JOSE REYNALDO B.

OCHOSA,
Petitioner,

G.R. No. 167459

Present:

- versus -

BONA J. ALANO and REPUBLIC

OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondents.

CORONA, C.J.,
Chairperson,
VELASCO, JR.,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
DEL CASTILLO, and
PEREZ, JJ.
Promulgated:

January 26, 2011

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DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to
set aside the Decision[1] dated October 11, 2004 as well as the Resolution [2]dated March 10,
2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 65120, which reversed and set aside the
Decision[3] dated January 11, 1999 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 140 in
Civil Case No. 97-2903. In the said January 11, 1999 Decision, the trial court granted petitioner
Jose Reynaldo Ochosas (Jose) petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage between him
and private respondent Bona J. Alano (Bona).
The relevant facts of this case, as outlined by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
It appears that Jose met Bona in August 1973 when he was a young lieutenant in the AFP
while the latter was a seventeen-year-old first year college drop-out. They had a whirlwind
romance that culminated into sexual intimacy and eventual marriage on 27 October 1973 before
the Honorable Judge Cesar S. Principe in Basilan. The couple did not acquire any property.
Neither did they incur any debts. Their union produced no offspring. In 1976, however, they
found an abandoned and neglected one-year-old baby girl whom they later registered as their
daughter, naming her Ramona Celeste Alano Ochosa.
During their marriage, Jose was often assigned to various parts of the Philippine
archipelago as an officer in the AFP. Bona did not cohabit with him in his posts, preferring to
stay in her hometown of Basilan. Neither did Bona visit him in his areas of assignment, except in
one (1) occasion when Bona stayed with him for four (4) days.
Sometime in 1985, Jose was appointed as the Battalion Commander of the Security
Escort Group. He and Bona, along with Ramona, were given living quarters at Fort Bonifacio,
Makati City where they resided with their military aides.
In 1987, Jose was charged with rebellion for his alleged participation in the failed coup
detat. He was incarcerated in Camp Crame.
It appears that Bona was an unfaithful spouse. Even at the onset of their marriage when
Jose was assigned in various parts of the country, she had illicit relations with other men. Bona

apparently did not change her ways when they lived together at Fort Bonifacio; she entertained
male visitors in her bedroom whenever Jose was out of their living quarters. On one occasion,
Bona was caught by Demetrio Bajet y Lita, a security aide, having sex with Joses driver,
Corporal Gagarin. Rumors of Bonas sexual infidelity circulated in the military community. When
Jose could no longer bear these rumors, he got a military pass from his jail warden and
confronted Bona.
During their confrontation, Bona admitted her relationship with Corporal Gagarin who
also made a similar admission to Jose. Jose drove Bona away from their living quarters. Bona
left with Ramona and went to Basilan.
In 1994, Ramona left Bona and came to live with Jose. It is Jose who is currently
supporting the needs of Ramona.
Jose filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, docketed as Civil Case No.
97-2903 with the RTC of Makati City, Branch 140, seeking to nullify his marriage to Bona on
the ground of the latters psychological incapacity to fulfill the essential obligations of marriage.
Summons with a copy of the petition and its annexes were duly served upon Bona who
failed to file any responsive pleading during the reglementary period.
Pursuant to the order of the trial court, the Public Prosecutor conducted an investigation
to determine whether there was collusion between the parties. Said prosecutor submitted a report
that she issued a subpoena to both parties but only Jose appeared; hence, it can not be reasonably
determined whether or not there was collusion between them.
Trial on the merits of the case ensued. Petitioner along with his two military aides,
Gertrudes Himpayan Padernal and Demetrio Bajet y Lita, testified about respondents marital
infidelity during the marriage.
The fourth and final witness was Elizabeth E. Rondain, a psychiatrist, who testified that
after conducting several tests, she reached the conclusion that respondent was suffering from
histrionic personality disorder which she described as follows:
Her personality is that she has an excessive emotion and attention seeking
behavior. So therefore they dont develop sympathy in feelings and they have
difficulty in maintaining emotional intimacy. In the case of Mr. Ochosa he has
been a military man. It is his duty to be transferred in different areas in the
Philippines. And while he is being transferred from one place to another because
of his assignments as a military man, Mrs. Bona Alano refused to follow him in
all his assignments. There were only few occasions in which she followed him.
And during those times that they were not living together, because of the
assignments of Mr. Ochosa she developed extra marital affair with other man of
which she denied in the beginning but in the latter part of their relationship she
admitted it to Mr. Ochosa that she had relationship with respondents driver. I
believe with this extra marital affair that is her way of seeking attention and
seeking emotions from other person and not from the husband. And of course, this
is not fulfilling the basic responsibility in a marriage.
According to Rondain, respondents psychological disorder was traceable to her family
history, having for a father a gambler and a womanizer and a mother who was a battered wife.
There was no possibility of a cure since respondent does not have an insight of what is
happening to her and refused to acknowledge the reality.
With the conclusion of the witnesses testimonies, petitioner formally offered his evidence
and rested his case.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) submitted its opposition to the petition on the
ground that the factual settings in the case at bench, in no measure at all, can come close to the
standards required to decree a nullity of marriage (Santos v. CA, 240 SCRA 20 [1995]).

In a Decision dated 11 January 1999, the trial court granted the petition and
nullified the parties marriage on the following findings, viz:
xxxx
Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended, provides as follows:
A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void
even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.
Such a ground to be invalidative (sic) of marriage, the degree of incapacity
must exhibit GRAVITY, ANTECEDENCE and INCURABILITY.
From the evidence presented, the Court finds that the psychological
incapacity of the respondent exhibited GRAVITY, ANTECEDENCE and
INCURABILITY.
It is grave because the respondent did not carry out the normal and
ordinary duties of marriage and family shouldered by any average couple existing
under everyday circumstances of life and work. The gravity was manifested in
respondents infidelity as testified to by the petitioner and his witnesses.
The psychological incapacity of the respondent could be traced back to
respondents history as testified to by the expert witness when she said that
respondents bad experience during her childhood resulted in her difficulty in
achieving emotional intimacy, hence, her continuous illicit relations with several
men before and during the marriage.
Considering that persons suffering from this kind of personality disorder
have no insight of their condition, they will not submit to treatment at all. As in
the case at bar, respondents psychological incapacity clinically identified as
Histrionic Personality Disorder will remain incurable.[4] (Emphasis supplied.)

Thus, the dispositive portion of the trial court Decision dated January 11, 1999 read:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered DECLARING the
marriage of JOSE REYNALDO B. OCHOSA and BONA J. ALANO on October 27, 1973 at
Basilan City VOID AB INITIO on ground of psychological incapacity of the respondent under
Article 36 of the Family Code as amended with all the effects and consequences provided for by
all applicable provisions of existing pertinent laws.
After this Decision becomes final, let copies thereof be sent to the Local Civil Registrar
of Basilan City who is directed to cancel the said marriage from its Civil Registry, and the Local
Civil Registrar of Makati City for its information and guidance.[5]

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) appealed the said ruling to the Court of
Appeals which sided with the OSGs contention that the trial court erred in granting the petition
despite Joses abject failure to discharge the burden of proving the alleged psychological
incapacity of his wife, Bona, to comply with the essential marital obligations.
Thus, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the trial court Decision in its assailed
Decision dated October 11, 2004, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED, the appealed Decision dated 11 January 1999
in Civil Case No. 97-2903 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 140, is

accordingly REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and another is entered DISMISSING the petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage.[6]

Jose filed a Motion for Reconsideration but this was denied by the Court of Appeals for
lack of merit in its assailed Resolution dated March 10, 2005.
Hence, this Petition.
The only issue before this Court is whether or not Bona should be deemed
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations.
The petition is without merit.
The petition for declaration of nullity of marriage which Jose filed in the trial court hinges on
Article 36 of the Family Code, to wit:
A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall
likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

In the landmark case of Santos v. Court of Appeals,[7] we observed that psychological

incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c)
incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of
carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the
party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after
marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the
means of the party involved.
Soon after, incorporating the three basic requirements of psychological incapacity as
mandated in Santos, we laid down in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina[8] the following
guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code:
(1)
The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff.
Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and
against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our
laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an
entire Article on the Family, recognizing it as the foundation of the nation. It decrees marriage as
legally inviolable, thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the
family and marriage are to be protected by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and
emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2)
The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or
clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d)
clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must
be psychological not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical.
The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or physically
ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or
knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such
incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the
principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological
illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.

(3)
The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the
marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their
I dos. The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself
must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4)
Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent
or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other
spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such
incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those
not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a
pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure
them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own
children as an essential obligation of marriage.
(5)
Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to
assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, mild characteriological peculiarities, mood
changes, occasional emotional outburst cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be
shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will.
In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral
element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting
and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6)
The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Article 68 up to 71
of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the
same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must
also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7)
Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great
respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision
Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983
and which provides:
The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are
unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of
psychological nature.
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to
harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason
that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to
decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally subject to our law on evidence what is
decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void.
This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of
the Family Code provision, contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be
given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the Church while remaining
independent, separate and apart from each other shall walk together in synodal
cadence towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage and the
family as the inviolable base of the nation.
(8)
The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor
General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor
General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his
reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor
General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within
fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The
Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated
under Canon 1095.[9] (Citations omitted.)

In Marcos v. Marcos,[10] we previously held that the foregoing guidelines do not require
that a physician examine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the

root cause may be medically or clinically identified. What is important is the presence of
evidence that can adequately establish the partys psychological condition.For, indeed, if the
totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then
actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to.
It is also established in jurisprudence that from these requirements arise the concept that
Article 36 of the Family Code does not really dissolve a marriage; it simply recognizes that
there never was any marriage in the first place because the affliction already then existing was
so grave and permanent as to deprive the afflicted party of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she was to assume or had assumed.[11]
A little over a decade since the promulgation of the Molina guidelines, we made a critical
assessment of the same in Ngo Te v. Yu-Te,[12] to wit:
In hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for the Court to impose a rigid set of rules,
as the one in Molina, in resolving all cases of psychological incapacity. Understandably, the
Court was then alarmed by the deluge of petitions for the dissolution of marital bonds, and was
sensitive to the OSGs exaggeration of Article 36 as the most liberal divorce procedure in the
world. The unintended consequences of Molina, however, has taken its toll on people who have
to live with deviant behavior, moral insanity and sociopathic personality anomaly, which, like
termites, consume little by little the very foundation of their families, our basic social
institutions. Far from what was intended by the Court, Molina has become a strait-jacket, forcing
all sizes to fit into and be bound by it. Wittingly or unwittingly, the Court, in conveniently
applying Molina, has allowed diagnosed sociopaths, schizophrenics, nymphomaniacs, narcissists
and the like, to continuously debase and pervert the sanctity of marriage. Ironically, the Roman
Rota has annulled marriages on account of the personality disorders of the said individuals.[13]

However, our critique did not mean that we had declared an abandonment of
the Molina doctrine. On the contrary, we simply declared and, thus, clarified in the same Tecase
that there is a need to emphasize other perspectives as well which should govern the disposition
of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. Furthermore, we reiterated in the same
case the principle that each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions,
predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts.And, to repeat for emphasis,
courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings
of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.[14]
In the case at bar, the trial court granted the petition for the declaration of nullity of
marriage on the basis of Dr. Elizabeth Rondains testimony [15] and her psychiatric evaluation
report[16] as well as the individual testimonies of Jose [17] and his military aides - Mrs. Gertrudes
Himpayan Padernal[18] and Corporal Demetrio Bajet.[19]
We are sufficiently convinced, after a careful perusal of the evidence presented in this
case, that Bona had been, on several occasions with several other men, sexually disloyal to her
spouse, Jose. Likewise, we are persuaded that Bona had indeed abandoned Jose. However, we
cannot apply the same conviction to Joses thesis that the totality of Bonas acts constituted
psychological incapacity as determined by Article 36 of the Family Code. There is inadequate
credible evidence that her defects were already present at the inception of, or prior to, the
marriage. In other words, her alleged psychological incapacity did not satisfy the jurisprudential
requisite of juridical antecedence.
With regard to Bonas sexual promiscuity prior to her marriage to Jose, we have only the
uncorroborated testimony of Jose made in open court to support this allegation.To quote the
pertinent portion of the transcript:
Q: So, what was the reason why you have broken with your wife after several years -

A: Well, I finally broke up with my wife because I can no longer bear the torture because of the
gossips that she had an affair with other men, and finally, when I have a chance to
confront her she admitted that she had an affair with other men.
Q: With other men. And, of course this her life with other men of course before the marriage you
have already known
A: Yes, your honor.
Q: So, that this gossips because you said that you thought that this affair would go to end after
your marriage?
A: Yes, I was thinking about that.
Q: So, that after several years she will not change so thats why you cant bear it anymore?
A: Yes, maam.[20]

Dr. Rondains testimony and psychiatric evaluation report do not provide evidentiary
support to cure the doubtful veracity of Joses one-sided assertion. Even if we take into account
the psychiatrists conclusion that Bona harbors a Histrionic Personality Disorder that existed
prior to her marriage with Jose and this mental condition purportedly made her helplessly prone
to promiscuity and sexual infidelity, the same cannot be taken as credible proof of antecedence
since the method by which such an inference was reached leaves much to be desired in terms of
meeting the standard of evidence required in determining psychological incapacity.
The psychiatrists findings on Bonas personality profile did not emanate from a personal
interview with the subject herself as admitted by Dr. Rondain in court, as follows:
Q: How about, you mentioned that the petitioner came for psychological test, how about the
respondent, did she come for interview and test?
A: No, maam.
Q: Did you try to take her for such?
A: Yes, maam.
Q: And what did she tell you, did she come for an interview?
A: There was no response, maam.[21]

As a consequence thereof, Dr. Rondain merely relied on her interview with Jose and his
witness, Mrs. Padernal, as well as the court record of the testimonies of other witnesses, to wit:
Q: And you said you did interviews. Who did the interview?
A: I interviewed Mr. Ochosa and their witness Padernal, maam.
Q: When you say Padernal are you referring to Gertrudes Himpayan Padernal who testified in
this court?
A: Yes, maam.
xxxx
Q: Other than the interviews what else did you do in order to evaluate members of the parties?

A: I also interviewed (sic) the transcript of stenographic notes of the testimonies of other
witnesses, maam.
xxxx
Q: Was there also a psychological test conducted on the respondent?
A: Yes, your honor.
Q: It was on the basis of the psychological test in which you based your evaluation report?
A: It was based on the psychological test conducted and clinical interview with the other
witnesses, your Honor.[22]

Verily, Dr. Rondain evaluated Bonas psychological condition indirectly from the
information gathered solely from Jose and his witnesses. This factual circumstance evokes the
possibility that the information fed to the psychiatrist is tainted with bias for Joses cause, in the
absence of sufficient corroboration.
Even if we give the benefit of the doubt to the testimonies at issue since the trial court
judge had found them to be credible enough after personally witnessing Jose and the witnesses
testify in court, we cannot lower the evidentiary benchmark with regard to information on
Bonas pre-marital history which is crucial to the issue of antecedence in this case because we
have only the word of Jose to rely on. In fact, Bonas dysfunctional family portrait which
brought about her Histrionic Personality Disorder as painted by Dr. Rondain was based solely
on the assumed truthful knowledge of Jose, the spouse who has the most to gain if his wife is
found to be indeed psychologically incapacitated. No other witness testified to Bonas family
history or her behavior prior to or at the beginning of the marriage. Both Mrs. Padernal and
Corporal Bajet came to know Bona only during their employment in petitioners
household during the marriage. It is undisputed that Jose and Bona were married in 1973 while
Mrs. Padernal and Corporal Bajet started to live with petitioners family only in 1980 and 1986,
respectively.
We have previously held that, in employing a rigid and stringent level of evidentiary
scrutiny to cases like this, we do not suggest that a personal examination of the party alleged to
be psychologically incapacitated is mandatory; jurisprudence holds that this type of
examination is not a mandatory requirement. While such examination is desirable, we recognize
that it may not be practical in all instances given the oftentimes estranged relations between the
parties. For a determination though of a partys complete personality profile, information coming
from persons with personal knowledge of the juridical antecedents may be helpful. This is an
approach in the application of Article 36 that allows flexibility, at the same time that it avoids, if
not totally obliterate, the credibility gaps spawned by supposedly expert opinion based entirely
on doubtful sources of information.[23]
However, we have also ruled in past decisions that to make conclusions and
generalizations on a spouses psychological condition based on the information fed by only one
side, similar to what we have pointed out in the case at bar, is, to the Courts mind, not different
from admitting hearsay evidence as proof of the truthfulness of the content of such evidence.[24]
Anent the accusation that, even at the inception of their marriage, Bona did not wish to be
with Jose as a further manifestation of her psychological incapacity, we need only to look at the
testimonial records of Jose and his witnesses to be convinced otherwise, to wit:

JOSE OCHOSAS TESTIMONY:

Q: How long did you stay with your wife?
A: We were married in 1973 and we separated in 1988 but in all those years there were only few
occasions that we were staying together because most of the time Im in the field.
Q: Now, you said most of the time you were in the field, did you not your wife come with you in
any of your assignments?
A: Never, but sometimes she really visited me and stayed for one (1) day and then
Q: And, where did your wife stayed when she leaves you?
A: She was staying with her mother in Basilan.
Q: Where were you assigned most of the time?
A: I was assigned in Davao, Zamboanga, Cotabato, Basilan.
Q: And, of course she would come to your place every now and then because it is not very far
A: No, maam, once in a while only.
Q: Did you not go home to your conjugal home?
A: I have a chanced also to go home because we were allowed to at least three (3) days every
other month.
Q: So, if you start from the marriage up to 1988 so that is 16 years you were supposed to have
been living together?
A: No, actually in 19 middle of 1987 because in 1987 I was in x x x.[25]

GERTRUDES PADERNALS TESTIMONY:

Q: Now, do you know when they lived together as husband and wife?
A: 1979.
Q: And you said that you have known the petitioner and the respondent in this case because in
fact, you lived with them together in the same quarters. Does the quarters have different
rooms?
A: Yes, maam.
Q: But very near each other?
A: Yes, maam.
Q: You know them because of the proximity of the quarters?
A: Yes, maam.
Q: It was only during this 1980 to 1983, three (3) years that you lived together that you have a
chance to be with the spouses?
xxxx

A: Since 1980 to 1983 we lived together in the same house.

xxxx
Q: Now, Madam Witness, after 1983, where did you reside together with your husband?
A: In Cagayan de Oro and in 1986 we came back to Manila, in Fort Bonifacio.
Q: You mean, in the same house where petitioner and the respondent lived together?
A: Yes. Maam.
Q: How long did you live in the house where the petitioner and the respondent stay?
A: Twelve years now since 1983 to 1995.
Q: Where was the petitioner working at that time, from 1982 to 1995?
A: He is a soldier, a Colonel.
Q: Do you know where he was assigned during this time?
A: Yes, maam, G-3.
Q: May we know where this G-3 is?
A: Fort Bonifacio, maam.
Q: What about the wife, where does she stay?
A: At Fort Bonifacio, in their house.[26]

DR. ELIZABETH E. RONDAINS TESTIMONY:

Q: Now, they got married in 1973, am I correct?
A: Yes, maam.
Q: But the matter of the work or assignment of the petitioner, he was assigned in different
Provinces or Barangays in the Philippines?
A: Yes, maam.
Q: Now, when the wife or the respondent in this case did not go with the husband in different
places of his assignment did you ask her why what was the reason why she did not like to
go those places?
A: She just did not want to. The wife did not go with him because by transferring from one place
to another, she just dont want to go, she just wanted to stay in Basilan where her
hometown is, maam.
Q: Did the petitioner herein tell you why the respondent dont want to go with him?
A: Yes, I asked, the answer of the petitioner was she simply did not want to go with him because
she did not want him to be appointed to far away places.
Q: And would it be that since she did not like to go with the husband in some far away different
assignments she also assumed that the assignments were in this war regions they were
always fighting considering the place in Basilan they were in fighting atmosphere?

A: It is possible but he was transferred to Manila and she also refused to stay in Manila, maam.
Q: When was that that she refused to come to Manila?
A: I think, sometime in 1983, maam. She did not follow immediately. She stayed with him only
for four (4) months, maam.
Q: Now, do you know if the petitioner and the respondent were living together as husband and
wife for this period of time during the relationship?
A: Yes, maam. After their marriage I believe their relationship was good for a few months until
he was transferred to Julu. I believe during that time when they were together the
husband was giving an attention to her. The husband was always there and when the
husband transferred to Basilan, the attention was not there anymore, maam.[27]

It is apparent from the above-cited testimonies that Bona, contrary to Joses assertion, had no
manifest desire to abandon Jose at the beginning of their marriage and was, in fact, living with
him for the most part of their relationship from 1973 up to the time when Jose drove her away
from their conjugal home in 1988. On the contrary, the record shows that it was Jose who was
constantly away from Bona by reason of his military duties and his later incarceration. A
reasonable explanation for Bonas refusal to accompany Jose in his military assignments in other
parts of Mindanao may be simply that those locations were known conflict areas in the
seventies. Any doubt as to Bonas desire to live with Jose would later be erased by the fact that
Bona lived with Jose in their conjugal home in Fort Bonifacio during the following decade.
In view of the foregoing, the badges of Bonas alleged psychological incapacity, i.e., her
sexual infidelity and abandonment, can only be convincingly traced to the period of time after
her marriage to Jose and not to the inception of the said marriage.
We have stressed time and again that Article 36 of the Family Code is not to be confused with a
divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefore manifest themselves. It
refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the
marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties
and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. These marital obligations
are those provided under Articles 68 to 71, 220, 221 and 225 of the Family Code.[28]
While we are not insensitive to petitioners suffering in view of the truly appalling and shocking
behavior of his wife, still, we are bound by judicial precedents regarding the evidentiary
requirements in psychological incapacity cases that must be applied to the present case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED.

G.R. No. 171557

February 12, 2014

REPUBLIC
OF
vs.
RODOLFO O. DE GRACIA, Respondent.

THE

PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari are the Decision dated June 2, 2005 and Resolution dated February
3, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 69103 which affirmed the Decision dated October 17, 2000
of the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga del Norte, Branch 11 (RTC) in Civil Case No. S-665 declaring the
marriage of respondent Rodolfo O. De Gracia (Rodolfo) and Natividad N. Rosalem (Natividad) void on the ground of
psychological incapacity pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines (Family Code).
1

The Facts
Rodolfo and Natividad were married on February 15, 1969 at the Parish of St. Vincent Ferrer in Salug, Zamboanga
del Norte. They lived in Dapaon, Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte and have two (2) children, namely, Ma. Reynilda
R. De Gracia (Ma. Reynilda) and Ma. Rizza R. De Gracia (Ma. Rizza), who were born on August 20, 1969 and
January 15, 1972, respectively.
6

On December 28, 1998, Rodolfo filed a verified complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage (complaint) before the
RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. S-665, alleging that Natividad was psychologically incapacitated to comply with
her essential marital obligations. In compliance with the Order dated January 5, 1999 of the RTC, the public
prosecutor conducted an investigation to determine if collusion exists between Rodolfo and Natividad and found that
there was none. Trial on the merits then ensued.
8

In support of his complaint, Rodolfo testified, among others, that he first met Natividad when they were students at
the Barangay High School of Sindangan, and he was forced to marry her barely three (3) months into their
courtship in light of her accidental pregnancy. At the time of their marriage, he was 21 years old, while Natividad
was 18 years of age. He had no stable job and merely worked in the gambling cockpits as "kristo" and "bangkero sa
hantak." When he decided to join and train with the army, Natividad left their conjugal home and sold their house
without his consent. Thereafter, Natividad moved to Dipolog City where she lived with a certain Engineer Terez
(Terez), and bore him a child named Julie Ann Terez. After cohabiting with Terez, Natividad contracted a second
marriage on January 11, 1991 with another man named Antonio Mondarez and has lived since then with the latter in
Cagayan de Oro City. From the time Natividad abandoned them in 1972, Rodolfo was left to take care of Ma.
Reynilda and Ma. Rizza and he exerted earnest efforts to save their marriage which, however, proved futile
because of Natividads psychological incapacity that appeared to be incurable.
10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

For her part, Natividad failed to file her answer, as well as appear during trial, despite service of
summons. Nonetheless, she informed the court that she submitted herself for psychiatric examination to Dr. Cheryl
T. Zalsos (Dr. Zalsos) in response to Rodolfos claims. Rodolfo also underwent the same examination.
18

19

20

In her two-page psychiatric evaluation report, Dr. Zalsos stated that both Rodolfo and Natividad were
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations, finding that both parties suffered from
"utter emotional immaturity [which] is unusual and unacceptable behavior considered [as] deviant from persons who
abide by established norms of conduct." As for Natividad, Dr. Zalsos also observed that she lacked the willful
cooperation of being a wife and a mother to her two daughters. Similarly, Rodolfo failed to perform his obligations as
a husband, adding too that he sired a son with another woman. Further, Dr. Zalsos noted that the mental condition
of both parties already existed at the time of the celebration of marriage, although it only manifested after. Based on
the foregoing, Dr. Zalsos concluded that the "couples union was bereft of the mind, will and heart for the obligations
of marriage."
21

22

23

On February 10, 1999, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing petitioner Republic of the Philippines
(Republic), filed an opposition to the complaint, contending that the acts committed by Natividad did not
demonstrate psychological incapacity as contemplated by law, but are mere grounds for legal separation under the
Family Code.
24

25

The RTC Ruling

In a Decision dated October 17, 2000, the RTC declared the marriage between Rodolfo and Natividad void on the
ground of psychological incapacity. It relied on the findings and testimony of Dr. Zalsos, holding that Natividads
emotional immaturity exhibited a behavioral pattern which in psychiatry constitutes a form of personality disorder
that existed at the time of the parties marriage but manifested only thereafter. It likewise concurred with Dr. Zalsoss
observation that Natividads condition is incurable since it is deeply rooted within the make-up of her personality.
Accordingly, it concluded that Natividad could not have known, much more comprehend the marital obligations she
was assuming, or, knowing them, could not have given a valid assumption thereof.
26

27

The Republic appealed to the CA, averring that there was no showing that Natividads personality traits constituted
psychological incapacity as envisaged under Article 36 of the Family Code, and that the testimony of the expert
witness was not conclusive upon the court.
28

The CA Ruling
In a Decision dated June 2, 2005, the CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC, finding that while Natividads emotional
immaturity, irresponsibility and promiscuity by themselves do not necessarily equate to psychological incapacity,
"their degree or severity, as duly testified to by Dr. Zalsos, has sufficiently established a case of psychological
disorder so profound as to render [Natividad] incapacitated to perform her essential marital obligations."
29

30

The Republic moved for reconsideration which was, however, denied in a Resolution dated February 3, 2006,
hence, the instant petition.
31

The Issue Before the Court

The primordial issue in this case is whether or not the CA erred in sustaining the RTCs finding of psychological
incapacity.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition is meritorious.
"Psychological incapacity," as a ground to nullify a marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, should refer to no
less than a mental not merely physical incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so
expressed in Article 68 of the Family Code, among others, include their mutual obligations to live together,
observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the
law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. In Santos
v. CA (Santos), the Court first declared that psychological incapacity must be characterized by: (a) gravity (i.e., it
must be grave and serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a
marriage); (b) juridical antecedence (i.e., it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage,
although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage); and (c) incurability (i.e., it must be incurable,
or even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved). The Court laid down more
definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code in Republic of the Phils. v.
CA, whose salient points are footnoted hereunder. These guidelines incorporate the basic requirements that the
Court established in Santos.
32

33

34

35

36

37

38

39

40

Keeping with these principles, the Court, in Dedel v. CA, held that therein respondents emotional immaturity and
irresponsibility could not be equated with psychological incapacity as it was not shown that these acts are
manifestations of a disordered personality which make her completely unable to discharge the essential marital
obligations of the marital state, not merely due to her youth, immaturity or sexual promiscuity. In the same light, the
Court, in the case of Pesca v. Pesca (Pesca), ruled against a declaration of nullity, as petitioner therein "utterly
failed, both in her allegations in the complaint and in her evidence, to make out a case of psychological incapacity
on the part of respondent, let alone at the time of solemnization of the contract, so as to warrant a declaration of
nullity of the marriage," significantly noting that the "[e]motional immaturity and irresponsibility, invoked by her,
cannot be equated with psychological incapacity." In Pesca, the Court upheld the appellate courts finding that the
petitioner therein had not established that her husband "showed signs of mental incapacity as would cause him to
be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenant, as so provided for in Article 68 of the Family Code; that the
incapacity is grave, has preceded the marriage and is incurable; that his incapacity to meet his marital responsibility
is because of a psychological, not physical illness; that the root cause of the incapacity has been identified medically
or clinically, and has been proven by an expert; and that the incapacity is permanent and incurable in nature."
41

42

43

44

The Court maintains a similar view in this case. Based on the evidence presented, there exists insufficient factual
or legal basis to conclude that Natividads emotional immaturity, irresponsibility, or even sexual promiscuity, can be
equated with psychological incapacity.
1wphi1

The RTC, as affirmed by the CA, heavily relied on the psychiatric evaluation report of Dr. Zalsos which does not,
however, explain in reasonable detail how Natividads condition could be characterized as grave, deeply-rooted, and
incurable within the parameters of psychological incapacity jurisprudence. Aside from failing to disclose the types of
psychological tests which she administered on Natividad, Dr. Zalsos failed to identify in her report the root cause of
Natividad's condition and to show that it existed at the time of the parties' marriage. Neither was the gravity or
seriousness of Natividad's behavior in relation to her failure to perform the essential marital obligations sufficiently
described in Dr. Zalsos's report. Further, the finding contained therein on the incurability of Natividad's condition
remains unsupported by any factual or scientific basis and, hence, appears to be drawn out as a bare conclusion
and even self-serving. In the same vein, Dr. Zalsos's testimony during trial, which is essentially a reiteration of her
report, also fails to convince the Court of her conclusion that Natividad was psychologically incapacitated. Verily,
although expert opm10ns furnished by psychologists regarding the psychological temperament of parties are
usually given considerable weight by the courts, the existence of psychological incapacity must still be proven by
independent evidence. After poring over the records, the Court, however, does not find any such evidence
sufficient enough to uphold the court a quo's nullity declaration. To the Court's mind, Natividad's refusal to live with
Rodolfo and to assume her duties as wife and mother as well as her emotional immaturity, irresponsibility and
infidelity do not rise to the level of psychological incapacity that would justify the nullification of the parties' marriage.
Indeed, to be declared clinically or medically incurable is one thing; to refuse or be reluctant to perform one's duties
is another. To hark back to what has been earlier discussed, psychological incapacity refers only to the most serious
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. In the final analysis, the Court does not perceive a disorder of this nature to exist in
the present case. Thus, for these reasons, coupled too with the recognition that marriage is an inviolable social
institution and the foundation of the family, the instant petition is hereby granted.
45

46

47

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated June 2, 2005 and Resolution dated February 3, 2006
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 69103 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the complaint for
declaration of nullity of marriage filed under Article 36 of the Family Code is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

ENRIQUE
AGRAVIADOR yALUNAN,
Petitioner,

versus -

G.R. No. 170729

Present:
CARPIO MORALES, J., Chairperson,
BRION,
BERSAMIN,
VILLARAMA, JR., and
SERENO, JJ.
Promulgated:

ERLINDA
AMPAROAGRAVIADOR and REPUBLIC
OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondents. -- -

December 8, 2010

x--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION
BRION, J.:

Enrique Agraviador y Alunan (petitioner) challenges through his petition for review
on certiorari[1] the decision dated May 31, 2005[2] and the resolution dated December 6,
2005[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 75207.The challenged decision
reversed the resolution[4] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 276, Muntinlupa City,
declaring the marriage of the petitioner and Erlinda Amparo-Agraviador (respondent) null and
void on the ground of the latters psychological incapacity. The assailed resolution, on the other
hand, denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration.
Antecedent Facts
The petitioner first met the respondent in 1971 at a beerhouse where the latter worked. The
petitioner, at that time, was a 24-year old security guard of the Bureau of Customs, while the
respondent was a 17-year old waitress. Their meeting led to a courtship, and they eventually
became sweethearts. They often spent nights together at the respondents rented room, and soon
entered into a common-law relationship.
On May 23, 1973, the petitioner and the respondent contracted marriage in a ceremony
officiated by Reverend Juanito Reyes at a church in Tondo, Manila. The petitioners family was
apprehensive about this marriage because of the nature of the respondents work and because she
came from a broken family. Out of their union, the petitioner and the respondent begot four (4)
children, namely: Erisque, Emmanuel, Evelyn, and Eymarey.
On March 1, 2001, the petitioner filed with the RTC a petition for the declaration of
nullity of his marriage with the respondent, under Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended.
[5]
The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 01-081. He alleged that the respondent was
psychologically incapacitated to exercise the essential obligations of marriage as she was
carefree and irresponsible, and refused to do household chores like cleaning and cooking;
stayed away from their house for long periods of time; had an affair with a lesbian; did not take
care of their sick child; consulted a witch doctor in order to bring him bad fate; and refused to
use the family name Agraviador in her activities.
The petitioner likewise claimed that the respondent refused to have sex with him since
1993 because she became very close to a male tenant in their house. In fact, he discovered their
love notes to each other, and caught them inside his room several times.
The respondent moved to dismiss the petition on the ground that the root cause of her
psychological incapacity was not medically identified and alleged in the petition. [6]The RTC
denied this motion in its order dated July 2, 2001.[7]
In her answer,[8] the respondent denied that she engaged in extramarital affairs and
maintained that it was the petitioner who refused to have sex with her. She claimed that the
petitioner wanted to have their marriage annulled because he wanted to marry their former
household helper, Gilda Camarin. She added that she was the one who took care of their son at
the hospital before he died.

The RTC ordered the city prosecutor and/or the Solicitor General to investigate if
collusion existed between the parties.[9] The RTC, in its Order of November 20, 2001, allowed
the petitioner to present his evidence ex parte.[10] The petitioner, thus, presented testimonial and
documentary evidence to substantiate his claims.
In his testimony, the petitioner confirmed what he stated in his petition, i.e., that the
respondent was carefree, irresponsible, immature, and whimsical; stubbornly did what she
wanted; did not stay long in the conjugal dwelling; refused to do household chores; refused to
take care of him and their children; and consulted a witch doctor in order to bring bad luck upon
him.
The petitioner further confirmed that the respondent abandoned their sick child, which
led to the latters death. The petitioner further stated that the respondent became very close to a
male border of their house; he discovered their love notes to each other, and caught them inside
his room several times.
The petitioner declared that he filed the petition for nullity because the respondent
refused to change; he loves his children and does not want their children to be affected by their
mothers conduct. He intimated that he might remarry if it would benefit their children.
Aside from his testimony, the petitioner also presented a certified true copy of their
marriage contract (Exh. B)[11] and the psychiatric evaluation report (Exh. A)[12] of Dr. Juan Cirilo
L. Patac.
In his Psychiatric Evaluation Report, Dr. Patac made the following findings:
REMARKS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Based on the information gathered from Enrique, his son and their helper, the
psychological report and the mental status examination, Enrique is found to be
psychologically capable to fulfill the essential obligations of marriage. He
coped with Erlindas selfish and irresponsible behavior as he dutifully
performed what she failed to do for the family. He patiently tried to understand
her and exerted every effort to make her realize the harm caused by her neglect
to the family. Throughout their marriage, he provided emotional and material
support for the family. He engaged in other business endeavors aside from his
employment as he maintained to be financially productive.
The same data revealed that Erlinda failed to fulfill the essential obligations of
marriage. She manifested inflexible maladaptive behavior even at the time
before their marriage. She is known to be stubborn and uncaring who did things
her way without regard to the feelings of others. She is an irresponsible
individual who selfishly ignored and neglected her role as daughter to her
parents as wife to Enrique and mother to their children. Before the marriage at
a young age of 17, Erlinda defied her parents as she lived alone, rented a room
for herself and allowed Enrique to sleep with her. She did not care about the
needs of Enrique before and after marriage and she maintained to be so with
her children. She abandoned and relegated her duty to her family to their
helper. She never stayed long in their house despite pleadings from her children
and Enrique. Her irresponsible, uncaring behavior even led to the death of one
of their children. Likewise, she does not show concern and ignores a daughter

who is presently manifesting behavioral problem. She kept secrets as she never
allowed her husband and children know where she stays when shes not at work.
She falsified documents as she hid her marital status when she used her maiden
surname in her present employment. She is having illicit affairs and is reported
to be presently having an affair with a lesbian. Her desire to bring bad fate and
death to Enrique through her consultation with amangkukulam point out her
lack of care, love, and respect to Enrique.
Erlindas lack of motivation and insight greatly affected her capacity to render
love, respect and support to her family.
The above data shows that Erlinda is suffering from a Personality Disorder
(Mixed Personality Disorder). She has been having this disorder since her
adolescence. There is no definite treatment for this disorder. She is deemed
psychologically incapacitated to perform the obligations of marriage.
In fairness to Erlinda, she is recommended to undergo the same examination as
Enrique underwent.[13]

The RTC Ruling

The RTC nullified the marriage of the petitioner and the respondent in its decision
of April 26, 2002. It saw merit in the petitioners testimony and Dr. Patacs psychiatric evaluation
report, and concluded that:
Without contradiction the recitation by Petitioner and the findings of the doctor
show that Respondent is indeed suffering from Mixed Personality Disorder that render
her incapable of complying with her marital obligations. Respondents refusal to
commit herself to the marriage, her tendencies to avoid a close relationship with
Petitioner, preferring to be with her lover and finally abandoning their home for a
lesbian, a disregard of social norm, show that she was never prepared for marital
commitment in the first place. This incapacity is deeply rooted from her family
upbringing with no hope for a cure. Therefore, for the good of society and of the
parties themselves, it is best that this marriage between ENRIQUE AGRAVIADOR Y
ALUNAN and ERLINDA AMPARO AGRAVIADOR be annulled as if it never took
place at all. The Civil Registrar of the City of Manila and the General Civil Registrar,
National Census and Statistics Office, East Avenue, Quezon City, are
hereby requested to make the necessary correction of the civil record of the marriage
between the parties and on their respective civil status.
The children ERISQUE AGRAVIADOR, EMMANUEL AGRAVIADOR,
EVELYN AGRAVIADOR and EYMAREY AGRAVIADOR will however remain as
their legitimate children.
It is SO ORDERED.[14]

The CA Decision
The Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General, appealed the RTC
decision to the CA. The CA, in its decision [15] dated May 31, 2005, reversed and set aside the
RTC resolution, and dismissed the petition.

The CA held that Dr. Patacs psychiatric evaluation report failed to establish that the respondents
personality disorder was serious, grave and permanent; it likewise did not mention the root
cause of her incapacity. The CA further ruled that Dr. Patac had no basis in concluding that the
respondents disorder had no definite treatment because he did not subject her to a mental
assessment.
The CA added that the psychiatric remarks in the Report were nothing but a showcase of
respondents character flaws and liabilities. There was no proof of a natal or supervening factor
that effectively incapacitated the respondent from accepting and complying with the essential
obligations of marriage. If at all, these character flaws may only give rise to a legal separation
suit.
The petitioner moved to reconsider this decision, but the CA denied his motion in its
resolution of December 6, 2005.[16]
The Petition and Issues
The petitioner now comes to us via the present petition to challenge and seek the reversal of the
CA ruling, based on the following arguments:
I.

THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY [HIM] WAS MORE THAN

SUBSTANTIAL
TO
ESTABLISH
THE PSYCHOLOGICAL
INCAPACITY OF THE RESPONDENT[;]

II.

THE GUIDELINES SET FORTH IN REPUBLIC V. MOLINA [HAD

BEEN] SATISIFIED[;]

III.

THE ADMISSIBILITY XXX OF THE PSYCHIATRIC EVALUATION

REPORT XXX STILL STANDS FOR NOT HAVING BEEN
CONTESTED XXX BY THE STATE AND/THE RESPONDENT[; and]

IV.

THE DEGREE OF PROOF REQUIRED IN CIVIL CASES HAD

BEEN SATISIFIED[.]

The issue in this case essentially boils down to whether there is basis to nullify the petitioners
marriage to the respondent on the ground of psychological incapacity to comply with the
essential marital obligations.

The Courts Ruling

We resolve to deny the petition for lack of merit, and hold that no sufficient basis exists to annul
the marriage, pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code and its related jurisprudence.
The totality of evidence presented
failed to establish the respondents
psychological incapacity

The petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is anchored on Article 36 of the Family Code
which provides that "[a] marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration,
was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage,
shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization." It
introduced the concept of psychological incapacity as a ground for nullity of marriage, although
this concept eludes exact definition.
The initial common consensus on psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family
Code was that it did not involve a species of vice of consent. Justices Sempio-Diy and Caguioa,
both members of the Family Code revision committee that drafted the Code, conceded that the
spouse may have given free and voluntary consent to a marriage but was, nonetheless, incapable
of fulfilling such rights and obligations. Dr. Arturo Tolentino likewise stated in the 1990 edition
of his commentaries on the Family Code that this psychological incapacity to comply with the
essential marital obligations does not affect the consent to the marriage.[17]
In Santos v. Court of Appeals,[18] the Court first declared that psychological incapacity
must be characterized by (a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability. It should
refer to "no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged
by the parties to the marriage."[19] It must be confined to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage.
We laid down more definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of
the Family Code in Republic v. Court of Appeals[20] (the Molina case) where we said:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of
the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both
our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family.
Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it as the
foundation of the nation. It decrees marriage as legally inviolable, thereby protecting
it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be
protected by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family
and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or
clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts
and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that
the incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations and/or
symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or
one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could
not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have
given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be
given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle
ofejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological
illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by
qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration
of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties
exchanged their I do's. The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such
time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent
or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the
other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a
profession or employment in a job. x x x
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party
to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, mild characteriological
peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as
root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a
refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting
and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up
to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221
and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied
marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and
included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given
great respect by our courts. x x x
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor
General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless
the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision,
briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be,
to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit
to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is
deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge
the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.

These guidelines incorporate the basic requirements we established in Santos. A later

case, Marcos v. Marcos,[21] further clarified that there is no requirement that the
defendant/respondent spouse should be personally examined by a physician or psychologist as a
condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological
incapacity. Accordingly, it is no longer necessary to introduce expert opinion in a petition under
Article 36 of the Family Code if the totality of evidence shows that psychological incapacity
exists and its gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability can be duly established.
A later case, Ngo Te v. Yu-Te,[22] declared that it may have been inappropriate for the Court to
impose a rigid set of rules, as the one in Molina, in resolving all cases of psychological
incapacity. We stated that instead of serving as a guideline, Molina unintentionally became a
straightjacket, forcing all cases involving psychological incapacity to fit into and be bound by it,
which is not only contrary to the intention of the law but unrealistic as well because, with
respect to psychological incapacity, no case can be considered as on "all fours" with

another. Ngo Te, therefore, put into question the applicability of time-tested guidelines set forth
in Molina.
Ting v. Velez-Ting[23] and the fairly recent case of Suazo v. Suazo[24] squarely met the issue and
laid to rest any question regarding the applicability of Molina. In these cases, we clarified
that Ngo Te did not abandon Molina; far from abandoning Molina, it simply suggested the
relaxation of its stringent requirements.
We
also
explained
in Suazo thatNgo Te merely stands for a more flexible approach in considering petitions for
declaration of nullity of marriages based on psychological incapacity.
Under these established guidelines, we find the totality of the petitioners evidence
insufficient to prove the respondents psychological incapacity.

a. Petitioners court testimony

For clarity, we reproduce the pertinent portions of the petitioners testimony that
essentially confirmed what the petition alleged:
Q: Out of your marriage with the said respondent, were you blessed with
children, and how many?
A: Yes, sir, we were blessed with four (4), two (2) boys and two (2) girls.
Q: Where are they now?
A: All grown up with the exception of one who died of pneumonia due to the
neglect and fault of my said wife who abandone[d] him at the time of his
illness.
Q: Is that the reason why you file[d] the instant petition, Mr. Witness?
A: It is only one of the several reasons, Sir.
Q: Can you cite these reasons, you mentioned?
A: She appears to be carefree, irresponsible, immature, whimsical and used
to impose what she wanted to get, she refused to do household
chores, like cooking, caring for the husband and children, used to
stay from the conjugal dwelling, initially for weeks, then for months
and lately fully abandoned the family house and stay with a lesbian.
[sic]
At first, I discovered a love note while being so secretive and used to be
very close to a male renter in the ground floor of their house and
caught them several times alone in his room, thus explaining the
reason why she refused to have sex since 1993, up to and until the
present time.
Lately, we discovered that she used to consult a cult mangkukulam to bring
bad fate against the family and death for me.

Q: By the way did you give her the chance to change?

A: I gave her but she refused to reform.
xxxx
Q: Can you not give a last chance for you to save your marriage?
A: I think I cannot since she does not accept her fault and she does not want to
change for the sake of our family.[25]

These exchanges during trial significantly constituted the totality of the petitioners
testimony on the respondents supposed psychological or mental malady. We glean from these
exchanges the petitioners theory that the respondents psychological incapacity is premised on
her refusal or unwillingness to perform certain marital obligations, and a number of unpleasant
personality traits such as immaturity, irresponsibility, and unfaithfulness.
These acts, in our view, do not rise to the level of psychological incapacity that the law
requires, and should be distinguished from the difficulty, if not outright refusal or neglect, in the
performance of some marital obligations that characterize some marriages. [26] The intent of the
law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of
personality disorders existing at the time of the marriage clearly demonstrating an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. [27] The psychological
illness that must have afflicted a party at the inception of the marriage should be a malady so
grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond he or she is about to assume.[28]
In the present case, the petitioners testimony failed to establish that the respondents
condition is a manifestation of a disordered personality rooted on some incapacitating or
debilitating psychological condition that makes her completely unable to discharge the essential
marital obligations. If at all, the petitioner merely showed that the respondent had some
personality defects that showed their manifestation during the marriage; his testimony sorely
lacked details necessary to establish that the respondents defects existed at the inception of the
marriage. In addition, the petitioner failed to discuss the gravity of the respondents condition;
neither did he mention that the respondents malady wasincurable, or if it were otherwise, the
cure would be beyond the respondents means to undertake. The petitioners declarations that the
respondent does not accept her fault, does not want to change, and refused to reform are
insufficient to establish a psychological or mental defect that is serious, grave, or incurable as
contemplated by Article 36 of the Family Code.
In a similar case, Bier v. Bier,[29] we ruled that it was not enough that the respondent,
alleged to be psychologically incapacitated, had difficulty in complying with his marital
obligations, or was unwilling to perform these obligations. Proof of a natal or supervening
disabling factor an adverse integral element in the respondent's personality structure that
effectively incapacitated him from complying with his essential marital obligations had to be
shown.
b. Dr. Patacs Psychiatric Evaluation Report

The Court finds that Dr. Patacs Psychiatric Evaluation Report fell short in proving that
the respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital duties. We
emphasize that Dr. Patac did not personally evaluate and examine the respondent; he, in fact,
recommended at the end of his Report for the respondent to undergo the same examination [that
the petitioner] underwent.[30] Dr. Patac relied only on the information fed by
the petitioner, the parties second child, Emmanuel, and household helper. Sarah. Largely, the
doctor relied on the information provided by the petitioner. Thus, while his Report can be used
as a fair gauge to assess the petitioners own psychological condition (as he was, in fact,
declared by Dr. Patac to be psychologically capable to fulfill the essential obligations of
marriage), the same statement cannot be made with respect to the respondents condition. The
methodology employed simply cannot satisfy the required depth and comprehensiveness of the
examination required to evaluate a party alleged to be suffering from a psychological disorder.
[31]

We do not suggest that a personal examination of the party alleged to be psychologically

incapacitated is mandatory. We have confirmed in Marcos v. Marcos that the person sought to
be declared psychologically incapacitated must be personally examined by a psychologist as a
condition sine qua non to arrive at such declaration.[32] If a psychological disorder can be proven
by independent means, no reason exists why such independent proof cannot be admitted and
given credit.[33] No such independent evidence appears on record, however, to have been
gathered in this case.
In his Report, Dr. Patac attempted to establish the juridical antecedence of the
respondents condition by stating that the respondent manifested inflexible maladaptive behavior
before marriage, pointing out how the respondent behaved before the marriage the respondent
defied her parents and lived alone; rented a room for herself; and allowed the petitioner to sleep
with her. These perceived behavioral flaws, to our mind, are insufficient to establish that the
incapacity was rooted in the history of the respondent antedating the marriage. Dr. Patac failed
to elucidate on the circumstances that led the respondent to act the way she did, for example,
why she defied her parents and decided to live alone; why she neglected her obligations as a
daughter; and why she often slept with the petitioner. This is an area where independent
evidence, such as information from a person intimately related to the respondent, could prove
useful. As earlier stated, no such independent evidence was gathered in this case. In the absence
of such evidence, it is not surprising why the Psychiatric Report Evaluation failed to explain
how and why the respondents so-called inflexible maladaptive behavior was already present at
the time of the marriage.
Dr. Patacs
Psychiatric
Evaluation
Report
likewise
failed
to prove
the gravity or seriousness of the respondents condition. He simply made an enumeration of the
respondents purported behavioral defects (as related to him by third persons), and on this basis
characterized the respondent to be suffering from mixed personality disorder. In the Background
History portion of his Psychiatric Evaluation Report, Dr. Patac mentioned that the respondent
employed one of her siblings to do the household chores; did not help in augmenting the
familys earnings; belittled the petitioners income; continued her studies despite the petitioners
disapproval; seldom stayed at home; became close to a male border; had an affair with a
lesbian; did not disclose the actual date of her departure to Taiwan; threatened to poison the
petitioner and their children; neglected and ignoredtheir children; used her maiden name at
work; and consulted a witch doctor to bring bad fate to the petitioner. Except for the isolated

and unfounded statement that Erlindas lack of motivation and insight greatly affected her
capacity to render love, respect and support to the family,[34] there was no other statement
regarding the degree of severity of the respondents condition, why and to what extent the
disorder
is
grave,
and
how
it
incapacitated
her
to
comply
with the duties required in marriage. There was likewise no showing of a supervening disabling
factor or debilitating psychological condition that effectively incapacitated the respondent from
complying with the essential marital obligations. At any rate, the personality flaws mentioned
above, even if true, could only amount to insensitivity, sexual infidelity, emotional immaturity,
and irresponsibility, which do not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity
under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Interestingly, Dr. Patacs Psychiatric Evaluation Report highlighted only the respondents
negative behavioral traits without balancing them with her other qualities. The allegations of
infidelity and insinuations of promiscuity, as well as the claim that the respondent refused to
engage in sexual intercourse since 1993, of course, came from the petitioner, but these claims
were not proven. Even assuming ex gratia argumenti that these accusations were true, the
Psychiatric Evaluation Report did not indicate that unfaithfulness or promiscuousness were
traits that antedated or existed at the time of marriage. Likewise, the accusation that the
respondent abandoned her sick child which eventually led to the latters death appears to be an
exaggerated claim in the absence of any specifics and corroboration. On the other hand, the
petitioners own questionable traits his flirtatious nature before marriage and his admission that
he inflicted physical harm on the respondent every time he got jealous were not pursued. From
this perspective, the Psychiatric Evaluation Report appears to be no more than a one-sided
diagnosis against the respondent that we cannot consider a reliable basis to conclusively
establish the root cause and the degree of seriousness of her condition.
The Psychiatric Evaluation Report likewise failed to adequately explain how Dr. Patac
came to the conclusion that the respondents personality disorder had no definite treatment. It
did not discuss the concept of mixed personality disorder, i.e., its classification, cause,
symptoms, and cure, and failed to show how and to what extent the respondent exhibited this
disorder in order to create a necessary inference that the respondents condition had no definite
treatment or is incurable. A glaring deficiency, to our mind, is the Psychiatric Evaluation
Reports failure to support its findings and conclusions with any factual basis. It simply
enumerated the respondents perceived behavioral defects, and then associated these traits with
mixed personality disorder. We find it unfortunate that Dr. Patac himself was not called on the
witness stand to expound on the findings and conclusions he made in his Psychiatric Evaluation
Report. It would have aided petitioners cause had he called Dr. Patac to testify.
Admittedly, the standards used by the Court in assessing the sufficiency
of psychological evaluation reports may be deemed very strict, but these are proper, in view of the
principle that any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage and the indissolubility
of the marital vinculum.[35] Marriage, an inviolable institution protected by the State, cannot be
dissolved at the whim of the parties, especially where the prices of evidence presented are
grossly deficient to show the juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability of the condition of
the party alleged to be psychologically incapacitated to assume and perform the essential
marital duties.

The petitioners marriage to the respondent may have failed and appears to be without
hope of reconciliation The remedy, however, is not always to have it declared void ab initio on the
ground of psychological incapacity. We stress that Article 36 of the Family Code contemplates
downright incapacity or inability to assume and fulfill the basic marital obligations,not a mere refusal,
neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will, on the part of the errant spouse. It is
not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the grounds for
divorce manifest themselves. The State, fortunately or unfortunately, has not seen it fit to decree
that divorce should be available in this country. Neither should an Article 36 declaration of
nullity be equated with legal separation, in which the grounds need not be rooted in
psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure, moral corruption, civil
interdiction, drug addiction, sexual infidelity, abandonment, and the like.[36] Unless the evidence
presented clearly reveals a situation where the parties or one of them, by reason of a grave and incurable
psychological illness existing at the time the marriage was celebrated, was incapacitated to fulfill the
obligations of marital life (and thus could not then have validly entered into a marriage), then we are
compelled to uphold the indissolubility of the marital tie.
WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, we DENY the petition and AFFIRM the
Decision and the Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated May 31, 2005 andDecember 6, 2005,
respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 75207. Costs against the petitioner.

JOCELYN M. SUAZO,
Petitioner,

G.R. No. 164493

Present:
CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
BRION,
DEL CASTILLO,

versus -

ABAD, and
PEREZ, JJ.

Promulgated:

ANGELITO
SUAZO
REPUBLIC
THEPHILIPPINES,

and March 10, 2010

OF

Respondents.
x--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION
BRION, J.:

We resolve the appeal filed by petitioner Jocelyn Suazo (Jocelyn) from

the July 14, 2004 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA)[1] in CA-G.R. CV No.
62443, which reversed the January 29, 1999 judgment of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 119, Pasay City in Civil Case No. 97-1282.[2] The
reversed RTC decision nullified Jocelyns marriage with respondent Angelito
Suazo (Angelito) on the ground of psychological incapacity.
THE FACTS

Jocelyn and Angelito were 16 years old when they first met in June 1985;
they were residents of Laguna at that time. After months of courtship,
Jocelyn went to Manila with Angelito and some friends. Having been gone
for three days, their parents sought Jocelyn and Angelito and after finding
them, brought them back to Bian, Laguna. Soon thereafter, Jocelyn and
Angelitos marriage was arranged and they were married on March 3,
1986 in a ceremony officiated by the Mayor of Bian.

Without any means to support themselves, Jocelyn and Angelito lived with
Angelitos parents after their marriage. They had by this time stopped
schooling. Jocelyn took odd jobs and worked for Angelitos relatives as
household help. Angelito, on the other hand, refused to work and was most
of the time drunk. Jocelyn urged Angelito to find work and violent quarrels
often resulted because of Jocelyns efforts.

Jocelyn left Angelito sometime in July 1987. Angelito thereafter found

another woman with whom he has since lived. They now have children.

Ten years after their separation, or on October 8, 1997, Jocelyn filed with the
RTC a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code, as amended. She claimed that Angelito was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. In
addition to the above historical narrative of their relationship, she alleged in
her complaint:

xxxx

8. That from the time of their marriage up to their separation in July

1987, their relationship had been marred with bitter quarrels which
caused unbearable physical and emotional pains on the part of the
plaintiff because defendant inflicted physical injuries upon her every
time they had a troublesome encounter;

9. That the main reason for their quarrel was always the refusal of
the defendant to work or his indolence and his excessive drinking
which makes him psychologically incapacitated to perform his
marital obligations making life unbearably bitter and intolerable to
the plaintiff causing their separation in fact in July 1987;

10. That such psychological incapacity of the defendant started from

the time of their marriage and became very apparent as time went
and proves to be continuous, permanent and incurable;

xxxx

Angelito did not answer the petition/complaint. Neither did he submit

himself to a psychological examination with psychologist Nedy Tayag (who
was presumably hired by Jocelyn).
The case proceeded to trial on the merits after the trial court found that no
collusion existed between the parties. Jocelyn, her aunt Maryjane Serrano,
and the psychologist testified at the trial.

In her testimony, Jocelyn essentially repeated the allegations in her

petition, including the alleged incidents of physical beating she received
from Angelito. On cross-examination, she remained firm on these
declarations but significantly declared that Angelito had not treated her
violently before they were married.

Asst. Sol. Gen. Kim Briguera:

Q. Can you describe your relationship with the respondent
before you got married?

A. He always go (sic) to our house to court me.

Q. Since you cited violence, after celebration of marriage, will

you describe his behavioural (sic) pattern before you got married?

A. He show (sic) kindness, he always come (sic) to the house.

Q. So you cannot say his behavioral pattern composing of

violent nature before you got married (sic), is there any signs (sic) of
violence?

A. None maam (sic), because we were not sweethearts.

Q. Even to other people?

A. He also quarrel (sic).[3]

Maryjane Serrano corroborated parts of Jocelyns testimony.

When the psychologist took the witness stand, she declared:

Q. What about the respondent, did you also make clinical

interpretation of his behavior?

A. Apparently, the behavior and actuation of the respondent

during the time of the marriage the respondent is suffering from
anti-social personality Disorder this is a serious and severe
apparently incurable (sic). This disorder is chronic and long-standing
before the marriage.

Q. And you based your interpretation on the report given by

the petitioner?

A. Based on the psychological examination wherein there is no

pattern of lying when I examined her, the petitioner was found to be
very responsive, coherent, relevant to marital relationship with
respondent.

Q. And the last page of Exhibit E which is your report there is a

statement rather on the last page, last paragraph which state: It is
the clinical opinion of the undersigned that marriage between the
two, had already hit bottom rock (sic) even before the actual
celebration of marriage. Respondent(s) immature, irresponsible and
callous emotionality practically harbors (sic) the possibility of having
blissful relationship. His general behavior fulfill(s) the diagnostic
criteria for a person suffering from Anti Social Personality Disorder.
Such disorder is serious and severe and it interferred (sic) in his
capacity to provide love, caring, concern and responsibility to his
family. The disorder is chronic and long-standing in proportion and
appear(s) incurable. The disorder was present at the time of the
wedding and became manifest thereafter due to stresses and
pressure of married life. He apparently grew up in a dysfunctional
family. Could you explain what does chronic mean?

A. Chronic is a clinical language which means incurable it has

been there long before he entered marriage apparently, it came
during early developmental (sic) Basic trust was not develop (sic).

Q. And this long standing proportion (sic).

A. That no amount of psychological behavioral help to cure

such because psychological disorder are not detrimental to men but
to others particularly and this (sic) because the person who have
this kind of disorder do not know that they have this kind of disorder.

Q. So in other words, permanent?

A. Permanent and incurable.

Q. You also said that this psychological disorder is present

during the wedding or at the time of the wedding or became
manifest thereafter?

A. Yes, maam.

xxxx

Court:

Q. Is there a clinical findings (sic)?

A. That is the clinical findings. Personality Disorder labeled on

Anti-Social Personality Disorder (sic).

Q. How was shown during the marriage (sic)?

A. The physical abuses on the petitioner also correlated without

any employment exploitative and silent (sic) on the part of the
respondent is clearly Anti-Social Disorder.

Q. Do the respondent know that he has that kind of

psychological disorder (sic)?

A. Usually a person suffering that psychological disorder will

not admit that they are suffering that kind of disorder (sic).

Court:

Q. So because of this Anti-Social Disorder the petitioner suffers

a lot (sic)?

A. Yes, because the petitioner is a victim of hardships of marital

relation to the respondent (sic).

Court:

Q. Was the Anti-Social Personality Disorder also shown to the

parents (sic)?

A. Yes, according to the petitioner, respondent never give due

respect more often than not he even shouted at them for no
apparent reason (sic).

Court:

Q. Did you say Anti-Social Disorder incurable (sic)?

A. Yes, sir.

Court:

Q. Is there a physical violence (sic)?

A. Actually, I could see the petitioner is tortured mentally of the

respondent (sic).

Court:

Q. How was the petitioner tortured?

A. She was able to counter-act by the time she was separated

by the respondent (sic).

Court:

Q. Do you mean to tell us that Anti-Social disorder is incurable?

A. Yes, sir.

Court:

Q. Why did you know?

A. Anti-Social disorder is incurable again because the person
itself, the respondent is not aware that this kind of personality affect
the other party (sic).

Court:

Q. This Anti-Social behavior is naturally affected the petitioner (sic)?

A. They do not have children because more often than not the
respondent is under the influence of alcohol, they do not have
peaceful harmonious relationship during the less than one year and
one thing what is significant, respondent allowed wife to work as
housemaid instead of he who should provide and the petitioner
never receive and enjoy her earning for the five months that she
work and it is also the petitioner who took sustainance of the vices.
(sic)

Q. And because of that Anti-Social disorder he had not shown

love to the petitioner?

A. From the very start the respondent has no emotion to

sustain the marital relationship but what he need is to sustain his
vices thru the petitioner (sic).

Court:

Q. What are the vices?

A. Alcohol and gambling.

Court:

Q. And this affected psychological incapacity to perform marital

obligation?

A. Not only that up to this time from my clinical analysis of

Anti-Social Personality Disorder, he is good for nothing person. [4]

The psychologist also identified the Psychological Report she prepared. The
Report pertinently states:[5]

Report on the psychological condition of JOCELYN M. SUAZO, a

petitioner for Nullity of Marriage versus ANGELITO D. SUAZO

GENERAL DATA

[This pertains to Jocelyns]

BRIEF MARITAL HISTORY

xxxx

Husband is Angelito D. Suazo, 28 years old reached 3 rd year

high school, a part time tricycle driver, eldest among 4
siblings. Father is a machine operator, described to be an alcoholic,
womanizer and a heavy gambler. While mother is a sales agent. It
was a common knowledge within their vicinity that she was also
involved in an illicit relationship. Familial relationship was described
to be stormy, chaotic whose bickering and squabbles were part and
parcel of their day to day living.

TEST RESULTS AND EVALUATION

Projective data reveal an introvert person whose impulse life is

adequately suppressed so much so that it does not create inner
tension and anxiety. She is fully equipped in terms of drives and
motivation particularly in uplifting not, only her socio-emotional
image but was as her morale. She may be sensitive yet capable of
containing the effect of such sensitiveness; in order to remain in
goodstead (sic) with her immediate environment.

She is pictured as a hard-working man (sic) who looks forward

for a better future in spite of difficulties she had gone through in the
past. She is fully aware of external realities of life that she set simple
life goals which is (sic) commensurate with her capabilities and
limitations. However, she needs to prioritize her interest in order to
direct her energy toward specific goals.Her tolerance for frustration
appears to be at par with her coping mechanism that she is able to
discharge negative trends appropriately.

REMARKS :

[Already cited in full in the psychologists testimony quoted above] [6]

The Office of the Solicitor General representing the Republic of

the Philippines strongly opposed the petition for declaration of nullity of the
marriage. Through a Certification filed with the RTC, it argued that the
psychologist failed to examine and test Angelito; thus, what she said about
him was purely hearsay.

THE RTC RULING

The RTC annulled the marriage under the following reasoning:

While there is no particular instance setforth (sic) in the law

that a person may be considered as psychologically incapacitated,
there as (sic) some admitted grounds that would render a person to
be unfit to comply with his marital obligation, such as immaturity,
i.e., lack of an effective sense of rational judgment and
responsibility, otherwise peculiar to infants (like refusal of the
husband to support the family or excessive dependence on parents
or peer group approval) and habitual alcoholism, or the condition by
which a person lives for the next drink and the next drinks (The
Family Code of the Phils, Alicia Sempio-Diy, p.39, 1988 ed.)

The evidence presented by the petitioner and the testimony of

the petitioner and Dr. Tayag, points (sic) to one thing that the
petitioner failed to establish a harmonious family life with the
respondent. On the contrary, the respondent has not shown love
and respect to the petitioner manifested by the formers being
irresponsible, immature, jobless, gambler, drunkard and worst of all
a wife beater. The petitioner, unable to bear any longer the
misbehavior and attitude of the respondent, decided, after one year
and four months of messy days, to leave the respondent.

In this regard, the petitioner was able to prove that right from
the start of her married life with the respondent, she already
suffered from maltreatment, due to physical injuries inflicted upon
her and that she was the one who worked as a housemaid of a
relative of her husband to sustain the latters niece (sic) and because
they were living with her husbands family, she was obliged to do the
household chores an indication that she is a battered wife coupled
with the fact that she served as a servant in his (sic) husbands
family.

This situation that the petitioner had underwent may be

attributed to the fact that at the time of their marriage, she and her
husband are still young and was forced only to said marriage by her
relatives. The petitioner and the respondent had never developed
the feeling of love and respect, instead, the respondent blamed the
petitioners family for said early marriage and not to his own liking.

Applying the principles and the requisites of psychological incapacity

enunciated by this Court in Santos v. Court of Appeals,[7] the RTC concluded:

The above findings of the psychologist [referring to the

psychologist testimony quoted above] would only tend to show that
the respondent was, indeed, suffering from psychological incapacity
which is not only grave but also incurable.

Likewise, applying the principles set forth in the case of

Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Molina, 268 SCRA 198, wherein
the Supreme Court held that:

x x x x [At this point, the RTC cited the pertinent Molina ruling]

The Court is satisfied that the evidence presented and the

testimony of the petitioner and Dr. Familiar (sic) [the psychologist
who testified in this case was Nedy Tayag, not a Dr.
Familiar] attesting that there is psychological incapacity on the part
of the respondent to comply with the essential marital obligations
has been sufficiently and clearly proven and, therefore, petitioner is
entitled to the relief prayed for.

A claim that the marriage is valid as there is no psychological

incapacity of the respondent is a speculation and conjecture and
without moral certainty. This will enhanced (sic) a greater tragedy as
the battered wife/petitioner will still be using the surname of the
respondent, although they are now separated, and a grim and sad
reminder of her husband who made here a slave and a punching
bag during the short span of her marriage with him. The law on
annulment should be liberally construed in favor of an innocent
suffering petitioner otherwise said law will be an instrument to
protect persons with mental illness like the serious anti-social
behavior of herein respondent.[8]

THE CA RULING

The Republic appealed the RTC decision to the CA. The CA reversed the RTC
decision, ruling that:

True, as stated in Marcos vs Marcos 343 SCRA 755, the

guidelines set in Santos vs Court of Appeals and Republic vs Court of
Appeals do not require that a physician personally examine the
person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. The Supreme
Court adopted the totality of evidence approach which allows the
fact of psychological incapacity to be drawn from evidence that
medically or clinically identify the root causes of the illness. If the
totality of the evidence is enough to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the
person concerned need not be resorted to. Applied in Marcos,
however, the aggregate testimony of the aggrieved spouse,
children, relatives and the social worker were not found to be
sufficient to prove psychological incapacity, in the absence of any
evaluation of the respondent himself, the person whose mental and
psychological capacity was in question.

In the case at bench, there is much scarcer evidence to hold

that the respondent was psychologically incapable of entering into
the marriage state, that is, to assume the essential duties of
marriage due to an underlying psychological illness. Only the wife
gave first-hand testimony on the behavior of the husband, and it is
inconclusive. As observed by the Court in Marcos, the respondent
may have failed to provide material support to the family and has
resorted to physical abuse, but it is still necessary to show that they
were manifestations of a deeper psychological malaise that was
clinically or medically identified. The theory of the psychologist that
the respondent was suffering from an anti-social personality
syndrome at the time of the marriage was not the product of any
adequate medical or clinical investigation. The evidence that she got
from the petitioner, anecdotal at best, could equally show that the
behavior of the respondent was due simply to causes like
immaturity or irresponsibility which are not equivalent to
psychological incapacity, Pesca vs Pesca 356 SCRA 588, or the
failure or refusal to work could have been the result of
rebelliousness on the part of one who felt that he had been forced
into a loveless marriage. In any event, the respondent was not
under a permanent compulsion because he had later on shown his
ability to engage in productive work and more stable relationships
with another. The element of permanence or incurability that is one
of the defining characteristic of psychological incapacity is not
present.

There is no doubt that for the short period that they were
under the same roof, the married life of the petitioner with the

respondent was an unhappy one. But the marriage cannot for this
reason be extinguished. As the Supreme Court intimates in Pesca,
our strict handling of Article 36 will be a reminder of the inviolability
of the marriage institution in our country and the foundation of the
family that the law seeks to protect. The concept of psychological
incapacity is not to be a mantra to legalize what in reality are
convenient excuses of parties to separate and divorce.

THE PETITION
Jocelyn now comes to us via the present petition to challenge and seek the
reversal of the CA ruling based on the following arguments:

1. The Court of Appeals went beyond what the law says, as it

totally disregarded the legal basis of the RTC in declaring the
marriage null and void Tuason v. Tuason (256 SCRA 158; to be
accurate, should be Tuason v. Court of Appeals) holds that the
finding of the Trial Court as to the existence or non-existence of
petitioners psychological incapacity at the time of the marriage is
final and binding on us (the Supreme Court); petitioner has not
sufficiently shown that the trial courts factual findings and
evaluation of the testimonies of private respondents witnesses vis-vis petitioners defenses are clearly and manifestly erroneous;

2. Article 36 of the Family Code did not define psychological

incapacity; this omission was intentional to give the courts a wider
discretion to interpret the term without being shackled by statutory
parameters. Article 36 though was taken from Canon 1095 of the
New Code of Canon Law, which gives three conditions that would
make a person unable to contract marriage from mental incapacity
as follows:
1095. They are incapable of contracting marriage:
(1) who lack the sufficient use of reason;

(2) who suffer from grave lack of discretion of judgment

concerning essential matrimonial rights and duties which are to
be mutually given and accepted;

(3) who are not capable of assuming the essential

obligations of matrimony due to causes of a psychic nature.

The decision of the RTC, Jocelyn claims, intelligently conforms to these

criteria. The RTC, being clothed with discretionary functions, applied its
finding of psychological incapacity based on existing jurisprudence and the
law itself which gave lower court magistrates enough latitude to define what
constitutes psychological incapacity. On the contrary, she further claims, the
OSG relied on generalities without being specific on why it is opposed to the
dissolution of a marriage that actually exists only in name.
Simply stated, we face the issue of whether there is basis to nullify
Jocelyns marriage with Angelito under Article 36 of the Family Code.

THE COURTS RULING

We find the petition devoid of merit. The CA committed no

reversible error of law in setting aside the RTC decision, as no basis exists to
declare Jocelyns marriage with Angelito a nullity under Article 36 of the
Family Code and its related jurisprudence.

The Law, Molina and Te

Article 36 of the Family Code provides that a marriage contracted by

any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage,
shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after
its solemnization.

A unique feature of this law is its intended open-ended application, as

it merely introduced an abstract concept psychological incapacity that
disables compliance with the contractual obligations of marriage without
any concrete definition or, at the very least, an illustrative example. We
must therefore apply the law based on how the concept of psychological
incapacity was shaped and developed in jurisprudence.

Santos
v.
Court
of
Appeals[9] declared
that
psychological
incapacity must
be
characterized
by
(a) gravity;
(b) juridical
antecedence; and (c) incurability. It should refer to no less than a mental
(not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the
basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage. It must be confined to the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. [10]

The Court laid down more definitive guidelines in the interpretation and
application of the law in Republic v. Court of Appeals[11] (Molina) as follows:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage
belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our
Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity
of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the
Family, recognizing it as the foundation of the nation. It decrees
marriage as legally inviolable, thereby protecting it from dissolution
at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be
protected by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage
and the family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and
solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a)
medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity
must be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations
and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the
court that the parties or one of them was mentally or psychically ill
to such an extent that the person could not have known the
obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have
given valid assumption thereof.
Although no example of
such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application
of the provision under the principle ofejusdem generis, nevertheless
such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given
by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of
the celebration of the marriage. The evidence must show that the
illness was existing when the parties exchanged their I do's. The
manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time,
but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior
thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or

clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute
or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily
absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore,
such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the
exercise of a profession or employment in a job. x x x
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the
disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Thus, mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes.
The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a
refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there
is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse
integral element in the personality structure that effectively
incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby
complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced
by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband
and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in
regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital
obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence
and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts x
xx
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No
decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a
certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating
therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may
be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting
attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen
(15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution
of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent
function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.[12]

Molina, subsequent jurisprudence holds, merely expounded on the basic

requirements of Santos.[13]

A later case, Marcos v. Marcos,[14] further clarified that there is no

requirement that the defendant/respondent spouse should be personally
examined by a physician or psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the

declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity.

Accordingly, it is no longer necessary to introduce expert opinion in a
petition under Article 36 of the Family Code if the totality of evidence shows
that
psychological
incapacity
exists
and
its gravity, juridical
antecedence, andincurability can be duly established.[15]

Pesca v. Pesca[16] clarifies that the Molina guidelines apply even to

cases then already pending, under the reasoning that the courts
interpretation or construction establishes the contemporaneous legislative
intent of the law; the latter as so interpreted and construed would thus
constitute a part of that law as of the date the statute is enacted. It is
only when a prior ruling of this Court finds itself later overruled, and a
different view is adopted, that the new doctrine may have to be applied
prospectively in favor of parties who have relied on the old doctrine and
have acted in good faith in accordance therewith under the familiar rule of
lex prospicit, non respicit.
On March 15, 2003, the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 08-1110 SC, Rules) promulgated by the Court took effect. Section 2(d) of the
Rules pertinently provides:

(d) What to allege. A petition under Article 36 of the Family

Code shall specifically allege the complete facts showing that either
or both parties were psychologically incapacitated from complying
with the essential marital obligations of marriage at the time of the
celebration of marriage even if such incapacity becomes manifest
only after its celebration.

The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if

any, as are indicative of psychological incapacity at the time of the
celebration of the marriage but expert opinion need not be
alleged.

Section 12(d) of the Rules requires a pre-trial brief containing all the
evidence presented, including expert opinion, if any, briefly stating or
describing the nature and purpose of these pieces of evidence. Section
14(b) requires the court to consider during the pre-trial conference the
advisability of receiving expert testimony and such other matters as may
aid in the prompt disposition of the petition. Under Section 17 of the
Rules, the grounds for the declaration of the absolute nullity or annulment
of marriage must be proved.

All cases involving the application of Article 36 of the Family Code that
came to us were invariably decided based on the principles in the cited
cases. This was the state of law and jurisprudence on Article 36 when the
Court decided Te v. Yu-Te[17] (Te) which revisited the Molina guidelines.

Te begins with the observation that the Committee that drafted the
Family Code did not give any examples of psychological incapacity for fear
that by so doing, it would limit the applicability of the provision under the
principle of ejusdem generis; that the Committee desired that the courts
should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by
experience, by the findings of experts and researchers in psychological
disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals that, although not binding
on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision itself
was taken from the Canon Law.[18] Te thus assumes it a basic
premise that the law is so designed to allow some resiliency in its
application.[19]

Te then sustained Santos doctrinal value, saying that its interpretation

is consistent with that of the Canon Law.

Going back to its basic premise, Te said:

Conscious of the laws intention that it is the courts, on a caseto-case basis, that should determine whether a party to a marriage
is psychologically incapacitated, the Court, in sustaining the lower
courts judgment of annulment in Tuason v. Court of Appeals, ruled
that the findings of the trial court are final and binding on the
appellate courts.

Again, upholding the trial courts findings and declaring that its
decision was not a judgment on the pleadings, the Court, in Tsoi v.
Court of Appeals, explained that when private respondent testified
under oath before the lower court and was cross-examined by the
adverse party, she thereby presented evidence in the form of
testimony. Importantly, the Court, aware of parallel decisions of
Catholic marriage tribunals, ruled that the senseless and protracted

refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the marital obligation of

procreating children is equivalent to psychological incapacity.

With this as backdrop, Te launched an attack on Molina. It said that the

resiliency with which the concept should be applied and the case-to-case
basis by which the provision should be interpreted, as so intended by its
framers, had, somehow, been rendered ineffectual by the imposition of a
set of strict standards in Molina. Molina, to Te, has become a strait-jacket,
forcing all sizes to fit into and be bound by it; wittingly or unwittingly, the
Court, in conveniently applying Molina, has allowed diagnosed sociopaths,
schizophrenics, nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the like, to continuously
debase and pervert the sanctity of marriage.

Te then enunciated the principle that each case must be judged, not on the
basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations, but according
to its own facts. Courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case
basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in
psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.

As a final note though, Te expressly stated that it is not suggesting the

abandonment of Molina, but that, following Antonio v. Reyes, it merely
looked at other perspectives that should also govern the disposition of
petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. The subsequent Ting v.
Velez-Ting[20] follows Tes
lead
when
it
reiterated
that Tedid
not
abandon Molina; far from abandoning Molina, it simply suggested the
relaxation of its stringent requirements, cognizant of the explanation given
by the Committee on the Revision of the Rules on the rationale of the Rule
on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages:[21]

To require the petitioner to allege in the petition the particular

root cause of the psychological incapacity and to attach thereto the
verified written report of an accredited psychologist or psychiatrist
have proved to be too expensive for the parties. They adversely
affect access to justice of poor litigants. It is also a fact that there
are provinces where these experts are not available. Thus, the
Committee deemed it necessary to relax this stringent requirement
enunciated in the Molina Case. The need for the examination of a
party or parties by a psychiatrist or clinical psychologist and the
presentation of psychiatric experts shall now be determined by the
court during the pre-trial conference.

Te, therefore, instead of substantially departing from Molina,[22] merely

stands for a more flexible approach in considering petitions for declaration
of nullity of marriages based on psychological incapacity. It is also
noteworthy for its evidentiary approach in these cases, which it expounded
on as follows:

By the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the

primary task and burden of decision-making, must not discount
but, instead, must consider as decisive evidence the expert
opinion on the psychological and mental temperaments of
the parties.

xxxx

Hernandez v. Court of Appeals emphasizes the importance of

presenting expert testimony to establish the precise cause of a
partys psychological incapacity, and to show that it existed at the
inception of the marriage. And as Marcos v. Marcos asserts, there is
no requirement that the person to be declared psychologically
incapacitated be personally examined by a physician, if the totality
of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity. Verily, the evidence must show a link,
medical or the like, between the acts that manifest
psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder
itself.

This is not to mention, but we mention nevertheless for

emphasis, that the presentation of expert proof presupposes
a thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by the
psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave,
severe and incurable presence of psychological incapacity.
[23]
[Underscoring supplied]

This evidentiary approach is repeated in Ting v. Velez-Ting.[24]

Under this evolutionary development, as shown by the current

string of cases on Article 36 of the Family Code, what should not be
lost on us is the intention of the law to confine the application of
Article 36 to the most serious cases of personality disorders,
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage; that the psychological
illness that must have afflicted a party at the inception of the
marriage should be a malady so grave and permanent as to deprive
one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond he or she is about to assume. [25] It is not enough
that the respondent, alleged to be psychologically incapacitated, had
difficulty in complying with his marital obligations, or was unwilling to
perform these obligations. Proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor
an adverse integral element in the respondents personality structure that
effectively incapacitated him from complying with his essential marital
obligations must be shown.[26] Mere difficulty, refusal or neglect in the
performance of marital obligations or ill will on the part of the spouse is
different from incapacity rooted in some debilitating psychological condition
or illness; irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion,
emotional immaturity and irresponsibility and the like, do not by themselves
warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under Article 36, as the same
may only be due to a persons refusal or unwillingness to assume the
essential obligations of marriage.[27]

If all these sound familiar, they do, for they are but iterations
of Santos juridical
antecedence,
gravity
and
incurability
requisites. This is proof of Santoscontinuing doctrinal validity.

The Present Case

As the CA did, we find Jocelyns evidence insufficient to establish

Angelitos psychological incapacity to
perform essential marital
obligations. We so conclude based on our own examination of the evidence
on record, which we were compelled to undertake because of the
differences in the trial court and the appellate courts appreciation and
evaluation of Jocelyns presented evidence.

a. The Expert Opinion Evidence

Both the psychologists testimony and the psychological report did not
conclusively show the root cause, gravity and incurability of Angelitos
alleged psychological condition.

We first note a critical factor in appreciating or evaluating the expert

opinion evidence the psychologists testimony and the psychological
evaluation report that Jocelyn presented. Based on her declarations in open
court, the psychologist evaluated Angelitos psychological condition only in
an indirect manner she derived all her conclusions from information coming
from Jocelyn whose bias for her cause cannot of course be doubted. Given
the source of the information upon which the psychologist heavily relied
upon, the court must evaluate the evidentiary worth of the opinion with due
care and with the application of the more rigid and stringent set of
standards outlined above, i.e., that there must be a thorough and in-depth
assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive
diagnosis of a psychological incapacity that is grave, severe and incurable.

In saying this, we do not suggest that a personal examination of the

party alleged to be psychologically incapacitated is mandatory;
jurisprudence holds that this type of examination is not a mandatory
requirement. While such examination is desirable, we recognize that it may
not be practical in all instances given the oftentimes estranged relations
between the parties. For a determination though of a partys complete
personality profile, information coming from persons intimately related to
him (such as the partys close relatives and friends) may be helpful. This is
an approach in the application of Article 36 that allows flexibility, at the
same time that it avoids, if not totally obliterate, the credibility gaps
spawned by supposedly expert opinion based entirely on doubtful sources of
information.

From these perspectives, we conclude that the psych`ologist, using

meager information coming from a directly interested party, could not have
secured a complete personality profile and could not have conclusively
formed an objective opinion or diagnosis of Angelitos psychological
condition. While the report or evaluation may be conclusive with respect to
Jocelyns psychological condition, this is not true for Angelitos. The
methodology employed simply cannot satisfy the required depth and
comprehensiveness of examination required to evaluate a party alleged to
be suffering from a psychological disorder. In short, this is not the
psychological report that the Court can rely on as basis for the conclusion
that psychological incapacity exists.

Other than this credibility or reliability gap, both the psychologists

report and testimony simply provided a general description of
Angelitos purported anti-social personality disorder, supported by the
characterization of this disorder as chronic, grave and incurable. The
psychologist was conspicuously silent, however, on the bases for her
conclusion or the particulars that gave rise to the characterization she
gave. These particulars are simply not in the Report, and neither can they
be found in her testimony.

For instance, the psychologist testified that Angelitos personality disorder is

chronic or incurable; Angelito has long been afflicted with the disorder prior
to his marriage with Jocelyn or even during his early developmental stage,
as basic trust was not developed. However, she did not support this
declaration with any factual basis. In her Report, she based her conclusion
on the presumption that Angelito apparently grew up in a dysfunctional
family. Quite noticeable, though, is the psychologists own equivocation on
this point she was not firm in her conclusion for she herself may have
realized that it was simply conjectural. The veracity, too, of this finding is
highly suspect, for it was based entirely on Jocelyns assumed knowledge of
Angelitos family background and upbringing.

Additionally, the psychologist merely generalized on the questions of

why and to what extent was Angelitos personality disorder grave and
incurable, and on the effects of the disorder on Angelitos awareness of and
his capability to undertake the duties and responsibilities of marriage.

The psychologist therefore failed to provide the answers to the more

important concerns or requisites of psychological incapacity, all of which are
critical to the success of Jocelyns cause.

b. Jocelyns Testimony

The inadequacy and/or lack of probative value of the psychological

report and the psychologists testimony impel us to proceed to the
evaluation of Jocelyns testimony, to find out whether she provided the court
with sufficient facts to support a finding of Angelitos psychological
incapacity.

Unfortunately, we find Jocelyns testimony to be insufficient. Jocelyn

merely testified on Angelitos habitual drunkenness, gambling, refusal to
seek employment and the physical beatings she received from him all of
which occurred after the marriage. Significantly, she declared in her
testimony that Angelito showed no signs of violent behavior,assuming this
to be indicative of a personality disorder, during the courtship stage or at
the earliest stages of her relationship with him. She testified on the alleged
physical beatings after the marriage, not before or at the time of the
celebration of the marriage. She did not clarify when these beatings exactly
took place whether it was near or at the time of celebration of the marriage
or months or years after. This is a clear evidentiary gap that materially
affects her cause, as the law and its related jurisprudence require that the
psychological incapacity must exist at the time of the celebration of the
marriage.

Habitual drunkenness, gambling and refusal to find a job, while

indicative of psychological incapacity, do not, by themselves, show
psychological incapacity. All these simply indicate difficulty, neglect or mere
refusal to perform marital obligations that, as the cited jurisprudence holds,
cannot be considered to be constitutive of psychological incapacity in the
absence of proof that these are manifestations of an incapacity rooted in
some debilitating psychological condition or illness.

The physical violence allegedly inflicted on Jocelyn deserves a different

treatment. While we may concede that physical violence on women
indicates abnormal behavioral or personality patterns, such violence,
standing alone, does not constitute psychological incapacity. Jurisprudence
holds that there must be evidence showing a link, medical or the like,
between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the
psychological disorder itself. The evidence of this nexus is irretrievably lost
in the present case under our finding that the opinion of the psychologist
cannot be relied upon. Even assuming, therefore, that Jocelyns account of
the physical beatings she received from Angelito were true, this evidence
does not satisfy the requirement of Article 36 and its related jurisprudence,
specifically the Santos requisites.

On the whole, the CA correctly reversed the RTC judgment, whose

factual bases we now find to be clearly and manifestly erroneous. Our ruling
in Tuason recognizing the finality of the factual findings of the trial court in
Article 36 cases (which is Jocelyns main anchor in her present appeal with
us) does not therefore apply in this case. We find that, on the contrary, the
CA correctly applied Article 36 and its related jurisprudence to the facts and
the evidence of the present case.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition for lack of

merit. We AFFIRM the appealed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 62443.Costs against the petitioner.

MA. SOCORRO CAMACHO-REYES,

Petitioner,

G.R. No. 185286

Present:

- versus -

CARPIO, J.,
Chairperson,
NACHURA,
PERALTA,
ABAD and
MENDOZA, JJ.
Promulgated:

RAMON REYES,
Respondent.

August 18, 2010

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
This case is, again, an instance of the all-too-familiar tale of a marriage in disarray.

In this regard, we air the caveat that courts should be extra careful before making a
finding of psychological incapacity or vicariously diagnosing personality disorders in spouses
where there are none. On the other hand, blind adherence by the courts to the exhortation in the
Constitution[1] and in our statutes that marriage is an inviolable social institution, and validating
a marriage that is null and void despite convincing proof of psychological incapacity, trenches
on the very reason why a marriage that is doomed from its inception should not be forcibly
inflicted upon its hapless partners for life.
At bar is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA
-G.R. CV No. 89761[2] which reversed the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 89,
Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-01-44854.[3]
First, we unfurl the facts.
Petitioner Maria Socorro Camacho-Reyes met respondent Ramon Reyes at the University of the
Philippines (UP), Diliman, in 1972 when they were both nineteen (19) years old. They were

simply classmates then in one university subject when respondent cross-enrolled from the UP
Los Baos campus. The casual acquaintanceship quickly developed into a boyfriend-girlfriend
relationship. Petitioner was initially attracted to respondent who she thought was free spirited
and bright, although he did not follow conventions and traditions. [4] Since both resided in
Mandaluyong City, they saw each other every day and drove home together from the university.
Easily impressed, petitioner enjoyed respondents style of courtship which included dining out,
unlike other couples their age who were restricted by a university students budget. At that time,
respondent held a job in the family business, the Aristocrat Restaurant. Petitioners good
impression of the respondent was not diminished by the latters habit of cutting classes, not even
by her discovery that respondent was taking marijuana.
Not surprisingly, only petitioner finished university studies, obtaining a degree in AB Sociology
from the UP. By 1974, respondent had dropped out of school on his third year, and just
continued to work for the Aristocrat Restaurant.
On December 5, 1976, the year following petitioners graduation and her fathers death,
petitioner and respondent got married. At that time, petitioner was already five (5) months
pregnant and employed at the Population Center Foundation.
Thereafter, the newlyweds lived with the respondents family in Mandaluyong City. All living
expenses were shouldered by respondents parents, and the couples respective salaries were
spent solely for their personal needs. Initially, respondent gave petitioner a monthly allowance
of P1,500.00 from his salary.
When their first child was born on March 22, 1977, financial difficulties started. Rearing a child
entailed expenses. A year into their marriage, the monthly allowance ofP1,500.00 from
respondent stopped. Further, respondent no longer handed his salary to petitioner. When
petitioner mustered enough courage to ask the respondent about this, the latter told her that he
had resigned due to slow advancement within the family business. Respondents game plan was
to venture into trading seafood in the province, supplying hotels and restaurants, including the
Aristocrat Restaurant. However, this new business took respondent away from his young family
for days on end without any communication. Petitioner simply endured the set up, hoping that
the situation will change.
To prod respondent into assuming more responsibility, petitioner suggested that they live
separately from her in-laws. However, the new living arrangement engendered further financial
difficulty. While petitioner struggled to make ends meet as the single-income earner of the
household, respondents business floundered. Thereafter, another attempt at business, a fishpond
in Mindoro, was similarly unsuccessful. Respondent gave money to petitioner sporadically.
Compounding the familys financial woes and further straining the parties relationship was the
indifferent attitude of respondent towards his family. That his business took him away from his
family did not seem to bother respondent; he did not exert any effort to remain in touch with
them while he was away in Mindoro.
After two (2) years of struggling, the spouses transferred residence and, this time, moved in
with petitioners mother. But the new set up did not end their marital difficulties. In fact, the
parties became more estranged. Petitioner continued to carry the burden of supporting a family
not just financially, but in most aspects as well.

In 1985, petitioner, who had previously suffered a miscarriage, gave birth to their third son. At
that time, respondent was in Mindoro and he did not even inquire on the health of either the
petitioner or the newborn. A week later, respondent arrived in Manila, acting nonchalantly while
playing with the baby, with nary an attempt to find out how the hospital bills were settled.
In 1989, due to financial reverses, respondents fishpond business stopped operations. Although
without any means to support his family, respondent refused to go back to work for the family
business. Respondent came up with another business venture, engaging in scrap paper and
carton trading. As with all of respondents business ventures, this did not succeed and added to
the trail of debt which now hounded not only respondent, but petitioner as well. Not
surprisingly, the relationship of the parties deteriorated.
Sometime in 1996, petitioner confirmed that respondent was having an extra-marital affair. She
overheard respondent talking to his girlfriend, a former secretary, over the phone inquiring if the
latter liked respondents gift to her. Petitioner soon realized that respondent was not only unable
to provide financially for their family, but he was, more importantly, remiss in his obligation to
remain faithful to her and their family.
One of the last episodes that sealed the fate of the parties marriage was a surgical operation on
petitioner for the removal of a cyst. Although his wife was about to be operated on, respondent
remained unconcerned and unattentive; and simply read the newspaper, and played dumb when
petitioner requested that he accompany her as she was wheeled into the operating room. After
the operation, petitioner felt that she had had enough of respondents lack of concern, and asked
her mother to order respondent to leave the recovery room.
Still, petitioner made a string of final attempts to salvage what was left of their marriage.
Petitioner approached respondents siblings and asked them to intervene, confessing that she was
near the end of her rope. Yet, even respondents siblings waved the white flag on respondent.
Adolfo Reyes, respondents elder brother, and his spouse, Peregrina, members of a
marriage encounter group, invited and sponsored the parties to join the group. The elder couple
scheduled counseling sessions with petitioner and respondent, but these did not improve the
parties relationship as respondent remained uncooperative.
In 1997, Adolfo brought respondent to Dr. Natividad A. Dayan for a psychological assessment
to determine benchmarks of current psychological functioning. As with all other attempts to
help him, respondent resisted and did not continue with the clinical psychologists
recommendation to undergo psychotherapy.
At about this time, petitioner, with the knowledge of respondents siblings, told respondent to
move out of their house. Respondent acquiesced to give space to petitioner.
With the de facto separation, the relationship still did not improve. Neither did respondents
relationship with his children.
Finally, in 2001,[5] petitioner filed (before the RTC) a petition for the declaration of nullity of
her marriage with the respondent, alleging the latters psychological incapacity to fulfill the
essential marital obligations under Article 36 of the Family Code.

Traversing the petition, respondent denied petitioners allegations that he was psychologically
incapacitated. Respondent maintained that he was not remiss in performing his obligations to
his familyboth as a spouse to petitioner and father to their children.
After trial (where the testimonies of two clinical psychologists, Dr. Dayan and Dr. Estrella
Magno, and a psychiatrist, Dr. Cecilia Villegas, were presented in evidence), the RTC granted
the petition and declared the marriage between the parties null and void on the ground of their
psychological incapacity. The trial court ruled, thus:
Wherefore, on the ground of psychological incapacity of both parties, the
petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the marriage between petitioner MA. SOCORRO
PERPETUA CAMACHO and respondent RAMON REYES contracted on December
4, 1976 at the Archbishops Chapel Villa San Miguel Mandaluyong, Rizal, is declared
null and void under Art. 36 of the Family Code, as amended. Henceforth, their
property relation is dissolved.
Parties are restored to their single or unmarried status.
Their children JESUS TEODORO CAMACHO REYES and JOSEPH
MICHAEL CAMACHO REYES, who are already of age and have the full civil
capacity and legal rights to decide for themselves having finished their studies, are
free to decide for themselves.
The Decision becomes final upon the expiration of fifteen (15) days from
notice to the parties. Entry of Judgment shall be made if no Motion for
Reconsideration or New Trial or Appeal is filed by any of the parties, the Public
Prosecutor or the Solicitor General.
Upon finality of this Decision, the Court shall forthwith issue the corresponding
Decree if the parties have no properties[.] [O]therwise, the Court shall observe the
procedure prescribed in Section 21 of AM 02-11-10 SC.
The Decree of Nullity quoting the dispositive portion of the Decision (Sec. 22
AM 02-11-10 SC) shall be issued by the Court only after compliance with Articles 50
& 51 of the Family Code as implemented under the Rules on Liquidation, Partition
and Distribution of Property (Sections 19 & 21, AM 02-11-10 SC) in a situation where
the parties have properties.
The Entry of Judgment of this Decision shall be registered in the Local Civil
Registry of Mandaluyong and Quezon City.
Let [a] copy of this Decision be furnished the parties, their counsel, the Office
of the Solicitor General, the Public Prosecutor, the Office of the Local Civil Registrar,
Mandaluyong City, the Office of the Local Civil Registrar, Quezon City and the Civil
Registrar General at their respective office addresses.
SO ORDERED.[6]

Finding no cogent reason to reverse its prior ruling, the trial court, on motion for
reconsideration of the respondent, affirmed the declaration of nullity of the parties marriage.

Taking
exception
to
the
trial
courts
rulings,
respondent
appealed
to
the Court of Appeals, adamant on the validity of his marriage to petitioner. The appellate court,
agreeing with the respondent, reversed the RTC and declared the parties marriage as valid and
subsisting. Significantly, a special division of five (two members dissenting from the majority
decision and voting to affirm the decision of the RTC) ruled, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated
May 23, 2007 and Order dated July 13, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 89 inCivil Case No. Q-01-44854 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Amended Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage is hereby DISMISSED. No
pronouncement as to costs.[7]

Undaunted by the setback, petitioner now appeals to this Court positing the following issues:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT RESPONDENT IS
PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED TO COMPLY WITH THE ESSENTIAL
OBLIGATIONS OF MARRIAGE.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT PETITIONER IS
LIKEWISE PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED TO COMPLY WITH THE
ESSENTIAL OBLIGATIONS OF MARRIAGE.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT DISREGARDED THE
TESTIMONIES OF THE EXPERT WITNESSES PRESENTED BY PETITIONER.
IV
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE FINDINGS OF
THE TRIAL COURT ARE BINDING ON IT.

V
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE TOTALITY OF
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED DULY ESTABLISHED THE PSYCHOLOGICAL
INCAPACITIES OF THE PARTIES TO COMPLY WITH THE ESSENTIAL
OBLIGATIONS OF MARRIAGE.
VI
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITIES OF THE PARTIES TO COMPLY WITH THE
ESSENTIAL OBLIGATIONS OF MARRIAGE WERE ESTABLISHED, NOT
MERELY BY A TOTALITY, BUT BY A PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE.

VII
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE PARTIES
MARRIAGE, WHICH IS UNDOUBTEDLY VOID AB INITIO UNDER ARTICLE
36 OF THE FAMILY CODE, DOES NOT FURTHER THE INITIATIVES OF THE
STATE CONCERNING MARRIAGE AND FAMILY AND THEREFORE, NOT
COVERED BY THE MANTLE OF THE CONSTITUTION ON THE PROTECTION
OF MARRIAGE.
VIII
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE AMENDED
PETITION WAS VALIDLY AMENDED TO CONFORM TO EVIDENCE.[8]

Essentially, petitioner raises the singular issue of whether the marriage between the
parties is void ab initio on the ground of both parties psychological incapacity, as provided in
Article 36 of the Family Code.
In declaring the marriage null and void, the RTC relied heavily on the oral and
documentary evidence obtained from the three (3) experts i.e., Doctors Magno, Dayan and
Villegas. The RTC ratiocinated, thus:
After a careful evaluation of the entire evidence presented, the Court finds merit in the
petition.

Article 36 of the Family Code reads:

A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration,
was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity
becomes manifest only after solemnization.
and Art. 68 of the same Code provides:
The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love,
respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support.
Similarly, Articles 69-71 further define the mutual obligations of a marital partner
towards each other and Articles 220, 225 and 271 of the Family Code express the
duties of parents toward their children.
Article 36 does not define what psychological incapacity means. It left the
determination of the same solely to the Court on a case to case basis.
xxxx
Taking into consideration the explicit guidelines in the determination of psychological
incapacity in conjunction to the totality of the evidence presented, with emphasis on
the pervasive pattern of behaviors of the respondent and outcome of the
assessment/diagnos[is] of expert witnesses, Dra. Dayan, Dra. Mango and Dra. Villegas

on the psychological condition of the respondent, the Court finds that the marriage
between the parties from its inception has a congenital infirmity termed psychological
incapacity which pertains to the inability of the parties to effectively function
emotionally, intellectually and socially towards each other in relation to their essential
duties to mutually observe love, fidelity and respect as well as to mutually render help
and support, (Art. 68 Family Code). In short, there was already a fixed niche in the
psychological constellation of respondent which created the death of his marriage.
There is no reason to entertain any slightest doubt on the truthfulness of the personality
disorder of the respondent.
The three expert witnesses have spoken. They were unanimous in their findings that
respondent is suffering from personality disorder which psychologically incapacitated
him to fulfill his basic duties to the marriage. Being professionals and hav[ing] solemn
duties to their profession, the Court considered their assessment/diagnos[is] as credible
or a product of an honest evaluation on the psychological status of the respondent. This
psychological incapacity of the respondent, in the uniform words of said three (3)
expert witnesses, is serious, incurable and exists before his marriage and renders him a
helpless victim of his structural constellation. It is beyond the respondents impulse
control. In short, he is weaponless or powerless to restrain himself from his consistent
behaviors simply because he did not consider the same as wrongful. This is clearly
manifested from his assertion that nothing was wrong in his marriage with the
petitioner and considered their relationship as a normal one. In fact, with this belief, he
lent deaf ears to counseling and efforts extended to them by his original family
members to save his marriage. In short, he was blind and too insensitive to the reality
of his marital atmosphere. He totally disregarded the feelings of petitioner who
appeared to have been saturated already that she finally revealed her misfortunes to her
sister-in-law and willingly submitted to counseling to save their marriage. However,
the hard position of the respondent finally constrained her to ask respondent to leave
the conjugal dwelling. Even the siblings of the respondent were unanimous that
separation is the remedy to the seriously ailing marriage of the parties. Respondent
confirmed this stand of his siblings.
xxxx
The process of an ideal atmosphere demands a give and take relationship and not a
one sided one. It also requires surrender to the fulfillment of the essential duties to the
marriage which must naturally be observed by the parties as a consequence of their
marriage. Unfortunately, the more than 21 years of marriage between the parties did
not create a monument of marital integrity, simply because the personality disorder of
the respondent which renders him psychologically incapacitated to fulfill his basic
duties to his marriage, is deeply entombed in his structural system and cure is not
possible due to his belief that there is nothing wrong with them.
The checkered life of the parties is not solely attributable to the respondent. Petitioner,
too, is to be blamed. Dra. Villegas was firm that she, too, is afflicted with
psychological incapacity as her personality cannot be harmonized with the personality
of the respondent. They are poles apart. Petitioner is a well-organized person or a
perfectionist while respondent is a free spirited or carefree person. Thus, the weakness
of the respondent cannot be catered by the petitioner and vice-versa.
Resultantly, the psychological incapacities of both parties constitute the thunder bolt
or principal culprit on their inability to nurture and reward their marital life with
meaning and significance. So much so that it is a pity that though their marriage is
intact for 21 years, still it is an empty kingdom due to their psychological incapacity
which is grave, incurable and has origin from unhealthy event in their growing years.

Both parties to the marriage are protected by the law. As human beings, they are
entitled to live in a peaceful and orderly environment conducive to a healthy life. In
fact, Article 72 of the Family Code provides remedy to any party aggrieved by their
marital reality. The case of the parties is already a settled matter due to their
psychological incapacity. In the words of Dra. Magno, their marriage, at the very
inception, was already at the funeral parlor. Stated differently, there was no life at all
in their marriage for it never existed at all. The Court finds that with this reality, both
parties suffer in agony by continuously sustaining a marriage that exists in paper only.
Hence, it could no longer chain or jail the parties whose marriage remains in its crib
with its boots and diaper due to factors beyond the physical, emotional, intellectual
and social ability of the parties to sustain. [9]
In a complete turnaround, albeit disposing of the case through a divided decision, the
appellate court diverged from the findings of the RTC in this wise:
On the basis of the guidelines [in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina] vis-vis the totality of evidence presented by herein [petitioner], we find that the latter
failed to sufficiently establish the alleged psychological incapacity of her husband, as
well as of herself. There is thus no basis for declaring the nullity of their marriage
under Article 36 of the Family Code.
[Petitioner] presented several expert witnesses to show that [respondent] is
psychologically incapacitated. Clinical psychologist Dayan diagnosed [respondent] as
purportedly suffering from Mixed Personality Disorder (Schizoid Narcissistic and
Anti-Social Personality Disorder). Further, clinical psychologist Magno found
[respondent] to be suffering from an Antisocial Personality Disorder with narcissistic
and dependent features, while Dr. Villegas diagnosed [respondent] to be suffering
from Personality Disorder of the anti-social type, associated with strong sense of
Inadequacy especially along masculine strivings and narcissistic features.
Generally, expert opinions are regarded, not as conclusive, but as purely advisory in
character. A court may place whatever weight it chooses upon such testimonies. It
may even reject them, if it finds that they are inconsistent with the facts of the case or
are otherwise unreasonable. In the instant case, neither clinical psychologist Magno
nor psychiatrist Dr. Villegas conducted a psychological examination on the
[respondent].
Undoubtedly, the assessment and conclusion made by Magno and Dr. Villegas are
hearsay. They are unscientific and unreliable as they have no personal knowledge of
the psychological condition of the [respondent] as they never personally examined the
[respondent] himself.
xxxx
[I]t can be gleaned from the recommendation of Dayan that the purported
psychological incapacity of [respondent] is not incurable as the [petitioner] would like
this Court to think. It bears stressing that [respondent] was referred to Dayan for
psychological evaluation to determine benchmarks of current psychological
functioning. The undeniable fact is that based on Dayans personal examination of the
[respondent], the assessment procedures used, behavioral observations made,
background information gathered and interpretation of psychological data, the
conclusion arrived at is that there is a way to help the [respondent] through individual
therapy and counseling sessions.

Even granting arguendo that the charges cast by the [petitioner] on [respondent], such
as his failure to give regular support, substance abuse, infidelity and come and go
attitude are true, the totality of the evidence presented still falls short of establishing
that [respondent] is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations within the contemplation of Article 36 of the Family Code.
xxxx
In the case at bar, we hold that the court a quos findings regarding the [respondents]
alleged mixed personality disorder, his come and go attitude, failed business ventures,
inadequate/delayed financial support to his family, sexual infidelity, insensitivity to
[petitioners] feelings, irresponsibility, failure to consult [petitioner] on his business
pursuits, unfulfilled promises, failure to pay debts in connection with his failed
business activities, taking of drugs, etc. are not rooted on some debilitating
psychological condition but on serious marital difficulties/differences and mere
refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
[Respondents] defects were not present at the inception of marriage. They were even
able to live in harmony in the first few years of their marriage, which bore them two
children xxx. In fact, [petitioner] admitted in her Amended Petition that initially they
lived comfortably and [respondent] would give his salary in keeping with the tradition
in most Filipino households, but the situation changed when [respondent] resigned
from the family-owned Aristocrat Restaurant and thereafter, [respondent] failed in his
business ventures. It appears, however, that [respondent] has been gainfully employed
with Marigold Corporation, Inc. since 1998, which fact was stipulated upon by the
[petitioner].
xxxx
As regards the purported psychological incapacity of [petitioner], Dr. Villegas
Psychiatric Report states that [petitioner] manifested inadequacies along her affective
sphere, that made her less responsive to the emotional needs of her husband, who
needed a great amount of it, rendering her relatively psychologically incapacitated to
perform the duties and responsibilities of marriage.
However, a perusal of the Amended Petition shows that it failed to specifically allege
the complete facts showing that petitioner was psychologically incapacitated from
complying with the essential marital obligations of marriage at the time of celebration
[thereof] even if such incapacity became manifest only after its celebration xxx. In
fact, what was merely prayed for in the said Amended Petition is that judgment be
rendered declaring the marriage between the petitioner and the respondent solemnized
on 04 December 1976 to be void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity
on the part of the respondent at the time of the celebration of marriage x x x.
xxxx
What is evident is that [petitioner] really encountered a lot of difficulties in their
marriage. However, it is jurisprudentially settled that psychological incapacity must be
more than just a difficulty, a refusal or a neglect in the performance of some marital
obligations, it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to
some psychological illness existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage.
While [petitioners] marriage with [respondent] failed and appears to be without hope
of reconciliation, the remedy, however, is not always to have it declared void ab
initio on the ground of psychological incapacity. An unsatisfactory marriage, however,
is not a null and void marriage. No less than the Constitution recognizes the sanctity

of marriage and the unity of the family; it decrees marriage as legally inviolable and
protects it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage
are to be protected by the State.
Thus, in determining the import of psychological incapacity under Article 36, it must
be read in conjunction with, although to be taken as distinct from Articles 35, 37, 38
and 41 that would likewise, but for different reasons, render the marriage void ab
initio, or Article 45 that would make the marriage merely voidable, or Article 55 that
could justify a petition for legal separation. Care must be observed so that these
various circumstances are not applied so indiscriminately as if the law were
indifferent on the matter. Article 36 should not be confused with a divorce law that
cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefor manifest themselves. x x x
It remains settled that the State has a high stake in the preservation of marriage rooted
in its recognition of the sanctity of married life and its mission to protect and
strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. Hence, any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and
against its dissolution and nullity.[10]

After a thorough review of the records of the case, we cannot subscribe to the appellate courts
ruling that the psychological incapacity of respondent was not sufficiently established. We
disagree with its decision declaring the marriage between the parties as valid and subsisting.
Accordingly, we grant the petition.
Santos v. Court of Appeals[11] solidified the jurisprudential foundation of the principle that the
factors characterizing psychological incapacity to perform the essential marital obligations are:
(1) gravity, (2) juridical antecedence, and (3) incurability. We explained:
The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable
of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the
history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may
emerge only after the marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise,
the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved. [12]

As previously adverted to, the three experts were one in diagnosing respondent with a
personality disorder, to wit:
1. Dra. Cecilia C. Villegas
PSYCHODYNAMICS OF THE CASE
[Petitioner] is the second among 6 siblings of educated parents. Belonging to an
average social status, intellectual achievement is quite important to the family values
(sic). All children were equipped with high intellectual potentials (sic) which made
their parents proud of them. Father was disabled, but despite his handicap, he was able
to assume his financial and emotional responsibilities to his family and to a limited
extent, his social functions (sic). Despite this, he has been described as the unseen
strength in the family.
Mother [of petitioner] was [actively involved] in activities outside the home. Doing
volunteer and community services, she was not the demonstrative, affectionate and the
emotional mother (sic). Her love and concern came in the form of positive attitudes,

advices (sic) and encouragements (sic), but not the caressing, sensitive and soothing
touches of an emotional reaction (sic). Psychological home environment did not
permit one to nurture a hurt feeling or depression, but one has to stand up and to help
himself (sic). This trained her to subjugate (sic) emotions to reasons.
Because of her high intellectual endowment, she has easy facilities for any
undertakings (sic). She is organized, planned (sic), reliable, dependable, systematic,
prudent, loyal, competent and has a strong sense of duty (sic). But emotionally, she is
not as sensitive. Her analytical resources and strong sense of objectivity predisposed
her to a superficial adjustments (sic). She acts on the dictates of her mind and reason,
and less of how she feels (sic). The above qualities are perfect for a leader, but less
effective in a heterosexual relationship, especially to her husband, who has deep
seated sense of inadequacy, insecurity, low self esteem and self-worth despite his
intellectual assets (sic). Despite this, [petitioner] remained in her marriage for more
than 20 years, trying to reach out and lending a hand for better understanding and
relationship (sic). She was hoping for the time when others, like her husband would
make decision for her (sic), instead of being depended upon. But the more [petitioner]
tried to compensate for [respondents] shortcomings, the bigger was the discrepancy in
their coping mechanisms (sic). At the end, [petitioner] felt unloved, unappreciated,
uncared for and she characterized their marriage as very much lacking in relationship
(sic).

On the other hand, [respondent] is the 9 th of 11 siblings and belonged to the second set
of brood (sic), where there were less bounds (sic) and limitations during his growing
up stage. Additionally, he was acknowledged as the favorite of his mother, and was
described to have a close relationship with her. At an early age, he manifested clinical
behavior of conduct disorder and was on marijuana regularly. Despite his apparent
high intellectual potentials (sic), he felt that he needed a push to keep him going. His
being a free spirit, attracted [petitioner], who adored him for being able to do what he
wanted, without being bothered by untraditional, unacceptable norms and differing
ideas from other people. He presented no guilt feelings, no remorse, no anxiety for
whatever wrongdoings he has committed. His studies proved too much of a pressure
for him, and quit at the middle of his course, despite his apparent high intellectual
resources (sic).
His marriage to [petitioner] became a bigger pressure. Trying to prove his worth, he
quit work from his family employment and ventured on his own. With no much
planning and project study, his businesses failed. This became the sources (sic) of
their marital conflicts, the lack of relationships (sic) and consultations (sic) with each
other, his negativistic attitudes (sic) and sarcasm, stubbornness and insults, his spitting
at her face which impliedly meant you are nothing as compared to me were in reality,
his defenses for a strong sense of inadequacy (sic).
As described by [petitioner], he is intelligent and has bright ides. However, this
seemed not coupled with emotional attributes such as perseverance, patience,
maturity, direction, focus, adequacy, stability and confidence to make it work. He
complained that he did not feel the support of his wife regarding his decision to go
into his own business. But when he failed, the more he became negativistic and closed
to suggestions especially from [petitioner]. He was too careful not to let go or make
known his strong sense of inadequacy, ambivalence, doubts, lack of drive and
motivation or even feelings of inferiority, for fear of rejection or loss of pride. When
things did not work out according to his plans, he suppressed his hostilities in negative
ways, such as stubbornness, sarcasm or drug intake.

His decision making is characterized by poor impulse control, lack of insight and
primitive drives. He seemed to feel more comfortable in being untraditional and
different from others. Preoccupation is centered on himself, (sic) an unconscious wish
for the continuance of the gratification of his dependency needs, (sic) in his motherson relationship. From this stems his difficulties in heterosexual relationship with his
wife, as pressures, stresses, (sic) demands and expectations filled up in (sic) up in
their marital relationship. Strong masculine strivings is projected.
For an intelligent person like [respondent], he may sincerely want to be able to
assume his duties and responsibilities as a husband and father, but because of a
severe psychological deficit, he was unable to do so.
Based on the clinical data presented, it is the opinion of the examiner, that
[petitioner] manifested inadequacies along her affective sphere, that made her less
responsive to the emotional needs of her husband, who needed a great amount of it,
rendering her relatively psychologically incapacitated to perform the duties and
responsibilities of marriage. [Respondent], on the other hand, has manifested
strong clinical evidences (sic), that he is suffering from a Personality Disorder, of
the antisocial type, associated with strong sense of Inadequacy along masculine
strivings and narcissistic features that renders him psychologically incapacitated
to perform the duties and responsibilities of marriage. This is characterized by
his inability to conform to the social norms that ordinarily govern many aspects
of adolescent and adult behavior. His being a free spirit associated with no
remorse, no guilt feelings and no anxiety, is distinctive of this clinical condition.
His prolonged drug intake [marijuana] and maybe stronger drugs lately, are
external factors to boost his ego.
The root cause of the above clinical conditions is due to his underlying defense
mechanisms, or the unconscious mental processes, that the ego uses to resolve
conflicts. His prolonged and closed attachments to his mother encouraged cross
identification and developed a severe sense of inadequacy specifically along
masculine strivings. He therefore has to camouflage his weakness, in terms of
authority, assertiveness, unilateral and forceful decision making, aloofness and
indifference, even if it resulted to antisocial acts. His narcissistic supplies rendered by
his mother was not resolved (sic).
It existed before marriage, but became manifest only after the celebration, due to
marital demands and stresses. It is considered as permanent in nature because it
started early in his psychological development, and therefore became so engrained
into his personality structures (sic). It is considered as severe in degree, because it
hampered, interrupted and interfered with his normal functioning related to
heterosexual adjustments. (emphasis supplied) [13]

2. Dr. Natividad A. Dayan

Adolfo and Mandy[, respondent]s brothers, referred [respondent] to the clinic.
According to them, respondent has not really taken care of his wife and children. He
does not seem to have any direction in life. He seems to be full of bright ideas and
good at starting things but he never gets to accomplish anything. His brothers are
suspecting (sic) that until now [respondent] is still taking drugs. There are times when
they see that [respondent] is not himself. He likes to bum around and just spends the
day at home doing nothing. They wish that hed be more responsible and try to give
priority to his family. [Petitioner,] his wife[,] is the breadwinner of the family because

she has a stable job. [Respondent]s brothers learned from friends that [petitioner] is
really disappointed with him. She has discussed things with him but he always refused
to listen. She does not know what to do with him anymore. She has grown tired of
him.
When [respondent] was asked about his drug problem, he mentioned that he stopped
taking it in 1993. His brothers think that he is not telling the truth. It is so hard for
[respondent] to stop taking drugs when he had been hooked to it for the past 22 years.
When [respondent] was also asked what his problems are at the moment, he
mentioned that he feels lonely and distressed. He does not have anyone to talk to. He
feels that he and his wife [have] drifted apart. He wants to be close to somebody and
discuss things with this person but he is not given the chance. He also mentioned that
one of his weak points is that he is very tolerant of people[,] that is why he is taken
advantage of most of the time. He wants to avoid conflict so hed rather be submissive
and compliant. He does not want to hurt anyone [or] to cause anymore pain. He wants
to make other people happy.
xxxx
Interpretation of Psychological Data
A. Intellectual / Cognitive Functioning
xxxx
B. Vocational Preference
xxxx
C. Socio Emotional Functioning
xxxx
In his relationships with people, [respondent] is apt to project a reserved, aloof and
detached attitude. [Respondent] exhibits withdrawal patterns. He has deep feelings of
inadequacy. Due to a low self-esteem, he tends to feel inferior and to exclude himself
from association with others. He feels that he is different and as a result is prone to
anticipate rejections. Because of the discomfort produced by these feelings, he is apt
to avoid personal and social involvement, which increases his preoccupation with
himself and accentuates his tendency to withdraw from interpersonal contact.
[Respondent] is also apt to be the less dominant partner. He feels better when he has
to follow than when he has to take the lead. A self-contained person[,] he does not
really need to interact with others in order to enjoy life and to be able to move on. He
has a small need of companionship and is most comfortable alone. He, too[,] feels
uncomfortable in expressing his more tender feelings for fear of being hurt. Likewise,
he maybe very angry within but he may choose to repress this feeling. [Respondents]
strong need for social approval, which could have stemmed from some deep seated
insecurities makes him submissive and over [compliant]. He tends to make extra effort
to please people. Although at times[, he] already feels victimized and taken advantage
of, he still tolerates abusive behavior for fear of interpersonal conflicts. Despite
his [dis]illusion with people, he seeks to minimize dangers of indifference and
disapproval [of] others. Resentments are suppressed. This is likely to result in anger
and frustrations which is likewise apt to be repressed.

There are indications that [respondent] is[,] at the moment[,] experiencing

considerable tension and anxiety. He is prone to fits of apprehension and nervousness.
Likewise, he is also entertaining feelings of hopelessness and is preoccupied with
negative thought. He feels that he is up in the air but with no sound foundation. He is
striving [for] goals which he knows he will never be able to attain. Feeling
discouraged and distressed, he has difficulty concentrating and focusing on things
which he needs to prioritize. He has many plans but he cant accomplish anything
because he is unable to see which path to take. This feeling of hopelessness is further
aggravated by the lack of support from significant others.
Diagnostic Impression
Axis I : Drug Dependence
Axis II : Mixed Personality Disorder
[Schizoid, Narcissistic
Disorder]

and

Antisocial

Personality

Axis III : None

Axis IV : Psychosocial and Environmental Problems:
Severe
He seems to be very good at planning and starting things
but is unable to accomplish anything; unable to give
priority to the needs of his family; in social relationships.
Axis V : Global Assessment of Functioning Fair (Emphasis supplied) [14]
3. Dr. Estrella T. Tiongson-Magno
Summary and Conclusion
From the evidence available from [petitioners] case history and from her
psychological assessment, and despite the non-cooperation of the respondent, it is
possible to infer with certainty the nullity of this marriage. Based on the
information available about the respondent, he suffers from [an] antisocial
personality disorder with narcissistic and dependent features that renders him
too immature and irresponsible to assume the normal obligations of a
marriage. As for the petitioner, she is a good, sincere, and conscientious person and
she has tried her best to provide for the needs of her children. Her achievements in

this regard are praiseworthy. But she is emotionally immature and her comprehension
of human situations is very shallow for a woman of her academic and professional
competence. And this explains why she married RRR even when she knew he was a
pothead, then despite the abuse, took so long to do something about her situation.
Diagnosis for [petitioner]:
Axis I Partner Relational Problem
Axis II Obsessive Compulsive Personality Style with Self-Defeating features
Axis III No diagnosis
Axis IV Psychosocial Stressors-Pervasive Family Discord (spouses immaturity, drug
abuse, and infidelity)
Severity: 4-severe
Diagnosis for [respondent]
Axis I Partner Relational Problem
Axis II Antisocial Personality Disorder with marked narcissistic, aggressive
sadistic and dependent features
Axis III No diagnosis
Axis IV Psychosocial Stressors-Pervasive Family Discord (successful wife)
Severity: 4 (severe)
xxxx
One has to go back to [respondents] early childhood in order to understand the root
cause of his antisocial personality disorder. [Respondent] grew up the ninth child in a
brood of 11. His elder siblings were taken cared of by his grandmother. [Respondents]
father was kind, quiet and blind and [respondent] was [reared] by his mother.
Unfortunately, [respondents] mother grew up believing that she was not her mothers
favorite child, so she felt api, treated like poor relations. [Respondents] mothers
reaction to her perceived rejection was to act outwith poor impulse control and poor
mood regulation (spent money like water, had terrible temper tantrums, etc.).
Unwittingly, his mother became [respondents] role model.
However, because [respondent] had to get on with the business of living, he learned to
use his good looks and his charms, and learned to size up the weaknesses of others, to
lie convincingly and to say what people wanted to hear (esp. his deprived mother who
liked admiration and attention, his siblings from whom he borrowed money, etc.). In
the process, his ability to love and to empathize with others was impaired so that he
cannot sustain a relationship with one person for a long time, which is devastating in a
marriage.
[Respondents] narcissistic personality features were manifested by his selfcenteredness (e.g. moved to Mindoro and lived there for 10 years, leaving his family
in Manila); his grandiose sense of self-importance (e.g. he would just come and go,
without telling his wife his whereabouts, etc.); his sense of entitlement (e.g. felt
entitled to a mistress because [petitioner] deprived him of his marital rights, etc.);

interpersonally exploitative (e.g. let his wife spend for all the maintenance needs of
the family, etc.); and lack of empathy (e.g. when asked to choose between his mistress
and his wife, he said he would think about it, etc.) The aggressive sadistic
personality features were manifested whom he has physically, emotionally and
verbally abusive [of] his wife when high on drugs; and his dependent personality
features were manifested by his need for others to assume responsibility for most
major areas of his life, and in his difficulty in doing things on his own.
[Respondent], diagnosed with an antisocial personality disorder with marked
narcissistic features and aggressive sadistic and dependent features, is
psychologically incapacitated to fulfill the essential obligations of marriage: to
love, respect and render support for his spouse and children. A personality
disorder is not curable as it is permanent and stable over time.
From a psychological viewpoint, therefore, there is evidence that the marriage of
[petitioner] and [respondent is] null and void from the very beginning. (emphasis
supplied)[15]

Notwithstanding these telling assessments, the CA rejected, wholesale, the testimonies of

Doctors Magno and Villegas for being hearsay since they never personally examined and
interviewed the respondent.
We do not agree with the CA.
The lack of personal examination and interview of the respondent, or any other person
diagnosed with personality disorder, does not per se invalidate the testimonies of the doctors.
Neither do their findings automatically constitute hearsay that would result in their exclusion as
evidence.
For one, marriage, by its very definition,[16] necessarily involves only two persons. The
totality of the behavior of one spouse during the cohabitation and marriage is generally and
genuinely witnessed mainly by the other. In this case, the experts testified on their individual
assessment of the present state of the parties marriage from the perception of one of the parties,
herein petitioner. Certainly, petitioner, during their marriage, had occasion to interact with, and
experience, respondents pattern of behavior which she could then validly relay to the clinical
psychologists and the psychiatrist.
For another, the clinical psychologists and psychiatrists assessment were not based solely
on the narration or personal interview of the petitioner. Other informants such as respondents
own son, siblings and in-laws, and sister-in-law (sister of petitioner), testified on their own
observations of respondents behavior and interactions with them, spanning the period of time
they knew him.[17] These were also used as the basis of the doctors assessments.
The recent case of Lim v. Sta. Cruz-Lim,[18] citing The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual
of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition (DSM IV) ,[19] instructs us on the general diagnostic criteria
for personality disorders:
A. An enduring pattern of inner experience and behavior that deviates markedly
from the expectations of the individual's culture. This pattern is manifested in two (2)

or

more

of

the

following

areas:

(1) cognition (i.e., ways of perceiving and interpreting self, other people, and
events)
(2) affectivity (i.e., the range, intensity, liability, and appropriateness of
emotional response)

(3) interpersonal functioning

(4) impulse control
B. The enduring pattern is inflexible and pervasive across a broad range of
personal and social situations.
C. The enduring pattern leads to clinically significant distress or impairment in
social, occupational or other important areas of functioning.
D. The pattern is stable and of long duration, and its onset can be traced back
at least to adolescence or early adulthood.
E. The enduring pattern is not better accounted for as a manifestation or a
consequence of another mental disorder.
F. The enduring pattern is not due to the direct physiological effects of a
substance (i.e., a drug of abuse, a medication) or a general medical condition (e.g.,
head trauma).

Specifically, the DSM IV outlines the diagnostic criteria for Antisocial Personality
Disorder:
A. There is a pervasive pattern of disregard for and violation of the rights of
others occurring since age 15 years, as indicated by three (or more) of the following:
(1) failure to conform to social norms with respect to lawful behaviors as
indicated by repeatedly performing acts that are grounds for arrest
(2) deceitfulness, as indicated by repeated lying, use of aliases, or conning
others for personal profit or pleasure
(3) impulsivity or failure to plan ahead
(4) irritability and aggressiveness, as indicated by repeated physical fights or
assaults
(5) reckless disregard for safety of self or others
(6) consistent irresponsibility, as indicated by repeated failure to sustain
consistent work behavior or honor financial obligations
(7) lack of remorse as indicated by being indifferent to or rationalizing having
hurt, mistreated, or stolen from another
B. The individual is at least 18 years.
C. There is evidence of conduct disorder with onset before age 15 years.

D. The occurrence of antisocial behavior is not exclusively during the course of

schizophrenia or a manic episode.[20]

Within their acknowledged field of expertise, doctors can diagnose the psychological
make up of a person based on a number of factors culled from various sources. A person
afflicted with a personality disorder will not necessarily have personal knowledge thereof. In
this case, considering that a personality disorder is manifested in a pattern of behavior, selfdiagnosis by the respondent consisting only in his bare denial of the doctors separate diagnoses,
does not necessarily evoke credence and cannot trump the clinical findings of experts.
The CA declared that, based on Dr. Dayans findings and recommendation, the
psychological incapacity of respondent is not incurable.
The appellate court is mistaken.
A recommendation for therapy does not automatically imply curability. In general,
recommendations for therapy are given by clinical psychologists, or even psychiatrists, to
manage behavior. In Kaplan and Saddocks textbook entitled Synopsis of Psychiatry,
[21]
treatment, ranging from psychotherapy to pharmacotherapy, for all the listed kinds of
personality disorders are recommended. In short, Dr. Dayans recommendation that respondent
should undergo therapy does not necessarily negate the finding that respondents psychological
incapacity is incurable.
Moreover, Dr. Dayan, during her testimony, categorically declared that respondent is
psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations.[22] As aptly stated by
Justice Romero in her separate opinion in the ubiquitously cited case of Republic v. Court of
Appeals & Molina:[23]
[T]he professional opinion of a psychological expert became increasingly important
in such cases. Data about the persons entire life, both before and after the ceremony,
were presented to these experts and they were asked to give professional opinions
about a partys mental capacity at the time of the wedding. These opinions were rarely
challenged and tended to be accepted as decisive evidence of lack of valid consent.
[Because] of advances made in psychology during the past decades. There was now
the expertise to provide the all-important connecting link between a marriage
breakdown and premarital causes.

In sum, we find points of convergence & consistency in all three reports and the
respective testimonies of Doctors Magno, Dayan and Villegas, i.e.: (1) respondent does have
problems; and (2) these problems include chronic irresponsibility; inability to recognize and
work towards providing the needs of his family; several failed business attempts; substance
abuse; and a trail of unpaid money obligations.
It is true that a clinical psychologists or psychiatrists diagnoses that a person has
personality disorder is not automatically believed by the courts in cases of declaration of nullity
of marriages. Indeed, a clinical psychologists or psychiatrists finding of a personality disorder

does not exclude a finding that a marriage is valid and subsisting, and not beset by one of the
parties or both parties psychological incapacity.
On more than one occasion, we have rejected an experts opinion concerning the supposed
psychological incapacity of a party.[24] In Lim v. Sta. Cruz-Lim,[25] we ruled that, even without
delving into the non-exclusive list found in Republic v. Court of Appeals & Molina,[26] the
stringent requisites provided in Santos v. Court of Appeals[27]must be independently met by the
party alleging the nullity of the marriage grounded on Article 36 of the Family Code. We
declared, thus:
It was folly for the trial court to accept the findings and conclusions of Dr.
Villegas with nary a link drawn between the "psychodynamics of the case" and the
factors characterizing the psychological incapacity. Dr. Villegas' sparse testimony does
not lead to the inevitable conclusion that the parties were psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. Even on questioning
from the trial court, Dr. Villegas' testimony did not illuminate on the parties'
alleged personality disorders and their incapacitating effect on their marriage x x x.
Curiously, Dr. Villegas' global conclusion of both parties' personality disorders
was not supported by psychological tests properly administered by clinical
psychologists specifically trained in the tests' use and interpretation. The
supposed personality disorders of the parties, considering that such diagnoses were
made, could have been fully established by psychometric and neurological tests which
are designed to measure specific aspects of people's intelligence, thinking,
or personality.
xxxx
The expert opinion of a psychiatrist arrived at after a maximum of seven (7)
hours of interview, and unsupported by separate psychological tests, cannot tie the
hands of the trial court and prevent it from making its own factual finding on what
happened in this case. The probative force of the testimony of an expert does not lie in
a mere statement of his theory or opinion, but rather in the assistance that he can
render to the courts in showing the facts that serve as a basis for his criterion and the
reasons upon which the logic of his conclusion is founded.

In the case at bar, however, even without the experts conclusions, the factual
antecedents (narrative of events) alleged in the petition and established during trial, all point to
the inevitable conclusion that respondent is psychologically incapacitated to perform the
essential marital obligations.

Article 68 of the Family Code provides:

Art. 68. The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love,
respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support.

In this connection, it is well to note that persons with antisocial personality disorder exhibit the
following clinical features:
Patients with antisocial personality disorder can often seem to be normal and even
charming and ingratiating. Their histories, however, reveal many areas of disordered
life functioning. Lying, truancy, running away from home, thefts, fights, substance
abuse, and illegal activities are typical experiences that patients report as beginning in
childhood. x x x Their own explanations of their antisocial behavior make it seem
mindless, but their mental content reveals the complete absence of delusions and other
signs of irrational thinking. In fact, they frequently have a heightened sense of reality
testing and often impress observers as having good verbal intelligence.
x x x Those with this disorder do not tell the truth and cannot be trusted to carry out
any task or adhere to any conventional standard of morality. x x x A notable finding is
a lack of remorse for these actions; that is, they appear to lack a conscience. [28]

In the instant case, respondents pattern of behavior manifests an inability, nay, a

psychological incapacity to perform the essential marital obligations as shown by his: (1)
sporadic financial support; (2) extra-marital affairs; (3) substance abuse; (4) failed business
attempts; (5) unpaid money obligations; (6) inability to keep a job that is not connected with the
family businesses; and (7) criminal charges of estafa.
On the issue of the petitioners purported psychological incapacity, we agree with the CAs
ruling thereon:
A perusal of the Amended Petition shows that it failed to specifically allege the
complete
facts
showing
that
petitioner
was
psychologically incapacitated from complying with the essential marital
obligations of marriage at the time of the celebration of marriage even if such
incapacity became manifest only after its celebration x x x. In fact,
what was merely prayed for in the said Amended Petition is that judgment be rendered
declaring the marriage between the petitioner and the respondent solemnized on 04
December 1976 to be void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity on the
part of the respondent at the time of the celebration of the marriage x x x
At any rate, even assuming arguendo that [petitioners] Amended Petition was indeed
amended to conform to the evidence, as provided under Section 5, Rule 10 of the
Rules of Court, Dr. Villegas finding that [petitioner] is supposedly suffering from an
Inadequate Personality [Disorder] along the affectional area does not amount to
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. Such alleged condition
of [petitioner] is not a debilitating psychological condition that incapacitates her from
complying with the essential marital obligations of marriage. In fact, in the
Psychological Evaluation Report of clinical psychologist Magno, [petitioner] was

given a glowing evaluation as she was found to be a good, sincere, and conscientious
person and she has tried her best to provide for the needs of her children. Her
achievements in this regard are praiseworthy. Even in Dr. Villegas psychiatric report,
it was stated that [petitioner] was able to remain in their marriage for more than 20
years trying to reach out and lending a hand for better understanding and relationship.
With the foregoing evaluation made by no less than [petitioners] own expert
witnesses, we find it hard to believe that she is psychologically incapacitated within
the contemplation of Article 36 of the Family Code. [29]

All told, it is wise to be reminded of the caveat articulated by Justice Teodoro R. Padilla
in his separate statement in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina:[30]
x x x Each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections
or generalizations but according to its own facts. In the field of psychological
incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on all
fours with another case. The trial judge must take pains in examining the factual
milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own
judgment for that of the trial court.

In fine, given the factual milieu of the present case and in light of the foregoing disquisition, we
find ample basis to conclude that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform the
essential marital obligations at the time of his marriage to the petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA -G.R.
CV No. 89761 is REVERSED. The decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 89, Quezon
City in Civil Case No. Q-01-44854 declaring the marriage between petitioner and
respondent NULL and VOID under Article 36 of the Family Code isREINSTATED. No costs.