G.R. No.

L-48006

July 8, 1942

FAUSTO BARREDO, petitioner,

vs.
SEVERINO GARCIA and TIMOTEA ALMARIO, respondents.
Celedonio P. Gloria and Antonio Barredo for petitioner.
Jose G. Advincula for respondents.
BOCOBO, J.:
This case comes up from the Court of Appeals which held the petitioner herein, Fausto Barredo,
liable in damages for the death of Faustino Garcia caused by the negligence of Pedro Fontanilla, a
taxi driver employed by said Fausto Barredo.
At about half past one in the morning of May 3, 1936, on the road between Malabon and Navotas,
Province of Rizal, there was a head-on collision between a taxi of the Malate Taxicab driven by
Pedro Fontanilla and a carretela guided by Pedro Dimapalis. The carretela was overturned, and one
of its passengers, 16-year-old boy Faustino Garcia, suffered injuries from which he died two days
later. A criminal action was filed against Fontanilla in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, and he was
convicted and sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of one year and one day to two years
of prision correccional. The court in the criminal case granted the petition that the right to bring a
separate civil action be reserved. The Court of Appeals affirmed the sentence of the lower court in
the criminal case. Severino Garcia and Timotea Almario, parents of the deceased on March 7, 1939,
brought an action in the Court of First Instance of Manila against Fausto Barredo as the sole
proprietor of the Malate Taxicab and employer of Pedro Fontanilla. On July 8, 1939, the Court of First
Instance of Manila awarded damages in favor of the plaintiffs for P2,000 plus legal interest from the
date of the complaint. This decision was modified by the Court of Appeals by reducing the damages
to P1,000 with legal interest from the time the action was instituted. It is undisputed that Fontanilla 's
negligence was the cause of the mishap, as he was driving on the wrong side of the road, and at
high speed. As to Barredo's responsibility, the Court of Appeals found:
... It is admitted that defendant is Fontanilla's employer. There is proof that he exercised the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. (See p. 22, appellant's brief.) In fact
it is shown he was careless in employing Fontanilla who had been caught several times for
violation of the Automobile Law and speeding (Exhibit A) violation which appeared in the
records of the Bureau of Public Works available to be public and to himself. Therefore, he
must indemnify plaintiffs under the provisions of article 1903 of the Civil Code.
The main theory of the defense is that the liability of Fausto Barredo is governed by the Revised
Penal Code; hence, his liability is only subsidiary, and as there has been no civil action against
Pedro Fontanilla, the person criminally liable, Barredo cannot be held responsible in the case. The
petitioner's brief states on page 10:
... The Court of Appeals holds that the petitioner is being sued for his failure to exercise all
the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of Pedro Fontanilla

to prevent damages suffered by the respondents. In other words, The Court of Appeals
insists on applying in the case article 1903 of the Civil Code. Article 1903 of the Civil Code is
found in Chapter II, Title 16, Book IV of the Civil Code. This fact makes said article to a civil
liability arising from a crime as in the case at bar simply because Chapter II of Title 16 of
Book IV of the Civil Code, in the precise words of article 1903 of the Civil Code itself, is
applicable only to "those (obligations) arising from wrongful or negligent acts or commission
not punishable by law.
The gist of the decision of the Court of Appeals is expressed thus:
... We cannot agree to the defendant's contention. The liability sought to be imposed upon
him in this action is not a civil obligation arising from a felony or a misdemeanor (the crime of
Pedro Fontanilla,), but an obligation imposed in article 1903 of the Civil Code by reason of
his negligence in the selection or supervision of his servant or employee.
The pivotal question in this case is whether the plaintiffs may bring this separate civil action against
Fausto Barredo, thus making him primarily and directly, responsible under article 1903 of the Civil
Code as an employer of Pedro Fontanilla. The defendant maintains that Fontanilla's negligence
being punishable by the Penal Code, his (defendant's) liability as an employer is only subsidiary,
according to said Penal code, but Fontanilla has not been sued in a civil action and his property has
not been exhausted. To decide the main issue, we must cut through the tangle that has, in the minds
of many confused and jumbled together delitos and cuasi delitos, or crimes under the Penal Code
and fault or negligence under articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code. This should be done, because
justice may be lost in a labyrinth, unless principles and remedies are distinctly envisaged.
Fortunately, we are aided in our inquiry by the luminous presentation of the perplexing subject by
renown jurists and we are likewise guided by the decisions of this Court in previous cases as well as
by the solemn clarity of the consideration in several sentences of the Supreme Tribunal of Spain.
Authorities support the proposition that a quasi-delict or "culpa aquiliana " is a separate legal
institution under the Civil Code with a substantivity all its own, and individuality that is entirely apart
and independent from delict or crime. Upon this principle and on the wording and spirit article 1903
of the Civil Code, the primary and direct responsibility of employers may be safely anchored.
The pertinent provisions of the Civil Code and Revised Penal Code are as follows:
CIVIL CODE
ART. 1089 Obligations arise from law, from contracts and quasi-contracts, and from acts and
omissions which are unlawful or in which any kind of fault or negligence intervenes.
xxx

xxx

xxx

ART. 1092. Civil obligations arising from felonies or misdemeanors shall be governed by the
provisions of the Penal Code.

ART. 1093. Those which are derived from acts or omissions in which fault or negligence, not
punishable by law, intervenes shall be subject to the provisions of Chapter II, Title XVI of this
book.
xxx

xxx

xxx

ART 1902. Any person who by an act or omission causes damage to another by his fault or
negligence shall be liable for the damage so done.
ART. 1903. The obligation imposed by the next preceding article is enforcible, not only for
personal acts and omissions, but also for those of persons for whom another is responsible.
The father and in, case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are liable for any damages
caused by the minor children who live with them.
Guardians are liable for damages done by minors or incapacitated persons subject to their
authority and living with them.
Owners or directors of an establishment or business are equally liable for any damages
caused by their employees while engaged in the branch of the service in which employed, or
on occasion of the performance of their duties.
The State is subject to the same liability when it acts through a special agent, but not if the
damage shall have been caused by the official upon whom properly devolved the duty of
doing the act performed, in which case the provisions of the next preceding article shall be
applicable.
Finally, teachers or directors of arts trades are liable for any damages caused by their pupils
or apprentices while they are under their custody.
The liability imposed by this article shall cease in case the persons mentioned therein prove
that they are exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage.
ART. 1904. Any person who pays for damage caused by his employees may recover from
the latter what he may have paid.
REVISED PENAL CODE
ART. 100. Civil liability of a person guilty of felony. Every person criminally liable for a
felony is also civilly liable.
ART. 101. Rules regarding civil liability in certain cases. The exemption from criminal
liability established in subdivisions 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6 of article 12 and in subdivision 4 of article
11 of this Code does not include exemption from civil liability, which shall be enforced to the
following rules:

First. In cases of subdivision, 1, 2 and 3 of article 12 the civil liability for acts committed by
any imbecile or insane person, and by a person under nine years of age, or by one over nine
but under fifteen years of age, who has acted without discernment shall devolve upon those
having such person under their legal authority or control, unless it appears that there was no
fault or negligence on their part.
Should there be no person having such insane, imbecile or minor under his authority, legal
guardianship, or control, or if such person be insolvent, said insane, imbecile, or minor shall
respond with their own property, excepting property exempt from execution, in accordance
with the civil law.
Second. In cases falling within subdivision 4 of article 11, the person for whose benefit the
harm has been prevented shall be civilly liable in proportion to the benefit which they may
have received.
The courts shall determine, in their sound discretion, the proportionate amount for which each one
shall be liable.
When the respective shares can not be equitably determined, even approximately, or when the
liability also attaches to the Government, or to the majority of the inhabitants of the town, and, in all
events, whenever the damage has been caused with the consent of the authorities or their agents,
indemnification shall be made in the manner prescribed by special laws or regulations.
Third. In cases falling within subdivisions 5 and 6 of article 12, the persons using violence or causing
the fear shall be primarily liable and secondarily, or, if there be no such persons, those doing the act
shall be liable, saving always to the latter that part of their property exempt from execution.
ART. 102. Subsidiary civil liability of innkeepers, tavern keepers and proprietors of
establishment. In default of persons criminally liable, innkeepers, tavern keepers, and any
other persons or corporation shall be civilly liable for crimes committed in their
establishments, in all cases where a violation of municipal ordinances or some general or
special police regulation shall have been committed by them or their employees.
Innkeepers are also subsidiarily liable for the restitution of goods taken by robbery or theft
within their houses lodging therein, or the person, or for the payment of the value thereof,
provided that such guests shall have notified in advance the innkeeper himself, or the person
representing him, of the deposit of such goods within the inn; and shall furthermore have
followed the directions which such innkeeper or his representative may have given them with
respect to the care of and vigilance over such goods. No liability shall attach in case of
robbery with violence against or intimidation against or intimidation of persons unless
committed by the innkeeper's employees.
ART. 103. Subsidiary civil liability of other persons. The subsidiary liability established in
the next preceding article shall also apply to employers, teachers, persons, and corporations
engaged in any kind of industry for felonies committed by their servants, pupils, workmen,
apprentices, or employees in the discharge of their duties.

xxx

xxx

xxx

ART. 365. Imprudence and negligence. Any person who, by reckless imprudence, shall
commit any act which, had it been intentional, would constitute a grave felony, shall suffer
the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum
period; if it would have constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its
minimum and medium periods shall be imposed.
Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act which would
otherwise constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium
and maximum periods; if it would have constituted a less serious felony, the penalty
of arresto mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed."
It will thus be seen that while the terms of articles 1902 of the Civil Code seem to be broad enough
to cover the driver's negligence in the instant case, nevertheless article 1093 limits cuasi-delitos to
acts or omissions "not punishable by law." But inasmuch as article 365 of the Revised Penal Code
punishes not only reckless but even simple imprudence or negligence, the fault or negligence under
article 1902 of the Civil Code has apparently been crowded out. It is this overlapping that makes the
"confusion worse confounded." However, a closer study shows that such a concurrence of scope in
regard to negligent acts does not destroy the distinction between the civil liability arising from a crime
and the responsibility for cuasi-delitos or culpa extra-contractual. The same negligent act causing
damages may produce civil liability arising from a crime under article 100 of the Revised Penal
Code, or create an action for cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractual under articles 1902-1910 of the
Civil Code.
The individuality of cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractual looms clear and unmistakable. This legal
institution is of ancient lineage, one of its early ancestors being the Lex Aquilia in the Roman Law. In
fact, in Spanish legal terminology, this responsibility is often referred to as culpa aquiliana. The
Partidas also contributed to the genealogy of the present fault or negligence under the Civil Code;
for instance, Law 6, Title 15, of Partida 7, says: "Tenudo es de fazer emienda, porque, como quier
que el non fizo a sabiendas en dao al otro, pero acaescio por su culpa."
The distinctive nature of cuasi-delitos survives in the Civil Code. According to article 1089, one of the
five sources of obligations is this legal institution of cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractual: "los
actos . . . en que intervenga cualquier genero de culpa o negligencia." Then article 1093 provides
that this kind of obligation shall be governed by Chapter II of Title XVI of Book IV, meaning articles
1902-0910. This portion of the Civil Code is exclusively devoted to the legal institution of culpa
aquiliana.
Some of the differences between crimes under the Penal Code and the culpa aquiliana or cuasidelito under the Civil Code are:
1. That crimes affect the public interest, while cuasi-delitos are only of private concern.
2. That, consequently, the Penal Code punishes or corrects the criminal act, while the Civil Code, by
means of indemnification, merely repairs the damage.

3. That delicts are not as broad as quasi-delicts, because the former are punished only if there is a
penal law clearly covering them, while the latter, cuasi-delitos, include all acts in which "any king of
fault or negligence intervenes." However, it should be noted that not all violations of the penal law
produce civil responsibility, such as begging in contravention of ordinances, violation of the game
laws, infraction of the rules of traffic when nobody is hurt. (See Colin and Capitant, "Curso Elemental
de Derecho Civil," Vol. 3, p. 728.)
Let us now ascertain what some jurists say on the separate existence of quasi-delicts and the
employer's primary and direct liability under article 1903 of the Civil Code.
Dorado Montero in his essay on "Responsibilidad" in the "Enciclopedia Juridica Espaola" (Vol.
XXVII, p. 414) says:
El concepto juridico de la responsabilidad civil abarca diversos aspectos y comprende a
diferentes personas. Asi, existe una responsabilidad civil propiamente dicha, que en ningun
casl lleva aparejada responsabilidad criminal alguna, y otra que es consecuencia
indeclinable de la penal que nace de todo delito o falta."
The juridical concept of civil responsibility has various aspects and comprises different
persons. Thus, there is a civil responsibility, properly speaking, which in no case carries with
it any criminal responsibility, and another which is a necessary consequence of the penal
liability as a result of every felony or misdemeanor."
Maura, an outstanding authority, was consulted on the following case: There had been a collision
between two trains belonging respectively to the Ferrocarril Cantabrico and the Ferrocarril del Norte.
An employee of the latter had been prosecuted in a criminal case, in which the company had been
made a party as subsidiarily responsible in civil damages. The employee had been acquitted in the
criminal case, and the employer, the Ferrocarril del Norte, had also been exonerated. The question
asked was whether the Ferrocarril Cantabrico could still bring a civil action for damages against the
Ferrocarril del Norte. Maura's opinion was in the affirmative, stating in part (Maura,Dictamenes, Vol.
6, pp. 511-513):
Quedando las cosas asi, a proposito de la realidad pura y neta de los hechos, todavia
menos parece sostenible que exista cosa juzgada acerca de la obligacion civil de
indemnizar los quebrantos y menoscabos inferidos por el choque de los trenes. El titulo en
que se funda la accion para demandar el resarcimiento, no puede confundirse con las
responsabilidades civiles nacidas de delito, siquiera exista en este, sea el cual sea,
una culpa rodeada de notas agravatorias que motivan sanciones penales, mas o menos
severas. La lesion causada por delito o falta en los derechos civiles, requiere restituciones,
reparaciones o indemnizaciones, que cual la pena misma ataen al orden publico; por tal
motivo vienen encomendadas, de ordinario, al Ministerio Fiscal; y claro es que si por esta
via se enmiendan los quebrantos y menoscabos, el agraviado excusa procurar el ya
conseguido desagravio; pero esta eventual coincidencia de los efectos, no borra la
diversidad originaria de las acciones civiles para pedir indemnizacion.

Estas, para el caso actual (prescindiendo de culpas contractuales, que no vendrian a cuento
y que tiene otro regimen), dimanan, segun el articulo 1902 del Codigo Civil, de toda accion u
omision, causante de daos o perjuicios, en que intervenga culpa o negligencia. Es trivial
que acciones semejantes son ejercitadas ante los Tribunales de lo civil cotidianamente, sin
que la Justicia punitiva tenga que mezclarse en los asuntos. Los articulos 18 al 21 y 121 al
128 del Codigo Penal, atentos al espiritu y a los fines sociales y politicos del mismo,
desenvuelven y ordenan la materia de responsabilidades civiles nacidas de delito, en
terminos separados del regimen por ley comun de la culpa que se denomina aquiliana, por
alusion a precedentes legislativos del Corpus Juris. Seria intempestivo un paralelo entre
aquellas ordenaciones, y la de la obligacion de indemnizar a titulo de culpa civil; pero viene
al caso y es necesaria una de las diferenciaciones que en el tal paralelo se notarian.
Los articulos 20 y 21 del Codigo Penal, despues de distribuir a su modo las
responsabilidades civiles, entre los que sean por diversos conceptos culpables del delito o
falta, las hacen extensivas a las empresas y los establecimientos al servicio de los cuales
estan los delincuentes; pero con caracter subsidiario, o sea, segun el texto literal, en defecto
de los que sean responsables criminalmente. No coincide en ello el Codigo Civil, cuyo
articulo 1903, dice; La obligacion que impone el articulo anterior es exigible, no solo por los
actos y omisiones propios, sino por los de aquellas personas de quienes se debe responder;
personas en la enumeracion de las cuales figuran los dependientes y empleados de los
establecimientos o empresas, sea por actos del servicio, sea con ocasion de sus funciones.
Por esto acontece, y se observa en la jurisprudencia, que las empresas, despues de
intervenir en las causas criminales con el caracter subsidiario de su responsabilidad civil por
razon del delito, son demandadas y condenadas directa y aisladamente, cuando se trata de
la obligacion, ante los tribunales civiles.
Siendo como se ve, diverso el titulo de esta obligacion, y formando verdadero postulado de
nuestro regimen judicial la separacion entre justicia punitiva y tribunales de lo civil, de suerte
que tienen unos y otros normas de fondo en distintos cuerpos legales, y diferentes modos
de proceder, habiendose, por aadidura, abstenido de asistir al juicio criminal la Compaia
del Ferrocarril Cantabrico, que se reservo ejercitar sus acciones, parece innegable que la de
indemnizacion por los daos y perjuicios que le irrogo el choque, no estuvo sub judice ante
el Tribunal del Jurado, ni fue sentenciada, sino que permanecio intacta, al pronunciarse el
fallo de 21 de marzo. Aun cuando el veredicto no hubiese sido de inculpabilidad, mostrose
mas arriba, que tal accion quedaba legitimamente reservada para despues del proceso;
pero al declararse que no existio delito, ni responsabilidad dimanada de delito,
materia unica sobre que tenian jurisdiccion aquellos juzgadores, se redobla el motivo para la
obligacion civil ex lege, y se patentiza mas y mas que la accion para pedir su cumplimiento
permanece incolume, extraa a la cosa juzgada.
As things are, apropos of the reality pure and simple of the facts, it seems less tenable that
there should beres judicata with regard to the civil obligation for damages on account of the
losses caused by the collision of the trains. The title upon which the action for reparation is
based cannot be confused with the civil responsibilities born of a crime, because there exists
in the latter, whatever each nature, a culpa surrounded with aggravating aspects which give
rise to penal measures that are more or less severe. The injury caused by a felony or

misdemeanor upon civil rights requires restitutions, reparations, or indemnifications which,

like the penalty itself, affect public order; for this reason, they are ordinarily entrusted to the
office of the prosecuting attorney; and it is clear that if by this means the losses and
damages are repaired, the injured party no longer desires to seek another relief; but this
coincidence of effects does not eliminate the peculiar nature of civil actions to ask for
indemnity.
Such civil actions in the present case (without referring to contractual faults which are not
pertinent and belong to another scope) are derived, according to article 1902 of the Civil
Code, from every act or omission causing losses and damages in which culpa or negligence
intervenes. It is unimportant that such actions are every day filed before the civil courts
without the criminal courts interfering therewith. Articles 18 to 21 and 121 to 128 of the Penal
Code, bearing in mind the spirit and the social and political purposes of that Code, develop
and regulate the matter of civil responsibilities arising from a crime, separately from the
regime under common law, of culpa which is known as aquiliana, in accordance with
legislative precedent of the Corpus Juris. It would be unwarranted to make a detailed
comparison between the former provisions and that regarding the obligation to indemnify on
account of civil culpa; but it is pertinent and necessary to point out to one of such differences.
Articles 20 and 21 of the Penal Code, after distriburing in their own way the civil
responsibilities among those who, for different reasons, are guilty of felony or misdemeanor,
make such civil responsibilities applicable to enterprises and establishments for which the
guilty parties render service, but with subsidiary character, that is to say, according to the
wording of the Penal Code, in default of those who are criminally responsible. In this regard,
the Civil Code does not coincide because article 1903 says: "The obligation imposed by the
next preceding article is demandable, not only for personal acts and omissions, but also for
those of persons for whom another is responsible." Among the persons enumerated are the
subordinates and employees of establishments or enterprises, either for acts during their
service or on the occasion of their functions. It is for this reason that it happens, and it is so
observed in judicial decisions, that the companies or enterprises, after taking part in the
criminal cases because of their subsidiary civil responsibility by reason of the crime, are
sued and sentenced directly and separately with regard to the obligation, before the civil
courts.
Seeing that the title of this obligation is different, and the separation between punitive justice
and the civil courts being a true postulate of our judicial system, so that they have different
fundamental norms in different codes, as well as different modes of procedure, and
inasmuch as the Compaa del Ferrocarril Cantabrico has abstained from taking part in the
criminal case and has reserved the right to exercise its actions, it seems undeniable that the
action for indemnification for the losses and damages caused to it by the collision was
notsub judice before the Tribunal del Jurado, nor was it the subject of a sentence, but it
remained intact when the decision of March 21 was rendered. Even if the verdict had not
been that of acquittal, it has already been shown that such action had been legitimately
reserved till after the criminal prosecution; but because of the declaration of the nonexistence of the felony and the non-existence of the responsibility arising from the crime,
which was the sole subject matter upon which the Tribunal del Jurado had jurisdiction, there

is greater reason for the civil obligation ex lege, and it becomes clearer that the action for its
enforcement remain intact and is not res judicata.
Laurent, a jurist who has written a monumental work on the French Civil Code, on which the Spanish
Civil Code is largely based and whose provisions on cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractual are
similar to those of the Spanish Civil Code, says, referring to article 1384 of the French Civil Code
which corresponds to article 1903, Spanish Civil Code:
The action can be brought directly against the person responsible (for another), without
including the author of the act. The action against the principal is accessory in the sense that
it implies the existence of a prejudicial act committed by the employee, but it is not subsidiary
in the sense that it can not be instituted till after the judgment against the author of the act or
at least, that it is subsidiary to the principal action; the action for responsibility (of the
employer) is in itself a principal action. (Laurent, Principles of French Civil Law, Spanish
translation, Vol. 20, pp. 734-735.)
Amandi, in his "Cuestionario del Codigo Civil Reformado" (Vol. 4, pp. 429, 430), declares that the
responsibility of the employer is principal and not subsidiary. He writes:
Cuestion 1. La responsabilidad declarada en el articulo 1903 por las acciones u omisiones
de aquellas personas por las que se debe responder, es subsidiaria? es principal? Para
contestar a esta pregunta es necesario saber, en primer lugar, en que se funda el precepto
legal. Es que realmente se impone una responsabilidad por una falta ajena? Asi parece a
primera vista; pero semejante afirmacion seria contraria a la justicia y a la maxima universal,
segun la que las faltas son personales, y cada uno responde de aquellas que le son
imputables. La responsabilidad de que tratamos se impone con ocasion de un delito o culpa,
pero no por causa de ellos, sino por causa del causi delito, esto es, de la imprudencia o de
la negligencia del padre, del tutor, del dueo o director del establecimiento, del maestro, etc.
Cuando cualquiera de las personas que enumera el articulo citado (menores de edad,
incapacitados, dependientes, aprendices) causan un dao, la ley presume que el padre, el
tutor, el maestro, etc., han cometido una falta de negligencia para prevenir o evitar el dao.
Esta falta es la que la ley castiga. No hay, pues, responsabilidad por un hecho ajeno, sino en
la apariencia; en realidad la responsabilidad se exige por un hecho propio. La idea de que
esa responsabilidad sea subsidiaria es, por lo tanto, completamente inadmisible.
Question No. 1. Is the responsibility declared in article 1903 for the acts or omissions of
those persons for who one is responsible, subsidiary or principal? In order to answer this
question it is necessary to know, in the first place, on what the legal provision is based. Is it
true that there is a responsibility for the fault of another person? It seems so at first sight; but
such assertion would be contrary to justice and to the universal maxim that all faults are
personal, and that everyone is liable for those faults that can be imputed to him. The
responsibility in question is imposed on the occasion of a crime or fault, but not because of
the same, but because of the cuasi-delito, that is to say, the imprudence or negligence of the
father, guardian, proprietor or manager of the establishment, of the teacher, etc. Whenever
anyone of the persons enumerated in the article referred to (minors, incapacitated persons,
employees, apprentices) causes any damage, the law presumes that the father, guardian,

teacher, etc. have committed an act of negligence in not preventing or avoiding the damage.
It is this fault that is condemned by the law. It is, therefore, only apparent that there is a
responsibility for the act of another; in reality the responsibility exacted is for one's own act.
The idea that such responsibility is subsidiary is, therefore, completely inadmissible.
Oyuelos, in his "Digesto: Principios, Doctrina y Jurisprudencia, Referentes al Codigo Civil Espaol,"
says in Vol. VII, p. 743:
Es decir, no responde de hechos ajenos, porque se responde solo de su propia culpa,
doctrina del articulo 1902; mas por excepcion, se responde de la ajena respecto de aquellas
personas con las que media algun nexo o vinculo, que motiva o razona la responsabilidad.
Esta responsabilidad, es directa o es subsidiaria? En el orden penal, el Codigo de esta clase
distingue entre menores e incapacitados y los demas, declarando directa la primera (articulo
19) y subsidiaria la segunda (articulos 20 y 21); pero en el orden civil, en el caso del articulo
1903, ha de entenderse directa, por el tenor del articulo que impone la responsabilidad
precisamente "por los actos de aquellas personas de quienes se deba responder."
That is to say, one is not responsible for the acts of others, because one is liable only for his
own faults, this being the doctrine of article 1902; but, by exception, one is liable for the acts
of those persons with whom there is a bond or tie which gives rise to the responsibility. Is this
responsibility direct or subsidiary? In the order of the penal law, the Penal Code
distinguishes between minors and incapacitated persons on the one hand, and other
persons on the other, declaring that the responsibility for the former is direct (article 19), and
for the latter, subsidiary (articles 20 and 21); but in the scheme of the civil law, in the case of
article 1903, the responsibility should be understood as direct, according to the tenor of that
articles, for precisely it imposes responsibility "for the acts of those persons for whom one
should be responsible."
Coming now to the sentences of the Supreme Tribunal of Spain, that court has upheld the principles
above set forth: that a quasi-delict or culpa extra-contractual is a separate and distinct legal
institution, independent from the civil responsibility arising from criminal liability, and that an
employer is, under article 1903 of the Civil Code, primarily and directly responsible for the negligent
acts of his employee.
One of the most important of those Spanish decisions is that of October 21, 1910. In that case,
Ramon Lafuente died as the result of having been run over by a street car owned by the "compaia
Electric Madrilea de Traccion." The conductor was prosecuted in a criminal case but he was
acquitted. Thereupon, the widow filed a civil action against the street car company, paying for
damages in the amount of 15,000 pesetas. The lower court awarded damages; so the company
appealed to the Supreme Tribunal, alleging violation of articles 1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code
because by final judgment the non-existence of fault or negligence had been declared. The Supreme
Court of Spain dismissed the appeal, saying:
Considerando que el primer motivo del recurso se funda en el equivocado supuesto de que
el Tribunal a quo, al condonar a la compaia Electrica Madrilea al pago del dao causado
con la muerte de Ramon La fuente Izquierdo, desconoce el valor y efectos juridicos de la

sentencia absolutoria deictada en la causa criminal que se siguio por el mismo hecho,
cuando es lo cierto que de este han conocido las dos jurisdicciones bajo diferentes as
pectos, y como la de lo criminal declrao dentro de los limites de su competencia que el
hecho de que se trata no era constitutivo de delito por no haber mediado descuido o
negligencia graves, lo que no excluye, siendo este el unico fundamento del fallo absolutorio,
el concurso de la culpa o negligencia no califacadas, fuente de obligaciones civiles segun el
articulo 1902 del Codigo, y que alcanzan, segun el 1903, netre otras perosnas, a los
Directores de establecimientos o empresas por los daos causados por sus dependientes
en determinadas condiciones, es manifesto que la de lo civil, al conocer del mismo hehco
baho este ultimo aspecto y al condenar a la compaia recurrente a la indemnizacion del
dao causado por uno de sus empleados, lejos de infringer los mencionados textos, en
relacion con el articulo 116 de la Ley de Enjuciamiento Criminal, se ha atenido estrictamente
a ellos, sin invadir atribuciones ajenas a su jurisdiccion propia, ni contrariar en lo mas
minimo el fallo recaido en la causa.
Considering that the first ground of the appeal is based on the mistaken supposition that the
trial court, in sentencing the Compaia Madrilea to the payment of the damage caused by
the death of Ramon Lafuente Izquierdo, disregards the value and juridical effects of the
sentence of acquittal rendered in the criminal case instituted on account of the same act,
when it is a fact that the two jurisdictions had taken cognizance of the same act in its
different aspects, and as the criminal jurisdiction declared within the limits of its authority that
the act in question did not constitute a felony because there was no grave carelessness or
negligence, and this being the only basis of acquittal, it does no exclude the co-existence of
fault or negligence which is not qualified, and is a source of civil obligations according to
article 1902 of the Civil Code, affecting, in accordance with article 1903, among other
persons, the managers of establishments or enterprises by reason of the damages caused
by employees under certain conditions, it is manifest that the civil jurisdiccion in taking
cognizance of the same act in this latter aspect and in ordering the company, appellant
herein, to pay an indemnity for the damage caused by one of its employees, far from
violating said legal provisions, in relation with article 116 of the Law of Criminal
Procedure, strictly followed the same, without invading attributes which are beyond its own
jurisdiction, and without in any way contradicting the decision in that cause. (Emphasis
supplied.)
It will be noted, as to the case just cited:
First. That the conductor was not sued in a civil case, either separately or with the street car
company. This is precisely what happens in the present case: the driver, Fontanilla, has not been
sued in a civil action, either alone or with his employer.
Second. That the conductor had been acquitted of grave criminal negligence, but the Supreme
Tribunal of Spain said that this did not exclude the co-existence of fault or negligence, which is not
qualified, on the part of the conductor, under article 1902 of the Civil Code. In the present case, the
taxi driver was found guilty of criminal negligence, so that if he had even sued for his civil
responsibility arising from the crime, he would have been held primarily liable for civil damages, and
Barredo would have been held subsidiarily liable for the same. But the plaintiffs are directly suing

Barredo, on his primary responsibility because of his own presumed negligence which he did not
overcome under article 1903. Thus, there were two liabilities of Barredo: first, the subsidiary one
because of the civil liability of the taxi driver arising from the latter's criminal negligence; and,
second, Barredo's primary liability as an employer under article 1903. The plaintiffs were free to
choose which course to take, and they preferred the second remedy. In so doing, they were acting
within their rights. It might be observed in passing, that the plaintiff choose the more expeditious and
effective method of relief, because Fontanilla was either in prison, or had just been released, and
besides, he was probably without property which might be seized in enforcing any judgment against
him for damages.
Third. That inasmuch as in the above sentence of October 21, 1910, the employer was held liable
civilly, notwithstanding the acquittal of the employee (the conductor) in a previous criminal case, with
greater reason should Barredo, the employer in the case at bar, be held liable for damages in a civil
suit filed against him because his taxi driver had been convicted. The degree of negligence of the
conductor in the Spanish case cited was less than that of the taxi driver, Fontanilla, because the
former was acquitted in the previous criminal case while the latter was found guilty of criminal
negligence and was sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of one year and one day to two years
of prision correccional.
(See also Sentence of February 19, 1902, which is similar to the one above quoted.)
In the Sentence of the Supreme Court of Spain, dated February 14, 1919, an action was brought
against a railroad company for damages because the station agent, employed by the company, had
unjustly and fraudulently, refused to deliver certain articles consigned to the plaintiff. The Supreme
Court of Spain held that this action was properly under article 1902 of the Civil Code, the court
saying:
Considerando que la sentencia discutida reconoce, en virtud de los hechos que consigna
con relacion a las pruebas del pleito: 1., que las expediciones facturadas por la compaia
ferroviaria a la consignacion del actor de las vasijas vacias que en su demanda relacionan
tenian como fin el que este las devolviera a sus remitentes con vinos y alcoholes; 2., que
llegadas a su destino tales mercanias no se quisieron entregar a dicho consignatario por el
jefe de la estacion sin motivo justificado y con intencion dolosa, y 3., que la falta de entrega
de estas expediciones al tiempo de reclamarlas el demandante le originaron daos y
perjuicios en cantidad de bastante importancia como expendedor al por mayor que era de
vinos y alcoholes por las ganancias que dejo de obtener al verse privado de servir los
pedidos que se le habian hecho por los remitentes en los envases:
Considerando que sobre esta base hay necesidad de estimar los cuatro motivos que
integran este recurso, porque la demanda inicial del pleito a que se contrae no contiene
accion que nazca del incumplimiento del contrato de transporte, toda vez que no se funda
en el retraso de la llegada de las mercancias ni de ningun otro vinculo contractual entre las
partes contendientes, careciendo, por tanto, de aplicacion el articulo 371 del Codigo de
Comercio, en que principalmente descansa el fallo recurrido, sino que se limita a pedir la
reparaction de los daos y perjuicios producidos en el patrimonio del actor por la
injustificada y dolosa negativa del porteador a la entrega de las mercancias a su nombre

consignadas, segun lo reconoce la sentencia, y cuya responsabilidad esta claramente

sancionada en el articulo 1902 del Codigo Civil, que obliga por el siguiente a la Compaia
demandada como ligada con el causante de aquellos por relaciones de caracter economico
y de jurarquia administrativa.
Considering that the sentence, in question recognizes, in virtue of the facts which it declares,
in relation to the evidence in the case: (1) that the invoice issued by the railroad company in
favor of the plaintiff contemplated that the empty receptacles referred to in the complaint
should be returned to the consignors with wines and liquors; (2) that when the said
merchandise reached their destination, their delivery to the consignee was refused by the
station agent without justification and with fraudulent intent, and (3) that the lack of delivery
of these goods when they were demanded by the plaintiff caused him losses and damages
of considerable importance, as he was a wholesale vendor of wines and liquors and he failed
to realize the profits when he was unable to fill the orders sent to him by the consignors of
the receptacles:
Considering that upon this basis there is need of upholding the four assignments of error, as
the original complaint did not contain any cause of action arising from non-fulfillment of a
contract of transportation, because the action was not based on the delay of the goods nor
on any contractual relation between the parties litigant and, therefore, article 371 of the Code
of Commerce, on which the decision appealed from is based, is not applicable; but it limits to
asking for reparation for losses and damages produced on the patrimony of the plaintiff on
account of the unjustified and fraudulent refusal of the carrier to deliver the goods consigned
to the plaintiff as stated by the sentence, and the carrier's responsibility is clearly laid down
in article 1902 of the Civil Code which binds, in virtue of the next article, the defendant
company, because the latter is connected with the person who caused the damage by
relations of economic character and by administrative hierarchy. (Emphasis supplied.)
The above case is pertinent because it shows that the same act may come under both the Penal
Code and the Civil Code. In that case, the action of the agent was unjustified and fraudulent and
therefore could have been the subject of a criminal action. And yet, it was held to be also a proper
subject of a civil action under article 1902 of the Civil Code. It is also to be noted that it was the
employer and not the employee who was being sued.
Let us now examine the cases previously decided by this Court.
In the leading case of Rakes vs. Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co. (7 Phil., 359, 362-365 [year 1907]), the
trial court awarded damages to the plaintiff, a laborer of the defendant, because the latter had
negligently failed to repair a tramway in consequence of which the rails slid off while iron was being
transported, and caught the plaintiff whose leg was broken. This Court held:
It is contended by the defendant, as its first defense to the action that the necessary
conclusion from these collated laws is that the remedy for injuries through negligence lies
only in a criminal action in which the official criminally responsible must be made primarily
liable and his employer held only subsidiarily to him. According to this theory the plaintiff
should have procured the arrest of the representative of the company accountable for not

repairing the track, and on his prosecution a suitable fine should have been imposed,
payable primarily by him and secondarily by his employer.
This reasoning misconceived the plan of the Spanish codes upon this subject. Article 1093 of
the Civil Code makes obligations arising from faults or negligence not punished by the law,
subject to the provisions of Chapter II of Title XVI. Section 1902 of that chapter reads:
"A person who by an act or omission causes damage to another when there is fault
or negligence shall be obliged to repair the damage so done.
"SEC. 1903. The obligation imposed by the preceeding article is demandable, not
only for personal acts and omissions, but also for those of the persons for whom they
should be responsible.
"The father, and on his death or incapacity, the mother, is liable for the damages
caused by the minors who live with them.
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"Owners or directors of an establishment or enterprise are equally liable for the

damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter
may be employed or in the performance of their duties.
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"The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons mentioned
therein prove that they employed all the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid
the damage."
As an answer to the argument urged in this particular action it may be sufficient to point out
that nowhere in our general statutes is the employer penalized for failure to provide or
maintain safe appliances for his workmen. His obligation therefore is one 'not punished by
the laws' and falls under civil rather than criminal jurisprudence. But the answer may be a
broader one. We should be reluctant, under any conditions, to adopt a forced construction of
these scientific codes, such as is proposed by the defendant, that would rob some of these
articles of effect, would shut out litigants against their will from the civil courts, would make
the assertion of their rights dependent upon the selection for prosecution of the proper
criminal offender, and render recovery doubtful by reason of the strict rules of proof
prevailing in criminal actions. Even if these articles had always stood alone, such a
construction would be unnecessary, but clear light is thrown upon their meaning by the
provisions of the Law of Criminal Procedure of Spain (Ley de Enjuiciamiento Criminal),
which, though never in actual force in these Islands, was formerly given a suppletory or
explanatory effect. Under article 111 of this law, both classes of action, civil and criminal,
might be prosecuted jointly or separately, but while the penal action was pending the civil
was suspended. According to article 112, the penal action once started, the civil remedy
should be sought therewith, unless it had been waived by the party injured or been expressly

reserved by him for civil proceedings for the future. If the civil action alone was prosecuted,
arising out of a crime that could be enforced only on private complaint, the penal action
thereunder should be extinguished. These provisions are in harmony with those of articles 23
and 133 of our Penal Code on the same subject.
An examination of this topic might be carried much further, but the citation of these articles
suffices to show that the civil liability was not intended to be merged in the criminal nor even
to be suspended thereby, except as expressly provided in the law. Where an individual is
civilly liable for a negligent act or omission, it is not required that the injured party should
seek out a third person criminally liable whose prosecution must be a condition precedent to
the enforcement of the civil right.
Under article 20 of the Penal Code the responsibility of an employer may be regarded as
subsidiary in respect of criminal actions against his employees only while they are in process
of prosecution, or in so far as they determine the existence of the criminal act from which
liability arises, and his obligation under the civil law and its enforcement in the civil courts is
not barred thereby unless by the election of the injured person. Inasmuch as no criminal
proceeding had been instituted, growing our of the accident in question, the provisions of the
Penal Code can not affect this action. This construction renders it unnecessary to finally
determine here whether this subsidiary civil liability in penal actions has survived the laws
that fully regulated it or has been abrogated by the American civil and criminal procedure
now in force in the Philippines.
The difficulty in construing the articles of the code above cited in this case appears from the
briefs before us to have arisen from the interpretation of the words of article 1093, "fault or
negligence not punished by law," as applied to the comprehensive definition of offenses in
articles 568 and 590 of the Penal Code. It has been shown that the liability of an employer
arising out of his relation to his employee who is the offender is not to be regarded as
derived from negligence punished by the law, within the meaning of articles 1902 and 1093.
More than this, however, it cannot be said to fall within the class of acts unpunished by the
law, the consequence of which are regulated by articles 1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code.
The acts to which these articles are applicable are understood to be those not growing out of
pre-existing duties of the parties to one another. But where relations already formed give rise
to duties, whether springing from contract or quasi contract, then breaches of those duties
are subject to articles 1101, 1103, and 1104 of the same code. A typical application of this
distinction may be found in the consequences of a railway accident due to defective
machinery supplied by the employer. His liability to his employee would arise out of the
contract of employment, that to the passengers out of the contract for passage, while that to
the injured bystander would originate in the negligent act itself.
In Manzanares vs. Moreta, 38 Phil., 821 (year 1918), the mother of the 8 of 9-year-old child Salvador
Bona brought a civil action against Moreta to recover damages resulting from the death of the child,
who had been run over by an automobile driven and managed by the defendant. The trial court
rendered judgment requiring the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of P1,000 as indemnity: This
Court in affirming the judgment, said in part:

If it were true that the defendant, in coming from the southern part of Solana Street, had to
stop his auto before crossing Real Street, because he had met vehicles which were going
along the latter street or were coming from the opposite direction along Solana Street, it is to
be believed that, when he again started to run his auto across said Real Street and to
continue its way along Solana Street northward, he should have adjusted the speed of the
auto which he was operating until he had fully crossed Real Street and had completely
reached a clear way on Solana Street. But, as the child was run over by the auto precisely at
the entrance of Solana Street, this accident could not have occurred if the auto had been
running at a slow speed, aside from the fact that the defendant, at the moment of crossing
Real Street and entering Solana Street, in a northward direction, could have seen the child in
the act of crossing the latter street from the sidewalk on the right to that on the left, and if the
accident had occurred in such a way that after the automobile had run over the body of the
child, and the child's body had already been stretched out on the ground, the automobile still
moved along a distance of about 2 meters, this circumstance shows the fact that the
automobile entered Solana Street from Real Street, at a high speed without the defendant
having blown the horn. If these precautions had been taken by the defendant, the deplorable
accident which caused the death of the child would not have occurred.
It will be noticed that the defendant in the above case could have been prosecuted in a criminal case
because his negligence causing the death of the child was punishable by the Penal Code. Here is
therefore a clear instance of the same act of negligence being a proper subject-matter either of a
criminal action with its consequent civil liability arising from a crime or of an entirely separate and
independent civil action for fault or negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code. Thus, in this
jurisdiction, the separate individually of a cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana under the Civil Code has
been fully and clearly recognized, even with regard to a negligent act for which the wrongdoer could
have been prosecuted and convicted in a criminal case and for which, after such a conviction, he
could have been sued for this civil liability arising from his crime.
Years later (in 1930) this Court had another occasion to apply the same doctrine. In Bernal and
Enverso vs. House and Tacloban Electric & Ice Plant, Ltd., 54 Phil., 327, the parents of the five-yearold child, Purificacion Bernal, brought a civil action to recover damages for the child's death as a
result of burns caused by the fault and negligence of the defendants. On the evening of April 10,
1925, the Good Friday procession was held in Tacloban, Leyte. Fortunata Enverso with her daughter
Purificacion Bernal had come from another municipality to attend the same. After the procession the
mother and the daughter with two others were passing along Gran Capitan Street in front of the
offices of the Tacloban Electric & Ice Plant, Ltd., owned by defendants J. V. House, when an
automobile appeared from the opposite direction. The little girl, who was slightly ahead of the rest,
was so frightened by the automobile that she turned to run, but unfortunately she fell into the street
gutter where hot water from the electric plant was flowing. The child died that same night from the
burns. The trial courts dismissed the action because of the contributory negligence of the plaintiffs.
But this Court held, on appeal, that there was no contributory negligence, and allowed the parents
P1,000 in damages from J. V. House who at the time of the tragic occurrence was the holder of the
franchise for the electric plant. This Court said in part:
Although the trial judge made the findings of fact hereinbefore outlined, he nevertheless was
led to order the dismissal of the action because of the contributory negligence of the

plaintiffs. It is from this point that a majority of the court depart from the stand taken by the
trial judge. The mother and her child had a perfect right to be on the principal street of
Tacloban, Leyte, on the evening when the religious procession was held. There was nothing
abnormal in allowing the child to run along a few paces in advance of the mother. No one
could foresee the coincidence of an automobile appearing and of a frightened child running
and falling into a ditch filled with hot water. The doctrine announced in the much debated
case of Rakes vs. Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co. ([1907]), 7 Phil., 359), still rule. Article 1902 of
the Civil Code must again be enforced. The contributory negligence of the child and her
mother, if any, does not operate as a bar to recovery, but in its strictest sense could only
result in reduction of the damages.
It is most significant that in the case just cited, this Court specifically applied article 1902 of the Civil
Code. It is thus that although J. V. House could have been criminally prosecuted for reckless or
simple negligence and not only punished but also made civilly liable because of his criminal
negligence, nevertheless this Court awarded damages in an independent civil action for fault or
negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code.
In Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes (30 Phil., 624 [year 1915), the action was for damages for the
death of the plaintiff's daughter alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the servant in
driving an automobile over the child. It appeared that the cause of the mishap was a defect in the
steering gear. The defendant Leynes had rented the automobile from the International Garage of
Manila, to be used by him in carrying passengers during the fiesta of Tuy, Batangas. Leynes was
ordered by the lower court to pay P1,000 as damages to the plaintiff. On appeal this Court reversed
the judgment as to Leynes on the ground that he had shown that the exercised the care of a good
father of a family, thus overcoming the presumption of negligence under article 1903. This Court
said:
As to selection, the defendant has clearly shown that he exercised the care and diligence of
a good father of a family. He obtained the machine from a reputable garage and it was, so far
as appeared, in good condition. The workmen were likewise selected from a standard
garage, were duly licensed by the Government in their particular calling, and apparently
thoroughly competent. The machine had been used but a few hours when the accident
occurred and it is clear from the evidence that the defendant had no notice, either actual or
constructive, of the defective condition of the steering gear.
The legal aspect of the case was discussed by this Court thus:
Article 1903 of the Civil Code not only establishes liability in cases of negligence, but also
provides when the liability shall cease. It says:
"The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons mentioned
therein prove that they employed all the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid
the damage."
From this article two things are apparent: (1) That when an injury is caused by the
negligence of a servant or employee there instantly arises a presumption of law that there

was negligence on the part of the matter or employer either in the selection of the servant or
employee, or in supervision over him after the selection, or both; and (2) that presumption
is juris tantum and not juris et de jure, and consequently, may be rebutted. It follows
necessarily that if the employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that in selection and
supervision he has exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family, the
presumption is overcome and he is relieve from liability.
This theory bases the responsibility of the master ultimately on his own negligence and not
on that of his servant.
The doctrine of the case just cited was followed by this Court in Cerf vs. Medel (33 Phil., 37 [year
1915]). In the latter case, the complaint alleged that the defendant's servant had so negligently
driven an automobile, which was operated by defendant as a public vehicle, that said automobile
struck and damaged the plaintiff's motorcycle. This Court, applying article 1903 and following the
rule in Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes, said in part (p. 41) that:
The master is liable for the negligent acts of his servant where he is the owner or director of
a business or enterprise and the negligent acts are committed while the servant is engaged
in his master's employment as such owner.
Another case which followed the decision in Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes was Cuison vs. Norton &
Harrison Co., 55 Phil., 18 (year 1930). The latter case was an action for damages brought by Cuison
for the death of his seven-year-old son Moises. The little boy was on his way to school with his sister
Marciana. Some large pieces of lumber fell from a truck and pinned the boy underneath, instantly
killing him. Two youths, Telesforo Binoya and Francisco Bautista, who were working for Ora, an
employee of defendant Norton & Harrison Co., pleaded guilty to the crime of homicide through
reckless negligence and were sentenced accordingly. This Court, applying articles 1902 and 1903,
held:
The basis of civil law liability is not respondent superior but the relationship of pater familias.
This theory bases the liability of the master ultimately on his own negligence and not on that
of his servant. (Bahia vs.Litonjua and Leynes [1915], 30 Phil., 624; Cangco vs. Manila
Railroad Co. [1918], 38 Phil., 768.)
In Walter A. Smith & Co. vs. Cadwallader Gibson Lumber Co., 55 Phil., 517 (year 1930) the plaintiff
brought an action for damages for the demolition of its wharf, which had been struck by the steamer
Helen C belonging to the defendant. This Court held (p. 526):
The evidence shows that Captain Lasa at the time the plaintiff's wharf collapsed was a duly
licensed captain, authorized to navigate and direct a vessel of any tonnage, and that the
appellee contracted his services because of his reputation as a captain, according to F. C.
Cadwallader. This being so, we are of the opinion that the presumption of liability against the
defendant has been overcome by the exercise of the care and diligence of a good father of a
family in selecting Captain Lasa, in accordance with the doctrines laid down by this court in
the cases cited above, and the defendant is therefore absolved from all liability.

It is, therefore, seen that the defendant's theory about his secondary liability is negatived by the six
cases above set forth. He is, on the authority of these cases, primarily and directly responsible in
damages under article 1903, in relation to article 1902, of the Civil Code.
Let us now take up the Philippine decisions relied upon by the defendant. We study first, City of
Manila vs. Manila Electric Co., 52 Phil., 586 (year 1928). A collision between a truck of the City of
Manila and a street car of the Manila Electric Co. took place on June 8, 1925. The truck was
damaged in the amount of P1,788.27. Sixto Eustaquio, the motorman, was prosecuted for the crime
of damage to property and slight injuries through reckless imprudence. He was found guilty and
sentenced to pay a fine of P900, to indemnify the City of Manila for P1,788.27, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency. Unable to collect the indemnity from Eustaquio, the City of
Manila filed an action against the Manila Electric Company to obtain payment, claiming that the
defendant was subsidiarily liable. The main defense was that the defendant had exercised the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage. The lower court rendered judgment in
favor of the plaintiff. This Court held, in part, that this case was governed by the Penal Code, saying:
With this preliminary point out of the way, there is no escaping the conclusion that the
provisions of the Penal Code govern. The Penal Code in easily understandable language
authorizes the determination of subsidiary liability. The Civil Code negatives its application by
providing that civil obligations arising from crimes or misdemeanors shall be governed by the
provisions of the Penal Code. The conviction of the motorman was a misdemeanor falling
under article 604 of the Penal Code. The act of the motorman was not a wrongful or
negligent act or omission not punishable by law. Accordingly, the civil obligation connected
up with the Penal Code and not with article 1903 of the Civil Code. In other words, the Penal
Code affirms its jurisdiction while the Civil Code negatives its jurisdiction. This is a case of
criminal negligence out of which civil liability arises and not a case of civil negligence.
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Our deduction, therefore, is that the case relates to the Penal Code and not to the Civil
Code. Indeed, as pointed out by the trial judge, any different ruling would permit the master
to escape scot-free by simply alleging and proving that the master had exercised all
diligence in the selection and training of its servants to prevent the damage. That would be a
good defense to a strictly civil action, but might or might not be to a civil action either as a
part of or predicated on conviction for a crime or misdemeanor. (By way of parenthesis, it
may be said further that the statements here made are offered to meet the argument
advanced during our deliberations to the effect that article 0902 of the Civil Code should be
disregarded and codal articles 1093 and 1903 applied.)
It is not clear how the above case could support the defendant's proposition, because the Court of
Appeals based its decision in the present case on the defendant's primary responsibility under article
1903 of the Civil Code and not on his subsidiary liability arising from Fontanilla's criminal negligence.
In other words, the case of City of Manila vs. Manila Electric Co., supra, is predicated on an entirely
different theory, which is the subsidiary liability of an employer arising from a criminal act of his
employee, whereas the foundation of the decision of the Court of Appeals in the present case is the

employer's primary liability under article 1903 of the Civil Code. We have already seen that this is a
proper and independent remedy.
Arambulo vs. Manila Electric Co. (55 Phil., 75), is another case invoked by the defendant. A
motorman in the employ of the Manila Electric Company had been convicted o homicide by simple
negligence and sentenced, among other things, to pay the heirs of the deceased the sum of P1,000.
An action was then brought to enforce the subsidiary liability of the defendant as employer under the
Penal Code. The defendant attempted to show that it had exercised the diligence of a good father of
a family in selecting the motorman, and therefore claimed exemption from civil liability. But this Court
held:
In view of the foregoing considerations, we are of opinion and so hold, (1) that the exemption
from civil liability established in article 1903 of the Civil Code for all who have acted with the
diligence of a good father of a family, is not applicable to the subsidiary civil liability provided
in article 20 of the Penal Code.
The above case is also extraneous to the theory of the defendant in the instant case, because the
action there had for its purpose the enforcement of the defendant's subsidiary liability under the
Penal Code, while in the case at bar, the plaintiff's cause of action is based on the defendant's
primary and direct responsibility under article 1903 of the Civil Code. In fact, the above case
destroys the defendant's contention because that decision illustrates the principle that the
employer's primary responsibility under article 1903 of the Civil Code is different in character from
his subsidiary liability under the Penal Code.
In trying to apply the two cases just referred to, counsel for the defendant has failed to recognize the
distinction between civil liability arising from a crime, which is governed by the Penal Code, and the
responsibility for cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana under the Civil Code, and has likewise failed to give
the importance to the latter type of civil action.
The defendant-petitioner also cites Francisco vs. Onrubia (46 Phil., 327). That case need not be set
forth. Suffice it to say that the question involved was also civil liability arising from a crime. Hence, it
is as inapplicable as the two cases above discussed.
The foregoing authorities clearly demonstrate the separate individuality of cuasi-delitos or culpa
aquiliana under the Civil Code. Specifically they show that there is a distinction between civil liability
arising from criminal negligence (governed by the Penal Code) and responsibility for fault or
negligence under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code, and that the same negligent act may
produce either a civil liability arising from a crime under the Penal Code, or a separate responsibility
for fault or negligence under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code. Still more concretely, the
authorities above cited render it inescapable to conclude that the employer in this case the
defendant-petitioner is primarily and directly liable under article 1903 of the Civil Code.
The legal provisions, authors, and cases already invoked should ordinarily be sufficient to dispose of
this case. But inasmuch as we are announcing doctrines that have been little understood in the past,
it might not be inappropriate to indicate their foundations.

Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in article 365 punishes not only reckless but also simple negligence.
If we were to hold that articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code refer only to fault or negligence not
punished by law, according to the literal import of article 1093 of the Civil Code, the legal institution
of culpa aquiliana would have very little scope and application in actual life. Death or injury to
persons and damage to property through any degree of negligence even the slightest would
have to be indemnified only through the principle of civil liability arising from a crime. In such a state
of affairs, what sphere would remain for cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana? We are loath to impute to
the lawmaker any intention to bring about a situation so absurd and anomalous. Nor are we, in the
interpretation of the laws, disposed to uphold the letter that killeth rather than the spirit that giveth
life. We will not use the literal meaning of the law to smother and render almost lifeless a principle of
such ancient origin and such full-grown development as culpa aquiliana or cuasi-delito, which is
conserved and made enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code.
Secondly, to find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt is
required, while in a civil case, preponderance of evidence is sufficient to make the defendant pay in
damages. There are numerous cases of criminal negligence which can not be shown beyond
reasonable doubt, but can be proved by a preponderance of evidence. In such cases, the defendant
can and should be made responsible in a civil action under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code.
Otherwise, there would be many instances of unvindicated civil wrongs. Ubi jus ibi remedium.
Thirdly, to hold that there is only one way to make defendant's liability effective, and that is, to sue
the driver and exhaust his (the latter's) property first, would be tantamount to compelling the plaintiff
to follow a devious and cumbersome method of obtaining relief. True, there is such a remedy under
our laws, but there is also a more expeditious way, which is based on the primary and direct
responsibility of the defendant under article 1903 of the Civil Code. Our view of the law is more likely
to facilitate remedy for civil wrongs, because the procedure indicated by the defendant is wasteful
and productive of delay, it being a matter of common knowledge that professional drivers of taxis
and similar public conveyance usually do not have sufficient means with which to pay damages.
Why, then, should the plaintiff be required in all cases to go through this roundabout, unnecessary,
and probably useless procedure? In construing the laws, courts have endeavored to shorten and
facilitate the pathways of right and justice.
At this juncture, it should be said that the primary and direct responsibility of employers and their
presumed negligence are principles calculated to protect society. Workmen and employees should
be carefully chosen and supervised in order to avoid injury to the public. It is the masters or
employers who principally reap the profits resulting from the services of these servants and
employees. It is but right that they should guarantee the latter's careful conduct for the personnel
and patrimonial safety of others. As Theilhard has said, "they should reproach themselves, at least,
some for their weakness, others for their poor selection and all for their negligence." And according
to Manresa, "It is much more equitable and just that such responsibility should fall upon the principal
or director who could have chosen a careful and prudent employee, and not upon the injured person
who could not exercise such selection and who used such employee because of his confidence in
the principal or director." (Vol. 12, p. 622, 2nd Ed.) Many jurists also base this primary responsibility
of the employer on the principle of representation of the principal by the agent. Thus, Oyuelos says
in the work already cited (Vol. 7, p. 747) that before third persons the employer and employee
"vienen a ser como una sola personalidad, por refundicion de la del dependiente en la de quien le

emplea y utiliza." ("become as one personality by the merging of the person of the employee in that
of him who employs and utilizes him.") All these observations acquire a peculiar force and
significance when it comes to motor accidents, and there is need of stressing and accentuating the
responsibility of owners of motor vehicles.
Fourthly, because of the broad sweep of the provisions of both the Penal Code and the Civil Code
on this subject, which has given rise to the overlapping or concurrence of spheres already
discussed, and for lack of understanding of the character and efficacy of the action for culpa
aquiliana, there has grown up a common practice to seek damages only by virtue of the civil
responsibility arising from a crime, forgetting that there is another remedy, which is by invoking
articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code. Although this habitual method is allowed by our laws, it has
nevertheless rendered practically useless and nugatory the more expeditious and effective remedy
based on culpa aquiliana or culpa extra-contractual. In the present case, we are asked to help
perpetuate this usual course. But we believe it is high time we pointed out to the harm done by such
practice and to restore the principle of responsibility for fault or negligence under articles 1902 et
seq. of the Civil Code to its full rigor. It is high time we caused the stream of quasi-delict or culpa
aquiliana to flow on its own natural channel, so that its waters may no longer be diverted into that of
a crime under the Penal Code. This will, it is believed, make for the better safeguarding of private
rights because it re-establishes an ancient and additional remedy, and for the further reason that an
independent civil action, not depending on the issues, limitations and results of a criminal
prosecution, and entirely directed by the party wronged or his counsel, is more likely to secure
adequate and efficacious redress.
In view of the foregoing, the judgment of the Court of Appeals should be and is hereby affirmed, with
costs against the defendant-petitioner.
Yulo, C.J., Moran, Ozaeta and Paras, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-35095 August 31, 1973
GERMAN C. GARCIA, LUMINOSA L. GARCIA, and ESTER FRANCISCO, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE MARIANO M. FLORIDO OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MISAMIS
OCCIDENTAL, MARCELINO INESIN, RICARDO VAYSON, MACTAN TRANSIT CO., INC., and
PEDRO TUMALA Y DIGAL,respondents.
Paulino A. Conol for petitioners.
Dominador M. Canastra and Wilfredo C. Martinez for private respondents.
Hon. Mariano M. Florido for and in his own behalf.

ANTONIO, J.:

Appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental, Branch
III, in Civil Case No. 2850 (German C. Garcia, et al. vs. Marcelino Inesin et al.) dated October 21,
1971, dismissing petitioners' action for damages against respondents, Mactan Transit Co., Inc. and
Pedro Tumala "without prejudice to refiling the said civil action after conviction of the defendants in
the criminal case filed by the Chief of Police of Sindangan Zamboanga del Norte", and from the
order of said Court dated January 21, 1972, denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
On August 4, 1971, petitioners, German C. Garcia, Chief of the Misamis Occidental Hospital,
together with his wife, Luminosa L. Garcia, and Ester Francisco, bookkeeper of said hospital, hired
and boarded a PU car with plate No. 241-8 G Ozamis 71 owned and operated by respondent,
Marcelino Inesin, and driven by respondent, Ricardo Vayson, for a round-trip from Oroquieta City to
Zamboanga City, for the purpose of attending a conference of chiefs of government hospitals,
hospital administrative officers, and bookkeepers of Regional Health Office No. 7 at Zamboanga
City. At about 9:30 a.m., while the PU car was negotiating a slight curve on the national highway at
kilometer 21 in Barrio Guisukan, Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte, said car collided with an
oncoming passenger bus (No. 25) with plate No. 77-4 W Z.N. 71 owned and operated by the Mactan
Transit Co., Inc. and driven by defendant, Pedro Tumala. As a result of the aforesaid collision,
petitioners sustained various physical injuries which necessitated their medical treatment and
hospitalization.
Alleging that both drivers of the PU car and the passenger bus were at the time of the accident
driving their respective vehicles at a fast clip, in a reckless, grossly negligent and imprudent manner
in gross violation of traffic rules and without due regard to the safety of the passengers aboard the
PU car, petitioners, German C. Garcia, Luminosa L. Garcia, and Ester Francisco, filed on September
1, 1971 with respondent Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental an action for damages (Civil
Case No. 2850) against the private respondents, owners and drivers, respectively, of the PU car and
the passenger bus that figured in the collision, with prayer for preliminary attachment.
On September 16, 1971, Marcelino Inesin and Ricardo Vayson filed their answer in the
aforementioned Civil Case No. 2850 admitting the contract of carriage with petitioners but alleged,
by way of defense, that the accident was due to the negligence and reckless imprudence of the bus
driver, as when Ricardo Vayson, driver of the PU car, saw the oncoming passenger bus No. 25
coming from the opposite direction ascending the incline at an excessive speed, chasing another
passenger bus, he had to stop the PU car in order to give way to the passenger bus, but, in spite of
such precaution, the passenger bus bumped the PU car, thus causing the accident in question, and,
therefore, said private respondents could not be held liable for the damages caused on petitioners.
On September 29, 1971, respondents, Mactan Transit Co., Inc. and Pedro Tumala, filed a motion to
dismiss on three (3) grounds, namely: 1) that the plaintiffs (petitioners) had no cause of action; 2)
that the complaint carries with it a prayer for attachment but without the requisite verification, hence
defective under the provision of Sec. 3, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court; and 3) that the defendants
(respondents), Mactan Transit Co., Inc. and its driver, accused Pedro Tumala, had operated said
passenger bus with maximum care and prudence.
The principal argument advanced in said motion to dismiss was that the petitioners had no cause of
action for on August 11, 1971, or 20 days before the filing of the present action for damages,

respondent Pedro Tumala was charged in Criminal Case No. 4960 of the Municipal Court of
Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte, in a complaint filed by the Chief of Police for "double serious and
less serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence", and that, with the filing of the aforesaid
criminal case, no civil action could be filed subsequent thereto unless the criminal case has been
finally adjudicated, pursuant to Sec. 3 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, and, therefore, the filing of
the instant civil action is premature, because the liability of the employer is merely subsidiary and
does not arise until after final judgment has been rendered finding the driver, Pedro Tumala guilty of
negligence; that Art. 33 of the New Civil Code, is not applicable because Art. 33 applied only to the
crimes of physical injuries or homicide, not to the negligent act or imprudence of the driver.
On October 14, 1971, petitioners filed an opposition to said motion to dismiss alleging that the
aforesaid action for damages was instituted not to enforce the civil liability of the respondents under
Art. 100 of the Revised Penal Code but for their civil liability on quasi-delicts pursuant to Articles
2176-2194, as the same negligent act causing damages may produce civil liability arising from a
crime under the Revised Penal Code or create an action for quasi-delict or culpa extra-contractual
under the Civil Code, and the party seeking recovery is free to choose which remedy to enforce.
In dismissing the complaint for damages in Civil Case No. 2850, the lower court sustained the
arguments of respondents, Mactan Transit Co., Inc. and Pedro Tumala, and declared that whether or
not "the action for damages is based on criminal negligence or civil negligence known as culpa
aquiliana in the Civil Code or tort under American law" there "should be a showing that the offended
party expressly waived the civil action or reserved his right to institute it separately" and that "the
allegations of the complaint in culpa aquiliana must not be tainted by any assertion of violation of law
or traffic rules or regulations" and because of the prayer in the complaint asking the Court to declare
the defendants jointly and severally liable for moral, compensatory and exemplary damages, the
Court is of the opinion that the action was not based on "culpa aquiliana or quasi-delict."
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied by the trial court on January 21, 1972, hence this
appeal oncertiorari.
There is no question that from a careful consideration of the allegations contained in the complaint in
Civil Case No. 2850, the essential averments for a quasi-delictual action under Articles 2176-2194 of
the New Civil Code are present, namely: a) act or omission of the private respondents; b) presence
of fault or negligence or the lack of due care in the operation of the passenger bus No. 25 by
respondent Pedro Tumala resulting in the collision of the bus with the passenger car; c) physical
injuries and other damages sustained by petitioners as a result of the collision; d) existence of direct
causal connection between the damage or prejudice and the fault or negligence of private
respondents; and e) the absence of pre-existing contractual relations between the parties. The
circumstance that the complaint alleged that respondents violated traffic rules in that the driver drove
the vehicle "at a fast clip in a reckless, grossly negligent and imprudent manner in violation of traffic
rules and without due regard to the safety of the passengers aboard the PU car" does not detract
from the nature and character of the action, as one based on culpa aquiliana. The violation of traffic
rules is merely descriptive of the failure of said driver to observe for the protection of the interests of
others, that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, which
failure resulted in the injury on petitioners. Certainly excessive speed in violation of traffic rules is a
clear indication of negligence. Since the same negligent act resulted in the filing of the criminal

action by the Chief of Police with the Municipal Court (Criminal Case No. 4960) and the civil action
by petitioners, it is inevitable that the averments on the drivers' negligence in both complaints would
substantially be the same. It should be emphasized that the same negligent act causing damages
may produce a civil liability arising from a crime under Art. 100 of the Revised Penal Code or create
an action for quasi-delict or culpa extra-contractual under Arts. 2176-2194 of the New Civil Code.
This distinction has been amply explained in Barredo vs. Garcia, et al. (73 Phil. 607, 620-621). 1
It is true that under Sec. 2 in relation to Sec. 1 of Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Court which
became effective on January 1, 1964, in the cases provided for by Articles 31, 33, 39 and 2177 of
the Civil Code, an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the civil action, may be
instituted by the injured party during the pendency of the criminal case, provided said party has
reserved his right to institute it separately, but it should be noted, however, that neither Section 1 nor
Section 2 of Rule 111 fixes a time limit when such reservation shall be made. In Tactaquin v.
Palileo, 2 where the reservation was made after the tort-feasor had already pleaded guilty and after the
private prosecutor had entered his appearance jointly with the prosecuting attorney in the course of the
criminal proceedings, and the tort-feasor was convicted and sentenced to pay damages to the offended
party by final judgment in said criminal case, We ruled that such reservation is legally ineffective because
the offended party cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant. We
explained in Meneses vs. Luat 3 that when the criminal action for physical injuries against the defendant
did not proceed to trial as he pleaded guilty upon arraignment and the Court made no pronouncement on
the matter or damages suffered by the injured party, the mere appearance of private counsel in
representation of the offended party in said criminal case does not constitute such active intervention as
could impart an intention to press a claim for damages in the same action, and, therefore, cannot bar a
separate civil action for damages subsequently instituted on the same ground under Article 33 of the New
Civil Code.
In the case at bar, there is no question that petitioners never intervened in the criminal action
instituted by the Chief of Police against respondent Pedro Tumala, much less has the said criminal
action been terminated either by conviction or acquittal of said accused.
It is, therefore, evident that by the institution of the present civil action for damages, petitioners have
in effect abandoned their right to press recovery for damages in the criminal case, and have opted
instead to recover them in the present civil case.
As a result of this action of petitioners the civil liability of private respondents to the former has
ceased to be involved in the criminal action. Undoubtedly an offended party loses his right to
intervene in the prosecution of a criminal case, not only when he has waived the civil action or
expressly reserved his right to institute, but also when he has actually instituted the civil action. For
by either of such actions his interest in the criminal case has disappeared.
As we have stated at the outset, the same negligent act causing damages may produce a civil
liability arising from crime or create an action for quasi-delict or culpa extra-contractual. The former is
a violation of the criminal law, while the latter is a distinct and independent negligence, having
always had its own foundation and individuality. Some legal writers are of the view that in
accordance with Article 31, the civil action based upon quasi-delict may proceed independently of
the criminal proceeding for criminal negligence and regardless of the result of the latter. Hence, "the
proviso in Section 2 of Rule 111 with reference to ... Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code is

contrary to the letter and spirit of the said articles, for these articles were drafted ... and are intended
to constitute as exceptions to the general rule stated in what is now Section 1 of Rule 111.
The proviso which is procedural, may also be regarded as an unauthorized amendment of
substantive law, Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code, which do not provide for the reservation
required in the proviso." 4 But in whatever way We view the institution of the civil action for recovery of
damages under quasi-delict by petitioners, whether as one that should be governed by the provisions of
Section 2 of Rule 111 of the Rules which require reservation by the injured party considering that by the
institution of the civil action even before the commencement of the trial of the criminal case, petitioners
have thereby foreclosed their right to intervene therein, or one where reservation to file the civil action
need not be made, for the reason that the law itself (Article 33 of the Civil Code) already makes the
reservation and the failure of the offended party to do so does not bar him from bringing the action, under
the peculiar circumstances of the case, We find no legal justification for respondent court's order of
dismissal.
WHEREFORE, the decision and order appealed from are hereby reversed and set aside, and the
court a quo is directed to proceed with the trial of the case. Costs against private respondents.
Zaldivar, Castro Fernando, Teehankee, Makasiar and Esguerra, JJ., concur.
Makalintal, Actg., C.J., concurs in the result.

Separate Opinions

BARREDO, J., concurring:

I would like to limit my concurrence.
I believe that the only substantive legal provision involved in this case are Articles 2176 and 2177 of
the Civil Code which read as follows:
ART 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault
or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if
there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasidelict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
ART 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is
entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the
Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or
omission of the defendant.

These provisions definitely create a civil liability distinct and different from the civil action arising from
the offense of negligence under the Revised Penal Code. Since Civil Case No. 2850 is predicated
on the above civil code articles and not on the civil liability imposed by the Revised Penal Code, I
cannot see why a reservation had to be made in the criminal case. As to the specific mention of
Article 2177 in Section 2 of the Rule 111, it is my considered view that the latter provision is
inoperative, it being substantive in character and is not within the power of the Supreme Court to
promulgate, and even if it were not substantive but adjective, it cannot stand because of its
inconsistency with Article 2177, an enactment of the legislature superseding the Rules of 1940.
Besides, the actual filing of Civil Case No. 2850 should be deemed as the reservation required, there
being no showing that prejudice could be caused by doing so.
Accordingly, I concur in the judgment reversing the order of dismissal of the trial court in order that
Civil Case No. 2850 may proceed, subject to the limitation mentioned in the last sentence of Article
2177 of the Civil Code, which means that of the two possible judgments, the injured party is entitled
exclusively to the bigger one.

Separate Opinions
BARREDO, J., concurring:
I would like to limit my concurrence.
I believe that the only substantive legal provision involved in this case are Articles 2176 and 2177 of
the Civil Code which read as follows:
ART 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault
or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if
there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasidelict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
ART 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is
entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the
Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or
omission of the defendant.
These provisions definitely create a civil liability distinct and different from the civil action arising from
the offense of negligence under the Revised Penal Code. Since Civil Case No. 2850 is predicated
on the above civil code articles and not on the civil liability imposed by the Revised Penal Code, I
cannot see why a reservation had to be made in the criminal case. As to the specific mention of
Article 2177 in Section 2 of the Rule 111, it is my considered view that the latter provision is
inoperative, it being substantive in character and is not within the power of the Supreme Court to

promulgate, and even if it were not substantive but adjective, it cannot stand because of its
inconsistency with Article 2177, an enactment of the legislature superseding the Rules of 1940.
Besides, the actual filing of Civil Case No. 2850 should be deemed as the reservation required, there
being no showing that prejudice could be caused by doing so.
Accordingly, I concur in the judgment reversing the order of dismissal of the trial court in order that
Civil Case No. 2850 may proceed, subject to the limitation mentioned in the last sentence of Article
2177 of the Civil Code, which means that of the two possible judgments, the injured party is entitled
exclusively to the bigger one.
G.R. No. L-24803 May 26, 1977
PEDRO ELCANO and PATRICIA ELCANO, in their capacity as Ascendants of Agapito Elcano,
deceased,plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
REGINALD HILL, minor, and MARVIN HILL, as father and Natural Guardian of said
minor, defendants-appellees.
Cruz & Avecilla for appellants.
Marvin R. Hill & Associates for appellees.

BARREDO, J.:
Appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City dated January 29, 1965 in Civil
Case No. Q-8102, Pedro Elcano et al. vs. Reginald Hill et al. dismissing, upon motion to dismiss of
defendants, the complaint of plaintiffs for recovery of damages from defendant Reginald Hill, a
minor, married at the time of the occurrence, and his father, the defendant Marvin Hill, with whom he
was living and getting subsistence, for the killing by Reginald of the son of the plaintiffs, named
Agapito Elcano, of which, when criminally prosecuted, the said accused was acquitted on the ground
that his act was not criminal, because of "lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistake."
Actually, the motion to dismiss based on the following grounds:
1. The present action is not only against but a violation of section 1, Rule 107, which
is now Rule III, of the Revised Rules of Court;
2. The action is barred by a prior judgment which is now final and or in resadjudicata;
3. The complaint had no cause of action against defendant Marvin Hill, because he
was relieved as guardian of the other defendant through emancipation by marriage.

(P. 23, Record [p. 4, Record on Appeal.])

was first denied by the trial court. It was only upon motion for reconsideration of the defendants of
such denial, reiterating the above grounds that the following order was issued:
Considering the motion for reconsideration filed by the defendants on January 14,
1965 and after thoroughly examining the arguments therein contained, the Court
finds the same to be meritorious and well-founded.
WHEREFORE, the Order of this Court on December 8, 1964 is hereby reconsidered
by ordering the dismissal of the above entitled case.
SO ORDERED.
Quezon City, Philippines, January 29, 1965. (p. 40, Record [p. 21, Record on
Appeal.)
Hence, this appeal where plaintiffs-appellants, the spouses Elcano, are presenting for Our resolution
the following assignment of errors:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE CASE BY UPHOLDING THE
CLAIM OF DEFENDANTS THAT I
THE PRESENT ACTION IS NOT ONLY AGAINST BUT ALSO A VIOLATION OF
SECTION 1, RULE 107, NOW RULE 111, OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT,
AND THAT SECTION 3(c) OF RULE 111, RULES OF COURT IS APPLICABLE;
II
THE ACTION IS BARRED BY A PRIOR JUDGMENT WHICH IS NOW FINAL OR
RES-ADJUDICTA;
III
THE PRINCIPLES OF QUASI-DELICTS, ARTICLES 2176 TO 2194 OF THE CIVIL
CODE, ARE INAPPLICABLE IN THE INSTANT CASE; and
IV
THAT THE COMPLAINT STATES NO CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST DEFENDANT
MARVIN HILL BECAUSE HE WAS RELIEVED AS GUARDIAN OF THE OTHER
DEFENDANT THROUGH EMANCIPATION BY MARRIAGE. (page 4, Record.)

It appears that for the killing of the son, Agapito, of plaintiffs-appellants, defendant- appellee
Reginald Hill was prosecuted criminally in Criminal Case No. 5102 of the Court of First Instance of
Quezon City. After due trial, he was acquitted on the ground that his act was not criminal because of
"lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistake." Parenthetically, none of the parties has favored Us with a
copy of the decision of acquittal, presumably because appellants do not dispute that such indeed
was the basis stated in the court's decision. And so, when appellants filed their complaint against
appellees Reginald and his father, Atty. Marvin Hill, on account of the death of their son, the
appellees filed the motion to dismiss above-referred to.
As We view the foregoing background of this case, the two decisive issues presented for Our
resolution are:
1. Is the present civil action for damages barred by the acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case
wherein the action for civil liability, was not reversed?
2. May Article 2180 (2nd and last paragraphs) of the Civil Code he applied against Atty. Hill,
notwithstanding the undisputed fact that at the time of the occurrence complained of. Reginald,
though a minor, living with and getting subsistenee from his father, was already legally married?
The first issue presents no more problem than the need for a reiteration and further clarification of
the dual character, criminal and civil, of fault or negligence as a source of obligation which was firmly
established in this jurisdiction in Barredo vs. Garcia, 73 Phil. 607. In that case, this Court postulated,
on the basis of a scholarly dissertation by Justice Bocobo on the nature of culpa aquiliana in relation
to culpa criminal or delito and mereculpa or fault, with pertinent citation of decisions of the Supreme
Court of Spain, the works of recognized civilians, and earlier jurisprudence of our own, that the same
given act can result in civil liability not only under the Penal Code but also under the Civil Code.
Thus, the opinion holds:
The, above case is pertinent because it shows that the same act machinist. come
under both the Penal Code and the Civil Code. In that case, the action of the agent
killeth unjustified and fraudulent and therefore could have been the subject of a
criminal action. And yet, it was held to be also a proper subject of a civil action under
article 1902 of the Civil Code. It is also to be noted that it was the employer and not
the employee who was being sued. (pp. 615-616, 73 Phil.). 1
It will be noticed that the defendant in the above case could have been prosecuted in
a criminal case because his negligence causing the death of the child was
punishable by the Penal Code. Here is therefore a clear instance of the same act of
negligence being a proper subject matter either of a criminal action with its
consequent civil liability arising from a crime or of an entirely separate and
independent civil action for fault or negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code.
Thus, in this jurisdiction, the separate individuality of a cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana,
under the Civil Code has been fully and clearly recognized, even with regard to a
negligent act for which the wrongdoer could have been prosecuted and convicted in
a criminal case and for which, after such a conviction, he could have been sued for
this civil liability arising from his crime. (p. 617, 73 Phil.) 2

It is most significant that in the case just cited, this Court specifically applied article 1902
of the Civil Code. It is thus that although J. V. House could have been criminally
prosecuted for reckless or simple negligence and not only punished but also made civilly
liable because of his criminal negligence, nevertheless this Court awarded damages in
an independent civil action for fault or negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code. (p.
618, 73 Phil.) 3

The legal provisions, authors, and cases already invoked should ordinarily be
sufficient to dispose of this case. But inasmuch as we are announcing doctrines that
have been little understood, in the past, it might not he inappropriate to indicate their
foundations.
Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in articles 365 punishes not only reckless but also
simple negligence. If we were to hold that articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code
refer only to fault or negligence not punished by law, accordingly to the literal import
of article 1093 of the Civil Code, the legal institution ofculpa aquiliana would have
very little scope and application in actual life. Death or injury to persons and damage
to property- through any degree of negligence - even the slightest - would have to be
Idemnified only through the principle of civil liability arising from a crime. In such a
state of affairs, what sphere would remain for cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana? We are
loath to impute to the lawmaker any intention to bring about a situation so absurd and
anomalous. Nor are we, in the interpretation of the laws, disposed to uphold the letter
that killeth rather than the spirit that giveth life. We will not use the literal meaning of
the law to smother and render almost lifeless a principle of such ancient origin and
such full-grown development as culpa aquiliana or cuasi-delito, which is conserved
and made enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code.
Secondary, to find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt is required, while in a civil case, preponderance of evidence is
sufficient to make the defendant pay in damages. There are numerous cases of
criminal negligence which can not be shown beyond reasonable doubt, but can be
proved by a preponderance of evidence. In such cases, the defendant can and
should be made responsible in a civil action under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil
Code. Otherwise. there would be many instances of unvindicated civil wrongs. "Ubi
jus Idemnified remedium." (p. 620,73 Phil.)
Fourthly, because of the broad sweep of the provisions of both the Penal Code and
the Civil Code on this subject, which has given rise to the overlapping or concurrence
of spheres already discussed, and for lack of understanding of the character and
efficacy of the action for culpa aquiliana, there has grown up a common practice to
seek damages only by virtue of the civil responsibility arising from a crime, forgetting
that there is another remedy, which is by invoking articles 1902-1910 of the Civil
Code. Although this habitual method is allowed by, our laws, it has nevertheless
rendered practically useless and nugatory the more expeditious and effective remedy
based on culpa aquiliana or culpa extra-contractual. In the present case, we are
asked to help perpetuate this usual course. But we believe it is high time we pointed
out to the harms done by such practice and to restore the principle of responsibility

for fault or negligence under articles 1902 et seq. of the Civil Code to its full rigor. It is
high time we caused the stream of quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana to flow on its own
natural channel, so that its waters may no longer be diverted into that of a crime
under the Penal Code. This will, it is believed, make for the better safeguarding or
private rights because it realtor, an ancient and additional remedy, and for the further
reason that an independent civil action, not depending on the issues, limitations and
results of a criminal prosecution, and entirely directed by the party wronged or his
counsel, is more likely to secure adequate and efficacious redress. (p. 621, 73 Phil.)
Contrary to an immediate impression one might get upon a reading of the foregoing excerpts from
the opinion in Garcia that the concurrence of the Penal Code and the Civil Code therein referred to
contemplate only acts of negligence and not intentional voluntary acts - deeper reflection would
reveal that the thrust of the pronouncements therein is not so limited, but that in fact it actually
extends to fault or culpa. This can be seen in the reference made therein to the Sentence of the
Supreme Court of Spain of February 14, 1919, supra, which involved a case of fraud or estafa, not a
negligent act. Indeed, Article 1093 of the Civil Code of Spain, in force here at the time of Garcia,
provided textually that obligations "which are derived from acts or omissions in which fault or
negligence, not punishable by law, intervene shall be the subject of Chapter II, Title XV of this book
(which refers to quasi-delicts.)" And it is precisely the underline qualification, "not punishable by law",
that Justice Bocobo emphasized could lead to an ultimo construction or interpretation of the letter of
the law that "killeth, rather than the spirit that giveth lift- hence, the ruling that "(W)e will not use the
literal meaning of the law to smother and render almost lifeless a principle of such ancient origin and
such full-grown development as culpa aquiliana or quasi-delito, which is conserved and made
enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code." And so, because Justice Bacobo was
Chairman of the Code Commission that drafted the original text of the new Civil Code, it is to be
noted that the said Code, which was enacted after the Garcia doctrine, no longer uses the term, 11
not punishable by law," thereby making it clear that the concept of culpa aquiliana includes acts
which are criminal in character or in violation of the penal law, whether voluntary or matter. Thus, the
corresponding provisions to said Article 1093 in the new code, which is Article 1162, simply says,
"Obligations derived from quasi-delicto shall be governed by the provisions of Chapter 2, Title XVII of
this Book, (on quasi-delicts) and by special laws." More precisely, a new provision, Article 2177 of
the new code provides:
ART. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is
entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the
Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or
omission of the defendant.
According to the Code Commission: "The foregoing provision (Article 2177) through at first sight
startling, is not so novel or extraordinary when we consider the exact nature of criminal and civil
negligence. The former is a violation of the criminal law, while the latter is a "culpa aquiliana" or
quasi-delict, of ancient origin, having always had its own foundation and individuality, separate from
criminal negligence. Such distinction between criminal negligence and "culpa extracontractual" or
"cuasi-delito" has been sustained by decision of the Supreme Court of Spain and maintained as
clear, sound and perfectly tenable by Maura, an outstanding Spanish jurist. Therefore, under the
proposed Article 2177, acquittal from an accusation of criminal negligence, whether on reasonable

doubt or not, shall not be a bar to a subsequent civil action, not for civil liability arising from criminal
negligence, but for damages due to a quasi-delict or 'culpa aquiliana'. But said article forestalls a
double recovery.", (Report of the Code) Commission, p. 162.)
Although, again, this Article 2177 does seem to literally refer to only acts of negligence, the same
argument of Justice Bacobo about construction that upholds "the spirit that giveth lift- rather than that
which is literal that killeth the intent of the lawmaker should be observed in applying the same. And
considering that the preliminary chapter on human relations of the new Civil Code definitely
establishes the separability and independence of liability in a civil action for acts criminal in character
(under Articles 29 to 32) from the civil responsibility arising from crime fixed by Article 100 of the
Revised Penal Code, and, in a sense, the Rules of Court, under Sections 2 and 3 (c), Rule 111,
contemplate also the same separability, it is "more congruent with the spirit of law, equity and justice,
and more in harmony with modern progress"- to borrow the felicitous relevant language in Rakes vs.
Atlantic. Gulf and Pacific Co., 7 Phil. 359, to hold, as We do hold, that Article 2176, where it refers to
"fault or negligencia covers not only acts "not punishable by law" but also acts criminal in character,
whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the
offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted,
provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to recover
damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the
two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In other words, the extinction of civil liability
referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100
of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasidelict only and not as a crime is not estinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the
criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed by the accused. Briefly stated,
We here hold, in reiteration of Garcia, that culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts
which may be punishable by law.4
It results, therefore, that the acquittal of Reginal Hill in the criminal case has not extinguished his
liability for quasi-delict, hence that acquittal is not a bar to the instant action against him.
Coming now to the second issue about the effect of Reginald's emancipation by marriage on the
possible civil liability of Atty. Hill, his father, it is also Our considered opinion that the conclusion of
appellees that Atty. Hill is already free from responsibility cannot be upheld.
While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of the child (Article 327, Civil
Code), and under Article 397, emancipation takes place "by the marriage of the minor (child)", it is,
however, also clear that pursuant to Article 399, emancipation by marriage of the minor is not really
full or absolute. Thus "(E)mancipation by marriage or by voluntary concession shall terminate
parental authority over the child's person. It shall enable the minor to administer his property as
though he were of age, but he cannot borrow money or alienate or encumber real property without
the consent of his father or mother, or guardian. He can sue and be sued in court only with the
assistance of his father, mother or guardian."
Now under Article 2180, "(T)he obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's
own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. The father and, in
case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible. The father and, in case of his death or

incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in
their company." In the instant case, it is not controverted that Reginald, although married, was living
with his father and getting subsistence from him at the time of the occurrence in question. Factually,
therefore, Reginald was still subservient to and dependent on his father, a situation which is not
unusual.
It must be borne in mind that, according to Manresa, the reason behind the joint and solidary liability
of presuncion with their offending child under Article 2180 is that is the obligation of the parent to
supervise their minor children in order to prevent them from causing damage to third persons. 5 On
the other hand, the clear implication of Article 399, in providing that a minor emancipated by marriage
may not, nevertheless, sue or be sued without the assistance of the parents, is that such emancipation
does not carry with it freedom to enter into transactions or do any act that can give rise to judicial
litigation. (See Manresa, Id., Vol. II, pp. 766-767, 776.) And surely, killing someone else invites judicial
action. Otherwise stated, the marriage of a minor child does not relieve the parents of the duty to see to it
that the child, while still a minor, does not give answerable for the borrowings of money and alienation or
encumbering of real property which cannot be done by their minor married child without their consent.
(Art. 399; Manresa, supra.)
Accordingly, in Our considered view, Article 2180 applies to Atty. Hill notwithstanding the
emancipation by marriage of Reginald. However, inasmuch as it is evident that Reginald is now of
age, as a matter of equity, the liability of Atty. Hill has become milling, subsidiary to that of his son.
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is reversed and the trial court is ordered to proceed in
accordance with the foregoing opinion. Costs against appellees.
Fernando (Chairman), Antonio, and Martin, JJ., concur.
Concepcion Jr., J, is on leave.
Martin, J, was designated to sit in the Second Division.

Separate Opinions

AQUINO, J, concurring:
Article 2176 of the Civil Code comprehends any culpable act, which is blameworthy, when judged by
accepted legal standards. "The Idea thus expressed is undoubtedly board enough to include any
rational conception of liability for the tortious acts likely to be developed in any society." (Street, J. in
Daywalt vs. Corporacion de PP. Agustinos Recoletos, 39 Phil. 587, 600). See article 38, Civil Code
and the ruling that "the infant tortfeasor is liable in a civil action to the injured person in the same

manner and to the same extent as an adult" (27 Am. Jur. 812 cited by Bocobo, J., in Magtibay vs.
Tiangco, 74 Phil. 576, 579).

Separate Opinions
AQUINO, J, concurring:
Article 2176 of the Civil Code comprehends any culpable act, which is blameworthy, when judged by
accepted legal standards. "The Idea thus expressed is undoubtedly board enough to include any
rational conception of liability for the tortious acts likely to be developed in any society." (Street, J. in
Daywalt vs. Corporacion de PP. Agustinos Recoletos, 39 Phil. 587, 600). See article 38, Civil Code
and the ruling that "the infant tortfeasor is liable in a civil action to the injured person in the same
manner and to the same extent as an adult" (27 Am. Jur. 812 cited by Bocobo, J., in Magtibay vs.
Tiangco, 74 Phil. 576, 579).
Footnotes
1 Referring to Sentence of the Supreme Court of Spain of February 14, 1919.
2 Referring to Manzanares vs. Moreta, 38 Phil. 821.
3 Referring to Bernal et al, vs. House et al., 54 Phil. 327.
4 Parenthetically, Manresa seemingly holds. the contrary view thus:
"Sin embargo, para no ineurrir en error hay que tener en cuenta que los lineage. del
precepts contenido en el presente articulo son bastante mas reducidos, pues no se
hallan comprendidos en el todos los datios que pues tener por causa la culpa o la
negligencia.
"En efecto, examinando detenidamente la terminos general de la culpa y de la
negligencia. se observe que, tanto en una como en otra de dichas causas, hay tres
generoso o tres especies distintas, a saber:
1. La que represents una accion u omision voluntaria por la que results incumplida
una obligacion anteriormente constituida.
2. La que sin existencia de una obligacion anterior produce un dano o perjuicio que,
teniendo su origen en un hecho ilicito, no reviste los caracteres de delito o falta; y
3. La que teniendo por origen un hecho que constituya delito o falta produce una
responsabilidad civil como accesoria de la responsabilidad criminal.

"La primera de estas tres especies de culpa o negligencia es siempre accesoria de

una obligacion principal, cuyo incumplimiento da origen a la terminos especial de la
culpa en materia de contratos, y el eatudio de esta debe harms al examinar cada
contrato, en especial, como lo hicimos asi, analizando entoces los peculiares efectos
de dicha culpa en cada uno de ellos.
"La tercera de las especies citadas es accesoria tambien, pues no puede concebirse
su existencia sin la de un delicto o falts que la produzca. Es decir, que solo al lado
de la responsabilidad criminal puede supuesto esa responsabilidad civil y la
obligacion proveniente de la culpa, ineurrir como una consecuencia de la
responsabilidad criminal, y, por consiguente, su examen y regulacion perusal. al
Derecho penal.
"Como consecuencia de ello, results que la unica especie de culpa y omisiones o
negligencia que puede ser y es meanwhile.' del presente capitulo, es la separability,
o sea la que sin la existencia de una obligacion anterior, y sin ningun antecedents
contractual, produce un dano o perjuico que tiene su origen en una accion u omision
culpable solo civilmente; as decir, que siendo ilicita, no reviste sin embargo, los
caracteres de un delito o falta por no estar penada por la ley. Y aun dentro de estos
lineage hay que restringir aun mas los terminos o la materia propria de este articulo,
el cual se refiere unicamente a la culpa o negligencia personates del obligado, pero
no a las que prudencia de actos o de omisiones de persons., distintas de este." (pp.
642-643, Vol. XII, Manresa, Codigo Civil Espanol.)
5 "Nuestro Codigo no ha seguido la escuela italiana, sino que mas bien se ha
instantaneous, en el criterio de la doctrina full-grown puesto que impone la
obligacion de reparar, el dano causado en virtud de una presuncion juris tecum de
culpa por parte del que tiene bajo su autoridad o dependecia al causante del daho,
derivada del hicimos de no haber puesto el cuidado y la vinculos debida en los actos
de sus subordinados para evitar dicho resultado. Asi es que, segun el parrafo ultimo
del art. 1,903, cesa dicha responsabilidad cuando se prueba que los obligados por
los actos ajenos emplearon toda la diligencia de un buen padre de familia. Luego no
es la causa de la obligacion impuesta la representacion, ni el interes, ni la necesidad
de que haya quienes responda del dano causado por el que no tiene personalidad in
garantias de specialist. para responsabilidad por siendo sino el incumplimiento
implicito o supuesto de los deberes de precaucion y de prudencia que impuesta los
vinculos civiles que unicamente al obligado con las persons., por quienes debe
representacion, el mal causado, Por ese motivo coloca dicha obligacion entre las
que prudencia de la culpa of negligentj (pp. 670671, Manresa, Codigo Civil Espanol,
Vol. XII.)
G.R. No. L-46179 January 31, 1978
CANDIDA VIRATA, TOMAS VIRATA, MANOLITO VIRATA, EDERLINDA VIRATA, NAPOLEON
VIRATA, ARACELY VIRATA, ZENAIDA VIRATA, LUZMINDA VIRATA, PACITA VIRATA, and
EVANGELINA VIRATA,petitioners,

vs.
VICTORIO OCHOA, MAXIMO BORILLA and THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CAVITE, 7th
JUDICIAL DISTRICT, BRANCH V, stationed at BACOOR, CAVITE, respondents.
Remulla, Estrella & Associates for petitioners
Exequil C. Masangkay for respondents.

FERNANDEZ, J.:
This is an appeal by certiorari, from the order of the Court of First Instance of Cavite, Branch V, in
Civil Case No. B-134 granting the motion of the defendants to dismiss the complaint on the ground
that there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause. 1
The record shows that on September 24, 1975 one Arsenio Virata died as a result of having been
bumped while walking along Taft Avenue, Pasay City by a passenger jeepney driven by Maximo
Borilla and registered in the name Of Victoria Ochoa; that Borilla is the employer of Ochoa; that for
the death of Arsenio Virata, a action for homicide through reckless imprudence was instituted on
September 25, 1975 against Maximo Borilla in the Court of First Instance of Rizal at Pasay City,
docketed as C Case No. 3162-P of said court; that at the hearing of the said criminal case on
December 12, 1975, Atty. Julio Francisco, the private prosecutor, made a reservation to file a
separate civil action for damages against the driver on his criminal liability; that on February 19,
1976 Atty. Julio Francisco filed a motion in said c case to withdraw the reservation to file a separate
civil action; that thereafter, the private prosecutor actively participated in the trial and presented
evidence on the damages; that on June 29, 1976 the heirs of Arsenio Virata again reserved their
right to institute a separate civil action; that on July 19, 1977 the heirs of Arsenio Virata, petitioners
herein, commenced Civil No. B-134 in the Court of First Instance of Cavite at Bacoor, Branch V, for
damages based on quasi-delict against the driver Maximo Borilla and the registered owner of the
jeepney, Victorio Ochoa; that on August 13, 1976 the defendants, private respondents filed a motion
to dismiss on the ground that there is another action, Criminal Case No. 3162-P, pending between
the same parties for the same cause; that on September 8, 1976 the Court of First Instance of Rizal
at Pasay City a decision in Criminal Case No. 3612-P acquitting the accused Maximo Borilla on the
ground that he caused an injury by name accident; and that on January 31, 1977, the Court of First
Instance of Cavite at Bacoor granted the motion to Civil Case No. B-134 for damages. 2
The principal issue is weather or not the of the Arsenio Virata, can prosecute an action for the
damages based on quasi-delict against Maximo Borilla and Victoria Ochoa, driver and owner,
respectively on the passenger jeepney that bumped Arsenio Virata.
It is settled that in negligence cases the aggrieved parties may choose between an action under the
Revised Penal Code or of quasi-delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. What is
prohibited by Article 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines is to recover twice for the same
negligent act.

The Supreme Court has held that:

According to the Code Commission: 'The foregoing provision (Article 2177) though at
first sight startling, is not so novel or extraordinary when we consider the exact
nature of criminal and civil negligence. The former is a violation of the criminal law,
while the latter is a 'culpa aquiliana' or quasi-delict, of ancient origin, having always
had its own foundation and individuality, separate from criminal negligence. Such
distinction between criminal negligence and 'culpa extra-contractual' or quasi-delito
has been sustained by decision of the Supreme Court of Spain and maintained as
clear, sound and perfectly tenable by Maura, an outstanding Spanish jurist.
Therefore, under the proposed Article 2177, acquittal from an accusation of criminal
negligence, whether on reasonable doubt or not, shall not be a bar to a subsequent
civil action, not for civil liability arising from criminal negligence, but for damages due
to a quasi-delict or 'culpa aquiliana'. But said article forestalls a double recovery.
(Report of the Code Commission, p. 162.)
Although, again, this Article 2177 does seem to literally refer to only acts of
negligence, the same argument of Justice Bocobo about construction that upholds
'the spirit that given life' rather than that which is literal that killeth the intent of the
lawmaker should be observed in applying the same. And considering that the
preliminary chapter on human relations of the new Civil Code definitely establishes
the separability and independence of liability in a civil action for acts criminal in
character (under Articles 29 to 32) from the civil responsibility arising from crime fixed
by Article 100 of the Penal Code, and, in a sense, the Rules of Court, under Sections
2 and 3(c), Rule 111, contemplate also the same separability, it is 'more congruent'
with the spirit of law, equity and justice, and more in harmony with modern progress',
to borrow the felicitous language in Rakes vs. Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co., 7 Phil. to
359, to hod as We do hold, that Article 2176, where it refers to 'fault covers not only
acts 'not punishable by law' but also criminal in character, whether intentional and
voluntary or consequently, a separate civil action lies against the in a criminal act,
whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty and acquitted, provided
that the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to
recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to
the bigger award of the, two assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In
other words the extinction of civil liability refereed to in Par. (c) of Section 13, Rule
111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal
Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only
and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that
the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed by the
accused. Brief stated, We hold, in reitration of Garcia, that culpa aquilina includes
voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable by law. 3
The petitioners are not seeking to recover twice for the same negligent act. Before Criminal Case
No. 3162-P was decided, they manifested in said criminal case that they were filing a separate civil
action for damages against the owner and driver of the passenger jeepney based on quasidelict. The acquittal of the driver, Maximo Borilla, of the crime charged in Criminal Case No. 3162-P

is not a bar to the prosecution of Civil Case No. B-134 for damages based on quasi-delict The
source of the obligation sought to be enforced in Civil Case No. B-134 is quasi-delict, not an act or
omission punishable by law. Under Article 1157 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, quasi-delict and
an act or omission punishable by law are two different sources of obligation.
Moreover, for the petitioners to prevail in the action for damages, Civil Case No. B-134, they have
only to establish their cause of action by preponderance of the evidence.
WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal appealed from is hereby set aside and Civil Case No. B-134 is
reinstated and remanded to the lower court for further proceedings, with costs against the private
respondents.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Muoz Palma and Guerrero, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-33171 May 31, 1979

PORFIRIO P. CINCO, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
HON. MATEO CANONOY, Presiding Judge of the Third Branch of the Court of First Instance
of Cebu, HON. LORENZO B. BARRIA City Judge of Mandaue City, Second Branch ROMEO
HILOT, VALERIANA PEPITO and CARLOS PEPITO, respondents-appellees.
Eriberto Seno for appellant.
Jose M. Mesina for appellees.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu
rendered on November 5, 1970.
The background facts to the controversy may be set forth as follows:
Petitioner herein filed, on February 25, 1970, a Complaint in the City Court of Mandaue City, Cebu,
Branch II, for the recovery of damages on account of a vehicular accident involving his automobile
and a jeepney driven by Romeo Hilot and operated by Valeriana Pepito and Carlos Pepito, the last
three being the private respondents in this suit. Subsequent thereto, a criminal case was filed
against the driver, Romeo Hilot, arising from the same accident. At the pre-trial in the civil case,
counsel for private respondents moved to suspend the civil action pending the final determination of
the criminal suit, invoking Rule 111, Section 3 (b) of the Rules of Court, which provides:

(b) After a criminal action has been commenced. no civil action arising from the same
offense can be prosecuted, and the same shall be suspended, in whatever stage it
may be found, until final judgment in the criminal proceeding has been rendered;
The City Court of Mandaue City in an Order dated August 11, 1970, ordered the suspension of the
civil case. Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration thereof, having been denied on August 25,
1970, 1 petitioner elevated the matter on certiorari to the Court of First Instance of Cebu, respondent
Judge presiding, on September 11, 1970, alleging that the City Judge had acted with grave abuse of
discretion in suspending the civil action for being contrary to law and jurisprudence. 2
On November 5, 1970, respondent Judge dismissed the Petition for certiorari on the ground that
there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the City Court in suspending the civil action
inasmuch as damage to property is not one of the instances when an independent civil action is
proper; that petitioner has another plain, speedy, and adequate remedy under the law, which is to
submit his claim for damages in the criminal case; that the resolution of the City Court is interlocutory
and, therefore, certiorari is improper; and that the Petition is defective inasmuch as what petitioner
actually desires is a Writ of mandamus (Annex "R"). Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was
denied by respondent Judge in an Order dated November 14,1970 (Annex "S" and Annex "U").
Hence, this Petition for Review before this Tribunal, to which we gave due course on February 25,
1971. 3
Petitioner makes these:
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
1. THE TRIAL COURT, RESPONDENT JUDGE MATEO CANONOY, ERRED IN
HOLDING THAT THE TRIAL OF THE CIVIL CASE NO. 189 FILED IN THE CITY
COURT OF MANDAUE SHOULD BE SUSPENDED UNTIL AFTER A FINAL
JUDGMENT IS RENDERED IN THE CRIMINAL CASE.
2. THAT THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT IN ORDER TO AVOID DELAY
THE OFFENDED PARTY MAY SUBMIT HIS CLAIM FOR DAMAGES IN THE
CRIMINAL CASE.
3. THAT THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PETITION FOR certiorari IS
NOT PROPER, BECAUSE THE RESOLUTION IN QUESTION IS
INTERLOCUTORY.
4. THAT THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PETITION IS DEFECTIVE.

all of which can be synthesized into one decisive issue: whether or not there can be an independent
civil action for damage to property during the pendency of the criminal action.

From the Complaint filed by petitioner before the City Court of Mandaue City, Cebu, it is evident that
the nature and character of his action was quasi-delictual predicated principally on Articles 2176 and
2180 of the Civil Code, which provide:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault
or negligence is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if
there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is caned a quasidelict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. (1902a)
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's
own acts or omissions but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
xxx xxx xxx
Employers shall be liable for the damages cause by their employees and household
helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are
not engaged in any business or industry.
xxx xxx xxx
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein
mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damage. (1903a)
Thus, plaintiff made the essential averments that it was the fault or negligence of the driver, Romeo
Hilot, in the operation of the jeepney owned by the Pepitos which caused the collision between his
automobile and said jeepney; that damages were sustained by petitioner because of the collision;
that there was a direct causal connection between the damages he suffered and the fault and
negligence of private respondents.
Similarly, in the Answer, private respondents contended, among others, that defendant, Valeriana
Pepito, observed due diligence in the selection and supervision of her employees, particularly of her
co-defendant Romeo Hilot, a defense peculiar to actions based on quasi-delict. 5
Liability being predicated on quasi-delict the civil case may proceed as a separate and independent
civil action, as specifically provided for in Article 2177 of the Civil Code.
Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely
separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal
Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of
the defendant. (n)
The crucial distinction between criminal negligence and quasi-delict, which is readily
discernible from the foregoing codal provision, has been expounded in Barredo
vs. Garcia, et al., 73 Phil. 607, 620-621,6 thus:

Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in article 365 punishes not only reckless but also
simple imprudence. if we were to hold that articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code
refer only to fault or negligence not punished by law, according to the literal import of
article 1093 of the Civil Code, the legal institution ofculpa aquiliana would have very
little scope and application in actual life. Death or injury to personsand damage to
property through any degree of negligence even the slightest would have to be
indemnified only through the principle of civil hability arising from crime. In such a
state of affairs, what sphere would remain for quasidelito or culpa aquiliana We are
loath to impute to the lawmaker any intention to bring about a situation so absurd and
anomalous. Nor are we, in the interpretation of the laws, disposed to uphold the letter
that killeth rather than the spirit that giveth life. We will not use the literal meaning of
the law to smother and render almost lifeless a principle of such ancient origin and
such full-grown development as culpa aquiliana or quasi-delito, which is conserved
and made enduring in articles 1902 to 11910 of the Spanish Civil Code.
Secondly, to find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt is required, while in a civil case, preponderance of evidence is
sufficient to make the defendant pay in damages. There are numerous cases of
criminal negligence which cannot be shown beyond reasonable doubt, but can be
proved by a preponderance of evidence. In such cases, the defendant can and
should be made responsible in a civil action under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil
Code, otherwise, there would be many instances of unvindicated civil wrongs. Ubi jus
ibi remedium.
Thirdly, to hold that there is only one way to make defendants liability effective, and
that is, to sue the driver and exhaust his (the latter's) property first, would be
tantamount to compelling the plaintiff to follow a devious and cumbersome method of
obtaining a reliel True, there is such a remedy under our laws, but there is also a
more expeditious way, which is based on the primary and direct responsibility of the
defendant under article 1903 of the Civil Code. Our view of the law is more likely to
facilitate remedy for civil wrongs because the procedure indicated by the defendant is
wasteful and productive of delay, it being a matter of common knowledge that
professional drivers of taxis and similar public conveyances usually do not have
sufficient means with which to pay damages. Why, then, should the plaintiff be
required in all cases to go through this round-about, unnecessary, and probably
useless procedure? In construing the laws, courts have endeavored to shorten and
facilitate the pathways of right and justice.
At this juncture, it should be said that the primary and direct responsibility of
employers and their presumed negligence are principles calculated to protect society.
Workmen and employees should be carefully chosen and supervised in order to
avoid injury to the public. It is the masters or employers who principally reap the
profits resulting from the services of these servants and employees. It is but right that
they should guarantee the latter's careful conduct for the personnel and patrimonial
safety of others. As Theilhard has said, "they should reproach themselves, at least,
some for their weakness, others for their poor selection and all for their negligence."

And according to Manresa, "It is much more equitable and just that such
responsibility should fail upon the principal or director who could have chosen a
careful and prudent employee, and not upon the such employee because of his
confidence in the principal or director." (Vol. 12, p. 622, 2nd Ed.) Many jurists also
base this primary responsibility of the employer on the principle of representation of
the principal by the agent. Thus, Oyuelos says in the work already cited (Vol. 7, p.
747) that before third persons the employer and employee vienen a ser como una
sola personalidad, por refundicion de la del dependiente en la de quien la emplea y
utihza (become as one personality by the merging of the person of the employee in
that of him who employs and utilizes him.) All these observations acquire a peculiar
force and significance when it comes to motor accidents, and there is need of
stressing and accentuating the responsibility of owners of motor vehicles.
Fourthly, because of the broad sweep of the provisions of both the Penal Code and
the Civil Code on this subject, which has given rise to overlapping or concurrence of
spheres already discussed, and for lack of understanding of the character and
efficacy of the action for culpaaquiliana there has grown up a common practice to
seek damages only by virtue of the Civil responsibility arising from crime, forgetting
that there is another remedy, which is by invoking articles 1902-1910 of the Civil
Code. Although this habitual method is allowed by our laws, it has nevertheless
rendered practically useless and nugatory the more expeditious and effective remedy
based on culpa aquiliana or culpa extra-contractual. In the present case, we are
asked to help perpetuate this usual course. But we believe it is high time we pointed
out to the harm done by such practice and to restore the principle of responsibility for
fault or negligence under articles 1902 et seq. of the Civil Code to its full rigor. It is
high time we cause the stream of quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana to flow on its own
natural channel, so that its waters may no longer be diverted into that of a crime
under the Penal Code. This will, it is believed, make for the bet ter safeguarding of
private rights because it re-establishes an ancient and additional remedy, and for the
further reason that an independent civil action, not depending on the issues, stations
and results of a criminal prosecution, and entirely directed by the party wronged or
his counsel is more likely to secure adequate and efficacious redress. (Garcia vs.
Florida 52 SCRA 420, 424-425, Aug. 31, 1973). (Emphasis supplied)
The separate and independent civil action for a quasi-delict is also clearly recognized in section 2,
Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, reading:
Sec. 2. Independent civil action. In the cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34
and 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, Are independent civil action entirely
separate and distinct from the c action, may be brought by the injured party during
the pendency of the criminal case, provided the right is reserved as required in the
preceding section. Such civil action shag proceed independently of the criminal
prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
Significant to note is the fact that the foregoing section categorically lists cases provided for in Article
2177 of the Civil Code, supra, as allowing of an "independent civil action."

Tested by the hereinabove-quoted legal tenets, it has to be held that the City Court, in surrounding
the civil action, erred in placing reliance on section 3 (b) of Rule 111 of the Rules of
Court, supra which refers to "other civil actions arising from cases not included in the section just
cited" (i.e., Section 2, Rule 111 above quoted), in which case 6 once the criminal action has being
commenced, no civil action arising from the same offense can be prosecuted and the same shall be
suspended in whatever stage it may be found, until final judgment in the criminal proceeding has
been rendered." Stated otherwise, the civil action referred to in Secs. 3(a) and 3(b) of Rule 111 of the
Rules of Court, which should be suspended after the criminal action has been instituted is that
arising from the criminal offense not the civil action based on quasi-delict
Article 31 of the Civil Code then clearly assumes relevance when it provides:
Art. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or
omission complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed independently of
the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.
For obviously, the jural concept of a quasi-delict is that of an independent source of obligation "not
arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony." Article 1157 of the Civil Code bolsters
this conclusion when it specifically recognizes that:
Art. 1157. Obligations arise from:
(1) Law;
(2) Contracts;
(3) Quasi-contracts;
(4) Acts or omissions punished by law; and
(5) Quasi-delicts. (1089a)
(Emphasis supplied)
It bears emphasizing that petitioner's cause of action is based on quasi-delict. The concept of
quasidelica as enunciated in Article 2176 of the Civil Code (supra), is so broad that it includes not
only injuries to persons but also damage to property. 7 It makes no distinction between "damage to
persons" on the one hand and "damage to property" on the other. Indeed, the word "damage" is used in
two concepts: the "harm" done and "reparation" for the harm done. And with respect to harm it is plain
that it includes both injuries to person and property since "harm" is not limited to personal but also to
property injuries. In fact, examples of quasi-delict in the law itself include damage to property. An instance
is Article 2191(2) of the Civil Code which holds proprietors responsible for damages caused by excessive
smoke which may be harmful to persons or property."
In the light of the foregoing disquisition, we are constrained to hold that respondent Judge gravely
abused his discretion in upholding the Decision of the City Court of Mandaue City, Cebu, suspending

the civil action based on aquasi-delict until after the criminal case is finally terminated. Having
arrived at this conclusion, a discussion of the other errors assigned becomes unnecessary.
WHEREFORE, granting the Writ of certiorari prayed for, the Decision of the Court of First Instance of
Cebu sought to be reviewed is hereby set aside, and the City Court of Mandaue City, Cebu, Branch
11, is hereby ordered to proceed with the hearing of Civil Case No. 189 of that Court.
Without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Fernandez, Guerrero and De Castro, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-30036 April 15, 1988

MARCOS BORDAS, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
SENCENO CANA DALLA and PRIMO TABAR defendants-appellees.

YAP, J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari, plaintiff-appellant seeks the reversal and setting aside of the
decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu dated November 2,1968 in toto the Order of the City
Court of Cebu dated September 2, 1968, granting defendants-appellees' motion to dismiss Civil
Case No. L-13110, on the ground that no express reservation was made by the plaintiff-appellant in
the criminal action (Criminal Case No. R-28941) to institute a separate civil action.
Record shows that defendant-appellee Senceno Canadalla was charged before the City Court of
Cebu, Branch III, with the offense of Serious Physical injuries Thru Reckless Imprudence, docketed
as Criminal Case No. R-28941, for having allegedly sideswiped plaintiff-appellant Marcos Bordas
along M. C. Briones St., Cebu City, on May 2, l968 at about 8:40 a.m. Canadalla s driving a jeepney
with Plate No. PUJ-13914 owned and registered in the name of Primo Tabar who is Canadalla's
employer. While Criminal Case No. R-28941 was pending, plaintiff-appellant flied a separate civil
action for damages based on culpa aquiliana against Canadalla and the latter's employer, Primo
Tabar docketed as Civil Case No. 13110. In lieu of an answer to the complaint, defendants-appellees
filed a motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 13110 on the ground that the complaint for damages was
filed without the proper reservation in the criminal action to institute a separate and independent civil
action as provided by Sections 1 and 2 of Rule III of the Rules of Court. The trial court granted the
motion and dismissed Civil Case No. 13110 in an Order dated September 2, 1968. Plaintiff-appellant
appealed to the Court of First Instance of Cebu wherein the case was docketed as Civil Case No. R10824. On November 2, 1968, the Court of First Instance promulgated the questioned decision,
affirming in toto the order appealed from. Hence, this petition on a pure question of law.

We find the petition meritorious. Indeed, there is no need for the plaintiff- appellant to make a
reservation of his right to file a separate civil action inasmuch as the civil action contemplated is not
derived from the criminal liability of the accused but one based on culpa aquiliana. The trial court
was therefore in error in considering the conviction of the accused as a "prejudicial question' to the
civil hability of Canadalla and his employer Primo Tabar. The confusion lies in the failure to
distinguish between the civil liability arising out of criminal negligence governed by the Penal Code)
on one hand, and the responsibility for culpa aquiliana or quasi-delict on the other, the latter being
separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from crime. It is thus clear that the plaintiffappellant's action, being one forculpa aquiliana (Article 2176) may not be classified as a civil action
arising from the criminal offense of Senceno Canadalla to be suspended "until judgment in the
criminal case has been rendered.
Moreover, Section 2, Rule III of the Rules of Court on independent civil actions has been amended
on January 1, 1985 to read as follows:
In the cases provided for in Article 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code of the Philippines,
an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action may
be brought by the injured party during the pendency of the criminal case. Such civil
action shall Proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only
a preponderance of evidence.
As revised, it should be noted that Section 2, Rule III, eliminated not only the requirement that the
right to institute such independent civil actions be reserved by the complainant but more significantly
eliminated Articles 31 and 2177 of the Civil Code from its purview. This is so because the civil
actions contemplated in Articles 31 and 2177 are not civil actions ex delicto. Moreover, said articles
by themselves, authorize the institution of a civil action for damages based on quasi-delict which
may proceed independently of the criminal proceeding for negligence and regardless of the result of
the latter. (Articles 31 and 2177, Civil Code; Corpus vs. Paje, 28 SCRA 1062).
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the appealed order of the trial court dated November
2, 1968 is hereby set aside, and it is ordered that the hearing of the civil case be resumed without
regard to the criminal case. This decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED
Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 74761 November 6, 1990
NATIVIDAD V. ANDAMO and EMMANUEL R. ANDAMO, petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (First Civil Cases Division) and MISSIONARIES OF OUR
LADY OF LA SALETTE, INC., respondents.
Lope E. Adriano for petitioners.

Padilla Law Office for private respondent.

FERNAN, C.J.:
The pivotal issue in this petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus is whether a corporation,
which has built through its agents, waterpaths, water conductors and contrivances within its land,
thereby causing inundation and damage to an adjacent land, can be held civilly liable for damages
under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts such that the resulting civil case can
proceed independently of the criminal case.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Petitioner spouses Emmanuel and Natividad Andamo are the owners of a parcel of land situated in
Biga (Biluso) Silang, Cavite which is adjacent to that of private respondent, Missionaries of Our Lady
of La Salette, Inc., a religious corporation.
Within the land of respondent corporation, waterpaths and contrivances, including an artificial lake,
were constructed, which allegedly inundated and eroded petitioners' land, caused a young man to
drown, damaged petitioners' crops and plants, washed away costly fences, endangered the lives of
petitioners and their laborers during rainy and stormy seasons, and exposed plants and other
improvements to destruction.
In July 1982, petitioners instituted a criminal action, docketed as Criminal Case No. TG-907-82,
before the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 4 (Tagaytay City), against Efren Musngi, Orlando
Sapuay and Rutillo Mallillin, officers and directors of herein respondent corporation, for destruction
by means of inundation under Article 324 of the Revised Penal Code.
Subsequently, on February 22, 1983, petitioners filed another action against respondent corporation,
this time a civil case, docketed as Civil Case No. TG-748, for damages with prayer for the issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction before the same court. 1
On March 11, 1983, respondent corporation filed its answer to the complaint and opposition to the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. Hearings were conducted including ocular inspections on
the land. However, on April 26, 1984, the trial court, acting on respondent corporation's motion to
dismiss or suspend the civil action, issued an order suspending further hearings in Civil Case No,
TG-748 until after judgment in the related Criminal Case No. TG-907-82.
Resolving respondent corporation's motion to dismiss filed on June 22, 1984, the trial court issued
on August 27, 1984 the disputed order dismissing Civil Case No. TG-748 for lack of jurisdiction, as
the criminal case which was instituted ahead of the civil case was still unresolved. Said order was
anchored on the provision of Section 3 (a), Rule III of the Rules of Court which provides that
"criminal and civil actions arising from the same offense may be instituted separately, but after the
criminal action has been commenced the civil action cannot be instituted until final judgment has
been rendered in the criminal action." 2

Petitioners appealed from that order to the Intermediate Appellate Court.

On February 17, 1986, respondent Appellate Court, First Civil Cases Division, promulgated a
decision 4 affirming the questioned order of the trial court. 5 A motion for reconsideration filed by
petitioners was denied by the Appellate Court in its resolution dated May 19, 1986. 6
Directly at issue is the propriety of the dismissal of Civil Case No. TG-748 in accordance with
Section 3 (a) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. Petitioners contend that the trial court and the
Appellate Court erred in dismissing Civil Case No. TG-748 since it is predicated on a quasi-delict.
Petitioners have raised a valid point.
It is axiomatic that the nature of an action filed in court is determined by the facts alleged in the
complaint as constituting the cause of action. 7 The purpose of an action or suit and the law to govern it,
including the period of prescription, is to be determined not by the claim of the party filing the action,
made in his argument or brief, but rather by the complaint itself, its allegations and prayer for relief. 8 The
nature of an action is not necessarily determined or controlled by its title or heading but the body of the
pleading or complaint itself. To avoid possible denial of substantial justice due to legal technicalities,
pleadings as well as remedial laws should be liberally construed so that the litigants may have ample
opportunity to prove their respective claims. 9
Quoted hereunder are the pertinent portions of petitioners' complaint in Civil Case No. TG-748:
4) That within defendant's land, likewise located at Biga (Biluso), Silang, Cavite,
adjacent on the right side of the aforesaid land of plaintiffs, defendant constructed
waterpaths starting from the middle-right portion thereof leading to a big hole or
opening, also constructed by defendant, thru the lower portion of its concrete hollowblocks fence situated on the right side of its cemented gate fronting the provincial
highway, and connected by defendant to a man height inter-connected cement
culverts which were also constructed and lain by defendant cross-wise beneath the
tip of the said cemented gate, the left-end of the said inter-connected culverts again
connected by defendant to a big hole or opening thru the lower portion of the same
concrete hollowblocks fence on the left side of the said cemented gate, which hole or
opening is likewise connected by defendant to the cemented mouth of a big canal,
also constructed by defendant, which runs northward towards a big hole or opening
which was also built by defendant thru the lower portion of its concrete hollow-blocks
fence which separates the land of plaintiffs from that of defendant (and which serves
as the exit-point of the floodwater coming from the land of defendant, and at the
same time, the entrance-point of the same floodwater to the land of plaintiffs, year
after year, during rainy or stormy seasons.
5) That moreover, on the middle-left portion of its land just beside the land of
plaintiffs, defendant also constructed an artificial lake, the base of which is soil, which
utilizes the water being channeled thereto from its water system thru inter-connected
galvanized iron pipes (No. 2) and complimented by rain water during rainy or stormy
seasons, so much so that the water below it seeps into, and the excess water above
it inundates, portions of the adjoining land of plaintiffs.

6) That as a result of the inundation brought about by defendant's aforementioned

water conductors, contrivances and manipulators, a young man was drowned to
death, while herein plaintiffs suffered and will continue to suffer, as follows:
a) Portions of the land of plaintiffs were eroded and converted to
deep, wide and long canals, such that the same can no longer be
planted to any crop or plant.
b) Costly fences constructed by plaintiffs were, on several occasions,
washed away.
c) During rainy and stormy seasons the lives of plaintiffs and their
laborers are always in danger.
d) Plants and other improvements on other portions of the land of
plaintiffs are exposed to destruction. ... 10
A careful examination of the aforequoted complaint shows that the civil action is one under Articles
2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts. All the elements of a quasi-delict are present, to
wit: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff, (b) fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other
person for whose acts he must respond; and (c) the connection of cause and effect between the
fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff. 11
Clearly, from petitioner's complaint, the waterpaths and contrivances built by respondent corporation
are alleged to have inundated the land of petitioners. There is therefore, an assertion of a causal
connection between the act of building these waterpaths and the damage sustained by petitioners.
Such action if proven constitutes fault or negligence which may be the basis for the recovery of
damages.
In the case of Samson vs. Dionisio, 12 the Court applied Article 1902, now Article 2176 of the Civil Code
and held that "any person who without due authority constructs a bank or dike, stopping the flow or
communication between a creek or a lake and a river, thereby causing loss and damages to a third party
who, like the rest of the residents, is entitled to the use and enjoyment of the stream or lake, shall be
liable to the payment of an indemnity for loss and damages to the injured party.
While the property involved in the cited case belonged to the public domain and the property subject
of the instant case is privately owned, the fact remains that petitioners' complaint sufficiently alleges
that petitioners have sustained and will continue to sustain damage due to the waterpaths and
contrivances built by respondent corporation. Indeed, the recitals of the complaint, the alleged
presence of damage to the petitioners, the act or omission of respondent corporation supposedly
constituting fault or negligence, and the causal connection between the act and the damage, with no
pre-existing contractual obligation between the parties make a clear case of aquasi delict or culpa
aquiliana.
It must be stressed that the use of one's property is not without limitations. Article 431 of the Civil
Code provides that "the owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in such a manner as to injure the

rights of a third person." SIC UTERE TUO UT ALIENUM NON LAEDAS. Moreover, adjoining
landowners have mutual and reciprocal duties which require that each must use his own land in a
reasonable manner so as not to infringe upon the rights and interests of others. Although we
recognize the right of an owner to build structures on his land, such structures must be so
constructed and maintained using all reasonable care so that they cannot be dangerous to adjoining
landowners and can withstand the usual and expected forces of nature. If the structures cause injury
or damage to an adjoining landowner or a third person, the latter can claim indemnification for the
injury or damage suffered.
Article 2176 of the Civil Code imposes a civil liability on a person for damage caused by his act or
omission constituting fault or negligence, thus:
Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being
fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence,
if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasidelict and is governed by the provisions of this chapter.
Article 2176, whenever it refers to "fault or negligence", covers not only acts "not punishable by law"
but also acts criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a
separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally
prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, (if the
tortfeasor is actually charged also criminally), to recover damages on both scores, and would be
entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the
two cases vary. 13
The distinctness of quasi-delicta is shown in Article 2177 of the Civil Code, which states:
Article 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is
entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the
Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or
omission of the defendant.
According to the Report of the Code Commission "the foregoing provision though at first sight
startling, is not so novel or extraordinary when we consider the exact nature of criminal and civil
negligence. The former is a violation of the criminal law, while the latter is a distinct and independent
negligence, which is a "culpa aquiliana" or quasi-delict, of ancient origin, having always had its own
foundation and individuality, separate from criminal negligence. Such distinction between criminal
negligence and "culpa extra-contractual" or "cuasi-delito" has been sustained by decisions of the
Supreme Court of Spain ... 14
In the case of Castillo vs. Court of Appeals, 15 this Court held that a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a
separate legal institution under the Civil Code with a substantivity all its own, and individuality that is
entirely apart and independent from a delict or crime a distinction exists between the civil liability
arising from a crime and the responsibility for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual. The same
negligence causing damages may produce civil liability arising from a crime under the Penal Code, or
create an action for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual under the Civil Code. Therefore, the acquittal
or conviction in the criminal case is entirely irrelevant in the civil case, unless, of course, in the event of an

acquittal where the court has declared that the fact from which the civil action arose did not exist, in which
case the extinction of the criminal liability would carry with it the extinction of the civil liability.

In Azucena vs. Potenciano, 16 the Court declared that in quasi-delicts, "(t)he civil action is entirely
independent of the criminal case according to Articles 33 and 2177 of the Civil Code. There can be no
logical conclusion than this, for to subordinate the civil action contemplated in the said articles to the
result of the criminal prosecution whether it be conviction or acquittal would render meaningless the
independent character of the civil action and the clear injunction in Article 31, that his action may proceed
independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter."
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision dated February 17, 1986 of the then Intermediate Appellate
Court affirming the order of dismissal of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 18 (Tagaytay City)
dated August 17, 1984 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The trial court is ordered to reinstate
Civil Case No. TG-748 entitled "Natividad V. Andamo and Emmanuel R. Andamo vs. Missionaries of
Our Lady of La Salette Inc." and to proceed with the hearing of the case with dispatch. This decision
is immediately executory. Costs against respondent corporation.
SO ORDERED.
Gutierrez, Jr. and Bidin, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., is on leave.
G.R. No. 97336 February 19, 1993
GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MARILOU T. GONZALES, respondents.
Public Attorney's Office for petitioner.
Corleto R. Castro for private respondent.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to review and set aside
the Decision 1 of the respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 24256 which affirmed in toto the 16
October 1939 Decision of Branch 38 (Lingayen) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pangasinan in Civil
Case No. 16503. Presented is the issue of whether or not damages may be recovered for a breach of
promise to marry on the basis of Article 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
The antecedents of this case are not complicated:
On 27 October 1987, private respondent, without the assistance of counsel, filed with the aforesaid
trial court a complaint 2 for damages against the petitioner for the alleged violation of their agreement to

get married. She alleges in said complaint that: she is twenty-two (22) years old, single, Filipino and a
pretty lass of good moral character and reputation duly respected in her community; petitioner, on the
other hand, is an Iranian citizen residing at the Lozano Apartments, Guilig, Dagupan City, and is an
exchange student taking a medical course at the Lyceum Northwestern Colleges in Dagupan City; before
20 August 1987, the latter courted and proposed to marry her; she accepted his love on the condition that
they would get married; they therefore agreed to get married after the end of the school semester, which
was in October of that year; petitioner then visited the private respondent's parents in Baaga, Bugallon,
Pangasinan to secure their approval to the marriage; sometime in 20 August 1987, the petitioner forced
her to live with him in the Lozano Apartments; she was a virgin before she began living with him; a week
before the filing of the complaint, petitioner's attitude towards her started to change; he maltreated and
threatened to kill her; as a result of such maltreatment, she sustained injuries; during a confrontation with
a representative of the barangay captain of Guilig a day before the filing of the complaint, petitioner
repudiated their marriage agreement and asked her not to live with him anymore and; the petitioner is
already married to someone living in Bacolod City. Private respondent then prayed for judgment ordering
the petitioner to pay her damages in the amount of not less than P45,000.00, reimbursement for actual
expenses amounting to P600.00, attorney's fees and costs, and granting her such other relief and
remedies as may be just and equitable. The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 16503.

In his Answer with Counterclaim, 3 petitioner admitted only the personal circumstances of the parties as
averred in the complaint and denied the rest of the allegations either for lack of knowledge or information
sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof or because the true facts are those alleged as his Special
and Affirmative Defenses. He thus claimed that he never proposed marriage to or agreed to be married
with the private respondent; he neither sought the consent and approval of her parents nor forced her to
live in his apartment; he did not maltreat her, but only told her to stop coming to his place because he
discovered that she had deceived him by stealing his money and passport; and finally, no confrontation
took place with a representative of the barangay captain. Insisting, in his Counterclaim, that the complaint
is baseless and unfounded and that as a result thereof, he was unnecessarily dragged into court and
compelled to incur expenses, and has suffered mental anxiety and a besmirched reputation, he prayed for
an award of P5,000.00 for miscellaneous expenses and P25,000.00 as moral damages.
After conducting a pre-trial on 25 January 1988, the trial court issued a Pre-Trial Order 4 embodying
the stipulated facts which the parties had agreed upon, to wit:
1. That the plaintiff is single and resident (sic) of Baaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan,
while the defendant is single, Iranian citizen and resident (sic) of Lozano Apartment,
Guilig, Dagupan City since September 1, 1987 up to the present;
2. That the defendant is presently studying at Lyceum Northwestern, Dagupan City,
College of Medicine, second year medicine proper;
3. That the plaintiff is (sic) an employee at Mabuhay Luncheonette , Fernandez
Avenue, Dagupan City since July, 1986 up to the present and a (sic) high school
graduate;
4. That the parties happened to know each other when the manager of the Mabuhay
Luncheonette, Johhny Rabino introduced the defendant to the plaintiff on August 3,
1986.

After trial on the merits, the lower court, applying Article 21 of the Civil Code, rendered on 16
October 1989 a decision 5 favoring the private respondent. The petitioner was thus ordered to pay the
latter damages and attorney's fees; the dispositive portion of the decision reads:
IN THE LIGHT of the foregoing consideration, judgment is hereby rendered in favor
of the plaintiff and against the defendant.
1. Condemning (sic) the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of twenty thousand
(P20,000.00) pesos as moral damages.
2. Condemning further the defendant to play the plaintiff the sum of three thousand
(P3,000.00) pesos as atty's fees and two thousand (P2,000.00) pesos at (sic)
litigation expenses and to pay the costs.
3. All other claims are denied. 6
The decision is anchored on the trial court's findings and conclusions that (a) petitioner and private
respondent were lovers, (b) private respondent is not a woman of loose morals or questionable
virtue who readily submits to sexual advances, (c) petitioner, through machinations, deceit and false
pretenses, promised to marry private respondent, d) because of his persuasive promise to marry
her, she allowed herself to be deflowered by him, (e) by reason of that deceitful promise, private
respondent and her parents in accordance with Filipino customs and traditions made some
preparations for the wedding that was to be held at the end of October 1987 by looking for pigs and
chickens, inviting friends and relatives and contracting sponsors, (f) petitioner did not fulfill his
promise to marry her and (g) such acts of the petitioner, who is a foreigner and who has abused
Philippine hospitality, have offended our sense of morality, good customs, culture and traditions. The
trial court gave full credit to the private respondent's testimony because, inter alia, she would not
have had the temerity and courage to come to court and expose her honor and reputation to public
scrutiny and ridicule if her claim was false. 7
The above findings and conclusions were culled from the detailed summary of the evidence for the
private respondent in the foregoing decision, digested by the respondent Court as follows:
According to plaintiff, who claimed that she was a virgin at the time and that she
never had a boyfriend before, defendant started courting her just a few days after
they first met. He later proposed marriage to her several times and she accepted his
love as well as his proposal of marriage on August 20, 1987, on which same day he
went with her to her hometown of Baaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan, as he wanted to
meet her parents and inform them of their relationship and their intention to get
married. The photographs Exhs. "A" to "E" (and their submarkings) of defendant with
members of plaintiff's family or with plaintiff, were taken that day. Also on that
occasion, defendant told plaintiffs parents and brothers and sisters that he intended
to marry her during the semestral break in October, 1987, and because plaintiff's
parents thought he was good and trusted him, they agreed to his proposal for him to
marry their daughter, and they likewise allowed him to stay in their house and sleep
with plaintiff during the few days that they were in Bugallon. When plaintiff and

defendant later returned to Dagupan City, they continued to live together in

defendant's apartment. However, in the early days of October, 1987, defendant
would tie plaintiff's hands and feet while he went to school, and he even gave her
medicine at 4 o'clock in the morning that made her sleep the whole day and night
until the following day. As a result of this live-in relationship, plaintiff became
pregnant, but defendant gave her some medicine to abort the fetus. Still plaintiff
continued to live with defendant and kept reminding him of his promise to marry her
until he told her that he could not do so because he was already married to a girl in
Bacolod City. That was the time plaintiff left defendant, went home to her parents,
and thereafter consulted a lawyer who accompanied her to the barangay captain in
Dagupan City. Plaintiff, her lawyer, her godmother, and a barangay tanod sent by the
barangay captain went to talk to defendant to still convince him to marry plaintiff, but
defendant insisted that he could not do so because he was already married to a girl
in Bacolod City, although the truth, as stipulated by the parties at the pre-trial, is that
defendant is still single.
Plaintiff's father, a tricycle driver, also claimed that after defendant had informed them
of his desire to marry Marilou, he already looked for sponsors for the wedding,
started preparing for the reception by looking for pigs and chickens, and even
already invited many relatives and friends to the forthcoming wedding. 8
Petitioner appealed the trial court's decision to the respondent Court of Appeals which docketed the
case as CA-G.R. CV No. 24256. In his Brief, 9 he contended that the trial court erred (a) in not
dismissing the case for lack of factual and legal basis and (b) in ordering him to pay moral damages,
attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs.
On 18 February 1991, respondent Court promulgated the challenged decision 10 affirming in toto the
trial court's ruling of 16 October 1989. In sustaining the trial court's findings of fact, respondent Court
made the following analysis:
First of all, plaintiff, then only 21 years old when she met defendant who was already
29 years old at the time, does not appear to be a girl of loose morals. It is
uncontradicted that she was a virgin prior to her unfortunate experience with
defendant and never had boyfriend. She is, as described by the lower court, a barrio
lass "not used and accustomed to trend of modern urban life", and certainly would
(sic) not have allowed
"herself to be deflowered by the defendant if there was no persuasive promise made
by the defendant to marry her." In fact, we agree with the lower court that plaintiff and
defendant must have been sweethearts or so the plaintiff must have thought because
of the deception of defendant, for otherwise, she would not have allowed herself to
be photographed with defendant in public in so (sic) loving and tender poses as
those depicted in the pictures Exhs. "D" and "E". We cannot believe, therefore,
defendant's pretense that plaintiff was a nobody to him except a waitress at the
restaurant where he usually ate. Defendant in fact admitted that he went to plaintiff's
hometown of Baaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan, at least thrice; at (sic) the town fiesta
on February 27, 1987 (p. 54, tsn May 18, 1988), at (sic) a beach party together with

the manager and employees of the Mabuhay Luncheonette on March 3, 1987 (p. 50,
tsn id.), and on April 1, 1987 when he allegedly talked to plaintiff's mother who told
him to marry her daughter (pp. 55-56, tsn id.). Would defendant have left Dagupan
City where he was involved in the serious study of medicine to go to plaintiff's
hometown in Baaga, Bugallon, unless there was (sic) some kind of special
relationship between them? And this special relationship must indeed have led to
defendant's insincere proposal of marriage to plaintiff, communicated not only to her
but also to her parents, and (sic) Marites Rabino, the owner of the restaurant where
plaintiff was working and where defendant first proposed marriage to her, also knew
of this love affair and defendant's proposal of marriage to plaintiff, which she
declared was the reason why plaintiff resigned from her job at the restaurant after
she had accepted defendant's proposal (pp. 6-7, tsn March 7, 1988).
Upon the other hand, appellant does not appear to be a man of good moral character
and must think so low and have so little respect and regard for Filipino women that
he openly admitted that when he studied in Bacolod City for several years where he
finished his B.S. Biology before he came to Dagupan City to study medicine, he had
a common-law wife in Bacolod City. In other words, he also lived with another woman
in Bacolod City but did not marry that woman, just like what he did to plaintiff. It is not
surprising, then, that he felt so little compunction or remorse in pretending to love
and promising to marry plaintiff, a young, innocent, trustful country girl, in order to
satisfy his lust on her. 11
and then concluded:
In sum, we are strongly convinced and so hold that it was defendant-appellant's
fraudulent and deceptive protestations of love for and promise to marry plaintiff that
made her surrender her virtue and womanhood to him and to live with him on the
honest and sincere belief that he would keep said promise, and it was likewise these
(sic) fraud and deception on appellant's part that made plaintiff's parents agree to
their daughter's living-in with him preparatory to their supposed marriage. And as
these acts of appellant are palpably and undoubtedly against morals, good customs,
and public policy, and are even gravely and deeply derogatory and insulting to our
women, coming as they do from a foreigner who has been enjoying the hospitality of
our people and taking advantage of the opportunity to study in one of our institutions
of learning, defendant-appellant should indeed be made, under Art. 21 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines, to compensate for the moral damages and injury that he had
caused plaintiff, as the lower court ordered him to do in its decision in this case. 12
Unfazed by his second defeat, petitioner filed the instant petition on 26 March 1991; he raises
therein the single issue of whether or not Article 21 of the Civil Code applies to the case at bar. 13
It is petitioner's thesis that said Article 21 is not applicable because he had not committed any moral
wrong or injury or violated any good custom or public policy; he has not professed love or proposed
marriage to the private respondent; and he has never maltreated her. He criticizes the trial court for
liberally invoking Filipino customs, traditions and culture, and ignoring the fact that since he is a

foreigner, he is not conversant with such Filipino customs, traditions and culture. As an Iranian
Moslem, he is not familiar with Catholic and Christian ways. He stresses that even if he had made a
promise to marry, the subsequent failure to fulfill the same is excusable or tolerable because of his
Moslem upbringing; he then alludes to the Muslim Code which purportedly allows a Muslim to take
four (4) wives and concludes that on the basis thereof, the trial court erred in ruling that he does not
posses good moral character. Moreover, his controversial "common law life" is now his legal wife as
their marriage had been solemnized in civil ceremonies in the Iranian Embassy. As to his unlawful
cohabitation with the private respondent, petitioner claims that even if responsibility could be pinned
on him for the live-in relationship, the private respondent should also be faulted for consenting to an
illicit arrangement. Finally, petitioner asseverates that even if it was to be assumed arguendo that he
had professed his love to the private respondent and had also promised to marry her, such acts
would not be actionable in view of the special circumstances of the case. The mere breach of
promise is not actionable. 14
On 26 August 1991, after the private respondent had filed her Comment to the petition and the
petitioner had filed his Reply thereto, this Court gave due course to the petition and required the
parties to submit their respective Memoranda, which they subsequently complied with.
As may be gleaned from the foregoing summation of the petitioner's arguments in support of his
thesis, it is clear that questions of fact, which boil down to the issue of the credibility of witnesses,
are also raised. It is the rule in this jurisdiction that appellate courts will not disturb the trial court's
findings as to the credibility of witnesses, the latter court having heard the witnesses and having had
the opportunity to observe closely their deportment and manner of testifying, unless the trial court
had plainly overlooked facts of substance or value which, if considered, might affect the result of the
case. 15
Petitioner has miserably failed to convince Us that both the appellate and trial courts had overlooked
any fact of substance or values which could alter the result of the case.
Equally settled is the rule that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. It is not the function of this Court to analyze or
weigh all over again the evidence introduced by the parties before the lower court. There are,
however, recognized exceptions to this rule. Thus, in Medina vs.Asistio, Jr., 16 this Court took the time,
again, to enumerate these exceptions:
xxx xxx xxx
(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or
conjectures (Joaquin v. Navarro, 93 Phil. 257 [1953]); (2) When the inference made
is manifestly mistaken, absurb or impossible (Luna v. Linatok, 74 Phil. 15 [1942]); (3)
Where there is a grave abuse of discretion (Buyco v. People, 95 Phil. 453 [1955]); (4)
When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts (Cruz v. Sosing,
L-4875, Nov. 27, 1953); (5) When the findings of fact are conflicting (Casica v.
Villaseca, L-9590 Ap. 30, 1957; unrep.) (6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its
findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the
admissions of both appellate and appellee (Evangelista v. Alto Surety and Insurance

Co., 103 Phil. 401 [1958]);

(7) The findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court (Garcia
v. Court of Appeals, 33 SCRA 622 [1970]; Sacay v. Sandiganbayan, 142 SCRA 593
[1986]); (8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based (Ibid.,); (9) When the facts set forth in the petition
as well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed by the
respondents (Ibid.,); and (10) The finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised
on the supposed absence of evidence and is contradicted by the evidence on record
(Salazar v. Gutierrez, 33 SCRA 242 [1970]).
Petitioner has not endeavored to joint out to Us the existence of any of the above quoted exceptions
in this case. Consequently, the factual findings of the trial and appellate courts must be respected.
And now to the legal issue.
The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. 17 Congress
deliberately eliminated from the draft of the New Civil Code the provisions that would have made it so.
The reason therefor is set forth in the report of the Senate Committees on the Proposed Civil Code, from
which We quote:
The elimination of this chapter is proposed. That breach of promise to marry is not
actionable has been definitely decided in the case of De Jesus vs. Syquia. 18 The
history of breach of promise suits in the United States and in England has shown that no
other action lends itself more readily to abuse by designing women and unscrupulous
men. It is this experience which has led to the abolition of rights of action in the so-called
Heart Balm suits in many of the American states. . . . 19
This notwithstanding, the said Code contains a provision, Article 21, which is designed to expand the
concept of torts or quasi-delict in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold
number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and
punish in the statute books. 20
As the Code Commission itself stated in its Report:
But the Code Commission had gone farther than the sphere of wrongs defined or
determined by positive law. Fully sensible that there are countless gaps in the
statutes, which leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless, even though they
have actually suffered material and moral injury, the Commission has deemed it
necessary, in the interest of justice, to incorporate in the proposed Civil Code the
following rule:
Art. 23. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage.
An example will illustrate the purview of the foregoing norm: "A" seduces the
nineteen-year old daughter of "X". A promise of marriage either has not been made,

or can not be proved. The girl becomes pregnant. Under the present laws, there is no
crime, as the girl is above nineteen years of age. Neither can any civil action for
breach of promise of marriage be filed. Therefore, though the grievous moral wrong
has been committed, and though the girl and family have suffered incalculable moral
damage, she and her parents cannot bring action for damages. But under the
proposed article, she and her parents would have such a right of action.
Thus at one stroke, the legislator, if the forgoing rule is approved, would vouchsafe
adequate legal remedy for that untold number of moral wrongs which it is impossible
for human foresight to provide for specifically in the statutes. 21
Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which defines a quasi-delict thus:
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there
is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and
is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
is limited to negligent acts or omissions and excludes the notion of willfulness or
intent. Quasi-delict, known in Spanish legal treatises as culpa aquiliana, is a civil law concept
while torts is an Anglo-American or common law concept. Torts is much broader than culpa
aquiliana because it includes not only negligence, but international criminal acts as well such
as assault and battery, false imprisonment and deceit. In the general scheme of the
Philippine legal system envisioned by the Commission responsible for drafting the New Civil
Code, intentional and malicious acts, with certain exceptions, are to be governed by the
Revised Penal Code while negligent acts or omissions are to be covered by Article 2176 of
the Civil Code. 22 In between these opposite spectrums are injurious acts which, in the absence
of Article 21, would have been beyond redress. Thus, Article 21 fills that vacuum. It is even
postulated that together with Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code, Article 21 has greatly
broadened the scope of the law on civil wrongs; it has become much more supple and adaptable
than the Anglo-American law on torts. 23
In the light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21, We are of the opinion, and so hold, that
where a man's promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a
woman and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the
giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying
her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to
accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of damages pursuant
to Article 21 not because of such promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and
the willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential, however, that
such injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy.
In the instant case, respondent Court found that it was the petitioner's "fraudulent and deceptive
protestations of love for and promise to marry plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue and
womanhood to him and to live with him on the honest and sincere belief that he would keep said

promise, and it was likewise these fraud and deception on appellant's part that made plaintiff's
parents agree to their daughter's living-in with him preparatory to their supposed marriage." 24 In
short, the private respondent surrendered her virginity, the cherished possession of every single Filipina,
not because of lust but because of moral seduction the kind illustrated by the Code Commission in its
example earlier adverted to. The petitioner could not be held liable for criminal seduction punished under
either Article 337 or Article 338 of the Revised Penal Code because the private respondent was above
eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the seduction.
Prior decisions of this Court clearly suggest that Article 21 may be applied in a breach of promise to
marry where the woman is a victim of moral seduction. Thus, in Hermosisima vs. Court of
Appeals, 25 this Court denied recovery of damages to the woman because:
. . . we find ourselves unable to say that petitioner is morally guilty of seduction, not
only because he is approximately ten (10) years younger than the complainant
who was around thirty-six (36) years of age, and as highly enlightened as a former
high school teacher and a life insurance agent are supposed to be when she
became intimate with petitioner, then a mere apprentice pilot, but, also, because the
court of first instance found that, complainant "surrendered herself" to petitioner
because, "overwhelmed by her love" for him, she "wanted to bind" him by having a
fruit of their engagement even before they had the benefit of clergy.
In Tanjanco vs. Court of Appeals, 26 while this Court likewise hinted at possible recovery if there had
been moral seduction, recovery was eventually denied because We were not convinced that such
seduction existed. The following enlightening disquisition and conclusion were made in the said case:
The Court of Appeals seem to have overlooked that the example set forth in the
Code Commission's memorandum refers to a tort upon a minor who had
been seduced. The essential feature is seduction, that in law is more than mere
sexual intercourse, or a breach of a promise of marriage; it connotes essentially the
idea of deceit, enticement, superior power or abuse of confidence on the part of the
seducer to which the woman has yielded (U.S. vs. Buenaventura, 27 Phil. 121; U.S.
vs. Arlante, 9 Phil. 595).
It has been ruled in the Buenaventura case (supra) that
To constitute seduction there must in all cases be some sufficient
promise or inducementand the woman must yield because of the
promise or other inducement. If she consents merely from carnal lust
and the intercourse is from mutual desire, there is no seduction (43
Cent. Dig. tit. Seduction, par. 56) She must be induced to depart from
the path of virtue by the use of some species of arts, persuasions and
wiles, which are calculated to have and do have that effect, and
which result in her person to ultimately submitting her person to the
sexual embraces of her seducer (27 Phil. 123).
And in American Jurisprudence we find:

On the other hand, in an action by the woman, the enticement,

persuasion or deception is the essence of the injury; and a mere
proof of intercourse is insufficient to warrant a recovery.
Accordingly it is not seduction where the willingness arises out of
sexual desire of curiosity of the female, and the defendant merely
affords her the needed opportunity for the commission of the act. It
has been emphasized that to allow a recovery in all such cases
would tend to the demoralization of the female sex, and would be a
reward for unchastity by which a class of adventuresses would be
swift to profit. (47 Am. Jur. 662)
xxx xxx xxx
Over and above the partisan allegations, the fact stand out that for one whole year,
from 1958 to 1959, the plaintiff-appellee, a woman of adult age, maintain intimate
sexual relations with appellant, with repeated acts of intercourse. Such conduct is
incompatible with the idea of seduction. Plainly there is here voluntariness and
mutual passion; for had the appellant been deceived, had she surrendered
exclusively because of the deceit, artful persuasions and wiles of the defendant, she
would not have again yielded to his embraces, much less for one year, without
exacting early fulfillment of the alleged promises of marriage, and would have cut
short all sexual relations upon finding that defendant did not intend to fulfill his
defendant did not intend to fulfill his promise. Hence, we conclude that no case is
made under article 21 of the Civil Code, and no other cause of action being alleged,
no error was committed by the Court of First Instance in dismissing the complaint. 27
In his annotations on the Civil Code, 28 Associate Justice Edgardo L. Paras, who recently retired from
this Court, opined that in a breach of promise to marry where there had been carnal knowledge, moral
damages may be recovered:
. . . if there be criminal or moral seduction, but not if the intercourse was due to
mutual lust. (Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals,
L-14628, Sept. 30, 1960; Estopa vs. Piansay, Jr., L-14733, Sept. 30, 1960; Batarra
vs. Marcos, 7 Phil. 56 (sic); Beatriz Galang vs. Court of Appeals, et al., L-17248, Jan.
29, 1962). (In other words, if the CAUSE be the promise to marry, and the EFFECT
be the carnal knowledge, there is a chance that there was criminal or moral
seduction, hence recovery of moral damages will prosper. If it be the other way
around, there can be no recovery of moral damages, because here mutual lust has
intervened). . . .
together with "ACTUAL damages, should there be any, such as the expenses for the
wedding presentations (See Domalagon v. Bolifer, 33 Phil. 471).
Senator Arturo M. Tolentino 29 is also of the same persuasion:

It is submitted that the rule in Batarra vs. Marcos, 30 still subsists, notwithstanding the
incorporation of the present article 31 in the Code. The example given by the Code
Commission is correct, if there was seduction, not necessarily in the legal sense, but in
the vulgar sense of deception. But when the sexual act is accomplished without any
deceit or qualifying circumstance of abuse of authority or influence, but the woman,
already of age, has knowingly given herself to a man, it cannot be said that there is an
injury which can be the basis for indemnity.
But so long as there is fraud, which is characterized by willfulness (sic), the action
lies. The court, however, must weigh the degree of fraud, if it is sufficient to deceive
the woman under the circumstances, because an act which would deceive a girl
sixteen years of age may not constitute deceit as to an experienced woman thirty
years of age. But so long as there is a wrongful act and a resulting injury, there
should be civil liability, even if the act is not punishable under the criminal law and
there should have been an acquittal or dismissal of the criminal case for that reason.
We are unable to agree with the petitioner's alternative proposition to the effect that granting, for
argument's sake, that he did promise to marry the private respondent, the latter is nevertheless also
at fault. According to him, both parties are in pari delicto; hence, pursuant to Article 1412(1) of the
Civil Code and the doctrine laid down in Batarra vs. Marcos, 32 the private respondent cannot recover
damages from the petitioner. The latter even goes as far as stating that if the private respondent had
"sustained any injury or damage in their relationship, it is primarily because of her own doing, 33 for:
. . . She is also interested in the petitioner as the latter will become a doctor sooner
or later. Take notice that she is a plain high school graduate and a mere
employee . . . (Annex "C") or a waitress (TSN, p. 51, January 25, 1988) in a
luncheonette and without doubt, is in need of a man who can give her economic
security. Her family is in dire need of financial assistance. (TSN, pp. 51-53, May 18,
1988). And this predicament prompted her to accept a proposition that may have
been offered by the petitioner. 34
These statements reveal the true character and motive of the petitioner. It is clear that he harbors a
condescending, if not sarcastic, regard for the private respondent on account of the latter's ignoble
birth, inferior educational background, poverty and, as perceived by him, dishonorable employment.
Obviously then, from the very beginning, he was not at all moved by good faith and an honest
motive. Marrying with a woman so circumstances could not have even remotely occurred to him.
Thus, his profession of love and promise to marry were empty words directly intended to fool, dupe,
entice, beguile and deceive the poor woman into believing that indeed, he loved her and would want
her to be his life's partner. His was nothing but pure lust which he wanted satisfied by a Filipina who
honestly believed that by accepting his proffer of love and proposal of marriage, she would be able
to enjoy a life of ease and security. Petitioner clearly violated the Filipino's concept of morality and
brazenly defied the traditional respect Filipinos have for their women. It can even be said that the
petitioner committed such deplorable acts in blatant disregard of Article 19 of the Civil Code which
directs every person to act with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith in
the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his obligations.
No foreigner must be allowed to make a mockery of our laws, customs and traditions.

The pari delicto rule does not apply in this case for while indeed, the private respondent may not
have been impelled by the purest of intentions, she eventually submitted to the petitioner in sexual
congress not out of lust, but because of moral seduction. In fact, it is apparent that she had qualms
of conscience about the entire episode for as soon as she found out that the petitioner was not going
to marry her after all, she left him. She is not, therefore, in pari delicto with the petitioner. Pari
delicto means "in equal fault; in a similar offense or crime; equal in guilt or in legal fault." 35 At most, it
could be conceded that she is merely in delicto.
Equity often interferes for the relief of the less guilty of the parties, where his
transgression has been brought about by the imposition of undue influence of the
party on whom the burden of the original wrong principally rests, or where his
consent to the transaction was itself procured by
fraud. 36
In Mangayao vs. Lasud, 37 We declared:
Appellants likewise stress that both parties being at fault, there should be no action
by one against the other (Art. 1412, New Civil Code). This rule, however, has been
interpreted as applicable only where the fault on both sides is, more or less,
equivalent. It does not apply where one party is literate or intelligent and the other
one is not. (c.f. Bough vs. Cantiveros, 40 Phil. 209).
We should stress, however, that while We find for the private respondent, let it not be said that this
Court condones the deplorable behavior of her parents in letting her and the petitioner stay together
in the same room in their house after giving approval to their marriage. It is the solemn duty of
parents to protect the honor of their daughters and infuse upon them the higher values of morality
and dignity.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the challenged decision, the instant petition is hereby
DENIED, with costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Feliciano, Bidin, Romero and Melo, JJ., concur.
Gutierrez, Jr., J., is on leave.
G.R. No. 108017 April 3, 1995
MARIA BENITA A. DULAY, in her own behalf and in behalf of the minor children KRIZTEEN
ELIZABETH, BEVERLY MARIE and NAPOLEON II, all surnamed DULAY, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, Former Eighth Division, HON. TEODORO P. REGINO, in his
capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court National Capital Region, Quezon City,
Br. 84, SAFEGUARD INVESTIGATION AND SECURITY CO., INC., and SUPERGUARD
SECURITY CORPORATION, respondents.

BIDIN, J.:
This petition for certiorari prays for the reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals dated October
29, 1991 in CA-G.R. CV No. 24646 which affirmed the order of the Regional Trial Court dismissing
Civil Case No. Q-89-1751, and its resolution dated November 17, 1991 denying herein, petitioner's
motion for reconsideration.
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
On December 7, 1988, an altercation between Benigno Torzuela and Atty. Napoleon Dulay occurred
at the "Big Bang Sa Alabang," Alabang Village, Muntinlupa as a result of which Benigno Torzuela,
the security guard on duty at the said carnival, shot and killed Atty. Napoleon Dulay.
Herein petitioner Maria Benita A. Dulay, widow of the deceased Napoleon Dulay, in her own behalf
and in behalf of her minor children, filed on February 8, 1989 an action for damages against Benigno
Torzuela and herein private respondents Safeguard Investigation and Security Co., Inc.,
("SAFEGUARD") and/or Superguard Security Corp. ("SUPERGUARD"), alleged employers of
defendant Torzuela. The complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-89-1751 among others alleges the
following:
1. . . .
Defendants SAFEGUARD INVESTIGATION AND SECURITY CO., INC., (Defendant
Safeguard) and SUPERGUARD SECURITY CORPORATION (Defendant
Superguard) are corporations duly organized and existing in accordance with
Philippine laws, with offices at 10th Floor, Manufacturers Building, Inc., Plaza Santa
Cruz, Manila. They are impleaded as alternative defendants for, while the former
appears to be the employer of defendant BENIGNO TORZUELA (defendant
TORZUELA), the latter impliedly acknowledged responsibility for the acts of
defendant TORZUELA by extending its sympathies to plaintiffs.
Defendant BENIGNO TORZUELA is of legal age, an employee of defendant
SAFEGUARD and/or defendant SUPERGUARD and, at the time of the incident
complained of, was under their control and supervision. . . .
3. On December 7, 1988 at around 8:00 a.m., defendant TORZUELA, while he was
on duty as security guard at the "Big Bang sa Alabang," Alabang Village, Muntinlupa,
Metro Manila shot and killed NAPOLEON V. DULAY with a .38 caliber revolver
belonging to defendant SAFEGUARD, and/or SUPERGUARD (per Police Report
dated January 7, 1989, copy attached as Annex A);
4. The incident resulting in the death of NAPOLEON V. DULAY was due to the
concurring negligence of the defendants. Defendant TORZUELA'S wanton and
reckless discharge of the firearm issued to him by defendant SAFEGUARD and/or

SUPERGUARD was the immediate and proximate cause of the injury, while the
negligence of defendant SAFEGUARD and/or SUPERGUARD consists in its having
failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in the supervision and
control of its employee to avoid the injury.
xxx xxx xxx
(Rollo, pp. 117-118)
Petitioners prayed for actual, compensatory, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees.
The said Civil Case No. Q-89-1751 was raffled to Branch 84 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, presided by respondent Judge Teodoro Regino.
On March 2, 1989, private respondent SUPERGUARD filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that
the complaint does not state a valid cause of action. SUPERGUARD claimed that Torzuela's act of
shooting Dulay was beyond the scope of his duties, and that since the alleged act of shooting was
committed with deliberate intent (dolo), the civil liability therefor is governed by Article 100 of the
Revised Penal Code, which states:
Art. 100. Civil liability of a person guilty of a felony. Every person criminally liable
for a felony is also civilly liable.
Respondent SUPERGUARD further alleged that a complaint for damages based on negligence
under Article 2176 of the New Civil Code, such as the one filed by petitioners, cannot lie, since the
civil liability under Article 2176 applies only to quasi-offenses under Article 365 of the Revised Penal
Code. In addition, the private respondent argued that petitioners' filing of the complaint is premature
considering that the conviction of Torzuela in a criminal case is a condition sine qua non for the
employer's subsidiary liability (Rollo, p. 55-59).
Respondent SAFEGUARD also filed a motion praying that it be excluded as defendant on the
ground that defendant Torzuela is not one of its employees (Rollo, p. 96).
Petitioners opposed both motions, stating that their cause of action against the private respondents
is based on their liability under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code, which provides:
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's
own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
xxx xxx xxx
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household
helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are
not engaged in any business or an industry.
xxx xxx xxx

(Emphasis supplied)
Petitioners contended that a suit against alternative defendants is allowed under Rule 3, Section 13
of the Rules of Court. Therefore, the inclusion of private respondents as alternative defendants in the
complaint is justified by the following: the Initial Investigation Report prepared by Pat. Mario Tubon
showing that Torzuela is an employee of SAFEGUARD; and through overt acts, SUPERGUARD
extended its sympathies to petitioners (Rollo, pp. 64 and 98).
Meanwhile, an Information dated March 21, 1989 charging Benigno Torzuela with homicide was filed
before the Regional Trial Court of Makati and was docketed as Criminal Case No. 89-1896.
On April 13, 1989, respondent Judge Regino issued an order granting SUPERGUARD'S motion to
dismiss and SAFEGUARD'S motion for exclusion as defendant. The respondent judge held that the
complaint did not state facts necessary or sufficient to constitute a quasi-delict since it does not
mention any negligence on the part of Torzuela in shooting Napoleon Dulay or that the same was
done in the performance of his duties. Respondent judge ruled that mere allegations of the
concurring negligence of the defendants (private respondents herein) without stating the facts
showing such negligence are mere conclusions of law (Rollo, p. 106). Respondent judge also
declared that the complaint was one for damages founded on crimes punishable under Articles 100
and 103 of the Revised Penal Code as distinguished from those arising from, quasi-delict. The
dispositive portion of the order dated April 13, 1989 states:
WHEREFORE, this Court holds that in view of the material and ultimate facts alleged
in the verified complaint and in accordance with the applicable law on the matter as
well as precedents laid down by the Supreme Court, the complaint against the
alternative defendants Superguard Security Corporation and Safeguard Investigation
and Security Co., Inc., must be and (sic) it is hereby dismissed. (Rollo, p. 110)
The above order was affirmed by the respondent court and petitioners' motion for reconsideration
thereof was denied.
Petitioners take exception to the assailed decision and insist that quasi-delicts are not limited to acts
of negligence but also cover acts that are intentional and voluntary, citing Andamo v. IAC (191 SCRA
195 [1990]). Thus, petitioners insist that Torzuela' s act of shooting Napoleon Dulay constitutes a
quasi-delict actionable under Article 2176 of the New Civil Code.
Petitioners further contend that under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code, private respondents are
primarily liable for their negligence either in the selection or supervision of their employees. This
liability is independent of the employee's own liability for fault or negligence and is distinct from the
subsidiary civil liability under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. The civil action against the
employer may therefore proceed independently of the criminal action pursuant to Rule 111 Section 3
of the Rules of Court. Petitioners submit that the question of whether Torzuela is an employee of
respondent SUPERGUARD or SAFEGUARD would be better resolved after trial.
Moreover, petitioners argue that Torzuela's act of shooting Dulay is also actionable under Article 33
of the New Civil Code, to wit:

Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for
damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by
the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal
prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. (Emphasis
supplied)
In the same vein, petitioners cite Section 3, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court which provides:
Rule 111. . . . .
Sec. 3. When civil action may proceed independently In the cases provided for in
Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the independent
civil action which has been reserved may be brought by the offended party, shall
proceed independently of the criminal action, and shall require only a preponderance
of evidence. (Emphasis supplied)
The term "physical injuries" under Article 33 has been held to include consummated, frustrated and
attempted homicide. Thus, petitioners maintain that Torzuela's prior conviction is unnecessary since
the civil action can proceed independently of the criminal action. On the other hand, it is the private
respondents' argument that since the act was not committed with negligence, the petitioners have no
cause of action under Articles 2116 and 2177 of the New Civil Code. The civil action contemplated in
Article 2177 is not applicable to acts committed with deliberate intent, but only applies to quasioffenses under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code. Torzuela's act of shooting Atty. Dulay to
death, aside from being purely personal, was done with deliberate intent and could not have been
part of his duties as security guard. And since Article 2180 of the New Civil Code covers only: acts
done within the scope of the employee's assigned tasks, the private respondents cannot be held
liable for damages.
We find for petitioners.
It is undisputed that Benigno Torzuela is being prosecuted for homicide for the fatal shooting of
Napoleon Dulay. Rule 111 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:
Sec. 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. When a criminal action is instituted,
the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal
action, unless the offended party waives the civil action , reserves his right to
institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and
damages under Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
arising from the same act or omission of the accused. (Emphasis supplied)
It is well-settled that the filing of an independent civil action before the prosecution in the criminal
action presents evidence is even far better than a compliance with the requirement of express
reservation (Yakult Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 190 SCRA 357 [1990]). This is precisely what the
petitioners opted to do in this case. However, the private respondents opposed the civil action on the

ground that the same is founded on a delict and not on a quasi-delict as the shooting was not
attended by negligence. What is in dispute therefore is the nature of the petitioner's cause of action.
The nature of a cause of action is determined by the facts alleged in the complaint as constituting
the cause of action (Republic v. Estenzo, 158 SCRA 282 [1988]). The purpose of an action or suit
and the law to govern it is to be determined not by the claim of the party filing the action, made in his
argument or brief, but rather by the complaint itself, its allegations and prayer for relief. (De Tavera v.
Philippine Tuberculosis Society, 112 SCRA 243 [1982]). An examination of the complaint in the
present case would show that the plaintiffs, petitioners herein, are invoking their right to recover
damages against the private respondents for their vicarious responsibility for the injury caused by
Benigno Torzuela's act of shooting and killing Napoleon Dulay, as stated in paragraphs 1 and 2 of
the complaint.
Article 2176 of the New Civil Code provides:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault
or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if
there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties is called a quasidelict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
Contrary to the theory of private respondents, there is no justification for limiting the scope of Article
2176 of the Civil Code to acts or omissions resulting from negligence. Well-entrenched is the
doctrine that article 2176 covers not only acts committed with negligence, but also acts which are
voluntary and intentional. As far back as the definitive case of Elcano v. Hill (77 SCRA 98 [1977]),
this Court already held that:
. . . Article 2176, where it refers to "fault or negligence," covers not only acts "not
punishable by law" but also acts criminal in character; whether intentional and
voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action against the offender in a
criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted,
provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged also
criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such
eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two
cases vary. In other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of
Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the
Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as quasidelict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the
criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been
committed by the accused. Briefly stated, We here hold, in reiteration of Garcia,
that culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable
by law. (Emphasis supplied)
The same doctrine was echoed in the case of Andamo v. Intermediate Appellate Court (191 SCRA
195 [1990]), wherein the Court held:

Article 2176, whenever it refers to "fault or negligence," covers not only acts criminal
in character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a civil
action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is prosecuted or
found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, (if the
tortfeasor is actually also charged criminally), to recover damages on both scores,
and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two,
assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. [citing Virata v. Ochoa, 81 SCRA
472] (Emphasis supplied)
Private respondents submit that the word "intentional" in the Andamo case is inaccurate obiter, and
should be read as "voluntary" since intent cannot be coupled with negligence as defined by Article
365 of the Revised Penal Code. In the absence of more substantial reasons, this Court will not
disturb the above doctrine on the coverage of Article 2176.
Private respondents further aver that Article 33 of the New Civil Code applies only to injuries
intentionally committed pursuant to the ruling in Marcia v. CA (120 SCRA 193 [1983]), and that the
actions for damages allowed thereunder are ex-delicto. However, the term "physical injuries" in
Article 33 has already been construed to include bodily injuries causing death (Capuno v. Pepsi-Cola
Bottling Co. of the Philippines, 121 Phil. 638 [1965); Carandang v. Santiago, 97 Phil. 94 [1955]). It is
not the crime of physical injuries defined in the Revised Penal Code. It includes not only physical
injuries but also consummated, frustrated, and attempted homicide (Madeja v. Caro, 126 SCRA 293
[1983]). Although in the Marcia case (supra), it was held that no independent civil action may be filed
under Article 33 where the crime is the result of criminal negligence, it must be noted however, that
Torzuela, the accused in the case at bar, is charged with homicide, not with reckless imprudence,
whereas the defendant in Marcia was charged with reckless imprudence. Therefore, in this case, a
civil action based on Article 33 lies.
Private respondents also contend that their liability is subsidiary under the Revised Penal Code; and
that they are not liable for Torzuela's act which is beyond the scope of his duties as a security guard.
It having been established that the instant action is not ex-delicto, petitioners may proceed directly
against Torzuela and the private respondents. Under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code as
aforequoted, when an injury is caused by the negligence of the employee, there instantly arises a
presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the master or employer either in the
selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision over him after selection or both (Layugan v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 167 SCRA 363 [1988]). The liability of the employer under Article 2180
is direct and immediate; it is not conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent employee and
a prior showing of the insolvency of such employee (Kapalaran Bus Lines v. Coronado, 176 SCRA
792 [1989]). Therefore, it is incumbent upon the private respondents to prove that they exercised the
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employee.
Since Article 2176 covers not only acts of negligence but also acts which are intentional and
voluntary, it was therefore erroneous on the part of the trial court to dismiss petitioner's complaint
simply because it failed to make allegations of attendant negligence attributable to private
respondents.

With respect to the issue of whether the complaint at hand states a sufficient cause of action, the
general rule is that the allegations in a complaint are sufficient to constitute a cause of action against
the defendants if, admitting the facts alleged, the court can render a valid judgment upon the same
in accordance with the prayer therein. A cause of action exist if the following elements are present,
namely: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is
created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right;
and (3) an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or
constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may
maintain an action for recovery of damages (Del Bros Hotel Corporation v. CA, 210 SCRA 33
[1992]); Development Bank of the Philippines v. Pundogar, 218 SCRA 118 [1993])
This Court finds, under the foregoing premises, that the complaint sufficiently alleged an actionable
breach on the part of the defendant Torzuela and respondents SUPERGUARD and/or
SAFEGUARD. It is enough that the complaint alleged that Benigno Torzuela shot Napoleon Dulay
resulting in the latter's death; that the shooting occurred while Torzuela was on duty; and that either
SUPERGUARD and/or SAFEGUARD was Torzuela's employer and responsible for his acts. This
does not operate however, to establish that the defendants below are liable. Whether or not the
shooting was actually reckless and wanton or attended by negligence and whether it was actually
done within the scope of Torzuela's duties; whether the private respondents SUPERGUARD and/or
SAFEGUARD failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of a family; and whether the
defendants are actually liable, are questions which can be better resolved after trial on the merits
where each party can present evidence to prove their respective allegations and defenses. In
determining whether the allegations of a complaint are sufficient to support a cause of action, it must
be borne in mind that the complaint does not have to establish or allege the facts proving the
existence of a cause of action at the outset; this will have to be done at the trial on the merits of the
case (Del Bros Hotel Corporation v. CA, supra). If the allegations in a complaint can furnish a
sufficient basis by which the complaint can be maintained, the same should not be dismissed
regardless of the defenses that may be assessed by the defendants (Rava Dev't. Corp. v. CA, 211
SCRA 152 [1992] citing Consolidated Bank & Trust Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 197 SCRA 663
[1991]). To sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, the complaint must show that the
claim for relief does not exist rather than that a claim has been defectively stated, is ambiguous,
indefinite or uncertain (Azur v. Provincial Board, 27 SCRA 50 [1969]). Since the petitioners clearly
sustained an injury to their rights under the law, it would be more just to allow them to present
evidence of such injury.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review is hereby GRANTED. The decision of
the Court of Appeals as well as the Order of the Regional Trial Court dated April 13, 1989 are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. Q-89-1751 is remanded to the Regional Trial Court for
trial on the merits. This decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-32055 February 26, 1988

REYNALDO BERMUDEZ, SR., and, ADONITA YABUT BERMUDEZ petitioners-appellants,

vs.
HON. JUDGE A. MELENCIO-HERRERA, DOMINGO PONTINO y TACORDA and CORDOVA NG
SUN KWAN,respondents-appellees.

YAP, J.:
This is a direct appeal on pure questions of law from the Order of March 10, 1970 of the Honorable
Judge (now Supreme Court Justice) Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera of the defunct Court of First
Instance of Manila, Branch XVII, dismissing plaintiffs-appellants' complaint in Civil Case No. 77188
entitled "Reynaldo Bermudez, Sr. and Adonita Yabut Bermudez, plaintiffs, versus Domingo Pontino y
Tacorda and Cordova Ng Sun Kwan, defendants," and from the Order of May 7, 1970 denying
plaintiffs-appellants' Motion for Reconsideration.
The background facts of the case are as follows:
A cargo truck, driven by Domingo Pontino and owned by Cordova Ng Sun Kwan, bumped a jeep on
which Rogelio, a six-year old son of plaintiffs-appellants, was riding. The boy sustained injuries
which caused his death. As a result, Criminal Case No.92944 for Homicide Through Reckless
Imprudence was filed against Domingo Pontino by the Manila City Fiscal's Office. Plaintiffsappellants filed on July 27,1969 in the said criminal case "A Reservation to File Separate Civil
Action."
On July 28,1969, the plaintiffs-appellants filed a civil case for damages with the Court of First
Instance of Manila docketed as Civil Case No. 77188, entitled "Reynaldo Bermudez, Sr. et al.,
Plaintiffs vs. Domingo Pontino y Tacorda and Cordova Ng Sun Kwan, Defendants." Finding that the
plaintiffs instituted the action "on the assumption that defendant Pontino's negligence in the accident
of May 10, 1969 constituted a quasi-delict," the trial court stated that plaintiffs had already elected to
treat the accident as a "crime" by reserving in the criminal case their right to file a separate civil
action. That being so, the trial court decided to order the dismissal of the complaint against
defendant Cordova Ng Sun Kwan and to suspend the hearing of the case against Domingo Pontino
until after the criminal case for Homicide Through Reckless Imprudence is finally terminated. From
said order, plaintiffs filed the present appeal, stating as their main reasons the following:
I. The main issue brought before this Honorable Court is whether the present action
is based on quasi-delict under the Civil Code and therefore could proceed
independently of the criminal case for homicide thru reckless imprudence.
II. The second question of law is whether the lower court could properly suspend the
hearing of the civil action against Domingo Pontino and dismiss the civil case against
his employer Cordova Ng Sun Kwan by reason of the fact that a criminal case for
homicide thru reckless imprudence is pending in the lower court against Domingo
Pontino

III. The last question of law is whether the suspension of the civil action against
Domingo Pontino and the dismissal of the civil case against his employer Cordova
Ng Sun Kwan by reason of the pending criminal case against Domingo Pontino for
homicide thru reckless imprudence in the lower court could be validly done
considering that the civil case against said defendants-appellees also sought to
recover actual damages to the jeep of plaintiffs-appellants."
We find the appeal meritorious.
The heart of the issue involved in the present case is whether the civil action filed by the plaintiffsappellants is founded on crime or on quasi-delict. The trial court treated the case as an action based
on a crime in view of the reservation made by the offended party in the criminal case (Criminal Case
No. 92944), also pending before the court, to file a separate civil action. Said the trial court:
It would appear that plaintiffs instituted this action on the assumption that defendant
Pontino's negligence in the accident of May 10, l969 constituted a quasi-delict. The
Court cannot accept the validity of that assumption. In Criminal Case No. 92944 of
this Court, plaintiffs had already appeared as complainants. While that case was
pending, the offended parties reserved the right to institute a separate civil action. If,
in a criminal case, the right to file a separate civil action for damages is reserved,
such civil action is to be based on crime and not on tort. That was the ruling in
Joaquin vs. Aniceto, L-18719, Oct. 31, 1964."
We do not agree. The doctrine in the case cited by the trial court is inapplicable to the instant case.
In Joaquin vs. Aniceto, the Court held:
The issue in this case is: May an employee's primary civil liability for crime and his
employer's subsidiary liability therefor be proved in a separate civil action even while
the criminal case against the employee is still pending?
To begin with, obligations arise from law, contract, quasi-contract, crime and quasidelict. According to appellant, her action is one to enforce the civil liability arising
from crime. With respect to obligations arising from crimes, Article 1161 of the New
Civil Code provides:
Civil obligations arising from criminal offenses shall be governed by
the penal laws, subject to the provisions of article 21 77, and of the
pertinent provisions of Chapter 2, Preliminary, Title, on Human
Relations, and of Title XVIII of this book, regulating damages.
xxx xxx xxx
It is now settled that for an employer to be subsidiarily liable, the following requisites
must be present: (1) that an employee has committed a crime in the discharge of his
duties; (2) that said employee is insolvent and has not satisfied his civil liability; (3)

that the employer is engaged in some kind of industry. (1 Padilla, Criminal Law,
Revised Penal Code 794 [1964])
Without the conviction of the employee, the employer cannot be subsidiarily liable.
In cases of negligence, the injured party or his heirs has the choice between an action to enforce the
civil liability arising from crime under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code and an action for quasidelict under Article 2176-2194 of the Civil Code. If a party chooses the latter, he may hold the
employer solidarity liable for the negligent act of his employee, subject to the employer's defense of
exercise of the diligence of a good father of the family.
In the case at bar, the action filed b appellant was an action for damages based on quasi-delict. 1 The
fact that appellants reserved their right in the criminal case to file an independent civil action did not
preclude them from choosing to file a civil action for quasi-delict.
The appellants invoke the provisions of Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, which
provide:
Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil action. When a criminal action is
instituted, the civil action for recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged
is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party expressly
waives the civil action or reserves his right to institute it separately.
Section 2. Independent civil action.-In the cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33,
34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, an independent civil action entirely
separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party
during the pendency of the criminal case,provided the right is reserved as required in
the preceding section. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal
prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
Article 2177 of the Civil Code, cited in Section 2, of Rule 111, provides that
Article 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is
entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the
Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or
omission of the defendant.
The appellant precisely made a reservation to file an independent civil action in accordance with the
provisions of Section 2 of Rule 111, Rules of Court. In fact, even without such a reservation, we have
allowed the injured party in the criminal 1 case which resulted in the acquittal of the accused to
recover damages based on quasi-delict. In People vs. Ligon, G.R. No. 74041, we held:
However, it does not follow that a person who is not criminally liable is also free from
civil liability. While the guilt of the accused in a criminal prosecution must be
established beyond reasonable doubt, only a preponderance of evidence is required
in a civil action for damages (Article 29, Civil Code). The judgment of acquittal

extinguishes the civil liability of the accused only when it includes a declaration that
the facts from which the civil liability might arise did not exist (Padilla vs. Court of
Appeals, 129 SCRA 559).
WHEREFORE, we grant the petition and annul and set aside the appealed orders of the trial court,
dated March 10, 1970 and May 7, 1970, and remand the case for further proceedings. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Paras, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.
Melencio-Herrera, J., took no part.

G.R. No. 74041

July 29, 1987

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ROGELIO LIGON y TRIAS and FERNANDO GABAT y ALMERA, accused,
FERNANDO GABAT y ALMERA, accused-appellant.
YAP, J.:
This is an appeal from the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XX, rendered on
February 17, 1986, convicting the accused-appellant, Fernando Gabat, of the crime of Robbery with
Homicide and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua. The victim was Jose Rosales y Ortiz, a
,Seventeen-year old working student who was earning his keep as a cigarette vendor. He was
allegedly robbed of Es cigarette box containing cigarettes worth P300.00 more or less. 1
Only Fernando Gabat was arrested and brought to trial and convicted. The other accused, Rogelio
Ligon, was never apprehended and is still at large.
The fatal incident happened on a Sunday, October 23, 1983 at about 6:10 p.m. The accused,
Fernando Gabat, was riding in a 1978 Volkswagen Kombi owned by his father, Antonio Gabat, and
driven by the other accused, Rogelio Ligon. The Kombi was coming from Espana Street going
towards the direction of Quiapo. Fernando Gabat was seated beside the driver, in the front seat by
the window on the right side of the Kombi. At the intersection of Quezon Boulevard and Lerma Street
before turning left towards the underpass at C.M. Recto Avenue, the Kombi had to stop as the traffic
light was red. While waiting for the traffic light to change, Fernando Gabat beckoned a cigarette
vendor, Jose Rosales y Ortiz (Rosales for short) to buy some cigarettes from him. Rosales
approached the Kombi and handed Gabat two sticks of cigarettes. While this transaction was
occurring, the traffic light changed to green, and the Kombi driven by Rogelio Ligon suddenly moved
forward. As to what precisely happened between Gabat and Rosales at the crucial moment, and
immediately thereafter, is the subject of conflicting versions by the prosecution and the defense. It is
not controverted, however, that as the Kombi continued to speed towards Quiapo, Rosales clung to

the window of the Kombi but apparently lost his grip and fell down on the pavement. Rosales was
rushed by some bystanders to the Philippine General Hospital, where he was treated for multiple
physical injuries and was confined thereat until his death on October 30, 1983.
Following close behind the Kombi at the time of the incident was a taxicab driven by Prudencio
Castillo. He was behind the Kombi, at a distance of about three meters, travelling on the same lane
in a slightly oblique position ("a little bit to the right"). 2 As the Kombi did not stop after the victim fell
down on the pavement near the foot of the underpass, Castillo pursued it as it sped towards Roxas
Boulevard, beeping his horn to make the driver stop. When they reached the Luneta near the Rizal
monument, Castillo saw an owner-type jeep with two persons in it. He sought their assistance in
chasing the Kombi, telling them "nakaaksidente ng tao."3 The two men in the jeep joined the chase
and at the intersection of Vito Cruz and Roxas Boulevard, Castillo was able to overtake the Kombi
when the traffic light turned red. He immediately blocked the Kombi while the jeep pulled up right
behind it. The two men on board the jeep turned out to be police officers, Patrolmen Leonardo
Pugao and Peter Ignacio. They drew their guns and told the driver, Rogelio Ligon, and his
companion, Fernando Gabat, to alight from the Kombi. It was found out that there was a third person
inside the Kombi, a certain Rodolfo Primicias who was sleeping at the rear seat. 4 The three were all
brought by the police officers to the Western Police District and turned over to Pfc. Fernan Payuan.
The taxicab driver, Prudencio Castillo, also went along with them. The written statements of Castillo
and Rodolfo Primicias were taken by the traffic investigator, Pfc. Fernan Payuan. 5 Payuan also
prepared a Traffic Accident Report, dated October 23, 1983. 6 Fernando Gabat and Rodolfo Primicias
were released early morning the following day, but Rogelio Ligon was detained and turned over to
the City Fiscal's Office for further investigation.
Investigating Fiscal Alfredo Cantos, filed an information in court against Rogelio Ligon dated
December 6, 1983 charging him with Homicide thru Reckless Imprudence. 7 Six months later,
however, or on June 28, 1984, Assistant Fiscal Cantos filed another information against Rogelio
Ligon and Fernando Gabat for Robbery with Homicide. 8 He filed the latter information on the basis of
a Supplemental Affidavit of Prudencio Castillo9 and a joint affidavit of Armando Espino and Romeo
Castil, cigarette vendors, who allegedly witnessed the incident on October 23, 1983. 10These
affidavits were already prepared and merely sworn to before Fiscal Cantos on January 17, 1984.
On October 31, 1983, an autopsy was conducted by the medico-legal officer of the National Bureau
of Investigation, Dr. Orlando V. Salvador, who stated in his autopsy report that the cause of death of
Rosales was "pneumonia hypostatic, bilateral, secondary to traumatic injuries of the head." 11
The prosecution tried to establish, through the sole testimony of the taxicab driver, Prudencio
Castillo, that Gabat grabbed the box of cigarettes from Rosales and pried loose the latter's hand
from the window of the Kombi, resulting in the latter falling down and hitting the pavement. In its
decision, the trial court summarized the testimony of Castillo as follows: At about 6:00 o'clock in the
evening of October 23, 1983, Castillo was then driving his taxicab along Lerma Street near Far
Eastern University, and at the intersection of Lerma and Quezon Boulevard, the traffic light changed
from green to red. The vehicular traffic stopped and Prudencio Castillo's taxi was right behind a
Volkswagen Kombi. While waiting for the traffic light to change to green, Castillo Idly watched the
Volkswagen Kombi and saw Gabat, the passenger sitting beside the driver, signal to a cigarette
vendor. The cigarette vendor, Rosales, approached the right side of the Kombi. While Rosales was

handing the cigarettes to Gabat, the traffic light suddenly changed to green. When the Kombi moved
forward, Gabat suddenly grabbed the cigarette box held by Rosales. Taken aback, Jose Rosales ran
beside the Kombi and was able to hold on to the windowsill of the right front door with his right hand.
While Rosales was clinging to the windowsill, with both feet off the ground, the Kombi continued to
speed towards the C.M. Recto underpass. Castillo, who was closely following the Kombi, then saw
Gabat forcibly remove the hand of Rosales from the windowsill and the latter fell face down on
Quezon Boulevard near the Recto underpass.12
The version of the defense, on the other hand, was summarized by the court as follows: On the date
and time in question, Fernando Gabat, 31 years old, an underwriter, was on board the Volkswagen
Kombi driven by Rogelio Ligon. The Kombi had to stop at the intersection of Lerma Street and
Quezon Boulevard when the traffic light turned red. Fernando Gabat, who wanted to buy cigarettes,
called a cigarette vendor who approached the right side of the Kombi. Gabat bought two sticks of
cigarettes and handed to the cigarette vendor, Rosales, a P5.00 bill. In order to change the P5.00
big, Rosales placed his cigarette box containing assorted cigarettes on the windowsill of the front
door of the Kombi between the arm of Gabat and the window frame. Suddenly, the traffic light
changed from red to green and Rogelio Ligon moved the vehicle forward, heedless of the
transaction between Gabat and the cigarette vendor. As the vehicle sped onward, the cigarette box
which was squeezed between the right arm of Gabat and the window frame fell inside the Kombi.
Rosales then ran beside the vehicle and clung to the windowsill of the moving vehicle. Gabat
testified that when he saw the cigarette vendor clinging on the side of the front door, he told Ligon to
veer to the right in order that Rosales could get off at the sidewalk. However, Gabat declared, that
Ligon said that it could not be done because of the moving vehicular traffic. Then, while the vehicle
slowed down and Ligon was maneuvering to the right in an attempt to go toward the sidewalk,
Rosales lost his grip on the window frame and fell to the pavement of Quezon Boulevard. Gabat
allegedly shouted at Ligon to stop but Ligon replied that they should go on to Las Pinas and report
the incident to the parents of Gabat, and later they would come back to the scene of the incident.
However, while the Kombi was speeding along Dewey Boulevard, it was blocked by the taxi of
Prudencio Castillo and a jeep driven by policemen. Gabat and Ligon were brought to police
headquarters, but neither of them executed any written statement.13
The trial court gave full credence to the prosecution's version, stating that there can be no doubt that
Gabat forcibly took or grabbed the cigarette box from Rosales because, otherwise, there could be no
reason for the latter to run after the Kombi and hang on to its window. The court also believed
Castillo's testimony that Gabat forcibly removed or pried off the right hand of Rosales from the
windowsill of the Kombi, otherwise, the latter could not have fallen down, having already been able
to balance himself on the stepboard.
On the other hand, the trial court dismissed as incredible the testimony of Gabat that the cigarette
vendor placed the cigarette box on the windowsill of the Kombi, holding it with his left hand, while he
was trying to get from his pocket the change for the 5-peso bill of Gabat. The court said that it is of
common knowledge that cigarette vendors plying their trade in the streets do not let go of their
cigarette box; no vendor lets go of his precious box of cigarettes in order to change a peso bin given
by a customer.

As a rule, the findings of fact of the trial court are accorded great respect and are not disturbed on
appeal, unless it is shows that the findings are not supported by the evidence, or the court failed to
consider certain material facts and circumstances in its evaluation of the evidence. In the case at
bar, a careful review of the record shows that certain material facts and circumstances had been
overlooked by the trial court which, if taken into account, would alter the result of the case in that
they would introduce an element of reasonable doubt which would entitle the accused to acquittal.
While the prosecution witness, Castillo, may be a disinterested witness with no motive, according to
the court a quo, "other than to see that justice be done," his testimony, even if not tainted with bias,
is not entirely free from doubt because his observation of the event could have been faulty or
mistaken. The taxicab which Castillo was driving was lower in height compared to the Kombi in
which Gabat was riding-a fact admitted by Castillo at the trial.14 Judicial notice may also be taken of
the fact that the rear windshield of the 1978 Volkswagen Kombi is on the upper portion, occupying
approximately one-third (1/3) of the rear end of the vehicle, thus making it visually difficult for Castillo
to observe clearly what transpired inside the Kombi at the front end where Gabat was seated. These
are circumstances which must be taken into consideration in evaluating Castillo's testimony as to
what exactly happened between Gabat and the cigarette vendor during that crucial moment before
the latter fell down. As the taxicab was right behind the Kombi, following it at a distance of about
three meters, Castillo's line of vision was partially obstructed by the back part of the Kombi. His
testimony that he saw Gabat grab the cigarette box from Rosales and forcibly pry loose the latter's
hand from the windowsill of the Kombi is thus subject to a reasonable doubt, specially considering
that this occurrence happened in just a matter of seconds, and both vehicles during that time were
moving fast in the traffic.
We find it significant that in his statement given to the police that very evening, 15 Castillo did not
mention that he saw Gabat forcibly prying off the hand of Rosales from the windowsill of the Kombi,
although the police report prepared by the investigating officer, Pfc. Fermin M. Payuan, on the same
date, stated that when the traffic signal changed to green and the driver stepped on the gas, the
cigarette box of the cigarette vendor (Rosales) was grabbed by the passenger Gabat and "instantly
the former clung to the door and was dragged at a distance while at the same time the latter
punched the vendor's arm until the same (sic) fell to the pavement," thus showing that during the
police investigation Castillo must have given a statement to the police which indicated that Gabat did
something to cause Rosales to fall from the Kombi.16 It was by way of a supplementary affidavit
prepared by the lawyer of the complainant and sworn to by Castillo before the Assistant City Fiscal
on January 17, 1984 that this vital detail was added. This supplementary affidavit was made the
basis for filing another information charging both Gabat and the driver with the crime of Robbery with
Homicide.
Considering the above circumstances, the Court is not convinced with moral certainty that the guilt of
the accused Fernando Gabat has been established beyond reasonable doubt. In our view, the
quantum of proof necessary to sustain Gabat's conviction of so serious a crime as robbery with
homicide has not been met in this case. He is therefore entitled to acquittal on reasonable doubt.
However, it does not follow that a person who is not criminally liable is also free from civil
liability. While the guilt of the accused in a criminal prosecution must be established beyond
reasonable doubt, only a preponderance of evidence is required in a civil action for damages. 17 The
1avvphi1

judgment of acquittal extinguishes the civil liability of the accused only when it includes a declaration
that the facts from which the civil liability might arise did not exist.18
The reason for the provisions of Article 29 of the Civil Code, which provides that the acquittal of the
accused on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt does not
necessarily exempt him from civil liability for the same act or omission, has been explained by the
Code Commission as follows:
The old rule that the acquittal of the accused in a criminal case also releases him from civil
liability is one of the most serious flaws in the Philippine legal system. It has given rise to
numberless instances of miscarriage of justice, where the acquittal was due to a reasonable
doubt in the mind of the court as to the guilt of the accused. The reasoning followed is that
inasmuch as the civil responsibility is derived from the criminal offense, when the latter is not
proved, civil liability cannot be demanded.
This is one of those cases where confused thinking leads to unfortunate and deplorable
consequences. Such reasoning fails to draw a clear line of demarcation between criminal
liability and civil responsibility, and to determine the logical result of the distinction. The two
liabilities are separate and distinct from each other. One affects the social order and the
other, private rights. One is for the punishment or correction of the offender while the other is
for reparation of damages suffered by the aggrieved party. The two responsibilities are so
different from each other that article 1813 of the present (Spanish) Civil Code reads thus:
"There may be a compromise upon the civil action arising from a crime; but the public action
for the imposition of the legal penalty shall not thereby be extinguished." It is just and proper
that, for the purposes of the imprisonment of or fine upon the accused, the offense should be
proved beyond reasonable doubt. But for the purpose of indemnifying the complaining party,
why should the offense also be proved beyond reasonable doubt? Is not the invasion or
violation of every private right to be proved only by a preponderance of evidence? Is the right
of the aggrieved person any less private because the wrongful act is also punishable by the
criminal law?
For these reasons, the Commission recommends the adoption of the reform under
discussion. It will correct a serious defect in our law. It will close up an inexhaustible source
of injustice a cause for disillusionment on the part of the innumerable persons injured or
wronged. 19
In the instant case, we find that a preponderance of evidence exists sufficient to establish the facts
from which the civil liability of Gabat arises. On the basis of the trial court's evaluation of the
testimonies of both prosecution and defense witnesses at the trial and applying the quantum of proof
required in civil cases, we find that a preponderance of evidence establishes that Gabat by his act
and omission with fault and negligence caused damage to Rosales and should answer civilly for the
damage done. Gabat's wilfull act of calling Rosales, the cigarette vendor, to the middle of a busy
street to buy two sticks of cigarettes set the chain of events which led to the death of Rosales.
Through fault and negligence, Gabat (1) failed to prevent the driver from moving forward while the
purchase was completed; (2) failed to help Rosales while the latter clung precariously to the moving
vehicle, and (3) did not enforce his order to the driver to stop. Finally, Gabat acquiesced in the

driver's act of speeding away, instead of stopping and picking up the injured victim. These proven
facts taken together are firm bases for finding Gabat civilly liable under the Civil Code 20 for the
damage done to Rosales.
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered acquitting the appellant Gabat for the crime of Robbery with
Homicide. However, he is hereby held civilly liable for his acts and omissions, there being fault or
negligence, and sentenced to indemnify the heirs of Jose Rosales y Ortiz in the amount of
P15.000.00 for the latter's death, P1,733.35 for hospital and medical expenses, and P4,100.00 for
funeral expenses. The alleged loss of income amounting to P20,000.00, not being supported by
sufficient evidence, is DENIED. Costs de officio.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, C.J., Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano,
Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento and Cortes, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-12191

October 14, 1918

JOSE CANGCO, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
MANILA RAILROAD CO., defendant-appellee.
Ramon Sotelo for appellant.
Kincaid & Hartigan for appellee.

FISHER, J.:
At the time of the occurrence which gave rise to this litigation the plaintiff, Jose Cangco, was in the
employment of Manila Railroad Company in the capacity of clerk, with a monthly wage of P25. He
lived in the pueblo of San Mateo, in the province of Rizal, which is located upon the line of the
defendant railroad company; and in coming daily by train to the company's office in the city of Manila
where he worked, he used a pass, supplied by the company, which entitled him to ride upon the
company's trains free of charge. Upon the occasion in question, January 20, 1915, the plaintiff arose
from his seat in the second class-car where he was riding and, making, his exit through the door,
took his position upon the steps of the coach, seizing the upright guardrail with his right hand for
support.
On the side of the train where passengers alight at the San Mateo station there is a cement platform
which begins to rise with a moderate gradient some distance away from the company's office and
extends along in front of said office for a distance sufficient to cover the length of several coaches.
As the train slowed down another passenger, named Emilio Zuiga, also an employee of the railroad
company, got off the same car, alighting safely at the point where the platform begins to rise from the
level of the ground. When the train had proceeded a little farther the plaintiff Jose Cangco stepped
off also, but one or both of his feet came in contact with a sack of watermelons with the result that

his feet slipped from under him and he fell violently on the platform. His body at once rolled from the
platform and was drawn under the moving car, where his right arm was badly crushed and lacerated.
It appears that after the plaintiff alighted from the train the car moved forward possibly six meters
before it came to a full stop.
The accident occurred between 7 and 8 o'clock on a dark night, and as the railroad station was
lighted dimly by a single light located some distance away, objects on the platform where the
accident occurred were difficult to discern especially to a person emerging from a lighted car.
The explanation of the presence of a sack of melons on the platform where the plaintiff alighted is
found in the fact that it was the customary season for harvesting these melons and a large lot had
been brought to the station for the shipment to the market. They were contained in numerous sacks
which has been piled on the platform in a row one upon another. The testimony shows that this row
of sacks was so placed of melons and the edge of platform; and it is clear that the fall of the plaintiff
was due to the fact that his foot alighted upon one of these melons at the moment he stepped upon
the platform. His statement that he failed to see these objects in the darkness is readily to be
credited.
The plaintiff was drawn from under the car in an unconscious condition, and it appeared that the
injuries which he had received were very serious. He was therefore brought at once to a certain
hospital in the city of Manila where an examination was made and his arm was amputated. The
result of this operation was unsatisfactory, and the plaintiff was then carried to another hospital
where a second operation was performed and the member was again amputated higher up near the
shoulder. It appears in evidence that the plaintiff expended the sum of P790.25 in the form of
medical and surgical fees and for other expenses in connection with the process of his curation.
Upon August 31, 1915, he instituted this proceeding in the Court of First Instance of the city of
Manila to recover damages of the defendant company, founding his action upon the negligence of
the servants and employees of the defendant in placing the sacks of melons upon the platform and
leaving them so placed as to be a menace to the security of passenger alighting from the company's
trains. At the hearing in the Court of First Instance, his Honor, the trial judge, found the facts
substantially as above stated, and drew therefrom his conclusion to the effect that, although
negligence was attributable to the defendant by reason of the fact that the sacks of melons were so
placed as to obstruct passengers passing to and from the cars, nevertheless, the plaintiff himself
had failed to use due caution in alighting from the coach and was therefore precluded form
recovering. Judgment was accordingly entered in favor of the defendant company, and the plaintiff
appealed.
It can not be doubted that the employees of the railroad company were guilty of negligence in piling
these sacks on the platform in the manner above stated; that their presence caused the plaintiff to
fall as he alighted from the train; and that they therefore constituted an effective legal cause of the
injuries sustained by the plaintiff. It necessarily follows that the defendant company is liable for the
damage thereby occasioned unless recovery is barred by the plaintiff's own contributory negligence.
In resolving this problem it is necessary that each of these conceptions of liability, to-wit, the primary
responsibility of the defendant company and the contributory negligence of the plaintiff should be
separately examined.

It is important to note that the foundation of the legal liability of the defendant is the contract of
carriage, and that the obligation to respond for the damage which plaintiff has suffered arises, if at
all, from the breach of that contract by reason of the failure of defendant to exercise due care in its
performance. That is to say, its liability is direct and immediate, differing essentially, in legal viewpoint
from that presumptive responsibility for the negligence of its servants, imposed by article 1903 of the
Civil Code, which can be rebutted by proof of the exercise of due care in their selection and
supervision. Article 1903 of the Civil Code is not applicable to obligations arising ex contractu, but
only to extra-contractual obligations or to use the technical form of expression, that article relates
only toculpa aquiliana and not to culpa contractual.
Manresa (vol. 8, p. 67) in his commentaries upon articles 1103 and 1104 of the Civil Code, clearly
points out this distinction, which was also recognized by this Court in its decision in the case of
Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co. (7 Phil. rep., 359). In commenting upon article 1093 Manresa
clearly points out the difference between "culpa, substantive and independent, which of itself
constitutes the source of an obligation between persons not formerly connected by any legal tie"
and culpa considered as an accident in the performance of an obligation already existing . . . ."
In the Rakes case (supra) the decision of this court was made to rest squarely upon the proposition
that article 1903 of the Civil Code is not applicable to acts of negligence which constitute the breach
of a contract.
Upon this point the Court said:
The acts to which these articles [1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code] are applicable are
understood to be those not growing out of pre-existing duties of the parties to one another.
But where relations already formed give rise to duties, whether springing from contract or
quasi-contract, then breaches of those duties are subject to article 1101, 1103, and 1104 of
the same code. (Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co., 7 Phil. Rep., 359 at 365.)
This distinction is of the utmost importance. The liability, which, under the Spanish law, is, in certain
cases imposed upon employers with respect to damages occasioned by the negligence of their
employees to persons to whom they are not bound by contract, is not based, as in the English
Common Law, upon the principle of respondeat superior if it were, the master would be liable in
every case and unconditionally but upon the principle announced in article 1902 of the Civil Code,
which imposes upon all persons who by their fault or negligence, do injury to another, the obligation
of making good the damage caused. One who places a powerful automobile in the hands of a
servant whom he knows to be ignorant of the method of managing such a vehicle, is himself guilty of
an act of negligence which makes him liable for all the consequences of his imprudence. The
obligation to make good the damage arises at the very instant that the unskillful servant, while acting
within the scope of his employment causes the injury. The liability of the master is personal and
direct. But, if the master has not been guilty of any negligence whatever in the selection and
direction of the servant, he is not liable for the acts of the latter, whatever done within the scope of
his employment or not, if the damage done by the servant does not amount to a breach of the
contract between the master and the person injured.

It is not accurate to say that proof of diligence and care in the selection and control of the servant
relieves the master from liability for the latter's acts on the contrary, that proof shows that the
responsibility has never existed. As Manresa says (vol. 8, p. 68) the liability arising from extracontractual culpa is always based upon a voluntary act or omission which, without willful intent, but
by mere negligence or inattention, has caused damage to another. A master who exercises all
possible care in the selection of his servant, taking into consideration the qualifications they should
possess for the discharge of the duties which it is his purpose to confide to them, and directs them
with equal diligence, thereby performs his duty to third persons to whom he is bound by no
contractual ties, and he incurs no liability whatever if, by reason of the negligence of his servants,
even within the scope of their employment, such third person suffer damage. True it is that under
article 1903 of the Civil Code the law creates apresumption that he has been negligent in the
selection or direction of his servant, but the presumption is rebuttable and yield to proof of due care
and diligence in this respect.
The supreme court of Porto Rico, in interpreting identical provisions, as found in the Porto Rico
Code, has held that these articles are applicable to cases of extra-contractual culpa exclusively.
(Carmona vs. Cuesta, 20 Porto Rico Reports, 215.)
This distinction was again made patent by this Court in its decision in the case of Bahia vs. Litonjua
and Leynes, (30 Phil. rep., 624), which was an action brought upon the theory of the extracontractual liability of the defendant to respond for the damage caused by the carelessness of his
employee while acting within the scope of his employment. The Court, after citing the last paragraph
of article 1903 of the Civil Code, said:
From this article two things are apparent: (1) That when an injury is caused by the
negligence of a servant or employee there instantly arises a presumption of law that there
was negligence on the part of the master or employer either in selection of the servant or
employee, or in supervision over him after the selection, or both; and (2) that that
presumption is juris tantum and not juris et de jure, and consequently, may be rebutted. It
follows necessarily that if the employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that in selection
and supervision he has exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family, the
presumption is overcome and he is relieved from liability.
This theory bases the responsibility of the master ultimately on his own negligence and not
on that of his servant. This is the notable peculiarity of the Spanish law of negligence. It is, of
course, in striking contrast to the American doctrine that, in relations with strangers, the
negligence of the servant in conclusively the negligence of the master.
The opinion there expressed by this Court, to the effect that in case of extra-contractual culpa based
upon negligence, it is necessary that there shall have been some fault attributable to the defendant
personally, and that the last paragraph of article 1903 merely establishes a rebuttable presumption,
is in complete accord with the authoritative opinion of Manresa, who says (vol. 12, p. 611) that the
liability created by article 1903 is imposed by reason of the breach of the duties inherent in the
special relations of authority or superiority existing between the person called upon to repair the
damage and the one who, by his act or omission, was the cause of it.

On the other hand, the liability of masters and employers for the negligent acts or omissions of their
servants or agents, when such acts or omissions cause damages which amount to the breach of a
contact, is not based upon a mere presumption of the master's negligence in their selection or
control, and proof of exercise of the utmost diligence and care in this regard does not relieve the
master of his liability for the breach of his contract.
Every legal obligation must of necessity be extra-contractual or contractual. Extra-contractual
obligation has its source in the breach or omission of those mutual duties which civilized society
imposes upon it members, or which arise from these relations, other than contractual, of certain
members of society to others, generally embraced in the concept of status. The legal rights of each
member of society constitute the measure of the corresponding legal duties, mainly negative in
character, which the existence of those rights imposes upon all other members of society. The
breach of these general duties whether due to willful intent or to mere inattention, if productive of
injury, give rise to an obligation to indemnify the injured party. The fundamental distinction between
obligations of this character and those which arise from contract, rests upon the fact that in cases of
non-contractual obligation it is the wrongful or negligent act or omission itself which creates
the vinculum juris, whereas in contractual relations the vinculumexists independently of the breach of
the voluntary duty assumed by the parties when entering into the contractual relation.
With respect to extra-contractual obligation arising from negligence, whether of act or omission, it is
competent for the legislature to elect and our Legislature has so elected whom such an
obligation is imposed is morally culpable, or, on the contrary, for reasons of public policy, to extend
that liability, without regard to the lack of moral culpability, so as to include responsibility for the
negligence of those person who acts or mission are imputable, by a legal fiction, to others who are in
a position to exercise an absolute or limited control over them. The legislature which adopted our
Civil Code has elected to limit extra-contractual liability with certain well-defined exceptions to
cases in which moral culpability can be directly imputed to the persons to be charged. This moral
responsibility may consist in having failed to exercise due care in the selection and control of one's
agents or servants, or in the control of persons who, by reason of their status, occupy a position of
dependency with respect to the person made liable for their conduct.
The position of a natural or juridical person who has undertaken by contract to render service to
another, is wholly different from that to which article 1903 relates. When the sources of the obligation
upon which plaintiff's cause of action depends is a negligent act or omission, the burden of proof
rests upon plaintiff to prove the negligence if he does not his action fails. But when the facts
averred show a contractual undertaking by defendant for the benefit of plaintiff, and it is alleged that
plaintiff has failed or refused to perform the contract, it is not necessary for plaintiff to specify in his
pleadings whether the breach of the contract is due to willful fault or to negligence on the part of the
defendant, or of his servants or agents. Proof of the contract and of its nonperformance is
sufficient prima facie to warrant a recovery.
As a general rule . . . it is logical that in case of extra-contractual culpa, a suing creditor
should assume the burden of proof of its existence, as the only fact upon which his action is
based; while on the contrary, in a case of negligence which presupposes the existence of a
contractual obligation, if the creditor shows that it exists and that it has been broken, it is not
necessary for him to prove negligence. (Manresa, vol. 8, p. 71 [1907 ed., p. 76]).

As it is not necessary for the plaintiff in an action for the breach of a contract to show that the breach
was due to the negligent conduct of defendant or of his servants, even though such be in fact the
actual cause of the breach, it is obvious that proof on the part of defendant that the negligence or
omission of his servants or agents caused the breach of the contract would not constitute a defense
to the action. If the negligence of servants or agents could be invoked as a means of discharging the
liability arising from contract, the anomalous result would be that person acting through the medium
of agents or servants in the performance of their contracts, would be in a better position than those
acting in person. If one delivers a valuable watch to watchmaker who contract to repair it, and the
bailee, by a personal negligent act causes its destruction, he is unquestionably liable. Would it be
logical to free him from his liability for the breach of his contract, which involves the duty to exercise
due care in the preservation of the watch, if he shows that it was his servant whose negligence
caused the injury? If such a theory could be accepted, juridical persons would enjoy practically
complete immunity from damages arising from the breach of their contracts if caused by negligent
acts as such juridical persons can of necessity only act through agents or servants, and it would no
doubt be true in most instances that reasonable care had been taken in selection and direction of
such servants. If one delivers securities to a banking corporation as collateral, and they are lost by
reason of the negligence of some clerk employed by the bank, would it be just and reasonable to
permit the bank to relieve itself of liability for the breach of its contract to return the collateral upon
the payment of the debt by proving that due care had been exercised in the selection and direction
of the clerk?
This distinction between culpa aquiliana, as the source of an obligation, and culpa contractual as a
mere incident to the performance of a contract has frequently been recognized by the supreme court
of Spain. (Sentencias of June 27, 1894; November 20, 1896; and December 13, 1896.) In the
decisions of November 20, 1896, it appeared that plaintiff's action arose ex contractu, but that
defendant sought to avail himself of the provisions of article 1902 of the Civil Code as a defense.
The Spanish Supreme Court rejected defendant's contention, saying:
These are not cases of injury caused, without any pre-existing obligation, by fault or
negligence, such as those to which article 1902 of the Civil Code relates, but of damages
caused by the defendant's failure to carry out the undertakings imposed by the
contracts . . . .
A brief review of the earlier decision of this court involving the liability of employers for damage done
by the negligent acts of their servants will show that in no case has the court ever decided that the
negligence of the defendant's servants has been held to constitute a defense to an action for
damages for breach of contract.
In the case of Johnson vs. David (5 Phil. Rep., 663), the court held that the owner of a carriage was
not liable for the damages caused by the negligence of his driver. In that case the court commented
on the fact that no evidence had been adduced in the trial court that the defendant had been
negligent in the employment of the driver, or that he had any knowledge of his lack of skill or
carefulness.
In the case of Baer Senior & Co's Successors vs. Compania Maritima (6 Phil. Rep., 215), the plaintiff
sued the defendant for damages caused by the loss of a barge belonging to plaintiff which was

allowed to get adrift by the negligence of defendant's servants in the course of the performance of a
contract of towage. The court held, citing Manresa (vol. 8, pp. 29, 69) that if the "obligation of the
defendant grew out of a contract made between it and the plaintiff . . . we do not think that the
provisions of articles 1902 and 1903 are applicable to the case."
In the case of Chapman vs. Underwood (27 Phil. Rep., 374), plaintiff sued the defendant to recover
damages for the personal injuries caused by the negligence of defendant's chauffeur while driving
defendant's automobile in which defendant was riding at the time. The court found that the damages
were caused by the negligence of the driver of the automobile, but held that the master was not
liable, although he was present at the time, saying:
. . . unless the negligent acts of the driver are continued for a length of time as to give the
owner a reasonable opportunity to observe them and to direct the driver to desist therefrom. .
. . The act complained of must be continued in the presence of the owner for such length of
time that the owner by his acquiescence, makes the driver's acts his own.
In the case of Yamada vs. Manila Railroad Co. and Bachrach Garage & Taxicab Co. (33 Phil. Rep.,
8), it is true that the court rested its conclusion as to the liability of the defendant upon article 1903,
although the facts disclosed that the injury complaint of by plaintiff constituted a breach of the duty to
him arising out of the contract of transportation. The express ground of the decision in this case was
that article 1903, in dealing with the liability of a master for the negligent acts of his servants "makes
the distinction between private individuals and public enterprise;" that as to the latter the law creates
a rebuttable presumption of negligence in the selection or direction of servants; and that in the
particular case the presumption of negligence had not been overcome.
It is evident, therefore that in its decision Yamada case, the court treated plaintiff's action as though
founded in tort rather than as based upon the breach of the contract of carriage, and an examination
of the pleadings and of the briefs shows that the questions of law were in fact discussed upon this
theory. Viewed from the standpoint of the defendant the practical result must have been the same in
any event. The proof disclosed beyond doubt that the defendant's servant was grossly negligent and
that his negligence was the proximate cause of plaintiff's injury. It also affirmatively appeared that
defendant had been guilty of negligence in its failure to exercise proper discretion in the direction of
the servant. Defendant was, therefore, liable for the injury suffered by plaintiff, whether the breach of
the duty were to be regarded as constituting culpa aquiliana or culpa contractual. As Manresa points
out (vol. 8, pp. 29 and 69) whether negligence occurs an incident in the course of the performance of
a contractual undertaking or its itself the source of an extra-contractual undertaking obligation, its
essential characteristics are identical. There is always an act or omission productive of damage due
to carelessness or inattention on the part of the defendant. Consequently, when the court holds that
a defendant is liable in damages for having failed to exercise due care, either directly, or in failing to
exercise proper care in the selection and direction of his servants, the practical result is identical in
either case. Therefore, it follows that it is not to be inferred, because the court held in the Yamada
case that defendant was liable for the damages negligently caused by its servants to a person to
whom it was bound by contract, and made reference to the fact that the defendant was negligent in
the selection and control of its servants, that in such a case the court would have held that it would
have been a good defense to the action, if presented squarely upon the theory of the breach of the

contract, for defendant to have proved that it did in fact exercise care in the selection and control of
the servant.
The true explanation of such cases is to be found by directing the attention to the relative spheres of
contractual and extra-contractual obligations. The field of non- contractual obligation is much more
broader than that of contractual obligations, comprising, as it does, the whole extent of juridical
human relations. These two fields, figuratively speaking, concentric; that is to say, the mere fact that
a person is bound to another by contract does not relieve him from extra-contractual liability to such
person. When such a contractual relation exists the obligor may break the contract under such
conditions that the same act which constitutes the source of an extra-contractual obligation had no
contract existed between the parties.
The contract of defendant to transport plaintiff carried with it, by implication, the duty to carry him in
safety and to provide safe means of entering and leaving its trains (civil code, article 1258). That
duty, being contractual, was direct and immediate, and its non-performance could not be excused by
proof that the fault was morally imputable to defendant's servants.
The railroad company's defense involves the assumption that even granting that the negligent
conduct of its servants in placing an obstruction upon the platform was a breach of its contractual
obligation to maintain safe means of approaching and leaving its trains, the direct and proximate
cause of the injury suffered by plaintiff was his own contributory negligence in failing to wait until the
train had come to a complete stop before alighting. Under the doctrine of comparative negligence
announced in the Rakes case (supra), if the accident was caused by plaintiff's own negligence, no
liability is imposed upon defendant's negligence and plaintiff's negligence merely contributed to his
injury, the damages should be apportioned. It is, therefore, important to ascertain if defendant was in
fact guilty of negligence.
It may be admitted that had plaintiff waited until the train had come to a full stop before alighting, the
particular injury suffered by him could not have occurred. Defendant contends, and cites many
authorities in support of the contention, that it is negligence per se for a passenger to alight from a
moving train. We are not disposed to subscribe to this doctrine in its absolute form. We are of the
opinion that this proposition is too badly stated and is at variance with the experience of every-day
life. In this particular instance, that the train was barely moving when plaintiff alighted is shown
conclusively by the fact that it came to stop within six meters from the place where he stepped from
it. Thousands of person alight from trains under these conditions every day of the year, and sustain
no injury where the company has kept its platform free from dangerous obstructions. There is no
reason to believe that plaintiff would have suffered any injury whatever in alighting as he did had it
not been for defendant's negligent failure to perform its duty to provide a safe alighting place.
We are of the opinion that the correct doctrine relating to this subject is that expressed in
Thompson's work on Negligence (vol. 3, sec. 3010) as follows:
The test by which to determine whether the passenger has been guilty of negligence in
attempting to alight from a moving railway train, is that of ordinary or reasonable care. It is to
be considered whether an ordinarily prudent person, of the age, sex and condition of the
passenger, would have acted as the passenger acted under the circumstances disclosed by

the evidence. This care has been defined to be, not the care which may or should be used
by the prudent man generally, but the care which a man of ordinary prudence would use
under similar circumstances, to avoid injury." (Thompson, Commentaries on Negligence, vol.
3, sec. 3010.)
Or, it we prefer to adopt the mode of exposition used by this court in Picart vs. Smith (37 Phil. rep.,
809), we may say that the test is this; Was there anything in the circumstances surrounding the
plaintiff at the time he alighted from the train which would have admonished a person of average
prudence that to get off the train under the conditions then existing was dangerous? If so, the plaintiff
should have desisted from alighting; and his failure so to desist was contributory negligence.
1awph!l.net

As the case now before us presents itself, the only fact from which a conclusion can be drawn to the
effect that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence is that he stepped off the car without being
able to discern clearly the condition of the platform and while the train was yet slowly moving. In
considering the situation thus presented, it should not be overlooked that the plaintiff was, as we
find, ignorant of the fact that the obstruction which was caused by the sacks of melons piled on the
platform existed; and as the defendant was bound by reason of its duty as a public carrier to afford
to its passengers facilities for safe egress from its trains, the plaintiff had a right to assume, in the
absence of some circumstance to warn him to the contrary, that the platform was clear. The place,
as we have already stated, was dark, or dimly lighted, and this also is proof of a failure upon the part
of the defendant in the performance of a duty owing by it to the plaintiff; for if it were by any
possibility concede that it had right to pile these sacks in the path of alighting passengers, the
placing of them adequately so that their presence would be revealed.
As pertinent to the question of contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff in this case the
following circumstances are to be noted: The company's platform was constructed upon a level
higher than that of the roadbed and the surrounding ground. The distance from the steps of the car
to the spot where the alighting passenger would place his feet on the platform was thus reduced,
thereby decreasing the risk incident to stepping off. The nature of the platform, constructed as it was
of cement material, also assured to the passenger a stable and even surface on which to alight.
Furthermore, the plaintiff was possessed of the vigor and agility of young manhood, and it was by no
means so risky for him to get off while the train was yet moving as the same act would have been in
an aged or feeble person. In determining the question of contributory negligence in performing such
act that is to say, whether the passenger acted prudently or recklessly the age, sex, and
physical condition of the passenger are circumstances necessarily affecting the safety of the
passenger, and should be considered. Women, it has been observed, as a general rule are less
capable than men of alighting with safety under such conditions, as the nature of their wearing
apparel obstructs the free movement of the limbs. Again, it may be noted that the place was perfectly
familiar to the plaintiff as it was his daily custom to get on and of the train at this station. There could,
therefore, be no uncertainty in his mind with regard either to the length of the step which he was
required to take or the character of the platform where he was alighting. Our conclusion is that the
conduct of the plaintiff in undertaking to alight while the train was yet slightly under way was not
characterized by imprudence and that therefore he was not guilty of contributory negligence.
The evidence shows that the plaintiff, at the time of the accident, was earning P25 a month as a
copyist clerk, and that the injuries he has suffered have permanently disabled him from continuing

that employment. Defendant has not shown that any other gainful occupation is open to plaintiff. His
expectancy of life, according to the standard mortality tables, is approximately thirty-three years. We
are of the opinion that a fair compensation for the damage suffered by him for his permanent
disability is the sum of P2,500, and that he is also entitled to recover of defendant the additional sum
of P790.25 for medical attention, hospital services, and other incidental expenditures connected with
the treatment of his injuries.
The decision of lower court is reversed, and judgment is hereby rendered plaintiff for the sum of
P3,290.25, and for the costs of both instances. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Street and Avancea, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

MALCOLM, J., dissenting:

With one sentence in the majority decision, we are of full accord, namely, "It may be admitted that
had plaintiff waited until the train had come to a full stop before alighting, the particular injury
suffered by him could not have occurred." With the general rule relative to a passenger's contributory
negligence, we are likewise in full accord, namely, "An attempt to alight from a moving train is
negligence per se." Adding these two points together, should be absolved from the complaint, and
judgment affirmed.
Johnson, J., concur.

G.R. No. L-48930

February 23, 1944

ANTONIO VAZQUEZ, petitioner,

vs.
FRANCISCO DE BORJA, respondent.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. L-48931

February 23, 1944

FRANCISCO DE BORJA, petitioner,

vs.
ANTONIO VAZQUEZ, respondent.
OZAETA, J.:
This action was commenced in the Court of First Instance of Manila by Francisco de Borja against
Antonio Vazquez and Fernando Busuego to recover from them jointly and severally the total sum of
P4,702.70 upon three alleged causes of action, to wit: First, that in or about the month of January,
1932, the defendants jointly and severally obligated themselves to sell to the plaintiff 4,000 cavans of
palay at P2.10 per cavan, to be delivered during the month of February, 1932, the said defendants
having subsequently received from the plaintiff in virtue of said agreement the sum of P8,400; that
the defendants delivered to the plaintiff during the months of February, March, and April, 1932, only
2,488 cavans of palay of the value of P5,224.80 and refused to deliver the balance of 1,512 cavans
of the value of P3,175.20 notwithstanding repeated demands. Second, that because of defendants'
refusal to deliver to the plaintiff the said 1,512 cavans of palay within the period above mentioned,
the plaintiff suffered damages in the sum of P1,000. And, third, that on account of the agreement
above mentioned the plaintiff delivered to the defendants 4,000 empty sacks, of which they returned
to the plaintiff only 2,490 and refused to deliver to the plaintiff the balance of 1,510 sacks or to pay
their value amounting to P377.50; and that on account of such refusal the plaintiff suffered damages
in the sum of P150.
The defendant Antonio Vazquez answered the complaint, denying having entered into the contract
mentioned in the first cause of action in his own individual and personal capacity, either solely or
together with his codefendant Fernando Busuego, and alleging that the agreement for the purchase
of 4,000 cavans of palay and the payment of the price of P8,400 were made by the plaintiff with and
to the Natividad-Vasquez Sabani Development Co., Inc., a corporation organized and existing under
the laws of the Philippines, of which the defendant Antonio Vazquez was the acting manager at the
time the transaction took place. By way of counterclaim, the said defendant alleged that he suffered
damages in the sum of P1,000 on account of the filing of this action against him by the plaintiff with
full knowledge that the said defendant had nothing to do whatever with any and all of the
transactions mentioned in the complaint in his own individual and personal capacity.
The trial court rendered judgment ordering the defendant Antonio Vazquez to pay to the plaintiff the
sum of P3,175.20 plus the sum of P377.50, with legal interest on both sums, and absolving the
defendant Fernando Busuego (treasurer of the corporation) from the complaint and the plaintiff from
the defendant Antonio Vazquez' counterclaim. Upon appeal to the Court of Appeals, the latter
modified that judgment by reducing it to the total sum of P3,314.78, with legal interest thereon and
the costs. But by a subsequent resolution upon the defendant's motion for reconsideration, the Court
of Appeals set aside its judgment and ordered that the case be remanded to the court of origin for
further proceedings. The defendant Vazquez, not being agreeable to that result, filed the present
petition for certiorari (G.R. No. 48930) to review and reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals;
and the plaintiff Francisco de Borja, excepting to the resolution of the Court of Appeals whereby its
original judgment was set aside and the case was ordered remanded to the court of origin for further
proceedings, filed a cross-petition for certiorari (G.R. No. 48931) to maintain the original judgment of
the Court of Appeals.
The original decision of the Court of Appeals and its subsequent resolutions on reconsideration read
as follows:
Es hecho no controvertido que el 25 de Febrero de 1932, el demandado-apelante vendio al
demandante 4,000 cavanes de palay al precio de P2.10 el cavan, de los cuales, dicho

demandante solamente recibio 2,583 cavanes; y que asimismo recibio para su envase 4,000
sacos vacios. Esta provbado que de dichos 4,000 sacos vacios solamente se entregaron,
2,583 quedando en poder del demandado el resto, y cuyo valor es el de P0.24 cada uno.
Presentada la demanda contra los demandados Antonio Vazquez y Fernando Busuego para
el pago de la cantidad de P4,702.70, con sus intereses legales desde el 1.o de marzo de
1932 hasta su completo pago y las costas, el Juzgado de Primera Instancia de Manila el
asunto condenando a Antonio Vazquez a pagar al demandante la cantidad de P3,175.20,
mas la cantidad de P377.50, con sus intereses legales, absolviendo al demandado
Fernando Busuego de la demanda y al demandante de la reconvencion de los demandados,
sin especial pronunciamiento en cuanto a las costas. De dicha decision apelo el demandado
Antonio Vazquez, apuntado como principal error el de que el habia sido condenado
personalmente, y no la corporacion por el representada.
Segun la preponderancia de las pruebas, la venta hecha por Antonio Vazquez a favor de
Francisco de Borja de los 4,000 cavanes de palay fue en su capacidad de Presidente
interino y Manager de la corporacion Natividad-Vazquez Sabani Development Co., Inc. Asi
resulta del Exh. 1, que es la copia al carbon del recibo otorgado por el demandado Vazquez,
y cuyo original lo habia perdido el demandante, segun el. Asi tambien consta en los libros de
la corporacion arriba mencionada, puesto que en los mismos se ha asentado tanto la
entrada de los P8,400, precio del palay, como su envio al gobierno en pago de los alquileres
de la Hacienda Sabani. Asi mismo lo admitio Francisco de Borja al abogado Sr. Jacinto
Tomacruz, posterior presidente de la corporacion sucesora en el arrendamiento de la Sabani
Estate, cuando el solicito sus buenos oficios para el cobro del precio del palay no entregado.
Asi igualmente lo declaro el que hizo entrega de parte del palay a Borja, Felipe Veneracion,
cuyo testimonio no ha sido refutado. Y asi se deduce de la misma demanda, cuando se
incluyo en ella a Fernando Busuego, tesorero de la Natividad-Vazquez Sabani Development
Co., Inc.
Siendo esto asi, la principal responsable debe ser la Natividad-Vazquez Sabani
Development Co., Inc., que quedo insolvente y dejo de existir. El Juez sentenciador declaro,
sin embargo, al demandado Vazquez responsable del pago de la cantidad reclamada por su
negligencia al vender los referidos 4,000 cavanes de palay sin averiguar antes si o no dicha
cantidad existia en las bodegas de la corporacion.
Resulta del Exh. 8 que despues de la venta de los 4,000 cavanes de palay a Francisco de
Borja, el mismo demandado vendio a Kwong Ah Phoy 1,500 cavanes al precio de P2.00 el
cavan, y decimos 'despues' porque esta ultima venta aparece asentada despues de la
primera. Segun esto, el apelante no solamente obro con negligencia, sino interviniendo
culpa de su parte, por lo que de acuerdo con los arts. 1102, 1103 y 1902 del Codigo Civil, el
debe ser responsable subsidiariamente del pago de la cantidad objecto de la demanda.
En meritos de todo lo expuesto, se confirma la decision apelada con la modificacion de que
el apelante debe pagar al apelado la suma de P2,295.70 como valor de los 1,417 cavanes
de palay que dejo de entregar al demandante, mas la suma de P339.08 como importe de los
1,417 sacos vacios, que dejo de devolver, a razon de P0.24 el saco, total P3,314.78, con
sus intereses legales desde la interposicion de la demanda y las costas de ambas
instancias.
Vista la mocion de reconsideracion de nuestra decision de fecha 13 de Octubre de 1942, y
alegandose en la misma que cuando el apelante vendio los 1,500 cavanes de palay a Ah
Phoy, la corporacion todavia tenia bastante existencia de dicho grano, y no estando dicho
extremo suficientemente discutido y probado, y pudiendo variar el resultado del asunto,

dejamos sin efecto nuestra citada decision, y ordenamos la devolucion de la causa al

Juzgado de origen para que reciba pruebas al efecto y dicte despues la decision
correspondiente.
Upon consideration of the motion of the attorney for the plaintiff-appellee in case CA-G.R.
No. 8676,Francisco de Borja vs. Antonio Vasquez et al., praying, for the reasons therein
given, that the resolution of December 22, 1942, be reconsidered: Considering that said
resolution remanding the case to the lower court is for the benefit of the plaintiff-appellee to
afford him opportunity to refute the contention of the defendant-appellant Antonio Vazquez,
motion denied.
The action is on a contract, and the only issue pleaded and tried is whether the plaintiff entered into
the contract with the defendant Antonio Vazquez in his personal capacity or as manager of the
Natividad-Vazquez Sabani Development Co., Inc. The Court of Appeals found that according to the
preponderance of the evidence "the sale made by Antonio Vazquez in favor of Francisco de Borja of
4,000 cavans of palay was in his capacity as acting president and manager of the corporation
Natividad-Vazquez Sabani Development Co., Inc." That finding of fact is final and, it resolving the
only issue involved, should be determinative of the result.
The Court of Appeals doubly erred in ordering that the cause be remanded to the court of origin for
further trial to determine whether the corporation had sufficient stock of palay at the time appellant
sold, 1500 cavans of palay to Kwong Ah Phoy. First, if that point was material to the issue, it should
have been proven during the trial; and the statement of the court that it had not been sufficiently
discussed and proven was no justification for ordering a new trial, which, by the way, neither party
had solicited but against which, on the contrary, both parties now vehemently protest. Second, the
point is, in any event, beside the issue, and this we shall now discuss in connection with the original
judgment of the Court of Appeals which the plaintiff cross-petitioner seeks to maintain.
The action being on a contract, and it appearing from the preponderance of the evidence that the
party liable on the contract is the Natividad-Vazquez Sabani Development Co., Inc. which is not a
party herein, the complaint should have been dismissed. Counsel for the plaintiff, in his brief as
respondent, argues that altho by the preponderance of the evidence the trial court and the Court of
Appeals found that Vazquez celebrated the contract in his capacity as acting president of the
corporation and altho it was the latter, thru Vazquez, with which the plaintiff had contracted and
which, thru Vazquez, had received the sum of P8,400 from Borja, and altho that was true from the
point of view of a legal fiction, "ello no impede que tambien sea verdad lo alegado en la demanda de
que la misma persona de Vasquez fue la que contrato con Borja y que la misma persona de
Vasquez fue quien recibio la suma de P8,400." But such argument is invalid and insufficient to show
that the president of the corporation is personally liable on the contract duly and lawfully entered into
by him in its behalf.
It is well known that a corporation is an artificial being invested by law with a personality of its own,
separate and distinct from that of its stockholders and from that of its officers who manage and run
its affairs. The mere fact that its personality is owing to a legal fiction and that it necessarily has to
act thru its agents, does not make the latter personally liable on a contract duly entered into, or for
an act lawfully performed, by them for an in its behalf. The legal fiction by which the personality of a
corporation is created is a practical reality and necessity. Without it no corporate entities may exists
and no corporate business may be transacted. Such legal fiction may be disregarded only when an
attempt is made to use it as a cloak to hide an unlawful or fraudulent purpose. No such thing has
been alleged or proven in this case. It has not been alleged nor even intimated that Vazquez
personally benefited by the contract of sale in question and that he is merely invoking the legal
fiction to avoid personal liability. Neither is it contended that he entered into said contract for the

corporation in bad faith and with intent to defraud the plaintiff. We find no legal and factual basis
upon which to hold him liable on the contract either principally or subsidiarily.
The trial court found him guilty of negligence in the performance of the contract and held him
personally liable on that account. On the other hand, the Court of Appeals found that he "no
solamente obro con negligencia, sino interveniendo culpa de su parte, por lo que de acuerdo con los
arts. 1102, 1103 y 1902 del Codigo Civil, el debe ser responsable subsidiariamente del pago de la
cantidad objeto de la demanda." We think both the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in law in
so holding. They have manifestly failed to distinguish a contractual from an extracontractual
obligation, or an obligation arising from contract from an obligation arising from culpa aquiliana. The
fault and negligence referred to in articles 1101-1104 of the Civil Code are those incidental to the
fulfillment or nonfullfillment of a contractual obligation; while the fault or negligence referred to in
article 1902 is the culpa aquiliana of the civil law, homologous but not identical to tort of the common
law, which gives rise to an obligation independently of any contract. (Cf. Manila R.R. Co. vs. Cia.
Trasatlantica, 38 Phil., 875, 887-890; Cangco vs.Manila R.R. Co., 38 Phil. 768.) The fact that the
corporation, acting thru Vazquez as its manager, was guilty of negligence in the fulfillment of the
contract, did not make Vazquez principally or even subsidiarily liable for such negligence. Since it
was the corporation's contract, its nonfulfillment, whether due to negligence or fault or to any other
cause, made the corporation and not its agent liable.
On the other hand if independently of the contract Vazquez by his fault or negligence cause
damaged to the plaintiff, he would be liable to the latter under article 1902 of the Civil Code. But then
the plaintiff's cause of action should be based on culpa aquiliana and not on the contract alleged in
his complaint herein; and Vazquez' liability would be principal and not merely subsidiary, as the
Court of Appeals has erroneously held. No such cause of action was alleged in the complaint or tried
by express or implied consent of the parties by virtue of section 4 of Rule 17. Hence the trial court
had no jurisdiction over the issue and could not adjudicate upon it (Reyes vs. Diaz, G.R. No. 48754.)
Consequently it was error for the Court of Appeals to remand the case to the trial court to try and
decide such issue.
It only remains for us to consider petitioner's second assignment of error referring to the lower
courts' refusal to entertain his counterclaim for damages against the respondent Borja arising from
the bringing of this action. The lower courts having sustained plaintiff's action. The finding of the
Court of Appeals that according to the preponderance of the evidence the defendant Vazquez
celebrated the contract not in his personal capacity but as acting president and manager of the
corporation, does not warrant his contention that the suit against him is malicious and tortious; and
since we have to decide defendant's counterclaim upon the facts found by the Court of Appeals, we
find no sufficient basis upon which to sustain said counterclaim. Indeed, we feel that a a matter of
moral justice we ought to state here that the indignant attitude adopted by the defendant towards the
plaintiff for having brought this action against him is in our estimation not wholly right. Altho from the
legal point of view he was not personally liable for the fulfillment of the contract entered into by him
on behalf of the corporation of which he was the acting president and manager, we think it was his
moral duty towards the party with whom he contracted in said capacity to see to it that the
corporation represented by him fulfilled the contract by delivering the palay it had sold, the price of
which it had already received. Recreant to such duty as a moral person, he has no legitimate cause
for indignation. We feel that under the circumstances he not only has no cause of action against the
plaintiff for damages but is not even entitled to costs.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the complaint is hereby dismissed, without
any finding as to costs.
Yulo, C.J., Moran, Horrilleno and Bocobo, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions
PARAS, J., dissenting:
Upon the facts of this case as expressly or impliedly admitted in the majority opinion, the plaintiff is
entitled to a judgment against the defendant. The latter, as acting president and manager of
Natividad-Vazquez Sabani Development Co., Inc., and with full knowledge of the then insolvent
status of his company, agreed to sell to the plaintiff 4,000 cavans of palay. Notwithstanding the
receipt from the plaintiff of the full purchase price, the defendant delivered only 2,488 cavans and
failed and refused to deliver the remaining 1,512 cavans and failed and refused to deliver the
remaining 1,512 cavans and a quantity of empty sacks, or their value. Such failure resulted,
according to the Court of First Instance of Manila and the Court of Appeals, from his fault or
negligence.
It is true that the cause of action made out by the complaint is technically based on a contract
between the plaintiff and Natividad-Vazquez Sabani Development Co., Inc. which is not a party to
this case. Nevertheless, inasmuch as it was proven at the trial that the defendant was guilty of fault
in that he prevented the performance of the plaintiff's contract and also of negligence bordering on
fraud which cause damage to the plaintiff, the error of procedure should not be a hindrance to the
rendition of a decision in accordance with the evidence actually introduced by the parties, especially
when in such a situation we may order the necessary amendment of the pleadings, or even consider
them correspondingly amended.
As already stated, the corporation of which the defendant was acting president and manager was, at
the time he made the sale of the plaintiff, known to him to be insolvent. As a matter of fact, said
corporation was soon thereafter dissolved. There is admitted damage on the part of the plaintiff,
proven to have been inflicted by reason of the fault or negligence of the defendant. In the interest of
simple justice and to avoid multiplicity of suits I am therefore impelled to consider the present action
as one based on fault or negligence and to sentence the defendant accordingly. Otherwise, he would
be allowed to profit by his own wrong under the protective cover of the corporate existence of the
company he represented. It cannot be pretended that any advantage under the sale inured to the
benefit of Natividad-Vazquez Sabani Development Co., Inc. and not of the defendant personally,
since the latter undoubtedly owned a considerable part of its capital.
G.R. No. L-21438

September 28, 1966

AIR FRANCE, petitioner,

vs.
RAFAEL CARRASCOSO and the HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Lichauco, Picazo and Agcaoili for petitioner.
Bengzon Villegas and Zarraga for respondent R. Carrascoso.

SANCHEZ, J.:

The Court of First Instance of Manila 1 sentenced petitioner to pay respondent Rafael Carrascoso
P25,000.00 by way of moral damages; P10,000.00 as exemplary damages; P393.20 representing
the difference in fare between first class and tourist class for the portion of the trip Bangkok-Rome,
these various amounts with interest at the legal rate, from the date of the filing of the complaint until
paid; plus P3,000.00 for attorneys' fees; and the costs of suit.
On appeal,2 the Court of Appeals slightly reduced the amount of refund on Carrascoso's plane ticket
from P393.20 to P383.10, and voted to affirm the appealed decision "in all other respects", with costs
against petitioner.
The case is now before us for review on certiorari.
The facts declared by the Court of Appeals as " fully supported by the evidence of record", are:
Plaintiff, a civil engineer, was a member of a group of 48 Filipino pilgrims that left Manila for
Lourdes on March 30, 1958.
On March 28, 1958, the defendant, Air France, through its authorized agent, Philippine Air
Lines, Inc., issued to plaintiff a "first class" round trip airplane ticket from Manila to Rome.
From Manila to Bangkok, plaintiff travelled in "first class", but at Bangkok, the Manager of the
defendant airline forced plaintiff to vacate the "first class" seat that he was occupying
because, in the words of the witness Ernesto G. Cuento, there was a "white man", who, the
Manager alleged, had a "better right" to the seat. When asked to vacate his "first class" seat,
the plaintiff, as was to be expected, refused, and told defendant's Manager that his seat
would be taken over his dead body; a commotion ensued, and, according to said Ernesto G.
Cuento, "many of the Filipino passengers got nervous in the tourist class; when they found
out that Mr. Carrascoso was having a hot discussion with the white man [manager], they
came all across to Mr. Carrascoso and pacified Mr. Carrascoso to give his seat to the white
man" (Transcript, p. 12, Hearing of May 26, 1959); and plaintiff reluctantly gave his "first
class" seat in the plane.3
1. The trust of the relief petitioner now seeks is that we review "all the findings" 4 of respondent Court
of Appeals. Petitioner charges that respondent court failed to make complete findings of fact on all
the issues properly laid before it. We are asked to consider facts favorable to petitioner, and then, to
overturn the appellate court's decision.
Coming into focus is the constitutional mandate that "No decision shall be rendered by any court of
record without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is
based". 5 This is echoed in the statutory demand that a judgment determining the merits of the case
shall state "clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based"; 6 and that "Every
decision of the Court of Appeals shall contain complete findings of fact on all issues properly raised
before it". 7
A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity. It is open to direct attack. 8 The law,
however, solely insists that a decision state the "essential ultimate facts" upon which the court's
conclusion is drawn. 9 A court of justice is not hidebound to write in its decision every bit and piece of

evidence 10 presented by one party and the other upon the issues raised. Neither is it to be burdened
with the obligation "to specify in the sentence the facts"which a party "considered as proved". 11 This
is but a part of the mental process from which the Court draws the essential ultimate facts. A
decision is not to be so clogged with details such that prolixity, if not confusion, may result. So long
as the decision of the Court of Appeals contains the necessary facts to warrant its conclusions, it is
no error for said court to withhold therefrom "any specific finding of facts with respect to the evidence
for the defense". Because as this Court well observed, "There is no law that so requires". 12 Indeed,
"the mere failure to specify (in the decision) the contentions of the appellant and the reasons for
refusing to believe them is not sufficient to hold the same contrary to the requirements of the
provisions of law and the Constitution". It is in this setting that in Manigque, it was held that the mere
fact that the findings "were based entirely on the evidence for the prosecution without taking into
consideration or even mentioning the appellant's side in the controversy as shown by his own
testimony", would not vitiate the judgment. 13 If the court did not recite in the decision the testimony of
each witness for, or each item of evidence presented by, the defeated party, it does not mean that
the court has overlooked such testimony or such item of evidence. 14 At any rate, the legal
presumptions are that official duty has been regularly performed, and that all the matters within an
issue in a case were laid before the court and passed upon by it. 15
Findings of fact, which the Court of Appeals is required to make, maybe defined as "the written
statement of the ultimate facts as found by the court ... and essential to support the decision and
judgment rendered thereon". 16They consist of the court's "conclusions" with respect to the
determinative facts in issue". 17 A question of law, upon the other hand, has been declared as "one
which does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the
parties." 18
2. By statute, "only questions of law may be raised" in an appeal by certiorari from a judgment of the
Court of Appeals. 19 That judgment is conclusive as to the facts. It is not appropriately the business of
this Court to alter the facts or to review the questions of fact. 20
With these guideposts, we now face the problem of whether the findings of fact of the Court of
Appeals support its judgment.
3. Was Carrascoso entitled to the first class seat he claims?
It is conceded in all quarters that on March 28, 1958 he paid to and received from petitioner a first
class ticket. But petitioner asserts that said ticket did not represent the true and complete intent and
agreement of the parties; that said respondent knew that he did not have confirmed reservations for
first class on any specific flight, although he had tourist class protection; that, accordingly, the
issuance of a first class ticket was no guarantee that he would have a first class ride, but that such
would depend upon the availability of first class seats.
These are matters which petitioner has thoroughly presented and discussed in its brief before the
Court of Appeals under its third assignment of error, which reads: "The trial court erred in finding that
plaintiff had confirmed reservations for, and a right to, first class seats on the "definite" segments of
his journey, particularly that from Saigon to Beirut". 21

And, the Court of Appeals disposed of this contention thus:

Defendant seems to capitalize on the argument that the issuance of a first-class ticket was
no guarantee that the passenger to whom the same had been issued, would be
accommodated in the first-class compartment, for as in the case of plaintiff he had yet to
make arrangements upon arrival at every station for the necessary first-class reservation.
We are not impressed by such a reasoning. We cannot understand how a reputable firm like
defendant airplane company could have the indiscretion to give out tickets it never meant to
honor at all. It received the corresponding amount in payment of first-class tickets and yet it
allowed the passenger to be at the mercy of its employees. It is more in keeping with the
ordinary course of business that the company should know whether or riot the tickets it
issues are to be honored or not.22
Not that the Court of Appeals is alone. The trial court similarly disposed of petitioner's contention,
thus:
On the fact that plaintiff paid for, and was issued a "First class" ticket, there can be no question.
Apart from his testimony, see plaintiff's Exhibits "A", "A-1", "B", "B-1," "B-2", "C" and "C-1", and
defendant's own witness, Rafael Altonaga, confirmed plaintiff's testimony and testified as follows:
Q. In these tickets there are marks "O.K." From what you know, what does this OK mean?
A. That the space is confirmed.
Q. Confirmed for first class?
A. Yes, "first class". (Transcript, p. 169)
xxx

xxx

xxx

Defendant tried to prove by the testimony of its witnesses Luis Zaldariaga and Rafael Altonaga that
although plaintiff paid for, and was issued a "first class" airplane ticket, the ticket was subject to
confirmation in Hongkong. The court cannot give credit to the testimony of said witnesses. Oral
evidence cannot prevail over written evidence, and plaintiff's Exhibits "A", "A-l", "B", "B-l", "C" and "C1" belie the testimony of said witnesses, and clearly show that the plaintiff was issued, and paid for,
a first class ticket without any reservation whatever.
Furthermore, as hereinabove shown, defendant's own witness Rafael Altonaga testified that the
reservation for a "first class" accommodation for the plaintiff was confirmed. The court cannot believe
that after such confirmation defendant had a verbal understanding with plaintiff that the "first class"
ticket issued to him by defendant would be subject to confirmation in Hongkong. 23
We have heretofore adverted to the fact that except for a slight difference of a few pesos in the
amount refunded on Carrascoso's ticket, the decision of the Court of First Instance was affirmed by
the Court of Appeals in all other respects. We hold the view that such a judgment of affirmance has
merged the judgment of the lower court. 24Implicit in that affirmance is a determination by the Court of

Appeals that the proceeding in the Court of First Instance was free from prejudicial error and "all
questions raised by the assignments of error and all questions that might have been raised are to be
regarded as finally adjudicated against the appellant". So also, the judgment affirmed "must be
regarded as free from all error". 25 We reached this policy construction because nothing in the
decision of the Court of Appeals on this point would suggest that its findings of fact are in any way at
war with those of the trial court. Nor was said affirmance by the Court of Appeals upon a ground or
grounds different from those which were made the basis of the conclusions of the trial court. 26
If, as petitioner underscores, a first-class-ticket holder is not entitled to a first class seat,
notwithstanding the fact that seat availability in specific flights is therein confirmed, then an air
passenger is placed in the hollow of the hands of an airline. What security then can a passenger
have? It will always be an easy matter for an airline aided by its employees, to strike out the very
stipulations in the ticket, and say that there was a verbal agreement to the contrary. What if the
passenger had a schedule to fulfill? We have long learned that, as a rule, a written document speaks
a uniform language; that spoken word could be notoriously unreliable. If only to achieve stability in
the relations between passenger and air carrier, adherence to the ticket so issued is desirable. Such
is the case here. The lower courts refused to believe the oral evidence intended to defeat the
covenants in the ticket.
The foregoing are the considerations which point to the conclusion that there are facts upon which
the Court of Appeals predicated the finding that respondent Carrascoso had a first class ticket and
was entitled to a first class seat at Bangkok, which is a stopover in the Saigon to Beirut leg of the
flight. 27 We perceive no "welter of distortions by the Court of Appeals of petitioner's statement of its
position", as charged by petitioner. 28 Nor do we subscribe to petitioner's accusation that respondent
Carrascoso "surreptitiously took a first class seat to provoke an issue". 29 And this because, as
petitioner states, Carrascoso went to see the Manager at his office in Bangkok "to confirm my seat
and because from Saigon I was told again to see the Manager". 30 Why, then, was he allowed to take
a first class seat in the plane at Bangkok, if he had no seat? Or, if another had a better right to the
seat?
4. Petitioner assails respondent court's award of moral damages. Petitioner's trenchant claim is that
Carrascoso's action is planted upon breach of contract; that to authorize an award for moral
damages there must be an averment of fraud or bad faith;31 and that the decision of the Court of
Appeals fails to make a finding of bad faith. The pivotal allegations in the complaint bearing on this
issue are:
3. That ... plaintiff entered into a contract of air carriage with the Philippine Air Lines for a
valuable consideration, the latter acting as general agents for and in behalf of the defendant,
under which said contract, plaintiff was entitled to, as defendant agreed to furnish plaintiff,
First Class passage on defendant's plane during the entire duration of plaintiff's tour of
Europe with Hongkong as starting point up to and until plaintiff's return trip to Manila, ... .
4. That, during the first two legs of the trip from Hongkong to Saigon and from Saigon to
Bangkok, defendant furnished to the plaintiff First Class accommodation but only after
protestations, arguments and/or insistence were made by the plaintiff with defendant's
employees.

5. That finally, defendant failed to provide First Class passage, but instead furnished plaintiff
only TouristClass accommodations from Bangkok to Teheran and/or Casablanca, ... the
plaintiff has been compelled by defendant's employees to leave the First Class
accommodation berths at Bangkok after he was already seated.
6. That consequently, the plaintiff, desiring no repetition of the inconvenience and
embarrassments brought by defendant's breach of contract was forced to take a Pan
American World Airways plane on his return trip from Madrid to Manila.32
xxx

xxx

xxx

2. That likewise, as a result of defendant's failure to furnish First Class accommodations aforesaid,
plaintiff suffered inconveniences, embarrassments, and humiliations, thereby causing plaintiff mental
anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings, social humiliation, and the like injury, resulting in moral
damages in the amount of P30,000.00. 33
xxx

xxx

xxx

The foregoing, in our opinion, substantially aver: First, That there was a contract to furnish plaintiff a
first class passage covering, amongst others, the Bangkok-Teheran leg; Second, That said contract
was breached when petitioner failed to furnish first class transportation at Bangkok; and Third, that
there was bad faith when petitioner's employee compelled Carrascoso to leave his first class
accommodation berth "after he was already, seated" and to take a seat in the tourist class, by reason
of which he suffered inconvenience, embarrassments and humiliations, thereby causing him mental
anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and social humiliation, resulting in moral damages. It is
true that there is no specific mention of the term bad faith in the complaint. But, the inference of bad
faith is there, it may be drawn from the facts and circumstances set forth therein. 34 The contract was
averred to establish the relation between the parties. But the stress of the action is put on wrongful
expulsion.
Quite apart from the foregoing is that (a) right the start of the trial, respondent's counsel placed
petitioner on guard on what Carrascoso intended to prove: That while sitting in the plane in Bangkok,
Carrascoso was ousted by petitioner's manager who gave his seat to a white man; 35 and (b)
evidence of bad faith in the fulfillment of the contract was presented without objection on the part of
the petitioner. It is, therefore, unnecessary to inquire as to whether or not there is sufficient averment
in the complaint to justify an award for moral damages. Deficiency in the complaint, if any, was cured
by the evidence. An amendment thereof to conform to the evidence is not even required. 36 On the
question of bad faith, the Court of Appeals declared:
That the plaintiff was forced out of his seat in the first class compartment of the plane
belonging to the defendant Air France while at Bangkok, and was transferred to the tourist
class not only without his consent but against his will, has been sufficiently established by
plaintiff in his testimony before the court, corroborated by the corresponding entry made by
the purser of the plane in his notebook which notation reads as follows:

"First-class passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against his will, and that
the captain refused to intervene",
and by the testimony of an eye-witness, Ernesto G. Cuento, who was a co-passenger. The
captain of the plane who was asked by the manager of defendant company at Bangkok to
intervene even refused to do so. It is noteworthy that no one on behalf of defendant ever
contradicted or denied this evidence for the plaintiff. It could have been easy for defendant to
present its manager at Bangkok to testify at the trial of the case, or yet to secure his
disposition; but defendant did neither. 37
The Court of appeals further stated
Neither is there evidence as to whether or not a prior reservation was made by the white
man. Hence, if the employees of the defendant at Bangkok sold a first-class ticket to him
when all the seats had already been taken, surely the plaintiff should not have been picked
out as the one to suffer the consequences and to be subjected to the humiliation and
indignity of being ejected from his seat in the presence of others. Instead of explaining to the
white man the improvidence committed by defendant's employees, the manager adopted the
more drastic step of ousting the plaintiff who was then safely ensconsced in his rightful seat.
We are strengthened in our belief that this probably was what happened there, by the
testimony of defendant's witness Rafael Altonaga who, when asked to explain the meaning
of the letters "O.K." appearing on the tickets of plaintiff, said "that the space is confirmed for
first class. Likewise, Zenaida Faustino, another witness for defendant, who was the chief of
the Reservation Office of defendant, testified as follows:
"Q How does the person in the ticket-issuing office know what reservation the
passenger has arranged with you?
A They call us up by phone and ask for the confirmation." (t.s.n., p. 247, June 19,
1959)
In this connection, we quote with approval what the trial Judge has said on this point:
Why did the, using the words of witness Ernesto G. Cuento, "white man" have a
"better right" to the seat occupied by Mr. Carrascoso? The record is silent. The
defendant airline did not prove "any better", nay, any right on the part of the "white
man" to the "First class" seat that the plaintiff was occupying and for which he paid
and was issued a corresponding "first class" ticket.
If there was a justified reason for the action of the defendant's Manager in Bangkok,
the defendant could have easily proven it by having taken the testimony of the said
Manager by deposition, but defendant did not do so; the presumption is that
evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced [Sec. 69, par (e), Rules
of Court]; and, under the circumstances, the Court is constrained to find, as it does
find, that the Manager of the defendant airline in Bangkok not merely asked but
threatened the plaintiff to throw him out of the plane if he did not give up his "first

class" seat because the said Manager wanted to accommodate, using the words of
the witness Ernesto G. Cuento, the "white man".38
It is really correct to say that the Court of Appeals in the quoted portion first transcribed did
not use the term "bad faith". But can it be doubted that the recital of facts therein points to
bad faith? The manager not only prevented Carrascoso from enjoying his right to a first class
seat; worse, he imposed his arbitrary will; he forcibly ejected him from his seat, made him
suffer the humiliation of having to go to the tourist class compartment - just to give way to
another passenger whose right thereto has not been established. Certainly, this is bad faith.
Unless, of course, bad faith has assumed a meaning different from what is understood in
law. For, "bad faith" contemplates a "state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design
or with some motive of self-interest or will or for ulterior purpose." 39
And if the foregoing were not yet sufficient, there is the express finding of bad faith in the
judgment of the Court of First Instance, thus:
The evidence shows that the defendant violated its contract of transportation with
plaintiff in bad faith, with the aggravating circumstances that defendant's Manager in
Bangkok went to the extent of threatening the plaintiff in the presence of many
passengers to have him thrown out of the airplane to give the "first class" seat that
he was occupying to, again using the words of the witness Ernesto G. Cuento, a
"white man" whom he (defendant's Manager) wished to accommodate, and the
defendant has not proven that this "white man" had any "better right" to occupy the
"first class" seat that the plaintiff was occupying, duly paid for, and for which the
corresponding "first class" ticket was issued by the defendant to him.40
5. The responsibility of an employer for the tortious act of its employees need not be essayed. It is
well settled in law. 41 For the willful malevolent act of petitioner's manager, petitioner, his employer,
must answer. Article 21 of the Civil Code says:
ART. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage.
In parallel circumstances, we applied the foregoing legal precept; and, we held that upon the
provisions of Article 2219 (10), Civil Code, moral damages are recoverable. 42
6. A contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind and degree from any other contractual
relation. 43 And this, because of the relation which an air-carrier sustains with the public. Its business
is mainly with the travelling public. It invites people to avail of the comforts and advantages it offers.
The contract of air carriage, therefore, generates a relation attended with a public duty. Neglect or
malfeasance of the carrier's employees, naturally, could give ground for an action for damages.
Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They have a right to be treated by the carrier's
employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration. They are entitled to be protected
against personal misconduct, injurious language, indignities and abuses from such employees. So it

is, that any rule or discourteous conduct on the part of employees towards a passenger gives the
latter an action for damages against the carrier. 44
Thus, "Where a steamship company 45 had accepted a passenger's check, it was a breach of
contract and a tort, giving a right of action for its agent in the presence of third persons to falsely
notify her that the check was worthless and demand payment under threat of ejection, though the
language used was not insulting and she was not ejected." 46 And this, because, although the
relation of passenger and carrier is "contractual both in origin and nature" nevertheless "the act that
breaks the contract may be also a tort". 47 And in another case, "Where a passenger on a railroad
train, when the conductor came to collect his fare tendered him the cash fare to a point where the
train was scheduled not to stop, and told him that as soon as the train reached such point he would
pay the cash fare from that point to destination, there was nothing in the conduct of the passenger
which justified the conductor in using insulting language to him, as by calling him a lunatic," 48 and
the Supreme Court of South Carolina there held the carrier liable for the mental suffering of said
passenger.
1awphl.nt

Petitioner's contract with Carrascoso is one attended with public duty. The stress of Carrascoso's
action as we have said, is placed upon his wrongful expulsion. This is a violation of public duty by
the petitioner air carrier a case of quasi-delict. Damages are proper.
7. Petitioner draws our attention to respondent Carrascoso's testimony, thus
Q You mentioned about an attendant. Who is that attendant and purser?
A When we left already that was already in the trip I could not help it. So one of the
flight attendants approached me and requested from me my ticket and I said, What for? and
she said, "We will note that you transferred to the tourist class". I said, "Nothing of that kind.
That is tantamount to accepting my transfer." And I also said, "You are not going to note
anything there because I am protesting to this transfer".
Q Was she able to note it?
A No, because I did not give my ticket.
Q About that purser?
A Well, the seats there are so close that you feel uncomfortable and you don't have enough
leg room, I stood up and I went to the pantry that was next to me and the purser was there.
He told me, "I have recorded the incident in my notebook." He read it and translated it to me
because it was recorded in French "First class passenger was forced to go to the
tourist class against his will, and that the captain refused to intervene."
Mr. VALTE
I move to strike out the last part of the testimony of the witness because the best evidence
would be the notes. Your Honor.

COURT
I will allow that as part of his testimony. 49
Petitioner charges that the finding of the Court of Appeals that the purser made an entry in his
notebook reading "First class passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against his will, and
that the captain refused to intervene" is predicated upon evidence [Carrascoso's testimony above]
which is incompetent. We do not think so. The subject of inquiry is not the entry, but the ouster
incident. Testimony on the entry does not come within the proscription of the best evidence rule.
Such testimony is admissible. 49a
Besides, from a reading of the transcript just quoted, when the dialogue happened, the impact of the
startling occurrence was still fresh and continued to be felt. The excitement had not as yet died
down. Statements then, in this environment, are admissible as part of the res gestae. 50 For, they
grow "out of the nervous excitement and mental and physical condition of the declarant". 51 The
utterance of the purser regarding his entry in the notebook was spontaneous, and related to the
circumstances of the ouster incident. Its trustworthiness has been guaranteed. 52 It thus escapes the
operation of the hearsay rule. It forms part of the res gestae.
At all events, the entry was made outside the Philippines. And, by an employee of petitioner. It would
have been an easy matter for petitioner to have contradicted Carrascoso's testimony. If it were really
true that no such entry was made, the deposition of the purser could have cleared up the matter.
We, therefore, hold that the transcribed testimony of Carrascoso is admissible in evidence.
8. Exemplary damages are well awarded. The Civil Code gives the court ample power to grant
exemplary damages in contracts and quasi- contracts. The only condition is that defendant should
have "acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner." 53 The manner of
ejectment of respondent Carrascoso from his first class seat fits into this legal precept. And this, in
addition to moral damages.54
9. The right to attorney's fees is fully established. The grant of exemplary damages justifies a similar
judgment for attorneys' fees. The least that can be said is that the courts below felt that it is but just
and equitable that attorneys' fees be given. 55 We do not intend to break faith with the tradition that
discretion well exercised as it was here should not be disturbed.
10. Questioned as excessive are the amounts decreed by both the trial court and the Court of
Appeals, thus: P25,000.00 as moral damages; P10,000.00, by way of exemplary damages, and
P3,000.00 as attorneys' fees. The task of fixing these amounts is primarily with the trial court. 56 The
Court of Appeals did not interfere with the same. The dictates of good sense suggest that we give
our imprimatur thereto. Because, the facts and circumstances point to the reasonableness thereof. 57
On balance, we say that the judgment of the Court of Appeals does not suffer from reversible error.
We accordingly vote to affirm the same. Costs against petitioner. So ordered.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Zaldivar and Castro, JJ.,
concur.
Bengzon, J.P., J., took no part.
G.R. No. L-24837

June 27, 1968

JULIAN C. SINGSON and RAMONA DEL CASTILLO, plaintiffs,

vs.
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS and SANTIAGO FREIXAS, in his capacity as President of
the said Bank,defendants.
Gil B. Galang for plaintiffs.
Aviado and Aranda for defendants.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
Appeal by plaintiffs, Julian Singson and his wife, Ramona del Castillo, from a decision of the Court of
First Instance of Manila dismissing their complaint against defendants herein, the Bank of the
Philippine Islands and Santiago Freixas.
It appears that Singson, was one of the defendants in civil case No. 23906 of the Court of First
Instance, Manila, in which judgment had been rendered sentencing him and his co-defendants
therein, namely, Celso Lobregat and Villa-Abrille & Co., to pay the sum of P105,539.56 to the plaintiff
therein, Philippine Milling Co. Singson and Lobregat had seasonably appealed from said judgment,
but not Villa-Abrille & Co., as against which said judgment, accordingly, became final and executory.
In due course, a writ of garnishment was subsequently served upon the Bank of the Philippine
Islands in which the Singsons had a current account insofar as Villa-Abrille's credits against
the Bank were concerned. What happened thereafter is set forth in the decision appealed from, from
which we quote:
Upon receipt of the said Writ of Garnishment, a clerk of the bank in charge of all matters of
execution and garnishment, upon reading the name of the plaintiff herein in the title of the
Writ of Garnishment as a party defendants, without further reading the body of the said
garnishment and informing himself that said garnishment was merely intended for the
deposits of defendant Villa-Abrille & Co., Valentin Teus, Fernando F. de Villa-Abrille and
Joaquin Bona, prepared a letter for the signature of the President of the Bank informing the
plaintiff Julian C. Singson of the garnishment of his deposits by the plaintiff in that case.
Another letter was also prepared and signed by the said President of the Bank for the
Special Sheriff dated April 17, 1963.
Subsequently, two checks issued by the plaintiff Julian C. Singson, one for the amount of
P383 in favor of B. M. Glass Service dated April 16, 1963 and bearing No. C-424852, and
check No. C-394996 for the amount of P100 in favor of the Lega Corporation, and drawn
against the said Bank, were deposited by the said drawers with the said bank. Believing that
the plaintiff Singson, the drawer of the check, had no more control over the balance of his
deposits in the said bank, the checks were dishonored and were refused payment by the

said bank. After the first check was returned by the bank to the B. M. Glass Service, the latter
wrote plaintiff Julian C. Singson a letter, dated April 19, 1963, advising him that his check for
P383.00 bearing No. C-424852 was not honored by the bank for the reason that his account
therein had already been garnished. The said B. M. Glass Service further stated in the said
letter that they were constrained to close his credit account with them. In view thereof,
plaintiff Julian C. Singson wrote the defendant bank a letter on April 19, 1963, claiming that
his name was not included in the Writ of Execution and Notice of Garnishment, which was
served upon the bank. The defendant President Santiago Freixas of the said bank took steps
to verify this information and after having confirmed the same, apologized to the plaintiff
Julian C. Singson and wrote him a letter dated April 22, 1963, requesting him to disregard
their letter of April 17, 1963, and that the action of garnishment from his account had already
been removed. A similar letter was written by the said official of the bank on April 22, 1963 to
the Special Sheriff informing him that his letter dated April 17, 1963 to the said Special
Sheriff was considered cancelled and that they had already removed the Notice of
Garnishment from plaintiff Singson's account. Thus, the defendants lost no time to rectify the
mistake that had been inadvertently committed, resulting in the temporary freezing of the
account of the plaintiff with the said bank for a short time.
xxx

xxx

xxx

On May 8, 1963, the Singsong commenced the present action against the Bank and its president,
Santiago Freixas, for damages1 in consequence of said illegal freezing of plaintiffs' account.
1wph1.t

After appropriate proceedings, the Court of First Instance of Manila rendered judgment dismissing
the complaint upon the ground that plaintiffs cannot recover from the defendants upon the basis of a
quasi-delict, because the relation between the parties is contractual in nature; because this case
does not fall under Article 2219 of our Civil Code, upon which plaintiffs rely; and because plaintiffs
have not established the amount of damages allegedly sustained by them.
The lower court held that plaintiffs' claim for damages cannot be based upon a tort or quasi-delict,
their relation with the defendants being contractual in nature. We have repeatedly held, however,
that the existence of a contract between the parties does not bar the commission of a tort by the one
against the order and the consequent recovery of damages therefor.2 Indeed, this view has been, in
effect, reiterated in a comparatively recent case. Thus, in Air France vs. Carrascoso,3 involving an
airplane passenger who, despite his first-class ticket, had been illegally ousted from his first-class
accommodation and compelled to take a seat in the tourist compartment, was held entitled to
recover damages from the air-carrier, upon the ground of tort on the latter's part, for, although the
relation between a passenger and a carrier is "contractual both in origin and nature ... the act that
breaks the contract may also be a tort".
In view, however, of the facts obtaining in the case at bar, and considering, particularly, the
circumstance, that the wrong done to the plaintiff was remedied as soon as the President of the bank
realized the mistake he and his subordinate employee had committed, the Court finds that an award
of nominal damages the amount of which need not be proven4 in the sum of P1,000, in addition
to attorney's fees in the sum of P500, would suffice to vindicate plaintiff's rights. 5

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed, and another one shall be entered
sentencing the defendant Bank of the Philippine Islands to pay to the plaintiffs said sums of P1,000,
as nominal damages, and P500, as attorney's fees, apart from the costs. It is so ordered.
Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro and Angeles, JJ., concur.
Fernando, J., took no part.
G.R. No. 79578

March 13, 1991

RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (RCPI), petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, and SPOUSES MINERVA TIMAN and FLORES
TIMAN, respondents.
Salalima, Trenas, Pagaoa & Associates for petitioner.
Paul P. Lentejas for private respondents.
SARMIENTO, J.:
A social condolence telegram sent through the facilities of the petitioner gave rise to the present
petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals which
affirmed in toto the judgment of the trial court, dated February 14, 1985, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
1

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:

1. Ordering the defendant RCPI to pay plaintiff the amount of P30,848.05 representing actual
and compensatory damages; P10,000.00 as moral damages and P5,000.00 as exemplary
damages.
2. Awarding of attorney's fees in the sum of P5,000.00. Costs against the defendant.
SO ORDERED.

The facts as gleaned from the records of the case are as follows:
On January 24, 1983, private respondents-spouses Minerva Timan and Flores Timan sent a
telegram of condolence to their cousins, Mr. and Mrs. Hilario Midoranda, at Trinidad, Calbayog City,
through petitioner Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc. (RCPI, hereinafter) at Cubao,
Quezon City, to convey their deepest sympathy for the recent death of the mother-in-law of Hilario
Midoranda to wit:
4

MR. & MRS. HILARIO MIDORANDA

TRINIDAD, CALBAYOG CITY

MAY GOD GIVE YOU COURAGE AND STRENGTH TO BEAR YOUR LOSS. OUR DEEPEST
SYMPATHY TO YOU AND MEMBERS OF THE FAMILY.
MINER & FLORY.

The condolence telegram was correctly transmitted as far as the written text was concerned.
However, the condolence message as communicated and delivered to the addressees was
typewritten on a "Happy Birthday" card and placed inside a "Christmasgram" envelope. Believing
that the transmittal to the addressees of the aforesaid telegram in that nonsuch manner was done
intentionally and with gross breach of contract resulting to ridicule, contempt, and humiliation of the
private respondents and the addressees, including their friends and relatives, the spouses Timan
demanded an explanation. Unsatisfied with RCPI's explanations in its letters, dated March 9 and
April 20, 1983, the Timans filed a complaint for damages.
6

The parties stipulated at the pre-trial that the issue to be resolved by the trial court was:
WHETHER or not the act of delivering the condolence message in a Happy Birthday" card
with a "Christmasgram" envelope constitutes a breach of contract on the part of the
defendant. If in the affirmative, whether or not plaintiff is entitled to damages.
7

The trial court rendered judgment in favor of the respondents Timans which was affirmed in toto by
the Court of Appeals. RCPI now submits the following assignment of errors:
I
THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN CONDEMNING PETITIONER TO PAY ACTUAL
AND COMPENSATORY DAMAGES IN THE AMOUNT OF P30,848.05.
II
THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN CONDEMNING PETITIONER TO PAY MORAL
DAMAGES IN THE AMOUNT OF P10,000.00.
III
THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN CONDEMNING PETITIONER TO PAY
EXEMPLARY DAMAGES IN THE AMOUNT OF P5,000.00.
IV
THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN CONDEMNING PETITIONER TO PAY
ATTORNEYS FEES IN THE AMOUNT OF P5,000.00 PLUS COSTS OF SUIT.
8

The four assigned errors are going to be discussed jointly because they are all based on the same
findings of fact.

We fully agree with the appellate court's endorsement of the trial court's conclusion that RCPI, a
corporation dealing in telecommunications and offering its services to the public, is engaged in a
business affected with public interest. As such, it is bound to exercise that degree of diligence
expected of it in the performance of its obligation.
9

One of RCPI's main arguments is that it still correctly transmitted the text of the telegram and was
received by the addressees on time despite the fact that there was "error" in the social form and
envelope used. RCPI asserts that there was no showing that it has any motive to cause harm or
damage on private respondents:
10

Petitioner humbly submits that the "error" in the social form used does not come within the
ambit of fraud, malice or bad faith as understood/defined under the law.
11

We do not agree.
In a distinctly similar case, and oddly also involving the herein petitioner as the same culprit, we
held:
12

Petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of receiving and transmitting

messages. Everytime a person transmits a message through the facilities of the petitioner, a
contract is entered into. Upon receipt of the rate or fee fixed, the petitioner undertakes to
transmit the message accurately . . . As a corporation, the petitioner can act only through its
employees. Hence the acts of its employees in receiving and transmitting messages are the
acts of the petitioner. To hold that the petitioner is not liable directly for the acts of its
employees in the pursuit of petitioner's business is to deprive the general public availing of
the services of the petitioner of an effective and adequate remedy.
13

Now, in the present case, it is self-evident that a telegram of condolence is intended and meant to
convey a message of sorrow and sympathy. Precisely, it is denominated "telegram of condolence"
because it tenders sympathy and offers to share another's grief. It seems out of this world, therefore,
to place that message of condolence in a birthday card and deliver the same in a Christmas
envelope for such acts of carelessness and incompetence not only render violence to good taste
and common sense, they depict a bizarre presentation of the sender's feelings. They ridicule the
deceased's loved ones and destroy the atmosphere of grief and respect for the departed.
Anyone who avails of the facilities of a telegram company like RCPI can choose to send his
message in the ordinary form or in a social form. In the ordinary form, the text of the message is
typed on plain newsprint paper. On the other hand, a social telegram is placed in a special form with
the proper decorations and embellishments to suit the occasion and the message and delivered in
an envelope matching the purpose of the occasion and the words and intent of the message. The
sender pays a higher amount for the social telegram than for one in the ordinary form. It is clear,
therefore, that when RCPI typed the private respondents' message of condolence in a birthday card
and delivered the same in a colorful Christmasgram envelope, it committed a breach of contract as
well as gross negligence. Its excuse that it had run out of social condolence cards and envelopes is
flimsy and unacceptable. It could not have been faulted had it delivered the message in the ordinary
form and reimbursed the difference in the cost to the private respondents. But by transmitting it
14

unfittinglythrough other special forms clearly, albeit outwardly, portraying the opposite feelings of
joy and happiness and thanksgivingRCPI only exacerbated the sorrowful situation of the
addressees and the senders. It bears stress that this botchery exposed not only the petitioner's
gross negligence but also its callousness and disregard for the sentiments of its clientele, which
tantamount to wanton misconduct, for which it must be held liable for damages.
It is not surprising that when the Timans' telegraphic message reached their cousin, it became the
joke of the Midorandas' friends, relatives, and associates who thought, and rightly so, that the
unpardonable mix-up was a mockery of the death of the mother-in-law of the senders' cousin. Thus it
was not unexpected that because of this unusual incident, which caused much embarrassment and
distress to respondent Minerva Timan, he suffered nervousness and hypertension resulting in his
confinement for three days starting from April 4, 1983 at the Capitol Medical Center in Quezon City.
15

The petitioner argues that "a court cannot rely on speculation, conjectures or guess work as to the
fact and amount of damages, but must depend on the actual proof that damages had been suffered
and evidence of the actual amount. In other words, RCPI insists that there is no causal relation of
the illness suffered by Mr. Timan with the foul-up caused by the petitioner. But that is a question of
fact. The findings of fact of the trial court and the respondent court concur in favor of the private
respondents. We are bound by such findingsthat is the general rule well-established by a long line
of cases. Nothing has been shown to convince us to justify the relaxation of this rule in the
petitioner's favor. On the contrary, these factual findings are supported by substantial evidence on
record.
16

Anent the award of moral and exemplary damages assigned as errors, the findings of the
respondent court are persuasive.
1wphi1

. . . When plaintiffs placed an order for transmission of their social condolence telegram,
defendant did not inform the plaintiff of the exhaustion of such social condolence forms.
Defendant-appellant accepted through its authorized agent or agency the order and received
the corresponding compensation therefor. Defendant did not comply with its contract as
intended by the parties and instead of transmitting the condolence message in an ordinary
form, in accordance with its guidelines, placed the condolence message expressing sadness
and sorrow in forms conveying joy and happiness. Under the circumstances, We cannot
accept the defendant's plea of good faith predicated on such exhaustion of social
condolence forms. Gross negligence or carelessness can be attributed to defendantappellant in not supplying its various stations with such sufficient and adequate social
condolence forms when it held out to the public sometime in January, 1983, the availability of
such social condolence forms and accepted for a fee the transmission of messages on said
forms. Knowing that there are no such forms as testified to by its Material Control Manager
Mateo Atienza, and entering into a contract for the transmission of messages in such forms,
defendant-appellant committed acts of bad faith, fraud or malice. . . .
17

RCPI's argument that it can not be held liable for exemplary damages, being penal or punitive in
character, is without merit. We have so held in many cases, and oddly, quite a number of them
likewise involved the herein petitioner as the transgressor.
18

xxx

xxx

xxx

. . . In contracts and quasi-contracts, exemplary damages may be awarded if the defendant

acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner. There was gross
negligence on the part of RCPI personnel in transmitting the wrong telegram, of which RCPI
must be held liable. Gross carelessness or negligence constitutes wanton misconduct.
1wphi1

xxx

xxx

xxx

. . . punitive damages may be recovered for wilful or wantonly negligent acts in respect of
messages, even though those acts are neither authorized nor ratified (Arkansas & L.R. Co.
vs. Stroude 91 SW 18; West vs. Western U. Tel. Co., 17 P807; Peterson vs. Western U. Tel.
Co., 77 NW 985; Brown vs. Western U. Tel. Co., 6 SE 146). Thus, punitive damages have
been recovered for mistakes in the transmission of telegrams (Pittman vs. Western Union
Tel. Co., 66 SO 977; Painter vs. Western Union Tel. Co., 84 SE 293) (emphasis supplied).
19

We wish to add a little footnote to this Decision. By merely reviewing the number of cases that has
reached this Court in which the petitioner was time and again held liable for the same causes as in
the present case breach of contract and gross negligencethe ineluctable conclusion is that it has
not in any way reformed nor improved its services to the public. It must do so now or else next time
the Court may be constrained to adjudge stricter sanctions.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED in toto.
Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Padilla and Regalado, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 98695 January 27, 1993
JUAN J. SYQUIA, CORAZON C. SYQUIA, CARLOTA C. SYQUIA, CARLOS C. SYQUIA and
ANTHONY C. SYQUIA, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and THE MANILA MEMORIAL PARK CEMETERY,
INC., respondents.
Pacis & Reyes Law Offices for petitioners.
Augusto S. San Pedro & Ari-Ben C. Sebastian for private respondents.

CAMPOS, JR., J.:

Herein petitioners, Juan J. Syquia and Corazon C. Syquia, Carlota C. Syquia, Carlos C. Syquia, and
Anthony Syquia, were the parents and siblings, respectively, of the deceased Vicente Juan Syquia.
On March 5, 1979, they filed a complaint 1 in the then Court of First Instance against herein private
respondent, Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc. for recovery of damages arising from breach of contract
and/or quasi-delict. The trial court dismissed the complaint.
The antecedent facts, as gathered by the respondent Court, are as follows:
On March 5, 1979, Juan, Corazon, Carlota and Anthony all surnamed Syquia,
plaintiff-appellants herein, filed a complaint for damages against defendant-appellee,
Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc.
The complaint alleged among others, that pursuant to a Deed of Sale (Contract No.
6885) dated August 27, 1969 and Interment Order No. 7106 dated July 21, 1978
executed between plaintiff-appellant Juan J. Syquia and defendant-appellee, the
former, father of deceased Vicente Juan J. Syquia authorized and instructed
defendant-appellee to inter the remains of deceased in the Manila Memorial Park
Cemetery in the morning of July 25, 1978 conformably and in accordance with
defendant-appellant's (sic) interment procedures; that on September 4, 1978,
preparatory to transferring the said remains to a newly purchased family plot also at
the Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, the concrete vault encasing the coffin of the
deceased was removed from its niche underground with the assistance of certain
employees of defendant-appellant (sic); that as the concrete vault was being raised
to the surface, plaintiffs-appellants discovered that the concrete vault had a hole
approximately three (3) inches in diameter near the bottom of one of the walls closing
out the width of the vault on one end and that for a certain length of time (one hour,
more or less), water drained out of the hole; that because of the aforesaid discovery,
plaintiffs-appellants became agitated and upset with concern that the water which
had collected inside the vault might have risen as it in fact did rise, to the level of the
coffin and flooded the same as well as the remains of the deceased with ill effects
thereto; that pursuant to an authority granted by the Municipal Court of Paraaque,
Metro Manila on September 14, 1978, plaintiffs-appellants with the assistance of
licensed morticians and certain personnel of defendant-appellant (sic) caused the
opening of the concrete vault on September 15, 1978; that upon opening the vault,
the following became apparent to the plaintiffs-appellants: (a) the interior walls of the
concrete vault showed evidence of total flooding; (b) the coffin was entirely damaged
by water, filth and silt causing the wooden parts to warp and separate and to crack
the viewing glass panel located directly above the head and torso of the deceased;
(c) the entire lining of the coffin, the clothing of the deceased, and the exposed parts
of the deceased's remains were damaged and soiled by the action of the water and
silt and were also coated with filth.
Due to the alleged unlawful and malicious breach by the defendant-appellee of its
obligation to deliver a defect-free concrete vault designed to protect the remains of
the deceased and the coffin against the elements which resulted in the desecration
of deceased's grave and in the alternative, because of defendant-appellee's gross

negligence conformably to Article 2176 of the New Civil Code in failing to seal the
concrete vault, the complaint prayed that judgment be rendered ordering defendantappellee to pay plaintiffs-appellants P30,000.00 for actual damages, P500,000.00 for
moral damages, exemplary damages in the amount determined by the court, 20% of
defendant-appellee's total liability as attorney's fees, and expenses of litigation and
costs of suit. 2
In dismissing the complaint, the trial court held that the contract between the parties did not
guarantee that the cement vault would be waterproof; that there could be no quasi-delict because
the defendant was not guilty of any fault or negligence, and because there was a pre-existing
contractual relation between the Syquias and defendant Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc.. The
trial court also noted that the father himself, Juan Syquia, chose the gravesite despite knowing that
said area had to be constantly sprinkled with water to keep the grass green and that water would
eventually seep through the vault. The trial court also accepted the explanation given by defendant
for boring a hole at the bottom side of the vault: "The hole had to be bored through the concrete vault
because if it has no hole the vault will (sic) float and the grave would be filled with water and the
digging would caved (sic) in the earth, the earth would caved (sic) in the (sic) fill up the grave." 3
From this judgment, the Syquias appealed. They alleged that the trial court erred in holding that the
contract allowed the flooding of the vault; that there was no desecration; that the boring of the hole
was justifiable; and in not awarding damages.
The Court of Appeals in the Decision 4 dated December 7, 1990 however, affirmed the judgment of
dismissal. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated April 25, 1991. 5
Unsatisfied with the respondent Court's decision, the Syquias filed the instant petition. They allege
herein that the Court of Appeals committed the following errors when it:
1. held that the contract and the Rules and Resolutions of private respondent allowed
the flooding of the vault and the entrance thereto of filth and silt;
2. held that the act of boring a hole was justifiable and corollarily, when it held that no
act of desecration was committed;
3. overlooked and refused to consider relevant, undisputed facts, such as those
which have been stipulated upon by the parties, testified to by private respondent's
witnesses, and admitted in the answer, which could have justified a different
conclusion;
4. held that there was no tort because of a pre-existing contract and the absence of
fault/negligence; and
5. did not award the P25,000.00 actual damages which was agreed upon by the
parties, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees.

At the bottom of the entire proceedings is the act of boring a hole by private respondent on the vault
of the deceased kin of the bereaved petitioners. The latter allege that such act was either a breach
of private respondent's contractual obligation to provide a sealed vault, or, in the alternative, a
negligent act which constituted a quasi-delict. Nonetheless, petitioners claim that whatever kind of
negligence private respondent has committed, the latter is liable for desecrating the grave of
petitioners' dead.
In the instant case, We are called upon to determine whether the Manila Memorial Park Cemetery,
Inc., breached its contract with petitioners; or, alternatively, whether private respondent was guilty of
a tort.
We understand the feelings of petitioners and empathize with them. Unfortunately, however, We are
more inclined to answer the foregoing questions in the negative. There is not enough ground, both in
fact and in law, to justify a reversal of the decision of the respondent Court and to uphold the pleas of
the petitioners.
With respect to herein petitioners' averment that private respondent has committed culpa aquiliana,
the Court of Appeals found no negligent act on the part of private respondent to justify an award of
damages against it. Although a pre-existing contractual relation between the parties does not
preclude the existence of a culpa aquiliana, We find no reason to disregard the respondent's Court
finding that there was no negligence.
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault
or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if
there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasidelict . . . . (Emphasis supplied).
In this case, it has been established that the Syquias and the Manila Memorial Park
Cemetery, Inc., entered into a contract entitled "Deed of Sale and Certificate of Perpetual
Care" 6 on August 27, 1969. That agreement governed the relations of the parties and defined
their respective rights and obligations. Hence, had there been actual negligence on the part of the
Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc., it would be held liable not for a quasi-delict or culpa
aquiliana, but for culpa contractual as provided by Article 1170 of the Civil Code, to wit:
Those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence, or
delay, and those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for
damages.
The Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc. bound itself to provide the concrete box to be send in the
interment. Rule 17 of the Rules and Regulations of private respondent provides that:
Rule 17. Every earth interment shall be made enclosed in a concrete box, or in an
outer wall of stone, brick or concrete, the actual installment of which shall be made
by the employees of the Association. 7

Pursuant to this above-mentioned Rule, a concrete vault was provided on July 27, 1978, the day
before the interment, and was, on the same day, installed by private respondent's employees in the
grave which was dug earlier. After the burial, the vault was covered by a cement lid.
Petitioners however claim that private respondent breached its contract with them as the latter held
out in the brochure it distributed that the . . . lot may hold single or double internment (sic)
underground in sealed concrete vault." 8 Petitioners claim that the vault provided by private respondent
was not sealed, that is, not waterproof. Consequently, water seeped through the cement enclosure and
damaged everything inside it.
We do not agree. There was no stipulation in the Deed of Sale and Certificate of Perpetual Care and
in the Rules and Regulations of the Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc. that the vault would be
waterproof. Private respondent's witness, Mr. Dexter Heuschkel, explained that the term "sealed"
meant "closed." 9 On the other hand, the word "seal" is defined as . . . any of various closures or
fastenings . . . that cannot be opened without rupture and that serve as a check against tampering or
unauthorized opening." 10 The meaning that has been given by private respondent to the word conforms
with the cited dictionary definition. Moreover, it is also quite clear that "sealed" cannot be equated with
"waterproof". Well settled is the rule that when the terms of the contract are clear and leave no doubt as
to the intention of the contracting parties, then the literal meaning of the stipulation shall
control. 11 Contracts should be interpreted according to their literal meaning and should not be interpreted
beyond their obvious intendment. 12 As ruled by the respondent Court:
When plaintiff-appellant Juan J. Syquia affixed his signature to the Deed of Sale
(Exhibit "A") and the attached Rules and Regulations (Exhibit "1"), it can be assumed
that he has accepted defendant-appellee's undertaking to merely provide a concrete
vault. He can not now claim that said concrete vault must in addition, also be
waterproofed (sic). It is basic that the parties are bound by the terms of their contract,
which is the law between them (Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation vs. Court of
Appeals, et al. 178 SCRA 739). Where there is nothing in the contract which is
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy, the validity of the
contract must be sustained (Phil. American Insurance Co. vs. Judge Pineda, 175
SCRA 416). Consonant with this ruling, a contracting party cannot incur a liability
more than what is expressly specified in his undertaking. It cannot be extended by
implication, beyond the terms of the contract (Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation
vs. Court of Appeals, supra). And as a rule of evidence, where the terms of an
agreement are reduced to writing, the document itself, being constituted by the
parties as the expositor of their intentions, is the only instrument of evidence in
respect of that agreement which the law will recognize, so long as its (sic) exists for
the purpose of evidence (Starkie, Ev., pp. 648, 655, Kasheenath vs. Chundy, 5 W.R.
68 cited in Francisco, Revised Rules of Court in the Phil. p. 153, 1973 Ed.). And if the
terms of the contract are clear and leave no doubt upon the intention of the
contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulations shall control (Santos vs. CA,
et al., G. R. No. 83664, Nov. 13, 1989; Prudential Bank & Trust Co. vs. Community
Builders Co., Inc., 165 SCRA 285; Balatero vs. IAC, 154 SCRA 530). 13
We hold, therefore, that private respondent did not breach the tenor of its obligation to the Syquias.
While this may be so, can private respondent be liable for culpa aquiliana for boring the hole on the

vault? It cannot be denied that the hole made possible the entry of more water and soil than was
natural had there been no hole.
The law defines negligence as the "omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of the
obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place." 14 In
the absence of stipulation or legal provision providing the contrary, the diligence to be observed in the
performance of the obligation is that which is expected of a good father of a family.
The circumstances surrounding the commission of the assailed act boring of the hole negate
the allegation of negligence. The reason for the act was explained by Henry Flores, Interment
Foreman, who said that:
Q It has been established in this particular case that a certain Vicente
Juan Syquia was interred on July 25, 1978 at the Paraaque
Cemetery of the Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc., will you please
tell the Hon. Court what or whether you have participation in
connection with said internment (sic)?
A A day before Juan (sic) Syquia was buried our personnel dug a
grave. After digging the next morning a vault was taken and placed in
the grave and when the vault was placed on the grave a hole was
placed on the vault so that water could come into the vault becauseit
was raining heavily then because the vault has no hole the vault will
float and the grave would be filled with water and the digging would
caved (sic) in and the earth, the earth would (sic) caved in and fill up
the grave. 15 (Emphasis ours)
Except for the foreman's opinion that the concrete vault may float should there be a heavy rainfall,
from the above-mentioned explanation, private respondent has exercised the diligence of a good
father of a family in preventing the accumulation of water inside the vault which would have resulted
in the caving in of earth around the grave filling the same with earth.
Thus, finding no evidence of negligence on the part of private respondent, We find no reason to
award damages in favor of petitioners.
In the light of the foregoing facts, and construed in the language of the applicable laws and
jurisprudence, We are constrained to AFFIRM in toto the decision of the respondent Court of
Appeals dated December 7, 1990. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Regalado and Nocon, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 122039 May 31, 2000

VICENTE CALALAS, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, ELIZA JUJEURCHE SUNGA and FRANCISCO SALVA, respondents.

MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision1 of the Court of Appeals, dated March 31,
1991, reversing the contrary decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 36, Dumaguete City, and
awarding damages instead to private respondent Eliza Jujeurche Sunga as plaintiff in an action for
breach of contract of carriage.
The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
At 10 o'clock in the morning of August 23, 1989, private respondent Eliza Jujeurche G. Sunga, then
a college freshman majoring in Physical Education at the Siliman University, took a passenger
jeepney owned and operated by petitioner Vicente Calalas. As the jeepney was filled to capacity of
about 24 passengers, Sunga was given by the conductor an "extension seat," a wooden stool at the
back of the door at the rear end of the vehicle.
On the way to Poblacion Sibulan, Negros Occidental, the jeepney stopped to let a passenger off. As
she was seated at the rear of the vehicle, Sunga gave way to the outgoing passenger. Just as she
was doing so, an Isuzu truck driven by Iglecerio Verena and owned by Francisco Salva bumped the
left rear portion of the jeepney. As a result, Sunga was injured. She sustained a fracture of the "distal
third of the left tibia-fibula with severe necrosis of the underlying skin." Closed reduction of the
fracture, long leg circular casting, and case wedging were done under sedation. Her confinement in
the hospital lasted from August 23 to September 7, 1989. Her attending physician, Dr. Danilo V.
Oligario, an orthopedic surgeon, certified she would remain on a cast for a period of three months
and would have to ambulate in crutches during said period.
On October 9, 1989, Sunga filed a complaint for damages against Calalas, alleging violation of the
contract of carriage by the former in failing to exercise the diligence required of him as a common
carrier. Calalas, on the other hand, filed a third-party complaint against Francisco Salva, the owner
of the Isuzu truck.
The lower court rendered judgment against Salva as third-party defendant and absolved Calalas of
liability, holding that it was the driver of the Isuzu truck who was responsible for the accident. It took
cognizance of another case (Civil Case No. 3490), filed by Calalas against Salva and Verena, for
quasi-delict, in which Branch 37 of the same court held Salva and his driver Verena jointly liable to
Calalas for the damage to his jeepney.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the ruling of the lower court was reversed on the ground that
Sunga's cause of action was based on a contract of carriage, not quasi-delict, and that the common
carrier failed to exercise the diligence required under the Civil Code. The appellate court dismissed
the third-party complaint against Salva and adjudged Calalas liable for damages to Sunga. The
dispositive portion of its decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE,
and another one is entered ordering defendant-appellee Vicente Calalas to pay
plaintiff-appellant:
(1) P50,000.00 as actual and compensatory damages;
(2) P50,000.00 as moral damages;
(3) P10,000.00 as attorney's fees; and
(4) P1,000.00 as expenses of litigation; and
(5) to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, this petition. Petitioner contends that the ruling in Civil Case No. 3490 that the negligence of
Verena was the proximate cause of the accident negates his liability and that to rule otherwise would
be to make the common carrier an insurer of the safety of its passengers. He contends that the
bumping of the jeepney by the truck owned by Salva was a caso fortuito. Petitioner further assails
the award of moral damages to Sunga on the ground that it is not supported by evidence.
The petition has no merit.
The argument that Sunga is bound by the ruling in Civil Case No. 3490 finding the driver and the
owner of the truck liable for quasi-delict ignores the fact that she was never a party to that case and,
therefore, the principle of res judicata does not apply.
Nor are the issues in Civil Case No. 3490 and in the present case the same. The issue in Civil Case
No. 3490 was whether Salva and his driver Verena were liable for quasi-delict for the damage
caused to petitioner's jeepney. On the other hand, the issue in this case is whether petitioner is liable
on his contract of carriage. The first, quasi-delict, also known as culpa aquiliana or culpa extra
contractual, has as its source the negligence of the tortfeasor. Thesecond, breach of contract
or culpa contractual, is premised upon the negligence in the performance of a contractual obligation.
Consequently, in quasi-delict, the negligence or fault should be clearly established because it is the
basis of the action, whereas in breach of contract, the action can be prosecuted merely by proving
the existence of the contract and the fact that the obligor, in this case the common carrier, failed to
transport his passenger safely to his destination. 2 In case of death or injuries to passengers, Art.
1756 of the Civil Code provides that common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have
acted negligently unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as defined in Arts.
1733 and 1755 of the Code. This provision necessarily shifts to the common carrier the burden of
proof.
There is, thus, no basis for the contention that the ruling in Civil Case No. 3490, finding Salva and
his driver Verena liable for the damage to petitioner's jeepney, should be binding on Sunga. It is
immaterial that the proximate cause of the collision between the jeepney and the truck was the
negligence of the truck driver. The doctrine of proximate cause is applicable only in actions for quasidelict, not in actions involving breach of contract. The doctrine is a device for imputing liability to a
person where there is no relation between him and another party. In such a case, the obligation is
created by law itself. But, where there is a pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, it is

the parties themselves who create the obligation, and the function of the law is merely to regulate
the relation thus created. Insofar as contracts of carriage are concerned, some aspects regulated by
the Civil Code are those respecting the diligence required of common carriers with regard to the
safety of passengers as well as the presumption of negligence in cases of death or injury to
passengers. It provides:
Art. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of
public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the
goods and for the safety of the passengers transported by them, according to all the
circumstances of each case.
Such extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods is further expressed in
articles 1734, 1735, and 1746, Nos. 5, 6, and 7, while the extraordinary diligence for
the safety of the passengers is further set forth in articles 1755 and 1756.
Art. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human
care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons,
with due regard for all the circumstances.
Art. 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are
presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that
they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed by articles 1733 and 1755.
In the case at bar, upon the happening of the accident, the presumption of negligence at once arose,
and it became the duty of petitioner to prove that he had to observe extraordinary diligence in the
care of his passengers.
Now, did the driver of jeepney carry Sunga "safely as far as human care and foresight could provide,
using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard for all the circumstances" as
required by Art. 1755? We do not think so. Several factors militate against petitioner's contention.
First, as found by the Court of Appeals, the jeepney was not properly parked, its rear portion being
exposed about two meters from the broad shoulders of the highway, and facing the middle of the
highway in a diagonal angle. This is a violation of the R.A. No. 4136, as amended, or the Land
Transportation and Traffic Code, which provides:
Sec. 54. Obstruction of Traffic. No person shall drive his motor vehicle in such a
manner as to obstruct or impede the passage of any vehicle, nor, while discharging
or taking on passengers or loading or unloading freight, obstruct the free passage of
other vehicles on the highway.
Second, it is undisputed that petitioner's driver took in more passengers than the allowed seating
capacity of the jeepney, a violation of 32(a) of the same law. It provides:
Exceeding registered capacity. No person operating any motor vehicle shall allow
more passengers or more freight or cargo in his vehicle than its registered capacity.
The fact that Sunga was seated in an "extension seat" placed her in a peril greater than that to which
the other passengers were exposed. Therefore, not only was petitioner unable to overcome the
presumption of negligence imposed on him for the injury sustained by Sunga, but also, the evidence
shows he was actually negligent in transporting passengers.

We find it hard to give serious thought to petitioner's contention that Sunga's taking an "extension
seat" amounted to an implied assumption of risk. It is akin to arguing that the injuries to the many
victims of the tragedies in our seas should not be compensated merely because those passengers
assumed a greater risk of drowning by boarding an overloaded ferry. This is also true of petitioner's
contention that the jeepney being bumped while it was improperly parked constitutes caso fortuito.
A caso fortuito is an event which could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, was
inevitable.3 This requires that the following requirements be present: (a) the cause of the breach is
independent of the debtor's will; (b) the event is unforeseeable or unavoidable; (c) the event is such
as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner, and (d) the debtor
did not take part in causing the injury to the
creditor.4 Petitioner should have foreseen the danger of parking his jeepney with its body protruding
two meters into the highway.
Finally, petitioner challenges the award of moral damages alleging that it is excessive and without
basis in law. We find this contention well taken.
In awarding moral damages, the Court of Appeals stated:
Plaintiff-appellant at the time of the accident was a first-year college student in that
school year 1989-1990 at the Silliman University, majoring in Physical Education.
Because of the injury, she was not able to enroll in the second semester of that
school year. She testified that she had no more intention of continuing with her
schooling, because she could not walk and decided not to pursue her degree, major
in Physical Education "because of my leg which has a defect already."
Plaintiff-appellant likewise testified that even while she was under confinement, she
cried in pain because of her injured left foot. As a result of her injury, the Orthopedic
Surgeon also certified that she has "residual bowing of the fracture side." She
likewise decided not to further pursue Physical Education as her major subject,
because "my left leg . . . has a defect already."
Those are her physical pains and moral sufferings, the inevitable bedfellows of the
injuries that she suffered. Under Article 2219 of the Civil Code, she is entitled to
recover moral damages in the sum of P50,000.00, which is fair, just and reasonable.
As a general rule, moral damages are not recoverable in actions for damages predicated on a
breach of contract for it is not one of the items enumerated under Art. 2219 of the Civil Code. 5 As an
exception, such damages are recoverable: (1) in cases in which the mishap results in the death of a
passenger, as provided in Art. 1764, in relation to Art. 2206(3) of the Civil Code; and (2) in the cases
in which the carrier is guilty of fraud or bad faith, as provided in Art. 2220. 6
In this case, there is no legal basis for awarding moral damages since there was no factual finding
by the appellate court that petitioner acted in bad faith in the performance of the contract of carriage.
Sunga's contention that petitioner's admission in open court that the driver of the jeepney failed to
assist her in going to a nearby hospital cannot be construed as an admission of bad faith. The fact
that it was the driver of the Isuzu truck who took her to the hospital does not imply that petitioner was
utterly indifferent to the plight of his injured passenger. If at all, it is merely implied recognition by
Verena that he was the one at fault for the accident.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated March 31, 1995, and its resolution, dated
September 11, 1995, are AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that the award of moral damages is
DELETED.

SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo and Buena, JJ., concur.
Quisumbing and De Leon, Jr., JJ., are on leave.