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SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

APPELATE DIVISION: SECOND JUDUCIAL DEPARTMENT


In the Matter of Michael Krichevsky,
Falsely Accused, Claimant,

Appellate Division Docket


No 2015-01323

-againstElena Svenson

INDEX No. F-28901-08/13F

Respondent.

MOTION TO CLARIFY

"When an honest man, honestly mistaken, comes face-to-face with undeniable and irrefutable
truth, he is faced with one of two choices, he must either cease been mistaking or cease being
honest." Amicus Solo
Michael Krichevsky, sui juris, self-governed alive man under protest and duress; by special
appearance in challenge of jurisdiction and authority of the State's run Family Court, Attorney
General, other attorneys and judiciary; and acting in self-defense says:
INTRODUCTION
The common law doctrine of estoppel by acquiescence is applied when one party gives legal
notice to a second party of a fact or claim, and the second party fails to challenge or refute that
claim within a reasonable time. The second party is said to have acquiesced to the claim, and is
estopped from later challenging it, or making a counterclaim. The doctrine is similar to, and
often applied with, estoppel by laches.
" 5. No objection made. If one party presents his account to the other, and the latter makes no
objection, it may well be inferred that he is satisfied with and assents to it as correct. So, if an
account be made up and transmitted by one party to the other by mail, and the latter keeps it for
some considerable time without making any objection, he is held to have acquiesced in it.
Stentonv. Jerome, 54 N. Y. (9 Sick.) 480" [Taken from A Treatise Upon Some of the General
Principles of the Law written in A.D. 1877 by William Wait.]
DEFINITIONS AND TERMS

The following terms are taken from the Black's law dictionary 9 ed.
res judicata (rays joo-di-kay-ta or -kah-ta). [Latin "a thing adjudicated"] (I7c) 1. An issue that
has been definitively settled by judicial decision. [Cases: Judgment (;:::;;540,584,585.) 2. An
affirmative defense barring the same parties from litigating a second lawsuit on the same claim,
or any other claim arising from the same transaction or series of transactions and that could have
been but was not raised in the first suit. The three essential elements are (1) an earlier decision
on the issue, (2) a final judgment on the merits, and (3) the involvement of the same parties, or
parties in privity-with the original parties. Restatement (Second) of Judgments 17,24 (1982).
Also termed res adjudicata; claim preclusion; doctrine of res judicata. Cf. COLLATERAL
ESTOPPEL. [Cases: Judgment C=>540, 584,948(1).]
'"Res judicata1 has been used in this section as a general term referring to all of the ways in which
one judgment will have a binding effect on another. That usage is and doubtless will continue to
be common, but it lumps under a single name two quite different effects of judgments. The first
is the effect of foreclosing any litigation of matters that never have been litigated, because of the
determination that they should have been advanced in an earlier suit. The second is the effect of
foreclosing relitigation of matters that have once been litigated and decided. The first of these,
preclusion of matters that were never litigated, has gone under the name, 'true res judicata,' or the
names, 'merger' and 'bar.' The second doctrine, preclusion of matters that have once been
decided, has usually been called 'collateral estoppel.' Professor Allan Vestal has long argued for
the use of the names 'claim preclusion' and 'issue preclusion' for these two doctrines [Vestal,
Rationale of Preclusion, 9 St. Louis U. L.j. 29 (1964)], and this usage is increasingly employed
by the courts as it is by Restatement Second of Judgments." Charles Alan Wright, The Law of
Federal Courts 100A, at 722-23 (5th ed. 1994).
Page 298
collateral fact. See FACT.
collateral attack. (1833) An attack on a judgment in a proceeding other than a direct appeal; esp.,
an attempt to undermine a judgment through a judicial proceeding in which the ground of the
proceeding (or a defense in the proceeding) is that the judgment is ineffective.* Typically a
collateral attack is made against a point of procedure or another matter not necessarily apparent
in the record, as opposed to a direct attack on the merits exclusively. A petition for a writ of
habeas corpus is one type of collateral attack. Also termed indirect attack. Cf. DIRECT
ATTACK (1). [Cases: Criminal Law 0:=' 1407; Habeas Corpus 0:='203; Judgment
collateral estoppel (e-stop-JI). (1941) 1. The binding effect of a judgment as to matters actually
litigated and determined in one action on later controversies between the parties involving a
different claim from that on which the original judgment was based. 2. A doctrine barring a party
from relitigating an issue determined against that party in an earlier action, even if the second
action differs Significantly from the first one. - Also termed issue preclusion; issue estoppel;
direct estoppel; estoppel by judgment; estoppel by record; estoppel by verdict; cause-ai-action
estoppel; technical estoppel; estoppel per remjudicatam. Cf. RES JUDICATA. [Cases:
Judgment-634, 713, 948(1).]
administrative collateral estoppel. Estoppel that arises from a decision made by an agency acting
in ajudicial capacity. [Cases: Administrative Law and Procedure (;:::::;501.]

offensive collateral estoppel. (1964) Estoppel asserted by a plaintiff to prevent a defendant from
relitigating an issue previously decided against the defendant. [Cases: Judgment 0:-632.]
collateral fraud. See extrinsic fraud (1) under FRAUD,
the fraud must appear on the face of the record.
Page 731
fraud, n. (14c) 1. A knowing misrepresentation of the truth or concealment of a material fact to
induce another to act to his or her detriment. Fraud is usu. a tort, but in some cases (esp. when
the conduct is willful) it may be a crime. - Also termed intentional fraud. [Cases: Fraud (;:=> 1,
3, 16, 68.] 2. A misrepresentation made recklessly without belief in its truth to induce another
person to act. [Cases: Fraud (;:=> 13(3).] 3. A tort arising from a knowing misrepresentation,
concealment of material fact, or reckless misrepresentation made to induce another to act to his
or her detriment. [Cases: Fraud C=> 13(2), 13(3), 16.] 4. Unconscionable dealing; esp., in
contract law, the unfair use of the power arising out of the parties' relative positions and resulting
in an unconscionable bargain. [Cases: Contracts (;:=> 1.] - fraudulent, adj.
"[T]he use of the term fraud has been wider and less precise in the chancery than in the
common-law courts. This followed necessarily from the remedies which they respectively
administered. Common law gave damages for a wrong, and was compelled to define with care
the wrong which furnished a cause of action. Equity refused specific performance of a contract,
or set aside a transaction, or gave compensation where one party had acted unfairly by the other.
Thus 'fraud' at common law is a false statement... : fraud In equity has often been used as
meaning unconscientious dealing - 'although, I think, unfortunately,' a great equity lawyer has
said." William R. Anson, Principles of the Law of Contract 263 (Arthur L Corbin ed., 3d Am.
ed. 1919)
Page 732
extrinsicfraud. (1851) 1. Deception that is collateral to the issues being considered in the case;
intentional misrepresentation or deceptive behavior outside the transaction itself (whether a
contract or a lawsuit), depriving one party of informed consent or full participation.* For
example, a person might engage in extrinsic fraud by convincing a litigant not to hire counselor
answer by dishonestly saying the matter will not be pursued. Also termed collateral fraud. 2.
Deception that prevents a person from knowing about or asserting certain rights. [Cases: Federal
Civil Procedure (."::::>2654; Judgment 0=>375,443(1).]
fraud on the court. (1810) In ajudicial proceeding, a lawyer's or party's misconduct so serious
that it undermines or is intended to undermine the integrity of the proceeding . Examples are
bribery of a juror and introduction of fabricated evidence. [Cases: Federal Civil Procedure
Judgment 0=>372, 440.]
fraud in thefactum. (1848) Fraud occurring when a legal instrument as actually executed differs
from the one intended for execution by the person who executes it, or when the instrument may
have had no legal existence . Compared to fraud in the inducement, fraud in the facnrm occurs
only rarely, as when a blind person signs a mortgage when misleadingly told that the paper is just

a letter. Also termed fraud in the execution;fraud in the making. Cf. fraud in the inducement.
[Cases: Contracts 0=>94(1).]
fraud in the inducement. (1831) Fraud occurring when a misrepresentation leads another to enter
into a transaction with a false impression of the risks, duties, or obligations involved; an
intentional misrepresentation of a material risk or duty reasonably relied on, thereby injuring the
other party without vitiating the contract itself, esp. about a fact relating to value. - Also termed
fraud in the procurement. C^. fraud in thefactum. [Cases: Contracts C='94(l); Fraud 24.] fraud
in the making. Se&fraudin the factum. fraud in the procurement. See fraud in the inducement.
Page 733
insurance fraud. Fraud committed against an insurer, as when an insured lies on a policy
application or fabricates a claim.
inti'insicfraud, (1832) Deception that pertains to an issue involved in an original action .
Examples include the use of fabricated evidence, a false return of service, perjured testimony,
and false receipts or other commercial documents. [Cases: Judgment 373,441.]
fraudulent act. Conduct involving bad faith, dishonesty, a lack of integrity, or moral turpitude.
Also termed dishonest act; fraudulent or dishonest act.
Page 1183
obstruction of justice. (1854) Interference with the orderly administration of law and justice, as
by giving false information to or Withholding evidence from a police officer or prosecutor, or by
harming or intimidating a witness or juror . Obstruction of justice is a crime in most
jurisdictions. - Also termed obstructing justice; obstructing public justice. [Cases: Obstructing
Justice ~1; Sentencing and Punishment C=>761.] The goal, to proscribe every Wilful act of
corruption, intimidation or force which tends in any way to distort or impede the administration
of law either civil or criminal-has been very largely attained, partly by aid of legislation. And any
punishable misdeed of such a nature which is not recognized as a distinct crime, is usually called
'obstruction of justice,1 or 'obstructing justice,1 - a common-law misdemeanor." Rollin M. Perkins
& Ronald N. Boyce, Criminal Law 552 (3d ed. 1982).
obvious error. A standard of review that applies to unobjected-to actions and omissions at trial
that are so seriously prejudicial as to result in manifest injustice. [Cases: Appeal and Error (':;=,
181; Criminal Law 1030(1); Federal Courts -611.]
obtest (ob- or db-test), vb. (16c) 1. To call to or invoke as a witness. 2. To ask for earnestly;
beseech; implore. 3. To protest.
Page 118.7
offense against public justice and authority. A crime that impairs the administration of justice. The common-law offenses of this type were obstruction of justice, barratry, maintenance,
champerty, embracery, escape, prison breach, rescue, misprision of felony, compounding a
crime, subornation of perjury, bribery, and misconduct in office.
Page 170

barrator (bar-d-tdr), n. (ISc) 1. One who commits barratry (in any sense). 2. A fomenter of
quarrels and lawsuits; one who stirs up dissension and litigation among people. - Also spelled
barretor. Cf. CHAMPERTOR. "Barrator or Barater(Fr, Barateur, a Deceiver) Is a common
mover or maintainer of Suits, Quarrels, or Parts, either in Courts or elsewhere in the Country,
and is himself never quiet, but at variance with one or other." Thomas Blount, Nomo-Lexicon: A
Law Dictionary (1670). barratry (bar-;J-tree or bair-), n, (ISc) 1. Vexatious incitement to
litigation, esp. by soliciting potential legal clients . Barratry is a crime in most jurisdictions. A
person who is hired by a lawyer to solicit business is called a capper. See CAPPER (1). [Cases:
Champerty and Maintenance ~4(.5), 5(.5),9.] 2. Maritime law. Fraudulent or grossly negligent
conduct (by a master or crew) that is prejudicial to a shipowner. [Cases: Seamen ~14;
Shipping~61.J
"[SJailing out of port in violation of an embargo, or without paying the port duties, or to go out
of the regular course upon a smuggling expedition, or to be engaged in smuggling against the
consent of the owner, are all of them acts of barratry, equally with more palpable and direct acts
of violence and fraud, for they are willful breaches of duty by the master. It makes no difference
in the reason of the thing, whether the injury the owner suffers be owing to an act of the master,
induced by motives of advantage to himself, or of malice to the owner, or a disregard of those
laws which it was the master's duty to obey, and which the owner relied upon him to observe. It
is, in either case, equally barratry:" 3 James Kent, Commentaries on American Law*305-06
(George Comstock ed., llth ed. 1866).
3. The buying or selling of ecclesiastical or governmental positions. 4. The crime committed by a
judge who accepts a bribe in exchange for a favorable decision. Cf. BRIBE. - barratrous
(bar~;Hr;)s), adj.
Page 233
champers. Hist. The share of a lawsuit's proceeds payable to a champertor. See CHAMPERTY.
[Cases: Champerty and Maintenance
champertor (cham-p<:lr-tar), n. (16c) A person who engages in champerty; one who supports
and promotes another person's lawsuit for pecuniary gain. - Also termed (archaically)
campiparticeps. Cf. BARRATOR.
Page 1039
maintain, vb. (14c) 1. To continue (something). 2. To continue in possession of (property, etc.).
3. To assert (a position or opinion); to uphold (a position or opinion) in argument. 4. To care for
(property) for purposes of operational productivity or appearance; to engage in general repair and
upkeep. 5. To support (someone) financially; esp. to pay alimony to. [Cases: Divorce ~ 231-247;
Husband and Wife 282-3 01.16. (Of a third party to a lawsuit) to assist a litigant in prosecuting
or defending a lawsuit; to meddle in someone else's litigation. [Cases: Champerty and
Maintenance
maintainor. (15c) Criminal law. A person who meddles in someone else's litigation by providing
money or other assistance; a person who is guilty of maintenance. Also spelled maintainer. See
MAINTENANCE (6). [Cases: Champerty and Maintenance
maintenance, n. (14c) 1. The continuation of something, such as a lawsuit. 2. The continuing
possession of something, such as property. 3. The assertion of a position or opinion; the act of
upholding a position in argument. 6. Improper assistance in prosecuting or defending a lawsuit

given to a litigant by someone who has no bona fide interest in the case; meddling in someone
else's litigation. Cf. CHAMPERTY. [Cases: Champerty and Maintenance ~ 1,4.]
AFFIDAVIT OF MATERIAL FACTS
1.

I have firsthand knowledge of the following facts and could competently testify thereto,

except as to those matters, which I stated upon information and belief.


2.

I am not in the military and have a status of Federal Victim and Federal Witness.

3.

I challenge falsely presumed, illegal and unlawful continuous jurisdiction of family court

due to corruption, bias, and harassment; and without consent to any of its corrupt administrative
proceedings against me.
4.

I aver that no jurisdiction exists and existed over me without my consent and demand that

the STATE finally enters evidence of jurisdictional facts and elements on the record.
5.

The STATE never entered any jurisdictional evidence.

6.

I am Falsely Accused victim in the within 7 years long simulated, fictitious actions of

domestic terrorism, harassment, Barratry, Champerty and Maintenance; Personage and Human
Trafficking; and demand the STATE and its actors cease and decease its criminal practice.
7.

This affidavit is another of my numerous, ignored by judiciary attempts to report Federal

Crimes of Treason and Misprision of Treason to the judge, as well as conspiracy, obstruction of
Justice, witness tampering, violations of Code of Judicial Conduct and New York Rules of
Professional Conduct to New York Tribunal per Rule 8.3 - Reporting Professional Misconduct.
8.

I will get to the questions I need clarification from this court after I finished laying a

foundation.
9.

Attached as Exhibit A, are the orders of this Court, which are subject of this motion,

objection, notice and affidavit.


OBJECTION, NOTICE OF EXTRINSIC FRAUD, RICO VIOLATIONS AND

DUTY TO CURE; FINDIGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW


10.

For the sake of brevity, I address first order and denial of justice by this court. Upon

information and belief, said order is done sua sponte by the clerk of court based on wrongful,
mistaken presumptions drawn from fraud upon the court by officer of the court, void Judge's
Maria Arias final order (Exhibit B).
11 .

In her order she intentionally, maliciously created the presumption(s) that I intentionally

failed to attend a SCHEDULED final hearing or trial, and as such I abandoned my claim as
Petitioner, which resulted in a final order dismissing the action for failure to prosecute - nothing
could be further from the truth.
12.

Family Court Act 145. Liability of judge states:


"Any family court judge who in good faith issues process hi any proceeding under
this act shall not be liable therefore unless it is shown that his action in so doing
was malicious or a deliberate abuse of his discretion."
Judge Maria Arias deliberately disregarded Family Court Act 145. No more than
Affidavit is necessary to make a prima facie case!

13 .

Upon information, belief and circumstantial evidence, this order was done through

Judge's Maria Arias role-playing of blissful ignorance of the facts that her law clerk of Part 9 of
Kings County Family Court (Family Court) on December 2, 2014, sua sponte, suddenly and
without any explanation, over my objection adjourned my motion to consolidate contempt
petition filed by Svenson and my petition for order of protection against Svenson's constant
harassment and perjury in her attempt to obstruct Justice hi Bankruptcy Court where I am a
Plaintiff. By such adjournment, judge Arias and her law clerk conspired, abstracted and denied
Justice to me.
BRIEF RELEVANT PROCEDURAL HISTORY

14.

From 2010, Svenson never replied, denied or rebutted any of my numerous affidavits in

my motions while magistrates and judges were -willfully blind; in deliberate disregard of my
rights and due process, continued harassment and perjury of their officer's oaths into 2015.
15.

In 2013, without a cause, Svenson filed in Part 27 her second false, fraudulent, perjurious

and harassing me petition to hold me in contempt of court's void child support order. Svenson's
first petition to punish me for contempt of void child support order was regretfully dismissed by
magistrate Fasone of Part 27 for lack of evidence. That contempt proceeding is cause of action
for malicious prosecution in Supreme Court because it resulted in stroke to me due to stress.
16.

This order of support was corruptly established by Fasone on February 3, 2010 without

discovery and trial - in secret from me.


17.

I was never in compliance with this order because it was absurd; with conscious disregard

to evidence and my ability to pay, especially after I became immediately unemployed, and
thereafter disabled in 2010 due to stroke mentioned above.
18.

My attempt to appeal this order to Appellate Division failed a) when my request for

poor person status was denied and b) due to subsequent unlawful seizure of my last $150
from my bank account by Child Support Collection Unit.
19.

On or about September of 2014,1 filed petition for order of protection against Svenson's

continuous aggravated harassment in second degree and perjury against me in Family Court WHICH IS A FAMILY OFFENSE.
20.

Said petition was assigned to Judge Maria Arias. At first hearing on September 30, 2014,

Judge Arias appeared neutral to me. She scheduled April 10, 2015 as trial date, suggested that I
serve on Svenson a bill of particulars and said that preponderance of evidence will be used as
evidentiary standard.

21.

Thereafter, I filed in her Part 9 ex parte emergency motion (Exhibit C) to proceed as

poor person in order to obtain free copies of the transcripts where Svenson perjured herself.
22.

Simultaneously, I filed and served Svenson with emergency motion to consolidate and

restore (consolidation motion) (Exhibit D) Svenson's contempt petition with my petition for
order of protection. One of the reasons I wanted to consolidate those petitions was that I objected
to magistrate Milsap's authority to conduct contempt proceedings because that matter and my
affirmative defenses required a judge as per Family Court Act (will be addressed in detail
below).
23.

During a scheduling conference on said motion, Judge Arias offered me a hearing date in

January 2015.
24.

I objected to that date and explained that I have the final hearing on Svenson's petition to

hold me in contempt where Svenson continuously perjure herself and that my motion to
consolidate will become moot.
25.

Judge Arias expressed understanding of the issue. She scheduled the hearing of said

motion to consolidate on December 2, 2014 and put 9:30 AM as the earliest time so that this
hearing will go before 11 AM hearing scheduled in Part 24 on contempt. I left this hearing
confident that a fair trial would start in part 9.
26.

On December 2, 2014 at around 11:00 AM, law clerk of Judge Arias called me in clerk's

office and told me that motion to consolidate hearing is adjourned until January 23, 2015.
27.

I immediately objected. I explained once again that if I would not have a hearing today

my motion to consolidate would be moot


28.

I requested explanation as to why my hearing is suddenly rescheduled, but law clerk was

rude and refused to give me explanation.

29.

I continued to object. I told law clerk that this is conspiracy to abstract justice and I will

not be attending January 23, 2015 hearing on the motion to consolidate since it will be moot.
3.0.

She replied that I can do whatever I want.

31.

I left law clerk's office with clear understanding that she knew what she was doing and

rescheduling of this motion was intentionally done to abstract and deny justice by an order from
some "Wizard behind the curtain," hence law clerks bold rudeness and refusal to give a reason
why and by whose authority. Said clerk's behavior shows her mens rea.
32.

On that day, I attended Part's 24 hearing under duress and threat to be arrested if I would

not attend. Prosecutor-magistrate Milsap of that Part was in violation of FCA 453 that states:
" 453. Petition; violation of court order. Proceedings under this part shall be
originated by the filing of a petition containing an allegation that the respondent has
failed to obey a lawful order of this court." [emphasis mine]
33.

His petition did not say that, and therefore was defective per CPLR 3211 (a) (7) - the

pleadings fails to state a cause of action.


34.

.However, my, under duress, motion to dismiss petition was summarily denied by Milsap

without a hearing or written order.


3 5.

Milsap was in violation of FCA 43 9 that states:


"Support magistrates shall not be empowered to hear, determine and grant any
relief with respect to issues specified in section four hundred fifty-five of this article,
issues of contested paternity involving claims of equitable estoppel, custody,
visitation including visitation as a defense, and orders of protection or exclusive
possession of the home, which shall be referred to a judge as provided in
subdivision (b) or (c) of this section" [emphasis mine]

36.

In Part 24, Milsap offered me adjournment to hire a lawyer. I replied that I have no

money and requested adjournment of the hearing based on my motion to consolidate cases.
Milsap told me, "You can go to Part 14 immediately and ask for consolidation there." In Part 14,
which is across Part 9, there was no people waiting for a hearing. I noticed that there was no

people in Part 9 either (I infer from this fact that my hearing in Judge's Arias Part 9 was
intentionally denied). I asked a court officer of Part 14 what this part is for and what is going to
happen at this proceeding. Court officer told me that someone would come out and explain it to
me, but nobody came out. I came in the courtroom with an expectation that I am going to have a
fair hearing scheduled by the neutral judge, not magistrate whom I was trying to recuse to no
avail. Judge started reading to me something along the absurd lines of what magistrate Milsap as
prosecutor accused me of doing. I sought that the judge wanted to hear my version of the case
directly from me when he gave me the floor. However, when I just started explanation of my
side of the case and Petitioner's perjury, the judge suddenly ran out of the courtroom and I could
not make my record. Rude officers ordered me to leave and wait in the hallway to be called back.
I thought that the judge had some emergency. When I came back hoping to continue my
argument, the judge started reading his order of commitment, which would start one month from
the date of the order if I do not purge myself.
37.

Without any reason, court officers immediately assaulted me.

38.

Milsap recommended my incarceration in -willful blindness to lack of jurisdiction and/or

authority to proceed as prosecutor and a judge, evidence of Svenson's perjury and in conscious
disregard to my rights, due process and with deliberate indifference to perjury. This was a
kangaroo court or Inquisitorial Star Chamber hearing abolished in 1215 by Magna Carta.
Additionally, Millsap committed fraud upon the court by officer of the court when he told me
that I can go to Part 14 and request an immediate hearing on my motion to consolidate.
39.

I had an option not to go to part 14, and instead file objection to Milsap's final order or

start an Article 78 petition. However, deceived and misled by Milsap, Svenson and I
immediately went to Part 14 where I was assaulted without a hearing, warrant or order.
IN SUMMARY - VIOLATIONS OF RICO AND FAMILY COURT ACT 145

40.

My conclusion of law is that court's employees and Svenson conspired to obstruct Justice

with engineered, predetermined outcome has merit. Magistrate Milsap offered me adjournment
to obtain an attorney, knowing that I have no money, but refused to adjourn on the ground that
my motion to consolidate was rescheduled until January 23, 2015 - evidently mens rea.
41.

Judge Arias did not have authority and reason to sua sponte dismiss my Petition because

trial was scheduled on April 10, 2015. Arias order falsely, in violation of due process, states:
"and the matter having duly come on to be heard before this Court and the following
having appeared: Elena Svenson; NOW, after examination and inquiry into the
facts and circumstances of the case, it is hereby ADJUDGED that the petition is
dismissed due to failure of Petitioner to appear..." [emphasis is mine]
42.

The truth is - nothing duly came before her court due to corruption. My emergency

motions to proceed as poor person, to consolidate contempt proceeding and order of protection
were unlawfully rescheduled, which as I predicted by January 23, 2015 became moot. This order
is written with the deliberate indifference to falsity of facts in it. This order is a confession of
Judge's Arias own mens rea because only motion to consolidate was scheduled on that date, and
only motion (not whole petition) could be dismissed for nonappearance or as moot. I wonder, if I
attended that hearing and told her on the record what I think of her - what would she do, recuse
herself? Is this order judge's role-playing of'blissful ignorance of above stated by me facts? It is
rather -willful blindness to the facts and conscious disregard of Judge's fiduciary duties of
neutrality to me.

CONSPIRACY TO ASSAULT, FALSE ARREST AND IMPREASON


43.

Upon information, belief and circumstantial logical evidence, I aver that on December 2,

2014 some "Wizard(s) behind the curtain" was/were coordinating conspiracy between judge
Arias with her LAW clerk (attorney) of Part 9 to adjourn (denial of justice) its hearing and.

Milsap with his LAW clerk (attorney) and the court police officers of Part 24 to bait, switch and
lure me to judge William F. Perry with his LAW clerk (attorney) and the court police officers of
Part 14 where I was ambushed, assaulted, kidnapped, shackled and thrown into dungeon violation of RICO by conspiracy and extortion (evidently mens rea) resulting in bodily harm to

me.
44.

, At about 9:00 PM on December 2, 2014 I was admitted into emergency room of Coney

Island hospital. It is dangerous for a man, father to enter family court at all, because it functions
rather as a pirate ship with judges as pirates or privateers, where one never knows if he will come
out alive or unharmed. For the last 7 years, every possible wrong in the "book of wrongs" was
done to me by Acts of Judicial Corruption, Deception and Tyranny, undermining public
confidence in judiciary and administration of Justice.
My request to proceed as poor person on appeal is a litmus test for obstruction of justice.
45.

I want to make sure that this is clear to the court I am physically disabled, type slow,

but not stupid. I can read, understand and follow the law and procedures, which I did for seven
years laboring for free in an attempt to obtain a remedy from slavery while Family Court actors
were handsomely paid by the STATE (TAXPAYER'S dollars) for their barratry. All my
paperwork was ignored. It was fiduciary duty of Family Court actors to diffuse any conflict and
keep the peace. However, they intentionally stirred conflict, war and litigation between the
parties and destroyed my health, life, child's life and inheritance.
46.

Within all these years, not one motion filed by me was granted. Not one motion was

denied after a fair hearing. I was never given a chance to rebut S YENS ON's perjury, which
axiomatically would be against barrater's interests.
47.

Now, the appellate court committed an act of barratry by soliciting Svenson's opinion

about my finances, knowing full well that she will commit perjury, which she did. That in turn

stirred more litigation forcing me to more labor for free for the appellate court's advantage.
48.

In the adversary system of law, I must be given an opportunity to rebut SVENSON's

perjurious affidavit.
49.

To do just that, I was forced to create FIRST SET OF INTEROGATORIES AND

REQUEST FOR ADMISSION, Exhibit C. However, clerks of this court refused to accept it
stating that the order blocking me from proceeding as a poor person is already issued. Thereafter,
court's clerk suggested that I file this motion to clarify.
Questions for clarification
50.

Question for clarification # I: in this court, do I have a right to rebut and impeach my

adversary's perjury in her affidavit filed in this court?


51.

Question for clarification # 2: would that be a criminal offense when someone knowingly

files affidavit or creates an order with false information in order to mislead the court and harm
the opposing party?
52.

Question for clarification # 3: according to doctrines of res judicata and collateral

estoppel did administrative federal agency and I had full and fair opportunity to litigate federally
created statutory poor person status of Krichevsky when this agency made an administrative
adjudication that Mr. Krichevsky is poor person and decided to provide Mr. Krichevsky with
Medicaid - federal public assistance based on federal statutory poverty level?
53.

Question for clarification # 4: does this State court has jurisdiction and/or standing to sua

sponte collaterally attack and overrule administrative collateral estoppel created by federal
agency by forcing me to relitigate with this court my poor person status?
54.

Question for clarification # 5: since my poor person status was determined before this

apeal, and I submitted proof, Exhibit D, would that be this court's ministerial duty to issue orders

what happens to my friend, Lidya Radin, in Bronx Supreme Court?


55.

Question for clarification # 5: when the relationship between the State and me is reached

the point where it is literally adversarial, what is predominant purpose for the court's inquiry intd
my ability to pay for transcripts and filing fees (I pay $1 for each medication), if not to find any
pretext to find me rich and deny justice to me?
56.

Question for clarification # 6: if I waive my claim(s) for res judicata and/or collateral

estoppel to poor person status, submit the requested paperwork to this court and my motion to
proceed as poor person would be denied (which I see indication it would), would this create a
new res judicata and/or collateral estoppel against me by fraud in the inducement!
51.

Question for clarification # 7: what CPLR and/or case law did this court use to issue

above stated two orders?


58.

Question for clarification # 8: if I am unable to pay for the transcripts from Family Court,

what remedy is there for me and how can I set aside corrupt orders of Family Court?
59.

Question for clarification # 9: if the State's Family Court Judiciary is not following its

own laws and procedures, fixes cases and takes bribes - offense against public justice and
authority., extrinsic fraud, fraud on the court, fraud in thefactum, obstructing public justice, does
it have a moral and/or legal right to demand that I obey its orders?

Without Prejudice, underHuTeis-^Eefeei-Krichevsky, Sui Juris


Sworn to before me this
13 day of July, 2015
NOTARY PUBLIC
ALICE ASH E'R
NOTARY PUBLIC, State of New York
No.01AS6062200
Qualified in Kings County
Commission Expires July 30, 2017