Lapuz-Sy vs.

Eufemio 43 SCRA 177

SECTION 5- Legitime Article 887
Lapuz vs. Eufemio
An action for legal separation which involves nothing more than the bed-and-board separation of the spouses (there being no absolute divorce in this
jurisdiction) is purely personal. Being personal in character, it follows that the death of one party to the action causes the death of the action itself
actio personalis moritur cum persona. Thus, death of either party during the pendency of a petition for legal separation results in the dismissal of the
case.
FACTS:
Carmen Lapuz-Sy filed a petition for legal separation against Eufemio Eufemio on August 1953. They were married civilly on September 21, 1934
and canonically after nine days. They had lived together as husband and wife continuously without any children until 1943 when her husband
abandoned her. They acquired properties during their marriage. Petitioner then discovered that her husband cohabited with a Chinese woman
named Go Hiok on or about 1949. She prayed for the issuance of a decree of legal separation, which among others, would order that the defendant
Eufemio should be deprived of his share of the conjugal partnership profits.
Eufemio counterclaimed for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Lapuz-Sy on the ground of his prior and subsisting marriage with Go Hiok.
Trial proceeded and the parties adduced their respective evidence. However, before the trial could be completed, respondent already scheduled to
present surrebuttal evidence, petitioner died in a vehicular accident on May 1969. Her counsel duly notified the court of her death. Eufemio moved
to dismiss the petition for legal separation on June 1969 on the grounds that the said petition was filed beyond the one-year period provided in Article
102 of the Civil Code and that the death of Carmen abated the action for legal separation. Petitioners counsel moved to substitute the deceased
Carmen by her father, Macario Lapuz.
ISSUE: Whether the death of the plaintiff, before final decree in an action for legal separation, abate the action and will it also apply if the action
involved property rights.
HELD:
An action for legal separation is abated by the death of the plaintiff, even if property rights are involved. These rights are mere effects of decree of
separation, their source being the decree itself; without the decree such rights do not come into existence, so that before the finality of a decree,
these claims are merely rights in expectation. If death supervenes during the pendency of the action, no decree can be forthcoming, death producing
a more radical and definitive separation; and the expected consequential rights and claims would necessarily remain unborn.
The petition of Eufemio for declaration of nullity is moot and academic and there could be no further interest in continuing the same after her
demise, that automatically dissolved the questioned union. Any property rights acquired by either party as a result of Article 144 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines 6 could be resolved and determined in a proper action for partition by either the appellee or by the heirs of the appellant.

Intestate Estate of Petra V. Rosales. Irenea C. Rosales v. Fortunato Rosales, et. al. G.R. No. L-40789, February 27, 1987
FACTS: On February 26, 1971, Mrs. Petra Rosales died intestate. She was survived by her husband Fortunato Rosales and their two children
Magna Rosales Acebes and Antonio Rosales. Another child, Carterio Rosario, predeceased her, leaving behind a child, Macikequerox Rosales, and
his widow Irenea C. Rosales, the herein petitioner. Magna Rosales Acebes instituted the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of
the deceased. The trial court ordered that Fortunato, Magna, Macikequerox and Antonio be entitled each to share in the estate of decedent.
Irenea, on the other hand, insisted in getting a share of the estate in her capacity as the surviving spouse of the late Carterio Rosales, son of the
deceased, claiming that she is a compulsory heir of her mother-in-law.
ISSUE: Whether or not Irenea is entitled to inherit from her mother-in-law.
RULING: No. Under the law, intestate or legal heirs are classified into two groups, namely, those who inherit by their own right, and those who
inherit by the right of representation. There is no provision in the Civil Code which states that a widow (surviving spouse) is an intestate heir of her
mother-in-law. The law has already meticulously enumerated the intestate heirs of a decedent. The Court held that Irenea misinterpreted the
provision of Article 887 because the provision refers to the estate of the deceased spouse in which case the surviving spouse is a compulsory heir. It
does not apply to the estate of a parent-in-law. Therefore, the surviving spouse is considered a third person as regards the estate of the parent-inlaw.