G.R. No.

82189 August 2, 1990

PORFIRIO AUXILIO, JR., petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, BAGUIO COUNTRY CLUB
CORPORATION and LOLITA GENOVE, respondents.
PARAS, J.:
In the herein petition for certiorari, petitioner seeks the review of the decision
of public respondent National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) dated
February 12, 1988, which reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter in NLRC
Case No. RAB-1-0048-82, finding as legal and valid the employer's act of
terminating the services of petitioner and dismissing the latter's complaint
for illegal dismissal.
The facts of the case are undisputed:
Petitioner Porfirio Auxilio, Jr. was first employed by private respondent
Baguio Country Club Corporation as a houseman in 1977. He became a
regular employee in 1978 and in 1981 was assigned as a front desk clerk
with a basic pay of P524.00 per month. He was in charge of hotel rooms,
received guests' registration and acted as switchboard operator.
On January 17, 1982, the amount of Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P15,000.00),
which had been placed in the cashier's office of the Baguio Country Club,
was found to be missing. The loss was brought to the attention of the
management on January 18, 1982. Upon receipt of the report, the Baguio
City Police Department (INP) forthwith conducted a spot investigation. Police
investigation ruled out signs of forcible entry or robbery, and concluded that
it was an "inside job." Accordingly, all employees of the Country Club who
had access to the cashier's office, including the petitioner, were invited for
questioning. All of them denied having stolen the money. They were then
subjected to a Polygraph examination conducted by the NBI.
Meanwhile, on January 20, 1982, petitioner was placed under preventive
suspension for the usual 30-day period due to his possible involvement in
the theft, pending final result of the investigation.
The results of the Polygraph Examination revealed that petitioner could not
fully explain his answers to vital questions relative to the missing money. He
was again invited to the Police Headquarters for further investigation but he
refused to attend and said that he was not feeling well when he was under
the polygraph examination (Comment of Solicitor General, p. 3). In the
polygraph report on the petitioner dated February 16, 1982, it was declared
that petitioner offered no satisfactory explanation for the adverse result of the
polygraph test conducted on him. All the other employees subjected to the
same examination showed no indications of deception as they explained their
side satisfactorily that they did not steal the money.
Petitioner was asked to appear for investigation by the management.
However, no further examination was conducted by the police or the
employer because petitioner could not be found in his residence and the
notices sent to him were rejected by his wife.
Thus, in a Memorandum dated February 20, 1982 issued by the Baguio
Country Club Corporation, Porfirio Auxilio, Jr. was terminated for "loss of
trust and confidence" and for "giving false statement during official
investigation."

Aggrieved, petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the Labor
Arbiter alleging that he was dismissed on mere suspicion that he stole the
money and that he was denied an opportunity to defend himself pursuant to
the provision of the Collective Bargaining Agreement between private
respondent and the union of which petitioner was a member.
In a decision dated October 26, 1984, Labor Arbiter Saturnino P. Orate
ordered the reinstatement of petitioner, finding that there was no reasonable
ground in dismissing the latter because private respondent failed to establish
by preponderance of evidence the legality of the dismissal.
On appeal, the NLRC, on February 12, 1988, set aside the Labor Arbiters
decision and entered another dismissing petitioner's complaint for illegal
dismissal for lack of merit.
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner Porfirio Auxilio, Jr. claims that he was denied due process of law
because the grievance procedure provided in the Collective Bargaining
Agreement (CBA) was not strictly observed. He likewise maintains that with
the rejection by the Labor Arbiter of the probative value of his flight, the
Special Investigation Report and Polygraph Report, his dismissal from
employment is not legal.
A review of the records of this case shows that public respondent did not
commit any grave abuse of discretion in reversing the Labor Arbiter's
decision.
The Grievance Machinery in the CBA states:
. . . Sec. 2. A GRIEVANCE is any controversy by the union or
an employee against the CLUB or any controversy by the
CLUB against the UNION or an employee concerning any
ruling practice or working condition in the CLUB, or any
dispute as to the interpretation of any provisions of this
Agreement. (p 38, Rollo)
As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General in his Comment, the
instances enumerated where the grievance machinery may be availed of are
not present in this case and that there was no overt act on the part of
petitioner to bring any cause for complaint to the attention of the immediate
supervisor concerned as prescribed in Step 1 on the Supervisory level. What
is truly involved in the case at hand is the last action pursued by private
respondent in the face of overwhelming evidence found by the police
investigators on the theft of its P15,000.00 on January 17, 1982. The
invocation of the grievance machinery provisions of the CBA is not in place.
(Comment, p. 8).
No doubt petitioner was afforded due process of law. There is convincing and
sufficient evidence on record to show that private respondent corporation
fully complied with the notice and hearing requirements of due process.
Petitioner was notified and repeatedly invited for further investigation but he
"chose to ignore" the said notices by his "convenient absence" from his
residence and the continued refusal by his wife to receive the notices
(Memorandum of public respondent, p. 5). Private respondent cannot be
faulted as petitioner had ample opportunity to be heard. Since he
unjustifiably rejected the opportunity, petitioner cannot now complain that
he was denied due process of law.

Petitioner also maintains that his dismissal was without basis as his
complicity in the theft of the P15,000.00 was solely based on suspicions and
on the polygraph test conducted on his person.
Loss of confidence is a valid ground for dismissing an
employee. Proof beyond reasonable doubt of the employer's
misconduct is not required, it being sufficient that there is
some basis for the same or that the employer has reasonable
ground to believe that the employee is responsible for the
misconduct and his participation therein rendered him
unworthy of the trust and confidence demanded of his
position. (Nat'l Org. of Laborers and Employers vs. MRR, 21
SCRA 191; Nevans vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 23
SCRA 1321; Galsim vs. PNB, 29 SCRA 293; Reyes v. Zamora,
90 SCRA 92; Villadolid v. Inciong, 121 SCRA 205; San
Miguel Corp. v. Deputy Minister of Labor and Employment,
G.R. Nos. 61232-33, Dec. 29, 1983)
The job of petitioner is of such nature as to require a substantial amount of
trust and confidence on the part of the employer. He may thus be dismissed
on the ground of loss of trust and confidence. It was established that
petitioner had ready access to the cashier's office. He admitted having
borrowed the nail cutter of the cashier included among the bunch of keys to
the latter's drawer. The investigations and inquiries conducted were made on
all the employees who had access to the cashier's drawer and not on the
petitioner alone. However, his erratic reaction to the investigator's
questioning narrowed down the list of suspects to him alone. We agree with
the public respondent that petitioner's continued absence from his residence
and unexplained disappearance despite several notices for further police
investigation implied flight associated with guilt. The requirement that there
be some basis or reasonable ground to believe that the employee is
responsible for the misconduct is sufficiently met in the case at bar.
Petitioner's behavior rendered him unworthy of the trust and confidence
demanded by his position. Considering that an employer is entitled to
terminate the services of employees for just cause and that stealing and other
forms of dishonesty have been held to be sufficient grounds for dismissal, as
a measure of self-protection, private respondent was justified in dismissing
petitioner. Although petitioner's guilt was not proved beyond reasonable
doubt, the totality of the evidence presented is sufficient to warrant the
dismissal of petitioner Porfirio Auxilio, Jr. As held in the case of Filipro, Inc.
vs. NLRC, 145 SCRA 123:
The law, in protecting the rights of the laborer, authorizes
neither oppression nor self-destruction of the employer.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. L-69934. September 26, 1988.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MARIANITO
INTINO, Defendant-Appellant.
SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES; ABSENCE

OF EVIL MOTIVE TO IMPLICATE A CLOSE RELATIVE, BOLSTERS
CREDIBILITY. Witnesses Calipayan had no motive to implicate appellant
who is their close relative being the son of the first cousin of Rosario
Calipayan as admitted by appellant himself in his testimony.
2. ID.; ID.; DYING DECLARATION; NO PROBATIVE VALUE WHERE THE
DECEASED WAS NOT IN A POSITION TO IDENTIFY HIS ASSAILANT. We
do not question the credibility of witness Segundina Delda in declaring that
her brother, Bienvenido Caluser, made a dying statement inside the bus that
Pare Benny wounded him. While there may be such statement made since
that was the belief of the deceased Bienvenido Caluser, We cannot give it
probative value. As already shown earlier, Bienvenido Caluser was not in a
position to identify his assailant as he was stabbed from behind and when
he, already wounded, bloodied and weak from his wounds, took a look at his
assailant, Bienvenido Caluser was again stabbed several times by the
appellant giving him no opportunity to fully identify his attacker. Maybe
because of the fact that Bienvenido Caluser and Marianito Intino had no
quarrel or misunderstanding in the past the former never thought of the
latter as his attacker, thus he uttered someone elses name who was their
drinking
guest
earlier
as
his
attacker.
3. CRIMINAL LAW; QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE; TREACHERY; MANIFEST
WHERE THE ATTACK WAS SUDDEN AND UNEXPECTED. There is no
question that there was treachery as the attack that came from behind was
so sudden and unexpected leaving the poor victim helpless to defend himself.
4. ID.; MURDER; IMPOSABLE PENALTY. With the abolition of the death
penalty, the penalty now imposed by law for the crime of murder is reclusion
temporal
in
its
maximum
period
to reclusion
perpetua.
5. ID.; INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW; MURDER, PENALTY.
Considering the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum
imposable penalty in the case at bar is the medium period of the
aforementioned period (that is, the higher half of reclusion temporal
maximum) and the minimum is one degree lower than the prescribed penalty
now of reclusion temporal maximum to reclusion perpetua.

DECISION

PARAS, J.:
Appellant Marianito Intino alias "Marian" was charged before the lower court
with the crime of Murder in an Information quoted hereunder:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"That on or about the 17th day of September, 1976, in the Municipality of
Babatngon, Province of Leyte, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with the decided intent to kill
and by means of treachery did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and wound one Bienvenido Caluser with a bolo
which he purposely provided himself, thereby hitting and inflicting upon the
said Bienvenido Caluser with wounds on the different parts of his body which
caused
his
death
shortly
thereafter.
"Contrary to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code." (p. 1, Rollo)
After due trial, judgment 1 was rendered by the trial court on October 3,
1984,
its
dispositive
portion
reading
as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREFORE, finding the accused Marianito Intino guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder, there being no mitigating nor
aggravating circumstance, this Court hereby renders judgment sentencing
the accused to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, with all the accessory
penalties
provided
for
by
law,
and
to
pay
the
costs.
"In the service of his sentence, the accused shall be entitled to the full time
during
which
he
was
under
preventive
imprisonment.
"The accused is hereby directed to pay to the heirs of the late Bienvenido
Caluser, as compensation, the amount of P12,000.00, without subsidiary
imprisonment
in
case
of
insolvency.
"SO

ORDERED."

(p.

7,

Decision;

p.

25

Rollo)

Hence, the appeal interposed by the accused with the following:chanrob1es virtual
1aw

library

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO CONSIDER, APPRECIATE
OR GIVE DUE WEIGHT TO THE DYING DECLARATION OF THE DECEASED
BIENVENIDO CALUSER WHEN THE EVIDENCE THEREOF IS CLEAR,
SUFFICIENT, STRAIGHTFORWARD AND UNIMPEACHED, THUS RESULTING
IN GRAVE INJUSTICE TO THE ACCUSED APPELLANT.

II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE APPELLANT GUILTY OF
MURDER BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT ON THE BASIS OF THE
EVIDENCE ON RECORD.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT TREACHERY ATTENDED
THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIME.

Briefly, the evidence for the prosecution tends to show that the appellant
Marianito Intino is a farmer who had been hired as a coconut picker by the
victim Bienvenido Caluser.

On September 17, 1976 at about 3:00 oclock in the afternoon, appellant and
the victim went to the house of the latters girl friend, Norma Calipayan, who
served them tuba. While they were drinking, they invited Benny Raliente, a
passerby to join them in their drinking spree. The latter accepted their
invitation but after drinking about two or three glasses of tuba, he left
Marianito and Bienvenido who continued with their drinking until about 6:00
oclock p.m. Thereafter, Bienvenido Caluser joined Norma, Rosario, her
mother and Luciano, her father in their supper. Marianito Intino seated
himself at the porch approximately four meters away from the dining table,
while Primo Calipayan, a brother of Norma was lying on a bench beside
Marianito. After eating Rosario went inside the bedroom to breastfeed her
one-year old child, while her husband went outside the house. Norma was
left with Bienvenido at the dining table. While they were conversing, Norma
saw Marianito suddenly rise from his seat, then approach Bienvenido from
behind him since Bienvenido was seated with his back facing the door
leading to the porch. Norma was seated on another bench at the right side of
Bienvenido, sideways to the door leading to the porch so that she was able to
see the action of Marianito. (Exh. E-3, p. 18, Record). After hearing
Bienvenido say "I am wounded" in the vernacular, Norma stood up as
Bienvenido held on to her. As Bienvenido tried to glance at his assailant,
appellant again stabbed him with his bolo which prompted witness Norma to
utter "Marian husto na." Then Normas mother, Rosario, who rushed out of
the room upon hearing somebody cry that he was wounded, saw Marianito
who was still attacking Bienvenido, who was already wounded. Rosario
pushed Marianito aside as she took the bolo from him to prevent him from
further attacking Bienvenido Caluser. Marianito ran away. When Luciano
Calipayan arrived, upon seeing Bienvenido Caluser bathed in his own blood
with intestines protruding from his abdomen, he immediately sought the help
of Punay de San Miguel and Peping de San Miguel and their other neighbors.
They placed Bienvenido Caluser on a hammock and boarded him on a baby

bus enroute to the Daniel Z. Romualdez Memorial Hospital in Tacloban City,

where he died about midnight of that same day.

On the other hand, the evidence for the defense consists of the testimonies of
witnesses Marianito Intino (appellant), Segundina C. Delda and Alejo D.
Ripalda. Appellant denied that he stabbed and killed the victim. He identified
the assailant as Benedicto Relente 2 or "Pare Benny" (of the victim).
According to the testimonies of Segundina C. Delda, sister of the victim, and
Alejo D. Ripalda, the victim made a dying declaration to Segundina while
inside the baby bus, (he repeated such declaration to Fernando San Miguel
while inside the intensive care unit of the hospital) that his attacker was
"Pare Benny" referring to Benedicto Relente of Villa Magsaysay. These two
separate dying statements were allegedly heard by witness Alejo Ripalda who
was then present on both instances.

The appeal is meritless. After a careful perusal of the evidence on record, We

entertain no doubt that appellant was positively identified by the
prosecutions witnesses Norma and Rosario Calipayan both in their sworn
statements given before NBI agents Reynaldo C. Manzanero on January 21,
1977 and March 14, 1977, respectively and in their oral testimonies in open
court. Witness Norma Calipayan in her sworn statement admitted that she
did not see appellant stab Bienvenido Caluser the first time even is she was
there with Bienvenido although she saw appellant approach the victim from
behind, not knowing that Marianito harbored any bad intention towards the
victim. Norma and Rosario Calipayan also declared that they do not know of
any ill-feelings or bad blood between the victim and the appellant except
during that instance when the victim told the appellant jokingly that he
would box appellant because he was from Pagsulhugan. When Rosario heard
such conversation she cut in by asking Bienvenido what this talk was all
about. The latter simply answered that he was only joking.

The discrepancies in their testimonies (cited by appellant) are not serious

enough to cast real doubt on their credibility. Witnesses Calipayan had no
motive to implicate appellant who is their close relative being the son of the
first cousin of Rosario Calipayan as admitted by appellant himself in his
testimony (tsn-Anota, May 14, 1982, p. 12). There is no witness aside from
the appellant who can testify that "Pare Benny" or Benedicto Relente
mentioned in the dying statement of the victim, actually stabbed the victim.
But as against appellant Marianito Intino, both Norma Calipayan and her
mother Rosario positively saw appellant stab the victim after the first blow
and all the attending circumstances point to him as the one who killed the
deceased. It is true that appellant pointed to Benny Relente as the one who
allegedly stabbed the victim, as shown in his testimony in court, to
wit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Q. Will you tell the court the sitting position of the persons drinking?

A. Bienvenido Caluser and Benny were facing each other and Rosario was
behind Luciano Calipayan, sir.

posterior lumbar, wound of exit epigastric, penetrating perforating Kidney

Right #1, Liver #1, Transverse Colon #2, Misocolon, Severe hemorrhage." (see
also Exh. "B." A sketch of a human body showing the entrance and exist of
the
fatal
wounds
of
the
victim,
p.
142,
Records)

Q. How do you know that?

A. Because I could see them from the porch.
Q. What was illuminating them?

The testimony of Norma Calipayan that the assailant approached the victim
from behind is strengthened by the victims medical certificate which was
never disputed by the parties and Exh. E-3 (p. 18, Records) which is a sketch
demonstrating the seating arrangement or the positions of those persons
present in the house of the Calipayans that fateful night.

A. A kerosene lamp sir.

Q. Now while these persons were drinking at around 8.00 oclock what
happened?
A. Bienvenido Caluser was stabbed by a person called Benny.
Q. What did Benny do to Caluser?
A. Benny held the shoulder of Bienvenido Caluser and then stabbed him sir.

Furthermore, We have also considered the fact that appellant was nowhere to
be found immediately after the incident while Benny Relente never left the
place to escape being investigated in connection with the death of Bienvenido
Caluser. Likewise, the National Bureau of Investigation thru NBI agent
Reynaldo C. Manzanero in coordination with the PC investigating arm,
conducted polygraph tests (lie-detector tests) on the suspect Benny or
Benedicto Relente who denied authorship of the killing and on Rosario
Calipayan who firmly asserted having actually seen respondent Marianito
Intino deliver hacking blows on Bienvenido Caluser which caused his death.
Both
successfully
hurdled
the
NBI
polygraph
tests.

Q. Was Bienvenido Calusar hit?

A. Yes, sir.
Q. Where?
A. He was hit in the abdomen.
x

Q. What did Benny use in stabbing Bienvenido Caluser?

A. A bolo, sir.
Q. Where did he get this bolo used in stabbing Caluser?
A. He got it from the wall, sir, behind him." (tsn-Anota, May 14, 1982, p. 4).
However, from the above testimony, the logical conclusion is that the
assailant Benny was facing the victim as he delivered the stabbing blow in
the abdomen of the victim, as the witness would want the court to believe.
However, this is belied by the medical certificate.(Exh. "A" or Exh. "E-7," p.
10, Records) issued by the attending physician, Dr. Sherlito T. Siao and
confirmed by Dr. Alden Tabao who testified on this in court that the fatal
wound (that is, the one inflicted in the abdomen) was described
as:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Operative Findings: Wound stab, thru and thru wound of entrance right

We do not question the credibility of witness Segundina Delda in declaring

that her brother, Bienvenido Caluser, made a dying statement inside the bus
that Pare Benny wounded him. While there may be such statement made
since that was the belief of the deceased Bienvenido Caluser, We cannot give
it probative value. As already shown earlier, Bienvenido Caluser was not in a
position to identify his assailant as he was stabbed from behind and when
he, already wounded, bloodied and weak from his wounds, took a look at his
assailant, Bienvenido Caluser was again stabbed several times by the
appellant giving him no opportunity to fully identify his attacker. Maybe
because of the fact that Bienvenido Caluser and Marianito Intino had no
quarrel or misunderstanding in the past the former never thought of the
latter as his attacker, thus he uttered someone elses name who was their
drinking
guest
earlier
as
his
attacker.
We now come to the issue of treachery raised by appellant. There is no
question that there was treachery as the attack that came from behind was
so sudden and unexpected leaving the poor victim helpless to defend himself.
With the abolition of the death penalty, the penalty now imposed by law for
the crime of murder is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion
perpetua.
Considering the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum
imposable penalty in the case at bar is the medium period of the
aforementioned period (that is, the higher half of reclusion temporal
maximum) and the minimum is one degree lower than the prescribed penalty
now
3
of
reclusion
temporal maximum
to reclusion perpetua.
WHEREFORE, the accused is hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment from

12 years of prision mayor, as minimum to 18 years and 9 months of

reclusion temporal as maximum; to suffer the accessory penalties and to pay
an indemnity of P30,000.00 to heirs of the victim, and costs. In all other
respects,
the
judgment
appealed
from
is
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. Nos. 116196-97. June 23, 1999]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
ADOVISO, defendant-appellant.

vs. PABLO

DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:

Pablo Adoviso appeals from the Joint Judgment[1] of the Regional Trial
Court of Camarines Sur[2] declaring him guilty beyond reasonable doubt for
two counts of Murder.
Appellant, allegedly a member of the Citizens Armed Forces
Geographical Unit (CAFGU), was originally charged with four unidentified
persons who have, however, remained at large. The information[3] charging
appellant with the Murder of Rufino Agunos under Criminal Case No. P-2079
alleges:

That on or about the 18th day of February 1990 at about 8:00 oclock
[sic] in the evening at Sitio Tan-agan, Barangay Casugad,
Municipality of Bula, Province of Camarines Sur, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, while armed with assorted long firearms, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill
and with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously shoot one Rufino Agunos several
times with said firearms hitting the latter on the different parts of his
body which were the direct and immediate cause of his death, to the
damage and prejudice of the heirs of said Rufino Agunos.
That the crime complained of against the accused is not service
connected.
ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.
Except for the name of the victim, the information in Criminal Case No.
P-2080 with respect to the killing of Emeterio Vasquez, contains the same
allegations.[4]
Appellant pleaded not guilty to both charges. At the joint trial of
Criminal Case Nos. P-2079 and P-2080, the prosecution presented their
version of the events that transpired on the evening of February18, 1990, as
follows:
The spouses Emeterio and Anastacia Vasquez had two adjacent houses
in Sitio Tan-agan, Barangay Casugad, Bula, Camarines Sur. One of the
houses was actually a camalig where they stored harvested rice. The spouses

preferred to live there because it was cooler. The living area of thecamalig had
walls of bamboo called salsag. This area was elevated from the ground. Three
steps led down to an awning (suyab) walled with bamboo slats. These slats
were placed horizontally approximately four to six inches apart. A portion of
the awning was used as a kitchen but another portion had a papag where
the Vasquez grandson, Rufino Agunos, son of their daughter Virginia, would
sleep whenever he tended the irrigation pump. The spouses son Bonifacio
occupied the other house eight (8) meters from the camalig with his own son
Elmer.
At around 8:00 in the evening of February 18, 1990, Emeterio Vazquez
was preparing coffee as his wife was about to retire for the night. Their
grandson Rufino had already gone to sleep in the papag. Anastacia had just
finished spreading the sleeping mat when she heard three or four
gunshots. Emeterio then uttered that he had been shot. Seeing Emeterio,
Anastacia exclaimed, Why should you not be hit when in fact there are guns
in front of you. Anastacia saw the protruding edge of the gun on the wall
near the stairs where Emeterio went down. A lamp near the stairs where
Emeterio drank coffee illuminated the camalig but Anastacia failed to
recognize the persons who fired their guns at her husband.
The Vasquez son Bonifacio was in the bigger house when he heard the
gunshots. Earlier that evening, Bonifacio was talking to Rufino regarding the
engine of the irrigation pump. Bonifacio was still talking when he noticed
that Rufino had fallen asleep, the latters back against the bamboo
wall. Bonifacio left Rufino snoring in the papag and went to the other
house. Only a minute had passed after he had gone up when Bonifacio heard
the gunshots. He and his 16-year-old son Elmer immediately went down the
front yard to investigate.
Bonifacio hid himself in the dark portion of the yard, behind a coconut
tree. From a distance of eight (8) meters, Bonifacio saw Rufino, who was
inside the camalig, being shot by several persons from the outside. Looking
through the bamboo slats of the camalig wall, Bonifacio recognized one of the
assailants, with a large built and long hair, as appellant Pablo Adoviso
because of the gas lamp that was lighted inside the camalig. Of Rufinos
assailants, only appellant was not wearing a mask. Appellant was holding a
long firearm wrapped inside a sack with its muzzle protruding and directed
where Rufino was sleeping. Appellant then fired hitting Rufino. At that
moment, Bonifacio heard his father Emeterio shout Pino, (referring to his
grandson Rufino) and saw his father go down the stairs carrying a gas
lamp. Appellant fired again, hitting Emeterio at the stomach.
For his part, Elmer, who rushed towards the camalig with his father
Bonifacio, saw five (5) persons aiming their firearms at the camalig. Except
for appellant, each of these persons had a cover over their faces. Three (3) of
them were positioned in a ditch near the camalig while two (2) others were
near its door. Elmer saw these five (5) persons shoot his cousin Rufino who
was lying down on the papag. Although his back was hit, Rufino was able to
crawl under the papag. Elmers grandfather was also hit on the stomach but
he managed to go up the camalig. When appellant and his companion by
the camalig door saw Elmer, they fired at him then, with the three others at

the ditch, escaped to the banana plantation. Elmer, on the other hand, fled
towards the coconut plantation.
Upon returning to the camalig, Elmer saw his father carrying his
grandfather Emeterio. He also found Rufino at the foot of a coconut tree near
the river, lying on his side with his body curled. Rufino told Elmer that he
had been hit and, when Elmer failed to locate his wound, Rufino took Elmers
hand and put it on his back. Elmer then moved Rufino sidewise. Upon
returning to the camalig, Elmer carried his grandfather and bandaged his
stomach with diapers.
In the meantime, Bonifacio went to the municipal building of Bula to
fetch the police. Inspector Antonio Lopez and Senior Police Officer 1 Claro
Ballevar returned to the scene of the crime with him. The police brought
Emeterio and Rufino to the municipal hall of Bula and then to the Bicol
Regional Hospital. Both Emeterio and Rufino died early the next morning.
The certification[5] dated March 7, 1990 and signed by Dr. Janice
Nanette Estrada, resident physician of the Bicol Regional Hospital in Naga
City, states that 35-year-old Rufino Agunos died of four (4) gunshot wounds:
at the inguinal area, the sacral area, the thigh and the abdomen. The
wounds at the inguinal area and the thigh bore contusion collars. The same
physician certified that Emeterio Vasquez, 88 years of age, sustained seven
(7) gunshot wounds at the paraumbilical area, lumbar area, hypogastrium,
anterior aspect of the right forearm, anteromedial aspect of the right forearm,
anteromedial aspect left arm and anterolateral aspect of the left arm. Four (4)
of these gunshot wounds had contusion collars at the paraumbilical area,
the hypogastrium, the right forearm and the left arm.[6]
Appellant Adoviso interposed alibi and denial as his defense.
Appellant claimed that he was a member of the CAFGU whose
headquarters was located in Barangay Palsong, Bula, Camarines Sur. At
around 7:00 in the evening of February 18, 1990, he was in Sitio Burabod,
Palsong, about a kilometer away from the CAFGU headquarters. He, together
with Francisco Bislombre, Benjamin Alina, Jr. and PFC Antero Esteron, had
some drinks in the store of Honoria Tragante until around 11:00 p.m.
Honoria Tragante and Francisco Bislombre corroborated appellants
alibi. Antero Esteron likewise testified that from 7:00 until past 11:00 that
night of February 18, 1990, he and appellant had a drinking spree at the
Tragante store. He distinctly remembered that date because it was the fiesta
of Balatan.
To support his denial, appellant presented Lt. Antonio Lopez, the deputy
chief of police and SPO2 Claro Ballebar of the PNP Bula Police Station. Lopez
identified a police certification[7] prepared by Pfc. Ramon N. Canabe to the
effect that the shooting incident was perpetrated by unidentified armed men.
Lopez said that he (Lopez) was one of those who brought the victims to the
hospital who were then still conscious. The victims told him that they did not
know who shot them or why they were shot.

SPO2 Claro Ballebar, however testified that in the follow-up

investigation he conducted several days after the incident, Bonifacio Vasquez
revealed to him that he (Bonifacio) vividly saw the incident and recognized
appellant as one of the perpetrators of the crime and that the killings had
some something to do with land dispute between Bonifacios parents and the
Galicia family.
The defense also offered in evidence the testimony of Ernesto A. Lucena,
Polygraph Examiner II of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) in
Manila, who conducted a polygraph test on appellant. In Polygraph Report
No. 900175,[8] Lucena opined that appellants polygrams revealed that there
were no specific reactions indicative of deception to pertinent questions
relevant to the investigation of the crimes.
In rebuttal, Bonifacio Vasquez revealed that when he reported the
incident to the police, he did not identify appellant as one of the culprits
because he was afraid of appellant who was a member of the
CAFGU. Nevertheless, Bonifacio did mention to the police that he recognized
appellant as one of the perpetrators of the crime although he told them that
he did not recognize appellants four (4) companions. He did not mention to
Lopez and Canabe appellants identity because he was confused about what
had happened in their house.
On March 25, 1994, the trial court rendered a Joint Judgment finding
appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt for two (2) counts of murder and
disposing of Criminal Case Nos. P-2079 and P-2080 as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, joint judgment is hereby

rendered:
In Criminal Case No. P-2079, finding the accused PABLO ADOVISO
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER and
imposing upon him the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and to pay
the legal heirs of Rufino Agunos, consisting of the widow, Evelyn T.
Agunos and their four (4) children the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND
PESOS (P50,000.00) Philippine Currency;
In Criminal Case No. P-2080, likewise finding said accused PABLO
ADOVISO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER
and imposing upon him another penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA and to pay the legal heirs of the late EMETERIO
VASQUEZ, consisting of Anastacia Vasquez and Bonifacio Vasquez,
another sum of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) Philippine
Currency with all the accessory penalties provided therefore in both
cases and to pay the costs in both instances.
SO ORDERED.[9]

Appellant hinges his bid for exoneration on whether he was properly

identified by the two (2) eyewitnesses as one of the killers of the victims. He
contends that eyewitnesses Bonifacio and Elmer Vasquez presented an
incredible story because it is highly improbable that they could have
distinctly and positively recognized accused-appellant as one of the
perpetrators of the crimes."[10] According to appellant, Bonifacio, who was in
the dark portion of the yard hiding behind a coconut tree, could not have
identified appellant by the light emanating from gas lamp inside
thecamalig where Emeterio Vasquez and Rufino Agunos were staying at the
time of the incident. Neither could Elmer Vasquez, who declared that he saw
his grandfather shot by appellant, could have identified appellant because of
the poor lighting coming from the gas lamp being carried by his
grandfather. Appellant claims that the gas lamp carried by Elmer's
grandfather was a small can about two (2) inches tall and the wick is smaller
than a cigarette and the lamp inside the camalig was placed inside a bigger
can so that the direction of the light emanating therefrom was upwards and
not sidewise.[11]
Visibility is indeed a vital factor in the determination of whether or not
an eyewitness could have identified the perpetrator of a crime. However, it is
settled that when conditions of visibility are favorable, and the witnesses do
not appear to be biased, their assertion as to the identity of the malefactor
should normally be accepted.[12] Illumination produced by kerosene lamp or a
flashlight is sufficient to allow identification of persons. [13] Wicklamps,
flashlights, even moonlight or starlight may, in proper situations be
considered sufficient illumination, making the attack on the credibility of
witnesses solely on that ground unmeritorious.[14]
In this case, not one (1) but two (2) gas lamps illuminated the place the
one placed inside the camalig and that held by Emeterio as he descended
from the stairs after the first volley of gunfire. Appellants contention therefore
that one particular gas lamp could not have lighted the place because it was
placed inside a can is puerile. Besides, Elmer was not describing either of the
gas lamps during the incident. The defense counsel at the trial and
appellants counsel misunderstood the testimonies of Elmer and his
grandmother on that matter. Thus, Elmer testified:
ATTY. CORTES:
Q Is it not that the lamp you said placed along the door, which is already marked
as lamp, is that not this lamp was placed inside a kerosene can as testified to
by your grandmother so that the cat could not cause it to fall?

A It was placed just on the floor not inside the can.[15] (Underlining
supplied.)
For her part, Anastacia testified as follows:
ATTY. CORTES:

xxx.
Q Because you were already about to retire, the doors and windows were already
closed, is that correct?

A Yes, sir.
Q That you also shut down or closed the light, is that correct?
A No, sir, we even placed the kerosene lamp inside a can.
Q You said, you placed the lamp inside a can so that the light is going up, is that
correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q So, the light was not illuminating sidewise because it was inside a can?
A When we left, I got the kerosene lamp and brought it with me.
ATTY. CORTES:
I think, the witness did not get the question right, Your Honor.
COURT:
Repeat the question.
ATTY. CORTES:
Q My question Madam Witness is, when you were about to retire?
A The lamp was placed on the floor where my husband was drinking coffee.
COURT:
Q Who are the persons you are referring to as having left when you placed the light
inside the can?
A My son, Bonifacio, and the policemen, Your Honor, when the(y) brought Emeterio
and Rufino to the hospital.[16] (underlining supplied).

Clearly then, the lamp inside the camalig was placed on the floor and a
can was placed over it only after the incident when Anastacia left with her
son and the police to bring the victims to the hospital.
The bamboo slats of the camalig could not have effectively obstructed
the eyewitnesses' view of appellant, considering that the slats were built four
(4) meters apart. Besides, it is the natural reaction of relatives of victims to
strive to observe the faces and appearance of the assailants, if not ascertain
their identities, and the manner in which the crime is committed. [17] A relative
will naturally be interested in identifying the malefactor to secure his
conviction to obtain justice for the death of his relative(s).[18] It must
remembered that appellant was not a complete stranger to the
eyewitnesses. Bonifacio had known him for ten (10) years[19] while Elmer had
been acquainted with him for four (4) years. Elmer recalled that appellant
used to join the rabuz at the barracks.[20] Familiarity with appellants face and
appearance minimized if not erased the possibility that they could have been
mistaken as to his identity.
Appellants allegation that it was improbable for him to have committed
the crimes without a mask, unlike the other participants, deserves scant
consideration. It is not contrary to human experience for a person to commit
a crime before the very eyes of people who are familiar to them.Indeed, some

may even take pride in their identification as the perpetrator of a criminal

act.
Appellant also considers as a positive sign, Bonifacios failure to
immediately identify him as the perpetrator of the crime to the police. [21] The
delay in reporting his participation to the police was however sufficiently
explained by Bonifacio. Bonifacio was afraid of appellant since the latter was
a member of the CAFGU and, as such, was provided with a gun. He was also
hesitant in identifying appellant immediately lest he got wind of his
impending arrest and posthaste escaped the clutches of the law. The failure
of a witness to reveal at once the identity of the accused as one of the
perpetrators of the crime does not affect, much less, impair his credibility as
a witness.[22] The general or common rule is that witnesses react to a crime in
different ways.[23] There is no standard form of human behavioral response to
a strange, startling and frightful event, and there is no standard rule by
which witnesses to a crime must react.[24]
There is no merit in appellants contention that Bonifacio had a motive
in implicating him. According to appellant, Bonifacio suspected that he was
hired by the Galicia family to kill Bonifacio's father who had earlier won in a
land dispute with the Galicias. It is irrelevant here to talk of motive on the
part of Bonifacio inasmuch as to credible witnesses had positively identified
appellant as one of the participants in the killing of Emeterio Vasquez and
Rufino Agunos.
Appellants alibi thus crumbles in the face of his positive identification
as one of the perpetrators of the crimes.[25] For an alibi to prosper, moreover,
there must be proof that the defendant was not only somewhere else when
the crime was committed but that he could not be physically present at the
place of the crime or its immediate vicinity at the time of its
commission.[26] Appellant did not prove the physical impossibility of his being
in Sitio Tan-agan which is not exactly remote from Sitio Palsong where he
claimed to be when the incident happened. Both places are within the
Municipality of Bula. Appellant admitted that the distance between the
two sitios could be negotiated in three hours even without any means of
transportation.[27] On the other hand, his alleged companion in Sitio Palsong,
Antero Esteron, testified that the distance could be traveled in thirty-five (35)
minutes by trimobile or private vehicle.[28]
26

Apart from the fact that appellant's alibi was inherently weak, he was
not even sure where he was and who were his companions at the time the
crimes were committed. We quote the observation of the trial court on this
point:
On the premise that the trial court rendered the judgment of conviction
on the basis of mere conjectures and speculations,[29] appellant argues that
the negative result of the polygraph test should be given weight to tilt the
scales of justice in his favor.
A polygraph is an electromechanical instrument that simultaneously
measures and records certain physiological changes in the human body that
are believed to be involuntarily caused by an examinees conscious attempt to
deceive the questioner.[30] The theory behind a polygraph or lie detector test is

that a person who lies deliberately will have a rising blood pressure and a
subconscious block in breathing, which will be recorded on the
graph.[31] However, American courts almost uniformly reject the results of
polygraph tests when offered in evidence for the purpose of establishing the
guilt or innocence of one accused of a crime, whether the accused or the
prosecution seeks its introduction, for the reason that polygraph has not as
yet attained scientific acceptance as a reliable and accurate means of
ascertaining truth or deception.[32] The rule is no different in this
jurisdiction. Thus, in People v. Daniel,[33] stating that much faith and credit
should not be vested upon a lie detector test as it is not
conclusive. Appellant, in this case, has not advanced any reason why this
rule should not apply to him.
Appellant was therefore correctly adjudged guilty of two counts of
Murder. Treachery qualified the killings to murder. There is treachery when
the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means,
methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially
to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which
the offended party might make.[34] In other words, there is treachery when the
attack on an unarmed victim who has not given the slightest provocation is
sudden, unexpected and without warning.[35] The victims in this case were
totally unaware of an impending assault Rufino was sleeping and Emeterio
was going down the stairs when they were shot.
WHEREFORE, the Joint Judgment of the trial court is hereby
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-39110

November 28, 1933

ANTONIA L. DE JESUS, ET AL., plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
CESAR SYQUIA, defendant-appellant.
STREET, J.:
This action was instituted in the Court of First Instance of Manila by Antonia
Loanco de Jesus in her own right and by her mother, Pilar Marquez, as next
friend and representative of Ismael and Pacita Loanco, infants, children of
the first-named plaintiff, for the purpose of recovering from the defendant,
Cesar Syquia, the sum of thirty thousand pesos as damages resulting to the
first-named plaintiff from breach of a marriage promise, to compel the
defendant to recognize Ismael and Pacita as natural children begotten by him
with Antonia, and to pay for the maintenance of the three the amount of five
hundred pesos per month, together with costs. Upon hearing the cause, after
answer of the defendant, the trial court erred a decree requiring the
defendant to recognize Ismael Loanco as his natural child and to pay
maintenance for him at the rate of fifty pesos per month, with costs,
dismissing the action in other respects. From this judgment both parties
appealed, the plaintiffs from so much of the decision as denied part of the
relief sought by them, and the defendant from that feature of the decision
which required him to recognize Ismael Loanco and to pay for his
maintenance.
At the time with which we are here concerned, the defendant, Cesar Syquia
was of the age of twenty-three years, and an unmarried scion of the
prominent family in Manila, being possessed of a considerable property in his
own right. His brother-in-law, Vicente Mendoza is the owner of a barber shop
in Tondo, where the defendant was accustomed to go for tonsorial attention.
In the month of June Antonia Loanco, a likely unmarried girl of the age of
twenty years, was taken on as cashier in this barber shop. Syquia was not
long in making her acquaintance and amorous relations resulted, as a
consequence of which Antonia was gotten with child and a baby boy was
born on June 17, 1931. The defendant was a constant visitor at the home of
Antonia in the early months of her pregnancy, and in February, 1931, he
wrote and placed in her hands a note directed to the padre who has expected
to christen the baby. This note was as follows:
Saturday, 1:30 p. m.
February 14, 1931
Rev. FATHER,
The baby due in June is mine and I should like for my name to be given to it.
CESAR SYQUIA

The occasion for writing this note was that the defendant was on the eve of
his departure on a trip to China and Japan; and while he was abroad on this
visit he wrote several letters to Antonia showing a paternal interest in the
situation that had developed with her, and cautioning her to keep in good
condition in order that "junior" (meaning the baby to be, "Syquia, Jr.") might
be strong, and promising to return to them soon. The baby arrived at the
time expected, and all necessary anticipatory preparations were made by the
defendant. To this he employed his friend Dr. Crescenciano Talavera to
attend at the birth, and made arrangements for the hospitalization of the
mother in Saint Joseph's Hospital of the City of Manila, where she was cared
for during confinement.
When Antonio was able to leave the hospital, Syquia took her, with her
mother and the baby, to a house at No. 551 Camarines Street, Manila, where
they lived together for about a year in regular family style, all household
expenses, including gas and electric light, being defrayed by Syquia. In
course of time, however, the defendant's ardor abated and, when Antonia
began to show signs of a second pregnancy the defendant decamped, and he
is now married to another woman. A point that should here be noted is that
when the time came for christening the child, the defendant, who had charge
of the arrangement for this ceremony, caused the name Ismael Loanco to be
given to him, instead of Cesar Syquia, Jr., as was at first planned.
The first question that is presented in the case is whether the note to
the padre, quoted above, in connection with the letters written by the
defendant to the mother during pregnancy, proves an acknowledgment of
paternity, within the meaning of subsection 1 of article 135 of the Civil Code.
Upon this point we have no hesitancy in holding that the acknowledgment
thus shown is sufficient. It is a universal rule of jurisprudence that a child,
upon being conceived, becomes a bearer of legal rights and capable of being
dealt with as a living person. The fact that it is yet unborn is no impediment
to the acquisition of rights. The problem here presented of the recognition of
unborn child is really not different from that presented in the ordinary case
of the recognition of a child already born and bearing a specific name. Only
the means and resources of identification are different. Even a bequest to a
living child requires oral evidence to connect the particular individual
intended with the name used.
It is contended however, in the present case that the words of description
used in the writings before us are not legally sufficient to indemnify the child
now suing as Ismael Loanco. This contention is not, in our opinion, well
founded. The words of recognition contained in the note to the padre are not
capable of two constructions. They refer to a baby then conceived which was
expected to be born in June and which would thereafter be presented for
christening. The baby came, and though it was in the end given the name of
Ismael Loanco instead of Cesar Syquia, Jr., its identity as the child which the
defendant intended to acknowledge is clear. Any doubt that might arise on
this point is removed by the letters Exhibit F, G, H, and J. In these letters the
defendant makes repeated reference to junior as the baby which Antonia, to
whom the letters were addressed, was then carrying in her womb, and the

writer urged Antonia to eat with good appetite in order that junior might be
vigorous. In the last letter (Exhibit J) written only a few days before the birth
of the child, the defendant urged her to take good care of herself and
of junior also.
It seems to us that the only legal question that can here arise as to the
sufficiency of acknowledgment is whether the acknowledgment contemplated
in subsection 1 of article 135 of the Civil Code must be made in a single
document or may be made in more than one document, of indubitable
authenticity, written by the recognizing father. Upon this point we are of the
opinion that the recognition can be made out by putting together the
admissions of more than one document, supplementing the admission made
in one letter by an admission or admissions made in another. In the case
before us the admission of paternity is contained in the note to the padreand
the other letters suffice to connect that admission with the child then being
carried by Antonia L. de Jesus. There is no requirement in the law that the
writing shall be addressed to one, or any particular individual. It is merely
required that the writing shall be indubitable.
The second question that presents itself in this case is whether the trial court
erred in holding that Ismael Loanco had been in the uninterrupted
possession of the status of a natural child, justified by the conduct of the
father himself, and that as a consequence, the defendant in this case should
be compelled to acknowledge the said Ismael Loanco, under No. 2 of article
135 of the Civil Code. The facts already stated are sufficient, in our opinion,
to justify the conclusion of the trial court on this point, and we may add here
that our conclusion upon the first branch of the case that the defendant had
acknowledged this child in writings above referred to must be taken in
connection with the facts found by the court upon the second point. It is
undeniable that from the birth of this child the defendant supplied a home
for it and the mother, in which they lived together with the defendant. This
situation continued for about a year, and until Antonia became enciente a
second time, when the idea entered the defendant's head of abandoning her.
The law fixes no period during which a child must be in the continuous
possession of the status of a natural child; and the period in this case was
long enough to evince the father's resolution to concede the status. The
circumstance that he abandoned the mother and child shortly before this
action was started is unimportant. The word "continuous" in subsection 2 of
article 135 of the Civil Code does not mean that the concession of status
shall continue forever, but only that it shall not be of an intermittent
character while it continues.
What has been said disposes of the principal feature of the defendant's
appeal. With respect to the appeal of the plaintiffs, we are of the opinion that
the trial court was right in refusing to give damages to the plaintiff, Antonia
Loanco, for supposed breach of promise to marry. Such promise is not
satisfactorily proved, and we may add that the action for breach of promise to
marry has no standing in the civil law, apart from the right to recover money
or property advanced by the plaintiff upon the faith of such promise. This
case exhibits none of the features necessary to maintain such an action.

Furthermore, there is no proof upon which a judgment could be based

requiring the defendant to recognize the second baby, Pacita Loanco.
Finally, we see no necessity or propriety in modifying the judgment as to the
amount of the maintenance which the trial court allowed to Ismael Loanco.
And in this connection we merely point out that, as conditions change, the
Court of First Instance will have jurisdiction to modify the order as to the
amount of the pension as circumstances will require.
The judgment appealed from is in all respects affirmed, without costs. So
ordered.

[G.R. No. 162571. June 15, 2005]

ARNEL L. AGUSTIN, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS

AND
MINOR
MARTIN
JOSE
PROLLAMANTE,
REPRESENTED BY HIS MOTHER/GUARDIAN FE ANGELA
PROLLAMANTE, respondents.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:

At issue in this petition for certiorari is whether or not the Court

of Appeals (CA) gravely erred in exercising its discretion, amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction, in issuing a decision and
resolution upholding the resolution and order of the trial
court, which denied petitioners motion to dismiss private
respondents complaint for support and directed the parties to submit
themselves to deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) paternity testing.
[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

Respondents Fe Angela and her son Martin Prollamante sued

Martins alleged biological father, petitioner Arnel L. Agustin, for
support and support pendente lite before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 106.
[5]

long before Martins conception. He claimed that Fe had at least one

other secret lover. Arnel admitted that their relationship started in
1993 but he never really fell in love with (Fe) not only because (she)
had at least one secret lover, a certain Jun, but also because she
proved to be scheming and overly demanding and possessive. As a
result, theirs was a stormy on-and-off affair. What started as a
romantic liaison between two consenting adults eventually turned out
to be a case of fatal attraction where (Fe) became so obsessed with
(Arnel), to the point of even entertaining the idea of marrying him,
that she resorted to various devious ways and means to alienate
(him) from his wife and family. Unable to bear the prospect of losing
his wife and children, Arnel terminated the affair although he still
treated her as a friend such as by referring potential customers to the
car aircon repair shop where she worked. Later on, Arnel found out
that Fe had another erstwhile secret lover. In May 2000, Arnel and
his entire family went to the United States for a vacation. Upon their
return in June 2000, Arnel learned that Fe was telling people that he
had impregnated her. Arnel refused to acknowledge the child as his
because their last intimacy was sometime in 1998. Exasperated, Fe
started calling Arnels wife and family. On January 19, 2001, Fe
followed Arnel to the Capitol Hills Golf and Country Club parking lot
to demand that he acknowledge Martin as his child. According to
Arnel, he could not get through Fe and the discussion became so
heated that he had no alternative but to move on but without
bumping or hitting any part of her body. Finally, Arnel claimed that
the signature and the community tax certificate (CTC) attributed to
him in the acknowledgment of Martins birth certificate were falsified.
The CTC erroneously reflected his marital status as single when he
was actually married and that his birth year was 1965 when it
should have been 1964.
[7]

[8]

[9]

In their complaint, respondents alleged that Arnel courted Fe in

1992, after which they entered into an intimate relationship. Arnel
supposedly impregnated Fe on her 34th birthday on November 10,
1999. Despite Arnels insistence on abortion, Fe decided otherwise
and gave birth to their child out of wedlock, Martin, on August 11,
2000 at the Capitol Medical Hospital in Quezon City. The babys birth
certificate was purportedly signed by Arnel as the father. Arnel
shouldered the pre-natal and hospital expenses but later refused Fes
repeated requests for Martins support despite his adequate financial
capacity and even suggested to have the child committed for
adoption. Arnel also denied having fathered the child.
On January 19, 2001, while Fe was carrying five-month old
Martin at the Capitol Hills Golf and Country Club parking lot, Arnel
sped off in his van, with the open car door hitting Fes leg. This
incident was reported to the police. In July 2001, Fe was diagnosed
with leukemia and has, since then, been undergoing chemotherapy.
On March 5, 2002, Fe and Martin sued Arnel for support.
[6]

In his amended answer, Arnel denied having sired Martin

because his affair and intimacy with Fe had allegedly ended in 1998,

[10]

In his pre-trial brief filed on May 17, 2002, Arnel vehemently

denied having sired Martin but expressed willingness to consider any
proposal to settle the case.
[11]

On July 23, 2002, Fe and Martin moved for the issuance of an

order directing all the parties to submit themselves to DNA paternity
testing pursuant to Rule 28 of the Rules of Court.
[12]

Arnel opposed said motion by invoking his constitutional right

against self-incrimination. He also moved to dismiss the complaint
for lack of cause of action, considering that his signature on the birth
certificate was a forgery and that, under the law, an illegitimate child
is not entitled to support if not recognized by the putative father. In
his motion, Arnel manifested that he had filed criminal charges for
falsification of documents against Fe (I.S. Nos. 02-5723 and 02-7192)
and a petition for cancellation of his name appearing in Martins birth
[13]

[14]

certificate (docketed as Civil Case No. Q-02-46669). He attached the

certification of the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory that
his signature in the birth certificate was forged.
The trial court denied the motion to dismiss the complaint and
ordered the parties to submit themselves to DNA paternity testing at
the expense of the applicants. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court.
Thus, this petition.
In a nutshell, petitioner raises two issues: (1) whether a
complaint for support can be converted to a petition for recognition
and (2) whether DNA paternity testing can be ordered in a proceeding
for support without violating petitioners constitutional right to
privacy and right against self-incrimination.
[15]

The petition is without merit.

First of all, the trial court properly denied the petitioners motion
to dismiss because the private respondents complaint on its face
showed that they had a cause of action against the petitioner. The
elements of a cause of action are: (1) the plaintiffs primary right and
the defendants corresponding primary duty, and (2) the delict or
wrongful act or omission of the defendant, by which the primary right
and duty have been violated. The cause of action is determined not
by the prayer of the complaint but by the facts alleged.
[16]

In the complaint, private respondents alleged that Fe had

amorous relations with the petitioner, as a result of which she gave
birth to Martin out of wedlock. In his answer, petitioner admitted that
he had sexual relations with Fe but denied that he fathered Martin,
claiming that he had ended the relationship long before the childs
conception and birth. It is undisputed and even admitted by the
parties that there existed a sexual relationship between Arnel and Fe.
The only remaining question is whether such sexual relationship
produced the child, Martin. If it did, as respondents have alleged,
then Martin should be supported by his father Arnel. If not, petitioner
and Martin are strangers to each other and Martin has no right to
demand and petitioner has no obligation to give support.
Preliminaries aside, we now tackle the main issues.
Petitioner refuses to recognize Martin as his own child and
denies the genuineness and authenticity of the childs birth certificate
which he purportedly signed as the father. He also claims that the
order and resolution of the trial court, as affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, effectively converted the complaint for support to a petition
for recognition, which is supposedly proscribed by law. According to

petitioner, Martin, as an unrecognized child, has no right to ask for

support and must first establish his filiation in a separate suit under
Article 283 in relation to Article 265 of the Civil Code and Section
1, Rule 105 of the Rules of Court.
[17]

[18]

[19]

The petitioners contentions are without merit.

The assailed resolution and order did not convert the action for
support into one for recognition but merely allowed the respondents
to prove their cause of action against petitioner who had been
denying the authenticity of the documentary evidence of
acknowledgement. But even if the assailed resolution and order
effectively integrated an action to compel recognition with an action
for support, such was valid and in accordance with jurisprudence.
In Tayag v. Court of Appeals, we allowed the integration of an action
to compel recognition with an action to claim ones inheritance:
[20]

In Paulino, we held that an illegitimate child, to be entitled to support

and successional rights from the putative or presumed parent, must
prove his filiation to the latter. We also said that it is necessary to
allege in the complaint that the putative father had acknowledged
and recognized the illegitimate child because such acknowledgment
is essential to and is the basis of the right to inherit. There being no
allegation of such acknowledgment, the action becomes one to
compel recognition which cannot be brought after the death of the
putative father. The ratio decidendi in Paulino, therefore, is not the
absence of a cause of action for failure of the petitioner to allege the
fact of acknowledgment in the complaint, but the prescription of the
action.
Applying the foregoing principles to the case at bar, although
petitioner contends that the complaint filed by herein private
respondent merely alleges that the minor Chad Cuyugan is an
illegitimate child of the deceased and is actually a claim for
inheritance, from the allegations therein the same may be considered
as one to compel recognition. Further, that the two causes of
action, one to compel recognition and the other to claim
inheritance, may be joined in one complaint is not new in our
jurisprudence.
As early as [1922] we had occasion to rule thereon in Briz vs. Briz, et
al. (43 Phil. 763 [1922]) wherein we said:
The question whether a person in the position of the present plaintiff
can in any event maintain a complex action to compel recognition as
a natural child and at the same time to obtain ulterior relief in the

character of heir, is one which in the opinion of this court must be

answered in the affirmative, provided always that the conditions
justifying the joinder of the two distinct causes of action are present
in the particular case. In other words, there is no absolute
necessity requiring that the action to compel acknowledgment
should have been instituted and prosecuted to a successful
conclusion prior to the action in which that same plaintiff seeks
additional relief in the character of heir. Certainly, there is
nothing so peculiar to the action to compel acknowledgment as to
require that a rule should be here applied different from that
generally applicable in other cases. x x x
The conclusion above stated, though not heretofore explicitly
formulated by this court, is undoubtedly to some extent supported by
our prior decisions. Thus, we have held in numerous cases, and
the doctrine must be considered well settled, that a natural child
having a right to compel acknowledgment, but who has not been
in fact legally acknowledged, may maintain partition proceedings
for the division of the inheritance against his coheirs x x x; and
the same person may intervene in proceedings for the distribution of
the estate of his deceased natural father, or mother x x x. In neither
of these situations has it been thought necessary for the plaintiff to
show a prior decree compelling acknowledgment. The obvious reason
is that in partition suits and distribution proceedings the other
persons who might take by inheritance are before the court; and the
declaration of heirship is appropriate to such proceedings.
(Underscoring supplied)
Although the instant case deals with support rather than
inheritance, as in Tayag, the basis or rationale for integrating them
remains the same. Whether or not respondent Martin is entitled to
support depends completely on the determination of filiation. A
separate action will only result in a multiplicity of suits, given how
intimately related the main issues in both cases are. To
paraphrase Tayag, the declaration of filiation is entirely appropriate
to these proceedings.
On the second issue, petitioner posits that DNA is not recognized
by this Court as a conclusive means of proving paternity. He also
contends that compulsory testing violates his right to privacy and
right against self-incrimination as guaranteed under the 1987
Constitution. These contentions have no merit.
Given that this is the very first time that the admissibility of DNA
testing as a means for determining paternity has actually been the

focal issue in a controversy, a brief historical sketch of our past

decisions featuring or mentioning DNA testing is called for.
In the 1995 case of People v. Teehankee where the appellant
was convicted of murder on the testimony of three eyewitnesses, we
stated as an obiter dictum that while eyewitness identification is
significant, it is not as accurate and authoritative as the scientific
forms of identification evidence such as the fingerprint or
the DNA test result (emphasis supplied).
[21]

Our faith in DNA testing, however, was not quite so steadfast in

the previous decade. In Pe Lim v. Court of Appeals, promulgated in
1997, we cautioned against the use of DNA because DNA, being a
relatively new science, (had) not as yet been accorded official
recognition by our courts. Paternity (would) still have to be resolved
by such conventional evidence as the relevant incriminating acts,
verbal and written, by the putative father.
[22]

In 2001, however, we opened the possibility of admitting DNA as

evidence of parentage, as enunciated in Tijing v. Court of Appeals:
[23]

A final note. Parentage will still be resolved using conventional

methods unless we adopt the modern and scientific ways available.
Fortunately, we have now the facility and expertise in using DNA test
for identification and parentage testing. The University of the
Philippines Natural Science Research Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA
Analysis Laboratory has now the capability to conduct DNA typing
using short tandem repeat (STR) analysis. The analysis is based on
the fact that the DNA of a child/person has two (2) copies, one copy
from the mother and the other from the father. The DNA from the
mother, the alleged father and child are analyzed to establish
parentage. Of course, being a novel scientific technique, the use of
DNA test as evidence is still open to challenge. Eventually, as the
appropriate case comes, courts should not hesitate to rule on the
admissibility of DNA evidence. For it was said, that courts should
apply the results of science when competently obtained in aid of
situations presented, since to reject said result is to deny progress.
The first real breakthrough of DNA as admissible and
authoritative evidence in Philippine jurisprudence came in 2002 with
our en banc decision in People v. Vallejo where the rape and murder
victims DNA samples from the bloodstained clothes of the accused
were admitted in evidence. We reasoned that the purpose of DNA
testing (was) to ascertain whether an association exist(ed) between
the evidence sample and the reference sample. The samples collected
[24]

(were) subjected to various chemical processes to establish their

profile.
A year later, in People v. Janson, we acquitted the accused
charged with rape for lack of evidence because doubts persist(ed) in
our mind as to who (were) the real malefactors. Yes, a complex
offense (had) been perpetrated but who (were) the perpetrators? How
we wish we had DNA or other scientific evidence to still our doubts!
[25]

In 2004, in Tecson, et al. v. COMELEC where the Court en

banc was faced with the issue of filiation of then presidential
candidate Fernando Poe Jr., we stated:
[26]

In case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to

satisfactorily establish or would be difficult to obtain, DNA testing,
which examines genetic codes obtained from body cells of the
illegitimate child and any physical residue of the long dead parent
could be resorted to. A positive match would clear up filiation or
paternity. In Tijing vs. Court of Appeals, this Court has acknowledged
the strong weight of DNA testing
Moreover, in our en banc decision in People v. Yatar, we
affirmed the conviction of the accused for rape with homicide, the
principal evidence for which included DNA test results. We did a
lengthy discussion of DNA, the process of DNA testing and the
reasons for its admissibility in the context of our own Rules of
Evidence:
[27]

Deoxyribonucleic Acid, or DNA, is a molecule that encodes the

genetic information in all living organisms. A persons DNA is the
same in each cell and it does not change throughout a persons
lifetime; the DNA in a persons blood is the same as the DNA found in
his saliva, sweat, bone, the root and shaft of hair, earwax, mucus,
urine, skin tissue, and vaginal and rectal cells. Most importantly,
because of polymorphisms in human genetic structure, no two
individuals have the same DNA, with the notable exception of
identical twins.
xxx xxx xxx
In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, courts should
consider, inter alia, the following factors: how the samples were
collected, how they were handled, the possibility of contamination of
the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the samples,
whether proper standards and procedures were followed in

conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst who

conducted the tests.
In the case at bar, Dr. Maria Corazon Abogado de Ungria was duly
qualified by the prosecution as an expert witness on DNA print or
identification techniques. Based on Dr. de Ungrias testimony, it was
determined that the gene type and DNA profile of appellant are
identical to that of the extracts subject of examination. The blood
sample taken from the appellant showed that he was of the following
gene types: vWA 15/19, TH01 7/8, DHFRP29/10 and CSF1PO
10/11, which are identical with semen taken from the victims vaginal
canal. Verily, a DNA match exists between the semen found in the
victim and the blood sample given by the appellant in open court
during the course of the trial.
Admittedly, we are just beginning to integrate these advances in
science and technology in the Philippine criminal justice system, so
we must be cautious as we traverse these relatively uncharted
waters. Fortunately, we can benefit from the wealth of persuasive
jurisprudence that has developed in other jurisdictions. Specifically,
the prevailing doctrine in the U.S. has proven instructive.
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow (509 U.S. 579 (1993); 125 L. Ed. 2d 469) it
was ruled that pertinent evidence based on scientifically valid
principles could be used as long as it was relevant and reliable.
Judges, under Daubert, were allowed greater discretion over which
testimony they would allow at trial, including the introduction of new
kinds of scientific techniques. DNA typing is one such novel
procedure.
Under Philippine law, evidence is relevant when it relates directly to a
fact in issue as to induce belief in its existence or non-existence.
Applying the Daubert test to the case at bar, the DNA evidence
obtained through PCR testing and utilizing STR analysis, and which
was appreciated by the court a quo is relevant and reliable since it is
reasonably based on scientifically valid principles of human genetics
and molecular biology.
Significantly, we upheld the constitutionality of compulsory DNA
testing and the admissibility of the results thereof as evidence. In
that case, DNA samples from semen recovered from a rape victims
vagina were used to positively identify the accused Joel Kawit Yatar
as the rapist. Yatar claimed that the compulsory extraction of his
blood sample for DNA testing, as well as the testing itself, violated his

right against self-incrimination, as embodied in both Sections 12 and

17 of Article III of the Constitution. We addressed this as follows:

whose very life is at stake can be compelled to submit to DNA testing,

we see no reason why, in this civil case, petitioner herein who does
not face such dire consequences cannot be ordered to do the same.

The contention is untenable. The kernel of the right is not against all
compulsion, but against testimonial compulsion. The right against
self-incrimination is simply against the legal process of extracting
from the lips of the accused an admission of guilt. It does not apply
where the evidence sought to be excluded is not an incrimination but
as part of object evidence.

DNA paternity testing first came to prominence in the United

States, where it yielded its first official results sometime in 1985. In
the decade that followed, DNA rapidly found widespread general
acceptance. Several cases decided by various State Supreme Courts
reflect the total assimilation of DNA testing into their rules of
procedure and evidence.

Over the years, we have expressly excluded several kinds of

object evidence taken from the person of the accused from the realm
of self-incrimination. These include photographs, hair, and other
bodily substances. We have also declared as constitutional several
procedures performed on the accused such as pregnancy tests for
women accused of adultery, expulsion of morphine from ones
mouth and the tracing of ones foot to determine its identity with
bloody footprints. In Jimenez v. Caizares, we even authorized the
examination of a womans genitalia, in an action for annulment filed
by her husband, to verify his claim that she was impotent, her orifice
being too small for his penis. Some of these procedures were, to be
sure, rather invasive and involuntary, but all of them were
constitutionally sound. DNA testing and its results, per our ruling
in Yatar, are now similarly acceptable.

The case of Wilson v. Lumb shows that DNA testing is so

commonly accepted that, in some instances, ordering the procedure
has become a ministerial act. The Supreme Court of St. Lawrence
County, New York allowed a party who had already acknowledged
paternity to subsequently challenge his prior acknowledgment. The
Court pointed out that, under the law, specifically Section 516 of the
New York Family Court Act, the Family Court examiner had the duty,
upon receipt of the challenge, to order DNA tests:

[28]

[29]

[30]

[31]

[32]

[33]

[34]

[35]

Nor does petitioners invocation of his right to privacy persuade

us. In Ople v. Torres, where we struck down the proposed national
computerized identification system embodied in Administrative Order
No. 308, we said:
[36]

In no uncertain terms, we also underscore that the right to privacy

does not bar all incursions into individual privacy. The right is not
intended to stifle scientific and technological advancements that
enhance public service and the common good... Intrusions into the
right must be accompanied by proper safeguards that enhance public
service and the common good.
Historically, it has mostly been in the areas of legality of searches
and
seizures, and
the
infringement
of
privacy
of
communication where the constitutional right to privacy has been
critically at issue. Petitioners case involves neither and, as already
stated, his argument that his right against self-incrimination is in
jeopardy holds no water. His hollow invocation of his constitutional
rights elicits no sympathy here for the simple reason that they are
not in any way being violated. If, in a criminal case, an accused
[37]

[38]

[39]

[40]

[41]

516-a. Acknowledgment of paternity. (a) An acknowledgment of

paternity executed pursuant to section one hundred eleven-k of the
social services law or section four thousand one hundred thirty-five-b
of the public health law shall establish the paternity of and liability
for the support of a child pursuant to this act. Such acknowledgment
must be reduced to writing and filed pursuant to section four
thousand one hundred thirty-five-b of the public health law with the
registrar of the district in which the birth occurred and in which the
birth certificate has been filed. No further judicial or administrative
proceedings are required to ratify an unchallenged acknowledgment
of paternity.
(b) An acknowledgment of paternity executed pursuant to section one
hundred eleven-k of the social services law or section four thousand
one hundred thirty-five-b of the public health law may be rescinded
by either signators filing of a petition with the court to vacate the
acknowledgment within the earlier of sixty days of the date of signing
the acknowledgment or the date of an administrative or a judicial
proceeding (including a proceeding to establish a support order)
relating to the child in which either signator is a party. For purposes
of this section, the "date of an administrative or a judicial proceeding"
shall be the date by which the respondent is required to answer the
petition. After the expiration of sixty days of the execution of the
acknowledgment, either signator may challenge the acknowledgment
of paternity in court only on the basis of fraud, duress, or material
mistake of fact, with the burden of proof on the party challenging the

voluntary acknowledgment. Upon receiving a partys challenge to

an acknowledgment, the court shall order genetic marker tests
or DNA tests for the determination of the childs paternity and
shall make a finding of paternity, if appropriate, in accordance
with this article. Neither signators legal obligations, including the
obligation for child support arising from the acknowledgment, may be
suspended during the challenge to the acknowledgment except for
good cause as the court may find. If a party petitions to rescind an
acknowledgment and if the court determines that the alleged father is
not the father of the child, or if the court finds that an
acknowledgment is invalid because it was executed on the basis of
fraud, duress, or material mistake of fact, the court shall vacate the
acknowledgment of paternity and shall immediately provide a copy of
the order to the registrar of the district in which the childs birth
certificate is filed and also to the putative father registry operated by
the department of social services pursuant to section three hundred
seventy-two-c of the social services law. In addition, if the mother of
the child who is the subject of the acknowledgment is in receipt of
child support services pursuant to title six-A of article three of the
social services law, the court shall immediately provide a copy of the
order to the child support enforcement unit of the social services
district that provides the mother with such services.
(c) A determination of paternity made by any other state, whether
established through the parents acknowledgment of paternity or
through an administrative or judicial process, must be accorded full
faith and credit, if and only if such acknowledgment meets the
requirements set forth in section 452(a)(7) of the social security act.
(emphasis supplied)
DNA testing also appears elsewhere in the New York Family
Court Act:
[42]

532. Genetic marker and DNA tests; admissibility of records or

reports of test results; costs of tests.
a) The court shall advise the parties of their right to one or more
genetic marker tests or DNA tests and, on the courts own motion or
the motion of any party, shall order the mother, her child and the
alleged father to submit to one or more genetic marker or DNA tests
of a type generally acknowledged as reliable by an accreditation body
designated by the secretary of the federal department of health and
human services and performed by a laboratory approved by such an
accreditation body and by the commissioner of health or by a duly
qualified physician to aid in the determination of whether the alleged

father is or is not the father of the child. No such test shall be

ordered, however, upon a written finding by the court that it is
not in the best interests of the child on the basis of res judicata,
equitable estoppel, or the presumption of legitimacy of a child
born to a married woman. The record or report of the results of any
such genetic marker or DNA test ordered pursuant to this section or
pursuant to section one hundred eleven-k of the social services law
shall be received in evidence by the court pursuant to subdivision (e)
of rule forty-five hundred eighteen of the civil practice law and rules
where no timely objection in writing has been made thereto and that
if such timely objections are not made, they shall be deemed waived
and shall not be heard by the court. If the record or report of the
results of any such genetic marker or DNA test or tests indicate
at least a ninety-five percent probability of paternity, the
admission of such record or report shall create a rebuttable
presumption of paternity, and shall establish, if unrebutted, the
paternity of and liability for the support of a child pursuant to
this article and article four of this act.
(b) Whenever the court directs a genetic marker or DNA test pursuant
to this section, a report made as provided in subdivision (a) of this
section may be received in evidence pursuant to rule forty-five
hundred eighteen of the civil practice law and rules if offered by any
party.
(c) The cost of any test ordered pursuant to subdivision (a) of this
section shall be, in the first instance, paid by the moving party. If the
moving party is financially unable to pay such cost, the court may
direct any qualified public health officer to conduct such test, if
practicable; otherwise, the court may direct payment from the funds
of the appropriate local social services district. In its order of
disposition, however, the court may direct that the cost of any such
test be apportioned between the parties according to their respective
abilities to pay or be assessed against the party who does not prevail
on the issue of paternity, unless such party is financially unable to
pay. (emphasis supplied)
In R.E. v. C.E.W., a decision of the Mississippi Supreme Court,
DNA tests were used to prove that H.W., previously thought to be an
offspring of the marriage between A.C.W. and C.E.W., was actually
the child of R.E. with whom C.E.W. had, at the time of conception,
maintained an adulterous relationship.
[43]

In Erie County Department of Social Services on behalf of Tiffany

M.H. v. Greg G., the 4th Department of the New York Supreme
[44]

Courts Appellate Division allowed G.G., who had been adjudicated as

T.M.H.s father by default, to have the said judgment vacated, even
after six years, once he had shown through a genetic marker test that
he was not the childs father. In this case, G.G. only requested the
tests after the Department of Social Services, six years after G.G. had
been adjudicated as T.M.H.s father, sought an increase in his
support obligation to her.

conducting typing or identification profiling; compensation of expert;

result of typing or identification profiling; filing summary report;
objection; admissibility; presumption; burden of proof; summary
disposition.

In Greco v. Coleman, the Michigan Supreme Court while ruling

on the constitutionality of a provision of law allowing non-modifiable
support agreements pointed out that it was because of the difficulty
of determining paternity before the advent of DNA testing that such
support agreements were necessary:

(1) In a proceeding under this act before trial, the court, upon
application made by or on behalf of either party, or on its own
motion, shall order that the mother, child, and alleged father
submit to blood or tissue typing determinations, which may
include, but are not limited to, determinations of red cell
antigens, red cell isoenzymes, human leukocyte antigens, serum
proteins, or DNA identification profiling, to determine whether
the alleged father is likely to be, or is not, the father of the
child. If the court orders a blood or tissue typing
or DNAidentification profiling to be conducted and a party
refuses to submit to the typing or DNA identification profiling, in
addition to any other remedies available, the court may do
either of the following:

[45]

As a result of DNA testing, the accuracy with which paternity can be

proven has increased significantly since the parties in this lawsuit
entered into their support agreement(current testing methods can
determine the probability of paternity to 99.999999% accuracy).
However, at the time the parties before us entered into the disputed
agreement, proving paternity was a very significant obstacle to an
illegitimate child's access to child support. The first reported results
of modern DNA paternity testing did not occur until 1985. ("In fact,
since its first reported results in 1985, DNAmatching has progressed
to 'general acceptance in less than a decade'"). Of course, while prior
blood-testing methods could exclude some males from being the
possible father of a child, those methods could not affirmatively
pinpoint a particular male as being the father. Thus, when the
settlement agreement between the present parties was entered in
1980, establishing paternity was a far more difficult ordeal than at
present. Contested paternity actions at that time were often no more
than credibility contests. Consequently, in every contested paternity
action, obtaining child support depended not merely on whether the
putative father was, in fact, the child's biological father, but rather on
whether the mother could prove to a court of law that she was only
sexually involved with one man--the putative father. Allowing parties
the option of entering into private agreements in lieu of proving
paternity eliminated the risk that the mother would be unable meet
her burden of proof.
It is worth noting that amendments to Michigans Paternity law
have included the use of DNA testing:
[46]

722.716 Pretrial proceedings; blood or tissue typing determinations

as to mother, child, and alleged father; court order; refusal to submit
to typing or identification profiling; qualifications of person

Sec. 6.

(a) Enter a default judgment at the request of the appropriate

party.
(b) If a trial is held, allow the disclosure of the fact of the refusal
unless good cause is shown for not disclosing the fact of refusal.
(2) A blood or tissue typing or DNA identification profiling shall be
conducted by a person accredited for paternity determinations by a
nationally recognized scientific organization, including, but not
limited to, the American association of blood banks.
xxx xxx xxx
(5) If the probability of paternity determined by the qualified
person described in subsection (2) conducting the blood or tissue
typing or DNA identification profiling is 99% or higher, and
the DNA identification profile and summary report are
admissible as provided in subsection (4), paternity is presumed.
If the results of the analysis of genetic testing material from 2 or
more persons indicate a probability of paternity greater than
99%, the contracting laboratory shall conduct additional genetic
paternity testing until all but 1 of the putative fathers is

eliminated, unless the dispute involves 2 or more putative

fathers who have identical DNA.
(6) Upon the establishment of the presumption of paternity as
provided in subsection (5), either party may move for summary
disposition under the court rules. this section does not abrogate the
right of either party to child support from the date of birth of the
child if applicable under section 7. (emphasis supplied)
In Rafferty v. Perkins, the Supreme Court of Mississippi ruled
that DNA test results showing paternity were sufficient to overthrow
the presumption of legitimacy of a child born during the course of a
marriage:
[47]

The presumption of legitimacy having been rebutted by the results of

the blood test eliminating Perkins as Justin's father, even considering
the evidence in the light most favorable to Perkins, we find that no
reasonable jury could find that Easter is not Justin's father based
upon the 99.94% probability of paternity concluded by the DNA
testing.

In M.A.S. v. Mississippi Dept. of Human Services, another case

decided by the Supreme Court of Mississippi, it was held that even if
paternity was established through an earlier agreed order of filiation,
child support and visitation orders could still be vacated once DNA
testing established someone other than the named individual to be
the biological father. The Mississippi High Court reiterated this
doctrine in Williams v. Williams.
[50]

[51]

The foregoing considered, we find no grave abuse of discretion on

the part of the public respondent for upholding the orders of the trial
court which both denied the petitioners motion to dismiss and
ordered him to submit himself for DNA testing. Under Rule 65 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the remedy of certiorari is only
available when any tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in
excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal,
nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law. In Land Bank of the Philippines v. the Court of Appeals where
we dismissed a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65, we
discussed at length the nature of such a petition and just what was
meant by grave abuse of discretion:
[52]

[53]

In S.J.F. and J.C.F. v. R.C.W., the North Dakota Supreme Court

upheld an order for genetic testing given by the Court of Appeals,
even after trial on the merits had concluded without such order being
given. Significantly, when J.C.F., the mother, first filed the case for
paternity and support with the District Court, neither party
requested genetic testing. It was only upon appeal from dismissal of
the case that the appellate court remanded the case and ordered the
testing, which the North Dakota Supreme Court upheld.

Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical

exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction or, in
other words, where the power is exercised in an arbitrary manner
by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility, and it must
be so patent or gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive
duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act
at all in contemplation of law.

The case of Kohl v. Amundson, decided by the Supreme Court of

South Dakota, demonstrated that even default judgments of paternity
could be vacated after the adjudicated father had, through DNA
testing, established non-paternity. In this case, Kohl, having
excluded himself as the father of Amundsons child through DNA
testing, was able to have the default judgment against him vacated.
He then obtained a ruling ordering Amundson to reimburse him for
the amounts withheld from his wages for child support. The Court
said (w)hile Amundson may have a remedy against the father of the
child, she submit(ted) no authority that require(d) Kohl to support
her child. Contrary to Amundson's position, the fact that a default
judgment was entered, but subsequently vacated, (did) not foreclose
Kohl from obtaining a money judgment for the amount withheld from
his wages.

The special civil action for certiorari is a remedy designed for the
correction of errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment.
The raison detre for the rule is when a court exercises its jurisdiction,
an error committed while so engaged does not deprive it of the
jurisdiction being exercised when the error is committed. If it did,
every error committed by a court would deprive it of its jurisdiction
and every erroneous judgment would be a void judgment. In such a
scenario, the administration of justice would not survive. Hence,
where the issue or question involved affects the wisdom or legal
soundness of the decisionnot the jurisdiction of the court to render
said decisionthe same is beyond the province of a special civil action
for certiorari.

[48]

[49]

The proper recourse of the aggrieved party from a decision of the CA

is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised

Rules of Court. On the other hand, if the error subject of the recourse
is one of jurisdiction, or the act complained of was perpetrated by a
quasi-judicial officer or agency with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the proper remedy
available to the aggrieved party is a petition for certiorari under Rule
65 of the said Rules. (emphasis supplied)
In the instant case, the petitioner has in no way shown any
arbitrariness, passion, prejudice or personal hostility that would
amount to grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Court of
Appeals. The respondent court acted entirely within its jurisdiction in
promulgating its decision and resolution, and any error made would
have only been an error in judgment. As we have discussed, however,
the decision of the respondent court, being firmly anchored in law
and jurisprudence, was correct.

Epilogue
For too long, illegitimate children have been marginalized by
fathers who choose to deny their existence. The growing
sophistication of DNA testing technology finally provides a much
needed equalizer for such ostracized and abandoned progeny. We
have long believed in the merits of DNA testing and have repeatedly
expressed as much in the past. This case comes at a perfect time
when DNA testing has finally evolved into a dependable and
authoritative form of evidence gathering. We therefore take this
opportunity to forcefully reiterate our stand that DNA testing is a
valid means of determining paternity.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby
DENIED. The Court of Appeals decision dated January 28, 2004 in
CA-G.R. SP No. 80961 is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 148220. June 15, 2005]

developed the Molecular Biology Program and taught Molecular

Biology. In her testimony, Dr. Halos described the process for DNA
paternity testing and asserted that the test had an accuracy rate of
99.9999% in establishing paternity.
[4]

ROSENDO HERRERA, petitioner, vs. ROSENDO ALBA, minor,

represented by his mother ARMI A. ALBA, and HON.
NIMFA CUESTA-VILCHES, Presiding Judge, Branch 48,
Regional Trial Court, Manila,respondents.
DECISION

Petitioner opposed DNA paternity testing and contended that it

has not gained acceptability. Petitioner further argued that DNA
paternity testing violates his right against self-incrimination.

The Ruling of the Trial Court

CARPIO, J.:

In an Order dated 3 February 2000, the trial court granted

respondents motion to conduct DNA paternity testing on petitioner,
respondent and Armi Alba. Thus:

The Case
This is a petition for review to set aside the Decision dated 29
November 2000 of the Court of Appeals (appellate court) in CA-G.R.
SP No. 59766. The appellate court affirmed two Orders issued by
Branch 48 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila (trial court) in SP No.
98-88759. The Order dated 3 February 2000 directed Rosendo
Herrera (petitioner) to submit to deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA)
paternity testing, while the Order dated 8 June 2000 denied
petitioners motion for reconsideration.
[1]

[2]

[3]

The Facts
On 14 May 1998, then thirteen-year-old Rosendo Alba
(respondent), represented by his mother Armi Alba, filed before the
trial court a petition for compulsory recognition, support and
damages against petitioner. On 7 August 1998, petitioner filed his
answer with counterclaim where he denied that he is the biological
father of respondent. Petitioner also denied physical contact with
respondents mother.
Respondent filed a motion to direct the taking of DNA paternity
testing to abbreviate the proceedings. To support the motion,
respondent presented the testimony of Saturnina C. Halos, Ph.D.
When she testified, Dr. Halos was an Associate Professor at De La
Salle University where she taught Cell Biology. She was also head of
the University of the Philippines Natural Sciences Research Institute
(UP-NSRI), a DNA analysis laboratory. She was a former professor at
the University of the Philippines in Diliman, Quezon City, where she

In view of the foregoing, the motion of the petitioner is GRANTED and the relevant individuals, namely: the
petitioner, the minor child, and respondent are directed to undergo DNA paternity testing in a laboratory of
their common choice within a period of thirty (30) days from receipt of the Order, and to submit the results
thereof within a period of ninety (90) days from completion. The parties are further reminded of the hearing
set on 24 February 2000 for the reception of other evidence in support of the petition.
IT IS SO ORDERED.[5] (Emphasis in the original)

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the 3 February

2000 Order. He asserted that under the present circumstances, the
DNA test [he] is compelled to take would be inconclusive, irrelevant
and the coercive process to obtain the requisite specimen,
unconstitutional.
In an Order dated 8 June 2000, the trial court denied petitioners
motion for reconsideration.
[6]

On 18 July 2000, petitioner filed before the appellate court a

petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. He asserted that the trial court rendered the Orders dated
3 February 2000 and 8 June 2000 in excess of, or without
jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction. Petitioner further contended that there is no
appeal nor any [other] plain, adequate and speedy remedy in the
ordinary course of law. Petitioner maintained his previous objections
to the taking of DNA paternity testing. He submitted the following
grounds to support his objection:
1. Public respondent misread and misapplied the ruling in Lim vs. Court of Appeals (270 SCRA 2).
2. Public respondent ruled to accept DNA test without considering the limitations on, and conditions
precedent for the admissibility of DNA testing and ignoring the serious constraints affecting
the reliability of the test as admitted by private respondents expert witness.
3. Subject Orders lack legal and factual support, with public respondent relying on scientific findings
and conclusions unfit for judicial notice and unsupported by experts in the field and scientific
treatises.

4. Under the present circumstances the DNA testing petitioner [is] compelled to take will be
inconclusive, irrelevant and the coercive process to obtain the requisite specimen from the
petitioner, unconstitutional.[7]

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

On 29 November 2000, the appellate court issued a decision
denying the petition and affirming the questioned Orders of the trial
court. The appellate court stated that petitioner merely desires to
correct the trial courts evaluation of evidence. Thus, appeal is an
available remedy for an error of judgment that the court may commit
in the exercise of its jurisdiction. The appellate court also stated that
the proposed DNA paternity testing does not violate his right against
self-incrimination because the right applies only to testimonial
compulsion. Finally, the appellate court pointed out that petitioner
can still refute a possible adverse result of the DNA paternity testing.
The dispositive portion of the appellate courts decision reads:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Petition is hereby DENIED DUE COURSE, and ordered
dismissed, and the challenged orders of the Trial Court AFFIRMED, with costs to Petitioner.
SO ORDERED.[8]

The petition has no merit.

Before discussing the issues on DNA paternity testing, we deem
it appropriate to give an overview of a paternity suit and apply it to
the facts of this case. We shall consider the requirements of the
Family Code and of the Rules of Evidence to establish paternity and
filiation.

An Overview of the Paternity and Filiation Suit

Filiation proceedings are usually filed not just to adjudicate
paternity but also to secure a legal right associated with paternity,
such as citizenship, support (as in the present case), or inheritance.
The burden of proving paternity is on the person who alleges that the
putative father is the biological father of the child. There are four
significant procedural aspects of a traditional paternity action which
parties have to face: a prima facie case, affirmative defenses,
presumption of legitimacy, and physical resemblance between the
putative father and child.
[13]

[14]

Petitioner moved for reconsideration, which the appellate court

denied in its Resolution dated 23 May 2001.
[9]

A prima facie case exists if a woman declares that she had sexual
relations with the putative father. In our jurisdiction, corroborative
proof is required to carry the burden forward and shift it to the
putative father.
[15]

Issues
Petitioner raises the issue of whether a DNA test is a valid
probative tool in this jurisdiction to determine filiation. Petitioner
asks for the conditions under which DNA technology may be
integrated into our judicial system and the prerequisites for the
admissibility of DNA test results in a paternity suit.
[10]

Petitioner further submits that the appellate court gravely

abused its discretion when it authorized the trial court to embark in
[sic] a new procedure xxx to determine filiation despite the absence of
legislation to ensure its reliability and integrity, want of official
recognition as made clear in Lim vs. Court of Appeals and the
presence of technical and legal constraints in respect of [sic] its
implementation. Petitioner maintains that the proposed DNA
paternity testing violates his right against self-incrimination.
[11]

[12]

The Ruling of the Court

There are two affirmative defenses available to the putative

father. The putative father may show incapability of sexual relations
with the mother, because of either physical absence or
impotency. The putative father may also show that the mother had
sexual relations with other men at the time of conception.
[16]

A child born to a husband and wife during a valid marriage is

presumed legitimate. The childs legitimacy may be impugned only
under the strict standards provided by law.
[17]

[18]

Finally, physical resemblance between the putative father and

child may be offered as part of evidence of paternity. Resemblance is
a trial technique unique to a paternity proceeding. However, although
likeness is a function of heredity, there is no mathematical formula
that could quantify how much a child must or must not look like his
biological father. This kind of evidence appeals to the emotions of
the trier of fact.
[19]

In the present case, the trial court encountered three of the four
aspects. Armi Alba, respondents mother, put forward a prima
facie case when she asserted that petitioner is respondents biological

father. Aware that her assertion is not enough to convince the trial
court, she offered corroborative proof in the form of letters and
pictures. Petitioner, on the other hand, denied Armi Albas assertion.
He denied ever having sexual relations with Armi Alba and stated
that respondent is Armi Albas child with another man. Armi Alba
countered petitioners denial by submitting pictures of respondent
and petitioner side by side, to show how much they resemble each
other.
Paternity and filiation disputes can easily become credibility
contests. We now look to the law, rules, and governing jurisprudence
to help us determine what evidence of incriminating acts on paternity
and filiation are allowed in this jurisdiction.

Under Article 278 of the New Civil Code, voluntary recognition by a

parent shall be made in the record of birth, a will, a statement before
a court of record, or in any authentic writing. To be effective, the
claim of filiation must be made by the putative father himself and the
writing must be the writing of the putative father. A notarial
agreement to support a child whose filiation is admitted by the
putative father was considered acceptable evidence. Letters to the
mother vowing to be a good father to the child and pictures of the
putative father cuddling the child on various occasions, together with
the certificate of live birth, proved filiation. However, a student
permanent record, a written consent to a fathers operation, or a
marriage contract where the putative father gave consent, cannot be
taken as authentic writing. Standing alone, neither a certificate of
baptism nor family pictures are sufficient to establish filiation.
[21]

[22]

[23]

[24]

[25]

Laws, Rules, and Jurisprudence

Establishing Filiation
The relevant provisions of the Family Code provide as follows:
ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same
evidence as legitimate children.
xxx

[26]

So far, the laws, rules, and jurisprudence seemingly limit

evidence of paternity and filiation to incriminating acts alone.
However, advances in science show that sources of evidence of
paternity and filiation need not be limited to incriminating acts. There
is now almost universal scientific agreement that blood grouping
tests are conclusive on non-paternity, although inconclusive on
paternity.
[27]

In Co Tao v. Court of Appeals, the result of the blood grouping

test showed that the putative father was a possible father of the
child. Paternity was imputed to the putative father after the
possibility of paternity was proven on presentation during trial of
facts and circumstances other than the results of the blood grouping
test.
[28]

ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.

In Jao v. Court of Appeals, the child, the mother, and the

putative father agreed to submit themselves to a blood grouping test.
The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) conducted the test, which
indicated that the child could not have been the possible offspring of
the mother and the putative father. We held that the result of the
blood grouping test was conclusive on the non-paternity of the
putative father.
[29]

The Rules on Evidence include provisions on pedigree. The

relevant sections of Rule 130 provide:
SEC. 39. Act or declaration about pedigree.The act or declaration of a person deceased, or unable to testify,
in respect to the pedigree of another person related to him by birth or marriage, may be received in
evidence where it occurred before the controversy, and the relationship between the two persons is shown
by evidence other than such act or declaration. The word pedigree includes relationship, family genealogy,
birth, marriage, death, the dates when and the places where these facts occurred, and the names of the
relatives. It embraces also facts of family history intimately connected with pedigree.
SEC. 40. Family reputation or tradition regarding pedigree.The reputation or tradition existing in a family
previous to the controversy, in respect to the pedigree of any one of its members, may be received in
evidence if the witness testifying thereon be also a member of the family, either by consanguinity or
affinity. Entries in family bibles or other family books or charts, engraving on rings, family portraits and the
like, may be received as evidence of pedigree.

This Courts rulings further specify what incriminating acts are

acceptable as evidence to establish filiation. In Pe Lim v. CA, a case
petitioner often cites, we stated that the issue of paternity still has to
be
resolved
by
such
conventional
evidence
as
the
relevantincriminating verbal and written acts by the putative father.
[20]

The present case asks us to go one step further. We are now

asked whether DNA analysis may be admitted as evidence to prove
paternity.

DNA Analysis as Evidence

DNA is the fundamental building block of a persons entire

genetic make-up. DNA is found in all human cells and is the same in
every cell of the same person. Genetic identity is unique. Hence, a
persons DNA profile can determine his identity.
[30]

DNA analysis is a procedure in which DNA extracted from a

biological sample obtained from an individual is examined. The DNA
is processed to generate a pattern, or a DNA profile, for the individual
from whom the sample is taken. This DNA profile is unique for each
person, except for identical twins. We quote relevant portions of the
trial courts 3 February 2000 Order with approval:

parentage testing. The University of the Philippines Natural Science Research Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA
Analysis Laboratory has now the capability to conduct DNA typing using short tandem repeat (STR) analysis.
xxx For it was said, that courts should apply the results of science when completely obtained in aid of
situations presented, since to reject said result is to deny progress. Though it is not necessary in this case
to resort to DNA testing, in [the] future it would be useful to all concerned in the prompt resolution of
parentage and identity issues.

Admissibility of
DNA Analysis as Evidence

[31]

Everyone is born with a distinct genetic blueprint called DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid). It is exclusive to an
individual (except in the rare occurrence of identical twins that share a single, fertilized egg), and DNA is
unchanging throughout life. Being a component of every cell in the human body, the DNA of an individuals
blood is the very DNA in his or her skin cells, hair follicles, muscles, semen, samples from buccal swabs,
saliva, or other body parts.
The chemical structure of DNA has four bases. They are known as A (adenine), G (guanine), C (cystosine)
and T (thymine). The order in which the four bases appear in an individuals DNA determines his or her
physical makeup. And since DNA is a double-stranded molecule, it is composed of two specific paired
bases, A-T or T-A and G-C or C-G. These are called genes.
Every gene has a certain number of the above base pairs distributed in a particular sequence. This gives a
person his or her genetic code. Somewhere in the DNA framework, nonetheless, are sections that differ.
They are known as polymorphic loci, which are the areas analyzed in DNA typing (profiling, tests,
fingerprinting, or analysis/DNA fingerprinting/genetic tests or fingerprinting). In other words, DNA typing
simply means determining the polymorphic loci.
How is DNA typing performed? From a DNA sample obtained or extracted, a molecular biologist may proceed
to analyze it in several ways. There are five (5) techniques to conduct DNA typing. They are: the RFLP
(restriction fragment length polymorphism); reverse dot blot or HLA DQ a/Pm loci which was used in 287
cases that were admitted as evidence by 37 courts in the U.S. as of November 1994; mtDNA process; VNTR
(variable number tandem repeats); and the most recent which is known as the PCR-([polymerase] chain
reaction) based STR (short tandem repeats) method which, as of 1996, was availed of by most forensic
laboratories in the world. PCR is the process of replicating or copying DNA in an evidence sample a million
times through repeated cycling of a reaction involving the so-called DNA polymerize enzyme. STR, on the
other hand, takes measurements in 13 separate places and can match two (2) samples with a reported
theoretical error rate of less than one (1) in a trillion.
Just like in fingerprint analysis, in DNA typing, matches are determined. To illustrate, when DNA or
fingerprint tests are done to identify a suspect in a criminal case, the evidence collected from the crime
scene is compared with the known print. If a substantial amount of the identifying features are the same,
the DNA or fingerprint is deemed to be a match. But then, even if only one feature of the DNA or fingerprint
is different, it is deemed not to have come from the suspect.
As earlier stated, certain regions of human DNA show variations between people. In each of these regions, a
person possesses two genetic types called allele, one inherited from each parent. In [a] paternity test, the
forensic scientist looks at a number of these variable regions in an individual to produce a DNA profile.
Comparing next the DNA profiles of the mother and child, it is possible to determine which half of the childs
DNA was inherited from the mother. The other half must have been inherited from the biological father. The
alleged fathers profile is then examined to ascertain whether he has the DNA types in his profile, which
match the paternal types in the child. If the mans DNA types do not match that of the child, the man
is excluded as the father. If the DNA types match, then he is not excluded as the father.[32] (Emphasis in the
original)

Although the term DNA testing was mentioned in the 1995 case
of People v. Teehankee, Jr., it was only in the 2001 case of Tijing
v. Court of Appeals that more than a passing mention was given to
DNA analysis. In Tijing, we issued a writ of habeas corpus against
respondent who abducted petitioners youngest son. Testimonial and
documentary evidence and physical resemblance were used to
establish parentage. However, we observed that:
[33]

[34]

Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods unless we adopt the modern and scientific ways
available. Fortunately, we have now the facility and expertise in using DNA test for identification and

The 2002 case of People v. Vallejo discussed DNA analysis as

evidence. This may be considered a 180 degree turn from the Courts
wary attitude towards DNA testing in the 1997 Pe Lim case, where
we stated that DNA, being a relatively new science, xxx has not yet
been accorded official recognition by our courts. In Vallejo, the DNA
profile from the vaginal swabs taken from the rape victim matched
the accuseds DNA profile. We affirmed the accuseds conviction of
rape with homicide and sentenced him to death. We declared:
[35]

[36]

In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, therefore, courts should consider, among other things, the
following data: how the samples were collected, how they were handled, the possibility of contamination of
the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether the proper standards and procedures
were followed in conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests.[37]

Vallejo discussed the probative value, not admissibility, of DNA

evidence. By 2002, there was no longer any question on the validity
of the use of DNA analysis as evidence. The Court moved from the
issue of according official recognition to DNA analysis as evidence to
the issue of observance of procedures in conducting DNA analysis.
In 2004, there were two other cases that had a significant impact
on jurisprudence on DNA testing: People v. Yatar and In re: The
Writ of Habeas Corpus for Reynaldo de Villa. In Yatar, a match
existed between the DNA profile of the semen found in the victim and
the DNA profile of the blood sample given by appellant in open court.
The Court, following Vallejos footsteps, affirmed the conviction of
appellant because the physical evidence, corroborated by
circumstantial evidence, showed appellant guilty of rape with
homicide. In De Villa, the convict-petitioner presented DNA test
results to prove that he is not the father of the child conceived at the
time of commission of the rape. The Court ruled that a difference
between the DNA profile of the convict-petitioner and the DNA profile
of the victims child does not preclude the convict-petitioners
commission of rape.
[38]

[39]

In the present case, the various pleadings filed by petitioner and

respondent refer to two United States cases to support their
respective positions on the admissibility of DNA analysis as
evidence: Frye
v.
U.S. and Daubert
v.
Merrell
Dow
[40]

Pharmaceuticals. In Frye v. U.S., the trial court convicted Frye of

murder. Frye appealed his conviction to the Supreme Court of the
District of Columbia. During trial, Fryes counsel offered an expert
witness to testify on the result of a systolic blood pressure deception
test made on defendant. The state Supreme Court affirmed Fryes
conviction and ruled that the systolic blood pressure deception test
has not yet gained such standing and scientific recognition among
physiological and psychological authorities as would justify the
courts in admitting expert testimony deduced from the discovery,
development, and experiments thus far made. The Frye standard of
general acceptance states as follows:

Daubert cautions that departure from the Frye standard of

general acceptance does not mean that the Federal Rules do not
place limits on the admissibility of scientific evidence. Rather, the
judge must ensure that the testimonys reasoning or method is
scientifically valid and is relevant to the issue. Admissibility would
depend on factors such as (1) whether the theory or technique can be
or has been tested; (2) whether the theory or technique has been
subjected to peer review and publication; (3) the known or potential
rate of error; (4) the existence and maintenance of standards
controlling the techniques operation; and (5) whether the theory or
technique is generally accepted in the scientific community.

Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the experimental and demonstrable
stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must be
recognized, and while courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well
recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be
sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.

Another
product liability case, Kumho
Tires
Co.
v.
Carmichael, further modified the Daubert standard. This led to the
amendment of Rule 702 in 2000 and which now reads as follows:

In
1989, State
v.
Schwartz modified the Frye standard.
Schwartz was charged with stabbing and murder. Bloodstained
articles and blood samples of the accused and the victim were
submitted for DNA testing to a government facility and a private
facility. The prosecution introduced the private testing facilitys
results over Schwartzs objection. One of the issues brought before
the state Supreme Court included the admissibility of DNA test
results in a criminal proceeding. The state Supreme Court concluded
that:

If scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence
or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon
sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the
witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.

[41]

[42]

[43]

While we agree with the trial court that forensic DNA typing has gained general acceptance in the scientific
community, we hold that admissibility of specific test results in a particular case hinges on the laboratorys
compliance with appropriate standards and controls, and the availability of their testing data and results.[44]

In
1993, Daubert
v.
Merrell
Dow
Pharmaceuticals,
Inc. further modified the Frye-Schwartz standard. Daubert was a
product liability case where both the trial and appellate courts denied
the admissibility of an experts testimony because it failed to meet
theFrye standard of general acceptance. The United States Supreme
Court ruled that in federal trials, the Federal Rules of Evidence have
superseded the Frye standard. Rule 401 defines relevant evidence,
while Rule 402 provides the foundation for admissibility of evidence.
Thus:
[45]

Rule 401. Relevant evidence is defined as that which has any tendency to make the existence of any fact
that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be
without the evidence.
Rule 402. All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United
States, by Act of Congress, by these rules, or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to
statutory authority. Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible.

Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence governing expert

testimony provides:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence
or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.

[46]

We now determine the applicability in this jurisdiction of these

American cases. Obviously, neither the Frye-Schwartz standard nor
the Daubert-Kumho standard is controlling in the Philippines. At
best, American jurisprudence merely has a persuasive effect on our
decisions. Here, evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the fact
in issue and is not otherwise excluded by statute or the Rules of
Court. Evidence is relevant when it has such a relation to the fact in
issue as to induce belief in its existence or non-existence. Section 49
of Rule 130, which governs the admissibility of expert testimony,
provides as follows:
[47]

[48]

[49]

The opinion of a witness on a matter requiring special knowledge, skill, experience or training which he is
shown to possess may be received in evidence.

This Rule does not pose any legal obstacle to the admissibility of DNA
analysis as evidence. Indeed, even evidence on collateral matters is
allowed when it tends in any reasonable degree to establish the
probability or improbability of the fact in issue.
[50]

Indeed, it would have been convenient to merely refer petitioner

to our decisions in Tijing, Vallejo and Yatar to illustrate that DNA
analysis is admissible as evidence. In our jurisdiction, the restrictive
tests for admissibility established by Frye-Schwartz andDaubertKumho go into the weight of the evidence.

Probative Value of
DNA Analysis as Evidence

Despite our relatively liberal rules on admissibility, trial courts

should be cautious in giving credence to DNA analysis as evidence.
We reiterate our statement in Vallejo:
In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, therefore, courts should consider, among other things, the
following data: how the samples were collected, how they were handled, the possibility of contamination of
the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether the proper standards and procedures
were followed in conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests.[51]

We also repeat the trial courts explanation of DNA analysis used

in paternity cases:
In [a] paternity test, the forensic scientist looks at a number of these variable regions in an individual to
produce a DNA profile. Comparing next the DNA profiles of the mother and child, it is possible to determine
which half of the childs DNA was inherited from the mother. The other half must have been inherited from
the biological father. The alleged fathers profile is then examined to ascertain whether he has the DNA types
in his profile, which match the paternal types in the child. If the mans DNA types do not match that of the
child, the man is excluded as the father. If the DNA types match, then he is not excluded as the father.[52]

It is not enough to state that the childs DNA profile matches that of
the putative father. A complete match between the DNA profile of the
child and the DNA profile of the putative father does not necessarily
establish paternity. For this reason, following the highest standard
adopted in an American jurisdiction, trial courts should require at
least 99.9% as a minimum value of the Probability of Paternity (W)
prior to a paternity inclusion. W is a numerical estimate for the
likelihood of paternity of a putative father compared to the probability
of a random match of two unrelated individuals. An appropriate
reference population database, such as the Philippine population
database, is required to compute for W. Due to the probabilistic
nature of paternity inclusions, W will never equal to 100%. However,
the accuracy of W estimates is higher when the putative father,
mother and child are subjected to DNA analysis compared to those
conducted between the putative father and child alone.
[53]

[54]

DNA analysis that excludes the putative father from paternity

should be conclusive proof of non-paternity. If the value of W is less
than 99.9%, the results of the DNA analysis should be considered as
corroborative evidence. If the value of W is 99.9% or higher, then
there
is refutable presumption
of
paternity. This
refutable
presumption
of
paternity
should
be
subjected
to
the Vallejo standards.
[55]

Right Against
Self-Incrimination
Section 17, Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution provides that no
person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Petitioner
asserts that obtaining samples from him for DNA testing violates his

right against self-incrimination. Petitioner ignores our earlier

pronouncements that the privilege is applicable only to testimonial
evidence. Again, we quote relevant portions of the trial courts 3
February 2000 Order with approval:
Obtaining DNA samples from an accused in a criminal case or from the respondent in a paternity case,
contrary to the belief of respondent in this action, will not violate the right against self-incrimination. This
privilege applies only to evidence that is communicative in essence taken under duress (People vs. Olvis,
154 SCRA 513, 1987). The Supreme Court has ruled that the right against self-incrimination is just a
prohibition on the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communication (testimonial evidence) from
a defendant, not an exclusion of evidence taken from his body when it may be material. As such, a
defendant can be required to submit to a test to extract virus from his body (as cited in People vs. Olvis,
Supra); the substance emitting from the body of the accused was received as evidence for acts of
lasciviousness (US vs. Tan Teng, 23 Phil. 145); morphine forced out of the mouth was received as proof (US
vs. Ong Siu Hong, 36 Phil. 735); an order by the judge for the witness to put on pair of pants for size was
allowed (People vs. Otadora, 86 Phil. 244); and the court can compel a woman accused of adultery to submit
for pregnancy test (Villaflor vs. Summers, 41 Phil. 62), since the gist of the privilege is the restriction
on testimonial compulsion.[56]

The policy of the Family Code to liberalize the rule on the

investigation of the paternity and filiation of children, especially of
illegitimate children, is without prejudice to the right of the putative
parent to claim his or her own defenses. Where the evidence to aid
this investigation is obtainable through the facilities of modern
science and technology, such evidence should be considered subject
to the limits established by the law, rules, and jurisprudence.
[57]

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. We AFFIRM the

Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 29 November 2000 in CA-G.R.
SP No. 59766. We also AFFIRM the Orders dated 3 February 2000
and 8 June 2000 issued by Branch 48 of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila in Civil Case No. SP-98-88759.
SO ORDERED.

JENIE SAN JUAN DELA

CRUZ and minor
CHRISTIANDELA CRUZ
AQUINO, represented by
JENIE SANJUAN DELA
CRUZ,
Petitioners,

G.R. No. 177728

Present:
QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,
CARPIO MORALES,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and
PERALTA,* JJ.

versus

Jenie applied for registration of the childs birth, using

Dominiques surname Aquino, with the Office of the City Civil
Registrar, Antipolo City, in support of which she submitted the
childs Certificate of Live Birth,[2] Affidavit to Use the Surname of the
Father[3] (AUSF) which she had executed and signed, and Affidavit of
Acknowledgment executed by Dominiques father Domingo Butch
Aquino.[4] Both affidavits attested, inter alia, that during the lifetime

RONALD PAUL S. GRACIA, in

Promulgated:
his capacity as City Civil
July 31, 2009
Registrar of Antipolo City,
Respondent.
x-----------------------------------------------x

of Dominique, he had continuously acknowledged his yet unborn

child, and that his paternity had never been questioned. Jenie
attached to the AUSF a document entitled AUTOBIOGRAPHY which
Dominique, during his lifetime, wrote in his own handwriting, the
pertinent portions of which read:
AQUINO, CHRISTIAN DOMINIQUE S.T.

DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
For several months in 2005, then 21-year old petitioner Jenie
San Juan Dela Cruz (Jenie) and then 19-year old Christian
Dominique Sto. Tomas Aquino (Dominique) lived together as husband
and wife without the benefit of marriage. They resided in the house of
Dominiques parents Domingo B. Aquino and Raquel Sto. Tomas
Aquino at Pulang-lupa, Dulumbayan, Teresa, Rizal.
On September 4, 2005, Dominique died.[1] After almost two
months, or on November 2, 2005, Jenie, who continued to live with
Dominiques parents, gave birth to her herein co-petitioner minor
child Christian Dela Cruz Aquino at the Antipolo Doctors Hospital,
Antipolo City.

AUTOBIOGRAPHY
IM CHRISTIAN DOMINIQUE STO. TOMAS
AQUINO, 19 YEARS OF AGE TURNING 20 THIS
COMING OCTOBER 31, 2005.[5] I RESIDE AT
PULANG-LUPA
STREET
BRGY.
DULUMBAYAN,
TERESA, RIZAL. I AM THE YOUNGEST IN OUR
FAMILY. I HAVE ONE BROTHER NAMED JOSEPH
BUTCH STO. TOMAS AQUINO. MY FATHERS NAME IS
DOMINGO BUTCH AQUINO AND MY MOTHERS
NAME IS RAQUEL STO. TOMAS AQUINO. x x x.
xxxx
AS OF NOW I HAVE MY WIFE NAMED JENIE
DELA CRUZ. WE MET EACH OTHER IN OUR
HOMETOWN, TEREZA RIZAL. AT FIRST WE BECAME
GOOD FRIENDS, THEN WE FELL IN LOVE WITH
EACH
OTHER,
THEN
WE
BECAME
GOOD
COUPLES. AND AS OF NOW SHE IS PREGNANT AND
FOR THAT WE LIVE TOGETHER IN OUR HOUSE
NOW. THATS ALL.[6] (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

By letter dated November 11, 2005,[7] the City Civil Registrar

of Antipolo City, Ronald Paul S. Gracia (respondent), denied Jenies
application for registration of the childs name in this wise:
7. Rule 7 of Administrative Order No. 1, Series of
2004 (Implementing Rules and Regulations of
Republic Act No. 9255 [An Act Allowing Illegitimate
Children to Use the Surname of their Father,
Amending for the Purpose, Article 176 of Executive
Order No. 209, otherwise Known as the Family
Code of the Philippines]) provides that:
Rule 7. Requirements for the Child to Use the
Surname of the Father
7.1 For Births Not Yet Registered
7.1.1 The

illegitimate child shall use the

surname of the father if a public
document is executed by the father,
either at the back of the Certificate
of Live Birth or in a separate
document.
7.1.2 If admission of paternity is made through
a private handwritten instrument,
the child shall use the surname of
the father, provided the registration
is supported by the following
documents:
a. AUSF[8]
b. Consent of the child, if 18 years old
and over at the time of the filing
of the document.
c. Any two of the following
documents showing clearly the
paternity between the father and
the child:
1. Employment records
2. SSS/GSIS records
3. Insurance
4. Certification of membership in any organization
5. Statement of Assets and Liability

6. Income Tax Return (ITR)

In summary, the child cannot use the surname of his
father because he was born out of wedlock and the
father unfortunately died prior to his birth and has no
more capacity to acknowledge his paternity to the
child (either through the back of Municipal Form No.
102 Affidavit
of
Acknowledgment/Admission
of
Paternity or the Authority to Use the Surname of the
Father). (Underscoring supplied)

Jenie

and

the

injunction/registration

child
of

promptly

name

filed

against

complaint [9] for

respondent

before

the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, docketed as SCA Case No.
06-539, which was raffled to Branch 73 thereof. The complaint
alleged that, inter alia, the denial of registration of the childs name is
a violation of his right to use the surname of his deceased father
under Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 9255,[10] which provides:
Article 176. Illegitimate children shall use the
surname and shall be under the parental authority of
their mother, and shall be entitled to support in
conformity with this Code. However, illegitimate
children may use the surname of their father if their
filiation has been expressly recognized by the
father through the record of birth appearing in the civil
register, or when
an
admission
in
a public
document or private handwritten instrument is
made by the father. Provided, the father has the right
to institute an action before the regular courts to prove
non-filiation during his lifetime. The legitime of each
illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the
legitime of a legitimate child. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

They maintained that the Autobiography executed by Dominique

constitutes an admission of paternity in a private handwritten

instrument within the contemplation of the above-quoted provision of

law.
For failure to file a responsive pleading or answer despite
service of summons, respondent was declared in default.
Jenie thereupon presented evidence ex-parte. She testified on

WHETHER
OR
NOT
THE
UNSIGNED
HANDWRITTEN STATEMENT OF THE DECEASED
FATHER OF MINOR CHRISTIAN DELA CRUZ CAN BE
CONSIDERED AS A RECOGNITION OF PATERNITY IN
A PRIVATE HANDWRITTEN INSTRUMENT WITHIN
THE CONTEMPLATION OF ARTICLE 176 OF THE
FAMILY CODE, AS AMENDED BY R.A. 9255, WHICH
ENTITLES THE SAID MINOR TO USE HIS FATHERS
SURNAME.[15] (Underscoring supplied)

the circumstances of her common-law relationship with Dominique

and affirmed her declarations in her AUSF that during his lifetime, he

Petitioners contend that Article 176 of the Family Code, as

had acknowledged his yet unborn child.[11]She offered Dominiques

amended, does not expressly require that the private handwritten

handwritten Autobiography (Exhibit A) as her documentary evidence-

instrument containing the putative fathers admission of paternity

in-chief.[12] Dominiques lone brother, Joseph Butch S.T. Aquino, also

must be signed by him. They add that the deceaseds handwritten

testified, corroborating Jenies declarations.[13]

Autobiography, though unsigned by him, is sufficient, for the

By Decision[14] of April 25, 2007, the trial court dismissed the

requirement in the above-quoted paragraph 2.2 of the Administrative

complaint for lack of cause of action as the Autobiography

Order that the admission/recognition must be duly signed by the

was unsigned, citing paragraph 2.2, Rule 2 (Definition of Terms)

father is void as it unduly expanded the earlier-quoted provision of

of Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 1, Series of 2004 (the Rules

Article 176 of the Family Code.[16]

and

Regulations

Governing

the

Implementation

of

R.A.

9255) which defines private handwritten document through which a

father may acknowledge an illegitimate child as follows:
2.2 Private
handwritten
instrument
an
instrument executed in the handwriting of the father
and duly signed by him where he expressly recognizes
paternity to the child. (Underscoring supplied)

Petitioners further contend that the trial court erred in not

finding that Dominiques handwritten Autobiography contains a clear
and unmistakable recognition of the childs paternity. [17]
In its Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
submits that respondents position, as affirmed by the trial court, is
in consonance with the law and thus prays for the dismissal of the

The trial court held that even if Dominique was the author of the

petition. It further submits that Dominiques Autobiography merely

handwritten Autobiography, the same does not contain any express

acknowledged Jenies pregnancy but not [his] paternity of the child

recognition of paternity.

she was carrying in her womb.[18]

Hence, this direct resort to the Court via Petition for Review
on Certiorari raising this purely legal issue of:

Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by R.A. 9255,

That a father who acknowledges paternity of a child through a

permits an illegitimate child to use the surname of his/her father if

written instrument must affix his signature thereon is clearly implied

the latter had expressly recognized him/her as his offspring through

in Article 176 of the Family Code. Paragraph 2.2, Rule 2 of A.O. No.

the record

1, Series of 2004, merely articulated such requirement; it did not

of

birth

an admission

appearing

made

in a

in

the

civil

public

register, orthrough

or private

handwritten

unduly expand the import of Article 176 as claimed by petitioners.

instrument. The recognition made in any of these documents is, in

itself, a consummated act of acknowledgment of the childs paternity;
hence, no separate action for judicial approval is necessary. [19]

In the present case, however, special circumstances exist to

hold

that

Dominiques

Autobiography,

though

unsigned

by

him, substantially satisfies the requirement of the law.

Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended, does not, indeed,
explicitly

state

that

the

private

handwritten

First, Dominique died about two months prior to the childs

instrument

acknowledging the childs paternity must be signed by the putative

birth. Second, the

father. This provision must, however, be read in conjunction with

unquestionably handwritten by Dominique, correspond to the facts

related provisions of the Family Code which require that recognition

culled from the testimonial evidence Jenie proffered. [20]Third, Jenies

by the father must bear his signature, thus:

testimony

Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish

their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the
same evidence as legitimate children.
xxxx
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is
established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the
civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in
a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by
the
parent
concerned.
x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

relevant

is corroborated by

matters

in

the Affidavit

the

of

Autobiography,

Acknowledgment of

Dominiques father Domingo Aquino and testimony of his brother

Joseph Butch Aquino whose hereditary rights could be affected by
the registration of the questioned recognition of the child. These
circumstances indicating Dominiques paternity of the child give life
to his statements in his Autobiography that JENIE DELA CRUZ is
MY WIFE as WE FELL IN LOVE WITH EACH OTHER and NOW SHE
IS PREGNANT AND FOR THAT WE LIVE TOGETHER.
In Herrera v. Alba,[21] the Court summarized the laws, rules,
and jurisprudence on establishing filiation, discoursing in relevant
part:
Laws, Rules, and Jurisprudence
Establishing Filiation

The relevant provisions of the Family Code

provide as follows:
ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish
their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the
same evidence as legitimate children.
xxxx
ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is
established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil
register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a
public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent
concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the
legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of
the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of
Court and special laws.
The Rules on Evidence include provisions on
pedigree. The relevant sections of Rule 130 provide:
SEC. 39. Act or declaration about pedigree. The
act or declaration of a person deceased, or unable to
testify, in respect to the pedigree of another person
related to him by birth or marriage, may be received in
evidence where it occurred before the controversy, and
the relationship between the two persons is shown by
evidence other than such act or declaration. The word
"pedigree" includes relationship, family genealogy,
birth, marriage, death, the dates when and the places
where these facts occurred, and the names of the
relatives. It embraces also facts of family history
intimately connected with pedigree.

SEC. 40. Family reputation or tradition

regarding pedigree. The reputation or tradition existing
in a family previous to the controversy, in respect to
the pedigree of any one of its members, may be
received in evidence if the witness testifying thereon be
also a member of the family, either by consanguinity
or affinity. Entries in family bibles or other family
books or charts, engraving on rings, family portraits
and the like, may be received as evidence of pedigree.
This Court's rulings further specify what
incriminating acts are acceptable as evidence to
establish filiation. In Pe Lim v. CA, a case petitioner
often cites, we stated that the issue of paternity still
has to be resolved by such conventional evidence as
the relevant incriminating verbal and written acts
by the putative father. Under Article 278 of the New
Civil Code, voluntary recognition by a parent shall be
made in the record of birth, a will, a statement before a
court of record, or in any authentic writing. To be
effective, the claim of filiation must be made by
the putative father himself and the writing must be
the writing of the putative father. A notarial
agreement to support a child whose filiation is
admitted by the putative father was considered
acceptable evidence. Letters to the mother vowing to
be a good father to the child and pictures of the
putative father cuddling the child on various
occasions, together with the certificate of live birth,
proved filiation. However, a student permanent record,
a written consent to a father's operation, or a marriage
contract where the putative father gave consent,
cannot be taken as authentic writing. Standing alone,
neither a certificate of baptism nor family pictures are
sufficient to establish filiation. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied.)

In the case at bar, there is no dispute that the earlier quoted

statements in Dominiques Autobiography have been made and
written by him. Taken together with the other relevant facts extant
herein that Dominique, during his lifetime, and Jenie were living
together as common-law spouses for several months in 2005 at his

or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child

shall be a primary consideration.[23] (Underscoring
supplied)

parents house in Pulang-lupa, Dulumbayan, Teresa, Rizal; she was

pregnant when Dominique died on September 4, 2005; and about two
months after his death, Jenie gave birth to the child they sufficiently
establish that the child of Jenie is Dominiques.

It is thus (t)he policy of the Family Code to liberalize the rule

on

the

investigation

of

the paternity

and

filiation

of

In view of the pronouncements herein made, the Court sees it

children, especially of illegitimate children x x x.[24] Too, (t)he State

fit to adopt the following rules respecting the requirement of affixing

as parens patriae affords special protection to children from abuse,

the signature of the acknowledging parent in any private handwritten

exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to their development.[25]

instrument wherein an admission of filiation of a legitimate or

illegitimate child is made:
1) Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone piece
of evidence submitted to prove filiation, there should be strict

In the eyes of society, a child with an unknown father bears

compliance with the requirement that the same must be signed by

the stigma of dishonor. It is to petitioner minor childs best interests

the acknowledging parent; and

to allow him to bear the surname of the now deceased Dominique

and enter it in his birth certificate.

2) Where

the

private

handwritten

instrument

is accompanied by other relevant and competent evidence, it suffices

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The City Civil

that the claim of filiation therein be shown to have been made and

Registrar of Antipolo City is DIRECTED to immediately enter the

handwritten

surname

by

the

acknowledging

parent

as

it

is

merely

of

the

late

Christian

Dominique

Sto.

Tomas Aquino as the surname of petitioner minor Christian dela

corroborative of such other evidence.

Cruz in his Certificate of Live Birth, and record the same in the
Our laws instruct that the welfare of the child shall be the
paramount

consideration

in

resolving

questions

affecting

him.[22] Article 3(1) of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of

a Child of which the Philippines is a signatory is similarly emphatic:
Article 3
1. In all actions concerning children, whether
undertaken by public or private social welfare
institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities

Register of Births.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Co, a partir desde el mes de Enero de 1954 hasta que el mismo llegue
a su mayoria de edad;

Manila
EN BANC

(b) La cantidad de P200, por las deudas que ella habia contraido;

April 25, 1957

(c) La cantidad de P500, como daos morales;

G.R. No. L-9194

(d) La cantidad de P200, para honorarios de abogado; y

CO TAO, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and LUCITA VALLEJO, for herself and
as a mother and natural guardian of MANUEL CO, respondents.
C. F. Mata and Associates for petitioner.
Felipe B. Pagkalungan for respondents.
PADILLA, J.:
Appeal by certiorari under Rule 46 from a judgment of the Court of
Appeals which affirms that of the Court of First Instance of Manila
(1) Declarando que el nio Manuel Co, hijo natural de la demandante
Lucita Vallejo, es hijo ilegitimo del demandado Co Tao habido con
ella;
(2) Condenando al demandado Co Tao a pagar a la demandante
Lucita Vallejo;
(a) La cantidad de P320, por la manutencion de so hijo Manuel Co
desde el mes de Mayo de 1951, en que se presento la demanda, hasta
el Diciembre de 1953, a razon de P10 manutencion de dicho Manuel

(e) Las costas del juicio. (civil case No. 13738.)

The first, second, third, fourth and fifth errors claimed to have been
committed by the Court of Appeals involve the credibility of
witnesses, and in effect dispute the findings of fact of the Court of
Appeals. This Court cannot review such findings in this proceedings.
The Court of Appeals found
It appears that in January, 1947, plaintiff Lucita Vallejo, a young girl
of 18, native of Camiling, Tarlac, entered the services, as maid and
laundress, with a monthly salary of P30, of one Co Bun Kim, who
resided in house No. 733, Teodora Alonzo Street, Manila. There lived
also defendant Co Tao alias Jose Co, a cousin and trusted employee
of Co Bun Kim in a store and Chinese pharmacy under the same
house. Defendant was then receiving a monthly salary of P40 and his
wife and three children were then out of the Islands. Defendant Co
Tao courted Lucita Vallejo and promised to marry her. And believing
that he was single, Lucita accepted him and in no time they were
having carnal relations in the said house almost every day, as must

be expected, she became pregnant. To avoid scandal, the defendant

children had arrived in the meanwhile, and defendant did not write

brought her to the house of her uncle, Candido Vallejo, at No. 389,

or send money to the plaintiff anymore. So plaintiff was forced to

Prudencia street, Tondo, Manila, requesting said uncle to permit

work, washing clothes and planting palay for others.

Lucita to stay in the said house until she delivered and promising to

Plaintiff became also ill and she had been borrowing money from

pay the rentals thereof. At 3:00 o'clock, morning of August 13, 1948,

friends, until she decided to come to Manila and see defendant Co

assisted by a midwife, Felisa Galang, who was summoned by Candido

Tao who refused to give her any help. Plaintiff engaged the services of

Vallejo, Lucita, Vallejo gave birth to baby boy. At 8:00 o'clock, same

a lawyer to file the present action.

morning Candido accompanied Felisa to the pharmacy of Co Bun

Kim to inform the defendant Co Tao of the advent of his of spring.

Defendant Co Tao's defense followed the usual pattern of

Defendant gave Felisa the, sum of P20 for the delivery and asked her

irresponsible men of passing the buck. He claims that under the

what would she charge if she continued rendering service midwife for

service of Co Bun Kim, there were other men such as Jose Nabong

20 days more, to which Felisa fixed the amount of P50 for the whole

(the driver), a certain Filipino and Chua Chiam with whom the

service. The defendant, in the last day of her service, paid Felisa,

plaintiff, Lucita Vallejo, used to go out, after her working hours; and

through Lucita, the balance of P30. It further appears that after the

that Lucita was also visited often times by other Filipinos who used to

parturition, everytime he (Co Tao) went out of the store to deposit Co

wait for her and with whom she also went out, and such suspicious

Bun Kim's money in the bank, the defendant asked the driver, Jose

conduct of the plaintiff was even protested to by her master, Co Bun

Nabong, of Co Bun Kim, to pass by Candido's house to see Lucita,

Kim. Defendant admitted, however, that she had carnal relations

and his child. On October 24, 1948, the child was baptized with the

with Lucita for three times only and for such acts she often

name of Manuel Co, in the Catholic church of Espiritu Santo, Rizal

approached him for money; that after the lapse of months, he found

Avenue, Manila, acting as sponsor thereof, upon the request of

that she had already received from him the sum of P1.400.00 besides

defendant himself, the driver Jose Nabong and his wife (Exhibit C).

some pieces of jewelries, consisting of a ring and a watch. He alleged

After the baptism, Lucita continued living in his uncle's house where

finally that either for Lucita's frequent outings with several men, or

defendant continued also visiting her and his child, sleeping with her

for her carnal relations with him (defendant), she found herself in the

every night, having marital life with her throughout, and providing

family way and in June, 1948, she quit her work, and went to live

here with money and food. In October, 1949, however, the child feel

with her uncle; that during the christening in the Espiritu Santo

sick, and upon suggestion of defendant Co Tao, Lucita and her child

Church, he was not present; that plaintiff filed a complaint for rape

went to live with her parents in Camiling. Defendant's, wife and

in the City Fiscal's Office of Manila, but the same was dismissed for

despues del alumbramiento de Lucita, demuestran a todas luces que

lack of evidence.

el mismo demandado estaba convecido que el hijo que Lucita Vallejo

trajo el mundo era suyo, fruto de vida marital que habia llevado con

Upon the petition of the defendant, the trial court ordered the experts

ella. Cuando Lucita entro servicio de Co Bun Kim, ella no contaba

of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to test the blood of the

mas que unos 18 aos de edad, y como era una campesina que nacio

defendant Co Tao and the child Manuel Co, in order to determine

y crecio en la sementera, era humilde y timida por naturaliza. A esa

whether the former could be the father of the latter. On October 18,

edad y con tal caracter, mas su estado de simple criada, Lucita era

1951, the NBI expert rendered a report of the analysis made, with the

una facil presa del demandado, un hombre ducho, y se puedo decir,

following findings: "From their blood groups and types, the

experto en lances amorosos, pues ya tenia entonces 39 afios encima,

defendant, Co Tao, is a possible father of the child" (Exhibit B).

mas de doble de la edad de Lucita, sobre quien, ejercia cierto grado

cierto grado de influencia moral, por ser el primo y empleado de

In upholding the cause for the plaintiff-appellee, the trial court

declared that the minor Manuel Co is the illegitimate child of the
defendant Co Tao, and gave much weight to the testimony of Jose K.
Obando Chemist of the NBI and awarded the damages and attorney's
fees mentioned heretofore. After a careful survey of the evidence of
record, We hold that the judgment appealed from should be
sustained. As far as credibility of the witnesses is concerned, We find
no reason at all for disturbing the findings of the trial court to the
effect that the testimony of the plaintiff-appellee and her witnesses
deserves more credence than that of the defendant-appellant. The
following disquisition's of the trial court are fully supported by the
facts of record:
No solo el informs del experts de la NBI convinience al Juzgado que el
demandado Co Tao es el padre del nio Manuel Co, hijo de Lucita
Vallejo sino ademas la misma conducta observada por dicho
demandado y los actos ejecutados por el mismo antes, durante y

confianza del amo de aquella. Este hecho, unido a al circunstancia de

que la esposa e hijos del demandado se encontraban in China a la
sazon, circunstancia completamente vedada a Lucita, reavivo los
planes de conquista del demandado y precipito la caida de Lucita. La
solicitud con que Co Tao demostro al pedir a candido Vallejo, a quien
el llamba entonces tio, que permitiera a Lucita trasladarse a su casa,
pagando el los alquileres de la misma, por ser dicha casa mas fresca
que la de Co Bun Kim; el hecho de haber el mismo Co Tao pagado los
servicios de la comadrona que asistio a Lucita en el parto y atendio el
cuidado de la misma y de su hijo por cierto periods; el hecho de
haber el mismo Co Tao solicitado a Jose Nabong y a su esposa para,
ser los padrinos de bautistmo del hijo de Lucita y a quienies el llego a
llamar compadres; el hecho de haber el mismo demandado estado
sosteniendo y sufragando los gastos de subsistencia y alojamiento de
Lucita y de suijo durante la estancia de estos en la casa de Candido;
el hecho de haber el mismo demandado instado a Lucita que tomara

vacacion en Camiling cuando su hijo se cayo enfermo en dicha casa

incompatible with the concept of love. We find these allegations to be

de Candido; el hecho admitido por el mismo demandado, de haber el,

flimsy and shallow subterfuges of an irresponsible father. For obvious

por las tres unicas veces en que en gozo de aquella mujer el primer

reasons, the NBI expert cannot give assurance that the appellant was

de su juventud dado a ella mas de P1,400, mas las joyas y prendas

the father of the child; he can only give his opinion that he is a

que habia regalado, a saber: una cama de P70 y una lampara de P25;

"possible father". This possibility, coupled with the other facts and

to dos estos hechos demuestran que el mismo demandado creia que

circumstances brought out during the trial, tends to definitely

la mujer humilde y timida que habia caido en sus brazos en

establish that appellant Co Tao is the father of the child Manuel.

momentos de debilidad, valia algo mas que lo que vale una mujer

While it is admitted that the complaint for rape filed by the appellee

impudica que vende su cario, su cuerpo y alma al primero que se

was dismissed by the Fiscal, this fact alone should not deprive the

presente.

appellee of the right which she seeks to be protected in the instant

case. With the attitude of the appellant who, after satiating his lustful

La conclusion, por tanto, del Juzgados es que cuando el demandado

desires and begetting a child from her, and after abandoning them

Co Tao se unio maritalmente con Lucita Vallejo, esta era una joven

completely, the appellee must have become desperate and went to a

soltera y doncella, y, como fruto de aquellas relaciones, nacio un nio

lawyer who tried to enlist the aid of the Fiscal's Office. This

que fue bautizado con el nombre de Manuel Co, que es hijo ilegitimo

notwithstanding, as a whole, the story given by the plaintiff-appellee

de Co Tao, por estar este casado con otra mujer, cuando aquel fue

and her witnesses is deserving of credence and belief.

concebido por su madre.

The fact that the Judge who heard the evidence is not the one who
rendered the judgment and that for that reason the latter did not

The appellant alleges that the plaintiff had been having carnal
knowledge with him for 3 times, by selling herself; that she had been
outing with different men, mentioning even his compadre Jose

have the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses

during the trial but merely relied on the records of the case does not
render the judgment erroneous.

Nabong, among them; that Manuel Co must have been another's

child because the expert of the NBI was only able to say that he

The sixth error assigned raises a question of law. Petitioner contends

(appellant) is a "possible father" of the child; that he could not have

that as the acts alleged in the complaint filed on May 2, 1951 took

been his father, because everytime he had carnal act with the

place in 1947 and 1948 and the new Civil Code took effect on 30

plaintiff, used a strong french umbrella; and that the plaintiff had

August 1950 article 2217 thereof, which provides for moral damages,

even accused him with rape at the fiscal's office but the complaint
was dismissed; thereby concluding that the idea of rape is

should not have been applied retroactively. The Court of Appeals held

of the new Civil Code. The damages fixed by the trial court are

reasonable and conscionable.

The judgment under review is affirmed, with costs against the

. . . The right of action for support as embodied in Article 298 of the

new Civil Code accrues or becomes demandable from the time the
person who has a right to receive the same need it for maintenance,
but it shall not be paid except from the date it is extra-judicially
demanded. In the case at bar, therefore the action for support
accrued from the filing of the complaint, which was May 2, 1951,
long after the, new Civil Code was in force and effect. Even granting
for the purpose of argument that the moral damages as contemplated
by the new Civil Code, did not exist at the time the action accrued in
this case, still We believe and so hold, that these provisions of the
said Code may have a retroactive effect, because such provisions do
not prejudice or impair any vested or acquired right of the appellant
in accordance with the old legislation (Art. 2 252, New Civil
Code). 1 Moreover, "if a right should declared for the first time in this
[[ ]]

Code, it shall be effective at once, even though the act or event which
gives rise thereto may have been done or may have occurred under
the prior legislation, provided said new right does not impair or
prejudice any vested or acquired right, of the same origin" (Art 2253,
New Civil Code). Evidently, appellant did not have a vested right or
acquired right not be held or responsible for moral damages, either
by judicial pronouncement or by provision of law. By the same token,
therefore, defendant-appellant is also liable to plaintiff- appellee for
attorney's fees, under paragraphs (1), (2), (5), (6) and (11) Article 2208

petitioner.

[G.R. No. 128314. May 29, 2002]

RODOLFO V. JAO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and

PERICO V. JAO, respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Rodolfo and Perico Jao were the only sons of the spouses Ignacio
Jao Tayag and Andrea V. Jao, who died intestate in 1988 and 1989,
respectively. The decedents left real estate, cash, shares of stock and
other personal properties.
On April 17, 1991, Perico instituted a petition for issuance of
letters of administration before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 99, over the estate of his parents, docketed as Special
Proceedings No. Q-91-8507.[1] Pending the appointment of a regular
administrator, Perico moved that he be appointed as special
administrator. He alleged that his brother, Rodolfo, was gradually
dissipating the assets of the estate. More particularly, Rodolfo was
receiving rentals from real properties without rendering any
accounting, and forcibly opening vaults belonging to their deceased
parents and disposing of the cash and valuables therein.
Rodolfo moved for the dismissal of the petition on the ground of
improper venue.[2] He argued that the deceased spouses did not reside
in Quezon City either during their lifetime or at the time of their
deaths. The decedents actual residence was in Angeles City,
Pampanga, where his late mother used to run and operate a
bakery. As the health of his parents deteriorated due to old age, they
stayed in Rodolfos residence at 61 Scout Gandia Street, Quezon City,
solely for the purpose of obtaining medical treatment and
hospitalization. Rodolfo submitted documentary evidence previously
executed by the decedents, consisting of income tax returns, voters
affidavits, statements of assets and liabilities, real estate tax
payments, motor vehicle registration and passports, all indicating
that their permanent residence was in Angeles City, Pampanga.
In his opposition,[3] Perico countered that their deceased parents
actually resided in Rodolfos house in Quezon City at the time of their
deaths. As a matter of fact, it was conclusively declared in their death
certificates that their last residence before they died was at 61 Scout
Gandia Street, Quezon City.[4] Rodolfo himself even supplied the entry

appearing on the death certificate of their mother, Andrea, and

affixed his own signature on the said document.
Rodolfo filed a rejoinder, stating that he gave the information
regarding the decedents residence on the death certificates in good
faith and through honest mistake. He gave his residence only as
reference, considering that their parents were treated in their late
years at the Medical City General Hospital in Mandaluyong, Metro
Manila. Their stay in his house was merely transitory, in the same
way that they were taken at different times for the same purpose to
Pericos residence at Legaspi Towers in Roxas Boulevard. The death
certificates could not, therefore, be deemed conclusive evidence of the
decedents residence in light of the other documents showing
otherwise.[5]
The court required the parties to submit their respective
nominees for the position.[6] Both failed to comply, whereupon the
trial court ordered that the petition be archived. [7]
Subsequently, Perico moved that the intestate proceedings be
revived.[8] After the parties submitted the names of their respective
nominees, the trial court designated Justice Carlos L. Sundiam as
special administrator of the estate of Ignacio Jao Tayag and Andrea
Jao.[9]
On April 6, 1994, the motion to dismiss filed by petitioner
Rodolfo was denied, to wit:
A mere perusal of the death certificates of the spouses issued
separately in 1988 and 1989, respectively, confirm the fact that
Quezon City was the last place of residence of the
decedents. Surprisingly, the entries appearing on the death certificate
of Andrea V. Jao were supplied by movant, Rodolfo V. Jao, whose
signature appears in said document. Movant, therefore, cannot
disown his own representation by taking an inconsistent position
other than his own admission. xxx xxx xxx.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing consideration, this court
DENIES for lack of merit movants motion to dismiss.
SO ORDERED.[10]
Rodolfo filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals,
which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 35908. On December 11,
1996, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, no error, much less any grave abuse of discretion of

the court a quo having been shown, the petition for certiorari is
hereby DISMISSED. The questioned order of the respondent Judge is
affirmed in toto.
SO ORDERED.[11]
Rodolfos motion for reconsideration was denied by the Court of
Appeals in the assailed resolution dated February 17, 1997. [12] Hence,
this petition for review, anchored on the following grounds:
I

RESPONDENT COURT HAD DECIDED A QUESTION OF

SUBSTANCE IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE LAW AND IS
DIRECTLY CONTRADICTORY TO THE APPLICABLE DECISION
ALREADY RENDERED BY THIS HONORABLE COURT.
II

RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE RULING OF

THIS HONORABLE COURT IN THE CASE OF EUSEBIO VS.
EUSEBIO, 100 PHILS. 593, WHICH CLEARLY INTERPRETED WHAT
IS MEANT BY RESIDENCE IN SEC. 1 OF RULE 73 OF THE RULES
OF COURT.
III

RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN GIVING MORE WEIGHT TO THE

ENTRY OF PETITIONER AND PRIVATE RESPONDENT IN THE
RESPECTIVE DEATH CERTIFICATES OF THE DECEDENTS RATHER
THAN THE OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE SHOWING THE CLEAR
INTENTION OF THE DECEDENTS TO ESTABLISH THEIR
PERMANENT RESIDENCE IN ANGELES CITY.
VI

RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN APPLYING THE PRINCIPLE OF

ESTOPPEL AS AGAINST PETITIONER WHICH CAN NOT BE MORE
PERSUASIVE THAN THE CLEAR INTENTION OF THE DECEDENTS
THEMSELVES TO ESTABLISH PERMANENT RESIDENCE IN
ANGELES CITY.
VII

RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR

CERTIORARI DESPITE THE CLEAR ABUSE OF DISCRETION ON
THE PART OF THE TRIAL COURT IN INSISTING TO TAKE
COGNIZANCE OF SP. PROCEEDING NO. Q-91-8507.[13]
The main issue before us is: where should the settlement
proceedings be had --- in Pampanga, where the decedents had their
permanent residence, or in Quezon City, where they actually stayed
before their demise?
Rule 73, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:

RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PHYSICAL

PRESENCE IN A PLACE AT THE TIME OF DEATH IS
DETERMINATIVE OF DECEDENTS RESIDENCE RATHER THAN THE
INTENTION OF THE DECEDENTS TO ESTABLISH THEIR
PERMANENT RESIDENCE IN ANOTHER PLACE.
IV

RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN APPLYING BY ANALOGY THE

RESIDENCE CONTEMPLATED IN SEC. 2 OF RULE 4 FOR THE
PURPOSE OF SERVING SUMMONS TO A DEFENDANT IN A
PERSONAL ACTION TO THE RESIDENCE CONTEMPLATED IN SEC.
1 OF RULE 73 FOR THE PURPOSE OF DETERMINING VENUE IN
THE SETTLEMENT OF THE ESTATE OF A DECEASED.
V

Where estate of deceased persons be settled. If the decedent is an

inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a
citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of
administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First
Instance in the province in which he resides at the time of his
death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of
First Instance of any province in which he had estate. The court first
taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent shall
exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The
jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of
residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be
contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that
court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears
on the record. (underscoring ours)

Clearly, the estate of an inhabitant of the Philippines shall be

settled or letters of administration granted in the proper court located
in the province where the decedent resides at the time of his death.
Petitioner Rodolfo invokes our ruling in the case of Eusebio v.
Eusebio, et al.,[14] where we held that the situs of settlement
proceedings shall be the place where the decedent had his permanent
residence or domicile at the time of death. In determining residence
at the time of death, the following factors must be considered,
namely, the decedent had: (a) capacity to choose and freedom of
choice; (b) physical presence at the place chosen; and (c) intention to
stay therein permanently.[15] While it appears that the decedents in
this case chose to be physically present in Quezon City for medical
convenience, petitioner avers that they never adopted Quezon City as
their permanent residence.
The contention lacks merit.
The facts in Eusebio were different from those in the case at
bar. The decedent therein, Andres Eusebio, passed away while in the
process of transferring his personal belongings to a house in Quezon
City. He was then suffering from a heart ailment and was advised by
his doctor/son to purchase a Quezon City residence, which was
nearer to his doctor. While he was able to acquire a house in Quezon
City, Eusebio died even before he could move therein. In said case,
we ruled that Eusebio retained his domicile --- and hence, residence -- in San Fernando, Pampanga. It cannot be said that Eusebio
changed his residence because, strictly speaking, his physical
presence in Quezon City was just temporary.
In the case at bar, there is substantial proof that the decedents
have transferred to petitioners Quezon City residence. Petitioner
failed to sufficiently refute respondents assertion that their elderly
parents stayed in his house for some three to four years before they
died in the late 1980s.
Furthermore, the decedents respective death certificates state
that they were both residents of Quezon City at the time of their
demise. Significantly, it was petitioner himself who filled up his late
mothers death certificate. To our mind, this unqualifiedly shows that
at that time, at least, petitioner recognized his deceased mothers
residence to be Quezon City. Moreover, petitioner failed to contest the
entry in Ignacios death certificate, accomplished a year earlier by
respondent.
The recitals in the death certificates, which are admissible in
evidence, were thus properly considered and presumed to be correct
by the court a quo. We agree with the appellate courts observation

that since the death certificates were accomplished even before

petitioner and respondent quarreled over their inheritance, they may
be relied upon to reflect the true situation at the time of their parents
death.
The death certificates thus prevailed as proofs of the decedents
residence at the time of death, over the numerous documentary
evidence presented by petitioner. To be sure, the documents
presented by petitioner pertained not to residence at the time of
death, as required by the Rules of Court, but to permanent
residence or domicile. In Garcia-Fule v. Court of Appeals,[16] we held:
xxx xxx xxx the term resides connotes ex vi termini actual residence
as distinguished from legal residence or domicile. This term resides,
like the terms residing and residence, is elastic and should be
interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or
rule in which it is employed. In the application of venue statutes and
rules Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such
nature residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even
where the statute uses the word domicile still it is construed as
meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense.Some
cases make a distinction between the terms residence and domicile
but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are
synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term
inhabitant. In other words, resides should be viewed or understood in
its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical
habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies
physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular
sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal residence,
not legal residence or domicile. Residence simply requires bodily
presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires
bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it ones
domicile. No particular length of time of residence is required though;
however, the residence must be more than temporary. [17]
Both the settlement court and the Court of Appeals found that
the decedents have been living with petitioner at the time of their
deaths and for some time prior thereto. We find this conclusion to be
substantiated by the evidence on record. A close perusal of the
challenged decision shows that, contrary to petitioners assertion, the
court below considered not only the decedents physical presence in
Quezon City, but also other factors indicating that the decedents stay
therein was more than temporary. In the absence of any substantial
showing that the lower courts factual findings stemmed from an

erroneous apprehension of the evidence presented, the same must be

held to be conclusive and binding upon this Court.
Petitioner strains to differentiate between the venue provisions
found in Rule 4, Section 2,[18] on ordinary civil actions, and Rule 73,
Section 1, which applies specifically to settlement proceedings. He
argues that while venue in the former understandably refers to actual
physical residence for the purpose of serving summons, it is the
permanent residence of the decedent which is significant in Rule 73,
Section 1. Petitioner insists that venue for the settlement of estates
can only refer to permanent residence or domicile because it is the
place where the records of the properties are kept and where most of
the decedents properties are located.
Petitioners argument fails to persuade.
It does not necessarily follow that the records of a persons
properties are kept in the place where he permanently
resides. Neither can it be presumed that a persons properties can be
found mostly in the place where he establishes his domicile. It may
be that he has his domicile in a place different from that where he
keeps his records, or where he maintains extensive personal and
business interests. No generalizations can thus be formulated on the
matter, as the question of where to keep records or retain properties
is entirely dependent upon an individuals choice and peculiarities.
At any rate, petitioner is obviously splitting straws when he
differentiates between venue in ordinary civil actions and venue in
special proceedings. In Raymond v. Court of Appeals[19] and Bejer v.
Court of Appeals,[20] we ruled that venue for ordinary civil actions and
that for special proceedings have one and the same meaning. As thus
defined, residence, in the context of venue provisions, means nothing
more than a persons actual residence or place of abode, provided he
resides therein with continuity and consistency.[21] All told, the lower
court and the Court of Appeals correctly held that venue for the
settlement of the decedents intestate estate was properly laid in the
Quezon City court.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is
DENIED, and the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
35908 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.