BATTLE OF SHAKARGARH

(WITH SPEC REF TO C ATTKS BY 19 FF REGT)

Intro

1.

Gentleman, since its inception, for the last 60 yrs

Pakistan Army has found itself engaged in wars, battles and

skirmishes, to thwart the evil / nefarious designs of its
adversaries. On internal front, it has been equally involved
to defeat the anti state activities of rebellious elms, and
currently it has been in a state of cont confrontation with
such groups. Notwithstanding the rel ops during various
disasters and mishaps of enormous magnitude, its current
emp in intricate envmts prevalent in FATA and Balochistan is
a clear manifestation of its pledge to protect the motherland
from any turmoil.
2.

Whenever any crisis has set in, this nation has always

stood up against all odds and seized the opportunity to

preserve its raison detat. It is only due to this spirit and
character that despite its conflict ridden hist, it has emerged
as the only Muslim Nuc State.
3.

Notwithstanding, 1971 war beyond any doubt has been

a great tragedy but there are numerous examples of brilliant

tac actions which can be quoted from eastern and western
theatre of war. Out of these gallant actions, an act of bravery

and tac acumen was performed by the ldrs and the led of 19
FF in Shakargarh Salient of RCC.
4.

I also feel privileged and honoured to narrate the

events and actions of this op which happened in the area of

8 Inf Div. The div I am presently commanding. This brings
me to the aim of this presentation;
5.

Aim To critically analyse Battle of Shakargarh with spec

emphasis on C attks by 19 FF Regt to draw pertinent lessons

at bn/coy lvl.
Scheme of Presentation
6.

I shall fol the seq as flashed:a.

Part I.

Characteristics of Terrain and Opposing

Forces
(1) An Overview, 1971 War
(2) Types of Border
(3) Description of RCC and Shakargarh Salient
(4) Op Perspective of RCC
(5) Overview of Opposing Forces & Plans
(6) Conduct of Def Battle
b.

Part II. Battle of Shakargarh

(1) Terrain Highlts
(2) Opposing Forces

(3) Conduct
c.
7.

Part III. Analysis and Lessons Learnt

I have endeavoured to dev this presentation keeping in

mind the lvl of the audience sitting in front of me.

PART I
AN OVERVIEW, 1971 WAR
8.

Comparison of Forces.

Gentleman, before I go over

to terrain highlights, may I give you a very brief overview of

1971 war so as to estb context of my talk. However, the
focus of my talk would remain on the action of 19 FF. So
therefore, let us see the co relation of forces first:a.

Eastern Theatre of War. In tangible terms India

enjoyed marked superiority of forces in the Eastern
Theatre of war. The comparison is as flased:Fmns
Corps HQ
Inf / Mtn Divs (w/o Tks)

Pakistan

India

Ratio

1
3

3
8

1:3
1:2.6

Inf Bdes
Para Bde
Inf Bns
Armd Regts
Indep Armd Sqns
Arty Regts
Anti Aircraft Regts
Paramil Forces (Bns)
Mukti Bahini

b.

9
34
1
1
6
1
13
-

28
1
72
6
3
46
4
32
100,000

1:3
0:1
1:2.1
1:6
1:3
1:8
1:4
1:3
-

Intangibles
(1) Eastern theatre of war was far away from
Western theatre.
(2) East Pakistan was surrounded by India from
three sides.
(3) Sea Blockade also restd the mov.

c.

Western Theatre of War.

One the Western

Theatre of war, India had marginal superiority:Formations

Corps HQ
Armoured Divs
Inf/Mtn Divs
Indep Armd Bdes
Indep Inf Bdes

Pakistan
3
2
10
2
1

India

Ratio

3
1
13
4
3

1:1
2:1
1:1.3
1:2
1:3

TERRAIN HIGHLTS AND OPPOSING FORCES

Types of Border

9.

Before I give you the details of terrain of Shakargarh

salient, it might of interest to you that I refresh your

memories by acquainting you with variety of 3245 kms bdry
regions we share with India on our Eastern side. Starting
from North, Pakistan has four different kinds of bdrys with
India and they are as flashed:a.

Line of Actual Contact.

b.

Line of Control.

c.

Working Bdry.

d.

International border, Now the brief description:-

a.

Line of Actual Contact(LAC). It starts from Indra

Coli Pass in the north till NJ-9842 towards south
along the Saltoro Mtn Range. The dispute arose due
to differing interpretations of a provision of the 1949
ceasefire line and subsequent Simla Agreement of
1972. Indian Forces intruded into the areas of
Siachen Glacier in 1984 and occupied an area of
2500 Sq Kms. The length of LAC is 65 kms. It is
violable and not recognised by any intl or bilateral
agreement.

b.

Line of Control (LOC).

It

is

the

dividing

line

between Nothern areas / Azad Kashmir and IHK. It

starts from NJ-9842 and runs up to Thaku Chak a

place near Iftikharabad/Munawar, covering a total

length of about 740 KMs. This line is recognised by
Simla agreement signed in 1972, prior to Simla
agreement it was Cease Fire Line.
c.

Working Bdry(WB). The

200

kms

long

bdry

between Pakistan and IHK from Thaku Chak in the

north to Abhial Dogran in south is termed as Working
Bdry. It is a de-facto border between India and
Pakistan till resolution of issue of Jammu and
Kashmir. ( India considers this portion beyond LOC
to be part of intl border whereas Pakistan subscribes
to the segment as the working boundary (WB)
between Pakistani Punjab and Indian Kashmir.
The implications of Working bdry are:(1)

No concrete Pillars are instl however it is

marked by placing drums/ temp katcha pillars.
(According to Border Gr Rules of 1960/1961
Concrete Pillars can only be instl on Intl border)

(2) No side can carry out fencing along the border as

allowed in case of intl border. (However, the
Indians have done it in violation to this rule).
(3) Def const within 150 ms of the bdry cannot be
carried out by any side (However, India and

Pakistan both have done it in violation to this

rule).
(4) No recce/ log sp ac can fly within 1000 m of WB
and no cbt ac can fly within 10 kms.
e.

Intl Border. The International Border starts from

Abial Dogran and runs south till Arabian Sea, having
a total length of 2,240 KMs. It is undisputed
internationally recognised except the Sir Creek
demarcation which is 100 km long estuary in saline
water lands of the Run of Kutch between the states
of the Gujarat in India and Sindh in Pakistan.

13. Description

of

RCC

and

Shakargarh

Salient.

Gentlemen now I shall briefly orientate you with the Ravi

Chenab Corridor (RCC) in gen and Shakargarh salient in
particular:a.

Ravi Chenab Corridor (RCC) is an area between the

two famous rivers flowing through Punjab i,e Chenab
in the NW and Ravi in the SE. Parmandal

range

across WB lie to its NE and GT rd to its west, with a

total frontage of 371 Km.
b.

Shakargarh Salient extends from east of Degh Nadi

to incl MRL BRBL

sub link Junc in the west.

Parmandal range to its NE and River Ravi in SE.

Total frontage of Shakargarh Salient is 202 Kms, out

of which 58 Kms is WB and remaining 144 Kms is IB.
c.

The significant water channels in the area are, Degh

Nadi, few nullahs, Bein (which figures out in conduct)
and River Ravi.

d.

In Cis-frontier imp comm centres are as flashed,

Zafarwal, Darman, Chak Amru, Kot Naina, Dhamtal,
Shakargarh, Nurkot, Ikhlaspur, Narowal, Baddomalhi,
QSS (Ahmedabad), and Pasrur.

e.

A reasonably well dev comm infrastructure of both

rail and rd linked different towns and vills

f.

On transfrontier, area is well populated with large,

medium and small size towns like Jammu, Samba,
Kuta,

Kathua,

Madhopur,

Mamun,

Pathankot,

Gurdaspur, Batala and Amritsar.

e.

Main communication arteries of rd/rail, linking IHK

with mainland India passes perilously close to WB
through this narrow strip.

Op Perspective Of RCC
14. Gentlemen, RCC and Shakargarh salient stand out as
one of the most strategically vital pieces of gr for def of
motherland. Any Pakistani thrust launched from the Salient
into Kashmir at any pt along the entire 54 miles stretch from

Kathua to Jammu could enable the Pakistan Army to sever the

road link between India and Kashmir by advancing just five to
fifteen miles inside Indian Territory. On Indian side capture of
Shakargarh Salient was imperative to guard her vuln rd link
between India and Kashmir by launching a protective mnvr.
Overview of Opposing Forces/ Plan
15. Gentlemen, now let us see how both sides planned in
RCC.
16. Indian Offn Plan.In 1971 war, Indian 1 corps had the
dual task, not only to def the AOR opposite RCC but was also
tasked to add depth to her vuln line of comm by launching a
protective mnvr in Shakargarh Salient. The resources at the
disposal of 1 Corps are as flashed:a.

Indian Army (1 Corps) - Forces

(1) 36 Inf Div Comd by Maj Gen Ahluwalia.
(2) 39 Inf Div Comd by Maj Gen Prabhu.
(3) 54 Inf Div Comd by Maj Gen Pinto.
(4) 16 Indep Armd Bde.
(5) 2 Indep Armd Bde.
(6) 16 Cav ex 14 Armd Bde.
(7) 2 Indep Arty Bde.
(8) 41 Indep Arty Bde.

17. Indian Army (1 Corps Offn Plan). Offn plan of the en

is as flashed:a.

Main Effort. Emp 54 Div (UC Maj Gen Pinto)

alongwith 16 IABG less a regt to launch offn b/w
Degh and Karir Nadi on axis Mawa Darman
Zafarwal commencing op at 1900 hrs on 5/6 Dec
71 to clear area upto Zafarwal Azizpur.

b.

Sdry Effort. By 39 Div (UC Maj Gen Prabhu) less

a bde alongwith 2 IABG less a regiment to launch
offn b/w Karir Nadi and River Bein on axis Samba
Delhra Chak Amru Shakargarh commencing
op at 1900 hrs on ni 5/6 Dec 71 to clear area upto
Shakargarh.

c.

Aux Effort. With 36 Div (UC Maj Gen Ahluwalia)

less a bde alongwith 14 H (ex 2 IAB) to launch offn
on axis Thakarpur - Kotnaina Shakargarh /
Nurkot across river front commencing op on ni
10/11 Dec 71 to clear area up to

line Nurkot-

Shakargarh.
d.

Note. ( The delay of 5/6 days b/w Main, Sdry and

Aux effort was to embroil / cut the base of own offn
( if launched ) towards Kathua Madhopur.
(However, it did not materialise and taking the

advantage

Indian

planned

offn

to

clear

line

Shakargarh Nurkot on ni 10/11 Dec )

18. Pakistan Army (1 Corps) Forces. Forces aval to 1
Corps were :a.

Def Forces
(1) 8 Div, UC Maj Gen Abdul Malik
(2) 15 Div, UC Maj Gen Abdul aziz
(3) 8 IABG, UC Brig Mohammad Ahmed

b.

Offn Forces
(4) 6 Armd Div
(5) 17 Inf Div UC R.D Shamim

19. Pakistan Army (1 Corps Def Plan).

Gentlemen,

Corps UC Lt Gen Irshad Ahmed was resp for the Def of RCC
from Marala HW to MRL sub link (the area which is now
being def by 30 Corps) with,
a.

15 Div to def area from incl Marala HW to incl Deg

Nadi.

b.

and,

8 Div was resp:(1) To def Shakargarh Salient from excl Degh Nadi
to incl MRL sub Link Canal in SW.

(2) Capture Dharam enclave on the out break of

hostilities.
(3) 8 IABG. To act as Corps Res and was loc in gen
area Dhamthal.
c.

8 Div Def Plan.

The depl plan in response to en

offn plan was:(1) Main Def Effort. 24 Bde was resp to def
Zafarwal Sec. Zafarwal was to be def as str pt.
(2) Sdry Def Effort. 14 (P) Bde was resp to def
Shakargarh Sec as under:(a) 23 FF was depl as lt fwd bn.
(b) 19 FF was depl in Shakargarh sub sec as
cen fwd bn.
(c) 20 PR was depl in Nurkot sub sec as rt
fwd bn.
(3) Aux Def Effort

115 Bde was to def

Narowal Sec with an addl task to capture

Dharam enclave.
(4) Covering Tps Changez Task Force. To
conduct delaying battle b/w Degh and Bein.
Note ( Changez Task Force UC Brig Nisar with
20 L, 33 Cav and 13 Punjab fought covering
tps battle b/w Basanter Nullah and Bein River

from 5 to 11 Dec. Delaying Indian offn for

seven days against the perceived 72 hrs delay)

PART II
BATTLE OF SHAKARGARH
20. Terrain Shakargarh. Gentlemen, just to have quick
look at the area where Battle of Shakargarh was fought by 19
FF, it is a stretch of 30 kms in length and 20 kms in width. Two
famous rivers Ravi and Bein flow in this area from north to
south. Tarnah N and River Ravi flow in the east and Bein in
the centre of AOO. Shakargarh is connected with Narowal
through rd and rly. Rly line and rd terminates at Chak Amru in
the north of Shakargarh. Major portion of the battle was fought
in north of Shakargarh. Imp vills/ towns in the AOO (are as
flashed) Shakargarh,Tehra, Phalware, Chatrana, Chatrana
Forest, Pindi Sainyan, Pindi Manan, Chak Amru, Sukol (En
Post), Inayatpur, Jalala Bund, Kot Naina, Ikhlaspur, Dinpur
Kalan and Dinpur Khurd.
21. Apchs ldg to Shakargarh. 3 x apchs entered into the
AOO. These were:-

a.

Chak Amru Apch.

Kuta Chak Amru - Maryal-

Shakargarh.
b.

Ikhlaspur Apch.

Kathua

Ikhlaspur

Shakargarh.
c.

Kot Naina Apch. Gurdaspur - Kukar enclave

Kot Naina Shakargarh.
( all apch can take div/ div plus with armr bde)

19 FF Def Plan
22. Msn.

The bn msn was to def Shakargarh by taking

up def from incl Pindi Manan to lncl Din pur Kalan by Ist lt
28 Nov 1971 with protective dets at:a.

Coy in area Inayatpur.

b.

Coy at Jalala Bund in area Ikhlaspur.

23. Resources Aval to 19 FF

a.

Under Comd
(1) Pl ex 21 Balcoh (R&S)
(2) 1 x Det ex 226 Sp Coy (COBRA).
(3) C Coy ex 2 Wing Chenab Rangers.

b.

In DS
(1) Q Bty ex 78 Fd Regt.

24. Depl Plan.

As flashed:-

a.

Ali Coy. Initially to act as part of protective det with a

coy of West Pakistan Rangers in area Inayatpur with
fall back posn (16 kms) at Pindi Manan incl to Pindi
Sainiyan excl facing north as part of left fwd coy of bn
main def posn.

b.

Bahadur Coy.

As rt fwd coy in gen area from incl

Dinpur Khurd to incl Dinpur Kalan.

c.

Chattak Coy.

Depl as cen fwd coy in gen area

Chatrana vill incl to Chatrana Forest excl.

d.

Dalair Coy. Initially depl as protective dets at Jalala

Bund with fall back posn as depth coy in gen area vill
Phalwari facing east

e.

Bn HQ. At vill Tehra.

f.

Mor Pl. At Chatrana Forest.

g.

Pl ex 21 Baloch (R&S).

To

cover

gap

b/w

Bahadur and Chattak coys.

h.

C Coy ex 2 Wing Chenab Rangers.

It was depl

in gen area Afzal Pura facing south from rd Dinpur

Kalan excl to Afzal Pura incl.
j.

Obs Plan.

Def M fd in front of FDLs over a

frontage of 8 x kms.

k.

Obsn Plan. Listening Posts (LPs) and standing ptl

(SP) for early wng in front of fwd coys.

En Attk Plan on Shakargarh

25. Gentleman,

before I dilate upon the offn plan on

Shakargarh, let me very briefly acquaint you with the

unfolding of battle up to 13/14 Dec 1971 inside Shakargarh
Salient:a.

Indian 54 & 39 Div launched the offn on 5/6 Dec as

per plan.

b.

By 7/8 Dec, 54 Div had contacted line SakrorLagwal and 39 Div had secured area up to Chak
Amru Khaira after a tough delaying battle given
by Changez tasks force.

c.

By 10/11 Dec 54 Div had captured Dehlara and 39

Div had secured area further south of Chak Amru.
Meanwhile Changez task force was ordered to wdr
on 11 Dec.

d.

Towards Shakargarh Sec, on 10 Dec, 8 IABG had

launched a C attk b/w Kotnaina Nurkot

on

possible break out by 36 Div towards line Nurkot

Shakargarh (However, this attk went in vaccum as
the en had not launched the offn as yet).
e.

On 11 Dec, GOC 8 Div ordered re-depl of 14 (P)

Bde west of Bein as Flashed:(1) 23 FF (West of Shakargarh)
(2) 19 FF ( N & E of Shakargarh)
(3) 27 FF (b/w Nurkot South of 19 FF)
(4) 20 PR (Nurkot)

f.

By 14/15 Dec, 54 Div Commenced the offn and

captured Barapind Jarpal, where a famous acct of
battle by 35 FF was given.

26. Towards Shakargarh Sec en had planned a two

pronged attk as fol:a.

115 Bde ex 36 Div (Kotnaina - Shakargarh Apch)

(1) Ph 1. 4 Grenadiers was to attk and capture
vill Dinpur commencing op at 1900 hrs on ni
13/14 Dec 71.

(2) Ph 2. 10 Grenadiers and 1st

Mahar Regts

with armr in close sp were to attk and capture

Shakargarh commencing op at 1st lt 14 Dec.
b.

87 Bde ex 39 Div (Chak Amru Shakargarh Apch)

(1) Ph 1. 3/9 Gorkha Rifles were to attk and
capture vill Chatrana and Chatrana Forest
commencing op at 2000 hrs on ni 14/15 Dec.
(2) Ph 2. 14 Rajputana Rifles and 9

Mahar

Regts sp by armr elms were to attk and capture

vill

Phalwari

and

Shakargarh

from

NE

commencing op at 1st lt 15 Dec.

27. Conduct - Battle of Protective Dets
a.

Ali and Dalair coys were to act as protective dets and

occupy successive delaying lines till joining bn main
def posn north of Shakargarh. Both the coys
occupied their fwd posn at Jalala bund and Inayatpur
by 29 Nov 71.

b.

On 4 Dec at 0600 hrs No1 Pl of Ali Coy attacked

sukol post at own initiative and destroyed OP tower.
However could not over run the post. On 5 Dec, No.1
Pl/ Ali Coy again attk en Sukol Post from different dir
and was able to capture the post alongwith 3 sq
miles area upto Tarnah N.

c.

Due to dev of en op on Kot Naina and Chak Amru

axis, on 9 Dec 71 both the coys were ordered to imed
wdr to main def and by morning 10 Dec 71 both coys
were in their respective AOR of bn main def north of
Shakargarh.

28. Main Battle of Shakargarh

a.

Conduct of Battle (Kotnaina Shakargarh Apch)

(1) At 1900 on ni 13/14 Dec En commenced attk.
Coy plus size force of 4 Grenadiers attk rt fwd pl
(4) of Bahader Coy at Dinpur Kalan. Attk was
repulsed and en left behind 5 dead and 4 POWs.
Own cas incl 4 x shaheeds and 7x injured incl
OC Bahader Coy who was replaced by Bn 2IC.
(2) This pl (4) was rft with Bn Pnr pl by 1800 hrs 14
Dec 71.
(3) At 1900 hrs on 14 Dec, en attempted second
attk on No 4 Pl at Dinpur. This time the en was
successful and pl posn was over run by 1950
hrs.
(4) 1st C Attk.

At 2000 hrs, Dalair coy less a Pl

was ordered to launch C attk. Bde HQ had

promised provn of few tks for C attk but the
same did not arrive in time.

(5) Keeping in mind the time constraints, Bn Comd

ordered to launch C attk without tks. Dalair Coy
less a pl UC Maj Hamid ( later Brig Hamid) , loc
5 miles away from its obj launched timely C attk
and recaptured the lost posn by approx 2300
hrs, ni 14/15 Dec 71.
b. Conduct

of Battle

(Chak Amru Shakargarh

Apch)
(1) At 2000 hrs on ni 14/15 Dec, 3/9 Gorkha Rifles
launched the attk.
(2) At this moment 19 FF was under attk from two
dir. In south No 4 Pl / Bahader Coy was over run
by en and own Dalair Coy less a pl (depth Coy)
was on mov for the C attk. Whereas in north en
had commenced attk on Chatrana forest.
(3) LP and SP of 19 FF could not report en attk and
thus en was able to achieve surprise and entered
Chatrana forest where it confronted Mor pl depl
between and rear of Ali & Chattak Coy.
(4) Due to resilient fight put up by mor pl and timely
on loc (OL) arty fire en attk was halted at mere
25 yds from the mor posn.

(5) At the same time fresh en tps contacted No 2 Pl /

Ali Coy from Chatrana forest on reverse front.
Adv en was checked very gallantly by a Bangali
Lnk Suleman Sarkar who was performing sentry
duty on LMG and kept on firing volley after volley
despite en pressure till he ran out of the ammo,
but the brave man started throwing Energa grens
on adv en.
(6) Due to well-timed, well coord and gutsy response
by Mor Pl and Lnk Sulaman Sarkar of No2 Pl/Ali
Coy, en wdr few hundred yards south and took
up re-org posn in Chatrana Forest in between Ali
& Chattak Coy.
(7) Reading the fast changing battle sit, the CO imed
ordered No 12 Pl / Dalair Coy UC Adjt Capt
Faryad Ali to occupy Pl C pen posn south of Ali
Coy and NW of Chattak Coy in front of the en
depl to check the further adv towards the depth
of bn.
(8) As per en plan a coy of 3/9 Gorkha was to attk
Chatrana vill from Chatrana Forest in bn Phase
II. Chattak Coy Comd (defending Chatrana vill)
was aware of the en presence north and rear of
his coy. He info the current sit to Bn Comd who in

turn instr the coy comd to get more info about the
en. Coy Comd alongwith CHM and runner started
mov toward Chatrana vill where he was engaged
by the en fire, on his way back he was
surrounded by en and made captive as the en
had over run his Coy HQ by that time.
(Later when the area was recaptured by
successful C attk, bullets ridden dead body of
Maj Afzal was found along with body of CHM.)
c. Sit at 0100 hrs, 15 Dec 71
(1) En had captured Chatrana vill and forest and
was in process of quick re org/consolidation in
an area of over 1000 yds facing SW.
(2) No 12 Pl/Dalair Coy UC Adjt lost dir to occupy C
Pen posn and reached west of Chatrana village
where he cfm en presence in vill Chatrana to bn
HQ.
(3) Own Dalair Coy less one pl had recaptured lost
area of Bahader Coy at Din Pur Kalan.
(4) Ali Coy and mor pl were intact.
(5) Bn Comd was in serious sit, however the
audacious CO kept his wits on and decided fol:-

(a) Asked 12 Pl / Dalair Coy UC Adjt to fall back

to Bn HQ as rft.
(b) Dalair Coy less one pl alongwith pnr pl to fall
back to Bn HQ from Dinpur Kalan. (On
insistence from OC Bahader Coy 1 x Pl ex
Dalair Coy was left in situ).
(c) Asked Bde HQ for aval of few tks.
(d) Alerted all the elms of bn HQ incl cks / clks
swprs, and even civs.
d. 2nd C Attk
(1) CO waited for tp of tk, Dalair Coy and pnr pl but
they were still not in loc. Seeing the criticality of
time he imed ordered to launch a two pronged C
attk. CO along with elms of Bn HQ to run over
the en from rt of village Chatrana whereas Adjt
Capt Faryad along with SM Galeen Khan with
No 12 pl/Dalair Coy to launch the C attk from left
dir.
(2) The two pronged C attk commenced at 0200 hrs
on on ni 14/15 Dec 71.
(3) Soon after the C attk commenced, Capt Faryad
sustained a bullet injury on chest and comd was
taken over by SM Galeen Khan. Both the C attks

met success and en was evicted from Chatrana

vill and was pushed towards Chatrana Forest by
0330 hrs 15 Dec 71.
e. 3rd C Attk
(1) By 0400 hrs 15 Dec, Dalair Coy less one pl
along with pnr pl and tp of tk arrived at Bn HQ.
(2) Without any delay Maj Hamid, coy comd was
called upon by the CO and ordered to launch C
attk on Chatrana Forest. Tk led the C attk up to
outer fringes of forest and from then on went in
fire sp role and inf charged through the forest.
The C attk met success and en was evicted,
during the process 23 x en soldiers were made
POW by Dalair Coy. It was the second
successful C attk by the Dalair Coy in one ni
under the dynamic comd of Maj Hamid.
(3) When the Dalair Coy was clearing the Chatrana
forest they were fired upon by some en tps
hidden in BUA of Chatrana vill, Dalair Coy
encircled them and made another 30 x POWs
incl a fd offr.
(4) By 0600 hrs, 15 Dec due to well-timed and
heroic action 19 FF recaptured all the lost area

and def was restored before the cease fire at

1930 hrs on 17 Dec 1971. This was a fine
example of dash, initiative and courage on the
part of commanders and tps, and goes on to
prove that timely C attk, even if vastly inferior in
no, can throw back a much larger enemy force
from his lodgements.
29. Over View of Losses
a.

b.

Own
(1) Shaheed

13 (1xOffr,12xOR)

(2) Wounded

30 (2xOffrs, 2xJCOs, 26xOR)

(1) Killed

73

(2) Wounded

09

(3) POWs

70 (3xOffrs,1xJCO,66xOR)

En

PART III
ANALYSIS AND LESSONS LEARNT
Analysis and Lessons Learnt
30. As a defender while conceiving a def plan one must be
able to visualize how the def battle takes place. The
visualization of ens cap will enable the defender to

ascertain the bias of def, anti tk def, formulate the obsn

plan, obs plan and make sure that aval firepower is
optimally utilized. As a comd you must remember that the
attk will always have an initial advantage of initiative, str
ratio and choice of pt of application. Then starts the duel b /
w two thinking minds with the obj of defeating each other. As
Clauswitz said that def is the stronger form of warfare, the
def must ident his strs. The str of def lies after having
absorbed the initial disadvantage making use of the flexibility
that comes to his hands after the en has cmt itself. Another
imp factor that you must understand is ident of correct time
and place of decisive action by the bn and bde comd. If
these two things are correctly conceived then the def can
bring the en to the killing zone of his own choice by taking
appropriate measures, in the process causing attrition to the
en and conc max possible fire power at that place and time of
his own choosing then the attacker is doomed to lose. In
nutshell, if you as a def aprc and analyse the terrain better,
coord good obs and obsn plan, carryout sound vis of en,
ident correct time and place of decisive battle, you can
snatch that initial advantage from the en, disturb his
design, attrite him through bold and offn application of
resources and bring him to the place of your choosing
and then give him that final blow, there is no reason why

the en cant be defeated. This all will req the ability of jnr ldrs
to handle unforeseen sits, willpower and endurance by all
ranks to stand the mental as well as phy stress. With this
premise lets go over some of the lessons which if carried
home can become instinctive reactions at the time of crisis:a.

Deliberate Planning, Prep and Knowledge of

Terrain. On being given orders to occupy defs on 28
Nov, CO carried out deliberate planning as regards to
depl of his coys on gr and laying of obs sys, posting
of security elms etc. He also had advantage of
knowledge of the terrain owing to initial task as bde
res. This deliberate planning and thorough prep for
battle lead the way for victory of 19 FF despite some
flaws like failure of Standing Ptl and Listening Post to
info about ens adv towards Chatak Coy and loss of
dir by 12 pl of Dalair Coy which was being led by
Capt Faryad.

b.

Comd, Con and Flow of Info. Once the bn is depl

over extended frontages and under the fog of the
battle

and

sketchy

info

is

being

shared

by

undercomds, then it is perceived that comd and con

becomes little difficult. However, in case of 19 FF,
the timely info was passed on to bn comd which
enabled him to take quick and right decisions.

d.

En Attk Plan and Exec. En had planned to attk

Shakargarh with two bdes on either of the flanks of
19 FF. However, the exec did not commensurate with
the planning. En attks lacked boldness, conc of effort
and desired impetus. GM, if you recollect the conduct
of the battle, the en had some serious voids in their
attk plan. Instead of going with bde attks, she
resorted to bn and coy lvl attks. Though the attks
were multi directional yet en was strong no where.

e.

Change of Op Task. 19 FF was initially asg the task

to act as bde res. However, in Nov 71 unit was asg
the task of def Shakargarh Sec. 19 FF was able to
perform the changed task successfully due to their
advantage of their presence in the area for 8 months.
Ideally speaking under the prevailing envmt no bn will
be purly for def or offn roll.

f.

Personality of the CO.

Study of mil history is

testament to the fact that all battles have been

impacted by personal style and comportment of
comds. Lt Col Shafique SJ, a war veteran of 1965
war, with attributes of professional excellence,
courage, determination and mental robustness led 19
FF by setting personal example who was capable of

responding to the unforeseen sits and leading his tps

resolutely through the adverse conditions of B fd.
g.

Aggressiveness in Def.

Best form of def is

characterized by aggressive spirit and vigorous

behaviour of the def. The def battle has to be seen to
begin where you can improve your posture, display
the will to fight and deliver a fatal blow during main
def battle. As en is in new area, is disoriented,
imbalanced and fatigued so this is the time to seize
the opportunity with aggressive spirit. Cadence, beat
and attitude is the recipe of aggressive spirit.
h.

Stress Bearing Capacity. A hard contested battle

would always stretch you to extreme limits of physical
and psychological pressures. Under the sit of
immense pressure, despite the cas of coy comds of
Bahadur and Chatak coys and Adjt, the remaining
offrs and men of 19 FF in gen and Dalair coy in
particular displayed high lvl of stress bearing
capacity. The attitude of fighting till last man last
bullet should become instinct for ldrs and led. Def
must not succumb to initial reversal but always strive
resolutely to recover and re-gp to give another tough
fight to the attk.So the pt to remember here is that
whatever is the nature of physical and psychological

pressures during peace time exs, you the jnr ldrs

should conceive the ways and methods to put
undercomd through demanding sits where they are
able to survive the stress for 72 hrs and still fight in
the face of strong opposn.
j.

Role of Jnr Ldrs. Jnr ldr have always played a very

crucial role in the outcome of any battle. This would
be even more applicable in any future conflict. During
any conflict with the en, ups and downs are basic
ingredient of the battle. Only those comds and jnr ldrs
who can keep their wits about in the face of
intimidating

sits

and

exhibit

resilience

while

confronting adverse sits, likely to confront them

frequently, can take right decisions and lead their
outfits to the ultimate success. Jnr Ldrs who have
conviction in the rightness of their obj, are self
assured, proud to be led by excellence of their comds
and fearlessly vigorous to disregard any threat to
their life are recipe of success in the profession of
arms. During the exec of 2nd C attk, Capt Faryad
sustained bullet injury and the comd was imed taken
over by SM Galeen Khan, who led the action to
success

l.

Aval of Res.

Res at all lvls provide flexibility to

local comds to react promptly and restore the sit.

While planning any def battle comd must keep
adequate res at his disposal in order to react imed
w/o waiting for help from higher HQ. Though Dalair
Coy was cmt in def of depth loc, yet the Bn Comd
took the risk of up sticking two pls to exploit the
opportunity to evict the en from his defs w/o waiting
for the bde res. This calc risk proved very beneficial
and the C attk was a success.
30. Now, before I conclude lets hear the views of Maj Gen
(Retd) Shafique then CO 19 FF and Brig ( Retd) Hamid then
Coy comd Dalair Coy.
CONCL
31. There are always lessons to be learnt from the past
battles and the conflicts. Taking a realistic stock of our failings
of the past also helps us to realize the inadequacy of our
present preparation for the test of war. It is important to ask
ourselves as where do we stand today vis--vis our state in
1971?

Is the state of our leadership, character, efficiency,

discipline and training and preparation significantly better,

marginally better, at the same level or have we deteriorated
even further?

It is time that we answer this question with

courage, maturity and honesty if we have to redeem our

honour and self respect. If we are truly conscious of this, we

are bound to be successful in any future war, Insha Allah.
I thank you all gentlemen. Now if you have any question, I
will be privileged to answer.