AMOR v.

FLORENTINO
FACTS:
Maria Florentino owned a house and a
camarin (warehouse). By a will, she
transferred the house to Jose Florentino and
the warehouse to Maria Florentino. Maria
sold the warehouse to Amor. Amor then
demolished the old warehouse in order to
build a new 2-storey structure. The problem
is it will shut off the light and air that come in
through the window of the adjacent house
owned by Jose. Hence the latter files for
prohibition claiming there is a negative
easement prohibiting Amor from constructing
any structure at any height that would block
the window. Amor counters that there is no
easement. Moreover, since the death of
testator was before the Civil Code took
effect, the rules on easement do not apply.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not there is an easement
prohibiting
Amor
from
doing
said
construction.
2. Whether or not the Civil Code may be
applied
RULING:
1. Yes. Easement are established by law or
by will of the owners or by title. Under Art.
624, there is title by the doctrine of apparent
sign. When the estate is subsequently owned
by two different persons and the service (it
cannot be an easement before the transfer)
is not revoked in the title nor removed, an
easement
is
established.
The Cortez case cannot be invoked by Amor
because
it
involved
acquisition
by
prescription. Art. 624 is acquisition by title.
2. Amor failed to prove that the death of the
testator occurred before the effectivity of the
Old Civil Code. The facts show that it
happened after the effectivity of the said
code so the law on easement is already
applicable. In any case, even if we assume
Amors supposition, the law on easement
was already integrated into the Spanish Law
and in fact, had been established by
Jurisprudence.
Therefore,
Amor
is
prohibitied
from
constructing the warehouse above the level
of the window.
DISSENTING OPINION OF OZAETA.

1) The Majority opinio committed a travesty

on justice when it ignored the evidence
produced by Amor that the testators death
occurred before the effectivity of the Code.
2) Hence, the law on easement will not apply.
Moreover, the Spanish Law and the Partidas
provided for only three ways of acquiring
easements: 1) contract 2) testament 3)
prescription. There was no provision similar
to the doctrine of apparent sign.
3) There is no doctrine established by the
Spanish Tribunal regarding the doctrine.
4) In this modern age of flourescent lights
and air conditioning devices, the easement
of light and view would be obsolete and
deterrent to economic progress especially
when in the cities, buildings are side to side
with each other.
RONQUILLO vs. ROCO- Easement of Right
of Way
Easements of right of way may not be
acquired by prescription because it is not a
continuous easement.
FACTS:
Petitioners parcel of land was connected to
the Naga Market Place and Igualdad St. by
an easement of a right of way through the
land of the Respondents, which they have
been using for more than 20 years. On May
1953, however, respondents built a chapel
right in the middle of the road, blocking their
usual path to the marketplace. One year
after, by means of force, intimidation, and
threats, the owners (respondents) of the land
where the easement was situated, planted
wooden posts and fenced with barbed wires
the road, closing their right of way from their
house to Igualdad St. and Naga public
market.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the easement of a right of
way may be acquired by prescription?
HELD: No.
Art. 620 of the CC provides that only
continuous and apparent easements may be
acquired by prescription. The easement of a
right of way cannot be considered

continuous because its use is at intervals and

is dependent on the acts of man.
Minority Opinion (including the ponente):
Easements of right of way may already be
acquired by prescription, at least since the
introduction into this jurisdiction of the
special law on prescription through the Old
Code of Civil Procedure, Act No. 190. Said
law, particularly, Section 41 thereof, makes
no distinction as to the real rights which are
subject to prescription, and there would
appear to be no valid reason, at least to the
writer of this opinion, why the continued use
of a path or a road or right of way by the
party, specially by the public, for ten years or
more, not by mere tolerance of the owner of
the land, but through adverse use of it,
cannot give said party a vested right to such
right of way through prescription.
The
uninterrupted
and
continuous
enjoyment of a right of way necessary to
constitute adverse possession does not
require the use thereof every day for the
statutory period, but simply the exercise of
the right more or less frequently according to
the nature of the use. (17 Am. Jur. 972)
"It is submitted that under Act No. 190, even
discontinuous servitudes can be acquired by
prescription, provided it can be shown that
the servitude was actual, open, public,
continuous, under a claim of title exclusive of
any other right and adverse to all other
claimants'."
NORTH NEGROS SUGAR CO. VS HIDALGO
October 31,
FACTS:
Plaintiff is the owner of a sugar central
(known as mill site) and also its adjoining
plantation
Hacienda
Begona.
He
constructed a road adjoining the mill site
and the provincial highway. Plaintiff allows
vehicles to pass upon paying toll charge of
P0.15 for each one; pedestrians are allowed
free passage.

Defendant owns the adjoining Hacienda

Sangay wherein he has a billiard hall and a
tuba saloon (as in drinking place). The road
of the plaintiff is the only means of access to
get to Hacienda Sangay.

At one point, plaintiff stopped defendant

from using the said road. Hence, instead of
taking the road to get to his Hacienda
Sangay, defendant passed through Hacienda
Begona in a passageway used by the
carabaos.

Plaintiff applied for injunction to restrain the

defendant from entering/passing through his
properties (road & Hacienda).
ISSUE: WON injunction should be granted.
HELD: NO.
RATIO:
For injunction to be granted, it must be
established that the right sought to be
protected exists, but also that the acts
against which the injunction to be directed
are violative of said right.

In the case at bar, plaintiff failed to establish

his right and that the defendant has
committed/attempts to commit acts that
endanger such right. The complaint does not
state how and why the mere passage of
defendant over plaintiffs estate conveying
tuba to his Hacienda has caused damage
to plaintiffs property rights. The real damage
that the plaintiff seeks to avoid is the fact
that tuba is disposed of at defendants
hacienda in which the plaintiffs laborers
have access (apparently, the plaintiff hates
that his laborers are getting drunk in the
tuba saloon of the defendant). This however,
is a nothing more than an exercise of
legitimate business on the part of the
defendant. What the law does not authorize
to be done directly, cannot be done indirectly
(if plaintiff cannot enjoin defendant from
selling tuba, neither can it obtain injunction
to prevent him from passing over its property
to transport tuba).
(TOPICAL: on mode of acquiring easements):
The road was constructed by the plaintiff on
hisown land and it made this road accessible
to the public, regardless of class/group of
persons/entities.
This
is
a
voluntary
easement constituted in favor of the
community. Indeed, the plaintiff may close
the road at its pleasure as no period has
been fixed when the easement was
constituted, but while the road is still open,
he may not capriciously exclude defendant

from its use. Having the road devoted to the

public in general, the road is charged with
public interest and while so devoted, the
plaintiff may not establish discriminatory.
MUNICIPALITY OF DUMANGAS V. BISHOP
OF JARO
The municipality applied for registration of
parcels of land claiming that there were
owners since time immemorial. Bishop
opposed saying that the church had been in
possession also since time immemorial.
Since the construction of the church, there
had been a side door in the wall through
which the worshippers attending mass enter
and leave ,passing and entering the land in
question. As this use of the land has been
continuous, it is evident that the church has
acquired a right to such use by prescription,
in view of the time that has elapsed since the
church was built and dedicated to religious
worship, during which period the Municipality
has not prohibited the passage over the land
by persons who attend services held by the
church.
VALDERRAMA V. THE NORTH NEGROS
SUGAR CO., INC.
What is prohibited by Art. 543 is that in
extending the line or repairing or using the
same, a larger area of land is occupied or
excavations or materials deposited are
outside the area occupied not by causing
wagons to pass just because of a change of
ownership of the objects being transported.
FACTS:
Several hacienda owners in Manapla,
Occidental Negros, entered into a milling
contract with Miguel Osorio wherein the
latter would build a sugar central of a
minimum capacity of 300 tons for the milling
and grinding of all the sugar cane to be
grown by the hacienda owners who in turn
would furnish the central with all the cane
they might produce in their estates for 30
years from the execution of the contract.
Later on, Osorios rights and interests were
acquired by the North Negros Sugar Co., Inc.
2 years after, the current petitioners,
Catalino Valderrama, Emilio Rodriguez,
Santos Urra et. al, made other milling
contracts identical to the first one with the

North Negros Sugar, Co., Inc. The hacienda

owners, however, could not furnish the
central sufficient cane for milling as required
by its capacity, so the North Negros made
other milling contracts with the various
hacienda owners of Cadiz, Occidental
Negros. This prompted Valderrama et. al to
each file a complaint against North Negros.
The CFI entered 1 single judgment for all of
them, ruling in Valderrama et. als favor
finding that North Negros had no right to
pass through the lands of the hacienda
owners for the transportation of sugar cane
not grown from their lands. Thus the appeal
to the SC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the easement of way
established was restricted to transporting
only sugar cane from the hacienda owners
lands
HELD: NO
(the SC also made 1 judgment for all the 3
cases)
The contract entered into by each of the
hacienda owners contained a clause that
granted the North Negros an easement of
way 7 meters wide for the period of 50 years
upon their properties for the construction of
a railroad. The owners allege ambiguity since
it could permit the transportation of sugar
cane which they did not produce which is
contrary to their intent but the SC held that it
is clear that the easement was established
for the benefit of all producers and of the
corporation as it is the intent of the milling
contract.
Since the easement is a voluntary, apparent,
continuous easement of way in favor of the
corporation, it is contrary to the nature of the
contract that it is only limited to canes
produced by the servient estates since it is a
well settled rule that things serve their owner
by reason of ownership and not by reason of
easement. The owners also cannot limit its
use for there is nothing in the contract
prohibiting the central from obtaining other
sources.
Transporting cane from Cadiz also does not
make it more burdensome since what is
prohibited in Art. 543 of the CC is that in
extending the road or in repairing it, it should

occupy a greater area or deposit excavations

outside the granted 7 meters. This does not
happen in this case when the North Negros
transports sugar cane from Cadiz, crossing
the servient estates, since it continues to
occupy the same area and the encumbrance
is still the same regardless of the number of
times it passes through the estates.
Also the period of the easement is longer
than the period of the milling contracts, so
even if the owners no longer desire to furnish
the central canes for milling, the North
Negros still has the right to the easement for
the remaining period so the contention that
it should be limited to the canes produced by
the owners has no basis.
QUIMEN V. CA
LEAST DAMAGE > SHORTEST DISTANCE
When the easement may be established on
any of several tenements surrounding the
dominant estate, the one where the way is
shortest and will cause the least damage
should be chosen. However, as elsewhere
stated, if these two (2) circumstances do not
concur in a single tenement, the way which
will cause the least damage should be used,
even if it will not be the shortest.
FACTS:
Anastacia Quimen, together with her 3
brothers and sister, inherited a piece of
property in Bulacan. They agreed to
subdivide the property equally among
themselves. The shares of Anastacia and 3
other siblings were next to the municipal
road. Anastacias was at the extreme left of
the road while the lots on the right were sold
by her brothers to Catalina Santos. A portion
of the lots behind Anastacias were sold by
her (as her brothers adminstratix) brother to
Yolanda.
Yolanda was hesitant to buy the back
property at first because it d no access to the
public road. Anastacia prevailed upon her by
assuring her that she would give her a right
of way on her adjoining property (which was
in front) for p200 per square meter.
Yolonda constructed a house on the lot she
bought using as her passageway to the
public highway a portion of anastacias
property. But when yolanda finally offered to
pay for the use of the pathway anastacia

refused to accept the payment. In fact she

was thereafter barred by Anastacia from
passing through her property.
After a few years, Yolanda purchased another
lot from the Quimens (a brother), located
directly behind the property of her parents
who provided her a pathway gratis et amore
between their house, extending about 19m
from the lot of Yolanda behind the sari-sari
store of one brother, and Anastacias
perimeter fence.
In 1987, Yolanda filed an action with the
proper court praying for a right of way
through Anastacias property. The proposed
right of way was at the extreme right of
Anastacias property facing the public
highway, starting from the back of the sarisari store and extending inward by 1m to her
property and turning left for about 5m to
avoid the store in order to reach the
municipal road. The way was unobstructed
except for an avocado tree standing in the
middle.
The trial court dismissed the complaint for
lack of cause of action, explaining that the
right of way through the brothers property
was a straight path and to allow a detour by
cutting through Anastacias property would
no longer make the path straight. They held
that it was more practical to extend the
existing pathway to the public road by
removing that portion of the store blocking
the path as that was the shortest route to
the public road and the least prejudicial to
the parties concerned than passing through
Anastacias property.
CA reversed and held that Yolanda was
entitled to a right of way on Anastacias
property. The court, however, did not award
damages to her and held that Anastacia was
not in bad faith when she resisted the claim.
Anastacia went to the SC alleging that her lot
should be considered as a servient estate
despite the fact that it does not abut or
adjoin the property of private respondent.
She denies ever promising Yolonda a right of
way.
Anastacia also argues that when Yolanda
purchased the second lot, the easement of

right of way she provided was ipso jure

extinguished as a result of the merger of
ownership of the dominant and the servient
estates in one person so that there was no
longer any compelling reason to provide
private respondent with a right of way as
there are other surrounding lots suitable for
the purpose.
She also strongly maintains that the
proposed right of way is not the shortest
access to the public road because of the
detour and that, moreover, she is likely to
suffer the most damage as she derives a net
income of P600.00 per year from the sale of
the fruits of her avocado tree, and
considering that an avocado has an average
life span of seventy (70) years, she expects a
substantial earning from it.
ISSUE:
1) Whether or not there was a valid grant of
an easement
2) Whether or not the right of way proposed
by Yolonda is the least onerous/least
prejudicial to the parties
HELD: YES to both
1) A right of way in particular is a privilege
constituted by covenant or granted by law to
a person or class of persons to pass over
anothers property when his tenement is
surrounded by realties belonging to others
without an adequate outlet to the public
highway. The owner of the dominant estate
can demand a right of way through the
servient estate provided he indemnifies the
owner thereof for the beneficial use of his
property.
The conditions for a valid grant of an
easement of right of way are:
(a) the dominant estate is surrounded by
other immovables without an adequate
outlet to a public highway;
(b) the dominant estate is willing to pay the
proper indemnity;
(c) the isolation was not due to the acts of
the dominant estate; and,
(d) the right of way being claimed is at a
point least prejudicial to the servient estate.
These elements were clearly present. The
evidence clearly shows that the property of
private respondent is hemmed in by the
estates of other persons including that of

petitioner; that she offered to pay P200.00

per square meter for her right of way as
agreed between her and petitioner; that she
did not cause the isolation of her property;
that the right of way is the least prejudicial
to the servient estate. These facts are
confirmed in the ocular inspection report of
the clerk of court, more so that the trial court
itself declared that [t]he said properties of
Antonio Quimen which were purchased by
plaintiff Yolanda Quimen Oliveros were totally
isolated from the public highway and there
appears an imperative need for an easement
of right of way to the public highway.
2) Article 650 of the NCC explicitly states
that the easement of right of way shall be
established at the point least prejudicial to
the servient estate and, insofar as consistent
with this rule, where the distance from the
dominant estate to a public highway may be
the shortest.
The criterion of least prejudice to the
servient estate must prevail over the
criterion of shortest distance although this is
a matter of judicial appreciation. When the
easement may be established on any of
several tenements surrounding the dominant
estate, the one where the way is shortest
and will cause the least damage should be
chosen. However, as elsewhere stated, if
these two (2) circumstances do not concur in
a single tenement, the way which will cause
the least damage should be used, even if it
will not be the shortest.
TCs findings:
> Yolandas property was situated at the
back of her fathers property and held that
there existed an available space of about
19m long which could conveniently serve as
a right of way between the boundary line
and the house of Yolanda s father
> The vacant space ended at the left back of
the store which was made of strong
materials
> Which explained why Yolanda requested a
detour to the lot of Anastacia and cut an
opening of one (1) meter wide and five (5)
meters long to serve as her right of way to
the public highway.
CAs finding:
> The proposed right of way of Yolanda,
which is 1m wide and 5m long at the

extreme right of Anastacias property will

cause the least prejudice and/or damage as
compared to the suggested passage through
the property of Yolanda s father which would
mean destroying the sari-sari store made of
strong materials.
Absent any showing that these findings and
conclusion are devoid of factual support in
the records, or are so glaringly erroneous,
the SC accepts and adopts them. As between
a right of way that would demolish a store of
strong materials to provide egress to a public
highway, and another right of way which
although longer will only require an avocado
tree to be cut down, the second alternative
should be preferred.
PACITA DAVID-CHAN
vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PHIL.
RABBIT BUS LINES, INC.G.R. No. 105294.
February 26, 1997
FACTS:
Petitioner
alleged
that
her
property,
consisting of around 635 square meters,
situated in Del Pilar, San Fernando,
Pampanga and covered by TCT No. 57596-R,
located around the property are the
following: Northern and western sides:
various business establishments .Southern
boundary: land of the Pineda family Eastnortheastern boundary: a lot with an area of
approximately 161 square meters owned by
private Philippine Rabbit Lines, which lied
between her property and the MacArthur
Highway.On September 29, 1987, petitioner
filed with the trial court an amended petition
with prayer for preliminary prohibitory
injunction,
seeking
to
stop
private
respondent from fencing its property and
depriving her of access tothe highway. In
short, petitioners lot was almost completely
surrounded by other immovables and cut off
from the highway. Her only access to the
highway was a very small opening
measuring two feet four inches wide through
the aforementioned property of private
respondent, which was now being obstructed
by the bus lines construction of aconcrete
fence. Petitioner believed she was entitled to
a wider compulsory easement of right of way
through
thesaid
property
of
private
respondent.

ISSUE: WON petitioner is legally entitled to a

right of way through private respondents
property?
HELD: Citing Articles 649 and 650 of the
Civil Code, petitioner submits that the
owner of an estate may claim a compulsory
right of way only after he (or she) has
established the existence of four requisites,
namely: (1) the estate is surrounded by other
immovables and is without adequate outlet
to a public highway; (2) proper indemnity is
paid;(3) the isolation is not due to the
proprietors own acts; and (4) the right of
way claimed is at a point least prejudicial to
the servient estate and, insofar as consistent
with this rule, where the distance from the
dominant estate to a public highway may be
the shortest.While petitioner may be correct
in her theoretical reading of Articles 649 and
650, she nevertheless failed to show
sufficient factual evidence to satisfy their
requirements .Evaluating her evidence,
respondent Court ruled that petitioner is not
without adequate outlet to a public
highway since she built a concrete fence on
the southern boundary of her property to
separate it from the property of the Pineda
family. Worse, during the pendency of the
case, she closed the 28-inch clearance which
she could use as a means to reach the
National Highway without passing through
the property of defendant. If plaintiff wants a
bigger opening, then she can always destroy
a portion of the concrete fence which she
erected and pass through the property of the
Pineda family which, as shown on the
attached sketch on the Commissioners
Report, has an open space on the southern
boundary of plaintiffs land .The appellate
court likewise found that petitioner failed to
satisfy the third requirement because she
caused her own isolation by closing her
access through the Pineda property, The
Court of Appeals also ruled that petitioner
failed to prove she made a valid tender of
the proper indemnity, since her complaint
contained no averment that demand for the
easement of right of way had been made
after payment of the proper indemnity.
LA VISTA ASSOCIATION, INC vs. CAEasement of Right of Way
Like any other contractual stipulation, a
voluntary easement cannot be extinguished

except by voluntary recession of the contract

establishing the servitude or renunciation by
the owner of the dominant lots.
FACTS:
The controversy in this case is regarding the
right of way in Manyan road. The road is a 15
meter wide road abutting Katipunan Avenue
on the west, traverses the edges of La Vista
Subdivision on the north and of the Ateneo
de Manila University and Maryknoll College
on the south. The said road was originally
owned by the Tuasons sold a portion of their
land to Philippine Building Corporation.
Included in such sale was half or 7.5 meters
width of the Mangyan road. The said
corporation assigned its rights, with the
consent of the tuasons, to AdMU through a
Deed of Assignment with Assumption of
Mortgage. Ateneo later on sold to Maryknoll
the western portion of the land. Tuason
developed their land which is now known as
La Vista. On January, 1976, Ateneo and La
Vista acknowledged the voluntary easement
or a Mutual right of way wherein the parties
would allow the other to use their half
portion of the Manyan road (La Vista to use
AdMUs 7.5 meters of the mangyan road and
also the other way around.) Ateneo
auctioned off the property wherein Solid
Homes Inc., the developer of Loyola Grand
Villas, was the highest bidder.
ADMU transferred not only the property, but
also the right to negotiate the easement on
the road. However, La Vista did not want to
recognize the easement thus they block the
road using 6 cylindrical concrete and some
guards over the entrance of the road
blocking the entrance of the residents of
Loyola Grand Villas. Solid Homes Inc. filed for
injunction and La vista in turn filed a third
party complaint against AdMU. Some of the
arguments of the petitioner were that Loyola
residents had adequate outlet to a public
highway using other roads and also that
AdMU has not yet finalized the negotiation of
the easement.
ISSUES: Whether or not
easement of right of way?

there

is

an

RULING: YES.
There was a voluntary easement of right of
way which was acknowledged on January
1976 by the Tuasons and Admu (the

easement was established by PBC and the

Tuasons but I dont think I can find the details
regarding it in the case I just saw the one
regarding
acknowledgement
between
admu and the Tuasons.) Being such, the 4
requisites for a compulsory easement need
not be met. And like any other contractual
stipulation, the same cannot be extinguished
except by voluntary recession of the contract
establishing the servitude or renunciation by
the owner of the dominant lots. In the case
at bar, all the predecessors-in-interest of
both parties recognized the existence of such
easement and there was no agreement yet
to revoke the same. The free ingress and
egress along Mangyan Road created by the
voluntary agreement is thus demandable.
The Court also emphasized that they are not
creating an easement but merely declaring
one (there no such thing as a judicial
easement).
VDA. DE
APPEALS

BALTAZAR

V.

COURT

OF

For someone to be entitled of an easement

of right of way, 4 requisites must be present:
(1) the estate must be surrounded by other
immovables and is without adequate outlet
to a public highway (2) after payment of the
proper indemnity (3) the isolation is not due
to the propietors own acts and (4) the right
of way claimed is at a point least prejudicial
to the servient estate and in so far as
consistent with this rule, where the distance
from the dominant estate to a public
highway may be the shortest.
FACTS:
Daniel Panganiban is the owner of Lot No.
1027. It is bounded on the north by Sta. Ana
River, on the south by the land of vda. de
Baltazar and on the west by lot 1028 and on
the east by Lot 1025. Directly in front of
1026, 1028, and 1025 is the Braulio St.
Panganiban filed a complaint against the
Baltazars for the establishment of a
permanent and perpetual easement of right
of way for him to have access to the
provincial road. The RTC dismissed the
complaint for it found 2 other passageways.
The CA reversed the decision for it found that
there was a strip of land used by Panganiban
and his grandfather as a right of way for 30

years until it was closed and that the 2 other

passageways were only temporary and was
granted to Panganiban when the right of way
was closed. Thus the case at bar.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Panganiban is entitled to an
easement of right of way
RULING: YES
It has been held that for someone to be
entitled of an easement of right of way, 4
requisites must be present. (1) the estate
must be surrounded by other immovables
and is without adequate outlet to a public
highway (2) after payment of the proper
indemnity (3) the isolation is not due to the
propietors own acts and (4) the right of way
claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the
servient estate and in so far as consistent

with this rule, where the distance from the

dominant estate to a public highway may be
the shortest.
Panganiban has all 4 requisites. With regard
to the 1st requisite, his land is bounded on
all sides by immovables, the lands of
Baltazar, Legaspi and Calimon and by the
river. The 2nd requisite is settled by a
remand to the lower court for the
determination of the proper indemnity. As
regards the 3rd requisite, it was found that
Panganiban bought the land from the
Baltazars therefore its isolation was not due
to his own acts. And with regard to the 4th
requisite, the passage claimed is the shortest
distance from his lot to Braulio Street.
Panganiban was established all 4 requisites
therefore is entitled to the easement.