Almirol v.

Register of Deeds of Agusan

G.R. No. L-22486 March 20, 1968

FACTS: On June 28, 1961 Teodoro Almirol

purchased from Arcenio Abalo a parcel
of land situated in the municipality of
Esperanza, province of Agusan, and covered
by original certificate of title P-1237 in the
name of "Arcenio Abalo, married to Nicolasa
M. Abalo." Sometime in May, 1962 Almirol
went to the office of the Register of Deeds of
Agusan in Butuan City to register the deed of
sale and to secure in his name a transfer
certificate of title. Registration was refused
by the Register of Deeds upon the following
grounds:

1.
That Original Certificate
of Title No. P-1237 is registered in the
name of Arcenio Abalo, married to
Nicolasa M. Abalo, and by legal
presumption, is considered conjugal
property;
2.
That in the sale of a
conjugal property acquired after the
effectivity of the New Civil Code it is
necessary that both spouses sign the
document; but
3.
Since, as in this case, the
wife has already died when the sale
was made, the surviving husband
cannot dispose of the whole property
without violating the existing law.

In view of such refusal, Almirol went to the

Court of First Instance of Agusan on a
petition for mandamus to compel the
Register of Deeds to register the deed of sale
and to issue to him the corresponding
transfer certificate of title. In its resolution of
October 16, 1963 the lower court, declaring
that the Mandamus does not lie because

the adequate remedy is that provided by

Section 4 of Rep. Act 1151 dismissed the
petition, with costs against the petitioner.
Hence, this present appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Register of Deeds

was justified in refusing to register the
transaction appealed to by the petitioner.

HELD: No. Although the reasons relied upon

by the respondent show a sincere desire on
his part to maintain inviolate the law on
succession and transmission of rights over
real properties, these do not constitute legal
grounds for his refusal to register the deed.
Whether a document is valid or not, is not for
the register of deeds to determine; this
function belongs properly to a court of
competent jurisdiction.
A
register of deeds is entirely precluded by sec
tion 4 of Republic Act 1151 from exercising
his personal judgment and discretion when
confronted with the problem of whether to
register a deed or instrument on the ground
that it is invalid. For under the said section,
when he is in doubt as to the proper step to
be
taken
with
respect
to
any deed or other instrument presented to hi
m for registration all that he is supposed to
do is to submit and certify the question to
the Commissioner of Land Registration who
shall, after notice and hearing, enter an
order prescribing the step to be taken on the
doubtful question.

Baranda vs. Gustillo

title to each of Eduardo S. Baranda

and Alfonso Hitalia.

Facts:

In compliance with the

order or the RTC, the Acting Register of
Deeds Avito Saclauso annotated the
order declaring TCT T-25772 null and
void, cancelled the same and issued
new certificate of titles in the name of
petitioners.

A
petition
for
reconstitution of title was filed with
the CFI (now RTC) of Iloilo involving a
parcel of land known as Lot No. 4517
of the Sta. Barbara Cadastre covered
by OCT No. 6406 in the name of
Romana Hitalia.

However, by reason of a
separate case pending in the Court of
Appeals, a notice of lis pendens was
annotated in the new certificate of
title.

The OCT was cancelled

and TCT No. 106098 was issued in the
names of petitioners Baranda and
Hitalia.

This
prompted
the
petitioners
to
move
for
the
cancellation of the notice of lis
pendens in the new certificates.

The Court issued a writ of

possession which Gregorio Perez,
Maria P. Gotera and Susana Silao
refused to honor on the ground that
they also have TCT No. 25772 over the
same Lot No. 4517.

Judge Tito Gustilo then

ordered the Acting Register of Deeds
for the cancellation of the notice of lis
pendens but the Acting Register of
Deeds
filed
a
motion
for
reconsideration invoking Sec 77 of PD
1529.

The Court found out that

TCT No. 257772 was fraudulently
acquired by Perez, Gotera and Susana.

Thereafter,
the
court
issued a writ of demolition which was
questioned by Perez and others so a
motion for reconsideration was filed.

Another case was filed by

Baranda and Hitalia (GR. NO. 62042)
for the execution of judgement in the
resolutions issued by the courts.

In the meantime,
dismissed a civil case (GR. NO.
involving the same properties.
This time three cases na ang
excluding the case at bar.)

the CA
00827)
(NOTE:
involve

The petitioners prayed

that an order be released to cancel
No.T-25772. Likewise to cancel No.T106098 and once cancelled to issue
new certificates of title to each of
Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso
Hitalia To cancel No.T-25772. Likewise
to cancel No.T-106098 and once
cancelled to issue new certificates of

Issue: What is the nature of the duty of a

Register of Deeds to annotate or annul a
notice of lis pendens in a torrens certificate
of title.

Held:

Section 10, Presidential Decree No. 1529

states that "It shall be the duty of the
Register of Deeds to immediately register an
instrument presented for registration dealing
with real or personal property which
complies with all the requisites for
registration. ... If the instrument is not
registrable,
he
shall
forthwith
deny
registration thereof and inform the presentor
of such denial in writing, stating the ground

or reasons therefore, and advising him of his

right to appeal by consulta in accordance
with Section 117 of this Decree."

Section 117 provides that "When the

Register of Deeds is in doubt with regard to
the proper step to be taken or memoranda to
be made in pursuance of any deed,
mortgage or other instrument presented to
him for registration or where any party in
interest does not agree with the action taken
by the Register of Deeds with reference to
any such instrument, the question shall be
submitted to the Commission of Land
Registration by the Register of Deeds, or by
the party in interest thru the Register of
Deeds. ... ."

No room for construction for the laws

on functions of ROD
The elementary rule in statutory construction
is that when the words and phrases of the
statute are clear and unequivocal, their
meaning must be determined from the
language employed and the statute must be
taken to mean exactly what it says. The
statute concerning the function of the
Register of Deeds to register instruments in a
torrens certificate of title is clear and leaves
no room for construction.

CHENG V. GENATO (December 29, 1998)

The function of ROD is ministerial in
nature
The function of a Register of Deeds with
reference to the registration of deeds
encumbrances, instruments and the like is
ministerial in nature. The respondent Acting
Register of Deeds did not have any legal
standing to file a motion for reconsideration
of the respondent Judge's Order directing
him to cancel the notice of lis pendens
annotated in the certificates of titles of the
petitioners over the subject parcel of land.

In case of doubt as to the proper step to be

taken in pursuance of any deed ... or other
instrument presented to him, he should have
asked the opinion of the Commissioner of
Land Registration now, the Administrator of
the National Land Title and
Deeds
Registration Administration in accordance
with Section 117 of Presidential Decree No.
1529.

FACTS:
Respondent Genato entered a contract to sell
to spouses Da Jose pertaining to his property
in Bulacan. The contract made in public
document states that the spouses shall pay
the down payment and 30 days after
verifying the authenticity of the documents,
they shall pay the remaining purchase price.

Da Jose spouses was not able to finish

verifying the documents and as such asked
for a 30 day extension. Pending the
extension and without notice to the spouses,
Genato made a document for the annulment
of the contract.

Petitioner Cheng expressed interest over the

property and paid 50K check with the
assurance that the contract between Genato
and the spouses Da Jose will be annulled. Da
Jose spouses protested with the annulment
and persuaded Genato to continue the
contract. Genato returned the check to
Cheng and hence, this petition.

HELD:
The contract between Genato and spouses
Da Jose was a contract to sell which is
subject to a suspensive condition. Thus,
there will be no contract to speak of, if the
obligor failed to perform the suspensive
condition which enforces a juridical relation.
Obviously, the foregoing jurisprudence
cannot be made to apply to the situation in
the instant case because no default can be
ascribed to the Da Jose spouses since the 30day extension period has not yet expired.

Art.1544 should apply because for not only

was the contract between herein
respondents first in time; it was also
registered long before petitioner's intrusion
as a second buyer (PRIMUS TEMPORE,
PORTIOR JURE). (Spouses made annotation
on the title of Genato). Since Cheng was fully
aware, or could have been if he had chosen
to inquire, of the rights of the Da Jose
spouses under the Contract to Sell duly
annotated on the transfer certificates of titles
of Genato, it now becomes unnecessary to
further elaborate in detail the fact that he is
indeed in bad faith in entering into such
agreement.

Capitol Subdivisions vs. Province of

Negros Oriental
7 SCRA 60 (1963)

Even assuming that the spouses defaulted,

the contract also cannot be validly rescinded
because no notice was given to them. Thus,
Cheng's contention that the Contract to Sell
between Genato and the Da Jose spouses
was rescinded or resolved due to Genato's
unilateral rescission finds no support in this
case.

The contract between Genato and Cheng is a

contract to sell not a contract of sale. But But
even assuming that it should be treated as a
conditional contract of sale, it did not acquire
any obligatory force since it was subject to a
suspensive condition that the earlier contract
to sell between Genato and the Da Jose
spouses should first be cancelled or
rescinded.

FACTS: Lot 378, which is the subject matter

of this case, is part of Hacienda Madalagan,
registered under the name of Agustin
Amenabar and Pilar Amenabar, covered by
Original Certificate of Title No. 1776 issued in
the name of the aforementioned in 1916.

Sometime in 1920, the Amenabars sold the

aforementioned Hacienda to Jose Benares for
the purchase price of P300,000, payable in
instalments. In 1924, the Original Certificate
of Title issued in the name of the Amenabars
was cancelled, and in lieu thereof, Benares
obtained a Transfer Certificate of Title under
his name.

Meanwhile, in 1921, Benares mortgaged the

Hacienda including Lot 378 to BacolodMurcia Milling Co. And then later in 1926, he
again mortgaged the Hacienda, including
said Lot 378, on the Philippine National Bank,
subject to the first mortgage held by the
Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co.

These transactions were duly recorded in the

office of the Register of Deeds of Negros
Occidental.

The mortgage in favor of the Bank was

subsequently foreclosed and the Bank
acquired the Hacienda, including Lot 378, as
purchaser at the foreclosure sale.

Accordingly, the TCT in the name of Benares

was cancelled and another TCT was issued in
the name of the Bank.

In 1935, the Bank agreed to sell the

Hacienda to the son of Jose Benares, Carlos
Benares, for the sum of P400,000, payable in
annual installments, subject to the condition
that the title will remain with the Bank until
full payment.

Thereafter, Carlos Benares transferred his

rights, under his contract with the Bank, to
plaintiff herein, which completed the
payment of the installments due to the Bank
in 1949.

Hence, the Bank executed the corresponding

deed of absolute sale to the plaintiff and a
transfer certificate of title covering Lot 378
was issued.

It should be noted that, despite the

acquisition of the Hacienda in 1934 by the
Bank, the latter did not take possession of
the property for Jose Benares claimed to be
entitled to retain it under an alleged right of
lease.

For this reason, the deed of promise to sell,

executed by the Bank in favour of Carlos P.
Benares, contained a caveat emptor
stipulation.

When, upon the execution of the deed of

absolute sale 1949, plaintiff took steps to
take possession the Hacienda and it was
discovered that Lot 378 was the land
occupied by the Provincial Hospital of Negros
Occidental. Immediately thereafter, plaintiff
made representations with or on October 4,
1949, plaintiff made representations with the
proper officials to clarify the status of said
occupation. Not being satisfied with the
explanations given by said officials, it
brought the present action on June 10, 1950.

In its answer, defendant maintained that it

had acquired the lot in question in the year
1924-1925 through expropriation
proceedings and that it took possession of
the lost and began the construction of the
provincial hospital thereon. They further
claimed that for some reason beyond their
comprehension, title was never transferred in
its name and it was placed in its name only
for assessment purposes.

And that defendant acted in bad faith in

purchasing the lot knowing that the
provincial hospital was situated there and
that he did not declare such property for
assessment purposes only until 1950.

ISSUE: Whether or not defendant herein had

acquired the lot in question in the
aforementioned expropriation proceedings.

HELD: The Court held that defendant was

not able to sufficiently prove that they have
acquired the legal title over Lot 378. Several
circumstances indicate that the expropriation
had not been consummated.

First, there, the entries in the docket

pertaining to the expropriation case refer
only to its filing and the publication in the
newspaper of the notices. Second, there was
an absence of a deed of assignment and of a

TCT in favour of the Province as regards Lot

378. Third, the property was mortgaged to
Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co. Lot 378 could not
have been expropriated without the
intervention of the Milling Co. And yet, the
latter was not made a party in the
expropriation proceedings. And fourth, a
second mortgage was constituted in favour
of the Back, which would not have accepted
the mortgage had Lot 378 not belonged to
the mortgagor. Neither could said lot have
been expropriated without the Banks
knowledge and participation.

Furthermore, in the deed executed by the

Bank promising to sell the Hacienda
Mandalagan to Carlos Benares, it was
explicitly stated that some particular lots had
been expropriated by the Provincial
Government of Negros Occidental, thus
indicating, by necessary implication, that Lot
378 had not been expropriated.