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Peter Sloterdijk
University of Art and Design, Karlsruhe, Germany
Abstract
This paper focuses on the latent spatial philosophy in Heideggers Being and Time,
highlighting a key aspect of the Heideggerian oeuvre that has mostly been overlooked
by commentators. It outlines the concept of an original spatiality of being that is
opposed to the philosophies of space in both physics and Cartesian metaphysics.
Through an elaboration of the essentially relational character of Da-sein, it is argued
that Heideggers vocabulary in Being and Time yields an onto-topology that shows
Da-seins primary spatial embeddedness in the world. Finally, the paper argues that
Heideggers concept of spatiality remained cursory due to its residual existentialist
focus. In this context, it attempts a re-evaluation of its intellectual trajectory within
the realm of the Spheres project.
Keywords
Heidegger, space, spatiality, Da-sein, Sloterdijk, spheres, Spheres project
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Notes
1. In his analytic of place, Aristotle had already fantastically approached the
problem of an existential topology even if for him being of something in
something else couldnt have been addressed as an existential problem. In
Physics Book IV, we find the following explanation of the eight different
significations of in: The next step we must take is to see in how many
senses one thing is said to be in another. (1) As the finger is in the
hand and generally the part in the whole. (2) As the whole is in the
parts: for there is no whole over and above the parts. (3) As man is in
animal and generally species in genus. (4) As the genus is in the species
and generally the part of the specific form in the definition of the specific
form. (5) As health is in the hot and the cold and generally the form in
the matter. (6) As the affairs of Greece centre in the king, and generally
events centre in their primary motive agent. (7) As the existence of a thing
centres in its good and generally in its end, i.e. in that for the sake of
which it exists. (8) In the strictest sense of all, as a thing is in a vessel, and
generally in place. One might raise the question whether a thing can be in
itself, or whether nothing can be in itself everything being either nowhere or
in something else (Aristotle, 1930: 56).
2. This remains the case in Heideggers most significant lecture course in
Freiburg, from the winter term 192930. On a notice-board of the institute,
Heidegger had written Singularisation (Vereinzelung) instead of Solitude in
the title (Heidegger, 2001).
References
Aristotle (1930) Physika, trans. R.P. Hardie and R.K. Gaye. Oxford: The
Clarendon Press.
Heidegger, M. (1996) Being and Time, trans. Joan Stambaugh. Albany: SUNY
Press.
Heidegger, M. (2001) The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World
Finitude Solitude. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
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