"The Islam Industry" and Scholarship: Review Article

The Future of Political Islam by Graham E. Fuller; Face to Face with Political Islam by
Franois Burgat; The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror by Bernard Lewis; What
Went Wrong? Western Impact and Middle Eastern Response by Bernard Lewis; Islam
Unveiled: Disturbing Questions about the World's Fastest-Growing Faith by Robert Spencer;
Onward Muslim Soldiers: How Jihad Still Threatens America and the West ...
Review by: As'ad AbuKhalil
Middle East Journal, Vol. 58, No. 1 (Winter, 2004), pp. 130-137
Published by: Middle East Institute
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4329978 .
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Book

Reviews

"TheIslamIndustry"
and Scholarship
Review Article by As'ad AbuKhalil

The Future of Political Islam, by GrahamE. Fuller.New York:Palgrave,2003. xix + 213

pages. Notes to p. 220. Index to p. 227. $29.95.
Face to Face with Political Islam, by FranqoisBurgat.New York:I.B. Tauris,2003. xvii +
185 pages. Notes to p. 222. Index to p. 230. $55 cloth; $22.50 paper.
The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror, by BernardLewis. New York:The
ModernLibrary,2003. xxxii + 165 pages. Notes to p. 171. Index to p. 184. $29.95 cloth;
$12.95 paper.
What Went Wrong? Western Impact and Middle Eastern Response, by BernardLewis.
New York and Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2002. 161 pages. Notes to p. 172.
Index to p. 180. $23 cloth; $12.95 paper.
Islam Unveiled:Disturbing Questions about the World'sFastest-growingFaith, by Robert
Spencer. San Francisco, CA: EncounterBooks, 2002. xiii + 177 pages. Notes to p.202.
Index to p. 214. $24.95.
Onward Muslim Soldiers: How Jihad Still Threatens America and the West, by Robert
Spencer.Washington,DC: Regnery, 2003. xiii + 304 pages. Notes to p. 336. Index to p.
352. $27.95.
What the Koran Really Says: Language, Text, and Commentary,by IbnWarraq.Amherst,
NY: PrometheusBooks, 2002. 744 pages. Appends. to p. 782. $36.
The Quest for the Historical Muhammad, ed. and trans.by Ibn Warraq.Amherst,NY:
PrometheusBooks, 2000. 526 pages. Map. Gloss. to p. 534. Abbrevs.to p. 536. Dramatic
personaeto p. 545. Table to p. 546. Chron.to p. 550. $37.
Terror and Liberalism, by Paul Berman.New York:W.W.Norton, 2003. 216 pages. $21
cloth; $10.95 paper.

T he body of literatureon the subject of Islam by policy makers,journalists, and even

tourists and travelershas overwhelmedthe market.We now have an Islam industry- a
popular and political culture that encourages the productionof books, articles, and movies that deal with Islam and the Middle East. This production is closely tied (through
financing and through ideological affinity) with the prevalent trends about Islam in the
United States. The Islam industryfeaturesthe works of Middle East and Islam experts at
US universitieswho have revived the classical Orientalistapproach,as well as of a swarm
MIDDLEEASTJOURNALVOLUME58, NO. 1, WINTER2004

MIDDLEEAST JOURNAL* 131

of untrainednewcomers whose primaryqualificationsappearto be their ideological orientationsand religious zealotry.September 11th has only increasedthe rate of production
of sensationalworks that promise to reveal the true evil intentionsof Muslims and Islam.
Scholarly works receive less attention;and the public seems eager to consume books and
articlesthatcontainthe persistentdogmas and recycled cliches of classical Orientalism,or
of the productionof the terrorismindustry.
Given this disturbingtrend, one does not normally look forward to reviewing new
books on Islam and Islamic fundamentalism.But TheFutureof Political Islam by Graham
E. Fuller and Face to Face with Islam by FrancoisBurgatare, refreshingly,the exceptions
to the rule. Both authorsare experienced scholars who are trainedin Middle East studies,
and who have traveledto the region for decades. GrahamFuller,who used to work in the
US intelligence community, has been warning about the consequences of US foreign
policy for years, and Francois Burgat, prior to having produced the book under review,
had written an outstandingstudy of Islamic movements in North Africa, I'islamisme au
Maghreb(Karthala,1986). Both authorsreadand speakArabicandhave, especially Burgat,
interviewed scores of Islamic activities and leaders.Fuller writes a book with analytic
categories and concepts. Thus, the reader is spared the frequently-told chronological
accounts of Hasan al-Banna, Sayyid Qutb, and others, though the book could have been
betterorganized so that themes and concepts do not overlap. Fuller makes many sensible
points that are often left out of US policy debates, and sometimes out of academicdebates
as well. Fuller reminds the reader,for example, that Islamic fundamentalismconstitutes
only "a thin wedge of the overall Islamic political spectrum(p. xi). He also states that it is
incorrectto "thinkof political Islam as a fixed ideology to be accepted or rejected as a
whole [italics in original] (p. 45). And while he takes into his analytic consideration
various underlyingcauses for the rise and potency of Islamic fundamentalism,he possibly
overstates his case when he asserts: "Islampervades the daily life of Islamic society and
political culture more profoundly than any other single ideological or conceptual force
(p. xii). Nevertheless, recent evidence from reliable public opinion surveys of Muslim
countriesbelies the claims by some Westernscholars,most notablyBernardLewis, regarding the extent to which Islam determinesthe behaviorof Muslims, or dominatestheir lives
and thought.As Fuller observes, Islam itself is "nota political ideology but a religion" (p.
14), althoughit is often treatedas a mere violent political force that shapes all facets of the
lives of all Muslims. Furthermore,Fuller succeeds in trying to refutethe notion that Islam
is peculiar or exceptional as an activist religion, and shows that religion has intersected
with political conflicts in many partsof the world (p. 78). Yet, people do not dwell on the
political role of Judaism in Israel, for example, although it is politically salient in a
country where some one third of voters are OrthodoxJews who are influenced by their
religious beliefs. Of the many interestingideas and insights in the book, Fuller's discussion of "umma versus national identity" (pp. 19-23) is quite interesting; it shows the
fluidity and malleability of people's political foci of identification.
As Fuller also rightly points out, the evaluation of Islamic movements and governments varies depending on who is doing the evaluation, and where (p. 98). The Iranian
regime, for example, is judged in the West by the standardsof liberal democracies,and is
found to be clearly wanting and deficient. Yet, the Iranianregime can be comparedquite
favorablywith the Saudi government'soppressive rule. The relative openness of the Iranian political system and the Iranianpress contrasts sharply with the closed nature of
Saudi government and society. This is by no means intended to suggest that Iran is a
democracy,or to underplaythe oppressivenessof Iran's rulers and their violation of human rights and exploitationof religion. The point is that people in the West do not use the
same measuresor standardsof evaluationas people in the Middle East. Of course, thereare

132 * MIDDLEEASTJOURNAL
also Westernpolitical considerationsas well; Americanofficials seem always to pay closer
attentionto humanrights violations in countriesthat are opposed to US policies, than to
violations committedby client regimes. That explains why Saudi Arabiahas gotten away
with its humanrights violations for decades. The fanaticaland dictatorialTalibanregime,
for example, is rightly seen as a horrificallymisogynist and oppressivegovernment,which
some Pashtunsnonethelessjudged as an ethnically representativegovernmentwhich had
brought "security"to people's lives (p. 115). On the subject of Islam and democracy,
Fuller is right in saying that "no religion is inherently 'compatible' with democracy"(p.
121). In fact, democracies had, and still have, to marginalize or to compartmentalize
religion in orderto achieve fuller democraticsystems of government.The threemonotheistic religions have tremendousattachmentsto what they perceive as "divine"laws and
some religious advocates wish to apply them in the whole of society, regardlesswhether
one is a memberof the faith or whethershe/he is even religious at all.
Burgat uses language that is more sweeping, sharp, and stridentthan that of Fuller.
However,Burgatknows his subjectmatterexceedingly well. Armedwith his own research
and familiarwith the availablescholarship,Burgatbegins by lamentingthe state of Western discourseon Islam and Islamic fundamentalists.He puts a high premiumon the knowledge of the culture,religion, and language of the region under study.Burgateven finds a
benefit in personally meeting Islamic fundamentalist interlocutors and noticing their
"physicalappearanceand style of dress [and] the tone of their voice and the framework
within which they express themselves"(p. 3). Burgatinsists, correctly,thatpersonaldirect
experience is essential as a basis for empirical research of the Islamic fundamentalist
phenomenon.
Burgatis quite critical of Westernmedia portrayalsof Islam, althoughone can easily
note that the French and British media are superiorto Americanmedia when it comes to
coverage of the Middle East, or coverage of foreign affairs in general. Even the most
respectedmedia outlets in the United States are not as intelligent in their coverage as are
mainstreamnewspapersin the United Kingdom and France. Burgat maintainsthat with
Westernmedia, "exoticism is thus guaranteed"(p. 16). But exoticism has always been a
feature of some classical Orientalistliterature.The prostituteor the princess is of more
interest to the Westerneye than are the majorityof women in the region. Similarly,the
extremeconditions of sexism and misogyny in SaudiArabiaare often extrapolatedon the
entire Middle East and the Islamic worlds.
Burgat's chapter on women is a must read for anybody who has not been reading
feminist literatureon, or by, women in the Middle East. He analyzes the veil without
falling into the outrightjudgmental hostility common in some Westernwriting; nor can
he be accused of naivete or of subscribing to that emotional and uncritical school of
Islamic apologetics that dominates much of Islamic studies in the Middle East. Burgat
shows women of the Middle East as they are, in their diversity,and not as a monolithic
group that is helpless and eager for Westerntears of sympathy,or for US-style "warsof
liberation."He identifies the tension between professional feminist-leaningwomen and
the Islamic fundamentalistagenda (pp. 145-47). But he believes that the dynamics of the
struggle within the "Islamistmovement"is much more likely to provide answers to the
problems posed by the relationship between Islamism and modernization,than by the
struggle between feminists and fundamentalists(p. 151).
Burgathas a very interestingengagementwith Olivier Roy's thesis in his The Failure
of Political Islam (HarvardUniversityPress, 1994), and suggests thatperhapsit was Western methodology that may have failed, and that Islamism may in fact "evolve" (p. 161).
The evolution of FIS (FrontIslamiquedu Salut) in Algeria is an example on Burgat'sside,
although one can enter into a debate about sincerity and motives, which no one can

MIDDLEEASTJOURNAL* 133
decisively resolve. Burgatalso discusses the phenomenonof Islamismin the context of its
dealings not only with the repressivestate, but also with the secularleftist opposition.He
concedes that Middle East governmentshave enjoyed almost unparalleledstability for at
least three decades, but he does not see that as a result of the failure of the opposition as
Yet, it is hardto disagree with Roy that
much as it is the result of fierce authoritanianism.
Islamism has been incapable of providing solutions to the acute social and economic
problemsfaced by Muslims in the Middle East. Burgatis also correctin pointing out the
deceptive and manipulativemethods of Arab governments,who legalize some fundamentalists but only to underminethe powersof rivalIslamists(e.g., Morocco).And to the West,
the Arab governments wish to characterizetheir Islamic fundamentalistdissidents (or
even their seculardissidents) as fans of Usama Bin Ladin no matterwhat. This facilitates
Western,particularlyAmerican,toleranceif not outrightsupportfor their oppression.
Fuller and Burgathave thus given readersmuch to ponderand discuss. The Future of
Political Islam and Face to Face with Islam standas proof thatnot all books on the Middle
East and Islam adhereto the paradigmsof the Islam industry.Fine academicbooks written
by trainedand knowledgeable experts are still being published, althoughthey might not
get the media notoriety,or the attentionof the public or of governmentofficials that they
deserve.
Yet, as mentioned at the outset, the market is saturatedwith pseudo-authoritative
works on political Islam and on the contemporaryMiddle East, many of which have been
written by "instantexperts" - scholars, journalists, and ministers who have no backgroundin Middle East or Islamic studies. Some membersof this group,like Paul Berman,
may even come from the American"left."Berman,who claims to have spent time uncovering the real origins of Islamic terrorism,thus stumbles across Sayyid Qutb.' Berman
regardsSayyid Qutbas the real inspirationbehindMuslim terrorism,andto makehis story
more palatableto Westernaudiences,links Qutbwith Europeanfascism and Nazism. This
link is of course politically convenient,as all forms of war and violence arejustified when
directed against fascists and Nazis. But those references to the phenomenonof "Islamic
fascism"which mayhave been popularizedby formerleftistjournalistChristopherHitchens
ignore a basic fact. Bin Ladin and his fellow travelershave failed to inspire "themasses,"
the so-called "Arabstreet."Theirrepeatedcalls for Jihadhave fallen on deaf Muslim ears.
Robert Spencer,who (like Berman)does not have any backgroundin Middle East or
Islamic studies, and who is active in right-wing Christiancauses, has now written two
books on mattersIslamic. Spencer,much like Berman,insists that Bin Ladinis an Islamic
figure who inspiresthe masses. Spenceris very good at findingquotationsfromthe Qur'an
or from obscureMuslim clerics to "prove"the dangerof Islam. However,this methodcan
easily be turnedagainsthim. There are in the Old and New Testamentelements that are as
disturbingandoffensive - if not more, in the case of the Old Testament- as his anthology
of Islam's statements. Far from adding to our knowledge or promoting understanding
between peoples, cultures, and religions, this method merely encourages fanatics on all
sides, not scholars, to engage in one-upmanship. Spencer states that "[w]hen modern
Muslims like JaffarUmar Thalib [sic] and Usama Bin Ladin declareJihad,Muslims take
them seriously...."2 In the new world of the Islam industry,all sources are treatedequally,
and documentationis unnecessary.However,those who want to employ endnotes in Arabic or Persianfor their"studies"of the Middle East and Islamcan now rely on daily supply
of the media's favorite source on the region nowadays, MEMRI (Middle East Media
1. Paul Berman,Terrorand Liberalism(New York:W.W.Norton, 2003).

Americaand the West

2. RobertSpencer,OnwardMuslimSoldiers:HowJihadStill Threatens
(Washington,DC: Regnery,2003), p. 11.

134 * MIDDLEEASTJOURNAL
Research Institute), which was founded by "retired"Israeli intelligence experts.3This
repositoryof selective press items has become particularlyuseful for membersof congress
duringhearings on the Middle East, for newspapers,and for those newcomers to Middle
East studies who seek "damagingquotes"aboutArabs/Muslims.
In present-daystudies of Islam, one can easily cite as a source for research"a writeron
a Muslim bulletin board."4In Islam and the West(1993), none other than BernardLewis
cited the authorityof "a young man in a shop where I went to make a purchase"5or a letter
to the editorin the New YorkTimes.'In post-September11thAmerica,BernardLewis, who
has been accustomed to telling jokes about the Middle East, informs his audiences that
jokes are permissibleas a source of public opinion orientationsbecause they are the "only
authenticand uncensoredexpression of political opinion."7[In fact, public opinion surveys are conducted and published in many countriesof the region.]
Lewis deserves special attention.As is well known, Lewis was brought back from
retirement to advise the US government. He has visited the White House, though he
refuses to confirmhaving met with PresidentGeorge W. Bush. Lewis' recent books, What
WentWrong?and The Crisis of Islam, were on the best seller lists simultaneously,and his
older books remainin print. But one finds a contrastbetween his historicalbooks, where
he is thoroughand where his scholarshipis based on extensive researchand knowledge
(e.g., his learnedbook on the emergenceof modernTurkey),and his popularbooks on the
ModernMiddle East, which are woefully devoid of researchand can be quite lacking in
basic knowledge about the region.
In writing about contemporaryIslam, for years Lewis has been largely recycling his
1976 Commentaryarticle titled "The Return of Islam" ("return"from where?). In this
piece, Lewis exhibits his adherenceto the most discreditedforms of classical Orientalist
dogmas by invoking such terms as "themodernWesternmind."8He therebyresurrectsthe
notion of an epistemological distinction between "our"mind and "theirs,"as articulated
by Raphael Patai in The Arab Mind (Charles Scribner, 1973), which, incidentally,went
into a new printing after September 11th. For Lewis, the Muslim mind never seems to
change. Every Muslim, or any Muslim, regardlessof geographyor time, is representative
of any or all Muslims. Thus, a quotationfrom an obscure medieval source is sufficient to
explain present-daybehavior. Lewis even tracesAbu 'Ammar's(Yasir'Arafat's)own name
to early Islamic historyand to the names of the ProphetMuhammad'scompanions,though
'Arafathimself had explained that his name derives from the root 'amr (a reference to
'Arafat'sconstructionactivities in Kuwaitpriorto his ascension within the Palestine Liberation Organization).Because 'Arafatembraced,literally,AyatollahRuhollahKhomeini
of Iranwhen he met him, Lewis finds evidence of a universalIslamic bond. When Lewis
revised his book years later, he took note in passing of the deep rift that later developed
between 'Arafatand Khomeini by saying simply that "laterthey partedcompany."9
The Islam of BernardLewis is an unchangingIslam. Indeed,accordingto Lewis, Islam
is religion, culture, history, people, geography, law, outlook, paradigm,and, of course,
texts (preferably,ancient religious texts). Muslims are dominatedexclusively by Islam.
3. See theinvestigative
articleon MEMRIin Guardian,
August12,2002.
4. Spencer,OnwardMuslimSoldiers, p. 21.

5. See BernardLewis,IslamandtheWest(NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,1993),p. 57.

6. Lewis, Islam and the West,p. 100.
7. BernardLewis, "Timefor Toppling:the argumentsagainst"regimechange"arebackward,"The
WallStreetJournal, September28, 2002.
8. So enamoredis Lewis with thatarticle,thatit also appearedin Islam and the West,p. 134.
9. Lewis, Islam and the West,p. 141.

MIDDLEEAST JOURNAL* 135

He: "ForMuslims, Islam is not merely a system of belief and worship, a compartmentof
life, so to speak, distinct from other compartmentswhich are the concern of nonreligious
authorities administeringnonreligious laws. It is ratherthe whole of life, and its rules
include civil, criminal, and even what we would call constitutionallaw."1"
The dangersof
this view does not lie merely in its impact on college and public educationin the United
States, where no studentof Middle East studies can escape Lewis' books. Lewis now has
access to the highest circles of the US government.None otherthanVice-PresidentRichard Cheney once answereda question in public by saying: "I've talked to BernardLewis
about that very subject."'1
In Lewis' two best-sellingbooks, WhatWentWrong?and TheCrisis of Islam, the reader
reads the same passages and anecdotestwice. Lewis relishes recountingthat syphilis was
importedinto the Middle East from the new world.'2His discussion about Napoleon in
Egypt appearsin bothbooks, almostverbatim.'3 The secondbook containscalls for (mostly
military) action. In The Crisis of Islam, Lewis asserts: "the West must defend itself by
whatevermeans."'4Lewis was an enthusiasticchampionof the war on Iraq.In fact, he was
one of those who assured the American governmentthat Iraqis (if not all Arabs) would
welcome the war on theircountry.[Vice-PresidentCheneyrelied on the authorityof Fouad
Ajami to assertthat not only Iraqis,but all Arabs,would joyously greetAmericantroops'5
welcome them with, in KananMakiya'swords, "sweets and flowers."'6]
The Crisis of Modern Islam reveals much about Lewis and the ideology of hostility
that permeateshis work, especially when he deals with contemporaryevents of the Arab
world. One is astonishedto read some of Lewis' observationson Muslim and Arab sentiments and opinions. He is deeply convinced that Muslims are "pained"by the absence of
the caliphate,' as if this constitutesa serious demandor goal even for Muslim fundamentalist organizations.One does not see crowds chantingfor the restorationof the caliphate.
Furthermore,Lewis treats Bin Ladin, not as the fanatic that he is, but as a respected
theologian, anotherGhazzali. In other words, he takes his Islamic pronouncementstoo
seriously,'8instead of treatinghis subject as the criminalthat he is. Methodologically,he
insists thatterrorismby individualMuslims should be consideredIslamic terrorism,while
terrorismby individualJews or Christiansis never consideredJewish or Christianterrorism. Lewis' reply to this criticismis thatwhat is uniqueaboutMuslim terroristsis thatthey
are the only ones who appropriatethe religious label for their actions.'9Perhapshe is right
if one is to ignore some facts: thatIsraeldefines itself as a Jewish state,thatJewish settlers
who operateagainst Palestiniansdo so in the name of religious conviction, that Christian

10.Lewis,IslamandtheWest,p. 4.
11. Seethetextin http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/2003/tr20030513-0182.html.
12. See BernardLewis, WhatWentWrong:WesternImpactand Middle EasternResponse, New

York:OxfordUniversityPress,2002),p. 39.
13. See Lewis, WhatWentWrong?,p. 31; and BernardLewis, The Crisis of Islam: Holy Warand

UnholyTerror(NewYork:TheModernLibrary,
2003),p. 54.
14. Lewis, The Crisis of Islam, p. xxxii.
15. Forthe full text of Cheney'sspeech, see http://www.newamericancentury.org/iraq-082602.htm.
16. Makiyausedthose wordsin pressinterviewswithAmericanjournalists.See the dispatchby Inter
Press Service,March25, 2003. Makiyalaterconcededthathe was "wrong"in thatprediction.See New
YorkTimes,November30, 2003.
17. Lewis, The Crisis of Islam, p. xvii.
18. See BernardLewis, "Licenseto Kill: Usamabin Ladin'sDeclarationof Jihad,"ForeignAffairs,
November-December1998.
19. Lewis, The Crisis of Islam, p. 137.

136 * MIDDLEEASTJOURNAL
fundamentalistswho have used violence against abortionclinics do so from a religious
perspective.Perhapshe never heardof David Koresh,leader of the BranchDavidians, 82
of whom perishedin Waco,Texas in 1993, or of ReverendJim Jones, leaderof the People's
Temple,who presidedover the mass suicide of his hundredsof his followers in Jonestown,
Guyana in 1980, or of those Jewish terrorist organizations that are on the US State
Department'slist of terroristorganizationsand states.
Lewis is free in his retirementnot even to disguise his hostility to Arabs and Muslims
hostility thatat least some of his readershad suspectedfor years.After all, he arguedto
Dick Cheney before the war, using that dreadedcliche from Zionist and colonial history,
that Arabs only understandthe language of force.20His disdain for the Palestinians is
unmasked.Though he lists acts of violence by PLO groups - only the ones that are not
directedagainstIsraeli soldiers - he lists not one act of Israeli violence againstPalestinians).21 To discredit the Palestinian national movement, he finds it necessary to tell yet
again the story of HajjAmin Al-Husayni's visit to Nazi Germany,22
apparentlyseeking to
stigmatize all Palestinians with that association. His is so disdainful of the Palestinians
that he finds their opposition to Britain during the mandateperiod inexplicable because
he believes thatBritainwas, alas, opposed to Zionism.23Lewis is so insistentin attributing
Arab popular antipathy to the United States to Nazi influence and inspiration that he
actually maintainsthat Arabs obtained their hostility to the US from reading the likes of
Otto Spengler, FreidrichGeorg Junger,and MartinHeidegger.24This is ratheramusing.
There is no evidence that the Egyptianmasses have been known to devour Sein und Zeit
(which, incidentally,does not contain anti-Americanism).But even the Ba'th Party,for
Lewis, has Nazi components (in fact, the Ba'th, says Lewis, is a melange of Nazism and
Soviet communism).25
The powerfulre-entranceof Lewis into the public arenaafter September11thhas only
encouragedthe rejuvenationof classical Orientalism.The "political"careerof Ibn Warraq
(a pseudonym for a former Muslim) is a good example. Ibn Warraqis on a mission to
"expose" and attack the dangers of Islam. For his efforts, he, like Lewis, received an
invitationto the White House to meet with high-rankingofficials.26Ibn Warraqprobably
takes his name from the courageousfree thinkerin classical Islam, Abu 'Isa Muhammad
bin Harunbin Muhammadal-Warraq.But unlike the present-dayIbnWarraq,Abu 'Isa was
a courageous freethinkerwho wrote refutationsof more than one religion.27Ibn Warraq
claims to subscribeto secularismand freethinking,yet he objects to Islam only and aligns
himself with Christianfundamentalism,which raises questions aboutthe truethrustof his
mission. Free thinking, in any religion and against all religions, should be encouraged
although there is a difference between religious bigotry and enlightened freethinking.
The latest two books by Ibn Warraqmerely collect old writingsby classical Orientalists.28
The more rigid and biased the Orientalists, the better for Warraq.Warraqhimself has
20. See Newsweek,March31, 2003.

21. Lewis,TheCrisisof Islam,p. 148.

22. Lewis, The Crisis of Islam, pp. 59-60.

23. Lewis,TheCrisisof Islam,p. 94.

24. Lewis,TheCrisisof Islam,p. 69.
25. Lewis,TheCrisisof Islam,p. 118.
26. See the articlein theAmericanProspect,December 17, 2001.

27. See DominiqueUrvoy,Lespenseurslibresdans l'Islamclassique:L'interrogation

sur la
religionchezlespenseursarabesindependents
(Paris:AlbinMichel,1996).
28. See Ibn Warraq(ed) The Questfor the Historical Muhammad(Amherst,NY: Prometheus,
2002); and Ibn Warraq(ed) Whatthe KoranReally Says (Amherst,NY: Prometheus,2002).

MIDDLEEAST JOURNAL* 137

nothing original to say on the subject; he merely resuscitates the writings of those
Orientalistswho have been long discredited,such as Henri Lammens and Ernest Renan,
among other less discredited Orientalists.Warraqrejects mainstreamOrientalists, like
W.M. Watt.He quotes Renan's famous Islam et la Science lecture approvingly:"Toliberate the Muslim from his religion is the best service that one can renderhim."29It is now
acceptableto express such views in polite company.
Even the US Congresshas inserteditself into the fray, with some memberswantingto
shape Middle East studies to adjust to the augmentedpowers of pro-Israeligroups and
terrorismstudies.And how frightfullydisturbingthata Middle East expert,Noah Feldman,
who advised the US occupationapparatusin Iraq,would be quoted in the year 2003 -25
years after the first release of Orientalism- as saying that "people in the Middle East
don't always act rationally,"30
or that the same expert would express his opposition to
elections and democracyin Iraqfor fear that "the wrong people could get elected.'
The perniciouseffects of the dominanceof the Islam industryover Islam scholarship
are, or should be, manifestly clear. So is the remedy.We need to extend the insights and
conclusions of scholarly studies of Islam and the Middle East into the realm of Western
political and popularcultures.The chasm between the contoursof Westernpolicy debates
on Islam and between the scholarlyproductionby expertson Islam and the Middle East is
responsiblefor the accusationthat these experts are somewhatguilty not only of political
errors,but in some cases, of ties to terrorism.This only places pressureson Westernacademics to toe the political lines of their governments.The horrific events of September
11th have increased the temptations to conform. Thankfully, Fuller and Burgat have
chosen to inform, ratherthan to conform.Werethere many more works of Islam scholarship - more of the qualityof TheFutureof Political Islam and Face to Face with Islamand many fewer of the kind churned out by the Islam industry,specialists, the general
public, and even US officials would be far better served. And who knows? Maybe with
betterknowledge, we can expect to be sparedthose "liberationwars."
As'ad AbuKhalilis Professor of Political science at CaliforniaState University,
Stanislaus and VisitingProfessor at the Centerfor Middle Eastern Studies at UC,
Berkeley. He is the authormost recentlyof SaudiArabia,Wahhabiyyah,and the US: The
CrumblingHouse of Saud (New York:Seven Stories Press,forthcoming).

29. See Ibn Warraq(ed) The Questfor the HistoricalMuhammad,p. 19.

30. Quotedin New YorkTimes,October7, 2003.
31. Quotedin New YorkTimes,November29, 2003.