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THIRDDIVISION

[G.R.No.137110.August1,2000]

VINCENTPAULG.MERCADOa.k.a.VINCENTG.MERCADO,petitioner, vs.
CONSUELOTAN,respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN,J.:

A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a subsequent

one can be legally contracted. One who enters into a subsequent marriage without first
obtainingsuchjudicialdeclarationisguiltyofbigamy.This principle applies even if the earlier
unionischaracterizedbystatuteasvoid.
TheCase
BeforeusisaPetitionforReviewonCertiorariassailingtheJuly14,1998Decisionofthe
CourtofAppeals(CA)[1] inCAGRCRNo.19830anditsJanuary4,1999Resolutiondenying
reconsideration.TheassailedDecisionaffirmedtherulingoftheRegionalTrialCourt(RTC)of
Bacolod City in Criminal Case No. 13848, which convicted herein petitioner of bigamy as
follows:
WHEREFORE,findingtheguiltofaccusedDr.VincentPaulG.Mercadoa.k.a.Dr.VincentG.
MercadoofthecrimeofBigamypunishableunderArticle349oftheRevisedPenalCodeto
havebeenprovenbeyondreasonabledoubt,[thecourtherebyrenders]judgmentimposing
uponhimaprisontermofthree(3)years,four(4)monthsandfifteen(15)daysofprision
correccional,asminimumofhisindeterminatesentence,toeight(8)yearsandtwentyone(21)
daysofprisionmayor,asmaximum,plusaccessorypenaltiesprovidedbylaw.
Costsagainstaccused.[2]
TheFacts
ThefactsarequotedbyCourtofAppeals(CA)fromthetrialcourtsjudgment,asfollows:
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From the evidence adduced by the parties, there is no dispute that accused Dr. Vincent
Mercado and complainant Ma. Consuelo Tan got married on June 27, 1991 before MTCC
BacolodCityBr.7JudgeGorgonioJ.Ibaez[byreasonof]whichaMarriageContractwasduly
executedandsignedbythe parties.As entered in said document, the status of accused was
single. There is no dispute either that at the time of the celebration of the wedding with
complainant, accused was actually a married man, having been in lawful wedlock with Ma.
Thelma Oliva in a marriage ceremony solemnized on April 10, 1976 by Judge Leonardo B.
Caares,CFIBr.XIV,CebuCityperMarriageCertificateissuedinconnectiontherewith,which
matrimony was further blessed by Rev. Father Arthur Baur on October 10, 1976 in religious
ritesattheSacredHeartChurch,CebuCity.Inthesamemanner,thecivilmarriagebetween
accusedandcomplainantwasconfirmedinachurchceremonyonJune29,1991officiatedby
Msgr. Victorino A. Rivas, Judicial Vicar, Diocese of Bacolod City. Both marriages were
consummatedwhenoutofthefirstconsortium,Ma.ThelmaOlivaboreaccusedtwochildren,
whileachild,VincentPaul,Jr.wassiredbyaccusedwithcomplainantMa.ConsueloTan.
OnOctober5,1992,alettercomplaintforbigamywasfiledbycomplainantthroughcounsel
withtheCityProsecutorofBacolodCity,whicheventuallyresulted[in]theinstitutionofthe
presentcasebeforethisCourtagainstsaidaccused,Dr.VincentG.Mercado,onMarch1,
1993inanInformationdatedJanuary22,1993.
OnNovember13,1992,ormorethanamonthafterthebigamycasewaslodgedinthe
ProsecutorsOffice,accusedfiledanactionforDeclarationofNullityofMarriageagainstMa.
ThelmaV.OlivainRTCBr.22,CebuCity,andinaDecisiondatedMay6,1993themarriage
betweenVincentG.MercadoandMa.ThelmaV.Olivawasdeclarednullandvoid.
Accusedischarged[with]bigamyunderArticle349oftheRevisedPenalCodeforhaving
contractedasecondmarriagewithhereincomplainantMa.ConsueloTanonJune27,1991
whenatthattimehewaspreviouslyunitedinlawfulmarriagewithMa.ThelmaV.OlivaonApril
10,1976atCebuCity,withoutsaidfirstmarriagehavingbeenlegallydissolved.Asshownby
theevidenceandadmittedbyaccused,alltheessentialelementsofthecrimearepresent,
namely:(a)thattheoffenderhasbeenpreviouslylegallymarried(2)thatthefirstmarriagehas
notbeenlegallydissolvedorincasethespouseisabsent,theabsentspousecouldnotyetbe
presumeddeadaccordingtotheCivilCode(3)thathecontract[ed]asecondorsubsequent
marriageand(4)thatthesecondorsubsequentmarriageha[d]alltheessentialrequisitesfor
validity.xxx
Whileacknowledgingtheexistenceofthetwomarriage[s],accusedpositedthedefensethathis
previousmarriageha[d]beenjudiciallydeclarednullandvoidandthattheprivatecomplainant
hadknowledgeofthefirstmarriageofaccused.
ItisanadmittedfactthatwhenthesecondmarriagewasenteredintowithMa.ConsueloTan
onJune27,1991,accusedspriormarriagewithMa.ThelmaV.Olivawassubsisting,nojudicial
actionhavingyetbeeninitiatedoranyjudicialdeclarationobtainedastothenullityofsuchprior
marriagewithMa.ThelmaV.Oliva.Sincenodeclarationofthenullityofhisfirstmarriageha[d]
yetbeenmadeatthetimeofhissecondmarriage,itisclearthataccusedwasamarriedman
whenhecontractedsuchsecondmarriagewithcomplainantonJune27,1991.Hewasstillat
thetimevalidlymarriedtohisfirstwife.[3]
RulingoftheCourtofAppeals
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Agreeingwiththelowercourt,theCourtofAppealsstated:
UnderArticle40oftheFamilyCode,theabsolutenullityofapreviousmarriagemaybeinvoked
forpurposesofremarriageonthebasissolelyofafinaljudgmentdeclaringsuchprevious
marriagevoid.Buthere,thefinaljudgmentdeclaringnullandvoidaccusedspreviousmarriage
camenotbeforethecelebrationofthesecondmarriage,butafter,whenthecaseforbigamy
againstaccusedwasalreadytriedincourt.Andwhatconstitutesthecrimeofbigamyistheact
ofanypersonwhoshallcontractasecondsubsequentmarriagebeforetheformermarriage
hasbeenlegallydissolved.[4]
Hence,thisPetition.[5]
TheIssues
InhisMemorandum,petitionerraisesthefollowingissues:
A
Whetherornottheelementofpreviouslegalmarriageispresentinordertoconvictpetitioner.
B
WhetherornotaliberalinterpretationinfavorofpetitionerofArticle349oftheRevisedPenal
Codepunishingbigamy,inrelationtoArticles36and40oftheFamilyCode,negatestheguilt
ofpetitioner.
C
Whetherornotpetitionerisentitledtoanacquittalonthebasisofreasonabledoubt.[6]
TheCourtsRuling
ThePetitionisnotmeritorious.
MainIssue:EffectofNullityofPreviousMarriage
Petitioner was convicted of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, which
provides:
Thepenaltyofprisionmayorshallbeimposeduponanypersonwhoshallcontractasecondor
subsequentmarriagebeforetheformermarriagehasbeenlegallydissolved,orbeforethe
absentspousehasbeendeclaredpresumptivelydeadbymeansofajudgmentrenderedinthe
properproceedings.
Theelementsofthiscrimeareasfollows:
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1.Thattheoffenderhasbeenlegallymarried
2.Thatthemarriagehasnotbeenlegallydissolvedor,incasehisorherspouseisabsent,the
absentspousecouldnotyetbepresumeddeadaccordingtotheCivilCode
3.Thathecontractsasecondorsubsequentmarriage
4.Thatthesecondorsubsequentmarriagehasalltheessentialrequisitesforvalidity.[7]
When the Information was filed on January 22, 1993, all the elements of bigamy were
present.ItisundisputedthatpetitionermarriedThelmaG.OlivaonApril10,1976inCebuCity.
While that marriage was still subsisting, he contracted a second marriage, this time with
RespondentMa.ConsueloTanwhosubsequentlyfiledtheComplaintforbigamy.
Petitioner contends, however, that he obtained a judicial declaration of nullity of his first
marriageunderArticle36oftheFamilyCode,therebyrenderingitvoidabinitio.Unlikevoidable
marriages which are considered valid until set aside by a competent court, he argues that a
voidmarriageisdeemednevertohavetakenplaceatall.[8]Thus,heconcludesthatthereisno
first marriage to speak of. Petitioner also quotes the commentaries[9] of former Justice Luis
Reyesthatitisnowsettledthatifthefirstmarriageisvoidfromthebeginning,itisadefensein
abigamycharge.Butifthefirstmarriageisvoidable,itisnotadefense.
Respondent,ontheotherhand,admitsthatthefirstmarriagewasdeclarednullandvoid
underArticle36oftheFamilyCode,butshepointsoutthatthatdeclarationcameonlyafterthe
Information had been filed. Hence, by then, the crime had already been consummated. She
arguesthatajudicialdeclarationofnullityofavoidpreviousmarriagemustbeobtainedbefore
apersoncanmarryforasubsequenttime.
Weagreewiththerespondent.
To be sure, jurisprudence regarding the need for a judicial declaration of nullity of the
previousmarriagehasbeencharacterizedasconflicting.[10]InPeoplev.Mendoza,[11]abigamy
caseinvolvinganaccusedwhomarriedthreetimes,theCourtruledthattherewasnoneedfor
such declaration. In that case, the accused contracted a second marriage during the
subsistenceofthefirst.Whenthefirstwifedied,hemarriedforthethirdtime.Thesecondwife
then charged him with bigamy. Acquitting him, the Court held that the second marriage was
voidabinitio because it had been contracted while the first marriage was still in effect. Since
thesecondmarriagewasobviouslyvoidandillegal,theCourtruledthattherewasnoneedfor
ajudicialdeclarationofitsnullity.Hence,theaccuseddidnotcommitbigamywhenhemarried
forthethirdtime.ThisrulingwasaffirmedbytheCourtinPeoplev.Aragon,[12] whichinvolved
substantiallythesamefacts.
Butinsubsequentcases,theCourtimpressedtheneedforajudicialdeclarationofnullity.
InVdadeConsuegrav.GSIS,[13]JoseConsuegramarriedforthesecondtimewhilethefirst
marriagewasstillsubsisting.Uponhisdeath,theCourtawardedonehalfoftheproceedsofhis
retirement benefits to the first wife and the other half to the second wife and her children,
notwithstandingthemanifestnullityofthesecondmarriage.Itheld:Andwithrespecttotheright
ofthesecondwife,thisCourtobservesthatalthoughthesecondmarriagecanbepresumedto
bevoidabinitio as it was celebrated while the first marriage was still subsisting, still there is
needforjudicialdeclarationofsuchnullity.
InTolentinov.Paras,[14]however,theCourtagainheldthatjudicialdeclarationofnullityof
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avoidmarriagewasnotnecessary.Inthatcase,amanmarriedtwice.InhisDeathCertificate,
hissecondwifewasnamedashissurvivingspouse.ThefirstwifethenfiledaPetitiontocorrect
thesaidentryintheDeathCertificate.TheCourtruledinfavorofthefirstwife,holdingthatthe
second marriage that he contracted with private respondent during the lifetime of the first
spouse is null and void from the beginning and of no force and effect. No judicial decree is
necessarytoestablishtheinvalidityofavoidmarriage.
InWiegelv.SempioDiy,[15]theCourtstressedtheneedforsuchdeclaration.Inthatcase,
Karl Heinz Wiegel filed an action for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to Lilia Olivia
Wiegelonthegroundthatthelatterhadapriorexistingmarriage.Afterpretrial,Liliaaskedthat
she be allowed to present evidence to prove, among others, that her first husband had
previously been married to another woman. In holding that there was no need for such
evidence, the Court ruled: x x x There is likewise no need of introducing evidence about the
existingpriormarriageofherfirsthusbandatthetimetheymarriedeachother,forthensucha
marriagethoughvoidstillneeds,accordingtothisCourt,ajudicialdeclarationofsuchfactand
foralllegalintentsandpurposesshewouldstillberegardedasamarriedwomanatthetime
shecontractedhermarriagewithrespondentKarlHeinzWiegelxxx.
Subsequently, in Yap v. CA,[16] the Court reverted to the ruling in People v. Mendoza,
holdingthattherewasnoneedforsuchdeclarationofnullity.
InDomingov.CA,[17] theissueraisedwaswhetherajudicialdeclarationofnullitywasstill
necessaryfortherecoveryandtheseparationofpropertiesoferstwhilespouses.Rulinginthe
affirmative, the Court declared: The Family Code has settled once and for all the conflicting
jurisprudenceonthematter.Adeclarationoftheabsolutenullityofamarriageisnowexplicitly
required either as a cause of action or a ground for defense in fact, the requirement for a
declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage is also for the protection of the spouse who,
believingthathisorhermarriageisillegalandvoid,marriesagain.Withthejudicialdeclaration
ofthenullityofhisorherfirstmarriage,thepersonwhomarriesagaincannotbechargedwith
bigamy.[18]
UnlikeMendozaandAragon,Domingo as well as the other cases herein cited was not a
criminal prosecution for bigamy. Nonetheless, Domingo underscored the need for a judicial
declaration of nullity of a void marriage on the basis of a new provision of the Family Code,
whichcameintoeffectseveralyearsafterthepromulgationofMendozaandAragon.
InMendozaandAragon, the Court relied on Section 29 of Act No. 3613 (Marriage Law),
whichprovided:
Illegalmarriages.Anymarriagesubsequentlycontractedbyanypersonduringthelifetimeof
thefirstspouseshallbeillegalandvoidfromitsperformance,unless:
(a)Thefirstmarriagewasannulledordissolved
(b) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second
marriagewithoutthespousepresenthavingnewsoftheabsenteebeingalive,ortheabsentee
beinggenerallyconsideredasdeadandbelievedtobesobythespousepresentatthetimeof
contractingsuchsubsequentmarriage,themarriageascontractedbeingvalidineither case
untildeclarednullandvoidbyacompetentcourt."

The Court held in those two cases that the said provision plainly makes a subsequent
marriagecontractedbyanypersonduringthelifetimeofhisfirstspouseillegalandvoidfromits
performance, and no judicial decree is necessary to establish its invalidity, as distinguished
frommereannulablemarriages.[19]
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The provision appeared in substantially the same form under Article 83 of the 1950 Civil
Code and Article 41 of the Family Code. However, Article 40 of the Family Code, a new
provision,expresslyrequiresajudicialdeclarationofnullityofthepreviousmarriage,asfollows:
ART.40.Theabsolutenullityofapreviousmarriagemaybeinvokedforpurposesof
remarriageonthebasissolelyofafinaljudgmentdeclaringsuchmarriagevoid.
Inview ofthisprovision, Domingo stressed that a final judgment declaring such marriage
voidwasnecessary.Verily, the Family Code and Domingo affirm the earlier ruling in Wiegel.
Thus,aCivilLawauthorityandmemberoftheCivilCodeRevisionCommiteehasobserved:
[Article40]isalsoinlinewiththerecentdecisionsoftheSupremeCourtthatthemarriageofa
personmaybenullandvoidbutthereisneedofajudicialdeclarationofsuchfactbeforethat
personcanmarryagainotherwise,thesecondmarriagewillalsobevoid(Wiegelv.Sempio
Diy,Aug.19/86,143SCRA499,Vda.DeConsuegrav.GSIS,37SCRA315).Thisprovision
changestheoldrulethatwhereamarriageisillegalandvoidfromitsperformance,nojudicial
decreeisnecessarytoestablishitsvalidity(Peoplev.Mendoza,95Phil.843Peoplev.
Aragon,100Phil.1033).[20]
In this light, the statutory mooring of the ruling in Mendoza and Aragon that there is no
needforajudicialdeclarationofnullityofavoidmarriagehasbeencastasidebyArticle40of
the Family Code. Such declaration is now necessary before one can contract a second
marriage. Absent that declaration, we hold that one may be charged with and convicted of
bigamy.
The present ruling is consistent with our pronouncement in Terre v. Terre,[21] which
involved an administrative Complaint against a lawyer for marrying twice. In rejecting the
lawyersargumentthathewasfreetoenterintoasecondmarriagebecausethefirstonewas
voidabinitio, the Court ruled: for purposes of determining whether a person is legally free to
contractasecondmarriage,ajudicial declarationthatthefirstmarriagewasnullandvoid ab
initio is essential. The Court further noted that the said rule was cast into statutory form by
Article 40 of the Family Code. Significantly, it observed that the second marriage, contracted
without a judicial declaration that the first marriage was void, was bigamous and criminal in
character.
Moreover, Justice Reyes, an authority in Criminal Law whose earlier work was cited by
petitioner,changedhisviewonthesubjectinviewofArticle40oftheFamilyCodeandwrotein
1993thatapersonmustfirstobtainajudicialdeclarationofthenullityofavoidmarriagebefore
contractingasubsequentmarriage:[22]
Itisnowsettledthatthefactthatthefirstmarriageisvoidfromthebeginningisnotadefensein
abigamycharge.Aswithavoidablemarriage,theremustbeajudicialdeclarationofthenullity
ofamarriagebeforecontractingthesecondmarriage.Article40oftheFamilyCodestatesthat
xxx.TheCodeCommissionbelievesthatthepartiestoamarriageshouldnotbeallowedto
assumethattheirmarriageisvoid,evenifsuchisthefact,butmustfirstsecureajudicial
declarationofnullityoftheirmarriagebeforetheyshouldbeallowedtomarryagain.xxx.
In the instant case, petitioner contracted a second marriage although there was yet no
judicialdeclarationofnullityofhisfirstmarriage.In fact, he instituted the Petition to have the
firstmarriagedeclaredvoidonlyaftercomplainanthadfiledalettercomplaintcharginghimwith
bigamy.Bycontractingasecondmarriagewhilethefirstwasstillsubsisting,hecommittedthe
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actspunishableunderArticle349oftheRevisedPenalCode.
Thathesubsequentlyobtainedajudicialdeclarationofthenullityofthefirstmarriagewas
immaterial.Torepeat,thecrimehadalreadybeenconsummatedbythen.Moreover,hisview
effectivelyencouragesdelayintheprosecutionofbigamycasesanaccusedcouldsimplyfilea
petition to declare his previous marriage void and invoke the pendency of that action as a
prejudicialquestioninthecriminalcase.Wecannotallowthat.
Underthecircumstancesofthepresentcase,heisguiltyofthechargeagainsthim.
Damages
In her Memorandum, respondent prays that the Court set aside the ruling of the Court of
Appealsinsofarasitdeniedherclaimofdamagesandattorneysfees.[23]
Herprayerhasnomerit.ShedidnotappealtherulingoftheCAagainstherhence,she
cannotobtainaffirmativerelieffromthisCourt.[24]Inanyevent,wefindnoreasontoreverseor
setasidethepertinentrulingoftheCAonthispoint,whichwequotehereunder:
WeareconvincedfromthetotalityoftheevidencepresentedinthiscasethatConsueloTanis
nottheinnocentvictimthatsheclaimstobeshewaswellawareoftheexistenceofthe
previousmarriagewhenshecontractedmatrimonywithDr.Mercado.Thetestimoniesofthe
defensewitnessesprovethis,andwefindnoreasontodoubtsaidtestimonies.
xxxxxxxxx
Indeed,theclaimofConsueloTanthatshewasnotawareofhispreviousmarriagedoesnot
inspirebelief,especiallyasshehadseenthatDr.Mercadohadtwo(2)childrenwithhim.We
areconvincedthatshetooktheplungeanyway,relyingonthefactthatthefirstwifewouldno
longerreturntoDr.Mercado,shebeingbythenalreadylivingwithanotherman.
ConsueloTancanthereforenotclaimdamagesinthiscasewhereshewasfullyconsciousof
theconsequencesofheract.Sheshouldhaveknownthatshewouldsufferhumiliationinthe
eventthetruth[would]comeout,asitdidinthiscase,ironicallybecauseofherpersonal
instigation.Ifthereareindeeddamagescausedtoherreputation,theyareofherownwillful
making.[25]
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs
againstpetitioner.
SOORDERED.
Melo,(Chairman),Purisima,andGonzagaReyes,JJ.,concur.
Vitug,J.,seeconcurringanddissentingopinion.
CONCURRINGANDDISSENTINGOPINION
VITUG,J.:

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Atthepithofthecontroversyisthedefenseoftheabsolutenullityofapreviousmarriagein
an indictment for bigamy.The majority opinion, penned by my esteemed brother, Mr. Justice
ArtemioV.Panganiban,enunciatesthatitisonlyajudiciallydecreedpriorvoidmarriagewhich
canconstituteadefenseagainstthecriminalcharge.
The civil law rule stated in Article 40 of the Family Code is a given but I have strong
reservationsonitsapplicationbeyondwhatappearstobeitsexpressedcontext.Thesubjectof
the instant petition is a criminal prosecution, not a civil case, and the ponencia affirms the
convictionofpetitionerVincentPaulG.Mercadoforbigamy.
Article40oftheFamilycodereads:
ART.40.Theabsolutenullityofapreviousmarriagemaybeinvokedforpurposesof
remarriageonthebasissolelyofafinaljudgmentdeclaringsuchpreviousmarriagevoid.
Thephraseforpurposesofremarriageisnotatallinsignificant.Void marriages, like void
contracts,areinexistentfromtheverybeginning.ItisonlybywayofexceptionthattheFamily
code requires a judicial declaration of nullity of the previous marriage before a subsequent
marriageiscontractedwithoutsuchdeclaration,thevalidityandthefulllegalconsequenceof
the subsequent marriage would itself be in similar jeopardy under Article 53, in relation to
Article52,oftheFamilyCode.Parenthetically,Iwoulddaresaythatthenecessityofajudicial
declaration of nullity of a void marriage for the purpose of remarriage should be held to refer
merelytocaseswhereitcanbesaidthatamarriage,atleastostensibly,hadtakenplace.No
such judicial declaration of nullity, in my view, should still be deemed essential when the
marriage,forinstance,isbetweenpersonsofthesamesexorwheneitherorbothpartieshad
notatallgivenconsenttothemarriage.Indeed, it is likely that Article 40 of the Family Code
hasbeenmeantandintendedtoreferonlytomarriagesdeclaredvoidundertheprovisionsof
Articles35,36,37,38and53thereof.
Infine,theFamilyCode,Irespectfullysubmit,didnothavetheeffectofoverturningtherule
incriminallawandrelatedjurisprudence.TheRevisedPenalCodeexpresses:
Art.349.Bigamy.Thepenaltyofprisionmayorshallbeimposeduponanypersonwhoshall
contractasecondorsubsequentmarriagebeforetheformermarriagehasbeenlegally
dissolved,orbeforetheabsentspousehasbeendeclaredpresumptivelydeadbymeansofa
judgmentrenderedintheproperproceedings.
Surely,theforegoingprovisioncontemplatedanexisting,notvoid,priormarriage.Covered by
article 349 would thus be, for instance, a voidable marriage, it obviously being valid and
subsistinguntilsetasidebyacompetentcourt.AsearlyasPeoplevs.Aragon,1 thisCourthas
underscored:
xxxOurRevisedPenalCodeisofrecentenactmentandhadtheruleenunciatedinSpain
andinAmericarequiringjudicialdeclarationofnullityofabinitiovoidmarriagesbeen
withinthecontemplationofthelegislature,anexpressprovisiontothateffectwouldor
shouldhavebeeninsertedinthelaw.Initsabsence,weareboundbysaidruleofstrict
interpretation.
Unlikeavoidablemarriagewhichlegallyexistsuntiljudiciallyannulled(andthereforenota
defenseinbigamyifthesecondmarriagewerecontractedpriortothedecreeofannulment),
the complete nullity, however, of a previously contracted marriage, being a total nullity and
inexistent,shouldbecapableofbeingindependentlyraisedbywayofadefenseinacriminal
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caseforbigamy.IseenoincongruencebetweenthisruleincriminallawandthatoftheFamily
Code,andeachmaybeappliedwithintherespectivespheresofgovernance.
Accordingly,Ivotetograntthepetition.

1100Phil.1033.

[1]PennedbyJ.SalomeA.Montoya,DivisionchairmanwiththeconcurrenceofJJConchitaCarpioMoralesandBernardo
P.Abesamis,members.
[2]RTCDecision,pp.1617rollo,pp.136137.ThiswaswrittenbyJudgeEdgarG.Garvilles.
[3]CADecision,pp.24rollo,pp.4547.
[4]Ibid.,p.6rollo,p.13.
[5] ThecasewasdeemedsubmittedforresolutiononMay26,2000,uponreceiptbythisCourtoftheOSGMemorandum
signed by Sol. Gen. Ricardo P. Galvez, Asst. Sol. Gen. Mariano M Martinez and Sol. Jesus P. Castelo. Respondents
Memorandum, which was signed by Atty. Julius C. Baldado, was received on November 11, 1999 while petitioners
Memorandum,signedbyAttys.BernardB.LopezandMaritoniZ.Liwanag,hadbeenfiledearlieronSeptember30,1999.
[6]PetitionersMemorandum,p.5rollo,p.215.
[7]Reyes,TheRevisedPenalCode,BookTwo,13thed.(1993),p.828.
[8]CitingTolentino,CivilCodeofthePhilippines:CommentariesandJurisprudence,Vol.I,p.265.
[9]Reyes,TheRevisedPenalCode,BookTwo,12thed.(1981),p.907.9
[10]Domingov.CA,226SCRA572,September17,1993,perRomero,J.
[11]95Phil.845,September28,1954.
[12]100Phil.1033,February28,1957.
[13] 37SCRA315,326,January30,1971,perZaldivar,J.Emphasissupplied.SeealsoGomezv.Lipana, 33 SCRA 615,
June30,1970.
[14]122SCRA525,529,May30,1983perMelencioHerrera,J.Emphasissupplied.
[15]143SCRA499,August19,1986,perParas,J.Emphasissupplied.
[16]145SCRA229,October28,1986.
[17] 226 SCRA 572, September 17, 1993, per Romero, J, citing SempioDiy, Handbook of the Family Code of the
Philippines,1988,p.46.
[18]Supra,p.579.
[19] Peoplev.Mendoza,95Phil.845,847,September28,1954,perParas,CJ.SeealsoPeoplev.Aragon, 100 Phil. 1033,
10341035,February28,1957,perLabrador,J.
[20]SempioDiy,HandbookontheFamilyCodeofthePhilippines,1995ed.,p.56.
[21]211SCRA6,11,July3,1992,percuriam.
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