AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION

Daez (P) v. CA, et al. (R) | GR No. 133507

1. The requisites for the grant of an application for exemption from coverage of the OLT and
those for the grant of an application for the exercise of a landowner's right of retention are
different.
2. The right of retention is a constitutionally guaranteed right, which is subject to qualification
by the legislature. It serves to mitigate the effects of compulsory land acquisition by
balancing the rights of the landowner and the tenant and by implementing the doctrine that
social justice was not meant to perpetrate an injustice against the landowner.
3. The issuance of EPs or CLOAs to beneficiaries does not absolutely bar the landowner from
retaining the area covered thereby. Under Administrative Order No. 2, series of 1994, an EP or
CLOA may be cancelled if the land covered is later found to be part of the landowner's
retained area.
4. Issued titles cannot confer title where the landowner failed to exercise the right of choice as
to what to retain among her landholdings.
Tenants of the Estate of Dr. Sison, petitioners, v. Court of Appeals, DAR, & the Heirs of
Dr. Sison | GR No. 93045
1. No one, not even the petitioners tenants, nor any court of justice, can deprive or deny the
land owners of the retention of seven (7) hectares which the law has reserved for them.
2. The failure of the private respondents to apply for retention of seven (7) hectares each of
their agricultural landholdings did not constitute an estoppel or waiver of their respective
right of retention. The omission was cured by their timely protest against the issuance of the
certificates of land transfer to the petitioners.
3. The concerned Heirs of Sison do not have to cultivate the retained and exempted areas,
unless the petitioners, as agricultural lessees, would voluntarily relinquish the task of
cultivation and vacate and surrender the said areas to the Heirs.
4. The issuance, recall or cancellation of certificates of land transfer falls within the secretary's
administrative jurisdiction as implementor of P.D. 27.
Lucia & Prudencia Rodrigues, petitioners, v. Salvador, respondent | GR No. 171972
1. Agricultural tenancy exists when all the following requisites are present: 1) the parties are the
landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; 2) the subject matter of the relationship is an
agricultural land; 3) there is consent between the parties to the relationship; 4) the purpose of
the relationship is to bring about agricultural production; 5) there is personal cultivation on
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the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and 6) the harvest is shared between landowner
and tenant or agricultural lessee.
2. Mere occupation or cultivation of an agricultural land will not ipso facto make the tiller an
agricultural tenant. It is incumbent upon a person who claims to be an agricultural tenant to
prove by substantial evidence all the requisites of agricultural tenancy.
Sta. Rosa Realty Devt Co., petitioner v. CA et al., respondents | GR No. 112526
1. The fact that during the DARAB hearing, petitioner presented proof that the Casile property
has slopes of 18% and over, which exempted the land from the coverage of CARL. R. A. No.
6657.
2. CARL, Section 10, provides, Exemptions and Exclusions. Lands actually, directly and
exclusively used and found to be necessary for parks, wildlife, forest reserves, reforestation,
fish sanctuaries and breeding grounds, watersheds and mangroves, national defense, school
sites and campuses including experimental farm stations operated by public or private
schools for educational purposes, seeds and seedlings research and pilot production centers,
church sites and convents appurtenent thereto, communal burial grounds and cemeteries,
penal colonies and penal farms actually worked by the inmates, government and private
research and quarantine centers, and all lands with eighteen percent (18%) slope and over,
except those already developed shall be exempt from coverage of this Act.
Roxas & Co., petitioner v. CA, DAR, et al., respondents | GR No. 127876
1. There was a violation of its rights and to require it to exhaust administrative remedies before
the DAR itself was not a plain, speedy and adequate remedy.
2. However, respondent DAR's failure to observe due process in the acquisition of petitioners'
landholdings does not ipso facto give the Supreme Court the power to adjudicate over
petitioner's application for conversion of its haciendas from agricultural to non-agricultural.
The power to determine whether Hacienda Palico, Banilad and Caylaway are non-agricultural,
hence, exempts from the coverage of the CARL lies with the DAR, not with the Supreme
Court.
3. As such, it does not give the Supreme Court the power to nullify the CLOAs already issued to
the farmer beneficiaries. To assume the power is to short-circuit the administrative process,
which has yet to run its regular course. Respondent DAR must be given the chance to correct
its procedural lapses in the acquisition proceedings.
Heirs of Dr. Jose Deleste, petitioners, v. Land Bank (LBP), et al. | GR No. 169913

1. The importance of an actual notice in subjecting a property under the agrarian reform
program cannot be underrated, as non-compliance with it trods roughshod with the essential
requirements of administrative due process of law. Heirs of Jugalbot v. CA.
2. Since land acquisition under either Presidential Decree No. 27 and the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law govern the extraordinary method of expropriating private property, the
law must be strictly construed. Faithful compliance with legal provisions, especially those
which relate to the procedure for acquisition of expropriated lands should therefore be
observed.
3. And it was incumbent upon the DAR to notify Deleste, being the landowner of the subject
property.
Heirs of Jugalbot, petitioners v. CA & Heirs of Roa | GR No. 170346
1. The petitioners are not de jure tenants of private respondents under Presidential Decree No.
27 due to the absence of the essential requisites that establish a tenancy relationship
between them. The taking of subject property was done in violation of constitutional due
process. Virginia A. Roa was denied due process because the DAR failed to send notice of the
impending land reform coverage to the proper party. The records show that notices were
erroneously addressed and sent in the name of Pedro N. Roa who was not the owner (Virginia
was only married to), hence, not the proper party in the instant case.
2. The absence of an ocular inspection or on-site fact-finding investigation and report likewise
deprives Virginia A. Roa of her right to property through the denial of due process.
HLI, LIPCo & RCBC, petitioner v. PARC et al. respondent | GR No. 171101
1. To be sure, intervenor RCBC and LIPCO knew that the lots they bought were subjected to
CARP coverage by means of a stock distribution plan, as the DAR conversion order was
annotated at the back of the titles of the lots they acquired. However, they are of the honest
belief that the subject lots were validly converted to commercial or industrial purposes and
for which said lots were taken out of the CARP coverage subject of PARC Resolution No. 89-122 and, hence, can be legally and validly acquired by them. After all, Sec. 65 of RA 6657
explicitly allows conversion and disposition of agricultural lands previously covered by CARP
land acquisition after the lapse of five (5) years from its award when the land ceases to be
economically feasible and sound for agricultural purposes or the locality has become
urbanized and the land will have a greater economic value for residential, commercial or
industrial purposes.
2. Under Sec. 31 of RA 6657, as implemented by DAO 10, the authority to approve the plan for
stock distribution of the corporate landowner belongs to PARC. Contrary to petitioner HLIs
posture, PARC also has the power to revoke the SDP which it previously approved. It may be,
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as urged, that RA 6657 or other executive issuances on agrarian reform do not explicitly vest
the PARC with the power to revoke/recall an approved SDP. Such power or authority, however,
is deemed possessed by PARC under the principle of necessary implication, a basic postulate
that what is implied in a statute is as much a part of it as that which is expressed.
Following the doctrine of necessary implication, it may be stated that the conferment of
express power to approve a plan for stock distribution of the agricultural land of corporate
owners necessarily includes the power to revoke or recall the approval of the plan.
3. YES, the revocation of the HLIs SDP valid. There was violation in the SDOA, basing from DARs
Administrative Order No. 10 (DAO 10): (1) the mechanics and timelines of HLIs stock
distribution violate DAO 10 because the minimum individual allocation of each original FWB of
18,804.32 shares was diluted as a result of the use of man days and the hiring of additional
farmworkers; (2) the 30-year timeframe for HLI-to-FWBs stock transfer is contrary to what
Sec. 11 of DAO 10 prescribes.
The revocation of the SDP by PARC should be upheld [because of violations of] DAO 10. It
bears stressing that under Sec. 49 of RA 6657, the PARC and the DAR have the power to issue
rules and regulations, substantive or procedural. Being a product of such rule-making power,
DAO 10 has the force and effect of law and must be duly complied with.
4. Also, since SDOA is no longer allowed, as it was repealed by RA 9700, providing that: That
after June 30, 2009, the modes of acquisition shall be limited to voluntary offer to sell and
compulsory acquisition. Thus, for all intents and purposes, the stock distribution scheme
under Sec. 31 of RA 6657 is no longer an available option under existing law. The question of
whether or not it is unconstitutional should be a moot issue.
Landbank, petitioner v. Dumlao(s) | GR No. 167809
1. To stretch such point, the computation should be a Judicial Prerogative. Using the
pronouncement in Export Processing Zone Authority v. Dulay: The determination of "just
compensation" in eminent domain case is a judicial function. The executive department or the
legislature may make the initial determinations, but when a party claims a violation of the
guarantee in the Bill of Rights that private property may not be taken for public use without
just compensation, no statute, decree, or executive order can mandate that its own
determination shall prevail over the court's findings.
2. The Court has repeatedly held that if just compensation was not settled prior to the passage
of RA No. 6657, it should be computed in accordance with said law, although the property was
acquired under PD No. 27. At the risk of being repetitive, we explain again that Section 17 of
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RA No. 6657 is made to apply only if the amount of just compensation of lands acquired
through PD No. 27 remains unresolved despite the passage of RA No. 6657. It is only in such a
case, and to such extent only, that this provision on the determination of just compensation in
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of 1988 is made to apply retrospectively.
Landbank, petitioner v. Soriano(s), respondents | GR No. 180772&76
1. Basic is the tenet that since respondents were deprived of their land, they are entitled to just
compensation which was provided by EO 228. In the advent of CARL, new guidelines were set
for the determination of just compensation (Sec. 17). Consequently, two divergent formulae
arose which prompted the Court to come up with a categorical pronouncement that, if just
compensation is not settled prior to the passage of Republic Act No. 6657, it should be
computed in accordance with the said law, although the property was acquired under
Presidential Decree No. 27.
2. We cannot subscribe to the arguments of LBP regarding the interest. Sec. 4, Article XIII of the
1987 Constitution, mandates that the redistribution of agricultural lands shall be subject to
the payment of just compensation. The deliberations expressly provided that it should not do
violence to the Bill of Rights, but should also not make an insurmountable obstacle to a
successful agrarian reform program. Hence, the landowner's right to just compensation
should be balanced with agrarian reform.
Landbank, petitioner v. Sps. Orilla, respondents | GR No. 157206
1. Section 2 (a) of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, simply stated: Execution of the judgment or
final order pending appeal is discretionary. As an exception to the rule that only a final
judgment may be executed, it must be strictly construed. Thus, execution pending appeal
should not be granted routinely but only in extraordinary circumstances.
2. The expropriation of private property under R.A. 6657 is a revolutionary kind of expropriation ,
being a means to obtain social justice by distributing land to the farmers, envisioning freedom
from the bondage to the land they actually till. As an exercise of police power, it puts the
landowner, not the government, in a situation where the odds are practically against him. He
cannot resist it. His only consolation is that he can negotiate for the amount of compensation
to be paid for the property taken by the government.
Landbank, petitioner v. CA, Yap, Heirs of Santiago & Agricultural Mgmt. & Devt Co.,
respondents | GR No. 118712&745
1. To allow the taking of the landowners' properties, and in the meantime leave them empty
handed by withholding payment of compensation while the government speculates on
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whether or not it will pursue expropriation, or worse for government to subsequently decide
to abandon the property and return it to the landowner when it has already been rendered
useless by force majeure, is undoubtedly an oppressive exercise of eminent domain that must
never be sanctioned. Unduly burdening the property owners from the resulting flaws in the
implementation of the CARP which was supposed to have been a carefully crafted legislation
is plainly unfair and unacceptable.
2. Section 16(e) of Republic Act 6657 was very specific in limiting the type of deposit to be made
as compensation for the rejecting landowners that is in "cash" or in "LBP bonds". The
provision is very clear and unambiguous, foreclosing any doubt as to allow an expanded
construction that would include the opening of "trust accounts" within the coverage of term
"deposit".
Assoc. of Small Landowners in the Philippines v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform | GR
No(s). 78742, 79310, 79744, & 79777
1. P.D. No. 27 by President Marcos during Martial Law has been sustained in Gonzales v. Estrella.
President Aquino is authorized under Section 6 of the Transitory Provisions of the 1987
Constitution to promulgate Proc. No. 131 and E.O. Nos. 228 & 229.
2. The said measures were issued before July 27, 1987, when the Congress was formally
convened and took over legislative power.
3. It is an exercise of the power of eminent domain because there is payment of just
compensation unlike in the exercise of police power wherein confiscation of property is not
compensable.
4. A statute may be sustained under the police power only if there is a concurrence of the lawful
subject and the lawful method. As the subject and purpose of agrarian reform have been laid
down by the Constitution itself, we may say that the first requirement has been satisfied.
What remains to be examined is the validity of the method employed to achieve the
constitutional goal.
5. It is declared that although money is the traditional mode of payment, other modes of
payment shall be permitted as compensation.
6. The CARP Law conditions the transfer of possession and ownership of the land to the
government on receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or the deposit by the
DAR of the compensation in cash or LBP bonds with an accessible bank. Until then, title also
remains with the landowner.
Heirs of Francisco Tantoco et al, petitioners v. CA, DARAB, ARBASF, ROD Gen. Trias,
Cavite, respondents | GR No. 149621

1. The failure of the DAR to comply with the requisites prescribed by law in the acquisition
proceedings does not give this Court the power to nullify the CLOA that had been issued to
ARBA. To assume the power is to short-circuit the administrative process, which has yet to run
its regular course. DAR must be given a chance to correct its administrative and procedural
lapses in the acquisition proceedings.
2. It is also worth noting at this juncture that the resolution of this case by the Department of
Agrarian Reform is to the best advantage of petitioners since it is in a better position to
resolve agrarian disputes, being the administrative agency possessing the necessary
expertise on the matter and vested with primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate
agrarian reform controversies.
Central Mindanao University (Univ. Pres. Chua), petitioner v. DARAB, CA & BUFFALO
(PRs)
1. Under Section 4 and Section 10 of R.A. 6657, it is crystal clear that the jurisdiction of the
DARAB is limited only to matters involving the implementation of the CARP. More specifically,
it is restricted to agrarian cases and controversies. It does not include those which are
actually, directly and exclusively used and found to be necessary for, among such purposes,
school sites and campuses for setting up experimental farm stations, research and pilot
production centers, etc.
2. The education of the youth and agrarian reform are admittedly among the highest priorities in
the government socio-economic programs. In this case, neither need give way to the other.
Certainly, there must still be vast tracts of agricultural land in Mindanao outside the CMU land
reservation which can be made available to landless peasants, assuming the claimants here,
or some of them, can qualify as CARP beneficiaries. To our mind, the taking of the CMU land
which had been segregated for educational purposes for distribution to yet uncertain
beneficiaries is a gross misinterpretation of the authority and jurisdiction granted by law to
the DARAB.
DAR v. DECS | GR No. 158228
1. Firstly, the subject lands fall under the category of alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain suitable for agriculture. The records of the case show that from the time they
were leased, the lands continued to be agricultural primarily planted to sugar cane, albeit
part of the public domain being owned by an agency of the government.
2. Here, the subject lands were not actually, and exclusively utilized as school sites and
campuses, as they were leased to Anglo Agricultural Corporation, not for educational
purposes but for the furtherance of its business.
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3. It was the income from the Contract of Lease and not the subject lands that was directly used
for the repairs and renovations of the schools in the locality.
Buklod ng Magbubukid sa Lupaing Ramos, Inc., [DAR] petitioner, v. EM Ramos & Sons,
respondent, | GR No. 131481
1. CARP coverage are limited to Agricultural Lands (Sec. 4 CARL)
2. CARL took effect on June 15, 1988, to be exempt, respondents land should be converted prior
to said date.
3. The local Autonomy Act of 1959, the precursor of the Local Government Code of 1991
provided that Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, Municipal Boards or City
Councils in cities, and Municipal Councils in municipalities are hereby authorized to adopt
zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations for their respective cities and municipalities
subject to the approval of the City Mayor or Municipal Mayor, as the case may be . Cities and
municipalities may, however, consult the National Planning Commission on matters pertaining
to planning and zoning.
4. Zoning classification is an exercise by the local government of police power, not the power of
eminent domain. A zoning ordinance is defined as a local city or municipal legislation which
logically arranges, prescribes, defines, and apportions a given political subdivision into
specific land uses as present and future projection of needs.
5. Municipal governments exercise the police power under the general welfare clause: pursuant
thereto they are clothed with authority to "enact such ordinances and issue such regulations
as may be necessary to carry out and discharge the responsibilities conferred upon it by law ,
and such as shall be necessary and proper to provide for the health, safety, comfort and
convenience, maintain peace and order, improve public morals, promote the prosperity and
general welfare of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and insure the protection of
property therein."
Milestone Farms Inc., petitioner, v. Office of the President, respondent | GR No.
182332.
1. When CA made its decision, DAR AO No. 9 was not yet declared unconstitutional by the
Supreme Court. Thus, it could not be said that the CA erred or gravely abused its discretion in
respecting the mandate of DAR A.O. No. 9, which was then subsisting and in full force and
effect.
2. As correctly held by respondent OP, the CA correctly held that the subject property is not
exempt from the coverage of the CARP, as substantial pieces of evidence show that the said
property is not exclusively devoted to livestock, swine, and/or poultry raising.
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3. The deliberations of the 1987 Constitutional Commission show a clear intent to exclude, inter
alia, all lands exclusively devoted to livestock, swine and poultry-raising from the coverage of
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program.
Luz Farms, petitioner, v. Hon. Secretary of DAR, respondent, | GR No. 86889
1. The primary task in constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the
realization of the purpose of the framers in the adoption of the Constitution.
2. The transcripts of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 on the meaning
of the word "agricultural," clearly show that it was never the intention of the framers of the
Constitution to include livestock and poultry industry in the coverage of the constitutionallymandated agrarian reform program of the Government.
3. The Committee adopted the definition of "agricultural land" as defined under Section 166 of
R.A. 3844, as land devoted to any growth, including but not limited to crop lands, saltbeds,
fishponds, idle and abandoned land (Record, CONCOM, August 7, 1986, Vol. III, p. 11).
Otilia Sta. Ana, petitioner, v. Sps Carpo, respondent, | GR No. 164340
1. The Office of the DAR Secretary is in a better position to resolve the issues on retention and
exclusion/exemption from agrarian reform coverage, being the agency lodged with such
authority inasmuch it possesses the necessary expertise on the matter.
2. Likewise, we refrain from entertaining the issue raised by respondents that petitioner and her
family are not landless tenants and are therefore not deserving of any protection under our
laws on agrarian reform, because fairness and due process dictate that issues not raised in
the proceedings below should not be raised for the first time on appeal.
Napoleon Magno, petitioner,
respondent | GR No. 168959

v.

Gonzalo

Francisco

& Regina Vda.

De

Lazaro,

1. An action for Ejectment for Non-Payment of lease rentals is clearly an agrarian dispute,
cognizable at the initial stage by the PARAD and thereafter by the DARAB. But issues with
respect to the retention rights of the respondents as landowners and the exclusion/exemption
of the subject land from the coverage of agrarian reform are issues not cognizable by the
PARAD and the DARAB, but by the DAR Secretary because, as aforementioned, the same are
Agrarian Law Implementation (ALI) Cases.
2. Therefore, the PARAD of Cabanatuan City had no authority to render a decision declaring the
lot under OLT coverage. In fact, when the case was appealed, the DARAB acknowledged that
it had no jurisdiction on the OLT coverage. In an Order dated 10 October 2002, the DARAB
suspended the case proceedings until the submission of the result of the administrative
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determination of the lot and thus submitted the entire records to the DAR Secretary . It is
therefore essential that the DAR Secretary should first resolve the issue on the lot's inclusion
or exclusion from OLT coverage before a final determination of this case can be had.
Alangilan Realty & Devt. Co., petitioner, v. Office of the President & DAR | GR No.
180471
1. Indeed, lands devoted to non-agricultural activity are outside the coverage of CARL.
2. As aptly explained by the DAR Secretary, the term reserved for residential simply reflects the
intended land use. It does not denote that the property has already been reclassified as
residential, because the phrase reserved for residential is not a land classification category.
3. In Natalia, the entire property was converted into residential use in 1979 and was developed
into a low-cost housing subdivision in 1982. Thus, the property was no longer devoted to
agricultural use at the time of the effectivity of the CARL.
Romanita Concha et al., petitioner v. Palino Rubio et al., respondent | GR No. 162446
1. This Court was categorical in ruling that the identification and selection of CARP beneficiaries
are matters involving strictly the administrative implementation of the CARP, a matter
exclusively cognizable by the Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform, and beyond
the jurisdiction of the DARAB.
2. The Adjudication Board is not clothed with power and authority to rule on the selection of
farmer beneficiaries. To do so would be an ultra vires act of said Board, being administrative
in character. Thus, the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officers (MARO) decision not to include
respondents as farmer-beneficiaries must be accorded respect in the absence of abuse of
discretion. It bears stressing that it is the MARO or the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer
(PARO) who, together with the Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee, screens and selects the
possible agrarian beneficiaries.

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