree. To say that when the one's country is unable to
afford him in its protection, he ceases to be bound to it by the sacred ties of
allegiance, is to advocate the doctrine that precisely when his country is in such
distress, and therefore most needs his loyalty, he is absolved from the loyalty.
Love of country should be something permanent and lasting, ending only in death;
loyalty should be its worth offspring. The outward manifestation of one or the
other may for a time be prevented or thwarted by the irresistible action of the
occupant; but this should not in the least extinguish nor obliterate the invisible
feelings, and promptings of the spirit. And beyond the unavoidable consequences of
the enemy's irresistible pressure, those invisible feelings and promptings of the
spirit of the people should never allow them to act, to speak, nor even to think a
whit contrary to their love and loyalty to the Fatherland. For them, indicted, to
face their country and say to it that, because when it was overrun and vanquished
by the barbarous invader and, in consequence was disabled from affording them
protection, they were released from their sacred obligation of allegiance and
loyalty, and could therefore freely adhere to its enemy, giving him aid and
comfort, incurring no criminal responsibility therefor, would only tend to
aggravate their crime.II. CHANGE OF SOVEREIGNTYArticle II, section 1, of the
Constitution provides that "Sovereignty resides in the people and all government
authority emanates from them." The Filipino people are the self-same people before
and after Philippine Independence, proclaimed on July 4, 1946. During the life of
the Commonwealth sovereignty resided in them under the Constitution; after the
proclamation of independence that sovereignty remained with them under the very
same fundamental law. Article XVIII of the said Constitution stipulates that the
government established thereby shall be known as the Commonwealth of the
Philippines; and that upon the final and complete withdrawal of the sovereignty of
the United States and the proclamation of Philippine independence, "The
Commonwealth of the Philippines shall thenceforth be known as the Republic of the
Philippines." Under this provision the Government of the Philippines immediately
prior to independence was essentially to be the identical government thereafter
only the name of that government was to be changed.Both before and after the
adoption of the Philippine Constitution the people of the Philippines were and are
always the plaintiff in all criminal prosecutions, the case being entitled: "The
People of the Philippinesvs.(the defendant or defendants)." This was already true
in prosecutions under the Revised Penal Code containing the law of treason. "The
Government of the Philippines" spoken of in article 114 of said Code merely
represents the people of the Philippines. Said code was continued, along with the
other laws, by Article XVI, section 2, of the Constitution which constitutional
provision further directs that "all references in such laws to the Government or
officials of the Philippine Islands shall be construed, in so far as applicable, to
refer to the Government and corresponding officials under this Constitution" of
course, meaning the Commonwealth of the Philippines before, and the Republic of the
Philippines after, independence (Article XVIII). Under both governments sovereignty
resided and resides in the people (Article II, section 1). Said sovereignty was
never transferred from that people they are the same people who preserve it to
this day. There has never been any change in its respect.If one committed treason
againsts the People of the Philippines before July 4, 1946, he continues to be
criminally liable for the crime to the same people now. And if, following the
literal wording of the Revised Penal Code, as continued by the Constitution, that
accused owed allegiance upon the commission of the crime to the "Government of the
Philippines," in the textual words of the Constitution (Article XVI, section 2, and
XVIII) that was the same government which after independence became known as the
"Republic of the Philippines." The most that can be said is that the sovereignty of
the people became complete and absolute after independence that they became,
politically, fully of age, to use a metaphor. But if the responsibility for a crime
against a minor is not extinguished by the mere fact of his becoming of age, why
should the responsibility for the crime of treason committed against the Filipino
people when they were not fully politically independent be extinguished after they
acquire this status? The offended party continues to be the same only his status
has changed.#PARAS,J.,dissenting:During the long period of Japanese occupation,
all the political laws of the Philippines were suspended. This is full harmony with
the generally accepted principles of the international law adopted by our
Constitution(Article II, section 3) as a part of the law of the Nation.
Accordingly, we have on more than one occasion already stated that "laws of a
political nature or affecting political relations, . . . are considered as
suspended or in abeyance during the military occupation" (Co Kim Chamvs.Valdez
Tan Keh and Dizon, 75 Phil., 113, 124), and that the rule "that laws of political
nature or affecting political relations are considered suspended or in abeyance
during the military occupation, is intended for the governing of the civil
inhabitants of the occupied territory." (Ruffyvs.Chief of Staff, Philippine Army,
75, Phil., 875, 881.)The principle is recognized by the United States of America,
which admits that the occupant will naturally suspends all laws of a political
nature and all laws which affect the welfare and safety of his command, such action
to be made known to the inhabitants.(United States Rules of Land Welfare, 1940,
Article 287.) As allegiance to the United States is an essential element in the
crime of treason under article 114 of the Revised Penal Code, and in view of its
position in our political structure prior to the independence of the Philippines,
the rule as interpreted and practiced in the United States necessarily has a
binding force and effect in the Philippines, to the exclusion of any other
construction followed elsewhere, such as may be inferred, rightly or wrongly, from
the isolated cases1brought to our attention, which, moreover, have entirely
different factual bases.Corresponding notice was given by the Japanese occupying
army, first, in the proclamation of its Commander in chief of January 2, 1942, to
the effect that as a "result of the Japanese Military operations, the sovereignty
of the United States of America over the Philippines has completely disappeared and
the Army hereby proclaims the Military Administration under martial law over the
district occupied by the Army;" secondly, in Order No. 3 of the said Commander in
Chief of February 20, 1942, providing that "activities of the administrative organs
and judicial courts in the Philippines shall be based upon the existing statutes,
orders, ordinances and customs until further orders provided that they are not
inconsistent with the present circumstances under the Japanese Military
Administration;" and, thirdly, in the explanation to Order No. 3 reminding that
"all laws and regulations of the Philippines has been suspended since Japanese
occupation," and excepting the application of "laws and regulations which are not
proper act under the present situation of the Japanese Military Administration,"
especially those "provided with some political purposes."The suspension of the

political law during enemy occupation is logical, wise and humane. The latter phase
outweighs all other aspects of the principle aimed more or less at promoting the
necessarily selfish motives and purposes of a military occupant. It thus consoling
to note that the powers instrumental in the crystallization of the Hague
Conventions of 1907 did not forget to declare that they were "animated by the
desire to serve . . . the interest of the humanity and the over progressive needs
of civilization," and that "in case not included in the Regulations adopted by
them, the inhabitants and the belligerents remain under the protection and the rule
of the principles of international law, as they result from the usages established
among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity, and the dictates of the public
conscience." These saving statements come to the aid of the inhabitants in the
occupied territory in a situation wherein, even before the belligerent occupant
"takes a further step and by appropriate affirmative action undertakes to acquire
the right of sovereignty for himself, . . . the occupant is likely to regard to
himself as clothed with freedom to endeavor to impregnate the people who inhabit
the area concerned with his own political ideology, and to make that endeavor
successful by various forms of pressure exerted upon enemy officials who are
permitted to retain the exercise of normal governmental functions." (Hyde,
International Law, Vol. III, Second Revised Edition, 1945, p. 1879.)The inhabitants
of the occupied territory should necessarily be bound to the sole authority of the
invading power, whose interest and requirements are naturally in conflict with
those of the displaced government, if it is legitimate for the military occupant to
demand and enforce from the inhabitants such obedience as may be necessary for the
security of his forces, for the maintenance of law and order, and for the proper
administration of the country (United States Rules of Land Warfare, 1940, article
297), and to demand all kinds of services "of such a nature as not to involve the
population in the obligation of taking part in military operations against their
own country" (Hague Regulations, article 52);and if, as we have in effect said, by
the surrender the inhabitants pass under a temporary allegiance to the government
of the occupant and are bound by such laws, and such only, as it chooses to
recognize and impose, and the belligerent occupant ìs totally independent of the
constitution and the laws of the territory, since occupation is an aim of warfare,
and the maintenance and safety of his forces, and the purpose of war, stand in the
foreground of his interest and must be promoted under all circumstances or
conditions." (Peraltavs.Director of Prisons, 75 Phil., 285, 295), citing United
Statesvs.Rice, 4 Wheaton, 246, and quoting Oppenheim, International Law, Vol. II.
Sixth Edition, Revised, 1944,p. 432.)He would be a bigot who cannot or would refuse
to see the cruel result if the people in an occupied territory were required to
obey two antagonistic and opposite powers. To emphasize our point, we would adopt
the argument, in a reverse order, of Mr. Justice Hilado inPeralta vs. Director of
Prisons(75 Phil., 285, 358), contained in the following passage:To have bound
those of our people who constituted the great majority who never submitted to the
Japanese oppressors, by the laws, regulations, processes and other acts of those
two puppet governments, would not only have been utterly unjust and downright
illegal, but would have placed them in the absurd and impossible condition of being
simultaneously submitted to two mutually hostile governments, with their respective
constitutional and legislative enactments and institutions on the one hand bound
to continue owing allegiance to the United States and the Commonwealth Government,
and, on the other, to owe allegiance, if only temporary, to Japan.The only sensible
purpose of the treason law which is of political complexion and taken out of the
territorial law and penalized as a new offense committed against the belligerent
occupant, incident to a state of war and necessary for the control of the occupant
(Alcantaravs.Director of Prisons, 75 Phil., 494), must be the preservation of
the nation, certainly not its destruction or extermination. And yet the latter is
unwittingly wished by those who are fond of the theory that what is suspended is
merely the exercise of sovereignty by thede juregovernment or the latter's
authority to impose penal sanctions or that, otherwise stated, the suspension
refers only to the military occupant. If this were to be the only effect, the rule
would be a meaningless and superfluous optical illusion, since it is obvious that

the fleeing or displaced government cannot, even if it should want, physically
assert its authority in a territory actually beyond its reach, and that the
occupant, on the other hand, will not take the absurd step of prosecuting and
punishing the inhabitants for adhering to and aiding it. If we were to believe the
opponents of the rule in question, we have to accept the absurd proposition that
the guerrillas can all be prosecuted with illegal possession of firearms. It should
be borne in the mind that "the possession by the belligerent occupant of the right
to control, maintain or modify the laws that are to obtain within the occupied area
is an exclusive one. The territorial sovereign driven therefrom, can not compete
with it on an even plane. Thus, if the latter attempt interference, its action is a
mere manifestation of belligerent effort to weaken the enemy. It has no bearing
upon the legal quality of what the occupant exacts, while it retains control. Thus,
if the absent territorial sovereign, through some quasi-legislative decree, forbids
its nationals to comply with what the occupant has ordained obedience to such
command within the occupied territory would not safeguard the individual from the
prosecution by the occupant." (Hyde, International Law, Vol. III, Second Revised
Edition, 1945, p. 1886.)As long as we have not outlawed the right of the
belligerent occupant to prosecute and punish the inhabitants for "war treason" or
"war crimes," as an incident of the state of war and necessity for the control of
the occupied territory and the protection of the army of the occupant, against
which prosecution and punishment such inhabitants cannot obviously be protected by
their native sovereign, it is hard to understand how we can justly rule that they
may at the same time be prosecuted and punished for an act penalized by the Revised
Penal Code, but already taken out of the territorial law and penalized as a new
offense committed against the belligerent occupant.InPeralta vs. Director of
Prisons, 75 Phil., 285, 296), we held that "the Constitution of the Commonwealth
Government was suspended during the occupation of the Philippines by the Japanese
forces or the belligerent occupant at regular war with the United States," and the
meaning of the term "suspended" is very plainly expressed in the following passage
(page 298):No objection can be set up to the legality of its provisions in the
light of the precepts of our Commonwealth Constitution relating to the rights of
the accused under that Constitution, because the latter was not in force during the
period of the Japanese military occupation, as we have already stated. Nor may said
Constitution be applied upon its revival at the time of the re-occupation of the
Philippines
by the virtue of the priciple of postliminium, because "a constitution should
operate prospectively only, unless the words employed show a clear intention that
it should have a retrospective effect," (Cooley's Constitutional Limitations,
seventh edition, page 97, and a case quoted and cited in the foot-note), especially
as regards laws of procedure applied to cases already terminated completely.In much
the same way, we should hold that no treason could have been committed during the
Japanese military occupation against the United States or the Commonwealth
Government, because article 114 of the Revised Penal Code was not then in force.
Nor may this penal provision be applied upon its revival at the time of the
reoccupation of the Philippines by virtue of the principle ofpostliminium, because
of the constitutional inhibition against anyex post factolaw and because, under
article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal laws shall have a retroactive effect
only in so far as they favor the accused. Why did we refuse to enforce the
Constitution, more essential to sovereignty than article 114 of the Revised Penal
Code in the aforesaid ofPeralta vs. Director of Prisonsif, as alleged by the
majority, the suspension was good only as to the military occupant? The decision in
the United Statesvs.Rice (4 Wheaton, 246), conclusively supports our position. As
analyzed and described in United Statesvs.Reiter (27 Fed. Cas., 773), that case
"was decided by the Supreme Court of the United States the court of highest human
authority on that subject and as the decision was against the United States, and
in favor of the authority of Great Britain, its enemy in the war, and was made
shortly after the occurrence of the war out of which it grew; and while no
department of this Government was inclined to magnify the rights of Great Britain
or disparage those of its own government, there can be no suspicion of bias in the
mind of the court in favor of the conclusion at which it arrived, and no doubt that
the law seemed to the court to warrant and demand such a decision. That case grew
out of the war of 1812, between the United States and Great Britain. It appeared
that in September, 1814, the British forces had taken the port of Castine, in the
State of Maine, and held it in military occupation; and that while it was so held,
foreign goods, by the laws of the United States subject to duty, had been
introduced into that port without paying duties to the United States. At the close
of the war the place by treaty restored to the United States, and after that was
done Government of the United States sought to recover from the persons so
introducing the goods there while in possession of the British, the duties to which
by the laws of the United States, they would have been liable. The claim of the
United States was that its laws were properly in force there, although the place
was at the time held by the British forces in hostility to the United States, and
the laws, therefore, could not at the time be enforced there; and that a court of
the United States (the power of that government there having since been restored)
was bound so to decide. But this illusion of the prosecuting officer there was
dispelled by the court in the most summary manner. Mr. Justice Story, that great
luminary of the American bench, being the organ of the court in delivering its
opinion, said: 'The single question is whether goods imported into Castine during
its occupation by the enemy are liable to the duties imposed by the revenue laws
upon goods imported into the United States.. We are all of opinion that the claim
for duties cannot be sustained. . . . The sovereignty of the United States over the
territory was, of course, suspended, and the laws of the United States could no
longer be rightfully enforced there, or be obligatory upon the inhabitants who
remained and submitted to the conquerors. By the surrender the inhabitants passed
under a temporary allegiance of the British Government, and were bound by such
laws, and such only, as it chose to recognize and impose. From the nature of the
case no other laws could be obligatory upon them. . . . Castine was therefore,
during this period, as far as respected our revenue laws, to be deemed a foreign
port, and goods imported into it by the inhabitants were subjects to such duties
only as the British Government chose to require. Such goods were in no correct
sense imported into the Unites States.' The court then proceeded to say, that the
case is the same as if the port of Castine had been foreign territory, ceded by
treaty to the United States, and the goods had been imported there previous to its
cession. In this case they say there would be no pretense to say that American
duties could be demanded; and upon principles of public or municipal law, the cases
are not distinguishable. They add at the conclusion of the opinion: 'The
authorities cited at the bar would, if there were any doubt, be decisive of the
question. But we think it too clear to require any aid from authority.' Does this
case leave room for a doubt whether a country held as this was in armed
belligerents occupation, is to be governed by him who holds it, and by him alone?
Does it not so decide in terms as plain as can be stated? It is asserted by the
Supreme Court of the United States with entire unanimity, the great and venerated
Marshall presiding, and the erudite and accomplished Story delivering the opinion
of the court, that such is the law, and it is so adjudged in this case. Nay, more:
it is even adjudged that no other laws could be obligatory; that such country, so
held, is for the purpose of the application of the law off its former government to
be deemed foreign territory, and that goods imported there (and by parity of
reasoning other acts done there) are in no correct sense done within the territory
of its former sovereign, the United States."But it is alleged by the majority that
the sovereignty spoken of in the decision of the United Statesvs.Rice should be
construed to refer to the exercise of sovereignty, and that, if sovereignty itself
was meant, the doctrine has become obsolete after the adoption of the Hague
Regulations in 1907. In answer, we may state that sovereignty can have any
important significance only when it may be exercised; and, to our way of thinking,
it is immaterial whether the thing held in abeyance is the sovereignty itself or
its exercise, because the point cannot nullify, vary, or otherwise vitiate the
plain meaning of the doctrinal words "the laws of the United States could no longer
be rightfully enforced there, or be obligatory upon the inhabitants who remained

and submitted to the conquerors." We cannot accept the theory of the majority,
without in effect violating the rule of international law, hereinabove adverted to,
that the possession by the belligerent occupant of the right to control, maintain
or modify the laws that are to obtain within the occupied area is an exclusive one,
and that the territorial sovereign driven therefrom cannot compete with it on an
even plane. Neither may the doctrine in the United Statesvs.Rice be said to have
become obsolete, without repudiating the actual rule prescribed and followed by the
United States, allowing the military occupant to suspend all laws of a political
nature and even require public officials and inhabitants to take an oath of
fidelity (United States Rules of Land Warfare, 1940, article 309). In fact, it is a
recognized doctrine of American Constitutional Law that mere conquest or military
occupation of a territory of another State does not operate to annex such territory
to occupying State, but that the inhabitants of the occupied district, no longer
receiving the protection of their native State, for the time being owe no
allegiance to it, and, being under the control and protection of the victorious
power, owe to that power fealty and obedience. (Willoughby, The Fundamental
Concepts of Public Law [1931], p.364.)The majority have resorted to distinctions,
more apparent than real, if not immaterial, in trying to argue that the law of
treason was obligatory on the Filipinos during the Japanese occupation. Thus it is
insisted that a citizen or subject owes not a qualified and temporary, but an
absolute and permanent allegiance, and that "temporary allegiance" to the military
occupant may be likened to the temporary allegiance which a foreigner owes to the
government or sovereign to the territory wherein he resides in return for the
protection he receives therefrom. The comparison is most unfortunate. Said
foreigner is in the territory of a power not hostile to or in actual war with his
own government; he is in the territory of a power which has not suspended, under
the rules of international law, the laws of political nature of his own government;
and the protections received by him from that friendly or neutral power is real,
not the kind of protection which the inhabitants of an occupied territory can
expect from a belligerent army. "It is but reasonable that States, when they
concede to other States the right to exercise jurisdiction over such of their own
nationals as are within the territorial limits of such other States, should insist
that States should provide system of law and of courts, and in actual practice, so
administer them, as to furnish substantial legal justice to alien residents. This
does not mean that a State must or should extend to aliens within its borders all
the civil, or much less, all the political rights or privileges which it grants to
its own citizens; but it does mean that aliens must or should be given adequate
opportunity to have such legal rights as are granted to them by the local law
impartially and judicially determined, and, when thus determined, protected."
(Willoughby, The Fundamental Concepts of Public
Law [1931], p. 360.)When it is therefore said that a citizen of a sovereign may be
prosecuted for and convicted of treason committed in a foreign country or, in the
language of article 114 of the Revised Penal Code, "elsewhere," a territory other
than one under belligerent occupation must have been contemplated. This would make
sense, because treason is a crime "the direct or indirect purpose of which is the
delivery, in whole or in part, of the country to a foreign power, or to pave the
way for the enemy to obtain dominion over the national territory" (Albert, The
Revised Penal Code, citing 3 Groizard, 14); and, very evidently, a territory
already under occupation can no longer be "delivered."The majority likewise argue
that the theory of suspended sovereignty or allegiance will enable the military
occupant to legally recruit the inhabitants to fight against their own government,
without said inhabitants being liable for treason. This argument is not correct,
because the suspension does not exempt the occupant from complying with the Hague
Regulations (article 52) that allows it to demand all kinds of services provided
that they do not involve the population "in the obligation of taking part military
operations against their own country." Neither does the suspension prevent the
inhabitants from assuming a passive attitude, much less from dying and becoming
heroes if compelled by the occupant to fight against their own country. Any
imperfection in the present state of international law should be corrected by such

world agency as the United Nations organizations.It is of common knowledge that
even with the alleged cooperation imputed to the collaborators, an alarming number
of Filipinos were killed or otherwise tortured by the ruthless, or we may say
savage, Japanese Army. Which leads to the conclusion that if the Filipinos did not
obey the Japanese commands and feign cooperation, there would not be any Filipino
nation that could have been liberated. Assuming that the entire population could go
to and live in the mountains, or otherwise fight as guerrillas after the formal
surrender of our and the American regular fighting forces, they would have faced
certain annihilation by the Japanese, considering that the latter's military
strength at the time and the long period during which they were left military
unmolested by America. In this connection, we hate to make reference to the atomic
bomb as a possible means of destruction.If a substantial number of guerrillas were
able to survive and ultimately help in the liberation of the Philippines, it was
because the feigned cooperation of their countrymen enabled them to get food and
other aid necessary in the resistance movement. If they were able to survive, it
was because they could camouflage themselves in the midst of the civilian
population in cities and towns. It is easy to argue now that the people could have
merely followed their ordinary pursuits of life or otherwise be indifferent to the
occupant. The fundamental defect of this line of thought is that the Japanese
assumed to be so stupid and dumb as not to notice any such attitude. During
belligerent occupation, "the outstanding fact to be reckoned with is the sharp
opposition between the inhabitants of the occupied areas and the hostile military
force exercising control over them. At heart they remain at war with each other.
Fear for their own safety may not serve to deter the inhabitants from taking
advantage of opportunities to interfere with the safety and success of the
occupant, and in so doing they may arouse its passions and cause to take vengeance
in cruel fashion. Again, even when it is untainted by such conduct, the occupant as
a means of attaining ultimate success in its major conflict may, under plea of
military necessity, and regardless of conventional or customary prohibitions,
proceed to utilize the inhabitants within its grip as a convenient means of
military achievement." (Hyde, International Law, Vol. III, Second Revised Edition
[1945], p. 1912.) It should be stressed that the Japanese occupation was not a
matter of a few months; it extended over a little more than three years. Said
occupation was a fact, in spite of the "presence of guerrilla bands in barrios and
mountains, and even in towns of the Philippines whenever these towns were left by
Japanese garrisons or by the detachments of troops sent on patrol to those places."
(Co Kim Chamvs.Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon, 75 Phil., 371, 373.) The law of nations
accepts belligerent occupation as a fact to be reckoned with, regardless of the
merits of the occupant's cause. (Hyde, International Law, Second Revised Edition
[1945], Vol. III, p. 1879.)Those who contend or fear that the doctrine herein
adhere to will lead to an over-production of traitors, have a wrong and low
conception of the psychology and patriotism of their countrymen. Patriots are such
after their birth in the first place, and no amount of laws or judicial decisions
can make or unmake them. On the other hand, the Filipinos are not so base as to be
insensitive to the thought that the real traitor is cursed everywhere and in all
ages. Our patriots who fought and died during the last war, and the brave
guerrillas who have survived, were undoubtedly motivated by their inborn love of
country, and not by such a thing as the treason law. The Filipino people as a
whole, passively opposed the Japanese regime, not out of fear of a treason statute
but because they preferred and will prefer the democratic and civilized way of life
and American altruism to Japanese barbaric and totalitarian designs. Of course,
there are those who might at heart have been pro-Japanese; but they met and will
unavoidably meet the necessary consequences. The regular soldiers faced the risks
of warfare; the spies and informers subjected themselves to the perils of military
operations, likely received summary liquidation or punishments from the guerrillas
and the parties injured by their acts, and may be prosecuted as war spies by the
military authorities of the returning sovereign; those who committed other common
crimes, directly or through the Japanese army, may be prosecuted under the
municipal law, and under this group even the spies and informers, Makapili or
otherwise, are included, for they can be made answerable for any act offensive to
person or property; the buy-and-sell opportunists have the war profits tax to
reckon with. We cannot close our eyes to the conspicuous fact that, in the majority
of cases, those responsible for the death of, or injury to, any Filipino or
American at the hands of the Japanese, were prompted more by personal motives than
by a desire to levy war against the United States or to adhere to the occupant. The
alleged spies and informers found in the Japanese occupation the royal road to
vengeance against personal or political enemies. The recent amnesty granted to the
guerrillas for acts, otherwise criminal, committed in the furtherance of their
resistance movement has in a way legalized the penal sanctions imposed by them upon
the real traitors.It is only from a realistic, practical and common-sense point of
view, and by remembering that the obedience and cooperation of the Filipinos were
effected while the Japanese were in complete control and occupation of the
Philippines, when their mere physical presence implied force and pressure and not
after the American forces of liberation had restored the Philippine Government
that we will come to realize that, apart from any rule of international law, it was
necessary to release the Filipinos temporarily from the old political tie in the
sense indicated herein. Otherwise, one is prone to dismiss the reason for such
cooperation and obedience. If there were those who did not in any wise cooperate or
obey, they can be counted by the fingers, and let their names adorn the pages of
Philippine history. Essentially, however, everybody who took advantage, to any
extent and degree, of the peace and order prevailing during the occupation, for the
safety and survival of himself and his family, gave aid and comfort to the enemy.
Our great liberator himself, General Douglas MacArthur, had considered the laws of
the Philippines ineffective during the occupation, and restored to their full vigor
and force only after the liberation. Thus, in his proclamation of October 23, 1944,
he ordained that "the laws now existing on the statute books of the Commonwealth of
the Philippines . . . are in full force and effect and legally binding upon the
people in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control," and that
"all laws . . . of any other government in the Philippines than that of the said
Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in areas of the
Philippinesfree of enemy occupation and control." Repeating what we have said
inCo Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon(75 Phil., 113, 133), "it is to be
presumed that General Douglas MacArthur, who was acting as an agent or a
representative of the Government and the President of the United States,
constitutional Commander-in-Chief of the United States Army, did not intend to act
against the principles of the law of nations asserted by the Supreme Court of the
United States from the early period of its existence, applied by the President of
the United States, and later embodied in the Hague Conventions of 1907."The
prohibition in the Hague Conventions (Article 45) against "any pressure on the
population to take oath to the hostile power," was inserted for the moral
protection and benefit of the inhabitants, and does not necessarily carry the
implication that the latter continue to be bound to the political laws of the
displaced government. The United States, a signatory to the Hague Conventions, has
made the point clear, by admitting that the military occupant can
suspend all the laws of a political nature and even require public officials and
the inhabitants to take an oath of fidelity (United States Rules of Land Warfare,
1940, article 309), and as already stated, it is a doctrine of American
Constitutional Law that the inhabitants, no longer receiving the protection of
their native state, for the time being owe no allegiance to it, and, being under
the control and protection of the victorious power, owe to that power fealty and
obedience. Indeed, what is prohibited is the application of force by the occupant,
from which it is fair to deduce that the Conventions do not altogether outlaw
voluntary submission by the population. The only strong reason for this is
undoubtedly the desire of the authors of the Conventions to give as much freedom
and allowance to the inhabitants as are necessary for their survival. This is wise
and humane, because the people should be in a better position to know what will
save them during the military occupation than any exile government."Before he was
appointed prosecutor, Justice Jackson made a speech in which he warned against the
use of judicial process for non judicial ends, and attacked cynics who "see no
reason why courts, just like other agencies, should not be policy weapons. If we
want to shoot Germans as a matter of policy, let it be done as such, said he, but
don't hide the deed behind a court. If you are determined to execute a man in any
case there is no occasion for a trial; the word yields no respect for courts that
are merely organized to convict." Mussoloni may have got his just desserts, but
nobody supposes he got a fair trial. . . . Let us bear that in mind as we go about
punishing criminals. There are enough laws on the books to convict guilty Nazis
without risking the prestige of our legal system. It is far, far better that some
guilty men escape than that the idea of law be endangered. In the long run the idea
of law is our best defense against Nazism in all its forms." These passages were
taken from the editorial appearing in the Life, May 28, 1945, page 34, and convey
ideas worthy of some reflection.If the Filipinos in fact committed any errors in
feigning cooperation and obedience during the Japanese military occupation, they
were at most borrowing the famous and significant words of President Roxas
errors of the mind and not of the heart. We advisedly said "feigning" not as an
admission of the fallacy of the theory of suspended allegiance or sovereignty, but
as an affirmation that the Filipinos, contrary to their outward attitude, had
always remained loyal by feeling and conscience to their country.Assuming that
article 114 of the Revised Penal Code was in force during the Japanese military
occupation, the present Republic of the Philippines has no right to prosecute
treason committed against the former sovereignty existing during the Commonwealth
Government which was none other than the sovereignty of the United States. This
court has already held that, upon a change of sovereignty, the provisions of the
Penal Code having to do with such subjects as treason, rebellion and sedition are
no longer in force (Peoplevs.Perfecto, 43 Phil., 887). It is true that, as
contended by the majority, section 1 of Article II of the Constitution of the
Philippines provides that "sovereignty resides in the people," but this did not
make the Commonwealth Government or the Filipino people sovereign, because said
declaration of principle, prior to the independence of the Philippines, was
subervient to and controlled by the Ordinance appended to the Constitution under
which, in addition to its many provisions essentially destructive of the concept of
sovereignty, it is expressly made clear that the sovereignty of the United States
over the Philippines had not then been withdrawn. The framers of the Constitution
had to make said declaration of principle because the document was ultimately
intended for the independent Philippines. Otherwise, the Preamble should not have
announced that one of the purposes of the Constitution is to secure to the Filipino
people and their posterity the "blessings of independence." No one, we suppose,
will dare allege that the Philippines was an independent country under the
Commonwealth Government.The Commonwealth Government might have been more autonomous
than that existing under the Jones Law, but its non-sovereign status nevertheless
remained unaltered; and what was enjoyed was the exercise of sovereignty over the
Philippines continued to be complete.The exercise of Sovereignty May be Delegated.
It has already been seen that the exercise of sovereignty is conceived of as
delegated by a State to the various organs which, collectively, constitute the
Government. For practical political reasons which can be easily appreciated, it is
desirable that the public policies of a State should be formulated and executed by
governmental agencies of its own creation and which are not subject to the control
of other States. There is, however, nothing in a nature of sovereignty or of State
life which prevents one State from entrusting the exercise of certain powers to the
governmental agencies of another State. Theoretically, indeed, a sovereign State
may go to any extent in the delegation of the exercise of its power to the
governmental agencies of other States, those governmental agencies thus becoming
quoad hoc parts of the governmental machinery of the State whose sovereignty is
exercised. At the same time these agencies do not cease to be Instrumentalities for
the expression of the will of the State by which they were originally created.By
this allegation the agent State is authorized to express the will of the delegating
State, and the legal hypothesis is that this State possesses the legal competence
again to draw to itself the exercise, through organs of its own creation, of the
powers it has granted. Thus, States may concede to colonies almost complete
autonomy of government and reserve to themselves a right of control of so slight
and so negative a character as to make its exercise a rare and improbable
occurence; yet, so long as such right of control is recognized to exist, and the
autonomy of the colonies is conceded to be founded upon a grant and the continuing
consent of the mother countries the sovereignty of those mother countries over them
is complete and they are to be considered as possessing only administrative
autonomy and not political independence. Again, as will be more fully discussed in
a later chapter, in the so-called Confederate or Composite State, the cooperating
States may yield to the central Government the exercise of almost all of their
powers of Government and yet retain their several sovereignties. Or, on the other
hand, a State may, without parting with its sovereignty of lessening its
territorial application, yield to the governing organs of particular areas such an
amplitude of powers as to create of them bodies-politic endowed with almost all of
the characteristics of independent States. In all States, indeed, when of any
considerable size, efficiency of administration demands that certain autonomous
powers of local self-government be granted to particular districts. (Willoughby,
The Fundamental Concepts of Public Law [1931], pp. 74, 75.).The majority have drawn
an analogy between the Commonwealth Government and the States of the American Union
which, it is alleged, preserve their own sovereignty although limited by the United
States. This is not true for it has been authoritatively stated that the
Constituent States have no sovereignty of their own, that such autonomous powers as
they now possess are had and exercised by the express will or by the constitutional
forbearance of the national sovereignty, and that the sovereignty of the United
States and the non-sovereign status of the individual States is no longer
contested.It is therefore plain that the constituent States have no sovereignty of
their own, and that such autonomous powers as they now possess are had and
exercised by the express will or by the constitutional forbearance of the national
sovereignty. The Supreme Court of the United States has held that, even when
selecting members for the national legislature, or electing the President, or
ratifying proposed amendments to the federal constitution, the States act,ad hoc,
as agents of the National Government. (Willoughby, the Fundamental Concepts of
Public Law [1931], p.250.)This is the situation at the present time. The
sovereignty of the United States and the non-sovereign status of the individual
States is no longer contested. (Willoughby, The Fundamental Concepts of Public Law
[1931], pp. 251, 252.)Article XVIII of the Constitution provides that "The
government established by this Constitution shall be known as the Commonwealth of
the Philippines. Upon the final and complete withdrawal of the sovereignty of the
United States and the proclamation of Philippine independence, the Commonwealth of
the Philippines shall thenceforth be known as the Republic of the Philippines."
From this, the deduction is made that the Government under the Republic of the
Philippines and under the Commonwealth is the same. We cannot agree. While the
Commonwealth Government possessed administrative autonomy and exercised the
sovereignty delegated by the United States and did not cease to be an
instrumentality of the latter (Willoughby, The Fundamental Concepts of Public Law
[1931], pp. 74, 75), the Republic of the Philippines is an independent State not
receiving its power or sovereignty from the United States. Treason committed
against the United States or against its instrumentality, the Commonwealth
Government, which exercised, but did not possess, sovereignty (id., p. 49), is
therefore not treason against the sovereign and independent Republic of the
Philippines. Article
XVIII was inserted in order, merely, to make the Constitution applicable to the
Republic.Reliance is also placed on section 2 of the Constitution which provides
that all laws of the Philippines Islands shall remain operative, unless
inconsistent therewith, until amended, altered, modified or repealed by the
Congress of the Philippines, and on section 3 which is to the effect that all cases
pending in courts shall be heard, tried, and determined under the laws then in
force, thereby insinuating that these constitutional provisions authorize the
Republic of the Philippines to enforce article 114 of the Revised Penal Code. The
error is obvious. The latter article can remain operative under the present regime
if it is not inconsistent with the Constitution. The fact remains, however, that
said penal provision is fundamentally incompatible with the Constitution, in that
those liable for treason thereunder should owe allegiance to the United States or
the government of the Philippines, the latter being, as we have already pointed
out, a mere instrumentality of the former, whereas under the Constitution of the
present Republic, the citizens of the Philippines do not and are not required to
owe allegiance to the United States. To contend that article 114 must be deemed to
have been modified in the sense that allegiance to the United States is deleted,
and, as thus modified, should be applied to prior acts, would be to sanction the
enactment and application of anex post factolaw.In reply to the contention of the
respondent that the Supreme Court of the United States has held in the case of
Bradfordvs.Chase National Bank (24 Fed. Supp., 38), that the Philippines had a
sovereign status, though with restrictions, it is sufficient to state that said
case must be taken in the light of a subsequent decision of the same court in
Cincinnati Soap Co.vs.United States (301 U.S., 308), rendered in May, 1937,
wherein it was affirmed that the sovereignty of the United States over the
Philippines had not been withdrawn, with the result that the earlier case only be
interpreted to refer to the exercise of sovereignty by the Philippines as delegated
by the mother country, the United States.No conclusiveness may be conceded to the
statement of President Roosevelt on August 12, 1943, that "the United States in
practice regards the Philippines as having now the status as a government of other
independent nations--in fact all the attributes of complete and respected
nationhood," since said statement was not meant as having accelerated the date,
much less as a formal proclamation of, the Philippine Independence as contemplated
in the Tydings-McDuffie Law, it appearing that (1) no less also than the President
of the United States had to issue the proclamation of July 4, 1946, withdrawing the
sovereignty of the United States and recognizing Philippine Independence; (2) it
was General MacArthur, and not President Osmea who was with him, that proclaimed
on October 23, 1944, the restoration of the Commonwealth Government; (3) the
Philippines was not given official participation in the signing of the Japanese
surrender; (4) the United States Congress, and not the Commonwealth Government,
extended the tenure of office of the President and Vice-President of the
Philippines.The suggestion that as treason may be committed against the Federal as
well as against the State Government, in the same way treason may have been
committed against the sovereignty of the United States as well as against the
sovereignty of the Philippine Commonwealth, is immaterial because, as we have
already explained, treason against either is not and cannot be treason against the
new and different sovereignty of the Republic of the Philippines.G.R. No. L-49
November 12, 1945WILLIAM F. PERALTA,petitioner,#vs.#THE DIRECTOR OF
PRISONS,respondent.William F. Peralta in his own behalf.#Office of the Solicitor
General Taada for respondent.#City Fiscal Mabanag as amicus curiae.FERIA,J.:
Petitioner-defendant, a member of the Metropolitan Constabulary of Manila charged
with the supervision and control of the production, procurement and distribution of
goods and other necessaries as defined in section 1 of Act No. 9 of the National
Assembly of the so-called Republic of the Philippines, was prosecuted for the crime
of robbery as defined and penalized by section 2 (a) of Act No. 65 of the same
Assembly. He was found guilty and sentenced to life imprisonment, which he
commenced to serve on August 21, 1944, by the Court of Special and Exclusive
Criminal Jurisdiction, created in section 1 of Ordinance No. 7 promulgated by the
President of the so-called Republic of the Philippines, pursuant to the authority
conferred upon him by the Constitution and laws of the said Republic. And the
procedure followed in the trial was the summary one established in Chapter II of
Executive Order No. 157 of the Chairman of the Executive Commission, made
applicable to the trial violations of said Act No. 65 by section 9 thereof and
section 5 of said Ordinance No. 7.The petition forhabeas corpusis based on the
ground that the Court of Special and Executive Criminal Jurisdiction created by
Ordinance No. 7 "was a political instrumentality of the military forces of the
Japanese Imperial Army, the aims and purposes of which are repugnant to those aims
and political purposes of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, as well as those of
the United States of America, and therefore, null and void ab initio," that the
provisions of said Ordinance No. 7 are violative of the fundamental laws of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines and "the petitioner has been deprived of his
constitutional rights"; that the petitioner herein is being punished by a law
created to serve the political purpose of the Japanese Imperial Army in the
Philippines, and "that the penalties provided for are much (more) severe than the
penalties provided for in the Revised Penal Code."The Solicitor General, in his
answer in behalf of the respondent, states that, in his own opinion, for the
reasons expressed in his brief in the case ofPeople of the Philippines, plaintiffappellant, vs. Benedicto Jose y Santos, defendant-appellee, G. R. No. L-22 (p.
612,post), the acts and proceedings taken and had before the said Court of Special
and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction which resulted in the conviction and
imprisonment of the herein petitioner, should now be denied force and efficacy, and
therefore the petition forhabeas corpusshould be granted. The reasons advanced by
the Solicitor General in said brief and in his reply memorandum in support of his
contention are, that the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction
created, and the summary procedure prescribed therefor, by said Ordinance No. 7 in
connection with Executive Order No. 157 of the Chairman of the Executive Commission
are tinged with political complexion; that the procedure prescribed in Ordinance
No. 7 does not afford a fair trial, violates the Constitution of the Commonwealth,
and impairs the Constitutional rights of accused persons under their legitimate
Constitution. And he cites, in support of this last proposition, the decisions of
the Supreme Court of the United States in the cases of Texasvs.White (7 Wall.,
700, 743); Hornvs.Lockart (17 Wall., 570, 581); United Statesvs.Home Insurance
Co. (22 Wall., 99, 104); Sprottvs.United States (20 Wall., 459).The City Fiscal of
Manila appeared before this Court asamicus curiae. In his memorandum he submits
that the petition forhabeas corpusbe denied on the following grounds: That the
Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction and the Acts, Ordinances and
Executive Orders, creating it are not of a political complexion, for said Court was
created, and the crimes and offenses placed under its jurisdiction were penalized
heavily, in response to an urgent necessity, according to the preamble of Ordinance
No. 7; that the right to appeal in a criminal case is not a constitutional right;
and that the summary procedure established in said Ordinance No. 7 is not violative
of the provision of Article III, section 1 (18) of the Constitution of the
Commonwealth, to the effect that no person shall be compelled to be a witness
against himself, nor of the provision of section 1 (1) of the same Article that no
person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.
The features of the summary procedure adopted by Ordinance No. 7, assailed by the
petitioner and the Solicitor General as impairing the constitutional rights of an
accused are: that court may interrogate the accused and witnesses before trial in
order to clarify the points in dispute; that the refusal of the accused to answer
the questions may be considered unfavorable to him; that if from the facts admitted
at the preliminary interrogatory it appears that the defendant is guilty, he may be
immediately convicted; and that the sentence of the sentence of the court is not
appealable, except in case of death penalty which cannot be executed unless and
until reviewed and affirmed by a special division of the Supreme Court composed of
three Justices.Before proceeding further, and in order to determine the law
applicable to the questions involved in the present case, it is necessary to bear
in mind the nature and status of the government established in these Islands by the
Japanese forces of occupation under the designation of Republic of the Philippines.
In the case ofCo Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon(G. R. No. L-5, pp. 113,
127,ante), recently decided, this Court, speaking through the Justice who pens
this decision, held:In view of the foregoing, it is evident that the Philippines
Executive Commission, which was organized by Order No. 1, issued on January 23,
1942, by the Commander of the Japanese forces, was
a civil government established by the military forces of occupation and therefore
ade factogovernment of the second kind. It was not different from the government
established by the British in Castine, Maine, or by the United States in Tanpico,

Mexico. As Halleck says, "the government established over an enemy's territory
during the military occupation may exercise all the powers given by the laws of war
to the conqueror over the conquered, and is subject to all restrictions which that
code imposes. It is of little consequence whether such government be called a
military or civil government. Its character is the same and the source of its
authority the same. In either case it is a government imposed by the laws of war
and so far as it concerns the inhabitants of such territory or the rest of the
world those laws alone determine the legality or illegality of its acts." (vol. 2
p. 466.) The fact that the Philippine Executive Commission was a civil and not a
military government and was run by Filipinos and not by Japanese nationals is of no
consequence.And speaking of the so-called Republic of the Philippines in the same
decision, this Court said:The so-called Republic of the Philippines, apparently
established and organized as a sovereign state independent from any other
government by the Filipino people, was, in truth and reality, a government
established by the belligerent occupant or the Japanese forces of occupation. It
was of the same character as the Philippine Executive Commission, and the ultimate
source of its authority was the same the Japanese military authority and
government. As General MacArthur stated in his proclamation of October 23, 1944, a
portion of which has been already quoted, "under enemy duress, a so-called
government styled as the 'Republic of the Philippines' was established on October
14, 1943, based upon neither the free expression of the peoples" will nor the
sanction of the Government of the United States.' Japan had no legal power to grant
independence to the Philippines or transfer the sovereignty of the United States
to, or recognize the latent sovereignty of the Filipino people, before its military
occupation and possession of the Islands had matured into an absolute and permanent
dominion or sovereignty by a treaty of peace or other means recognized in the law
of nations.As the so-called Republic of the Philippines was ade factogovernment
of the second kind (of paramount force), as the government established in Castine,
Maine, during its occupation by the British forces and as that of Tampico, Mexico,
occupied during the war with that the country by the United State Army, the
question involved in the present case cannot be decided in the light of the
Constitution of the Commonwealth Government; because the belligerent occupantwas
totally independent of the constitutionof the occupied territory in carrying out
the administration over said territory; and the doctrine laid down by the Supreme
Court of the United States in the cases involving the validity of judicial and
legislative acts of the Confederate States, considered asde factogovernments of
the third kind, does not apply to the acts of the so-called Republic of the
Philippines which is ade factogovernment of paramount force. The Constitution of
the so-called Republic of the Philippines can neither be applied, since the
validity of an act of a belligerent occupant cannot be tested in the light of
another act of the same occupant, whose criminal jurisdiction is drawn entirely
from the law martial as defined in the usages of nations.In the case of United
Statesvs.Rice (4 Wheaton, 246), the Supreme Court of the United States held that,
by the military occupation of Castine, Maine, the sovereignty of the United States
in the territory was, of course, suspended, and the laws of the United States could
no longer be rightfully enforced there or be obligatory upon the inhabitants who
remained and submitted to the belligerent occupant. By the surrender the
inhabitants passed under a temporary allegiance to the British government, and were
bound by such laws, and such only, as it chose to recognize and impose. And
Oppenheim, in his Treatise on International Law, says that, in carrying out the
administration over the occupied territory and its inhabitants, "the (belligerent)
occupant is totally independent of the constitution and the laws of the territory,
since occupation is an aim of warfare, and the maintenance and safety of his
forces, and the purpose of war, stand in the foreground of his interest and must be
promoted under all circumstances or conditions. (Vol. II, Sixth Edition, Revised,
1944, p. 342.)The doctrine laid down in the decisions of the Supreme Court of the
United States (in the cases of Texasvs.White, 7 Wall., 700; Hornvs.Lockart, 17
Wall., 570; Williamsvs.Bruffy, 96 U. S., 176 United Statesvs.Home Insurance
Co., 20 Wall., 249; Sprottvs.United States, 20 Wall., 459, and others) that the
judicial and legislative acts of the Confederate States which impaired the rights
of the citizens under the Constitution of the United States or of the States, or
were in conflict with those constitutions, were null and void, is not applicable to
the present case. Because that doctrine rests on the propositions that "the
concession (of belligerency) made to the Confederate Government . . . sanctioned no
hostile legislation . . . and it impaired in no respect the rights of loyal and
citizens as they existed at the commencement of hostilities"
(Williamsvs.Bruffy,supra);that the Union is perpetual and indissoluble, and the
obligation of allegiance to the to the estate and obedience to her laws and the
estate constitution, subject to the Constitution of the United States, remained
unimpaired during the War of Secession (Texasvs.White,supra) and that the
Confederate States "in most, if not in all instances, merely transferred the
existing state organizations to the support of a new and different national head.
the same constitution, the same laws for the protection of the property and
personal rights remained and were administered by the same officers."
(Sprottvs.United States,supra). In fine, because in the case of the Confederate
States, the constitution of each state and that of the United States or the Union
continued in force in those states during the War of Secession; while the
Constitution of the Commonwealth Government was suspended during the occupation of
the Philippines by the Japanese forces of the belligerent occupant at regular war
with the United States.The question which we have to resolve in the present case in
the light of the law of nations are, first, the validity of the creation of the
Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction, and of the summary procedure
adopted for that court; secondly, the validity of the sentence which imprisonment
during the Japanese military occupation; and thirdly, if they were then valid, the
effect on said punitive sentence of the reoccupation of the Philippines and the
restoration therein of the Commonwealth Government.(1) As to the validity of the
creation of the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction by Ordinance
No. 7, the only factor to be considered is the authority of the legislative power
which promulgated said law or ordinance. It is well established in International
Law that "The criminal jurisdiction established by the invader in the occupied
territory finds its source neither in the laws of the conquering or conquered
state, it is drawn entirely form the law martial as defined in the usages of
nations. The authority thus derived can be asserted either through special
tribunals, whose authority and procedure is defined in the military code of the
conquering state, or through the ordinary courts and authorities of the occupied
district." (Taylor, International Public Law, p. 598.) The so-called Republic of
the Philippines, being a governmental instrumentality of the belligerent occupant,
had therefore the power or was competent to create the Court of Special and
Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction. No question may arise as to whether or not a court
is of political complexion, for it is mere a governmental agency charged with the
duty of applying the law to cases falling within its jurisdiction. Its judgments
and sentences may be of political complexion, or not depending upon the nature or
character of the law so applied. There is no room for doubt, therefore, as to the
validity of the creation of the court in question.With respect to the Summary
procedure adopted by Ordinance No. 7, and followed in the trial of the case which
resulted in the conviction of the herein petitioner, there is also no question as
to the power or competence of the belligerent occupant to promulgate the law
providing for such procedure. For "the invader deals freely with the relations of
the inhabitants of the occupied territory towards himself . . . for his security
also, he declares certain acts, not forbidden by the ordinary laws of the country,
to be punishable;and he so far suspends the laws which guard personal liberty as
is required for the summary punishmentof any one doing such acts." (Hall's
International Law, seventh ed., p. 5000). A belligerent "occupant may where
necessary, set up military courts instead of the ordinary courts; and in case, and
in so far as, he admits the administration of justice by the ordinary courts, he
may nevertheless, so far as is necessary for military purposes, or for the
maintenance of public order and safetytemporarily alter the laws, especially the
Criminal Law, on the basis of which justice is administeredas well as the laws
regarding procedure." (Oppenheim's International Law, Vol. II, sixth edition, 1944,
p.349.)No objection can be set up to the legality of its provisions in the light of
the precepts
of our Commonwealth Constitution relating to the rights of accused under that
Constitution, because the latter was not in force during the period of the Japanese
military occupation, as we have already stated. Nor may said Constitution be
applied upon its revival at the time of the re-occupation of the Philippines by
virtue of the principle of postliminium because "a constitution should operate
prospectively only, unless the words employed show a clear intention that it should
have a retrospective effect" (Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, seventh edition,
page 97, and cases quoted and cited in the footnote), especially as regards laws of
procedure applied to cases already terminated completely.The only restrictions or
limitations imposed upon the power of a belligerent occupant to alter the laws or
promulgate new ones, especially the criminal law as well as the laws regarding
procedure, so far as it is necessary for military purposes, that is, for his
control of the territory and the safety and protection of his army, are those
imposed by the Hague Regulations, the usages established by civilized nations, the
laws of humanity and the requirements of public conscience. It is obvious that the
summary procedure under consideration does not violate those precepts. It cannot be
considered as violating the laws of humanity and public conscience, for it is less
objectionable, even from the point of view of those who are used to the accusatory
system of criminal procedure than the procedural laws based on the semiinquisitorial or mixed system prevailing in France and other countries in
continental Europe.(2) The validity of the sentence rendered by the Court of
Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction which imposes life imprisonment upon
the herein petitioner, depends upon the competence or power of the belligerent
occupant to promulgate Act No. 65 which punishes the crime of which said petitioner
was convicted.Westlake says that Article XLIII, Section III, of the Hague
Conventions of 1907 "indicates that the laws to be enforced by the occupant consist
of, first, the territorial law in general, as that which stands to the public order
and social and commercial life of the district in a relation of mutual adaptation,
so that any needless displacement of it would defeat the object which the invader
is enjoined to have in view, and secondly, such variations of the territorial law
as may be required by real necessity and are not expressly prohibited by any of the
rules which will come before us. Such variations will naturally be greatest in what
concerns the relation of the communities and individuals within the district to the
invading army and its followers, it being necessary for the protection of the
latter, and for the unhindered prosecution of the war by them, that acts committed
to their detriment shall not only lose what justification the territorial law might
give them as committed against enemies, but shall be repressed more severely than
the territorial law would repress acts committed against fellow subjects. Indeed
the entire relation between the invaders and the invaded, so far as it may fall
within the criminal department whether by the intrinsic nature of the acts done or
in consequence of the regulations made by the invaders, may be considered as taken
out of the territorial law and referred to what is called martial law." (Westlake,
International Law, Part II, War, p. 96.)According to Hyde (International Law, Vol.
II, p. 386), the term "martial law," in so far as it is used to describe any fact
in relation to belligerent occupation, does not refer to a particular code or
system of law, or to a special agency entrusted with its administration. The term
merely signifies that the body of law actually applied, having the sanction of
military authority, is essentially martial. All law, by whomsoever administered, in
an occupied district martial law; and it is none the less so when applied by civil
courts in matters devoid of special interest to the occupant. The words "martial
law" are doubtless suggestive of the power of the occupant to share the law as he
sees fit; that is, to determine what shall be deemed lawful or unlawful acts, to
establish tests for ascertaining the guilt of offenders, to fix penalties, and
generally to administer justice through such agencies as the found expedient.And
the United States Rules of Land Warfare provide that the belligerent occupant may
promulgate such new laws and regulations as military necessity demands, and in this
class will be included those laws which come into being as a result of military
rule; that is, those which establish new crimes and offenses incident to a state of
war and are necessary for the control of the country and the protection of the
army, for the principal object of the occupant is to provide for the security of
the invading army and to contribute to its support and efficiency and the success
of its operations. (Pub. 1940, pp. 76, 77.)From the above it appears clear that it
was within the power and competence of the belligerent occupant to promulgate,
through the National Assembly of the so-called Republic of the Philippines, Act No.
65 of the said Assembly, which penalizes the crimes of robbery and other offenses
by imprisonment ranging from the maximum period of the imprisonment prescribed by
the laws and ordinances promulgated by the President of the so-called Republic as
minimum, to life imprisonment or death as maximum. Although these crimes are
defined in the Revised Penal Code, they were altered and penalized by said Act No.
65 with different and heavier penalties, as new crimes and offenses demanded by
military necessity, incident to a state of war, and necessary for the control of
the country by the belligerent occupant, the protection and safety of the army of
occupation, its support and efficiency, and the success of its operations.They are
not the same ordinary offenses penalized by the Revised Penal Code. The criminal
acts penalized by said Act No. 65 are those committed by persons charged or
connected with the supervision and control of the production, procurement and
distribution of foods and other necessaries; and the penalties imposed upon the
violators are different from and much heavier than those provided by the Revised
Penal Code for the same ordinary crimes. The acts penalized by said Act were taken
out of the territorial law or Revised Penal Code, and referred to what is called
martial law by international jurists, defined above by Hyde, in order, not only to
prevent food and other necessaries from reaching the "guerrillas" which were
harassing the belligerent occupant from every nook and corner of the country, but
also to preserve the food supply and other necessaries in order that, in case of
necessity, the Imperial Japanese forces could easily requisition them, as they did,
and as they had the right to do in accordance with the law of nations for their
maintenance and subsistence (Art. LII, Sec. III, Hague Conventions of 1907).
Especially taking into consideration the fact, of which this court may take
judicial notice, that the Imperial Japanese Army had depended mostly for their
supply upon the produce of this country.The crimes penalized by Act No. 65 as
well as the crimes against national security and the law of nations, to wit:
treason, espionage, inciting war, violation of neutrality, correspondence with
hostile country, flight to enemy's country, piracy; and the crimes against public
order, such as rebellion, sedition and disloyalty, illegal possession of firearms
and other, penalized by Ordinance No. 7 and placed under jurisdiction of the Court
of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction are all of a political complexion,
because the acts constituting those offenses were punished, as are all political
offenses, for public rather than private reasons, and were acts in aid or favor of
the enemy and against the welfare, safety and security of the belligerent occupant.
While it is true that these offenses, when committed against the Commonwealth or
United States Government, are defined and also penalized by the territorial law
Revised Penal Code, they became inapplicable as crimes against the occupier upon
the occupation of the Islands by the Japanese forces. And they had to be taken out
of the territorial law and made punishable by said Ordinance No. 7, for they were
not penalized before under the Revised Penal Code when committed against the
belligerent occupant or the government established by him in these Island. They are
also considered by some writers as war crimes in a broad sense. In this connection
Wheaton observes the following:"Of 'war crimes' the number is naturally indefinite,
depending as they do on the acts from time to time ordered to be done or forbidden
to be done in the martial law proclamation or regulations of the invading or
occupying commander. Thus, in the Anglo-Boer war, the British military authorities
proclaimed the following to be offenses against their martial law; Being in
possession of arms, ammunition, etc.; traveling without a permit; sending
prohibited goods; holding meetings other than those allowed; using seditious
language; spreading alarmist reports; overcharging for goods; wearing uniforms

without due authority; going out of doors between certain hours; injuring military
animals or stores; being in possession, without a permit, of horses, vehicles,
cycles, etc.; hindering those in execution of military orders; trespassing on
defense works. Such offenses, together with several others, were specified in the
Japanese regulations made in the Russo-Japanese war." (Wheaton's International Law,
War, seventh edition, 1944, p. 242.)It is, therefore, evident that the sentence
rendered by the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction against the
petitioner,
imposing upon him the penalty of life imprisonment, was good and valid, since it
was within the admitted power or competence of the belligerent occupant to
promulgate the law penalizing the crime of which petitioner was convicted.(3) The
last question is the legal effect of the reoccupation of the Philippines and
restoration of the Commonwealth Government; that is whether or not, by the
principle of postliminy, the punitive sentence which petitioner is now serving fell
through or ceased to be valid from that time.In order to resolve this last
question, it is not necessary to enter into an elaborate discussion on the matter.
It is sufficient to quote the opinion on the subject of several international
jurists and our recent decision in the case ofCo Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and
Dizon, supra.Hall, commenting on the effect of the principle of postliminy upon
sentences of the tribunals continued or created by the belligerent occupant, opines
"that judicial acts done under this control, when they are not of a political
complexion, administrative acts so done, to the extent that they take effect during
the continuance of his control, and the various acts done during the same time by
private persons under the sanction of municipal law, remain good. . . . Political
acts on the other hand fall through as of course, whether they introduce any
positive change into the organization of the country, or whether they only suspend
the working of that already in existence. The execution also of punitive sentences
ceases as of course when they have had reference to acts not criminal by the
municipal law of the state, such for example as acts directed against the security
or control of the invader." (Hall's International Law, seventh edition, p. 518.)
Westlake, speaking of the duration of the validity of punitive sentences for
offenses such as the one in question, which is within the admitted power or
competence of the belligerent occupant to punish, says that: "To the extent to
which the legal power of the occupant is admitted he can make law for the duration
of his occupation. Like any other legislator he is morally subject to the duty of
giving sufficient notice of his enactments or regulations, not indeed so as to be
debarred from carrying out his will without notice, when required by military
necessity and so far as practically carrying out his will can be distinguished from
punishment, but always remembering that to punish for breach of a regulation a
person who was justifiably ignorant of it would be outrageous. But the law made by
the occupant within his admitted power, whether morally justifiable or not, will
bind any member of the occupied population as against any other member of it, and
will bind as between them all and their national government, so far as it produces
an effect during the occupation. When the occupation comes to an end the authority
of the national government is restored, either by the progress of operations during
the war or by the conclusion of a peace, no redress can be had for what has been
actually carried out but nothing further can follow from the occupant's
legislation. A prisoner detained under it must be released, and no civil right
conferred by it can be further enforced. The enemy's law depends on him for
enforcement as well as for enactment. The invaded state is not subject to the
indignity of being obliged to execute his commands. (Westlake, International Law,
Part II, War, pp. 97, 98.)And Wheaton, who, as above stated, considers as war
crimes such offenses as those penalized in Ordinance No. 7 and Act No. 65, says:
"In general, the cast of the occupant possess legal validity, and under
international law should not be abrogated by the subsequent government. But this
rule does not necessarily apply to acts that exceed the occupant's power
(e.g.,alienation of the domains of the State or the sovereign), to sentences for
'war treason'and'war crimes,'to acts of a political character, and to those that
beyond the period of occupation. When occupation ceases, no reparation is legally

due for what has already been carried out." (Wheaton's International Law,supra, p.
245.)We have already held in our recent decision in the case ofCo Kim Cham vs.
Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon, supra, that all judgments of political complexion of the
courts during the Japanese regime, ceased to be valid upon the reoccupation of the
islands by virtue of the principle or right of postliminium. Applying that doctrine
to the present case, the sentence which convicted the petitioner of a crime of a
political complexion must be considered as having ceased to be validipso facto
uponthe reoccupation or liberation of the Philippines by General Douglas
MacArthur.It may not be amiss to say in this connection that it is not necessary
and proper to invoke the proclamation of General Douglas MacArthur declaring null
and void all laws, among them Act No. 65, of the so-called Republic of the
Philippines under which petitioner was convicted, in order to give retroactive
effect to the nullification of said penal act and invalidate sentence rendered
against petitioner under said law, a sentence which, before the proclamation, had
already become null and of no effect.We therefore hold that the punitive sentence
under consideration, although good and valid during the military occupation of the
Philippines by the Japanese forces, ceased to be good and validipso factoupon the
reoccupation of these Island and the restoration therein of the Commonwealth
Government.In view of all the foregoing, the writ ofhabeas corpusprayed for is
hereby granted and it is ordered that the petitioner be released forthwith, without
pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.Jaranilla, Pablo and Bengzon,
JJ.,concur.#Moran, C.J.,concurs in the result.#Separate Opinions
OZAETA,J.,concurring:Amidst the forest of opinions that have cropped up in this
case it would seem unnecessary to plant an additional tree. To justify our effort
lest we seem intent to bring coal to Newcastle we ought to state that the
following opinion had been prepared before the others were tendered. It has been
impossible for the Court to reconcile and consolidate the divergent views of its
members although they arrive at practically the same result.Accused of robbery in
the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction of Manila, the petitioner
was found guilty and sentenced to life imprisonment. He commenced to serve the
sentence on August 21, 1944. He now petitions this Court for the writ ofhabeas
corpus, alleging that Ordinance No. 7, by which the Court of Special and Exclusive
Criminal Jurisdiction was created and which was promulgated on March 8, 1944, by
the President of the "Republic of the Philippines," was null and void ab initio.
The Solicitor General, answering the petition on behalf of the respondent Director
of Prisons, expressed the opinion that "the acts and proceedings taken and before
the said Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction which resulted in the
conviction and imprisonment of the herein prisoner should now be denied force and
efficacy," and recommended "that the writ ofhabeas corpusprayed for be granted and
that the City Fiscal be instructed to prepare and file the corresponding
information for robbery against the petitioner herein in the Court of First
Instance of Manila."The case was argued before us on September 21 and 22, 1945, by
the First Assistant Solicitor General on behalf of the respondent and the City
Fiscal asamicus curiae the former impugning and the latter sustaining the
validity of said Ordinance No. 7. Section 1 of the ordinance in question reads as
follows:SECTION 1. There is hereby created in every province and city throughout
the Philippines one or more courts of special criminal jurisdiction as the
President of the Republic of the Philippines may determine upon recommendation of
the Minister of Justice, which courts shall have exclusive jurisdiction to try and
determine crimes and offenses penalized by Act No. 65 entitled "An Act imposing
heavier penalties for crimes involving robbery, bribery, falsification, frauds,
illegal exactions and transactions, malversation of public funds and infidelity as
defined in the Revised Penal Code and violations of food control laws, when
committed by public officers and employees, and for similar offenses when committed
by private individuals or entities, and providing for a summary procedure for the
trial of such offenders."Section 2 confers upon the court mentioned in section 1
exclusive jurisdiction also to try the following crimes as defined in the Revised
Penal Code: crimes against national security and the law of nations, crimes against
public order, brigandage, arson and other crimes involving destruction, illegal
detention committed by private individuals and kidnapping of minors; and illegal
possession of firearms, as defined in an executive order. Section 3 provides for
the appointment of one judge of first instance to preside over the court above
mentioned and of a special prosecutor in each special court. Section 4 authorizes
the court to impose a longer term of imprisonment than that fixed by law, or
imprisonment for life or death where not already fixed by law, for the crimes and
offenses mentioned in section 2. The remaining sections read as follows:SEC. 5. The
trial of the cases arising sections 1 and 2 hereof shall be started within two days
after the filing of the corresponding information, shall be summary in procedure,
and shall aim at their expeditious and prompt disposition. Technicalities shall be
avoided and all measures calculated to serve this end shall be taken by the trial
judge. Said cases shall be decided within four days after the same are submitted
for decision. The summary procedure provided in Act No. 65 insofar as not
inconsistent
with the provisions of this Ordinance, shall govern the trial of the cases
enumerated in said sections 1 and 2 hereof.SEC. 6. The decisions of the special
courts herein created shall be final except where the penalty imposed is death, in
which case the records of the particular case shall be elevateden consultato a
special division of the Supreme Court composed of the three members to be
designated by the President of the Republic of the Philippines. The clerk of each
special court, upon the promulgation of a decision imposing the death penalty,
shall immediately forward the records of the case to the special division of the
Supreme Court herein created, which shall decide the case within fifteen days from
the receipt of the records thereof.SEC. 7. The interest of public safety so
requiring it, the privileges of the writ ofhabeas corpusare hereby suspended with
respect to persons accused of, or under investigations for, any of the crimes and
offenses enumerated in sections 1 and 2 hereof.SEC. 8. All laws, rules or orders,
or parts thereof, inconsistent with the provisions hereof, are hereby repealed or
modified accordingly.SEC. 9. This Ordinance shall take effect immediately upon its
promulgation.The summary procedure provided in Act No. 65 of the "Republic," as
referred to in section 5 above quoted, is in turn that established by Chapter II of
Executive Order No. 157 of the Chairman of the Philippine Executive Commission,
dated May 18, 1943. Under said procedure (section 17) "search warrants may be
issued by the court or by any prosecuting officer, authorizing peace officers to
search for and seize any articles or objects described in the warrant, including
those which may be regarded as evidence of an offense under this Order even if such
articles or objects are not included among those described in section 2, Rule 122,
of the Rules of Court." Section 18 reads as follows:SEC. 18. The accused or his
representative may be examined by the court, and with the permission of the court,
by the fiscal or other prosecuting officer as to any matters favorable or
unfavorable to him or his principal; and either may apply to the judge for the
examination of the co-accused or the representative of the latter in matters
related to the defense of the accused. Statements made by the accused, his coaccused, or the representative of the accused or a person acting in a similar
capacity, irrespective of the circumstances under which they were made, shall be
admissible in evidence if material to the issue.Section 21 provides for the summary
trial in the following manner:Such trials shall be conducted according to the
following rules:(a) After arraignment and plea, the court shall immediately cause
to be explained to the accused the facts constituting the offenses with which he is
charged, and the judge shall interrogate the accused and the witnesses as to the
facts and circumstances of the case in order to clarify the points in dispute and
those which are admitted.(b) Refusal of the accused to answer any questions made or
allowed by the court may be considered unfavorable to him.(c) Except for
justifiable reasons, the accused shall not be allowed to plead and assert defenses
that are inconsistent with each other.(d) If from the facts admitted at the
preliminary interrogation, it should appear that the accused is guilty of the crime
charged in the information, or in any other information, or in any other
information, or in any other information subsequently filed by the prosecuting
officer, a sentence of conviction may be immediately rendered against the accused.

Otherwise, the judge shall dictate an order distinctly specifying the facts
admitted by the accused and those which are in dispute, and the trial shall be
limited to the latter, unless the judge, for special reasons, otherwise directs.(e)
Unjustified absence of an accused who has been released on bail, or of his
representative shall not be a ground for interrupting the proceedings or attacking
the validity of the judgment.The provisions of Rules 115 to 117 of the Rules of
Court shall be suppletory to the foregoing insofar as they are not in conflict
therewith.The records shows that during their existence the courts of special and
exclusive criminal jurisdiction created by the ordinance in question convicted and
sentenced a total of 94 individuals, 55 of whom had been prosecuted for illegal
possession of firearms and 15 for robbery; and that of the 94 convicts only 3,
including the herein petitioner, remain in confinement, 21 having escaped, 37
having been released, and 33 having died.In synthesis, the argument of the
Solicitor General is as follows: Acts of the military occupant which exceed his
power tested by the criterion set forth in article 43 of the Hague Regulations, are
null and without effect as against the legitimate government. (Wheaton's
International Law, 7th ed., p. 245.) Acts in furtherance or support of rebellion
against the United States, or intended to defeat the just rights of citizens, and
other Acts of like nature, must, in general, be regarded as invalid and void.
(Texasvs.White, 74 U. S., 733; 19 Law. ed., 240.) Judicial or legislative acts in
the insurrectionary states were valid where they were not hostile in their purpose
or mode of enforcement to the authority of the national government, and did not
impair the rights of citizens under the Constitution. (Hornvs.Lockhart, 17 Wall.,
570-581; 21 Law. ed., 660.) All the enactment of thede factolegislatures in the
insurrectionary states during the war, which were not hostile to the Union or to
the authority of the General Government and which were not in conflict with the
Constitution of the United States, or of the states, have the same validity as if
they had been enactments of legitimate legislatures. (United Statesvs.The Home
Insurance Co., 22 Wall., 99-104; 22 Law. ed., 818.) Tested by these principles of
international law, Ordinance No. 7 must be declared void (1) because it favored the
forces of occupation and the civilian Japanese inasmuch as it provided an
excessively heavy penalty for the summary trial of possession of firearms and
violations of food control regulations and (2) because it impaired the rights of
citizens under the Constitution inasmuch as the procedure therein prescribed
withdrew the privilege of the accused against self-incrimination and his right to
appeal to the Supreme Court even where the penalty imposed was life imprisonment or
death.In substance, the City Fiscal argues that the heavier penalty for the illegal
possession of firearms than that fixed by the Administrative Code was not directed
toward the suppression of underground activities against the Japanese army, and the
rigid enforcement of the food control measures was not intended to insure the
procurement of supplies by said army, because in any event the Japanese military
occupant freely exercised the power to go after and punish his enemies directly
without recurring to the agencies of the "Republic," for there were even cases
where the offenders were already in the hands of the police or courts of the
"Republic" but they were unceremoniously taken from said agencies by the Japanese
military police and punished or liquidated by it at Fort Santiago or elsewhere; and
as regards food control, the Japanese forces did not have any need of the measures
or agencies established by the "Republic" because the Japanese forces themselves
commandeered what they needed or sent out their own agents to purchase it for them
at prices even much higher than those fixed by the "Republic"; that the procedure
prescribed afforded a fair trial and did not violate any fundamental rights; that
the military occupant was not in duty bound to respect the constitution and the
laws of the occupied territory; that he could abrogate all of them and promulgate
new ones if he so chose; that the cases cited by the Solicitor General are not
applicable because they deal with the validity of acts and processes of the
governments of the rebel states during the Civil War and are based upon the
indissolubility of the Union; that the validity or nullity of the ordinance in
question should be judged in the light of the provisions of the Constitution and
the laws of the "Republic" and of generally accepted principles of international

law; that even assuming that it should be judged by the standard or the
Constitution of the Commonwealth, the ordinance satisfies all the requirements of
said Constitution; that the right to appeal in a criminal case is not a
constitutional but a purely statutory right which may be granted or withheld at the
pleasure of the state; and, finally, that the supposed invalidity of the sentence
imposed against the petitioner cannot be raised byhabeas corpus.There is no
question that in virtue of that of the proclamation of General MacArthur of October
23, 1944 (41 Off. Gaz., 147, 148), Ordinance No. 7 is no longer of any force and
effect since the restoration of the Government of the Common wealth of the
Philippines. The question before us is whether said ordinance ever acquired any
force and effect or was null and voidab initio.Invoking decisions of the Supreme
Court of the United States in cases involving the validity of Acts of the
Confederacy and of a rebel state as ade factogovernment during the Civil War, the
Solicitor General maintains that the ordinance in question was null and void
because it impaired the rights of citizens under the Constitution and because it
was hostile in its purpose to the United States and the Commonwealth of the
Philippines.The decisions invoked would be applicable if the so-called Republic of
the Philippines should be considered as a government established by the Filipino
people in rebellion against the Commonwealth and the Sovereignty of the United
States. The decisions
of the Supreme Court of the United States declaring invalid Acts of a rebel state
or of the Confederacy which were in furtherance or support of rebellion against the
United States or which impaired the rights of citizens under the Constitution, rest
on the proposition that the Union is perpetual and indissoluble and that the
obligations of allegiance to the state, and obedience to her laws, subject to the
Constitution of the United States, remained unimpaired during the War of Secession.
(See Texasvs.White, 74 U.S., 700; 19 Law. ed., 227, 237; Williamvs.Bruffy, 96
U.S., 176; 24 Law. ed. 716.) Obviously, that proposition does not hold true with
respect to ade factogovernment established by the enemy in an invaded and
occupied territory in the course of a war between two independent nations. Such
territory is possessed temporarily so possessed temporarily by lawful government at
war with the country of which the territory so possessed is a part, and during that
possession the obligations of the inhabitants to their country are suspended,
although not abrogated (United Statesvs.Rice, 4 Wheat., 253; Flemingvs.Page 9
How., 614; Baldyvs.Hunter, 171 U.S., 388; 43 Law. ed., 208, 210.) In the case of
Williamsvs.Bruffy,supra, the court, speaking though Mr. Justice Field, observed:
"The rule stated by Vattel, that the justice of the cause between two enemies being
by law of nations reputed to be equal, whatsoever is permitted to the one in virtue
of war is also permitted to the other, applies only to cases of regular war between
independent nations. It has no application to the case of a war between an
established government and insurgents seeking to withdraw themselves from its
jurisdiction or to overthrow its authority. The court further stated that the
concession of belligerent rights made to the Confederate Government sanctioned no
hostile legislation and impaired in no respect the rights loyal citizens as they
had existed at the commencement of hostilities.On the other hand, in a war between
independent nations "the rights of the occupant as a law-giver have broad scope."
He many "suspend the existing laws and promulgate new ones when the exigencies of
the military service demand such action. According to the Rules of Land Warfare he
will naturally alter or suspend all laws of a political nature as well as a
political privileges, and laws which affect the welfare and safety of his command."
(Hyde on International Law, vol. 2, p. 367.) It will be seen then that in a war
between independent nation the army of occupation has the right to enact laws and
take measures hostile to its enemy, for its purpose was to harass and subdue the
latter; and it is not bound to respect or preserve the rights of the citizens of
the occupied territory under their Constitution.Let us now look into the nature and
status of the government styled "Republic of the Philippines "in order to
determined the criterion by which the validity of its enactments should be tested.
In the recent case ofCo Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh Dizon(G.R. No. L-5, p.
113,ante), this Court speaking through Justice Feria, had occasion to comment upon
the nature of said government in the following words:The so-called Republic of the
Philippines, apparently established and organized as a sovereign state independent
from any other government by the Filipino people, was, in truth and reality, a
government established by the belligerent occupant or the Japanese forces of
occupation. It was of the same character as the Philippines Executive Commission,
and the ultimate source of its authority was the same the Japanese military
authority and government. As General McArthur stated in his proclamation of October
23, 1944, a portion of which had been already quoted, "under enemy duress a was
established on October 14, 1943, base upon neither the free expression of the
peoples" will nor the sanction of the Government of the United States.' Japan had
no legal power to grant independence to the Philippines or transfer the sovereignty
of the United State to, or recognize the latent sovereignty of, the Filipino
people, before its military occupation and possession of the Islands had matured
into an absolute and permanent dominion or sovereignty by a treaty of peace or
other means recognized in the law of nations. For it is a well-established doctrine
in internal law, recognized in the law, recognized in Article 45 of the Hague
Conventions of 1907 (which prohibits compulsion of the population of the occupied
territory to swear allegiance to the hostile power), that belligerent
occupation,being essentially provisional, does not severe to transfer sovereignty
over the territory controlled although the de jure government is during the period
of occupancy deprived of the power to exercise its rights as such. (Thirty Hogshead
of Sugarvs.Boyle, 9 Cranch, 191; United Statesvs.Rice, 4 Wheat., 246;
Flemingvs.Page, 9 Howard, 603; Downesvs.Bidwell, 182 U.S., 345.) The formation
of the Republic of the Philippines was a scheme contrived by Japan to delude of the
Filipino people into believing in the apparent magnanimity of the Japanese gesture
of transferring or turning over the rights of governments into the hands of
Filipinos. It was established under the mistaken belief that, by doing so, Japan
would secure the cooperation or at least the neutrality of the Filipino people in
her war against the United States and other allied nations.We reaffirmed those
statements. To show further the fictitious character of much-propagandized
"independence" which Japan purported to grant to the Philippines through the
establishment of the "Republic", we may add that, as matter of contemporary history
and of common knowledge, in practice the Japanese military authorities in the
Philippines never treated the "Republic of the Philippines" as an independent
government after its inauguration. They continued to impose their will on its
executive officials when their interests so required. The Japanese military police
arrested and punished various high officials of said government, including the
First Assistant Solicitor General, and paid no attention to the protests and
representations made on their behalf by the President of the "Republic." As a
climax of their continual impositions, in December 1944 the Japanese military
authorities placed the President and the members of his Cabinet under the
"protective" custody of the military police, and on the 22nd of the month forced
them to leave the seat of the government in Manila and hide with them in the
mountains. The only measure they did not succeed in imposing upon the "Republic"
was the conscription of the Filipino youth into an army to fight with the Japanese
against the United States. So, while in theory and for the purpose of propaganda
Japan professed to be a benefactor and liberator of the Filipinos, hoping thereby
to secure their willing cooperation in her war efforts, in practice she continued
to enslave and oppress the Filipinos, as she saw that the latter remained loyal to
the United States. She found that the Filipinos merely feigned cooperation as their
only means of self-preservation and that those who could stay beyond the reach of
her army of occupation manifested their hospitality by harassing and attacking that
army. Thus Japan continued to oppress and tyrannize the Filipinos notwithstanding
the former's grant of "independence" to the latter. It would therefore be
preposterous to declare that the "Republic of the Philippines" was a government
established by the Filipino people in rebellion against the Commonwealth and the
sovereignty of the United States.The said government being a mere instrumentality
of the Commander in Chief of the Japanese army as military occupant, the ordinance
question promulgated by the President of the "Republic" must be deemed as an act

emanating from the power or authority of said occupant. The question, therefore, is
whether or not it was within the competence of the military occupant to pass such a
law.Article 43 of the Hague Regulations provides as follows:ART. 43. The authority
of the legitimate power having actually passed into the hands of the occupant, the
latter shall take all steps in his power to reestablish and insure, as far as
possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented,
the laws in force in the country.Commenting upon this article, Hyde in his work on
International Law, volume 2, pages 366, 367, 368, says:In consequence of his
acquisition of the power to control the territory concerned, the occupant enjoys
the right and is burdened with the duty to take all the measures within his power
to restore and insure public order and safety. In so doing he is given great
freedom may be partly due to circumstance that the occupant is obliged to consider
as a principal object the security, support, efficiency and success of his own
force in a hostile land inhabited by nationals of the enemy. . . .xxx
xxx xxxThe right to legislate is not deemed to be unlimited. According
to the Hague Regulations of 1907, the occupant is called upon to respect, "unless
absolutely prevented, the laws in force the ordinary civil and criminal laws which
do not conflict with security of his army or its support, efficiency, and success."
In the exercise of his powers the commander must be guided by his judgment and his
experience and a high sense of justice. (President McKinley, Order to the Secretary
of War, July 18, 1898, on the occupation of Santiago de Cuba by the American
forces, Moore, Dig. VII, p. 261.)Acts of the military occupant which exceed his
power tested by the criterion set forth in article 43 of the Hague Regulations, are
null and without effect as against the legitimate government. (Wheaton's
International Law, 7th ed. [1944], p.
245.)Hall in his Treatise on Internal Law, (7th edition), discussing the extent of
the right of a military occupant, states:If occupation is merely a phase in
military operations, and implies no change in the legal position of the invader
with respect to the occupied territory and its inhabitants, the rights which he
possesses over them are those which in the special circumstances represent his
general right to do whatever acts are necessary for the prosecution of his war; in
other words he has the right of exercising such control, and such control only,
within the occupied territory as is required for his safety and the success of his
operations. . . . On occupying a country an invader at once invest himself with
absolute authority; and the fact of occupation draws with it as of course the
substitution of his will for previously existing law whenever such substitution is
reasonably needed, and also the replacement of the actual civil judicial
administration by the military jurisdiction. In its exercise however this ultimate
authority is governed by the condition that the invader, having only a right to
such control as is necessary for his safety and the success of his operations, must
use his power within the limits defined by the fundamental notion of occupation,
and with due reference to its transient character. He is therefore forbidden as a
general rule to vary or suspend laws affecting property and private personal
relations, or which regulate the moral order of the community. . . . (Pages 498,
499.)We deduce from the authorities that the power of the occupant is broad and
absolute in matters affecting his safety. But in affairs which do not affect the
security, efficacy, and success of his military operations, his power is qualified
by the transient character of his administration. He is forbidden "to vary or
suspend laws affecting property and private personal relations, or which regulate
the moral order of the community." Unless absolutely prevented, he is bound to
laws, and civil and criminal, in force in the country.Tested by this criterion, was
it within the power or competence of the Commander in Chief of the Japanese army of
occupation of the Philippines to promulgate Ordinance No. 7? In so far as said
ordinance created new court of special criminal jurisdiction we think his power to
promulgate and enforce it during the occupation cannot be seriously disputed; but
in so far as that ordinance varied radically our law of criminal procedure and
deprived the accused of certain rights which our people have always treasured and
considered inviolate, we are of the that it transcended his power or competence. We
base this opinion upon the following considerations:1. The occupant was not
absolutely prevented from respecting our law of criminal procedure and the Court of
Special and Exclusive Criminal jurisdiction. The application or nonapplication of
said law did not affect the security, efficacy, and success of his military
operations. The crimes over which the said court was vested with jurisdiction were
mostly crimes against property penalized in our Revised Penal Code, which crimes
did not affect the army of occupation. As to the illegal possession of firearms the
City Fiscal himself, who the validity of the ordinance, informs us that the
occupant did not avail himself of said court but punished his enemies direct
without recurring to the agencies of the "Republic"; and he further informs us that
"as regards food control, the Japanese forces did not have any need of the measures
or agencies established by "Republic", nor did they make use of them.2. The summary
procedure prescribed in Ordinance No. 7 was inquisitorial, repugnant to the
humanitarian method of administering criminal justice adopted by all progressive,
democratic, and freedom-loving countries of the world, and, therefore, devoid of
that high sense of justice by which the military occupant must be guided in the
exercise of his powers. This concept is, we think, borne out by an examination of
the following features of said procedure:(a) Under the rule of procedure embodied
in said ordinance any prosecuting officer may, on his own volition and even without
probable cause, issue a search warrant for the seizure of documents and articles
which may be regarded as evidence of an offense in violation of section 2, Rule
122 of the Bill of Rights contained in the Constitution of the Commonwealth, which
guarantees "the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures," and prohibits the issuance
of warrants except upon probable causeto be determined by the judgeafter
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce.(b) The trial must be commencedwithintwo daysafter the filing of the
information in violation of section 7, Rule 114, which give the accusedat
leasttwo daysafter the pleaof not guilty within which to prepare fort trial.(c)
The presumption of innocence in favor of the accused in all criminal prosecutions
until the contrary is proved, which is likewise guaranteed by the Bill of Rights,
is violated in that, after the arraignment and before the presentation of any proof
for the prosecution, the accused is interrogated by the judge as to the facts and
circumstances of the case, and if from the facts obtained by such interrogation it
should appear (to the judge) that accused is guilty a sentence of conviction may be
immediately rendered against him, thereby also depriving him of his right to meet
the witnesses face to face and of his privilege against self-incrimination.The City
Fiscal justifies this feature of the procedure by giving the following hypothetical
case: "In the house of Juan and under his bed a policeman finds a revolver. Juan is
arrested and an information for illegal possession of firearms is filed against him
by the fiscal. He is brought before the judge of the corresponding special court
for the preliminary interrogatory. He is asked whether or not he admits that the
revolver was found in his house. He answers in the affirmative but says that he is
not the owner of the revolver and he does not know how it placed there. Asked
whether he knows of anybody who could have placed the revolver under his bed, he
answers that it might have been place there by a guest who slept on his bed the
night previous to its discovery by the polices. He is asked to give the name of the
guest reffered to and his address, but he refuses to answers. Asked if he has other
witnesses to support his claim, he answer that he has none. As may be seen, the
evidence of guilt is complete, and there being no further evidence to be presented
that may change the result the accused may be then and there sentenced by the
court. In this case, the conviction of the accused is reasonable and fair, for his
refusal to reveal the identity of his alleged guest may due, either to the fact
that there was no such guest, or that the cause for concealing his identity is
worth suffering for.Volente non fit injuria."But to us that hypothetical case is a
good illustration of the injustice of such procedure. There the accused was
convicted not because the prosecution had proved his guilt but because he was
unable to prove his innocence. His inability to prove who the owner of the revolver
was, did not to our mind prove him guilt, beyond reasonable doubt, under the
circumstances. He was accused of illegal possession of firearm, an offense

punishable under the ordinance in question with imprisonment for six to twelve
years. He pleaded not guilty, for according to him the revolver was not his and he
did not know how it got into his house. He had no time to investigate and try to
find out whether the policeman himself or some the other person who wished to do
him harm had planted it there, sooner was the revolver seized than he was brought
before the court and interrogated about it when he was naturally dazed and in a
state of alarm. If the law of criminal procedure had been followed, he would have
had ample time to reflect and endeavor to unravel the mystery. He could have
consulted a lawyer, and he would have been entitled to at least two days after the
information was read to him to investigate the facts and prepare for the trial. At
the trial he would not have been required to answer to any proof in his defense
until the prosecution had presented its witness, principally the policeman. His
lawyer could have cross-examined the policeman and found out from him whether he
had any grudge against the accused and how he happened to search the latter's
house. From the testimony of the policeman the accused might have been enlightened
as to how and by whom the revolver was place in his house. Suppose that the
policeman should say that his informant as to the presence of the revolver under
the bed of the accused was a houseboy of the latter, and suppose that houseboy was
really the one who planted the revolver because of some grievance he had against
his master but that the latter had not suspected before that his houseboy had any
revolver. In view of the revelation of the policeman he would had been able to
investigate and ascertain that fact. In that he way he could have satisfactory
explained how and by whom the revolver was placed under his bed. But under the
procedure in question as outlined by the City Fiscal, the accused was of course
utterly unable to do that and was consequently doomed to at least six years'
imprisonment for a crime he had not committed.(d) Section 6 of the Ordinance in
question provided: "The decisions of the special courts herein created shall be
final except where the penalty imposed is death, in which case the records of the
particular case shall be elevateden consultato a special division of the Supreme
Court composed of
three members to be designated by the President of the Republic of the
Philippines." Under our law of criminal procedure, which the military occupant was
bound to respect unless absolutely prevented, all persons accused of any offense
have the right to appeal to the Court Appeals or to the Supreme Court. It is true
that as rule that right is statutory and may be withdrawn by the legislature except
in certain cases where the right to appeal is provided in the Constitution itself,
as in the cases involving life imprisonment and death penalty; but the question
here is not whether the legislative department of the legitimate government has the
power to abrogate that right but whether it was within the competence of the
military occupant to do so.(e) In the instant case the penalty imposed upon accused
by the special court, after a summary trial waslife imprisonment, and he was
denied the right to have that sentence reviewed by the Supreme Court, altho under
sub-section 4, section 2, Article VIII of the Constitution of the Commonwealth, he
could not have been deprived by law of that right.(f) Section 7 of the Ordinance
suspended the privilege of the writ ofhabeas corpuswith respect to persons
accused of or under investigation for any of the crimes and offenses enumerated in
sections 1 and 2. The Constitution of the Commonwealth prohibit the suspension of
that privilege except in cases of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion when the
public safety requires it. The suspension by the ordinance was not motivated by any
one of these cases but by the necessity for waging a campaign against certain
classes of crime; martial law was not declared; and the suspension ofhabeas
corpusdid not apply to all persons living in the specified territory (as should
have been done if the public safety required such suspension) but only to those
accused of or investigated for certain specified crimes or offenses. The result of
such partial suspension was that persons accused of or under investigation for any
of the offenses specified in section 1 and 2 could be held in detention
indefinitely, whereas person accused of or under investigation for crimes other
than those specified, such for example as theft, physical injuries, homicide,
murder, and parricide, had the right to demand their release byhabeas corpusafter
the lapse of six hours. The same discrimination holds true with reference to the
other features already noted above, namely, unreasonable searches and seizures,
summary trial, denial of the presumption innocence, self-incrimination, and denial
of the right to appeal. Such discrimination was unwarranted and unjust and was
contrary to the concept of justice prevailing in all democratic countries, where
every person is entitled to the equal protection of the laws.3. It is apparent from
the foregoing examination of the main features of the ordinance that while the
methods thus adopted may not be unusual under totalitarian governments like those
of the aggressor nations in the recent global war, they are strange and repugnant
to the people of the democratic countries which united together to defeat said
aggressors and "to reaffirm faith in fundamental human person, in the equal rights
of men and women and of nations large and small, . . . and to promote social
progress and better standards of life in larger freedom." (Preamble Charter for
Peace adopted by the United Nations at San Francisco, California, June 26, 1945.)
The recent global war was a clash between two antagonistic ways of life, between
facism and democracy. It would be strange indeed if his Court, which functions
under a democratic government that fought with the other democratic nations in that
war, should sanction or approve the way of life, against which that war was fought
and won the cost of million of lives and untold sacrifices.4. The case involves the
interpretation not of constitution but of international law, which "is based on
usage and opinion"; and "he who in such a case bases his reasoning on high
considerations of morality may succeed in resolving the doubt in accordance with
humanity and justice." (Principles of International Lawrence, 7th ed., pp. 12, 13.)
We think the contentions for the petitioner against the validity of the ordinance
in question are in accord with humanity and justice.Before concluding this opinion
we deem it pertinent to comment on the remark of the City Fiscal that, as stated in
its preamble, the ordinance in question was promulgated in response to "an urgent
necessity for waging an immediately and relentless campaign against certain classes
and expediting the trail and determination thereof in order to hasten the reestablishment of peace and other throughout the country and promote a feeling of
security among the people conducive to the earlier return of normalcy in our
national life." We concede that the objective of the author of the ordinance was
commendable, but we think and in this we are supported by the actual result it
was unattainable thru the means and methods prescribed in said ordinance. Peace and
order and normalcy could not be restored unless the root cause of their disturbance
were eliminated first. That cause was the presence in the country of the Japanese
army, which wrecked our political, social, and economic structures, destroyed our
means of communication, robbed the people of their food, clothing, and medicine and
other necessities of life, ejected them from their own homes, punished and tortured
innocent men and women, and other wise made life unbearable. The relative rampancy
of the crimes mentioned in said ordinance was but the effect of that cause. The
cornering and hoarding of foodstuffs would not for the scarcity produced by the
Japanese army and the disruption of our commerce and industries on account of the
invasion. The possession of firearms was rendered desirable to many person to
defend themselves against or attack the invader. Robberies and other crimes against
property increased as a resulted of hunger and privation to which the people were
subjected by the rapacity of the Japanese. It was a delusion to expect peace and
normalcy to return without eliminating the cause of their disturbance or
destruction of the Japanese army in the Philippines an objective to which the
ordinance was not addressed. So, even from the point of view of the Filipino people
and not of the Japanese army of occupation, the ordinance in question results
untenable.Having reached the conclusion that the enactment of the procedure
embodied in said ordinance for the special court therein created was beyond the
competence of the occupant, inasmuch as that procedure was inseparable from the
first part of the ordinance which creates the special court and prescribes the
jurisdiction thereof, we are constrained to declare the whole ordinance null and
voidab initio. Consequently the proceedings in said court which resulted in the
conviction and sentence of the petitioner are also void.#PARAS,J.,concurring in
the result:Charged with robbery, the petitioner herein was found guilty and
sentence to suffer life imprisonment. He commenced to serve the term on August 21,
1944. Inasmuch as he was a member of the Metropolitan Constabulary, the basis of
the information was Act No. 65, passed during the Japanese sponsored Republic of
the Philippines and amending certain articles of the Revised Penal Code. The trial
was held by the then existing Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction
which was authorized to conduct proceedings in a special manner. Ordinance No. 7 of
the "Republic.")After General of the Army Douglas McArthur had issued the
Proclamation dated October 23, 1944, the Act under which the petitioner was charged
and convicted stands nullified, and the original provisions of the Revised Penal
Code restored. By virtue of article 22 of the said Code, "Penal laws shall have a
retroactive effect in so far as they favor the person guilty of a felony, who is
not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in rule 5 of article 62 of this
Code, although at the time of the publication of such laws a final sentence has
been pronounced and the convict is serving the same."In the absence of other
details, it may here be assumed that the offense committed is that defined in
article 294, paragraph 5, which provides as follows:Any person guilty of robbery
with the use of violence against or intimidation of any person shall suffer:The
penalty ofprision correccionaltoprision mayorin its medium period in other
cases.In accordance with the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law (Acts
Nos. 4103 and 4225 ), the maximum penalty that can be imposed is six months
ofarresto mayor.This Court has already dismissed cases wherein the defendants were
charge with the violation of law in force at the time of the commission and trial
of the crime, after said laws have been repealed by subsequent legislation,
Peoplevs.Moran (Phil., 44 387);People vs. Tamayo(61 Phil., 226 ), and also
repeatedly released on writs ofhabeas corpus prisonerswho, were given the benefit
of subsequent legislation either repealing statute under which they had been
convicted or modifying the same by imposing lesser penalties,Escalante vs.
Santos(56 Phil., 483);Directo vs. Director of Prisons(56 Phil., 692).Prisoners
who behave well are almost always liberated upon the expiration of the minimum
penalty fixed in the judgments of conviction or within a reasonable time
thereafter. In the present case, there being no information that the double the
period of the minimum penalty that could be imposed upon him, he should be
released. As this is the effect of the decision of the majority, I concur in the
result.#DE, JOYA,J.,concurring:The principal question involved in this case is
the validity of the judicial proceeding held in criminal
case No. 66 of the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction,
established in the City of Manila, during Japanese occupation, under the authority
of Ordinance No. 7, issued by the President of the so-called Philippine Republic,
and the effect on said proceeding of the proclamation of General Douglas McArthur,
dated October 23, 1944.In said criminal case, herein petitioner was accused of the
crime of robbery and sentenced to life imprisonment, on August 21, 1944.There can
be doubt that the government established in this country by the Commander in Chief
of the Japanese Imperial Forces, under the name of the Philippine Executive
Commission, was ade factogovernment, as already held by this Court in civil case
G.R. No. L-5 entitledCo Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon, decided on
September 17, 1945 (p. 133, ante). Said government possessed all the
characteristics of ade factogovernment as defined by the Supreme Court of the
United States, in the following language:But there is another description of
government, called also by publicists a governmentde facto, but which might,
perhaps, be more aptly denominated agovernment of paramount force. Its
distinguishing characteristics are (1), that its existence is maintained by active
military power within the territories, and against the rightful authority of an
established and lawful government; and (2), that while it exist it must necessarily
be obeyed in civil matters by private citizens who, by acts of obedience rendered
in submission to such force, do not become responsible, as wrongdoers, for those
acts, though not warranted by the laws of the rightful government. Actual
governments of this sort are established over districts differing greatly in extent
and conditions. They are usually administered directly by military authority, but
they may be administrated, also, by civil authority, supported more or less

directly by military force. (MacLeodvs.United States [1913,] 229 U. S., 416.)
Under ade factogovernment, the courts of the country, under military occupation,
should be kept open, and whenever practicable, the subordinate officers of the
local administration should be allowed to continue in their functions, supported by
the military force of the invader, because the responsibility of maintaining peace
and public order, and of punishing crime, falls directly upon the commander in
chief of the occupying forces. And in the performance of this duty, he may proclaim
martial law (Davis, Elements of International Law [3d.], pp. 330-332).In occupied
territory, the conquering power has a right to displace the pre-existing authority,
and to assume to such extent as it may deem proper the exercise by itself of all
the powers and functions of government. It may appoint all the necessary officers
and clothe them with designated powers, according to its pleasure. It may prescribe
the revenues to be paid, and apply them to its own use or otherwise. It may do
anything necessary to strengthen itself and weaken the enemy. There is no limit to
the powers that may be exerted in such cases, save those which are found in the
laws and customs and usages of war (Crossvs.Harrison, 16 How., 164 ;
Leitensdorfervs.Webb, 20Id., 176; The Grapeshot, 9 Wall.[ U.S.], 129; New
Orleansvs.Steamship Co., [1874], 20 Wall., [ U.S.], 287.It is generally the
better course for the inhabitants of the territory, under military occupation, that
they should continue to carry on the ordinary administration under the invader; but
the latter has no right to force them to do so. If they decline, his only rights,
and it is also his duty, is to replace them by appointees of his own, so far as
necessary for maintaining order and the continuance of the daily life of the
territory: other purposes, as these of the superior judicial offices, can bide
their time (Westlake, International Law, Part II, War, 2d ed., pp. 121-123).Though
the fact of occupation imposes no duties upon the inhabitants of the occupied
territory, the invader himself is not left equally free. As it is a consequence of
his acts that the regular government of the country is suspended, he is bound to
take whatever means are required for the security of public order; and as his
presence, so long as it is based upon occupation, is confessedly temporary, and his
rights of control spring only from the necessity of the case, he is also bound to
alter or override the existing laws as little as possible (Hall, International Law,
6th ed., 476).The government established here under the Philippine Executive
Commission was more in consonance with the general practice among civilized
nations, in establishing governments for the maintenance of peace and order and the
administration of justice, in territories of the enemy under military occupation;
because said government was of a temporary character.The government subsequently
established under the so-called Philippine Republic, with a new constitution, was
also of the nature of ade factogovernment, in accordance with International Law,
as it was established under the authority of the military occupant and supported by
the armed forces of the latter. But it was somewhat different from that established
under the Philippine Executive Commission, because the former apparently, at least,
had the semblance of permanency, which however, is unusual in the practices among
civilized nations, under similar circumstances.Under military occupation, the
original national character of the soil and of the inhabitants of the territory
remains unaltered; and although the invader is invested with quasisovereignity,
which give him a claim as of right to the obedience of the conquered population,
nevertheless, its exercise is limited by the qualification which has gradually
become established, that he must not, as a general rule, modify the permanent
institutions of the country (Hall, International Law, 6th ed., p. 460).The
Convention Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, adopted at The Hague in
1899, lays down (Arts. 42, 43) definite rules concerning military authority over
the territory of a hostile state. In addition to codifying the accepted law, it
provides that the occupant must respect, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in
force in the country.It will thus be readily seen that the municipal law of the
invaded state continues in force, in so far as it does not affect the hostile
occupant unfavorably. The regular courts of the occupied territory continue to act
in cases not affecting the military occupation; and it is not customary for the
invader to take the whole administration into his own hands, as it is easier to
preserve order through the agency of the native officials, and also because the
latter are more competent to administer the laws of the territory; and the military
occupant, therefore, generally keeps in their posts such of the judicial officers
as are willing to serve under him, subjecting them only to supervision by the
military authorities, or by superior civil authorities appointed by him
(Youngvs.United States, 97 U. S., 39; 24 Law. ed., 992; Colemanvs.Tennessee, 97
U. S., 509; 24 Law. ed., 1118; MacLeodvs.United States, 229 U. S., 416; 33 Sup.
Ct., 955; 57; Law. ed., 1260; Taylor, International Law, secs. 576, 578; Wilson,
International Law, pp. 331-337; Hall, International Law, 6th ed. (1909), pp. 464,
465,475,476; Lawrence, International Law, 7th ed., pp. 421-413; Davis, Elements of
International Law, 3rd ed., pp. 330-332, 335; Holland, International Law, pp. 35657, 359; Westlake, International Law, Part II, War 2d ed., pp. 121-123).The
judicial proceedings conducted, under the municipal law of the territory, before
the court established by the military occupant are general considered legal and
valid, even after the government established by the invader had been displaced by
the legitimate government of said territory.Thus the judgment rendered by the
Confederate courts, during the Civil War, merely settling the rights of private
parties actually within their jurisdiction, not tending to defeat the legal rights
of citizens of the United States, nor in furtherance of laws passed in aid of the
rebellion, had been declared legal, valid and binding (Colemanvs.Tennessee, 97 U.
S 509., 24 Law. ed., 1118; Williamsvs.Bruffy, 96 U. S., 176; Hornvs.Lockhart,
17 Wall., 570; 21 Law. ed., 660; Sprottvs.United States, 20 Wall., 249; 22 Law.
ed., 371)When the military forces of the Confederate states were destroyed, their
government perished, and with it all its enactments. But the legislative acts of
the several States forming the Confederacy stood on a different ground, and so far
as they did not impair or tend to impair the supremacy of the national authority,
or the just rights of citizens under the Federal constitution, they were considered
as legal, valid and binding (Williamsvs.Bruffy, 96 U. S., 177; 24 Law. ed., 716;
Fordvs.Surget, 97 U. S., 594; 24 Law. ed., 1018; United Statesvs.Ins. Co., 22
Wall. [ U. S.], 99; 22 Law. ed., 816; Ketchumvs.Buckley [1878], 99 U. S.,188;
Johnsonvs.Atlantic G. & W. I. Transit Co., 156 U. S., 618; 15 Sup. Ct., 520).In
the later case, the Supreme Court of the United States reaffirmed that the judicial
and legislative acts of the rebellious States, asde factogovernments, should be
respected by the courts, if they were not hostile in their purpose or mode of
enforcement to the authority of the national government, and did not impair the
rights of citizens under the Federal Constitution. (Baldyvs.Hunter, 171 U. S.,
388; 18 Sup. Ct., 890; Law. ed., 208.)Under the proclamation of General Douglas
MacArthur, dated October 23, 1944, declaring null and void all laws, regulations
and processes issued and promulgated by the Philippine Executive Commission and the
Philippine Republic, during Japanese occupation,
said Ordinance No. 7 promulgated on March 8, 1944, creating the Court of Special
and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction, ostensibly for the speedy reestablishment of
peace and order, and Executive Commission, prescribing summary rules of procedure,
and other allied laws, such as Act No. 65 of the puppet republic, prescribing
heavier penalties, became null and void, once the Japanese armies in the
Philippines had been defeated, as with them thede factogovernments, successively
established under them, perished, and with them all their enactments and processes
of a hostile character.But there are other considerations equally important why
judicial proceedings held and conducted before the courts established by saidde
factogovernments, under laws promulgated by them, should be declared null and
void, without violating, in the least, settled principles, judicial precedents or
public policy.Said Ordinance No. 7 adopted as integral parts thereof said Executive
Order No. 157, as well as said Act No. 65 of the National Assembly of the puppet
republic, prescribing exceptionally heavy penalties for the crimes enumerated
therein.The principal crimes mentioned in said Ordinance No. 7 and Act No. 65 of
the puppet republic and the other allied laws are illegal possession of firearms,
robbery, violations of food-control laws, falsification malversation and bribery;
and it was under said laws that herein petitioner was prosecuted and sentenced to
life imprisonment for the crime robbery.The penalty of life imprisonment or death
for robbery was aimed principally at the underground forces resolute and determined
to seize and remove stores of food provisions, whenever possible, to prevent them
from falling into the hands of the enemy.The penalty of twelve years' imprisonment
for illegal possession of firearms was directed mainly against those underground
forces, that had been receiving arms from the forces of liberation across the seas.
Violation of food-control laws were included and used as a pretext and
justification for the seizure and confiscation of food provisions so badly needed
by the invader.And the inclusion under said Ordinance No. 7 of the crime of bribery
and other was used as a cloak to conceal its venom and make said law look innocent.
By the imposition of excessive penalties , by the denial of the remedy ofhabeas
corpus, by compelling the accused to testify against themselves, and by denying
them the right of appeal to the highest court of the land, except where the death
penalty was imposed, and by its summary procedure, said Ordinance No. 7 and the
other allied laws impaired and defeated the just and legal rights of Filipino
citizens under the Commonwealth Constitution, and the supremacy of the authority of
the legitimate Government. Under said laws, the persons accused were deprived of
liberty without due process of law.In the language of this Court, "the phrase 'due
process of law' used in the Philippine Bill should receive a comprehensive
interpretation, and no procedure should be treated as unconstitutional which makes
due provision for the trial of alleged criminal before a court of competent
jurisdiction, for bringing the accused into court and notifying him of the cause he
is required to meet, for giving him an opportunity to be heard, for the
deliberation and judgement of the court, and for an appeal from such judgement to
the highest tribunal" (United Statesvs.Kennedy, 18 Phil., 122).In their
conception, in their purpose and mode of enforcement and execution said laws were
hostile to the authority of the Commonwealth Government and that of the United
States of America; as they had been promulgated in furtherance of the war aims of
the enemy, and they are, therefore, of political character and complexion.Those
repressive laws were aimed at the men and women who had kept the faith, and whose
heroes and martyrs now lie in graves still unknown and whose names remain unsung;
but whose heroic efforts and sacrifices have made immortal the legends of Filipino
resistance, and made possible our participation in the councils of free and
liberty-loving peoples and nations.Said laws are contrary to the principles of
Democracy, championed by North America, whose gigantic efforts and heroic
sacrifices have vindicated human rights, human dignity and human freedom, and
consecrated them anew all over the earth with the generous blood of her children.
They violate the fundamental principles of Justice for which civilized Mankind
stands, under the benign leadership of Totalitarianism and given all the nations of
the earth a new birth as well as a new character of freedom, to enable each and
everyone to live a nobler and more worthy life and realize the justice and
prosperity of the future.For the foregoing reasons, I concur in the dispositive
part of the opinion prepared by Mr. Justice Feria.#PERFECTO,J.,concurring:On
October 21, 1944, petitioner William F. Peralta began to serve, in the Muntinglupa
Prison Camp, a sentence of life imprisonment imposed by the Court of Special and
Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction, created by Ordinance No. 7 issued by President
Laurel of the Republic of the Philippines under the Japanese regime, and now seeks
a writ ofhabeas corpusin order that his liberty may be restored to him, contending
that said Ordinance No. 7 was null and voidab initiobecause it was of a political
complexion and its provisions are violative of the fundamental laws of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines.Petitioner alleges that sometime in the month of
September, 1943, he joined the Constabulary forces as a private, against his will,
and before joining it, he was for several times arrested and maltreated as
aguerrillamember, he being then a minor only 17 years old, and that he was
prosecuted, not because he committed any crime, but because he joined the guerrilla
organization, deserted the Constabulary forces, and followed political and military
activities in open allegiance to the Commonwealth Government and the United States
of America.The Solicitor General, appearing in behalf of respondent Director of
Prisons, answered the petition agreeing that the acts and proceedings taken and had
before said Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction should be denied
force and efficacy, and therefore, recommended that the writ prayed for be granted.
At the hearing held on September 21, and 22, 1945, there appeared to argue the
First Assistant Solicitor General, impugning the validity of said Ordinance No. 7,
and the City Fiscal of Manila, asamicus curiae, who sustained the validity if the
said Ordinance and the proceeding by virtue of which petitioner was sentenced to
life imprisonment.I. ORDINANCE NO. 7 AND PROCESSES UNDER IT NULLIFIED BY THE
OCTOBER PROCLAMATION OF GENERAL MACARTHUROn October 23, 1944, General of the Army
Douglas MacArthur, Commander in Chief of the Philippine-American Forces, which
fought in Bataan and later liberated the whole Philippines, as an aftermath of the
liberation, issued a proclamation declaring:1. That the Government of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines is, subject to the supreme authority of the
Government of the United States, the sole and only government having legal and
valid jurisdiction over the people in areas of the Philippines free of enemy
occupation and control;2. That the laws now existing on the statute books of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines and the regulations promulgated pursuant thereto
are in full force and effect and legally binding upon the people in areas of the
Philippines free of enemy occupation and control; and3. That all laws, regulations
and processes of any other government in the Philippines than that of the said
Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines
free of enemy occupation and control.It appears that Ordinance No. 7 in question
has been issued under the Japanese regime and that the judicial process under which
petitioner has been sentenced to life imprisonment, having been held in a court not
belonging to the Commonwealth of the Philippines but organized and established
under the authority of the enemy, became null and void and without effect since
October 23, 1944, by virtue of the above-quoted October Proclamation of General
MacArthur.We have explained at length our position as to the effects of said
October Proclamation in our dissenting opinion in the case ofCo Kim Cham vs.
Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon(G. R. No. L-5, 153,ante), and we deem it unnecessary to
repeat what we stated in said opinion.It is fortunate that all the members of the
Supreme Court arrived at a unanimous conclusion as to the absolute nullity of the
process under which petitioner is now being held in prison.The shocking character
of the provisions of Ordinance No. 7 and the processes held under it show once more
how General MacArthur was absolutely right and justified in issuing the October
Proclamation.There are indications that more processes held under the Japanese
regime will come to our knowledge, revealing strong grounds for their annulment,
justifying, like the process here in question, the wisdom of the decision of
General MacArthur in nullifying in a sweeping manner all judicial processes held
during enemy occupation.The October Proclamation is, in keeping with the following
official statement of the President of the United States:On the fourteenth of this
month, a puppet government was set up in the Philippine Islands with Jose P.
Laurel, formerly a justice of the Philippine Supreme Court as president. Jorge
Vargas, formerly a member of the Philippine Commonwealth Cabinet and Benigno
Aquino, also formerly a member of that cabinet, were closely associated with Laurel
in this movement. The first act of the new puppet regime was to sign a military
alliance with Japan. The second act was a hypocritical
appeal for American sympathy which was made in fraud and deceit, and was designed
to confuse and mislead the Filipino people.I wish to make it clear that neither the
former collaborationist "Philippine Executive Commission" nor the present
Philippine Republic has the recognition or sympathy of the Government of the United
States. . . .Our sympathy goes out to those who remain loyal to the United States
and the Commonwealth that great majority of the Filipino people who have not been
deceived by the promises of the enemy. . . .October 23, 1943FRANKLIN DELANO
ROOSEVELT#President of the United States##(From U. S. Naval War College,
International Law Documents, 1943, pp. 93, 94.)Putting aside the October
Proclamation, by a mere perusal of the ordinance in question, we will see
immediately how such law and the processes held under it are incompatible with the
fundamental principles and essential safeguards in criminal procedure, universally
recognized in civilized modern nations and how such ordinance and processes can
only be justified by a retrogressive and reactionary mentality developed under the

social, cultural, and political atmosphere of the era of darkness.II. VIOLATION OF
THE CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEE AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURESSection 5 of
Ordinance No. 7 provides that cases arising under it shall follow the summary
procedure provided in Act No. 65 of the Laurel Philippine Republic, which, in turn,
is the same as that established by Chapter II of Executive Order No. 157 of the
Chairman of the Vargas Philippine Executive Commission, dated May 18, 1943.Under
said procedure, "search warrants may be issued by the court or by any prosecuting
officer, authorizing peace officers to search for and seize any articles or objects
described in the warrant, including those which may be regarded as evidence of an
offense under this order even if such articles or objects are not included among
those described in section 2, Rule 122, of the Rules of Court." This provision is
repugnant to the Filipino sense of right in the matter of warrants of search and
seizure, sense of right which has been clearly and definitely stereotyped in the
following words of our fundamental law:The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizure shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause,
to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complaint and witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized. (Art. III, sec. 1, No. 3,
Constitution of the Philippines.)This constitutional provision is violated by the
summary, unreasonable, and arbitrary procedure provided under the authority of the
ordinance in question:(1) By authorizing "any prosecuting officer" to issue search
warrants, when under our Constitution such search warrants should be issued only by
a judge;(2) By trespassing the limits established by section 2, Rule 122, of the
Rules of Court, considered as a necessary element to make the warrant reasonable;
(3) By authorizing the search and seizure of articles or objects not described in
warrant, which is the real meaning of the words "including those which may be
regarded as evidence of an offense under this Ordinance."III. DISCRIMINATORY AND
INIQUITOUS SUSPENSION OF THE WRIT OFHABEAS CORPUSSection 7 of Ordinance No. 7 in
question provides that "the privileges of the writhabeas corpusare hereby
suspended with respect to persons accused of, or under investigation for, any of
the crimes and offenses enumerated in sections 1 and 2 hereof."This provision is
also violative of one of the fundamental guarantees established in the Constitution
of the Philippines, which provides that the writ ofhabeas corpusmay be suspended
only in case of "invasion, insurrection, or rebellion" and only "when the public
safety requires it."The privilege of the writ ofhabeas corpusshall not be
suspended except in cases of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion, when the public
safety requires it, in any of which events the same may be suspended wherever
during such period the necessity for such suspension shall exist. (Art. III, sec.
1, No. 14, Constitution of the Philippines.)Again, it is evident that the ordinance
in question is repugnant to the deep sense of right of our people. It is so, not
only because it suspends the privilege of the writ ofhabeas corpus, without the
circumstances which can only justify said suspension, but because it flagrantly
violates the fundamental principle of equality before the law, by depriving the
accused, in cases falling under the ordinance in question, of the privilege of the
writ ofhabeas corpus, which is not denied to the accused in all other cases:No
person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law,
nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws. (Art. III, sec. 1,
No. 1, Constitution of the Philippines.)IV. VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
GUARANTEE AGAINST SELF- INCRIMINATIONUnder section 18 of Executive Order No. 157,
above mentioned, "the accusedor his representativemay be examined by the court,
and with the permission of the court, by the fiscal or other prosecuting officer as
to any matters favorable or unfavorable to him of his principal." (Emphasis ours.)
It is also provided that "statements made by the accused, hisco-accused, or
therepresentativeof the accusedor a person acting in a similar capacity,
irrespective of the circumstances under which they were made shallbe admissible in
evidence if material to the issue." (Emphasis ours.)Under section 21 of Executive
Order No. 157, after arraignment and plea, "the judge shall interrogate the accused
. . . as to facts and circumstances of the case in order to clarify the points in

dispute and those which are admitted." In the same section it is also provided that
"refusal of the accused to answer any questions made or allowed by the court may be
consideredunfavorable to him." (Emphasis ours.)Under the same sectionthe
absenceof an accused or of his representative "shall not be a ground for
interrupting the proceedings or attacking the validity of the judgment."From the
foregoing, it appears:(1) That the accused may be examined by the court or any
prosecuting officer as to any matters favorable or unfavorable to him;(2) That the
refusal of the accused to answer may be considered unfavorable to him;(3) That
statements made by the accused, "irrespective of the circumstances under which they
were made" (that is, even under third degree procedure, or exacted through brutal
kempei tortures), shall be admissible in evidence;(4) That not only the accused,
but "his representative" (his lawyer, whose personal security was jeopardized under
the Japanese regime), may be examined by the court or by the fiscal or other
prosecuting officer, as if said representative or attorney is facing the same
criminal prosecution instituted against his client;(5) That the statement made by
said representative or attorney, although exacted under duress, intimidation, or
torture, shall be admissible in evidence;(6) That statements made by any person
acting in a similar capacity as a representative of the accused which may be a
relative or a friend or, even an impostor who might pose as a representative to
assure the doom of the accused, "irrespective of the circumstances under which they
were made (that is, even if made in the absence of the accused, or in the same
circumstances under which masked spies decreed the death of innocent citizens
pointed by them during zoning concentrations), shall be admissible in evidence;(7)
That trial shall proceed in the absence of the accused;(8) That trial shall proceed
in the absence of his attorney or other representative.It is evident that the
procedure established violates the following provisions of our fundamental code:In
all criminal prosecutions the accused shall be presumed to be innocent until the
contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel,
to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a
speedy and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory
process to secure the attendance of witnesses in his behalf. (Art. III, sec. 1, No.
17, Constitution of the Philippines.)No person shall be compelled to be a witness
against himself. (Art. III, sec. 1, No. 18,Idem.)The procedure is so revolving, so
nauseating, and so opposed to human nature, that it takes a real courage to keep
our equanimity while we are compelled to analyze it.It is beyond our comprehension
how a man, endowed with reason, could devise such an execrable system of judicial
procedure, which is but a shameless mockery of the administration of justice.We
must be very careful to retain zealously the constitutional guarantee against selfincrimination. We must not forget that that constitutional guarantee was acquired
as a result of protest against all inquisitorial and third degree procedures. We
must not forget how, not very long ago, in the thirteen colonies of America,
alleged witches were burned at the stake, as a means of compelling them to confess
their fantastic compacts with the devil. We must not forget how an institution
created in the twelfth century was the cause of so much tortures and sufferings,
and that the terroristic menace of its rakes was abolished in Spain, and therefore
in Philippines, only in 1834.We must not forget that during normal times, under the
twentieth century lights, just before the last global war started, in the United
States of America and in the Philippines, denunciations of third degree procedures
employed by agents the law were often heard. This very Supreme
Court, not only once, had to deal with cases where such tactics were conclusively
proved. Even today, among criminal cases we have under consideration, there is
evidence of confessions exacted through cruel and brutal means.No matter what
merits can be found, from the theoretical point of view, in the arguments of those
who are championing the suppression of the constitutional guarantee against selfincrimination, the undeniable reality of human experience shows conclusively the
absolute need of such guarantee if justice must be served. Even with the existence
of such guarantee, there are officers of the law who cannot resist temptation of
using their power to compel, through third degree methods, innocent or guilty
persons to admit involuntarily real or imaginary offenses. Let us allow changes

tending to nullify the protection against self-incrimination, and no man, however
innocent he may be, shall be secure in his person, in his liberty, in his honor, in
his life.V. THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT OF APPEAL TRAMPLED UPONIn section 6 of Ordinance
No. 7, it is provided that "the decision of the special courts herein created shall
be final except where the penalty imposed is death, in which case the records of
the particular case shall be elevateden consultato a special division of the
Supreme Court composed of three members to be designated by the President of the
Republic of the Philippines."This provision is a clear violation of the fundamental
right of appeal, constitutionally guaranteed to all accused in the Philippines.
Under the Constitution of the Philippines, all accused are entitled to appeal to
the Supreme Court:(1) In all cases in which the constitutionality or validity of
any treaty, law, ordinance, or executive order or regulations is in question. (Art.
VIII, sec. 2, No. 1, Constitution of the Philippines.)(2) In all cases involving
the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or toll, or any penalty imposed in
relation thereto. (Art. VIII, sec 2, No. 2,Idem.)(3) In all cases in which the
jurisdiction of any trial court is in issue. (Art. VIII, sec. 2, No. 3,Idem.)(4)
In all criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is death or life imprisonment.
(Art. VIII, sec. 2, No. 4,Idem.)(5) In all cases in which an error or question of
law is involved. (Art. VIII, sec. 2, No. 5,Idem.)Before the adoption of the
Constitution of the Philippines, it was the prevailing theory in judicial decisions
that the right of appeal is not a fundamental one, but it is a mere privilege or
mere statutory grant.The drafters of our Constitution, taught by the unerring
lessons of human experience, came to the conclusion that mistake is one of the most
irretrievable human weaknesses.The drafters of our Constitution, therefore,
considered it necessary to establish constitutional guarantees to reduce to its
minimum the effects of such innate human weakness by providing that the appeal to
the highest tribunal of the land may be enjoyed by any accused, who, under the
specific provisions of the Constitution, believed himself to be the victim of a
wrong in any inferior court.The fact that the provisions of section 2, of Article
VIII, of the Constitution, instead of stating that the accused shall not be denied
of the right of appeal in the cases mentioned therein, provide that the Supreme
Court may not be deprived of its jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify,
or affirm on appeal,certiorari, or writ of error as the law or the rules of court
may provide, final judgments and decrees of inferior courts, in the specified
cases, does not impair nor diminish the fundamental character of the right of
appeal of the accused to the Supreme Court.The provisions of section 2, of Article
VIII, of the Constitution, have been enacted by our Constitutional Convention, not
for the benefit and well-being of the people.In fact, the Supreme Court is just one
of the instrumentalities created by the Constitution in the service of the people.
The Supreme Court is not an entity or institution whose rights and privileges must
be constitutionally guaranteed. It is only a means. It is one of the means
considered necessary by our Constitution to better serve the supreme interest of
the people.As a matter of fact, the Supreme Court of the United States itself
declared that the elimination of said tribunal is not incompatible with the
existence of a government of laws. In a case of denaturalization wherein the
Government of the United States sought to deprive a person of his American
citizenship, on the ground that the 1928 platform of the Communist Party of the
United States, to which the respondent belonged, advocated the abolition of the
supreme Court, of the Senate and the veto power of the President, and replacement
of congressional districts with "councils of workers" in which legislative and
executive powers would be united, the Federal Supreme Court declared:These would
indeed be significant changes in our governmental structure changes which it is
safe to say are not desired by the majority of the people in this country but
whatever our personal views, as judges we cannot say that person who advocates
their adoption through peaceful and constitutional means is not in fact attached to
the Constitution those institutions are not enumerated as necessary in the
government's test of "general political philosophy", and it is conceivable that
"orderly liberty" could be maintained without them. The Senate has not gone free of
criticism and one object of the Seventeenth Amendment was to make it more
responsive to the popular will. The unicameral legislature is not unknown in the
country. It is that this Court has played a large in the unfolding of the
constitutional plan (sometimes too so in the opinion of some observers), but we be
arrogant indeed if we presume that a government of laws, with protection for
minority groups would be impossible without it. Like other agencies of government,
this Court at various lines its existence has not escaped the shafts of critics
whose sincerity and attachment to the Constitution is beyond question critics who
have accused it of assuming functions of judicial review not intended to be
conferred upon it, or of abusing those function to thwart the popular will, and who
advocated various remedies taking a wide range. (Schneidermanvs.United States of
America, June 21, 1943.)VI. ABRIDGMENT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEE OF EQUAL
PROTECTION OF THE LAWSThe constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws
is evidently abridged in the summary procedure in criminal cases under Ordinance
No. 7:(1) By the fact that the accused therein are victims of search warrants
specially provided for them, where the guarantees against unreasonableness in
search warrants issued against other accused are specially eliminated.(2) By
depriving the accused, under the Ordinance No. 7, the privilege of the writ
ofhabeas corpusenjoyed by the accused in other cases.(3) By depriving the
accused, under Ordinance No. 7 of the fundamental right of appeal in all cases,
except when sentenced of death is imposed.(4) By discriminating against the
accused, under Ordinance No. 7, where the right of appeal is retained for them,
that is, in cases where the sentenced imposed is death, by entrusting the power to
revised said sentence to small minority of the Supreme Court, under the Japanese
regime, and a minority of three justices to be specially called out by the
President of the Laurel Philippine Republic, undoubtedly with the evident purpose
of the confirmation of the conviction of the accused, and to make the appealen
consultajust an empty gesture to make the situation of the accused more pitiful by
lengthening is days of agony.(5) By placing the accused, in the case in question,
under the sword of Damocles of an unfavorable presumptions, should he refuse to
answer any question that the court or any prosecuting officer might propound to
him.Under our constitution, no one shall be deprived of the "equal protection of
the laws". (Art. III, sec. 1, No. 1, Constitution of the Philippines.)VII. THE
PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE OF THE ACCUSED IN ALL CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS VIOLATEDSince
the American flag began to fly over our soil, the fundamental guarantee that in all
criminal prosecution the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved beyond all reasonable doubt, has been implanted in our country to remain
forever.That guarantee was consecrated in our Constitution:In all criminal
prosecution the accused shall be presumed to be innocent until the contrary is
proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy
and a public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory
process to secure the attendance of witnesses in his behalf. (Art. III, sec. 1, No.
17, Constitution of the Philippines.)This guarantee is undoubtedly violated when,
in the summary procedure established by Ordinance No. 7, it is provided that the
refusal of the accused to answer any question, propounded by the court or any
officer, "may raise unfavorable presumption against him."If we have to keep
democracy in our country, we must be vigilant in upholding the constitutional
principle that all persons shall be presumed to be innocent until the contrary is
proved beyond all reasonable doubt.This principle is the opposite of that
prevailing under autocracies, or under facist or totalitarian regimes. During the
Japanese occupation all persons who might fall under the suspicion of any Japanese
or their spies and lackeys, were presumed to be guilty of any imaginary crime until
they were able to convince their victimizers of the contrary, beyond any reasonable
doubt. Even then, they were submitted to preventive tortures
and long months of imprisonment, just in case they might think later of committing
any offense against the Japanese or their collaborators.VIII. ORDINANCE NO. 7
VIOLATED THE HAGUE CONVENTION OF 1899In the convention concerning the laws and
customs of war on land, adopted by the Hague in 1899, it is provided that the
military occupant must respect the laws in force in the occupied country, unless
absolutely prevented. (Arts. 42 and 43.)The provision of the Convention has been
flagrantly violated when, under the enemy occupation the Laurel Philippine Republic
enacted Ordinance No. 7 which suspended our laws, including the fundamental one, by
substantially subverting the judicial procedures in the special criminal cases
instituted under said ordinance.For this reason, said ordinance, being violative of
international law, was null and voidab initio.Under international law, under the
most elemental principles of law, the legitimate government, once restored to its
own territory, after expelling the enemy invader, enjoys the absolute freedom of
not recognizing or of nullifying any and all acts of the invader, including those
internationally legal ones. The situation is exactly the same as that of the owner
of the house who can do anything in it that pleases him, after expelling the bandit
who was able to usurp its possession for a while.General McArthur exercised
correctly that power by the sweeping nullification decreed in his October
Proclamation.But even without the October Proclamation, the judicial process
maybe it is better to say injudicial process which resulted in the imprisonment
of petitioner, must be shorn of all effects because it had taken place under the
authority of an ordinance which was null and voidab initio.IX. THE DECISION
CONVICTING THE PETITIONER HAVING BEEN RENDERED UNDER FOREIGN AUTHORITY IS
UNENFORCEABLEThe decision by which petitioner William F. Peralta was convicted and
is being confined for life having been rendered by a tribunal created, functioning,
and acting under the authority of a foreign State, the Emperor of the Imperial
Government of Japan, is unenforceable.It has, therefore, the nature of a foreign
decision or judgment. For that reason, it is unenforceable within the Philippines
or under the Commonwealth, as we have shown in our opinion in the case ofCo Kim
Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon(G.R. No. 5, p. 153,ante)Said decision, having
been rendered under Ordinance No. 7, which was null and voidab initio, carries the
same vice as the ordinance under which it was rendered.But even
admittingarguendothat said decision is valid, because it is so under
international law, and is not included in the nullification decreed by General
Douglas MacArthur, still it cannot be enforced, being a foreign decision. A foreign
decision can only be enforced through the institution of an action before our
tribunals. Even decisions of a court of the United States or of any of its States
or territories can be enforced in the Philippines only by the institution of an
action or special proceeding before our own courts. This theory is confirmed by
sections 47 and 48, Rule 39, of the Rules of Court, which read:SEC. 47. Effect of
record of a court of the United States. The effect of a judicial record of a
court of the United States or of a court of one of the States or territories of the
United States, is the same in the Philippines as in the United States, or in the
States or territory where it was made, except that it can only be enforced here by
an action or special proceeding, and except, also, that the authority of a
guardian, or executor, or administrator does not extend beyond the jurisdiction of
the Government under which he was invested with his authority.SEC. 48. Effect of
foreign judgments. The effect of a judgement of a tribunal of a foreign country,
having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgement, is as follows:(a) In case of a
judgement against a specific thing, the judgment is conclusive upon the title to
the thing;(b) In case of a judgement against a person, the judgement is presumptive
evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a
subsequent title; but the judgement may be repelled by evidence of a want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of
law or fact.X. THE STUNNING FACTS REVEALED IN THE REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF
PRISONS.At the hearing of this case, respondent Director of Prisons was required to
submit statistical data concerning the number of prisoners and the various crimes
for which they were convicted by the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal
Jurisdiction.In submitting said statistical data, the Solicitor General, as counsel
for respondent, calls our attention to the fact that, out of the 92 prisoners
committed by said courts to the Bureau of Prisons for confinement, fifty-five (55),
that is more than one-half, were convicted of illegal possession of firearms, and
that only 3 are now actually in confinement serving sentences, among them the
petitioner in this proceeding, thus dissipating the unfounded fear entertained by

the City Fiscal of Manila, to the effect that a pronouncement by this Supreme
Tribunal that the sentences of the courts in question are null and void, will
signify the release of hundreds of criminals, whose liberty and mixing with society
will endanger public peace and order.Of the other two remaining prisoners serving
sentence, one has been committed for evasion of service of sentence, and the other
for illegal possession of firearms.Of the 55 prisoners convicted for illegal
possession of firearms, 25 died, 23 were released, and 6 escaped, and this is the
reason why only one remains in confinement.It is striking that so many prisoners
died, 25 of those convicted for illegal possession of firearms, that is, almost 50%
of them, 33 of the total of 94 prisoners committed, or more than one-third of them.
This unusual and shocking percentage of mortality is worth inquiring into and,
certainly, cannot be counted very favorably to judicial proceedings which
eventually lead to such wholesale death, if not outright massacre.The fact that a
big number of the prisoners, 21 of them, were able to escape, was not explained to
us. Is it reasonable to surmise, from the ruthless cruelty of the proceedings and
of the penalties imposed, which exacted from the mouth of the First Assistant
Solicitor General, who appeared to argue the case in behalf of the respondent, the
adjective "ferocious", that the wardens themselves, moved by pity, directly or
indirectly helped the escape? More than one-third of the prisoners committed by the
said courts in confinement to the Bureau of Prisons, that is, 33 of them died. May
we ask if they died because they were executed? Of those who died, one was
convicted of profiteering in rice, one of robbery, one of kidnapping of minor, one
of violation of certain sections of Act No. 66, four of crimes against public
order, and 25 of possession of firearms. If all of them were executed by virtue of
sentences rendered by the courts in question, that fact does not speak very highly
of their proceedings. If the accused died by natural death, there must be something
physically or morally fatal in said proceedings.If a tree must be judged by the
fruits it bears, how shall we judge proceedings so deadly, so fatal, so wantonly
inhuman as the proceedings had in the special courts in question? The City Fiscal of
Manila exerted great efforts to show that the fact that in the proceedings in
question "the refusal of the accused to answer any question made or allowed by the
court may be considered unfavorable to him," does not violate the constitutional
guarantee against self-incrimination. He even goes to the extent of maintaining the
theory that such constitutional guarantee is not essential for the protection of
the substantial rights of an accused.His argument centered on the alleged freedom
of the accused to refuse to answer any question made or allowed by the court,
alleging that, if the accused chooses to refuse to answer, the court cannot compel
him to answer under menace of punishment for contempt or through any other coercive
or minatory measures.The City Fiscal seems to labor under the belief that the fact
that the silence of the accused "may be considered unfavorable to him", is of no
consequence at all.Such belief can logically be entertained alone by ignoring
completely the lessons of experience in human conduct.If the refusal to answer can
be considered unfavorably to the accused, is not that the same as placing him on
the hard predicament of choosing between testifying self-incriminating and risking
the fatal effects of a legal presumption of guilt? Is not that the same as placing
him between the two steel cages of a dilemma: self-incrimination or presumption of
guilt? Is not that the same as placing him between Scylla and Charybdis, between a
dagger and a wall? Either way, he will always find himself under the inexorable
sword of Damocles of sure punishment, whether he testifies or refuses to testify.
It is not impossible to open a debate upon the abstract question whether the
constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination should not remain. But the
value of such a moot question, for purposes of this case, is nil.The constitutional
guarantee had to be adopted as a protest against inquisitorial method of the past,
when accused and suspects were submitted to the most brutal torture to compel them
to confess real or imaginary crimes. That past is not far away. It seems that we
are still smelling the stench of human flesh burned in the stakes, where suspected
witches suffered iniquitous death.There is no doubt that the procedure in question
shows the purpose of pandering to the most flagitious doctrines in criminal
proceedings.
The transgressions of the bill of rights in all its phases cannot be hidden even
to a chela in constitutional law. It is the very negation of the administration of
justice. Such procedure has absolutely no place in the framework of our juridical
system. We will feel mere whifflers in our professed convictions, principles, and
creed, if we should permit ourselves to fall into the weakness of abetting it even
for a moment, which could only happen once the flambeau of reason has ceased
completely to burn. No one but the truckling lackeys of the arrogant enemy could
have the servility of applauding the implantation of the criminal procedure in
question.All arguments and dissertations are useless to conceal the real fact.
Behind and under said criminal process stealthily crawls and trundles the Nippon
psychosis, like a cobra with fangs overflowing with venom. To ferret it out from
the hole where it lurks, waiting for its victims, and crush its head with one
hammer blow, is an imperative measure of national self-defense.XI. THE PETITIONER
IS ENTITLED, AS A MATTER OF ABSOLUTE RIGHT, TO IMMEDIATE RELEASEAfter showing the
absolute nullity of the judicial process under which petitioner has been convicted
to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment, the inevitable consequence is that he
is entitled, as a matter of absolute right, to be immediately released, so that he
can once again enjoy a life of freedom, which is the natural boon to law-abiding
residents of our country, and of which he was unjustly deprived through means most
abhorrent to human conscience.We must not hesitate for one moment to do our duty in
this case. The sooner we comply with it, the better. The process and judgement
under which petitioner has been convicted and is now undergoing an unjust
imprisonment, is one of the hateful vestiges left in our country by the moral
savagery of a people spiritually perverted and debased. The seriousness of this
matter cannot be viewed with insouciance. We must not lose time to wipe out such
vestiges if we must protect ourselves against their poisonous effects in our
political, social, and cultural patrimony.We must erase those vestiges if we want
to keep immune from all germs of decay the democratic institutions which are the
pride of our people and country, under which we are enjoying the blessings of
freedom and with which we hope to assure the well-being and happiness of the
unending generations who will succeed us in the enjoyment of the treasures
accumulated by a bountiful nature in this Pearl of the Orient.If we allow such
vestiges to remain we are afraid that some historian may write about Philippine
democracy, Philippine race, and Philippine culture, what, on ancient art, Hegel
said in the "Phenomenology of the Spirit", according to Kohler, the greatest work
of genius that the nineteenth century has produced:The statues set up are corpses
in stone, whence the animating soul has flown; while the hymns of praise are words
from which all belief has gone. The tables of the gods are bereft of spiritual food
and drink, and from his games and festivals, man no more receives the joyful sense
of his unity with the Divine Being. The works of the muse lack the force and energy
of the Spirit which derived the certainty and assurance of itself just from the
crushing ruin of goods and men. They are themselves now just what they are for us
beautiful fruit broken off the tree, a kindly fate has passed on those works to us,
as a maiden might offer such fruit off tree. It is not their actual life as they
exist, that is given us, not the tree that bore them, not the earth and the
elements, which constituted their substance, nor the climate that determined their
constitutive character, nor the change of seasons which controlled the process of
their growth. So, too, it is not their living world that fate preserves and gives
us with those works of ancient art, not the spring and summer of that ethical life
in which they bloomed and ripened, but the veiled remembrance alone of this
reality.Our sense of national self-preservation compels us, as an imperative duty,
not only to restore immediately the petitioner to his personal liberty, but, all
possible means, to obliterate even the memory of the inquisitorial summary
procedure depicted in the present case.Such procedure exhibits either inversion,
retroversion, subversion, or perversion of elemental human concepts. It ignores
completely and debases the high purposes of a judicial procedure. It represents a
hylistic ideology which proclaims the supremacy of the state force over fundamental
human rights. We must never allow the neck of our people to be haltered by the
lethal string of that ideology. It is a virus that must be eliminated before it

produces the logical disaster. Such ideology is a cancerous excrescence that must
be sheared, completely extirpated, from the live tissues of our body politic, if
the same must be saved.We cannot understand how any one can justify the summary
process in question under the principles embodied in our Constitution. To profess
attachment to those principles and, at the same time, to accept and justify such
kind of criminal miscarriage of justice, is just sheer hypocrisy. It is a
repetition of what Seneca did when, after preaching moral virtues, justified
without any compunction the act of Nero, the sanguinary Roman Emperor, of murdering
in cold blood his own mother. It is reproducing the crooked mentality of
Torquemada, who, upon the pretext of combating and persecuting heresy to save souls
from hell, conceived the diabolical idea of condemning their victims to an advanced
version of hell in this life, and among those who suffered under the same spirit of
intolerance and bigotry which was its very essence are counted some of the greatest
human characters, such as Galileo, Giordano Bruno, and Girolamo Savonarola. That
procedure might find justification in the thick heads of the Avars, Huns, Vandals,
and Teutons, or in the stratified mentality of Japanese cullions, but not in a
healthy mind of a cultured person of modern times. To allow any vestige any vestige
of such procedure to remain is tantamount to reviving the situation during which
our citizens endured sleepless nights in constant fear of the hobnail terror
stalking in the darkness, when their personal security and their life were hanging
by the thin of chance.We wish a way could be found to free completely our people of
the sense of shame, which they cannot help feeling, engendered by members of our
race who justified such abhorrent summary procedure and allowed themselves to
become a party to the execution of a scheme only acceptable to the undeveloped
mentalities of the dark ages. It is a shame that makes our blood boil when we think
that countrymen of Father Gomez, of Rizal, of Mabini, could accept procedures
representing the brutal ideology which is the very opposite of the humane, lofty,
and dignified ideology that placed said heroes and martyrs among the purest and
noblest specimens that humanity produced in all countries, in all time, for all
ones and light years to come.It is with joy and pride that we agree with all our
brethren in unanimously granting petitioner the redress he seeks in his petition.#
HILADO,J.,concurring:I concur in the result, as well as in the reasons stated in
the majority opinion not inconsistent with the views expressed in my dissenting
opinion in G. R. No. L-5,Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon(p. 199,ante).
However, I would additionally base my conclusion upon broader grounds.Firstly, I
reiterate here by reference the arguments advanced in said dissenting opinion in
additional support of the conclusion that the writ ofmandamusherein sought should
be granted. Secondly, the importance and transcendence of the legal principles
involved justify further elaboration.From the allegations of the petition herein,
it can be deduced that the petitioner William F. Peralta was a "guerrillero" when
he was arrested, tried and convicted; and that he had never voluntarily submitted
to the Japanese forces in his civil capacity.No attempt is made in the Solicitor
General's answer to controvert the facts alleged in the petition from which the
foregoing deduction flows, and from the record nothing appears which may tend to
gainsay them. Even when he was forced temporarily to join the Constabulary, which
had been organized under orders of the Japanese Army in the Philippines, he did so
against his will.Even granting for the sake of argument, and laying aside for the
moment the reasons to the contrary set forth in my aforesaid dissenting opinion,
that the rules of International Law regarding the power of a belligerent army of
occupation to establish a provisional government in an occupied enemy territory,
are still binding upon the United States and the Commonwealth of the Philippines,
yet such rules would not be any avail to bind the herein petitioner by the laws,
regulations, process and other acts of the so-called "Republic of the Philippines",
under and by virtue of which said petitioner has been convicted to life
imprisonment by the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction of Manila
in Criminal Case No. 66 thereof.If we analyze the different adjudications and
treatises which have been cited in support of the validity or binding force of the
acts of such provisional governments, which have been variously calledde
factogovernments, or governments of paramount force, with a view to finding the

real ground and philosophical justification for the doctrine therein announced, we
will see that reason and that justification are made to consist in the submission
of the inhabitants upon whom the said acts have been held to be of obligatory or
binding force, to the army of occupation. Thus, to cite just a few typical
examples, we quote the
following excerpts from three leading cases decided by the Supreme Court of the
United States:Excerpts from Thoringtonvs.Smith (8 Wall. [U. S.], 1; 19 Law. ed.,
361)That while it (government of paramount force) exists, it must necessarily be
obeyed in civil matters by private citizens who, by acts of obedience, rendered
insubmissionto such force, do not become responsible, as wrong-doers, for those
acts, though not warranted by the laws of the rightful government (p. 363; Emphasis
ours).The authority of the United States over the territory was suspended, and the
laws of the United States could no longer be rightfully enforced there, or be
obligatory upon the inhabitants whoremained and submitted to the conqueror. (P.
364; Emphasis ours.).Excerpts from Flemingvs.Page (9 Howard. [U. S.], 603; 13
Law. ed., 276):While it (Tampico) was occupied by our troops, they were in an
enemy's country, and not in their own; the inhabitants were still foreigners and
enemies, and owed to the United States nothing more than thesubmissionand
obedience, sometimes called temporary allegiance, which is due from a conquered
enemy, when hesurrendersto a force which he is unable to resist. (P. 281;
Emphasis ours.)Excerpts from United Statesvs.Rice (4 Wheat. [U. S.], 246; 4 Law.
ed., 562):The sovereignty of the United States over the territory was, of course,
suspended, and the laws of the United States could no longer be rightfully enforced
there, or be obligatory upon the inhabitants whoremainedand submitted to the
conquerors. (P. 564; Emphasis ours.)It results from the above-quoted pronouncements
of the Supreme Court of the United States that the laws, regulations, processes and
other acts of the government that the occupying belligerent establishes are made
binding only and precisely upon those inhabitants from whom obedience could be
effectively exacted, namely, those who remain within the effective reach of the
occupying forces and submit to them. This is plain common sense. Those who
conceived and developed the doctrine could not logically have thought of the army
of occupation setting upon a civil government for those who still continued
resistance. As to them, further military operations would be necessary to reduce
them to submission, before one could think of civilly governing them.In the
Philippines, during the occupation by the Japanese of Manila and certain other
portions of the Archipelago, the overwhelming majority of the people never
submitted to the Japanese invaders, and never recognized any legality in the
invasion of their country, and to the very date of liberation refused to accept the
alleged protection or benefits of the puppet governments of the "Philippine
Executive Commission" and the "Republic of the Philippines." The majority of our
people lived in the provinces, in the farms, hills and other places beyond the
effective reach of the Japanese military garrisons. Only a small minority submitted
to the invaders for various reasons, such as their having been caught in Manila or
other parts of the Island occupying government positions, or residing therein
without adequate facilities for escaping from or evading said invaders, reasons of
ill health, disabling them from living the hard life of the mountains, hills, or
country places, and the like.To have bound those of our people who constituted the
great majority who never submitted to the Japanese oppressors, by the laws,
regulations, processes and other acts of those two puppet governments, would not
only have been utterly unjust and downright illegal, but would have placed them in
the absurd and impossible condition of being simultaneously submitted to two
mutually hostile governments, with their respective constitutional and legislative
enactments and institutions on the one hand bound to continue owing allegiance to
the United States and the Commonwealth Government, and, on the other, to owe
allegiance, if only temporary, to Japan. Among them we find the petitioner William
F. Peralta. The surrender of the Fil-American forces in Bataan and Corregidor did
not matter so far as this was concerned. Much less did that surrender obligate all
the civil population to submit to the Japanese, and obey all their future
dictations. If it did, President Roosevelt and President Osmea would not have so
heartily commended the Philippine resistance movement and so enthusiastically
extolled the firm stand of those who participated therein, in the former's message
of October 23, 1943, and in the latter's speech of February 27, 1945, cited in the
writer's above mentioned dissenting opinion. If these historic utterances should
seem incompatible with any provision of the Hague Convention, we should understand
from them that both Presidents must have considered such provision as no longer
applicable to, or binding upon, the United States and the Philippines. Who knows
but that their attitude was based upon the renunciation of war as an instrument of
national policy by their respective peoples, which renunciation necessarily
includes all the "rights" or "powers" which may be claimed to be delivered from war
so employed? Or else, upon the ground that such provisions does not support the
wrongful acts of Japan in the Philippines? Another reason advanced to justify the
creation of a provisional civil government, with its courts and other departments,
in occupied enemy territory, is the alleged convenience of the civil population. It
can immediately be asserted in reply that the convenience of the above-mentioned
overwhelming majority of our people, far from requiring the establishment of such
government, was in the very nature of things positively opposed thereto. They not
only did not need the supposed benefits of such a government, but they actually
reputed them as inimical to the larger interest of the very ideology and cause for
which they were continuing their resistance to those who would extend here the
brutal power and pernicious influence of the now exploded "Greater East Asia CoProsperity Sphere." They suffered, yes, and suffered much but they placed that
ideology and that cause high above their private comfort. Let us not penalize them
for it. If this government is democratic, and when it comes to a question of
convenience, whose will and whose convenience should prevail, that of the majority
or that of the minority? Are we going to force those free citizens of this free
country to accept the alleged benefits and assume the burdens of a government they
have never consented to own? I am furthermore, of opinion that there is another
important consideration which argues against the recognition of the said government
as ade factogovernment or government of paramount force during the Japanese
occupation of the Philippine Islands. Japan, in starting and prosecuting this war
against the United States and her allies by breaking the most vital rules of
civilized warfare as prescribed by International Law, must be deemed to have
forfeited the right to invoke that law in so far as specific provisions thereof
would favor her or her acts. Japan in treacherously attacking Pearl Harbor and the
Philippines, successively on December 7 and 8, 1941, violated the rule providing
for the necessity of declaring war as established at the Hague Conference of 1907
(Lawrence, Principles of International Law, 7th ed., pp. 321-322, 325); she has
infringed the rule requiring that war prisoners be cared for and treated with
humanity (Ibid, p. 377); the rule imposing the obligation to properly tend the sick
and wounded (Ibid, 384), the rule interdicting bombing of open and defenseless
cities (Ibid, 522, 523) when she bombed Manila after it had been declared an open
city and all its military defenses had been removed; the rule exempting
noncombatants from personal injury (Ibid, 397) her violations of one or the other
of which were matters of daily occurrence, one might say, during her three and a
half years of tyranny and oppression in this country, and were climaxed by the
ignominious and indescribable atrocities of the mass massacre of innocent civilians
during the battle for Manila. In the interpretation of doubtful provisions of
International Law, Doctor Lawrence, in his work cited above, has the following to
say:. . . If a point of Municipal Law is doubtful, men resort to supreme court for
a decision, or to a supreme legislature for an interpreting statute; but if a point
of International Law is doubtful, they can resort only to general reasoning for a
convincing argument, unless, indeed, they settle the question by blows. And
International Law in many of its details is peculiarly liable to disputes and
doubts, because it is based on usage and opinion. He who in such a case bases his
reasoning on high considerations of morality may succeed in resolving the doubt in
accordance with humanity and justice. (Pp. 12, 13.).It would seem that to deny
Japan benefits, because she has refused to carry the burdens of the law, is to base
our reasoning "on high considerations of morality", and to resolve any doubt, there
be, as to the point in question, "in accordance with humanity and justice." In
other words (even if we applied said rules to the instant case), Japan, under the
circumstances of this case, could not be heard to say that the government which she
established here was ade factogovernment, or a government of paramount force, as
in the cases where such a government was deemed to exist.In additional to what has
been said above, let us see if the Japanese-sponsored "Republic of the Philippines"
did not introduces such fundamental and drastic changes in the political
organization of this country, as it existed upon the date of the Japanese invasion,
as to vitiate with invalidity the acts of all its department, executive, judicial,
and legislative. To begin with, the Commonwealth
Constitution was completely overthrown. It was replaced by the so-called
constitution of the "Republic." A casual comparison of these two instruments cannot
fail to reveal a most revolutionary transformation of the political organization of
the country. While under the Commonwealth Constitution the retention of American
sovereignty over the Philippines is expressly recognized, for the purposes
specified in the ordinance appended thereto, in the very preamble of the
constitution of the "Republic" the independence " of the Philippines is proclaim.
While under the Commonwealth Constitution the President and Vice-President are
elected "by direct vote of the people "Art. VII, sec. 2), under the constitution of
the "Republic" the President (no Vice-President is provided for) was elected "by
majority of all the members of the Assembly" (Art. II, sec. 2). While under
Commonwealth Constitution the legislative power is vested in a bicameral Congress
with a Senate and a House of Representatives (Art. VI, sec. 1), under the
constitution of the "Republic" that power was vested in a unicameral National
Assembly (Art. III, sec. 1). While under the Commonwealth Constitution the Senators
are chosen at large by the qualified electors of the Philippines (Art. VI, sec. 2)
and the Representatives by the qualified electors in the respective districts (Art.
VI, sec. 2) and the Representative by the qualified electors in the respective
districts (Art. VI, 5), under the constitution of the "Republic" the National
Assembly was composed of the provincial governors and city mayors as members exoficio, and of delegate elected every three years, one from each and every province
and chartered city (Art. III, sec. 2), While under the Commonwealth Constitution,
respecting the Judicial Department, the members of Supreme Court and all judges of
inferior courts are appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission
on Appointments of the Congress (Art. VII, sec.), under the constitution of the
"Republic" the members of the Supreme Court were appointed by the President with
the advice of the Cabinet, and all judges of interior courts, by the President with
the advice of the Supreme Court (Art. IV, sec. 4).These changes and innovations can
be multiplied many times, but the foregoing will suffice for our purpose.It has
been said constantly in this discussion that political acts, or acts of a political
complexion of ade factogovernment of paramount force, are the only ones vitiated
with nullity. Of course, I disagree with those who so hold. But even by this test
the "Republic" or, which is the same, the Imperial Japanese Forces which gave it
birth in thus introducing such positive changes in the organization of this
country or suspending the working of that already in existence, executed a
political act so fundamental and basic in nature and operation that all subsequent
acts of the new government which of course had to be based thereon, inevitably had
to be contaminated by the same vitiating defect.Thus judicial acts done under his
control, when they are not of a political complexion, administrative acts so done,
to the extent that they take effect during the continuance of his control, and
various acts done during the same time by private persons under the sanction of
municipal law, remain good.. Political acts on the other hand fall through as of
course, whether they introduce any positive change into the organization of the
country, or whether they only suspend the working of that already in existence. . .
. (Hall, International Law, 6th ed., p. 483; Emphasis ours.)Finally, upon closed
scrutiny, we will find that all of thede factogovernments or governments of
paramount force which have been cited in all this discussion were at the same
timebona fidegovernments. The British established such a government in Castine,
and ran it is a purely British organization. The Americans established another such
government in Tampico, and ran it as an American organization. The Confederate
States established a like government in the seceding States, and ran it as the
Government of the Confederacy. They were all frank, sincere, and honest in their
deeds as well as in their words. But what happened in this country during the
Japanese occupation? When the "Republic of the Philippines" was established on
October 14, 1943, under duress exerted by the Japanese Army, did the Japanese
openly, frankly, and sincerely say that government was being established under
their orders and was to be run subject to their direction and control? Far from it!
They employed all the means they could conceive to deceive the Filipino people and
the outside world that they had given the Filipinos their independence, and that
"Republic" thereunder. But behind the curtain, from beginning to end, there was the
Imperial Japanese Army giving orders and instructions and otherwise directing and
controlling the activities of what really was their creature for the furtherance of
their war aims. I cannot believe that those who conceived and developed the
doctrine ofde factogovernment or government of paramount force, ever intended to
include therein such a counterfeit organization as the Japanese contrived here an
organization which, like its counterparts in Manchukuo, Nanking, Burma, and Vichy,
has been appropriately called "puppet" by the civilized government of the world.#
BRIONES,M.,concurrente:El mandamiento dehabeas corpusque se solicita debe
concederse.La proclama del General McArthur de 23 de Octubre de 1944, lanzada
cuatro dias despues de su desembarco en Leyte con las fuerzas libertadoras, reza en
parte lo siguiente:3. Que todas las leyes, regulaciones y procesos de cualquier
otro gobierno en Filipinas que no fuera el del Commonwealth son nulos e invalidos y
carecen de efecto legal en areas de Filipinas liberadas de la ocupacion y control
del enemigo.Recientemente se ha discutido mucho en esta jurisdiccion sobre si la
anulacion de que trata dicha proclama puede referirse tambien a actuaciones
judiciales (judicial processes). En el asunto deCo Kim Cham contra Valdez Tan Keh
y Dizon, R.G. No. L-5 (pag, 133,ante), he opinado afirmativamente, esto es, que el
alcance de esa proclama puede extenderse a veces a ciertos actos oprocesos
judiciales. Reafirmo ahora mi opinion y con mayor vigor y enfasis si cabe. Porque,
a mi juicio, la sentencia de reclusion perpetua impuesta al recurrente bajo la
ocupacion militar japonesa es de aquellos actos judiciales del passado regimen que
por su naturaleza y circunstancias reclaman una decidida y pronta accion de parte
nuestra en el sentido de anularla y dejarla sin efecto. Mis razones se exponen a
continuacion.Parece innegable que la ley procesal bajo la cual fue enjuiciado y
convicto el recurrente durante la ocupacion japonesa era absolutamente incompatible
con las salvaguardias y garantias de un proceso justo, imparcial y ordenado que la
constitucion y legislacion procesal del Commonwealth de Filipinas otorgan a todo
acusado en una causa criminal. Hay en dicha ley ciertos aspectos decididamente
repulsivos para una conciencia disciplinada en las normas y pricipios de una
democracia constitucional.Bajo nuestro sistema procesal el acusado tiene derecho a
que no se le ponga en situacion de acriminarse. Tiene a derecho a callarse sin que
esto pueda astribuirsele cargo inculpatorio alguno. Este es un derecho fundamental,
garantido por la constitucion.Empero bajo el sistema procesal que se discute, "la
negativa del acusado a constestar cualqueira pregunta formulada por el tribunal o
permitida por el mismo, puede ser considerada en contra de dicho acusado." (Seccion
21, Orden Ejecutiva No. 157.) Bajo este mismo sistema el caracter sumarisimo del
proceso llega a tal extremo que "una sentencia condenatoria puede dictarse
inmediatemente contra el acusado siempre que los hechos discubiertos en
elinterrogatorio preliminardemuestren que el acusado es culpable."Bajo el sistema
procesal del Commonwealth, cualquier acusado convicto ante el Juzgado de Primera
Instancia tiene el derecho de apelar de la sentencia para ante el Tribunal superior
de revision; y en los casos de condena areclusion perpetuao a muerte, el Tribunal
Supremo es el llamado a revisar la causa, siendo compulsoria la revision en el caso
de condena a muerte. Esta jurisdiccion del Tribunal Supremo en los casos de condena
areclusion perpetuay a muerte no se halla estatuida simplemente por una ley
ordinaria, sino que esta proveida en la misma constitucion del Commonwealth. Asi
que el derecho del condenado areclusion perpetuao a muerte para que se revise su
cuasa por el Tribunal Supremo es constitucional y, por ende, no puede ser abolido
por un simplefiatlegislativo.En cambio, bajo el sistema procesal en controversia
las sentencias de los tribunales o sumarias eran de caracter final, excepto cuando
la pena impuesta fuera la de muerte, en cuyo caso los autos se elevaban en consulta
a una division especial del Tribunal Supremo compuesta de tres miembros (Ordenanza
No. 7 de la llamada Republica de Filipinas por la que se crearon las tribunales
especiales o sumarios). De modo que en esta ordenanza no solo se suprimia de una
plumada el derecho de apelar reconocido y establecido por la legislacion procesal
del Commonwealth aun en los casos de delitos y penas ordinarios, sino que inclusive
quedaba abolido el derecho de apelar otorgado por la constitucion del Commonwealth
al acusado condenado a reclusion perpetua. Por este motivo el recurrente, a quien
se le habia impuesto esta pena por el alergado delito de robo, no pudo apelar de al
sentencia para ante el Tribunal Supremo.La cuestion que ahora tenemos que
determinar y resolver es si debemos reconocer validez y eficacia en la sentencia
por la cual el recurrente se halla extinguiendo su condena de reclusion perpetua,
o debemos anularla ahora que esta en nuestras manos el poder hacerlo, restablecida
como esta enteramente la normalidad juridica y constitucional en nuestro pais.En
favor de la validez de dicha sentencia se arguye que fue dictada por un tribunal
creado por un gobiernode jure; que aun admitiendo el caracter inquisitorial, anti
democratico de la ley procesal bajo la cual fue enjuiciado el acusado, el
gobiernode factoera dueo de establecer los procedimientos legales que quisiera;
y que, segun las reglas y doctrinas conocidas de derecho international, las
sentencias por "crimenes de guerra" o delitos politicos" generalmente validas aun
despues de restablecido el gobiernode jure. Se alega que en estos casos el derecho
no tiene mas remedio que ceder a la fuerza, aceptando la realidad de los hechos
consumados.Se admite, sin embargo, que la regla tiene sus excepciones. Una de allas
esque "los actos del ocupante militar que rebasen su poder a tenor del criterio
establecido en el articulo 43 de las Regulaciones de La Haya, son nulos y sin
efecto con relacion al gobierno legitimo." (Wheaton's International Law, 7th ed.
[1944], p. 245.) Segun esto, las sentencias por "crimenes de guerra" o "delitos
politicos" cometidos durante la ocupacion son, por razones pecfetamente
comprensibles, nulas e invalidas al restablecerse la soberania legitima. Tambien
quedan comprendidos bajo esta excepcion los denominados actos de caracter o
complexion politica.Otra limitacion a los poderes de un gobierno de ocupacion
militar es que elejercicio de tales poderes debe extenderse tan solo hasta donde
fuese necesario para su seguridad y el exito de sus operaciones, teniendo
particularmente en cuental el caracter transeunte de su occupacion. Como regla
general, al invasor se leprohibe alterar o suspender las leyes referentes a la
propiedad y a las relaciones personales privadas, o las leyes que regulan el orden
moral de la comunidad. (Hall, Treatise on International Law, 7th ed., 498,499). Lo
que se hace fuera de estas limitaciones es en exceso de su competencia y es
generalmente nulo al rstaurarse la soberania legitima.Otra excepcion es la que se
refiere a los actos de un gobiernode factoresultante de una insurreccion,
rebelion, revolucion o guerra civil. A esteefecto se ha declarado, peo ejemplo. que
los actos en fomento o apoyo de unarebelion contra los Estados Unidos,o
encaminados a anular los justos derechos de los ciudadanos, y otros actos de igual
indole,deben ser considerados, por lo general, invalidos y nulos(Texasvs.White,
74 U. S.,733; 19 Law, ed., 240). En otro caso se ha declaro la validez de ciertos
actos judiciales o legislativos en estados insurreccionados,siempre que su
proposito o modo de operacion no fuerte hostil a la autoridad del gobierno
nacional, o no conculcaren derechos de los ciudadanos bajo la Constitucion.
Hornvs.Lockhart, 17 Well, 570-581; 2 Law. ed., 660.)Visto el caso que nos ocupa a
la luz de estas doctrinas, cual de ellas debemos adoptar para determinar si es o
no valida la sentencia por la la cual el recurrente sufre ahora pena de reclusion
perpetua y pide ser liberado mediante peticion dehabeas corpus? Se aservera que no
procede aplicar al presente caso la doctrina establecida en la jurisprudencia
americana sobre gobiernosde factoresultantes de una insureccion, revolucion o
guerra civil porque evidentemente la llamada Republica de Filipinas instaurada
durante la ocupacion militar japonesa no tenia este caracter, sino que era mas bien
un gobierno establecido mediantefuerza y coaccion por los mismos invasores para

promover ciertos designios politicos relacionados con sus fines de guerra. En otras
palabras, era el mismo gobierno militar de ocupacion con fachada filipina arreglada
y arbitrada coercitivamente.Mientras estoy conforme con una parte de la asercion,
esto es, que la aludida republica no tenia caracter insurreccional ni
revolucionario, en disfrute de plena autonomia, sino que era simple producto de la
coaccion y estaba mediatizada continuamente por el invasor, difiero de la otra
parte, aquella que declara inaplicable la conocida doctrina americana mencionada
arriba sobre gobiernosde factoestablecidos en el curso de una insurreccion,
revolucion o guerra civil. Y la razon es sencilla. Si a un gobiernode factode este
ultimo tipo gobierno establecido, despues de todo, por compatriotas,por
conciudadanos se le coarta con la restriccion de que sus actos legislativos o
judiciales, en tanto son validos, al restaurarse el regimende jure, en cuanto no
conculcaren los derechos justos de los ciudadanos, a los derechos garantidos por la
constitucion, parece que no existe ninguna razon por que no se ha de aplicar la
misma restriccion al gobiernode factoestablecido como incidente de una guerra
entre dos naciones independientes y enemigas. En realidad, la razon de nulidad es
mucho mas poderosa y fuertecuando, en su caso como el de Filipinas, el enemigo
invasor incio la agresion de una manera inicua y traicionera y la ejecuto luego con
vesania y sadismo que llegaron a extremos inconcebibles de barbarie. En este caso
laconculcacion de los justos derechos de los ciudadanos, o de los derechos
garantidos por la constitucion cobraproporciones de mucha mayor gravedad porque
viene a ser tan solo parte de un vasto plan de rapia, devastacion y atrocidades de
todo genero cometidas contra la humanidad y contra las leyes y usos de la guerra
entre naciones civilizadas. El invasor, en este caso, es como el foragido que se
coloca fuera de toda ley. Por tanto, no hay absolutamente ninguna razon para no
aplicarle una restriccion que se estimabuena para el insurrecto o revolucionario.La
ventaja de extender hasta cierto punto la doctrina sobre gobiernosde
factoresultantes de una insurreccion, rebelion o guerra civil a gobiernosde
factoestablecidos como incidente en el curso de una guerra entre dos naciones
independeientes enemigas es que, frente a casos de conculcacion de losjustos
derechos de los ciudadanos, o de los garantidos por laconstitucionpara los efectos
de declararlos validos o nulos al restablecerse el gobierno de jure, ya no se hace
preciso examinar si los actos conculcatorios fueron motivados por razones o
exigencias de las seguridad y exito de las operaciones del ocupante militar, sino
que la piedra de toque de la validez o nulidad viene a ser tan solo el acto
positivo mismo de la conculcacion.Esta forma de racioncinio no solo no es
heterodoxa a la luz de los pincipiosestablecidos de derecho internacional, sino
parece ser una logica inferenciade los mismos. Ya hemos visto que al ocupante
militar en el curso de unaguerra internacionalse le prohibe, como regla general,
alterar o suspenderlas leyes referentes a la propiedad y a las relaciones
personales privadas, olas leyes que regulan el orden moral de la comunidad. (Hall,
Treatise on International Law,supra.) Ahora cabe preguntar: Son los justos
derechos de los ciudadanos, o los fundamentales garantidos por la
constitucioninferiores en categoria a la propiedad, o las relaciones personales
privadas, o al ordenmoral de la comunidad? No son en cierto sentido hasta
superiores? Por tanto,a nadie debe chocar que la prohibicion se extienda a estas
materias. Es unainclusion y perfectamente natural, mas que justificada por los
avances y conquistas del moderno derecho internacional. Notese que en las fraguas
de esta ultima guerra se han forjado unas modalidades juridicas harto originalesque
denotan el esfuerzo supremo y gigante dela humanidad por superar la barbarie y por
dar al traste con las formulas arcaicas, reaccionarias. Para citar solamente
algunos ejemplos los mas destados, tenemos el enjuiciamento de los llamados
criminales de la guerra, y la responsabilidad que se exige a los jefes militares
por las atricidades cometidas por las tropas bajo su mando.Mi conclusion, por
tanto, es que desde cualquier angulo que se mire la sentencia impuesta al
recurrente por el tribunal sumario de la llamada republica de Filipinas debe ser
declarada nula, acotando las palabras delProcurador General, "no solo por razones
fundadas en principios de derecho internacional, sino tambien por la mas apremiante
y poderosa de las razones,la de preservar y salvaguardar a nuestros ciudadanos de

los actos del enemigo."Dar validez a esa sentencia ahora, en plena atmosfera de
libertad que respiran a pulmon lleno de resto de nuestros conciudadanos menos el
recurrente y otras que corrieron su suerte durante la ocupacion
japonesa,equivaldria tanto como prolongar el regimen de opresion bajo el cual se
tramito y se dicto la referida sentencia. Es mas, equivaldria a sancionar
laideologia totalitaria, despotica, medieval contra la cual nuestro pueblo lucho
tan heroicamente jugandose todo; vida libertad y bienes materiales.Ciertamente no
nos hemos librado de la opresion para llegar a tan irrisorioresultado.Concedase el
remedio pedido.G.R. No. 86773 February 14, 1992SOUTHEAST ASIAN FISHERIES
DEVELOPMENT CENTER-AQUACULTURE DEPARTMENT (SEAFDEC-AQD), DR. FLOR LACANILAO
(CHIEF), RUFIL CUEVAS (HEAD, ADMINISTRATIVE DIV.), BEN DELOS REYES (FINANCE
OFFICER),petitioners,#vs.#NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and JUVENAL
LAZAGA,respondents.Ramon Encarnacion for petitioners.Caesar T. Corpus for private
respondent.NOCON,J.:This is a petition forcertiorarito annul and set aside the
July 26, 1988 decision of the National Labor Relations Commission sustaining the
labor arbiter, in holding herein petitioners Southeast Asian Fisheries Development
Center-Aquaculture Department (SEAFDEC-AQD), Dr. Flor Lacanilao, Rufil Cuevas and
Ben de los Reyes liable to pay private respondent Juvenal Lazaga the amount of
P126,458.89 plus interest thereon computed from May 16, 1986 until full payment
thereof is made, as separation pay and other post-employment benefits, and the
resolution
denying the petitioners' motion for reconsideration of said decision dated January
9, 1989.The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:SEAFDEC-AQD is a department
of an international organization, the Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center,
organized through an agreement entered into in Bangkok, Thailand on December 28,
1967 by the governments of Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, Indonesia and
the Philippines with Japan as the sponsoring country (Article 1, Agreement
Establishing the SEAFDEC).On April 20, 1975, private respondent Juvenal Lazaga was
employed as a Research Associate an a probationary basis by the SEAFDEC-AQD and was
appointed Senior External Affairs Officer on January 5, 1983 with a monthly basic
salary of P8,000.00 and a monthly allowance of P4,000.00. Thereafter, he was
appointed to the position of Professional III and designated as Head of External
Affairs Office with the same pay and benefits.On May 8, 1986, petitioner Lacanilao
in his capacity as Chief of SEAFDEC-AQD sent a notice of termination to private
respondent informing him that due to the financial constraints being experienced by
the department, his services shall be terminated at the close of office hours on
May 15, 1986 and that he is entitled to separation benefits equivalent to one (1)
month of his basic salary for every year of service plus other benefits (Rollo, p.
153).Upon petitioner SEAFDEC-AQD's failure to pay private respondent his separation
pay, the latter filed on March 18, 1987 a complaint against petitioners for nonpayment of separation benefits plus moral damages and attorney's fees with the
Arbitration Branch of the NLRC (Annex "C" of Petition forCertiorari).Petitioners
in their answer with counterclaim alleged that the NLRC has no jurisdiction over
the case inasmuch as the SEAFDEC-AQD is an international organization and that
private respondent must first secure clearances from the proper departments for
property or money accountability before any claim for separation pay will be paid,
and which clearances had not yet been obtained by the private respondent.A formal
hearing was conducted whereby private respondent alleged that the non-issuance of
the clearances by the petitioners was politically motivated and in bad faith. On
the other hand, petitioners alleged that private respondent has property
accountability and an outstanding obligation to SEAFDEC-AQD in the amount of
P27,532.11. Furthermore, private respondent is not entitled to accrued sick leave
benefits amounting to P44,000.00 due to his failure to avail of the same during his
employment with the SEAFDEC-AQD (Annex "D",Id.).On January 12, 1988, the labor
arbiter rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:WHEREFORE,
premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering respondents:1. To pay
complainant P126,458.89, plus legal interest thereon computed from May 16, 1986
until full payment thereof is made, as separation pay and other post-employment
benefits;2. To pay complainant actual damages in the amount of P50,000, plus 10%
attorney's fees.All other claims are hereby dismissed.SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 51,
Annex "E")On July 26, 1988, said decision was affirmed by the Fifth Division of the
NLRC except as to the award of P50,000.00 as actual damages and attorney's fees for
being baseless. (Annex "A", p. 28,id.)On September 3, 1988, petitioners filed a
Motion for Reconsideration (Annex "G",id.) which was denied on January 9, 1989.
Thereafter, petitioners instituted this petition forcertiorarialleging that the
NLRC has no jurisdiction to hear and decide respondent Lazaga's complaint since
SEAFDEC-AQD is immune from suit owing to its international character and the
complaint is in effect a suit against the State which cannot be maintained without
its consent.The petition is impressed with merit.Petitioner Southeast Asian
Fisheries Development Center-Aquaculture Department (SEAFDEC-AQD) is an
international agency beyond the jurisdiction of public respondent NLRC.It was
established by the Governments of Burma, Kingdom of Cambodia, Republic of
Indonesia, Japan, Kingdom of Laos, Malaysia. Republic of the Philippines, Republic
of Singapore, Kingdom of Thailand and Republic of Vietnam (Annex "H", Petition).The
Republic of the Philippines became a signatory to the Agreement establishing
SEAFDEC on January 16,1968. Its purpose is as follows:The purpose of the Center is
to contribute to the promotion of the fisheries development in Southeast Asia by
mutual co-operation among the member governments of the Center, hereinafter called
the "Members", and through collaboration with international organizations and
governments external to the Center. (Agreement Establishing the SEAFDEC, Art. 1;
Annex "H" Petition) (p.310,Rollo)SEAFDEC-AQD was organized during the Sixth
Council Meeting of SEAFDEC on July 3-7, 1973 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia as one of
the principal departments of SEAFDEC (Annex "I",id.) to be established in Iloilo
for the promotion of research in aquaculture. Paragraph 1, Article 6 of the
Agreement establishing SEAFDEC mandates:1. The Council shall be the supreme organ
of the Center and all powers of the Center shall be vested in the Council.Being an
intergovernmental organization, SEAFDEC including its Departments (AQD), enjoys
functional independence and freedom from control of the state in whose territory
its office is located.As Senator Jovito R. Salonga and Former Chief Justice Pedro
L. Yap stated in their book, Public International Law (p. 83, 1956 ed.):Permanent
international commissions and administrative bodies have been created by the
agreement of a considerable number of States for a variety of international
purposes, economic or social and mainly non-political. Among the notable instances
are the International Labor Organization, the International Institute of
Agriculture, the International Danube Commission. In so far as they are autonomous
and beyond the control of any one State, they have a distinct juridical personality
independent of the municipal law of the State where they are situated. As such,
according to one leading authority "they must be deemed to possess a species of
international personality of their own." (Salonga and Yap, Public International
Law, 83 [1956 ed.])Pursuant to its being a signatory to the Agreement, the Republic
of the Philippines agreed to be represented by one Director in the governing
SEAFDEC Council (Agreement Establishing SEAFDEC, Art. 5, Par. 1, Annex "H",ibid.)
and that its national laws and regulations shall apply only insofar as its
contribution to SEAFDEC of "an agreed amount of money, movable and immovable
property and services necessary for the establishment and operation of the Center"
are concerned (Art. 11,ibid.). It expressly waived the application of the
Philippine laws on the disbursement of funds of petitioner SEAFDEC-AQD (Section 2,
P.D. No. 292).The then Minister of Justice likewise opined that Philippine Courts
have no jurisdiction over SEAFDEC-AQD in Opinion No. 139, Series of 1984 4. One of
the basic immunities of an international organization is immunity from local
jurisdiction,i.e.,that it is immune from the legal writs and processes issued by
the tribunals of the country where it is found. (SeeJenks,Id., pp. 37-44) The
obvious reason for this is that the subjection of such an organization to the
authority of the local courts would afford a convenient medium thru which the host
government may interfere in there operations or even influence or control its
policies and decisions of the organization; besides, such subjection to local
jurisdiction would impair the capacity of such body to discharge its
responsibilities impartially on behalf of its member-states. In the case at bar,

for instance, the entertainment by the National Labor Relations Commission of Mr.
Madamba's reinstatement cases would amount to interference by the Philippine
Government in the management decisions of the SEARCA governing board; even worse,
it could compromise the desired impartiality of the organization since it will have
to suit its actuations to the requirements of Philippine law, which may not
necessarily coincide with the interests of the other member-states. It is precisely
to forestall these possibilities that in cases where the extent of the immunity is
specified in the enabling instruments of international organizations,
jurisdictional immunity from the host country is invariably among the first
accorded. (SeeJenks,Id.;See alsoBowett, The Law of International Institutions,
pp. 284-1285).Respondent Lazaga's invocation of estoppel with respect to the issue
of jurisdiction is unavailing because estoppel does not apply to confer
jurisdiction to a tribunal that has none over a cause of action. Jurisdiction is
conferred by law. Where there is none, no agreement of the parties can provide one.
Settled is the rule that the decision of a tribunal not vested with appropriate
jurisdiction is null and void. Thus, inCalimlim vs.Ramirez, this Court held:A
rule, that had been settled by unquestioned acceptance and upheld in decisions so
numerous to cite is that the jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter of the
action is a matter of law and may not be conferred by consent or agreement of the
parties. The lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings, even on appeal. This doctrine has been qualified by recent
pronouncements which it stemmed principally from the ruling in the cited case
ofSibonghanoy. It is to be regretted, however, that the holding in said case had
been applied to situations which were obviously not contemplated therein. The
exceptional circumstances involved inSibonghanoywhich justified the departure
from the accepted concept of non-waivability of objection to jurisdiction has been
ignored
and, instead a blanket doctrine had been repeatedly upheld that rendered the
supposed ruling inSibonghanoynot as the exception, but rather the general rule,
virtually overthrowing altogether the time-honored principle that the issue of
jurisdiction is not lost by waiver or by estoppel. (Calimlim vs. Ramirez, G.R. No.
L-34362, 118 SCRA 399; [1982])Respondent NLRC'S citation of the ruling of this
Court inLacanilao v.De Leon(147 SCRA 286 [1987]) to justify its assumption of
jurisdiction over SEAFDEC is misplaced. On the contrary, the Court in said case
explained why it took cognizance of the case. Said the Court:We would note,
finally, that the present petition relates to a controversy between two claimants
to the same position;this is not a controversy between the SEAFDEC on the one
hand, and an officer or employee, or a person claiming to be an officer or
employee, of the SEAFDEC, on the other hand. There is before us no question
involving immunity from the jurisdiction of the Court, there being no plea for such
immunity whether by or on behalf of SEAFDEC, or by an official of SEAFDEC with the
consent of SEAFDEC (Id., at 300; emphasis supplied).WHEREFORE, finding SEAFDEC-AQD
to be an international agency beyond the jurisdiction of the courts or local agency
of the Philippine government, the questioned decision and resolution of the NLRC
dated July 26, 1988 and January 9, 1989, respectively, are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE for having been rendered without jurisdiction. No costs.G.R. No. 142396
February 11, 2003KHOSROW MINUCHER,petitioner,#vs.#HON. COURT OF APPEALS and
ARTHUR SCALZO,respondents.D E C I S I O NVITUG,J.:Sometime in May 1986, an
Information for violation of Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise also
known as the "Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972," was filed against petitioner Khosrow
Minucher and one Abbas Torabian with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 151, of Pasig
City. The criminal charge followed a "buy-bust operation" conducted by the
Philippine police narcotic agents in the house of Minucher, an Iranian national,
where a quantity of heroin, a prohibited drug, was said to have been seized. The
narcotic agents were accompanied by private respondent Arthur Scalzo who would, in
due time, become one of the principal witnesses for the prosecution. On 08 January
1988, Presiding Judge Eutropio Migrino rendered a decision acquitting the two
accused.On 03 August 1988, Minucher filed Civil Case No. 88-45691 before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 19, of Manila for damages on account of what he
claimed to have been trumped-up charges of drug trafficking made by Arthur Scalzo.
The Manila RTC detailed what it had found to be the facts and circumstances
surrounding the case."The testimony of the plaintiff disclosed that he is an
Iranian national. He came to the Philippines to study in the University of the
Philippines in 1974. In 1976, under the regime of the Shah of Iran, he was
appointed Labor Attach for the Iranian Embassies in Tokyo, Japan and Manila,
Philippines. When the Shah of Iran was deposed by Ayatollah Khomeini, plaintiff
became a refugee of the United Nations and continued to stay in the Philippines. He
headed the Iranian National Resistance Movement in the Philippines."He came to know
the defendant on May 13, 1986, when the latter was brought to his house and
introduced to him by a certain Jose Iigo, an informer of the Intelligence Unit of
the military. Jose Iigo, on the other hand, was met by plaintiff at the office of
Atty. Crisanto Saruca, a lawyer for several Iranians whom plaintiff assisted as
head of the anti-Khomeini movement in the Philippines."During his first meeting
with the defendant on May 13, 1986, upon the introduction of Jose Iigo, the
defendant expressed his interest in buying caviar. As a matter of fact, he bought
two kilos of caviar from plaintiff and paid P10,000.00 for it. Selling caviar,
aside from that of Persian carpets, pistachio nuts and other Iranian products was
his business after the Khomeini government cut his pension of over $3,000.00 per
month. During their introduction in that meeting, the defendant gave the plaintiff
his calling card, which showed that he is working at the US Embassy in the
Philippines, as a special agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration, Department
of Justice, of the United States, and gave his address as US Embassy, Manila. At
the back of the card appears a telephone number in defendants own handwriting, the
number of which he can also be contacted."It was also during this first meeting
that plaintiff expressed his desire to obtain a US Visa for his wife and the wife
of a countryman named Abbas Torabian. The defendant told him that he [could] help
plaintiff for a fee of $2,000.00 per visa. Their conversation, however, was more
concentrated on politics, carpets and caviar. Thereafter, the defendant promised to
see plaintiff again."On May 19, 1986, the defendant called the plaintiff and
invited the latter for dinner at Mario's Restaurant at Makati. He wanted to buy 200
grams of caviar. Plaintiff brought the merchandize but for the reason that the
defendant was not yet there, he requested the restaurant people to x x x place the
same in the refrigerator. Defendant, however, came and plaintiff gave him the
caviar for which he was paid. Then their conversation was again focused on politics
and business."On May 26, 1986, defendant visited plaintiff again at the latter's
residence for 18 years at Kapitolyo, Pasig. The defendant wanted to buy a pair of
carpets which plaintiff valued at $27,900.00. After some haggling, they agreed at
$24,000.00. For the reason that defendant did not yet have the money, they agreed
that defendant would come back the next day. The following day, at 1:00 p.m., he
came back with his $24,000.00, which he gave to the plaintiff, and the latter, in
turn, gave him the pair of carpets.1awphi1.nt"At about 3:00 in the afternoon of
May 27, 1986, the defendant came back again to plaintiff's house and directly
proceeded to the latter's bedroom, where the latter and his countryman, Abbas
Torabian, were playing chess. Plaintiff opened his safe in the bedroom and obtained
$2,000.00 from it, gave it to the defendant for the latter's fee in obtaining a
visa for plaintiff's wife. The defendant told him that he would be leaving the
Philippines very soon and requested him to come out of the house for a while so
that he can introduce him to his cousin waiting in a cab. Without much ado, and
without putting on his shirt as he was only in his pajama pants, he followed the
defendant where he saw a parked cab opposite the street. To his complete surprise,
an American jumped out of the cab with a drawn high-powered gun. He was in the
company of about 30 to 40 Filipino soldiers with 6 Americans, all armed. He was
handcuffed and after about 20 minutes in the street, he was brought inside the
house by the defendant. He was made to sit down while in handcuffs while the
defendant was inside his bedroom. The defendant came out of the bedroom and out
from defendant's attach case, he took something and placed it on the table in
front of the plaintiff. They also took plaintiff's wife who was at that time at the
boutique near his house and likewise arrested Torabian, who was playing chess with
him in the bedroom and both were handcuffed together. Plaintiff was not told why he
was being handcuffed and why the privacy of his house, especially his bedroom was
invaded by defendant. He was not allowed to use the telephone. In fact, his
telephone was unplugged. He asked for any warrant, but the defendant told him to
`shut up. He was nevertheless told that he would be able to call for his lawyer
who can defend him."The plaintiff took note of the fact that when the defendant
invited him to come out to meet his cousin, his safe was opened where he kept the
$24,000.00 the defendant paid for the carpets and another $8,000.00 which he also
placed in the safe together with a bracelet worth $15,000.00 and a pair of earrings
worth $10,000.00. He also discovered missing upon his release his 8 pieces handmade Persian carpets, valued at $65,000.00, a painting he bought for P30,000.00
together with his TV and betamax sets. He claimed that when he was handcuffed, the
defendant took his keys from his wallet. There was, therefore, nothing left in his
house."That his arrest as a heroin trafficker x x x had been well publicized
throughout the world, in various newspapers, particularly in Australia, America,
Central Asia and in the Philippines. He was identified in the papers as an
international drug trafficker. x x xIn fact, the arrest of defendant and Torabian
was likewise on television, not only in the Philippines, but also in America and in
Germany. His friends in said places informed him that they saw him on TV with said
news."After the arrest made on plaintiff and Torabian, they were brought to Camp
Crame handcuffed together, where they were detained for three days without food and
water."# HYPERLINK
"http://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2003/feb2003/gr_142396_2003.html" \l "fnt1" #1#
During the trial, the law firm of Luna, Sison and Manas, filed a special appearance
for Scalzo and moved for extension of time to file an answer pending a supposed
advice from the United States Department of State and Department of Justice on the
defenses to be raised. The trial court granted the motion. On 27 October 1988,
Scalzo filed another special appearance to quash the summons on the ground that he,
not being a resident of the Philippines and the action being one in personam, was
beyond the processes of the court. The motion was denied by the court, in its order
of 13 December 1988, holding that the filing by Scalzo of a motion for extension of
time to file an answer to the complaint was a voluntary appearance equivalent to
service
of summons which could likewise be construed a waiver of the requirement of formal
notice. Scalzo filed a motion for reconsideration of the court order, contending
that a motion for an extension of time to file an answer was not a voluntary
appearance equivalent to service of summons since it did not seek an affirmative
relief. Scalzo argued that in cases involving the United States government, as well
as its agencies and officials, a motion for extension was peculiarly unavoidable
due to the need (1) for both the Department of State and the Department of Justice
to agree on the defenses to be raised and (2) to refer the case to a Philippine
lawyer who would be expected to first review the case. The court a quo denied the
motion for reconsideration in its order of 15 October 1989.Scalzo filed a petition
for review with the Court of Appeals, there docketed CA-G.R. No. 17023, assailing
the denial. In a decision, dated 06 October 1989, the appellate court denied the
petition and affirmed the ruling of the trial court. Scalzo then elevated the
incident in a petition for review on certiorari, docketed G.R. No. 91173, to this
Court. The petition, however, was denied for its failure to comply with SC Circular
No. 1-88; in any event, the Court added, Scalzo had failed to show that the
appellate court was in error in its questioned judgment.Meanwhile, at the court a
quo, an order, dated 09 February 1990, was issued (a) declaring Scalzo in default
for his failure to file a responsive pleading (answer) and (b) setting the case for
the reception of evidence. On 12 March 1990, Scalzo filed a motion to set aside the
order of default and to admit his answer to the complaint. Granting the motion, the
trial court set the case for pre-trial. In his answer, Scalzo denied the material
allegations of the complaint and raised the affirmative defenses (a) of Minuchers
failure to state a cause of action in his complaint and (b) that Scalzo had acted
in the discharge of his official duties as being merely an agent of the Drug
Enforcement Administration of the United States Department of Justice. Scalzo

interposed a counterclaim of P100,000.00 to answer for attorneys' fees and expenses
of litigation.Then, on 14 June 1990, after almost two years since the institution
of the civil case, Scalzo filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground
that, being a special agent of the United States Drug Enforcement Administration,
he was entitled to diplomatic immunity. He attached to his motion Diplomatic Note
No. 414 of the United States Embassy, dated 29 May 1990, addressed to the
Department of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines and a Certification, dated 11 June
1990, of Vice Consul Donna Woodward, certifying that the note is a true and
faithful copy of its original. In an order of 25 June 1990, the trial court denied
the motion to dismiss.On 27 July 1990, Scalzo filed a petition for certiorari with
injunction with this Court, docketed G.R. No. 94257 and entitled "Arthur W. Scalzo,
Jr., vs. Hon. Wenceslao Polo, et al.," asking that the complaint in Civil Case No.
88-45691 be ordered dismissed. The case was referred to the Court of Appeals, there
docketed CA-G.R. SP No. 22505, per this Courts resolution of 07 August 1990. On 31
October 1990, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision sustaining the
diplomatic immunity of Scalzo and ordering the dismissal of the complaint against
him. Minucher filed a petition for review with this Court, docketed G.R. No. 97765
and entitled "Khosrow Minucher vs. the Honorable Court of Appeals, et. al." (cited
in 214 SCRA 242), appealing the judgment of the Court of Appeals. In a decision,
dated 24 September 1992, penned by Justice (now Chief Justice) Hilario Davide, Jr.,
this Court reversed the decision of the appellate court and remanded the case to
the lower court for trial. The remand was ordered on the theses (a) that the Court
of Appeals erred in granting the motion to dismiss of Scalzo for lack of
jurisdiction over his person without even considering the issue of the authenticity
of Diplomatic Note No. 414 and (b) that the complaint contained sufficient
allegations to the effect that Scalzo committed the imputed acts in his personal
capacity and outside the scope of his official duties and, absent any evidence to
the contrary, the issue on Scalzos diplomatic immunity could not be taken up.The
Manila RTC thus continued with its hearings on the case. On 17 November 1995, the
trial court reached a decision; it adjudged:"WHEREFORE, and in view of all the
foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered for the plaintiff, who
successfully established his claim by sufficient evidence, against the defendant in
the manner following:"Àdjudging defendant liable to plaintiff in actual and
compensatory damages of P520,000.00; moral damages in the sum of P10 million;
exemplary damages in the sum of P100,000.00; attorney's fees in the sum of
P200,000.00 plus costs.`The Clerk of the Regional Trial Court, Manila, is ordered
to take note of the lien of the Court on this judgment to answer for the unpaid
docket fees considering that the plaintiff in this case instituted this action as a
pauper litigant."# HYPERLINK
While the trial court gave credence to the claim of Scalzo and the evidence
presented by him that he was a diplomatic agent entitled to immunity as such, it
ruled that he, nevertheless, should be held accountable for the acts complained of
committed outside his official duties. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the
decision of the trial court and sustained the defense of Scalzo that he was
sufficiently clothed with diplomatic immunity during his term of duty and thereby
immune from the criminal and civil jurisdiction of the "Receiving State" pursuant
to the terms of the Vienna Convention.Hence, this recourse by Minucher. The instant
petition for review raises a two-fold issue: (1) whether or not the doctrine of
conclusiveness of judgment, following the decision rendered by this Court in G.R.
No. 97765, should have precluded the Court of Appeals from resolving the appeal to
it in an entirely different manner, and (2) whether or not Arthur Scalzo is indeed
entitled to diplomatic immunity.The doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment, or its
kindred rule of res judicata, would require 1) the finality of the prior judgment,
2) a valid jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties on the part of the
court that renders it, 3) a judgment on the merits, and 4) an identity of the
parties, subject matter and causes of action.# HYPERLINK
"http://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2003/feb2003/gr_142396_2003.html" \l "fnt3"
#3#Even while one of the issues submitted in G.R. No. 97765 - "whether or not
public respondent Court of Appeals erred in ruling that private respondent Scalzo
is a diplomat immune from civil suit conformably with the Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations" - is also a pivotal question raised in the instant petition,
the ruling in G.R. No. 97765, however, has not resolved that point with finality.
Indeed, the Court there has made this observation -"It may be mentioned in this
regard that private respondent himself, in his Pre-trial Brief filed on 13 June
1990, unequivocally states that he would present documentary evidence consisting of
DEA records on his investigation and surveillance of plaintiff and on his position
and duties as DEA special agent in Manila. Having thus reserved his right to
present evidence in support of his position, which is the basis for the alleged
diplomatic immunity, the barren self-serving claim in the belated motion to dismiss
cannot be relied upon for a reasonable, intelligent and fair resolution of the
issue of diplomatic immunity."# HYPERLINK
Scalzo contends that the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, to which the
Philippines is a signatory, grants him absolute immunity from suit, describing his
functions as an agent of the United States Drugs Enforcement Agency as "conducting
surveillance operations on suspected drug dealers in the Philippines believed to be
the source of prohibited drugs being shipped to the U.S., (and) having ascertained
the target, (he then) would inform the Philippine narcotic agents (to) make the
actual arrest." Scalzo has submitted to the trial court a number of documents -1.
Exh. '2' - Diplomatic Note No. 414 dated 29 May 1990;2. Exh. '1' - Certification of
Vice Consul Donna K. Woodward dated 11 June 1990;3. Exh. '5' - Diplomatic Note No.
757 dated 25 October 1991;4. Exh. '6' - Diplomatic Note No. 791 dated 17 November
1992; and5. Exh. '7' - Diplomatic Note No. 833 dated 21 October 1988.6. Exh. '3' 1st Indorsement of the Hon. Jorge R. Coquia, Legal Adviser, Department of Foreign
Affairs, dated 27 June 1990 forwarding Embassy Note No. 414 to the Clerk of Court
of RTC Manila, Branch 19 (the trial court);7. Exh. '4' - Diplomatic Note No. 414,
appended to the 1st Indorsement (Exh. '3'); and8. Exh. '8' - Letter dated 18
November 1992 from the Office of the Protocol, Department of Foreign Affairs,
through Asst. Sec. Emmanuel Fernandez, addressed to the Chief Justice of this
Court.# HYPERLINK
"http://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2003/feb2003/gr_142396_2003.html" \l "fnt5" #5#The
documents, according to Scalzo, would show that: (1) the United States Embassy
accordingly advised the Executive Department of the Philippine Government that
Scalzo was a member of the diplomatic staff of the United States diplomatic mission
from his arrival in the Philippines on 14 October 1985 until his departure on 10
August 1988; (2) that the United States Government was firm from the very beginning
in asserting the diplomatic immunity of Scalzo with respect to the case pursuant
to the provisions of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations; and (3) that
the United States Embassy repeatedly urged the Department of Foreign Affairs to
take appropriate action to inform the trial court of Scalzos diplomatic immunity.
The other documentary exhibits were presented to indicate that: (1) the Philippine
government itself, through its Executive Department, recognizing and respecting the
diplomatic status of Scalzo, formally advised the "Judicial Department" of his
diplomatic status and his entitlement to all diplomatic privileges and immunities
under the Vienna Convention; and (2) the Department of Foreign Affairs itself
authenticated Diplomatic Note No. 414. Scalzo additionally presented Exhibits "9"
to "13" consisting of his reports of investigation on the surveillance and
subsequent arrest of Minucher, the certification of the Drug Enforcement
Administration of the United States Department of Justice that Scalzo was a special
agent assigned to the Philippines at all times relevant to the complaint, and the
special power of attorney executed by him in favor of his previous counsel#
HYPERLINK "http://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2003/feb2003/gr_142396_2003.html" \l
"fnt6" #6#to show (a) that the United States Embassy, affirmed by its Vice Consul,
acknowledged Scalzo to be a member of the diplomatic staff of the United States
diplomatic mission from his arrival in the Philippines on 14 October 1985 until his
departure on 10 August 1988, (b) that, on May 1986, with the cooperation of the
Philippine law enforcement officials and in the exercise of his functions as member
of the mission, he investigated Minucher for alleged trafficking in a prohibited
drug, and (c) that the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs itself recognized
that Scalzo during his tour of duty in the Philippines (14 October 1985 up to 10
August 1988) was listed as being an Assistant Attach of the United States
diplomatic mission and accredited with diplomatic status by the Government of the
Philippines. In his Exhibit 12, Scalzo described the functions of the overseas
office of the United States Drugs Enforcement Agency, i.e., (1) to provide criminal
investigative expertise and assistance to foreign law enforcement agencies on
narcotic and drug control programs upon the request of the host country, 2) to
establish and maintain liaison with the host country and counterpart foreign law
enforcement officials, and 3) to conduct complex criminal investigations involving
international criminal conspiracies which affect the interests of the United
States.The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations was a codification of
centuries-old customary law and, by the time of its ratification on 18 April 1961,
its rules of law had long become stable. Among the city states of ancient Greece,
among the peoples of the Mediterranean before the establishment of the Roman
Empire, and among the states of India, the person of the herald in time of war and
the person of the diplomatic envoy in time of peace were universally held
sacrosanct.# HYPERLINK
"http://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2003/feb2003/gr_142396_2003.html" \l "fnt7" #7#By
the end of the 16th century, when the earliest treatises on diplomatic law were
published, the inviolability of ambassadors was firmly established as a rule of
customary international law.# HYPERLINK
#8#Traditionally, the exercise of diplomatic intercourse among states was
undertaken by the head of state himself, as being the preeminent embodiment of the
state he represented, and the foreign secretary, the official usually entrusted
with the external affairs of the state. Where a state would wish to have a more
prominent diplomatic presence in the receiving state, it would then send to the
latter a diplomatic mission. Conformably with the Vienna Convention, the functions
of the diplomatic mission involve, by and large, the representation of the
interests of the sending state and promoting friendly relations with the receiving
state.# HYPERLINK
"http://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2003/feb2003/gr_142396_2003.html" \l "fnt9" #9#The
Convention lists the classes of heads of diplomatic missions to include (a)
ambassadors or nuncios accredited to the heads of state,# HYPERLINK
#10#(b) envoys,# HYPERLINK
#11#ministers orinternunciosaccredited to the heads of states; and (c) charges
d' affairs# HYPERLINK
#12#accredited to the ministers of foreign affairs.# HYPERLINK
#13#Comprising the "staff of the (diplomatic) mission" are the diplomatic staff,
the administrative staff and the technical and service staff. Only the heads of
missions, as well as members of the diplomatic staff, excluding the members of the
administrative, technical and service staff of the mission, are accorded diplomatic
rank. Even while the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations provides for
immunity to the members of diplomatic missions, it does so, nevertheless, with an
understanding that the same be restrictively applied. Only "diplomatic agents,"
under the terms of the Convention, are vested with blanket diplomatic immunity from
civil and criminal suits. The Convention defines "diplomatic agents" as the heads
of missions or members of the diplomatic staff, thus impliedly withholding the same
privileges from all others. It might bear stressing that even consuls, who
represent their respective states in concerns of commerce and navigation and
perform certain administrative and notarial duties, such as the issuance of
passports and visas, authentication of documents, and administration of oaths, do
not ordinarily enjoy the traditional diplomatic immunities and privileges accorded
diplomats, mainly for the reason that they are not charged with the duty of
representing their states in political matters. Indeed, the main yardstick in
ascertaining whether a person is a diplomat entitled to immunity is the
determination of whether or not he performs duties of diplomatic nature.Scalzo
asserted, particularly in his Exhibits "9" to "13," that he was an Assistant
Attach of the United States diplomatic mission and was accredited as such by the
Philippine Government. An attach belongs to a category of officers in the
diplomatic establishment who may be in charge of its cultural, press,
administrative or financial affairs. There could also be a class of attaches
belonging to certain ministries or departments of the government, other than the
foreign ministry or department, who are detailed by their respective ministries or
departments with the embassies such as the military, naval, air, commercial,
agricultural, labor, science, and customs attaches, or the like. Attaches assist a
chief of mission in his duties and are administratively under him, but their main
function is to observe, analyze and interpret trends and developments in their
respective fields in the host country and submit reports to their own ministries or
departments in the home government.# HYPERLINK
#14#These officials are not generally regarded as members of the diplomatic
mission, nor are they normally designated as having diplomatic rank.In an attempt
to prove his diplomatic status, Scalzo presented Diplomatic Notes Nos. 414, 757 and
791, all issued post litem motam, respectively, on 29 May 1990, 25 October 1991 and
17 November 1992. The presentation did nothing much to alleviate the Court's
initial reservations in G.R. No. 97765, viz:"While the trial court denied the
motion to dismiss, the public respondent gravely abused its discretion in
dismissing Civil Case No. 88-45691 on the basis of an erroneous assumption that
simply because of the diplomatic note, the private respondent is clothed with
diplomatic immunity, thereby divesting the trial court of jurisdiction over his
person."x x x x x x x x x"And now, to the core issue - the alleged diplomatic
immunity of the private respondent. Setting aside for the moment the issue of
authenticity raised by the petitioner and the doubts that surround such claim, in
view of the fact that it took private respondent one (1) year, eight (8) months and
seventeen (17) days from the time his counsel filed on 12 September 1988 a Special
Appearance and Motion asking for a first extension of time to file the Answer
because the Departments of State and Justice of the United States of America were
studying the case for the purpose of determining his defenses, before he could
secure the Diplomatic Note from the US Embassy in Manila, and even granting for the
sake of argument that such note is authentic, the complaint for damages filed by
petitioner cannot be peremptorily dismissed."x x x x x x x x x"There is of course
the claim of private respondent that the acts imputed to him were done in his
official capacity. Nothing supports this self-serving claim other than the socalled Diplomatic Note. x x x. The public respondent then should have sustained the
trial court's denial of the motion to dismiss. Verily, it should have been the most
proper and appropriate recourse. It should not have been overwhelmed by the selfserving Diplomatic Note whose belated issuance is even suspect and whose
authenticity has not yet been proved. The undue haste with which respondent Court
yielded to the private respondent's claim is arbitrary."A significant document
would appear to be Exhibit No. 08, dated 08 November 1992, issued by the Office of
Protocol of the Department of Foreign Affairs and signed by Emmanuel
C. Fernandez, Assistant Secretary, certifying that "the records of the Department
(would) show that Mr. Arthur W. Scalzo, Jr., during his term of office in the
Philippines (from 14 October 1985 up to 10 August 1988) was listed as an Assistant
Attach of the United States diplomatic mission and was, therefore, accredited
diplomatic status by the Government of the Philippines." No certified true copy of
such "records," the supposed bases for the belated issuance, was presented in
evidence.Concededly, vesting a person with diplomatic immunity is a prerogative of
the executive branch of the government. In World Health Organization vs. Aquino,#
"fnt15" #15#the Court has recognized that, in such matters, the hands of the
courts are virtually tied. Amidst apprehensions of indiscriminate and incautious
grant of immunity, designed to gain exemption from the jurisdiction of courts, it
should behoove the Philippine government, specifically its Department of Foreign
Affairs, to be most circumspect, that should particularly be no less than
compelling, in its post litem motam issuances. It might be recalled that the
privilege is not an immunity from the observance of the law of the territorial
sovereign or from ensuing legal liability; it is, rather, an immunity from the
exercise of territorial jurisdiction.# HYPERLINK
#16#The government of the United States itself, which Scalzo claims to be acting
for, has formulated its standards for recognition of a diplomatic agent. The State
Department policy is to only concede diplomatic status to a person who possesses an
acknowledged diplomatic title and "performs duties of diplomatic nature."#
"fnt17" #17#Supplementary criteria for accreditation are the possession of a valid
diplomatic passport or, from States which do not issue such passports, a diplomatic
note formally representing the intention to assign the person to diplomatic duties,
the holding of a non-immigrant visa, being over twenty-one years of age, and
performing diplomatic functions on an essentially full-time basis.# HYPERLINK
#18#Diplomatic missions are requested to provide the most accurate and descriptive
job title to that which currently applies to the duties performed. The Office of
the Protocol would then assign each individual to the appropriate functional
category.# HYPERLINK
But while the diplomatic immunity of Scalzo might thus remain contentious, it was
sufficiently established that, indeed, he worked for the United States Drug
Enforcement Agency and was tasked to conduct surveillance of suspected drug
activities within the country on the dates pertinent to this case. If it should be
ascertained that Arthur Scalzo was acting well within his assigned functions when
he committed the acts alleged in the complaint, the present controversy could then
be resolved under the related doctrine of State Immunity from Suit.Theprecept that
a State cannot be sued in the courts of a foreign stateis a long-standing rule of
customary international law then closely identified with the personal immunity of a
foreign sovereign from suit# HYPERLINK
#20#and, with the emergence of democratic states, made to attach not just to the
person of the head of state, or his representative, but also distinctly to the
state itself in its sovereign capacity.# HYPERLINK
#21#If the acts giving rise to a suit are those of a foreign government done by
its foreign agent, although not necessarily a diplomatic personage, but acting in
his official capacity, the complaint could be barred by the immunity of the foreign
sovereign from suit without its consent. Suing a representative of a state is
believed to be, in effect, suing the state itself. The proscription is not accorded
for the benefit of an individual but for the State, in whose service he is, under
the maxim - par in parem, non habet imperium - that all states are sovereign equals
and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another.# HYPERLINK
#22#The implication, in broad terms, is that if the judgment against an official
would require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the award,
such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages decreed against
him, the suit must be regarded as being against the state itself, although it has
not been formally impleaded.# HYPERLINK
In United States of America vs. Guinto,# HYPERLINK
#24#involving officers of the United States Air Force and special officers of the
Air Force Office of Special Investigators charged with the duty of preventing the
distribution, possession and use of prohibited drugs, this Court has ruled -"While
the doctrine (of state immunity) appears to prohibit only suits against the state
without its consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of
the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. x
x x. It cannot for a moment be imagined that they were acting in their private or
unofficial capacity when they apprehended and later testified against the
complainant. It follows that for discharging their duties as agents of the United
States, they cannot be directly impleaded for acts imputable to their principal,
which has not given its consent to be sued. x x x As they have acted on behalf of
the government, and within the scope of their authority, it is that government, and
not the petitioners personally, [who were] responsible for their acts."# HYPERLINK
This immunity principle, however, has its limitations. Thus, Shauf vs. Court of
Appeals# HYPERLINK
#26#elaborates:"It is a different matter where the public official is made to
account in his capacity as such for acts contrary to law and injurious to the
rights of the plaintiff. As was clearly set forth by Justice Zaldivar in Director
of the Bureau of Telecommunications, et al., vs. Aligaen, et al. (33 SCRA 368):
Ìnasmuch as the State authorizes only legal acts by its officers, unauthorized
acts of government officials or officers are not acts of the State, and an action
against the officials or officers by one whose rights have been invaded or violated
by such acts, for the protection of his rights, is not a suit against the State
within the rule of immunity of the State from suit. In the same tenor, it has been
said that an action at law or suit in equity against a State officer or the
director of a State department on the ground that, while claiming to act for the
State, he violates or invades the personal and property rights of the plaintiff,
under an unconstitutional act or under an assumption of authority which he does not
have, is not a suit against the State within the constitutional provision that the
State may not be sued without its consent. The rationale for this ruling is that
the doctrine of state immunity cannot be used as an instrument for perpetrating an
injustice."x x x x x x x x x"(T)he doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply
and may not be invoked where the public official is being sued in his private and
personal capacity as an ordinary citizen. The cloak of protection afforded the
officers and agents of the government is removed the moment they are sued in their
individual capacity. This situation usually arises where the public official acts
without authority or in excess of the powers vested in him. It is a well-settled
principle of law that a public official may be liable in his personal private
capacity for whatever damage he may have caused by his act done with malice and in
bad faith or beyond the scope of his authority and jurisdiction."# HYPERLINK
"http://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2003/feb2003/gr_142396_2003.html" \l "fnt27" #27#A
foreign agent, operating within a territory, can be cloaked with immunity from suit
but only as long as it can be established that he is acting within the directives
of the sending state. The consent of the host state is an indispensable requirement
of basic courtesy between the two sovereigns. Guinto and Shauf both involve
officers and personnel of the United States, stationed within Philippine territory,
under the RP-US Military Bases Agreement. While evidence is wanting to show any
similar agreement between the governments of the Philippines and of the United
States (for the latter to send its agents and to conduct surveillance and related
activities of suspected drug dealers in the Philippines), the consent
orimprimaturof the Philippine government to the activities of the United States
Drug Enforcement Agency, however, can be gleaned from the facts heretofore
elsewhere mentioned. The official exchanges of communication between agencies of
the government of the two countries, certifications from officials of both the
Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs and the United States Embassy, as well as
the participation of members of the Philippine Narcotics Command in the "buy-bust
operation" conducted at the residence of Minucher at the behest of Scalzo, may be
inadequate to support the
"diplomatic status" of the latter but they give enough indication that the
Philippine government has given itsimprimatur, if not consent, to the activities
within Philippine territory of agent Scalzo of the United States Drug Enforcement
Agency. The job description of Scalzo has tasked him to conduct surveillance on
suspected drug suppliers and, after having ascertained the target, to inform local
law enforcers who would then be expected to make the arrest. In conducting
surveillance activities on Minucher, later acting as the poseur-buyer during the
buy-bust operation, and then becoming a principal witness in the criminal case
against Minucher, Scalzo hardly can be said to have acted beyond the scope of his
official function or duties.All told, this Court is constrained to rule that
respondent Arthur Scalzo, an agent of the United States Drug Enforcement Agency
allowed by the Philippine government to conduct activities in the country to help
contain the problem on the drug traffic, is entitled to the defense of state
immunity from suit.WHEREFORE, on the foregoing premises, the petition is DENIED. No
costs.G.R. No. 176628 March 19, 2012PHILIPPINE TOURISM
AUTHORITY,Petitioner,#vs.#PHILIPPINE GOLF DEVELOPMENT & EQUIPMENT,
INC.,Respondent.R E S O L U T I O NBRION,J.:Before this Court is a petition for
certiorari, under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, to annul the
decision# HYPERLINK
"http://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/mar2012/gr_176628_2012.html" \l "fnt1"
#1#dated December 13, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA G.R. SP No. 90402.
This CA decision dismissed the petition for annulment of judgment which sought to
set aside the decision# HYPERLINK
"http://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/mar2012/gr_176628_2012.html" \l "fnt2" #2#of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Muntinlupa City, Branch 203, in Civil Case No.
03-212. The RTC held the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA) liable for its unpaid
obligation to Philippine Golf Development & Equipment, Inc. (PHILGOLF).FACTUAL
BACKGROUNDOn April 3, 1996, PTA, an agency of the Department of Tourism, whose main
function is to bolster and promote tourism, entered into a contract with Atlantic
Erectors, Inc. (AEI) for the construction of the Intramuros Golf Course Expansion
Projects (PAR 60-66) for a contract price of Fifty-Seven Million Nine Hundred
Fifty-Four Thousand Six Hundred Forty-Seven and 94/100 Pesos (P57,954,647.94).The
civil works of the project commenced. Since AEI was incapable of constructing the
golf course aspect of the project, it entered into a sub-contract agreement with
PHILGOLF, a duly organized domestic corporation, to build the golf course amounting
to Twenty-Seven Million Pesos (P27,000,000.00). The sub-contract agreement also
provides that PHILGOLF shall submit its progress billings directly to PTA and, in
turn, PTA shall directly pay PHILGOLF.# HYPERLINK
"http://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/mar2012/gr_176628_2012.html" \l "fnt3" #3#On
October 2, 2003, PHILGOLF filed a collection suit against PTA amounting to Eleven
Million Eight Hundred Twenty Thousand Five Hundred Fifty and 53/100 Pesos
(P11,820,550.53), plus interest, for the construction of the golf course. Within
the period to file a responsive pleading, PTA filed a motion for extension of time
to file an answer.On October 30, 2003, the RTC granted the motion for extension of
time. PTA filed another motion for extension of time to file an answer. The RTC
again granted the motion.Despite the RTCs liberality of granting two successive
motions for extension of time, PTA failed to answer the complaint. Hence, on April
6, 2004, the RTC rendered a judgment of default, ruling as follows:WHEREFORE,
judgment is hereby rendered, ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff:1. The amount
of Eleven Million, Eight Hundred Twenty Thousand, Five Hundred Fifty Pesos and
Fifty Three Centavos (P11,820,550.53), representing defendants outstanding
obligation, plus interest thereon of twelve percent (12%) per annum from the time
the unpaid billings of plaintiff were due for payment by the defendant, until they
are fully paid.2. The amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00), as
attorneys fees.3. The amount of One Hundred Twenty Eight Thousand, Five Hundred
Twenty Nine Pesos and Fourteen Centavos (P128,529.14), as filing fees and other
costs of litigation.4. The amount of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00), as
moral damages.5. The amount of One Hundred Fifty Thousand (Pesos (P150,000.00), as
nominal damages, and6. The amount of Two Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P250,000.00), as exemplary damages.SO ORDERED.# HYPERLINK

"http://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/mar2012/gr_176628_2012.html" \l "fnt4" #4#On
July 11, 2005, PTA seasonably appealed the case to the CA. But before the appeal of
PTA could be perfected, PHILGOLF already filed a motion for execution pending
appeal with the RTC. The RTC, in an Order dated June 2, 2004, granted the motion
and a writ of execution pending appeal was issued against PTA. On June 3, 2004, a
notice of garnishment was issued against PTAs bank account at the Land Bank of the
Philippines, NAIA-BOC Branch to fully satisfy the judgment.PTA filed a petition for
certiorari with the CA, imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC
for granting the motion for execution pending appeal. The CA ruled in favor of PTA
and set aside the order granting the motion for execution pending appeal.On July
11, 2005, PTA withdrew its appeal of the RTC decision and, instead, filed a
petition# HYPERLINK
#5#for annulment of judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court. The petition for
annulment of judgment was premised on the argument that the gross negligence of
PTAs counsel prevented the presentation of evidence before the RTC.On December 13,
2006, the CA dismissed the petition for annulment of judgment for lack of merit.
PTA questions this CA action in the present petition for certiorari.THE PETITIONThe
petition cites three arguments: first, that the negligence of PTAs counsel
amounted to an extrinsic fraud warranting an annulment of judgment; second, that
since PTA is a government entity, it should not be bound by the inactions or
negligence of its counsel; and third, that there were no other available remedies
left for PTA but a petition for annulment of judgment.OUR RULINGWe find the
petition unmeritorious.The Rules of Court specifically provides for deadlines in
actions before the court to ensure an orderly disposition of cases. PTA cannot
escape these legal technicalities by simply invoking the negligence of its counsel.
This practice, if allowed, would defeat the purpose of the Rules on periods since
every party would merely lay the blame on its counsel to avoid any liability. The
rule is that "a client is bound by the acts, even mistakes, of his counsel in the
realm of procedural technique[,]and unless such acts involve gross negligence that
the claiming party can prove, the acts of a counsel bind the client as if it had
been the latters acts."# HYPERLINK
"http://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/mar2012/gr_176628_2012.html" \l "fnt6" #6#In
LBC Express - Metro Manila, Inc. v. Mateo,# HYPERLINK
#7#the Court held that "[g]ross negligence is characterized by want of even slight
care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not
inadvertently but willfully and intentionally with a conscious indifference to
consequences insofar as other persons may be affected." This cannot be invoked in
cases where the counsel is merely negligent in submitting his required pleadings
within the period that the rules mandate.It is not disputed that the summons
together with a copy of the complaint was personally served upon, and received by
PTA through its Corporate Legal Services Department, on October 10, 2003.#
HYPERLINK "http://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/mar2012/gr_176628_2012.html" \l
"fnt8" #8#Thus, in failing to submit a responsive pleading within the required
time despite sufficient notice, the RTC was correct in declaring PTA in default.
There was no extrinsic fraud"Extrinsic fraud refers to any fraudulent act of the
prevailing party in the litigation which is committed outside of the trial of the
case, whereby the unsuccessful party has been prevented from exhibiting fully his
case, by fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent."# HYPERLINK
#9#Under the doctrine of this cited case, we do not see the acts of PTAs counsel
to be constitutive of extrinsic fraud.The records reveal that the judgment of
default# HYPERLINK
#10#was sent via registered mail to PTAs counsel. However, PTA never availed of
the remedy of a motion to lift the order of default.# HYPERLINK
#11#Since the failure of PTA to present its evidence was not a product of any
fraudulent acts committed outside trial, the RTC did not err in declaring PTA in
default.Annulment of judgment is not the proper remedyPTAs appropriate remedy was
only to appeal the RTC decision. "Annulment of Judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules
of Court is a recourse equitable in character and allowed only in exceptional cases
where the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other
appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of petitioner."#
HYPERLINK "http://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/mar2012/gr_176628_2012.html" \l
"fnt12" #12#In this case, appeal was an available remedy. There was also no
extraordinary reason for a
petition for annulment of judgment, nor was there any adequate explanation on why
the remedy for new trial or petition for relief could not be used. The Court is
actually at a loss why PTA had withdrawn a properly filed appeal and substituted it
with another petition, when PTA could have merely raised the same issues through an
ordinary appeal.PTA was acting in a proprietary characterPTA also erred in invoking
state immunity simply because it is a government entity. The application of state
immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of sovereign transactions
and not in cases of commercial activities or economic affairs. The State, in
entering into a business contract, descends to the level of an individual and is
deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued.# HYPERLINK
"http://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/mar2012/gr_176628_2012.html" \l "fnt13" #13#
Since the Intramuros Golf Course Expansion Projects partakes of a proprietary
character entered into between PTA and PHILGOLF, PTA cannot avoid its financial
liability by merely invoking immunity from suit.A special civil action for
certiorari under Rule 65 is proper only when there is no other plain, speedy, and
adequate remedyLastly, a special civil action under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
is only available in cases when a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction,
or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and
there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law. It is not a mode of appeal, and cannot also be made as a substitute
for appeal. It will not lie in cases where other remedies are available under the
law.1wphi1InLand Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,# HYPERLINK
#14#the Court had the occasion to state:The general rule is that a [certiorari]
will not issue where the remedy of appeal is available to the aggrieved party. The
remedies of appeal in the ordinary course of law and that of certiorari under Rule
65 of the Revised Rules of Court are mutually exclusive and not alternative or
cumulative. Hence, the special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 is not and
cannot be a substitute for an appeal, where the latter remedy is available. xxxx x
x xThe proper recourse of the aggrieved party from a decision of the CA is a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court. On
the other hand, if the error subject of the recourse is one of jurisdiction, or the
act complained of was perpetrated by a quasi-judicial officer or agency with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the proper remedy
available to the aggrieved party is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
said Rules. [emphases supplied; citations omitted]In sum, PTA had the remedy of
appealing the RTC decision to the CA and, thereafter, to us. Under the
circumstances, we find no adequate reason to justify the elevation of this case to
the CA and then to us, under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.WHEREFORE,premises
considered, we herebyDISMISSthe petition for certiorari. No costs.G.R. No. L41299 February 21, 1983SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM,petitioner,#vs.#COURT OF APPEALS,
DAVID B. CRUZ, SOCORRO CONCIO CRUZ, and LORNA C. CRUZ,respondents.The Solicitor
General for petitioner.Eribert D. Ignacio for respondents David Cruz, Socorro
Concio Cruz and Lorna Cruz.MELENCIO-HERRERA,J.:This Petition for Review on
certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals1stems from the following
facts, as narrated by the Trial Court, adopted by the Court of Appeals, and quoted
by both petitioner2and private respondents3:Sometime in March, 1963 the spouses
David B. Cruz and Socorro Concio Cruz applied for and were granted a real estate
loan by the SSS with their residential lot located at Lozada Street, Sto. Rosario,
Pateros, Rizal covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 2000 of the Register of
Deeds of Rizal as collateral. Pursuant to this real estate ban said spouses
executed on March 26, 1963 the corresponding real estate mortgage originally in the
amount of P39,500.00 which was later increased to P48,000.00 covering the
aforementioned property as shown in their mortgage contract, Exhibit A and 1. From
the proceeds of the real estate loan the mortgagors constructed their residential
house on the mortgaged property and were furnished by the SSS with a passbook to
record the monthly payments of their amortizations (Exhibits B and B-1). The
mortgagors, plaintiffs herein, complied with their monthly payments although there
were times when delays were incurred in their monthly payments which were due every
first five (5) days of the month (Exhibits 3-A to 3-N). On July 9, 1968, defendant
SSS filed an application with the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal for the foreclosure
of the real estate mortgage executed by the plaintiffs on the ground, among others:
That the conditions of the mortgage have been broken since October, 1967 with the
default on the part of the mortgagor to pay in full the installments then due and
payable on the principal debt and the interest thereon, and, all of the monthly
installments due and payable thereafter up to the present date; ...That by the
terms of the contract herein above referred to, the indebtedness to the mortgagee
as of June, 1968 amounts to Ten Thousand Seven Hundred Two Pesos & 58/100
(P10,702.58), Philippine Currency, excluding interests thereon, plus 20% of the
total amount of the indebtedness as attorney's fees, also secured by the said
mortgage. (Exhibit "C ")Pursuant to this application for foreclosure, the notice of
the Sheriff's Sale of the mortgaged property was initially published in the Sunday
Chronicle in its issue of July 14, 1968 announcing the sale at public auction of
the said mortgaged property. After this first publication of the notice, and before
the second publication of the notice, plaintiff herein thru counsel formally wrote
defendant SSS, a letter dated July 19, 1968 and received on the same date by said
entity demanding, among others, for said defendant SSS to withdraw the foreclosure
and discontinue the publication of the notice of sale of their property claiming
that plaintiffs were up-to-date in the payment of their monthly amortizations
(Exhibits "E" and "E-1"). In answer to this letter defendant SSS sent a telegram to
Atty. Eriberto Ignacio requesting him to come to their office for a conference.
This telegram was received by said counsel on July 23, 1968 (Exhibit "G " and "G-1
"). To this telegraphic answer, Atty. Ignacio sent a telegraphic reply suggesting
instead that a representative of the SSS be sent to him because his clients were
the aggrieved parties (Exhibit-. "G-2"). Nothing came out of the telegraphic
communications between the parties and the second and third publications of the
notice of foreclosure were published successively in the Sunday Chronicle in its
issues of July 21 and 28, 1968 (Exhibits "N-1 " and "O-1").4On July 24, 1968, the
Cruz spouses, together with their daughter Lorna C. Cruz, instituted before the
Court of First Instance of Rizal an action for damages and attorney's fees against
the Social Security System (SSS) and the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal alleging,
among other things, that they had fully and religiously paid their monthly
amortizations and had not defaulted in any payment.In its Answer, with
counterclaim, the SSS stressed its right to foreclose the mortgage executed in its
favor by private respondents by virtue of the automatic acceleration clause
provided in the mortgage contract, even after private respondents had paid their
amortization installments. In its counterclaim, the SSS prayed for actual and other
damages, as well as attorney's fees, for malicious and baseless statements made by
private respondents and published in the Manila Chronicle.On September 23, 1968,
the Trial Court enjoined the SSS from holding the sale at public auction of private
respondent's property upon their posting of a P2,000.00 bond executed in favor of
the SSS.The Trial Court rendered judgment on March 5, 1971, the dispositive portion
of which reads:WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered against defendant SSS, directing it
to pay plaintiffs the following amounts:(a) P2,500.00 as actual damage;#(b)
P35,000.00 as moral damage;#(c) P10,000.00 as exemplary or corrective damages;
and#(d) P5,000.00 as attorney's fees.Defendant SSS shall further pay the costs.5In
respect of the moral and temperate damages awarded, the Trial Court stated:With
respect to moral and temperate damages, the Court holds that the first publication
of the notice was made in good faith but committed by defendant SSS in gross
negligence considering the personnel at its command and the ease with which
verifications of the actual defaulting mortgagors may be made. On this initial
publication of the notice of foreclosure (Exhibits "M" and "M-1"), the Court
believes plaintiffs are entitled to the amount of P5,000.00. The second publication
of the notice of foreclosure is another matter. There was already notice by
plaintiffs to defendant SSS that there was no reason for the foreclosure of their
mortgaged property as they were never in default. Instead of taking any corrective
measure to rectify its error, defendant SSS adopted a position of righteousness and
followed the same course of action contending that no error has open committed.
This act of defendant indeed was deliberate, calculated to cow plaintiffs into
submission, and made obviously with malice. On this score, the Court believes
defendant SSS should pay and indemnify plaintiffs jointly in the sum of P10,000.00.
Lastly, on the third publication
of the notice of foreclosure, the Court finds this continued publication an
outright disregard for the reputation and standing of plaintiffs. The publication
having reached a bigger segment of society and also done with malice and callous
disregard for the rights of its clients, defendant SSS should compensate plaintiffs
jointly in the sum of P20,000.00. All in all, plaintiffs are entitled to P35,000.00
by way of moral damages.6On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the lower Court
judgment in a Decision promulgated on March 14, 1975, but upon SSS's Motion for
Reconsideration, modified the judgment by the elimination of the P5,000.00 moral
damages awarded on account of the initial publication of the foreclosure notice. To
quote:xxx xxx xxxAfter a re-examination of the evidence, we find that the
negligence of the appellant is not so gross as to warrant moral and temperate
damages. The amount of P5,000.00 should be deducted from the total damages awarded
to the plaintiffs.WHEREFORE, the decision promulgated on March 14, 1975 is hereby
maintained with the sole modification that the amount of P5,000.00 awarded on
account of the initial publication is eliminated so that the said amount should be
deducted from the total damages awarded to the plaintiffs.SO ORDERED.7In so far as
exemplary and corrective damages are concerned, the Court of Appeals had this to
say.The Court finds no extenuating circumstances to mitigate the irresponsible
action of defendant SSS and for this reason, said defendant should pay exemplary
and corrective damages in the sum of P10,000.00 ...Upon denial of its Motion for
Reconsideration by respondent Court, the SSS filed this Petition alleging .I.
Respondent Court of Appeals erred in not finding that under Condition No. 10 of the
Mortgage contract, which is a self-executing, automatic acceleration clause, all
amortizations and obligations of the mortgagors becomeipso juredue and demandable
if they at any time fail to pay any of the amortizations or interest when due;II.
Respondent Court of Appeals erred in holding that a previous notice to the
mortgagor was necessary before the mortgage could be foreclosed;III. Respondent
Court of Appeals erred in not holding that, assuming that there was negligence
committed by subordinate employees of the SSS in staking 'Socorro C. Cruz' for
'Socorro J. Cruz' as the defaulting borrower, the fault cannot be attributed to the
SSS, much less should the SSS be made liable for their acts done without its
knowledge and authority;IV. Respondent Court of Appeals erred in holding that there
is no extenuating circumstance to mitigate the liability of petitioner;V.
Respondent Court of Appeals erred in not holding that petitioner is not liable for
damages not being a profit-oriented governmental institution but one performing
governmental functions petitions.8For failure of the First Division to obtain
concurrence of the five remaining members (Justices Plana and Gutierrez, Jr. could
take no part), the case was referred to the Courten banc.The pivotal issues raised
are: (1) whether the Cruz spouses had, in fact, violated their real estate mortgage
contract with the SSS as would have warranted the publications of the notices of
foreclosure; and (2) whether or not the SSS can be held liable for damages.The
first issue revolves around the question of appreciation of the evidence by the
lower Court as concurred in by the Court of Appeals. The appraisal should be left
undisturbed following the general rule that factual findings of the Court of
Appeals are not subject to review by this Court, the present case not being one of
the recognized exceptions to that rule.9Accordingly, we are upholding the finding
of the Court of Appeals that the SSS application for foreclosure was not justified,
particularly considering that the real estate loan of P48,000.00 obtained by the
Cruzes in March, 1963, was payable in 15 years with a monthly amortization of
P425.18, and that as of July 14, 1968, the date of the first notice of foreclosure
and sale, the outstanding obligation was still P38,875.06 and not P10,701.58, as
published.The appellant was not justified in applying for the extrajudicial
foreclosure of the mortgage contract executed in its favor by the spouses, David B.
Cruz and Socorro Concio-Cruz, Exh. 'A'. While it is true that the payments of the
monthly installments were previously not regular, it is a fact that as of June 30,
1968 the appellee, David B. Cruz and Socorro Concio-Cruz were up-to-date and
current in the payment of their monthly installments. Having accepted the prior
late payments of the monthly installments, the appellant could no longer suddenly
and without prior notice to the mortgagors apply for the extra-judicial foreclosure
of the mortgage in July 1968.10A similar conclusion was reached by the trial
Court.Defendant's contention that there was clerical error in the amount of the
mortgage loan due as of June, 1968 as per their application for foreclosure of real
estate mortgage is a naive attempt to justify an untenable position. As a matter of
fact plaintiffs were able to establish that the mortgagor who actually committed
the violation of her mortgage loan was a certain 'Socorro J. Cruz' who was in
arrears in the amount of P10,702.58 at the time the application for foreclosure of
real estate mortgage was filed Exhibits "BB" and "EE"). Defendant mortgagee must
have committed an error in picking the record of plaintiff 'Socorro C. Cruz'
instead of the record of 'SocorroJ. Cruz'. Defendant SSS, however, denied having
committed any error and insists that their motion for foreclosure covers the real
estate mortgage of spouses David E. Cruz and Socorro C. Cruz. This Court is
nonetheless convinced that the foreclosure proceedings should have been on the real
estate mortgage of 'Socorro J. Cruz' who was in arrears as of June, 1968 in the
amount of P10,701.58, the exact amount mentioned in the application for foreclosure
of real estate mortgage by defendant SSS.11We come now to the amendability of the
SSS to judicial action and legal responsibility for its acts. To our minds, there
should be no question on this score considering that the SSS is a juridical entity
with a personality of its own.12It has corporate powers separate and distinct from
the Government.13SSS' own organic act specifically provides that it can sue and
be sued in Court.14These words "sue and be sued" embrace all civil process
incident to a legal action.15So that, even assuming that the SSS, as it claims,
enjoys immunity from suit as an entity performing governmental functions, by virtue
of the explicit provision of the aforecited enabling law, the Government must be
deemed to have waived immunity in respect of the SSS, although it does not thereby
concede its liability. That statutoy law has given to the private-citizen a remedy
for the enforcement and protection of his rights. The SSS thereby has been required
to submit to the jurisdiction of the Courts, subject to its right to interpose any
lawful defense. Whether the SSS performs governmental or proprietary functions thus
becomes unnecessary to belabor. For by that waiver, a private citizen may bring a
suit against it for varied objectives, such as, in this case, to obtain
compensation in damages arising from contract16and even for tort.A recent case
squarely in point anent the principle, involving the National Power Corporation, is
that of Rayo vs. Court of First Instance of Bulacan, 110 SCRA 457 (1981), wherein
this Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Vicente Abad Santos, ruled:It is not
necessary to write an extended dissertation on whether or not the NPC performs a
governmental function with respect to the management and operation of the Angat
Dam. It is sufficient to say that the government has organized a private
corporation, put money in it and has snowed it to sue and be sued in any court
under its charter. (R.A. No. 6395, Sec. 3[d]). As a government owned and controlled
corporation, it has a personality of its own, distinct and separate from that of
the Government. (See National Shipyards and Steel Corp. vs. CIR, et al., L-17874,
August 31, 1963, 8 SCRA 78 1). Moreover, the charter provision that the NPC can
'sue and be sued in any court' is without qualification on the cause of action and
accordingly it can include a tort claim such as the one instituted by the
petitioners.The proposition that the SSS is not profit-oriented was rejected in the
case ofSSS Employees' Association vs. Hon. Soriano.17But even conceding that the
SSS is not, in the main, operated for profit, it cannot be denied that, in so far
as contractual loan agreements with private parties are concerned, the SSS enters
into them for profit considering that the borrowers pay interest, which is money
paid for the use of money, plus other charges.In so far as it is argued that to
hold the SSS liable for damages would be to deplete the benefit funds available for
its covered members, suffice it to say, that expenditures of the System are not
confined to the payment of social security benefits. For example, the System also
has to pay the salaries of its personnel. Moreover, drawing a parallel with the
NASSCO and the Virginia Tobacco Administration, whose funds are in the nature of
public funds, it has been held that those funds may even be made the object of a
notice of garnishment.18What is of paramount importance in this controversy is
that an injustice is not perpetrated and that when damage is caused a citizen, the
latter should have a right of redress particularly when it arises from a purely
private and contractual relationship between said individual and the System.We
find, however, that under the circumstances of the case, the SSS cannot be held
liable for the damages as awarded by the Trial Court and the Appellate Tribunal.As
basis for the award of actual damages, the Trial Court relied on the alleged
expenses incurred by private respondents for the wardrobe they were supposed to use
during their trip abroad, which was allegedly aborted because of the filing of the
foreclosure application by the SSS. We find the foregoing too speculative. There
could have been other reasons why the trip did not materialize. Moreover, it
appears that private respondents' passports had already expired but that they made
no effort to secure new passports.19Nor did they secure the necessary visas from
the local consulates of foreign countries they intended to visit for their trip
abroad.20Nor can the SSS be held liable for moral and temperate damages. As
concluded by the Court of Appeals "the negligence of the appellant is not so gross
as to warrant moral and temperate damages",21except that, said Court reduced
those damages by only P5,000.00 instead of eliminating them. Neither can we agree
with the findings of both the Trial Court and respondent Court that the SSS had
acted maliciously or in bad faith. The SSS was of the belief that it was acting in
the legitimate exercise of its right under the mortgage contract in the face of
irregular payments made by private respondents, and placed reliance on the
automatic acceleration clause in the contract. The filing alone of the foreclosure
application should not be a ground for an award of moral damages in the same way
that a clearly unfounded civil action is not among the grounds for moral
damages.22With the ruling out of compensatory, moral and temperate damages, the
grant of exemplary or corrective damages should also be set aside.23Moreover, no
proof has been submitted that the SSS had acted in a wanton, reckless and
oppressive manner.24However, as found by both the Trial and Appellate Courts,
there was clear negligence on the part of SSS when they mistook the loan account of
Socorro J. Cruz for that of private respondent Socorro C. Cruz. Its attention was
called to the error, but it adamantly refused to acknowledge its mistake. The SSS
can be held liable for nominal damages. This type of damages is not for the purpose
of indemnifying private respondents for any loss suffered by them but to vindicate
or recognize their rights which have been violated or invaded by petitioner SSS.25
The circumstances of the case also justify the award of attorney's fees, as granted
by the Trial and Appellate Courts, particularly considering that private
respondents were compelled to litigate for the prosecution of their interests.26
WHEREFORE, the judgment sought to be reviewed is hereby modified in that petitioner
SSS shall pay private respondents: P3,000.00 as nominal damages; and P5,000.00 as
attorney's fees.Costs against petitioner Social Security System.SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro, Vasquez and Relova,
JJ., concur.Fernando, C.J., concurs in the result.Plana, Escolin ** and Gutierrez,
Jr., *** JJ., took no part.Separate OpinionsAQUINO,J.,concurring:I concur.
The award of moral damages is not justified under arts. 2219 and 2220 of the Civil
Code. I vote to award the private respondents the additional sum of P2,000 as
litigation expenses.MAKASIAR,J.,dissenting:I dissent.ITo begin with, the

negligent acts committed by the officers and employees of the petitioner, Social
Security System, amounted to not simply a contractual breach but tort. For the
record is clear that petitioner's officers and employees were grossly negligent
bordering on malice or bad faith in applying for the extrajudicial foreclosure of
the mortgage contract executed in its favor by the spouses David B. Cruz and
Socorro Concio-Cruz, and that even after private respondents had brought to the
attention of the petitioner's officers and employees their mistake, they insisted
on their course of action, instead of making the necessary rectifications, which
grossly negligent and oppressive acts caused damage to private respondents. As
found by the Court of Appeals:The appellant was not justified in applying for the
extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage contract executed in its favor by the
spouses David B. Cruz and Socorro Concio-Cruz, Exh. 'A'. While it is true that the
payments of the monthly installments were previously not regular, it is a fact that
as of June 30, 1968 the appellees, David B. Cruz and Socorro Concio-Cruz were upto-date and current in the payment of their monthly installments. Having accepted
the prior late payments of the monthly installments, the appellant could no longer
suddenly and without prior notice to the mortgagors apply for the extra-judicial
foreclosure of the mortgage in July, 1968.It is obvious that the appellant applied
for the extra-judicial foreclosure of the mortgage in question because of thegross
negligence of its employees. This negligence was aggravated when the
appellant,after being informed of the error, insisted on proceeding with the
extra-judicial foreclosure by invoking alleged violations of the mortgage contract.
But these violations are either too minor to warrant the drastic step of
foreclosure or were deemed condoned when the appellant accepted late payments prior
to June 30, 1968. Hence the trial court did not err in concluding that 'the act of
defendant indeed was deliberate, calculated to cow plaintiffs into submission and
made obviously with malice (p. 54, rec.; emphasis supplied).The circumstance that
there was a pre-existing contractual relationship between the herein contending
parties, does not bar the tort liability of the officers and employees of
petitioner; because tort liability may still exist despite presence of contractual
relations as the act that breaks the contract may also be a tort, as in this case
(Air France vs. Carrascoso, L-21438, Sept. 28, 1966, 18 SCRA 155, 168-169; Singson
& Castillo vs. Bank of the Philippine Islands, L-24837, June 27, 1968, 23 SCRA
1117, 1119-20).Consequently, a tortious act being involved, the applicable
provision of law is Article 2180 in relation to Article 2176 of the New Civil Code.
Under Article 2180, ... The State is responsible in like manner when it acts
through a special agent; but not when the damage has been caused by the official to
whom the task done properly pertains, in which case what is provided in Article
2176 shall be applicable.In the case at bar, the petitioner Social Security System
as the instrumentality of the State to implement the social justice guarantee
enunciated in the Constitution, did not act through a special agent. Hence, the
Social Security System cannot be liable for the damages caused by the tortious acts
of its officers and employees while in the performance of their regular functions.
The remedy therefore of private respondents is to proceed against the guilty
officers and employees of petitioner Social Security System as mandated by Article
2176 of the New Civil Code.For as held in the leading case ofMerritt vs.
Government of the Philippine Islands(34 Phil. 311).The responsibility of the State
is limited by Article 1903 to the case wherein it acts through aspecial agent, ...
so that in representation of the state and being bound to act as an agent thereof,
he executes the trust confided to him. This concept does not apply to any executive
agent who is an employee of the active administration and who on his own
responsibility performs the functions which are inherent in and naturally pertain
to his office and which are regulated by law and the regulations.While Article 2180
of the New Civil Code was not invoked by the petitioner as a defense, this does not
prevent this Tribunal from taking cognizance of the same. For as stressed
inOrtigas, Jr. vs. Lufthansa German Airlines(June 30, 1975, 64 SCRA 610, 633),
failure to assign a defense as an error on appeal is a pure technicality that
should not prevail over the substantial issues in a controversy as the same would
not serve the interest of justice, and "this Court is clothed with ample authority
to review matters even if they are not assigned as errors in the appeal, if it
finds that our consideration is necessary in arriving at a just decision of the
case" (citing Saura & Export Co., Inc., May 31, 1963, 8 SCRA 143). Further, We
have, time and again, re-stated the rule that the Supreme Court can suspend its own
rules to serve the ends of justice (Jose vs. C.A., et al., L-38581, March 31, 1976;
Phil. Blooming Mills Employees Organization, et al. vs. PBM Co., et al., L-31195,
51 SCRA 189, 215; Ronquillo vs. Marasigan, May 31, 1962, 5 SCRA 304, 312-313;
Ordoveza vs. Raymundo, 63 Phil. 275).The principle that a defense not expressly
pleaded is deemed waived unless such failure is satisfactorily explained, is merely
a general rule which is subject to exceptions, among which is when the Court can
take judicial notice of such defense. In this case, We can take judicial notice of
the law, like Article 2180 of the New Civil Code. It must be emphasized that the
courts have as much duty as the Commission on August to protect the public treasury
from being mulcted or raided illegally. And this becomes more imperative
considering that a substantial portion of the funds of the petitioner comes from
the contributions of- employees and workers in private firms and is therefore in
the nature of a trust fund to be expended only for their welfare and benefit, with
the government merely giving some subsidy. Any amount of damages illegally assessed
against the Social Security System will deplete the benefit funds available to its
covered members for the contingencies of sickness, disability, retirement or death.
It cannot likewise be seriously questioned that the Social Security System is
comprehended in the definition in Section 2 of the Revised Administrative Code of
the term "Government of
the Republic of the Philippines ... which refers to the corporate governmental
entity through which the functions of government are exercised throughout the
Philippine Islands, including, save as the contrary appears from the context, the
various arms through which political authority is made effective in the
Philippines, whether pertaining to the central Government or to the provincial or
municipal branches or other forms of local government." And the second paragraph of
said Section 2 provides that the term "national government" refers to the central
government as distinguished from the different forms of local government. There is
nothing therein nor in the Social Security Act, as amended, intimating that the
national government does not include the Social Security System.It is true that the
Social Security System has a corporate or juridical personality of its own. But
this does not remove it as an integral part of the national or central government.
For such corporate or juridical personality invested in it is more for facility and
convenience in the attainment of the objectives for which it was created by the
legislative. Such vesting of corporate or juridical personality in the Social
Security System was never intended to destroy the shield from liability afforded it
as an integral part of the State or Government by Article 2180 of the New Civil
Code. Relatedly, such corporate or juridical personality of the Social Security
System and the express provision of the law creating the same that it can sue and
be sued, have the effect of merely waiving its immunity from suit as an entity
performing governmental functions. Such waiver of its immunity from suit is not an
admission of its liability. Such waiver merely allows a private citizen a remedy
for the enforcement and protection of his rights, but always subject to the lawful
defenses of the Social Security System one of which is Article 2180 of the New
Civil Code as aforestated. In other words, such waiver of immunity from suit is not
equivalent to instant liability. The Social Security System can only be held liable
for damages arising from the tortious acts of its officers and employees only if it
acts through a special agent, which is not true in the case at bar.IIIt must be
finally stressed that the Social Security System cannot be liable for damages
because it is an entity of government performing governmental functions; hence, not
profit-oriented. The 1963 doctrine inSSSEA vs. Soriano(7 SCRA 1016 [1963]) that
the system is exercising proprietary functions, is no longer controlling.For in
1969, the distinction between constituent and ministrant functions of the
Government as laid down in the case of Bacani vs. Nacoco (100 Phil. 468 [1956]) has
been obliterated. In the case of Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Financing
Administration (ACCFA) vs. Confederation of Unions in Government Corporations and

Offices (CUGCO) [30 SCRA 649 (1969)], this Court in re-examining the
aforesaidBacaniruling observed that the trend has been to abandon and reject the
traditional "Constituent- Ministrant" criterion in governmental functions in favor
of the more responsive postulate that the growing complexities of modern society
have rendered the traditional classification of government functions unrealistic
and obsolete.WE held in theACCFAcase, thus:The growing complexities of modern
society, however, have rendered this traditional classification of the functions of
government quite unrealistic, not to say obsolete. The areas which used to be left
to private enterprise and initiative and which the government was called upon to
enter optionally, and only 'because it was better equipped to administer for the
public welfare than is any private individual or groups of individuals,' continue
to lose their well-defined boundaries and to be absorbed within activities that the
government must have undertaken in its sovereign capacity if it is to meet the
increasing social challenges of the times. Here as almost everywhere, else, the
tendency is undoubtedly towards a greater socialization of economic forces. Here of
course, this development was envisioned indeed adopted as a national policy, by the
Constitution itself in its declaration of principle concerning the promotion of
social justice.Chief Justice Fernando, then Associate Justice, in his concurring
opinion stressed that:The decision reached by this Court so ably given expression
in the opinion of Justice Makalintal, characterized with vigor, clarity and
precision,represents what for me is a clear tendency not to be necessarily bound
by our previous pronouncements on what activities partake of a nature that is
governmental.Of even greater significance, there is a definite rejection of the
'constituent-ministrant' criterion of governmental functions, followed in Bacani
vs. National Coconut Corporation. That indeed is cause for gratification. For me at
least, there is again full adherence to the basic philosophy of the Constitution as
to the extensive and vast power lodged in our government to cope with the social
and economic problems that even now sorely beset us. There is therefore full
concurrence on my part to the opinion of the court, distinguished by its high
quality of juristic craftsmanship (pp. 666-667).xxx xxx xxx4. With the decision
reached by us today, the government is freed from the compulsion exerted by the
Bacani doctrine of the 'constituent-ministrant' test as a criterion for the type of
activity in which it may engage. It constricting effect is consigned to oblivion.
No doubts or misgivings need assail us that government efforts to promote the
public wealth whether through regulatory legislation of vast scope and emplitude or
through the undertaking of business activities, would have to face a searching and
rigorous scrutiny. It is clear that their legitimacy cannot be challenged on the
ground alone of their being offensive to the implications of the laissez- faire
concept. Unless there be a repugnancy then to the limitations expressly set forth
in the Constitution to protect individual rights, the government enjoys a much
wider latitude of action as to the means it chooses to cope with grave social and
economic problems that urgently press for solution. For me, at least, that is to
manifest deference to the philosophy of our fundamental law. Hence my full
concurrence, as announced at the outset. (pp- 682-683, emphasis supplied).The 1935
Constitution declared:Sec. 5. The promotion of social justice to insure the well
being and economic security of all the people should be the concern of the State.
(Art. II, Declaration of Principles).The present 1973 Constitution provides under
its Declaration of Principles and State Policies (Article 11), thatThe State shall
promote social justice to ensure the dignity, welfare, and security of all the
people. Towards this end, the State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use,
enjoyment, and disposition of private property, and equitably diffuse property
ownership and profits. (Section 6);andThe State shall establish, maintain, and
ensure adequate social services in the field of education, health, housing,
employment, welfare, and social security to guarantee the enjoyment by the people
of a decent standard of living. (Section 7).The strictly governmental function of
the SSS is spelled out unmistakably in Section 2 of R.A. No. 1161 entitled "The
Social Security Act of 1954," thus:It is hereby declared to be the policy of the
Republic of the Philippines to develop, establish gradually and perfect a social
security system which shall be suitable to the needs of the people throughout the
Philippines, and shall provide protection against the hazards of disability,
sickness, old age and death.As stated in the Explanatory Note to the Bill that
became R. A. No. 1161, the Social Security Act of 1954:It is a recognized principle
in free societies that the State must help its citizens to make provision for
emergencies beyond their control, such as unemployment, sickness requiring
expensive medical treatment, and similar emergencies to a greater or lesser degree
by means of social security legislation in a variety of forms.And this Court, in
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila vs. SSS (L-15045, 1 SCRA 10 [1961]), declared
that "the Social Security Law was enacted pursuant to the 'policy of the Republic
to develop, establish gradually and perfect a social security system which shall be
suitable to the needs of the people throughout the Philippines and provide
protection to employees against the hazards of disability, sickness, old age and
death' (Sec. 2, Republic Act No. 1161, as amended). Such enactment is a legitimate
exercise of the police power. It affords protection to labor, especially to working
women and minors, and is in full accord with the constitutional provisions on the
'promotion of social justice to insure the well being and economic security of all
the people.It is interesting to note that aforesaid pronouncement of this Court was
incorporated in the Social Security Act (R.A. 1161) by Presidential Decree No. 24
issued on October 19, 1972. Thus, as amended by said Decree, its section 2 now
reads: "It is the policy of the Republic of the Philippines to establish, develop,
promote and perfect a sound viable 'tax exempt social security service suitable to
the needs of the people throughout the Philippines, which shall provide to covered
employees and their families protection against the hazards of disability,
sickness, old age, and death,with a view to promoting their well-being in the
spirit of social justice"(emphasis supplied). And one of its whereases expressly
states that "the measure is necessary to effect reforms in SSS operations andto
revitalize its structure as an important agency in the promotion of the social and
economic
development programs of the Government; ... (emphasis supplied).Considering
therefore that the establishment and maintenance of an adequate social security and
social services, which the Social Security System seeks to perform and achieve are
functions pursuant to the basic constitutional mandate directing the State to
promote "social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the
people" (1935 Constitution) or "to insure the dignity, welfare and security of all
the people" as well as the police power of the State, the inescapable conclusion is
that the function of the SSS is and has always been governmental.It thus becomes
clear that petitioner Social Security System, under the obtaining facts and
applicable laws in the case, is not liable for the damages caused to private
respondents by the tortious acts of its officers and employees to whom the task
done properly pertained.A contrary rule as that enunciated in the majority opinion
invites conspiracy between officials and employees of the Social Security System
and private parties to create financial liabilities against the System. Its funds
are public funds and more importantly trust funds, which must be protected.
Separate OpinionsAQUINO,J.,concurring:I concur. The award of moral damages is
not justified under arts. 2219 and 2220 of the Civil Code. I vote to award the
private respondents the additional sum of P2,000 as litigation expenses.
MAKASIAR,J.,dissenting:I dissent.ITo begin with, the negligent acts committed by
the officers and employees of the petitioner, Social Security System, amounted to
not simply a contractual breach but tort. For the record is clear that petitioner's
officers and employees were grossly negligent bordering on malice or bad faith in
applying for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage contract executed in its
favor by the spouses David B. Cruz and Socorro Concio-Cruz, and that even after
private respondents had brought to the attention of the petitioner's officers and
employees their mistake, they insisted on their course of action, instead of making
the necessary rectifications, which grossly negligent and oppressive acts caused
damage to private respondents. As found by the Court of Appeals:The appellant was
not justified in applying for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage
contract executed in its favor by the spouses David B. Cruz and Socorro Concio-
Cruz, Exh. 'A'. While it is true that the payments of the monthly installments were
previously not regular, it is a fact that as of June 30, 1968 the appellees, David
B. Cruz and Socorro Concio-Cruz were up-to-date and current in the payment of their
monthly installments. Having accepted the prior late payments of the monthly
installments, the appellant could no longer suddenly and without prior notice to
the mortgagors apply for the extra-judicial foreclosure of the mortgage in July,
1968.It is obvious that the appellant applied for the extra-judicial foreclosure of
the mortgage in question because of thegross negligence of its employees. This
negligence was aggravated when the appellant,after being informed of the error,
insisted on proceeding with the extra-judicial foreclosure by invoking alleged
violations of the mortgage contract. But these violations are either too minor to
warrant the drastic step of foreclosure or were deemed condoned when the appellant
accepted late payments prior to June 30, 1968. Hence the trial court did not err in
concluding that 'the act of defendant indeed was deliberate, calculated to cow
plaintiffs into submission and made obviously with malice (p. 54, rec.; emphasis
supplied).The circumstance that there was a pre-existing contractual relationship
between the herein contending parties, does not bar the tort liability of the
officers and employees of petitioner; because tort liability may still exist
despite presence of contractual relations as the act that breaks the contract may
also be a tort, as in this case (Air France vs. Carrascoso, L-21438, Sept. 28,
1966, 18 SCRA 155, 168-169; Singson & Castillo vs. Bank of the Philippine Islands,
L-24837, June 27, 1968, 23 SCRA 1117, 1119-20).Consequently, a tortious act being
involved, the applicable provision of law is Article 2180 in relation to Article
2176 of the New Civil Code. Under Article 2180, ... The State is responsible in
like manner when it acts through a special agent; but not when the damage has been
caused by the official to whom the task done properly pertains, in which case what
is provided in Article 2176 shall be applicable.In the case at bar, the petitioner
Social Security System as the instrumentality of the State to implement the social
justice guarantee enunciated in the Constitution, did not act through a special
agent. Hence, the Social Security System cannot be liable for the damages caused by
the tortious acts of its officers and employees while in the performance of their
regular functions. The remedy therefore of private respondents is to proceed
against the guilty officers and employees of petitioner Social Security System as
mandated by Article 2176 of the New Civil Code.For as held in the leading case
ofMerritt vs. Government of the Philippine Islands(34 Phil. 311).The
responsibility of the State is limited by Article 1903 to the case wherein it acts
through aspecial agent, ... so that in representation of the state and being bound
to act as an agent thereof, he executes the trust confided to him. This concept
does not apply to any executive agent who is an employee of the active
administration and who on his own responsibility performs the functions which are
inherent in and naturally pertain to his office and which are regulated by law and
the regulations.While Article 2180 of the New Civil Code was not invoked by the
petitioner as a defense, this does not prevent this Tribunal from taking cognizance
of the same. For as stressed inOrtigas, Jr. vs. Lufthansa German Airlines(June
30, 1975, 64 SCRA 610, 633), failure to assign a defense as an error on appeal is a
pure technicality that should not prevail over the substantial issues in a
controversy as the same would not serve the interest of justice, and "this Court is
clothed with ample authority to review matters even if they are not assigned as
errors in the appeal, if it finds that our consideration is necessary in arriving
at a just decision of the case" (citing Saura & Export Co., Inc., May 31, 1963, 8
SCRA 143). Further, We have, time and again, re-stated the rule that the Supreme
Court can suspend its own rules to serve the ends of justice (Jose vs. C.A., et
al., L-38581, March 31, 1976; Phil. Blooming Mills Employees Organization, et al.
vs. PBM Co., et al., L-31195, 51 SCRA 189, 215; Ronquillo vs. Marasigan, May 31,
1962, 5 SCRA 304, 312-313; Ordoveza vs. Raymundo, 63 Phil. 275).The principle that
a defense not expressly pleaded is deemed waived unless such failure is
satisfactorily explained, is merely a general rule which is subject to exceptions,
among which is when the Court can take judicial notice of such defense. In this
case, We can take judicial notice of the law, like Article 2180 of the New Civil
Code. It must be emphasized that the courts have as much duty as the Commission on
August to protect the public treasury from being mulcted or raided illegally. And
this becomes more imperative considering that a substantial portion of the funds of
the petitioner comes from the contributions of- employees and workers in private
firms and is therefore in the nature of a trust fund to be expended only for their
welfare and benefit, with the government merely giving some subsidy. Any amount of
damages illegally assessed against the Social Security System will deplete the
benefit funds available to its covered members for the contingencies of sickness,
disability, retirement or death.It cannot likewise be seriously questioned that the
Social Security System is comprehended in the definition in Section 2 of the
Revised Administrative Code of the term "Government of the Republic of the
Philippines ... which refers to the corporate governmental entity through which the
functions of government are exercised throughout the Philippine Islands, including,
save as the contrary appears from the context, the various arms through which
political authority is made effective in the Philippines, whether pertaining to the
central Government or to the provincial or municipal branches or other forms of
local government." And the second paragraph of said Section 2 provides that the
term "national government" refers to the central government as distinguished from
the different forms of local government. There is nothing therein nor in the Social
Security Act, as amended, intimating that the national government does not include
the Social Security System.It is true that the Social Security System has a
corporate or juridical personality of its own. But this does not remove it as an
integral part of the national or central government. For such corporate or
juridical personality invested in it is more for facility and convenience in the
attainment of the objectives for which it was created by the legislative. Such
vesting of corporate or juridical personality in the Social Security System was
never intended to destroy the shield from liability afforded it as an integral part
of the State or Government by Article 2180 of the New Civil Code. Relatedly, such
corporate or juridical personality of the Social Security System and the express
provision of the law creating the same that it can sue and be sued, have the effect
of merely waiving its immunity from suit as an entity performing governmental
functions. Such waiver of its immunity from suit is not an admission of its
liability. Such waiver merely allows a private citizen a remedy for the enforcement
and protection
of his rights, but always subject to the lawful defenses of the Social Security
System one of which is Article 2180 of the New Civil Code as aforestated. In other
words, such waiver of immunity from suit is not equivalent to instant liability.
The Social Security System can only be held liable for damages arising from the
tortious acts of its officers and employees only if it acts through a special
agent, which is not true in the case at bar.IIIt must be finally stressed that the
Social Security System cannot be liable for damages because it is an entity of
government performing governmental functions; hence, not profit-oriented. The 1963
doctrine inSSSEA vs. Soriano(7 SCRA 1016 [1963]) that the system is exercising
proprietary functions, is no longer controlling.For in 1969, the distinction
between constituent and ministrant functions of the Government as laid down in the
case of Bacani vs. Nacoco (100 Phil. 468 [1956]) has been obliterated. In the case
of Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Financing Administration (ACCFA) vs.
Confederation of Unions in Government Corporations and Offices (CUGCO) [30 SCRA 649
(1969)], this Court in re-examining the aforesaidBacaniruling observed that the
trend has been to abandon and reject the traditional "Constituent- Ministrant"
criterion in governmental functions in favor of the more responsive postulate that
the growing complexities of modern society have rendered the traditional
classification of government functions unrealistic and obsolete.WE held in
theACCFAcase, thus:The growing complexities of modern society, however, have
rendered this traditional classification of the functions of government quite
unrealistic, not to say obsolete. The areas which used to be left to private
enterprise and initiative and which the government was called upon to enter
optionally, and only 'because it was better equipped to administer for the public
welfare than is any private individual or groups of individuals,' continue to lose
their well-defined boundaries and to be absorbed within activities that the

government must have undertaken in its sovereign capacity if it is to meet the
increasing social challenges of the times. Here as almost everywhere, else, the
tendency is undoubtedly towards a greater socialization of economic forces. Here of
course, this development was envisioned indeed adopted as a national policy, by the
Constitution itself in its declaration of principle concerning the promotion of
social justice.Chief Justice Fernando, then Associate Justice, in his concurring
opinion stressed that:The decision reached by this Court so ably given expression
in the opinion of Justice Makalintal, characterized with vigor, clarity and
precision,represents what for me is a clear tendency not to be necessarily bound
by our previous pronouncements on what activities partake of a nature that is
governmental.Of even greater significance, there is a definite rejection of the
'constituent-ministrant' criterion of governmental functions, followed in Bacani
vs. National Coconut Corporation. That indeed is cause for gratification. For me at
least, there is again full adherence to the basic philosophy of the Constitution as
to the extensive and vast power lodged in our government to cope with the social
and economic problems that even now sorely beset us. There is therefore full
concurrence on my part to the opinion of the court, distinguished by its high
quality of juristic craftsmanship (pp. 666-667).xxx xxx xxx4. With the decision
reached by us today, the government is freed from the compulsion exerted by the
Bacani doctrine of the 'constituent-ministrant' test as a criterion for the type of
activity in which it may engage. It constricting effect is consigned to oblivion.
No doubts or misgivings need assail us that government efforts to promote the
public wealth whether through regulatory legislation of vast scope and emplitude or
through the undertaking of business activities, would have to face a searching and
rigorous scrutiny. It is clear that their legitimacy cannot be challenged on the
ground alone of their being offensive to the implications of the laissez- faire
concept. Unless there be a repugnancy then to the limitations expressly set forth
in the Constitution to protect individual rights, the government enjoys a much
wider latitude of action as to the means it chooses to cope with grave social and
economic problems that urgently press for solution. For me, at least, that is to
manifest deference to the philosophy of our fundamental law. Hence my full
concurrence, as announced at the outset. (pp- 682-683, emphasis supplied).The 1935
Constitution declared:Sec. 5. The promotion of social justice to insure the well
being and economic security of all the people should be the concern of the State.
(Art. II, Declaration of Principles).The present 1973 Constitution provides under
its Declaration of Principles and State Policies (Article 11), thatThe State shall
promote social justice to ensure the dignity, welfare, and security of all the
people. Towards this end, the State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use,
enjoyment, and disposition of private property, and equitably diffuse property
ownership and profits. (Section 6);andThe State shall establish, maintain, and
ensure adequate social services in the field of education, health, housing,
employment, welfare, and social security to guarantee the enjoyment by the people
of a decent standard of living. (Section 7).The strictly governmental function of
the SSS is spelled out unmistakably in Section 2 of R.A. No. 1161 entitled "The
Social Security Act of 1954," thus:It is hereby declared to be the policy of the
Republic of the Philippines to develop, establish gradually and perfect a social
security system which shall be suitable to the needs of the people throughout the
Philippines, and shall provide protection against the hazards of disability,
sickness, old age and death.As stated in the Explanatory Note to the Bill that
became R. A. No. 1161, the Social Security Act of 1954:It is a recognized principle
in free societies that the State must help its citizens to make provision for
emergencies beyond their control, such as unemployment, sickness requiring
expensive medical treatment, and similar emergencies to a greater or lesser degree
by means of social security legislation in a variety of forms.And this Court, in
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila vs. SSS (L-15045, 1 SCRA 10 [1961]), declared
that "the Social Security Law was enacted pursuant to the 'policy of the Republic
to develop, establish gradually and perfect a social security system which shall be
suitable to the needs of the people throughout the Philippines and provide
protection to employees against the hazards of disability, sickness, old age and
death' (Sec. 2, Republic Act No. 1161, as amended). Such enactment is a legitimate
exercise of the police power. It affords protection to labor, especially to working
women and minors, and is in full accord with the constitutional provisions on the
'promotion of social justice to insure the well being and economic security of all
the people.It is interesting to note that aforesaid pronouncement of this Court was
incorporated in the Social Security Act (R.A. 1161) by Presidential Decree No. 24
issued on October 19, 1972. Thus, as amended by said Decree, its section 2 now
reads: "It is the policy of the Republic of the Philippines to establish, develop,
promote and perfect a sound viable 'tax exempt social security service suitable to
the needs of the people throughout the Philippines, which shall provide to covered
employees and their families protection against the hazards of disability,
sickness, old age, and death,with a view to promoting their well-being in the
spirit of social justice"(emphasis supplied). And one of its whereases expressly
states that "the measure is necessary to effect reforms in SSS operations andto
revitalize its structure as an important agency in the promotion of the social and
economic development programs of the Government; ... (emphasis supplied).
Considering therefore that the establishment and maintenance of an adequate social
security and social services, which the Social Security System seeks to perform and
achieve are functions pursuant to the basic constitutional mandate directing the
State to promote "social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of
all the people" (1935 Constitution) or "to insure the dignity, welfare and security
of all the people" as well as the police power of the State, the inescapable
conclusion is that the function of the SSS is and has always been governmental.It
thus becomes clear that petitioner Social Security System, under the obtaining
facts and applicable laws in the case, is not liable for the damages caused to
private respondents by the tortious acts of its officers and employees to whom the
task done properly pertained.A contrary rule as that enunciated in the majority
opinion invites conspiracy between officials and employees of the Social Security
System and private parties to create financial liabilities against the System. Its
funds are public funds and more importantly trust funds, which must be protected.
G.R. No. L-15751 January 28, 1961BUREAU OF PRINTING, SERAFIN SALVADOR
and MARIANO LEDESMA,petitioners,#vs.#THE BUREAU OF PRINTING EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION
(NLU), PACIFICO ADVINCULA, ROBERTO MENDOZA, PONCIANO ARGANDA and TEODULO
TOLERAN,respondents.Office of the Solicitor General for petitioners.#Eulogio R.
Lerum for respondents.GUTIERREZ DAVID,J.:This is a petition forcertiorariand
prohibition with preliminary injunction to annul Certain orders of the respondent
Court of Industrial Relations and to restrain it from further proceeding in the
action for unfair labor practice pending
before it on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Giving due course to the
petition, this Court ordered the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction
prayed for without bond.The action in question was upon complaint of the
respondents Bureau of Printing Employees Association (NLU) Pacifico Advincula,
Roberto Mendoza, Ponciano Arganda and Teodulo Toleran filed by an acting
prosecutor of the Industrial Court against herein petitioner Bureau of Printing,
Serafin Salvador, the Acting Secretary of the Department of General Services, and
Mariano Ledesma the Director of the Bureau of Printing. The complaint alleged that
Serafin Salvador and Mariano Ledesma have been engaging in unfair labor practices
by interfering with, or coercing the employees of the Bureau of Printing
particularly the members of the complaining association petition, in the exercise
of their right to self-organization an discriminating in regard to hire and tenure
of their employment in order to discourage them from pursuing the union activities.
Answering the complaint, the petitioners Bureau of Printing, Serafin Salvador and
Mariano Ledesma denied the charges of unfair labor practices attributed to the and,
by way of affirmative defenses, alleged, among other things, that respondents
Pacifico Advincula, Roberto Mendoza Ponciano Arganda and Teodulo Toleran were
suspended pending result of an administrative investigation against them for breach
of Civil Service rules and regulations petitions; that the Bureau of Printing has
no juridical personality to sue and be sued; that said Bureau of Printing is not an
industrial concern engaged for the purpose of gain but is an agency of the Republic
performing government functions. For relief, they prayed that the case be dismissed
for lack of jurisdiction. Thereafter, before the case could be heard, petitioners
filed an "Omnibus Motion" asking for a preliminary hearing on the question of
jurisdiction raised by them in their answer and for suspension of the trial of the
case on the merits pending the determination of such jurisdictional question. The
motion was granted, but after hearing, the trial judge of the Industrial Court in
an order dated January 27, 1959 sustained the jurisdiction of the court on the
theory that the functions of the Bureau of Printing are "exclusively proprietary in
nature," and, consequently, denied the prayer for dismissal. Reconsideration of
this order having been also denied by the court in banc, the petitioners brought
the case to this Court through the present petition for certiorari and prohibition.
We find the petition to be meritorious.The Bureau of Printing is an office of the
Government created by the Administrative Code of 1916 (Act No. 2657). As such
instrumentality of the Government, it operates under the direct supervision of the
Executive Secretary, Office of the President, and is "charged with the execution of
all printing and binding, including work incidental to those processes, required by
the National Government and such other work of the same character as said Bureau
may, by law or by order of the (Secretary of Finance) Executive Secretary, be
authorized to undertake . . .." (See. 1644, Rev. Adm. Code). It has no corporate
existence, and its appropriations are provided for in the General Appropriations
Act. Designed to meet the printing needs of the Government, it is primarily a
service bureau and obviously, not engaged in business or occupation for pecuniary
profit.It is true, as stated in the order complained of, that the Bureau of
Printing receives outside jobs and that many of its employees are paid for overtime
work on regular working days and on holidays, but these facts do not justify the
conclusion that its functions are "exclusively proprietary in nature." Overtime
work in the Bureau of Printing is done only when the interest of the service so
requires (sec. 566, Rev. Adm. Code). As a matter of administrative policy, the
overtime compensation may be paid, but such payment is discretionary with the head
of the Bureau depending upon its current appropriations, so that it cannot be the
basis for holding that the functions of said Bureau are wholly proprietary in
character. Anent the additional work it executes for private persons, we find that
such work is done upon request, as distinguished from those solicited, and only "as
the requirements of Government work will permit" (sec. 1654, Rev. Adm. Code), and
"upon terms fixed by the Director of Printing, with the approval of the Department
Head" (sec. 1655, id.). As shown by the uncontradicted evidence of the petitioners,
most of these works consist of orders for greeting cards during Christmas from
government officials, and for printing of checks of private banking institutions.
On those greeting cards, the Government seal, of which only the Bureau of Printing
is authorized to use, is embossed, and on the bank cheeks, only the Bureau of
Printing can print the reproduction of the official documentary stamps appearing
thereon. The volume of private jobs done, in comparison with government jobs, is
only one-half of 1 per cent, and in computing the costs for work done for private
parties, the Bureau does not include profit because it is not allowed to make any.
Clearly, while the Bureau of Printing is allowed to undertake private printing
jobs, it cannot be pretended that it is thereby an industrial or business concern.
The additional work it executes for private parties is merely incidental to its
function, and although such work may be deemed proprietary in character, there is
no showing that the employees performing said proprietary function are separate and
distinct from those employed in its general governmental functions.From what has
been stated, it is obvious that the Court of Industrial Relations did not acquire
jurisdiction over the respondent Bureau of Printing, and is thus devoid of any
authority to take cognizance of the case. This Court has already held in a long
line of decisions that the Industrial Court has no jurisdiction to hear and
determine the complaint for unfair labor practice filed against institutions or
corporations not organized for profit and, consequently, not an industrial or
business organization. This is so because the Industrial Peace Act was intended to
apply only to industrial employment, and to govern the relations between employers
engaged in industry and occupations for purposes of gain, and their industrial
employees. (University of the Philippines, et al. vs. CIR, et al., G.R. No. L15416, April 28, 1960; University of Sto. Tomas vs. Villanueva, et al., G.R. No. L13748, October 30, 1959; La Consolacion College vs. CIR, G.R. No. L-13282, April
22, 1960; See also the cases cited therein.) .Indeed, as an office of the
Government, without any corporate or juridical personality, the Bureau of Printing
cannot be sued. (Sec. 1, Rule 3, Rules of Court). Any suit, action or proceeding
against it, if it were to produce any effect, would actually be a suit, action or
proceeding against the Government itself, and the rule is settled that the
Government cannot be sued without its consent, much less over its objection. (See
Metran vs. Paredes, 45 Off. Gaz. 2835; Angat River Irrigation System, et al. vs.
Angat River Workers' Union, et. al., G.R. Nos. L-10943-44, December 28, 1957).The
record also discloses that the instant case arose from the filing of administrative
charges against some officers of the respondent Bureau of Printing Employees'
Association by the Acting Secretary of General Services. Said administrative
charges are for insubordination, grave misconduct and acts prejudicial to public
service committed by inciting the employees, of the Bureau of Printing to walk out
of their jobs against the order of the duly constituted officials. Under the law,
the Heads of Departments and Bureaus are authorized to institute and investigate
administrative charges against erring subordinates. For the Industrial Court now to
take cognizance of the case filed before it, which is in effect a review of the
acts of executive officials having to do with the discipline of government
employees under them, would be to interfere with the discharge of such functions by
said officials. WHEREFORE, the petition for a writ of prohibition is granted. The
orders complained of are set aside and the complaint for unfair labor practice
against the petitioners is dismissed, with costs against respondents other than the
respondent court.G.R. No. 104269 November 11, 1993DEPARTMENT OF
AGRICULTURE,petitioner,#vs.#THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, et
al.,respondents.Roy Lago Salcedo for private respondents.VITUG,J.:For
consideration are the incidents that flow from the familiar doctrine of nonsuability of the state.In this petition forcertiorari, the Department of
Agriculture seeks to nullify the Resolution,1dated 27 November 1991, of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), Fifth Division, Cagayan de Oro City,
denying the petition for injunction, prohibition andmandamusthat prays to enjoin
permanently the NLRC's Regional Arbitration Branch X and Cagayan de Oro City
Sheriff from enforcing the decision2of 31 May 1991 of the Executive Labor Arbiter
and from attaching and executing on petitioner's property.The Department of
Agriculture (herein petitioner) and Sultan Security Agency entered into a
contract3on 01 April 1989 for security services to be provided by the latter to
the said governmental entity. Save for the increase in the monthly rate of the
guards, the same terms and conditions were also made to apply to another contract,
dated 01 May 1990, between the same parties. Pursuant to their arrangements, guards
were deployed by Sultan Agency in the various premises of the petitioner.On 13
September 1990, several guards of the Sultan Security Agency filed a complaint
for underpayment of wages, non-payment of 13th month pay, uniform allowances,
night shift differential pay, holiday pay and overtime pay, as well as for
damages,4before the Regional Arbitration Branch X of Cagayan de Oro City,
docketed as NLRC Case No. 10-09-00455-90 (or 10-10-00519-90, its original docket
number), against the Department of Agriculture and Sultan Security Agency.The
Executive Labor Arbiter rendered a decision on 31 May finding herein petitioner
andjointlyandseverallyliable with Sultan Security Agency for the payment of
money claims, aggregating P266,483.91, of the complainant security guards. The
petitioner and Sultan Security Agency did not appeal the decision of the Labor
Arbiter. Thus, the decision became final and executory.On 18 July 1991, the Labor
Arbiter issued a writ of execution.5commanding the City Sheriff to enforce and
execute the judgment against the property of the two respondents. Forthwith, or on
19 July 1991, the City Sheriff levied on execution the motor vehicles of the
petitioner, i.e. one (1) unit Toyota Hi-Ace, one (1) unit Toyota Mini Cruiser, and
one (1) unit Toyota Crown.6These units were put under the custody of Zacharias
Roa, the property custodian of the petitioner, pending their sale at public auction
or the final settlement of the case, whichever would come first.A petition for
injunction, prohibition andmandamus, with prayer for preliminary writ of
injunction was filed by the petitioner with the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC), Cagayan de Oro, alleging,inter alia, that the writ issued was effected
without the Labor Arbiter having duly acquired jurisdiction over the petitioner,
and that, therefore, the decision of the Labor Arbiter was null and void and all
actions pursuant thereto should be deemed equally invalid and of no legal, effect.
The petitioner also pointed out that the attachment or seizure of its property
would hamper and jeopardize petitioner's governmental functions to the prejudice of
the public good.On 27 November 1991, the NLRC promulgated its assailed
resolution;viz:WHEREFORE, premises considered, the following orders are issued:1.
The enforcement and execution of the judgments against petitioner in NLRC RABX
Cases Nos. 10-10-00455-90; 10-10-0481-90 and 10-10-00519-90 are temporarily
suspended for a period of two (2) months, more or less, but not extending beyond
the last quarter of calendar year 1991 to enable petitioner to source and raise
funds to satisfy the judgment awards against it;2. Meantime, petitioner is ordered
and directed to source for funds within the period above-stated and to deposit the
sums of money equivalent to the aggregate amount. it has been adjudged to pay
jointly and severally with respondent Sultan Security Agency with the Regional
Arbitration Branch X, Cagayan de Oro City within the same period for proper
dispositions;3. In order to ensure compliance with this order, petitioner is
likewise directed to put up and post sufficientsuretyandsupersedeas
bondequivalent to at least to fifty (50%) percent of the total monetary award
issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the Supreme Court or by
the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental to answer for the satisfaction of the
money claims in case of failure or default on the part of petitioner to satisfy the
money claims;4. The City Sheriff is ordered to immediately release the properties
of petitioner levied on execution within ten (10) days from notice of the posting
of sufficient surety or supersedeas bond as specified above. In the meanwhile,
petitioner is assessed to pay the costs and/or expenses incurred by the City
Sheriff, if any, in connection with the execution of the judgments in the abovestated cases upon presentation of the appropriate claims or vouchers and receipts
by the city Sheriff, subject to the conditions specified in the NLRC Sheriff,
subject to the conditions specified in the NLRC Manual of Instructions for
Sheriffs;5. The right of any of the judgment debtors to claim reimbursement against
each other for any payments made in connection with the satisfaction of the
judgments herein is hereby recognized pursuant to the ruling in theEagle
Securitycase, (supra). In case of dispute between the judgment debtors, the
Executive Labor Arbiter of the Branch of origin may upon proper petition by any of
the parties conduct arbitration proceedings for the purpose and thereby render his
decision after due notice and hearings;7. Finally, the petition for injunction
isDismissedfor lack of basis. The writ of preliminary injunction previously
issued isLiftedandSet Asideand in lieu thereof, aTemporary Stay of
Executionis issued for a period of two (2) months but not extending beyond the
last quarter of calendar year 1991, conditioned upon the posting of a surety or
supersedeas bond by petitioner within ten (10) days from notice pursuant to
paragraph 3 of this disposition. The motion to admit the complaint in intervention
isDeniedfor lack of merit while the motion to dismiss the petition filed by Duty
Sheriff isNotedSO ORDERED.In this petition forcertiorari, the petitioner charges
the NLRC with grave abuse of discretion for refusing to quash the writ of
execution. The petitioner faults the NLRC for assuming jurisdiction over a money
claim against the Department, which, it claims, falls under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit. More importantly, the petitioner asserts,
the NLRC has disregarded the cardinal rule on the non-suability of the State.The
private respondents, on the other hand, argue that the petitioner has impliedly
waived its immunity from suit by concluding a service contract with Sultan Security
Agency.The basic postulate enshrined in the constitution that "(t)he State may not
be sued without its consent,"7reflects nothing less than a recognition of the
sovereign character of the State and an express affirmation of the unwritten rule
effectively insulating it from the jurisdiction of courts.8It is based on the
very essence of sovereignty. As has been aptly observed, by Justice Holmes, a
sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception or obsolete
theory, but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as
against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends.9True, the
doctrine, not too infrequently, is derisively called "the royal prerogative of
dishonesty" because it grants the state the prerogative to defeat any legitimate
claim against it by simply invoking its non-suability.10We have had occasion, to
explain in its defense, however, that a continued adherence to the doctrine of nonsuability cannot be deplored, for the loss of governmental efficiency and the
obstacle to the performance of its multifarious functions would be far greater in
severity than the inconvenience that may be caused private parties, if such
fundamental principle is to be abandoned and the availability of judicial remedy is
not to be accordingly restricted.11The rule, in any case, is not really absolute
for it does not say that the state may not be sued under any circumstances. On the
contrary, as correctly phrased, the doctrine only conveys, "the state may not be
sued without its consent;" its clear import then is that the State may at times be
sued.12The States' consent may be given expressly or impliedly. Express consent
may be made through a general law13or a special law.14In this jurisdiction, the
general law waiving the immunity of the state from suit is found in Act No. 3083,
where the Philippine government "consents and submits to be sued upon any money
claims involving liability arising from contract, express or implied, which could
serve as a basis of civil action between private parties."15Implied consent, on
the other hand, is conceded when the State itself commences litigation, thus
opening itself to a counterclaim16or when it enters into a contract.17In this
situation, the government is deemed to have descended to the level of the other
contracting party and to have divested itself of its sovereign immunity. This rule,
relied upon by the NLRC and the private respondents, is not, however, without
qualification. Not all contracts entered into by the government operate as a waiver
of its non-suability; distinction must still be made between one which is executed
in the exercise of its sovereign function and another which is done in its
proprietary capacity.18In theUnites States of America vs. Ruiz,19where the
questioned transaction dealt with improvements on the wharves in the naval
installation at Subic Bay, we held:The traditional rule of immunity exempts a State
from being sued in the courts of another State without its consent or waiver. This
rule is a necessary consequence of the principles of independence and equality of
States. However, the rules of International Law are not petrified; they are
constantly developing and evolving. And because the activities of states have
multiplied, it has been necessary to distinguish them between sovereign and
governmental acts (jure imperii) and private, commercial and proprietary act
(jure gestionisis). The result is that State immunity now extends only to
actsjure imperii. The restrictive application of State immunity is now the rule in
the United States, the United Kingdom and other states in Western Europe.xxx xxx
xxxThe restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the
proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its
commercial activities or economic affairs. Stated differently, a state may be said
to have descended to the level of an individual and can this be deemed to have
actually given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts.
It does not apply where the contracts relates
to the exercise of its sovereign functions. In this case the projects are an
integral part of the naval base which is devoted to the defense of both the United
States and the Philippines, indisputably a function of the government of the
highest order; they are not utilized for not dedicated to commercial or business
purposes.In the instant case, the Department of Agriculture has not pretended to
have assumed a capacity apart from its being a governmental entity when it entered
into the questioned contract; nor that it could have, in fact, performed any act
proprietary in character.But, be that as it may, the claims of private respondents,
i.e. for underpayment of wages, holiday pay, overtime pay and similar other items,
arising from the Contract for Service, clearly constitute money claims. Act No.
3083, aforecited, gives the consent of the State to be "sued upon any moneyed claim
involving liability arising from contract, express or implied, . . . Pursuant,
however, to Commonwealth Act ("C.A.") No. 327, as amended by Presidential Decree
("P.D.") No. 1145, the money claim first be brought to the Commission on Audit.
Thus, inCarabao, Inc., vs. Agricultural Productivity Commission,20we ruled:
(C)laimants have to prosecute their money claims against the Government under
Commonwealth Act 327, stating that Act 3083 stands now merely as the general law
waiving the State's immunity from suit, subject to the general limitation expressed
in Section 7 thereof that "no execution shall issue upon any judgment rendered by
any Court against the Government of the (Philippines), and that the conditions
provided in Commonwealth Act 327 for filing money claims against the Government
must be strictly observed."We fail to see any substantial conflict or inconsistency
between the provisions of C.A. No. 327 and the Labor Code with respect to money
claims against the State. The Labor code, in relation to Act No. 3083, provides the
legal basis for the State liability but the prosecution, enforcement or
satisfaction thereof must still be pursued in accordance with the rules and
procedures laid down in C.A. No. 327, as amended by P.D. 1445.When the state gives
its consent to be sued, it does thereby necessarily consent to unrestrained
execution against it. tersely put, when the State waives its immunity, all it does,
in effect, is to give the other party an opportunity to prove, if it can, that the
State has a liability.21InRepublic vs. Villasor22this Court, in nullifying the
issuance of an alias writ of execution directed against the funds of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines to satisfy a final and executory judgment, has explained,
thus The universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be sued by
private parties either by general or special law, it may limit the claimant's
action "only up to the completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of
execution" andthat the power of the Courts ends when the judgment is rendered,
since government funds and properties may not be seized under writs or execution or
garnishment to satisfy such judgments, is based on obvious considerations of public
policy. Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the correspondent
appropriation as required by law. The functions and public services rendered by the
State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public
funds from their legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by law.23
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The resolution, dated 27 November 1991, is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The writ of execution directed against the property
of the Department of Agriculture is nullified, and the public respondents are
hereby enjoined permanently from doing, issuing and implementing any and all writs
of execution issued pursuant to the decision rendered by the Labor Arbiter against
said petitioner.G.R. No. L-46930 June 10, 1988DALE SANDERS, AND A.S. MOREAU,
JR,petitioners,#vs.#HON. REGINO T. VERIDIANO II, as Presiding Judge, Branch I,
Court of First Instance of Zambales, Olongapo City, ANTHONY M. ROSSI and RALPH L.
WYERS,respondents.CRUZ,J.:The basic issue to be resolved in this case is whether
or not the petitioners were performing their official duties when they did the acts
for which they have been sued for damages by the private respondents. Once this
question is decided, the other answers will fall into place and this petition need
not detain us any longer than it already has.Petitioner Sanders was, at the time
the incident in question occurred, the special services director of the U.S. Naval
Station (NAVSTA) in Olongapo City.1Petitioner Moreau was the commanding officer
of the Subic Naval Base, which includes the said station.2Private respondent
Rossi is an American citizen with permanent residence in the Philippines,3as so
was private respondent Wyer, who died two years ago.4They were both employed as
gameroom attendants in the special services department of the NAVSTA, the former
having been hired in 1971 and the latter in 1969.5On October 3, 1975, the private
respondents were advised that their employment had been converted from permanent
full-time to permanent part-time, effective October 18, 1975.6Their reaction was
to protest this conversion and to institute grievance proceedings conformably to
the pertinent rules and regulations of the U.S. Department of Defense. The result
was a recommendation from the hearing officer who conducted the proceedings for the
reinstatement of the private respondents to permanent full-time status plus

backwages. The report on the hearing contained the observation that "Special
Services management practices an autocratic form of supervision."7In a letter
addressed to petitioner Moreau on May 17, 1976 (Annex "A" of the complaint),
Sanders disagreed with the hearing officer's report and asked for the rejection of
the abovestated recommendation. The letter contained the statements that: a ) "Mr.
Rossi tends to alienate most co-workers and supervisors;" b) "Messrs. Rossi and
Wyers have proven, according to their immediate supervisors, to be difficult
employees to supervise;" and c) "even though the grievants were under oath not to
discuss the case with anyone, (they) placed the records in public places where
others not involved in the case could hear."On November 7, 1975, before the start
of the grievance hearings, a-letter (Annex "B" of the complaint) purportedly
corning from petitioner Moreau as the commanding general of the U.S. Naval Station
in Subic Bay was sent to the Chief of Naval Personnel explaining the change of the
private respondent's employment status and requesting concurrence therewith. The
letter did not carry his signature but was signed by W.B. Moore, Jr. "by
direction," presumably of Moreau.On the basis of these antecedent facts, the
private respondent filed in the Court of First Instance of Olongapo City a for
damages against the herein petitioners on November 8, 1976.8The plaintiffs
claimed that the letters contained libelous imputations that had exposed them to
ridicule and caused them mental anguish and that the prejudgment of the grievance
proceedings was an invasion of their personal and proprietary rights.The private
respondents made it clear that the petitioners were being sued in their private or
personal capacity. However, in a motion to dismiss filed under a special
appearance, the petitioners argued that the acts complained of were performed by
them in the discharge of their official duties and that, consequently, the court
had no jurisdiction over them under the doctrine of state immunity.After extensive
written arguments between the parties, the motion was denied in an order dated
March 8, 1977,9on the main ground that the petitioners had not presented any
evidence that their acts were official in nature and not personal torts, moreover,
the allegation in the complaint was that the defendants had acted maliciously and
in bad faith. The same order issued a writ of preliminary attachment, conditioned
upon the filing of a P10,000.00 bond by the plaintiffs, against the properties of
petitioner Moreau, who allegedly was then about to leave the Philippines.
Subsequently, to make matters worse for the defendants, petitioner Moreau was
declared in a default by the trial court in its order dated August 9, 1977. The
motion to lift the default order on the ground that Moreau's failure to appear at
the pre-trial conference was the result of some misunderstanding, and the motion
for reconsideration of the denial of the motion to dismiss, which was filed by the
petitioner's new lawyers, were denied by the respondent court on September 7, 1977.
This petition forcertiorari, prohibition and preliminary injunction was thereafter
filed before this Court, on the contention that the above-narrated acts of the
respondent court are tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction.We return now to the basic question of whether the petitioners were
acting officially or only in their private capacities when they did the acts for
which the private respondents have sued them for damages.It is stressed at the
outset that the mere allegation that a government functionary is being sued in his
personal capacity will not automatically remove him from the protection of the law
of public officers and, if appropriate, the doctrine of state immunity. By the same
token, the mere invocation of official character will not suffice to insulate him
from suability and liability for an act imputed to him as a personal tort committed
without or in excess of his authority. These well-settled principles are applicable
not only to the officers of the local state but also where the person sued in its
courts pertains to the government of a foreign state, as in the present case.The
respondent judge, apparently finding
that the complained acts wereprimafaciepersonal and tortious, decided to
proceed to trial to determineinter aliatheir precise character on the strength of
the evidence to be submitted by the parties. The petitioners have objected, arguing
that no such evidence was needed to substantiate their claim of jurisdictional
immunity. Pending resolution of this question, we issued a temporary restraining

order on September 26, 1977, that has since then suspended the proceedings in this
case in the courta quo.In past cases, this Court has held that where the character
of the act complained of can be determined from the pleadings exchanged between the
parties before the trial, it is not necessary for the court to require them to
belabor the point at a trial still to be conducted. Such a proceeding would be
superfluous, not to say unfair to the defendant who is subjected to unnecessary and
avoidable inconvenience.Thus, inBaer v. Tizon,10we held that a motion to dismiss
a complaint against the commanding general of the Olongapo Naval Base should not
have been denied because it had been sufficiently shown that the act for which he
was being sued was done in his official capacity on behalf of the American
government. The United States had not given its consent to be sued. It was the
reverse situation inSyquia v. Almeda Lopez," where we sustained the order of the
lower court granting a where we motion to dismiss a complaint against certain
officers of the U.S. armed forces also shown to be acting officially in the name of
the American government. The United States had also not waived its immunity from
suit. Only three years ago, inUnited States of America v. Ruiz,12we set aside
the denial by the lower court of a motion to dismiss a complaint for damages filed
against the United States and several of its officials, it appearing that the act
complained of was governmental rather than proprietary, and certainly not personal.
In these and several other cases13the Court found it redundant to prolong the
other case proceedings after it had become clear that the suit could not prosper
because the acts complained of were covered by the doctrine of state immunity.It is
abundantly clear in the present case that the acts for which the petitioners are
being called to account were performed by them in the discharge of their official
duties. Sanders, as director of the special services department of NAVSTA,
undoubtedly had supervision over its personnel, including the private respondents,
and had a hand in their employment, work assignments, discipline, dismissal and
other related matters. It is not disputed that the letter he had written was in
fact a reply to a request from his superior, the other petitioner, for more
information regarding the case of the private respondents.14Moreover, even in the
absence of such request, he still was within his rights in reacting to the hearing
officer's criticismin effect a direct attack against him-that Special Services
was practicing "an autocratic form of supervision."As for Moreau,what he is claimed
to have done was write the Chief of Naval Personnel for concurrence with the
conversion of the private respondents' type of employment even before the grievance
proceedings had even commenced. Disregarding for the nonce the question of its
timeliness, this act is clearly official in nature, performed by Moreau as the
immediate superior of Sanders and directly answerable to Naval Personnel in matters
involving the special services department of NAVSTA In fact, the letter dealt with
the financial and budgetary problems of the department and contained
recommendations for their solution, including the re-designation of the private
respondents. There was nothing personal or private about it.Given the official
character of the above-described letters, we have to conclude that the petitioners
were, legally speaking, being sued as officers of the United States government. As
they have acted on behalf of that government, and within the scope of their
authority, it is that government, and not the petitioners personally, that is
responsible for their acts. Assuming that the trial can proceed and it is proved
that the claimants have a right to the payment of damages, such award will have to
be satisfied not by the petitioners in their personal capacities but by the United
States government as their principal. This will require that government to perform
an affirmative act to satisfy the judgment,viz,the appropriation of the necessary
amount to cover the damages awarded, thus making the action a suit against that
government without its consent.There should be no question by now that such
complaint cannot prosper unless the government sought to be held ultimately liable
has given its consent to' be sued. So we have ruled not only in Baer but in many
other decisions where we upheld the doctrine of state immunity as applicable not
only to our own government but also to foreign states sought to be subjected to the
jurisdiction of our courts.15The practical justification for the doctrine, as
Holmes put it, is that "there can be no legal right against the authority which
makes the law on which the right depends.16In the case of foreign states, the
rule is derived from the principle of the sovereign equality of states which wisely
admonishes thatpar in parem non habet imperiumand that a contrary attitude would
"unduly vex the peace of nations."17Our adherence to this precept is formally
expressed in Article II, Section 2, of our Constitution, where we reiterate from
our previous charters that the Philippines "adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the land.All this is not to
say that in no case may a public officer be sued as such without the previous
consent of the state. To be sure, there are a number of well-recognized exceptions.
It is clear that a public officer may be sued as such to compel him to do an act
required by law, as where, say, a register of deeds refuses to record a deed of
sale;18or to restrain a Cabinet member, for example, from enforcing a law claimed
to be unconstitutional;19or to compel the national treasurer to pay damages from
an already appropriated assurance fund;20or the commissioner of internal revenue
to refund tax over-payments from a fund already available for the purpose;21or,
in general, to secure a judgment that the officer impleaded may satisfy by himself
without the government itself having to do a positive act to assist him. We have
also held that where the government itself has violated its own laws, the aggrieved
party may directly implead the government even without first filing his claim with
the Commission on Audit as normally required, as the doctrine of state immunity
"cannot be used as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice."22This case must
also be distinguished from such decisions asFestejo v. Fernando,23where the
Court held that a bureau director could be sued for damages on a personal tort
committed by him when he acted without or in excess of authority in forcibly taking
private property without paying just compensation therefor although he did convert
it into a public irrigation canal. It was not necessary to secure the previous
consent of the state, nor could it be validly impleaded as a party defendant, as it
was not responsible for the defendant's unauthorized act.The case at bar, to
repeat, comes under the rule and not under any of the recognized exceptions. The
government of the United States has not given its consent to be sued for the
official acts of the petitioners, who cannot satisfy any judgment that may be
rendered against them. As it is the American government itself that will have to
perform the affirmative act of appropriating the amount that may be adjudged for
the private respondents, the complaint must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
The Court finds that, even under the law of public officers, the acts of the
petitioners are protected by the presumption of good faith, which has not been
overturned by the private respondents. Even mistakes concededly committed by such
public officers are not actionable as long as it is not shown that they were
motivated by malice or gross negligence amounting to bad faith.24This, to, is
well settled .25Furthermore, applying now our own penal laws, the letters come
under the concept of privileged communications and are not punishable,26let alone
the fact that the resented remarks are not defamatory by our standards. It seems
the private respondents have overstated their case.A final consideration is that
since the questioned acts were done in the Olongapo Naval Base by the petitioners
in the performance of their official duties and the private respondents are
themselves American citizens, it would seem only proper for the courts of this
country to refrain from taking cognizance of this matter and to treat it as coming
under the internal administration of the said base.The petitioners' counsel have
submitted a memorandum replete with citations of American cases, as if they were
arguing before a court of the United States. The Court is bemused by such attitude.
While these decisions do have persuasive effect upon us, they can at best be
invoked only to support our own jurisprudence, which we have developed and enriched
on the basis of our own persuasions as a people, particularly since we became
independent in 1946.We appreciate the assistance foreign decisions offer us, and
not only from the United States but also from Spain and other countries from which
we have derived some if not most of our own laws. But we should not place undue and
fawning reliance upon them and regard them as indispensable mental crutches without
which we cannot come to our own decisions through the employment of our own
endowments We live
in a different ambience and must decide our own problems in the light of our own
interests and needs, and of our qualities and even idiosyncrasies as a people, and
always with our own concept of law and justice.The private respondents must, if
they are still sominded, pursue their claim against the petitioners in accordance
with the laws of the United States, of which they are all citizens and under whose
jurisdiction the alleged offenses were committed. Even assuming that our own laws
are applicable, the United States government has not decided to give its consent to
be sued in our courts, which therefore has not acquired the competence to act on
the said claim,.WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The challenged orders dated
March 8,1977, August 9,1977, and September 7, 1977, are SET ASIDE. The respondent
court is directed to DISMISS Civil Case No. 2077-O. Our Temporary restraining order
of September 26,1977, is made PERMANENT. No costs.G.R. No. 84607 March 19, 1993
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, GEN. RAMON MONTANO, GEN. ALFREDO LIM, GEN. ALEXANDER
AGUIRRE, COL. EDGAR DULA TORRES, COL. CEZAR NAZARENO, MAJ. FILEMON GASMEN, PAT.
NICANOR ABANDO, PFC SERAFIN CEBU, JR., GEN. BRIGIDO PAREDES, COL. ROGELIO MONFORTE,
PFC ANTONIO LUCERO, PAT. JOSE MENDIOLA, PAT. NELSON TUASON, POLICE CORPORAL PANFILO
ROGOS, POLICE LT. JUAN B. BELTRAN, PAT. NOEL MANAGBAO, MARINE THIRD CLASS TRAINEE
(3CT) NOLITO NOGATO, 3CT ALEJANDRO B. NAGUIO, JR., EFREN ARCILLAS, 3CT AGERICO
LUNA, 3CT BASILIO BORJA, 3CT MANOLITO LUSPO, 3CT CRISTITUTO GERVACIO, 3CT MANUEL
DELA CRUZ, JR., MARINE (CDC) BN., (CIVIL DISTURBANCE CONTROL), MOBILE DISPERSAL
TEAM (MDT), LT. ROMEO PAQUINTO, LT. LAONGLAANG GOCE, MAJ. DEMETRIO DE LA CRUZ,
POLICE CAPTAIN RODOLFO NAVAL, JOHN DOE, RICHARD DOE, ROBERTO DOE AND OTHER
DOES,petitioners,#vs.#HON. EDILBERTO G. SANDOVAL, Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch IX, ERLINDA C. CAYLAO, ANATALIA ANGELES PEREZ, MYRNA BAUTISTA, CIPRIANA
EVANGELIO, ELMA GRAMPA, AMELIA GUTIERREZ, NEMESIO LAKINDANUM, PURITA YUMUL, MIGUEL
ARABE, TERESITA ARJONA, RONALDO CAMPOMANES AND CARMENCITA ARDONI VDA. DE
CAMPOMANES, ROGELIO DOMUNICO, in their capacity as heirs of the deceased (ROBERTO
C. CAYLAO, SONNY "BOY" PEREZ, DIONESIO BAUTISTA, DANTE EVANGELIO, ADELFA ARIBE,
DANILO ARJONA, VICENTE CAMPOMANES, RONILO DOMUNICO) respectively; and (names of
sixty-two injured victims) EDDIE AGUINALDO, FELICISIMO ALBASIA, NAPOLEON BAUTISTA,
DANILO CRUZ, EDDIE MENSOLA, ALBERT PITALBO, VICENTE ROSEL, RUBEN CARRIEDO, JOY
CRUZ, HONORIO LABAMBA, JR., EFREN MACARAIG, SOLOMON MANALOTO, ROMEO DURAN, NILO
TAGUBAT, JUN CARSELLAR, JOEY CLEMENTE, GERARDO COYOCA, LUISITO DACO, BENJAMIN DELA
CRUZ, ARTHUR FONTANILLA, WILSON GARCIA, CARLOS SIRAY, JOSE PERRAS, TOMAS VALLOS,
ARNOLD ENAJE, MARIANITA DIMAPILIS, FRANCISCO ANGELES, MARCELO ESGUERRA, JOSE
FERRER, RODEL DE GUIA, ELVIS MENDOZA, VICTORIANO QUIJANO, JOEY ADIME, RESIENO ADUL,
ALBERTO TARSONA, CARLOS ALCANTARA, MAMERTO ALIAS, EMELITO ALMONTE, BENILDA
ALONUEVO, EMMA ABADILLO, REYNALDO CABALLES, JR., JAIME CALDETO, FABIAN CANTELEJO,
RODRIGO CARABARA, ENRIQUE DELGADO, JUN DELOS SANTOS, MARIO DEMASACA, FRANCISCO
GONZALES, ERNESTO GONZALES, RAMIRO JAMIL, JUAN LUCENA, PERLITO SALAYSAY, JOHNNY
SANTOS, MARCELO SANTOS, EMIL SAYAO, BAYANI UMALI, REMIGIO MAHALIN, BONG MANLULO,
ARMANDO MATIENZO, CARLO MEDINA, LITO NOVENARIO, and ROSELLA ROBALE,respondents.
G.R. No. 84645 March 19, 1993ERLINDA C. CAYLAO, ANATALIA ANGELES PEREZ, MYRNA
BAUTISTA, CIPRIANA EVANGELIO, ELMA GRAMPA, AMELIA GUTIERREZ, NEMESIO LAKINDANUM,
PURITA YUMUL, MIGUEL ARABE, TERESITA ARJONA, RONALDO CAMPOMANES AND CARMENCITA
ARDONI VDA. DE CAMPOMANES, ROGELIO DOMUNICO, in their capacity as heirs of the
deceased (ROBERTO C. CAYLAO, SONNY "BOY" PEREZ, DIONESIO GRAMPA, ANGELITO
GUTIERREZ, BERNABE LAKINDANUM, ROBERTO YUMUL, LEOPOLDO ALONZO, ADELFA ARIBE, DANILO
ARJONA, VICENTE CAMPOMANES, RONILO DOMUNICO) respectively; and (names of sixty-two
injured victims) EDDIE AGUINALDO, FELICISIMO ALBASIA, NAPOLEON BAUTISTA, DANILO
CRUZ, EDDIE MENSOLA, ALBERT PITALBO, VICENTE ROSEL, RUBEN CARRIEDO, JOY CRUZ,
HONORIO LABAMBA, JR. EFREN MACARAIG, SOLOMON MANALOTO, ROMEO DURAN, NILO TAGUBAT,
JUN CARSELLAR, JOEY CLEMENTE, GERARDO COYOCA, LUISITO DACO, BENJAMIN DELA CRUZ,
ARTHUR FONTANILLA, WILSON GARCIA, CARLOS SIRAY, JOSE PERRAS TOMAS VALLOS, ARNOLD
ENAJE, MARIANITA DIMAPILIS, FRANCISCO ANGELES, MARCELO ESGUERRA, JOSE FERRER, RODEL
DE GUIA, ELVIS MENDOZA, VICTORINO QUIJANO, JOEY ADIME, RESIENO ADUL, ALBERTO
TARSONA, CARLOS ALCANTARA, MAMERTO ALIAS, EMELITO ALMONTE, BENILDA ALONUEVO, EMMA
ABADILLO, REYNALDO CABALLES, JR., JAIME CALDETO, FABIAN CANTELEJO, RODRIGO
CARABARA, ENRIQUE DELGADO, JUN DELOS SANTOS, MARIO DEMASACA, FRANCISCO GONZALES,
ERNESTO GONZALES, RAMIRO JAMIL, JUAN LUCENA, PERLITO SALAYSAY, JOHNNY SANTOS,
MARCELO SANTOS, EMIL SAYAO, BAYANI UMALI, REMIGIO MAHALIN, BONG MANLULO, ARMANDO
MATIENZO, CARLO MEDINA, LITO NOVENARIO, ROSELLA ROBALE, petitioners,#vs.#REPUBLIC
OF THE PHILIPPINES, and HONORABLE EDILBERTO G. SANDOVAL, Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 9, respondents.The Solicitor General for the Republic of the
Philippines.Structural Alternative Legal Assistance for Grassroots for petitioners
in 84645 & private respondents in 84607.CAMPOS, JR.,J.:People may have already
forgotten the tragedy that transpired on January 22, 1987. It is quite ironic that
then, some journalists called it a Black Thursday, as a grim reminder to the nation
of the misfortune that befell twelve (12) rallyists. But for most Filipinos now,
the Mendiola massacre may now just as well be a chapter in our history books. For
those however, who have become widows and orphans, certainly they would not settle
for just that. They seek retribution for the lives taken that will never be brought
back to life again.Hence, the heirs of the deceased, together with those injured
(Caylao group), instituted this petition, docketed as G.R. No. 84645, under Section
1 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking the reversal and setting aside of the
Orders of respondent Judge Sandoval,1dated May 31 and August 8, 1988, dismissing
the complaint for damages of herein petitioners against the Republic of the
Philippines in Civil Case No. 88-43351.Petitioner, the Republic of the Philippines,
through a similar remedy, docketed as G.R. No. 84607, seeks to set aside the Order
of respondent Judge dated May 31, 1988, in Civil Case No. 88-43351 entitled
"Erlinda Caylao, et al. vs. Republic of the Philippines, et al."The pertinent
portion of the questioned Order2dated May 31, 1988, reads as follows:With respect
however to the other defendants, the impleaded Military Officers, since they are
being charged in their personal and official capacity, and holding them liable, if
at all, would not result in financial responsibility of the government, the
principle of immunity from suit can not conveniently and correspondingly be applied
to them.WHEREFORE, the case as against the defendant Republic of the Philippines is
hereby dismissed. As against the rest of the defendants the motion to dismiss is
denied. They are given a period of ten (10) days from receipt of this order within
which to file their respective pleadings.On the other hand, the Order3, dated
August 8, 1988, denied the motions filed by both parties, for a reconsideration of
the abovecited Order, respondent Judge finding no cogent reason to disturb the said
order.The massacre was the culmination of eight days and seven nights of encampment
by members of the militant Kilusang Magbubukid sa Pilipinas (KMP) at the then
Ministry (now Department) of Agrarian Reform (MAR) at the Philippine Tobacco
Administration Building along Elliptical Road in Diliman, Quezon City.The farmers
and their sympathizers presented their demands for what they called "genuine
agrarian reform". The KMP, led by its national president, Jaime Tadeo, presented
their problems and demands, among which were: (a) giving lands for free to farmers;
(b) zero retention of lands by landlords; and (c) stop amortizations of land
payments.The dialogue between the farmers and the MAR officials began on January
15, 1987. The two days that followed saw a marked increase in people at the
encampment. It was only on January 19, 1987 that Jaime Tadeo arrived to meet with
then Minister Heherson Alvarez, only to be informed that the Minister can only meet
with him the following day. On January 20, 1987, the meeting was held at the MAR
conference room. Tadeo demanded that the minimum comprehensive land reform program
be granted immediately. Minister Alvarez, for his part, can only promise to do his
best to bring the matter to the attention of then President Aquino, during the
cabinet meeting on January 21, 1987.Tension mounted the following day. The farmers,
now on their seventh day of encampment, barricaded the MAR premises and prevented
the employees from going inside their offices. They hoisted the KMP flag together
with the Philippine flag.At around 6:30 p.m. of the same day, Minister Alvarez, in
a meeting with Tadeo and his leaders, advised the latter to instead wait for the
ratification of the 1987 Constitution and just allow the government to implement
its comprehensive land reform program. Tadeo, however, countered by saying that he
did not believe in the Constitution and that a genuine land reform cannot be
realized under a landlord-controlled Congress. A heated discussion ensued between
Tadeo and Minister Alvarez. This notwithstanding, Minister Alvarez suggested a

negotiating panel from each side to meet again the following day.On January 22,
1987, Tadeo's group instead decided to march to Malacaang to air their demands.
Before the march started, Tadeo talked to the press and TV media. He uttered fiery
words, the most telling of which were:#". . . inalis namin ang barikada bilang
kahilingan ng
ating Presidente, pero kinakailangan alisin din niya ang barikada sa Mendiola
sapagkat bubutasin din namin iyon at dadanak ang dugo . . . ."4The farmers then
proceeded to march to Malacaang, from Quezon Memorial Circle, at 10:00 a.m. They
were later joined by members of other sectoral organizations such as the Kilusang
Mayo Uno (KMU), Bagong Alyansang Makabayan (BAYAN), League of Filipino Students
(LFS) and Kongreso ng Pagkakaisa ng Maralitang Lungsod (KPML).At around 1:00 p.m.,
the marchers reached Liwasang Bonifacio where they held a brief program. It was at
this point that some of the marchers entered the eastern side of the Post Office
Building, and removed the steel bars surrounding the garden. Thereafter, they
joined the march to Malacaang. At about 4:30 p.m., they reached C.M. Recto Avenue.
In anticipation of a civil disturbance, and acting upon reports received by the
Capital Regional Command (CAPCOM) that the rallyists would proceed to Mendiola to
break through the police lines and rush towards Malacaang, CAPCOM Commander
General Ramon E. Montao inspected the preparations and adequacy of the government
forces to quell impending attacks.OPLAN YELLOW (Revised) was put into effect. Task
Force Nazareno under the command of Col. Cesar Nazareno was deployed at the
vicinity of Malacaang. The civil disturbance control units of the Western Police
District under Police Brigadier General Alfredo S. Lim were also activated.
Intelligence reports were also received that the KMP was heavily infiltrated by
CPP/NPA elements and that an insurrection was impending. The threat seemed grave as
there were also reports that San Beda College and Centro Escolar University would
be forcibly occupied.In its report, the Citizens' Mendiola Commission (a body
specifically tasked to investigate the facts surrounding the incident, Commission
for short) stated that the government anti-riot forces were assembled at Mendiola
in a formation of three phalanges, in the following manner:(1) The first line was
composed of policemen from police stations Nos. 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 and the
Chinatown detachment of the Western Police District.Police Colonel Edgar Dula
Torres, Deputy Superintendent of the Western Police District, was designated as
ground commander of the CDC first line of defense. The WPD CDC elements were
positioned at the intersection of Mendiola and Legarda Streets after they were
ordered to move forward from the top of Mendiola bridge. The WPD forces were in
khaki uniform and carried the standard CDC equipment aluminum shields, truncheons
and gas masks.(2) At the second line of defense about ten (10) yards behind the WPD
policemen were the elements of the Integrated National Police (INP) Field Force
stationed at Fort Bonifacio from the 61st and 62nd INP Field Force, who carried
also the standard CDC equipment truncheons, shields and gas masks. The INP Field
Force wasunder the command of Police Major Demetrio dela Cruz.(3) Forming the
third line was the Marine Civil Disturbance Control Battalion composed of the first
and second companies of the Philippine Marines stationed at Fort Bonifacio. The
marines were all equipped with shields, truncheons and M-16 rifles (armalites)
slung at their backs,under the command of Major Felimon B. Gasmin. The Marine CDC
Battalion was positioned in line formation ten (10) yards farther behind the INP
Field Force.At the back of the marines were four (4) 6 x 6 army trucks, occupying
the entire width of Mendiola street, followed immediately by two water cannons, one
on each side of the street and eight fire trucks, four trucks on each side of the
street. The eight fire trucks from Fire District I of Manilaunder Fire
Superintendent Mario C. Tanchanco, were to supply water to the two water cannons.
Stationed farther behind the CDC forces were the two Mobile Dispersal Teams (MDT)
each composed of two tear gas grenadiers, two spotters, an assistant grenadier, a
driver and the team leader.In front of the College of the Holy Spirit near Gate 4
of Malacaang stood the VOLVO Mobile Communications Van of theCommanding General
of CAPCOM/INP, General Ramon E. Montao. At this command post, after General
Montao had conferred withTF Nazareno Commander,Colonel Cezar Nazareno, about the
adequacy and readiness of his forces, it was agreed thatPolice General Alfredo S.
Limwould designatePolice Colonel Edgar Dula TorresandPolice Major Conrado
Franciscoas negotiators with the marchers. Police General Lim then proceeded to
the WPD CDC elements already positioned at the foot of Mendiola bridge to relay to
Police Colonel Torres and Police Major Francisco the instructions that the latter
would negotiate with the marchers.5(Emphasis supplied)The marchers, at around
4:30 p.m., numbered about 10,000 to 15,000. From C.M. Recto Avenue, they proceeded
toward the police lines. No dialogue took place between the marchers and the antiriot squad. It was at this moment that a clash occurred and, borrowing the words of
the Commission "pandemonium broke loose". The Commission stated in its findings, to
wit:. . . There was an explosion followed by throwing of pillboxes, stones and
bottles. Steel bars, wooden clubs and lead pipes were used against the police. The
police fought back with their shields and truncheons. The police line was breached.
Suddenly shots were heard. The demonstrators disengaged from the government forces
and retreated towards C.M. Recto Avenue. But sporadic firing continued from the
government forces.After the firing ceased, two MDTsheaded by Lt. Romeo
PaquintoandLt. Laonglaan Gocesped towards Legarda Street and lobbed tear gas at
the remaining rallyist still grouped in the vicinity of Mendiola. After dispersing
the crowd, the two MDTs, together with the two WPD MDTs, proceeded to Liwasang
Bonifacioupon order of General Montaoto disperse the rallyists assembled
thereat. Assisting the MDTs were a number of policemen from the WPD, attired in
civilian clothes with white head bands, who were armed with long
firearms.6(Emphasis ours)After the clash, twelve (12) marchers were officially
confirmed dead, although according to Tadeo, there were thirteen (13) dead, but he
was not able to give the name and address of said victim. Thirty-nine (39) were
wounded by gunshots and twelve (12) sustained minor injuries, all belonging to the
group of the marchers.Of the police and military personnel, three (3) sustained
gunshot wounds and twenty (20) suffered minor physical injuries such as abrasions,
contusions and the like.In the aftermath of the confrontation, then President
Corazon C. Aquino issued Administrative Order No. 11,7(A.O. 11, for brevity)
dated January 22, 1987, which created the Citizens' Mendiola Commission. The body
was composed of retired Supreme Court Justice Vicente Abad Santos as Chairman,
retired Supreme Court Justice Jose Y. Feria and Mr. Antonio U. Miranda, both as
members. A.O. 11 stated that the Commission was created precisely for the "purpose
of conducting an investigation of the disorder, deaths, and casualties that took
place in the vicinity of Mendiola Bridge and Mendiola Street and Claro M. Recto
Avenue, Manila, in the afternoon of January 22, 1987". The Commission was expected
to have submitted its findings not later than February 6, 1987. But it failed to do
so. Consequently, the deadline was moved to February 16, 1987 by Administrative
Order No. 13. Again, the Commission was unable to meet this deadline. Finally, on
February 27, 1987, it submitted its report, in accordance with Administrative Order
No. 17, issued on February 11, 1987.In its report, the Commission recapitulated its
findings, to wit:(1) The march to Mendiola of the KMP led by Jaime Tadeo, together
with the other sectoral groups, was not covered by any permit as required under
Batas Pambansa Blg. 880, the Public Assembly Act of 1985, in violation of paragraph
(a) Section 13, punishable under paragraph (a), Section 14 of said law.(2) The
crowd dispersal control units of the police and the military were armed with .38
and .45 caliber handguns, and M-16 armalites, which is a prohibited act under
paragraph 4(g), Section 13, and punishable under paragraph (b), Section 14 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 880.(3) The security men assigned to protect the WPD, INP Field
Force, the Marines and supporting military units, as well as the security officers
of the police and military commanders were incivilian attire in violationof
paragraph (a), Section 10, Batas Pambansa 880.(4) There was unnecessary firing by
the police and military crowd dispersal control units in dispersing the marchers, a
prohibited act under paragraph (e), Section 13, and punishable under paragraph (b),
Section 14, Batas Pambansa Blg. 880.(5) The carrying and use of steel bars,
pillboxes, darts, lead pipe, wooden clubs with spikes, and guns by the marchers as
offensive weapons are prohibited acts punishable under paragraph (g), Section 13,
and punishable under paragraph (e), Section 14 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 880.(6) The
KMP farmers broke off further negotiations with the MAR officials and were
determined to march to Malacaang, emboldened as they are, by the inflammatory and
incendiary utterances of their leader, Jaime Tadeo "bubutasin namin ang
barikada . . Dadanak and dugo . . . Ang nagugutom na magsasaka ay gagawa ng
sariling butas. . .(7) There was no dialogue between the rallyists and the
government forces. Upon approaching the intersections of Legarda and Mendiola, the
marchers began pushing the police lines and penetrated and broke through the first
line of the CDC contingent.(8) The police fought back with their truncheons and
shields. They stood their ground but the CDC line was breached. There ensued
gunfire from both sides. It is not clear who started the firing.(9) At the onset of
the disturbance and violence,
the water cannons and tear gas were not put into effective use to disperse the
rioting crowd.(10) The water cannons and fire trucks were not put into operation
because (a) there was no order to use them; (b) they were incorrectly
prepositioned; and (c) they were out of range of the marchers.(11) Tear gas was not
used at the start of the disturbance to disperse the rioters. After the crowd had
dispersed and the wounded and dead were being carried away, the MDTs of the police
and the military with their tear gas equipment and components conducted dispersal
operations in the Mendiola area and proceeded to Liwasang Bonifacio to disperse the
remnants of the marchers.(12) No barbed wire barricade was used in Mendiola but no
official reason was given for its absence.8From the results of the probe, the
Commission recommended9the criminal prosecution of four unidentified, uniformed
individuals, shown either on tape or in pictures, firing at the direction of the
marchers. In connection with this, it was the Commission's recommendation that the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) be tasked to undertake investigations
regarding the identities of those who actually fired their guns that resulted in
the death of or injury to the victims of the incident. The Commission also
suggested that all the commissioned officers of both the Western Police District
and the INP Field Force, who were armed during the incident, be prosecuted for
violation of paragraph 4(g) of Section 13, Batas Pambansa Blg. 880, the Public
Assembly Act of 1985. The Commission's recommendation also included the prosecution
of the marchers, for carrying deadly or offensive weapons, but whose identities
have yet to be established. As for Jaime Tadeo, the Commission said that he should
be prosecuted both for violation of paragraph (a), Section 13, Batas Pambansa Blg.
880 for holding the rally without a permit and for violation of Article 142, as
amended, of the Revised Penal Code for inciting to sedition. As for the following
officers, namely: (1) Gen. Ramon E. Montao; (2) Police Gen. Alfredo S. Lim; (3)
Police Gen. Edgar Dula Torres; (4) Police Maj. Demetrio dela Cruz; (5) Col. Cezar
Nazareno; and (5) Maj. Felimon Gasmin, for their failure to make effective use of
their skill and experience in directing the dispersal operations in Mendiola,
administrative sanctions were recommended to be imposed.The last and the most
significant recommendation of the Commission was for the deceased and wounded
victims of the Mendiola incident to be compensated by the government. It was this
portion that petitioners (Caylao group) invoke in their claim for damages from the
government.Notwithstanding such recommendation, no concrete form of compensation
was received by the victims. Thus, on July 27, 1987, herein petitioners, (Caylao
group) filed a formal letter of demand for compensation from the
Government.10This formal demand was indorsed by the office of the Executive
Secretary to the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) on August 13, 1987. The
House Committee on Human Rights, on February 10, 1988, recommended the expeditious
payment of compensation to the Mendiola victims.11After almost a year, on January
20, 1988, petitioners (Caylao group) were constrained to institute an action for
damages against the Republic of the Philippines, together with the military
officers, and personnel involved in the Mendiola incident, before the trial court.
The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 88-43351.On February 23, 1988, the
Solicitor General filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the State cannot be
sued without its consent. Petitioners opposed said motion on March 16, 1988,
maintaining that the State has waived its immunity from suit and that the dismissal
of the instant action is contrary to both the Constitution and the International
Law on Human Rights.Respondent Judge Sandoval, in his first questioned Order,

dismissed the complaint as against the Republic of the Philippines on the ground
that there was no waiver by the State. Petitioners (Caylao group) filed a Motion
for Reconsideration therefrom, but the same was denied by respondent judge in his
Order dated August 8, 1988. Consequently, Caylao and her co-petitioners filed the
instant petition.On the other hand, the Republic of the Philippines, together with
the military officers and personnel impleaded as defendants in the court below,
filed its petition forcertiorari.Having arisen from the same factual beginnings
and raising practically identical issues, the two (2) petitions were consolidated
and will therefore be jointly dealt with and resolved in this Decision.The
resolution of both petitions revolves around the main issue of whether or not the
State has waived its immunity from suit.Petitioners (Caylao group) advance the
argument that the State has impliedly waived its sovereign immunity from suit. It
is their considered view that by the recommendation made by the Commission for the
government to indemnify the heirs and victims of the Mendiola incident and by the
public addresses made by then President Aquino in the aftermath of the killings,
the State has consented to be sued.Under our Constitution the principle of immunity
of the government from suit is expressly provided in Article XVI, Section 3. The
principle is based on the very essence of sovereignty, and on the practical ground
that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on
which the right depends.12It also rests on reasons of public policy that public
service would be hindered, and the public endangered, if the sovereign authority
could be subjected to law suits at the instance of every citizen and consequently
controlled in the uses and dispositions of the means required for the proper
administration of the government.13This is not a suit against the State with its
consent.Firstly, the recommendation made by the Commission regarding
indemnification of the heirs of the deceased and the victims of the incident by the
government does not in any way mean that liability automatically attaches to the
State. It is important to note that A.O. 11 expressly states that the purpose of
creating the Commission was to have a body that will conduct an "investigation of
the disorder, deaths and casualties that took place."14In the exercise of its
functions, A.O. 11 provides guidelines, and what is relevant to Our discussion
reads:1 Its conclusions regarding the existence of probable cause for the
commission of any offense and of the persons probably guilty of the same shall be
sufficient compliance with the rules on preliminary investigation and the charges
arising therefrom may be filed directly with the proper court.15In effect,
whatever may be the findings of the Commission, the same shall only serve as the
cause of action in the event that any party decides to litigate his/her claim.
Therefore, the Commission is merely a preliminary venue. The Commission is not the
end in itself. Whatever recommendation it makes cannot in any way bind the State
immediately, such recommendation not having become final and, executory. This is
precisely the essence of it being afact-finding body.Secondly, whatever acts or
utterances that then President Aquino may have done or said, the same are not
tantamount to the State having waived its immunity from suit. The President's act
of joining the marchers, days after the incident, does not mean that there was an
admission by the State of any liability. In fact to borrow the words of petitioners
(Caylao group), "it was an act of solidarity by the government with the people".
Moreover, petitioners rely on President Aquino's speech promising that the
government would address the grievances of the rallyists. By this alone, it cannot
be inferred that the State has admitted any liability, much less can it be inferred
that it has consented to the suit.Although consent to be sued may be given
impliedly, still it cannot be maintained that such consent was given considering
the circumstances obtaining in the instant case.Thirdly, the case does not qualify
as a suit against the State.Some instances when a suit against the State is proper
are:16(1) When the Republic is sued by name;(2) When the suit is against an
unincorporated government agency;(3) When the, suit is on its face against a
government officer but the case is such that ultimate liability will belong not to
the officer but to the government.While the Republic in this case is sued by name,
the ultimate liability does not pertain to the government. Although the military
officers and personnel, then party defendants, were discharging their official
functions when the incident occurred, their functions ceased to be official the
moment they exceeded their authority. Based on the Commission findings, there was
lack of justification by the government forces in the use of firearms.17Moreover,
the members of the police and military crowd dispersal units committed a prohibited
act under B.P. Blg. 88018as there was unnecessary firing by them in dispersing
the marchers.19As early as 1954, this Court has pronounced that an officer cannot
shelter himself by the plea that he is a public agent acting under the color of his
office when his acts are wholly without authority.20Until recently in
1991,21this doctrine still found application, this Court saying that immunity
from suit cannot institutionalize irresponsibility and non-accountability nor grant
a privileged status not claimed by any other official of the Republic. The military
and police forces were deployed to ensure that the rally would be peaceful and
orderly as well as to guarantee the safety of the very people that they are dutybound to protect. However, the facts as found by the trial court showed that they
fired at the unruly crowd to disperse
the latter.While it is true that nothing is better settled than the general rule
that a sovereign state and its political subdivisions cannot be sued in the courts
except when it has given its consent, it cannot be invoked by both the military
officers to release them from any liability, and by the heirs and victims to demand
indemnification from the government. The principle of state immunity from suit does
not apply, as in this case, when the relief demanded by the suit requires no
affirmative official action on the part of the State nor the affirmative discharge
of any obligation which belongs to the State in its political capacity,even though
the officers or agents who are made defendants claim to hold or act only by virtue
of a title of the state and as its agents and servants.22This Court has made it
quite clear that even a "high position in the government does not confer a license
to persecute or recklessly injure another."23The inescapable conclusion is that
the State cannot be held civilly liable for the deaths that followed the incident.
Instead, the liability should fall on the named defendants in the lower court. In
line with the ruling of this court inShauf vs. Court of Appeals,24herein public
officials, having been found to have acted beyond the scope of their authority, may
be held liable for damages.WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error and no grave
abuse of discretion committed by respondent Judge in issuing the questioned orders,
the instant petitions are hereby DISMISSED.G.R. No. L-35645 May 22, 1985UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA, CAPT. JAMES E. GALLOWAY, WILLIAM I. COLLINS and ROBERT
GOHIER,petitioners,#vs.#HON. V. M. RUIZ, Presiding Judge of Branch XV, Court of
First Instance of Rizal and ELIGIO DE GUZMAN & CO., INC.,respondents.Sycip,
Salazar, Luna & Manalo & Feliciano Law for petitioners.Albert, Vergara, Benares,
Perias & Dominguez Law Office for respondents.ABAD SANTOS,J.:This is a petition
to review, set aside certain orders and restrain the respondent judge from trying
Civil Case No. 779M of the defunct Court of First Instance of Rizal.The factual
background is as follows:At times material to this case, the United States of
America had a naval base in Subic, Zambales. The base was one of those provided in
the Military Bases Agreement between the Philippines and the United States.Sometime
in May, 1972, the United States invited the submission of bids for the following
projects1. Repair offender system, Alava Wharf at the U.S. Naval Station Subic Bay,
Philippines.2. Repair typhoon damage to NAS Cubi shoreline; repair typhoon damage
to shoreline revetment, NAVBASE Subic; and repair to Leyte Wharf approach, NAVBASE
Subic Bay, Philippines.Eligio de Guzman & Co., Inc. responded to the invitation and
submitted bids. Subsequent thereto, the company received from the United States two
telegrams requesting it to confirm its price proposals and for the name of its
bonding company. The company complied with the requests. [In its complaint, the
company alleges that the United States had accepted its bids because "A request to
confirm a price proposal confirms the acceptance of a bid pursuant to defendant
United States' bidding practices." (Rollo, p. 30.) The truth of this allegation has
not been tested because the case has not reached the trial stage.]In June, 1972,
the company received a letter which was signed by Wilham I. Collins, Director,
Contracts Division, Naval Facilities Engineering Command, Southwest Pacific,
Department of the Navy of the United States, who is one of the petitioners herein.
The letter said that the company did not qualify to receive an award for the
projects because of its previous unsatisfactory performance rating on a repair
contract for the sea wall at the boat landings of the U.S. Naval Station in Subic
Bay. The letter further said that the projects had been awarded to third parties.
In the abovementioned Civil Case No. 779-M, the company sued the United States of
America and Messrs. James E. Galloway, William I. Collins and Robert Gohier all
members of the Engineering Command of the U.S. Navy. The complaint is to order the
defendants to allow the plaintiff to perform the work on the projects and, in the
event that specific performance was no longer possible, to order the defendants to
pay damages. The company also asked for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction to restrain the defendants from entering into contracts with third
parties for work on the projects.The defendants entered their special appearance
for the purpose only of questioning the jurisdiction of this court over the subject
matter of the complaint and the persons of defendants, the subject matter of the
complaint being acts and omissions of the individual defendants as agents of
defendant United States of America, a foreign sovereign which has not given her
consent to this suit or any other suit for the causes of action asserted in the
complaint." (Rollo, p. 50.)Subsequently the defendants filed a motion to dismiss
the complaint which included an opposition to the issuance of the writ of
preliminary injunction. The company opposed the motion. The trial court denied the
motion and issued the writ. The defendants moved twice to reconsider but to no
avail. Hence the instant petition which seeks to restrain perpetually the
proceedings in Civil Case No. 779-M for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the
trial court.The petition is highly impressed with merit.The traditional rule of
State immunity exempts a State from being sued in the courts of another State
without its consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence of the
principles of independence and equality of States. However, the rules of
International Law are not petrified; they are constantly developing and evolving.
And because the activities of states have multiplied, it has been necessary to
distinguish them-between sovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii) and
private, commercial and proprietary acts (juregestionis). The result is that State
immunity now extends only to acts jure imperil The restrictive application of State
immunity is now the rule in the United States, the United Kingdom and other states
in western Europe. (See Coquia and Defensor Santiago, Public International Law, pp.
207-209 [1984].)The respondent judge recognized the restrictive doctrine of State
immunity when he said in his Order denying the defendants' (now petitioners)
motion: " A distinction should be made between a strictly governmental function of
the sovereign state from its private, proprietary or non- governmental acts (Rollo,
p. 20.) However, the respondent judge also said: "It is the Court's considered
opinion that entering into a contract for the repair of wharves or shoreline is
certainly not a governmental function altho it may partake of a public nature or
character. As aptly pointed out by plaintiff's counsel in his reply citing the
ruling in the case of Lyons, Inc., [104 Phil. 594 (1958)], and which this Court
quotes with approval, viz.:It is however contended that when a sovereign state
enters into a contract with a private person, the state can be sued upon the theory
that it has descended to the level of an individual from which it can be implied
that it has given its consent to be sued under the contract. ...xxx xxx xxxWe agree
to the above contention, and considering that the United States government, through
its agency at Subic Bay, entered into a contract with appellant for stevedoring and
miscellaneous labor services within the Subic Bay Area, a U.S. Naval Reservation,
it is evident that it can bring an action before our courts for any contractual
liability that that political entity may assume under the contract. The trial
court, therefore, has jurisdiction to entertain this case ... (Rollo, pp. 20-21.)
The reliance placed on Lyons by the respondent judge is misplaced for the following
reasons:InHarry Lyons, Inc. vs. The United States of America, supra,plaintiff
brought suit in the Court of First Instance of Manila to collect several sums of
money on account of a contract between plaintiff and defendant. The defendant filed
a motion to dismiss on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction over defendant
and over the subject matter of the action. The court granted the motion on the
grounds that: (a) it had no jurisdiction over the defendant who did not give its
consent to the suit; and (b) plaintiff failed to exhaust the administrative
remedies provided in the contract. The order of dismissal was elevated to this
Court for review.In sustaining the action of the lower court, this Court said:It
appearing in the complaint that appellant has not complied with the procedure laid
down in Article XXI of the contract regarding the prosecution of its claim against
the United States Government, or, stated differently, it has failed to first
exhaust its administrative remedies against said Government, the lower court acted
properly in dismissing this case.(At p. 598.)It can thus be seen that the statement
in respect of the waiver of State immunity from suit was purely gratuitous and,
therefore,obiterso that it has no value as an imperative authority.The
restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise
out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities
or economic affairs. Stated differently, a State may be said to have descended to
the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent
to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. It does not apply where the
contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions. In this case the
projects are an integral part of the naval base which is devoted to the defense of
both the United States and the Philippines, indisputably a function of the
government of the highest order; they are not utilized for nor dedicated to
commercial or business purposes.That the correct test for the application of State
immunity is not the conclusion of a contract by a State but the legal nature of the
act is shown inSyquia vs. Lopez,84 Phil. 312 (1949). In that case the plaintiffs
leased three apartment buildings to the United States of America for the use of its
military officials. The plaintiffs sued to recover possession of the premises on
the ground that the term of the leases had expired. They also asked for increased
rentals until the apartments shall have been vacated.The defendants who were armed
forces officers of the United States moved to dismiss the suit for lack of
jurisdiction in the part of the court. The Municipal Court of Manila granted the
motion to dismiss; sustained by the Court of First Instance, the plaintiffs went to
this Court for review on certiorari. In denying the petition, this Court said:On
the basis of the foregoing considerations we are of the belief and we hold that the
real party defendant in interest is the Government of the United States of America;
that any judgment for back or Increased rentals or damages will have to be paid not
by defendants Moore and Tillman and their 64 co-defendants but by the said U.S.
Government. On the basis of the ruling in the case of Land vs. Dollar already
cited, and on what we have already stated, the present action must be considered as
one against the U.S. Government. It is clear hat the courts of the Philippines
including the Municipal Court of Manila have no jurisdiction over the present case
for unlawful detainer. The question of lack of jurisdiction was raised and
interposed at the very beginning of the action. The U.S. Government has not , given
its consent to the filing of this suit which is essentially against her, though not
in name. Moreover, this is not only a case of a citizen filing a suit against his
own Government without the latter's consent but it is of a citizen filing an action
against a foreign government without said government's consent, which renders more
obvious the lack of jurisdiction of the courts of his country. The principles of
law behind this rule are so elementary and of such general acceptance that we deem
it unnecessary to cite authorities in support thereof. (At p. 323.)InSyquia,the
United States concluded contracts with private individuals but the contracts
notwithstanding the States was not deemed to have given or waived its consent to be
sued for the reason that the contracts were forjure imperiiand not forjure
gestionis.WHEREFORE, the petition is granted; the questioned orders of the
respondent judge are set aside and Civil Case No. is dismissed. Costs against the
private respondent.Teehankee, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Melencio-Herrera,
Plana,*Escolin, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., De la Fuente, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ.,
concur.Fernando, C.J., took no part.Separate OpinionsMAKASIAR,J.,dissenting:
The petition should be dismissed and the proceedings in Civil Case No. 779-M in the
defunct CFI (now RTC) of Rizal be allowed to continue therein.In the case ofLyons
vs. the United States of America(104 Phil. 593), where the contract entered into
between the plaintiff (Harry Lyons, Inc.) and the defendant (U.S. Government)
involved stevedoring and labor services within the Subic Bay area, this Court
further stated that inasmuch as ". . . the United States Government. through its
agency at Subic Bay, entered into a contract with appellant for stevedoring and
miscellaneous labor services within the Subic Bay area, a U.S. Navy Reservation, it
is evident that it can bring an action before our courts for any contractual
liability that that political entity may assume under the contract."When the U.S.
Government, through its agency at Subic Bay, confirmed the acceptance of a bid of a
private company for the repair of wharves or shoreline in the Subic Bay area, it is
deemed to have entered into a contract and thus waived the mantle of sovereign
immunity from suit and descended to the level of the ordinary citizen. Its consent
to be sued, therefore, is implied from its act of entering into a contract (Santos
vs. Santos, 92 Phil. 281, 284).Justice and fairness dictate that a foreign
government that commits a breach of its contractual obligation in the case at bar
by the unilateral cancellation of the award for the project by the United States
government, through its agency at Subic Bay should not be allowed to take undue
advantage of a party who may have legitimate claims against it by seeking refuge
behind the shield of non-suability. A contrary view would render a Filipino
citizen, as in the instant case, helpless and without redress in his own country
for violation of his rights committed by the agents of the foreign government
professing to act in its name.Appropriate are the words of Justice Perfecto in his
dissenting opinion inSyquia vs. Almeda Lopez,84 Phil. 312, 325:Although,
generally, foreign governments are beyond the jurisdiction of domestic courts of
justice, such rule is inapplicable to cases in which the foreign government enters
into private contracts with the citizens of the court's jurisdiction. A contrary
view would simply run against all principles of decency and violative of all tenets
of morals.Moral principles and principles of justice are as valid and applicable as
well with regard to private individuals as with regard to governments either
domestic or foreign. Once a foreign government enters into a private contract with
the private citizens of another country, such foreign government cannot shield its
non-performance or contravention of the terms of the contract under the cloak of
non-jurisdiction. To place such foreign government beyond the jurisdiction of the
domestic courts is to give approval to the execution of unilateral contracts,
graphically described in Spanish as 'contratos leoninos', because one party gets
the lion's share to the detriment of the other. To give validity to such contract
is to sanctify bad faith, deceit, fraud. We prefer to adhere to the thesis that all
parties in a private contract, including governments and the most powerful of them,
are amenable to law, and that such contracts are enforceable through the help of
the courts of justice with jurisdiction to take cognizance of any violation of such
contracts if the same had been entered into only by private individuals.Constant
resort by a foreign state or its agents to the doctrine of State immunity in this
jurisdiction impinges unduly upon our sovereignty and dignity as a nation. Its
application will particularly discourage Filipino or domestic contractors from
transacting business and entering into contracts with United States authorities or
facilities in the Philippines whether naval, air or ground forces-because the
difficulty, if not impossibility, of enforcing a validly executed contract and of
seeking judicial remedy in our own courts for breaches of contractual obligation
committed by agents of the United States government, always, looms large, thereby
hampering the growth of Filipino enterprises and creating a virtual monopoly in our
own country by United States contractors of contracts for services or supplies with
the various U.S. offices and agencies operating in the Philippines.The sanctity of
upholding agreements freely entered into by the parties cannot be over emphasized.
Whether the parties are nations or private individuals, it is to be reasonably
assumed and expected that the undertakings in the contractwillbecomplied with in
good faith.One glaring fact of modern day civilization is that a big and powerful
nation, like the United States of America, can always overwhelm small and weak
nations. The declaration in the United Nations Charter that its member states are
equal and sovereign, becomes hollow and meaningless because big nations wielding
economic and military superiority impose upon and dictate to small nations,
subverting their sovereignty and dignity as nations. Thus, more often than not,
when U.S. interest clashes with the interest of small nations, the American
governmental agencies or its citizens invoke principles of international law for
their own benefit.In the case at bar, the efficacy of the contract between the U.S.
Naval authorities at Subic Bay on one hand, and herein private respondent on the
other, was honored more in the breach than in the compliance The opinion of the
majority will certainly open the floodgates of more violations of contractual
obligations. American authorities or any foreign government in the Philippines for
that matter, dealing with the citizens of this country, can conveniently seek
protective cover under the majority opinion. The result is disastrous to the
Philippines.This opinion of the majority manifests a neo-colonial mentality. It
fosters economic imperialism and foreign political ascendancy in our Republic.The
doctrine of government immunity from suit cannot and should not serve as an
instrument for perpetrating an injustice on a citizen (Amigable vs. Cuenca, L26400, February 29, 1972, 43 SCRA 360; Ministerio vs. Court of First Instance, L31635, August 31, 1971, 40 SCRA 464).Under the doctrine of implied waiver of its
non-suability, the United States government, through its naval authorities at Subic
Bay, should be held amenable to lawsuits in our country like any other juristic
person.The invocation by the petitioner United States of America is not in accord
with paragraph 3 of Article III of the original RP-US Military Bases Agreement of
March 14, 1947, which states that "in the exercise of the above-mentioned rights,
powers and authority,the United States agrees that the powers granted to it will
not be used unreasonably. . ." (Emphasis supplied).Nor is such posture of
the petitioners herein in harmony with the amendment dated May 27, 1968 to the
aforesaid RP-US Military Bases Agreement, which recognizes "the need to promote and
maintain sound employment practices which will assure equality of treatment of all
employees ... and continuing favorable employer-employee relations ..." and
"(B)elieving that an agreement will be mutually beneficial and will strengthen the
democratic institutions cherished by both Governments, ... the United States
Government agrees to accord preferential employment of Filipino citizens in the
Bases, thus (1) the U.S. Forces in the Philippines shall fill the needs for
civilian employment by employing Filipino citizens, etc." (Par. 1, Art. I of the
Amendment of May 27, 1968).Neither does the invocation by petitioners of state
immunity from suit express fidelity to paragraph 1 of Article IV of the aforesaid
amendment of May 2 7, 1968 which directs that " contractors and concessionaires
performing work for the U.S. Armed Forcesshall be requiredby their contract or
concession agreementsto comply with all applicable Philippine labor laws and
regulations, " even though paragraph 2 thereof affirms that "nothing in this
Agreement shall imply any waiver by either of the two Governments of such immunity
under international law."Reliance by petitioners on the non-suability of the United
States Government before the local courts, actually clashes with No. III on respect
for Philippine law of the Memorandum of Agreement signed on January 7, 1979, also
amending RP-US Military Bases Agreement, which stresses that "it is the duty of
members of the United States Forces, the civilian component and their dependents,
to respect the laws of the Republic of the Philippines and to abstain from any
activity inconsistent with the spirit of the Military Bases Agreement and, in
particular, from any political activity in the Philippines. The United States shag
take all measures within its authority to insure that they adhere to them (Emphasis
supplied).The foregoing duty imposed by the amendment to the Agreement is further
emphasized by No. IV on the economic and social improvement of areas surrounding
the bases, which directs that "moreover, the United States Forces shall procure
goods and services in the Philippines to the maximum extent feasible" (Emphasis
supplied).Under No. VI on labor and taxation of the said amendment of January 6,
1979 in connection with the discussions on possible revisions or alterations of the
Agreement of May 27, 1968, "the discussions shall be conducted on the basis of the
principles of equality of treatment, the right to organize, and bargain
collectively, and respect for the sovereignty of the Republic of the Philippines"
(Emphasis supplied)The majority opinion seems to mock the provision of paragraph 1
of the joint statement of President Marcos and Vice-President Mondale of the United
States dated May 4, 1978 that "the United States re-affirms that Philippine
sovereignty extends over the bases and that Its base shall be under the command of
a Philippine Base Commander," which is supposed to underscore the joint Communique
of President Marcos and U.S. President Ford of December 7, 1975, under which "they
affirm that sovereign equality, territorial integrity and political independence of
all States are fundamental principles which both countries scrupulously respect;
and that "they confirm that mutual respect for the dignity of each nation shall
characterize their friendship as well as the alliance between their two countries.
"The majority opinion negates the statement on the delineation of the powers,
duties and responsibilities of both the Philippine and American Base Commanders
that "in the performance of their duties, the Philippine Base Commander and the
American Base Commander shall be guided byfull respect for Philippine
sovereigntyon the one hand and the assurance of unhampered U.S. military
operations on the other hand and that "they shall promote cooperation understanding
and harmonious relations within the Base and with the general publicin the
proximate vicinity thereof" (par. 2 & par. 3 of the Annex covered by the exchange
of notes, January 7, 1979, between Ambassador Richard W. Murphy and Minister of
Foreign Affairs Carlos P. Romulo, Emphasis supplied).Separate Opinions
MAKASIAR,J.,dissenting:The petition should be dismissed and the proceedings in
Civil Case No. 779-M in the defunct CFI (now RTC) of Rizal be allowed to continue
therein.In the case ofLyons vs. the United States of America(104 Phil. 593),
where the contract entered into between the plaintiff (Harry Lyons, Inc.) and the
defendant (U.S. Government) involved stevedoring and labor services within the
Subic Bay area, this Court further stated that inasmuch as ". . . the United States
Government. through its agency at Subic Bay, entered into a contract with appellant
for stevedoring and miscellaneous labor services within the Subic Bay area, a U.S.
Navy Reservation, it is evident that it can bring an action before our courts for
any contractual liability that that political entity may assume under the
contract."When the U.S. Government, through its agency at Subic Bay, confirmed the
acceptance of a bid of a private company for the repair of wharves or shoreline in
the Subic Bay area, it is deemed to have entered into a contract and thus waived
the mantle of sovereign immunity from suit and descended to the level of the
ordinary citizen. Its consent to be sued, therefore, is implied from its act of
entering into a contract (Santos vs. Santos, 92 Phil. 281, 284).Justice and
fairness dictate that a foreign government that commits a breach of its contractual
obligation in the case at bar by the unilateral cancellation of the award for the
project by the United States government, through its agency at Subic Bay should not
be allowed to take undue advantage of a party who may have legitimate claims
against it by seeking refuge behind the shield of non-suability. A contrary view
would render a Filipino citizen, as in the instant case, helpless and without
redress in his own country for violation of his rights committed by the agents of
the foreign government professing to act in its name.Appropriate are the words of
Justice Perfecto in his dissenting opinion inSyquia vs. Almeda Lopez,84 Phil.
312, 325:Although, generally, foreign governments are beyond the jurisdiction of
domestic courts of justice, such rule is inapplicable to cases in which the foreign
government enters into private contracts with the citizens of the court's
jurisdiction. A contrary view would simply run against all principles of decency
and violative of all tenets of morals.Moral principles and principles of justice
are as valid and applicable as well with regard to private individuals as with
regard to governments either domestic or foreign. Once a foreign government enters
into a private contract with the private citizens of another country, such foreign
government cannot shield its non-performance or contravention of the terms of the
contract under the cloak of non-jurisdiction. To place such foreign government
beyond the jurisdiction of the domestic courts is to give approval to the execution
of unilateral contracts, graphically described in Spanish as 'contratos leoninos',
because one party gets the lion's share to the detriment of the other. To give
validity to such contract is to sanctify bad faith, deceit, fraud. We prefer to
adhere to the thesis that all parties in a private contract, including governments
and the most powerful of them, are amenable to law, and that such contracts are
enforceable through the help of the courts of justice with jurisdiction to take
cognizance of any violation of such contracts if the same had been entered into
only by private individuals.Constant resort by a foreign state or its agents to the
doctrine of State immunity in this jurisdiction impinges unduly upon our
sovereignty and dignity as a nation. Its application will particularly discourage
Filipino or domestic contractors from transacting business and entering into
contracts with United States authorities or facilities in the Philippines whether
naval, air or ground forces-because the difficulty, if not impossibility, of
enforcing a validly executed contract and of seeking judicial remedy in our own
courts for breaches of contractual obligation committed by agents of the United
States government, always, looms large, thereby hampering the growth of Filipino
enterprises and creating a virtual monopoly in our own country by United States
contractors of contracts for services or supplies with the various U.S. offices and
agencies operating in the Philippines.The sanctity of upholding agreements freely
entered into by the parties cannot be over emphasized. Whether the parties are
nations or private individuals, it is to be reasonably assumed and expected that
the undertakings in the contractwillbecomplied with in good faith.One glaring
fact of modern day civilization is that a big and powerful nation, like the United
States of America, can always overwhelm small and weak nations. The declaration in
the United Nations Charter that its member states are equal and sovereign, becomes
hollow and meaningless because big nations wielding economic and military
superiority impose upon and dictate to small nations, subverting their sovereignty
and dignity as nations. Thus, more often than not, when U.S. interest clashes with
the interest of small nations, the American governmental agencies or its citizens
invoke principles of international law for their own benefit.In the case at bar,
the efficacy of the contract between the U.S. Naval authorities at Subic Bay on one
hand, and herein private respondent on the other, was honored more in the breach
than in the compliance The opinion of the majority
will certainly open the floodgates of more violations of contractual obligations.
American authorities or any foreign government in the Philippines for that matter,
dealing with the citizens of this country, can conveniently seek protective cover
under the majority opinion. The result is disastrous to the Philippines.This
opinion of the majority manifests a neo-colonial mentality. It fosters economic
imperialism and foreign political ascendancy in our Republic.The doctrine of
government immunity from suit cannot and should not serve as an instrument for
perpetrating an injustice on a citizen (Amigable vs. Cuenca, L-26400, February 29,
1972, 43 SCRA 360; Ministerio vs. Court of First Instance, L-31635, August 31,
1971, 40 SCRA 464).Under the doctrine of implied waiver of its non-suability, the
United States government, through its naval authorities at Subic Bay, should be
held amenable to lawsuits in our country like any other juristic person.The
invocation by the petitioner United States of America is not in accord with
paragraph 3 of Article III of the original RP-US Military Bases Agreement of March
14, 1947, which states that "in the exercise of the above-mentioned rights, powers
and authority,the United States agrees that the powers granted to it will not be
used unreasonably. . ." (Emphasis supplied).Nor is such posture of the petitioners
herein in harmony with the amendment dated May 27, 1968 to the aforesaid RP-US
Military Bases Agreement, which recognizes "the need to promote and maintain sound
employment practices which will assure equality of treatment of all employees ...
and continuing favorable employer-employee relations ..." and "(B)elieving that an
agreement will be mutually beneficial and will strengthen the democratic
institutions cherished by both Governments, ... the United States Government agrees
to accord preferential employment of Filipino citizens in the Bases, thus (1) the
U.S. Forces in the Philippines shall fill the needs for civilian employment by
employing Filipino citizens, etc." (Par. 1, Art. I of the Amendment of May 27,
1968).Neither does the invocation by petitioners of state immunity from suit
express fidelity to paragraph 1 of Article IV of the aforesaid amendment of May 2
7, 1968 which directs that " contractors and concessionaires performing work for
the U.S. Armed Forcesshall be requiredby their contract or concession
agreementsto comply with all applicable Philippine labor laws and regulations, "
even though paragraph 2 thereof affirms that "nothing in this Agreement shall imply
any waiver by either of the two Governments of such immunity under international
law."Reliance by petitioners on the non-suability of the United States Government
before the local courts, actually clashes with No. III on respect for Philippine
law of the Memorandum of Agreement signed on January 7, 1979, also amending RP-US
Military Bases Agreement, which stresses that "it is the duty of members of the
United States Forces, the civilian component and their dependents, to respect the
laws of the Republic of the Philippines and to abstain from any activity
inconsistent with the spirit of the Military Bases Agreement and, in particular,
from any political activity in the Philippines. The United States shag take all
measures within its authority to insure that they adhere to them (Emphasis
supplied).The foregoing duty imposed by the amendment to the Agreement is further
emphasized by No. IV on the economic and social improvement of areas surrounding
the bases, which directs that "moreover, the United States Forces shall procure
goods and services in the Philippines to the maximum extent feasible" (Emphasis
supplied).Under No. VI on labor and taxation of the said amendment of January 6,
1979 in connection with the discussions on possible revisions or alterations of the
Agreement of May 27, 1968, "the discussions shall be conducted on the basis of the
principles of equality of treatment, the right to organize, and bargain
collectively, and respect for the sovereignty of the Republic of the Philippines"
(Emphasis supplied)The majority opinion seems to mock the provision of paragraph 1
of the joint statement of President Marcos and Vice-President Mondale of the United
States dated May 4, 1978 that "the United States re-affirms that Philippine
sovereignty extends over the bases and that Its base shall be under the command of
a Philippine Base Commander," which is supposed to underscore the joint Communique
of President Marcos and U.S. President Ford of December 7, 1975, under which "they
affirm that sovereign equality, territorial integrity and political independence of
all States are fundamental principles which both countries scrupulously respect;
and that "they confirm that mutual respect for the dignity of each nation shall
characterize their friendship as well as the alliance between their two countries.
"The majority opinion negates the statement on the delineation of the powers,
duties and responsibilities of both the Philippine and American Base Commanders
that "in the performance of their duties, the Philippine Base Commander and the
American Base Commander shall be guided byfull respect for Philippine
sovereigntyon the one hand and the assurance of unhampered U.S. military
operations on the other hand and that "they shall promote cooperation understanding
and harmonious relations within the Base and with the general publicin the
proximate vicinity thereof" (par. 2 & par. 3 of the Annex covered by the exchange
of notes, January 7, 1979, between Ambassador Richard W. Murphy and Minister of
Foreign Affairs Carlos P. Romulo, Emphasis supplied).G.R. No. L-34548 November 29,
1988RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING CORPORATION,petitioner,#vs.#THE HONORABLE PACIFICO
P. DE CASTRO and PHILIPPINE VIRGINIA TOBACCO ADMINISTRATION,respondentsMeer, Meer &
Meer for petitioner.The Solicitor General for respondents.CORTES,J.:The crux of
the instant controversy dwells on the liability of a bank for releasing its
depositor's funds upon orders of the court, pursuant to a writ of garnishment. If
in compliance with the court order, the bank delivered the garnished amount to the
sheriff, who in turn delivered it to the judgment creditor, but subsequently, the
order of the court directing payment was set aside by the same judge, should the
bank be held solidarily liable with the judgment creditor to its depositor for
reimbursement of the garnished funds? The Court does not think so.In Civil Case No.
Q-12785 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch IX entitled
"Badoc Planters, Inc. versus Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration, et al.,"
which was an action for recovery of unpaid tobacco deliveries, an Order (Partial
Judgment) was issued on January 15, 1970 by the Hon. Lourdes P. San Diego, then
Presiding Judge, ordering the defendants therein to pay jointly and severally, the
plaintiff Badoc Planters, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as "BADOC") within 48 hours
the aggregate amount of P206,916.76, with legal interests thereon.On January
26,1970, BADOC filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for a Writ of Execution of the said
Partial Judgment which was granted on the same day by the herein respondent judge
who acted in place of the Hon. Judge San Diego who had just been elevated as a
Justice of the Court of Appeals. Accordingly, the Branch Clerk of Court on the very
same day, issued a Writ of Execution addressed to Special Sheriff Faustino Rigor,
who then issued a Notice of Garnishment addressed to the General Manager and/or
Cashier of Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (hereinafter referred to as RCBC),
the petitioner in this case, requesting a reply within five (5) days to said
garnishment as to any property which the Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration
(hereinafter referred to as "PVTA") might have in the possession or control of
petitioner or of any debts owing by the petitioner to said defendant. Upon receipt
of such Notice, RCBC notified PVTA thereof to enable the PVTA to take the necessary
steps for the protection of its own interest [Record on Appeal, p. 36]Upon an
Urgent Ex-Parte Motion dated January 27, 1970 filed by BADOC, the respondent Judge
issued an Order granting the Ex-Parte Motion and directing the herein petitioner
"to deliver in check the amount garnished to Sheriff Faustino Rigor and Sheriff
Rigor in turn is ordered to cash the check and deliver the amount to the
plaintiff's representative and/or counsel on record." [Record on Appeal, p. 20;
Rollo, p. 5.] In compliance with said Order, petitioner delivered to Sheriff Rigor
a certified check in the sum of P 206,916.76.Respondent PVTA filed a Motion for
Reconsideration dated February 26,1970 which was granted in an Order dated April
6,1970, setting aside the Orders of Execution and of Payment and the Writ of
Execution and ordering petitioner and BADOC "to restore, jointly and severally, the
account of PVTA with the said bank in the same condition and state it was before
the issuance of the aforesaid Orders by reimbursing the PVTA of the amount of P
206, 916.76 with interests at the legal rate from January 27, 1970 until fully paid
to the account of the PVTA This is without prejudice to the right of plaintiff to
move for the execution of the partial judgment pending appeal in case the motion
for reconsideration is denied and appeal is taken from the said partial judgment."
[Record on Appeal, p. 58]The Motion for Reconsideration of the said Order of April
6, 1970 filed by herein petitioner was denied in the Order of respondent judge
dated June 10, 1970 and on June 19, 1970, which was within the period for
perfecting an appeal, the herein petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal to the Court
of Appeals from the said Orders.This case was then certified by the Court of
Appeals to this Honorable Court, involving as it
does purely questions of law.The petitioner raises two principal queries in the
instant case: 1) Whether or not PVTA funds are public funds not subject to
garnishment; and 2) Whether or not the respondent Judge correctly ordered the
herein petitioner to reimburse the amount paid to the Special Sheriff by virtue of
the execution issued pursuant to the Order/Partial Judgment dated January 15, 1970.
The record reveals that on February 2, 1970, private respondent PVTA filed a Motion
for Reconsideration of the Order/ Partial Judgment of January 15, 1970. This was
granted and the aforementioned Partial Judgment was set aside. The case was set for
hearings on November 4, 9 and 11, 1970 [Rollo, pp. 205-207.] However, in view of
the failure of plaintiff BADOC to appear on the said dates, the lower court ordered
the dismissal of the case against PVTA for failure to prosecute [Rollo, p. 208.]It
must be noted that the Order of respondent Judge dated April 6, 1970 directing the
plaintiff to reimburse PVTA t e amount of P206,916.76 with interests
becamefinalas to said plaintiff who failed to even file a motion for
reconsideration, much less to appeal from the said Order. Consequently, the order
to restore the account of PVTA with RCBC in the same condition and state it was
before the issuance of the questioned orders must be upheld as to the plaintiff,
BADOC.However, the questioned Order of April 6, 1970 must be set aside insofar as
it ordered the petitioner RCBC, jointly and severally with BADOC, to reimburse
PVTA.The petitioner merely obeyed a mandatory directive from the respondent Judge
dated January 27, 1970, ordering petitioner 94 "to deliver in check the amount
garnished to Sheriff Faustino Rigor and Sheriff Rigor is in turn ordered to cash
the check and deliver the amount to the plaintiffs representative and/or counsel on
record." [Record on Appeal, p. 20.]PVTA however claims that the manner in which the
bank complied with the Sheriffs Notice of Garnishment indicated breach of trust and
dereliction of duty on the part of the bank as custodian of government funds. It

insistently urges that the premature delivery of the garnished amount by RCBC to
the special sheriff even in the absence of a demand to deliver made by the latter,
before the expiration of the five-day period given to reply to the Notice of
Garnishment, without any reply having been given thereto nor any prior
authorization from its depositor, PVTA and even if the court's order of January 27,
1970 did not require the bank to immediately deliver the garnished amount
constitutes such lack of prudence as to make it answerable jointly and severally
with the plaintiff for the wrongful release of the money from the deposit of the
PVTA. The respondent Judge in his controverted Order sustained such contention and
blamed RCBC for the supposed "hasty release of the amount from the deposit of the
PVTA without giving PVTA a chance to take proper steps by informing it of the
action being taken against its deposit, thereby observing with prudence the fiveday period given to it by the sheriff." [Rollo, p. 81.]Such allegations must be
rejected for lack of merit. In the first place, it should be pointed out that RCBC
did not deliver the amount on the strength solely of a Notice of Garnishment;
rather, the release of the funds was made pursuant to the aforesaid Order of
January 27, 1970. While the Notice of Garnishment dated January 26, 1970 contained
no demand of payment as it was a mere request for petitioner to withold any funds
of the PVTA then in its possession, the Order of January 27, 1970 categorically
required the delivery in check of the amount garnished to the special sheriff,
Faustino Rigor.In the second place, the bank had already filed a reply to the
Notice of Garnishment stating that it had in its custody funds belonging to the
PVTA, which, in fact was the basis of the plaintiff in filing a motion to secure
delivery of the garnished amount to the sheriff. [See Rollo, p. 93.]Lastly, the
bank, upon the receipt of the Notice of Garnishment, duly informed PVTA thereof to
enable the latter to take the necessary steps for the protection of its own
interest [Record on Appeal, p. 36]It is important to stress, at this juncture, that
there was nothing irregular in the delivery of the funds of PVTA by check to the
sheriff, whose custody is equivalent to the custody of the court, he being a court
officer. The order of the court dated January 27, 1970 was composed of two parts,
requiring: 1) RCBC to deliver incheckthe amount garnished to the designated
sheriff and 2) the sheriff in turn to cash the check and deliver the amount to the
plaintiffs representative and/or counsel on record. It must be noted that in
delivering the garnished amount in check to the sheriff, the RCBC did not thereby
make any payment, for the law mandates that delivery of a check does not produce
the effect of payment until it has been cashed. [Article 1249, Civil Code.]
Moreover, by virtue of the order of garnishment, the same was placed incustodia
legisand therefore, from that time on, RCBC was holding the funds subject to the
orders of the courta quo. That the sheriff, upon delivery of the check to him by
RCBC encashed it and turned over the proceeds thereof to the plaintiff was no
longer the concern of RCBC as the responsibility over the garnished funds passed to
the court. Thus, no breach of trust or dereliction of duty can be attributed to
RCBC in delivering its depositor's funds pursuant to a court order which was merely
in the exercise of its power of control over such funds.... The garnishment of
property to satisfy a writ of execution operates as an attachment and fastens upon
the property a lien by which the property is brought under the jurisdiction of the
court issuing the writ. It is brought intocustodia legis, under the sole control
of such court [De Leon v. Salvador, G.R. Nos. L-30871 and L-31603, December
28,1970, 36 SCRA 567, 574.]The respondent judge however, censured the petitioner
for having released the funds "simply on the strength of the Order of the court
which. far from ordering an immediate release of the amount involved, merely serves
as a standing authority to make the release at the proper time as prescribed by the
rules." [Rollo, p. 81.]This argument deserves no serious consideration. As stated
earlier, the order directing the bank to deliver the amount to the sheriff was
distinct and separate from the order directing the sheriff to encash the said
check. The bank had no choice but to comply with the order demanding delivery of
the garnished amount in check. The very tenor of the order called for immediate
compliance therewith. On the other hand, the bank cannot be held liable for the
subsequent encashment of the check as this was upon order of the court in the
exercise of its power of control over the funds placed incustodia legisby virtue
of the garnishment.In a recent decision [Engineering Construction Inc., v. National
Power Corporation, G.R. No. L-34589, June 29, 1988] penned by the now Chief Justice
Marcelo Fernan, this Court absolved a garnishee from any liability for prompt
compliance with its order for the delivery of the garnished funds. The rationale
behind such ruling deserves emphasis in the present case:But while partial
restitution is warranted in favor of NPC, we find that the Appellate Court erred in
not absolving MERALCO, the garnishee, from its obligations to NPC with respect to
the payment of ECI of P 1,114,543.23, thus in effect subjecting MERALCO to double
liability. MERALCO should not have been faulted for its prompt obedience to a writ
of garnishment. Unless there are compelling reasons such as: a defect on the face
of the writ or actual knowledge on the part of the garnishee of lack of entitlement
on the part of the garnisher,it is not incumbent upon the garnishee to inquire or
to judge for itself whether or not the order for the advance execution of a
judgment is valid.Section 8, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court provides:Effect of
attachment of debts and credits.All persons having in their possession or under
their control any credits or other similar personal property belonging to the party
against whom attachment is issued, or owing any debts to the same, all the time of
service upon them of a copy of the order of attachment and notice as provided in
the last preceding section, shall be liable to the applicant for the amount of such
credits, debts or other property, until the attachment be discharged, or any
judgment recovered by him be satisfied, unless such property be delivered or
transferred, or such debts be paid, to the clerk, sheriff or other proper officer
of the court issuing the attachment.Garnishment is considered as a specie of
attachment for reaching credits belonging to the judgment debtor and owing to him
from a stranger to the litigation. Under the above-cited rule, the garnishee [the
third person] is obliged to deliver the credits, etc. to the proper officer issuing
the writ and "the law exempts from liability the person having in his possession or
under his control any credits or other personal property belonging to the
defendant, ..., if such property be delivered or transferred, ..., to the clerk,
sheriff, or other officer of the court in which the action is pending. [3 Moran,
Comments on the Rules of Court 34 (1970 ed.)]Applying the foregoing to the case at
bar, MERALCO, as garnishee, after having been judicially compelled to pay the
amount of the judgment represented by funds in its possession belonging to the
judgment debtor or NPC, should be released from all responsibilities over such
amount after delivery thereof to the sheriff.The reason for the rule is selfevident. To expose garnishees to risks for obeying court orders and processes would
only undermine the administration of justice.
[Emphasis supplied.]The aforequoted ruling thus bolsters RCBC's stand that its
immediate compliance with the lower court's order should not have been met with the
harsh penalty of joint and several liability. Nor can its liability to reimburse
PVTA of the amount delivered in check be premised upon the subsequent declaration
of nullity of the order of delivery. As correctly pointed out by the petitioner:xxx
xxx xxxThat the respondent Judge, after his Order was enforced, saw fit to recall
said Order and decree its nullity, should not prejudice one who dutifully abided by
it, the presumption being that judicial orders are valid and issued in the regular
performance of the duties of the Court" [Section 5(m) Rule 131, Revised Rules of
Court]. This should operate with greater force in relation to the herein petitioner
which, not being a party in the case, was just called upon to perform an act in
accordance with a judicial flat. A contrary view will invite disrespect for the
majesty of the law and induce reluctance in complying with judicial orders out of
fear that said orders might be subsequently invalidated and thereby expose one to
suffer some penalty or prejudice for obeying the same. And this is what will happen
were the controversial orders to be sustained. We need not underscore the danger of
this as a precedent.xxx xxx xxx[ Brief for the Petitioner, Rollo, p. 212; Emphasis
supplied.]From the foregoing, it may be concluded that the charge of breach of
trust and/or dereliction of duty as well as lack of prudence in effecting the
immediate payment of the garnished amount is totally unfounded. Upon receipt of the
Notice of Garnishment, RCBC duly informed PVTA thereof to enable the latter to take
the necessary steps for its protection. However, right on the very next day after
its receipt of such notice, RCBC was already served with the Order requiring
delivery of the garnished amount. Confronted as it was with a mandatory directive,
disobedience to which exposed it to a contempt order, it had no choice but to
comply.The respondent Judge nevertheless held that the liability of RCBC for the
reimbursement of the garnished amount is predicated on the ruling of the Supreme
Court in the case ofCommissioner of Public Highways v. Hon. San Diego[G.R. No. L30098, February 18, 1970, 31 SCRA 616] which he found practically on all fours with
the case at bar.The Court disagrees.The said case which reiterated the rule
inRepublic v. Palacio[G.R. No. L-20322, May 29, 1968, 23 SCRA 899] that
government funds and properties may not be seized under writs of execution or
garnishment to satisfy such judgment is definitely distinguishable from the case at
bar.In theCommissioner of Public Highwayscase [supra], the bank which
precipitately allowed the garnishment and delivery of the funds failed to inform
its depositor thereof, charged as it was with knowledge of the nullity of the writ
of execution and notice of garnishment against government funds. In the
aforementioned case, the funds involved belonged to the Bureau of Public Highways,
which being an arm of the executive branch of the government, has no personality of
its own separate from the National Government. The funds involved weregovernment
fundscovered by the rule on exemption from execution.This brings us to the first
issue raised by the petitioner: Are the PVTA funds public funds exempt from
garnishment? The Court holds that they are not.Republic Act No. 2265 created the
PVTA as an ordinary corporation with all the attributes of a corporate entity
subject to the provisions of the Corporation Law. Hence, it possesses the power "to
sue and be sued" and "to acquire and hold such assets and incur such liabilities
resulting directly from operations authorized by the provisions of this Act or as
essential to the proper conduct of such operations." [Section 3, Republic Act No.
2265.]Among the specific powers vested in the PVTA are: 1) to buy Virginia tobacco
grown in the Philippines for resale to local bona fide tobacco manufacturers and
leaf tobacco dealers [Section 4(b), R.A. No. 2265]; 2) to contracts of any kind as
may be necessary or incidental to the attainment of its purpose with any person,
firm or corporation, with the Government of the Philippines or with any foreign
government, subject to existing laws [Section 4(h), R.A. No. 22651; and 3)
generally, to exercise all the powers of a corporation under the Corporation Law,
insofar as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act [Section 4(k),
R.A. No. 2265.]From the foregoing, it is clear that PVTA has been endowed with a
personality distinct and separate from the government which owns an

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##################>###

whereby the soil is deposited along the banks of rivers.# HYPERLINK

alienable or disposable.There must still be a positive act declaring land of the

including interest and penalties, on the transfer of intangible personal properties

undesirable practice of forum-shopping(Bernardo v. NLRC,.255 SCRA 108 [1996]).

no controversy as to the facts. "1The insured, Florentino Pilapil had a child,

extranjeros, con las limitaciones y requisitos de que trataremos mis adelante."82.

said government as then organized by authority of the sovereign people of the

protection he receives; that duty is reciprocal to the right of protection he

a temporary one from a decent people.One of the implications of petitioner's

and domestic relations, religious convictions, personal service, and connection

especially those "provided with some political purposes."The suspension of the

would be a meaningless and superfluous optical illusion, since it is obvious that

be rightfully enforced there, or be obligatory upon the inhabitants who remained

imperfection in the present state of international law should be corrected by such

established by the British in Castine, Maine, or by the United States in Tanpico,

language; spreading alarmist reports; overcharging for goods; wearing uniforms

beyond the period of occupation. When occupation ceases, no reparation is legally

officer, a sentence of conviction may be immediately rendered against the accused.

the laws of the "Republic" and of generally accepted principles of international

question promulgated by the President of the "Republic" must be deemed as an act

circumstances. He was accused of illegal possession of firearm, an offense

they may be administrated, also, by civil authority, supported more or less

only be justified by a retrogressive and reactionary mentality developed under the

. . . as to facts and circumstances of the case in order to clarify the points in

persons to admit involuntarily real or imaginary offenses. Let us allow changes

petitioner in this proceeding, thus dissipating the unfounded fear entertained by

lethal string of that ideology. It is a virus that must be eliminated before it

factogovernments, or governments of paramount force, with a view to finding the

un gobierno establecido mediantefuerza y coaccion por los mismos invasores para

y poderosa de las razones,la de preservar y salvaguardar a nuestros ciudadanos de

responsibilities impartially on behalf of its member-states. In the case at bar,

Enforcement Administration of the United States Department of Justice. Scalzo

(P250,000.00), as exemplary damages.SO ORDERED.# HYPERLINK

litigation expenses.MAKASIAR,J.,dissenting:I dissent.ITo begin with, the

Administration (ACCFA) vs. Confederation of Unions in Government Corporations and

their well-defined boundaries and to be absorbed within activities that the

reinstatement of the private respondents to permanent full-time status plus

immunity. Pending resolution of this question, we issued a temporary restraining

Tadeo and Minister Alvarez. This notwithstanding, Minister Alvarez suggested a

Law on Human Rights.Respondent Judge Sandoval, in his first questioned Order,

dereliction of duty on the part of the bank as custodian of government funds. It

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