Johnny Rabadilla vs Court of Appeals

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334 SCRA 522 Civil Law Succession Transmissible Obligations

A certain Aleja Belleza died but he instituted in his will Dr. Jorge Rabadilla as a
devisee to a 511, 855 hectare land. A condition was however imposed to the effect
that:

1. the naked ownership shall transfer to Dr. Rabadilla;

2. he shall deliver the fruits of said land to Maria Belleza, sister of Aleja, during the
lifetime of said Maria Belleza;

3. that in case Dr. Rabadilla shall die before Maria Belleza, the near descendants,
shall continue delivering the fruits to Maria Belleza;

4. that the said land may only be encumbered, mortgaged, or sold only to a relative
of Belleza.

In 1983, Dr. Rabadilla died. He was survived by Johnny Rabadilla.

In 1989, Maria Belleza sued Johnny Rabadilla in order to compel Johnny to reconvey
the said land to the estate of Aleja Belleza because it is alleged that Johnny failed to
comply with the terms of the will; that since 1985, Johnny failed to deliver the fruits;

and that the the land was mortgaged to the Philippine National Bank, which is a
violation of the will.

In his defense, Johnny avers that the term near descendants in the will of Aleja
pertains to the near descendants of Aleja and not to the near descendants of Dr.
Rabadilla, hence, since Aleja had no near descendants at the time of his death, no
can substitute Dr. Rabadilla on the obligation to deliver the fruits of the devised
land.

ISSUE: Whether or not Johnny Rabadilla is not obliged to comply with the terms of
the Will left by Aleja Belleza.

HELD: No. The contention of Johnny Rabadilla is bereft of merit. The near
descendants being referred to in the will are the heirs of Dr. Rabadilla. Ownership
over the devised property was already transferred to Dr. Rabadilla when Aleja died.
Hence, when Dr. Rabadilla himself died, ownership over the same property was
transmitted to Johnny Rabadilla by virtue of succession.

Under Article 776 of the Civil Code, inheritance includes all the property, rights and
obligations of a person, not extinguished by his death. Conformably, whatever rights
Dr. Rabadilla had by virtue of the Will were transmitted to his forced heirs, at the
time of his death. And since obligations not extinguished by death also form part of
the estate of the decedent; corollarily, the obligations imposed by the Will on the
deceased Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, were likewise transmitted to his compulsory heirs
upon his death. It is clear therefore, that Johnny should have continued complying
with the terms of the Will. His failure to do so shall give rise to an obligation for him
to reconvey the property to the estate of Aleja.

CASE NO. 77
Rosales v. Rosales
148 SCRA 69; Feb. 27, 1987

J. Gancayco:
++
Petra Rosales Fortunado

Magna Rosales Acebes

+Antonio

+Carterio Irenea

Macikequerox

FACTS: During the proceedings for the intestate estate of Petra, the CFI declared
the following as legal heirs: Fortunato- ; Magna- ; Antonio: and Macikequerox. Irenea insisted in getting a share in her capacity as surviving spouse of the
deceased son of Petra, claiming that she is a compulsory heir under Art. 887.

HELD: NO. Intestate or legal heirs are classified into two:

1)

those who inherit by their own right;

2)

those who inherit by the right of representation.

The provisions Art. 980-982, 999 which relate to the ader of intestate succession
does not include a surviving spouse of a child as an intestate heir of the mother-inlaw.

Art. 887 [3] refers to the estate of the deceased spouse in which case the surviving
spouse is a compulsory heir but does not apply to the estate of a parent-in-law.
Indeed, the surviving spouse is considered a 3rd person as regards the estate of the
parent-in-law.

8. Lapuz-Sy vs Eufemio

43 SCRA 177

FACTS:
Carmen Lapuz-Sy filed a petition for legal separation against Eufemio Eufemio on
August 1953. They were married civilly on September 21, 1934 and canonically
after nine days. They had lived together as husband and wife continuously without
any children until 1943 when her husband abandoned her. They acquired properties
during their marriage. Petitioner then discovered that her husband cohabited with a
Chinese woman named Go Hiok on or about 1949. She prayed for the issuance of a
decree of legal separation, which among others, would order that the defendant
Eufemio should be deprived of his share of the conjugal partnership profits.
Eufemio counterclaimed for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Lapuz-Sy
on the ground of his prior and subsisting marriage with Go Hiok. Trial proceeded

and the parties adduced their respective evidence. However, before the trial could
be completed, respondent already scheduled to present surrebuttal evidence,
petitioner died in a vehicular accident on May 1969. Her counsel duly notified the
court of her death. Eufemio moved to dismiss the petition for legal separation on
June 1969 on the grounds that the said petition was filed beyond the one-year
period provided in Article 102 of the Civil Code and that the death of Carmen abated
the action for legal separation. Petitioners counsel moved to substitute the
deceased Carmen by her father, Macario Lapuz.
ISSUE: Whether the death of the plaintiff, before final decree in an action for legal
separation, abate the action and will it also apply if the action involved property
rights.
HELD:
An action for legal separation is abated by the death of the plaintiff, even if property
rights are involved. These rights are mere effects of decree of separation, their
source being the decree itself; without the decree such rights do not come into
existence, so that before the finality of a decree, these claims are merely rights in
expectation. If death supervenes during the pendency of the action, no decree can
be forthcoming, death producing a more radical and definitive separation; and the
expected consequential rights and claims would necessarily remain unborn.
The petition of Eufemio for declaration of nullity is moot and academic and there
could be no further interest in continuing the same after her demise, that
automatically dissolved the questioned union. Any property rights acquired by
either party as a result of Article 144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines 6 could be
resolved and determined in a proper action for partition by either the appellee or by
the heirs of the appellant.
BARITUA v COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 82233, 22 March 1990
183 SCRA 565

While legitimate parents are considered as compulsory heirs of their

legitimate child, the parents are secondary compulsory heirs and inherit only in
default of legitimate children and decendants of the deceased. Thus, the legitimate
parents have no right to demand indemnification for the death of their deceased
child, and such right to indemnification properly belongs to the latter's descendants
and/or spouse.

Sarmiento, J.:

In the evening of November 7, 1979, the tricycle then being driven by

Bienvenido Nacario along the national highway at Barangay San Cayetano, in Baao,
Camarines Sur, figured in an accident with JB Bus No. 80 x x x. As a result of that
accident Bienvenido and his passenger died, and the tricycle was damaged. No
criminal case arising from the accident was ever instituted.

Subsequently, on March 27, 1980, as a consequence of the extra-judicial

settlement of the matter negotiated by the petitioner and the bus' insurer Philippine First Insurance Company, Inc. (PFICI for brevity) - Bienvenido Nacario's
widow, Alicia Baracena vda. de Nacario, received P18,500. In consideration of the
amount she received, Alicia executed on March 27, 1980 a "Release of Claim" in
favor of the petitioners and PFICI, releasing and forever discharging them from all
actions, claims and demands arising from the accident which resulted in her
husband's death and the damage to the tricycle which the deceased was then
driving. Alicia likewise executed an affidavit of desistance in which she formally
manifested her lack of interest in instituting any case, either civil or criminal,
against the petitioners.

On September 2, 1981, or about one year and ten months from the date of
the accident on November 7, 1979, the private respondents, who are the parents of
Bienvenido Nacario, filed a complaint for damages against the petitioners with then
Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur. In their complaint, the private respondents
alleged that during the vigil for their deceased son, the petitioners through their
representatives promised them (the private respondents) that as extra-judicial
settlement, they shall be indemnified for the death of their son, for the funeral
expenses incurred by reason thereof, and for the damage to the tricycle the
purchase price of which they (the private respondents) only loaned to the victim.
The petitioners, however, reneged on their promise and instead negotiated and
settled their obligations with the long-estranged wife of their late son. The Nacario
spouses prayed that the defendants, petitioners herein, be ordered to indemnify
them in the amount of P25,000.00 for the death of their son Bienvenido, P10,000.00
for the damaged tricycle, P25,000.00 for compensatory and exemplary damages,
P5,000.00 for attorney's fees, and for moral damages.

After trial, the court a quo dismissed the complaint, holding that the payment
by the defendants (herein petitioners) to the widow and her child, who are the
preferred heirs and successors-in-interest of the deceased Bienvenido to the
exclusion of his parents, the plaintiffs (herein private respondents), extinguished
any claim against the defendants (petitioners).

The parents appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed the judgment of
the trial court. The appellate court ruled that the release executed by Alicia

Baracena vda. de Nacario did not discharge the liability of petitioners because the
case was instituted by the private respondents in their own capacity and not as
"heirs, representatives, successors and assigns" of Alicia; and Alicia could not have
validly waived the damages being prayed for (by the private respondents) since she
was not the one who suffered these damages arising from the death of their son.
Furthermore, the appellate court said that the petitioners "failed to rebut the
testimony of the appellants (private respondents) that they were the ones who
bought the tricycle that was damaged in the incident. Appellants had the burden of
proof of such fact, and they did establish such fact in their testimony x x x."
Anent the funeral expenses, "the expenses for the funeral were likewise shouldered
by the appellants (the private respondents). This was never contradicted by the
appellees (petitioners). x x x Payment (for these) were made by the appellants,
therefore, the reimbursement must accrue in their favor."

Consequently, the respondent appellate court ordered the petitioners to pay

the private respondents P10,000.00 for the damage to the tricycle, P5,000.00 for
"complete" funeral services, P450.00 for cemetery lot, P55.00 for oracion adulto,
and P5,000.00 for attorney's fees. The petitioners moved for a reconsideration of
the appellate court's decision but their motion was denied. Hence this petition.

The petition is meritorious.

Obligations are extinguished by various modes among them being payment.

Article 1231 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides:

There is no denying that the petitioner had paid their obligations arising from
the incident that occurred on November 7, 1979. The only question is whether or
not Alicia, the surviving spouse and the one who received the petitioner's payment,
is entitled to it.

Article 1240 of the Civil Code of the Philippines enumerates the persons to
whom payment to extinguish an obligation should be made.

Art. 1240. Payment shall be made to the person in whose favor the
obligation has been constituted, or his successor in interest, or any person
authorized to receive it.

Certainly there can be no question that Alicia and her son with the deceased
are the successors in interest referred to in the law as the persons authorized to
receive payment. The Civil Code states:

Article 887. The following are compulsory heirs:

1.
Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate
parents and ascendants;
2.
In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants, with
respect to their legitimate children and descendants;
3.

The widow or widower;

4.

Acknowledged natural children and natural children by legal fiction;

5.

Other illegitimate children referred to in Article 287.

Compulsory heirs named in nos. 3, 4 and 5 are not excluded by those in nos.
1 and 2. Neither do they exclude one another.

Article 985. In default of legitimate children and descendants of the

deceased, his parents and ascendants shall inherit from him, to the exclusion of
collateral relatives.

It is patently clear that the parents of the deceased succeed only when the
latter dies without a legitimate descendant. On the other hand, the surviving spouse
concurs will all classes of heirs. As it has been established that Bienvenido was
married to Alicia and that they begot a child, the private respondents are not
successors-in-interest of Bienvenido; they are not compulsory heirs. The petitioners
therefore acted correctly in settling their obligation with Alicia as the widow of
Bienvenido and as the natural guardian of their lone child. This is so even if Alicia
has been estranged from Bienvenido. Mere estrangement is not a legal ground for
the disqualification of a surviving spouse as an heir of the deceased spouse.

Neither could the private respondents, as alleged creditors of Bienvenido,

seek relief and compensation from the petitioners. While it may be true that the
private respondents loaned to Bienvenido the purchase price of the damaged
tricycle and shouldered the expenses for his funeral, the said purchase price and
expenses are but money claims against the estate of their deceased son. Those

money claims are not the liabilities of the petitioners, who, as we have said, had
been released by the agreement of extra-judicial settlement they concluded with
Alicia Baracena vda. de Nacario, the victim's widow and heir, as well as the natural
guardian of their child, her co-heir. As a matter of fact, she executed a "Release of
Claim" in favor of petitioners.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED; the decision of the Court of Appeals is

REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the decision of the Regional Trial Court is hereby
REINSTATED. Costs against the private respondents.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera (Chairman), Paras, Padilla and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 118449

February 11, 1998

LAURO G. VIZCONDE, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, Branch 120, Caloocan City, and
RAMON G. NICOLAS, respondents.

FRANCISCO, J.:

Petitioner Lauro G. Vizconde and his wife Estrellita Nicolas-Vizconde had two
children, viz., Carmela and Jennifer. Petitioner's wife, Estrellita, is one of the five
siblings of spouses Rafael Nicolas and Salud Gonzales-Nicolas. The other children of
Rafael and Salud are Antonio Nicolas; Ramon Nicolas; Teresita Nicolas de Leon, and
Ricardo Nicolas, an incompetent. Antonio predeceased his parents and is now
survived by his widow, Zenaida, and their four children.

On May 22, 1979, Estrellita purchased from Rafael a parcel of land with an area of
10,110 sq. m. located at Valenzuela, Bulacan (hereafter Valenzuela property)
covered by TCT No. (T-36734) 13206 for One Hundred Thirty Five Thousand Pesos
(P135,000.00), evidenced by a "Lubusang Bilihan ng Bahagi ng Lupa na
Nasasakupan ng Titulo TCT No. T-36734". 1 In view thereof, TCT No. V-554 covering
the Valenzuela property was issued to Estrellita. 2 On March 30, 1990, Estrellita sold
the Valenzuela property to Amelia Lim and Maria Natividad Balictar Chiu for Three
Million, Four Hundred Five Thousand, Six Hundred Twelve Pesos (P3,405,612.00). 3
In June of the same year, Estrellita bought from Premier Homes, Inc., a parcel of
land with improvements situated at Vinzon St., BF Homes, Paraaque (hereafter
Paraaque property) using a portion of the proceeds of sale of the Valenzuela
property. The remaining amount of the proceeds was used in buying a car while the
balance was deposited in a bank.

The following year an unfortunate event in petitioner's life occurred. Estrellita and
her two daughters, Carmela and Jennifer, were killed on June 30, 1991, an incident
popularly known as the "Vizconde Massacre". The findings of the investigation
conducted by the NBI reveal that Estrellita died ahead of her daughters. 4
Accordingly, Carmela, Jennifer and herein petitioner succeeded Estrellita and, with
the subsequent death of Carmela and Jennifer, petitioner was left as the sole heir of
his daughters. Nevertheless, petitioner entered into an "Extra-Judicial Settlement of
the Estate of Deceased Estrellita Nicolas-Vizconde With Waiver of Shares", 5 with
Rafael and Salud, Estrellita's parents. The extra-judicial settlement provided for the
division of the properties of Estrellita and her two daughters between petitioner and
spouses Rafael and Salud. The properties include bank deposits, a car and the
Paraaque property. The total value of the deposits deducting the funeral and other
related expenses in the burial of Estrellita, Carmela and Jennifer, amounts to Three
Million Pesos (P3,000,000.00). 6 The settlement gave fifty percent (50%) of the total
amount of the bank deposits of Estrellita and her daughters to Rafael, except
Savings Account No. 104-111211-0 under the name of Jennifer which involves a
token amount. The other fifty percent (50%) was allotted to petitioner. The
Paraaque property and the car and were also given to petitioner with Rafael and
Salud waiving all their "claims, rights, ownership and participation as heirs" 7 in the
said properties.

On November 18, 1992, Rafael died. To settle Rafael's estate, Teresita instituted an
intestate estate proceeding 8 docketed as Sp. Proc. No. C-1679, with Branch 120 of

the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City listing as heirs Salud, Ramon,
Ricardo, and the wife (Zenaida) and children of Antonio. Teresita prayed to be
appointed Special Administratrix of Rafael's estate. Additionally, she sought to be
appointed as guardian ad litem of Salud, now senile, and Ricardo, her incompetent
brother Herein private respondent Ramon filed an opposition 9 dated March 24,
1993, praying to be appointed instead as Salud and Ricardo's guardian. Barely three
weeks passed, Ramon filed another opposition 10 alleging, among others, that
Estrellita was given the Valenzuela property by Rafael which she sold for not less
than Six Million Pesos (P6,000,000.00) before her gruesome murder. Ramon pleaded
for the court's intervention "to determine the legality and validity of the intervivos
distribution made by deceased Rafael to his children," 11 Estrellita included. On May
12, 1993, Ramon filed his own petition, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. C-1699, entitled
"In The Matter Of The Guardianship Of Salud G. Nicolas and Ricardo G. Nicolas" and
averred that their legitime should come from the collation of all the properties
distributed to his children by Rafael during his lifetime. 12 Ramon stated that herein
petitioner is one of Rafael's children "by right of representation as the widower of
deceased legitimate daughter of Estrellita." 13

In a consolidated Order, dated November 9, 1993, the RTC appointed Ramon as the
guardian of Salud and Ricardo while Teresita, in turn, was appointed as the Special
Administratrix of Rafael's estate. The court's Order did not include petitioner in the
slate of Rafael's heirs. 14 Neither was the Paraaque property listed in its list of
properties to be included in the estate. 15 Subsequently, the RTC in an Order dated
January 5, 1994, removed Ramon as Salud and Ricardo's guardian for Selling his
ward's property without the court's knowledge and permission. 16

Sometime on January 13, 1994, the RTC released an Order giving petitioner "ten
(10) days . . . within which to file any appropriate petition or motion related to the
pending petition insofar as the case is concerned and to file any opposition to any
pending motion that has been filed by both the counsels for Ramon Nicolas and
Teresita de Leon." In response, petitioner filed a Manifestation, dated January 19,
1994, stressing that he was neither a compulsory heir nor an intestate heir of Rafael
and he has no interest to participate in the proceedings. The RTC noted said
Manifestation in its Order dated February 2, 1994. 17 Despite the Manifestation,
Ramon, through a motion dated February 14, 1994, moved to include petitioner in
the intestate estate proceeding and asked that the Paraaque property, as well as
the car and the balance of the proceeds of the sale of the Valenzuela property, be
collated. 18 Acting on Ramon's motion, the trial court on March 10, 1994 granted
the same in an Order which pertinently reads as follows:

xxx

xxx

xxx

On the Motion To Include Lauro G. Vizconde In Intestate proceedings in instant case

and considering the comment on his Manifestation, the same is hereby granted. 19

xxx

xxx

xxx

Petitioner filed its motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid Order which Ramon
opposed. 20 On August 12, 1994, the RTC rendered an Order denying petitioner's
motion for reconsideration. It provides:

xxx

xxx

xxx

The centerpoint of oppositor-applicant's argument is that spouses Vizconde were

then financially incapable of having purchased or acquired for a valuable
consideration the property at Valenzuela from the deceased Rafael Nicolas.
Admittedly, the spouses Vizconde were then living with the deceased Rafael Nicolas
in the latter's ancestral home. In fact, as the argument further goes, said spouses
were dependent for support on the deceased Rafael Nicolas. And, Lauro Vizconde
left for the United States in, de-facto separation, from the family for sometime and
returned to the Philippines only after the occurrence of violent deaths of Estrellita
and her two daughters.

To dispute the contention that the spouses Vizconde were financially incapable to
buy the property from the late Rafael Nicolas, Lauro Vizconde claims that they have
been engaged in business venture such as taxi business, canteen concessions and
garment manufacturing. However, no competent evidence has been submitted to
indubitably support the business undertakings adverted to.

In fine, there is no sufficient evidence to show that the acquisition of the property
from Rafael Nicolas was for a valuable consideration.

Accordingly, the transfer of the property at Valenzuela in favor of Estrellita by her

father was gratuitous and the subject property in Paraaque which was purchased
out of the proceeds of the said transfer of the property by the deceased Rafael
Nicolas in favor of Estrellita, is subject to collation.

WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED. 21 (Emphasis

added)

Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with respondent Court of
Appeals. In its decision of December 14, 1994, respondent Court of Appeals 22
denied the petition stressing that the RTC correctly adjudicated the question on the
title of the Valenzuela property as "the jurisdiction of the probate court extends to
matters incidental and collateral to the exercise of its recognized powers in handling
the settlement of the estate of the deceased (Cf.: Sec. 1, Rule 90, Revised Rules of
Court)." 23 Dissatisfied, petitioner filed the instant petition for review on certiorari.
Finding prima facie merit, the Court on December 4, 1995, gave due course to the
petition and required the parties to submit their respective memoranda.

The core issue hinges on the validity of the probate court's Order, which respondent
Court of Appeals sustained, nullifying the transfer of the Valenzuela property from
Rafael to Estrellita and declaring the Paraaque property as subject to collation.

The appeal is well taken.

Basic principles of collation need to be emphasized at the outset. Article 1061 of the
Civil Code speaks of collation. It states:

Art. 1061.
Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs,
must bring into the mass of the estate any property or right which he may have
received from the decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or
any other gratuitous title, in order that it may be computed in the determination of
the legitime of each heir, and in the account of the partition.

Collation is the act by virtue of which descendants or other forced heirs who
intervene in the division of the inheritance of an ascendant bring into the common
mass, the property which they received from him, so that the division may be made
according to law and the will of the testator. 24 Collation is only required of
compulsory heirs succeeding with other compulsory heirs and involves property or
rights received by donation or gratuitous title during the lifetime of the decedent.
25 The purpose is to attain equality among the compulsory heirs in so far as
possible for it is presumed that the intention of the testator or predecessor in
interest making a donation or gratuitous transfer to a forced heir is to give him
something in advance on account of his share in the estate, and that the
predecessor's will is to treat all his heirs equally, in the absence of any expression to
the contrary. 26 Collation does not impose any lien on the property or the subject
matter of collationable donation. What is brought to collation is not the property
donated itself, but rather the value of such property at the time it was donated, 27
the rationale being that the donation is a real alienation which conveys ownership

upon its acceptance, hence any increase in value or any deterioration or loss
thereof is for the account of the heir or donee. 28

The attendant facts herein do not make a case of collation. We find that the probate
court, as well as respondent Court of Appeals, committed reversible errors.

First: The probate court erred in ordering the inclusion of petitioner in the intestate
estate proceeding. Petitioner, a son-in-law of Rafael, is not one of Rafael's
compulsory heirs. Article 887 of the Civil Code is clear on this point:

Art. 887.

The following are compulsory heirs:

(1)
Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate parents
and ascendants;

(2)
In default of the following, legitimate parents and ascendants, with respect to
their legitimate children and ascendants;

(3)

The widow or widower;

(4)

Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal fiction;

(5)

Other illegitimate children referred to in article 287.

Compulsory heirs mentioned in Nos. 3, 4 and 5 are not excluded by those in Nos. 1
and 2; neither do they exclude one another.

In all cases of illegitimate children, their filiation must be duly proved.

The father or mother of illegitimate children of the three classes mentioned, shall
inherit from them in the manner and to the extent established by this Code.

With respect to Rafael's estate, therefore, petitioner who was not even shown to be
a creditor of Rafael is considered a third person or a stranger. 29 As such, petitioner
may not be dragged into the intestate estate proceeding. Neither may he be
permitted or allowed to intervene as he has no personality or interest in the said
proceeding, 30 which petitioner correctly argued in his manifestation. 31

Second:
As a rule, the probate court may pass upon and determine the title or
ownership of a property which may or may not be included in the estate
proceedings. 32 Such determination is provisional in character and is subject to final
decision in a separate action to resolve title. 33 In the case at bench, however, we
note that the probate court went beyond the scope of its jurisdiction when it
proceeded to determine the validity of the sale of the Valenzuela property between
Rafael and Estrellita and ruled that the transfer of the subject property between the
concerned parties was gratuitous. The interpretation of the deed and the true intent
of the contracting parties, as well as the presence or absence of consideration, are
matters outside the probate court's jurisdiction. These issues should be ventilated in
an appropriate action. We reiterate:

. . . we are of the opinion and so hold, that a court which takes cognizance of testate
or intestate proceedings has power and jurisdiction to determine whether or not the
properties included therein or excluded therefrom belong prima facie to the
deceased, although such a determination is not final or ultimate in nature, and
without prejudice to the right of the interested parties, in a proper action, to raise
the question bearing on the ownership or existence of the right or credit. 34

Third: The order of the probate court subjecting the Paraaque property to collation
is premature. Records indicate that the intestate estate proceedings is still in its
initiatory stage. We find nothing herein to indicate that the legitime of any of
Rafael's heirs has been impaired to warrant collation. We thus advert to our ruling in
Udarbe v. Jurado, 59 Phil. 11, 13-14, to wit:

We are of the opinion that this contention is untenable. In accordance with the
provisions of article 1035 35 of the Civil Code, it was the duty of the plaintiffs to
allege and prove that the donations received by the defendants were inofficious in
whole or in part and prejudiced the legitime or hereditary portion to which they are
entitled. In the absence of evidence to that effect, the collation sought is untenable
for lack of ground or basis therefor.

Fourth:
Even on the assumption that collation is appropriate in this case the
probate court, nonetheless, made a reversible error in ordering collation of the
Paraaque property. We note that what was transferred to Estrellita, by way of deed

of sale, is the Valenzuela property. The Paraaque property which Estrellita acquired
by using the proceeds of the sale of the Valenzuela property does not become
collationable simply by reason thereof. Indeed, collation of the Paraaque property
has no statutory basis. 36 The order of the probate court presupposes that the
Paraaque property was gratuitously conveyed by Rafael to Estrellita. Records
indicate, however, that the Paraaque property was conveyed for and in
consideration of P900,000.00, 37 by Premier Homes, Inc., to Estrellita. Rafael, the
decedent, has no participation therein, and petitioner who inherited and is now the
present owner of the Paraaque property is not one of Rafael's heirs. Thus, the
probate court's order of collation against petitioner is unwarranted for the obligation
to collate is lodged with Estrellita, the heir, and not to herein petitioner who does
not have any interest in Rafael's estate. As it stands, collation of the Paraaque
property is improper for, to repeat, collation covers only properties gratuitously
given by the decedent during his lifetime to his compulsory heirs which fact does
not obtain anent the transfer of the Paraaque property. Moreover, Rafael, in a
public instrument, voluntarily and willfully waived any "claims, rights, ownership
and participation as heir" 38 in the Paraaque property.

Fifth: Finally, it is futile for the probate court to ascertain whether or not the
Valenzuela property may be brought to collation. Estrellita, it should be stressed,
died ahead of Rafael. In fact, it was Rafael who inherited from Estrellita an amount
more than the value of the Valenzuela property. 39 Hence, even assuming that the
Valenzuela property may be collated collation may not be allowed as the value of
the Valenzuela property has long been returned to the estate of Rafael. Therefore,
any determination by the probate court on the matter serves no valid and binding
purpose.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals appealed from is hereby

REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Romero, Kapunan and Purisima, JJ., concur.