Welcome to Cryptography, the study of transforming information in order to make it secure from
unintended recipients or use.
Part I: Introducing Cryptography
1. Introduction to Cryptography
2. History of Cryptography
1. Classical Cryptography
2. Contemporary Cryptography
3. Cryptography in Popular Culture
4. Timeline of Notable Events
3. Fundamental Concepts
1. Goals of Cryptography
2. Goals of Cryptanalysis
3. Role of Cryptography in Computer Security
4. Symmetric Key Ciphers
5. Asymmetric Key Ciphers
6. Random Number Generation
7. Hashes
8. Key Distribution and Authentication (key management and the web of trust)
9. Common flaws and weaknesses
10. Secure Passwords
11. Sbox
Part II: Designing Cryptosystems
2. Frequency Analysis
3. Index of Coincidence
4. Linear Cryptanalysis
5. Differential Cryptanalysis
6. Meet in the Middle Attack
7. Maninthemiddle attack
4. Breaking Hash Algorithms
1. Collisions
1. Generating
2. Exploiting
2. Birthday Attack
3. Joux Attack
4. Time Memory Trade Off (rainbow tables)
5. How Historical Systems Were Broken
1. Transposition Ciphers
2. Caesar Cipher
3. Enigma Machine
4. Permutation Cipher
5. Vigenre Cipher
Part IV: Using Cryptosystems
1. Applying Cryptography
1. Digital Signatures
1. Introduction to Digital Signatures
2. DSA
2. Database protection
3. ECash
4. EVoting
5. DRM
6. Biometrics
7. Anonymity
2. Classical Ciphers
1. Beale Cipher
2. Transposition Ciphers
3. Caesar cipher
4. Atbash Cipher
5. Autokey cipher
6. Playfair Cipher
7. Polyalphabetic substitution
8. Scytale
9. Substitution cipher
10. nomenclator
11. Permutation Cipher
12. Affine cipher
13. Vigenre cipher
14. Polybius square
15. ADFGVX cipher
4. Prime numbers
1. Currently ungrouped content
1. Tabula Recta
2. Commitment schemes
3. Zeroknowledge proofs
4. Open source implementation of cryptographic algorithms
5. initialization vector
6. Linear Cryptanalysis
7. Differential Cryptanalysis
PART I
1. Cryptography/Introduction
Cryptography is the study of information hiding and verification. It includes the protocols,
algorithms and strategies to securely and consistently prevent or delay unauthorized access to
sensitive information and enable verifiability of every component in a communication.
Cryptography is derived from the Greek words: krypts, "hidden", and grphein, "to write"  or
"hidden writing". People who study and develop cryptography are calledcryptographers. The
study of how to circumvent the use of cryptography for unintended recipients is
called cryptanalysis, or codebreaking. Cryptography and cryptanalysis are sometimes grouped
together under the umbrella term cryptology, encompassing the entire subject. In practice,
"cryptography" is also often used to refer to the field as a whole, especially as an applied
science.
Cryptography is an interdisciplinary subject, drawing from several fields. Before the time of
computers, it was closely related to linguistics. Nowadays the emphasis has shifted, and
cryptography makes extensive use of technical areas of mathematics, especially those areas
collectively known as discrete mathematics. This includes topics from number theory, information
theory, computational complexity, statistics and combinatorics. It is also a branch of engineering,
but an unusual one as it must deal with active, intelligent and malevolent opposition.
An example of the subfields of cryptography is steganography the study of hiding the
very existence of a message, and not necessarily the contents of the message itself (for
example, microdots, or invisible ink) and traffic analysis, which is the analysis of patterns of
communication in order to learn secret information.
When information is transformed from a useful form of understanding to an opaque form of
understanding, this is called encryption. When the information is reverted back into a useful
form, it is called decryption. Intended recipients or authorized use of the information is
determined by whether the user has a certain piece of secret knowledge. Only users with the
secret knowledge can transform the opaque information back into its useful form. The secret
knowledge is commonly called the key, though the secret knowledge may include the entire
process or algorithm that is used in the encryption/decryption. The information in its useful form
is called plaintext (or cleartext); in its encrypted form it is calledciphertext. The algorithm used
for encryption and decryption is called a cipher (or cypher).
2. message integrity: The recipient should be able to determine if the message has been
altered.
3. sender authentication: The recipient should be able to verify from the message, the
identity of the sender, the origin or the path it traveled (or combinations) so to validate
claims from emitter or to validated the recipient expectations.
4. sender nonrepudiation: The emitter should not be able to deny sending the message.
Not all cryptographic systems achieve all of the above goals. Some applications of cryptography
have different goals; for example some situations require repudiation where a participant can
plausibly deny that they are a sender or receiver of a message, or extend this goals to include
variations like:
1. message access control: Who are the valid recipients of the message.
2. message availability: By providing means to limit the validity of the message, channel,
emitter or recipient in time or space.
2.Cryptography/History
Common forms of cryptography
Cryptography involves all legitimate users of information having the keys required to access that
information.
If the sender and recipient must have the same key in order to encode or decode the
protected information, then the cipher is a symmetric key cipher since everyone uses the
same key for the same message. The main problem is that the secret key must somehow be
given to both the sender and recipient privately. For this reason, symmetric key ciphers are
also called private key (or secret key) ciphers.
If the sender and recipient have different keys respective to the communication roles they
play, then the cipher is an asymmetric key cipher as different keys exist for encoding and
decoding the same message. It is also called public key encryption as the user publicly
distributes one of the keys without a care for secrecy. In the case of confidential messages to
the user, they distribute the encryption key. Asymmetric encryption relies on the fact that
possession of the encryption key will not reveal the decryption key.
Other:
Poorly designed, or poorly implemented, crypto systems achieve them only by accident or bluff
or lack of interest on the part of the opposition. Users can, and regularly do, find weaknesses in
even welldesigned cryptographic schemes from those of high reputation.
Even with well designed, well implemented, and properly used crypto systems, some goals aren't
practical (or desirable) in some contexts. For example, the sender of the message may wish to
be anonymous, and would therefore deliberately choose not to bother with nonrepudiation.
Alternatively, the system may be intended for an environment with limited computing resources,
or message confidentiality might not be an issue.
In classical cryptography, messages are typically enciphered and transmitted from one person or
group to some other person or group. In modern cryptography, there are many possible options
for "sender" or "recipient". Some examples, for real crypto systems in the modern world, include:
1. a computer program running on a local computer,
2. a computer program running on a 'nearby' computer which 'provides security services' for
users on other nearby systems,
3. a human being (usually understood as 'at the keyboard'). However, even in this example,
the presumed human is not generally taken to actually encrypt or sign or decrypt or
authenticate anything. Rather, he or she instructs a computer program to perform these
actions. This 'blurred separation' of human action from actions which are presumed
(without much consideration) to have 'been done by a human' is a source of problems in
crypto system design, implementation, and use. Such problems are often quite subtle
and correspondingly obscure; indeed, generally so, even to practicing cryptographers
with knowledge, skill, and good engineering sense.
When confusion on these points is present (e.g., at the design stage, during implementation, by a
user after installation, or ...), failures in reaching each of the stated goals can occur quite easily often without notice to any human involved, and even given a perfect cryptosystem. Such failures
are most often due to extracryptographic issues; each such failure demonstrates that good
algorithms, good protocols, good system design, and good implementation do not alone, nor
even in combination, provide 'security'. Instead, careful thought is required regarding the entire
crypto system design and its use in actual production by real people on actual equipment running
'production' system software (e.g., operating systems)  too often, this is absent or insufficient in
practice with realworld crypto systems.
Although cryptography has a long and complex history, it wasn't until the 19th century that it
developed anything more than ad hoc approaches to either encryption or cryptanalysis (the
science of finding weaknesses in crypto systems). Examples of the latter include Charles
Babbage's Crimean War era work on mathematical cryptanalysis of polyalphabetic ciphers,
repeated publicly rather later by the Prussian Kasiski. During this time, there was little theoretical
foundation for cryptography; rather, understanding of cryptography generally consisted of hardwon fragments of knowledge and rules of thumb; see, for example, Auguste Kerckhoffs' crypto
writings in the latter 19th century. An increasingly mathematical trend accelerated up to World
War II (notably in William F. Friedman's application of statistical techniques to cryptography and
in Marian Rejewski's initial break into the German Army's version of the Enigma system). Both
cryptography and cryptanalysis have become far more mathematical since WWII. Even then, it
has taken the wide availability of computers, and the Internet as a communications medium, to
bring effective cryptography into common use by anyone other than national governments or
similarly large enterprise.
Classical Cryptography
The earliest known use of cryptography is found in nonstandard hieroglyphs carved into
monuments from Egypt's Old Kingdom (ca 4500 years ago). These are not thought to be serious
attempts at secret communications, however, but rather to have been attempts at mystery,
intrigue, or even amusement for literate onlookers. These are examples of still another use of
cryptography, or of something that looks (impressively if misleadingly) like it. Later, Hebrew
scholars made use of simple Substitution ciphers (such as the Atbash cipher) beginning perhaps
around 500 to 600 BCE. Cryptography has a long tradition in religious writing likely to offend the
dominant culture or political authorities. Perhaps the most famous is the 'Number of the Beast'
from the book of Revelations in the Christian New Testament. '666' is almost certainly a
cryptographic (i.e., encrypted) way of concealing a dangerous reference; many scholars believe
it's a concealed reference to the Roman Empire, or the Emperor Nero, (and so to Roman policies
of persecution of Christians) that would have been understood by the initiated (who 'had the
codebook'), and yet be safe (or at least somewhat deniable and so less dangerous) if it came to
the attention of the authorities. At least for orthodox Christian writing, the need for such
concealment ended with Constantine's conversion and the adoption of Christianity as the official
religion of the Empire.
The Greeks of Classical times are said to have known of ciphers (e.g., the scytale transposition
cypher claimed to have been used by the Spartan military). Herodutus tells us of secret
messages physically concealed beneath wax on wooden tablets or as a tattoo on a slave's head
concealed by regrown hair (these are not properly examples of cryptography per se; see secret
writing). The Romans certainly did (e.g., the Caesar cipher and its variations). There is ancient
mention of a book about Roman military cryptography (especially Julius Caesar's); it has been,
unfortunately, lost.
In India, cryptography was apparently well known. It is recommended in the Kama Sutra as a
technique by which lovers can communicate without being discovered. This may imply that
cryptanalytic techniques were less than well developed in India ca 500 CE.
Cryptography became (secretly) important still later as a consequence of political competition
and religious analysis. For instance, in Europe during and after the Renaissance, citizens of the
various Italian states, including the Papacy, were responsible for substantial improvements in
cryptographic practice (e.g., polyalphabetic ciphers invented by Leon Alberti ca 1465). And in the
Arab world, religiously motivated textual analysis of the Koran led to the invention of the
frequency analysis technique for breaking monoalphabetic substitution cyphers sometime around
1000 CE.
Cryptography, cryptanalysis, and secret agent betrayal featured in the Babington plot during the
reign of Queen Elizabeth I which led to the execution of Mary, Queen of Scots. And an encrypted
message from the time of the Man in the Iron Mask (decrypted around 1900 by tienne Bazeries)
has shed some, regrettably nondefinitive, light on the identity of that legendary, and unfortunate,
prisoner. Cryptography, and its misuse, was involved in the plotting which led to the execution of
Mata Hari and even more reprehensibly, if possible, in the travesty which led to Dreyfus'
conviction and imprisonment, both in the early 20th century. Fortunately, cryptographers were
also involved in setting Dreyfus free; Mata Hari, in contrast, was shot.
Mathematical cryptography leapt ahead (also secretly) after World War I. Marian Rejewski, in
Poland, attacked and 'broke' the early German Army Enigma system (an electromechanical rotor
cypher machine) using theoretical mathematics in 1932. The break continued up to '39, when
changes in the way the German Army's Enigma machines were used required more resources
than the Poles could deploy. His work was extended by Alan Turing, Gordon Welchman, and
others at Bletchley Park beginning in 1939, leading to sustained breaks into several other of the
Enigma variants and the assorted networks for which they were used. US Navy cryptographers
(with cooperation from British and Dutch cryptographers after 1940) broke into several Japanese
Navy crypto systems. The break into one of them famously led to the US victory in the Battle of
Midway. A US Army group, the SIS, managed to break the highest security Japanese diplomatic
cipher system (an electromechanical 'stepping switch' machine called Purple by the Americans)
even before WWII began. The Americans referred to the intelligence resulting from cryptanalysis,
perhaps especially that from the Purple machine, as 'Magic'. The British eventually settled on
'Ultra' for intelligence resulting from cryptanalysis, particularly that from message traffic
enciphered by the various Enigmas. An earlier British term for Ultra had been 'Boniface'.
mathematical cryptography in this period, all in secrecy. Information about this period has begun
to be declassified in recent years as the official 50year (British) secrecy period has come to an
end, as the relevant US archives have slowly opened, and as assorted memoirs and articles
have been published.
The Germans made heavy use (in several variants) of an electromechanical rotor based cypher
system known as Enigma. The German military also deployed several mechanical attempts at a
onetime pad. Bletchley Park called them the Fish cyphers, and Max Newman and colleagues
designed and deployed the world's first programmable digital electronic computer, the Colossus,
to help with their cryptanalysis. The German Foreign Office began to use the onetime pad in
1919; some of this traffic was read in WWII partly as the result of recovery of some key material
in South America that was insufficiently carefully discarded by a German courier.
The Japanese Foreign Office used a locally developed electrical stepping switch based system
(called Purple by the US), and also used several similar machines for attaches in some
Japanese embassies. One of these was called the 'Mmachine' by the US, another was referred
to as 'Red'. All were broken, to one degree or another by the Allies.
Other cipher machines used in WWII included the British Typex and the American SIGABA; both
were electromechanical rotor designs similar in spirit to the Enigma.
Modern Cryptography
The era of modern cryptography really begins with Claude Shannon, arguably the father of
mathematical cryptography. In 1949 he published the paperCommunication Theory of
Secrecy Systems in the Bell System Technical Journal, and a little later the book Mathematical
Theory of Communication with Warren Weaver. These, in addition to his other works on
information and communication theory established a solid theoretical basis for cryptography and
for cryptanalysis. And with that, cryptography more or less disappeared into secret government
communications organizations such as the NSA. Very little work was again made public until the
mid '70s, when everything changed.
1969 saw two major public (i.e., nonsecret) advances. First was the DES (Data Encryption
Standard) submitted by IBM, at the invitation of the National Bureau of Standards (now NIST), in
an effort to develop secure electronic communication facilities for businesses such as banks and
other large financial organizations. After 'advice' and modification by the NSA, it was adopted and
published as a FIPS Publication (Federal Information Processing Standard) in 1977 (currently at
FIPS 463). It has been made effectively obsolete by the adoption in 2001 of the Advanced
Encryption Standard, also a NIST competition, as FIPS 197. DES was the first publicly
accessible cypher algorithm to be 'blessed' by a national crypto agency such as NSA. The
release of its design details by NBS stimulated an explosion of public and academic interest in
cryptography. DES, and more secure variants of it (such as 3DES or TDES; see FIPS 463), are
still used today, although DES was officially supplanted by AES (Advanced Encryption Standard)
in 2001 when NIST announced the selection of Rijndael, by two Belgian cryptographers. DES
remains in wide use nonetheless, having been incorporated into many national and
organizational standards. However, its 56bit keysize has been shown to be insufficient to guard
against bruteforce attacks (one such attack, undertaken by cyber civilrights group The
Electronic Frontier Foundation, succeeded in 56 hours  the story is in Cracking DES, published
by O'Reilly and Associates). As a result, use of straight DES encryption is now without doubt
insecure for use in new crypto system designs, and messages protected by older crypto systems
using DES should also be regarded as insecure. The DES key size (56bits) was thought to be
too small by some even in 1976, perhaps most publicly Whitfield Diffie. There was suspicion that
government organizations even then had sufficient computing power to break DES messages
and that there may be a back door due to the lack of randomness in the 'S' boxes.
Second was the publication of the paper New Directions in Cryptography by Whitfield Diffie
and Martin Hellman. This paper introduced a radically new method of distributing cryptographic
keys, which went far toward solving one of the fundamental problems of cryptography, key
distribution. It has become known as DiffieHellman key exchange. The article also stimulated
the almost immediate public development of a new class of enciphering algorithms, the
asymmetric key algorithms.
Prior to that time, all useful modern encryption algorithms had been symmetric key algorithms, in
which the same cryptographic key is used with the underlying algorithm by both the sender and
the recipient who must both keep it secret. All of the electromechanical machines used in WWII
were of this logical class, as were the Caesar and Atbash cyphers and essentially all cypher and
code systems throughout history. The 'key' for a code is, of course, the codebook, which must
likewise be distributed and kept secret.
Of necessity, the key in every such system had to be exchanged between the communicating
parties in some secure way prior to any use of the system (the term usually used is 'via a secure
channel') such as a trustworthy courier with a briefcase handcuffed to a wrist, or facetoface
contact, or a loyal carrier pigeon. This requirement rapidly becomes unmanageable when the
number of participants increases beyond some (very!) small number, or when (really) secure
channels aren't available for key exchange, or when, as is sensible crypto practice keys are
changed frequently. In particular, a separate key is required for each communicating pair if no
third party is to be able to decrypt their messages. A system of this kind is also known as a
private key, secret key, or conventional key cryptosystem. DH key exchange (and succeeding
improvements) made operation of these systems much easier, and more secure, than had ever
been possible before.
In contrast, with asymmetric key encryption, there is a pair of mathematically related keys for the
algorithm, one of which is used for encryption and the other for decryption. Some, but not all, of
these algorithms have the additional property that one of the keys may be made public since the
other cannot be (by any currently known method) deduced from the 'public' key. The other key in
these systems is kept secret and is usually called, somewhat confusingly, the 'private' key. An
algorithm of this kind is known as a public key / private key algorithm, although the
term asymmetric key cryptography is preferred by those who wish to avoid the ambiguity of
using that term for all such algorithms, and to stress that there are two distinct keys with different
secrecy requirements.
As a result, for those using such algorithms, only one key pair is now needed per recipient
(regardless of the number of senders) as possession of a recipient's public key (by anyone
whomsoever) does not compromise the 'security' of messages so long as the corresponding
private key is not known to any attacker (effectively, this means not known to anyone except the
recipient). This unanticipated, and quite surprising, property of some of these algorithms made
possible, and made practical, widespread deployment of high quality crypto systems which could
be used by anyone at all. Which in turn gave government crypto organizations worldwide a
severe case of heartburn; for the first time ever, those outside that fraternity had access to
cryptography that wasn't readily breakable by the 'snooper' side of those organizations.
Considerable controversy, and conflict, began immediately. It has not yet subsided. In the US, for
example, exporting strong cryptography remains illegal; cryptographic methods and techniques
are classified as munitions. Until 2001 'strong' crypto was defined as anything using keys longer
than 40 bits  the definition was relaxed thereafter. (See S Levy's Cryptofor a journalistic account
of the policy controversy in the US).
Note, however, that it has NOT been proven impossible, for any of the good public/private
asymmetric key algorithms, that a private key (regardless of length) can be deduced from a
public key (or vice versa). Informed observers believe it to be currently impossible (and perhaps
forever impossible) for the 'good' asymmetric algorithms; no workable 'companion key deduction'
techniques have been publicly shown for any of them. Note also that some asymmetric key
algorithms have been quite thoroughly broken, just as many symmetric key algorithms have.
There is no special magic attached to using algorithms which require two keys.
In fact, some of the well respected, and most widely used, public key / private key
algorithms can be broken by one or another cryptanalytic attack and so, like other encryption
algorithms, the protocols within which they are used must be chosen and implemented carefully
to block such attacks. Indeed, allcan be broken if the key length used is short enough to permit
practical brute force key search; this is inherently true of all encryption algorithms using keys,
including both symmetric and asymmetric algorithms.
This is an example of the most fundamental problem for those who wish to keep their
communications secure; they must choose a crypto system (algorithms + protocols + operation)
that resists all attack from any attacker. There being no way to know who those attackers might
be, nor what resources they might be able to deploy, nor what advances in cryptanalysis (or its
associated mathematics) might in future occur, users may ONLY do the best they know how, and
then hope. In practice, for well designed / implemented / used crypto systems, this is believed by
informed observers to be enough, and possibly even enough for all(?) future attackers.
Distinguishing between well designed / implemented / used crypto systems and crypto trash is
another, quite difficult, problem for those who are not themselves expert cryptographers. It is
even quite difficult for those who are.
Cryptography/Classical Cryptography
Cryptography has a long and colorful history from Caesar's encryption in first century BC to the
20th century.
Caesar Cipher
One of the most basic methods of encryption is the use of Caesar Ciphers. It simply consist in
shifting the alphabet over a few characters and matching up the letters.
Classical cryptography
This makes transposition and substituting the two major principles in classical cryptography.
Transposition ciphers
Lets look first at transposition, which is the changing in the position of the letters in the message
such as a simple writing backwards
THEPAN
ELINTH
EWALLM
OVESAA
then take the columns:
(the extra letters are called space fillers) The idea in transposition is NOT to randomize it but to
transform it to something that is not recognizable with a reversible algorithm (an algorithm is just
a procedure, reversible so your correspondent can read the message).
We discuss transposition ciphers in much more detail in a later
chapter, Cryptography/Transposition ciphers.
Substitution ciphers
The second most important pin cha principle is substitution. That is, substituting a Symbol for a
letter of your plaintext (or word or even sentence). Slang even can sometimes be a form of cipher
(the symbols replacing your plaintext), ever wonder why your parents never understood you?
Slang, though, is not something you would want to store a secret in for a long time. In WWII,
there were Navajo CodeTalkers who passed along info from unit to unit. From what I hear
(someone verify this) the Navajo language was a very exclusive almost unknown and unwritten
language. So the Japanese were not able to decipher it.
Even though this is a very loose example of substitution, whatever works works. The classical
example of a substitution cipher is a shifted alphabet cipher
Alphabet: ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ
Cipher: BCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZA
Cipher2: CDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZAB
etc...
Example:(using cipher 2)
Frequency Analysis
In the shifted alphabet cipher or any simple randomized cipher, the same letter in the cipher
replaces each of the same ones in your message (e.g. 'A' replaces all 'D's in the plaintext, etc.).
The weakness is that English uses certain letters more than any other letter in the alphabet. 'E' is
the most common, etc. Here's an exercise count all of each letter in this article. You'll find that in
the previous sentence there are 2 'H's,7 'E's, 3 'R's, 3 'S's, etc. By far 'E' is the most common
letter; here are the other frequencies [Frequency tables
http://rinkworks.com/words/letterfreq.shtml]. Basically you experiment with replacing different
symbols with letters (the most common with 'E', etc.).
Creating Cryptography/Contemporary
Cryptography
Cryptography/Cryptography in Popular
Culture
3.FUNDAMETAL CONCEPTS
BCE
1  1799 CE
1466  Leone Battista Alberti invents polyalphabetic cipher, also the first known
mechanical cipher machine
1586  Cryptanalysis used by spy master Sir Francis Walsingham to implicate Mary
Queen of Scots in the Babington Plot to murder Queen Elizabeth I of England. Queen Mary
was eventually executed.
1614  Scotsman John Napier (15501617) published a paper outlining his discovery of
the logarithm. Napier also invented an ingenious system of moveable rods (referred to as
Napier's Rods or Napier's bones) which were a precursor of the slide rule. These were based
on logarithms and allowed the operator to multiply, divide and calculate square and cube
roots by moving the rods around and placing them in specially constructed boards.
1793  Claude Chappe establishes the first longdistance semaphore "telegraph" line
1795  Thomas Jefferson invents the Jefferson disk cipher, reinvented over 100 years
later by Etienne Bazeries and widely used a a tactical cypher by the US Army.
18001899
180914 George Scovell's work on Napoleonic ciphers during the Peninsular War
c. 1854  Babbage's method for breaking polyalphabetic cyphers (pub 1863 by Kasiski);
the first known break of a polyaphabetic cypher. Done for the English during the Crimean
War, a general attack on Vigenre's autokey cipher (the 'unbreakable cypher' of its time) as
well as the much weaker cypher that is today termed "the Vigenre cypher". The advance
was kept secret and was, in essence, reinvented somewhat later by the Prussian Friedrich
Kasiski, after whom it is named.
1854  Wheatstone invents Playfair cipher
1883  Auguste Kerckhoffs publishes La Cryptographie militare, containing his celebrated
"laws" of cryptography
1885  Beale ciphers published
1894  The Dreyfus Affair in France involves the use of cryptography, and its misuse, re:
false documents.
1900  1949
1917  Gilbert Vernam develops first practical implementation of a teletype cipher, now
known as a stream cipher and, later, with Mauborgne the onetime pad
1917  Zimmermann telegram intercepted and decrypted, advancing U.S. entry into
World War I
1919  Weimar Germany Foreign Office adopts (a manual) onetime pad for some traffic
1919  Hebern invents/patents first rotor machine design  Damm, Scherbius and Koch
follow with patents the same year
c. 1924  MI8 (Yardley, et al.) provide breaks of assorted traffic in support of US position
at Washington Naval Conference
1929  U.S. Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson shuts down State Department
cryptanalysis "Black Chamber", saying "Gentlemen do not read each other's mail."
1931  The American Black Chamber by Herbert O. Yardley is published, revealing much
about American cryptography
December 7, 1941  U.S. Naval base at Pearl Harbor surprised by Japanese attack,
despite U.S. breaks into several Japanese cyphers. U.S. enters World War II
June 1942  Battle of Midway. Partial break into Dec 41 edition of JN25 leads to
successful ambush of Japanese carriers and to the momentum killing victory.
April 1943  Admiral Yamamoto, architect of Pearl Harbor attack, is assassinated by U.S.
forces who know his itinerary from decrypted messages
April 1943  Max Newman, WynnWilliams, and their team (including Alan Turing) at the
secret Government Code and Cypher School ('Station X'), Bletchley Park, Bletchley,
England, complete the "Heath Robinson". This is a specialized machine for cypherbreaking,
not a generalpurpose calculator or computer.
December 1943  The Colossus was built, by Dr Thomas Flowers at The Post Office
Research Laboratories in London, to crack the German Lorenz cipher (SZ42). Colossus was
used at Bletchley Park during WW II  as a successor to April's 'Robinson's. Although 10
were eventually built, unfortunately they were destroyed immediately after they had finished
their work  it was so advanced that there was to be no possibility of its design falling into the
wrong hands. The Colossus design was the first electronic digital computer and was
somewhat programmable. A epoch in machine capability.
1944  patent application filed on SIGABA code machine used by U.S. in WW II. Kept
secret, finally issued in 2001
1946  VENONA's first break into Soviet espionage traffic from early 1940s
1948  Claude Shannon writes a paper that establishes the mathematical basis of
information theory
1949  Shannon's Communication Theory of Secrecy Systems pub in Bell Labs Technical
Journal, based on work done during WWII.
1950  1999
1951  U.S. National Security Agency founded, subsuming the US Army and US Navy
'girls school' departments
1968  John Anthony Walker walks into the Soviet Union's embassy in Washington and
sells information on KL7 cipher machine. The Walker spy ring operates until 1985
June 8, 1967  USS Liberty incident in which a U.S. SIGINT ship is attacked by Israel,
apparently by mistake, though some continue to dispute this
January 23, 1968  USS Pueblo, another SIGINT ship, is captured by North Korea
1974?  Horst Feistel develops the Feistel network block cipher design at IBM
1976  the Data Encryption Standard was published as an official Federal Information
Processing Standard (FIPS) for the US
1981  Richard Feynman proposes quantum computers. The main application he had in
mind was the simulation of quantum systems, but he also mentioned the possibility of solving
other problems.
1988  First optical chip developed, it uses light instead of electricity to increase
processing speed.
1989  Tim BernersLee and Robert Cailliau built the prototype system which became the
World Wide Web at CERN
1991  Phil Zimmermann releases the public key encryption program PGP along with its
source code, which quickly appears on the Internet.
1992  Release of the movie Sneakers (film)Sneakers, in which security experts are
blackmailed into stealing a universal decoder for encryption systems (no such decoder is
known, likely because it is impossible).
1994  Peter Shor devises an algorithm which lets quantum computers determine the
factorization of large integers quickly. This is the first interesting problem for which quantum
computers promise a significant speedup, and it therefore generates a lot of interest in
quantum computers.
1994  DNA computing proof of concept on toy traveling salesman problem; a method for
input/output still to be determined.
1994  Russian crackers siphon $10 million from Citibank and transfer the money to bank
accounts around the world. Vladimir Levin, the 30yearold ringleader, uses his work laptop
after hours to transfer the funds to accounts in Finland and Israel. Levin stands trial in the
United States and is sentenced to three years in prison. Authorities recover all but $400,000
of the stolen money.
1994  Formerly proprietary trade secret, but not patented, RC4 cipher algorithm is
published on the Internet
1994  first RSA Factoring Challenge from 1977 is decrypted as The Magic Words are
Squeamish Ossifrage
1995  NSA publishes the SHA1 hash algorithm as part of its Digital Signature Standard;
SHA0 had a flaw corrected by SHA1
October 1998  Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) becomes law in U.S.,
criminalizing production and dissemination of technology that can circumvent measures
taken to protect copyright
1999: Bruce Schneier develops the Solitaire cipher, a way to allow field agents to
communicate securely without having to rely on electronics or having to carry incriminating
tools like a onetime pad. Unlike all previous manual encryption techniques  except the
onetime pad  this one is resistant to automated cryptanalysis. It is published in Neal
Stephenson's Cryptonomicon (2000).
January 14, 2000  U.S. Government announce restrictions on export of cryptography are
relaxed (although not removed). This allows many US companies to stop the long running,
and rather ridiculous process of having to create US and international copies of their
software.
March 2000  President Clinton says he doesn't use email to communicate with his
daughter, Chelsea Clinton, at college because he doesn't think the medium is secure.
September 6, 2000  RSA Security Inc. released their RSA algorithm into the public
domain, a few days in advance of their US patent 4405829 expiring. Following the relaxation
of the U.S. government export restrictions, this removed one of the last barriers to the worldwide distribution of much software based on cryptographic systems. It should be noted that
the IDEA algorithm is still under patent and also that government restrictions still apply in
some places.
November 2001  Microsoft and its allies vow to end "full disclosure" of security
vulnerabilities by replacing it with "responsible" disclosure guidelines.
2005  agents from the U.S. FBI demonstrate their ability to crack WEP using publicly
available tools
2015  year by which NIST suggests that 80bit keys for symmetric key cyphers be
phased out. Asymmetric key cyphers require longer keys which have different vulnerability
parameters.
Cryptography/Goals of Cryptography
Definition
Crytography is the science of secure communication in the presence of third parties (sometimes
called "adversaries").
Modern cryptographers and cryptanalysts work in many areas including
data confidentiality
data integrity
authentication
forward secrecy
digital currency
Examples
The term is very often used in conjunction in the context of message exchange between two
entities, but of course not restricted to this case.
Creating Cryptography/Cryptography in
Computer Security
Cryptography/Symmetric Ciphers
< Cryptography
A symmetric key cipher (also called a secretkey cipher, or a onekey cipher, or a privatekey cipher, or a sharedkey cipher) is one that uses the same (necessarily secret) key to
encrypt messages as it does to decrypt messages.
Until the invention of asymmetric key cryptography (commonly termed "public key / private key"
crypto) in the 1970s, all ciphers were symmetric. Each party to the communication needed a key
to encrypt a messages; and a recipient needed a copy of the same key to decrypt the message.
This presented a significant problem, as it required all parties to have a secure communication
system (e.g. facetoface meeting or secure courier) in order to distribute the required keys. The
number of secure transfers required rises impossibly, and wholly impractically, quickly with the
number of participants.
Formal Definition
Any cryptosystem based on a symmetric key cipher conforms to the following definition:
M : message to be enciphered
K : a secret key
E : enciphering function
D : deciphering function
Reciprocal Ciphers
Some sharedkey ciphers are also "reciprocal ciphers." A reciprocal cipher applies the same
transformation to decrypt a message as the one used to encrypt it. In the language of the formal
definition above, E = D for a reciprocal cipher.
An example of a reciprocal cipher is Rot 13, in which the same alphabetic shift is used in both
cases.
Further Reading
Key distribution
Cryptodox: "sharedkey" explains why most mechanical cipher machines use a reciprocal
cipher.
Cryptography/Asymmetric Ciphers
< Cryptography
A postal analogy
An analogy which can be used to understand the advantages of an asymmetric system is to
imagine two people, Alice and Bob, sending a secret message through the public mail. In this
example, Alice has the secret message and wants to send it to Bob, after which Bob sends a
secret reply.
With a symmetric key system, Alice first puts the secret message in a box, and then locks the
box using a padlock to which she has a key. She then sends the box to Bob through regular mail.
When Bob receives the box, he uses an identical copy of Alice's key (which he has somehow
obtained previously) to open the box, and reads the message. Bob can then use the same
padlock to send his secret reply.
In an asymmetric key system, Bob and Alice have separate padlocks. Firstly, Alice asks Bob to
send his open padlock to her through regular mail, keeping his key to himself. When Alice
receives it she uses it to lock a box containing her message, and sends the locked box to Bob.
Bob can then unlock the box with his key and read the message from Alice. To reply, Bob must
similarly get Alice's open padlock to lock the box before sending it back to her. The critical
advantage in an asymmetric key system is that Bob and Alice never need send a copy of their
keys to each other. This substantially reduces the chance that a third party (perhaps, in the
example, a corrupt postal worker) will copy a key while it is in transit, allowing said third party to
spy on all future messages sent between Alice and Bob. In addition, if Bob were to be careless
and allow someone else to copy his key, Alice's messages to Bob will be compromised, but
Alice's messages to other people would remain secret, since the other people would be providing
different padlocks for Alice to use.
Weaknesses
Of course, there is the possibility that someone could "pick" Bob's or Alice's lock. Unlike the case
of the onetime pad or its equivalents, there is no currently known asymmetric key algorithm
which has been proven to be secure against a mathematical attack. That is, it is not known to be
impossible that some relation between the keys in a key pair, or a weakness in an algorithm's
operation, might be found which would allow decryption without either key, or using only the
encryption key. The security of asymmetric key algorithms is based on estimates of how difficult
the underlying mathematical problem is to solve. Such estimates have changed both with the
decreasing cost of computer power, and with new mathematical discoveries.
Weaknesses have been found in promising asymmetric key algorithms in the past. The
'knapsack packing' algorithm was found to be insecure when an unsuspected attack came to
light. Recently, some attacks based on careful measurements of the exact amount of time it
takes known hardware to encrypt plain text have been used to simplify the search for likely
decryption keys. Thus, use of asymmetric key algorithms does not ensure security; it is an area
of active research to discover and protect against new and unexpected attacks.
Another potential weakness in the process of using asymmetric keys is the possibility of a 'Man
in the Middle' attack, whereby the communication of public keys is intercepted by a third party
and modified to provide the third party's own public keys instead. The encrypted response also
must be intercepted, decrypted and reencrypted using the correct public key in all instances
however to avoid suspicion, making this attack difficult to implement in practice.
History
The first known asymmetric key algorithm was invented by Clifford Cocks of GCHQ in the UK. It
was not made public at the time, and was reinvented by Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman at MIT in
1976. It is usually referred to as RSA as a result. RSA relies for its security on the difficulty of
factoring very large integers. A breakthrough in that field would cause considerable problems for
RSA's security. Currently, RSA is vulnerable to an attack by factoring the 'modulus' part of the
public key, even when keys are properly chosen, for keys shorter than perhaps 700 bits. Most
authorities suggest that 1024 bit keys will be secure for some time, barring a fundamental
breakthrough in factoring practice or practical quantum computers, but others favor longer keys.
At least two other asymmetric algorithms were invented after the GCHQ work, but before the
RSA publication. These were the Ralph Merkle puzzle cryptographic system and the DiffieHellman system. Well after RSA's publication, Taher Elgamal invented the Elgamal discrete log
cryptosystem which relies on the difficulty of inverting logs in a finite field. It is used in the SSL,
TLS, and DSA protocols.
A relatively new addition to the class of asymmetric key algorithms is elliptic curve cryptography.
While it is more complex computationally, many believe it to represent a more difficult
mathematical problem than either the factorisation or discrete logarithm problems.
have no, or easily avoidable, weak initial conditions which produce patterns or short
cycles
References
1. Jump up NIST. "Random number generation".
2. Jump up John Kelsey. "Entropy and Entropy Sources in X9.82" NIST. 2004. "Are you
measuring what you think you're measuring?" "How much of sample variability is entropy,
how much is just complexity?"
Further Reading
Cryptography/Random Quality
Algorithms/Randomization
Cryptography/Hashes
A digest, sometimes called a hash, is the result of the application of a hash function (a very
specific mathematical function or algorithm) that takes in some arbitrary value and produces a
hash value, based on the given input.
Information security often includes situations where a user wants to transform one block of
information into another block of information in such a way that the original block can not be
recreated. It is also required that every time the input block is processed, it will produce the same
output block. This means that the process is deterministic.
Such processes behave similar to a hash function and so are typically called cryptographic
hashes. These hashes are used in serving authentication and integrity goals of cryptography. A
cryptographic hash can be described as
and has property that the
hash function is one way. A given hash value can not feasibly be reversed to get a message that
produces that hash value. I.e. There is no useful inverse hash
function
This property can be formally expanded to provide the following properties of a secure hash:
Second preimage resistant: Given an input m1, it should be hard to find another input,
m2 (not equal to m1) such that hash(m1) = hash(m2).
Collisionresistant: it should be hard to find two different messages m1 and m2 such that
hash(m1) = hash(m2). Because of the birthday paradox this means the hash function must
have a larger image than is required for preimageresistance.
A hash function is the implementation of an algorithm that, given some data as input, will
generate a short result called a digest.
For Ex: If our hash function is 'X' and we have 'wiki' as our input... then X('wiki')= a5g78 i.e. some
hash value.
Qualities of a good hash function are
1. Produces a fixed length key for variable input
2. Has got infinite key space, implies the next point
3. No collisions (i.e. no two different pieces of input give the same key value)
In actual practice, Alice and Bob will often be computer programs, and the secret would be
something less easily spoofed than a claimed puzzle solution. The above application is called a
commitment scheme. Another important application of secure hashes is verification of message
integrity. Determination of whether or not any changes have been made to a message (or a file),
for example, can be accomplished by comparing message digests calculated before, and after,
transmission (or any other event) (see Tripwire, a system using this property as a defense
against malware and malfeasance). A message digest can also serve as a means of reliably
identifying a file.
A related application is password verification. Passwords are usually not stored in cleartext, for
obvious reasons, but instead in digest form. We discuss password handling  in particular, why
hashing the password once is inadequate  in more detail in a later chapter, Password handling.
A hash function is a key part of message authentication (HMAC).
Most distributed version control systems (DVCSs) use cryptographic hashes.
For both security and performance reasons, most digital signature algorithms specify that only
the digest of the message be "signed", not the entire message. Hash functions can also be used
in the generation of pseudorandom bits.
SHA1, MD5, and RIPEMD160 are among the most commonlyused message digest algorithms
as of 2004. In August 2004, researchers found weaknesses in a number of hash functions,
including MD5, SHA0 and RIPEMD. This has called into question the longterm security of later
algorithms which are derived from these hash functions. In particular, SHA1 (a strengthened
version of SHA0), RIPEMD128 and RIPEMD160 (strengthened versions of RIPEMD). Neither
SHA0 nor RIPEMD are widely used since they were replaced by their strengthened versions.
Other common cryptographic hashes include SHA2 and Tiger.
Later we will discuss the "birthday attack" and other techniques people use for Breaking Hash
Algorithms.
Hash speed
There are two contradictory requirements for cryptographic hash speed:
When using hashes for password verification, people prefer hash functions that take a
long time to run. If/when a password verification database (the /etc/passwd file,
the /etc/shadow file, etc.) is accidentally leaked, they want to force a bruteforce attacker
to take a long time to test each guess.
scrypt
bcrypt
PBKDF2
When using hashes for file verification, people prefer hash functions that run very fast.
They want a corrupted file can be detected as soon as possible (and queued for
retransmission, quarantined, or etc.).
SHA256
SHA3
Further reading
see Data Structures/Hash Tables for the most common application of noncryptographic
hash functions
1. Jump up applications of noncryptographic hash functions are described in Data
Structures/Hash Tables and Algorithm Implementation/Hashing.
2. Jump up Eric Sink. "Version Control by Example". Chapter 12: "Git: Cryptographic Hashes".
3. Jump up "Speed Hashing"
Cryptography relies on puzzles. A puzzle that can not be solved without more information than
the cryptanalyst has or can feasibly acquire is an unsolvable puzzle for the attacker. If the puzzle
can be understood in a way that circumvents the secret information the cryptanalyst doesn't have
then the puzzle is breakable. Obviously cryptography relies on an implicit form of security
through obscurity where there currently exists no likely ways to understand the puzzle that will
break it. The increasing complexity and subtlety of the mathematical puzzles used in
cryptography creates a situation where neither cryptographers or cryptanalysts can be sure of all
facets of the puzzle and security.
Like any puzzle, cryptography algorithms are based on assumptions  if these assumptions are
flawed then the underlying puzzle may be flawed.
Secret knowledge assumption  Certain secret knowledge is not available to unauthorised
people. Attacks such as packet sniffing, keylogging and meet in the middle attacks try to breach
this assumption.
Secret knowledge masks plaintext  The secret knowledge is applied to the plaintext so that the
nature of the message is no longer obvious. In general the secret knowledge hides the message
in way so that the secret knowledge is required in order rediscover the message. Attacks such as
chosen plaintext, brute force and frequency analysis try to breach this assumption
Cryptography/Secure Passwords
Passwords
A serious cryptographic system should not be based on a hidden algorithm, but rather on a
hidden password that is hard to guess (see Kerckhoffs's law in the Basic Design
Principles section). Passwords today are very important because access to a very large number
of portals on the Internet, or even your email account, is restricted to those who can produce the
correct password. This usually involves humans in choosing, remembering, and using
passwords. All three aspects are commonly weaknesses: humans are notoriously bad at
choosing hardtobreak passwords,[1] do not easily remember strong passwords, and are sloppy
and too trusting in their use of passwords when they remember them. It is nearly overwhelmingly
tempting to base passwords on already known items. As well, we can remember simple (e.g.
short), or familiar (e.g. telephone number) pretty well, but stronger passwords are more than
most of us can reliably remember; this leads to insecurity as easy methods of password
recovery, or even password bypass, are required. These are universally insecure. Finally,
humans are too easily prey to phishing fraud scams, to shoulder surfing, to helping out a friend
who has forgotten their own password, etc.
Security
But passwords must protect access and messages against more than just human attackers.
There are many machinebased ways of attacking cryptographic algorithms and cryptosystems,
so passwords should also be hard to attack automatically. To prevent one important class of
automatic attack, the brute force search, passwords must be difficult for the bad guys to
guess. be both long (single character passwords are easily guessed, obviously) and, ideally,
random  that is, without pattern of any kind. A long enough password will require so much
machine time as to be impractical for an attacker. A password without pattern will offer no
shortcut to brute force search. These considerations suggest several properties passwords
should possess:
no names (pets, friends, relatives, ...), no words findable in any dictionary, no phrases
found in any quotation book
Password handling
Password handling is simultaneously one of the few Solved Problems of Cryptography, *and*
one of the most misunderstood.
Dan Kaminsky , "Password Rejected: A Crypto Perspective"
Any web server that stores user passwords in some file or database somewhere, is doing it
wrong.
Passwords are usually not stored in cleartext, for obvious reasons, but instead in digest form. To
authenticate a user, the password presented by the user is salted, hashed, and compared with
the stored hash.
PBKDF2 was originally designed to "generating a cryptographic key from a password", but it
turns out to be good for generating password digests for safe storage for authentication
purposes.
In 2013, because only 3 algorithms are available for generating password digests for safe
storage for authentication purposes  PBKDF2, bcrypt, and scrypt  In 2013, the Password
Hashing Competition (PHC) was announced.
Further reading
competition for password hashing algorithms has been launched, using the model of
the previous AES, eSTREAM and SHA3 competitions. Submissions are due for the
end of January 2014."
11. Jump up "Password Hashing Competition"
12. Jump up "Are there more modern password hashing methods than bcrypt and scrypt?"
13. Jump up Simson Garfinkel, Alan Schwartz, Gene Spafford. "Practical Unix & Internet
Security". 2003. section "4.3.2.3 crypt16( ), DES Extended, and Modular Crypt Format" .
"The Modular Crypt Format (MCF) specifies an extensible scheme for formatting
encrypted passwords. MCF is one of the most popular formats for encrypted
passwords"
14. Jump up "Modular Crypt Format: or, a side note about a standard that isnt" .
15. Jump up "Binary Modular Crypt Format"
16. Jump up "Plain Text Offenders"
17. Jump up Dennis Fisher. "Cryptographers aim to find new password hashing algorithm" .
2013.
18. Jump up to:a b Paul Roberts. "Update: New 25 GPU Monster Devours Passwords In Seconds" .
2012.
19. Jump up to:a b Dan Goodin "Anatomy of a hack: even your 'complicated' password is easy to
crack". 2013.
Wikibook Web Application Security Guide/Password security lists some practical tips for
password "storage", resetting passwords, etc.
Cryptography/Sbox
< Cryptography
bits each. Fixed tables are normally used, as in the Data Encryption Standard (DES), but in some
ciphers the tables are generated dynamically from the key; e.g. the Blowfish and the Twofish
encryption algorithms. Bruce Schneier describes IDEA's modular multiplication step as a keydependent SBox.
Given a 6bit input, the 4bit output is found by selecting the row using the outer two bits (the first
and last bits), and the column using the inner four bits. For example, an input "011011" has outer
bits "01" and inner bits "1101"; the corresponding output would be "1001".
The 8 SBoxes of DES were the subject of intense study for many years out of a concern that a
backdoor a vulnerability known only to its designers might have been planted in the cipher.
The SBox design criteria were eventually published[2] after the public rediscovery of differential
cryptanalysis, showing that they had been carefully tuned to increase resistance against this
specific attack. Other research had already indicated that even small modifications to an SBox
could significantly weaken DES.
There has been a great deal of research into the design of good SBoxes, and much more is
understood about their use in block ciphers than when DES was released.
1.
Kerckhoffs's principle
Kerckhoffs's principle, also called Kerckhoffs's law:
A cryptosystem should be secure even if everything about the system, except the key, is public
knowledge.
In the words of Claude Shannon, "The enemy knows the system." (Shannon's maxim).
Diffusion
Having good diffusion means that making a small change in the plain text should ideally cause as
much as possible of cipher text to have a fifty percent possibility of change.
For example a Caesar cipher has almost no diffusion while a block cypher may contain lots of it.
Confusion
For good confusion the relationship between the cypher text and the plain text should be as
complex as possible.
Further reading
2.
Cryptography/Open Algorithms
Creating a good cryptographic algorithm that will stand against all that the best cryptanalysis can
throw at it, is hard. Very hard. So, this is why most people design algorithms by first designing the
basic system, then refining it, and finally letting it lose for all to see.
Why, do this? Surely, if you let everyone see your code that turns a plain bit of text into garbled
rubbish, then they will be able to reverse it! This assumption is unfortunately wrong. Now the
algorithms that have been/ are being made are so strong, that just reversing the algorithm is not
effective when trying to crack it. And when you let people look at your algorithm, they may spot a
security flaw that nobody else could see. We talk more about this counterintuitive idea in another
chapter, Basic Design Principles#Kerckhoffs's principle.
AES, one of the newest and strongest (2010) algorithms in the world, was created by a team of
two people, and was put forward into a sort of competition, where only the best algorithm would
be examined and put forward to be selected for the title of the Advanced Encryption Standard.
There were about 35 entrants, and although all of them appeared strong at first, it soon became
clear that some of these apparently strong algorithms were in fact, very weak!
AES is a good example of open algorithms.
Cryptography/Mathematical Background
Introduction
Modern publickey (asymmetric) cryptography is based upon a branch of mathematics known
as number theory, which is concerned solely with the solution of equations that yield only integer
results. These type of equations are known as diophantine equations, named after the Greek
mathematician Diophantos of Alexandria (ca. 200 CE) from his book Arithmetica that addresses
problems requiring such integral solutions.
One of the oldest diophantine problems is known as the Pythagorean problem, which gives the
length of one side of a right triangle when supplied with the lengths of the other two side,
according to the equation
where
is the length of the hypotenuse. While two sides may be known to be integral
values, the resultant third side may well be irrational. The solution to the Pythagorean
problem is not beyond the scope, but is beyond the purpose of this chapter. Therefore,
example integral solutions (known asPythagorean triplets) will simply be presented here. It is
left as an exercise for the reader to find additional solutions, either by bruteforce or
derivation.
Pythagorean Triplets
12
13
24
25
15
17
Prime Numbers
Description
Asymmetric key algorithms rely heavily on the use of prime numbers, usually exceedingly long
primes, for their operation. By definition, prime numbers are divisible only by themselves and
1. In other words, letting the symbol  denote divisibility (i.e. 
Where
or
only
The Fundamental Theorem of Arithmetic states that all integers can be decomposed into
a unique prime factorization. Any integer greater than 1 is considered
either prime or composite. A composite number is composed of more than one prime
factor

where ultimately
"),
in which
is the exponent.
Numerical Examples
543,312 = 24
553,696 = 25
32
30
50
50
73
70
111
113
131
a bruteforce approach. Primes and composites are noteworthy in the study of cryptography
since, in general, apublic key is a composite number which is the product of two or more primes.
One (or more) of these primes may constitute the private key.
There are several types and categories of prime numbers, three of which are of importance to
cryptography and will be discussed here briefly.
Fermat Primes
Fermat numbers take the following form
Mersenne Primes
Mersenne primes  another type of formulaic prime generation  follow the form
where
is a prime number. The [1] Wolfram Alpha engine reports Mersenne Primes, an
Numbers of the form Mp = 2p without the primality requirement are called Mersenne numbers.
Not all Mersenne numbers are prime, e.g. M11 = 2111 = 2047 = 23 89.
where
is the greatest common divisor. Two rules can be derived from the above
definition
If
If
and
, then
with
, then both
and
is asymptotic to
, that is to say
Introduction
The Euclidean Algorithm is used to discover the greatest common divisor of two integers. In
cryptography, it is most often used to determine if two integers are coprime, i.e.

In order to find
where
in 's
Numerical examples and a formal algorithm follow which should make this inherent pattern
clear.
Mathematical Description
When
, stop with
Numerical Examples
Example 1  To find gcd(17,043,12,660)
17,043 = 1
12,660 = 2
12,660 + 4383
4,383 + 3894
4,383
3,894
489
471
18
=
=
=
=
=
1
7
1
26
6
3,894
489 +
471 +
18 +
3 + 0
+ 489
471
18
3
2,008
1,963
45
28
17
11
6
5
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
1
43
1
1
1
1
1
5
1,963 + 45
45 + 28
28 + 17
17 + 11
11 + 6
6 + 5
5 + 1
1 + 0
Algorithmic Representation
Euclidean Algorithm(a,b)
Input:
Two integers a and b such that a > b
Output:
An integer r = gcd(a,b)
1.
Set a0 = a, r1 = r
2.
r = a0 mod r1
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
While(r1 mod r
0) do:
a0 = r1
r1 = r
r = a0 mod r1
Output r and halt
where , ,
, and
Equations of the form above occur in public key encryption algorithms such as RSA (RivestShamirAdleman) in the form
where
extended Euclidean algorithm; the iterative method and the recursive method.
As an example, we shall solve an RSA key generation problem with e = 216 + 1, p =
3,217, q = 1,279. Thus, 62,537d + 51,456w = 1.
Methods
The Iterative Method
This method computes expressions of the form
step of the Euclidean algorithm. Each modulus can be written in terms of the previous two
remainders and their whole quotient as follows:
The first two values are the initial arguments to the algorithm:
The expression for the last nonzero remainder gives the desired results
since this method computes every remainder in terms of a and b, as
desired.
Example
Step Quotient
Remainder
4,110,048 = a
Substitute
Combine terms
4,110,048 = 1a + 0b
65,537 = b
65,537 = 0a + 1b
46,754 = 4,110,048 
65,537 62
1b) 62
18,783 = 65,537 
46,754 1
62b) 1
9,188 = 46,754 
18,783 2
62b) 2
407 = 18,783 
9,188 2
188b) 2
22
439b) 22
62
22
61 = 234  173 1
10
51 = 173  61 2
11
10 = 61  51 1
12
1 = 51 10 5
46,754 = 1a  62b
9,188 = 3a  188b
173 = 164a +
9,846b) 1
10,285b
61 = (157a  9,846b)  (
61 = 321a +
164a + 10,285b) 1
20,131b
51 = (164a + 10,285b) 
51 = 806a +
(321a +20,131b) 2
50,547b
61 = (321a +20,131b)  (
10 = 1,127a 
806a + 50,547b) 1
70,678b
1 = (806a + 50,547b) 
1=
(1,127a  70,678b) 5
6,441a + 403,937b
13
10
End of algorithm
, it is shown
that
and
encryption, the value for w is discarded, and d is retained as the value of the private key In this
case
d = 0x629e1 = 01100010100111100001
The Recursive Method
This is a direct method for solving Diophantine equations of the form
Using this method, the dividend and the divisor are reduced over a series of steps. At the last
step, a trivial value is substituted into the equation, and is then worked backward until the
solution is obtained.
Example
Using the previous RSA vales of
and
Euclidean
Collect
Expansion
Terms
Substitute
+
4,110,048
w0
65,537d0 =
1
(62 65,537 +
46,754)
+
w0
65,537d0 =
1
Retrograde
Solve
Substitution
For dx
+
65,537
(62w0 + d0)
46,754w0 =
1
w1 =
4,595 = (62)(
62w0 + d0
6441) + d0
d0 = 403,937
+
65,537
w1
46,754d1 =
d1 = w0
w1 = 6,441
(1 46,754 +
18,783)
+
w1
46,754d1 =
1
+
46,754
(w1 + d1)
18,783w1 =
w2 = w1 + d1
1,846 = 4,595
+ d1
d1 = 6,441
+
46,754
w2
18,783d2 =
d2 = w1
(2 18,783 +
9,188)
+
w2
18,783
(2w2 + d2)
18,783
w3
(2 9,188 +
407)
18,783d2 =
w3
+ 9,188w2 =
1
+ 9,188d3 =
1
+ 9,188d3 =
1
w3 = 2w2 + d2
d3 = w2
903 = (2)(1,846) + d2
d2 = 4,595
9,188
(2w3 + d3)
+ 407w3 = 1
w4 = 2w3 + d3
9,188
w4
+ 407d4 = 1
d4 = w3
w4
+ 407d4 = 1
407
(22w4 + d4)
+ 234w4 = 1
407
w5
+ 234d5 = 1
(1 234 + 173)
w5
+ 234d5 = 1
234
(w5 + d5)
+ 173w5 = 1
w6 = w5 +d5
234
w6
+ 173d6 = 1
d6 = w5
(1 173 + 61)
w6
+ 173d6 = 1
173
(w6 + d6)
+ 61w6 = 1
w7 = w6 +d6
173
w7
+ 61d7 = 1
d7 = w6
(2 61 + 51)
w7
+ 61d7 = 1
61
(2w7 + d7)
+ 51w7 = 1
(22 407 +
234)
40 = (2)(903)
+ d3
w5 =
23 = (22)(40)
22w4 +d4
+ d4
d3 = 1846
d4 = 903
d5 = w4
w8 = 2w7 +d7
17 = 23 + d5
d5 = 40
6 = 17 + d6
d6 = 23
5 = (2)(6) + d7
d7 = 17
61
w8
+ 51d8 = 1
d8 = w7
(1 51 + 10)
w8
+ 51d8 = 1
51
(w8 + d8)
+ 10w8 = 1
w9 = w8 +d8
51
w9
+ 10d9 = 1
d9 = w8
(5 10 + 1)
w9
+ 10d9 = 1
10
(5w9 + d9)
+ 1w9 = 1
10
w10
+ 1d10 = 1
d10 = w9
(1 10 + 0)
w10
+ 1d10 = 1
(10w10 + d10)
+ 0w10 = 1
w11
+ 0d11 = 1
w11 =
10w10 +d10
d11 = w10
1 = 5 + d8
d8 = 6
0 = (5)(1) + d9
d9 = 5
1 = (10)(0) + d10
d10 = 1
w11 = 1, d11 = 0
less than
is represented as
. Mathematically, this
where
addition and multiplication operations. Several different types of fields exist; for example,
field of real numbers, and
, the
Finite Fields
Cryptography utilizes primarily finite fields, nearly exclusively composed of integers. The most
notable exception to this are the Gaussian numbers of the form
numbers with integer real and imaginary parts. Finite fields are defined as follows
The set of integers modulo
The set of integers modulo a prime
Since cryptography is concerned with the solution of diophantine equations, the finite fields
utilized are primarily integer based, and are denoted by the symbol for the field of integers,
A finite field
extension of
contains exactly
, written
nonzero elements. An
, and consisting of
Finite fields form an abelian group with respect to multiplication, defined by the following
properties
A subscript following the symbol for the field represents the set of integers modulo
integers run from
to
If
, and these
is represented
. An example for
such
is given below
such that
Composite n
. For example
Prime p
Generators
Every finite field has a generator. A generator
elements in the set
generator of
range
, then
. Assuming
is a
for the
is said to be cyclic.
Examples
For
(Prime)
generators
Let
, then
a generator
Since
is
is a generator, check if
, and
generator
, therefore,
is not a
, and
generator
, therefore,
is not a
Let
, then
a generator
Let
, then
is a generator
Let
, then
is a generator
There are a total of
is
generators,
as predicted by
the formula
For
(Composite)
generators
Let
, then
generator
is a
Let
, then
generator
is a
generators
as predicted by the
Congruences
Description
Number theory contains an algebraic system of its own called the theory of
congruences. The mathematical notion of congruences was introduced by Karl
Friedrich Gauss in Disquisitiones (1801).
Definition
If
and
, this can be
where
is an integer.
Examples
is an even number.
Represents that
is an odd number.
, it is
Properties of Congruence
All congruences (with fixed
if and only if
If
and
then
implies that
Given
such that
These properties represent an equivalence class, meaning that any integer is congruent
modulo
Congruences as Remainders
If the modulus of an integer
is the remainder of
divided by
, or as a congruence
and
Example
is equivalent to
implies
is the remainder of
divided by
and
. These
and
represented as
implies that
if and only if
The set of equivalence classes defined above
form a commutative ring, meaning the residue
classes can be added, subtracted and
multiplied, and that the operations are
associative, commutative and have additive
inverses.
Reducing Modulo m
Often, it is necessary to perform an operation
on a congruence
where
integer
the resultant
with
is based on the
Algorithm
Input: Integers
and
from
with
Output: Integer
such that
1. Let
2.
3.
4. Output
Example
Given
Note that
Exponentiation
Assume you begin with
is
Example
This simplifies to
implies
implies
is a positive integer
of a number which
1. Begin with
2. Square
and
3. Reduce
modulo
so that
to obtain
is obtained.
Note that
is the integer where
would be just larger than
the exponent desired
5. Add the successive exponents until you arrive at the desired
exponent
6. Multiply all
's associated with the 's of the selected powers
7. Reduce the resulting
for the desired result
Example
To find
Adding exponents:
Therefore:
Inverse of a Congruence
Description
While finding the correct symmetric or asymmetric keys is required to encrypt a plaintext
message, calculating the inverse of these keys is essential to successfully decrypt the
resultant ciphertext. This can be seen in cryptosystems Ranging from a simple affine
transformation
Where
To RSA public key encryption, where one of the deciphering (private) keys is
Definition
For the elements
where
such that
denoted
which
. Thus,
where
, there exists
is said to be the inverse of ,
is the
for
Example
Find
This is equivalent to saying
First use the Euclidean algorithm to verify
.
Next use the Extended Euclidean algorithm to discover the
value of .
In this case, the value is
.
Therefore,
It is easily verified that
Example
When
and
implies that
Conditions and Corollaries
An additional condition states that if
is not divisible by
, the following
equation holds
and
then
Euler's Generalization
If
, then
is
A simultaneous solution
if
, and any
algorithm
4. Multiply out
for each
5. Sum all
6. Compute
Given:
Quadratic Residues
If
is prime and
, it is
where
an
.
such that
residue modulo
can be calculated by
is a quadratic residue modulo
. If no such
exists, then
if
, there exists a
if there exists
is a quadratic non
if and only
Example
For the finite field
proceed as follows:
The values above are quadratic residues. The remaining (in this example) 9 values are known
as quadratic nonresidues. the complete listing is given below.
Quadratic residues:
Quadratic nonresidues:
Legendre Symbol
The Legendre symbol denotes whether or not
is only defined for primes
and integers
. The Legendre of
with respect to
divided by
and
is
.
has
Jacobi Symbol
The Jacobi symbol applies to all odd numbers
If
where
, then:
is prime, then the Jacobi symbol equals the Legendre symbol (which is the basis for the
Primality Testing
Description
In cryptography, using an algorithm to quickly and efficiently test whether a given number is
prime is extremely important to the success of the cryptosystem. Several methods of primality
testing exist (Fermat or SolovayStrassen methods, for example), but the algorithm to be used for
discussion in this section will be the MillerRabin (or RabinMiller) primality test. In its current
form, the MillerRabin test is an unconditional probabilistic (Monte Carlo) algorithm. It will be
shown how to convert MillerRabin into a deterministic (Las Vegas) algorithm.
Pseudoprime
Remember that if
is prime and
, with
that is congruent to
is
referred to as a pseudoprime. This forms the basis of primality testing. By testing different
's, we can probabilistically become more certain of the primality of the number in question.
The following three conditions apply to odd composite integers:
I. If the least positive power of
which is the order of
II. If
, then
is a pseudoprime to base
to
III. If
in
and
fails
fails
which is congruent to
and divides
is a pseudoprime.
and
, then
is also a pseudoprime
.
, for any single base
for at least half the bases
, then
.
holds
thought that the simple XOR cipher could be the answer to an unbreakable algorithm, but new
methods of cryptanalysis were born, and now, it can be cracked within moments.
Today's 'secure' ciphers such as AES and Twofish may be secure now, but in the future, with the
advent of faster computers, better techniques and even quantum computing, these ciphers will
only last so long.
2.Weaknesses
1. Proportionality of Secrecy
Cryptography/Proportionality of Secrecy
"The more secret information you know, the more successful the concealment of the plaintext."
It is important to realize that any crypto system in its design is an exercise in resource allocation
and optimization.
If we were to return to the postal analogy used in the discussion of Asymmetric Ciphers.
Suppose Alice has a secret message to send to Bob in the mail. Alice could put the message in
her lock box and use Bob's padlock to lock it allowing Bob to open it with his key, as describe
earlier. But if it were a really important message or Alice and Bob had a higher expectation of the
opponent they wished to thwart (Bob's girlfriend knows where Bob keeps his keys) Alice and Bob
might want to resort to a more complicated crypto system. For example Bob could have multiple
keys, one he keeps on his key chain, one he keeps in a rented Post Office box and one that is in
a box in a Swiss bank vault. Bob might welcome this sort of security for really serious messages
but for day to day messages between Bob and Alice Bob will no doubt find a daily flight to
Switzerland rather expensive inconvenient. All crypto systems must face a resource tradeoff
between convenience and security.
Cryptography/Key Lengths
< Cryptography
Key Length
Key length is directly proportional to security. In modern cryptosystems, key length is measured
in bits (i.e., AES uses 256 bit keys), and each bit of a key increases the difficulty of a bruteforce attack exponentially. It is important to note that in addition to adding more security, each bit
slows down the cryptosystem as well. Because of this, key length  like all things security  is a
tradeoff. In this case between practicality and security.
Furthermore, different types of cryptosystems require vastly different key lengths to maintain
security. For instance, modulobased public key systems such as DiffieHellman and RSA require
rather long keys (generally around 1,024 bits), whereas symmetric systems, both block and
stream, are able to use shorter keys (generally around 256 bits). Furthermore, elliptic curve
public key systems are capable of maintaining security at key lengths similar to those of
symmetric systems. While most block ciphers will only use one key length, most public key
systems can use any number of key lengths.
As an illustration of relying on different key lengths for the same level of security, modern
implementations of public key systems (see GPG and PGP) give the user a choice of keylengths.
Usually ranging between 768 and 4,096 bits. These implementations use the public key system
(generally eitherRSA or ElGamal) to encrypt a randomly generated blockcipher key (128 to 256
bits) which was used to encrypt the actual message.
Entropy
Equal to the importance of key length, is information entropy. Entropy, defined generally as "a
measure of the disorder of a system" has a similar meaning in this sense: if all of the bits of a key
are not securely generated and equally random (whether truly random or the result of a
cryptographically secure PRNG operation), then the system is much more vulnerable to attack.
For example, if a 128 bit key only has 64 bits of entropy, then the effective length of the key is 64
bits. This can be seen in the DES algorithm. DES actually has a key length of 64 bits, however 8
bits are used for parity, therefore the effective key length is 56 bits.
Common Mistakes
The fundamental deficiency in advantages of long block cipher keys when compare it to short
cipher keys could be in difficulties to screening physical random entropy in short digits. Perhaps
we can't store screening mechanism of randomness in secret, so we can't get randomness of
entropy 2^256 without energy, which will be liner to appropriate entropy. For example, typical
mistake of random generator implementation is simple addiction of individual digits with
probability 0.5. This generator could be easy broken by bruteforce by neighbor bits wave
functions. In this point of view, using block ciphers with large amount of digits, for ex. 10^1024
and more have a practical sense.
Other typical mistake is using public key infrastructure to encrypt session keys, because in this
key more preferable to use DiffieHellman algorithm. Using the DiffieHellman algorithm to create
session keys gives "forward secrecy".
Cryptography/Random Quality
"The higher the entropy of a random source, the better the quality of the random data it
generates."
Many cryptographic algorithms call for a random source, either in keygeneration, or some other
primitive. Implementors must be extremely cautious in selecting that random source, or they will
open themselves up to attack. For example, the only formally proven encryption technique, the
one time pad, requires a completely random and unbiased keystream that is at least as long as
the message itself, and is never reused. There are many implicit complications presented in this
requirement, as the only sources of "true randomness" are in the physical world (silicon decay is
an example), and are impossible to implement in software. Thus, it is often only feasible to obtain
pseudorandomness. PseudoRandom Number Generators, or PRNGs, use multiple sources
that are thought to be difficult to predict (mouse movement, least significant digits of the
computer clock, network statistics, etc.) in order to generate an entropy pool, which is passed
through assorted algorithms which attempt to remove any biases, and then used as a seed for a
predetermined static set of numbers. Even with all of the sources of entropy, a determined
attacker can usually reduce the effective strength of an implementation by cutting out some of
the factors  for instance making educated guesses on the time. PRNGs that are thought to be
acceptable for cryptographic purposes are called CryptographicallySecure PseudoRandom
Number Generators, or CSPRNGs.
Entropy
In terms of information theory, entropy is defined as the measure of the amount of information
expressed in a string of bits. For example gender contains 1bit of entropy as it can be
represented using a 1 for males and a 0 for females. The quality of a random source is
determined by just how much entropy it generates, if the entropy is less than the actual number
of bits then there is some repetition of information. The more information that is repeated, or the
shorter the period of some PRNG, the lower the entropy and the weaker and more predictable
the source of randomness. Therefore in cryptography one seeks to get as close to perfect
randomness as possible with the resources available  where a perfect random number
generator creates a sequence of bits which are unpredictable no matter how large a sample of
previously generated bits is obtained.
further reading
Cryptography/Statistical Weaknesses
Letter Frequency
Whenever you consider any available language, it gives information about the frequency of
letters that occur most frequently in it. The same matter is more enough for cryptanalysis
(process of discovering ciphertexts) which is more beneficial when encryption is performed using
the Conventional Classical Encryption Techniques.
This gives statistical information of data that cryptanalysts can use in order to decrypt the
encrypted data, provided the language in which data is present is known.
3.Faulty Implementation
Cryptography/Faults
The strength of your encryption method is based not only on your encryption method, but also on
your ability to use it effectively. A perfect encryption method which is finicky to use and hard to
get right is not likely to be useful in building a high quality security system.
For example, the OneTime Pad cypher is the only known provably unbreakable algorithm (in the
very strong sense of a more effective than brute force search attack being impossible), but this
proof applies ONLY if the key used is completely randomly chosen (there is currently no known
method for making such a choice nor is there any known method for demonstrating that any
particular choice is random), if the key is a long as the plaintext, if the key is never reused, and if
the key never becomes known to the enemy. These conditions are so difficult to ensure that the
OneTime Pad is almost never used in actual practice, whatever its theoretical advantages.
Any use of the OneTime Pad violating those assumed requirements is insecure, sometimes
trivially so. For instance, statistical analysis techniques may be immediately applicable, under
certain kinds of misuse.
4.Inadequate PeerReview
6.Side Channels
EFF project in the late 1990s. They even wrote a book about their exploit  Cracking DES,
O'Reilly and Assoc. The EFF is a nonprofit cyberspace civil rights group; many people feel that
wellfunded organisations like the NSA can successfully attack a symmetric key cipher with a 64bit key using brute force. This is surely true, as it has been done publicly. Many observers
suggest a minimum key length for symmetric key algorithms of 128 bits, and even then it is
important to select a secure algorithm. For instance, many algorithms can be reduced in effective
keylength until it is computationally feasible to launch a brute force attack. AES is recommended
for use until at least 2030.
The situation with regard to asymmetric algorithms is much more complicated and depends on
the individual algorithm. Thus the currently breakable key length for the RSA algorithm is at least
768 bits (broken publicly since 2009), but for most elliptic curve asymmetric algorithms, the
largest currently breakable key length is believed to be rather shorter, perhaps as little as 128
bits or so. A message encrypted with a 109 bit key by an elliptic curve encryption algorithm was
publicly broken by brute force key search in early 2003. As of 2015, a minimum key length of 224
bits is recommended for elliptic curve algorithms, and 2048 bits for such other asymmetric key
algorithms as RSA (asymmetric key algorithms that rely on complex mathematical problems for
their security always will need much larger keyspaces as there are shortcuts to cracking them,
as opposed to direct bruteforce).
Dictionary Attack
A dictionary attack is a common password cracking technique, relying largely on the weak
passwords selected by average computer users. For instance, if an attacker had somehow
accessed the hashed password files through various malicious database manipulations and
educated searching on an online store, he would then write a program to hash one at a time all
words in a dictionary (of, for example any or all languages and common derivative passwords),
and compare these hashes to the real password hashes he had obtained. If the hashes match,
he has obtained a password.
PreComputation Dictionary Attack
The simple dictionary attack method quickly becomes far too timeconsuming with any large
number of password hashes, such as an online database would yield. Thus, attackers developed
the method of precomputation. In this attack, the attacker has already hashed his entire suite of
dictionaries, and all he need do is compare the hashes. Additionally, his task is made easier by
the fact that many users will select the same passwords. To prevent this attack, a database
administrator must attach unique 32bit salts to the users passwords before hashing, thus
rendering precompution useless.
Changing a key frequently in response to an attempt to try all possible keys would require
an attacker to start over assuming he knew the key was changed or finish attempting all
possible keys before starting the attack again from the beginning.
A system could rely on a time out or lock out of the system after so many attempts at
guessing the key. Systems that time out can simply block further access, lock a user
account, contact the account owner, or even destroy the clear text information.
2 step verification is a method of requiring a second key to enter the system. This
complicates a brute force attack since the attacker must not only guess one key but then
guess a second possibly equally complex key. The most common implementation of this is to
ask for further authentication "What's your first dogs name?". There is a new trend on the
horizon for systems to utilize two step verification through a time based key that is emailed or
texted and having access to an account or particular electronic device serves as a secondary
key.
1.Dictionary Attack
2.Frequency Analysis
Cryptography/Frequency analysis
< Cryptography
Frequency analysis is based on the fact that certain letters, and combinations of letters, appear
with characteristic frequency in essentially all texts in a particular language. For instance, in the
English language E is very common, while X is not. Likewise, ST, NG, TH, and QU are common
combinations, while XT, NZ, and QJ are exceedingly uncommon, or "impossible". Given our
example of all E's turning into X's, a cyphertext message containing lots of X's already seems to
suggest one pair in the substitution mapping.
In practice the use of frequency analysis consists of first counting the frequency of cypher text
letters and then assigning "guessed" plaintext letters to them. Many letters will occur with roughly
the same frequency, so a cypher with X's may indeed map X onto R, but could also map X onto
G or M. But some letters in every language using letters will occur more frequently; if there are
more X's in the cyphertext than anything else, it's a good guess for English plaintext that X
stands for E. But T and A are also very common in English text, so X might be either of them. It's
very unlikely to be a Z or Q which aren't common in English. Thus the cryptanalyst may need to
try several combinations of mappings between cyphertext and plaintext letters. Once the
common letters are 'solved', the technique typically moves on to pairs and other patterns. These
often have the advantage of linking less commonly used letters in many cases, filling in the gaps
in the candidate mapping table being built. For instance, Q and U nearly always travel together in
that order in English, but Q is rare.
Frequency analysis is extremely effective against the simpler substitution cyphers and will break
astonishingly short ciphertexts with ease. This fact was the basis of Edgar Allan Poe's claim, in
his famous newspaper cryptanalysis demonstrations in the middle 1800's, that no cypher devised
by man could defeat him. Poe was overconfident in his proclamation, however, for polyalphabetic
substitution cyphers (invented by Alberti around 1467) defy simple frequency analysis attacks.
The electromechanical cypher machines of the first half of the 20th century (e.g., the Hebern?
machine, the Enigma, the Japanese Purple machine, the SIGABA, the Typex, ...) were, if
properly used, essentially immune to straightforward frequency analysis attack, being
fundamentally polyalphabetic cyphers. They were broken using other attacks.
Frequency analysis was first discovered in the Arab world, and is known to have been in use by
about 1000 CE. It is thought that close textual study of the Koran first brought to light that Arabic
has a characteristic letter frequency which can be used in cryptoanalysis. Its use spread, and
was so widely used by European states by the Renaissance that several schemes were invented
by cryptographers to defeat it. These included use of several alternatives to the most common
letters in otherwise monoalphabetic substitution cyphers (i.e., for English, both X and Y
cyphertext might mean plaintext E), use of several alphabets  chosen in assorted, more or less,
devious ways (Leon Alberti seems to have been the first to propose this), culminating in such
schemes as using only pairs or triplets of plaintext letters as the 'mapping index' to cyphertext
letters (e.g., the Playfair cipher invented by Charles Wheatstone in the mid 1800s). The
disadvantage of all these attempts to defeat frequency counting attacks is that it increases
complication of both encyphering and decyphering, leading to mistakes. Famously, a British
Foreign Secretary is said to have rejected the Playfair cipher because, even if school boys could
learn it as Wheatstone and Playfair had shown, 'our attaches could never learn it!'.
Frequency analysis requires a basic understanding of the language of the plaintext, as well as
tenacity, some problem solving skills, and considerable tolerance for extensive letter
bookkeeping. Neat handwriting also helps. During WWII, both the British and Americans
recruited codebreakers by placing crossword puzzles in major newspapers and running contests
for who could solve them the fastest. Several of the cyphers used by the Axis were breakable
using frequency analysis (e.g., the 'consular' cyphers used by the Japanese). Mechanical
methods of letter counting and statistical analysis (generally IBM card machinery) were first used
in WWII. Today, the hard work of letter counting and analysis has been replaced by the tireless
speed of the computer, which can carry out this analysis in seconds. No mere substitution cypher
can be thought credibly safe in modern times.
The frequency analysis method is neither necessary nor sufficient to solve ciphers. Historically,
cryptanalysts solved substitution ciphers using a variety of other analysis methods long before
and after the frequency analysis method became well known. Some people even question why
the frequency analysis method was considered useful for such a long time. [1] However, modern
cyphers are not simple substitution cyphers in any guise. They are much more complex than
WWII cyphers, and are immune to simple frequency analysis, and even to advanced statistical
methods. The best of them must be attacked using fundamental mathematical methods not
based on the peculiarities of the underlying plaintext language. See Cryptography/Differential
cryptanalysis or Cryptography/Linear cryptanalysis as examples of such techniques.
3.Index of Coincidence
Cryptography/Index of coincidence
< Crypto
The index of coincidence for a ciphertext is the probability that two letters selected from it are
identical. Usually denoted by I, it is a statistical measure of the redundancy of text. The index of
coincidence of totally random collection (uniform distribution) of letters is around 0.0385.
4.Linear Cryptanalysis
Cryptography/Linear cryptanalysis
In cryptography, linear cryptanalysis is a general form of cryptanalysis based on
finding affine approximations to the action of a cipher. Attacks have been developed for block
ciphers and stream ciphers. Linear cryptanalysis is one of the two most widely used attacks on
block ciphers; the other beingdifferential cryptanalysis.
The discovery is attributed to Mitsuru Matsui, who first applied the technique to the FEAL cipher
(Matsui and Yamagishi, 1992). Subsequently, Matsui published an attack on the Data Encryption
Standard (DES), eventually leading to the first experimental cryptanalysis of the cipher reported
in the open community (Matsui, 1993; 1994). The attack on DES is not generally practical,
requiring 243 known plaintexts.
A variety of refinements to the attack have been suggested, including using multiple linear
approximations or incorporating nonlinear expressions, leading to a generalized partitioning
cryptanalysis. Evidence of security against linear cryptanalysis is usually expected of new cipher
designs.
Overview
There are two parts to linear cryptanalysis. The first is to construct linear equations relating
plaintext, ciphertext and key bits that have a high bias; that is, whose probabilities of holding
(over the space of all possible values of their variables) are as close as possible to 0 or 1. The
second is to use these linear equations in conjunction with known plaintextciphertext pairs to
derive key bits.
In an ideal cipher, any linear equation relating plaintext, ciphertext and key bits would hold with
probability 1/2. Since the equations dealt with in linear cryptanalysis will vary in probability, they
are more accurately referred to as linear approximations.
The procedure for constructing approximations is different for each cipher. In the most basic type
of block cipher, a substitutionpermutation network, analysis is concentrated primarily on the Sboxes, the only nonlinear part of the cipher (i.e. the operation of an Sbox cannot be encoded in
a linear equation). For small enough Sboxes, it is possible to enumerate every possible linear
equation relating the Sbox's input and output bits, calculate their biases and choose the best
ones. Linear approximations for Sboxes then must be combined with the cipher's other actions,
such as permutation and key mixing, to arrive at linear approximations for the entire cipher.
The pilingup lemma is a useful tool for this combination step. There are also techniques for
iteratively improving linear approximations (Matsui 1994).
we can then apply a straightforward algorithm (Matsui's Algorithm 2), using known plaintextciphertext pairs, to guess at the values of the key bits involved in the approximation.
For each set of values of the key bits on the righthand side (referred to as a partial key), count
how many times the approximation holds true over all the known plaintextciphertext pairs; call
this count T. The partial key whose T has the greatest absolute difference from half the number
of plaintextciphertext pairs is designated as the most likely set of values for those key bits. This
is because it is assumed that the correct partial key will cause the approximation to hold with a
high bias. The magnitude of the bias is significant here, as opposed to the magnitude of the
probability itself.
This procedure can be repeated with other linear approximations, obtaining guesses at values of
key bits, until the number of unknown key bits is low enough that they can be attacked with brute
force.
Referencez
Matsui, M. and Yamagishi, A. "A new method for known plaintext attack of FEAL
cipher". Advances in Cryptology  EUROCRYPT 1992.
Matsui, M. "Linear cryptanalysis method for DES cipher" (PDF). Advances in Cryptology EUROCRYPT 1993. Archived from the original on 20060410. Retrieved 20070222.
5.Differential Cryptanalysis
Cryptography/Differential cryptanalysis
Differential cryptanalysis is a general form of cryptanalysis applicable primarily to block
ciphers, but also to stream ciphers and cryptographic hash functions. In the broadest sense, it is
the study of how differences in an input can affect the resultant difference at the output. In the
case of a block cipher, it refers to a set of techniques for tracing differences through the network
of transformations, discovering where the cipher exhibits nonrandom behaviour, and exploiting
such properties to recover the secret key.
History
The discovery of differential cryptanalysis is generally attributed to Eli Biham and Adi Shamir in
the late 1980s, who published a number of attacks against various block ciphers and hash
functions, including a theoretical weakness in the Data Encryption Standard (DES). It was noted
by Bamford inThe Puzzle Palace that DES is surprisingly resilient to differential cryptanalysis, in
the sense that even small modifications to the algorithm would make it much more susceptible.
In 1994, a member of the original IBM DES team, Don Coppersmith, published a paper stating
that differential cryptanalysis was known to IBM as early as 1974, and that defending against
differential cryptanalysis had been a design goal. [1] According to author Steven Levy, IBM had
discovered differential cryptanalysis on its own, and the NSA was apparently well aware of the
technique.[2] IBM kept some secrets, as Coppersmith explains: "After discussions with NSA, it
was decided that disclosure of the design considerations would reveal the technique of
differential cryptanalysis, a powerful technique that could be used against many ciphers. This in
turn would weaken the competitive advantage the United States enjoyed over other countries in
the field of cryptography."[1] Within IBM, differential cryptanalysis was known as the "Tattack"[1],
or "Tickle attack".[3]
While DES was designed with resistance to differential cryptanalysis in mind, other contemporary
ciphers proved to be vulnerable. An early target for the attack was the FEAL block cipher. The
original proposed version with four rounds (FEAL4) can be broken using only eight chosen
plaintexts, and even a 31round version of FEAL is susceptible to the attack.
Attack mechanics
Differential cryptanalysis is usually a chosen plaintext attack, meaning that the attacker must be
able to obtain encrypted ciphertexts for some set of plaintexts of his choosing. The scheme can
successfully cryptanalyze DES with an effort on the order 247 chosen plaintexts. There are,
however, extensions that would allow a known plaintext or even a ciphertextonly attack. The
basic method uses pairs of plaintext related by a constant difference; difference can be defined in
several ways, but the eXclusive OR (XOR) operation is usual. The attacker then computes the
differences of the corresponding ciphertexts, hoping to detect statistical patterns in their
distribution. The resulting pair of differences is called a differential. Their statistical properties
depend upon the nature of the Sboxes used for encryption, so the attacker analyses
differentials
, where
(and
denotes exclusive
or) for each such Sbox . In the basic attack, one particular ciphertext difference is expected to
be especially frequent; in this way, the cipher can be distinguished from randomness. More
sophisticated variations allow the key to be recovered faster than exhaustive search.
In the most basic form of key recovery through differential cryptanalysis, an attacker requests the
ciphertexts for a large number of plaintext pairs, then assumes that the differential holds for at
least r1 rounds, where r is the total number of rounds. The attacker then deduces which round
keys (for the final round) are possible assuming the difference between the blocks before the
final round is fixed. When round keys are short, this can be achieved by simply exhaustively
decrypting the ciphertext pairs one round with each possible round key. When one round key has
been deemed a potential round key considerably more often than any other key, it is assumed to
be the correct round key.
For any particular cipher, the input difference must be carefully selected if the attack is to be
successful. An analysis of the algorithm's internals is undertaken; the standard method is to trace
a path of highly probable differences through the various stages of encryption, termed
a differential characteristic.
Since differential cryptanalysis became public knowledge, it has become a basic concern of
cipher designers. New designs are expected to be accompanied by evidence that the algorithm
is resistant to this attack, and many, including the Advanced Encryption Standard, have been
proven secure against the attack.
References
1. Jump up to:a b c Coppersmith, Don (May 1994). "The Data Encryption Standard (DES) and its
strength against attacks" (PDF). IBM Journal of Research and Development 38 (3):
243. (subscription required)
2. Jump up Levy, Steven (2001). "Crypto: How the Code Rebels Beat the Government
Saving Privacy in the Digital Age. Penguin Books. pp. 5556. ISBN 0140244328.
3. Jump up Matt Blaze, sci.crypt, 15 August 1996, Re: Reverse engineering and the Clipper
chip"
Eli Biham, Adi Shamir, Differential Cryptanalysis of the Data Encryption Standard,
Springer Verlag, 1993. ISBN 0387979301, ISBN 3540979301.
Eli Biham, Adi Shamir,"Differential Cryptanalysis of the Full 16Round DES," CS 708,
Proceedings of CRYPTO '92, Volume 740 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, December
1991. (Postscript)
Eli Biham, slides from "How to Make a Difference: Early History of Differential
Cryptanalysis"PDF (850 KB), March 16, 2006, FSE 2006, Graz, Austria
and
respectively) are combined simply (by applying one then the other) to give a
or
as appropriate.
and correspondingly
Now, given that each has a 64 bit key, the amount of key needed to encrypt or decrypt is 128
bits, so a simple analysis would assume this is the same as a 128 bit cypher.
However, given sufficient storage, you can reduce the effective key strength of this to a few bits
larger than the largest of the two keys employed, as follows.
1. Given a plaintext/cyphertext pair, apply
key in turn, generating
where
intermediate cryptotexts
2. Store each of the cryptotexts in a hash table so that each can be referenced by its
cryptotext, and give the key used to generate that cryptotext
3. Apply
to the ciphertext for each possible key in turn, comparing
the intermediate plaintext to the hash table calculated earlier. this gives a pair of keys
(one for each of the two algorithms employed, and )
4. Taking the two keys from stage 3, test each against a second plaintext/cryptotext pair. if
this also matches, odds are extremely high you have a valid keypair for the message not in
operations, but a "mere"
operations (which nonetheless are
significantly longer due to the hash table operations, but not so much as to add more
than a couple of extra bits worth of time to the complexity of the task)
The downside to this approach is storage. Assuming you have a 64 bit key, then you will need at
least
units of storage  where each unit is the amount of space used by a single hash record.
Even given a minimal implementation (say, 64 bits for the key plus four bits hash collision
overhead), if you implemented such a system using 160GB hard drives, you would need close to
one billion of them to store the hash table alone.
7.Maninthemiddle attack
Creating Cryptography/Maninthemiddle
attack
Attacks still exist against it. Even though these hashes are not designed to be reversed, the
methods for computing hashes are widely known, making some of attacks possible to
succeed: Brute Force, Frequency Analysis[citation needed], Social Engineering and
Coercion and Birthday Attack. Also, it should be mentioned that some hashes, md4, md5, sha0 notably have been found to have collisions that allow one to take an existing hash and compute
a value that, once been hashed, will yield that value. This means that one can create other
values that may or may not be the actual original but since it brings about the same hash it
weakens the algorithm and allows exploitation of implementations that depend on it.
1.Collisions
Cryptography/Collisions
< Cryptography
A hash function is said to collide when two distinct inputs to the hash function yield the same
output.
For example, when the following blocks are input into the md5 hash function they both yield the
same output.
d131dd02c5e6eec4693d9a0698aff95c
2fcab58712467eab4004583eb8fb7f89
55ad340609f4b30283e488832571415a
085125e8f7cdc99fd91dbdf280373c5b
d8823e3156348f5bae6dacd436c919c6
dd53e2b487da03fd02396306d248cda0
e99f33420f577ee8ce54b67080a80d1e
c69821bcb6a8839396f9652b6ff72a70
d131dd02c5e6eec4693d9a0698aff95c
2fcab50712467eab4004583eb8fb7f89
55ad340609f4b30283e4888325f1415a
085125e8f7cdc99fd91dbd7280373c5b
d8823e3156348f5bae6dacd436c919c6
dd53e23487da03fd02396306d248cda0
e99f33420f577ee8ce54b67080280d1e
c69821bcb6a8839396f965ab6ff72a70
References
1.Generating
2.Exploiting
2.Birthday Attack
Cryptography/Birthday Attack
.
3.Joux Attack
1.Transposition Ciphers
2. Jump up Helen Fouch Gaines. "Cryptanalysis: A Study of Ciphers and Their Solution".
1956. section "The Turning Grille". p. 29 to 36.
3. Jump up "Elementary Course in Cryptanalysis: Assignment 9: Grille Transposition Ciphers".
2.Caesar Cipher
Breaking the Caesar cipher is trivial as it is vulnerable to most forms of attack. The system is
so easily broken that it is often faster to perform a brute force attack to discover if this cipher is in
use or not. An easy way for humans to decipher it is to examine the letter frequencies of the
cipher text and see where they match those found in the underlying language.
Frequency analysis[edit]
By graphing the frequencies of letters in the ciphertext and those in the original language of the
plaintext, a human can spot the value of the key but looking at the displacement of particular
features of the graph. For example in the English language the frequencies of the letters Q,R,S,T
have a particularly distinctive pattern.
Computers can also do this trivially by means of an autocorrelation function.
Brute force[edit]
As the system only has 26 nontrivial keys it is easy even for a human to cycle through all the
possible keys until they find one which allows the ciphertext to be converted into plaintext.
3.Enigma Machine
4.Permutation Cipher
5.Vigenre Cipher
Plain text is encrypted using the Vigenre cipher by first choosing a keyword consisting of letters
from the alphabet of symbols used in the plain text. The keyword is then used to encrypt the text
by way of the following example.
Using: Plain text: ilikewikibooks and choosing: Keyword: cta
1. Map all the plain text to numbers 025 or however long your alphabet is
ilikewikibooks converts to 8 11 8 10 4 22 8 10 8 1 14 14 10 18
cta maps to 2 19 0
11
10
22
10
14
14
10
18
19
19
19
19
19
33
14
12
resulting in
10 30
12
23
22 10 29
37
4. take each resulting number mod 26 ( or for the general case mod the number of characters in
your alphabet)
resulting in
10 4
12
23
22 10 3
14
12
11
5. map each number back to a letter to get the resulting cypher text
keimxwkdidhoml
The message can easily be decrypted with the keyword by reversing the above process. The
keyword can be any length equal to or less than that of the plain text.
Without the keyword the primary method of breaking the Vigenre cipher is known as the Kasiski
test, after the Prussian major who first published it. The first stage is determining the length of the
keyword.
Plaintext:
TOBEORNOTTOBE
Keyword:
KEYKEYKEYKEYK
Ciphertext: DSZOSPXSRDSZO
Upon inspection of the ciphertext, we see that there are a few digraphs repeated, namely DS,
SZ, and ZO. It is statistically unlikely that all of these would arise by random chance; the odds
are that repeated digraphs in the ciphertext correspond to repetitions in the plaintext. If that is the
case, the digraphs must be encoded by the same section of the key both times. Therefore, the
length of the key is a factor of the distance in the text between the repetitions.
Digraph
First Position
Second Position
Distance
Factors
DS
10
3,9
SZ
10
3,9
ZO
10
3,9
The common factors (indeed, the only factors in this simple example) are 3 and 9. This narrows
down the possibilities significantly, and the effect is even more pronounced with longer texts and
keys.
Frequency analysis
Once the length of the key is known, a slightly modified frequency analysis technique can be
applied. Suppose the length of the key is known to be three. Then every third letter will be
encrypted with the same letter of the key. The ciphertext can be split into three segments  one
for each key letterand the procedure described for the Caesar cipher can be used.
Cryptography/Digital signatures
< Cryptography
As of 2014, installing apps is probably the most common way people use digital signatures. Both
Android and iOS require an app to be digitally signed before it can be installed. [1][2]
Cryptography is generally used to provide some form of assurance about a message. This
assurance can be one or more of four general forms. These forms are
message confidentiality, integrity, authentication, and nonrepudiation. Up until the advent
of public key encryption, cryptography was generally only used to provide confidentiality, that is,
communications were encrypted to keep their contents secret. This encryption generally implies
the sender to know the scheme and key in use, and therefore provides some rudimentary
authentication. Modern digital signatures are much better at providing the assurance of
authentication, integrity, and nonrepudiation than historical symmetrickey encryption schemes.
Digital signatures rely on the ability of a publickey signing algorithm to sign a message  to
generate a signature from the message with a private key. Later, anyone with that signature can
verify the message using the corresponding public key. (This uses the keys in the opposite order
as publickey encryption and publickey decryption to provide confidentiality  encryption with a
public key and decryption only with the private key). However, to provide digital signing, a signer
must use his private key to sign the messageor some representation of the messagethat he
wants to sign with his private key, so that anyone who knows his public key can use it to verify
that only his private key could have signed that message.
There are a number of relevant details to proper implementation.
First, the signature itself is useless if the recipients do not have a verified copy of the signer's
public key. While perhaps the best method for exchanging that key would be to meet facetoface, this is often not possible. As a result, many public key infrastructures require the creation of
a Certificate Authoritywhose public key is preshared via some trusted method. An example of
this would be SSL CA's like VeriSign, whose certificates are preinstalled in most popular
browsers by the computer manufacturer. The CA is what's known as a Trusted Third Party, an
individual or organization who is trusted by all parties involved in the encrypted communications.
It is the duty of this organization to keep its private key safe and secret, and to use that key to
sign public keys of individuals it has verified. In other words, in order to save the trouble of
meeting facetoface to exchange keys with every individual you wish to communicate with, you
might engage the services of a trusted third party whose public key you already have to go meet
these individuals facetoface. The third party can then sign the public keys and send them along
to you, so that you end up with a verified copy without the trouble of exchanging each key pair
facetoface. The details of signing itself we will get to in a moment.
An alternative method commonly used for secure email transmission via PGP or GPG is known
as a web of trust. A web of trust is similar to the creation of a certificate authority, with the primary
difference being that it is less formal. Rather than creating an organization to act as a trusted
third party, individuals will instead sign keys of other individuals they have met in person. In this
manner, if Alice has Bob's key, and Bob signs Charlie's key, Alice can trust Charlie's key.
Obviously, this can be extended over a very complex web, but this ability is also a great
weakness; one compromised individual in the webthe weakest link in the chain of trustcan
render the rest useless.
The actual implementation of signing can also vary. One can sign a message simply by
encrypting it with his private keyit can be decrypted by his public key, and the act of valid
encryption can only be performed by that secret key, thus proving his identity. However, often
one may want to sign but not encrypt messages. To provide this functionality at a base level, one
might send two copies of the message, one of which would be encrypted. If a reader wishes to
verify that the unencrypted message he has read is valid, he can decrypt the duplicate and
compare the two. However, even this method is cumbersome; it doubles the size of every
message. To avoid this drawback, most implementations use Hash Functions to generate a hash
of the message, and use the private key to encrypt that hash. This provides nearly the same
security as encrypting a duplicate, but saves space.
Many early explanations of publickey signature algorithms describe publickey signing
algorithms as "encrypt a message with a private key". Then they describe publickey message
verify algorithms as "decrypt with the public key". Many people prefer to describe modern publickey cryptosystems as having 4 independent highlevel functions  encrypt, decrypt, sign, verify since none of them (if properly padded to avoid chosenciphertext attacks) can be substituted for
any of the others.[3][4][5][6][7][8][9][10][11][12]
1. Jump up Android Developers. "Signing Your Applications".
2. Jump up Genuitec. "iOS Application Provisioning Requirements".
3. Jump up Nate Lawson. "RSA public keys are not private".
4. Jump up "RSA encryption with private key and decryption with a public key".
5. Jump up "ElGamal encryption with private key".
6. Jump up "Is encrypting data with a private key dangerous?".
7. Jump up "Encryption with private key?".
8. Jump up "Can one encrypt with a private key/decrypt with a public key?".
9. Jump up "Encrypt with private key and decrypt with public key".
2.DSA
Creating Cryptography/DSA
2.Database protection
Cryptography/Database protection
< Cryptography
3 Get the encrypted record of user John Doe and decrypt the data.
"johndoe@anisp.localhost"; // The
$aRecord['name']
"John Doe";
$aRecord['creditnr']
"0192733652342" ;
Primary key
= $bf>encrypt( $aRecord['email'] );
$aRecord['name']
= $bf>encrypt( $aRecord['name'] );
$aRecord['creditnr']
= $bf>encrypt( $aRecord['creditnr'] );
require_once("Crypt/Blowfish.php");
// a Pear class
http://pear.php.net
$primary_key = "johndoe@anisp.localhost";
// crypt  oneway encryption
$cipher_key = crypt(
$primary_key , "A_SECRET_COMPANY_SALT");
$primary_key ) ;
= $bf>decrypt( $aRecord['email'] );
$aRecord['name']
= $bf>decrypt( $aRecord['name'] );
$aRecord['creditnr']
= $bf>decrypt( $aRecord['creditnr'] );
3.ECash
Creating Cryptography/Ecash
4.EVoting
Creating Cryptography/Evoting
5.DRM
Cryptography/DRM
< Cryptography
same document, illicitly distributed his/her own copy of the content, failing to meet possible
limitations of use and distribution.
e. Digital forensic: they are processing techniques supporting detective activities to use
multimedia content as an evidence of possible criminal acts. In our case, we are interested in
proving if a image or a video sequence we have at disposal has been acquired with a given
digital camera.
f. Signal processing in the encrypted domain: it is a new research field studying new technologies
to allow the processing of encrypted multimedia content without removing the encryption. Most of
technological solutions proposed so far to cope with multimedia security simply tried to apply
some cryptographic primitives on top of the signal processing modules. These solutions are
based on the assumption that the two communicating parties trust each other, so that the
encryption is used only to protect the data against third parties. In many cases, though, this is not
the case. A possible solution to the above problems could consist in the application of the signal
processing modules in the encrypted domain.
g. Steganography: it is the science of hiding sensitive messages into an apparently innocuous
document in such a way that no one apart from the intended recipient knows of the existence of
the message. In case of a multimedia document, the information is hidden by means of the
application of not perceivable modifications.
h. Steganalysis: it is the science of detecting the presence into a document of messages hidden
using steganography techniques, exploiting perceptual or statistical analysis.
6.Biometrics
Cryptography/Biometrics
< Cryptography
Biometrics
1. "Biometrics" is the science of human identity recognition based on physiological or behavioural
characteristics that are unique to each individual.
2. Due to recent advances in the use of Biometrics in Passport Documents, ATM, Credit Card,
Cellular Phone, PDA, Airport Checkin, Electronic Banking, web Access, Network Logon, Laptops
Data Security there are presently research activities concerning the following areas:
a. Advanced finger recognition: it focuses on the finger retrieval from large database which is
crucial part of the automatic fingerprint identification system. Conventional exclusive fingerprint
classification partitions fingerprints into a few prespecific nonoverlapping classes(usually 4 or 5
classes) based on the Henrry classes. This limits the efficiency the efficiency of the fingerprint
indexing. The continuous fingerprint classification overcome limitation of the number of classes.
However, the exhaustive search of the whole fingerprint database required by this approach
could be timeconsuming. Research is going on in exploring the methods that inherits the merits
of both the exclusive and continuous fingerprint classifications and overcomes the limitations and
drawbacks of these two conventional approaches.
b. Multiscale image processing of the fingerprint image to enhance fingerprint verification
accuracy: Multiscale image processing provides an effective way to find the optimal image
enhancement of the fingerprints, which is very important to improve the quality of heavily
corrupted fingerprint images.
7.Anonymity
Creating Cryptography/Anonymity
2.Classical Ciphers
1.Beale Cipher
Cryptography/Beale cipher
The Beale Cipher is a cipher in which two parties agree on a key which is a text (e.g., The
Declaration of Independence which was used by Thomas Beale[1] as the key for one of his three
encrypted texts), and the words in the text are then enumerated, and the encrypted text consists
of numbers from the key. The numbers will then be replaced with the first letter of the word from
the keytext when the cipher text is being deciphered.
The origin of the cipher was that Beale left an encrypted text with notes where to find his gold
(worth $20 million, [2]), although many commentators believe the story about the hidden gold to
have been a hoax.
There are no short cuts to break this cipher like there is for Vigenre, the monoalphabetic or the
polyalphabetic cipher; ultimately, the only way to successfully decipher it is to guess the original
keytext, which may not be an easy task. The difficult depends on clues left in the cipher text. For
example, it may be possible to infer the length of the book, etc., from the cipher text.
References
2.Transposition Ciphers
Cryptography/Transposition ciphers
< Cryptography
A transposition cipher encodes a message by reordering the plaintext in some definite way.
Mathematically, it can be described as applying some sort of bijective function. The receiver
decodes the message using the reordering in the opposite way, setting the ordering right again.
Mathematically this means using the inverse function of the original encoding function.
For example, to encrypt the sentence "A simple kind of transposition cipher writes the message
into a rectangle by rows and reads it out by columns," we could use the following rectangle:
Asimplekin
doftranspo
sitionciph
erwritesth
emessagein
toarectang
lebyrowsan
dreadsitou
tbycolumns
Then the encrypted text would be "Adsee tldts oirmo erbif tweab eymti rsrya cproi serdo lanta
cosle ncegt wiuks iseas tmipp tinao nnohh ngnus."
This cipher is often complicated by permuting the rows and columns, as in columnar
transposition.
Columnar transposition[edit]
The standard columnar transposition consists of writing the key out as column headers, then
writing the message out in successive rows beneath these headers (filling in any spare spaces
with nulls), finally, the message is read off in columns, in alphabetical order of the headers. For
example suppose we have a key of 'ZEBRAS' and a message of 'WE ARE DISCOVERED. FLEE
AT ONCE'. We start with:
Z
To decipher it, the recipient has to work out the column lengths by dividing the message length
by the key length. Then he can write the message out in columns again, then reorder the
columns by reforming the key word.
Double transposition[edit]
A single columnar transpostion could be attacked by guessing possible column lengths, writing
the message out in its columns (but in the wrong order, as the key is not yet known), and then
looking for possible anagrams. Thus to make it stronger, a double transposition was often used.
This is simply a columnar transposition applied twice, with two different keys of different
(preferably relatively prime) length. Double transposition was generally regarded as the most
complicated cipher that an agent could operate reliably under difficult field conditions. It was in
actual use at least as late as World War II (e.g. poem code).
Grille[edit]
Another type of transpositional cipher uses a grille. This is a square piece of cardboard with
holes in it such that each cell in the square appears in no more than one position when the grille
is rotated to each of its four positions. Only grilles with an even number of character positions in
the square can satisfy this requirement. As much message as will fit in the grille is written, then it
is turned to another position and more message is written. Removing the cardboard reveals the
cyphertext.
The following diagram shows the message "JIM ATTACKS AT DAWN" encoded using a 4x4
grille.
The top row shows the cardboard grille and the bottom row shows the paper underneath the
grille at five stages of encoding:
1. blank grille on the paper.
2. first four letters written in the blanks.
3. grille rotated one position, second set of letters written.
4. grille rotated two positions, third set of letters written.
3.Caesar cipher
Cryptography/Caesar cipher
< Cryptography
A Caesar cipher (also known as a shift cipher) is a substitution cipher in which the cipher
alphabet is merely the plain alphabet rotated left or right by some number of positions. For
instance, here is a Caesar cipher using a right rotation of three places:
Plain:
ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ
Cipher: XYZABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVW
To encipher a message, simply look up each letter of the message in the "plain" line and write
down the corresponding letter in the "cipher" line. To decipher, do the reverse. Because this
cipher is a group, multiple encryptions and decryptions provide NO additional security against
any attack, including bruteforce.
The Caesar cipher is named for Julius Caesar, who allegedly used it to protect messages of
military significance. It was secure at the time because Caesar's enemies could often not even
read plaintext, let alone ciphertext. But since it can be very easily broken even by hand, it has not
been adequate for secure communication for at least a thousand years since the Arabs
discovered frequency analysis and so made all simple substitution cyphers almost trivially
breakable. An ancient book on cryptography, now lost, is said to have discussed the use of such
cyphers at considerable length. Our knowledge is due to side comments by other writers, such
as Suetonius.
Indeed, the Caesar cypher is much weaker than the (competently done) random substitution
ciphers used in newspaper cryptogram puzzles. The most common places Caesar ciphers are
found today are in children's toys such as secret decoder rings and in the ROT13 cipher on
Usenet (which, of course, is meant to be trivial to decrypt)...
4.Atbash Cipher
Cryptography/Atbash cipher
< Cryptography
Atbash is an ancient encryption system created in the Middle East. It was originally used in the
Hebrew language. The name "Atbash" comes from the first Hebrew letter Aleph and the last Taff.
The Atbash cipher is a simple substitution cipher that relies on transposing all the letters in the
alphabet such that the resulting alphabet is backwards. Effectively Atbash is the 26th Caesar
shift. Atbash is also a substitution cipher. Since each letter corresponds to another, it offers very
little security. The first letter is replaced with the last letter, the second with the secondlast, and
so on. The completed cypher looks like so:
Plain:
ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ
Cipher: ZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
Plain:
MEETMEATONE
Cipher: NVVGNVZGLMV
As one can see, and as mentioned previously, the Atbash cipher offers no security once the
cipher method is found.
5.Autokey cipher
6.Playfair Cipher
Cryptography/Playfair cipher
< Cryptography
The Playfair Cipher is one of several methods used to foil a simple frequency analysis. Instead
of every letter having a substitute, every digraph has a substitute. This tends to level the
frequency distribution somewhat.
The classic Playfair tableau consists of four alphabets, usually in a square arrangement, two
plaintext and two ciphertext. In this example, keywords have been used to disorder the ciphertext
alphabets.
In use, two letters of the plaintext are located in the plaintext alphabets. Then reading across
from the first letter to the column of the second letter, the first ciphertext character is found. Next,
reading down from the first letter to the row of the second letter, the second ciphertext letter is
found.
As an example, using tableau above, the digraph "TE" is enciphered as "uw", whereas the
digraph "LE" is enciphered as "mk". This makes a frequency analysis difficult.
A second version of the Playfair cipher uses a single alphabet.
SECRT  Your secret keyword, share among you and your receiver
KYWDP
LAFIZ
BXCQG
HUMOK
If the letters of a digraph lie at the corners of a rectangle, then they are rotated clockwise round
the rectangle, SW to CK, AT to EZ.
If they lie in the same column or row they are moved one down or across, EA to YX, RS to TE.
The square is treated as though it wraps round in both directions, ST to ES, DO to IR
Both versions of the Playfair cipher are of comparable strength.
Further reading[edit]
Foursquare cipher
Playfair cipher
7.Polyalphabetic substitution
Cryptography/Polyalphabetic substitution
< Cryptography
Plain Alphabet:
A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
Now to encrypt the message ``The quick brown fox jumped over the lazy dog" we would
alternate between the two cipher alphabets, using #1 for every first letter and #2 for every
second, to get: ``Msj joxfp dicda ucu tfzkjw ceji msj xzyb hln".
Polyalphabetic substitution ciphers are useful because the are less easily broken by frequency
analysis, however if an attacker knows for instance that the message has a period n, then he
simply can individually frequency analyze each cipher alphabet.
The number of letters encrypted before a polyalphabetic substitution cipher returns to its first
cipher alphabet is called its period. The larger the period, the stronger the cipher. Of course, this
method of encryption is certainly not secure by any definition and should not be applied to any
reallife scenarios
8.Scytale
Cryptography/Scytale
< Cryptography
The Scytale cipher is a type of transposition cipher used since the 7th century BCE. The first
recorded use of the scytale cipher was by the Spartans and the ancient Greeks who used it to
transport battle information between generals.
_____________________________________________________________

 H  E  L  P  M 
__ E  I  A  M  U __
 N  D  E  R  A 
 T  T  A  C  K 
______________________________________________________________
HELPM...return to the beginning once you reach the end and skip used
letters. ...EIAMUNDERATTACK.
Insert spaces and the plain text returns, "Help me I am under attack"
9.Substitution cipher
Cryptography/Substitution cipher
< Cryptography
A Substitution Cipher is similar to a Caesar cipher, but instead of using a constant shift left or
right, the plain alphabets and the cipher alphabets are mixed arbitrarily.
For example:
Plain Alphabet:
A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
Cipher Alphabet: Z Y X W V U T S R Q P O N M L K J I H G F E D C B A
With the above, the Plain text "This is a sample" would encrypt to "Gsrh rh z hznkov." This
particular substitution cipher, which relies on transposing all the letters in the alphabet such that
the resulting alphabet is backwards, is known as an atbash cipher.
With Substitution Ciphers, the secret is in the mapping between the plain and cipher alphabets.
However, there are several analytical techniques to help break these ciphers with only the
ciphertext. See Frequency analysis
Repeating letter patterns may be common letter groups such as TH, SH, RE, CH, TR,
ING, ION, and ENT.
Double letters are most likely to be LL, followed in frequency by EE, SS, OO, and TT
(and on to less commonly seen doubles).
Twoletter words almost always have one vowel and one consonant. The five most
common twoletter words, in order of frequency, are OF, TO, IN, IS, and IT.
The most common threeletter words, in order of frequency, are THE, AND, FOR, WAS,
and HIS.
The most common fourletter word is THAT. An encrypted word beginning and ending
with the same letter is likely to be THAT. Others
are AQUA,AREA, AURA, BARB, BLAB, BLOB, BOOB, BULB, CHIC, DEAD, deed, DIED, DY
ED, ease, edge, ELSE, FIEF, GANG, GONG, HASH, HATH, HUSH,KICK, LULL, MAIM, NE
ON, NOON, NOUN, ONTO, ORZO, PEEP, PIMP, PLOP, POMP, PREP, PROP, PULP, PUM
P, REAR, ROAR, SAYS, SEAS, SEES,TACT, TART, TENT, TILT, TINT, TOOT, TORT, TUFT
, URDU, and WHEW.
See also[edit]
w:etaoin shrdlu
External links[edit]
McClung, O. William: Substitution Cipher Cracker a useful tool that will perform a
frequency analysis on ciphertext.
Olson, Edwin: Decrypto a fast and automated cryptogram solver that can solve simple
substitution ciphers often found in newspapers, including puzzles like cryptoquips and
patristocrats.
Ciphergram Solution Assistant solves, or nearly solves, ciphergrams like those in the
newspapers that are called cryptoquotes.
10.
nomenclator
Creating Cryptography/nomenclator
11.
Permutation Cipher
Cryptography/Permutation cipher
< Cryptography
12.
Affine cipher
13.
Vigenre cipher
Cryptography/Vigenre cipher
< Cryptography
Contents
[hide]
1 Vigenre Cipher
o
3 Further reading
Vigenre Cipher[edit]
One of the most famous and simple polyalphabetic cipher is the Vigenere Cipher developed by
Blaise de Vigenere in the 16th century. The Vigenre cipher operates in a manner similar to
a Caesar cipher, however, rather than shifting the plaintext character by a fixed value n, a
keyword (or phrase) is chosen and the ordinal values of the characters in that keyword are used
to determine the offset. The process that creates encrypted text is simple, but it was unbroken for
300 years.The system is so simple that the Vigenere encryption system has been discovered
and rediscovered dozens of times.
For example, if the keyword is "KEY" and the plaintext is "VIGENERE CIPHER," then first the
key must be repeated so that it is the same length as the text (so key becomes keykeykeykeyke).
Next, the ordinal value of V (22) is shifted by the ordinal value of K (11) yielding F (6), the ordinal
value of I (9) by the ordinal value of E (5) yielding M (13), etc. The keyword is repeated until the
entire message is encrypted:
P: VIGENERECIPHER
K: KEYKEYKEYKEYKE
C: FMEORCBIASTFOV
An easier, but equivalent way of encrypting text is by writing out each letter of the alphabet and
the key, and simply matching up the letters:
ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ
KLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZABCDEFGHIJ
EFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZABCD
YZABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWX
First The V in the first row would up with the F in the second. Then, one would go down a row,
and see that the I in the first row lines up with the M in the third. After one reaches the bottom
row, then they would continue lining up letters with the second row. This uses exactly the same
cipher, and is simply an easier method of performing the encryption when doing so by hand.
The Caesar cipher could be seen as a special case of the Vigenre cipher in which the chosen
keyword is only a single character long.
An algorithmic way of expressing this cipher would be:
GROMARK cipher[edit]
The Gronsfeld cipher is variation of Vigenere using a pseudorandom decimal key.[1]
The cipher developed by Count Gronsfeld (Gronsfeld's cipher) was used throughout Europe. It is
enciphered and deciphered identically to the Vigenere cipher, except the key is a block of
decimal digits (repeated as necessary) shifting each plaintext character 0 to 9, rather than a
block of letters (repeated as necessary) shifting each plaintext character 0 to 25. It was more
popular than the Vigenre cipher, despite its limitations.
An algorithmic way of expressing this cipher would be:[2]
The GROMARK Cipher is a Gronsfeld cipher using a mixed alphabet and a running key.[3]
The running key cipher is a type of polyalphabetic substitution cipher in which a text, typically
from a book, is used to provide a very long keystream. Usually, the book to be used would be
agreed ahead of time, while the passage to use would be chosen randomly for each message
and secretly indicated somewhere in the message.
A cryptanalyst will see peaks in the ciphertext letter distribution corresponding to letters that are
formed when highfrequency plaintext letters are encrypted with highfrequency key text letters. [4]
If a cryptanalyst discovers two ciphertexts produced by (incorrectly) encrypting two different
plaintext messages with the same "onetime" pad, the cryptanalyst can combine those messages
to produce a new ciphertext that is the same as using one of the original plaintext messages as a
running key to encrypt the other original plaintext, then use techniques that decode running key
ciphers to try to recover both plaintexts.
Further reading[edit]
Wikipedia has related information
at Vigenre cipher
In a later chapter of this book, we will discuss techniques for Breaking Vigenre cipher.
4. Jump up Sravana Reddy; Kevin Knight. "Decoding Running Key Ciphers". 2012.
Category:
Cryptography
14.
Polybius square
15.
ADFGVX cipher
Creating Cryptography/Fractionation
3.Contemporary Ciphers
1.Symmetric Ciphers
1.Enigma Machine
Cryptography/Enigma machine
< Cryptography
The Enigma was an electromechanical rotor cypher machine used for both encryption and
decryption, widely used in various forms in Europe from the early 1920s on. It is most famous for
having been adopted by most German military forces from about 1930 on. Ease of use and the
supposedly unbreakable cypher were the main reasons for its widespread use. The machine had
two inherent weaknesses: it guaranteed that a letter would never be encrypted to itself and the
rightmost rotor would rotate a set number of places before the next would rotate (26 in the initial
version). In German usage the failure to replace the rotors over many years of service and
patterns in messages further weakened the system. The cypher was broken, and the reading of
information in the messages it didn't protect is sometimes credited with ending World War II at
least a year earlier than it would have otherwise.
The counterpart British encryption machine, Typex, and several American ones, e.g. the SIGABA
(or M134C in Army use), were similar in principle to Enigma, but far more secure. The first
modern rotor cypher machine, by Edward Hebern, was considerably less secure, a fact noted by
William F. Friedman when it was offered to the US Government.
History[edit]
Enigma was developed by Arthur Scherbius in various versions dating back to 1919. He set up a
Berlin company to produce the machine, and the first commercial version (EnigmaA) was
offered for sale in 1923. Three more commercial versions followed, and the EnigmaD became
the most important when several copies were purchased by the Reichsmarine in 1926. The basic
design was then picked up by the Army in 1929, and thereafter by practically every German
military organization and by many parts of the Nazi hierarchy. In the German Navy, it was called
the "M" machine.
Versions of Enigma were used for practically all German (and much other European Axis) radio,
and often telegraph, communications throughout the war; even weather reports were encrypted
with an Enigma machine. Both the Spanish (during the Civil War) and Italians (during World War
II) are said to have used one of the commercial models, unchanged, for military communications.
This was unwise, for the British (and one presumes, others) had succeeded in breaking the plain
commercial version(s) or their equivalents. This contributed to the British defeat of a large part of
the Italian fleet at Matapan.
Operation[edit]
The Enigma machine was electromechanical, meaning it used a combination of electrical and
mechanical parts. The mechanism consisted primarily of a typewriterstyle keyboard, which
operated electrical switches as well as a gearing mechanism.
The electrical portion consisted of a battery attached through the keys to lamps. In general terms,
when a key was held down on the keyboard, one of the lamps would be lit up by the battery. In
the picture to the right you can see the typewriter keys at the front of the machine, and the lights
are the small (barely visible) circles "above" the keyboard in the middle of the machine.
The heart of the basic machine was mechanical, consisting of several connected rotors. Enigma
rotors in most versions consisted of flat disks with 26 contacts on each side, arranged in a
circular manner around the outer faces of the disk. Every contact on one side of each disk is
wired to a different contact on the other side. For instance, in a particular rotor the 1st contact on
one side of the rotor might be wired to the 14th contact on the other side, the 2nd one on the first
side to the 22nd on the other, and so forth. Each rotor in the set supplied with an Enigma was
wired differently than the others, and the German military/party models used different rotor
wirings than did any of the commercial models.
Inside the machine were three slots (in most variants) into which the rotors could be placed. The
rotors were "stacked" in the slots in such a way that the contacts on the "output" side of one rotor
were in contact with the "input" contacts on the next. The third rotor in most versions was
connected to areflector (unique to the Enigma family amongst the various rotor machines
designed in the period) which was hard wired to feed outputs of the third rotor back into different
contacts of the third rotor, thence back to the first rotor, but by a different route. In the picture you
can see the three stacked rotors at the very top of the machine, with teeth protruding from the
panel surface which allow the rotors to be turned by hand.
When a key was pressed on the keyboard, current from the battery flowed from the switch
controlled by that key, say A, into a position on the first rotor. There it would travel through the
rotor's internal wiring to, say, the J position on the other side. It would then go into the next rotor,
perhaps turned such that the first rotor's J was lined up with the second's X. From there it would
travel to the other side of the second rotor, and so on. Because the signal had travelled through
the rotors and back, some other letter than A would light in the lamp array thus substituting one
letter for another, the fundamental mechanism in all substitution cypher systems.
Because the rotors changed position (rather like an automobile odometer) with every key press,
A might be Q this time, but the next A would be something different, perhaps T. After 26 letters
were pressed, a cam on the rotor advanced the rotor in the next slot by one position. The
substitution alphabet thus changed with every plaintext letter, and kept changing with every
plaintext letter for a very long time.
Better yet, due to the "random" wiring of each rotor, the exact sequence of these substitution
alphabets varied depending on the initial position of the rotors, their installed order, and which
rotors were installed in the machine. These settings were referred to as the initial settings, and
were given out in books once a month (to start with  they became more frequent later on).
The most common versions of the machine were symmetrical in the sense that decipherment
works in the same way as encypherment: type in the cyphertext and the sequence of lit lamps
will correspond to the plaintext. However, this works only if the decyphering machine has the
same configuration (i.e., initial settings) as had the encrypting machine (rotor sequence, wiring,
alphabet ring settings, and initial positions); these changed regularly (at first monthly, then
weekly, then daily and even more often nearer the end of the War on some networks) and were
specified in key schedules distributed to Enigma users.
2.Solitaire cipher
3.OneTime Pads
A One Time Pad (OTP) is the only potentially unbreakable encryption method. Plain text
encrypted using an OTP cannot be retrieved without the encrypting key. However, there are
several key conditions that must be met by the user of a one time pad cipher, or the cipher can
be compromised.
The key must never be reused. Use of the same key to encrypt different messages, no
matter how trivially small, compromises the cipher.
The key must not fall in the hands of the enemy. This may seem obvious, but it points to
the weakness of system in that you must be able to transmit large amounts of data to the
reader of the pad. Typically, one time pad cipher keys are sent via diplomatic pouch.
A typical one time pad system works like this: Generate a long fresh new random key. XOR the
plaintext with the key to create the ciphertext. To decrypt the ciphertext, XOR it with the original
key. The system as presented is thus a symmetric and reciprocal cipher. Other functions (e.g.,
addition modulo n) could be used to combine the key and the plaintext to yield the ciphertext,
although the resulting system may not be a reciprocal cipher.
If the key is random and never reused, an OTP is provably unbreakable. Any ciphertext can be
decrypted to any message of the same length by using the appropriate key. Thus, the actual
original message cannot be determined from ciphertext alone, as all possible plaintexts are
equally likely. This is the only cryptosystem for which such a proof is known.
The OTP is extremely simple to implement.[1]
However, there are limitations. Reuse the key and the system becomes extremely weak; it can
be broken with pencil and paper. Try to build a "onetimepad" using some algorithm to generate
the keys and you don't have a onetimepad, you have a stream cipher. There are some very
secure stream ciphers, but people who do not know one from a onetime pad are probably not
able to design one. It is unfortunately fairly common to see weak stream ciphers advertised as
unbreakable onetime pads.
Also, even if you have a wellimplemented OTP system and your key is kept secure, consider an
attacker who knows the plaintext of part of a message. He can then recover that part of the key
and use it to encrypt a message of his own. If he can deliver that instead of yours, you are in
deep trouble.
Contents
[hide]
1 Example
o
1.1 Encryption
1.2 Decryption
4 Key Exchange
5 Further reading
Example[edit]
First, an OTP is selected for the plaintext:
The example indicates that the plaintext is not always the same length as the key material. This
can be handled by methods such as:
appending a terminator to the plaintext before encryption, and terminating the cyphertext
with random bits.
prepending the length and a preamble terminator to the plaintext, and terminating with
random bits.
Such signaling systems (and possibly the plaintext encoding method) must be designed so that
these terminators are not mistaken for plaintext. For this example, therefore, it is assumed the
plaintext already contains endpoint/length signaling.
For increasingly long plaintext/key pair lengths, the crosscorrelation gets closer to zero.
Encryption[edit]
Key(21)
= 101001001010101011101
Plaintext
= 110101010101010010100
bitwise

cyphertext = 011100011111111001001
For increasingly long plaintext/cyphertext pair lengths, the crosscorrelation also gets closer to
zero.
Decryption[edit]
Preshared Random Bits =
1010010010101010111010010000101011110101001110100011
cyphertext = 011100011111111001001
bitwise

An astute reader might observe that the decryptor needs to know the length of the plaintext in
actual practice. This is done by decrypting the cyphertext as a bitstream (i.e. xor each bit as it is
read), and observing the stream until the endofplaintext ruleset is satisfied by the signals
prepended/appended to the plaintext.
A full Englishlanguage Scrabble tile set. See Scrabble letter distributions for other languages.
Onetime pads were originally made without the use of a computer and this is still possible today.
The process can be tedious, but if done correctly and the pad used only once, the result is
unbreakable.
There are two components needed to make a onetime pad: a way to generate letters at random
and a way to record two copies of the result. The traditional way to do the latter was to use
a w:typewriter and w:carbon paper. The carbon paper and w:typewriter ribbon would then be
destroyed since it is often possible to recover the pad data from them. As typewriters have
become scarce, it is also acceptable to hand write the letters neatly in groups of five on two
part w:carbonless copy paper sheets, which can be purchased at office supply stores. Each
sheet can given a serial number or some other unique marking.
Historically, the key material for manual onetime pads was distributed as a pad of many small
pages of paper. Each small page typically had a series of 5digit groups, each digit randomly
selected from 0 to 9.[2][3][4][5][6][7][8][9]
A onetime pad set consists of two identical pads. Some writers refer to the two as "two identical
originals", to emphasize that no copies should ever be made of the key material. [10]
Traditionally twoway communication requires two pad sets (a total of 4 pads): One person gets
the "IN" pad of one set, and the "OUT" pad of the other set.[11]
Each small page typically contains 50 groups of 5 random decimal digits 0...9, enough for one
normal message, and a unique "page number" of five digits.[11][12]
A conversion table is used to convert the letters of the plaintext message to numbers, and the
numbers of the decoded message back to letters. [5]Perhaps the simplest conversion table is
A=01, B=01, ... Z=26, but historically some sort of straddling checkerboard was usually used,
such as CT37c,[13] CT37w, CT46,[14] etc.[15]
The key material for a onetime pad was sometimes written as 50 groups of 5 random letters
A...Z.[12][16]
The key material for cryptograpic machines, including onetime pad systems, was often punched
in a binary code on long, narrow paper tape  a "one time tape" OTT.[12][17][10]
letter tiles[edit]
The simplest way to generate random letters in the Roman alphabet is to obtain 26 identical
objects with a different letter of the alphabet marked on each object. Tiles from the
game w:Scrabble can be used, as long as only one of each letter is selected. Kits for making
name charm bracelets are another possibility. One can also write the letters on 26 otherwise
identical coins with a marking pen. The objects are placed in a box or cup and shaken vigorously,
then one object is withdrawn and its letter is recorded. The object is returned to the box and the
process is repeated.
10sided dice[edit]
Another way to make one time pads is to use w:tensided dice. One can generate random
number groups by rolling several tensided dice at a time and recording a group of decimal digits
 one decimal digit from each die  for each roll.[11] This method will generate random code
groups much faster than using Scrabble tiles. The plaintext message is converted into numeric
values with A =01, B =02 and so on. The resulting numeric values are encrypted by adding digits
from the one time pads using noncarrying addition. One can then either transmit the numeric
groups as is, or use the straddling checkerboard to convert the numbers back into letters and
transmit that result.
6sided dice[edit]
Another way to make one time pads is to use 6sided dice. [18]
It is possible to generate random decimal digits (to make a traditional decimal onetime pad)
using 6sided dice.[11]
If the message is converted into two digit base6 numbers, then ordinary sixsided dice can be
used to generate the random digits in a one time pad. Digits in the pad would be added modulo6
to the digits in the plaintext message (again without carry), and subtracted modulo 6 from the
ciphertext to decrypt. For example:
PT
CT
00
01
02
03
04
05
10
11
12
13
PT
CT
14
15
20
21
22
23
24
25
30
31
32
33
34
PT
CT
35
40
41
42
43
44
45
50
51
52
53
54
55
right
digit
left digit
x0
x1
x2
x3
x4
x5
0x
1x
2x
3x
4x
5x
Using this table, "Wikipedia" would convert to 52 30 32 30 41 22 21 30 14. If the pad digits were
42 26 21 35 32 34 22 62 43, the ciphertext would be 34 50 53 05 13 50 43 32 51. (Note that 6 =
0 modulo 6).
Key Exchange[edit]
In order to use this algorithm, each party must possess the same random key. This typically
involves meeting the other party in person or using a trusted courier. Other methods are
sometime proposed, such as or both users to have identical devices that generate the same
semirandom numbers, however these methods are essentially w:stream ciphers and are not
covered by the security proof of one time pads.
Further reading[edit]
1. Jump up Infoanarchy wiki: OneTime Pad Cryptosystem (mirror: [1])
2. Jump up Dirk Rijmenants. "Manual Onetime pads".
3. Jump up Marcus J. Ranum. "OneTimePad (Vernam's Cipher) Frequently Asked
Questions".
4. Jump up "One Time Pads : Cold War Coding."
5. Jump up to:a b Anonymous PI. "Nothing To See Here: The OneTime Pad".
6. Jump up "Onetime pad generator"
7. Jump up "The Artifacts of the CIA"
8. Jump up Hal Abelson, Ken Ledeen, Harry Lewis. "Secret Bits: How Codes Became
Unbreakable": "Historical Cryptography".
9. Jump up "The Manual Onetime Pad"
10. Jump up to:a b Crypto Museum: "EROLET Keytape generator"
11. Jump up to:a b c d Dirk Rijmenants. "The Manual Onetime Pad"
12. Jump up to:a b c Crypto Museum: "OneTime Pad (OTP)".
13. Jump up "Cryptographilia" describes CT37c.
14. Jump up "onetimepad"
15. Jump up "Checkerboard Variations"
16. Jump up "Raspberry Pi Thermal Printer One Time Pads"
"What is Visual Cryptography" uses a binary onetime pad. A special pattern of dots can
be used to implement XOR.
4.Ciphersaber
Creating Cryptography/Ciphersaber
Cryptography/DES
< Cryptography
The Data Encryption Standard (DES) was a widelyused algorithm for encrypting data. It was
developed by IBM under the name Lucifer, and was submitted to NBS in response to a 1973
solicitation for better cryptosystems. The US National Institute of Standards and Technology with
help from the National Security Agency took IBM's design and made some changes; DES was
adopted as a standard in January of 1977.
DES is a product block encryption algorithm (a cipher) in which 16 iterations, or rounds, of the
substitution and transposition (permutation) process are cascaded. The block size is 64 bits, so
that a 64bit block of data (plaintext) can be encrypted into a 64bit ciphertext. The key, which
controls the transformation, also consists of 64 bits. Only 56 of these, however, are at the user's
disposal; the remaining eight bits are employed for checking parity. The actual key length is
therefore 56 bits.
Subsets of the key bits are designated K1, K2, etc., with the subscript indicating the number of
the round. The cipher function (substitution and transposition) that is used with the key bits in
each round is labeled f. At each intermediate stage of the transformation process, the cipher
output from the preceding stage is partitioned into the 32 leftmost bits, Li, and the 32 rightmost
bits, Ri. Ri is transposed to become the lefthand part of the next higher intermediate cipher,
Li+1. The righthand half of the next cipher, Ri+1, however, is a complex function of the key and
of the entire preceding intermediate cipher. The essential feature to the security of the DES is
that f involves a very special nonlinear substitutioni.e., f(A) + f(B) does not equal f(A + B)specified by the Bureau of Standards? in tabulated functions known as Sboxes. This operation
results in a 32bit number, which is logically added to Ri to produce the lefthand half of the new
intermediate cipher. This process is repeated, 16 times in all. To decrypt a cipher, the process is
carried out in reverse order, with the 16th round being first. The DES algorithm lends itself to
integratedchip implementation. By 1984 the Bureau of Standards had certified over 35 LSI and
VLSIchip implementations of the DES, most on single 40pin chips, some of which operate at
speeds of several million bits per second.
When the cipher was first released, the design criteria for the Sboxes was not released. With the
National Security Agency's involvement in the design of the Sboxes, most security researchers
were wary of DES, and there was the widespread fear that the modifications of the NSA were
intended to weaken the cipher.
In 1990 with the independent discovery and open publication by Biham and Shamir of differential
cryptanalysis, it turned out that at least some of the wariness was uncalled for. After the
publication of this paper, the IBM personnel involved in the designed publically stated that the
main factor in the design was to strengthen them against differential cryptanalysis. The secrecy
behind the design criteria at the time appears to have been due to the fact that the technique
was not known to the public at the time.
Notably, DES is theoretically vulnerable to a technique discovered later by Matsui, linear
cryptanalysis. It is unknown whether the NSA was aware of linear cryptanalysis at the time DES
was finalized, but most knowledgeable observers think not. Don Coppersmith, one of DES's
designers at IBM, has stated that IBM itself was not aware of linear cryptanalysis at that time.
Because the key length is only 56 bits, DES can be, and has been, broken by the brute force
attack method of running through all possible keys. It is believed that one of the reasons this
reduced key length was chosen was that NSA in the mid'70s possessed enough computer
power to brute force break keys of this length. In the years since, computer hardware progress
has been such that most anyone now can have sufficient computational capacity. The EFF, a
cyberspace civil rights group (with neither much funding nor personnel), did it in a little more than
2 days' search at about the same time at least one attorney from the US Justice Department was
publicly announcing that DES was and would remain unbreakable.
The most obvious way of improving the security of DES is to encrypt the data multiple times with
different keys. Double encrypting data with DES does not add much security as it is vulnerable to
meet in the middle attacks. Going one step about this, many former DES users now use Triple
DES (3DES) which was described and analyzed by one of DES's patentees (see FIPS 463); it
involves DES encryption of each data block three times with different keys. 3DES is widely
regarded as adequately secure for now, though it is quite slow. Note, however, that there are
several ways to use DES three times; only one of those is Tuchman's 3DES.
After another, long delayed competition, (NIST) has selected a new cipher, the Advanced
Encryption Standard (AES) to replace DES (fall '01). AES was submitted by its designers under
the name Rijndael.
Implementations:
http://www.codeproject.com/KB/cs/NET_Encrypt_Decrypt.aspx (C#, Xinwen Cheng)
http://frank.anemaet.nl/crypto/DES/ (Java implementation, Frank Anemaet)
http://www.tero.co.uk/des/ (Javascript implementation, Paul Tero)
Cryptography/AES
< Cryptography
The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), also called Rijndael, is a symmetric blockcipher
with fixed 128bit blocks and keysizes of 128, 192, or 256 bits. This algorithm is currently used by
the U.S government for both classified and nonclassified information, and has already phased
out DES on all but legacy machines (triple DES is still authorized for government use, however).
There were five finalists in the bid for the Advanced Encryption Standard, and the NSA analyzed
all five and decreed them acceptable for encypting nonclassified government documents, but
Rijndael was eventually chosen for unspecified reasons, and later authorized for use on
classified documents.
2.Asymmetric Ciphers
1.Overview
We briefly mentioned Asymmetric Ciphers earlier in this book. In this and following chapters we
will describe how they work in much more detail.
The discovery of public key cryptography revolutionized the practice of cryptography in the
1970s. In public key cryptography, the key used to encrypt a message is not the same as the key
used to decrypt it. This requires an asymmetric key algorithm.
(All previous cryptographic algorithms and cryptosystems, now retroactively categorized as
"symmetric key cryptography" or "shared key cryptography", always use the same key to encrypt
a message and later to decrypt that message).
Public key cryptography is cryptography where the key exchange process betweeen person A
and person B must not be kept secret. Private keys actually are never exchanged. In fact Person
A sends information (possibly about a session key) to Person B so that it is only interpretable to
Person B. An intruder cannot discover the meaning of the exchange because Person B has a
piece of information that the intruder does not. Person A didn't access Person B's secret
information(private key) either he only indirectly accessed it via a "public" key. The public key is
formed from the private key by using a One Way Function.
The concepts behind public key cryptography are best expressed by a simple puzzle.
Alice wants to send a trinket to Bob without an intruder stealing it. Each person has a lock and a
key. A NonPublic Key Solution
1. Alice puts her key in the box and sends to Bob.
2. Bob copies the key and sends it back.
3. Alice sends the trinket in a locked box.
4. Bob opens the box with the copied key.
This solution, although the most intuitive, suffers from a major problem. The intruder could
monitor the boxes and copy the key as it sent. If an intruder has Alice's key the trinket or anythin
else will be stolen in transit. To some the puzzle seems impossible, but those who understand
public key cryptography solve it easily. Public Key Solution
1. Alice puts the trinket in a box, locks it and sends it to Bob.
2. Bob locks the box again with his lock and sends the box back.
3. Alice removes her lock and sends it to Bob.
4. Bob removes the final lock and takes the trinket.
The puzzle's trick is double locking the box.
This backandforth "double lock" process is used in many asymmetric key algorithms, such as
ElGamal encryption and DiffieHellman key exchange, but not all of them.
This is the double lock principle, but it is not Public Cryptography as both keys are secret. In
public cryptography one key is public, the other is secret. Nobody knowing the public key is able
to decipher a message encrypted with a public key. Only the secret key is able to decipher a
message encrypted with a public key.
A realworld analogy to public keys would be the padlock. The padlock can be easily closed, but
it is much harder to do the reverse, namely opening. It is not impossible, but it requires much
more effort to open it than to close it, assuming you don't have the (private) key. Alice could send
Bob an open padlock by mail (the equivalent to the public key). Bob then puts a message for
Alice into a box and locks the box with the padlock. Now, Bob sends the locked box back to Alice
and Alice opens it with her private key.
Note that this approach is susceptible to maninthemiddle attacks. If Charles intercepts the mail
with Alice's padlock and replaces it with his own padlock, Bob will lock the box with the wrong
padlock and Charles will be able to intercept the answer. Charles could then even lock the box
again with Alice's padlock and forward the box to Alice. That way, she will never notice that the
message got intercepted. This illustrates that it is very important to obtain public keys (the
padlocks) from a trusted source. That's what certificates are for. They come along with the public
keys and basically say something like 'I, Microsoft, hereby confirm that this padlock belongs to
Alice', and are signed using secure digital signatures.
So someone (Bob) is able to send securely an encrypted data to Alice, if Alice had made her key
public.
Bob is able to prove that he owns a secret key only by providing:
a plain text
Something similar to the double lock principle is Merkle's puzzle, which is the ancestor of the
Diffiehellman key exchange, which is itself a close cousin to RSA public key system.
2.RSA
Cryptography/RSA
< Cryptography
RSA is an asymmetric algorithm for public key cryptography, widely used in electronic
commerce. The algorithm was described in 1977 by Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir and Len Adleman;
the letters RSA are the initials of their surnames.
Clifford Cocks, a British mathematician working for GCHQ, described an equivalent system in an
internal document in 1973. His discovery, however, was not revealed until 1997 due to its topsecret classification.
The security of the RSA system relies on the difficulty of factoring very large integers. New fast
algorithms in this field could render RSA insecure, but this is generally considered unlikely.
The algorithm was patented by MIT in 1983 in the United States of America. The patent expired
21 September 2000. Since the algorithm had been published prior to the patent application, it
could not be patented in other countries.
Contents
[hide]
1 Operation
2 Security
3 Practical considerations
o
3.2 Speed
Operation[edit]
Key Generation[edit]
Suppose a user Alice wishes to allow Bob to send her a private message over an insecure
transmission medium. She takes the following steps to generate a public key and a private key:
1. Choose two large prime numbers p q randomly and independently of each other.
Compute N = p q.
2. Choose an integer 1 < e < N which is coprime to (p1)(q1).
3. Compute d such that d e 1 (mod (p1)(q1)).
4. Destroy all records of p and q.
(Steps 2 and 3 can be performed with the extended Euclidean algorithm; see modular
arithmetic. Additionally, solving for either e or d may be performed using the diophantine
equation
.)
N and e are the public key, and N and d are the private key. Note that only d is a secret as N is
known to the public. Alice transmits the public key to Bob, and keeps the private key secret.
You can generate and examine a real RSA keypair using OpenSSL and some Unix utilities.
( Cryptography/Generate a keypair using OpenSSL ).
Encrypting messages[edit]
Suppose Bob wishes to send a message m to Alice. He knows N and e, which Alice has
announced. He turns m into a number n < N, using some previously agreedupon reversible
protocol. For example, each character in a plaintext message could be converted to its ASCII
code, and the codes concatenated into a single number. If necessary, he can break m into pieces
and encrypt each piece separately. He then computes the ciphertext c:
This can be done quickly using the method of exponentiation by squaring. Bob then
transmits c to Alice.
Decrypting messages[edit]
Alice receives c from Bob, and knows her private key d. She can recover n from c by the
following procedure:
Alice can then extract n, since n < N. Given n, she can recover the original message m.
The decryption procedure works because
and ed 1 (mod p1) and ed 1 (mod q1). Fermat's little theorem yields
and
which implies (as p and q are different prime numbers)
Signing Messages[edit]
RSA can also be used to sign a message. Suppose Alice wishes to send a
signed message to Bob. She produces a hash value of the message,
encrypts it with her secret key, and attaches it as a "signature" to the
message. This signature can only be decrypted with her public key. When
Bob receives the signed message, he decrypts the signature with Alice's
public key, and compares the resulting hash value with the message's actual
hash value. If the two agree, he knows that the author of the message was
in possession of Alice's secret key, and that the message has not been
tampered with since.
Security[edit]
Suppose Eve, an eavesdropper, intercepts the public key N and e, and the
ciphertext c. However, she is unable to directly obtain d, which Alice keeps
secret. The most obvious way for Eve to deduce n from c is to
factor N into p and q, in order to compute (p1)(q1) which allows the
determination of dfrom e. No polynomialtime method for factoring large
integers on a classical computer has yet been found, but it has not been
proven that none exists. See integer factorization for a discussion of this
problem.
It has not been proven that factoring N is the only way of deducing n from c,
but no easier method has been discovered (at least to public knowledge.)
Therefore, it is generally presumed that Eve is defeated in practice if N is
sufficiently large.
If N is 256 bits or shorter, it can be factored in a few hours on a personal
computer, using software already freely available. If N is 512 bits or shorter,
it can be factored by several hundred computers as of 1999. It is currently
recommended that N be at least 1024 bits long.
In 1993, Peter Shor showed that a quantum computer could in principle
perform the factorization in polynomial time. If (or when) quantum computers
become a practical technology, Shor's algorithm will make RSA and related
algorithms obsolete.
Should an efficient classical factorization code be discovered or a practical quantum computer
constructed, using still larger key lengths would provide a stopgap measure. However, any such
security break in RSA would obviously be retroactive. An eavesdropper who had recorded a
public key and any ciphertext produced with it (easily found by just recording traffic to that public
key's owner), could simply wait until such a breakthrough. And then decipher that cyphertext into
the plaintext message. Therefore, it is inherently unsafe to exchange longterm secrets with RSA
or any cypher with similar vulnerabilities.
Practical considerations[edit]
Key generation[edit]
Finding the large primes p and q is usually done by testing random numbers of the right size with
probabilistic primality tests which quickly eliminate most nonprimes. If such a test finds a
"probable prime", a deterministic test should then be used to verify that the number is indeed
prime.
p and q should not be 'too close', lest the Fermat factorization for N be successful. Furthermore,
if either p1 or q1 has only small prime factors, N can be factored quickly and these values
of p or q should therefore be discarded as well.
One should not employ a prime search method which gives any information whatsoever about
the primes to the attacker. In particular, a good random number generator for the start value
needs to be employed. Note that the requirement here is both 'random' and 'unpredictable'.
These are not the same criteria; a number may have been chosen by a random process (i.e., no
pattern in the results), but if it is predictable in any manner (or even partially predicatable), the
method used will result in loss of security. For example, the random number table published by
the Rand Corp in the 1950s might very well be truly random, but it has been published and thus
can serve an attacker as well. If the attacker can guess half of the digits of p or q, they can
quickly compute the other half (shown by Coppersmith in 1997).
It is important that the secret key d be large enough. Wiener showed in 1990 that if p is
between q and 2q (which is quite typical) and d < N1/4/3, then dcan be computed efficiently
from N and e. The encryption key e = 2 should also not be used.
Speed
RSA is much slower than DES and other symmetric cryptosystems. In
practice, Bob typically encrypts a secret message with a symmetric
algorithm, encrypts the (comparatively short) symmetric key with RSA, and
transmits both the RSAencrypted symmetric key and the symmetricallyencypted message to Alice.
This procedure raises additional security issues. For instance, it is of utmost
importance to use a strong random number generator for the symmetric key,
because otherwise Eve could bypass RSA by guessing the symmetric key.
Key distribution
As with all ciphers, it is important how RSA public keys are distributed. Key
distribution must be secured against a maninthemiddle attack. Suppose
Eve has some way to give Bob arbitrary keys and make him believe they
belong to Alice. Suppose further that Eve can intercept transmissions
between Alice and Bob. Eve sends Bob her own public key, which Bob
believes to be Alice's. Eve can then intercept any ciphertext sent by Bob,
decrypt it with her own secret key, keep a copy of the message, encrypt the
message with Alice's public key, and send the new ciphertext to Alice. In
principle, neither Alice nor Bob would be able to detect Eve's presence.
Defenses against such attacks are often based on digital certificates or
other components of a public key infrastructure.
Timing attacks
Kocher described an ingenious unexpected new attack on RSA in 1995: if
the attacker Eve knows the hardware of Alice and is able to measure the
decryption times for several known cyphertexts, she can deduce the
decryption key d quickly. To thwart this attack, the decryption code should
decrypt in constant time. This is known as RSA blinding.
3.ElGamal
Cryptography/ElGamal
< Cryptography
ElGamal is one of the simplest cryptosystems based on the discrete logarithm problem. A quick
reminder of the discrete logarithm problem  given
, such that
, find . This is
a hard problem when dealing with finite sets. ElGamal has a set of public parameters which can
be shared by a number of users of the system. These are referred to as the domain parameters.
These parameters are:
is
, that is
calculate:
This gives us the ciphertext
4.Elliptic Curve
Cryptography/Elliptic curve
< Cryptography
Elliptic curve cryptography is a type of cryptography that relies on mathematical structures known
as "elliptic curves" and "finite fields". An elliptic curve is a relation of the
form
, where
and
and
are
and
, draw a line through them, and locate the third point on the curve
. If
and
them will be vertical and R will not exist, so in that case we call
the "point at infinity".
The point at infinity added to any other point is that point itself, so this point at infinity can be
thought of as the elliptic curve point analogue of the number zero. Otherwise, trace a vertical line
from
to the point at the same x coordinate on the opposite side of the curve. This point is
defined as
extend it to
. To calculate
and take the vertically opposite point as the answer just like in the
,
case.
Because elliptic curves are mathematical functions, we can use the tools of highschool algebra
and elementary calculus to derive formulas for
is:
For P+P:
and
. For
, for formula
Notice that the algorithm in both cases is the same: first we find the slope at , then we get the
xcoordinate of the answer, and then we use the slopepoint formula to get the ycoordinate.
From these formulas, however, we get a very surprising
result:
, regardless of whether ,
and
are different
or the same. Additionally, from the visual definition it is obvious that
. These
facts together mean that elliptic curve points form what is known as an _abelian group_  a
structure which supports addition, and therefore by extension multiplication by integers. For
example,
.
It's also quite easy to multiply an elliptic curve point by very large numbers. You might think
multiplying a point by a billion requires you to add it to itself a billion times, but in reality there is a
much simpler algorithm:
define multiply(P, k) {
if (k == 0) return point_at_infinity()
if (k == 1) return pt;
if (k % 2 == 0) return double(multiply(P,k/2))
if (k % 2 == 1) return add(P,double(multiply(P,(k1)/2)))
}
Basically, instead of repeatedly adding on the original point to zero many times, the algorithm
repeatedly uses doubling, cutting the size of the problem in half at every step. For
, for
example, the algorithm expands to:
83p
add(p,double(41p))
add(p,double(add(p,double(20p))))
add(p,double(add(p,double(double(10p)))))
add(p,double(add(p,double(double(double(5p))))))
add(p,double(add(p,double(double(double(add(p,double(2p))))))))
add(p,double(add(p,double(double(double(add(p,double(double(p)))))))))
For
, the algorithm takes a mere thirty steps. This makes it possible to
multiply elliptic curve numbers by extremely large numbers  numbers so large, in fact, that there
are not enough atoms in the universe to actually count to them.
Finite Fields
Now, we get into the more interesting part of elliptic curve mathematics. A while ago,
mathematicians discovered that the forms of addition, subtraction, multiplication and division that
we use today are not the only forms that are mathematically consistent. There are in fact many
other structures, some using numbers and others using more complex forms like polynomials,
over which we can define the basic operations in special ways and still have a working system of
algebra. The most common is "modular arithmetic". Modular addition and multiplication are just
like normal addition and multiplication, except after the calculation is done you divide the result
by a preset value, called the "modulus", and take only the remainder. For example, in modulo 7:
and
Subtraction is similar, except is the result turns out to be negative you add the modulus to force it
to be positive again. Thus:
given
The two most wellknown algorithms over elliptic curves are the elliptic curve Diffie
Hellman protocol and the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm, used for encrypting and
signing messages, respectively.
This page or section of the Cryptography book is a stub. You can help Wikibooks by expanding
it.
5.BlumGoldwasser
Cryptography/BlumGoldwasser
The BlumGoldwasser (BG) cryptosystem is an asymmetric key encryption algorithm proposed
by Manuel Blum and Shafi Goldwasser in 1984. BlumGoldwasser is a probabilistic, semantically
secure cryptosystem with a constantsize ciphertext expansion. The encryption algorithm
implements an XORbased stream cipher using the Blum Blum Shub (BBS) pseudorandom
number generator to generate the keystream. Decryption is accomplished by manipulating the
final state of the BBS generator using the private key, in order to find the initial seed and
reconstruct the keystream.
The BG cryptosystem is semantically secure based on the assumed intractability of integer
factorization; specifically, factoring a composite value
where
are large primes.
BG has multiple advantages over earlier probabilistic encryption schemes such as the
GoldwasserMicali cryptosystem. First, its semantic security reduces solely to integer
factorization, without requiring any additional assumptions (e.g., hardness of the quadratic
residuosity problem or the RSA problem). Secondly, BG is efficient in terms of storage, inducing
a constantsize ciphertext expansion regardless of message length. BG is also relatively efficient
in terms of computation, and fares well even in comparison with cryptosystems such as RSA
(depending on message length and exponent choices). However, BG is highly vulnerable to
adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks (see below).
Because encryption is performed using a probabilistic algorithm, a given plaintext may produce
very different ciphertexts each time it is encrypted. This has significant advantages, as it prevents
an adversary from recognizing intercepted messages by comparing them to a dictionary of
known ciphertexts.
Scheme definition
Note that the following description is a draft, and may contain errors!
BlumGoldwasser consists of three algorithms: a probabilistic key generation algorithm which
produces a public and a private key, a probabilistic encryption algorithm, and a deterministic
decryption algorithm.
Key generation
To allow for decryption, the modulus used in BlumGoldwasser encryption should be a Blum
integer. This value is generated in the same manner as an RSA modulus, except that the prime
factors
and
, randomly and
mod .[1]
such that
.
. [1]
to Bob.
Message encryption
Suppose Bob wishes to send a message m to Alice:
1. Bob first encodes
as a string of
bits
, and
random
to
3. Increment .
4. Compute
4. Bob computes the ciphertext bits using the bits from the BBS as a stream cipher
keystream, XORing the plaintext bits with the keystream:
1. For
to
2.
1. Bob sends a message to Alice  the enciphered bits and the final
value
(The value
.
is equal to
.)
of the
Message decryption
Alice receives
, Alice computes
.
of a chosen ciphertext
. The decryption
of the original
Depending on plaintext size, BG may be more or less computationally expensive than RSA.
Because most RSA deployments use a fixed encryption exponent optimized to minimize
encryption time, RSA encryption will typically outperform BG for all but the shortest messages.
However, as the RSA decryption exponent is randomly distributed, modular exponentiation may
require a comparable number of squarings/multiplications to BG decryption for a ciphertext of the
same length. BG has the advantage of scaling more efficiently to longer ciphertexts, where RSA
requires multiple separate encryptions. In these cases, BG may be significantly more efficient.
References
1. Jump up to:a b RFC 4086 section "6.2.2. The Blum Blum Shub Sequence Generator"
1. M. Blum, S. Goldwasser, "An Efficient Probabilistic Public Key Encryption Scheme which
Hides All Partial Information", Proceedings of Advances in Cryptology  CRYPTO '84,
pp. 289299, Springer Verlag, 1985.
2. Menezes, Alfred; van Oorschot, Paul C.; and Vanstone, Scott A. Handbook of Applied
Cryptography. CRC Press, October 1996. ISBN 0849385237
3.Hashes
Cryptography/Hashes
A digest, sometimes called a hash, is the result of the application of a hash function (a very
specific mathematical function or algorithm) that takes in some arbitrary value and produces a
hash value, based on the given input.
Information security often includes situations where a user wants to transform one block of
information into another block of information in such a way that the original block can not be
recreated. It is also required that every time the input block is processed, it will produce the same
output block. This means that the process is deterministic.
Such processes behave similar to a hash function and so are typically called cryptographic
hashes. These hashes are used in serving authentication and integrity goals of cryptography. A
cryptographic hash can be described as
and has property that the
hash function is one way. A given hash value can not feasibly be reversed to get a message that
produces that hash value. I.e. There is no useful inverse hash
function
This property can be formally expanded to provide the following properties of a secure hash:
Second preimage resistant: Given an input m1, it should be hard to find another input,
m2 (not equal to m1) such that hash(m1) = hash(m2).
Collisionresistant: it should be hard to find two different messages m1 and m2 such that
hash(m1) = hash(m2). Because of the birthday paradox this means the hash function must
have a larger image than is required for preimageresistance.
A hash function is the implementation of an algorithm that, given some data as input, will
generate a short result called a digest.
For Ex: If our hash function is 'X' and we have 'wiki' as our input... then X('wiki')= a5g78 i.e. some
hash value.
Qualities of a good hash function are
1. Produces a fixed length key for variable input
2. Has got infinite key space, implies the next point
3. No collisions (i.e. no two different pieces of input give the same key value)
Later we will discuss the "birthday attack" and other techniques people use for Breaking Hash
Algorithms.
Hash speed
There are two contradictory requirements for cryptographic hash speed:
When using hashes for password verification, people prefer hash functions that take a
long time to run. If/when a password verification database (the /etc/passwd file,
the /etc/shadow file, etc.) is accidentally leaked, they want to force a bruteforce attacker
to take a long time to test each guess.[3]
scrypt
bcrypt
PBKDF2
When using hashes for file verification, people prefer hash functions that run very fast.
They want a corrupted file can be detected as soon as possible (and queued for
retransmission, quarantined, or etc.).
SHA256
SHA3
1.MD5
Cryptography/MD5
MD5 is a popular Hash Function used by many people around the world. Developed
by Professor Ronald L. Rivest of MIT
It has two purposes:
1. Verify the integrity of a file after a specified period of time
2. Generate Hash values for a certain piece of data ( Ex: file) and store them, for later cross
checking if the file has been modified or not (this is in essence the 1st point stated
above)
For example, on a system that has a file called "SAMPLE.TXT" the MD5 hash would look like
this:
filename
C:\SAMPLE.TXT
hash value
BC8FEFECA210FC0C0F3EBC1614A37889
MD5 takes as input a message of arbitrary length and produces as output a 128 bit "fingerprint"
or "message digest" of the input. It is conjectured that it is computationally infeasible to produce
any message having a given prespecified target message digest. The MD5 algorithm was
intended for digital signature applications, where a large file must be "compressed" in a secure
manner before being signed with a private (secret) key under a publickey cryptosystem such as
RSA. However, practical attacks on the collision resistance of MD5 exist [1], and it should therefore
not be used with digital signatures or any other application requiring collision resistance.
Exact technical information is described in RFC:1321 (as HTML).
2.SHA1
Cryptography/SHA1
The Secure Hash Algorithm SHA (Secure Hash Algorithm), based on the MD4 (Message Digest)
algorithm created by Ronald L. Rivest of the MIT. Consists in three SHA distinct algorithms
labeled SHA0, SHA1, and SHA2.
SHA1 was considered a cryptographically secure oneway hash algorithm (some weaknesses
have already been found). It was designed by the NIST (National Institute of Standards and
Technology), along with the NSA (National Security Agency), see the Secure Hash Standard
FIPS 1801.
3.SHA2
Cryptography/SHA2
SHA2 was designed and developed by the National Security Agency (NSA) and is today one of
the hash algorithms where still no collisions have been found. SHA2 was created because of the
weakness of SHA1 where a simple step was missing. SHA2 takes the last bitgroup and after
some bit operations the group will be placed at the beginning. It has been shown that this step
makes SHA2 very robust against attacks. SHA2 can be used with different bit length: SHA256, SHA384 and SHA512.
4.SHA3
Creating Cryptography/SHA3
5.RIPEMD160
Creating Cryptography/RIPEMD160
6.Tiger
Cryptography/Tiger
Tiger hash
The Tiger hash processes data in 512bit blocks and produces a 192bit message digest. This
hash was designed by Ross Anderson and Eli Biham
(seehttp://www.cs.technion.ac.il/~biham/Reports/Tiger/), with the goal of producing a secure, fast
hash function that performs especially well on nextgeneration 64bit architectures, being still
efficient on 32 and 16bit architectures.
4.Protocols
Cryptography/Protocols
The ideas used in cryptography have been used to create a large number of protocols.
The original application of these ideas was secret hiding  Alice wanted to send a message to
Bob, but Alice and Bob didn't want anyone else to know exactly what the message said.
More recently, many "cryptographic protocols" have been developed that do useful things *other*
than secret hiding.
Some cryptographic protocols make secret hiding better or more convenient in some way 
Message authentication
Early "everyone in favor, hold up their hands while I count" voting systems don't hide any
secrets; endtoend auditable voting systems (which internally use cryptographic ideas) are
arguably better.
mental poker
convergent encryption
digital signatures
verifiable computing
various ideas for improving (nonsecret) email to reduce the amount of spam, such as
hashcash, Sender ID, DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM), etc.
In particular, the first fully homomorphic encryption was announced in 2009 by Craig Gentry. It is
widely expected that homomorphic encryption will make it relatively easy to do things that were
previously considered impossible or infeasible.
1.Authentication protocols
1.e.g. Kerberos
2.Key exchange protocols
1.DiffieHellman
Cryptography/DiffieHellman
DiffieHellman, named for creators Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman, was the first (publicly
known, at least) public key algorithm and was published in 1976. Its security relies on the
discrete logarithm problem, which is still thought to be difficult.
DiffieHellman is generally used to generate a unique key by two (or more) parties with which
they may then encrypt and exchange another key. This is similar to the use of the RSA algorithm
within PGP.
Alice and Bob select a large prime number n, which will be the modulus. They then select
another number c that is primitive mod n, which will be the base. These two numbers may be
broadcast far and wide. At this point Bob and Alice both select large, random integers (a and b,
respectively) in secret, and exchange the result of the exponentiation:
Alice performs
and,
3.Secure Communications
1.e.g. SSL, SSH
2.Generate a keypair using OpenSSL
Download and install the OpenSSL runtimes. If you are running Windows, grab
the Cygwin package.
OpenSSL can generate several kinds of public/private keypairs. RSA is the most common kind of
keypair generation.[1]
Other popular ways of generating RSA public key / private key pairs include PuTTYgen and sshkeygen.[2][3]
Contents
4 Passwordless login
5 Further reading
Make sure to prevent other users from reading your key by executing chmod gor
private_key.pem afterward.
All parts of private_key.pem are printed to the screen. This includes the modulus (also referred to
as public key and n), public exponent (also referred to as e and exponent; default value is
0x010001), private exponent, and primes used to create keys (prime1, also called p, and prime2,
also called q), a few other variables used to perform RSA operations faster, and the Base64 PEM
encoded version of all that data.[5] (The Base64 PEM encoded version of all that data is identical
to the private_key.pem file).
Passwordless login
Often a person will set up an automated backup process that periodically backs up all the content
on one "working" computer onto some other "backup" computer.
Because that person wants this process to run every night, even if no human is anywhere near
either one of these computers, using a "passwordprotected" private key won't work  that
person wants the backup to proceed right away, not wait until some human walks by and types in
the password to unlock the private key. Many of these people generate "a private key with no
password".[6] Some of these people, instead, generate a private key with a password, and then
somehow type in that password to "unlock" the private key every time the server reboots so that
automated tools can make use of the passwordprotected keys. [7][3]
Further reading
1. Jump up Key Generation
2. Jump up Michael Stahnke. "Pro OpenSSH". p. 247.
3. Jump up to:a b "SourceForge.net Documentation: SSH Key Overview"
4. Jump up "Public Private key encryption using OpenSSL"
5. Jump up "OpenSSL 1024 bit RSA Private Key Breakdown"
6. Jump up "DreamHost: Personal Backup".
7. Jump up Troy Johnson. "Using Rsync and SSH: Keys, Validating, and Automation".
Creating Cryptography/Laws
1.Future Possibilities
1.Quantum Cryptography
Cryptography/Quantum Cryptography
Quantum Cryptography is a phrase that seems to bleed across two topics  one is QBit
Cryptanalysis, and the other is Quantum Key Exchange (which is the most common use of the
term, and I will discuss here)
conversation between the recipient and sender as to orientation of filters will cause there to be
differences between the two sets of data  and reveal an eavesdropper has intercepted photons.
There are obvious problems with this scheme. the first is that sending a single photon down a
light pipe can be unreliable  sometimes, they fail to reach the recipient and are read as a false
"block". The second is that the obvious attack on this is a maninthemiddle one  the attacker
intercepts both the light pipe and the outofband data channel used for the discussion of filters
and acceptance lists  then negotiates different Quantum key Exchange keysets with both the
sender and the recipient independently. by converting the encrypted data between the keys each
is expecting to see, he can read the message en route (provided of course there is no way that
either party can verify the transmissions in a way the mitm cannot intercept and replace with
his own doctored version)
However, the problems have not stopped a commercial company selling a product which relies
on QKE for its operation.
2.Glossary of Terms
Creating Cryptography/Glossary
3.Further Reading
Cryptography/Further reading
< Cryptography
writer. Covers much more than merely cryptography. Brief on most topics due to the breadth
of coverage. Exceptionally clearly written.
Ferguson, Niels and Bruce Schneier Practical Cryptography, Wiley, 2003, ISBN
0471223573. Up to date cryptography reference. Covers both algorithms and protocols. This
is an in depth consideration of one cryptographic problem, including paths not taken and
some reasons why. Most of the material is not otherwise available in a single source. Some
is not otherwise available. In a sense, a followup to 'Applied Cryptography'.
Kahn, David The Codebreakers ISBN 0684831309 The best available single volume
source for cryptographic history, at least for events up to the mid '60s (i.e., to just before DES
and the public release of asymmetric key cryptography). The added chapter on more recent
developments (in the most recent edition) is regrettably far too thin. See also his other
publications on cryptography, and cryptographic history, which have been uniformly
excellent.
Katz, Jonathan and Yehuda Lindell  Introduction to Modern Cryptography, CRC Press,
2007. A textbook introduction to modern cryptography, aimed at undergraduate computer
science/mathematics majors as well as the technically educated public.
Paar, Christof and Pelz, Jan Understanding Cryptography, A Textbook for Students
and Practitioners Springer, 2009. Very accessible introduction to practical cryptography,
focus on being a textbook, i.e., it has pedagocical approach, problem sets, further reading
sections etc.
Piper, Fred and Sean Murphy Cryptography : A Very Short Introduction ISBN
0192803158 This book quickly sketches out the major goals, uses, methods, and
developments in cryptography.
Schneier, Bruce Applied Cryptography, 2 ed, Wiley, ISBN 0471117099. The best
single volume available covering modern cryptographic practice and possibilities. About as
comprehensive as a single volume could have been. Well written, not overly mathematical,
and so accessible mostly to the nontechnical.
Schneier, Bruce Secrets and Lies, Wiley, ISBN 0471253111, a discussion of the
context within which cryptography and cryptosystems work. Metacryptography, if you will.
Required reading for wouldbe cryptographers, and nearly so for all cryptography users.
Singh, Simon The Code Book ISBN 1857028899. An anecdotal introduction to the
history of cryptography, but much better than such an approach might be expected to
produce. Covers more recent material than does Kahn's The Codebreakers. Well written.
Sadly, the included cryptanalytic contest has been won and the prize awarded; the cyphers
are still worth having a go at, however.
Wikipedia: Wikipedia:WikiProject
Cryptography, Wikipedia:WikiReader/Cryptography, Wikipedia Book:Cryptography
2.Group Theory
3.Computational Complexity
Creating Cryptography/Computational
Complexity
4.Prime numbers
2.Commitment schemes
3.Zeroknowledge proofs
SNEFRU256), for Windows support you need to use cygwin to compile. A Python interface
exists.
NaCl (pronounced "salt") is the CACE Networking and Cryptography library, a publicdomain library for Python, C, and C++, for publickey authenticated encryption and network
communication.[1][2]
Bouncy Castle ( http://www.bouncycastle.org/ ) includes APIs for both the Java and the
C# programming languages.
5.initialization vector
6.Linear Cryptanalysis
Cryptography/Linear Cryptanalysis
< Cryptography
7.Differential Cryptanalysis
Cryptography/Differential Cryptanalysis
< Cryptography
Differential Cryptanalysis is decrypting a cyphertext with two different potential keys and
comparing the difference. Sometimes, this can provide insight into the nature of the
cryptosystem. Modern cryptosystems like AES are designed to prevent these kinds of attacks.
kriptografi
Kriptografi (cryptography) merupakan ilmu dan seni untuk menjaga pesan
agar aman. (Cryptography is the art and science of keeping messages
secure. [45]) Crypto berarti secret (rahasia) dan graphy berarti
writing (tulisan) [3]. Para pelaku atau praktisi kriptografi disebut
cryptographers. Sebuah algoritma kriptografik (cryptographic algorithm),
disebut cipher, merupakan persamaan matematik yang digunakan untuk
proses enkripsi dan dekripsi. Biasanya kedua persamaan matematik
(untuk
enkripsi dan dekripsi) tersebut memiliki hubungan matematis yang cukup
erat.
Proses yang dilakukan untuk mengamankan sebuah pesan (yang disebut
plaintext) menjadi pesan yang tersembunyi (disebut ciphertext) adalah
enkripsi (encryption). Ciphertext adalah pesan yang sudah tidak dapat
dibaca dengan mudah. Menurut ISO 74982, terminologi yang lebih tepat
digunakan adalah encipher.
Proses sebaliknya, untuk mengubah ciphertext menjadi plaintext, disebut
dekripsi (decryption). Menurut ISO 74982, terminologi yang lebih tepat
untuk proses ini adalah decipher.
Cryptanalysis adalah seni dan ilmu untuk memecahkan ciphertext tanpa
bantuan kunci. Cryptanalyst adalah pelaku atau praktisi yang
menjalankan
cryptanalysis. Cryptology merupakan gabungan dari cryptography dan
cryptanalysis.
Enkripsi
Enkripsi digunakan untuk menyandikan datadata atau informasi sehingga
tidak dapat dibaca oleh orang yang tidak berhak. Dengan enkripsi data
anda
disandikan (encrypted) dengan menggunakan sebuah kunci (key). Untuk
Ciphertext.
Ciphertext adalah informasi yang sudah dienkripsi. Kembali ke masalah
algoritma, keamanan sebuah algoritma yang digunakan dalam enkripsi
atau dekripsi bergantung kepada beberapa aspek. Salah satu aspek yang
cukup penting adalah sifat algoritma yang digunakan. Apabila kekuatan
dari sebuah algoritma sangat tergantung kepada pengetahuan (tahu atau
tidaknya) orang terhadap algoritma yang digunakan, maka algoritma
tersebut disebut restricted algorithm. Apabila algoritma tersebut bocor
atau ketahuan oleh orang banyak, maka pesanpesan dapat terbaca.
Tentunya hal ini masih bergantung kepada adanya kriptografer yang baik.
Jika tidak ada yang tahu, maka sistem tersebut dapat dianggap aman
(meskipun semu).
Meskipun kurang aman, metoda pengamanan dengan restricted algorithm
ini cukup banyak digunakan karena mudah implementasinya dan tidak
perlu
diuji secara mendalam. Contoh penggunaan metoda ini adalah enkripsi
yang menggantikan huruf yang digunakan untuk mengirim pesan dengan
huruf lain. Ini disebut dengan substitution cipher.
Substitution Cipher dengan Caesar Cipher
Salah satu contoh dari substitution cipher adalah Caesar Cipher yang
digunakan oleh Julius Caesar. Pada prinsipnya, setiap huruf digantikan
dengan huruf yang berada tiga (3) posisi dalam urutan alfabet. Sebagai
contoh huruf a digantikan dengan huruf D dan seterusnya.
Transformasi yang digunakan adalah:
plain : a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w x y z
cipher: D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z A B C
Penggunaan dari Caesar cipher ini dapat dimodifikasi dengan mengubah
jumlah gesaran (bukan hanya 3) dan juga arah geseran. Jadi kita dapat
rotor berputar untuk mengubah tabel konversi. Susunan dari rotor dan
kondisi awalnya merupakan kunci dari enkripsinya. Perubahan ini sangat
menyulitkan analisis biasa dan statistik. Buku Code Book [44] banyak
membahas tentang Enigma ini. Penyandian yang menggunakan Enigma
ini akhirnya berhasil dipecahkan oleh Alan Turing dan kawankawannya di
Inggris dengan menggunakan komputer. Jadi aplikasi komputer yang
pertama adalah untuk melakukan cracking terhadap Enigma. Banyak
orang yang percaya bahwa perang dunia kedua menjadi lebih singkat
dikarenakan Sekutu berhasil memecahkan sandi Jerman yang menentukan
posisi Uboat nya.
Penggunaan Kunci
Salah satu cara untuk menambah tingkat keamanan sebuah algoritma
enkripsi dan dekripsi adalah dengan menggunakan sebuah kunci (key)
yang
biasanya disebut K. Kunci K ini dapat memiliki rentang (range) yang cukup
lebar. Rentang dari kemungkinan angka (harga) dari kunci K ini disebut
keyspace. Kunci K ini digunakan dalam proses enkripsi dan dekripsi
sehingga persamaan matematisnya menjadi:
Ek (M) = C (5)
Dk ( M)= M (6)
Keamanan sistem yang digunakan kemudian tidak bergantung kepada
pengetahuan algoritma yang digunakan, melainkan bergantung kepada
kunci yang digunakan. Artinya, algoritma dapat diketahui oleh umum atau
dipublikasikan. Usaha untuk memecahkan keamanan sistem menjadi
usaha untuk memecahkan atau mencari kunci yang digunakan. Usaha
mencari kunci sangat bergantung kepada keyspace dari kunci K. Apabila
keyspace ini cukup kecil, maka cara brute force atau mencoba semua
kunci dapat dilakukan. Akan tetapi apabila keyspace dari kunci yang
digunakan cukup besar, maka usaha untuk mencoba semua kombinasi
kunci menjadi tidak realistis. Keyspace dari DES, misalnya, memiliki 56bit.
Untuk mencoba semua kombinasi yang ada diperlukan kombinasi 2
pangkat 56. (Cerita tentang kelemahan DES akan diutarakan di bagian
lain.)
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