Basic Concepts of Greek Civil Law PDF

PENELOPE AGALLOPOULOU
BASIC CONCEPTS
OF
GREEK CIVIL LAW
ANT. N. SAKKOULAS
ATHENS
STMPFLI
BRUYLANT
BERNE
BRUSSELS
BASIC CONCEPTS
OF
GREEK CIVIL LAW
PENELOPE AGALLOPOULOU
Professor of Civil Law
University of Piraeus
BASIC CONCEPTS
OF
GREEK CIVIL LAW
Translated & Edited
by
Youlika Kotsovolou Masry, LL.B., Ph.D.
ANT. N. SAKKOULAS
STMPFLI
BRUYLANT
ATHENS
BERNE
BRUSSELS
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced,

stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means,
electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the
prior written permission of the publisher.
Title of the Greek original and authors name:

, 2003
Athens, 2005
ISBN 960-15-1356-6 (Ant. N. Sakkoulas)
ISBN 2-8027-1963-7 (Bruylant)
ISBN 3-7272-2722-2 (Stmpfli)
Ant. N. Sakkoulas Publishers

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Printed in Greece
For Lena
PREFACE
Unlike what happens in many other areas of literature and scholarship,
translations of Greek law books into English, or for that matter into any
foreign language, have never been at the center of intellectual endeavor in
Hellas. In a sense this is surprising considering the fact that Greek law is
based on a series of most respectable sources: Ancient Greek law, which
was the precursor and intellectual source of the Roman law of the classical
period (jus Greco-romanum), Roman law, Byzantine law, and in modern
time some of the strongest legal traditions in Europe.
Specifically, the Greek civil law is mainly based on the Civil Code
which entered into force on February 23, 1946, as modified by recent laws,
especially in the area of family law and the law of obligations. This Code,
other than being the offspring of the earlier mentioned traditional sources,
is also grounded in the German Civil Code. Nonetheless, it constitutes an
original creation of the Greek legal thought and is known for its clear and
succinct style as well as for its overall progressive and avant-garde
character, especially as far as family law is concerned. Moreover, the Greek
civil law has come to include many new statutes of paramount importance,
such as the laws for the protection of the consumer or the laws regarding
the new types of contracts, so prominent in our era.
Still, it is only during the last few years that the interest in Greek law in
general and in the Greek civil law in particular has been rising, a
development that has already occasioned a number of translations of Greek
law books into English which were well received throughout Europe.
Naturally, this change in perspective is not unrelated to the accession of
Greece to the European Union and the increasing importance of the
countrys role in this broader context of extremely interdependent national
identities.
PREFACE
It is in this light that both the publishers of the present work and I
decided to undertake an English translation of this comprehensive and at
the same time law made simple textbook of Greek civil law.
The particular structure of this book (highlighting two of the five parts
of Greek civil law), originally dictated by the needs of its readership to get
acquainted with Greek civil law without necessarily becoming attorneys,
may further justify the undertaking of the translation and its anticipated
practical usefulness. Indeed, the idea behind writing this book in the
original Greek was to help students of disciplines other than law grasp the
notions of civil law, so central to all aspects of life and business, whatever
their current intellectual orientation or future profession. To better serve
this purpose, the text was intentionally designed to devote a much lengthier
discussion to the two branches of civil law that are pivotal to all private and
business concerns (General Principles and the Law of Obligations) and
offer throughout a wide range of examples from everyday life further
illustrating the already simplified analysis of all legal concepts discussed.
Finally, because the new types of contracts that have emerged in our
times (leasing, factoring, franchising, time-sharing) are ubiquitous, they too
have been included so as to equip students and future professionals with all
the conceptual tools they would need to better understand the world and
more effectively participate in it.
It is hoped that these same features will prove helpful to the European
readers and beyond both lay and professional should the need arise for
them to understand and apply Greek civil law. This may take place either in
the context of actual dealings across national borders which would include
Greece, or of comparative research involving issues that touch upon Greek
law.
The English edition of this book, which is also fully updated, may
additionally be of practical use to the many diaspora Greeks overseas, both
the laymen and their attorneys, providing them with an immediate and
direct understanding of Greek civil law.
I am immensely grateful to Dr. Youlika Kotsovolou Masry who agreed
to get involved in the translation and editing of a legal text such as this,
despite her absence from the law scene for nearly thirty years, time during
which she was pursuing very different intellectual and literary endeavors in
the United States of America.
Words of thanks are also in order to attorneys Alexandros Koutsoukalis
and Melina Sotou, holders of graduate degrees in law from the Department
PREFACE
XI
of Law of the Democritus University of Thrace, for their assistance with the
preparation of the index for this book.
Last but not least I owe many thanks to Ant. N. Sakkoulas, Stmpfli,
and Bruylant publishers for agreeing to this project and encouraging Greek
authors of law books, like myself, to present their work in languages other
than Greek. Moreover, I am grateful to the same for their diligent attention
to the technical aspects of this publication.
Athens, November 2004
P. Agallopoulou
Table of Contents
PREFACE
IX
BASIC GREEK BIBLIOGRAPHY
LVII
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
LXIII
1. Introduction to Law
CHAPTER A
LAW, MORALITY, CUSTOM
I.
THE CONCEPT OF LAW
II.
RULES OF MORALITY
III.
RULES OF CUSTOMS
CHAPTER B
DIVISIONS OF LAW
I.
DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
1. Domestic Law
2. International Law
II.
BRANCHES OF DOMESTIC LAW
1. Public Law
2. Private Law
III.
BRANCHES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
1. Public International Law

2. Private International Law
3. International Criminal Law
4
4
4
4
4
5
8
8
8
8
XIV
TABLE OF CONTENTS
4. Law of the European Union (or European Community Law)

A. Primary Community Law
B. Secondary or Derivative Community Law
8
9
12
CHAPTER C
SOURCES OF LAW
I.
THE LAW
1. Concept and Distinctions

2. When the Law Enters into Force
A. When the Law Enters into Force Formally
B. When the Law Enters into Force Substantively
3. Repeal of the Law
4. Retroactive Effect of the Law
II.
THE CUSTOM
16
16
17
17
17
18
19
1. The Concept
2. Distinctions of Customs
3. When the Custom Enters into Force
4. When the Custom is Abolished
19
19
19
20
20
III.
THE GENERALLY ACCEPTED RULES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
20
IV.
THE RATIFIED BY LAW INTERNATIONAL TREATIES
21
V.
THE RULES OF LAW OF THE EUROPEAN UNION (OR EC LAW)
22
CHAPTER D
JUDICIAL DECISIONS (JURISPRUDENCE)
AND THE WORK OF LEGAL SCHOLARS
I.
JUDICAL DECISIONS (JURISPRUDENCE)
25
II.
THE WORK OF LEGAL SCHOLARS
26
CHAPTER E
RULES OF LAW
I.
THE CONCEPT
27
II.
DISTINCTIONS
27
1. Rules of Law that are General

Rules of Law that are Special
2. Rules of Non-mandatory and of Mandatory Law
27
XV
TABLE OF CONTENTS
(or Public Policy)

III.
28
INTERPRETATION OF THE RULES OF LAW
1. Authentic Interpretation
2. Scientific Interpretation
A. Literal Interpretation
B. Rational Interpretation
C. Teleological Interpretation
a. Corrective Interpretation
b. Supplemental Interpretation
28
28
29
29
29
30
31
31
2. General Principles of Civil Law

INTRODUCTION
I.
THE MEANING OF THE TERM CIVIL LAW
33
II.
THE HISTORY OF THE GREEK CIVIL CODE
34
III.
USEFULNESS OF THE KNOWLEDGE OF CIVIL LAW
35
IV.
THE CONTENT OF THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL LAW
36
PART ONE
THE SUBJECTS OF LEGAL RELATIONS
CHAPTER A
GENERAL
I.
II.
LEGAL CAPACITY (OR CAPACITY TO HOLD RIGHTS AND ASSUME

OBLIGATIONS)
TYPES OF PERSONS
37
37
37
38
1. Natural Persons
2. Legal Persons
CHAPTER B
NATURAL PERSONS
I.
BEGINNING AND END OF NATURAL PERSONS
1. Beginning of the Natural Person

2. End of the Natural Person
39
39
40
XVI
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3. Evidence Regarding the Beginning and

End of the Natural Person
A. General
B. Legal Presumptions
4. Missing Person (absentia)
A. General
B. Conditions for Declaring a Person as Missing
C. The Process for Declaring a Person as Missing
D. Consequences of Declaring a Person as Missing
E. Reappearance of the Missing Person
II.
PROPERTIES AND STATUS OF THE NATURAL PERSON
1. Name
2. Gender
3. Citizenship
4. Age
5. Health
6. Religion
7. Honor
8. Kinship
9. Domicile
A. The Concept and Meaning of Domicile
B. Distinctions
C. Special Domicile
D. The Difference between Domicile and Residence
III.
THE PROTECTION OF PERSONS
1. Protection of the Personality

A. The Concept of Right to Ones Personality
B. The Content of the Protection
C. Protection of the Memory of the Deceased
2. Protection of the Name
A. The Concept of Right to a Name
3. Protection of the Products of Ones Intellect
A. The Concept of Right to the Products
of Ones Intellect
4. Protection of the Individual from the Gathering
and Processing of Personal Data
40
40
41
42
42
42
42
43
44
44
44
45
45
45
46
46
46
47
47
47
48
48
49
49
49
49
50
51
51
51
52
53
53
53
54
XVII
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER C
LEGAL PERSONS
I.
THE CONCEPT
57
II.
CATEGORIES
57
57
58
58
1. Legal Persons of Public Law

2. Legal Persons of Private Law
3. Legal Persons of Mixed or Dual Nature
III.
LEGAL PERSONS OF CIVIL LAW
1. General Rules
A. Formation of the Legal Person
B. Capacity of the Legal Person
C. Title and Seat of the Legal Person
D. Administration of the Legal Person
E. Juridical Acts of the Legal Person
F. Liability of the Legal Person for the
Unlawful Acts of Its Representing Organs
G. Protection of the Legal Person
H. End of the Legal Person
a. Dissolution of the Legal Person
b. Liquidation of the Legal Person
IV.
THE ASSOCIATION
1. The Concept
2. Conditions for Its Constitution
A. Constitutive Deed
B. Charter
C. Application to the Court
D. The Decision of the Court
E. Registration of the Association in the
Public Register of Associations
3. Organization and Operation of the Association
A. The Administration of the Association
B. The Meeting of the Members of the Association
C. Other Organs of the Association
4. Rights and Obligations of the Members of the Association
5. Ceasing to be a Member of the Association
6. Dissolution of the Association
V.
THE FOUNDATION
59
59
59
59
60
60
60
61
62
62
63
63
63
63
64
64
64
64
64
65
65
65
66
66
66
66
67
68
XVIII
VI.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. The Concept
2. Conditions for Establishing a Foundation
A. Establishing Deed
B. By-laws
C. Presidential Decree
3. Organization and Operation of the Foundation
4. Dissolution of the Foundation
68
68
68
69
69
69
70
THE FUND RAISING COMMITTEE
70
70
70
70
70
71
1. The Concept
B. Presidential Decree
3. Dissolution of the Fund Raising Committee
VII.
THE CIVIL PARTNERSHIP
1. The Concept
2. Conditions for the Acquisition of Legal Personality
71
71
71
PART TWO
THE RIGHT
CHAPTER A
CONCEPT AND DISTINCTIONS OF RIGHTS
I.
THE CONCEPTS OF LEGAL RELATION AND RIGHT
73
II.
TYPES OF RIGHTS
74
74
75
1. Property, Personal, and Mixed

2. Power Conferring and Condition Forming Rights
CHAPTER B
CLAIM AND DEFENDANTS PLEA
I.
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RIGHT AND CLAIM
77
II.
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CLAIM AND LEGAL ACTION
1. Legal Action in the Substantive Sense of the Term

2. Legal Action in the Procedural Sense of the Term
78
78
78
THE DEFENDANTS PLEA
79
III.
XIX
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER C
ACQUISITION, CHANGE, AND LOSS OF A RIGHT
I.
ACQUISITION OF A RIGHT
1. Original Acquisition
2. Derivative Acquisition
II.
CHANGE OF A RIGHT
1. Subjective Change
2. Objective Change
III.
LOSS OF A RIGHT
1. Loss of a Right with the Consent of the Bearer

2. Loss of a Right without the Consent of the Bearer
80
80
80
80
81
81
81
81
81
CHAPTER D
USE AND ABUSE OF A RIGHT
I.
THE EXERCISE OF A RIGHT
82
II.
THE ABUSE OF A RIGHT
83
83
83
84
1. General
2. Conditions Determining the Abusive Exercise of a Right
3. Legal Consequences of the Abusive Exercise of a Right
4. Means of Defense of the Adversely Affected Party
from the Abusive Exercise
85
CHAPTER E
THE PROTECTION OF RIGHTS
I.
JUDICIAL PROTECTION
1. General
2. Distinctions of Civil Courts
A. First Instance Courts
B. Courts of Appeals
C. The Court of Cassation (Areios Pagos)
3. The Procedural Steps to Litigation
before a First Instance Court
A. Bringing an Action
B. The Defense of the Defendant
C. Evidence
D. Court Ruling
86
86
87
87
88
89
89
90
90
91
91
XX
II.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
4. Legal Remedies
5. Forcible Execution
6. Provisional Remedies
91
92
92
SELF-RULE OR PRIVATE JUSTICE
93
93
94
95
1. Self-redress
2. Self- defense
3. State of Necessity
CHAPTER F
PRESCRIPTION AND TERM OF EXTINCTION
I.
PRESCRIPTION
1. The Concept
2. The Prescriptive Period
3. Beginning of the Prescriptive Period
4. Suspension of Prescription
A. The Concept
B. Distinctions
a. Absolute Suspension
b. Suspension of Completion
5. Interruption of the Prescriptive Period
II.
TERM OF EXTINCTION
1. The Concept
2. Differences between Prescription and Term of Extinction
97
97
98
98
99
99
99
99
100
101
102
102
102
PART THREE
JURIDICAL ACTS
CHAPTER A
THE CONCEPT AND DISTINCTION FROM OTHER SIMILAR CONCEPTS
I.
GENERAL
103
II.
THE JURIDICAL ACT
104
III.
ACTS NOT CONSTITUTING A JURIDICAL ACT
104
104
105
A. Quasi Juridical Acts

B. Material Acts
XXI
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER B
TYPES OF JURIDICAL ACTS
I.
UNILATERAL JURIDICAL ACTS AND CONTRACTS
1. Unilateral Juridical Acts

2. Contracts
A. Unilaterally Obliging Contracts
B. Reciprocal Contracts
II.
GRATUITOUS AND ONEROUS JURIDICAL ACTS
106
106
106
107
107
1. Gratuitous Juridical Acts

2. Onerous Juridical Acts
107
107
107
III.
JURIDICAL ACTS INTER VIVOS AND MORTIS CAUSA
108
IV.
FORMAL AND INFORMAL JURIDICAL ACTS
108
108
108
1. Formal Juridical Acts

2. Informal Juridical Acts
CHAPTER C
CONDITIONS FOR THE CONCLUSION OF A VALID JURIDICAL ACT
I.
GENERAL
109
II.
CAPACITY FOR CONCLUDING A JURIDICAL ACT
109
109
1. The Concept
2. Differences between: Legal Capacity,
the Capacity to Conclude Juridical Acts,
and the Capacity for Delictual Liability
3. The Institution of Judicial Assistance
A. General
B. Who is Placed under Judicial Assistance
C. The Procedure
D. The Consequences of Placement
under Judicial Assistance
a. Privative Judicial Assistance
b. Concurrent Judicial Assistance
c. Combination of Privative and Concurrent
E. Lifting of the Judicial Assistance
4. Distinctions of Persons Based on their Capacity
to Conclude Juridical Acts
A. Fully Capable of Concluding Juridical Acts
110
111
111
112
112
113
113
114
114
115
115
115
XXII
TABLE OF CONTENTS
B. Fully Incapable of Concluding Juridical Acts

a. Absolutely Incapable
b. Relatively (or Temporarily) Incapable
c. The Difference between Absolute
and Relative Incapacity
C. Limitedly Capable of Concluding Juridical Acts
a. Minors Having Completed
the Tenth Year of Age
b. Persons under Privative
Judicial Assistance in Part
c. Persons under Concurrent
Judicial Assistance
d. Persons under Privative Judicial Assistance
in Combination with Concurrent
e. The Difference between the Limited
Capacity for Juridical Acts of Minors
Having Completed the Tenth Year of
Age and Persons who Have been Placed
under Privative Judicial Assistance in Part,
Concurrent Judicial Assistance, or
a Combination of Privative and Concurrent
115
115
116
117
118
119
121
122
123
123
III.
WILL TO CONCLUDE A JURIDICAL ACT
124
IV.
WILL FREE OF DEFECTS
124
124
124
124
125
127
127
127
128
129
129
129
130
1. Error in the Reasons Leading up to the Shaping of the Will

A. The Concept
B. Distinctions
C. Consequences
2. Fraud
A. The Concept
B. Conditions
C. Consequences
3. Threat
A. The Concept
B. Conditions
C. Consequences
V.
CONVERGENCE OF WILL AND DECLARATION
1. Simulated Juridical Acts

A. The Concept
131
131
131
TABLE OF CONTENTS
VI.
B. Distinctions
C. Consequences
2. Error as to the Declaration
A. The Concept
B. Distinctions
C. Consequences
132
132
133
133
133
134
DECLARATION OF THE WILL
135
135
136
136
137
137
138
138
139

2. Contracts
A. Stage of Negotiations
B. Stage of Promise to Conclude a Contract
C. Stage of Conclusion of the Final Contract
a. Offer
b. Acceptance
c. Time of Conclusion of a Contract
VII.
COMPLIANCE WITH FORM
1. General
2. Types of Form
A. Constitutive and Evidential Form
a. Constitutive Form
aa. Private Document
bb. Notarial Document
cc. Declaration before a Public
Authority
b. Evidential Form
B. Form Required by Law and Form Required by the
Agreement of the Parties
VIII.
XXIII
THE CONTENT OF THE JURIDICAL ACT TO COMPLY WITH

THE LAW AND GOOD MORALS
1. The Content of the Juridical Act to Comply with the Law

2. The Content of the Juridical Act to Comply with
Good Morals
139
139
139
139
139
140
141
141
142
142
142
142
143
CHAPTER D
INTERPRETATION OF JURIDICAL ACTS
I.
RULES OF INTERPRETATION
145
II.
SUPPLEMENTAL AND CONDITION FORMING INTERPRETATION
146
XXIV
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER E
DEFECTIVE JURIDICAL ACTS
I.
CONCEPT AND DISTINCTIONS
148
II.
NULL AND VOID JURIDICAL ACTS
148
148
1. The Concept
2. Difference between Null and Void and Inactive
or Inoperative Transaction
3. Types of Nullity
A. Initial and Supervening
B. Absolute and Relative
C. Full and Partial
149
149
149
150
150
III.
VOIDABLE JURIDICAL ACTS
151
IV.
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN NULL AND VOID

AND VOIDABLE JURIDICAL ACTS
152
CHAPTER F
CONDITIONS AND TERMS (TIME-CLAUSES)
I.
CONDITIONS
1. Concept and Elements of the Condition

2. Non-genuine Conditions
3. Types of Conditions
A. The Suspensive Condition
B. The Resolutory Condition
4. Juridical Acts not Susceptible to Conditions
5. The Impact of Certain Conditions on the Validity
of the Juridical Act
6. The Function of the Condition
A. Stage of Pendency of the Condition
a. Suspensive Conditions
b. Resolutory Conditions
B. Stage of Fulfillment or Cancellation
of the Condition
II.
TERMS (TIME-CLAUSES)
1. The Concept
2. Term as an Additional Clause to the Juridical Act
A. The Concept
153
153
154
154
154
155
155
156
157
157
157
158
159
161
161
161
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
B. Types
a. Suspensive Term (time-clause)
b. Resolutory Term (time-clause)
C. The Difference between Condition and Term
3. Term as an Expression or Determination of Time
A. The Concept
B. Types
C. The Beginning of the Term
D. The End of the Term
4. Term as a Term of Extinction
XXV
162
162
162
162
162
162
163
163
163
164
CHAPTER G
REPRESENTATION AND POWER OF ATTORNEY
I.
REPRESENTATION
1. The Concept
2. Types of Representation
A. Direct and Indirect
B. Active and Passive
C. Legal and Voluntary
3. Conditions of Direct Representation
II.
POWER OF ATTORNEY
1. The Concept
2. Ways of Granting Power of Attorney
3. Types of Power of Attorney
A. General and Specific Power of Attorney
B. Express and Tacit Power of Attorney
C. Individual and Collective Power of Attorney
4. Form of the Juridical Act Granting Power of Attorney
5. Termination of the Power of Attorney
A. Reasons for Termination of the Power of Attorney
a. General Reasons
b. Special Reasons
B. Consequences of Termination
C. Transactions after Termination
6. Lack of Power of Attorney
7. Self-contracting
165
165
166
166
166
167
167
169
169
169
170
170
170
170
171
171
171
171
172
173
173
174
176
XXVI
TABLE OF CONTENTS
3. Law of Obligations
INTRODUCTION
CHAPTER A
THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS
I.
CONCEPT AND DIVISIONS OF THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS
179
II.
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS
179
III.
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS
180
180
181
182
183
1. The Principle of Autonomy of the Private Will

2. The Principle of Good Faith
3. The Principle of Favoring the Debtor (or the Feebler Party)
4. The Principle of Liability
CHAPTER B
OBLIGATION
I.
THE CONCEPT OF OBLIGATION
185
II.
OBLIGATION AND OBLIGATIONAL RELATION
185
III.
OBLIGATION AND RESPONSIBILITY
186
IV.
NATURAL OR IMPERFECT OBLIGATION
187
PART ONE
TYPES OF OBLIGATIONS
CHAPTER A
TYPES OF OBLIGATIONS ACCORDING TO THEIR OBJECT
I.
GENERIC AND SPECIFIC OBLIGATIONS
1. The Concept of Generic and Specific Obligations

2. The Significance of Distinguishing between
Generic and Specific Obligations
3. Choice
4. Specification (or Concretization)
II.
ALTERNATIVE OBLIGATION
1. The Concept of Alternative Obligation

2. Simplification of the Alternative Obligation
189
189
190
190
191
193
193
194
TABLE OF CONTENTS
III.
3. Alternative Faculty
4. The Difference between Alternative Obligation
and Alternative Faculty
194
MONETARY OBLIGATION
195
195
195
197
197
1. The Concept of Monetary Obligation and Money

A. Money in the Broad Sense of the Term
B. Money in the Strict Sense of the Term
2. The Value of Money
3. The Introduction of the Euro as the
Legal Currency of Greece
A. General
B. The Institutional Framework of the Economic
and Monetary Union
C. Legal Framework for the Euro
4. Rules Applying to the Monetary Obligation
5. Payment of Monetary Obligations
A. Debt in National Currency
B. Debt in Foreign Currency
IV.
OBLIGATION TO PAY INTEREST
1. The Concept of Interest

2. Types of Interest
A. Contractual Interest (Interest by Agreement)
B. Legal Interest
C. Discount Interest
3. Compound Interest
V.
XXVII
OBLIGATION TO COMPENSATE
1. The Concept
2. Conditions for the Obligation to Compensate
A. Damage
a. Concept and Types of Damage
b. Types of Property Damage
B. Legal Grounds for Liability
C. Causal Relation
3. Computation of Benefits in the Assessment of Damage
4. Damage Due to Concurrent Fault of the Injured Party
A. Liability to Compensate
B. Contribution of the Injured Party to the Damage
or Its Extent
195
198
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200
202
202
202
203
203
203
204
204
205
205
206
207
207
207
207
207
208
209
210
211
211
212
212
XXVIII
TABLE OF CONTENTS
C. Causal Relation
5. Types of Compensation
213
214
CHAPTER B
TYPES OF OBLIGATIONS ACCORDING TO THEIR SUBJECT
I.
GENERAL
215
II.
DIVISIBLE OBLIGATION
215
215
215
215
216
1. The Concept
2. Distinctions
A. Passive Divisible Obligation
B. Active Divisible Obligation
III.
JOINT AND SEVERAL OBLIGATION
1. The Concept
2. Distinctions
A. Passive Joint and Several Obligation
B. Active Joint and Several Obligation
IV.
INDIVISIBLE OBLIGATION
1. The Concept
2. Distinctions
A. Passive Indivisible Obligation
B. Active Indivisible Obligation
216
216
216
217
217
218
218
218
218
218
PART TWO
CIVIL LIABILITY
CHAPTER A
THE CONCEPT AND DISTINCTIONS OF CIVIL LIABLITY
I.
GENERAL
221
II.
THE CONCEPT OF CIVIL LIABILITY
222
III.
TYPES OF CIVIL LIABILITY
222
222
223
1. Subjective and Objective Liability

2. Contractual and Extra-contractual Liability
CHAPTER B
CONDITIONS FOR CIVIL LIABILITY
I.
GENERAL
225
XXIX
TABLE OF CONTENTS
II.
UNLAWFUL BEHAVIOR
1. The Concept
2. Reasons for Waiving the Unlawful Character of the Act
A. Self-redress
B. Self-defense
C. State of Necessity
D. Consent of the Injured Party
III.
FAULT
1. The Concept
2. Capacity for Delictual Liability
3. Degrees of Fault
A. Intention
a. Immediate Intention
b. Eventual Intention
B. Negligence
a. Gross Negligence
b. Slight Negligence
225
225
226
226
226
226
226
227
227
227
228
228
229
229
229
229
229
CHAPTER C
LIABILITY FOR THE ACTS OF THIRD PARTIES
(LIABILITY FOR THE ACTS OF AN UNDERLING)
I.
GENERAL
231
II.
CONDITIONS FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF LIABILITY

FOR THE ACTS OF AN UNDERLING
232
CONSEQUENCES OF THE LIABILITY FOR THE ACTS

OF AN UNDERLING
233
III.
PART THREE
GENERATION OF THE OBLIGATION
CHAPTER A
CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS
I.
GENERAL
235
II.
THE PRINCIPLE OF THE FREEDOM OF CONTRACTS
236
III.
TYPES OF CONTRACTS
236
237
237
1. Formal and Informal

2. Reciprocal and Unilaterally Obliging Contracts
XXX
TABLE OF CONTENTS
3. Gratuitous and Onerous Contracts

4. Consensual and Delivery Contracts
5. Forced Contracts and Contracts of Adhesion (or Accession)
6. Mixed (Compound) Contracts
7. Contracts in Favor of or Burdening a Third Party
A. Contracts in Favor of a Third Party
a. The Concept of the Contract in Favor
of a Third Party
b. Distinctions of the Contracts in Favor
of a Third Party
c. Relations between the Parties
B. Contracts Burdening a Third Party
8. Regulated and Non-regulated Contracts
(Nominate/ Innominate)
238
238
238
239
240
240
240
240
241
241
242
CHAPTER B
EXTRA-CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS
I.
OBLIGATIONS FROM UNLAWFUL ACTS
1. General
2. Types of Offenses in General
3. Civil, Criminal, and Disciplinary Offense: Relationship
4. Delictual Liability
A. General
B. Conditions Required for Delictual Liability
a. Unlawful Behavior
b. Fault
c. Damage
d. Causal Relation
C. Results of the Delictual Act
II.
OBLIGATIONS FROM UNJUST ENRICHMENT
1. General
2. Conditions for Unjust Enrichment
A. Enrichment of a Person
B. Enrichment from the Property or to
the Detriment of the Other
C. Causal Relation between Enrichment
and Impoverishment
D. Lack of Legal Grounds for the Enrichment
243
243
244
244
245
245
245
246
246
246
246
246
247
247
247
248
248
248
248
TABLE OF CONTENTS
III.
XXXI
3. Legal Consequences of Unjust Enrichment

4. Cases of Exclusion of the Claim for Unjust Enrichment
A. Payment of Non-due Debt with Knowledge
of the Facts
B. Payment of Non-due Debt Made out of Special
Moral Duty or Reasons of Propriety
C. Payment for Immoral Cause
250
251
OBLIGATIONS FROM MANAGEMENT OF ANOTHERS AFFAIRS
252
251
251
252
PART FOUR
DEVELOPMENT OF THE OBLIGATION
CHAPTER A
NORMAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE OBLIGATION
I.
WAY OF FULFILLING THE PERFORMANCE
1. Fulfillment of Performance in Good Faith

A. General
B. Extent of the Application of the Fulfillment
of Performance in Good Faith
C. Consequences of the Application of Good Faith
in the Fulfillment of Performance
2. Partial Fulfillment of Performance
3. Fulfillment of Performance by a Third Party
A. General
B. Cases where Performance
by a Third Party is Precluded
C. Consequences of Fulfillment of
Performance by a Third Party
255
255
255
256
257
258
259
259
259
259
II.
PLACE OF FULFILLMENT OF THE PERFORMANCE
260
III.
TIME OF FULFILLMENT OF THE PERFORMANCE
261
IV.
RIGHT OF RETENTION
263
263
263
263
263
263
264
1. The Concept
2. Conditions for the Exercise of the Right of Retention
A. Claim of the Creditor
B. Counter Claim of the Debtor
C. Relation between the Reciprocal Claims
3. Way of Exercising the Right of Retention
XXXII
TABLE OF CONTENTS
4. Consequences of the Exercise of the Right of Retention
264
CHAPTER B
ANOMALOUS DEVELOPMENT OF THE OBLIGATION
I.
IMPOSSIBILITY OF PERFORMANCE
1. The Concept and Types of Impossibility of Performance

A. Impossibility of Performance Arising
from Fault and not Due to Fault
B. Initial and Supervening Impossibility
of Performance
C. Subjective and Objective Impossibility
of Performance
D. Total and Partial Impossibility of Performance
E. Natural, Legal, Economic, and Moral
Impossibility of Performance
2. Consequences of the Impossibility of Performance
A. Impossibility of Performance Arising from
Fault of the Debtor
a. Total Impossibility of Performance
b. Partial Impossibility of Performance
B. Impossibility of Performance not Due to Fault
a. Total Impossibility of Performance
b. Partial Impossibility of Performance
II.
DEBTORS DEFAULT
265
265
265
266
266
266
267
268
268
268
268
269
269
270
1. The Concept and Conditions for the Debtors Default

A.Valid Obligational Relation
B. Possible Performance
C. Past Due Performance
D. Actionable Performance
E. Call Upon the Debtor to Perform
F. Fault of the Debtor
2. Consequences of the Debtors Default
A. Compensation
B. Intensification of the Debtors Liability
3. Debtors Default Lifted
270
270
270
270
271
271
271
272
272
272
273
273
III.
IMPROPER PERFORMANCE
274
IV.
CREDITORS DEFAULT
275
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. The Concept and Conditions for the Creditors Default

A. Performance Must be Offered
B. Performance Must be Possible
C. Performance Must be Furnished in Deed
D. Appropriate Performance
E. Not Acceptance of the Performance Offered
2. Consequences of the Creditors Default
A. Reduction of the Debtors Liability
B. Creditors Obligation to Pay for Expenses
3. Creditors Default Lifted
XXXIII
275
275
275
275
276
276
277
277
277
278
CHAPTER C
PRINCIPLES APPLYING TO RECIPROCAL CONTRACTS
I.
GENERAL
279
II.
PLEA OF THE UNPERFORMED CONTRACT
279
279
1. The Concept
2. Consequences of Opposing the Plea
of the Unperformed Contract
3. Difference between the Plea of the Unperformed Contract
and the Right of Retention
III.
IMPOSSIBILITY OF PERFORMANCE
1. Impossibility of Performance not Due to Fault

2. Impossibility of Performance Due to Fault
A. Impossibility of Performance
Due to Debtors Fault
B. Impossibility of Performance
Due to Creditors Fault
280
280
281
281
282
282
283
IV.
DEFAULT BY ONE OF THE PARTIES
284
V.
IMPROPER FULFILLMENT OF THE PERFORMANCE
285
VI.
UNFORESEEABLE CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES
285
285
286
286
1. General
2. Conditions for the Application of Article 388 CC
3. Legal Consequences of the Application of Article 388 CC
XXXIV
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PART FIVE
REINFORCEMENT OF THE OBLIGATION
CHAPTER A
GENERAL
289
CHAPTER B
EARNEST
291
CHAPTER C
PENALTY CLAUSE
293
PART SIX
TRANSFER OF THE OBLIGATION
CHAPTER A
GENERAL
295
CHAPTER B
ASSIGNMENT OF CLAIM
I.
II.
THE CONCEPT AND CONDITIONS FOR ASSIGNMENT
1. Conclusion of the Assignment Contract

2. Assignable Claim
3. Notification
296
296
296
297
LEGAL EFFECTS OF THE ASSIGNMENT
298
CHAPTER C
ASSUMPTION OF DEBT
I.
THE CONCEPT
299
II.
PRIVATIVE ASSUMPTION OF DEBT
299
III.
CUMULATIVE ASSUMPTION OF DEBT
300
300
1. General
2. Case of Transfer of Patrimonium or Enterprise
in Its Entirety
300
XXXV
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PART SEVEN
EXTINCTION OF THE OBLIGATION
CHAPTER A
PAYMENT
I.
THE CONCEPT
303
II.
CONDITIONS FOR VALID PAYMENT
303
304
304
304
1. Payment by the Debtor

2. Payment to the Creditor
3. Appropriate Payment
CHAPTER B
OTHER PERFORMANCE IN LIEU OF PAYMENT
I.
II.
CONCEPT AND CONDITIONS FOR FURNISHING

305
CONSEQUENCES OF FURNISHING OTHER PERFORMANCE

IN LIEU OF PAYMENT
305
CHAPTER C
DEPOSIT WITH A PUBLIC BODY
I.
CONCEPT AND CONDITIONS FOR DEPOSIT WITH A PUBLIC BODY
1. Legitimate Reason for Deposit

2. Thing Capable of Deposit
3. Deposit with the Appropriate Authority
II.
LEGAL EFFECTS OF PUBLIC DEPOSIT
306
306
307
307
307
CHAPTER D
SET OFF
I.
CONCEPT AND TYPES OF SET OFF
1. Voluntary or Contractual Set off

2. Involuntary or Unilateral Set off
II.
CONDITIONS FOR INVOLUNTARY OR UNILATERAL SET OFF
1. Reciprocal Claims
2. Existing and Valid Claims
3. Claims of the Same Kind
4. Past Due Claims
309
309
309
310
310
310
310
310
XXXVI
TABLE OF CONTENTS
5. Set off not to be Prohibited

6. Declaration of Set off
III.
EFFECTS OF INVOLUNTARY OR UNILATERAL SET OFF
CHAPTER E
RELEASE OF DEBT
311
311
311
312
PART EIGHT
REGULATION OF IMPORTANT CONTRACTS
CHAPTER A
GENERAL
313
CHAPTER B
THE MAIN CONTRACTS REGULATED BY THE CIVIL CODE
I.
DONATION
1. The Concept and Features of Donation

A.The Concept
B. Features
2. Conclusion of the Donation Contract
3. Obligations of the Donor
4. Revocation of the Donation
II.
SALE
1. The Concept and Features of Sale

A.The Concept
B. Features
2. Conclusion of the Sale Contract
3. Obligations of the Parties
A. Obligations of the Seller
a. Principal Obligations
b. Collateral Obligations
B. Obligations of the Buyer
a. Principal Obligations
4. Non-fulfillment of the Obligations of the Parties
A. Non-fulfillment of the Obligations of the Seller
a. Liability for Defect in Title
aa. The Content of the Liability
314
314
314
314
314
315
315
315
315
315
315
316
316
316
316
317
317
317
317
318
318
318
318
TABLE OF CONTENTS
bb. Release from Liability

b. Liability for Material Defects or Lack
of Conceded Qualities
aa. Introductory
bb. Conditions for the Generation
of Liability
cc. The Content of Liability
dd. Release from Liability
ee. Guarantee for the Thing Sold
B. Non-fulfillment of the Obligations of the Buyer
XXXVII
318
319
319
319
320
321
321
322
III.
EXCHANGE
322
IV.
LEASE OF A THING
323
323
323
323
323
323
324
324
325
325
325
325
325
325
325
1. The Concept and Features of the Lease of a Thing

A. The Concept
B. Features
2. Conclusion of the Lease of a Thing Contract
A. Obligations of the Lessor
a. Principal Obligation
B. Obligations of the Lessee
4. Termination of the Lease
A. Lease of a Thing for a Fixed Term
B. Lease of a Thing for an Indefinite Period
V.
EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT
1. The Concept and Features of the Employment Contract

A. The Concept
B. Features
2. Conclusion of the Employment Contract
A. Obligations of the Employee
B. Obligations of the Employer
326
326
326
326
327
327
327
327
327
328
328
XXXVIII
VI.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
4. Termination of the Employment Contract
A. Employment Contract for a Fixed Term
B. Employment Contract for an Indefinite Period
C. Death of the Employee
328
328
328
329
329
CONTRACT FOR WORK
329
329
330
330
330
330
331
331
331
331
331
1. The Concept and Features of the Contract for Work

2. Conclusion of the Contract for Work
A. Obligations of the Contractor
B. Obligations of the Master of Work
4. Termination of the Contract for Work
5. The Difference between Employment Contract
and Contract for Work
VII.
BROKERAGE
1. The Concept of Brokerage

2. Conclusion of the Brokerage Contract
VIII.
MANDATE
1. The Concept and Features of Mandate

A. The Concept
B. Features
2. Conclusion of the Mandate Contract
A. Obligations of the Mandatary
B. Obligations of the Mandator
4. Termination of the Mandate
IX.
X.
LOAN
332
332
332
332
332
333
333
333
333
333
334
334
334
334
1. The Concept and Features of the Loan

A. The Concept
B. Features
2. Conclusion of the Loan Contract
334
334
334
335
335
LOAN FOR USE
335
TABLE OF CONTENTS
XI.
1. The Concept and Features of the Loan for Use

A. The Concept
B. Features
2. Conclusion of the Loan for Use Contract
A. Obligations of the Lender for Use
B. Obligations of the Borrower for Use
4. Expiration of the Contract of Loan for Use
A. Loan for Use for a Fixed Term
B. Loan for Use for an Indefinite Period
C. Death of the Borrower for Use
5. Difference between Loan for Use and Loan
6. Difference between Loan for Use and Lease of a Thing
335
335
336
336
336
336
336
337
337
337
337
337
338
DEPOSIT
338
338
338
338
338
338
338
339
339
339
339
1. The Concept and Features of Deposit

A. The Concept
B. Features
2. Conclusion of the Contract of Deposit
A. Obligations of the Depositary
B. Obligations of the Depositor
4. Termination of the Contract of Deposit
A. Deposit for a Fixed Term
B. Deposit for an Indefinite Period
XII.
XXXIX
GUARANTEE
1. The Concept and Features of the Guarantee

A. The Concept
B. Features
2. Conclusion of the Contract of Guarantee
3. The Operation of the Contract of Guarantee
4. Differences between the Contract of Guarantee
and Cumulative Assumption of Debt
340
340
340
340
340
340
341
CHAPTER C
MAIN CONTRACTS IN CONTEMPORARY TRANSACTIONS
REGULATED BY SPECIAL LAWS
I.
GENERAL
342
XL
II.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
THE LEASING CONTRACT
1. General
2. The Concept and Features of Leasing
A. The Concept
B. Features
3. Usefulness of the Leasing Contract
4. Conclusion of the Leasing Contract
A. Form
B. Publicity
5. The Operation of the Leasing Contract
A. General
B. The Relationship between the Parties
a. Relationship between
Lessor and Lessee
b. Relationship between
Lessor and Supplier
c. Relationship between
Lessee and Supplier
6. Termination of the Leasing Contract
III.
THE TIME-SHARING CONTRACT
1. General
2. The Concept and Features of Time-sharing
A. The Concept
B. Features
3. Usefulness of the Time-sharing Contract
4. Conclusion of the Time-sharing Contract
5. Obligations and Rights of the Parties
A. Obligations and Rights of the Lessor
a. Obligations of the Lessor
b. Rights of the Lessor
B. Obligations and Rights of the Lessee
a. Obligations of the Lessee
b. Rights of the Lessee
6. Protection of the Rights of the Lessee
7. Control of the Time-sharing Contracts
and Imposition of Sanctions
IV.
THE FACTORING CONTRACT
1. General
342
342
343
343
343
344
345
345
345
346
346
346
346
347
347
347
348
348
348
348
349
350
350
351
351
351
352
352
352
353
353
354
355
355
TABLE OF CONTENTS
V.
XLI
2. The Concept and Features of the Factoring Contract

A. The Concept
B. Features
3. Usefulness of the Factoring Contract
4. Types of Factoring Contracts
5. Conclusion of the Factoring Contract
6. The Operation of the Factoring Contract
A. General
a. Relationship between Factor
and Supplier
b. Relationship between Factor
and Debtor-Client
c. Relationship between Supplier
and Debtor-Client
7. Duration and Expiration of the Factoring Contract
A. Factoring Contract for a Fixed Term
B. Factoring Contract for an Indefinite Period
355
355
356
357
357
357
358
358
358
THE FORFAITING CONTRACT
360
360
361
1. The Concept of the Forfaiting Contract

2. The Operation of the Forfaiting Contract
358
359
359
359
360
360
CHAPTER D
NON-REGULATED OR INNOMINATE CONTRACTS
I.
GENERAL
362
II.
THE FRANCHISE CONTRACT
363
363
363
363
363
1. General
2. The Concept and Features of Franchising
A. The Concept
B. Features
3. Advantages and Disadvantages of the
Franchise Contract
A. Advantages
a. Advantages for the Franchisee
b. Advantages for the Franchisor
B. Disadvantages
a. Disadvantages for the Franchisee
b. Disadvantages for the Franchisor
365
365
365
366
366
366
367
XLII
TABLE OF CONTENTS
4. Types of Franchising
A. Distribution Franchising
B. Franchising of Services
C. Production or Industrial Franchising
D. Mixed Franchising
5. Conclusion of the Franchise Contract
6. Main Obligations of the Parties
A. Main Obligations of the Franchisor
B. Main Obligations of the Franchisee
7. Termination of the Franchise Contract
A. Franchise Contract for a Fixed Term
B. Franchise Contract for an Indefinite Period
C. Legal Consequences of the Termination
of the Franchise Contract
367
367
367
368
368
368
369
369
369
370
370
370
371
4. Property Law
INTRODUCTION
373
PART ONE
THINGS
CHAPTER A
I.
THE CONCEPT
375
II.
DISTINCTIONS
376
376
376
376
377
377
377
377
378
1. Movables and Immovables

2. Fungibles and Non-fungibles
3. Consumables and Non-consumables
4. Principal and Dependent
5. Component Parts and Accessories
A. Component Parts
B. Accessories
6. Things out of Commerce (res extra commercium)
XLIII
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PART TWO
POSSESSION
CHAPTER A
THE CONCEPTS OF POSSESSION AND DETENTION
I.
THE CONCEPT OF POSSESSION
381
II.
THE CONCEPT OF DETENTION
382
CHAPTER B
ACQUISITION, LOSS, AND PROTECTION OF POSSESSION
I.
ACQUISTION OF POSSESSION
382
382
382
II.
LOSS OF POSSESSION
382
III.
PROTECTION OF POSSESSION
383
PART THREE
OWNERSHIP
CHAPTER A
THE CONCEPT OF OWNERSHIP
385
CHAPTER B
TYPES OF OWNERSHIP
I.
FULL OWNERSHIP
386
II.
BARE OWNERSHIP
386
III.
CO-OWNERSHIP
386
IV.
OWNERSHIP OF A STOREY OR HORIZONTAL OWNERSHIP
387
V.
VERTICAL OWNESRHIP
388
CHAPTER C
RESTRICTIONS OF OWNERSHIP
I.
RESTRICTIONS OF OWNERSHIP IMPOSED BY LAW
II.
388
XLIV
TABLE OF CONTENTS
FROM THIRD PARTY RIGHTS
389
CHAPTER D
ACQUISITION OF OWNERSHIP
I.
GENERAL
390
II.
DERIVATIVE ACQUISITION OF OWNERSHIP
390
390
392
392
1. Transfer of Ownership of Immovables

2. Transfer of Ownership of Movables
A. The General Rule
B. The Exception to the Rule
(Transfer of Movable by Non-owner)
III.
ORIGINAL WAYS OF ACQUISITION OF OWNERSHIP
1. Acquisitive Prescription
A. Ordinary Acquisitive Prescription
B. Extraordinary Acquisitive Prescription
2. Occupancy of a Thing Belonging to No one
3. Finding of a Lost Thing
CHAPTER E
LOSS OF OWNERSHIP
392
394
394
395
396
396
396
397
CHAPTER F
PROTECTION OF OWNERSHIP
I.
GENERAL
398
II.
MEANS OF PROTECTION
398
PART FOUR
SERVITUDES
CHAPTER A
THE CONCEPT AND DISTINCTIONS
I.
THE CONCEPT
401
II.
DISTINCTIONS
401
401
402
402
1. Predial (or Real) Servitudes

2. Personal Servitudes
a. Usufruct
XLV
TABLE OF CONTENTS
b. Habitation
c. Limited Personal Servitudes
403
404
CHAPTER B
CONSTITUTION OF SERVITUDES
I.
PREDIAL (OR REAL) SERVITUDES
1. Constitution of Servitude by Juridical Act

2. Constitution of Servitude by Acquisitive Prescription
II.
PERSONAL SERVITUDES
1. Usufruct
A. Constitution by Juridical Act
B. Constitution by Acquisitive Prescription
2. Habitation
3. Limited Personal Servitude
405
405
405
406
406
406
406
407
407
CHAPTER C
EXTINCTION OF SERVITUDES
I.
PREDIAL (OR REAL) SERVITUDES
408
II.
PERSONAL SERVITUDES
408
408
409
409
1. Usufruct
2. Habitation
3. Limited Personal Servitudes
CHAPTER D
PROTECTION OF SERVITUDES
409
PART FIVE
REAL SECURITY RIGHTS
CHAPTER A
PLEDGE
I.
THE CONCEPT
411
II.
FEATURES
411
III.
TYPES OF PLEDGE
412
413
413
1. Common Pledge
2. Fictitious Pledge (Pledge by Registration)
XLVI
TABLE OF CONTENTS
3. Legal Pledge
413
CHAPTER B
COMMON PLEDGE
I.
THE CONCEPT
414
II.
CONSTITUTION OF THE PLEDGE
414
III.
RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF THE CREDITOR

SECURED BY PLEDGE
1. Rights
2. Obligations
415
415
415
CONSTITUTION OF MORE THAN ONE RIGHT OF PLEDGE

ON THE SAME THING
415
V.
EXTINCTION OF THE RIGHT OF PLEDGE
416
VI.
PROTECTION OF THE RIGHT OF PLEDGE
417
IV.
CHAPTER C
FICTITIOUS PLEDGE (PLEDGE BY REGISTRATION)
I.
THE CONCEPT
418
II.
LIMITATIONS IN THE CONSTITUTION

OF FICTITIOUS PLEDGE
418
III.
ADVANTAGES OF FICTITIOUS PLEDGE
419
IV.
CONSTITUTION OF FICTITIOUS PLEDGE
419
V.
DURATION OF FICTITIOUS PLEDGE
420
VI.
PRIORITY AMONG CREDITORS OF FICTITIOUS PLEDGES
420
VII.
SPECIAL OBLIGATIONS OF THE PLEDGER
420
VIII.
SUPPLEMENTAL AND BY ANALOGY APPLICATION OF THE

PROVISIONS OF THE GREEK CIVIL CODE
421
CHAPTER D
MORTGAGE
I.
THE CONCEPT
422
II.
FEATURES
422
III.
CONSTITUTION OF A MORTGAGE
423
XLVII
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. Title for the Constitution of a Mortgage

2. Recordation of the Title in the Mortgage Records
423
424
IV.
DEBTORS RIGHTS OF THE CLAIM SECURED BY MORTGAGE
424
V.
CREDITORS RIGHTS OF THE CLAIM SECURED BY MORTGAGE
425
VI.
MORE MORTGAGES ON THE SAME IMMOVABLE
425
VII.
THE LIFTING OF A MORTGAGE
426
426
426
1. Extinction
2. Deletion
CHAPTER E
PRENOTICE OF MORTGAGE
I.
THE CONCEPT
427
II.
CONSTITUTION OF PRENOTICE OF MORTGAGE
427
1. Title Required for the Constitution

of Prenotice of Mortgage
2. Recordation of the Title
428
428
CONVERSION OF PRENOTICE OF MORTGAGE

TO MORTGAGE
428
III.
IV.
LIFTING OF THE PRENOTICE OF MORTGAGE
1. Extinction
2. Deletion
428
429
429
PART SIX
THE PUBLICITY OF REAL RIGHTS
REGARDING IMMOVABLES
CHAPTER A
THE SYSTEM OF THE PUBLIC BOOKS OF RECORDATION
I.
THE OPERATION OF THE SYSTEM
431
II.
THE DISADVANTAGES OF THE SYSTEM
432
CHAPTER B
THE SYSTEM OF LAND REGISTRY
I.
THE OPERATION OF THE SYSTEM
433
XLVIII
II.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
THE PRINCIPLES OF THE LAND REGISTRY SYSTEM
434
5. Family Law
INTRODUCTION
I.
THE CONCEPT OF FAMILY LAW AND FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS
435
II.
REFORMS OF GREEK FAMILY LAW
436
III.
THE CHARACTERISTICS OF FAMILY LAW
436
PART ONE
MARRIAGE
CHAPTER A
REQUIREMENTS FOR VALID MARRIAGE
I.
POSITIVE REQUIREMENTS
439
II.
IMPEDIMENTS
440
CHAPTER B
FORMALITIES RELATING TO CONTRACTING MARRIAGE
I.
DECLARATIONS OF THE WILL
II.
FORMALITIES RELATING TO
THE CEREMONY OF MARRIAGE
1. Marriage by Religious Ceremony

2. Civil Marriage
CHAPTER C
DEFECTIVE MARRIAGE
442
442
442
443
444
CHAPTER D
THE RESULTS OF THE MARRIAGE FOR THE SPOUSES
I.
PERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS
1. Obligation to Cohabit
2. Running the Conjugal Life
3. The Spouses Surname
4. Joint Contribution to the Needs of the Family
445
445
445
445
446
XLIX
TABLE OF CONTENTS
II.
PROPERTY RELATIONSHIPS
1. The Autonomy of Assets

2. Claim to Participate in the Increments
3. Community Property
446
446
447
448
CHAPTER E
DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE
I.
GENERAL
450
II.
DIVORCE
450
450
450
450
451
451
451
453
453
1. Types of Divorce
A. Divorce by Mutual Consent (Uncontested)
a. Prerequisites
b. Procedure
B. Contested Divorce
a. Grounds for Divorce
b. Procedure
2. The Results of Divorce
PART TWO
MEDICALLY ASSISTED HUMAN REPRODUCTION
AND KINSHIP
CHAPTER A
I.
INTRODUCTORY REMARKS
455
II.
GENERAL CONDITIONS FOR MEDICALLY ASSISTED

HUMAN REPRODUCTION TO BE ALLOWED
456
SPECIAL CONDITIONS REQUIRED FOR POST MORTEM

457
SPECIAL CONDITIONS FOR MEDICALLY ASSISTED HUMAN

REPRODUCTION IN THE CASE OF USE OF A SURROGATE MOTHER
457
THE ANONYMITY OF THE PERSONS WHO HAD OFFERED

THEIR SPERM OR FERTILIZED OVA
459
THE FATE OF EXCESS FROZEN SPERM OR FERTILIZED OVA
459
III.
IV.
V.
VI.
CHAPTER B
KINSHIP
460
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER C
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIP
I.
ESTABLISHMENT OF MATERNAL DESCENT
462
II.
ESTABLISHMENT OF PATERNAL DESCENT
462
463
463
463
463
464
464
1. Presumption of Paternity
2. Acknowledgment of Paternity
A. Ways of Acknowledgment of Paternity
a. Voluntary Acknowledgement
b. Judicial Acknowledgement
B. The Results of Acknowledgement
PART THREE
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PARENTS AND CHILDREN
CHAPTER A
THE CHILDS SURNAME
I.
II.
THE SURNAME OF CHILDREN

BORN DURING MARRIAGE
465
THE SURNAME OF CHILDREN

BORN OUT OF WEDLOCK
465
CHAPTER B
SPECIAL OBLIGATIONS
I.
OBLIGATION FOR ASSISTANCE,

AFFECTION, AND RESPECT
467
II.
OBLIGATION TO RENDER SERVICES
467
III.
PARENTS GRANTS TO THEIR CHILDREN
467
IV.
MUTUAL OBLIGATION FOR MAINTENANCE
468
CHAPTER C
PARENTAL CARE
I.
THE CONCEPT
470
II.
BEGINNING OF PARENTAL CARE
470
III.
THE EXERCISE OF PARENTAL CARE

DURING MARRIAGE
471
LI
TABLE OF CONTENTS
IV.
THE EXERCISE OF PARENTAL CARE IN CASE OF DIVORCE,

ANNULMENT, OR INTERRUPTION OF CONJUGAL LIVING
1. General
2. Ways of Dealing with the Issue of the Exercise
of Parental Care
A. Granting the Exercise of Parental Care
to One of the Parents
B. Granting the Exercise of Parental Care
to both Parents Jointly
C. Distributing the Exercise of Parental Care
between the Parents
D. Granting the Exercise of Parental Care
to a Third Party
V.
VI.
471
471
471
471
472
472
472
THE EXERCISE OF PARENTAL CARE OF CHILDREN

BORN OUT OF WEDLOCK
472
THE CESSATION OF PARENTAL CARE
473
PART FOUR
TUTELAGE OF MINORS
474
PART FIVE
ADOPTION
475
PART SIX
FOSTER CARE
476
PART SEVEN
JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE
477
PART EIGHT
JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION OF ANOTHERS AFFAIRS
478
6. Succession Law
INTRODUCTION
I.
THE CONCEPT OF SUCCESSION LAW
479
LII
TABLE OF CONTENTS
II.
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF TAXING THE INHERITANCE
479
III.
BASIC TERMS OF SUCCESSION LAW
480
PART ONE
TESTAMENTARY SUCESSION
CHAPTER A
THE CONCEPT AND FEATURES OF THE WILL
481
CHAPTER B
DRAWING UP A WILL
I.
CAPACITY TO DRAW UP A WILL
482
II.
TYPES OF WILLS
482
483
483
483
484
484
1. Ordinary Wills
A. The Holographic Will
B. The Public Will
C. The Secret Will
2. Extraordinary Wills
CHAPTER C
REVOCATION OF THE WILL
I.
THE CONCEPT
486
II.
GENERAL WAYS OF REVOKING A WILL
486
III.
SPECIAL WAYS OF REVOKING A WILL
486
CHAPTER D
PUBLICATION OF THE WILL
AND DECLARATION OF THE HOLOGRAPHIC WILL AS AUTHENTIC
I.
PUBLICATION OF THE WILL
488
II.
DECLARATION OF THE HOLOGRAPHIC WILL AS AUTHENTIC
489
CHAPTER E
THE CONTENT AND INTERPRETATION OF THE WILL
I.
THE CONTENT OF THE WILL
490
II.
THE INTERPRETATION OF THE WILL
490
LIII
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER F
NULL AND VOID AND VOIDABLE WILLS
I.
NULL AND VOID WILLS
492
II.
VOIDABLE WILLS
493
CHAPTER G
THE EXECUTOR OF THE WILL
494
PART TWO
SUCCESSION BY VIRTUE OF THE LAW
(OR INTESTATE SUCCESSION)
CHAPTER A
GENERAL REMARKS
495
CHAPTER B
RANKS OF INTESTATE SUCCESSION AND SURVIVING SPOUSE
I.
FIRST RANK
497
II.
SECOND RANK
498
III.
THIRD RANK
499
IV.
FOURTH RANK
500
V.
FIFTH RANK
500
VI.
SIXTH RANK
500
VII.
THE SURVIVING SPOUSE
500
CHAPTER C
COLLATION
I.
THE CONCEPT
501
II.
THE WAY COLLATION IS EFFECTED
501
PART THREE
FORCED HEIRSHIP
CHAPTER A
CONCEPT, RANKS, AND PERCENTAGE OF FORCED SHARE
LIV
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.
THE CONCEPT OF FORCED HEIRSHIP
505
II.
RANKS OF FORCED HEIRSHIP
505
III.
THE FORCED HEIRSHIP SHARE
506
CHAPTER B
DISHERITANCE
507
PART FOUR
ACCEPTANCE AND RENUNCIATION OF THE INHERITANCE
AND UNWORTHINESS OF HEIR
CHAPTER A
DEVOLUTION AND ACQUISITION OF INHERITANCE
I.
THE CONCEPT OF DEVOLUTION OF INHERITANCE
509
II.
ACCEPTANCE OF INHERITANCE
509
III.
RENUNCIATION OF INHERITANCE
510
IV.
ACCEPTANCE OF INHERITANCE
WITH THE BENEFIT OF INVENTORY
510
CHAPTER B
UNWORTHINESS OF HEIR
512
PART FIVE
WAYS FOR PERSONS OTHER THAN THE HEIRS
TO DRAW BENEFITS FROM THE ESTATE
CHAPTER A
FIDEICOMMISSARY SUBSTITUTION OF HEIR
(OR FIDEICOMMISSION)
I.
THE CONCEPT
513
II.
TIME OF DEVOLUTION OF THE FIDEICOMMISSION
514
CHAPTER B
LEGACY
I.
THE CONCEPT
515
II.
ACCEPTANCE AND RENUNCIATION OF LEGACY
515
TABLE OF CONTENTS
LV
III.
516
THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN HEIR AND LEGATEE
CHAPTER C
CHARGE (MODUS)
516
CHAPTER D
DONATION MORTIS CAUSA
517
PART SIX
CERTIFICATE OF HEIRSHIP
CHAPTER A
THE CONCEPT
CHAPTER B
CONSEQUENCES OF ISSUANCE
OF THE CERTIFICATE OF HEIRSHIP
PART SEVEN
JUDICIAL LIQUIDATION OF SUCCESSION
PART EIGHT
VACANT SUCCESSION
INDEX
519
520
521
522
523
A. INTRODUCTION TO LAW
ALEXIADIS, S., Elements of Law and Technical Legislation, 1979.
nd
ARAVANTINOS, I., Introduction to the Science of Law, 2 ed., 1983.
KARAKOSTAS, I., Einfhrung in das Griechische Privatrecht, 2003.
nd
KERAMEUS, K. KOZYRIS, PH. (eds.), Introduction to Greek Law, 2 ed.,
1993 (in English).

MANOLEDAKIS, I., Introduction to Science, 1980.
MICHELAKIS, E., Introduction to Law and the Science of Law, 1968.
PANTAZOPOULOS, N., Introduction to the Science of Law, 1976.
th
VALLINDAS, P., Introduction to the Science of Law, 6 ed., 1956.
B. INTRODUCTION TO CIVIL LAW

DELIYANNIS, I., Introduction to Civil Law, 1989.
DIMAKIS, P., Introduction to Private Law and Elements of the General
Principles of Civil Law, Vols. A-C, 1986-1987.

DORIS, F., Introduction to Civil Law, Vols. A & B1, 1991.
IATROU, A., An Outline of the Greek Civil Law, 1986 (in English).
KEFALAS, CH., Introduction to Private Law, Vol. A, 3d ed., 2003.
KRISPI NICOLETOPOULOU, E., Elements of Civil Law, Vol. A, 1971.
PANAGOPOULOS, K., Introduction to Law and to Civil Law, 1999.
SPYRIDAKIS, I., Introduction to Civil Law, 3d ed., 2004.
STATHOPOULOS M. AVGOUSTIANAKIS M. (eds.), Introduction to Civil
Law, 1992.
th
VAVOUSKOS, K., Manual of Civil Law, 5 ed., 1995.
Unless otherwise noted or inferred, all law books listed here are in the Greek language
(Translators note).
LVIII
C. ARTICLE BY ARTICLE COMMENTARIES

ON THE CIVIL CODE
ERMAK (INTERPRETATION OF THE CIVIL CODE collective work under
the general supervision of A. Litzeropoulos): Interpretation of Selected

Articles from all the Books of the Civil Code, 1949-1987.
GEORGIADIS AP. STATHOPOULOS M., Commentary on the Civil Code
(collective work, Article-by-Article interpretation): Vol. I, General
Principles (1978); Vol. II, General Law of Obligations (1979); Vols. III &
IV, Special Law of Obligations (1980, 1982); Vols. V & VI, Property Law
(1985); Vols. VII & VIII, Family Law (1991, 2003 {2nd ed.}); Vols. IX & X,
Succession Law (1996, 1998).
SPYRIDAKIS, I. PERAKIS, E., Civil Law, Vol. A, General Principles
(1976); Vol. B/1, Law of Obligations, General Part (1978); Vol. B/2, Law
of Obligations, Special Part (1978); Vol. C, Property Law (1970); Vol. D,
Family Law (1977); Vol. E, Succession Law (1977).
D. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL LAW
ASPROGERAKAS GRIVAS, K., General Principles of Civil Law, 1981.
th
BALIS, G., General Principles of Civil Law, 8 ed., 1961.
FILIOS, P., General Principles of Civil Law, Vol. A (2001); Vol. B (2002).
GAZIS, A., General Principles of Civil Law, Vols. A-C (1970-1974).
GEORGIADIS, AP., General Principles of Civil Law, 3d ed., 2002.
KARASSIS, M., General Principles of Civil Law The Juridical Act, Vol. A,
1996.
KARASSIS, M., Manual of General Principles of Civil Law The Law of the
Juridical Act, 1996.

PAPACHRISTOU, A., General Principles of Civil Law (Article-by-Article
interpretation), 1987.
PAPANTONIOU, N., General Principles of Civil Law, 3d ed., 1983.
PAPASTERIOU, D., General Principles of Civil Law, Vols. I/a (1994); I/b
(1998).
SHINAS, G., Elements of Civil Law, Vol. A, General Principles, 1989.
th
SIMANTIRAS, K., General Principles of Civil Law, 4 ed., 1988.
SPYRIDAKIS, I., General Principles (According to the Civil Code), 1987.
nd
TOUSSIS, A., General Principles of Civil Law, 2 ed., Vols. A & B, 1979.
VATHRAKOKILIS, B., General Principles, 2001.
LIX
E. LAW OF OBLIGATIONS
BALIS, G., Law of Obligations, General Part, 3d ed., 1969.
DELIYANNIS, I., Law of Obligations, Introduction (University Lectures),
1976.
DELIYANNIS, I. KORNILAKIS, P., Special Law of Obligations, Vols. I, II,
and III, 1992.

nd
FILIOS, P., Law of Obligations, General Part, 2 ed., 1996.
FILIOS, P., Law of Obligations, Special Part, Vols. I/1 (2002); I/2 (1997);
II/1 (1998); II/2 (1998).
FOURKIOTIS, K., The Greek Law of Obligations, General Part (unfinished),
Vol. A (1964); Vol. B (1996); Vol. C (1972); Vol. D (1974).
GEORGIADIS, AP., Law of Obligations, General Part, 1999.
th
GEORGIADIS, AP., New Types of Contracts in Contemporary Economy, 4
ed., 2000.
GEORGIADIS, AP., Law of Obligations, Special Part, Vol. I, 2004.
th
GEORGIADIS, AST., Law of Obligations, General Part, Vols. I-II, 4 ed.,
2003.
KAFKAS, K. KAFKAS, D., Law of Obligations (Article-by-Article
Interpretation) Special Part, 5th ed., Vol. A (1974); Vol. B (1975).
KEFALAS, CH., Manual of the General Law of Obligations, 1984.
KORNILAKIS, P., Abridged Special Law of Obligations, 2000.
KORNILAKIS, P., Special Law of Obligations, Vol. I, 2002.
LITZEROPOULOS, A., Elements of the Law of Obligations (University
Lectures), 1960.
MANTZOUFAS, G., Law of Obligations, 3d ed., 1959.
MICHAILIDIS NOUAROS, G., Law of Obligations (University Lectures),
1959.
PAPACHRISTOU, A., Law of Obligations, General Part, 1986.
SHINAS, G., Elements of Civil Law, Vol. B, Law of Obligations, General
Part (1989); Vol. C, Law of Obligations, Special Part (1989).
SPYRIDAKIS, I., Manual of Civil Law, General Law of Obligations, 3d ed.,
2004.
nd
SPYRIDAKIS, I., Manual of Civil Law, Special Law of Obligations, 2 ed.,
2004.
STATHOPOULOS, M., Contract Law in Hellas, 1995 (in English).
STATHOPOULOS, M., General Law of Obligations, 3d ed., 1998.
TOUSSIS, A., Law of Obligations, Vol. I, General Part (1973); Vol. II/1,
Special Part (1975).
LX
TRIANTAFYLLOPOULOS, K., The Greek Law of Obligations, General Part,
3d ed., 1943.
ZEPOS, P., Law of Obligations, A: General Part, 2nd ed., (1955); B: Special
Part, 2nd ed., (1965).
F. PROPERTY LAW
BALIS, G., Property Law, 1961.
nd
DIMAKIS, P., Property Law, 2 ed., 1986.
FILIOS, P., Property Law, Vols. I & II, 2000.
GEORGIADIS, AP., Property Law, Vol. I (1991); Vol. II (1993).
GEORGIADIS, AP., On Securing Credits, 2001.
KARIBALI TSIPTSIOU, Y., Property and Trust Law in Hellas, 2003 (in
English).
KOUSOULAS, CH., Property Law, 2004.
PAPACHRISTOU, A., Property Law, 1985.
PAPASTERIOU, D., Manual of Property Law, Vol. I/a (1999); Vol. I/b
(2000); Vol. II (2001), Vol. III/a (2004).

SPYRIDAKIS, I., Property Law, Vols. A, B, C, 2001.
th
TOUSSIS, AN. (TOUSSIS AR. ed.), Property Law, 4 ed., 1988.
VAVOUSKOS, K., Property Law, 1986.
G. FAMILY LAW
BALIS, G., Family Law, 1961.
DASKAROLIS, G., Lectures on Family Law, Vol. I (1992); Vol. II (2002).
DELIYANNIS, I., Family Law, Vol. I, 1986.
DELIYANNIS, I. KOUTSOURADIS, A., Family Law, Vol. II, 1987.
FILIOS, P., Family Law, Vol. I (2003); Vol. II (2004).
GAZIS, A., The New Family Law: Its Problems, 1985.
KOUMANTOS, G., Family Law, Vols. I & II , 1988.
KOUNOUGERI MANOLEDAKI, E., Family Law, Vols., I & II, 3d ed.,
2003.
MICHAILIDIS NOUAROS, G., Family Law, 1975.
PANAGOPOULOS, K., Family Law, 1998.
nd
PAPACHRISTOU, TH., Manual of Family Law, 2 ed., 1998.
PAPADIMITRIOU, G., Family Law, 1997.
ROILOS, G. KOUMANTOS, G., Family Law, Vols. I-III (1965-1966).
SPYRIDAKIS, I., Family Law, 1984.
th
TOUSSIS, A., Family Law, 4 ed., 1979.
LXI
VATHRAKOKILIS, B., Family Law, 2000.
H. SUCCESSION LAW
th
BALIS, G., Succession Law, 5 ed., 1965.

DIMAKIS, P., Succession Law, 1987.
th
FILIOS, P., Succession Law, General Part, 5 ed., 2003.
th
FILIOS, P., Succession Law, Special Part, 5 ed., 2003.
LITZEROPOULOS, A., Succession Law, Vol. A (1957); Vol. B (1958).
nd
PAPACHRISTOU, A. Succession Law, 2 ed., 1983.
PAPANTONIOU, N., The Law of Succession, 3d ed., 1989.
PSOUNI, N., Succession Law, Vol. I, 2004.
SPYRIDAKIS, I, Manual of Civil Law: Succession Law, 3d ed., 2004.
SPYRIDAKIS, I., Succession Law, 2002.
TOUSSIS, A., Succession Law, 1969.
VOUZIKAS, E., Succession Law, Vol. I (1972); Vol. II (1976); Vol. III
(1983).
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
AP
ArcN
Arm
CC
CCPr
ComN
CrC
decis
ECB
ECSB
EEC
EMI
EU
EmergL
ERMAK
Civil
FEK
footn
KNoB
L
LegD
No
NoB
para
PrD
RoyD
subpara
Areios Pagos (Greek Supreme Court)

Archives of Court Rulings (Archeio Nomologias, a Greek
Law Journal)
Armenopoulos (a Greek Law Journal)
Civil Code
Code of Civil Procedure
Commercial Law
Criminal Code
decision
European Central Bank
European System of Central Banks
European Economic Community
European Monetary Institute
European Union
Emergency Law
in Greek EPMAK (article-by-article Commentary on the
Civil Code/various authors)
Issue of the Official Government Gazette (Fyllo
Efimeridos tis Kiverniseos)
footnote
Code of Law Tribune (Kodikas Nomikou Vimatos)
Law
Legislative Decree
Number
Law Tribune (Nomiko Vima, a Greek Law Review)
paragraph
Presidential Decree
Royal Decree
subparagraph
1. Introduction to Law
CHAPTER A
LAW, MORALITY, CUSTOM
I. THE CONCEPT OF LAW
From the moment man began living in society even of a rudimentary
type it became obvious that it was necessary to find a way to regulate
human relations. Thus the first rules of communal living emerged. Most of
these rules are rules of law.1
Law is the sum total of heteronomous rules regulating communal living
in a mandatory way.
When analyzing the above definition, it is necessary to offer certain
clarifications:
1. Heteronomous rules are the rules enacted by the state following a
certain procedure. People do not regulate their social relations by
themselves.
2. The qualification of such rules as mandatory signifies that non
compliance with them results in sanctions.
3. Finally, by stating that these rules regulate life in a social setting we
mean that said rules regulate the external behavior of man; not his inner
world.
II. RULES OF MORALITY
Rules of morality are the autonomous rules addressing the inner world
of man. The rules of morality have the following characteristics:
For the concept of the rules of law, see below Ch. E, I.
BASIC CONCEPTS OF GREEK CIVIL LAW
1. They are autonomous. In contrast to the rules of law which are

heteronomous, the rules of morality stem from the conscience of man.
2. Contrary to the rules of law which regulate the external behavior of
human beings, the rules of morality address the inner world of man, i.e. the
human conscience.
3. The rules of morality are not mandatory and, unlike the rules of law,
non compliance with them does not result in sanctions. The only
consequence for man when not complying with the rules of morality is his
guilt feelings.
Example: In case of non compliance with a rule of law, such as when a person
kills another person, there are sanctions. Non compliance with the rules of
morality does not result in sanctions. For example, if one is covetous of his
neighbors assets, the only consequence is that he will have guilt feelings.
However, despite their differences, there is a close connection between

the rules of law and the rules of morality. A great number of the rules of law
are influenced by the rules of morality. This can be seen from the fact that
many a time the rules of law make reference to the rules of morality in
which case the latter become indirectly rules of law. For example, Articles
1782 and 9193 of the Greek Civil Code expressly refer to the good morals
(boni mores).4
III. RULES OF CUSTOMS
Rules of customs are the non mandatory rules concerning the social
behavior of men. As is the case with the rules of law, the rules of customs
concern the external behavior of man, but, as is the case with the rules of
morality, they are non mandatory. Non compliance with them may result in
social disapprobation.
Examples of rules of customs: Exchange of greetings between persons who know
each other; offering a present to a friend on his birthday; expression of
condolences in the case of death of a relative or friend.
Article 178 of the Greek Civil Code stipulates: A transaction which is contrary to good
morals shall be null and void.
3
Article 919 of the Greek Civil Code stipulates: A person who has intentionally caused
prejudice to another in a manner contrary to good morals shall be liable for compensation.
4
Good morals are the views on morality, and especially social morality, of the average
social man.
INTRODUCTION TO LAW
In certain instances the rules of law refer to modes of behavior

established in business transactions, in which case such behavioral rules are
considered as rules of customs. For example, Articles 200 and 288 of the
Greek Civil Code5 make reference to the business usage.6
Article 200 stipulates: Contracts shall be interpreted according to the requirements of good
faith, taking also into consideration business usage.
Article 288 stipulates: The debtor shall be bound to fulfill the performance in accordance
with the requirements of good faith taking also into consideration business usage.
6
Business usage refers to the sum total of practices prevailing in transactions.
CHAPTER B
DIVISIONS OF LAW
I. DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
1. Domestic Law
Domestic law is the sum total of rules regulating the legal relations of
persons living in a state.
2. International Law
International law is the sum total of rules regulating those legal
relations which extend beyond the boundaries of the state.
II. BRANCHES OF DOMESTIC LAW
The domestic law has two branches: public law and private law.
1. Public Law
Public law is the sum total of rules regulating on the one hand the
organization and operation of the state and on the other hand the relations of
the citizens with the state.
By organization and operation of the state we mean not only the
organization and operation of the state per se, but also of the various legal
persons of public law exercising state authority, e.g. the municipalities, the
communities, etc.
By relations between state and citizens which are regulated by public
law, we mean the relations in which the state, or any legal person of public
INTRODUCTION TO LAW
law,1 acts as an authority exercising agent, i.e. as a party which, in the

course of its exercise of supreme authority, is capable of compelling the
citizens to conform. In this category fall, for example, the rules imposing
taxes, the rules concerning military service, the rules imposing punishment
on those who commit crimes, etc.
The main branches of public law are:
A. Constitutional Law
Constitutional law is the sum total of rules which define the form of
government of the state, establish the basic principles of organization and
operation of the state, and determine the individual rights of the citizens.
B. Administrative Law
Administrative law is the sum total of rules regulating the organization
and operation of the sector of public service.
C. Criminal Law
Criminal law is the sum total of rules determining the acts punishable
by law and the penalties to be imposed if such acts are committed.
D. Procedural Law
Procedural law is the sum total of rules determining on the one hand the
organization and operation of the courts and on the other hand the procedure
to be followed before the courts for the sake of proper conferment of justice.
The branch of procedural law is subdivided in law of civil procedure, law of
criminal procedure, and law of administrative procedure, depending on the
category to which the disputes under litigation belong.
2. Private Law
Private law is the sum total of rules regulating the relations between
persons who are equal vis--vis each other. In other words the private law
regulates relations between persons, natural or legal, or between private
citizens and the state where the latter is not acting as an authority exercising
agent.
1
See below General Principles of Civil Law, Part One, Ch. C, II, 1.
Rules of private law are, for example, the rules regulating the contracts
of sale, loan, or services. The same rules regulate the relations in which the
state is involved as a private citizen, e.g. purchase or lease of an immovable
on the part of the state for the purpose of using it as office space.
The main branches of private law are the following:
A. Civil Law
Civil law is the law regulating the relations between all persons when
they act as private citizens, e.g. it regulates their relations vis--vis other
persons and things.
The civil law constitutes the general private law, as opposed to other
branches of private law which have detached themselves and constitute the
special private law.
Following the division of the Greek Civil Code in Five Books, the
Greek civil law is divided into the following five parts:
a. General Principles: in the general principles are contained the
general rules which apply not only to civil legal relations but also to legal
relations regulated by other branches of law.
b. Law of Obligations: the law of obligations contains the rules
regulating the so called obligational relations, i.e. the legal relations
created between creditors and debtors (e.g. loan, sale, lease of a thing).
c. Property Law: the property law contains the rules regulating the
relations between persons and things (e.g. rules regulating matters of
ownership, pledge, mortgage).
d. Family Law: the family law contains the rules regulating family
relations (e.g. relations resulting from marriage, divorce, or the relationships
between children and parents).
e. Succession Law: the succession law contains the rules regulating the
fate of the estate of the deceased (e.g. how should a will be drawn up, who
shall inherit the estate of the deceased in case he has not drawn up a will).
B. Commercial Law
Commercial law is the branch of private law referring to and regulating
matters of commerce. The main branches of commercial law are the
following:
INTRODUCTION TO LAW
a. General Commercial Law: the general commercial law contains

general rules referring to the qualifications of the merchant and the
definition of commercial activities.
b. Law of Commercial Companies (Business Associations): the law of
commercial companies regulates matters pertaining to commercial
companies.2
c. Law of Negotiable Instruments: the law of negotiable instruments
refers to such negotiable instruments as, for example, bills of exchange,
promissory notes, checks, etc.
d. Bankruptcy Law: the bankruptcy law refers to matters of the
bankruptcy of merchants.
e. Insurance Law: the insurance law refers to matters of private
insurance.
f. Maritime Law: the maritime law regulates on the one hand the
acquisition of and profiting from sea-vessels and on the other hand matters
of transportation by sea.
g. Aviation Law: the aviation law regulates matters of transportation by
air.
C. Labor Law
Labor law is the sum total of rules regulating the relationships
generated from dependent employment. The labor law is divided in two
parts: individual and collective labor law.
a. Individual Labor Law: the individual labor law regulates the
relationship of dependent employment, e.g. the conclusion of the
employment contract, the rights and obligations of employer and employee,
the termination of employment, etc.
b. Collective Labor Law: the collective labor law refers to collective
agreements, collective industrial disputes, and the organization and
operation of trade unions and employers associations.
Although labor law is a branch of private law, it harbors tendencies of
veering to the direction of public law. This happens because, for the sake of
protection either of the employees or of society as a whole, the state
interferes and regulates a number of issues, especially in the area of
collective labor law. Thus, many labor law rules are rules of public law.
2
The following are commercial companies (business associations): the general partnership,
the limited partnership, the silent partnership, the close corporation (often called limited
liability company), the corporation, and the cooperative.
D. Law of Intellectual Property

The law of intellectual property is the sum total of rules regulating the
rights of persons as creators of intellectual work, e.g. the rights of the author
or of the music composer.
III. BRANCHES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
The main branches of International Law are Public International Law,
Private International Law, Criminal International Law, and the Law of the
European Union (European Community Law).
1. Public International Law
Public international law is the sum total of rules regulating the relations
among various states.
2. Private International Law
Private international law is the sum total of rules determining which
law will apply in a legal relation where several states are involved. For
example, if a German citizen causes an accident in Greece, which law will
determine matters of his liability: the German or the Greek? Or, if a
Dutchman marries a Greek woman and they live in Belgium, the question
arises: according to which law (the Dutch, the Greek, or the Belgian) will
their relations to their children be regulated?
3. International Criminal Law
International criminal law is the sum total of rules regulating the
criminal responsibility of states and providing for the sanctions to be
imposed as regards acts seriously offending the universal principles of law.
The objective of the international criminal law is to punish crimes against
humanity (usually committed at wartime), e.g. genocide.
4. Law of the European Union (or European Community Law)
The law of the European Union or European Community Law is the
sum total of rules governing the structure, authority, operation of the
European Union, and its relations with the member states, the citizens of the
INTRODUCTION TO LAW
member states, and with other countries.3 The law of the European Union is
primarily public law at a supranational level. Many of its rules, however,
refer to private law, in particular to commercial and labor law.4
The law of the European Union is divided into primary and secondary.
A. Primary Community Law
Primary Community law is the law of the Treaties which established or
amended the European Communities.5 The primary Community law consists
basically of the three founding Treaties of the European Communities,6 the
various Treaties of accession of the new member states7 to the European
3
See P. Kanellopoulos, The Law of the European Union, 4th ed., 2003, p. 262.
See P. Dagtoglou, European Community Law, Vol. I, 2nd ed., 1985; P. Agallopoulou,
Introduction to European Community Law, 1988, p. 65.
5
The various Treaties which are concluded following direct negotiations between the
governments of the member states of the European Union are subsequently ratified by the
national parliaments of these states.
6
After the end of World War II the need for European unification was intensely felt. But the
main step towards the European unification was taken on May 9, 1950 by the then French
Foreign Minister Robert Schumann. Based on an initial proposal of Jean Monnet, Schumann
put forward a plan aiming at placing the entire Franco-German production of coal and steel
under the control and supervision of a Supranational Authority in the framework of an
organization in which other European countries could participate. This proposal was accepted
by Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg, and The Netherlands and on April 18,
1951 the Treaty founding the European Community of Steel and Coal (ECSC) was signed in
Paris. It entered into force on July 25, 1952. Few years later, and specifically on March 25,
1957, the six members of the first European Community signed in Rome the Treaties for the
foundation of the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy
Community (EURATOM) which entered into force on January 1, 1958 (see Agallopoulou,
op. cit., p. 11 et seq.; Th. Christodoulidis, The Historic Background of the European
Unification, in K. Stefanou A. Fatouros Th. Christodoulidis, (eds.), Introduction to
European Studies, (collective work), Vol. A, 2001, p. 25 et seq., esp. p. 36 et seq.; K.
Stefanou, European Integration, 6th ed., Vol. A, 2002, p. 17 et seq.).
7
The European Communities of the initial six members (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy,
Luxembourg, and The Netherlands) subsequently expanded with the addition of new
members which signed Treaties of accession. More specifically: (a) the Treaty of accession of
Great Britain, Denmark, and Ireland was signed on January 22, 1972 and entered into force
on January 1, 1973; (b) the Treaty of accession of Greece was signed on May 28, 1979 and
entered into force on January 1, 1981; (c) the Treaty of accession of Spain and Portugal was
signed on June 12, 1985 and entered into force on January 1, 1986; (d) the Treaty of
accession of Sweden, Finland, and Austria was signed on June 25, 1994 and entered into
force on January 1, 1995; (e) the Treaty of accession of Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia,
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia was signed on April 16,
2003 and entered into force on May 1, 2004.
4
10
Communities, the Single European Act,8 the Treaty for the European Union
(Treaty of Maastricht),9 the Treaty of Amsterdam,10 and the Treaty of
Nice.11
At this point it is important to note that the Single European Act, and to
a much greater extent the Treaty for the European Union (Treaty of
Maastricht), constitute landmarks in the evolution of the European
unification.12 The Treaty of Amsterdam does not compare in significance to
the Single European Act and the Treaty for the European Union. This is
because on the one hand it does not include steps of major importance
towards the unification of Europe and on the other hand it omits
fundamental amendments necessary mainly for the envisioned broadening
of the European Union.13
Finally, it should be noted that the most recent Treaty, the Treaty of
Nice, chiefly aimed at the institutional preparation of the European Union
precisely in order to realize the maximum broadening of its scope.14 15
The above account, despite its brevity, suffices to reveal the main trend
in the development of the European Union: a progressive concern for
8
The Single European Act, which was signed on February 17/28, 1986 and entered into force
on July 1, 1989, made important changes to the original Treaties. In particular it obliged the
European Community to establish the internal market by December 31, 1992, increased the
rights of the European Parliament, gave official status to the European Council, strengthened
the economic and social cohesion among the member states, and established the european
political cooperation (see Agallopoulou, op. cit., p. 18; Christodoulidis, op. cit., p. 73 et seq.).
9
The Treaty for the European Union (Treaty of Maastricht), which was signed on February 7,
1992 and entered into force on November 1, 1993, made very important changes to the
original Treaties. The Treaty of Maastricht established the European Union, founding it on
the European Communities, as the latter were supplemented by new community policies and
forms of cooperation.
10
The Treaty of Amsterdam, which was signed on October 2, 1997 and entered into force on
May 1, 1999, revised the Treaty for the European Union and established a more democratic
Europe securing the respect of human rights and democratic principles by the member states.
11
The Treaty of Nice, signed on February 26, 2001 and entered into force on February 1,
2003, made changes to the Treaty for the European Union and the founding Treaties of the
European Communities. This Treaty basically aspired to regulate institutional matters not
previously regulated by the Treaty of Amsterdam (see A. Gerontas I. Markakis (eds.), The
Treaty of Nice, 2002; P. Kanellopoulos, op. cit., p. 70 et seq.).
12
See P. Dagtoglou, Basic Elements of the Treaty of Maastricht, 1993, p. 21.
13
See P. Dagtoglou, Basic Elements of the Treaty of Amsterdam, 1999, p. 41.
14
The case of the subsequent accession of the ten states (see above footn. 7, e) is directly
related to this development.
15
Other states which have applied for membership to the European Union are Bulgaria,
Romania, and Turkey.
INTRODUCTION TO LAW
11
broadening the European Union on the one hand and for establishing it as a
political entity in the new world order on the other. In this light it is not
surprising that the issue of a Constitution for the European Union would
arise.
Indeed, with the European Union coming to a turning point in its
existence, the European Council which met in Laeken, Belgium, on
December 14 and 15, 2001, convoked the European Convention on the
Future of Europe.16 On July 18, 2003 the President of the European
Convention officially submitted to the President of the European Council in
Rome draft of a Treaty for the establishment of a Constitution for Europe
which had been earlier adopted by consensus by the European Convention
on June 13 and July 10, 2003. This Constitution:
-
enshrines the citizens rights by incorporating the European

Charter of Fundamental Rights;
turns Europe towards its citizens by holding out new opportunities
for them;
establishes a clear, transparent apportionment of powers between
the Union and its member states, enabling national parliaments to
intervene, and
provides Europe with stable, democratic, and effective
institutions.17
This draft of the Treaty for the establishment of the Constitution of

Europe constituted a good starting point for the Intergovernmental
Conference. Certain modifications to the basic text have already been agreed
by the Intergovernmental Conference in their meeting of June 17/18, 2004.
The Treaty establishing the Constitution was finally signed on October
29, 2004 by the heads of state or government of the 25 member states and
the 3 candidate countries. This Treaty can only enter into force when it has
been ratified by each of the signatory countries in accordance with the
constitutional procedures of each of them (parliamentary approval and/or
referendum). Once the Treaty has been ratified and the ratification has been
16
The composition of the European Convention was such that included the main parties
involved in the discussion on the future of the European Union: representatives of the heads
of states or governments of the member states, representatives of the national parliaments of
the member states, members of the European Parliament, representatives of the European
Commission (in Internet site, http://european-convention.eu.int).
17
See V. Giscard d Estaing, Chairman of the European Convention, Rome Declaration, July
18, 2003 (in Internet site: http://european-convention.eu.int).
12
officially notified by all the member states, it can enter into force and
become effective.
B. Secondary or Derivative Community Law
Secondary Community law is the law consisting of the acts of the
legislative organs of the European Union issued according to the process
laid down by the primary Community law.
More specifically:
The European Parliament18 jointly with the Council,19 or the Council by
itself, or the European Commission20 issue regulations and directives, make
18
The European Parliament consists of representatives of the member states of the European
Union elected every five years by direct universal suffrage. Its composition reflects the major
political currents in the European Union. One of its main functions is the legislative function.
Specifically, the European Parliament examines the proposals of the Commission and, along
with the Council, exercises the legislative power conferred upon it (Arts. 189-201, Treaty of
the European Community).
19
The Council of the European Union, or Council of Ministers, consists of a representative of
each member state at the ministerial level. It convenes under different compositions
depending on the issues on the agenda (e.g. financial matters, international affairs,
education). It is the legislative organ of the European Union. Many a time it exercises its
legislative function jointly with the European Parliament. Moreover, the European Councils
task is to ensure the coordination of the general economic policies of the member states (Arts.
202-210, Treaty of the European Community). The Council of the European Union should
not be confused with the European Council which is composed of the heads of state or
government and aims at two things: to propel the European Union towards development and
to determine its general orientation. The European Council does not adopt legal acts which
are binding for the member states in a formal way (see Art. 13, Treaty of the European
Union). Moreover, the Council of the European Union should not be confused with the
Council of Europe which is an international organization.
20
The European Commission, or just The Commission, consists of members selected by
the various member states on the basis of their general competence and undisputed
independent standing. Up until April 30, 2004, their number was twenty. With the accession
to the European Union of the ten new members on May 1, 2004, the members of the
Commission became thirty. This number was to hold until October 31, 2004 since the office
of the present Commission would run until then. After November 1, 2004 there will only be
one member per country, i.e. twenty five members in all. Once the European Union reaches
the number of twenty seven states, i.e. once Bulgaria and Romania join the European Union,
the Council will fix the maximum number of commissioners. The Commission has the right
to initiate legislation. Consequently, it formulates legislative proposals and submits them to
the Council and the European Parliament (right of initiative). The legislative process of the
European Union largely depends on the effective cooperation of these three organs. In
addition to its legislative function, the European Commission monitors the observance and
INTRODUCTION TO LAW
13
decisions, and express recommendations and opinions.21 The following is a

brief discussion of the regulations, directives, decisions, and
recommendations and opinions of the European Union.
a. Regulations: the regulations apply in full to all member states, are
binding as regards all their parts, and are directly applicable to the member
states.22
Thus, the characteristics of the regulations are the following:
-
they apply to all member states throughout the European Union,

regardless of national borders;
they are binding as regards all their parts and their application is
mandatory, i.e. a member state may not apply the provisions of a
regulation incompletely or selectively;
they are directly applicable to the member states, i.e. it is not
necessary for the regulations to be transposed into national law
because they confer rights and impose duties in the same way as
national law.
The regulations are published in the Official Journal of the European

Union and enter into force on the day specified in them or, in the absence
thereof, on the 20th day following that of their publication.23
b. Directives: the directives are only binding for the member state to
which they are addressed as far as the objective to be achieved is concerned
but leave the selection of the form and methods for the fulfillment of the
objective set forth by them to the national authorities.24 Thus, the
characteristics of the directives are the following:
proper implementation of the Community Law by the member states (Arts. 211-219, Treaty
of the European Community).
21
See Art. 249, Treaty of the European Community.
22
Examples of regulations: (1) Council Regulation (EC) No 2026/1997 of October 6, 1997
on protection against subsidized imports from countries not members of the European
Community; (2) Council Regulation (EC) No 1215/1999 of June 10, 1999 amending
Regulation No 19/65/EEC on the application of Article 81, 3 of the Treaty to certain
categories of agreements and concerted practices; (3) Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of
December 22, 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil
and commercial matters; (4) Council Regulation (EC) No 6/2002 of December 12, 2001 on
Community designs and models.
23
See Art. 254, 2 Treaty of the European Community.
24
Examples of directives: (1) Commission Directive 90/388/EEC of June 28, 1990 on
competition in the markets for telecommunication services; (2) Council Directive 92/59/EEC
14
Contrary to the regulation, which is generally binding, the directive

is only binding for the member state(s) it is addressed to, without it
being excluded, of course, that it may be addressed to all member
states.
The directive is binding for the member state it addresses as regards
the objective to be achieved; but it is left to the national authorities
to decide on the form and methods through which the objective will
be incorporated into their national legal systems. This implies that
the member states, while obliged to achieve the objective of the
European Union directive, and in fact within the time frame set for
it by the directive itself, in so doing they have the flexibility to take
into account their special national circumstances.
Thus, the law-making process unfolds in two stages:
In the first stage (European Community stage) the objective laid down
by the directive is determined in a binding way as far as the specific
addressees are concerned and the same is true regarding the time frame
within which it must be achieved.
In the second stage (national stage) the objective set by Community
Law is transposed into the national law of the member state(s) it addresses
and becomes incorporated in it by the issuance on the part of the latter of the
relevant acts. As was earlier mentioned, the member states are free to
choose the form and methods by which to transpose into national law their
Community obligations generated by the directive. For example, it is
immaterial to the European Union if Greece, in order to achieve the
objective aimed at by a Community directive, opts for the issuance of
statutory law, Presidential decree, or Ministerial decision.
The directives are published in the Official Journal of the European
Union. If they are addressed to all the member states, they enter into force
(just like the regulations) on the day specified in them or, in the absence
thereof, on the 20th day following that of their publication.25 Other directives
take effect on the day the member states they are addressed to are notified.26
of June 29, 1992 on general product safety; (3) Council Directive 93/13/EEC of April 5, 1993
on unfair terms in consumer contracts; (4) Directive 1999/44 of the European Parliament and
of the Council of May 25, 1999 on certain aspects of the sale of consumer goods and
associated guarantees.
25
See Art. 254, 2, Treaty of the European Community.
26
See Art. 254, 3, Treaty of the European Community.
INTRODUCTION TO LAW
15
c. Decisions: The decisions are binding as regards all their parts for all
the recipients referred therein. Recipients of a Community decision may be
one or more member states27 as well as natural or legal persons, i.e. private
citizens, companies, etc.28 Thus, the characteristic traits of a decision are the
following:
-
The decision is binding only for its recipients which may be one or
many (member states or persons, natural or legal). Therefore, the
character of the decision is individual and this is where it differs
from the regulation.
The decision is binding as regards all its parts. Therefore, it differs
from the directive which is binding only with regard to its objective.
The recipients of the decisions are notified and upon such
notification the decisions take effect.29
d. Recommendations and opinions: The recommendations aim at

offering advice to the recipient to conform to a certain behavior.30 The
opinions constitute the expression of an estimation of circumstances or
facts.31
Recipients of the recommendations and opinions are usually member
states but it is also possible for them to address natural or legal persons as
well. The recommendations and opinions are not binding. Consequently,
they do not entail legal consequences for their recipients.
27
Example of a Community decision addressed to a member state: according to Articles 87

and 88 of the Treaty of the European Community, the Commission of the European Union
may with a decision permit or prohibit the granting of public aids.
28
Example of a Community decision addressed to persons: decision of the Commission of
the European Union ascertaining the abuse of a companys dominant position in the market
(Art. 85, Treaty of the European Community) or decision declaring the nullity of agreements
tampering with free competition (Art. 81, Treaty of the European Community).
29
30
If, for example, it is feared that the adoption or amendment of provisions laid down by law
may cause distortion to the concept of free competition in the common market, the European
Commission may recommend to the member state(s) involved such measures as may be
appropriate to avoid the distortion in question (Art. 97, Treaty of the European Community).
31
If, for example, the Commission considers that a member state has failed to fulfill an
obligation under the Treaty, it delivers a well reasoned opinion on the matter, after giving the
member state concerned the opportunity to submit its remarks (Art. 226, Treaty of the
European Community).
CHAPTER C
SOURCES OF LAW
According to Article 1 of the Greek Civil Code, the sources of law are
the law and the custom. However, aside from these two, sources of law are
also the generally accepted rules of international law, the international
treaties which have been ratified by law, and the rules of law of the
European Union.
I. THE LAW
1. Concept and Distinctions
Law is the written rule, i.e. the statutes enacted by the state. The law is
distinguished in substantive and formal.
By substantive law we mean the statutes enacted by the state which
establish rules, it being irrelevant which particular organ enacted them.
By formal law we mean the law which is generated by the appropriate
(according to the Constitution) legislative organ, i.e. the Parliament and the
President of the Republic and for the enactment of which the process laid
down by the Constitution has been followed.1
It follows from the above definitions that the difference between
substantive and formal law lies in this: in the substantive law we focus on
the content, i.e. we examine whether the statute contains a legal rule or not,
whereas in the formal law we focus on the form with which the law in
question is clothed.
According to the Constitution currently in force (of 1975, amended in 1986 and 2001),
Greece is a presidential parliamentary democracy (Translators note).
1
The laws are voted by the Parliament; they are promulgated and published by the President
of the Republic (Arts. 26, para. 1; 42; 70-77 of the Greek Constitution).
17
INTRODUCTION TO LAW
Usually the formal law is also substantive, such as for example the
Constitution, the Civil Code, L. 1268/1982 concerning the structure and
operation of the universities, L. 1329/1983 amending the Greek Civil Code
so as to harmonize it with the constitutional principle of the equality of
sexes. There are, however, cases where a formal law is not necessarily
substantive law as well, such as for example the budget of the state which
does not contain a legal rule. The opposite is equally possible, i.e. that a law
may be substantive without also being formal. For example, a police
ordinance imposing a fine to those disturbing the peace and quiet contains a
substantive legal rule.
As is evident from Article 1 of the Greek Civil Code, only the
substantive statute constitutes a source of law, i.e. the statute containing a
legal rule regardless of whether it is also formal law.
2. When the Law Enters into Force
Regarding the question when a law enters into force we need to
distinguish between the statutes formal and substantial validity. This
distinction, however, is only relevant when we have a formal statute
establishing a substantive legal rule.
A. When the Law Enters into Force Formally
The law enters into force formally at the time of its publication in the
Official Government Gazette (FEK). Such publication helps determine
which law is the most recent one. This is important given the fact that the
posterior law repeals the anterior of contrary content.
B. When the Law Enters into Force Substantively

The law enters into force substantively, i.e. it is enacted, ten days after
its publication in the Official Government Gazette,2 provided that the law
itself does not stipulate otherwise. In the computation of the ten day time
period, the day on which the law was published in the specific issue of the
Official Government Gazette is not included, i.e. the ten day time period
begins on the day following the publication (Art. 241, 1 CC) and ends at the
The acronym FEK () stands for Issue of the Government Gazette/

(Translators note).
See Art. 103, Introductory Law to the Civil Code.
18
expiration of the entire tenth day since publication (Art. 242 CC). For
example, if a law was published in the issue of the Official Government
Gazette dated February 1, it will enter into force on February 12.
Nonetheless, the fact that the enforcement of the law begins ten days
after its publication in the Official Government Gazette holds only if the law
itself does not make other provisions in this regard. This is because several
times the law itself specifies the day on which it shall enter into force.
Many laws contain the standard phrase that they shall enter into force at
the time of their publication in the Official Government Gazette, such as, for
example, L. 1268/1982 on the structure and operation of the universities, L.
1329/1983 which amended the Greek Civil Code so as to reflect the
principle of equality between the sexes. Other laws state that they shall enter
into force after a period of time longer than the ten days following their
publication in the Official Government Gazette, such as L. 1837/1989 on the
protection of minors regarding employment contracts which stipulates that
the law shall enter into force three months after its publication in the Official
Government Gazette.
During the time extending between the publication of the law and the
date it enters into force the law is substantively inactive.
3. Repeal of the Law
A law is repealed by a posterior law. Article 2 of the Greek Civil Code
stipulates that the law remains in force so long as it has not been abrogated,
explicitly or implicitly, by another rule of law. When one examines this
statement, and in view of the fact that, according to Article 1 of the Greek
Civil Code, all rules of law are contained in the laws and the customs, one
might think that the law may be repealed by either a law or a custom.
However, in the Legislative Decree of May 7/10, 19463 it was expressly
stated that the custom cannot abrogate the law. Consequently, the law may
only be repealed by another, more recent, law.
A law may be repealed explicitly or implicitly.
The repeal is explicit when the newer law contains a specific provision
stating that the earlier law is thereby abrogated.
The repeal is implicit when the content of the more recent law is
contrary to or incompatible with the content of the earlier law.
3
See Art. 2 para. 2, LegD May 7/10, 1946 On the Restoration of the Civil Code and its
Introductory Law.
19
INTRODUCTION TO LAW
4. Retroactive Effect of the Law

According to Article 2 of the Greek Civil Code, the law provides for
the future and has no retroactive effect. Retroactive effect of a law means
that the law may be applied to situations or relations which were created
prior to its entering into force. In principle, the law does not have
retroactive effect. Exceptionally, it is possible for a law to have retroactive
effect either because it explicitly states so, or because this is deduced from
its content, as, for example, in the case of interpretive laws which are
considered in force from the time the law they interpret was enacted.4
II. THE CUSTOM
1. The Concept
Custom is the unwritten rule of law established after long and
consistent practice of a certain behavior by the members of a society in the
belief that it constitutes mandatory law. The elements of the custom are:
A. Consistent adoption of a uniform behavior over a long period of
time.
B. Belief on the part of those following such behavior that there exists a
corresponding rule of law compelling them to do so.
The customs to which the Civil Code refers are those established after
the Greek Civil Code had entered into force, i.e. after February 23, 1946,
because the ones that were in force prior to that time had been explicitly
abrogated by law.5
Today the significance of customs is limited due to the fast pace at
which social life progresses and the constant issuance of laws.
2. Distinctions of Customs
The customs are distinguished in general, local, and special.
A. General Custom
General custom is the custom which holds throughout the country. For
example, before the enactment of the Civil Code, in Greece the belief that
4
5
See below Ch. E, III, 1.

20
the unmarried status of the sisters should prevent the brother from getting
married tended to be elevated to general custom.
B. Local Custom
Local custom is the custom which holds in a certain local area. For
example, before the enactment of the Greek Civil Code, there was a custom
in the Aegean islands according to which the firstborn son would inherit the
fathers patrimony and the firstborn daughter the mothers to the exclusion
of the other siblings. Moreover, the custom called for the mother to also
bequeath one of her farmlands to her firstborn son.
C. Special Custom
Special custom is the custom applying to the persons of a certain group,
such as for example the merchants customs or the physicians code of
behavior based on custom.
3. When the Custom Enters into Force
The custom is considered having entered into force from the time it was
created.
4. When the Custom is Abolished
The custom may be abrogated explicitly or implicitly by the enactment
of a posterior law. Explicit, for example, is the abrogation by law6 of all the
customs that existed in Greece before the Civil Code was put into force. It is
also possible for a custom to be abrogated by another, more recent custom,
opposite or different from the earlier one.
III. THE GENERALLY ACCEPTED RULES
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
According to the Constitution, the generally accepted rules of the
international law constitute a source of law.7 These rules constitute a direct
source of domestic law because they are integrated in the Greek law and
6
7

See Art. 28, para. 1 of the Greek Constitution.
INTRODUCTION TO LAW
21
prevail over every contrary statutory provision. For this to happen, no

particular act on the part of the state is needed.
The theory of Public International Law determines which the generally
accepted rules of the international law are. Such are the rules of the general
international customs and the general principles of law recognized by the
state, e.g. the rules about conducting war or the responsibility of the state for
its illegal acts. In case of doubt as to whether a rule constitutes a generally
accepted rule of the international law, the matter will be decided by the
Supreme Special Court provided by the Constitution.8
IV. THE RATIFIED BY LAW INTERNATIONAL TREATIES
According to Article 28, para. 1 of the Greek Constitution, the
international treaties, as from their ratification by law and their coming into
force under the conditions of each of them,9 shall constitute an integral part
of domestic Greek law and shall prevail over any contrary statutory
provision.
When interpreting the above constitutional provision we see that
ratification of the international treaty calls on the one hand for a
parliamentary vote on the relevant formal law10 and on the other hand for
clothing the treaty in question with the appropriate status conferred to it by a
Presidential act issued in accordance with the rules of the international
law.11
Examples of such texts of international law are the International
Treaties by which organizations such as the United Nations or the Council
of Europe were established. Also, the International Conventions adopted by
international organizations, such as, for example, the International
Conventions of Labor of the International Labor Organization or the
International Conventions of the United Nations or the Council of Europe.
See Article 100, para. 1 (f) of the Greek Constitution.

An International Treaty, for example, may include the provision that in order to be put to
force it needs to be ratified by at least a certain number of states.
10
See Art. 28, para. 1 in conjunction with Art. 36, para. 2 of the Greek Constitution.
11
See K. Ioannou K. Economidis Ch. Rozakis A. Fatouros, Public International Law
(Theory of Sources), 1988, p. 117 et seq.; Ev. Venizelos, Lessons of Constitutional Law,
1991, p. 144.
9
22
V. THE RULES OF LAW OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

(OR EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW)
1. Rules of Primary Community Law
The rules of primary Community law12 became domestic Greek law
from the moment the Treaty of accession of Greece to the European
Communities was ratified or from the moment of ratification of the Treaties
amending the founding Treaties, such as the Single European Act, the
Treaty for the European Union (Treaty of Maastricht), the Treaty of
Amsterdam, and the Treaty of Nice, in accordance with the process laid
down by Article 28, paras. 2 and 3 of the Greek Constitution.13
2. Rules of Secondary or Derivative Community Law
In view of the fact that Greece, by acceding to the European
Communities acceded to a Community with law making authority, i.e. the
authority to create rules of law,14 it is not only the rules of primary
Community Law that are directly binding and, consequently, constitute a
source of law for the country, but also many of the rules of secondary or
derivative Community Law.15
More specifically:
A. The regulations are binding as regards all their parts and have
general and direct legal force in every member state.
B. Regarding the directives, it should be mentioned that they constitute
a type of Community general statute (loi-cadre) which is most appropriate
for harmonizing legislations.16 As was already mentioned, the member states
are bound only by the objective set forth by the directives; but when
transposing such directives into their national law, they have the flexibility
of taking into account the national circumstances.
Consequently, we must distinguish between the following:
12
See above Ch. B, III, 4, A.

The Treaty of accession of Greece to the European Communities was ratified by L.
945/1979; the Single European Act was ratified by L. 1681/1987; the Treaty for the European
Union was ratified by L. 2077/1992; the Treaty of Amsterdam was ratified by L. 2691/1999;
the Treaty of Nice was ratified by L. 3001/2002.
14
See Dagtoglou, European Community Law, op. cit., p. 199.
15
See above Ch. B, III, 4, B.
16
See N. Moussis, European Union: Law, Economy, Politics, 9th ed., 2001, p. 23.
13
INTRODUCTION TO LAW
23
a. If the member state has taken the necessary legislative or

administrative steps in order to transpose the directive into its national law,
i.e. if in the case of Greece it has transposed it into Greek law, the directive
takes effect immediately since it thus becomes part of the domestic law.17
b. However, in case a directive has not been transposed into national
law, the European Court of Justice has determined through a long line of
cases that, under certain circumstances, the citizen of a member state may
appeal directly to the provisions of such directive.18 That is, in this case the
citizen of a member state may vindicate the rights conferred to him by a
given directive and even be successful as he pleads his case before the
national courts. For this to happen (i.e. for a directive to take immediate
effect), the following conditions need to concur according to the consistent
view of the European Court of Justice established through a long line of
cases:
-
the provisions of the directive must lay down the rights of the
European Union citizen with sufficient clarity and precision;
the specific right invoked must not be dependent on a condition or a
measure that the member state may take;
the national authorities must not have any room for maneuver
regarding the content of the rules to be enacted;
the time period provided for the transposition of the directive into
national law must have already expired.
The European Court of Justice has applied the principle of

immediate effect only in cases between citizens and member states and
then only when the directive was for the citizens benefit and not to his
detriment.19 On the contrary, the immediate effect of the directives has not
17
Examples of directives that have been incorporated to Greek law: with L. 2472/1997 Greek
law was adapted to the provisions of Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of
the Council of October 24, 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the
processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data. With PrD 150 of June 25,
2001 Greek law was adapted to Directive 99/93/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of December 13, 1999 regarding the Community framework for electronic
signatures.
18
See Dagtoglou, op. cit., p. 226 et seq.; G. Vitalis, Community Legal Order, 1988, p. 45 et
seq.; Agallopoulou, op. cit., p. 74; N. Skandamis, European Law (Institutions and Legal
Orders of the European Union), Vol. I, 3d ed., 1997, p. 437 et seq.; Kanellopoulos, op. cit., p.
274; P. Paparseniou, Community Directives and Citizens Rights, 2002, p. 59 et seq.
19
This is the so-called vertical direct effect. In its judgments in A. Francovich and D.
Bonifaci the European Court of Justice held that member states are liable to pay damages
24
been accepted by the European Court of Justice in relations among the

citizens themselves.20
It should also be pointed out that after the expiration of the time period
set for the transposition of a directive into national law, the directive
acquires full legal status vis--vis all, i.e. all state authorities are obliged to
interpret and apply national law according to the directive in question.
C. The decisions which are addressed to a member state and compel it
to exhibit a certain behavior from which flow citizens rights may also
produce immediate legal effects for the citizens of the European Union, if
the above mentioned conditions required for the directive to produce such
results concur. This means that, in this case, the citizens of the member state
to which a decision is addressed may have recourse to the national courts in
order to seek legal protection regarding the rights conferred to them by the
decision in question.21
where loss is sustained by reason of failure to transpose a directive or by transposing it

incompletely. It was the question of eventual liability of the member state in the event of
failure of timely transposition of a directive pertaining to the protection of the employees in
case of the employers insolvency (see the jointly tried cases C-6/90 Francovich and C-9/90
Bonifaci, in European Court Reports 1991, p. I-05357).
20
This is the so-called horizontal direct effect (see Moussis, op. cit., p. 23).
21
See Dagtoglou, op. cit., p. 225; Vitalis, op. cit., p. 47 et seq.; Agallopoulou, op. cit., p. 75;
Skandamis, op. cit., p. 452 et seq.
CHAPTER D
JUDICIAL DECISIONS (JURISPRUDENCE)
AND THE WORK OF LEGAL SCHOLARS
I. JUDICIAL DECISIONS (JURISPRUDENCE)
By judicial decisions (jurisprudence ) we mean the sum total of court
rulings giving answers to specific legal questions. The court rulings do not
constitute a source of law but they contribute to the formation of law in the
following ways:
1. by interpreting the rules of law;

2. by filling a vacuum in the law (lacuna). This happens when the court
rulings shape new institutions lying outside the existing legal framework
(e.g. regarding matters of improper performance or the deactivation of a
right);
3. by providing a concrete content to certain abstract legal notions (e.g.
good morals, good faith, important cause/reason).
When through a string of court rulings the same judgment is made on a
specific legal issue, we talk about consistent judicial precedent.
Nevertheless, such consistent judicial precedent is not formally binding for
the courts which in a future case of similar content may rule differently.
However, in actuality the consistent judicial precedent of higher courts does
have a binding effect for the lower courts.
This is especially true of the consistent judicial precedent of the Court
of Cassation (Areios Pagos), the Greek Supreme Court,1 which may be
The term literally means wisdom of the law, prudenatia juris (Translators note).
Regarding the structure and hierarchy of the civil courts, see below General Principles of
Civil Law, Part Two, Ch. E, I, 2.
26
considered as the most important means for creating customary law as far as
the meaning of a specific rule of law is concerned. That is, when the same
legal meaning has been consistently given to a rule of law by Areios Pagos,
it is reasonable to believe that the view of the courts will be the same in the
future as well.
II. THE WORK OF LEGAL SCHOLARS
The work of legal scholars, i.e. the theoretical study of law, does not
constitute a source of law. The mission of the work of legal scholars is the
following:
1. To study the rules of law in force and to provide interpretation,
critique, and suggestions as to how to fill an eventual vacuum in the law.
2. To occupy itself with matters of legislative policy, i.e. study the
social data, provide a critique of the existing legal framework, point out the
need for change, and propose alternative new statutes, as they may seem
appropriate.
CHAPTER E
RULES OF LAW
I. THE CONCEPT
Rules of law are the heteronomous rules1 regulating the social life of
people in a mandatory way. The rules of law are contained in the statutes of
law and in the customs (Art. 1 CC).
II. DISTINCTIONS
We will limit ourselves to the most important distinctions of the rules
of law. They are:
1. Rules of Law that are General Rules of Law that are Special
A. Rules of Law that are General
Rules of law that are general are the rules regulating all the situations
and relations of persons without distinctions. For example, in the framework
of private law, civil law is a law that is general.2
B. Rules of Law that are Special
Rules of law that are special are the rules of law regulating certain
categories of legal relations. For example, in the framework of private law,
labor law is a law that is special because its rules apply only to a certain
category of persons, the persons who are in a dependant relationship of
employment.
1
2
Regarding the meaning of the term heteronomous rule of law, see above Ch. A, I.
See above Ch. B, II, 2, A.
28
2. Rules of Non-mandatory and of Mandatory Law (or Public Policy)

A. Rules of Law that are Non-mandatory
Rules of non-mandatory law (jus dispositivum) are the rules which
apply only if the parties have not agreed otherwise, i.e. those rules which
may be set aside by the will of the parties.
Example: In the Article 595 of the Greek Civil Code it is stipulated that in the case
of lease of a thing the rent shall be paid at the agreed or usual time periods. If no
agreement regarding such periods exists, the rent is payable at the expiration of
the lease. This provision contains a non-mandatory rule of law because it allows
the parties to determine the time for the payment of the rent as they see fit. Only if
such determination has not been made in the rental agreement is the last part of
the provision of the law applicable, i.e. the provision that the rent is payable at the
expiration of the lease.
B. Rules of Law that are Mandatory (Rules of Public Policy)

Mandatory rules of law (jus cogens) are the rules of law which must
apply regardless of the content of the parties will. Those rules cannot be set
aside by the will of the parties.
Example: For the valid transfer of ownership of an immovable a notarial deed is
needed (Arts. 369 and 1033 CC). It is not possible for the parties to agree between
themselves that a private document will suffice. If, despite this prohibition, the
parties proceed to transfer the ownership of an immovable by a private document,
the transfer will be null and void, i.e. it will not generate any legal effects.3
III. INTERPRETATION OF THE RULES OF LAW

By interpretation of a rule of law we mean the attempt to discover its
meaning. There are two kinds of interpretation: authentic interpretation
(interpretation authnentica) and scientific interpretation (intepretatio
doctrinalis).
1. Authentic Interpretation
By authentic interpretation we mean the interpretation provided by the
legislator himself through another statute of law called interpretive law.
See below General Principles of Civil Law, Part Three, Ch. E, II, 1.
INTRODUCTION TO LAW
29
Example: Let us suppose that a certain law makes provisions for unemployment
benefits to be given to young unemployed persons without specifying who
qualifies for young unemployed. To clarify this, another law is passed specifying
what is meant by young unemployed: a person who has completed the twentieth
year of age but is not older than twenty nine and has been out of work for such
and such time from the day he was registered in the special registry for the young
unemployed. The second statute of law is retroactive, i.e. it is considered in force
from the time of the enactment of the law it interprets.
Even Articles of the Civil Code interpret other Articles. For example,
Article 973 explains what is meant by real rights: the rights securing direct
and against all (erga omnes) power over a thing. The meaning of thing,
however, is given by Article 947 of the Greek Civil Code stipulating that
things are only corporeal objects. In this case Article 947 is interpretive of
Article 973.
2. Scientific Interpretation
Scientific interpretation is the work of the jurists (judges or
theoreticians of law) and it may be literal, rational, or teleological.
A. Literal Interpretation
Literal interpretation is the interpretation focusing on the letter of the
law, that is, on the wording of the law. For this type of interpretation one has
recourse to the rules of grammar and linguistics. For example, we use literal
interpretation to find out the meaning of the word to in Article 331 of the
Greek Civil Code where it is stated that the rules of Articles 915 to 918
are applicable. With the help of this kind of interpretation we establish that
in the reference made in Article 331 the word to means that Article 918 is
included in the counting (915 to 918 inclusive).
B. Rational Interpretation
In order to interpret a rule of law rationally we have recourse to certain
arguments. These arguments are the following:
a. The argumentum a contrario: this is the argument where we make
the following inference: since the law expressly regulates a certain matter,
say matter x, the contrary must hold true for matter y which is diametrically
opposite to matter x.
30
Example: Articles 915-917 of the Greek Civil Code stipulate which persons are
incapable of being legally at fault for purposes of delictual responsibility. By way
of contrast, those not mentioned therein are capable of delict and may be held
liable.
b. The argumentum a minore ad majus, i.e. the argument that what is

prohibited by law for the lesser, is prohibited all the more for the greater.
Example: Since, according to Article 136 of the Greek Civil Code, even the minor
who has reached the age of fifteen cannot conclude an employment contract as an
employee unless he has the consent of the persons exercising care over him, it
follows that the minor who has not reached the age of fifteen cannot enter into
such employment contract.
c. The argumentum a majore ad minus, i.e. the argument that what is

permitted by law for the greater, is permitted all the more for the lesser.
Example: If the highest permissible interest for a loan is 8%, it follows that it is
permissible to conclude a loan agreement at 5%.
d. The argumentum a silentio legis, i.e. the argument where we infer

that the conclusion we draw on a certain matter is true from the fact that the
law remains silent on it.
Example: Article 1475 of the Greek Civil Code rules that a father may
acknowledge as his own a child born outside of wedlock provided that the mother
gives her consent. If the father has died, such acknowledgment may be effected by
the paternal grandfather or grandmother. By the fact that the law states nothing
regarding the possibility for other descendants of the grandfather or the
grandmother, i.e. the childs uncles and aunts, to provide such acknowledgement,
it follows (argumentum a silentio legis) that the lawmaker wanted to exclude these
other parties.
C. Teleological Interpretation
The teleological interpretation focuses on the purpose the specific rule
of law serves. In order to discover this purpose several things are taken into
consideration, e.g. the previously existing law, the preliminary work done
during the stage of preparation of the law in question, the events leading up
to the institution of the specific rule of law.
The teleological interpretation may be either of the corrective or of the
supplementing type.
INTRODUCTION TO LAW
31
a. Corrective interpretation
Corrective interpretation is used when the lawmaker expressed himself
in either a more restrictive or a more expansive way than he intended.
Corrective interpretation is distinguished in broad interpretation
(interpretatio extensiva) and narrow interpretation (interpretatio restrictiva).
aa. Broad interpretation: this type of interpretation is used when the
lawmaker expressed himself more restrictively than he intended. In this
instance, with the use of broad interpretation the same rule of law is applied
to other cases which we consider included according to the spirit of the law.
Example: Article 4 of the Greek Civil Code stipulates that the alien in the
masculine gender enjoys the rights of the national. By broadly interpreting the
term alien in the masculine gender the alien female is also included.
bb. Narrow interpretation: this type of interpretation is used when the

lawmaker expressed himself in a broader way than he intended. By using the
narrow interpretation we limit the cases to which the letter of the law leads
us to believe that the rule applies so as to include only those that the
lawmaker intended to include.
Example: The reference made in the Article 1115 of the Greek Civil Code is to the
common real right without specification as to whether such right is on things
movable or immovable. By using the narrow interpretation, and in conjunction
with the mention of the requirement for notarial deed in the second part of the
sentence in the same Article, it is being accepted that the rule of law in question
refers to things immovable and not movable.
b. Supplemental interpretation
The supplemental interpretation helps fill the vacuums (lacuna) which
exist in the law. Such vacuums exist in the law in the following instances:
aa. when the lawmaker, although aware of a certain matter, did not
regulate it;
Example: Article 947, para. 2 of the Greek Civil Code states that shall also be
deemed things the natural forces or energies, in particular the electric current
and the heat, in so far as such forces are subject to control when concentrated
within a limited space. The lawmaker deliberately left out the magnetic forces
and nuclear energy so that the vacuum might be filled by interpretation.
32
bb. when the lawmaker did not think of a certain case, such as for
example the improper fulfillment of the performance or the deactivation of a
right;
cc. when the lawmaker could not have anticipated a certain case
because it emerged after the specific law entered into force.
Example: An old law (L. 2269/1920) regulated the work schedule of employees in
companies engaged in the transportation of persons or things by land (motor and
railroad) or by sea. It made no mention of air transportation because the use of air
transportation was not generalized at the time.
The supplemental interpretation is effected by way of analogy. Analogy

is the application of a certain rule of law to a case for which it was not
originally intended but which has similarities with the one regulated by the
law.
Example: L. 2269/1920 which had no provision for matters of air transportation
was nevertheless applicable to them up until a law was passed specifically
regulating air transportation. This was possible because the case of air
transportation had similarities with the cases of motor, railroad, and sea
transportation which were regulated by L. 2269/1920.
2. General Principles of Civil Law
INTRODUCTION
I. THE MEANING OF THE TERM CIVIL LAW
The civil law regulates the legal relations of all persons acting as private
citizens.
The civil law is not the law of the urban dwellers. The reason for the
adoption of the term civil law is explained historically. The term civil law is
the translation of the Latin term jus civile which for the Romans signified the
law of the civitas, i.e. of the city-state (any city-state) and included both the
private and the public law.
Later on, when the law of the Roman Empire was codified by the Emperor
Justinian, it was named corpus juris civilis, i.e. the body of law governing the
civitas, the city-state, including again both the private and the public law.
At the end of the Middle Ages, when the scientific editing of the Justinian
legislation began, the use of the term jus civile was limited to the private law
because the public law of that time was regulated by new institutions. Thus, the
term jus civile ended up referring solely to the private law.
In Greek, the Latin term jus civile was originally rendered as political
law. The term civil law was first used by the first Civil Law of 1856 which
encompassed both civil and political rights. It served the purpose of
distinguishing between political and civil rights.
In classical antiquity the Greek term polis and its Roman equivalent civitas did not simply mean
the city, as opposed to the countryside, but a state known as city-state in which the sovereignty
was vested in the free citizens of an independent city and extended over the territories under its
direct control (Translators note).
34
II. THE HISTORY OF THE GREEK CIVIL CODE

The first attempts to draft a Civil Code began in 1835 and the last one was
undertaken in 1930 by the Venizelos government when a Constitutive and a
broader Revisory Committee were established producing in 1933 the Draft of
the Civil Code.
But the final editing of the Draft of the Civil Code was assigned to
Professor Georgios Balis by the Metaxas government and the Civil Code
published in 1940 (Emergency Law 2250/1940) was intended to become
operative on July 1, 1941. However, war and foreign occupation led to the
suspension of its operativeness.
After the liberation, it was decided to revise the Civil Code. This resulted
in the publication of Emergency Law 777/1945 entitled Greek Civil Code
which came into force on February 23, 1946.
However, few months later, the Legislative Decree of May 7/10, 1946
retroactively repealed the Civil Code of 1945 and put into force, also
retroactively (i.e. from February 23, 1946), the Civil Code of 1940.1
The Civil Code of 1940, with certain subsequent revisions, is valid to this
day.
The following laws significantly reformed the Greek Civil Code:
-
L. 1250/1982 established the civil marriage alongside the religious one.

L. 1329/1983, in addition to introducing the necessary reforms so as to
reflect the equality of rights between the two sexes, which is in line
with the Constitution, also proceeded to partially modernize the Greek
Civil Code, especially in matters of family law. Specifically, this law
established the eighteenth year of age as the age of majority (as
opposed to the previous twenty first), modified the institution of
divorce, abolished the institution of dowry, restructured the
relationships between parents and children substituting paternal care
for parental authority, and equated the children born out of wedlock
with children born in marriage.
L. 2447/1996 further modernized institutions of family law which had
not been previously included in the reform introduced by L. 1329/1983.
More specifically, this law radically restructured the institutions of
Up to the time that the Civil Code entered into force, according to the Decree of February 23,
1835, the following were in force in Greece: the Byzantine-Roman Law, as modified by
subsequent laws, and three local codes: the Ionian code, the code of Samos, and the code of
Crete, operative in the corresponding geographical areas.
GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL LAW
35
adoption and tutelage of minors, introduced the institution of foster

care, and replaced the antiquated institutions of judicial interdiction
and judicial supervision by the new, contemporary one of judicial
assistance.
L. 3043/2002 drastically reformed the provisions of the Greek Civil
Code regarding the sellers liability for real defects and for the absence
of conceded qualities.
L. 3089/2002 on medically assisted human reproduction regulated the
various methods of assisted medical reproduction and the way it affects
matters of descent.
The text of the Civil Code was officially recast into the simplified version
of Modern Greek, demotike, by PrD 456/1984.
III. USEFULNESS OF THE KNOWLEDGE OF CIVIL LAW

The usefulness of the knowledge of civil law is immeasurable. The rules of
civil law accompany man throughout his life and regulate practically all his
actions, from the simplest (e.g. buying groceries or using transportation by
making use of the various means of transportation) to the most serious ones
(e.g. purchase or sale of immovables, marriage, divorce, or the drawing up of a
will). Even after mans death, it is the civil law (specifically the law of
succession) that regulates matters pertaining to his estate.
Moreover, the knowledge of civil law, which is the most important branch
of private law, facilitates the knowledge of the other branches of law.
For anyone not necessarily aiming at practicing law, the knowledge of
certain basic concepts of civil law is indispensable because in the business
world the transactions revolving around goods, labor, and capital are mainly
regulated by the civil law, such as for example the contracts of sale, exchange,
loan, and guarantee.
Demotike (the demotic) is the form of Modern Greek based on colloquial use and characterized
by the free acceptance of loanwords and the simplification of inflections. The previous form of
Modern Greek, the katharevousa (from katharos, meaning pure), was the language conforming
to classic Greek and rejecting foreign vocabulary. See Websters Third New International
Dictionary, 3d unabridged edition (Translators note).
36
IV. THE CONTENT OF THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL LAW

Following the division of the Greek Civil Code, the civil law of Greece is
divided in five parts: General Principles, Law of Obligations, Property Law,
Family Law, and Succession Law.2
The General Principles include the general rules which govern not only
civil legal relations but also legal relations included in other branches of law.
More specifically, the General Principles contain the provisions of the law
regarding persons, rights, and juridical acts.
For a brief account of the content of each branch of law, see above Introduction to Law, Ch. B,
II, 2, A.
PART ONE
THE SUBJECTS OF LEGAL RELATIONS
CHAPTER A
GENERAL
I. LEGAL CAPACITY
(OR CAPACITY TO HOLD RIGHTS AND ASSUME OBLIGATIONS)
The subjects of legal relations1 are the persons. This implies that the
persons can hold rights and assume obligations (Art. 34 CC), because every
legal relation generates rights and obligations.
The ability for one to be the subject of rights and obligations is called
legal capacity, or ability to hold rights and be subject to duties, or
personality.2 Every person has the ability to hold rights and be subject to
duties.
II. TYPES OF PERSONS
The Greek law recognizes two types of persons, natural and legal.
1. Natural Persons
All human beings are natural persons regardless of age or other
distinctions such as gender, citizenship etc. In the old days not all persons
1
For the concept of legal relation, see below Part Two, Ch. A, I.
For the difference between legal capacity, capacity to conclude juridical acts, and capacity
for delictual liability (i.e. to be held accountable for civil wrongdoing), see below Part Three,
Ch. C, II, 2.
2
38
were considered natural persons since there were slaves who were not
deemed capable of being the subject of rights and duties.
2. Legal Persons
Legal persons are unions of persons pursuing a certain goal or
aggregates of property assets appointed to serve a given purpose and having
acquired an independent personality (legal personality) by complying with
the rules of law. This means that the entities in question are thus enabled to
hold rights and assume obligations.
These entities are called legal persons because they are not entities
that exist in nature, as is man, but obtain their legal existence through a rule
of law.
CHAPTER B
NATURAL PERSONS
I. BEGINNING AND END OF NATURAL PERSONS
1. Beginning of the Natural Person
A. The natural person begins with live birth. The birth of a person,
assuming of course that the person is born alive, constitutes the starting
point of his personality. As soon as the newborn is separated from the
mothers body, it acquires legal capacity (or capacity to hold rights and
assume obligations), even if it breathes only for a second and regardless of
whether the newborn was born capable of surviving or not.
B. But, according to a rule of law (Art. 36 CC), the as yet unborn child,
the embryo (nasciturus), if born alive, is considered born at the time of
conception as far as the rights that accrued during gestation are concerned.1
The practical significance of this rule may be seen mainly in matters of
inheritance.2
Example: A, a married man without children, died suddenly of cardiac arrest.
According to the law (Arts. 1814 and 1820 CC), of his inheritance goes to his
wife and the other to his parents and siblings.3 If A, who has no children, leaves
his wife pregnant at the time of his death, the distribution of his inheritance can
1
Should the child be stillborn, Article 36 of the Greek Civil Code does not apply.
Article 36 equally applies to other rights (other than the rights to succession), e.g. claim for
damages caused to the embryo (nasciturus) during the mothers pregnancy. See A. Gazis,
General Principles of Civil Law, Vol. B1, 1973, p. 6; I. Karakatsanis, in Georgiadis
Stathopoulos, Commentary on the Civil Code, Art. 36, No 7; N. Papantoniou, General
Principles of Civil Law, 3d ed., 1983, p. 98; I. Spyridakis, General Principles (According to
the Civil Code), 1987, p. 184; K. Simantiras, General Principles of Civil Law, 4th ed., 1988,
p. 259; D. Papasteriou, General Principles of Civil Law, Vol. I/b, 1998, p. 30; Ap.
Georgiadis, General Principles of Civil Law, 3d ed., 2002, p. 116.
3
See below Law of Succession, Part Two, Ch. B.
2
40
only take place after the birth of the child. In case the child is stillborn, of As
inheritance goes to his wife and the other to his parents and siblings. In case the
child is born alive, the latter is considered as if he had been alive at the time of the
fathers death, in which case he has the same rights to his fathers inheritance as
he would have had if he had been alive at the time of the fathers death.
Consequently, of the fathers inheritance will go to the wife and to the child
(Arts. 1813 and 1820 CC). As parents and siblings will have no part in the
inheritance. Even if As child is born alive but dies shortly after, Article 36 of the
Greek Civil Code is applicable in which case the following will happen: initially
the wife of A will inherit of his inheritance and the child . However, after the
childs death, the mother will acquire the childs share () to the exclusion of
other relatives (Art. 1814 CC).
By establishing Article 36, the Greek lawmaker makes the provision

that, after a persons death, his inheritance goes to the members of his own
family and not to his other relatives, if a child of his which at the time of his
death was an embryo (nasciturus) was born alive.
Without the provision of Article 36, the child that would have been
born, even if such birth had taken place only a few seconds after the fathers
own death, would have had no rights to the paternal inheritance.
2. End of the Natural Person
The natural person ends with the persons death (Art. 35 CC). Medical
science determines with precision the exact time of death.
3. Evidence Regarding the Beginning and End of the Natural Person
A. General
Anyone claiming, for purposes of exercising a certain right, that a
natural person died or lived at a certain point in time or that such person was
survived by someone else, is obliged to adduce evidence (Art. 37 CC).
The simplest way to prove the birth or death of a person is to produce
the corresponding certificate which is generally based on a medical report.4
See Art. 32 of L. 344/1976, On Certificates of Registry, as modified by Art. 26, para. 9 of

L. 2130/1993. In the event a person died under circumstances making the issuance of a
medical certificate an impossibility, such as if one was killed during a battle, the death may
be certified by eye witnesses who saw his dead body. On the basis of such testimonies, it is
then possible for the death certificate to be issued (see Art. 38, para. 1 of L. 344/1976).
41
Example: A goes to B, tenant of his fathers apartment, and asks him to pay him
the rent due to his father because his father died and A is now the legal heir of the
deceased. A, who in order to exercise his right (the right to collect rent) makes the
claim that his father died, is under the obligation to provide evidence to this effect.
B. Legal Presumptions
a. Presumption of death
If the death of a person whose body was not recovered is certain but
happened under circumstances that preclude the existence of eye witnesses
(e.g. plane crash), the death of that person is deemed to have been proved
(Art. 39 CC).
In this case the presumption of death is established and it is possible for
a death certificate to be obtained on the basis of the report of the
authorities.5
In case a persons death is not certain but very probable, action may be
taken to declare such person as missing (in absentia) by a court ruling.6
b. Presumption of simultaneous death
If more persons died and it is not possible to establish the order of
survival, it is presumed that they all died simultaneously (Art. 38 CC.), i.e.
the presumption of simultaneous death is established.
The presumption of simultaneous death is rebuttable, i.e. it can be
overturned by the person whose interests are endangered by its application.
However, the party whose interests are endangered can only overturn the
presumption when proving that one of the deceased died before or after the
others.
Example: A and B, husband and wife, who had no children died aboard a ship
during a shipwreck. The closest relative of A is his brother K, and the closest
relatives of B are her parents. According to the presumption of simultaneous
death, since A and B died simultaneously, each will be succeeded by his closest
relatives. Consequently, according to Article 1814 of the Greek Civil Code, K will
inherit his brother A and the parents of B will inherit their daughter. However, if
K, wishing to inherit part of Bs share as well, claims that A died after B in
which case A had already inherited Bs share at the time of her death (according
to the provisions of Article 1820 of the Greek Civil Code stating that, in the
5
6
See Art. 38, para. 3 of L. 344/1976 On Certificates of Registry.

See below Ch. B, I, 4.
42
absence of children, the surviving spouse inherits of the deceased spouses

share) then K has to prove the fact that A survived B. In the event that K is able
to prove his claim (e.g. with eyewitnesses) that B died before A, the presumption
of simultaneous death is overturned and K does have the right to also inherit Bs
share because his brother A had a right to it at the time of his death, since the
husband survived his wife even for a short while. In this case Bs parents will only
inherit of their daughters share.
4. Missing Person (absentia)

A. General
There are cases when the death of a person, although not certain, is
nevertheless very probable. In such cases the uncertainty created may be
detrimental to the interest of some individuals. Thus, the Greek Civil Code
has a provision according to which, following a certain process, one may
demand from the court to declare the missing person an absentee (Arts. 4050 CC).
B. Conditions for Declaring a Person as Missing (an absentee)
In order for a person to be declared as missing, an absentee, his death
must be very probable.
The death of a person is very probable if one of the following happens:
-
if he disappeared while his life was in danger (e.g. during war or a

shipwreck) and at least one year has elapsed from that time, i.e. the
time of his exposure to the mortal danger, or, in the case of
prolonged danger (e.g. battle), since its last instance (Art. 41 CC);
if the person has been gone for a long time and there is no news
from him. In this case at least five years must have elapsed since the
last piece of news from him was dispatched, not since the time it
was received (Art. 41 CC).
C. The Process for Declaring a Person as Missing

Anyone whose rights depend on a persons death, e.g. spouse or
children, has standing to submit a petition to the court for such person to be
declared as missing (in absentia). Competent court to rule on the petition
is the One-member Court of First Instance of the last domicile or residence
43
of the missing person or, if such does not exist, the court of the capital of the
state.7
The procedure for judicial declaration of a person as missing follows
the rules established in the Greek Civil Code (Arts. 42-47 CC) and the Code
of Civil Procedure (Art. 783 et seq. CCPr.). An absentee is declared a
missing person by a court ruling.
D. Consequences of Declaring a Person as Missing
The publication in the press of a summary of the irreversible court
ruling8 declaring a person as missing (Art. 47 in conjunction with Art. 43, 1
CC) establishes the legal presumption of death for the missing person which
is effective against all (erga omnes). This implies that henceforth the rights
depending on the absentees death may be exercised as if the death had been
proven, i.e. the rights to succession or the cessation of the parental care
exercised by the absentee.
The results of the judicial declaration of a person as missing begin at
the time determined by the court as the beginning of absentia (Art. 48 CC).
Exceptionally, the only result that does not automatically follow from
the court ruling declaring a person as missing is the dissolution of marriage.
Instead, such ruling constitutes grounds for divorce (Art. 1440 CC).
Example: A is declared a missing person because there is no news from him for
ten years. With the court ruling the process of succession begins, i.e. his assets are
distributed to his heirs, but his marriage is not automatically dissolved. His wife
B, wishing to remarry, will have to file for divorce on the grounds of the
declaration of absentia. She can remarry only after the issuance of the divorce.
The legal presumption of death for the absentee may be overturned by

an irreversible court ruling lifting the declaration of absentia (Art. 46 CC).9
The court rules ex parte, i.e. according to the voluntary jurisdiction reserved for noncontentious matters (see Arts. 739, 740, 1 CC, and 783 et seq. CCPr.).
8
According to Art. 785, para. 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, for the judicial declaration of
a person as missing to be valid it is not sufficient for the court ruling to be final non
appealable (either because an appeal was filed but rejected or because no appeal was timely
filed), as stated in the Article 47 of the Greek Civil Code, but also irreversible, i.e. such that
cannot be overturned by any legal remedy.
9
The court decision lifting the declaration of absentia, just as the one establishing it, is
published in the press after becoming irreversible (Art. 47 in conjunction with Art. 43, 1 CC,
and Art. 785, 1 CCPr.).
44
E. Reappearance of the Missing Person

In the event that after the declaration of a person as missing he
reappears, he is entitled to recover his assets from those who had inherited
him following the relevant procedure (Articles 46, 49, 50, and 1883 of the
Greek Civil Code).
As far as the marriage of the person declared an absentee is concerned,
if it had not been dissolved through divorce, it continues to exist.10 If it had
been dissolved through divorce, the marriage is not automatically
reestablished. In the event that the former spouses wish to continue to be
married, they need to remarry.
II. PROPERTIES AND STATUS OF THE NATURAL PERSON
1. Name
The name, which consists of first and last name, serves as a means of
distinction for purposes of legal individualization of the person.
The first name is determined by the parent who has the care of the
child. Because normally the parental care of a child belongs to both parents,
they will jointly select the childs first name. In the event of disagreement,
the court will decide (Art. 1512 CC).
The last name11 is acquired in one of the following ways:
A. Children born during the marriage of their parents take the last name
the parents have determined for them by means of a joint, irrevocable
declaration, i.e. a declaration that cannot be revoked, made prior to the
marriage (Article 1505, 1 CC). Thus determined, the last name, which is the
same for all children born of the same parents, may be one of two: the last
name of either parent or a combination of both last names (Art. 1505, 2 CC).
In case the parents do not determine the last name they wish for their
children to have, the children take the last name of their father (Art. 1505, 3
CC).
B. Children born out of wedlock shall assume the last name of their
mother (Art. 1506, 1 CC). If a child born out of wedlock was subsequently
acknowledged by the father as his own, then his parents, either both or just
10
11
See below Family Law, Part One, Ch. E, II, 1, B, a, aa.

See below Family Law, Part Three, Ch. A.
45
one of them, may add the paternal last name to the childs last name by
making a declaration to the registry of civil status (Art. 1506, 3 CC).
C. The adopted child takes the last name of the adoptive parent (Art.
1563 CC).
D. The abandoned children shall assume their last name by way of an
administrative act. The registrar of civil status who issues the birth
certificate of a child shall determine his last name as well as the names of
his father and mother.12
E. Finally, it needs to be emphasized that marriage does not change the
wifes last name (Art. 1388, 1 CC). Only in their social relations each
spouse may, upon the other spouses consent, use the last name of the latter
or add it to his own (Art. 1388, 2 CC).
2. Gender
Gender is also a means of determining a persons identity. The Greek
Constitution declares the equality of the two sexes (Art. 4, 2). The Greek
Civil Code was appropriately modified by L. 1329/1983 so as to reflect the
constitutional principle of the equality of sexes.
3. Citizenship
Citizenship is the special legal relationship one has with a particular
country. Matters of citizenship are regulated by the Code of Greek
Citizenship.13
4. Age
Reaching a certain age is considered by law a criterion of a persons
mental maturity which determines the capacity of the person to conclude
legal transactions or to be held accountable for civil wrongdoing (delictual
liability), as well as several other special capacities, such as the capacity to
conclude an employment contract as an employee (Art. 136 CC), the
capacity to adopt (Arts. 1543, 1582 CC), or the capacity to consent to an
adoption (Art. 1555 CC).
12
See Art. 24, para. 4 of L. 344/1976 On Certificates of Registry.

Matters of citizenship are regulated by L. 3284/2004 which constitutes the new Code of
Greek Citizenship in Hellas.
13
46
5. Health
Physical as well as mental disabilities or mental disturbances may
influence the capacity of a person to conclude legal transactions14 or to be
held accountable for tort/delict.15
6. Religion
The Greek Constitution (Art. 13) establishes the principle of religious
freedom which consists in the freedom of religious consciousness and the
freedom of worship. Before the articles of the Greek Civil Code regulating
marriage were modified by L. 1250/1982 introducing civil marriage,16
religion influenced a good number of matters of family law. Today the
influence of religion is very limited. For example, concerning marriage
between persons belonging to different Christian denominations, or
marriage between persons embracing different religions, the religious
ceremony performed conforms to the requirements of each Christian
denomination, or of each of the religions of the future spouses, assuming
that the other (than the Greek Orthodox) Christian denomination or the
other (than the Christian) religion are recognized in Greece (Art. 1371
CC).17
7. Honor
Honor is the social esteem and dignity due to every person and it is
protected by special provisions of the Greek Civil Code (e.g. Art. 57 which
refers to the right to ones personality, Art. 920 which refers to
communicated defamatory statements against a person, etc.).
14
See below Part Three, Ch. C, II, 4.

16
The marriage can be performed either by way of a declaration of agreement of the future
spouses, made simultaneously, before the Mayor or the President of the Community of the
place where the marriage takes place (civil marriage), or by way of a religious ceremony
performed by a priest of the Greek Orthodox Church or a minister of any other Christian
denomination, or of any other religion known in Greece (religious marriage). See Art. 1367,
1 of the Greek Civil Code. See also below Family Law, Part One, Ch. B, II.
The religion of the Greeks is Christian and their Christian denomination is Greek Orthodox
(Translators note).
17
Regarding the meaning of the term recognized, see below Family Law, Part One, Ch. B,
II, 1, footn. 1.
15
47
8. Kinship
The term kinship means that two or more persons are related to each
other.18
There are two kinds of kinship: by blood, i.e. consanguinity (Art. 1461
CC), and by marriage alliance, i.e. affinity (Art. 1462 CC).
To be blood relatives means that two persons are either issued the one
from the other (e.g. parent and child), or that they are both issued from the
same ascendant (e.g. siblings).
To be related by marriage alliance means that the blood relatives of the
one spouse are related to the blood relatives of the other spouse (e.g. if A
and B are husband and wife and B has parents and siblings, the latter are
relatives by marriage alliance to A).
9. Domicile
A. The Concept and Meaning of Domicile
Domicile is the place where a person has established himself with the
intention of making it the permanent center of his life and relationships (Art.
51, 1 CC).
A persons domicile is important in many matters of civil law. For
example, in legal transactions the domicile determines the place of
performance (Arts. 320-321 CC).
Example: If A has to give B the 1,000 euros he owes him and they have not
agreed as to where the debt will be paid, according to the law, A (the debtor) must
make the payment in the place of the domicile of B (the creditor).
The domicile is also important for matters of civil procedure. For

example, the competence of the court, as far as locus is concerned, is
determined by the domicile of the defendant regarding actions brought
against him (Art. 22 CCPr.).
Example: If A, whose domicile is in Athens, does not pay the 15,000 euros he
owes to B, whose domicile is in Lamia, B (the plaintiff) will bring action against
A (the defendant) before the First Instance Court of Athens, i.e. the court located
in the area where the defendant has his domicile.
18
See below Family Law, Part Two, Ch. B.
48
B. Distinctions
There are two types of domicile: voluntary and legal or obligatory.
a. Voluntary domicile
Voluntary domicile is the domicile a person chooses freely for himself.
For a person to acquire voluntary domicile the following are required:
aa. The person needs to actually establish himself in a certain place.
bb. The person must indeed have the intention of making this locale the
permanent center of his life and relationships.
b. Legal (obligatory) domicile
Legal or obligatory domicile is the one determined by law. Persons
having such domicile are:
aa. Those appointed to a public service position with life tenure; they
shall have their domicile in the place where their services are supposed to
be rendered (Art. 54 CC).
bb. The minors under parental care; they shall have for domicile the
domicile of their parents, or of the parent who alone exercises the parental
care (Art. 56, 1 CC).
cc. The minors under tutelage; they shall have for domicile the
domicile of their tutor (Art. 56, 2 CC).
dd. Those placed under privative judicial assistance in whole;19 they
shall have for domicile the domicile of their judicial assistant (Art. 56, 2
CC).
C. Special Domicile
In the Greek civil law every person can have only one domicile.
Exceptionally, in matters related to the exercise of ones profession, the
place where one practices his profession is considered as special domicile
(Art. 51, 3 CC).
Example: Merchant A, who has stores in Athens, Thessaloniki, and Patras, has his
permanent dwelling in Athens where he lives together with his family. His
domicile is in Athens, whereas in Thessaloniki and Patras he has special domicile.
19
49
D. The Difference between Domicile and Residence

The difference between domicile and residence consists in this: in the
residence one dwells only temporarily and has no intention of establishing
himself permanently there.
Example: During the summer, A, whose domicile is in Athens, goes on vacation to

the island of Hydra for twenty days. For those twenty days Hydra becomes his
place of residence.
III. THE PROTECTION OF PERSONS20

1. Protection of the Personality
A. The Concept of Right to Ones Personality
The law recognizes and protects every mans right to his personality.
The right to ones personality refers to the right to all those things which are
indispensable (sine qua non) for the existence of a person, such as life,
health, free development of the personality, honor, and the private area of
the personality.
Outside the general provision of Article 57 of the Greek Civil Code
which protects the personality as a whole, there are also the special
provisions of Articles 58 and 59 which provide for the protection of the right
to ones name and the products of ones intellect. Such rights are established
as separate rights due to the great practical significance of the issues
connected therewith.
However, before referring to the protection provided by Article 57 of
the Greek Civil Code, we need to emphasize that the right to ones
personality is also protected by the Greek Constitution. Articles 2 para. 1, 5
para. 1, 7 para. 2, 9 paras. 1 & 2, and Article 19 of the Greek Constitution
make the protection of the value of man a primordial duty of the state,
The two ingredients present in the domicile are corpus, ones physical residence in a given
place, and animus, the intent of having that place as ones principal and permanent
establishment (Translators note).
20
Though the stipulations of Arts. 57-60 of the Greek Civil Code referring to the protection
of persons are located in the chapter dealing with natural persons, it is accepted that by
analogy they also apply to the protection of legal persons. See Gazis, op. cit., Vol. B2, 1974,
p. 62; . ritikos, in Georgiadis Stathopoulos, Commentary on the Civil Code, Art. 62, No
2; Papantoniou, op. cit., p. 143; Spyridakis, op. cit., p. 320; Simantiras, op. cit., p. 313;
Papasteriou, op. cit., p. 122; Ap. Georgiadis, General Principles of Civil Law, op. cit., p. 152
et seq.
50
protect the free development of ones personality, secure ones private and
public life, the privacy of ones communications and the right to ones
physical and psychological well being.
The general provision of Article 57 of the Greek Civil Code allows for
the protection of the personality in the event of its unlawful offense by
another. This, for example, happens in the case of slander, the use without
permission of a persons photographs for commercial purposes, the
circulation of printed matter offending the private life of a person, etc.
Special protection is provided regarding offenses directed against the
memory of the deceased person.
In case of unlawful offense of the personality, the person has the
following rights:
a. The right to demand the cessation of the offense (Art. 57, 1, 1 CC).
This means that the person has the right to demand for the state of affairs
which existed prior to the offense to be reinstated. For example, in the event
of circulation of printed matter offending the private life of a person, the
claim is for such printed matter to be removed from circulation.
b. The right to demand the non-recurrence of the offense in the future
(Art. 57, 1, 1 CC). This means that one may demand for the offense not to
be repeated in the future. For example, it may be demanded that no such
printed matter offending the private life of the person be published again.
c. The right to raise a claim for damages (Art. 57, 2 CC). Damages may
be claimed only when the defendant was at fault and has caused the
petitioner material damage.21
Examples: In the case of circulation of printed matter offending the private life
of a person, what constitutes damage is the diminution of that persons
professional credibility resulting from the statements contained in the printed
matter.
In the case of slander or defamation against a medical doctor, his damage
consists in the lessening of his income due to the offense.
21
The reference to material damage is made in order to distinguish it from moral damage.
Material damage is every type of damage which has the consequence of pecuniary loss for
the petitioner. Moral damage is the damage which cannot be assessed in monetary terms.
See M. Stathopoulos, General Law of Obligations, 3d ed., 1998, p. 165 et seq.; Stathopoulos,
in Georgiadis Stathopoulos, Commentary on the Civil Code, Art. 299, No 1; Ap.
Georgiadis, Law of Obligations, General Part, 1999, p. 133 et seq.
51
d. The right to raise a claim for moral damage (Art. 59 CC). This
means that one has a claim for damage which is not material but is due to
the mental anguish the offended person experienced following an offense
against his personality.
Examples: In the case of circulation of printed matter offending the private life
of a person, moral damage is the chagrin the person mentioned in the publication
experiences because his social standing is undermined.
In case of slander or defamation of a person, moral damage is the chagrin such
person experiences due to the slander or the defamation.
Reparations for moral damage may consist in:

aa. monetary compensation which, however, is not considered as
compensation for damages, because emotional suffering cannot be
assessed in monetary terms;
bb. publication in the press of a statement restoring the truth regarding
the previously published inaccuracies;
cc. whatever is dictated by the circumstances, e.g. a public apology, the
return or destruction of the offensive documents, photos, etc.
C. Protection of the Memory of the Deceased
In case of offense against the memory of a deceased person, the right to
demand the cessation of the offense, its non-recurrence in the future,
compensation for prejudice to property, as well as moral damage belongs to
the spouse, certain close relatives, and the testamentary heirs (Art. 57, 1, 2
CC).
2. Protection of the Name
A. The Concept of Right to a Name
A persons right to a name includes the right to ones first and last
name.22 The law even protects the pseudonym (assumed name) if its use is
such that the person is recognized by it.
The offense against ones name may manifest itself in the following
ways:
a. If another challenges the use of ones name. For example, when the
person is called by another name, or when a plaque carrying a persons
22
For the way the last name may be acquired, see above Ch. B, II, 1.
52
name is removed and the claim is made that said name does not belong to
the person using it.
b. If one unlawfully uses another persons name, e.g. A uses the name
of B. At this point it should be noted that it is not unlawful for one to use
anothers name if one has the right to do so, e.g. when both persons happen
to have the same name.
The person offended in his right to a name has the following claims:
a. The right to demand the cessation of the offense (Art. 58, 1 CC).
Examples: If a plaque carrying ones name was removed, one has the right to
demand that the plaque be put back in its place.
In the event that A presents himself under the name of B, the latter may demand
that A stop doing so.
b. The right to demand the non-recurrence of the offense in the future

(Art. 58, 1 CC).
Examples: One may demand the non-recurrence of the removal of the plaque in
the future.
B may demand the non-recurrence of the use of his name by A in the future.
c. The right to demand compensation for damages (Art. 58, 2 CC). This
means that the person offended in his name may ask to be compensated for
the damages he suffered on account of the offense.
Example: In the case of the removal of the plaque of a medical doctor, the
material damage sustained by him is the loss of income, due to the fact that he
missed visits from patients who were led to believe that the medical doctor in
question no longer practiced.
d. The right to demand reparations for moral damage (Art. 59 CC).

This means that the person who was offended in his name may ask to
receive reparations for the emotional distress he suffered because his name
was offended.23
23
For the way in which reparations for moral damage may be made, see above Ch. B, III, 1,
B, d.
53
3. Protection of the Products of Ones Intellect

A. The Concept of Right to the Products of Ones Intellect 24
Right to the products of ones intellect is the exclusive right of the
creator of the intellectual work over his output. Products of ones intellect
are the work of writers, composers, painters, inventors, etc.
These intangible things constitute in some way mans possession and
property and, according to the kind of output involved, the right to such
possessions is called right to intellectual property or to industrial property.
More specifically:
Intellectual property is the right granted to the creator of a piece of
intellectual work by the legal order. The product protected is the specific
intellectual creation (text, music, image).25
Industrial property is the sum total of intangible things pertaining to
transactions, e.g. patent, distinctive sign, trademark.26
In case a person is being offended in one of the products of his intellect
(e.g. a book is reprinted without the authors permission, ones book or
musical composition is appropriated by another), according to the Greek
Civil Code (Art. 60), he has the following rights:
a. The right to demand the cessation of the offense. For example, the
author may demand that the book reprinted without his permission be taken
out of circulation, or that the person who appropriates for himself the
authors book or musical composition stop doing so.
b. The right to demand the non-recurrence of the offense in the future.
For example, it may be demanded that further reprinting of the authors
book published without his permission be prohibited or that the
appropriation of the authors own work (book or musical composition) by
another be prohibited in the future.
24
The right to the products of ones intellect is a mixed right (see below Part Two, Ch. A, II,
1).
25
For more details, see G. Koumantos, Intellectual Property, 8th ed., 2002, p. 1 et seq.; see
also D. Kallinikou, Intellectual Property and the Rights of Kin, 2000, p. 19.
26
For more details, see Th. Liakopoulos, Industrial Property, 5th ed., 2000; N. Rokas,
Industrial Property, 2004.
54
c. The right to demand compensation for damages, e.g. the damage that
the author or the musician suffered by being deprived of the income he
would have otherwise derived from his intellectual work.
Today the protection offered by the Greek Civil Code for the products
of ones intellect is limited because of the existence of many special statutes.
However, these special statutes do not always contain a complete system of
civil sanctions in case of offense of the diverse rights to the products of
ones intellect. Only the law on intellectual property27 which is in effect
today contains a complete system of such sanctions. Consequently, on other
matters the sanctions need to be based on more general provisions of the law
and mainly on Article 60 of the Greek Civil Code.28
4. Protection of the Individual from the Gathering and Processing of
Personal Data
In our era where the general rules for the protection of the personality
are not sufficient to also protect a person from computer technology, it is
imperative to have special rules, substantive and procedural, in order to
protect the individual from the practically unlimited accumulation and
correlation of information on all aspects of his life. The reason for this is
that the dangers from the unlimited collection and correlation of information
are infinitely more immediate and different in nature for the individual and
his private life than the usual offenses against the personality.29
It is for this purpose that L. 2472/1997 was passed in order to protect
the individual from data processing of a personal nature.30
This law through which Greek legislation was aligned with European
Community Directive 95/46 of the European Parliament and of the Council
of October 24, 1995 On the protection of personal data and on the free
27
L. 2121/1993 entitled, Intellectual Property, Rights of Kin, and Cultural Issues.

See Koumantos, op. cit., p. 60.
29
See the Introductory Report of L. 2472/1997, No A2, in KNoB (1997), p. 501; see also M.
Avgoustianakis, Protection of the Individual from Processing of Personal Data, in The
Rights of Man, issue No 11/2001, p. 673 et seq., especially p. 684.
30
With regard to L. 2472/1997, see M. Stathopoulos, The Use of Personal Data and the
Conflict between two Freedoms: of Their Subjects and of Those in Possession of Such Data,
in NoB 48 (2000), p. 1 et seq.; P. Donos L. Mitrou F. Mittleton E. Papakonstantinou,
The Authority of Protection of Personal Data and the Increase of the Protection of Rights,
2002; I. Igglezakis, Sensitive Personal Data, 2003.
28
55
movement of such data constitutes a concretization of the broader

imperative of protection of the personality.31
Law 2472/1997 was certainly indispensable because through it one can
now protect in a special way contemporary aspects of the right to
personality stemming from a rapidly developing technology. Of course, it
cannot be claimed that this law will be sufficient in the future, given the fact
that the fast development of new technologies will keep creating new
problems.
At this point it is important to emphasize that the most recent revision
of our Constitution (2001) included three important Articles constituting one
entity which is immediately related to the protection of personal data. They
are Articles 5A, 9A, and 101A.
Article 5A explicitly stipulates the general and unlimited right to
information, i.e. the right for every citizen to have access to the sources of
information, limited only by considerations of national security and defense
as well as the respect of the rights of third parties.32
Article 9A introduces at the constitutional level the prohibition of
gathering and processing of personal data, i.e. it safeguards the protection of
the personality against the right to information established by Article 5A.33
Finally, it should be mentioned that the gathering and processing of
personal data should be conducted under the strict conditions dictated by the
rules of International Law, the European Community Law, and the
institutional guarantee of an independent Authority constituted according to
Article 101A.34
The Hellenic Data Protection Authority, which was constitutionally
secured after the 2001 revision of the Constitution,35 constitutes a public
authority whose mission is to oversee the application of L. 2472/1997 and
other regulations pertaining to the protection of the individual from the
processing of personal data, as well as to exercise the responsibilities with
which it is entrusted in every particular case (Art. 15 of L. 2472/1997).36
31
See Introductory Report of L. 2472/1997, No A3-4, op. cit.

See the Proposal of the General Spokesman for the Majority Ev. Venizelos in the 7th Greek
Revisory Parliament, 1st Period, Session A, p. 17.
33
See S. Koutsoumbinas, Independent Authorities and Individual Rights, in The Rights of
Man, No 10/2001, p. 376 et seq.
34
See the Proposal of the General Spokesman, op. cit., p. 17.
35
See Art. 101 A of the Greek Constitution.
36
Regarding the Hellenic Data Protection Authority, see L. Mitrou, The Authority of
Protection of Personal Data, 1999.
32
56
More specifically, the Hellenic Data Protection Authority aims at

securing:
-
37
the respect and protection of the rights of the individual and of the
democratic regime;
the upgrading of the protection of the rights of individuals as a value
in itself in the framework of a state governed by the rule of law;
the promotion of mutual cooperation between the individual and the
administration as well as the individual and private enterprises;
the exercise of constant preventive, suppressive, and structuring
action for the protection of the individuals personal data.37
See Art. 1 of decis. No 6/1997 entitled, Regulation of the Functioning of the Hellenic
Data Protection Authority.
CHAPTER C
LEGAL PERSONS
I. THE CONCEPT
Legal persons are unions of persons pursuing a certain goal or
aggregates of property assets appointed to serve a given purpose and having
acquired an independent personality (legal personality) by complying with
the rules of law. This means that the legal persons are the subjects of rights
and obligations.
The law recognizes legal capacity to the legal persons, thus equating
them with natural persons. What we mean by saying that the legal person
has legal capacity is that the subject of rights and obligations is the legal
entity and not the individuals constituting or managing it.
However, the legal capacity of the legal person does not extend to
activities or legal relations that presuppose the qualities of a natural person
(Art. 62 CC), e.g. the legal person can neither be adopted nor have heirs.
II. CATEGORIES
There are two basic categories of legal persons: legal persons of public
law and legal persons of private law, following the relevant distinction of
domestic law in public and private. But apart from those two categories,
there is a third one: legal persons of mixed or dual nature.
1. Legal Persons of Public Law
Legal persons of public law are the legal persons instituted by an act of
the state (mainly a statute) for the purpose of promoting public policy. The
legal persons of public law are basically regulated by the laws that constitute
them. Legal persons of public law are, for example, the municipalities, the
58
communities, the universities, the Social Insurance Organization (IKA), the

Agricultural Insurance Organization (G), etc.
2. Legal Persons of Private Law

The legal persons of private law are constituted by persons, devoted to
private purposes, and regulated by private law.
The legal persons of private law are further divided into legal persons
of civil law and legal persons of commercial law.
Legal persons of civil law are the association, the foundation, the fund
raising committee, and the civil company that has acquired legal personality.
Legal persons of commercial law1 are the general partnership (), the
limited partnership (), the close corporation (P), often called limited
liability company, the corporation (SA), and the cooperative.
3. Legal Persons of Mixed or Dual Nature

To this category belong the legal persons which, although organized as
legal persons of private law, are established by the state in order to serve the
public interest. In essence they are legal persons which in addition to their
private activity, either have been entrusted with management which
promotes a public purpose, or constitute in reality public enterprises.
Examples of the former are the Bank of Greece which has the privilege of
issuing bank notes in euros, possessing and administering the official
foreign currency reserve of the country, and exercising preventive control of
credit institutions, and the Agricultural Bank, entrusted with the supervision
and control of agricultural cooperatives. Examples of the latter are the
The Greek spelling of the acronym IKA, is also IKA and it stands for
. The Greek spelling of the acronym OGA, is and it stands for
(Translators note).
1
See specialized studies on commercial law such as A. Tsirintanis, Elements of Commercial
Law, issue b, 6th ed., 1964; N. Rokas, Commercial Companies, 4th ed., 1996; A. Sinanioti
Maroudi, Commercial Law, Vol. II, Commercial Companies, 2004.
The Greek spelling of the acronym OE, is also OE and it stands for ;
of the acronym EE, is also EE and it stands for ; of the acronym EPE
(i.e. Ltd.), is and it stands for ; of the acronym SA, is
AE and it stands for (Translators note).
59
public utilities companies of electricity (DEH), telecommunications (),

and radio-television (RT).
Because these legal persons are regulated both by the rules of private
and public law, they are called legal persons of mixed or dual nature.
III. LEGAL PERSONS OF CIVIL LAW

1. General Rules
Before referring to each and every type of legal person of private law,
we will mention the general rules of the Greek Civil Code governing them.
A. Formation of the Legal Person
For the formation of every legal person a constitutive or establishing
deed2 is required by law (Art. 63 CC), i.e. an instrument expressing the
intent of the individuals to set up the specific legal person, as well as a
charter or by-laws3 containing the terms of its operation and administration.
For both the constitutive or establishing instrument, and the charter or
by-laws a written document is required (Art. 63 CC).
B. Capacity of the Legal Person
a. Legal capacity:4 the law recognizes the legal person as having legal
capacity (capacity to be the subject of rights and duties) thus equating it with
the natural person. However, this capacity of the legal person does not
extend to legal relationships presupposing the qualities of a natural person
(Art. 62 CC), i.e. legal persons can neither be adopted nor have heirs.
b. Capacity for concluding juridical acts:5 the legal person, other than
having legal capacity, also has its own volition, expressed through the
The Greek spelling of the acronym DEH, is and it stands for
, of the acronym OTE, is also OTE and it stands for
, and of the acronym ERT, is standing for
(Translators note).
2
A constitutive deed is necessary for the formation of an association or a fund raising
committee, whereas an establishing deed is required for the formation of a foundation. See
below Ch. C, IV, (2, A), V (2, A), VI (2, A).
3
A charter is required for the association, whereas by-laws are required for the foundation
and the fund raising committee. See below Ch. C, IV (2, B), V (2, B), VI (2, B).
4
For the legal capacity, see above Ch. A, I.
5
60
persons who administer it. Consequently, the legal person has the capacity
to conclude juridical acts through the persons who administer it.
c. Capacity for delictual liability:6 the legal person has liability for civil
wrongdoing, i.e. it is responsible for the unlawful acts of its representing
organs.
C. Title and Seat of the Legal Person
Just as the natural person has a name, so does the legal person. The
name of the legal person is called title. The seat of the legal person is
equivalent to the domicile of the natural person. The seat of a legal person is
in the place where its administration is located (Art. 64 CC).
D. Administration of the Legal Person
The administration of the legal person consists of one or more persons.
On the one hand it carries out the business of the legal person and on the
other hand it represents it before the courts or out of court. As the organ of
the legal person, it concludes all the juridical acts with third parties.
In case of collegial administration, i.e. if the administration is
composed of many persons, unless otherwise provided in the constitutive or
establishing deed or in the charter or by-laws, an absolute majority of those
present is required in order for a decision to be reached, i.e. a majority of
50% plus 1 (Art. 65, 2 CC).
E. Juridical Acts of the Legal Person
As was mentioned earlier, the legal person has the capacity to conclude
juridical acts. The administration of the legal person is the organ through
which the volition of the legal entity is expressed.7 Consequently, the
juridical acts entered into by the persons entrusted with the administration of
the legal entity, provided that they have acted within the bounds of their
authority, are binding for the legal entity, i.e. they create for it rights and
obligations which are directly binding (Art. 70 CC).
In order for the legal person to be liable for the juridical acts concluded
by its representing organs, the latter need to have carried them out in their
6
See below Part Three, Ch. C, II, 2 and Law of Obligations, Part Two, Ch. D, III, 2.
Not only the legal capacity of the legal person is limited, but also its capacity for juridical
acts, because such capacity does not extend to the legal relations requiring the attributes of a
natural person. For example, the legal person cannot adopt or exercise parental care.
7
61
capacity as the organs of the legal entity, i.e. acting in its name and on its
behalf, and within the bounds of their powers, as determined in the
constitutive or establishing deed of the legal person or in the charter or bylaws. The same holds as regards third parties (Art. 68, 1 CC).
Examples: In order for a legal person, such as, for example, the athletic
association Sigma, to buy an apartment from A for the purpose of housing its
offices, the relevant legal transaction will be concluded between A and the Board
of Directors of the Sigma association, which is the organ administering the affairs
of the legal person. However, the rights and obligations stemming from this
transaction will directly affect the legal person of the Sigma association and not
the particular individuals constituting its Board of Directors. Thus, if for example
the payment is not made (i.e. the payment agreed upon for the purchase of the
apartment), A, the seller, will take action against the legal person, i.e. the Sigma
association, to force it to make the payment; he will not take action against the
individual members of the Board who concluded the agreement for the purchase
of the real estate.
In case the legal person hires an individual, the employment contract will be
concluded between the legal representative of the legal entity, usually the Board
of Directors, and the employee. But if the Board of Directors does not pay the
employees wages, the latter, in order to recover his wages, will sue the legal
person and not the Board of Directors.
F. Liability of the Legal Person for the Unlawful Acts of Its Representing
Organs.
The legal person is liable for the unlawful acts or omissions of its
representing organs under the following conditions:
a. The act or omission of the representative organs of the legal person
must give rise to liability for damages.
b. The act or omission must have been performed by the organ
representing the legal person. For the association, for example, such organs
are those whose position is outlined and determined in the constitutive deed
itself or in the charter.
c. The act or omission of the above mentioned organ must have taken
place in the course of the performance of the duties entrusted to it (Art. 71, 1
CC).
62
Naturally, in addition to the legal person, liable for the above jointly
and severally (in solidum) is also the person at fault (Art. 71, 2 CC).8
Example: A legal person, for example the Sigma association, asked A, its legal
representative, to arrange for the association to receive some financial assistance.
A, after deceiving a rich man, T, to whom he presented the purposes of the Sigma
association under an entirely different light, succeeded in securing a substantial
donation from him to the association. For As act the legal entity represented by A
is liable; and so is A as an individual. Consequently, T, upon realizing that he was
deceived by A, has a claim for damages against the Sigma association, since As
act took place during the performance of the duties he was entrusted with by the
legal entity; he also has a claim for damages against A himself because, along
with the legal entity, the latter is liable in solidum. (This means that each one of
them, the Sigma association and A, are liable to pay the entire amount of
damages, but that T has the right to receive payment only once.)
G. Protection of the Legal Person

Though Articles 57-60 of the Greek Civil Code are in the chapter of
protection of natural persons, it is accepted that by analogical application
they also apply to the protection of the legal persons.9
Just as the natural person, so is the legal person protected with regard to
its name, i.e. its title, as well as its personality in general, which includes
its good reputation, credibility, and all the other properties of which the
personality consists, provided, of course, that these properties are not such
that presuppose the existence of a natural person.
As long as the legal person is offended in the above properties, it also
has the right to claim compensation for moral damage.10
H. End of the Legal Person
Two things are important as regards the end of the legal person:
dissolution and liquidation.
8
Joint and several liability (in this case passive joint and several liability) exists when, in
case there are more debtors of one and the same performance, each of them is obliged to
effect the whole performance but the creditor is entitled to demand it only once (Art. 481
CC). See below Law of Obligations, Part One, Ch. B, III.
9
See above Ch. B, III, footn. 20.
10
See I. Karakatsanis, in Georgiadis Stathopoulos, Commentary on the Civil Code, Art. 59,
No 13; Papantoniou, op. cit., p. 143; Simantiras, op. cit., p. 313; Ap. Georgiadis, General
Principles of Civil Law, op. cit., p. 172.
63
a. Dissolution of the legal person

The dissolution of the legal person brings about the end of its activity.
However, the termination of it, i.e. its disappearance, only comes about with
liquidation.
The dissolution of the legal person results from certain reasons which
are determined in the Greek Civil Code and vary according to the specific
type of legal entity.11
b. Liquidation of the legal person
Liquidation is the condition into which a legal person lapses ipso jure
following its dissolution. During this time the accounts of the legal person
are being settled, i.e. its debts verified and, to the extent that it is possible,
paid off from the proceeds of the liquidation. As long as the liquidation goes
on, the legal entity is considered in existence but only for purposes of
liquidation, not for other activities (Art. 72 CC).
If neither the law nor the constitutive or establishing deed of the legal
person, the charter or by-laws, have determined what is to be done with the
assets of the dissolved legal entity (i.e. what is left after the debts are paid
off), and it has not been otherwise decided by the appropriate organ of the
legal person, they devolve on the state (Art. 77, 1 CC).
IV. THE ASSOCIATION
1. The Concept
Association is the union of at least twenty persons pursuing a non profit
goal (Art. 78 CC).
Non profit goals need not be solely ideological, i.e. artistic, intellectual,
or philanthropic; they can also be economic. For example, the purpose of the
professional associations is to protect and promote the financial and
professional interests of their members.
Trade unions and employers associations constitute a very important
kind of professional associations.12 They represent the interests of the
employees and the employers respectively.13
11
See below Ch. C, IV 6, V 4, VI 3.

L. 1264/1982 regulates matters pertaining to trade unions and L. 1712/1987 matters
pertaining to the employers associations.
12
64

In order for the union of at least twenty persons pursuing a non profit
goal to acquire legal personality, i.e. to be able to hold rights and assume
responsibilities, the following are required:
Constitutive deed is the agreement among at least twenty persons to
establish an association. This needs to be done in writing (Art. 63 CC) and
to be signed by the members who decided to establish the association, i.e.
the founding members.
B. Charter
The charter, which also needs to be in writing, determines the title, seat,
purpose of the association, working hours etc. (Art. 80 CC).
C. Application to the Court
The founders or the temporary administration of the association submit
an application to the One-member Court of First Instance of the district in
which the association will have its seat in order to start the process of
registering the association in the special public register of associations.
Attached to the petition are the constitutive deed, a document containing the
names of the members of the administration, and the charter dated and
signed by the members (Art. 79 CC).
D. The Decision of the Court
The One-member Court of First Instance must issue a ruling14
accepting the application and ordering on the one hand the publication in the
press of a summary of the charter containing its essential parts and on the
13
The trade unions and the employers associations have the legal right to negotiate and enter
into collective agreements of labor (thus shaping the labor relations), undertake labor
struggles (e.g. strikes), be litigants in the process of mediation, arbitration, etc. See Al.
Karakatsanis, Collective Labor Law, 3d ed., 1992, p. 48 et seq.; G. Leventis, Collective Labor
Law, 1996; P. Agallopoulou, Introduction to Labor Law, 2000, p. 99 et seq.; T. Koniaris,
Labor Law in Hellas, 2002, p. 169 et seq. (in English).
14
The court rules ex parte (see Arts. 739, 740 para. 1, and 787 CCPr.).
65
other hand the recordation of the association in the public register of

associations (Art. 81, 1 CC).
The court will issue its decision after verifying that the conditions
required by law for the constitution of an association have been complied
with and that the purpose of the association is neither unlawful nor immoral,
i.e. the court will check the legality of the association. It cannot check its
expediency because this is contrary to the Constitutional guarantee of the
right to associate.15
E. Registration of the Association in the Public Register of Associations
The association must be registered in the special public register of
associations kept in the Court of First Instance of the district in which the
association will have its seat.
The registration in the public register of associations takes place as
soon as the court decision becomes final non appealable.16 From the time of
registration in the public register of associations, the association acquires
legal personality, i.e. it begins to exist as a legal person (Art. 83 CC).
3. Organization and Operation of the Association
The necessary organs of the association are the Administration and the
Meeting of the Members.
A. The Administration of the Association
The Administration of the association, which may consist of one or
more members (in the case of the latter it is called Board of Directors), is the
executive organ of the association which carries out its business and
represents it before the courts or out of court.17
Examples: In case the Sigma association wishes to lease an apartment for office
space, the rental agreement (on behalf of the association) will be signed by the
Board of Directors or by the President alone, if it is stipulated in the charter that
the President may represent the association in such matters (representation out of
court).
15
See Art. 12, 1 of the Greek Constitution.

A court decision is final non appealable when it is not subject to appeal, either because it
was appealed but the appeal was rejected, or because the deadline determined by law for
appealing has passed.
17
See Arts. 67, 1 CC and 64 CCPr.
16
66
In case the Sigma association does not pay the rent to A (the lessor), the
latter will bring action against the Sigma association asking for payment.
The association will appear in court represented by the Board of Directors
or by the President alone, if according to the charter the President has the
right to represent the association in such matters (representation before the
court).
B. The Meeting of the Members of the Association

The Meeting of the Members of the association constitutes the highest
organ and is empowered to decide on all matters which do not fall under the
competence of other organs.
Unless otherwise provided in the charter, it falls within the powers of
the Meeting of the Members to elect the Administration, decide on the
acceptance or exclusion of a member, approve the balance, decide on the
change of the purpose of the association, the amendment of its charter, and
the dissolution of the association (Art. 93 CC).
Moreover, the Meeting of the Members has the supervision and control
of the representing organs of the association and the right to revoke them at
any time (Art. 94, 1 CC). The mode of functioning of the Meeting of the
Members is stipulated in the charter.
C. Other Organs of the Association
Provisions for other organs of the association, such as the Audit
Committee and the Disciplinary Council, may be found in the charter.
4. Rights and Obligations of the Members of the Association
All the members of the association have equal rights and
responsibilities (Art. 89, 1 CC). Special rights may be granted or taken away
either when the charter so stipulates or with the consent of all the members.
Unless otherwise provided in the charter, a member of the association
may not be represented and the qualification of being a member may neither
be transferred nor devolve through succession (Art. 91 CC).
5. Ceasing to be a Member of the Association
The capacity of being a member of the association ceases in the
following instances:
A. If the member leaves the association (Art. 87 CC).
67
B. If the member is expelled in the cases provided for in the charter

(such as, for example, for certain misdeeds), and in case of important reason
(e.g. serious violation of ones duties, indecent behavior) decided upon by
the Meeting of the Members (Art. 88, 1 CC).
C. If the member dies.
D. Ipso jure due to several specific reasons mentioned in the charter,
e.g. change of profession, change of domicile.
E. If the association is dissolved.
6. Dissolution of the Association
The association is dissolved in the following instances:
A. Ipso jure, i.e. without requiring decision of the Meeting of the
Members or Court ruling, in the following instances:
a. When it is so stipulated in the charter, e.g. when the time period for
which the association has been constituted has expired (Art. 104, 1 CC).
b. When the number of the members of the association has fallen below
ten (Art. 104, 2 CC).
B. With a decision of the Meeting of the Members reached with special
quorum and a qualified majority (Art. 103 in conjunction with Art. 99
CC).18
C. With a final non appealable decision of the One-member Court of
First Instance of the district where the seat of the association is located,19
following an application submitted by the Administration of the association,
or one fifth of its members, or the supervising authority20 in the cases
determined by law, such as when the purpose of the association has been
accomplished, abandoned, or evolved to a different one from the purpose set
forth in the charter (Art. 105 CC).
The patrimonium of a dissolved association is distributed as stipulated
by law or by the charter or constitutive deed, or as the appropriate organ has
18
For the Meeting of the Members to rule on the dissolution of the association it is necessary
for at least one half of the members to be present and for the majority vote to be a majority of
three quarters of those present (Art. 99 CC).
19
The One-member Court of First Instance rules ex parte (Arts. 739, 740, para. 1, and 787
CCPr.).
20
Supervising authority is the appropriate Circuit Governor. See Ap. Georgiadis, op. cit. p.
203, footn. 71 and the references cited thereat.
68
decided;21 for example, it will devolve on another association pursuing the

same or similar purpose. In case it is not determined in one of the above
mentioned ways what will happen with the patrimonium of an association
after dissolution, it devolves on the state which is then obliged to fulfill the
purpose for which the association was constituted (Art. 77 CC).
The patrimonium of an association that dissolved never devolves on its
members (Art. 106 CC).
Liquidation is the stage following dissolution. During liquidation the
general rules of liquidation of legal persons are followed.22
V. THE FOUNDATION
1. The Concept
Foundation is an aggregate of property assets (patrimonium) which has
been set up to serve a certain purpose (Art. 108 CC).
Examples: Through a juridical act inter vivos, A leaves part of his estate for the
establishment of a model hospital unit in his home town.
Through his will, A leaves his patrimonium for the establishment of a
foundation granting fellowships to exceptional students of the University of
Piraeus so that they may pursue graduate studies abroad.
2. Conditions for Establishing a Foundation

For a foundation to acquire legal personality the following are
necessary:
A. Establishing Deed
The establishing deed of a foundation may result either from a
unilateral juridical act inter vivos, embodied in a notarial document, or from
a testamentary disposition (Art. 109 CC).
It is necessary for the establishing deed to specify the purpose of the
foundation and the assets assigned to it (Art. 110, 1 CC).
21
If there is no mention of it in the charter, the matter is decided by the Meeting of the
Members.
22
See above Ch. C, III, 1, H, b.
69
B. By-laws
The by-laws of the Foundation determine the title, seat, and conditions
of operation of the foundation. The by-laws may be included in the
establishing deed or they may be determined in the Presidential Decree
approving the establishment of the foundation (Art. 110, 2 CC).
C. Presidential Decree
For the establishment of a foundation to be approved, a Presidential
Decree is required.
The issuance of the Presidential Decree (by the President of the
Republic) will be sought by the competent authority (Art. 112 CC)
following verification not only of the legality but also of the expediency of
establishing the foundation.23 If the purpose of the foundation is beneficial
to the public, competent authority is the Ministry of Finance jointly with
whatever other Ministry is appropriate in each particular case.
Example: In the case of a foundation established for the purpose of granting
fellowships, the Presidential Decree, necessary for the approval of its
establishment, is issued by the Ministers of Finance and National Education &
Religion.
The foundation acquires legal personality upon the publication in the

Official Government Gazette of the Presidential Decree approving its
establishment (Article 108 CC).
3. Organization and Operation of the Foundation
The operation of the foundation is regulated by its by-laws and the
general provisions of the Greek Civil Code regarding legal persons.
In case the purpose of the foundation has become unrealizable, it is
possible for a similar purpose to be assigned to it according to what may be
the most probable will of the founder (Art. 120 CC). For example, a
foundation whose purpose was to offer assistance to one category of
victims, now eclipsed, such as the victims of the 1913 war between the
Greeks and the Bulgarians, may, according to the founders most probable
will, serve the victims of the Greek-Italian war of 1940.
23
See Ap. Georgiadis, op. cit., p. 211.
70
4. Dissolution of the Foundation

The foundation is dissolved in the following instances:
A. Ipso jure in the cases provided for in the establishing deed of the
foundation or its by-laws (Art. 117 CC).
B. With a Presidential Decree in the cases provided for by law, e.g. if
the purpose of the foundation has been realized, if the foundation has
deviated from its purpose, and if the purpose or its operation have become
unlawful (Art. 118 CC).
VI. THE FUND RAISING COMMITTEE
1. The Concept
Fund raising committee is a committee composed of at least five
persons whose purpose is to use solicitation, the organization of festivities,
and other similar means in order to collect money or other useful items for
the sake of a public purpose or a purpose of public benefit (Art. 122 CC).
For the fund raising committee to acquire legal personality, the
following is necessary:
Constitutive deed is the written agreement of at least five persons to
establish a fund raising committee (Arts. 63 and 122 CC).
B. Presidential Decree
A Presidential Decree is needed for the approval of the constitution of
the fund raising committee.
The issuance of the Presidential Decree (by the President of the
Republic) is occasioned by the Ministry of Public Health and Social
Services which had previously checked the legality and expediency of the
fund raising committee. The Presidential Decree contains the by-laws of the
fund raising committee and the determination of its seat, its task and the
time frame set for the completion of its work.
71
The fund raising committee acquires legal personality at the time of the
publication in the Official Government Gazette of the Presidential Decree
approving its constitution.
3. Dissolution of the Fund Raising Committee
The fund raising committee is dissolved in the following instances:
A. Ipso jure, from the expiration of the time period set for the
completion of its task, or from the termination of its task (Art. 124 CC).
B. With a Presidential Decree in the cases provided for by law, e.g. if
the committee has deviated from its task, if the performance of its task has
become unrealizable, or if its purpose has become unlawful or immoral (Art.
125 CC).
VII. THE CIVIL PARTNERSHIP
1. The Concept
Civil partnership is the agreement of two or more persons mutually
assuming the obligation to pursue, with common contributions, a common
purpose, mainly economic (Art. 741 CC).
2. Conditions for the Acquisition of Legal Personality
Civil partnership is not a legal entity. However, if the purpose it
pursues is financial, it may acquire legal personality, if the conditions of
publicity laid down by law for general partnerships have been complied with
(Art. 784 CC).24
These conditions are the following:
A. Recordation of a summary of the agreement to form a civil
partnership (which is done in writing) in a special register kept by the
secretary of the Court of First Instance of the district where the partnership
has its seat.
B. Posting of the summary for three months in the courtroom, i.e. in a
public place of the Court of First Instance accessible to the public.
24
See Arts. 42-44 of the Greek ComN.
72
We need to distinguish between civil partnership and commercial

partnerships which pursue a commercial purpose and are regulated by the
rules of Commercial Law.25
25
See above Ch. C, II, 2.
PART TWO
THE RIGHT
CHAPTER A
CONCEPT AND DISTINCTIONS OF RIGHTS
I. THE CONCEPTS OF LEGAL RELATION AND RIGHT
Legal relation is every relation of human life regulated by law and
resulting in legal effects, e.g. the relationship between employer and
employee, seller and buyer, parents and children.
The regulation of a legal relation by the law results in the creation of
rights and obligations. Every right is usually accompanied by a
corresponding obligation, i.e. the binding of a specific person to perform in
a certain way.1 When, for example, the employee has the right to ask his
employer for his wages, there is a corresponding obligation of the employer
to pay the wages. Or the buyers right to demand that the ownership of the
item sold be transferred to him and that the same be materially delivered to
him corresponds to the sellers obligation to fulfill these demands.
The right is a basic concept of law. Right is the power a person is
granted by law to seek the vindication of an interest the law deems worthy
1
However, there are rights which are not linked from the start with a corresponding
obligation. For example, the right of ownership does not correspond with the specific
obligation of a certain person; there only exists the general obligation for all to refrain from
acts that would constitute an offense against that right. Only in case a persons right to
ownership was offended, is there an obligation for the offender to stop offending, to refrain
from doing so in the future, and perhaps to be liable for damages. Similarly, to every
obligation there does not necessarily exist a corresponding right. This, for example, is the
case when in his will the testator obliges his heir to furnish a performance to another, without
conferring to that other person the right to claim the performance in question (Art. 1715 CC).
74
of protecting. For example, the law recognizes the right of the child under
age to demand maintenance, given the fact that existence constitutes an
interest.
II. TYPES OF RIGHTS
From the several distinctions of rights that exist we will limit ourselves
to the following:
1. Property, Personal, and Mixed
A. Property Rights
Property rights are the rights which are recognized in order to satisfy an
economic interest. Property rights are the obligational rights, the real rights,
and the succession rights.
a. Obligational rights: obligational right is the right which enables the
beneficiary to demand from another the performance of an obligation.
Contracts are usually the source of obligational rights.2 In a sale contract, for
example, such is the right of the seller to demand payment for the item sold,
or in a loan agreement the right of the lender to demand from the borrower
the payment of his debt.
b. Real rights: real right is the right providing an immediate and against
all (erga omnes) authority on the object. Such is, for example, the right of
ownership, where the owner of a thing has direct (i.e. without the need of an
intermediary) and erga omnes authority on the object, meaning that he can
turn against anyone who takes away or disturbs his right to ownership.
c. Succession rights: succession right is the right a person has on the
property of another who is deceased, e.g. the right of the heir to demand that
the succession be delivered to him.
B. Personal Rights
Personal rights are the rights aiming at the satisfaction of a moral
interest. Personal rights are the right to ones personality3 and the family
2
3
For the concept of contract, see below Part Three, Ch. B, I, 2.

See above Part One, Ch. B, III, 1, A.
75
rights, i.e. the rights stemming from a family relationship (such as, for
example, marriage, or the relationship between parents and children).
C. Rights of Mixed Nature
Rights of mixed nature are the rights having at once a personal and a
property aspect. Such is, for example, the right to the products of ones
intellect, i.e. the right a person has on the products of his intellectual work.
Examples of mixed rights are the authors right to allow or disallow the
publication of his book, the musicians right to allow or disallow the
broadcasting of his musical compositions from a radio station, or the right of
an inventor over his invention.
From these mixed rights stem both moral rights (e.g. the right of the
writer to be recognized as the author of his work, publish, withdraw, or
modify it) and property rights (e.g. the right of the author to secure for
himself financial benefits from the publication of his work).
2. Power Conferring and Condition Forming Rights
A. Power Conferring Rights

Power conferring rights, or rights to claiming, are the rights
conferring the power to their bearer to control a certain thing (e.g.
ownership), or to interfere in the sphere of the personal life of another (e.g.
parental care).
The power conferring rights can be distinguished in absolute and
relative.
a. Absolute rights: absolute right is the right that may be asserted
against all (erga omnes). The law prohibits to all any kind of interference
with ones things. Consequently, the bearer of this type of right may pursue
the thing in whoevers hands it may be.
In contrast to common law, there is in Greek law a plethora of distinctions of rights all of
which are not easily translatable into English. In fact, at times this phenomenon of multiple
distinctions has been criticized as a preoccupation with rights to the detriment of focusing on
remedies or actions. See, for example, S. Symeonides The General Principles of Civil Law,
in K. Kerameus Ph. Kozyris (eds.), Introduction to Greek Law, 1993, p. 60 (in English).
Here we translate the Greek terms and as power conferring
and condition forming respectively in hopes of staying closer to the original by adopting
this circumlocutory rendition (Translators note).
76
The right of ownership is an absolute right. For example, A, the owner

of a piece of land, is entitled to demand from anyone not to offend his
property, such as by moving the fence away from his property. The right to
ones personality is also an absolute right. For example, A, a medical doctor,
may demand from all not to defame him.
b. Relative rights: relative rights may only be asserted against a specific
person and oblige him to conform to a certain behavior. Obligational rights,
i.e. the rights that stem from the law of obligations, are relative rights. If, for
example, A sells a car to B, the sellers right to demand payment from the
buyer (the monetary payment agreed upon) is relative because A, the seller,
can take action in this regard only against B.
B. Condition Forming Rights
Condition forming, or constitutive, rights are the rights which permit
the bearer to proceed unilaterally to the formation, change, or abrogation of
a legal relation or a right.
Examples: The right to seize an abandoned movable is a condition forming
right because its exercise results in the acquisition of the right of ownership on the
movable thing by the person who seized it.
The right of each of the spouses to dissolve the marriage through divorce is a
condition forming right because its exercise puts an end to the legal relation of
the marriage.
CHAPTER B
CLAIM AND DEFENDANTS PLEA
I. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RIGHT AND CLAIM
Claim is a kind of right. Claim is the right one has to demand from
another an action or omission (Art. 247 CC).
1. The concept of right is broader than that of claim. The right may be
the source of many claims, the same as it may be the source of no claim.
Example: The right to ones personality is an absolute sovereign right. If no one
offends the personality of another, this right does not give rise to any claim. The
only time claims arise is when one person offends the personality of another, such
as when A is being slandered or defamed by B. In this case the party whose
personality was offended has against the offender (i.e. A has against B) not just
one but more claims (the claim for the offense to cease, the claim for the offense
never to be repeated in the future, and the claim for damages).
From the above example two things follow: one, that the right to
personality, and, more generally, all absolute rights do not generate a claim
unless offended; two, that when offended, such rights do not generate just
one but several claims. The condition forming rights do not generate any
claim.
2. The right is subject to term of extinction, whereas the claim is
subject to prescription.
78
More specifically:
Term of extinction of a right is the time frame within which a right
needs to be exercised.1 If the right is not exercised during this time frame, it
is extinguished.
Prescription is the weakening of the claim.2 This means that, if the
person entitled to raise a claim does not do so within a certain period of
time, the law allows the debtor to refuse performance.
II. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CLAIM AND LEGAL ACTION
The term legal action has two meanings: the one is substantive and the
other procedural.
1. Legal Action in the Substantive Sense of the Term
In the substantive sense of the term legal action and claim coincide.3
2. Legal Action in the Procedural Sense of the Term
Legal action in the procedural sense of the term is the right of a person
to seek judicial protection from the state.
Legal actions in the procedural sense of the term are distinguished in:
A. Declaratory Actions
The declaratory legal action aims at declaring the existence or non
existence of a legal relation. Such is, for example, the lawsuit of A against B
demanding the recognition of the fact that between him (A) and B a rental
agreement exists regarding the lease of an immovable property; or the
lawsuit of a mother against the person she claims to be the childs father
demanding that the paternity of the child born out of wedlock be
acknowledged.
See below Ch. F, II.

See below Ch. F, I.
3
Regarding the concept of legal action in the substantive sense of the term, several views
have been upheld. See Papantoniou, op. cit., p. 202; Spyridakis, op. cit., p. 106; Simantiras,
op. cit., p. 177; Papasteriou, op. cit., Vol. I/a, p. 205 et seq.
2
79
B. Actions to Perform
Action to perform (or compelling to perform) is the action through
which it is demanded that a person be compelled to an action or omission.
For example, when A lodges an action against B for the payment of the
money the latter owes to him on account of a loan agreement existing
between them, what is being sought is for B to be forced to pay A the money
he owes to him.
C. Condition Forming Actions
Condition forming, or constitutive, action is the action seeking to

create, alter, or nullify a legal relation through the exercise of a condition
forming right. For example, given the fact that the right of each spouse to
demand the dissolution of the marriage is a condition forming right,4 the
lawsuit for divorce is a condition forming legal action seeking to abolish
the existing legal relation of the marriage.
III. THE DEFENDANTS PLEA
The defendants plea is also a right which is opposed against another
right and cripples its effect. That is, the plea is used as a means of defense
against the one who asserts a different right and raises a different claim.
Examples: A had loaned B 1,500 euros and the loan had to be paid back after
one year. After the year passed, A, who was claiming that B had not paid him
back the 1,500 euros, filed a lawsuit against B in order to recover his money. To
refute As claim, B may advance a plea claiming that he does not owe A anything
because he has already paid him back the loan.
Following a loan agreement, A owed B 1,000 euros. B was nonchalant and did
not pursue his claim against A. Twenty three years after the time the loan was
supposed to have been paid back, B filed a lawsuit against A demanding his
money. To refute Bs claim, A advanced the plea of prescription claiming that B
had not pursued his claim within the period of time set by law for this purpose.
Regarding terminology, see above Translators note, p. 75 (Translators note).

See above Ch. A, II, 2.
CHAPTER C
ACQUISITION, CHANGE, AND LOSS OF A RIGHT
I. ACQUISITION OF A RIGHT
Acquisition of a right is the connection of the right with a specific
person called the subject (bearer) of the right.
The acquisition of a right may be original or derivative.
The acquisition of a right is original when the right acquired is
independent of the right of another person.
Example: A finds an abandoned book and keeps it for himself (acquisition of a
derelict object). In this case A acquired his right on the book in an original
manner.
The acquisition of a right is derivative when the right acquired is based
on the right that another person had, i.e. the former owner of the right.
Example: A transfers the ownership of his car to B. In this case B acquires the
right of ownership on the car in a derivative manner because it is based on the
transfer made by A.
II. CHANGE OF A RIGHT

There are two ways a right may be changed: subjectively and
objectively.
81
GENERAL PRINCIPLES
1. Subjective Change
We have subjective change of a right when there is change in the
person of either the debtor or the creditor.
Examples: A, the debtor, owed B, the creditor, 1,500 euros from a loan
agreement. A died and C is his heir. Consequently, we have here a change in the
person of the debtor because C now enters in the place of the debtor (A).
A, the debtor, owed B, the creditor, 1,500 euros from a loan agreement. B died
and D is his heir. Consequently, we have here a change in the person of the
creditor because D now enters in the place of the creditor (B).
2. Objective Change
Objective change of the right means that the content of the right has
changed.
Example: A who owed B 1,500 euros from unpaid wages, gave him 600 euros. In
this case we have an objective change of the right in question because, following
the partial fulfillment of As obligation, Bs claim was reduced from 1,500 euros
to 900 euros.
III. LOSS OF A RIGHT

Loss of a right to its bearer may occur in the following ways:
1. Loss of a Right with the Consent of the Bearer
When the loss of the right results from the bearers will, it is called
disposition of right.
Example: A transfers the ownership of his car to B. In this case A willingly loses
his right of ownership on his vehicle.
2. Loss of a Right without the Consent of the Bearer

Loss of a right without the bearers consent may occur in different
ways, such as, for example, the bearers death, or total destruction of the
object of the right.
Examples: Upon his death, A loses the right to his personality or to his name.
With the total destruction of As stereo equipment due to fire, A loses his right
of ownership of the stereo equipment because the object of his right of ownership
was totally destroyed.
CHAPTER D
USE AND ABUSE OF A RIGHT
I. THE EXERCISE OF A RIGHT
Exercise of a right is the use of the power conferred by the right to its
bearer. The exercise of a right includes:
1. The enjoyment of the benefits included in the right.
Examples: A is the owner of a farm. His right of ownership of the farm gives
him the benefits of cultivating it and enjoying its fruits.
B is the owner of an apartment. His right of ownership of the apartment gives
him the benefits of living in it or leasing it.
2. The disposal of the right.

Examples: A, who is the owner of the farm, transfers it to B.
B, who is the owner of the apartment, transfers it to C.
3. The protection of the right, i.e. the recourse to any legal action in
case of its violation.
Examples: The trespassing on As farm by a third party constitutes a violation of
his right of ownership.
The breaking of the front door of Bs apartment by a third party constitutes a
violation of his right of ownership.
A right may be protected by way of court protection or by self-rule

(private justice).1
See below Ch. E.
83
II. THE ABUSE OF A RIGHT

1. General
The bearer of a right is free to exercise it to its full extent but the
lawmaker has set certain limitations by forbidding the exercise of a right
when it manifestly goes beyond the boundaries of good faith (bona fides),
good morals (boni mores), or the social or economic purpose for which the
right was granted.
In this fashion the exercise of a right remains under judicial control.
This is fair because the rights are granted by the legal order for the purpose
of securing the harmonious regulation of living in a social setting. Thus, it is
only natural that the same legal order would want to have the general
supervision, so that living in a social setting would not be disturbed by the
exercise of rights.
According to Article 281 of the Greek Civil Code the exercise of a
right shall be prohibited if such exercise obviously exceeds the limits
imposed by good faith or good morals or by the social or economic purpose
of the right.
2. Conditions Determining the Abusive Exercise of a Right
In order for the exercise of a right to be characterized as abusive, the
following two conditions need to concur:
A. The exercise of the right needs to exceed the limits set by good faith,
or good morals, or the economic or social purpose of the right.
The criteria determining the boundaries beyond which the exercise of a
right is abusive are:
a. Good faith (bona fides): good faith is the directness and honesty
required in legal transactions.
Examples of exercise of a right in a way that exceeds the limits set by good faith:
the firing of an employee because of revenge, the omission to promote an
employee while promoting another one instead with clearly fewer qualifications,
the construction of an unusually high boundary wall in order to bother the
neighbor.
b. Good morals (boni mores): good morals are the views of the
average social man on morality and especially on social morality.
84
Examples of exercise of a right in a way exceeding the boundaries set by good

morals: the firing of an employee due to illness or of a pregnant woman due to
her pregnancy; eviction of the lessee while he is bedridden.
c. The economic purpose of the right: the economic purpose of a right

follows from the more general economic interests that the legal order
purports to serve when protecting a specific right.
Example of exercising a right in a way that exceeds the boundaries set by the
economic purpose that the right in question purports to serve: eviction of a tenant
for whom there exists a guarantor allegedly because he is late in paying the rent
but in reality simply because the lessor wishes to find another tenant who would
pay him a higher rent. In this case, because a guarantor for the current tenant does
exist and he has undertaken the obligation to satisfy the creditor if the debtor of
the principal obligation defaults, the lessors right to evict the current tenant is not
justified since his claim for rent is protected by the guarantee.
d. The social purpose of the right: the social purpose of the right is the
social function which, according to the legal order, the right in question
serves.
Examples of exercise of a right in ways that exceed the limits set by its social
purpose: the firing of a female employee because of decrease of her productivity
due to problems in her constitution following childbirth; the firing of a male
employee because of his legal involvement in trade union activities.
B. The boundaries set by good faith, or good morals or the economic

or social purpose of the right must be significantly exceeded.
These boundaries are considered significantly exceeded only when the
exercise of the right indubitably clashes with the limits set by good faith, or
good morals, or the economic or social purpose of the right.
3. Legal Consequences of the Abusive Exercise of a Right
According to Article 281 of the Greek Civil Code the abusive exercise
of a right is forbidden. This means that such action would constitute an
illegal act. Consequently:
A. If the abusive exercise of the right is manifested by way of a
juridical act, e.g. termination of a contract of employment (i.e. by firing the
employee), this juridical act is null and void.
B. If the abusive exercise of the right is manifested by way of a
physical act, e.g. the construction of a boundary wall in order to bother the
neighbor, it is possible for the person adversely affected by the abusive
85
exercise of the right to demand for its exercise to cease at present and not to
be repeated in the future.
C. If the abusive exercise of the right is manifested by way of taking
legal action, e.g. filing a lawsuit in order to evict a lessee who is bedridden,
the lawsuit is dismissed.
Finally, it should be noted that in the event that, aside from the
illegality, the other conditions for delictual liability2 also concur, the person
who exercises the right abusively owes compensation to the one who is
adversely affected. For example, in the case of omitting to promote an
employee, the unfairly treated employee is entitled to damages.
4. Means of Defense of the Adversely Affected Party from the Abusive
Exercise
The person adversely affected by the abusive exercise of a right may
defend himself either by way of lodging legal action or by way of opposing
pleas.
Example of defense by way of lodging legal action: A, who is harmed by the
construction of a tall boundary wall, may bring legal action against B, the person
who built the wall, and demand for the wall to be torn down and not to be erected
again.
Example of defense by way of opposing a plea: A, the lessor of an apartment,
brings legal action against B, the lessee, who at the time is bedridden on account
of a serious stroke, and seeks to evict him because he owes him two months rent.
B refutes As claim by opposing a plea to the effect that such exercise of a right is
abusive and demands to keep residing in As apartment.
The conditions for establishing delictual liability are the following: (i) unlawful human
behavior; (ii) fault; (iii) damage; (iv) causal relationship between the unlawful and culpable
behavior and the damage (i.e. that indeed the damage was the result of the unlawful and
culpable behavior). See below Law of Obligations, Part Three, Ch. B, I, 4, B.
CHAPTER E
THE PROTECTION OF RIGHTS
The need to protect a right arises only when it is offended. The
protection of rights is usually judicial, i.e. handled by the courts of law.
Exceptionally, however, it is allowed for one to protect ones right by selfrule (private justice).
I. JUDICIAL PROTECTION
1. General
Judicial protection of a persons rights is the protection provided by
the state through its court system. If a persons right was offended, by
bringing the appropriate action he may demand from the court of law
having jurisdiction over the matter to issue the appropriate judgment.1
If the beneficiary of the right would not follow this path and would
proceed instead with self-rule regarding his right, we would end up
abolishing every concept of equity and fairness in the state. The right of the
stronger would prevail and, consequently, the weaker members of society
would never be able to find justice.
The legal protection of rights is regulated by the Greek Law of Civil
Procedure. Nonetheless, we think it necessary to provide here a summary
presentation of it.2
According to the Greek Constitution (Art. 20, para. 1) Everyone is entitled to legal
protection by the courts and may plead before them his position on his rights or interests, as
specified by law.
2
See G. Rammos N. Klamaris, Manual of Civil Procedural Law, Vol. A (unfin.), 3d ed.,
1998, p. 15 et seq.; K. Beis, Lessons on Political Procedure: Fundamental Concepts and the
Organization of the Courts, 4th ed., 1984, p. 109 et seq.; P. Yessiou Faltsi, Civil Procedure
in Hellas, 1997 (in English); K. Kerameus, in K. Kerameus Ph. Kozyris (eds.),
Introduction to Greek Law, op. cit., p. 265 et seq.
87
Justice is rendered by the courts which are divided in civil courts,

aiming at the resolution of civil disputes, criminal courts, aiming at the
persecution and punishment of the offenders of the criminal law, and
administrative courts, aiming at the resolution of administrative disputes,
i.e. disputes between the administration and those administered by it, such
as, for example, disputes over debts resulting from owing taxes.
Private disputes, as was earlier mentioned, are resolved by the civil
courts. The laws regulating the organs and the way of resolution of civil
disputes are contained in the Civil Procedure.
2. Distinctions of Civil Courts
The civil courts are distinguished in first instance courts, appellate
courts, and the Court of Cassation (Areios Pagos), i.e. the Greek Supreme
Court. The principle of having courts of two instances is established by the
Greek Code of Civil Procedure.3 According to this rule, for every case of
dispute the law generally provides for the possibility of two judgments, i.e.
the initial judgment and, following an appeal, the review of the first
instance judgment by a court of second instance, a court of appeals. Based
on this principle the courts are distinguished in first instance courts and
courts of appeals.
A. First Instance Courts
First instance courts are the courts before which the cases are first
introduced. There are three first instance courts: the Justices of the Peace,
the One-member Courts of First Instance, and the Multi-member Courts of
First Instance.4 5
The law distributes the private disputes among the above three courts
of first instance using as a criterion the importance of the object disputed.
The importance of the object in dispute usually depends on the value of the
object and, exceptionally, on the nature of the dispute.
See Art. 12 CCPr.

The One-member Courts of First Instance have the same seat as the Multi-member Courts
of First Instance but they constitute separate courts.
5
In rare cases even the courts of appeals function as first instance courts, as when they rule
on disputes from the execution of contracts of Public Works (Art. 61, Introductory Law of
the Code of Civil Procedure).
4
88
More specifically:
a. Justices of the Peace: 6 the Justices of the Peace have competence to
rule on:7
aa. all the disputes that can be assessed in monetary terms provided
that the value of their object does not exceed the amount of 12,000 euros;
bb. several simple and urgent cases, regardless of the value of the
object in dispute, e.g. certain rural disputes, such as the disputes
concerning damage to trees, vines, fruit, etc., disputes over the usage of
running water or the prevention of it.
b. One-member Courts of First Instance: 8 the One-member Courts of
First Instance have competence to rule on:9
aa. all the disputes that can be assessed in monetary terms provided
that the value of their object is over 12,000 euros but does not exceed
80,000 euros;
bb. certain categories of disputes even if the value of their object
exceeds 80,000 euros, such as the disputes between tenants and landlords,
employers and employees, or motor vehicle related disputes (e.g. claims
for damages stemming from car accidents).
c. Multi-member Courts of First Instance: 10 the Multi-member Courts
of First Instance have competence over all the disputes for which the
Justices of the Peace and the One-member Courts of First Instance do not
have competence. 11
B. Courts of Appeals
Courts of appeals are the courts ruling on appeals against the decisions
of the courts of first instance. Courts of appeals are the Multi-member
Courts of First Instance (acting as courts of appeals) and the Appellate
Courts.
6
7
For the competence of the Justices of the Peace, see Art. 14, para. 1 and Art. 15 CCPr.
In Greece there are today 63 One-member Courts of First Instance.
9
For the competence of One-member Courts of First Instance, see Art. 14, para. 2 and Art.
16 CCPr.
10
In Greece there are today 63 Multi-member Courts of First Instance, i.e. as many as there
are One-member Courts of First Instance.
11
For the competence of the Multi-member Courts of First Instance acting as Courts of First
Instance, see Art. 18, para. 1 CCPr.
8
89
a. Multi-member Courts of First Instance as Courts of Appeals: the

Multi-member Courts of First Instance rule on appeals against the decisions
of the Justices of the Peace in their area.12
b. Appellate Courts:13 the Appellate Courts rule on appeals against the
decisions of the One- and Multi-member Courts of First Instance in their
area.14
C. The Court of Cassation (Areios Pagos)
The Court of Cassation (Areios Pagos),15 which is the highest court in
Greece (the Greek Supreme Court), is neither a first instance court nor a
court of appeals because it does not deal with findings of fact; it only
examines whether the law has been properly applied by the other courts in
their judgments. The Court of Cassation (Areios Pagos) rules on petitions
for cassation review16 of the judgment of any civil court17 and can reverse
the judgment only for legal errors; not for errors related to the substantive
evaluation of evidence or the verification of findings of fact.
3. The Procedural Steps to Litigation before a First Instance Court

For legal protection to be provided a series of procedural steps are
taken which constitute the litigation.
12
For the competence of the Multi-member Courts of First Instance as Courts of Appeals,
see Art. 18, para. 2 CCPr.
13
In Greece there are today 15 Courts of Appeals. Under every Court of Appeals there are
one or more Multi-member Courts of First Instance and an equal number of One-member
Courts of First Instance.
14
For the jurisdiction of the Courts of Appeals, see Art. 19 CCPr.
15
There is only one Court of Cassation, the Areios Pagos, and its seat is in Athens.
The constitution of Areios Pagos is very different from the constitution of the American
Supreme Court. Its members are: one President, nine Vice Presidents, and fifty Supreme
Court Justices hearing cases either in panels of five or in full bench. See Art. 23 of L.
1756/1988 on Court Organization (Translators note).
16
Cassation review is the legal remedy through which the judgment of any civil court (i.e.
Justice of the Peace, One- or Multi-member Court of First Instance, and Court of Appeals) is
brought before the Court of Cassation (Areios Pagos) with the request that the judgment in
question be reversed for reasons of violation of a rule of law.
17
See Arts. 552 et seq. CCPr.
90
A. Bringing an Action
The first step for the litigation to commence is to bring an action
before the court. Legal action is the procedural means through which we
demand legal protection by way of issuance of a favorable court
judgment.18
The person who brings the action is called the plaintiff and the person
against whom an action is brought is called the defendant.19
The action is brought through the filing of a written complaint which
on the one hand is entered in the docket of the court having competence on
the matter and on the other hand is served on the defendant.
Example: A owes B 1,500 euros from a loan agreement but refuses to pay his
debt. B (the plaintiff) brings action against A (the defendant) demanding from the
court to issue a judgment according to which A would be ordered to pay him
back.
In his action B refers to the factual matters underlying his right which
was offended by the defendant.
Example: B refers to the factual matter that he loaned 1,500 euros to A for a
period of time. This time period expired and yet the defendant did not pay him
back.
B. The Defense of the Defendant

According to the procedure followed by the court, the defendant may:
a. Deny the facts as alleged by the plaintiff, i.e. claim that the facts
presented by the plaintiff have not taken place; hence the relevant right was
never created.
Example: A claims that a loan agreement between him and B was never
concluded; consequently, the right evoked by B (for the satisfaction of which the
latter brings the legal action in question) has never been created.
b. Oppose pleas: pleas20 are the means of defense through which the
defendant, though accepting that the conditions generating the crucial legal
relation are indeed present, maintains that other factual matters were also
present which either prevented the creation of the disputed right or
abolished it after it was created.
18
See above Ch. B, II, 2.

The plaintiff and the defendant together are called the litigants.
20
See above Ch. B, III
19
91
Examples: A claims that, because the loan agreement he concluded with B is

null and void due to his incapacity to conclude juridical acts21 at the time he
entered into the agreement (e.g. A was not conscious of his own acts), the
disputed right of B was never created, i.e. the right to demand the payment of the
loan.
A claims that, although a loan agreement between him and B has indeed been
concluded, because A has already paid it back, Bs right to demand from him the
payment of the loan has been extinguished, i.e. it no longer exists.
C. Evidence
For the court to decide on the truthfulness or lack thereof of the claims
advanced by the opposing parties during the litigation, several pieces of
evidence are being considered, such as for example witnesses, expert
witnesses, documents, etc.
Not all factual matters presented by the litigants (i.e. by the plaintiff
and the defendant) constitute subject matter of evidence22 but only those
which substantially influence the outcome of the proceedings, i.e. those
which have given rise to the disputed right (loan), or have extinguished it
(payment), or have prevented it from emerging (incapacity of the defendant
to enter into juridical acts at the time of their conclusion).
D. Court Ruling
The court, after weighing the claims of the litigants, issues the
appropriate judgment, i.e. it either accepts or rejects the action brought by
the plaintiff.
4. Legal Remedies23
If the court judgment is not considered satisfactory by the plaintiff or
the defendant, it may be appealed to a higher court (the judgments of the
courts of first instance are appealed before a court of second instance, and
the judgments of the courts of first and second instance are subject to
cassation review before the Court of Cassation, the Areios Pagos,24) from
which it is petitioned that the judgment be reversed or modified so that
justice may be better served.
21
For the incapacity to conclude juridical acts, see below Part Three, Ch. C, II, 4.
Regarding evidence, see Arts. 335-465 CCPr.
23
See Arts. 495-590 CCPr.
24
See above Ch. E, I, 2, C.
22
92
5. Forcible Execution25
The protection of the rights offered through a court judgment would
often be useless if it were not for forcible execution. Forcible execution,
which is performed by the public authorities, is the process forcing the
defendant to comply with the court judgment.
For the satisfaction of pecuniary claims, attachment26 to the
defendants property allows for it to be subsequently auctioned.27 The
plaintiffs claim is satisfied from the money received from the asset(s)
auctioned.
Example: A owed B the amount of 15,000 euros from a loan agreement. B
brought action against A demanding from the court that A be forced to pay him
the above amount. The court issued a condemnatory judgment but A would not
comply with it. During the enforcement proceedings that followed, As assets
were attached in order to be auctioned. Bs claim will be satisfied from the
money received from the auction sale.
6. Provisional Remedies
The big delays encountered in the process of conferring justice during
ordinary proceedings created the need for a parallel yet different type of
legal protection which is quick but only has a temporary character. It is the
proceedings of provisional remedies.
Provisional remedies are the summary proceedings established by
law28 in case of urgency or for the purpose of averting impending danger.
The purpose of these proceedings is to secure or safeguard a substantive
right or to manage a situation. The judgment on provisional remedies is
valid temporarily and in no way affects the main litigation.29 The court
before which the main litigation is pending always has the power to modify
or revoke the provisional remedies in part or in whole.30
Example: A, a farm owner, cuts fruit from the farm of his neighbor B or passes
through his neighbors farm without permission. In these cases, for the offenses
25

Attachment is the procedural act which binds the property of the debtor materially and
legally (see Beis, op. cit., p. 413).
27
Auction is the sale which takes place following a public invitation to every interested
potential buyer and the selection of the one who offers the highest bid (see Beis, op. cit., p.
422).
28
29
See Art. 695 CCPr.
30
See Art. 697 CCPr.
26
93
to cease, B may bring action before the courts against A on the grounds of
trespass on property. This process, however, is very slow. For this purpose the
law provides for the accelerated process of provisional remedies aiming at the
speedy and provisional settlement of disputes so as to avoid conflicts and
fighting.
II. SELF-RULE OR PRIVATE JUSTICE

Exceptionally, the law allows for self-rule with respect to ones right,
i.e. for the beneficiary of the right to perform all the necessary acts required
for its protection.
Those exceptional cases are self-redress, self-defense, and state of
necessity.
1. Self-redress
Self-redress is the satisfaction of a claim by the beneficiary using his
own force and without the assistance of the authorities (Art. 282 CC).
According to the law, self-redress is permitted only when the following
conditions concur:
A. A private law claim exists which may be pursued by bringing legal
action, e.g. a claim stemming from the trespass on ownership.
B. The assistance of the authorities cannot arrive in time. Authority
means every competent public organ, e.g. the police.
C. By reason of the delay, the realization of the claim runs the risk of
being frustrated or considerably obstructed. Whether such danger actually
exists or not is evaluated objectively.
Examples: If A removes from B, an author, the only manuscript of his work
and is about to set it on fire, there is danger of frustration of Bs claim.
If A, a tenant in Bs apartment, loads his furniture on a truck in order to move
when he has not paid rent in four months, or if A, an unknown individual, grabs
Bs briefcase while the latter sits and chats in a restaurant and runs to the
door, there is danger of considerable obstruction regarding the satisfaction of Bs
claims.
For self-redress to be permitted by law, i.e. for it not to be considered

an unlawful act, the beneficiary needs to have employed only the absolutely
necessary means for the protection of his claim. For example, suffices that
he regains possession of the stolen object; it is not necessary for him to also
arrest the offender.
94
If either the above conditions were not present or the means used by
the beneficiary were not absolutely necessary, the act is unlawful and the
person who engaged in self-redress is liable to pay damages.
Example: In the event that A stole the briefcase of B, the latter is entitled to
regain possession of the briefcase on his own. But if B, in order to remove his
briefcase from As hands, caused A serious personal injury, i.e. something that is
not necessary for the satisfaction of his claim, B will be forced to pay damages to
A.
2. Self-defense
Self-defense is the act of defense one is allowed to resort to in order to
avert present and unlawful attack on himself or a third party (Art. 284 CC).
According to the law, in order for self-defense not to be considered an
unlawful act, the following conditions need to concur:
A. Attack, i.e. a human act offending a person (natural or legal) or said
persons equitable goods, such as freedom, honor, personal integrity,
property.
B. The attack must be present, i.e. it must have begun and not have
finished as yet.
C. The attack needs to be unjust, i.e. the person attacking must commit
an unlawful act.
D. The defendants act must constitute an act of defense, i.e. purport to
avert the attack. If the act is not a defensive act, then we are dealing with
counter attack.
E. The act of the defendant must be directed against the attacker and
not against a third party.
F. The defense must be the necessary one. Whether in each case the
defense was indeed the necessary one or was in excess of the limits of
defense is to be evaluated by objective criteria.
To the extent that the defendant exceeded the limits of defense, he has
committed a counter attack against which the original attacker has the right
to counter defend himself.
Example: During a fight between A and B the former pushes the latter. B, who is
on the defense, may beat A. This act of defense is permitted by law;
consequently, it does not constitute an unlawful act. However, if B, instead of
beating A, causes him serious bodily injury by using a pocket knife which he
carried with him, B has exceeded the limits of defense and his act constitutes an
attack.
95
In case the above conditions of self-defense do not concur, or the

defendants act exceeds the limits of defense, the defendants act is
unlawful, thus creating for him the obligation to pay damages to the person
who attacked.
In the above example Bs attack entitles A to seek damages.
3. State of Necessity
A state of necessity is present when a person is forced to damage or
even destroy an object belonging to another in order to avert danger
threatening to cause much greater damage to the individual who caused the
damage or to a third party (Art. 285 CC).
According to the law, in order for the damage or destruction of a
foreign object not to constitute an unlawful act, the following conditions
need to concur:
A. Danger, i.e. a condition threatening to cause damage to a
commodity. The danger may come from a natural cause (e.g. a snow
storm), or from the same object which is being destroyed (e.g. a chasing
dog on the loose), or from a human act (e.g. a chasing madman on the
loose).
B. The danger must be imminent. The danger is imminent when the
damage is highly probable or expected within a short time.
C. Damage or destruction of an object belonging to another.
D. The damage or destruction of the object belonging to another must
be necessary for the imminent danger to be averted.
E. Threat of damage which is disproportionately greater than the one
caused by the destruction of another persons object. For example, human
life is something the value of which is always far greater than the value of
an object.
But even when the conditions of the state of necessity concur, it is
possible for the court to force the party who caused the damage to pay
reasonable damages to the injured party (Art. 286 CC).31
31
Reasonable damages are the damages which depend on the circumstances in each and
every particular case and on the judgment of the court. This compensation is based on the
principle of equity (aequitas), given the fact that the lawmaker thought that in some cases it
is neither appropriate to award full compensation nor to abstain from awarding any. See A.
Litzeropoulos, in ERMAK, Art. 298, No 41 et seq.; M. Stathopoulos, in Georgiadis
Stathopoulos, Commentary on the Civil Code, Arts. 297-298, No 71 et seq.; M.
Stathopoulos, General Law of Obligations, 3d ed., 1998, p. 188 et seq.; Ap. Georgiadis, Law
96
Examples: In order for A to save his life from a snow storm, he breaks the front
door of a country residence so that he can get in.
In order for A to save his life from a chasing dog with rabies, he kills the dog.
In order for A to save his life from a madman chasing him, he breaks the
crystal front door of an apartment building, so as to get in.
In all of the above cases the damage caused was not due to an unlawful act; it
was a necessary damage in order for a far greater damage to the person who
initiated such act to be averted, i.e. in order for his life to be saved. However,
because for the sake of saving a persons life some damage did occur (e.g.
damage to the front door of the country residence, the killing of a dog, or the
breaking of the front door of an apartment building), the judge will force the
person who caused this damage to pay reasonable compensation to the one who
sustained it (i.e. the owner of the country residence, the owner of the dog, or the
owners of the apartment building), so that part of the damage they sustained may
be recovered.
In case the conditions of the state of necessity do not concur, the

damage or destruction of another persons object is unlawful and the person
who caused the damage is obliged to compensate the one who sustained it.
Example: If A caused the destruction or damage of another persons object which
was not necessary in order to avert an imminent danger (i.e. if he simply believed
that he was being chased by a madman or a dog having rabies but in reality he
was not), then he is obliged to make full restitution for the damage he caused.
of Obligations, General Part, op. cit., p. 151 et seq.; Ast. Georgiadis, Law of Obligations,
General Part, Vol. I, 4th ed., 2003, p. 143 et seq.
CHAPTER F
PRESCRIPTION AND TERM OF EXTINCTION
I. PRESCRIPTION
1. The Concept
If the person entitled to a claim does not exercise it within a certain
time, the law gives the debtor the right to refuse fulfillment of his
performance. This weakening of the claim is called prescription
(praescriptio).1
Examples: On March 14, 1989 A loaned B the amount of 500,000 drachmas

which B was to pay back on March 15, 1990. B did not return the money on
March 15, 1990 and A did not legally pursue his claim, as he was entitled to, i.e.
he did not bring action against B before the courts for this loan. If A continues to
abstain from bringing action against B for twenty years, i.e. until March 16, 2010,
As claim will weaken, which means that it will prescribe.
B owes A 1,500 euros from wages. If for five years A does not claim the
amount due to him from wages, his claim will weaken, i.e. it will prescribe.
What does it mean that a claim weakens? It means that the debtor
may refuse fulfillment of his performance.
Prescription is presented as an opposing plea, i.e. it depends on the
good conscience of the debtor to invoke it and try to get out of his
performance or not. The court does not take it into account ex officio, i.e. on
its own motion (Art. 277 CC).
In the above mentioned examples, if after prescription has accrued, i.e. after the
claim of A against B has prescribed, A brings action against B demanding the
1
See above Ch. B, I, 2.

This is what in common law is known as limitation of actions (statute of limitations)
(Translators note).
98
return of the loan money or the wages owed to him, B has the right to oppose the
plea that, after such a long time during which the claim was inactive, he does not
owe A anything. But if B does not oppose the plea of prescription by invoking the
statute of limitations argument, the court may not take it into consideration on its
own motion (ex officio) and dismiss As claim on account of the fact that such
claim has prescribed.
Prescription is an institution of public order (jus cogens). As with all

institutions of public order, the rules governing it may not be altered
following the parties agreement.2 Every agreement precluding prescription
or defining a different period for it (shorter or longer than the one
established by law), or terms which generally attenuate or aggravate the
conditions for prescription, is null and void (Art. 275 CC).
Example: If A owes B a certain amount of money from a loan, according to the
law the debt will prescribe in twenty years. A and B may not agree that As debt
to B will never be subject to prescription, or that it will prescribe after a longer or
shorter period of time (i.e. in ten or twenty five years). If, despite this prohibition,
A and B proceed to conclude such agreement, it will be null and void.
2. The Prescriptive Period

In principle the prescriptive period is twenty years (Art. 249 CC).
However, the law provides for shorter periods in case of certain claims such
as claims from wages, rent, and interest for which the time period is five
years (Art. 250 CC).
In the above examples As claim from a loan is subject to a twenty year
prescription, whereas his claim for wages to a five year prescription.
The computation of the time for prescription follows the general

provisions of the law regarding terms.3
3. Beginning of the Prescriptive Period
The prescriptive period commences from the time the claim was born
and it is possible for one to pursue the recovery thereof judicially (Art. 251
CC).
Regarding the rules of jus dispositivum and public order, see above Introduction to Law,
Ch. E, II, 2.
3
See Art. 241 et seq. CC. See below Part Three, Ch. F, II, 3, C and D.
99
Example: On May 15, 2002 A had to return to B the amount of 800 euros he had
borrowed from him. Bs claim against A starts on May 16, 2002, i.e. at the time
the claim was born and it was possible for B to pursue it by legal action against A
in order to recover his money.
An exception to the rule determining the beginning of the prescriptive

period can be found in Article 253 of the Greek Civil Code which deals with
claims subject to a five year prescriptive period.
In these cases the prescriptive period starts running from the expiration
of the year during which the prescription began.
Example: A has a claim against B, his employer, for wages owed to him for the
months of May and June 2001. Due to the fact that B was paying his employees in
advance, i.e. for the month just starting he was paying them on the 1st of that
month, the prescriptive period of As claims for wages began on May 2, 2001 and
June 2, 2001 respectively; but in actuality, according to the above mentioned
exception, it is considered having begun on January 1, 2002.
4. Suspension of Prescription
A. The Concept
Suspension of prescription means that during the prescriptive period a
certain stretch of time is not counted on account of the occurrence of a
specific event constituting the reason for the suspension. The prescription
continues after the cessation of the suspension but may not be completed
before at least a further six months from the cessation of the suspension
causing event (Art. 257 CC).
At this point it should be emphasized that for the accrual of prescription
the time that had elapsed prior to the occurrence of the suspension causing
event is added to the computation.
B. Distinctions
There are two types of suspension of prescription: absolute suspension
and suspension of completion.
a. Absolute suspension
The suspension is absolute when the accrual of prescription is
prevented no matter at which point the suspension causing event occurred.
The law determines the cases of the absolute suspension of prescription
(Art. 256 CC). They are:
100
aa. between spouses during the time of the marriage;

bb. between parents and children during the time of the childrens
minority;
cc. between tutors and wards during tutelage;4
dd. between masters and servants during the time of their masterservant relationship but not more than fifteen years.
The reason for absolute suspension of prescription during the above
mentioned instances is that the close relationship that exists between
creditor and debtor should not be disturbed by a potential lawsuit.
Example: On March 15, 1980 the 500,000 drachmas loan Mr. A had taken from
Miss B a year earlier was due and payable. On said date, however, A did not pay
back his loan to B. Consequently, from March 16, 1980 starts the prescriptive
period of Bs claim. A and B got married on March 16, 1983 but were divorced
eight years later, i.e. on March 16, 1991. In this case the prescription of Bs claim
against A, the period of which had begun running on March 16, 1980, was
suspended for the eight years of the duration of their marriage, i.e. from March 16,
1983 until March 16, 1991. The prescriptive period continues to run after the
dissolution of the marriage. This means that the prescriptive period will be
completed at the expiration of the 17th of March of 2008. The time periods
computed for the completion of the prescription were: the time that had elapsed
prior to the marriage, i.e. three years (March 16, 1980 to March 16, 1983), plus
seventeen years after the dissolution of the marriage (March 17, 1991 to March
17, 2008). What was not computed and does not count towards accrual is the time
of eight years during which the marriage lasted (March 16, 1983 to March 16, 1991).
b. Suspension of completion
Suspension of completion of the prescriptive period means that the
period could not be completed because the suspension causing event
occurred during its last six months. This, for example, would happen if, as
stated in Article 255 of the Greek Civil Code, for a certain period of time5
during the last six months of the prescriptive period the beneficiary was
prohibited to pursue his claim on account of force majeure (vis major).
The law refers to moratorium as a special case of force majeure.
Moratorium is any real reason interrupting the operation of the courts (e.g.
earthquake, flood, war).
4
A minor is under tutelage if neither parent has, or can exercise, the parental care (Art. 1589
CC).
5
It makes no difference how long this stretch of time might have been.
101
The prescriptive period continues to run after the cessation of the

suspension but may in no case be completed before the elapse of a further
six months (Art. 257, 2 CC).
Example: A had a claim against B from a loan agreement and the prescriptive
period would be completed on September 15, 2003. However, between May 15,
2003 and May 31, 2003 A was unable to bring action against B because the courts
were closed on account of earthquakes. In this case there is suspension of
completion of the period of prescription because the suspension causing event
took place during the last six months of the prescriptive period. Thus, the
prescriptive period was continued from June 1, 2003 and was completed six
months later, i.e. after the expiration of the 1st of December of 2003.
5. Interruption of the Prescriptive Period

There are certain reasons interrupting the prescriptive period. But in the
case of interruption of prescription, unlike what happens in the case of its
suspension, the time that had run before the interrupting event is not taken
into account for the computation. Instead, from the end of the interruption a
new full period of prescription begins. For the new prescription the length of
time required is the same as was for the one that was interrupted.
The most important reasons for the interruption of the prescriptive
period are the acknowledgement of the claim by the debtor (Art. 260 CC) 6
and the commencement of legal proceedings (Art. 261 CC).
The prescriptive period that was interrupted by the commencement of
legal proceedings begins to run anew from the last act of procedure on
behalf of the litigants or the court (Art. 261 CC).
Example: On May 15, 1990 A should have made a payment to B in the amount of
500,000 drachmas resulting from a loan agreement the two of them had concluded
a year earlier. But on that date A did not make the payment in which case the
prescription of Bs claim against A began on May 16, 1990. On September 10,
1991 B filed a lawsuit against A7 demanding from him payment of the debt. Since
the commencement of legal proceedings interrupts the prescriptive period,
beginning September 11, 1991 a new prescriptive period began. Given the fact
that, in addition to the initial act of filing a lawsuit, other procedural acts followed,
6
The acknowledgment by the debtor of his obligation may be done by any type of action
from which it clearly follows that he considers as valid the existence of a claim against him
(e.g. by making a payment for interest to the beneficiary, or by requesting the court to give
him an extension for the payment of his debt).
7
The legal action begins with filing the action with the court clerk and serving the defendant.
See above Ch. E, I, 3, A.
102
each procedural act brought a new interruption of the period of prescription. In the
event, for example, that the lawsuit filed on September 10, 1991 was discussed by
the court on January 15, 1992, we have a new interruption of the prescriptive
period. The new period of prescription started on January 16, 1992. If, finally, the
court ruling was issued on May 17, 1992, we have yet another interruption of the
prescriptive period. The new period of prescription, which had begun on May 18,
1992, will be completed after the expiration of the 18th of May of 2012.
II. TERM OF EXTINCTION
1. The Concept
Term of extinction of a right is the time frame determined by law or by
the parties within which a right needs to be exercised (Art. 279 CC). This
means that, if the right is not exercised within this time frame, it is
extinguished.
Example: The legal action of a member of an association demanding the
nullification of a resolution of the Meeting of the Members may only be brought
within six months from the date of adoption of the resolution (Art. 101 CC).
2. Differences between Prescription and Term of Extinction

The basic differences between prescription and term of extinction are
the following:
A. Prescription refers to claims, whereas the term of extinction
refers to rights.
B. If the term of extinction elapses, the right is lost, whereas upon
completion of the prescriptive period the claim is weakened but has not been
extinguished.
C. If the term of extinction is laid down by law,8 the court considers it
on its own motion (ex officio), i.e. without the need for the interested party
to advance an argument to this effect. As regards prescription, however, it
can only be considered by the court if pleaded.
This special kind of time limitation recognized in the Greek law may be translated in
English as peremption or forefeiture (Translators note).
8
This, however, is not applicable to the term of extinction laid down by agreement between
the parties.
PART THREE
JURIDICAL ACTS
CHAPTER A
THE CONCEPT
AND DISTINCTION FROM OTHER SIMILAR CONCEPTS
I. GENERAL
From all the acts of man some are of interest to the law and others are
not. The law is interested in those acts which are directed by the human will
and bring about certain changes in the external world, e.g. the purchase of
an item, the destruction of an object belonging to another, the injury of a
person, the marriage. On the contrary, acts in which the law is not interested
are, for example, the social relations and the relations resulting from
friendship.
The acts which interest the law are distinguished in two categories: the
just or lawful ones and the unjust or unlawful.
Just or lawful acts are those which are permitted by law and,
consequently, bring about legal results (e.g. purchase of an object,
marriage).
Unjust or unlawful acts are those prohibited by law. Such acts, if
enacted, result in unfavorable consequences for the culprit (e.g. the
destruction of an object belonging to another, the injury of a person).
From among the lawful acts the most important is the juridical act.
104
II. THE JURIDICAL ACT
Juridical act is the declaration of the human will which in conjunction,

possibly, with other events, is directed towards the production of an
intended legal result, e.g. sale or lease of an object, employment contract,
loan agreement.
Hence, the juridical act does not solely consist of a declaration (or
declarations) of the will but, possibly, of other legal happenings as well,
necessary for a legal result to come about.
Example: For a loan agreement of an amount of money to be concluded, other
than the declarations of will of the lender and the borrower (the one that he loans
this amount of money and the other that he promises to pay it back after a certain
time), physical delivery of the loaned sum is required.
The characteristic feature of the juridical act is that the legal results it
generates are the product of the will, i.e. the person or persons who
concluded the juridical act wanted those results.
Examples: The legal result of a testament, which is the devolution of the
inheritance on the persons designated by the testator, is the result desired by the
testator.
In the case of sale of an object the legal results are what the contracting parties
wanted, i.e. the transfer of ownership of the object sold from the seller to the
buyer and its material delivery to the latter by the former, plus payment of the
agreed price.
III. ACTS NOT CONSTITUTING A JURIDICAL ACT

There are just and lawful human acts which do not constitute juridical
acts. They are the quasi juridical acts and the material acts.
1. Quasi Juridical Acts
Quasi juridical acts are the acts which, although containing a
declaration of will, are characterized by the fact that the legal results they
generate stem directly from the law and do not depend on the will of the
person or persons who engaged in them.
In the English language, the term legal transaction is synonymous with the term juridical
act. In this text, although an attempt is being made to favor the former in hopes of remaining
faithful to the Greek, we often use both interchangeably (Translators note).
105
Example: When a person settles in a place with the intention of making that place
the center of his life relationships, this by law results in the acquisition of a
domicile for the person, whether this was the content of his will at the time of
settlement or not.
2. Material Acts
Material acts are the acts with which the law connects certain results,
even though they do not contain a declaration of will.
Example: Writing a piece of literature or a musical composition results in granting
the author a right over them, the right of intellectual property, even though he may
not have been aware that by so doing he acquires such right.
CHAPTER B
TYPES OF JURIDICAL ACTS
From the several distinctions of juridical acts we will limit ourselves to
the following basic ones:
I. UNILATERAL JURIDICAL ACTS AND CONTRACTS
Unilateral juridical acts are the juridical acts which contain the
declaration of will of only one person, as is for example the case in the
testament or the offer of an award to be given following a contest.
2. Contracts
Contracts are the juridical acts which contain the declarations of will of
two or more persons, acting each with a different interest in mind but
towards the same legal end.
Examples: In a sale we have the declaration of two wills: the will of the seller
and the will of the buyer. Each of them acts out of a different interest (the seller
wishes to transfer the ownership of the thing sold and to deliver the same in order
to receive payment; the buyer wishes to have the ownership of the thing purchased
transferred to him and the thing delivered when he pays the price). However, both
seller and buyer pursue the same legal result: the transfer of ownership of a thing
and its delivery in exchange for payment.
In an employment contract, where the employee wishes to offer his services and
receive his wages and the employer wishes for the employee to offer him his
services upon payment of wages, the commonly pursued legal result is the offer of
services in exchange for payment of wages.
107
The most important distinction of contracts is the distinction in

unilaterally obliging and reciprocal.
A. Unilaterally Obliging Contracts
Unilaterally obliging (or unilaterally charging) contracts are the
contracts which create an obligation for the one party and a right for the other,
e.g. donation.
In the contract of donation the donor has the obligation to deliver the
donated thing to the recipient of the donation and the latter has the right to
demand the thing given to him as a gift.
B. Reciprocal Contracts
Reciprocal contracts are the contracts which create rights and
obligations for both parties, i.e. sale.
In the sale the seller has the obligation to transfer the ownership of the
thing sold to the buyer and to materially deliver the same to him; he also has
the right to receive payment. The buyer has the obligation to make the
payment and the right to demand the transfer of ownership of the thing sold
to him as well as delivery of the same.
II. GRATUITOUS AND ONEROUS JURIDICAL ACTS
1. Gratuitous Juridical Acts
Gratuitous juridical acts are the acts in which the performance on
behalf of the one party is effected without any counter-performance.
Examples: Donation (A donates a television set to B), loan for use (A allows B to
use his car without a quid pro quo).
2. Onerous Juridical Acts

A juridical act is onerous when the performance of the one party
towards the other is done on condition of counter-performance.
Examples: Sale (A is obliged to transfer the ownership of a television set to B
and deliver it to him and B is obliged to pay to A the amount agreed upon).
For the term unilaterally obliging (or unilaterally charging), see below Law of
Obligations, Part Three, Ch. A., III, 2 (Translators note).
108
Lease of a thing (A is obliged to give B the use of his apartment and B is

obliged to pay A the amount of rent agreed upon).
III. JURIDICAL ACTS INTER VIVOS AND MORTIS CAUSA

1. Juridical Acts inter vivos
Juridical acts inter vivos are all the juridical acts except for those which
are mortis causa. Such are, for example, the sale, the lease of a thing, the
employment contract, etc.
2. Juridical Acts mortis causa
Juridical acts mortis causa are the juridical acts which generate results
upon the death of the person who concluded them, e.g. testament (testament
is the instrument through which a person determines the fate of his estate
after his death).
IV. FORMAL AND INFORMAL JURIDICAL ACTS
1. Formal Juridical Acts
A juridical act is formal when a certain type of form is required for its
valid conclusion, e.g. it has to be concluded in writing. Sometimes for the
valid conclusion of that type of act suffices a private document (e.g. for the
constitutive deed and the charter of an association), whereas other times a
notarial deed is needed (e.g. for the sale of an immovable).
The Greek Civil Code establishes the principle of informality of
juridical acts (Art. 158 CC) with formal being the exception.
2. Informal Juridical Acts
A juridical act is informal when there are no particular formal
requirements for its valid conclusion, e.g. lease of a thing, employment
contract. If an informal juridical act is clothed in a certain form, such form
will only have evidential value.1
See below Ch. C, VII, 2 A, b.
CHAPTER C
CONDITIONS FOR THE CONCLUSION
OF A VALID JURIDICAL ACT
I. GENERAL
For the valid conclusion of a juridical act the following conditions need
to concur:
1. Capacity for concluding juridical acts.
2. The presence of will, i.e. the will of the party concluding the juridical
act.
3. The will of the party concluding the juridical act should be free of
defects, i.e. it should not be the result of error as far as the reasons leading
up to the shaping of the will are concerned; nor should it be the result of
fraud or threat.
4. Agreement of the will and of the declaration of the will, i.e. the
declaration of the will should accord with the will.
5. Declaration of the will, i.e. externalization of the will of the party
concluding the juridical act.
6. The declaration of the will should be vested the form required by
law.
7. The content of the juridical act must be in agreement with the law
and with good morals (boni mores).
II. CAPACITY FOR CONCLUDING A JURIDICAL ACT
1. The Concept
Capacity for concluding a juridical act is the capacity of a person to
conclude such act in person. This capacity is only held by mature and
healthy persons.
110
2. Differences between: Legal Capacity, the Capacity to Conclude

Juridical Acts, and the Capacity for Delictual Liability
The capacity to conclude juridical acts should not be confused with
either the legal capacity or the capacity to be held liable for tort/delict (civil
wrongdoing).
A. Legal Capacity
Legal capacity, as was mentioned earlier,1 is the capacity to enjoy
rights and have duties. All persons have this capacity from the time of their
birth till the time of their death.
B. Capacity for Delictual2 Liability
Capacity for delictual liability is the capacity of a person to understand
the meaning of his actions, so that he can distinguish between right and
wrong. Only when a person who commits an unlawful act can distinguish
between right and wrong, can he meet with disapprobation and be
considered liable for his action.
Because the rule is for every mature and healthy person to be
considered capable of causing prejudice to another, the law regulates this
capacity by a negative statement, i.e. it determines not who is but who is not
capable for delictual liability.
According to the Greek Civil Code, the following are incapable of
delictual liability, i.e. of being held accountable for tort/delict:
a. The minor who has not yet completed the tenth year of age (Art. 916
CC).
b. The person who, at the time the prejudice was caused, is proved not
to have been conscious of his acts (e.g. on account of drunkenness or high
In translating the Greek words astiko adikima ( ), which basically mean

civil offense or civil wrongdoing, we use the terms tort and delict interchangeably to
cover both the common law terminology, tort, and the Roman law terminology, delict (from
the Latin delictum, delinquere), used in countries whose legal system is based on the Roman
trandition (Translators note).
1
See above Part One, Ch. A, I.
2
See below Law of Obligations, Part Two, Ch. B, III, 2.
111
fever), or to have been in a state of psychological or mental disturbance

decisively limiting the functioning of his reason and will (Art. 915, 1 CC).3
c. The minor who has completed the tenth but not the fourteenth year of
age, if it is proved that he acted without discretion (Art. 917, 1 CC).4
d. The deaf-mute, if it is proved that he acted without discretion (Art.
917, 2 CC).
3. The Institution of Judicial Assistance
A. General
To provide a better understanding of the various categories of persons
in connection with their capacity to conclude juridical acts, we consider it
necessary to present a brief overview of the institution of judicial assistance
as a whole. The institution of judicial assistance, which is contained in the
Articles 1666-1688 of the Greek Civil Code, belongs to family law5 and was
established by L. 2447/1996 which considerably changed the previously
existing family law provisions.6 The reason for including judicial assistance
in this section is because placing a person under judicial assistance of any
kind directly affects his capacity to conclude juridical acts.
The person who put himself in the condition of being unconscious of his actions or in a state
of psychological or mental disturbance, critically limiting the functioning of his reason and
will, by way of use of alcohol or other similar substances (such as drugs), is liable for the
prejudice he caused while being in this state, unless he was reduced to that condition without
fault on his part (Art. 915, 2 CC).
4
Without discretion means that one is unable to evaluate the unlawful character of his
action. Example: if minor A, eleven years old, deliberately injures his friend, he has
discretion. If the same minor changes the grade he received from 3 to 8, we cannot consider
him as having discretion due to the fact that, because of his young age, it is natural for him to
believe that altering a document is not something very serious.
5
See below Family Law, Part Seven.
6
Law 2447/1996, which radically and substantially reformed the protection of ailing adults,
replaced the institutions of judicial interdiction and judicial supervision by the unified
institution of judicial assistance. See Introductory Report of L. 2447/1996, in I. Spyridakis,
The Reform of Family Law, 1997, p. 1 et seq.; I. Deliyannis, The Proceedings of the Law
Preparatory Committee for the Modification of the Institutions of Adoption and Tutelage,
Vol. I, 1993, Vol. II, 1996; A. Koutsouradis, in Georgiadis Stathopoulos, Commentary on
the Civil Code, Introductory Remarks to Arts. 1666-1688.
112
B. Who is Placed under Judicial Assistance

The following persons are placed under judicial assistance (Art. 1666
CC):
a. Whoever, on account of psychological or mental disturbance or
physical disability, is unable (in part or in whole) to take care of his affairs
by himself.
b. Whoever, on account of prodigality,7 drug addiction, or alcoholism,8
exposes to danger of want himself, his spouse, his descendants, or his
ascendants.
At this point it should be noted that it is possible for persons serving a
sentence which deprives them of their freedom for at least two years to be
placed under concurrent judicial assistance in part,9 but only if they request
it themselves and solely for the acts they would have themselves specified10
in their request (Art. 1688 CC).
C. The Procedure
For a person to be placed under judicial assistance a court decision is
required, following a request made by the patient himself11 or his spouse if
he happens to be married or his parents or children or the public
prosecutor or the court ex officio (Art. 1667 CC).
It is worth emphasizing that the possibility for the court to place
someone under judicial assistance ex officio is an important innovation
introduced by L. 2447/1996 because it helps protect those individuals who
are not cared for, either because there is no spouse or close relatives, or
because of indifference.12
Prodigal is the person who spends aimlessly and disproportionately to his means.
It is not necessary for alcoholism or drug addiction to be a chronic condition. It is sufficient
that the dependency of the person on alcohol or drugs be demonstrated. See Th. Papachristou,
Manual of Family Law, 2nd ed., 1998, p. 368; Koutsouradis, op. cit., Art. 1666, No 31.
9
Regarding the results of concurrent judicial assistance in part, see below Ch. C, II, D, b, bb.
10
With this arrangement the anachronistic institution of legal interdiction, which had been
severely criticized both on the grounds of its legal purposefulness and its constitutionality,
was abolished (see Introductory Report of L. 2447/1996, in I. Spyridakis, The Reform,
1997, p. 73; Koutsouradis, op. cit., Art. 1668).
11
When the person is only physically disabled, the court decides solely upon the disabled
persons own petition (Art. 1667, 2 CC).
12
See P. Agallopoulou, The Impact of One Spouses Mental Disturbance on the Marriage,
1995, p. 109.
8
113
In view of the fact that the institution of judicial assistance is based on

the respect for the personality and the dignity of the patient, no matter how
severe his condition may be, the law lays down the following provisions:
-
when deciding on placing someone under judicial assistance and

appointing a judicial assistant for him, the court will take into
account the report of the appropriate social services regarding the
necessity of the measure and the appropriateness of the person to
be appointed as judicial assistant (Art. 1674 CC);
when placing a person under judicial assistance the court hearing is
held behind closed doors (Art. 802, 3 CCPr);
before deciding on placing a person under judicial assistance the
court should seek a personal communication with that person and
take into account the persons own opinion. This is so because, as
the Article 1684 of the Greek Civil Code clearly states, the court
decision must have the patients interest in view.
Finally, it should be noted that the court decision placing a person

under judicial assistance appoints the persons judicial assistant.
D. The Consequences of Placement under Judicial Assistance
Depending on the case, the court is free to decide to place a person
under privative judicial assistance (in whole or in part) or under concurrent
judicial assistance (in whole or in part) or combine the two (Art. 1676 CC).
More specifically:
a. Privative judicial assistance
aa. In whole
When a person is placed under privative judicial assistance in whole,13
he is incapable of concluding any juridical act in his own name. Instead,
the judicial assistant, who is his legal representative, acts on his behalf
complying with the formalities required by law.14
13
The placement of the judicially assisted person under a regime where he is fully deprived
of his capacity to conclude juridical acts must be expressly stated in the court decision (Art.
1678, 1 CC).
14
See Art. 1682, para. 1 of the Greek Civil Code.
114
bb. In part
If a person is placed under privative judicial assistance in part, he is
incapable of concluding in person only certain juridical acts, as specified
in the court decision instituting his placement under judicial assistance.15
The juridical acts a person is declared incapable of concluding are
concluded by his judicial assistant who, in this particular instance, acts as
his legal representative. Naturally, the formalities required by law need to
be complied with at all times.16
b. Concurrent judicial assistance
aa. In whole
When a person is placed under concurrent judicial assistance in whole,
for all the juridical acts he concludes to be valid the consent of his judicial
assistant is needed.17
bb. In part
When a person is placed under concurrent judicial assistance in part,
the consent of his judicial assistant is required for certain juridical acts, as
specified in the court decision.18
c. Combination of privative and concurrent judicial assistance
It is possible for the court to place the person under judicial assistance
that combines both the privative and the concurrent types, by expressly
stating in which acts the assisted person cannot engage in propria persona,
but needs to be represented by his judicial assistant, and in which acts he
cannot engage without the consent of his judicial assistant (Art. 1679, 1
CC).
15
If the court decision does not specify the juridical acts the assisted person is incapable of
concluding, he cannot conclude those juridical acts that the tutor of a minor is prevented from
concluding without the permission of the court (Art. 1678, 2 CC). Such are, for example, the
sale of an immovable or of a commercial, industrial, or other enterprise; loan agreements (see
Art. 1624 CC).
16
See Art. 1682, para. 1 of the Greek Civil Code.
17
Consent is the permission given before the conclusion of the juridical act or during its
conclusion (see below Ch. G, II, 6, footn. 10).
18
If the court decision does not specify in which juridical acts the assisted person may not
engage without the consent of his assistant, he is incapable of engaging in those acts that the
tutor of a minor may not engage without the courts permission (Art. 1678, 2 CC). Such are,
for example, the sale of an immovable or of a commercial, industrial or other enterprise; loan
agreements (see Art. 1624 CC).
115
E. Lifting of the Judicial Assistance

If the reasons on account of which the judicial assistance was decided
are no longer present, such assistance may be lifted by a court decision upon
the request of the persons who are entitled to do so, or even by the court ex
officio (Art. 1685, 1 CC).
4. Distinctions of Persons Based on their Capacity to Conclude Juridical
Acts.
From the point of view of concluding juridical acts there are three
categories of persons:
-
those fully capable of concluding juridical acts

those fully incapable
those having limited capacity
A. Fully Capable of Concluding Juridical Acts

Fully capable of concluding any juridical act are those who have
completed the eighteenth year of age, i.e. the persons who have reached
majority (Art. 127 CC), provided that no reason exists for them to be
deprived of their capacity to conclude juridical acts.
For the computation of ones age the day of the persons birth is also
taken into account (Art. 241, 2 CC).19 For example, A, who was born on
May 15, 1990, will reach majority on May 15, 2008.
B. Fully Incapable of Concluding Juridical Acts
Those fully incapable of concluding juridical acts are divided into two
categories: the absolutely incapable and the relatively incapable.
a. Absolutely incapable
Absolutely incapable of concluding juridical acts are the persons who
are totally incapable of concluding any juridical act. In this category belong
those who have not yet completed the tenth year of age and the persons who
are placed under privative judicial assistance in whole (Art. 128 CC).
19
See below Ch. F, II, 3, C.
116
More specifically:
aa. Minors who have not yet completed the tenth year of age. If such
minors conclude a juridical act, it will be null and void. The juridical acts
of these persons are concluded by their legal representatives who need to
act according to the formal requirements, if any, laid down by law. The
minors legal representatives are their parents, since in principle the
parental care belongs to the parents jointly (Art. 1510, 1 CC).
bb. Persons under privative judicial assistance in whole. As was earlier
mentioned,20 when a person is placed under privative judicial assistance in
whole, he is incapable of concluding any juridical act in his own name.
The judicial assistant acts in his stead as legal representative, with the
formal requirements laid down by law complied with at all times.
Consequently, all the juridical acts concluded by the assisted person in
propria persona during the entire period of duration of the privative
judicial assistance in whole are null and void, even if it is proved that at
the time of the conclusion of the particular juridical act he was fully
conscious of its meaning (e.g. because the transaction was insignificant, or
because the health of the psychologically disturbed person had been
restored but the state of privative judicial assistance in whole under which
he had been placed had not yet been lifted).
Example: A, who was under privative judicial assistance in whole due to
psychological disturbance, sold an immovable of his to B. The sale is null and
void even if it is proved, via a medical certificate, that at the time A concluded the
sale with B he had been restored to health and, consequently, he was conscious of
his actions. As long as the court judgment placing A under privative judicial
assistance in whole is not reversed, all of As transactions are null and void. The
transfer of the real estate property from A to B would have been valid if it had
been concluded between As judicial assistant and B, with the formalities
stipulated by law always complied with.
b. Relatively (or temporarily) incapable

Relatively (or temporarily) incapable of concluding a juridical act are
the adults who, although not placed under privative judicial assistance in
whole, nevertheless, at the time of conclusion of a particular transaction,
are either not conscious of their actions, or in a state of psychological or
20
See above Ch. C, II, 3, D, a, aa.
117
mental disturbance decisively limiting the functioning of their will (Art.

131, 1 CC).
More specifically:
aa. a person is not conscious of his actions when, during a certain
limited period of time, he cannot understand the meaning of the acts in
which he engages, e.g. because of high fever, drunkenness, or the use of
drugs;
bb. a person is in a state of psychological or mental disturbance,
critically affecting the function of his will, when his ability to objectively
evaluate reality is significantly reduced.21
In the above cases the person has relative inability to conclude juridical
acts because the inability to conclude such acts exists only when it is proved
that, during the conclusion of a specific juridical act, a reason exists on
account of which the person is prevented from freely shaping his will or
from realizing the consequences of his declaration of will. If despite this
relative (temporary) inability a person concludes a juridical act, the latter
will be null and void (Arts. 131 and 171 CC).
This provision of the law is for those who are not conscious of their
acts temporarily as well as for those who suffer from a certain psychological
or mental disturbance but have not been placed under privative judicial
assistance in whole (either because nobody started the process or because,
even though the process has begun, the court decision has not yet been
pronounced).
Example: A, who was not conscious of his actions on account of drunkenness,
sold his stereo equipment to B for 10 euros. If the above mentioned stipulation did
not exist (Art. 131 CC), B would acquire ownership of the stereo equipment and A
would be deprived of the same receiving an insignificant amount of money in
exchange. But, because this stipulation exists and the transaction is null and void,
the court will consider the transaction as never having taken place; thus the stereo
equipment will remain in As hands.
c. The difference between absolute and relative incapacity

Those characterized as absolutely incapable, cannot conclude any
juridical act. If despite this prohibition they do, the juridical act is null and
21
See Introductory Report of L. 2447/1997, in Spyridakis, The Reform, op. cit., p. 76.
118
void regardless of whether in the specific case they were conscious of the act
they were concluding.
Those relatively incapable of concluding juridical acts are persons who,
while generally capable of concluding juridical acts, at the time of
conclusion of the specific juridical act, it was proved that they were either
not conscious of their actions, or in a state of psychological or mental
disturbance critically limiting the functioning of their will. Such transactions
will be null and void.
Examples: A, while in a state of psychological disturbance, sells an immovable
property of his to B.
If A is under privative judicial assistance in whole, the transaction he concluded
with B is null and void even if it is proved that during its conclusion A was fully
conscious of his actions because he had recovered. This is so because, as was
mentioned earlier, the mere fact that a person is under privative judicial assistance
in whole results in his inability to conclude any juridical act. This inability lasts
until the privative judicial assistance in whole is lifted by a court decision.
If A had not been placed under privative judicial assistance in whole (either
because a petition was never filed in order for the process to begin or because
it was filed but the court decision has not yet been pronounced), the transaction
between A and B is null and void only if it is proved that, during the time of the
conclusion of the transaction, he did not have the capacity of objectively
evaluating reality.
C. Limitedly Capable of Concluding Juridical Acts

The persons who have limited capacity to conclude juridical acts are
capable of entering into legal transactions only in the cases specified by law
or only if the terms required by law are being complied with (Art. 133 CC).
According to Article 129 of the Greek Civil Code, are of limited
capacity to conclude juridical acts those who have completed the tenth but
not the eighteenth year of age,22 those under privative judicial assistance in
part, and those under concurrent judicial assistance. At this point it should
be added that of limited capacity are also those who, according to Article
1676 of the Greek Civil Code, have been placed under privative judicial
assistance in combination with concurrent.
22
The exception provided by law regarding the completion of the time leading up to majority
(Art. 241, 2 CC), i.e. the inclusion of the day of birth in the computation, is applicable to the
calculations made for any age. For example, A, who was born on May 15, 1998, will be ten
years old on May 15, 2008. See above Ch. C, II, 4, A, and below Ch. F, II, 3, C.
119
More specifically:
a. Minors having completed the tenth year of age
Of limited capacity for concluding juridical acts due to the fact that
they are minors are the following:
aa. The minor who has completed the tenth year of age is capable of
concluding the following juridical acts:
1) juridical acts from which he only draws lawful benefits (Art. 134
CC), e.g. the acquisition of an object by reason of donation, in which
case he is not burdened with any obligation;
2) juridical acts he concludes as the representative of another (Art. 213
CC).23
bb. The minor who has completed the twelfth year of age is capable of
appearing in court in person during the hearing of the case of his adoption
and consenting to it, i.e. expressing his opinion of agreement regarding his
adoption (Art. 1555, 1 CC).
cc. The minor who has completed the fourteenth year of age may freely
dispose of his earnings derived from his personal labor or what was freely
given to him (Art. 135 CC), such as allocation, clothing, books, toys, etc.
dd. The minor who has completed the fifteenth year of age may enter
into an employment contract as an employee,24 provided that the persons
charged with his care, i.e. in principle both his parents jointly,25 consent to
it (Art. 136, 1 CC).
Example: A, fifteen years of age, may enter into an employment contract as an
employee and work for B who has a car repair business. For this legal
transaction to be valid the law requires that the persons charged with As care,
i.e. in principle both his parents jointly, consent to it.
23
See below Ch. G, I, 3, D.

The original Article 136 of the Greek Civil Code, which set the age limit at fourteen, has
been modified by L. 1329/1983 in order for the Civil Code to be brought into harmony with
the lower age standard for starting work set by the International Labor Convention No
138/1973, ratified in Greece by L. 1182/1981.
25
In principle, the care of a minor belongs to both parents jointly (Art. 1510, 1 CC).
However, it is possible for it to be entrusted to one parent only (Art. 1510, 2 & 3, CC), or to a
tutor (Art. 1589 CC).
24
120
The consent required by law is general, i.e. permission is not required

for every employment contract into which the minor enters.
Example: Having obtained his parents general consent, A enters into an
employment contract with B, owner of a car repair business, to work as an
employee. After a certain time, when A is no longer employed by B, he may
enter into an employment contract with a new employer, e.g. C, who owns a
business of electrical appliances, without needing a new consent on the part of
his parents.
If the persons charged with the care of a minor refuse to consent, i.e.
they do not give the minor permission to enter into an employment
contract, the minor may submit a petition to the court which, after hearing
the arguments of such persons, decides on the issue along the guidelines of
the minors interest (Art. 136, 2 CC).
One question may be raised: how is it possible that a minor who has
completed the fourteenth year of age may dispose of his earnings derived
from work, when he can conclude a valid employment contract only after
he has completed fifteen years of age?
Indeed, the minor who has not completed fifteen years of age can not
conclude an employment contract; but he can earn money from occasional
employment or from an employment contract concluded on his behalf by
his legal representatives (i.e. his parents or his tutor) with regard to work
permissible to a minor below the age of fifteen.26
ee. Exceptionally,27 the minor who is married may engage in propria
persona in certain transactions specified by law (Art. 137 CC). Such are
the transactions necessary for the maintenance or improvement of his
property, the transactions necessary for the purpose of meeting the needs
of his personal sustenance and education, as well as those needed for the
current needs of his family.
26
There are exceptions where the age limit may be set between thirteen and fifteen years of
age as, for example, when the work is light or connected with the professional education of
the minors. See A. Karakatsanis S. Gardikas, Individual Labor Law, 5th ed., 1995, p. 109.
27
The conditions laid down by law for a valid marriage are that both future spouses must
have completed the eighteenth year of age (Art. 1350, 2 CC). This age limit, which coincides
with the age of majority, must be completed by both future spouses by the day the marriage is
performed. Exceptionally, the court, after hearing the future spouses and the persons charged
with their care, may allow the marriage even before the completion of that age, if its
performance is necessary due to an important reason. See below Family Law, Part One, Ch.
A, 2.
121
In case a minor with limited capacity to conclude juridical acts enters

into a legal transaction for which the law does not specify that he may (e.g.
sale of an immovable by a minor sixteen years of age, or employment
contract by a minor less than fifteen years of age), or if he enters into a
transaction for which he does have the legal age but has not complied with
the terms laid down by law for its valid conclusion (e.g. employment
contract concluded by a minor above the age of fifteen without the consent
of the persons charged with his care), the juridical act is null and void, i.e.
it does not generate any legal effect.28 Those juridical acts are concluded
on behalf of the minors by their legal representatives in accordance with
the formal requirements, if any, stipulated by law. As was mentioned
earlier, the legal representatives of the minors are their parents, if they
have the parental care, since in principle the parental care is exercised by
both parents jointly (Art. 1510, 1 CC).
b. Persons under privative judicial assistance in part
As was already mentioned,29 if a person was placed under privative
judicial assistance in part, he is incapable of concluding in propria persona
certain juridical acts specified in the relevant court decision which placed
him under this status. For all other juridical acts the person is fully capable.
Consequently, the juridical acts a person concludes in propria persona for
the entire duration he is under privative judicial assistance in part are null
and void if they belong to the category of legal transactions for the
conclusion of which the particular person has been declared incapable. This
nullity is not reversed even if it is proved that, at the time the person was
entering into the particular transaction, he was fully conscious of its
meaning.
Example: A is under privative judicial assistance in part on account of
psychological disturbance and the relevant court decision has specified that he is
incapable of transferring ownership over his real estate in propria persona. In
spite of this, A sold an immovable of his to B. This sale is null and void even if it
is proved that at the time of the sale A was fully conscious of his actions. This is
so because, as long as the privative judicial assistance in part has not been lifted
by a court decision, the juridical acts A concludes are null and void, if they
happen to be of the kind for the conclusion of which A has been declared
incapable. Such juridical acts would only be valid if they were concluded between
28
29
See below Ch. E, II, 1.

See above Ch. C, II, 3, D, a, bb.
122
As judicial assistant and B, provided that the formalities stipulated by law are
complied with.
c. Persons under concurrent judicial assistance

In this case it is necessary to distinguish between concurrent judicial
assistance in whole and in part.
aa. Concurrent judicial assistance in whole
When a person has been placed under concurrent judicial assistance in
whole, for all his transactions to be valid the consent of his judicial
assistant is required. Consequently, all the juridical acts such a person
concludes during the entire time he is under concurrent judicial assistance
in whole without the consent of his judicial assistant are null and void,
regardless of whether during their conclusion he was fully conscious of his
actions or not.
Example: A, who is under concurrent judicial assistance in whole because of
substance abuse, sold his immovable to B without the consent of his judicial
assistant. The sale is null and void even if it is proved that, at the time of the sale
of the real estate, A was fully conscious of his actions.
bb. Concurrent judicial assistance in part

If a person is placed under concurrent judicial assistance in part, for the
conclusion of certain juridical acts, specified in the court decision, the
consent of his judicial assistant is required. For all other transactions the
person is fully capable. Consequently, the transactions such a person enters
into during the entire duration of the concurrent judicial assistance in part
without the consent of his judicial assistant are null and void if they
happen to be of the kind for the valid conclusion of which the judicial
assistants consent is required.
Example: A is under concurrent judicial assistance in part on account of
substance abuse and according to the court decision he is not capable of selling
his enterprises without the consent of his judicial assistant. If, in spite of this, he
sells his enterprises without the consent of his judicial assistant, the sale is null
and void, even if it is proved that, when the sale took place, A was fully
conscious of his actions.
123
d. Persons under privative judicial assistance in combination with

concurrent
It is possible for a person to be placed under a combination of privative
and concurrent judicial assistance. Naturally, this combination can occur
only if both the privative and the concurrent judicial assistance are in part.
In such case the court decision specifies which juridical acts the
particular person is incapable of concluding and which he may conclude
with the consent of his judicial assistant. For all other transactions the
person is fully capable. Consequently, all the legal transactions the person
entered into without complying with the terms specified in the court
decision and this throughout the entire time he was placed under this type
of judicial assistance are null and void.
Example: A was placed under a combination of privative and concurrent judicial
assistance and more specifically he was declared incapable of selling his
immovable property, whereas for leasing it he had to obtain the consent of his
judicial assistant. If, in spite of this, A in propria persona sells one immovable
property and leases another without the consent of his judicial assistant, these
juridical acts are null and void, even if it is proved that during their conclusion he
was conscious of his actions.
e. The difference between the limited capacity for juridical acts of minors
having completed the tenth year of age and persons who have been placed
under privative judicial assistance in part, concurrent judicial assistance, or
a combination of privative and concurrent
The minors having completed the tenth year of age are in principle
incapable of concluding juridical acts. Only exceptionally are they capable
of entering into legal transactions in the cases specified by law.
The persons placed under privative judicial assistance in part,
concurrent judicial assistance, as well as under a combination of privative
and concurrent judicial assistance, are in principle capable of concluding
juridical acts. Exceptionally, however, and depending on the type of judicial
assistance they have been placed under, the following may happen:
-
they may not conclude certain juridical acts in propria persona

(privative judicial assistance in part);
they may not conclude all or certain juridical acts without the
consent of their judicial assistant (concurrent judicial assistance);
they may not conclude certain juridical acts in propria persona,
whereas for others they may not conclude them without the consent
124
of their judicial assistant (combination of privative and concurrent

judicial assistance).
III. WILL TO CONCLUDE A JURIDICAL ACT
For a juridical act to be concluded the will of the person who enters
into it is necessary. Will means the volition of a person to generate legal
results with a specific declaration.
IV. WILL FREE OF DEFECTS
Will free of defects means that the will of the person concluding a
juridical act must not have been formed in a defective way, i.e. it must not
result from error as regards the reasons leading up to the shaping of the will,
fraud, or threat.
1. Error in the Reasons Leading up to the Shaping of the Will
A. The Concept
Error is the ignorance or incorrect knowledge of reality. There are two
kinds of error: error in the reasons leading up to the shaping of the will
(error in the will) and error in the declaration of the will.
The error which contributes to the formation of the defective will is
error in the reasons leading up to the shaping of the will.
Error in the reasons leading up to the shaping of the will is the
ignorance or incorrect knowledge of reality resulting in the shaping of the
will in a manner it would not have been shaped had the person known the
real situation.
Examples: A bought Bs apartment, erroneously believing that his application to
the National Bank for a home loan was approved.
A bought a luxurious car from car dealership K, erroneously believing that he
had won a large amount of money in the lottery.
B. Distinctions
Error in the reasons leading up to the shaping of the will is of two
kinds: essential and non-essential.
125
In principle, the error in the reasons leading up to the shaping of the

will is non-essential, because the motives affecting a persons decision are
immaterial to the law.
Exceptionally, when the error in the reasons leading up to the shaping
of the will refers to properties of the person or the object, it may be
considered essential. 30 31
Error based on the properties of the person or the object is considered
essential if, according to the agreement of the parties or on the basis of good
faith and business usage, these properties are so important for the whole
juridical act that, had the person known the real situation, he would not have
engaged in the transaction (Art. 142 CC).
Examples: A employed B believing that she has excellent computer skills,
whereas B did not have any such skills (essential error in the properties of the
person).
A bought a painting believing that it is the original work of a famous painter,
whereas it was simply a copy (essential error in the properties of the object).
C. Consequences
a. Essential error
If the error in the reasons leading up to the shaping of the will is
essential, as is the case with error in the properties of the person or the
object, the juridical act that was concluded on account of this error is not
null and void but voidable, i.e. it may be annulled by a court decision.32
30
Regarding the error referring to properties of the person or the object, several views have
been advanced (see G. Balis, General Principles of Civil Law, 8th ed., 1961, para. 42, p. 134;
I Karakatsanis, in Georgiadis Stathopoulos, Commentary on Civil Law, Art. 142, No 1;
Papantoniou, op. cit., p. 369 et seq.; Spyridakis, op. cit., p. 596 et seq.; Simantiras, op. cit., p.
542 et seq.). We follow the view we believe to be the most accurate, i.e. the view accepting
that error in the properties of the person or the object is an error in the reasons leading up to
the shaping of the will. (See Gazis, op. cit., Vol. C, 1973, p. 63; A. Litzeropoulos, The
Articles 173 and 200 of the Civil Code and the Cassation Review for False Interpretation of a
Juridical Act, in Honorary Volume for the 125th Year of the Court of Cassation Areios
Pagos, 1963, p. 544, note 238; F. Doris, Introduction to Civil Law, Vol. B1, 1991, p. 165;
Ap. Georgiadis, General Principles, op. cit., p. 511 et seq.; P. Filios, General Principles of
Civil Law, Vol. B, 2002, p. 100).
31
Another exception can be found in the Law of Succession where the testament based on
erroneous reasons is voidable. See below Law of Succession, Part One, Ch. F, II.
32
See below Ch. E, III.
126
The right to seek the annulment of the juridical act belongs to the one
who was in error or to his descendents (Art. 154 CC).
Examples: If A employed B believing that she has excellent computer skills,
whereas she had no computer skills at all, the employment contract between A and
B may be annulled because, had A known that B is computer illiterate, he would
not have employed her. Consequently, A may bring action against B and demand
that the employment contract concluded with her be annulled.
If A bought a painting from B believing that it is the original work of a famous
painter, whereas it is simply a copy, the transaction between A and B may be
annulled because, had A known the real situation, he would not have entered into
this legal transaction. Consequently, A may bring action against B demanding for
the sale contract he concluded with him to be annulled.
The right of the person who was in error to lodge action for the
annulment of the legal transaction is extinguished after two years from the
time of the conclusion of the transaction (Art. 157, 1 CC). It is the case of a
term of extinction of a right which begins running on the day following the
conclusion of the juridical act.
If the error in the reasons leading up to the shaping of the will
continued even after the conclusion of the transaction, the two year period
begins to run from the time the situation ceased to exist (Art. 157, 2 CC).
Example: If A discovered that B had no idea of computers one month after she
was employed, or that the painting is simply a copy and not the original work one
year after the purchase, the two year time period for annulment begins to run one
month after the conclusion of the employment contract in the first case and one
year after the sale contract in the second.
However, in no case is it possible for the legal transaction to be

annulled if twenty years have passed since its conclusion (Art. 157, 3 CC).
Once again it is the case of a term of extinction of a right which begins to
run on the day following the transaction.
Finally, the party demanding the annulment of the transaction by reason
of essential error is obliged to compensate the other for the damages he
sustained because of believing that he had concluded a valid legal
transaction (Art. 145, 1 CC).
b. Non-essential error
If the error in the reasons leading up to the shaping of the will is nonessential, it does not lead to annulment of the transaction.
127
Example: A, who bought Bs apartment, erroneously believing that the home loan
he had applied for to the National Bank was approved, cannot demand the
annulment of his transaction with B on the grounds of error in the reasons that
prompted his will. Thus, the legal transaction concluded between A and B is
perfectly valid.
2. Fraud
A. The Concept
Fraud is the deliberate behavior aiming at misguiding a person so as to
lead him to a declaration of will that he would not have otherwise made.
Examples: A, after having misleadingly reassured B that his piece of land would
soon be included in the City Plan, succeeded in selling it to him for 115,000 euros,
when its real value was only 75,000 euros, i.e. A caused B to pay for the land the
amount of money it would have been worth if indeed it were to be part of the City
Plan.
A, having misleadingly persuaded B that the painting he was selling him was
the original of a great painter, when it was only a copy, sold the painting to him
for what the original would have been worth and not at the value of the copy.
The juridical act concluded on the basis of fraud is not null and void
but voidable,33 i.e. it does generate its legal results but may be annulled by a
court judgment (Art. 147, 1 CC).
B. Conditions
For a transaction to be annulled due to fraud the following conditions
need to concur:
a. There needs to exist intent to defraud. Intent to defraud exists when
one person, being aware of the inaccuracy of the facts he presents,
nevertheless wishes to deceive the other so as to lead him to a certain
declaration of will.
Examples: A, although aware of the fact that his piece of land wont be included
in the City Plan, lied to B in order to convince him to purchase it.
A, although aware of the fact that the painting is a copy and not the original
work of a great painter, lied to B in order to persuade him to buy it.
33
128
b. Real misleading must have taken place. Real misleading exists only
when, because of the fraud committed by one person,34 the other party was
led to form his will the way the culprit wanted him to.
Examples: Because of As fraud, B purchased As piece of land which was not
included in the City Plan at a price he would have paid if it were included.
Because of As fraud, B purchased from A the copy of the original painting at
the price he would have paid for the original.
C. Consequences
When the above conditions concur, the juridical act concluded is
voidable, i.e. it may be annulled. The person who was defrauded has the
right to demand the annulment of the legal transaction concluded. For this
purpose, either he or his heirs may bring action against the party who
engaged in fraud (Art. 154 CC). The court, after conducting an investigation
of the facts, will pronounce judgment declaring the transaction concluded
under conditions of fraud null and void.
The right of the defrauded party to bring action in order to annul the
legal transaction is extinguished after two years from the conclusion of the
transaction (Art. 157, 1 CC). It is the case of a term of extinction of a right35
which begins to run on the day following the conclusion of the transaction.
If the deception continues past the conclusion of the transaction, the
term of two years begins to run from the time the conditions of deception
ceased to exist (Art. 157, 2 CC).
Example: If B discovered that the piece of land will not be included in the City
Plan one year after the purchase, or that the painting is a copy and not the original
work of art five years after the purchase, the term of two years begins from the
time B discovered the truth, i.e. one year later for the land and five years later for
the painting.
In no case is it possible for the transaction to be annulled if twenty

years have passed since its conclusion (Art. 157, 3 CC). Here, too, it is the
case of a term of extinction of a right which begins the day after the
conclusion of the legal transaction.
34
It is possible for fraud to be committed either by the party to whom the declaration of will
is directed, or by a third party. Regarding the issue of fraud by a third party, see Art. 147,
para. 2 of the Greek Civil Code.
35
See above Part Two, Ch. F, II, 4.
129
Example: If B discovers the fact that the painting he purchased from A is not the
original but a copy twenty two years after the conclusion of the sale contract, the
transaction with A cannot be annulled.
Finally, the victim of the fraud has the right, in addition to the
annulment of the transaction, to demand compensation from the party who
committed the fraud (Art. 149 CC).
3. Threat
A. The Concept
Threat is the exercise of psychological violence,36 i.e. the act of
instilling fear in the other person by way of announcement of an evil
depending on the will of the person who makes such announcement. The
threat aims at making the person to whom it is addressed proceed with a
certain declaration of will.
Examples: A threatened B that, if he doesnt sell him his house worth 60,000
euros at the price of 30,000 euros, he will kill him. Following this threat, B
entered into a sale contract with A whereby he indeed sold A his house at the price
of 30,000 euros.
A threatened B, owner of a chain of restaurants, that, unless he gives him his
gold watch as a gift, he will report him to the Market Police Inspection
Department for his violations. Subsequently, B gave his watch to A as a gift.
The juridical act concluded under conditions of threat is not null and
void but voidable, i.e. it may be annulled.37 As such it does generate its legal
effects but may be annulled by a court decision (Art. 150 CC).
B. Conditions
For a juridical act to be annulled on account of threat the following
conditions need to concur:
36
In the case of physical violence, the person against whom such violence is exercised does
not have a will of his own because he is simply acting as the organ of the other person. In this
case there is no will to be declared; consequently, the transaction is null and void (see Gazis,
op. cit., p. 85; Papantoniou, op. cit., p. 414; Spyridakis, op. cit., p. 624; Simantiras, op. cit.,
pp. 514 and 571; Doris, op. cit., p. 166, footn. 62; Ap. Georgiadis, General Principles, op.
cit., p. 524; Filios, op. cit., p. 119).
37
130
a. The threat must have been exercised unlawfully and in a manner

contrary to the principles of good morals (Art. 150 CC).
Examples: A threatened to kill B if he would not give him his car as a gift or sell
him his home at a very low price (threat unlawfully exercised).
A threatened to report B for his market police violations or for his burglary of
Cs home, if B would not give A his car as a gift (threat exercised in a manner
contrary to the principles of good morals).
b. The threat should be such that can instill fear in a reasonable person
(Art. 151 CC).
Examples: As threat to kill B if the latter does not give him his car as a gift,
does instill fear in a reasonable person.
As threat to get mad at B if the latter does not give him his car as a gift, does
not instill fear in a reasonable person.
c. The threat should be such that could expose to serious and imminent
danger the life, physical integrity, freedom, honor, or property of the person
threatened or the persons closely connected with him (Art. 151 CC).
Example: A threatened to kill B (or Bs son) if B would not give A his farm as a
gift.
d. Because of the exercise of threat, the person threatened must have

been led to make the declaration of will desired by the person who made the
threat.
Examples: A threatened to kill B if the latter would not give him his car as a
gift. Because of As threat, B donated his car to A. The juridical act between A
and B is voidable.
A threatened to kill B because of the latters irritability often causing serious
incidents in the village where they live. B got scared, sold his house in the village
to C, and moved to the next town. The sale of Bs house to C is valid because As
threat against B did not aim at the conclusion of the specific transaction between
B and C.
C. Consequences
When the above mentioned conditions concur, the juridical act
concluded is voidable. The threatened party is entitled to demand the
annulment of the transaction by bringing action (himself or his heirs) against
the party who threatened him (Art. 154 CC). The court, following an
131
investigation of the facts, issues a decision pronouncing the transaction

concluded under conditions of threat null and void.
The right of the threatened party to claim annulment of the transaction
is extinguished at the expiration of two years from the conclusion of the
transaction (Art. 157, 1 CC). In this instance, too, we have a term of
extinction of a right38 which begins to run the day after the transaction is
concluded.
If the threat continues after the conclusion of the legal transaction, the
term of two years begins to run after the situation ceased to exist, i.e. after
the psychological violence stopped. However, in no case is it possible for
the transaction to be annulled if twenty years have passed since its
conclusion (Art. 157, 2 and 3 CC). Once again it is the case of a term of
extinction of a right which begins to run the day after the conclusion of the
transaction.
Finally, the person threatened, in addition to the annulment of the
transaction, is entitled to demand compensation from the other party who
threatened him (Art. 152 CC).
V. CONVERGENCE OF WILL AND DECLARATION
For a valid legal transaction to be concluded the declaration of the party
and his will need to converge, i.e. the declaration of the will and the will
need to be one and the same.
If there is discrepancy between will and declaration of the will, we
distinguish between intentional and unintentional discrepancy.
If the discrepancy between the will and the declaration of the will is
intentional, we have a case of simulated juridical act or of simulation,
whereas if it is unintentional we have error.
1. Simulated Juridical Acts
A. The Concept
The declaration of the will is simulated when the person making it is
aware that such declaration does not correspond to his real will. According
to the definition of the Greek Civil Code, simulated is the declaration of the
will which was not seriously intended but was only made in pretense (Art.
138, 1 CC).
38
See above Part Two, Ch. F, II and below Part Three, Ch. F, II, 4.
132
Examples: A simulates a sale of his real estate property to B, whereas in reality

he did not wish to sell it.
A simulates a sale of his real estate property to B, when in reality he wished to
give it to him as a gift.
B. Distinctions
There are two kinds of simulation, absolute and relative.
a. Absolute simulation
Absolute simulation exists when there is no other transaction latent in
the juridical act.
Example: A, who had many debts and was afraid that his creditors would attempt
to satisfy their claims from his real estate property (i.e. attach his property and
subsequently auction it), made a simulated sale of his sole immovable to B, so that
it appears that A no longer owns any real estate. In this case there is no other
transaction latent in the sale contract. The only purpose for the sale was to protect
As assets from being sold by the creditors.
b. Relative simulation
Relative simulation exists when latent in the juridical act there is
another transaction.
Example: Upon retirement from dentistry, A wanted to give the equipment of his
office to B as a gift. However, in order to avoid facing the discontent of his
relatives, he simulated a sale contract with B. In this case beneath the simulated
transaction (sale), there exists another transaction (donation).
C. Consequences
a. Absolute simulation
In the case of absolute simulation the simulated juridical act is null and
void (Art. 138, 1 CC), i.e. it does not generate any result.
b. Relative simulation
In the case of relative simulation, the simulated juridical act is null and
void but the transaction underlying the simulated act is valid, provided that
the parties willed it and the conditions required for it are met (Art. 138, 2
CC).
133
Example: In the above example the sale by A to B of the equipment of the dental
office is simulated and, consequently, null and void. The underlying donation will
be valid only if both parties willed it and the conditions required by law for its
conclusion were met. For donation the law requires a notarial deed. But in the case
of donation of a movable object without a notarial deed, the donation is valid if
the donor delivered the object to the donee (Art. 498 CC). Consequently, in this
particular case the underlying simulated transaction will be valid only if a notarial
act was executed or if A delivered the equipment of his dental office to B. If the
simulated sale transaction regarding the dental equipment was concluded
informally or with a private contract and A has not actually delivered the
equipment to B, the underlying transaction is null and void.
2. Error as to the Declaration

A. The Concept
When the lack of convergence of will and declaration is not intentional
but unintentional, there is error as to the declaration of the will.
As was earlier mentioned,39 error is the ignorance or incorrect
knowledge of reality. There are, as already stated,40 two kinds of error: error
in the reasons leading up to the shaping of the will and error in the
declaration.
Error in the declaration exists when the ignorance or incorrect
knowledge of reality results in a declaration of will which is not in
accordance with the real will of the declarant.
B. Distinctions
Error in the declaration may be essential or non-essential.
a. Essential error
Essential error exists when it refers to a point of such importance for
the whole legal transaction that, if the person knew the true situation, he
would not have concluded the transaction (Art. 141 CC).
Examples: In a letter, A (a farmer) proposed to B (a merchant) to sell him 5,000
kilos of grain for x amount of euros per kilo, whereas what he wanted to write was
500 kilos. B replied that he accepts and the contract between A and B was
concluded for 5,000 kilos.
39
40
See above Ch. C, IV, 1, A.

See above Ch. C, IV, 1, A.
134
In a letter, A asked B if he wanted to buy his car for 550 euros, whereas he
wanted to write 5,500 euros. B replied that he accepts and the sale contract
between A and B regarding the car was concluded for 550 euros.
In the above examples there is essential error of A because, if A knew what he
was writing (in the first case concerning quantity and in the second concerning
price), he would never have wanted to conclude the respective transactions.
Non-essential error is the error concerning minor issues in the
transaction.
Example: In a letter, A asked B if he wants to buy his car for 2,500 euros when he
actually wanted to write 2,600 euros. B replied that he accepts and the contract for
the sale of the car was concluded at the price of 2,500 euros. The mistake that A
made may not be considered essential because the difference in price (between
what A proposed and what he was thinking) is very slight.
C. Consequences
a. Essential error
The transaction concluded because of essential error is not null and
void but voidable, i.e. it may be annulled.41 The party who was in error (or
his heirs) has the right to demand the annulment of the act by bringing the
appropriate action (Art. 154 CC).
The right of the person in error to bring action seeking the annulment of
the legal transaction is subject to a two year term of extinction from the
conclusion of the transaction (Art. 157, 1 CC). This is a time limit for the
exercise of a right past which the right will be extinguished which
begins to run the day after the conclusion of the transaction.
If the error has continued past the conclusion of the legal transaction,
the two year term begins to run from the time the situation ceased to exist.
However, in no case is it permitted for the transaction to be annulled if
twenty years have elapsed since its conclusion (Art. 157, 2 and 3 CC). Once
again it is a time limitation for the exercise of a right past which the right
will be extinguished which begins to run the day after the conclusion of
the transaction.
41
135
The party claiming the nullity of the transaction on the basis of error is
bound to compensate the other party for the damage the latter suffered
because he believed in a valid transaction (Art. 145, 1 CC).
Non-essential error does not lead to the annulment of the transaction.
VI. DECLARATION OF THE WILL
Declaration of the will is the outward expression of the will of the
person who wishes to conclude the juridical act. In order for the declaration
of will to produce results in law it must conform to the stipulations of the
law.
We distinguish between unilateral juridical acts and contracts.
1. Unilateral Juridical Acts42
The unilateral juridical acts are divided into those containing a
declaration of will which is not addressed to a specific person and those
addressed to a specific person.
A. Unilateral Juridical Act Containing Declaration of Will not Addressed to
Specific Person
The unilateral juridical act containing a declaration of will which is not
addressed to a specific person takes effect from the moment of the
externalization of the declaration of the will, e.g. testament, establishment of
a foundation via an act inter vivos.
B. Unilateral Juridical Act Containing Declaration of Will Addressed to
Specific Person
In order for the unilateral juridical act containing a declaration of will
addressed to a specific person to take effect, the declaration of will needs to
reach the offeree, regardless of whether the latter has taken cognizance of
the content of the juridical act or not (Art. 167 CC).
42
Regarding the concept of the unilateral juridical act, see above Ch. B, I, 1.
136
Example: B is employed by A in his business the headquarters of which are in

Larissa. A who lives in Athens wishes to terminate the employment contract with
B, i.e. to fire B. Consequently, he sends B a letter containing a document which
terminates the employment contract. The termination is a unilateral juridical act
addressed to a specific person, in this case B, and produces legal effects as soon as
B receives the letter containing the termination notice. It is irrelevant whether B
became aware of the content of As letter or not.
From the moment the addressee received the declaration of will, the
declarant is bound and cannot revoke his declaration. Revocation is possible
either before the declaration reaches the addressee, or if it reaches the
addressee simultaneously with the initial declaration (Art. 168 CC).
If the declarant dies or becomes incapable of concluding juridical acts
after he made the declaration, the declaration remains valid even before it
reaches the offeree for the sake of the safety of transactions (Art. 169 CC).
2. Contracts43
Contract is the juridical act containing the declarations of will of two or
more persons acting out of different interests each but aiming at the same
legal result.
In the conclusion of a contract it is possible for the following stages to
exist:
-
stage of negotiations
stage of promise to conclude a contract
stage of conclusion of the final contract
A. Stage of Negotiations
Stage of negotiations is the stage during which discussions are taking
place regarding the conclusion of a contract. This stage ends with an
agreement promising to conclude a contract or with the conclusion of the
final contract.
Since during the stage of negotiations a relationship of trust is being
created between the parties, they are reciprocally bound to adopt the conduct
dictated by good faith and business usage (Art. 197 CC).
During the stage of negotiations whoever causes prejudice to the other
party through his fault, shall be liable for compensation even if the contract
43
Regarding the concept of the contract, see above Ch. B, I, 2.
137
was not concluded (Art. 198 CC). We have here the case of liability
resulting from negotiations (precontractual liability, culpa in contrahendo).
Example: It was agreed between A and B that A would buy Bs real estate. With
this sale in view A incurred some expenses, for example he retained an attorney to
conduct title search for the real estate; moreover, he missed the opportunity to buy
another property offered to him under better terms. But, while all had been agreed
upon regarding the sale and only the conclusion of the sale contract before a
notary public was still pending, B, the seller, did not show up at the notary
publics office on the day and time agreed.
The sale contract between A and B was not concluded but B has the obligation to
compensate A for the damages he caused him to suffer because he created in him
the conviction that a valid contract would be concluded between them. The
compensation covers not only the expenses A incurred counting on the conclusion
of the sale, but also the damage he suffered because he missed the opportunity to
conclude another contract under more favorable terms than the one which was
cancelled.
The stage of negotiations ends with the agreement promising to

conclude a contract or with the conclusion of the final contract.
B. Stage of Promise to Conclude a Contract
Promise to conclude a contract is the agreement whereby the parties
assume the obligation to conclude another contract, the final one. This
agreement is subject to the form required by law for the conclusion of the
final contract (Art. 166 CC).
Example: Between A and B it was agreed that a contract of sale of As apartment
to B would be concluded. This preliminary agreement has to be vested the form of
a notarial document because, since for the sale of an immovable property the form
of notarial document is required, the same form is required for the agreement
promising to conclude the final contract.
C. Stage of Conclusion of the Final Contract

The final contract is concluded with the meeting of the opposite wills,
usually two, to produce legal effect. Usually the wills coincide in time.
However, sometimes the one precedes the other. The declaration of will
which comes first is called offer, whereas the one that follows acceptance.
138
a. Offer
In order for the offer to be valid, it must be clearly formulated so that
the mere reply I accept on behalf of the offeree would suffice for the
contract to be concluded. For example, A offers to sell his car to B for 3,000
euros. The party offering to conclude a contract44 is bound throughout the
entire time period during which the offeree may accept the offer (Art. 185
CC).
This period of time has either been fixed, i.e. a deadline has been set
(e.g. A declares that he expects Bs answer within fifteen days), or lasts as
long as is deemed necessary, depending on the circumstances, for the
offeree to declare his acceptance.
b. Acceptance
Acceptance is the declaration of will of the offeree stating that he
agrees to conclude a contract. For example, B, to whom A offered to sell his
car for 3,000 Euros, declares that he accepts.
The acceptance of the offer to conclude a contract needs to reach the
offeror within the time frame set by him. If he had not set any time frame,
the acceptance needs to reach him up until such time that, depending on the
circumstances, the offeror was bound to wait for it (Art. 189 CC).
If the declaration of acceptance was dispatched in time but reached the
offeror after the expiration of the prescribed time frame, it is valid unless
the offeror notifies the offeree immediately about the delay of his
acceptance (Art. 190 CC). In this case the declaration of acceptance has no
legal effect.
If the acceptance is dispatched belatedly, it is considered as a new offer
for the conclusion of a contract (Art. 191, 1 CC).
Example: A offered to sell his car to B for 3,000 euros and set a time frame of
fifteen days for B to accept. Two months later B declared that he accepts. In this
case Bs declaration of acceptance is considered a new offer for the conclusion of
a contract (i.e. it is considered an offer made by B to A for the former to buy the
latters car).
Acceptance with amendments is deemed as rejection accompanied by a

new offer (Art. 191, 2 CC).
44
The offeror may revoke the offer but his declaration of revocation needs to reach the
offeree in time, i.e. the latest simultaneously with the initial offer (Art. 168 CC).
139
Example: A offered to sell his car to B for 3,000 euros. B replied, I accept the
price of 2,500 euros. In this case B rejects As offer and makes him a counter
offer, i.e. now it is B who offers to buy As car at the price of 2,500 euros.
c. Time of conclusion of a contract

The contract is concluded as soon as the acceptance reaches the offeror
(Art. 192 CC). In order for a contract to be concluded the offer and the
acceptance must be the mirror image of each other, i.e. there must be mutual
agreement of the parties on all the points of the contract, both essential and
non-essential. If such agreement is missing, the contract is considered as
never having been concluded.
VII. COMPLIANCE WITH FORM
1. General
The declaration of will needs to be vested the form required by law.
The Greek Civil Code follows the principle that no form is required for
the conclusion of contracts. This means that for the valid conclusion of a
contract the declaration of will needs to be vested a certain form only when
the law so stipulates (Art. 158 CC), as is the case, for example, in the
transfer of ownership of an immovable where a notarial document is
required (Arts. 369 and 1033 CC). In all other cases the contract is valid
without the need for it to comply with any form.
The reasons why in certain contracts compliance with some type of
form is required are the following:
A. To protect the parties decisions from levity.
B. To facilitate the proof of conclusion of a contract.
C. To protect third parties because by giving publicity to a legal
transaction the concerned others become informed.
2. Types of Form
A. Constitutive and Evidential Form
a. Constitutive form
A form is constitutive when its observance is a sine qua non for the
valid conclusion of a juridical act. In the cases where constitutive form is
required, non adherence to it causes the legal transaction to be null and
140
void.45 For example, a notarial deed is necessary for the sale of an

immovable property. Consequently, the sale of a piece of real estate without
a notarial document is null and void.
The types of constitutive form are: private document, notarial
document, and declaration before a public authority.
aa. Private document: A private document is valid if it bears the
handwritten signature of the person who issued it (Art. 160 CC).46 A
private document is required by law in the case, for example, of the
constitutive deed of an association or its charter (Art. 63 CC), the
conclusion of an agreement of guarantee (Art. 849 CC), etc.
At this point, taking into account the technology of our times we should
examine whether the document which is transmitted via teletype (telex) or
facsimile (fax) is a valid private document.
The teletype (telex), since it bears no signature, cannot possibly be
considered a valid private document.
The facsimile (fax), which mechanically reproduces the handwritten
signature of the person who issued it,47 cannot, according to the prevailing
view, be considered a valid private document since it does not carry a
handwritten signature.48 In the cases where a facsimile is used for the
conclusion of a contract, the contract is concluded when the offeror
receives the original document, i.e. the one that carries the handwritten
signature of the offeree.
The electronic document, i.e. the one obtained via a computer and,
consequently, having an entirely electronic nature,49 cannot, of course,
bear the handwritten signature of the person who issued it.
45
This rule is valid as long as the law does not stipulate the opposite, i.e. that the juridical act
is not null and void. For example, in the case of donation of a movable object for which no
notarial document exists, the legal transaction is validated from the time the donor materially
delivers the object to the donee (Art. 498, 2 CC).
46
Exceptionally, the printing of a signature via a mechanical device has the validity of a
handwritten signature if it is affixed on anonymous title-deeds that are issued in great number
(Art. 163 CC).
47
The same holds a fortiori for the type of facsimile which, without even bearing the
mechanical reproduction of the issuers signature, comes as a printout from a computer
connected with the terminal of the documents destination.
48
See Ap. Georgiadis, op. cit., p. 388 and the references cited thereat. An opposite view
claims that the facsimile which bears a handwritten signature may be considered a valid
private document (see Spyridakis, op. cit., p. 506).
49
See K. Christodoulou, Electronic Documents and Electronic Legal Transactions, 2001, pp.
2 et seq.; Ap. Georgiadis, op. cit., p. 438 et seq.; I. Karakostas, Law and the Internet: Legal
141
However, the Community Legislator, in order on the one hand to

strengthen the confidence of the parties in the constantly developing new
modes of communication and on the other hand to unify the way of
regulating the international phenomenon of electronic trade,50 established
the Directive No 1999/93/EC regarding the Community framework for
electronic signing. Greek law conformed to the Directive No. 1999/93/EC
by PrD No 150 of June 25, 2001.
According to the above mentioned Directive, electronic signatures are
considered tantamount to handwritten signatures under strict conditions, in
order to safeguard the authenticity of origin and the dependability of the
electronic document.51
Consequently, if on account of the concurrence of specific conditions,
the electronic signature is tantamount to the handwritten one, the
electronic document bearing such signature will have the validity and
evidential power of a private document with a handwritten signature.52
bb. Notarial document: This is a document composed by a notary
public. It is required by law in case, for example, of transfer of ownership
on an immovable property (Arts. 369 and 1033 CC), for the establishing
deed of a foundation inter vivos (Art. 109 CC), or for the contract of
donation (Art. 498, 1 CC).
cc. Declaration before a public authority: In certain cases the law
requires that a declaration of will be made before a certain public authority
which, subsequently, on the basis of this declaration, composes a
document called report. For example, the declaration of the future spouses
regarding the last name of their children (Art. 1505, 1 CC), or the
declaration regarding the last name of the child born out of wedlock but
Issues, 2nd ed., 2003, p. 121 et seq; I. Igglezakis, The Legal Framework of the Electronic
Commerce, 2003, p. 127 et seq.; G. Georgiadis, The Conclusion of Transactions via the
Internet, 2003, p. 29 et seq.
50
For the electronic trade see Directive No 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of
the Council of June 8, 2000 regarding certain legal aspects of the services of the information
society, especially of the electronic trade in the internal market. The above directive was
adapted to Greek law by PrD No 131 of May 16, 2003.
51
Article 3, 1 of PrD No 150/2001 states the following: The advanced electronic signature
based on a recognized certificate and created from a safe provision for the creation of a
signature is tantamount to handwritten signature, in both the substantive and the procedural
law. See Christodoulou, op. cit., p. 75 et seq.
52
See above footn. 51.
142
acknowledged by the father as his own (Art. 1506, 3 CC), or the

declaration of renunciation of succession (Art. 1848, 1 CC).
b. Evidential form
Evidential form is the form we adopt in transactions in order to
facilitate the proof regarding the conclusion of a contract and its terms. For a
private document to have evidential power it should bear the handwritten
signature of the person who issued it.53 Evidential form is not a sine qua non
for the validity of the juridical act.
Example: For the valid conclusion of a lease contract (e.g. lease of an apartment)
the law does not require any form. However, the parties usually draw up a
document (rental agreement) in order to prove the between them transaction and
its terms. This document only has evidential power.
B. Form Required by Law and Form Required by the Agreement of the

Parties
a. Form required by law: the form required by law is constitutive. If it
is not complied with, in principle it results in rendering the transaction null
and void (Art. 159, 1 CC).54
b. Form required by the agreement of the parties: it depends on the
agreement made by the parties whether the form required will be
constitutive or evidential.
VIII. THE CONTENT OF THE JURIDICAL ACT TO COMPLY WITH
THE LAW AND GOOD MORALS
The content of every legal transaction should not be contrary to the law
or good morals.
1. The Content of the Juridical Act to Comply with the Law
A. Every legal transaction which is contrary to a prohibitive provision
of the law is null and void (Art. 174 CC).55 Such is, for example, the
53
See Article 443 CCPr.

It is possible for the law to stipulate that non-compliance with the requirement for form
which is dictated by law and is of the constitutive type results in other consequences, as, for
example, in the case of Article 618 of the Greek Civil Code.
55
The nullity is absolute. See below Ch. E, II, 3, B, a.
54
143
contract precluding prescription, or determining a time period for it which is

shorter or longer than the one stipulated by law, or the contract excluding
the possibility of termination of an employment contract for a fixed time on
important grounds.56 57
B. Equally null and void is every contract which, even though not
contrary to a prohibitive provision of the law, is nevertheless contrary to the
spirit of the law, i.e. it constitutes an attempt to circumvent a prohibitive
provision of the law.
Example: If the parties in an employment contract did not right out exclude the
termination of the contract on important grounds but agreed either that certain
events will not constitute important reason, or that termination will only be
permissible for certain reasons, they act to circumvent the law. This is so because,
strictly speaking, such an agreement, although not altogether excluding the right
of termination, it limits it in an inadmissible way.
2. The Content of the Juridical Act to Comply with Good Morals

According to an explicit provision of the law, every juridical act
contrary to good morals (boni mores),58 is null and void (Art. 178 CC).59
It is left to the court to decide which juridical acts are contrary to
morality. Based on court judgments the legal transactions considered as
contrary to good morals are of the following type:
A. Juridical acts seeking an immoral result. For example, A promises to
pay an amount of money to B in order for the latter to defame C; or A pays
B a sum of money in order for the latter to forge a public document.
B. Juridical acts in which one person promises another something in
exchange for the latters compliance with the law or the principles of
56
According to Article 672 of the Greek Civil Code, in case of employment contract for a
fixed term each of the parties (the employer and the employee) has the right to terminate it at
any time for important reason. This right may not be waived by an agreement between
employer and employee because such agreement would be contrary to a prohibitive provision
of the law.
57
What constitutes important reason is not defined by law. Whether this is indeed the case
is determined in each particular situation. For example, for the employer important reason
exists when the employee does not comply with the instructions of the employer or when he
abuses the trust shown to him by the employer. For the employee important reason exists
when the employer does not pay him his wages, when he treats him with cruelty, etc.
58
Good morals (boni mores) is the average mans concept of social morality. See above
Introduction to Law, Ch. A, II.
59
It is absolute nullity. See below Ch. E, II, 3, B, a.
144
morality, such as, for example, to abstain from committing a crime in

exchange for money.
C. Juridical acts inordinately limiting the freedom of a person, e.g.
when A promises B that he will pay him a sum of money if B abstains from
voting, or if he changes his profession or religion.
D. Exploitative juridical acts. The law refers specifically to the
exploitative contracts (Art. 179 CC). Exploitative is the juridical act where
one, by exploiting the need, levity,60 or inexperience of the other, succeeds
in obtaining for a certain performance pecuniary advantages that are
extremely disproportional to his supply.
Examples: A, being in great financial hardship on account of his need for an
urgent surgical procedure abroad, sold his immovable property to B, worth 90,000
euros, for a mere 30,000 euros.
A, pressured by great financial need, borrowed money from B at great cost, i.e.
he concluded a loan contract at an exorbitant interest rate.
60
Levity is the indifference and naivet on account of which one may not evaluate the
meaning and consequences of his actions.
CHAPTER D
INTERPRETATION OF JURIDICAL ACTS
If the formulation of the declaration of the will, i.e. its letter, leaves no
room for ambiguity as to the meaning of its content, naturally, there is no
reason for interpretation. Only when the declaration of the will creates
doubts, is there reason for interpretation.
I. RULES OF INTERPRETATION
The Greek Civil Code has two general rules which apply to the
interpretation of juridical acts whether they are unilateral juridical acts or
contracts. These rules are contained in Articles 173 and 200 of the Civil
Code.
1. According to Article 173 of the Greek Civil Code, when interpreting
a declaration of the will the true intention shall be sought without focusing
exclusively on the literal meaning of the words.
This rule, which emphasizes the subjective criterion, establishes the
subjective interpretation. But when the law says that the true will of the
person is being sought, it does not imply that it is necessary for one to seek
the innermost will of the declarant; only his true will as reflected in his
declaration. In other words interpretation seeks the truth about the will that
was declared.
In this interpretation are taken into consideration not only the words
used in the phrasing of the declaration of the will, but also the circumstances
in the framework of which the declaration was made. For example, the
discussions that took place during the stage of negotiations for the
conclusion of the legal transaction will be taken into account.
2. According to Article 200 of the Greek Civil Code, contracts shall be
interpreted in conformity with the requirements of good faith taking into
consideration business usage.
146
With this rule, which pays special attention to the objective criteria of
good faith1 and business usage,2 is established the objective interpretation.
Objective interpretation is the one based on the good faith required in
transactions, i.e. the interpretation where the declarations of will must be
interpreted as they are usually understood by honest parties when dealing
under similar circumstances.
From the combination of the above mentioned rules for the
interpretation of legal transactions it follows that the law seeks to determine
the true declared will in an objective way, i.e. by using the yardstick of
business honesty. Consequently, in every concrete case it should be
examined what the average honest man could and should have gathered
from a declaration of will made by the declarant.
II. SUPPLEMENTAL AND CONDITION FORMING
INTERPRETATION
By interpretation we also mean the filling of the gaps in a juridical act.

A juridical act has a gap when the parties did not regulate a certain matter
during the conclusion of the legal transaction, either because they did not
anticipate it or because, although they anticipated it, they did not want to
regulate it.
Gaps mainly arise in contracts of duration or standing contracts (e.g.
lease of a thing, employment contract) because, during the long period of
time over which they stretch from conclusion to termination it is
possible for changes to occur which could not have been anticipated by the
parties at the time of conclusion of the legal transaction.
These gaps are filled by the use of either supplemental or condition
forming interpretation.
1. Supplemental Interpretation
Supplemental interpretation aims at filling the gaps of the juridical act
by seeking the surmised, the presumed will of the parties.
Objective good faith is the directness and honesty required during transactions and in social
life in general. See below Law of Obligations, Introduction, Ch. A, III, 2.
2
Business usage means the sum total of practices prevailing in transactions. See above
Introduction to Law, Ch. A, III.
147
To find the surmised, the presumed will, one has recourse to familiar
practices of the parties as well as to solutions the parties have adopted in
similar cases. If such data is not available, it is presumed that the content of
their will is that of a prudent man under the same circumstances.
Example: A leased an apartment of his to B who is an engineer. In the rental
agreement it was not mentioned whether B may also use the premises as an office.
At some point disagreement arose between A and B. It will be solved by the court
which will have recourse to supplemental interpretation.
2. Condition Forming Interpretation

Condition forming, or constitutive, interpretation is adopted when
there are gaps in the juridical act because of a change in circumstances
which took place after the conclusion of the transaction. With this type of
interpretation one does not seek to supplement the true will of the parties
concluding the transaction but to replace it so that it may be carried out. The
judge uses objective criteria by applying the provisions of the Articles 200
and 288 of the Greek Civil Code3 and seeks the fulfillment of the juridical
act according to the principles of good faith in legal transactions.
Example: A had leased an apartment of his to B for two years. When the lease
expired, i.e. when the two years elapsed, B had to return the premises to A.
However, at the time of the expiration of the lease B was seriously ill and could
not be moved. Because A insisted on the immediate vacation of the premises, a
disagreement arose between A and B. The issue will be solved by the court which,
practicing condition forming interpretation, will rule that, based on the principle
of good faith during transactions, the lease should be slightly extended.
Art. 288 of the Greek Civil Code stipulates that the debtor is obliged to fulfill the
performance in accordance with the requirements of good faith taking also into consideration
business usage.
CHAPTER E
DEFECTIVE JURIDICAL ACTS
I. CONCEPT AND DISTINCTIONS
Because of their defects, certain juridical acts either do not produce
legal effects or produce them but may be annulled by a court decision in
which case it is as if they were null and void from the start (ab initio).
Defective juridical acts are distinguished in null and void and voidable.
II. NULL AND VOID JURIDICAL ACTS
1. The Concept
Null and void juridical act is the juridical act which, due to the absence
of an essential element, does not produce the legal effects the parties were
aiming at. The juridical act which is null and void is deemed not to have
taken place (Art. 180 CC).
There are many reasons on account of which a juridical act may be null
and void: legal transaction entered into by a person lacking the capacity to
conclude juridical acts (e.g. contract of sale of immovable property by a
person under age), non-compliance with the form required by law for the
transaction to be vested (e.g. contract of sale of immovable property without
a notarial deed), clash between the content of a legal transaction and good
morals (e.g. conclusion of an exploitative transaction), etc.
In order for a person to raise the issue of nullity, it is not necessary for
the legal transaction to have been previously declared null and void by a
court ruling.1
1
Exceptionally, a court ruling is required by law in the case of a null and void marriage (Art.
1376 CC) as well as in the case of a null and void decision of the Meeting of the Members of
an association (Art. 101 CC).
149
2. Difference between Null and Void and Inactive or Inoperative

Transaction
A transaction is null and void when it does not produce its legal effects,
whereas it is inactive or inoperative when for its finalization certain
additional conditions need to concur and there is uncertainty as to whether
they will. Up until these additional conditions concur, the legal transaction is
in abeyance.
Example: If a transaction is concluded via a false representative, its validity
depends on its approval by the person represented. If the latter approves it, it is
considered valid from the time of its conclusion. If he does not approve it, it is
considered null and void. During the time this uncertainty exists the transaction is
in abeyance.2
3. Types of Nullity
A. Initial and Supervening
a. Initial nullity: the nullity is initial when it already existed at the time
of the conclusion of the transaction, i.e. it is due to a defect which existed at
the time of its conclusion, e.g. sale of an immovable property by a person
lacking the capacity to conclude juridical acts, sale of real estate without a
notarial document.
b. Supervening nullity: the nullity is supervening when it happened
after the conclusion of the transaction, i.e. when it is due to reasons which
developed subsequently. For example, the extraordinary will3 becomes null
and void three months after the circumstances giving rise to it ceased to
exist for the testator and the latter is still alive. That is to say, when the
testator, after executing the extraordinary will, returns to normal
circumstances which allow him to draw up an ordinary will but does not do
so for three months, the extraordinary will is null and void.
See below Ch. G, II, 6.

Extraordinary wills are the wills executed under certain extraordinary circumstances
(aboard a ship, during a military campaign, during a blockade). As such they are subject to
simpler requirements than those of a public will (Arts. 1749-1762 CC). For more, see below
Succession Law, Part One, Ch. B, II, 2.
3
150
B. Absolute and Relative

a. Absolute nullity: the nullity is absolute when it may be invoked by
anyone having a lawful interest and not only by the contracting parties. Such
is the nullity stemming from the violation of a provision aiming at serving a
more general interest. For example, the juridical acts concluded in violation
of a prohibitive provision of the law, those that are against the good
morals, or the transactions lacking the form required by law are absolutely
null and void.
Example: A sold an immovable property to B with a private instead of a notarial
document, as is required by law for the sale of real estate. In this case the
transaction is absolutely null and void. This implies that, other than A, anyone
having a lawful interest may invoke the nullity, e.g. As creditor because of his
lawful interest in keeping the property in As hands.
b. Relative nullity: the nullity is relative when only certain persons may
invoke it, in fact the very same persons that the infringed provision aimed at
protecting. Such is the case of nullity in case of violation of a provision of
the law serving a private interest. Up until the time the nullity is invoked,
the juridical act produces all its legal effects.
Examples: Donations on the part of the parents from the estate of their child (Art.
1524 CC) as well as management on behalf of the parents of their childs estate
without compliance with the provisions of the law (Art. 1526 CC) are relatively
null and void. In these cases, where the provisions of the law serve a private
interest, i.e. the interest of the child, the nullity of the juridical acts may be
invoked by the father, the mother, the child himself, and the childs heirs (Art.
1528 CC).
C. Full and Partial

a. Full nullity: the nullity is full when, because of it, the entire juridical
act is overturned; for example, conclusion of a transaction by a person
lacking the capacity to conclude juridical acts, sale of an immovable without
a notarial document, as is required by law.
b. Partial nullity: the nullity is partial when it only affects part of the
juridical act. Consequently, the part of the transaction which is not affected
remains valid.
Example: A loaned an amount of money to B at the annual interest rate of 50%. In
view of the fact that, on the one hand, the highest contractual annual interest rate
151
is set in principle by the European Central Bank4 and, on the other, that according
to the law (Art. 294 CC) every transaction regarding interest which exceeds the
highest limit set is null and void as regards the excess, the part of the transaction
regarding the interest rate is null and void for the amount of the excess. In this
case it is not the entire transaction which is null and void but only the part of it
referring to the interest rate that was set higher than what is permitted by law. In
other words, the loan contract remains valid but the debtors obligation to pay
interest is adjusted to the highest rate permitted.
III. VOIDABLE JURIDICAL ACTS

A voidable juridical act produces its legal effects but, due to some
defect, it may be annulled by a court judgment. After its annulment, the
voidable juridical act is identical with the null and void, i.e. it is considered
as null and void from the time of its conclusion.
Voidable are the transactions which were concluded by reason of
essential error, fraud, or threat (Art. 154, 1 CC).
The action for the annulment of the voidable transaction may be
brought only by the person in error, the defrauded, or the threatened party
and their heirs (Art. 154, 2 CC). It is brought against the other contracting
party.
The right to claim the annulment of a voidable transaction is
extinguished either if the beneficiary waives his right to annul (Art. 156 CC)
or at the expiration of two years from the conclusion of the transaction (Art.
157, 1 CC). The two year period is a term of extinction of the beneficiarys
right to claim annulment5 which begins running the day after the conclusion
of the transaction.
If the error, fraud, or threat continued past the conclusion of the
transaction, the two year term of extinction begins after this situation ceased
to exist. But in no case is it possible to claim annulment if twenty years have
elapsed from the conclusion of the transaction (Art. 157, 2 and 3 CC). The
twenty year period is also a term of extinction of a right and it begins
running the day after the conclusion of the transaction.
If the annulment of a voidable juridical act is not sought during the
term of extinction of the right to annul set by law, the transaction remains
Since June 6, 2003 the highest contractual annual interest rate is set at 8% (decis. of the
Board of Directors of the European Central Bank dated June 5, 2003).
5
See above Part Two, Ch. F, II, 4 and below Part Three, Ch. F, II, 4.
152
valid and may no longer be annulled. Consequently, its legal effects no

longer run the risk of being reversed.
IV. DIFFERENCE BETWEEN NULL AND VOID
AND VOIDABLE JURIDICAL ACTS
The juridical act which is null and void is considered never having
taken place; consequently, it produces no legal effects. In principle,6 the
nullity occurs ipso jure and there is no need for a court ruling to declare the
transaction null and void.
The voidable juridical act produces all its legal effects up until it is
declared null and void by a court ruling. If the annulment of the juridical act
is not sought within the term set by law for the extinction of such right, the
voidable transaction remains valid in all respects.
See above Ch. E, II, footn. 1.
CHAPTER F
CONDITIONS AND TERMS (TIME-CLAUSES)
I. CONDITIONS
1. Concept and Elements of the Condition
A. The Concept
Sometimes the contracting parties make the legal results of the juridical
act they are concluding (their attainment or reversal) dependent on a future
and uncertain event. This event is called condition (condicio).
Condition is a term (or limitation) the contracting parties add to a legal
transaction according to which the operativeness of the latter (i.e. its legal
effects) depends on an event which is future and uncertain.
Example: A promises to give B 600 Euros if A wins the 13 matches in the game of
PRO-PO (football pool).
B. Elements of the Condition

The elements of the condition are:
a. The term limiting the operativeness of the juridical act must have
been added by the contracting parties.
b. The event on which the operativeness of the transaction depends
must be future.
c. The event on which the operativeness of the transaction depends
must be objectively uncertain.
The condition having all the above mentioned elements is called
genuine as opposed to the non-genuine one which is a condition in name
only.
154
2. Non-genuine Conditions
A. The Concept
Non-genuine condition is the condition which exists only in name
because in reality there is no future and uncertain event in it. Consequently,
in the case of non-genuine conditions the provisions regarding conditions
are not applicable.
B. Cases of Non-genuine Conditions
a. Conditions referring to the present or the past: in those cases there is
no objective uncertainty. The event referred to in the condition either is true
or it isnt. The uncertainty is only subjective; it is the uncertainty of the
contracting parties alone.
Examples: A promises to give B 1,500 euros, if he passes the university
admission exams the results of which have already been posted.
A sells his land to B on condition that As representative has not already sold
the same to C.
b. Conditions of law: the conditions of law consist in this: the event

they are referring to as being dependent upon is by law a prerequisite for the
juridical act to have legal effects, i.e. such conditions are redundant.
Examples: A sells his apartment to B provided that they will agree on the price.
A leases his apartment to B provided that they will agree on the rent.
c. Necessary conditions: in the case of these conditions it is certain that

the event will occur, e.g. the death of a person.
Example: A promises to pay an amount of money to the x foundation if ever B
were to die.
3. Types of Conditions
The basic two categories of genuine conditions are suspensive and
resolutory.
A. The Suspensive Condition
Suspensive condition is the condition where the attainment of the legal
effects of the juridical act is made dependent on a future and uncertain
event. This means that, when a legal transaction contains a suspensive
155
condition, it will generate results only when the future and uncertain event
takes place (Art. 201 CC).
Example: A donates his vehicle to his son B and they agree that A will transfer
him the ownership of the car, if the donee gets his degree from the University of
Piraeus in July. Thus, for the transaction to generate results, the future and
uncertain event of Bs graduation in July must take place.
B. The Resolutory Condition

Resolutory condition is the condition which makes the reversal of the
legal effects of the transaction dependent upon a future and uncertain event.
The results of the transaction containing the resolutory condition occur
immediately, but they are reversed when the future and uncertain event
takes place, at which point the former situation is ipso jure restored (Art.
202 CC).
Example: A donates his car to his son B and transfers the ownership of the vehicle
to him with the understanding that the ownership of the car will revert to A (the
father), if B (the son) fails his exams and does not get his degree from the
University of Piraeus in July. In this case the legal transaction does produce its
legal effects immediately, but they are not definitive because they may be
overturned, if the future and uncertain event takes place, i.e. if B does not get his
degree in July.
4. Juridical Acts not Susceptible to Conditions

The rule is that all juridical acts may be made dependent upon
conditions. Exceptionally, however, there are certain juridical acts which are
not susceptible to conditions.
The prohibition of conditions may result either directly from the law or
from the nature and goal of the juridical act.
In the first category, i.e. the category of juridical acts which by law are
not susceptible to conditions, belong certain family law juridical acts, such
as the declarations of the future spouses in the case of marriage (Art. 1350, 1
CC), the declarations in adoption (Art. 1548 CC), or in the voluntary
acknowledgment by the father of the child born out of wedlock as his own
(Art. 1476, 2 CC).
In the second category, i.e. the category of juridical acts non
susceptible to conditions by reason of their nature or goal, belong the
juridical acts in which the necessity to protect the interests of certain persons
imposes the imperative to avoid creating ambiguity. For example, it is not
156
possible for the termination of an employment contract to be subject to

conditions (i.e. for an employer to fire the employee under conditions), or
for the power of attorney to be revoked1 under conditions.
To add a condition to a juridical act where this is prohibited renders the
transaction null and void.
5. The Impact of Certain Conditions on the Validity of the Juridical Act
There are certain cases where, even though the juridical act is
susceptible to conditions, to add a certain condition to it in principle entails
its nullity. Those conditions are the following:
A. The Contradictory Condition
A condition is contradictory when its fulfillment is contrary to the
content of the transaction. The contradictory condition renders the
transaction null and void (Art. 208, 1 CC).
Examples: A leases his apartment to B on condition that he (A) will continue to
live in it.
A designates B as his heir on condition that C will inherit him (A).
B. The Incomprehensible Condition

A condition is incomprehensible when it is not understandable due to
its unclear formulation. The incomprehensible condition makes the juridical
act null and void (Art. 208, 1 CC).
C. The Unlawful Condition
Unlawful is the condition which makes the content of the transaction
unlawful. Consequently, it brings about the nullity of the juridical act (Art.
208, 1 CC).
Example: A promises to pay B an amount of money, if the latter succeeds in
arranging for A an illegal export of archaeological inscriptions.
See below Ch. G, II, 5, A, b, aa.
157
D. The Immoral Condition

Immoral is the condition which makes the content of the transaction
immoral. Consequently, it brings about the nullity of the juridical act (Art.
208, 1 CC).
Example: A promises to pay an amount of money to B, if the latter kills D or
defames C.
E. The Impossible Condition

Impossible is the condition referring to an event which, at the time of
conclusion of the juridical act, cannot possibly happen.
a. If the impossible condition is of the suspensive kind, it renders the
juridical act null and void (Art. 208, 2 CC).
Example: A promises to give B 6,000 euros, if C lives to be two hundred years
old.
b. If the impossible condition is of the resolutory kind, this condition

does not have any effect; consequently, it does not affect the validity of the
juridical act containing such condition (Art. 208, 2 CC).
Example: A gives B a certain amount of money subject to the condition that C will
not live to be two hundred years old.
6. The Function of the Condition

Each condition goes through two stages: the stage of pendency and the
stage of fulfillment or cancellation.
A. Stage of Pendency of the Condition
A condition is pendent from the time of the conclusion of the
transaction to the time of the fulfillment or cancellation of the condition, i.e.
during the stage when the condition is not yet decided upon.
During the stage of pendency we distinguish between suspensive and
resolutory conditions:
a. Suspensive conditions: If a juridical act contains a suspensive
condition, during this stage its legal effects do not occur. However, a bond
between the contracting parties is created because the conditional
beneficiary has the right of expectation.
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The right of expectation creates the following obligations for the

obligor:
aa. He may not through fault of his own commit an action or omission
bringing about the frustration or impairment of the conditional right, such
as for example the destruction or damage of the thing sold under condition.
If the obligor violates this obligation, in the event that the condition is
fulfilled, he needs to compensate the conditional beneficiary (Art. 204
CC).
Example: On June 15, 2004 A donated his car to B and they agreed that he
would transfer the ownership of the vehicle to him, if B gets his degree from the
University of Piraeus in July of 2005. If on August 15, 2004, through fault of his
own, A destroyed or caused serious damage to the car he had donated to B, then,
in case the condition is fulfilled and B gets his degree in July of 2005, A would
have to compensate B regarding the destruction of the car or pay for the
damages he caused to it.
bb. The obligor may not alienate the object of the transaction. If the
obligor violates this obligation, in the event that the condition is fulfilled,
the alienation will be ipso jure null and void because it frustrates or
impairs the result which is dependent on the condition (Art. 206 CC).
Example: On June 10, 2004 A donated his car to B and they agreed for the
ownership to be transferred to him if B gets his degree in July of 2005. On
August 12, 2004, i.e. during the stage of pendency of the condition, A sold to C
the car he had earlier donated to B. In the event that the condition is fulfilled,
that is, if B gets his degree in July of 2005 (at which point A would have to
transfer to him the ownership of the car), the disposal of the car to C is ipso jure
null and void.
This nullity may be claimed only by the person for the protection of
whose interest it was imposed. It is the case of relative nullity.2
In the above example only B may invoke the nullity.
b. Resolutory conditions: If a juridical act contains a resolutory

condition, during the stage of pendency all the legal effects are attained but
they are reversed if the condition is fulfilled.
In other words, in the case of resolutory condition the situation is
turned upside down. The position of the beneficiary subject to resolutory
2
See above Ch. E, II, 3, B, b.
159
condition is analogous to the position of the obligor subject to suspensive

condition. Consequently, the beneficiary who acquired under resolutory
condition must:
aa. Abstain from every action that could frustrate or impair the
conditional right. If, despite this prohibition, the beneficiary through fault
of his own frustrates or impairs the conditional right, he is obliged to
compensate the party who granted him the right (Art. 204 CC);
Example: On June 5, 2004 A donated his car to B and transferred the ownership
of the vehicle to him under the condition that B would not fail his exams but get
his degree from the University of Piraeus in July of 2005. On August 15, 2004,
through fault of his own, B destroyed or caused serious damage to the car he got
from A. In the event that the resolutory condition is fulfilled, i.e. if B does not
get his degree in July of 2005 (at which point he would have to return the car to
A), he must compensate him for the destruction of the vehicle or the damage he
caused to it.
bb. Not alienate the object of the transaction during this stage of
pendency because every alienation frustrating or impairing the effects of
the transaction subject to condition is ipso jure null and void (Art. 206
CC).
Example: On June 5, 2004 A donated his car to B and transferred the ownership
of the vehicle to him under the condition that B would not fail his exams but
would get his degree from the University of Piraeus in July of 2005. On August
15, 2004 B sold As car to C. In the event that the condition is fulfilled, i.e. if B
does not get his degree in July of 2005 (at which point he would have to return
the car to A), the alienation of the vehicle (sale to C) is ipso jure null and void.
Finally, it should be pointed out that in the case of resolutory condition

the right of expectation is created in favor of the party who would benefit
from the fulfillment of the condition.
In the above example the right of expectation belongs to A.
B. Stage of Fulfillment or Cancellation of the Condition

a. Stage of fulfillment of the condition
Fulfillment of the condition means the occurrence of the future and
uncertain event.
The effects of the fulfillment of the condition take place ipso jure, i.e.
without it being necessary for the parties to engage in any other act. The
160
effects concern the future, i.e. they begin at the time of the fulfillment of the
condition (ex nunc) and do not go back to the time of the conclusion of the
transaction (ex tunc).3
We distinguish between suspensive and resolutory conditions.
aa. Suspensive conditions: fulfillment of a suspensive condition means
that the future and uncertain event on which the operativeness of the
transaction depended has come to pass.
In the above example of donation of As car to B subject to the condition that
the latter gets his degree in July, the fulfillment of the suspensive condition takes
place when B gets his degree in July.
The consequences of the fulfillment of the suspensive condition are that

the legal effects of the transaction are attained.
In the above example A is obliged to deliver the car to B.
bb. Resolutory conditions: fulfillment of a resolutory condition means

that the future and uncertain event on which the reversal of the effects and
the restoration of the previous situation are dependent, has come to pass.
In the example of donation and transfer of ownership of As car to B, subject to
the condition that the latter would not fail his exams and would get his degree in
July, fulfillment of the resolutory condition occurs when B does not get his
degree in July.
The result of fulfillment of a resolutory condition is that the effects of

the transaction are reversed and the previous situation (status quo ante) is
ipso jure restored.
In the above example B is obliged to return the car to A.
b. Stage of cancellation of the condition

Cancellation of the condition means that the future and uncertain event
did not occur.
We distinguish between suspensive and resolutory conditions.
aa. Suspensive conditions: cancellation of the suspensive condition
means that the future and uncertain event on which the operativeness of
the transaction was dependent did not occur.
3
However, it may follow from the content of the transaction that the effects of the condition
go back to a time prior to the fulfillment of the condition (Art. 203 CC).
161
In the example of donation of As car to B, subject to the condition that B gets

his degree in July, the cancellation of the suspensive condition takes place when
B does not get his degree in July.
The result of the cancellation of the suspensive condition is that the

transaction does not bring about its legal effects.
In the above example A does not have any obligation to transfer the ownership
of his car to B.
bb. Resolutory condition: cancellation of the resolutory condition

means that the future and uncertain event on which the restoration of the
previous situation was dependent did not occur.
In the example of the donation and transfer of ownership of As car to B, subject
to the condition that the latter does not fail his exams and that he gets his degree
in July, the cancellation of the resolutory condition takes place when B gets his
degree in July.
The consequence of cancellation of a resolutory condition is that the

legal effects of the transaction, which were originally attained at the point
of its conclusion, now become permanent.
In the above example B keeps the car that A gave him as a gift.
II. TERMS (TIME-CLAUSES)

1. The Concept
In the Civil Code the word term is used in three different ways:
-
as an additional clause to the juridical act

as an expression or determination of time
as a time period for the extinction of a right
2. Term as an Additional Clause to the Juridical Act

A. The Concept
Term as an additional clause to the juridical act is the time-clause (dies)
which the contracting parties have added to the transaction to make the
occurrence or reversal of its legal effects dependent on a future point in
time. In this case the provisions regarding conditions also apply to terms by
analogy (Art. 210 CC).
162
B. Types
As an additional clause in the juridical act the term (time-clause) may
be suspensive or resolutory.
a. Suspensive term (time-clause)
Suspensive term (time-clause) is the term added to the transaction
which makes the attainment of its legal effects dependent on a future but
definite point in time.
Example: A promises to give B 600 euros when the latter reaches majority.
b. Resolutory term (time-clause)

Resolutory term (time-clause) is the term added to the transaction
which makes the reversal of its legal effects dependent on a future but
definite point in time.
Example: A loans the use of one of his books to B provided that the latter will
return it to him a month later.
C. The Difference between Condition and Term

When there is a condition in a juridical act, the occurrence or reversal
of the transactions legal effects depends on a future and uncertain event,
whereas when there is a term, the occurrence or reversal of the transactions
legal effects depends on a future but certain event.
3. Term as an Expression or Determination of Time
A. The Concept
Term as an expression or determination of time means either a certain
point in time or a certain period of time within which or after which an event
will occur.
Examples: A agrees with B to transfer the ownership of his apartment to him on
March 12, 2005.
On June 7, 2004 A loaned 1,500 euros to B which the latter is obliged to pay
back after one year.
A agrees to paint Bs apartment within fifteen days.
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B. Types
As an expression or determination of time the term may be set by law,
in which case it is called legal, by a court ruling, in which case it is called
judicial, or, finally, by the juridical act, in which case it is called
transactional (Art. 240 CC).
C. The Beginning of the Term
The term begins running from the day following the occurrence of the
event which constitutes its starting point (Art. 241, 1 CC).4
Example: On July 4, 2004 A loaned 1,500 euros to B for one year. The time
period of one year begins on the 5th of July.
The law provides for an exception in the computation of the time

period in the case of coming of age (reaching majority) where the day of
birth is included in the calculation (Art. 241, 2 CC).
Example: A, who was born on May 15, 1984, reached majority on May 15, 2002.
The same holds for the computation of any other age.5

Example: A, who was born on August 10, 1990, completed the tenth year of age
on August 10, 2000.
D. The End of the Term

The time period ends at the expiration of the entire last day of the term.
If the last day of the time period is a legal holiday, the time period ends at
the expiration of the entire next working day (Art. 242 CC).
In the above example of the conclusion of a loan between A and B, the one year
term for its payment will expire at the end of the last day of the year, i.e. on July
5, 2005.
If, in the above example, the 5th of July is a Sunday, the term will end at the
expiration of Monday, the 6th of July.
In case the following day or, possibly, even the day after it is a legal
holiday, the term ends respectively at the expiration of the day after the
holiday or of the third next working day.
4
The time period for prescription is computed in the same fashion. See above Part Two, Ch.
F, I, 3.
5
See above Ch. C, II, 4, A.
164
Example: If a term ends on December 24 and the 24th of December is a Sunday,

due to the fact that both the 25th and the 26th of December are legal holidays, the
term will end at the expiration of the 27th of December.
4. Term as a Term of Extinction

Term as a term of extinction is the time period set by law or the
contracting parties during which a right has to be exercised (Art. 279 CC),
that is, if the right is not exercised within this time frame, it is extinguished.6
Example: The lawsuit for annulment of a juridical act on the grounds of essential
error, fraud, or threat may be filed only within two years from the time of the
conclusion of the transaction (Art. 157 CC).
The court considers ex officio the term of extinction set by law, that is,
it is not necessary for the litigant to invoke such plea.
Example: In the case of legal action for the annulment of a transaction on the
grounds of essential error, fraud, or threat, if the court establishes that the lawsuit
was filed after the two year term stipulated by law, it will reject it whether the
litigant opposed such plea or not.
For the differences between the term of prescription and the term of extinction, see above
Part Two, Ch. F, II, 2.
CHAPTER G
REPRESENTATION AND POWER OF ATTORNEY
I. REPRESENTATION
1. The Concept
A. General
Sometimes a person, for different reasons, real (e.g. absence from the
place where the transaction is concluded, illness) or legal (incapacity to
conclude a juridical act in propria persona), cannot act in person. In these
cases he seeks to conclude the transaction via another person, his
representative, who acts on his behalf. For example A, who acts as the
representative of B, buys a car from C on behalf of B.
Representation is the institution through which a juridical act is
concluded by one person (the representative) on behalf of another person
(the represented, the principal).
B. Difference between Representative and Messenger
The representative differs from the messenger (nuntius) in that,
whereas the representative makes a declaration of will and concludes a
transaction on behalf of another person, the messenger, just like a live
letter, conveys someone elses declaration of will.
Examples: A, who represents B, declares to C, I am selling such and such piece
of property that belongs to B in his (Bs) name.
A, who is Bs messenger, declares to C, B asked me to tell you that he is
selling such and such piece of his property.
166
2. Types of Representation
A. Direct and Indirect
a. Direct representation: the representation is direct when an individual
(the representative) makes a declaration of will in the name and on behalf of
another person (the represented, the principal) within the bounds of the
authority of representation conferred. The results of the juridical act occur
immediately in the person of the represented.
Example: A (representative) buys an apartment from C in the name and on behalf
of B (principal).
b. Indirect representation: the representation is indirect when a person

(representative) makes a declaration of will in his name, i.e. in the
representatives own name, on behalf of another person (the principal). In
this case the juridical act produces its effects in the person of the
representative who subsequently, with a separate juridical act between
himself and the represented, transfers them to the principal.
Example: A (representative) buys in his own name an apartment from C on behalf
of B. Subsequently, with a separate transaction, he transfers it to B.
The Greek Civil Code regulates only the direct representation, not the
indirect one1 which, however, is often used in the business world when the
principal does not wish to reveal his identity in the conclusion of certain
transactions.
B. Active and Passive
a. Active representation: the representation is active when the
representative makes a declaration of will in the name and on behalf of the
represented (principal).
Example: A, as the representative of B, declares to C that he sells Bs car.
b. Passive representation: the representation is passive when the

representative receives a declaration of will addressed to the represented
(principal).
1
To be noted that this is a significant substantive difference between common law and Greek
law. See, for example, the relevant comments of S. Symeonides, The General Principles of
the Civil Law, in K. Kerameus Ph. Kozyris (eds.), op. cit., p. 69.
167
Example: C declares to A, who is the representative of B, that he will buy Bs car.
C. Legal and Voluntary

a. Legal representation: the representation is legal or statutory when the
authority to represent stems directly from a provision of the law.
Examples: The parents are the legal representatives of their minor children (Art.
1510 CC).
The judicial assistant is the legal representative of the person under privative
judicial assistance in whole (Art. 1676, 1 CC).
b. Voluntary representation: the representation is voluntary when the

authority to represent stems from the will of the represented. The principal
grants authority to the representative to conclude a juridical act in the
principals name. In this case the authority of representation granted to the
representative is called power of attorney (procuration).2
Example: B appoints A as his representative for the purpose of managing his
estate.
3. Conditions of Direct Representation

The conditions of direct representation are the following:
A. Declaration of Will
Representation can only occur in reference to the declaration of will.
There can be no representation in civil offense (tort/delict).3 For example, A
cannot appoint B as his representative to burn down Cs house or to murder
D.
B. Declaration of Will Susceptible to Representation
In principle all juridical acts may be concluded through representation.
Exceptionally, certain declarations of will are not susceptible to
representation, i.e. they must be made in person, such as, for example, the
2
See below Part Three, Ch. G, II.

Every illegal behavior constitutes an unlawful act, regardless of whether it is also due to
fault; but if such behavior is also due to fault, it constitutes a tort (delict). All torts are also
unlawful acts but all unlawful acts are not also torts, e.g. the unlawful act of a
psychologically disturbed person or a minor under ten years of age is not a tort. See below
Law of Obligations, Part Three, Ch. B, I, 1.
3
168
declarations of the future spouses regarding their will to get married (Art.
1350, 1 CC), the fathers voluntary acknowledgement of a child born out of
wedlock as his own (Art. 1476 CC), the declaration of adoption (Art. 1549
CC), the drawing up of a will (Art. 1716 CC). If these juridical acts are
concluded via a representative, they are null and void.
C. Declaration of Will in the Name of Another (the Principal)
The declaration of will made by the representative needs to be made in
the name of the principal, i.e. it should be clear that the juridical act
concluded by the representative is another persons transaction: the
principals.
The fact that the representative concludes the transaction in the name of
the principal sometimes is expressly stated (explicit representation) and
other times is inferred from the circumstances (tacit or implied
representation).
Example: The sales associate in a store selling the stores merchandise to the
public or the employee in an auto repair shop concluding agreements with
customers about car repairs act in the name of their respective employers (the
businessman operating the store or the owner of the car repair shop) even though
no special mention of this is being made to the customers during the respective
transactions (tacit or implied representation).
D. Suffices for the Representative to Have Limited Capacity to Conclude

Juridical Acts
According to the express rule of Article 213 of the Greek Civil Code,
suffices for the representative to have limited capacity to conclude juridical
acts.4
The legislator was led to this arrangement thinking that, since the
transaction concluded by the representative affects the person of the
principal, it is in the principals interest to select the right person to
represent him. That is, it is the principal who takes the risk to be poorly
represented by the person he chose as his representative.
The provision of article 213 of the Greek Civil Code is in principle
inapplicable in the case of legal representation, i.e. the minor with limited
capacity to conclude juridical acts cannot exercise parental care nor can he
be appointed as a tutor.
4
See above Ch. C, II, 4, C, a.
169
E. The Representative Must be Granted the Authority to Represent

The authority to represent is granted by the law (legal representation) or
by an agreement between representative and principal called power of
attorney (voluntary representation).
F. Declaration of Will within the Bounds of the Power Granted
In the case of legal representation the content of the authority of
representation granted is determined directly by the law, whereas in the case
of voluntary representation from the power of attorney agreement or from
the underlying legal relationship between representative and represented.
If the exercise of the authority of representation exceeds the above
mentioned bounds, the provisions of the law regarding false representation
are applicable.5
II. POWER OF ATTORNEY
1. The Concept
Power of attorney (procuration) is the authority of representation
conferred through a unilateral juridical act. We have power of attorney only
in the case of voluntary representation.
The term power of attorney signifies both the unilateral juridical act
through which the authority of representation is granted and the authority
conferred thereby (Art. 216 CC).
2. Ways of Granting Power of Attorney
The power of attorney may be granted in the following ways:
a. With a declaration to the representative (internal power of attorney).
Example: A gives power of attorney to B for the purpose of buying a house in As
name and on As behalf.
b. With a declaration to the third party with whom the transaction of the
attorney (representative) is to be concluded (external power of attorney).
Example: A declares to C with whom he does business that one or more
transactions will be concluded by B in As name and on As behalf.
5
See below Ch. G, II, 6.
170
c. By public announcement, i.e. with a declaration communicated via

the usual media (e.g. newspapers, radio, TV).
Example: Company A declares publicly (through a newspaper publication or a
radio or TV announcement) that B is the companys representative.
3. Types of Power of Attorney

A. General and Specific Power of Attorney
Depending on the extent of the authority of representation conferred,
the power of attorney may be general or specific.
a. General power of attorney: the power of attorney is general when it
refers either to all or a group of the principals transactions.
b. Specific power of attorney: the power of attorney is specific when it
refers to a specific juridical act of the principal.
B. Express and Tacit Power of Attorney
Depending on the way the power of representation is granted, it may be
express or tacit (implied).
a. Express power of attorney: the power of attorney is express when it
is granted by way of a declaration which needs to reach another person,
whether that person is the attorney (representative) or a third party with
whom the transaction will be concluded.
b. Tacit power of attorney: the power of attorney is tacit when it is
inferred either from the subjacent legal relationship binding representative
and represented, or from the overall behavior of the represented, creating the
certainty in third parties that he has granted power of attorney to a specific
person. For example, this is the case when a businessman has placed a
person in a position in the business involving transactions with the public.
C. Individual and Collective Power of Attorney
Depending on whether one or more attorneys (representatives) have
been appointed, the power of attorney may be individual or collective.
a. Individual power of attorney: the power of attorney is individual
when only one attorney is appointed.
b. Collective power of attorney: the power of attorney is collective
when more persons are appointed as attorneys, acting either separately or
jointly.
171
4. Form of the Juridical Act Granting Power of Attorney

As a rule, the declaration through which power of attorney is granted is
not subject to any special formalities, i.e. for the appointment of an
attorney suffices an oral declaration. Exceptionally, if it is required that the
juridical act with the third party (for the conclusion of which the power of
attorney is granted) conform to a certain form, the granting of the power of
attorney should be clothed in the same form (Art. 217, 2 CC).
Example: If A grants B power of attorney to buy him an immovable property,
since for the conclusion of such contract a notarial deed is required by law (Arts.
369 and 1033 CC), the power of attorney should also be vested the form of a
notarial deed.
5. Termination of the Power of Attorney

Termination of the power of attorney means the end of the attorneys
power of representation.
A. Reasons for Termination of the Power of Attorney
There are two kinds of reasons for termination of the power of attorney:
general and special.
a. General reasons
The general reasons for termination of the power of attorney are the
same as in all legal relations. For example:
aa. Expiry of the term for which the power of attorney was granted.
Example: A granted power of attorney to B for two years. At the expiration of the
two year period, the power of attorney is terminated.
bb. Fulfillment of the resolutory condition upon which the power of

attorney depended.
Example: A gave B power of attorney on condition that the latter would be a
permanent resident of Greece. From the moment B settled abroad, the resolutory
condition was fulfilled. Consequently, the power of attorney ceased.
cc. Conclusion of the transaction for which the power of attorney was
granted.
172
Example: A gave B power of attorney to purchase for him an immovable. When

the purchase of the immovable was concluded, the power of attorney ceased.
b. Special reasons
The special reasons for the cessation of the power of attorney are the
following:
aa. Revocation of the power of attorney: since the power of attorney is
based on a trust relationship between the principal and the representative,
if this relationship breaks down, the represented is free to revoke the
power of attorney. The power of attorney is freely revocable at any time.
The revocation of the power of attorney is made by way of a
declaration addressed to the representative or the third party with whom
the transaction is to be concluded (Art. 219 CC). If the power of attorney
was given by a declaration to a third party, the declaration of its revocation
shall solely be addressed to the same party (Art. 221 CC). If the power of
attorney was given by way of public announcement, its revocation must be
made in the same way. This is necessary for the protection of third parties
who need to become aware of the revocation.
The power of attorney may be revoked by a simple declaration of the
person who granted it. If the power of attorney was given by notarial deed,
as is for example the case concerning the sale of immovables, it may only
be revoked by notarial deed (Art. 220 CC).
bb. Termination of the subjacent legal relationship on which the power
of attorney was based, e.g. an employment contract or a business
association (Art. 222 CC).
Example: A was hired as an employee at Bs store for a year. After the termination
of the employment contract between A and B, i.e. after the elapse of one year, the
power of attorney which had been tacitly given to A by B (to sell the merchandise
of the store to the customers) also ceases.
cc. Death of the principal or the attorney (Art. 223 CC): the missing
person who was declared an absentee is also considered deceased.6
Moreover, as far as legal persons are concerned, the dissolution of the
legal person results in the cessation of the power of attorney.7
6
7
See above Part One, Ch. B, I, 4.

See above Part One, Ch. C, III, 1, H, a.
173
dd. Incapacity of the principal or the attorney to conclude juridical

acts, assuming of course that the incapacity occurred after the power of
attorney was granted (Art. 223 CC).
Example: If, on account of psychological disturbance, either the principal B or the
attorney A is placed under privative judicial assistance in whole, the power of
attorney given to A by B ceases.
ee. Resignation of the attorney: the resignation of the attorney is

effected by a declaration of the attorney to the person who granted him
the power of attorney.
B. Consequences of Termination of the Power of Attorney
Since the authority of representation ceases with the termination of the
power of attorney, the attorney, in case the power of attorney was granted
to him in writing, is obliged to restitute the power of attorney document or
deposit it with a public authority, e.g. the police or a notary public (Art. 227
CC).
If the attorney, though aware of the cessation of the power of
attorney, refuses to restitute the power of attorney document (a private
document or a notarial deed), the person who granted the written power of
attorney to him has the right to demand from the court to confirm the
cessation of the power of attorney and declare the relevant document non
effective (Art. 228 CC).
C. Transactions after Termination of the Power of Attorney
Regarding the validity of the juridical act concluded by the attorney
after the cessation of the power of attorney, it depends whether at the time of
the conclusion of the transaction the attorney knew of the cessation or not.
a. If at the time of the conclusion of the transaction the attorney was
unaware of the cessation of the power of attorney, the transaction he
concluded is valid and binding for the principal. The transaction is null and
void only when the other contracting party knew or should have known of
the termination of the power of attorney (Art. 224 CC).
Example: B, permanent resident in London, had granted A, permanent resident in
Athens, general power of attorney. Because Bs trust in A was shattered, he sent A
a notarial deed by mail revoking the power of attorney he had earlier given him.
When Bs letter reached As residence in Athens, the latter was already in
174
Thessaloniki to purchase from C a specific immovable in Bs name and on Bs

behalf. Unaware of the revocation of the power of attorney, A concluded the
transaction of the purchase of the immovable from C. The contract concluded
between A and C is valid and binding for the principal (B) because, at the time it
was concluded, the attorney (A) was unaware of the fact that B had revoked the
power of attorney he had earlier given him.
The above transaction would only be null and void thus creating no obligation
for the principal (B) if the other contracting party (C) knew, or should have
known, that A no longer represents B.
b. If at the time of the conclusion of the transaction, the attorney knew

of the termination of the power of attorney, the transaction concluded is not
valid; consequently, it is not binding for the principal8 (Art. 225 CC), unless
he approves it.
In case the principal does not approve the transaction his representative
concluded after the termination of the power of attorney, the representative
is obliged, at the choice of the other contracting party, either to perform the
transaction or to pay damages.9
Example: A knows that he is no longer Bs representative. Nevertheless, he sells
one of Bs vehicles to C as Bs attorney. This transaction does not create any
liability for B vis--vis C, unless B approves the sale. If B does not approve the
sale, A is liable, at Cs choice, either to perform, i.e. deliver to C the car he sold
him as Bs representative, or to compensate him (C).
6. Lack of Power of Attorney

For a person to conclude a valid transaction as the representative of
another, he must have power of attorney. Moreover, the transaction he
concludes must lie within the boundaries of the power of attorney granted to
him. If the above two conditions do not concur, the representative acts as a
pseudo representative (falsus procurator).
Regarding the consequences of such false representation we need to
distinguish between contracts and unilateral juridical acts.
It is the case of inactive or inoperative juridical act (see above Ch. E, II, 2).
In this case Articles 229-234 of the Greek Civil Code are applied, i.e. the law regarding
transactions concluded by a pseudo representative (falsus procurator).
9
175
A. Contracts
A contract concluded by a pseudo representative is binding for the
principal only if the latter approves it (Art. 229, 1 CC). Up until then, the
transaction is in abeyance.10
In fact, the law gives the other contracting party the right to demand
from the principal to expressly approve the contract within a reasonable time
determined by the other contracting party himself (Art. 229, 2 CC).
The approval11 is given by a declaration addressed to either the other
contracting party or the representative. After the approval, the contract has
force from the date it was concluded and is binding ex tunc for the principal.
If the principal does not approve the contract concluded in his name, he
is not liable vis--vis the other contracting party. In this case the pseudo
representative is liable, at the choice of the other contracting party, either to
perform the contract himself, i.e. as if he were the contracting party and had
acted in his own person, or to pay damages (Art. 231, 1 CC).
The pseudo representative is released from any obligation vis--vis the
other contracting party only when the latter knew, or should have known, of
the absence of authority to represent (Art. 231, 3 CC).
Example: A falsely presents himself as the representative of C (pseudo
representative) and concludes a sale contract with B regarding a car that belonged
to C. If C approves the sale, the contract is binding for him and produces legal
effects between B and C. If C does not approve the sale, A is liable, at the choice
of B, either to perform the contract, i.e. deliver to B the car he had sold him, or to
pay damages to him for the prejudice he caused him due to the non performance
of the contract. A is released from any liability only if B knew or should have
been aware of the fact that A was a pseudo representative.
10
It is the case of inactive or inoperative juridical act (see above Ch. E, II, 2).
Approval is the consent of a third person (i.e. a person who was not a party to the
transaction) given after the conclusion of the juridical act. With the approval the juridical act,
which up until then was in abeyance, takes force retroactively, i.e. from the time of its
conclusion (Art. 238 CC). The approval differs from the consent (which is also the agreement
of a third party who was not a party to the transaction) in that the consent is given either
before or during the transaction. The consent secures the validity of the transaction for which
it is given (Art. 236 CC). Cases where consent is required are, for example, the cases referred
in the Article 136 of the Greek Civil Code, according to which for a minor who has
completed fifteen years of age to be able to conclude a valid employment contract as an
employee, the consent of the persons exercising care over him is required; also the case in the
Article 1550 of the Greek Civil Code, according to which for the adoption of a minor, the
consent of his parents or of the minors legal representative, as well as of the minor himself,
if he has completed twelve years of age (Art. 1555, 1 CC) is required.
11
176
B. Unilateral Juridical Acts12

Regarding the unilateral juridical acts concluded by a pseudo
representative, we need to distinguish as follows:
-
if the unilateral juridical act is not addressed to a specific person (e.g.

the establishing deed of a foundation resulting from a unilateral
juridical act inter vivos), it is null and void (Art. 232 CC);
if the unilateral juridical act is addressed to a specific person (e.g.
termination of an employment contract), as long as the addressee did
not reject it for reasons of lack of representation, it is valid if the
principal approved it (Art. 233, 1 CC).
7. Self-contracting
We speak of self-contract when the representative concludes a
transaction with himself either as the other contracting party or as the
representative of a third contracting party.
Examples: A, the representative of B, sells to himself an immovable belonging
to B. In this transaction A acts on the one hand as the seller (being the
representative of B) and on the other hand as the buyer (acting for himself).
A, the representative of B and C, sells (as the representative of B) an immovable
of Bs to himself (acting as the representative of C). In this transaction A acts on
the one hand as the seller (acting as the representative of B), and on the other hand
as the buyer, (acting as the representative of C).
Self-contracting involves certain dangers because one and the same

person represents conflicting interests. It is therefore prohibited by law (Art.
235, 1 CC). Self-contract concluded despite the prohibition of the law is null
and void.13
Exceptionally, self-contracting is permitted in the following cases:
A. If the principal had authorized it. The permission may be express or
implied from the content of the power of attorney, the circumstances, or the
principle of good faith governing transactions.
12
See above Ch. C, VI, 1.

The nullity is relative and may only be invoked by the principal. Regarding relative nullity,
see above Ch. E, II, 3, B, b.
13
177
Examples: The cashier of a shipping company, who acts as the representative of

the company, buys for himself a ticket for a cruise.
The employee of a clothing store for women, acting as the representative of the
store owner, buys from the store a dress for herself.
B. If self-contracting constitutes exclusively the fulfillment of an

obligation of the representative vis--vis the principal, of the principal vis-vis the representative, or, finally, of the principal vis--vis another principal
(double representation).
Examples: A, who as Bs representative manages his estate, pays to himself (as
the representative of B) out of his own money the amount of 1,000 euros he owes
him (fulfillment of an obligation of the representative vis--vis the principal).
A, who as Bs representative manages his estate, pays from Bs estate to himself
(A) the amount of 1,000 euros B owes him (fulfillment of an obligation of the
principal vis--vis the representative).
A, who is the representative of both B and C and manages their estates, pays
from Cs estate (as the representative of C) to himself (as the representative of B)
the amount of 1,000 euros C owes to B (fulfillment of an obligation of one
principal vis--vis another principal).
But even in these exceptional cases where the law allows for selfcontracting, for the juridical act to be valid it must be vested the form of a
notarial deed (Art. 235, 2 CC). The reason why the law requires such form is
in order to safeguard the interests of the principal.
However, because the provision in Article 235, para. 2 of the Greek
Civil Code requiring the form of notarial deed was considered excessively
austere, it is being accepted14 that the lack of notarial deed may be remedied
by the subsequent approval of the transaction by the principal (e.g. approval
by the shipping company of the purchase of the cruise ticket by its cashier,
approval by the store owner of the purchase of the dress by its employee).
14
See Papantoniou, op. cit., p. 488; Spyridakis, op. cit., p. 783; Simantiras, op. cit., p. 715;
Ap. Georgiadis, op. cit., p. 626; Filios, op. cit., Vol. II, 2002, p. 175.
3. Law of Obligations
INTRODUCTION
CHAPTER A
THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS
I. CONCEPT AND DIVISIONS OF THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS
The law of obligations is the branch of civil law which regulates the
obligational relations. The law of obligations is contained in the Second
Book of the Greek Civil Code and is divided in two parts: General and
Special.
The general part contains the general rules which are applicable in
every obligational relation.
The special part contains the rules which regulate either certain types of
contracts (nominate contracts), such as, for example, the contract of
donation, sale, lease of a thing, contract for work, loan, or obligations
stemming from non-contractual sources, i.e. obligations stemming from tort
or from the law (e.g. obligations born of unjust enrichment).
II. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS
The law of obligations is basically the law of contracts. Contracts
propel the entire economic life, from the simple everyday transactions to the
complex big ones. However, outside of contracts, the rules of the law of
obligations regulate on the one hand the compensation for damages, caused
from unlawful acts, and on the other hand the shift of proprietary assets not
based on a just cause.
180
III. FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS

The following are the fundamental principles of the law of obligations:
-
The principle of autonomy of the private will

The principle of good faith
The principle of favoring the debtor (or the feebler party)
The principle of liability
1. The Principle of Autonomy of the Private Will

The principle of autonomy of the private will constitutes the foundation
of the private law.1 Manifestations of this principle in the law of obligations
are the freedom of contracts and the informal character of the juridical acts.
Freedom of contracts (Art. 361 CC) means that every person is free not
only to decide whether and with whom he will enter into a legal transaction
but also what the content of the transaction will be.2
Informal character of the juridical acts (Art. 158 CC) means that for a
juridical act to be concluded, no particular form is generally required.
The consequence of the principle of autonomy of the private will is that
most of the rules of the law of obligations are non-mandatory (jus
dispositivum).3
However, in recent times, when increasing numbers of rules of
mandatory law are enforced with special statutes, the autonomy of the
private will is constantly limited. Thus, both the concept of forced contract
and the so-called contract of adhesion (or accession) were created.
More specifically:
Forced contract is the contract whose conclusion is imposed on the
other contracting party (e.g. the extension of leases). Contract of adhesion
(or accession) is the contract whose content is not determined following
negotiations between the parties but the one party formulates it and the other
either adheres to it or not (e.g. the standard form contracts into which the
The constitutional grounding of this principle may be found in the text of the Greek
Constitution (Art. 5, para. 1).
2
See below Part Three, Ch. A, II.
3
See above Introduction to Law, Ch. E, II, 2.
LAW OF OBLIGATIONS
181
subscribers enter with public utilities companies such as electricity,

telephone, water utilities companies, etc.4).
2. The Principle of Good Faith (bona fides)
The concept of good faith which stamps the law of obligations consists
in the directness and honesty required in legal transactions. Everyone must
act as a direct, honest, fair, and sociable human being. The contracting party
should not behave selfishly and antisocially, e.g. pursue the satisfaction of
his own interests disregarding the equitable goods enjoyed by others which
are affected by the obligational relation. Individual rights must yield to the
interests of society as a whole. This definition of good faith coincides with
objective good faith.
Objective good faith, which is used as a behavioral standard, is
distinguished from subjective good faith, which refers to the conviction of
the contracting party that his action is based on the existence of a right that
he has. That is to say, subjective good faith refers to the contracting partys
inner disposition,5 whereas objective good faith refers to the objectively
honest behavior of the contracting party, regardless of what his inner frame
of mind might be.
Objective good faith is basically founded on Articles 288, 281, and 200
of the Greek Civil Code.
More specifically:
The provision of Article 288 of the Greek Civil Code that the debtor is
required to fulfill his performance according to the requirements of good
faith, taking also into account business usage, constitutes the guideline for
the operation of every obligational relation.
The provision of Article 281 of the Greek Civil Code decrees a general
ban on the abusive exercise of all rights, that is, their exercise in violation of
4
5
See below Part Three, Ch. A, III, 5.

Examples of subjective good faith:
The person to whom the ownership of a movable thing is transferred, even though it
did not belong to the transferring party, is considered to be in good faith either if he
believes that the person who transferred him the ownership of the thing was indeed the
owner, and consequently he had the right to transfer it, or if his lack of such knowledge
is not due to gross negligence. See below Property Law, Part Three, Ch. D, II, 2, B.
The person who has in his possession anothers movable object is in good faith if he
believes that this object belongs to him, i.e. that he (the possessor) is its rightful owner.
See below Property Law, Part Three, Ch. D, III, 1, A.
182
the principles of good faith, good morals, and the economic or social
purpose of rights.6
Article 200 of the Greek Civil Code stipulates that the interpretation of
contracts needs to be done according to the requirements of good faith,7
taking also into account business usage.
Moreover, the principle of good faith is established in other provisions
of the law of obligations as well, such as in the Articles 388, 197, and 142 of
the Greek Civil Code.
3. The Principle of Favoring the Debtor (or the Feebler Party)
In the law of obligations the tendency to favor the debtor is evident.
This happens because the debtor is assumed to be the financially weaker
party.
However, it is more accurate to say that the law of obligations is
permeated by the principle of favoring the feebler party, regardless of
whether he is the debtor or the creditor or both. This is because in the
reciprocal contracts (sale, employment contract, lease of a thing) both
contracting parties are at once debtors and creditors.
Example: In an employment contract the employee is creditor vis--vis the
employer regarding his wages and debtor regarding the services he must offer.
Correspondingly, the employer is debtor vis--vis the employee who works in his
business regarding wages and creditor regarding the claim he has for services to
be provided.
Provisions imbued by the principle of favoring the feebler party are,

for example, those of Articles 179, 388, and 409 of the Greek Civil Code.
More specifically:
The provision of Article 179 of the Greek Civil Code refers to the
nullity of an exploitative (usurious) juridical act.8
The provision of Article 388 of the Greek Civil Code refers to the
protection of the debtor from an excessively burdensome performance in
case there has been an unforeseen change of circumstances after the
conclusion of the transaction.
See above General Principles, Part Two, Ch. D, II.

See above General Principles, Part Three, Ch. D, II.
8
See above General Principles, Part Three, Ch. C, VIII, 2.
7
LAW OF OBLIGATIONS
183
The provision of Article 409 of the Greek Civil Code provides for the
reduction of a penalty clause if it is excessive.9
4. The Principle of Liability
A. According to the principle of liability,10 every person is responsible
for the consequences of his acts. The types of liability are:
-
Precontractual liability
Contractual liability
Delictual liability
Liability from unjust enrichment
More specifically:
a. Precontractual liability
Precontractual liability is the liability created during the stage of
negotiations (Arts. 197-198 CC).11
b. Contractual liability
Contractual liability is the liability created because one of the
contracting parties violates his contractual obligations.
Whoever concludes a contract must abide by his contractual obligation
and implement it (Arts. 287, 361 CC). But if the contracting party does not
abide by his contractual obligations, he is obliged assuming of course that
certain conditions concur to compensate the other party (Arts. 330 et seq.,
335 et seq., 340 et seq., 349 et seq., 362 et seq., 380 et seq. CC).12
Penalty clause is the amount of money or something else the debtor promises to the
creditor in case the former does not implement or does not properly implement his
performance (Art. 404 CC). See below Part Five, Ch. C.
10
Of course, this type of liability is civil liability the purpose of which is to restore the
damage suffered by the injured party. Civil liability should not be confused with criminal
liability which aims at satisfying the offended legal order by enforcing punishment on the
offender (i.e. the punishment provided by the Criminal Code, such as short term
imprisonment, long term imprisonment, etc.). See below Part Two, Ch. A, I.
11
See above General Principles, Part Three, Ch. C, VI, 2, A.
12
See below Part One, Ch. A, V, 2, B, a; Part Two, Ch. A, III, 2; Part Four, Ch. B, and Ch. C,
III, IV, V.
184
c. Delictual liability13
The term delictual liability means that every person is obliged to restore
the damage he unlawfully and culpably caused to another (Arts. 914 et seq.
CC).
d. Liability from unjust enrichment14
Liability from unjust enrichment means that the person who became
richer without a lawful cause (unjustifiably) from the property of another or
at anothers expense is obliged to return the benefit (Arts. 904 et seq.).
B. In principle, the prerequisite for precontractual, contractual, and
delictual liability is culpability on the part of the person who caused the
damage. The liability which is grounded on fault is called subjective liability
and it constitutes the norm.15
Exceptionally, in certain cases, liability is created even without
culpability. This is called objective liability.16 The following are examples of
instances of objective liability:
-
13
The liability of the legal person for actions or omissions of its

representing organs (Art. 71 CC).17
The liability stemming from the fault of an underling (Arts. 334
and 922 CC).18
The liability of the person in possession of an animal for damage
caused to a third party (Art. 924, 1 CC).
The liability of the employer in case of a work related accident (L.
551/1915).
See below Part Three, Ch. B, I, 4, C.

See below Part Three, Ch. B, II, 3.
15
See below Part Two, Ch. A, III, 1, A.
16
See below Part Two, Ch. A, III, 1, B.
17
See above General Principles, Part One, Ch. C, III, F.
18
See below Part Two, Ch. C.
14
CHAPTER B
OBLIGATION
I. THE CONCEPT OF OBLIGATION
According to Article 287 of the Greek Civil Code, obligation is the
relation whereby a person undertakes to furnish a performance to another.
Thus, obligation is a legal relation between two persons where the one is
obliged to render performance and the other is entitled to receive
performance.
The parties involved in an obligation are called debtor (obligor) and
creditor (obligee). Creditor is the person entitled to demand performance
from another. Debtor is the person obliged to perform.
The object of the obligation is performance. Performance is a certain
behavior (action or omission) which the debtor is obliged to manifest and
the creditor is entitled to demand.
Examples: Performance consisting in action is, in the case of sale, the sellers
obligation to transfer the ownership of the thing sold; in the case of employment
contract, the obligation of the employee to offer his services; in the case of lease
of a thing, the lessors obligation to surrender the use of the thing leased.
Performance consisting in omission is, for example, the promise given by A
(employee in Bs store) to the latter that he will not start a similar business in the
same area.
II. OBLIGATION AND OBLIGATIONAL RELATION

According to the definition given by the Greek Civil Code, obligation
is a simple connection between two persons which generates a claim in
favor of the one party and a corresponding obligation on the part of the
other. However, this phenomenon of simple obligations seldom appears in
186
the world of transactions. In most transactions from one and the same legal
fact stem not only one but several obligations and corresponding rights. That
is, from one obligational relation (called the main obligational relation) stem
more obligations, which are either born right from the start, i.e.
simultaneously with the main obligational relation, or develop later on,
during its unfolding.
It follows from the above that the concept of obligational relation is
broader than the concept of obligation because from one obligational
relation more than one obligation may be generated.
Example: The obligational relation of sale, other than the main obligations of the
contracting parties (for the seller to transfer the ownership of the thing sold and
deliver its possession and for the buyer to pay the agreed price), generates other
collateral (derivative) obligations as well, some of which are born right from the
start of the obligational relation and others develop during its unfolding. Collateral
obligations born from the start are, for example, the obligation of the seller to
inform the buyer of the legal relations involving the object sold, his obligation to
safeguard the item, package, and ship it. Collateral obligations developing during
the unfolding of the obligational relation are, for example, the obligation of the
seller to compensate the buyer if the former does not fulfill his obligations, or the
obligation of the buyer to notify the seller in a timely fashion about the defects of
the thing sold, if any.
III. OBLIGATION AND RESPONSIBILITY

Besides the element of obligation, the obligational relation also carries
the element of enforceability. This means that, if the debtor does not fulfill
his obligation out of his own free will, the creditor is entitled to lodge action
against him and, in case he does not conform with the relevant court
judgment, to attempt forcible execution on his assets.1 The element of the
obligational relation rendering the obligation coercible is called
responsibility.2 That is, responsibility consists in the obligation of the debtor
to be put through the process of forcible execution in order for the claims of
the creditor to be satisfied.
See above General Principles, Part Two, Ch. E, I, 5.

In the broad sense of the term responsibility signifies all the consequences a person suffers
in case he offends a lawful good. See below Part Two, Ch. A, I.
2
LAW OF OBLIGATIONS
187
IV. NATURAL OR IMPERFECT OBLIGATION

In the obligational relation, as was earlier mentioned, the main element
is that performance is coerced. However, there are obligations, the so-called
natural or imperfect obligations, where the element of coercion of the debtor
is missing. In these cases the creditor can not coerce the debtor to fulfill his
performance. If, however, the debtor, on his own free will, implements
performance, he may not claim it back.3
The following are cases of natural or imperfect obligations:
1. Prescribed Claims
When the prescriptive period has been completed, the debtor is entitled
to refuse implementation of performance (Art. 272, 1 CC). However,
whatever was paid without the knowledge of prescription may not be
claimed back (272, 2, 1 CC).
Example: B had a claim of 2,500 euros against A but he was negligent and let the
time period set by law for prescription go by without pursuing it. His claim has
prescribed. After the expiration of the last day of the prescription period B lodges
action against A to recover his money. A has the right, by opposing the plea of
prescription, to refuse fulfillment of his obligation. But if A does not oppose the
plea of prescription and out of his own free will implements performance, he may
not claim back what he paid, even if he claims later on that at the time of
performance he was not aware that his debt had prescribed.
2. Claims from Game or Bet

No claim arises from gaming or betting (Art. 844 CC). However, debts
arising from game or bet which were paid voluntarily and without fraud or
other deception on the part of the winner, may not be claimed back (Art. 845
CC).
See M. Stathopoulos, General Law of Obligations, 3d ed., 1998, p. 43; Ap. Georgiadis, Law
of Obligations, General Part, 1999, p. 44.
PART ONE
TYPES OF OPBLIGATIONS
CHAPTER A
TYPES OF OBLIGATIONS ACCORDING TO THEIR OBJECT
I. GENERIC AND SPECIFIC OBLIGATIONS
1. The Concept of Generic and Specific Obligations
Generic obligation or obligation in kind is the obligation whose object
of performance is determined only by the general characteristics of the
genus to which it belongs. This obligation is distinguished in obligation of
pure genus and obligation of limited genus.
Obligation of pure genus exists when the thing due is always available
in the market.
Examples: A owes B 100 kilos of Tripoli apples.
A owes B a 2004 Peugeot 206 vehicle.
Obligation of limited genus exists when the thing due will be taken
from a limited stock of the entire genus.
Examples: A owes B 100 kilos of Tripoli apples from his (As) apple orchard.
A owes B 1,000 kilos of grain from the grain stored in his (As) barn.
Specific obligation is the obligation whose object is determined by

individual characteristics. That is, in the specific obligation the thing to be
furnished to the creditor is predetermined.
Examples: A owes B the passenger vehicle with license plate number YAH
1983.
190
A owes B the apartment No 7, on the second floor of the apartment building

located on 555 Patission Street.
2. The Significance of Distinguishing between Generic and Specific

Obligations
In generic obligations, due to the inexhaustible number of items
contained in the genus, there cannot be impossibility of performance
(genera non pereunt). This means that the chance destruction of one item
from the genus does not release the debtor from his obligation to perform
but he is obliged to give another item, identical with the one that was
destroyed. This is because, since the genus was not destroyed, other things
identical to the one that was destroyed do exist. In this instance we say that
the risk of chance destruction of an object is borne by the debtor.
Example: If, due to a chance event (fire, flood), the 100 kilos of Tripoli apples
or the 2004 Peugeot 206 vehicle are destroyed (items that A intended to furnish
to B), A is not released from his obligations but is obliged to furnish to B another
100 kilos of Tripoli apples or another 2004 Peugeot 206 vehicle respectively.
In specific obligations the chance destruction of an item owed releases

the debtor who no longer has the obligation to perform. That is to say, in
specific obligations the risk of chance destruction is borne by the creditor.
Example: If, due to a chance event, the passenger vehicle with license plate YAH
1983 that A owes to B is destroyed, A is released from the obligation to furnish a
car to B.
3. Choice
In the generic obligation the right to choose, i.e. to determine the thing
to be furnished, belongs to the debtor, unless a different conclusion may be
drawn from the relationship (Art. 289, 1 CC). This provision of the law is
non mandatory;1 consequently, it is possible for the parties to agree that the
right of choice belongs to the creditor.
As concerns the quality of the thing to be furnished, regardless of who
has the right to choose, the law sets forth the limitation if, of course, the
contracting parties have not agreed otherwise that the thing to be furnished
should be of at least average quality (Art. 289, 2 CC).
1
Regarding the non-mandatory rules of law (jus dispositivum), see above Introduction to
Law, Ch. E, II, 2.
LAW OF OBLIGATIONS
191
4. Specification (or Concretization)

Specification or concretization of the obligation signifies the
transformation of the obligation from generic to specific. With
concretization the object of the obligation becomes a specific thing or a
specific quantity owed thereafter. Consequently, the risk of chance
destruction is transferred from the debtor to the creditor. Mere choosing
does not bring about specification of the obligation.
The ways for an obligation to become specified are:
A. Subsequent Agreement between the Parties
The contracting parties later on agree that the object of the obligation
becomes focused on a specific thing or a specific quantity of the genus
which will be owed thereafter.
Examples: A owes to furnish a 2004 Peugeot 206 vehicle to B. Subsequently, A
and B agree that the vehicle to be furnished is the 2004 Peugeot 206 with license
plate No 23323 and engine No 5322.
A owes to furnish 100 kilos of Tripoli apples to B. Subsequently, A and B agree
that the apples to be furnished are the 100 kilos of Tripoli apples placed in specific
crates with Bs name on them.
B. Delivery by the Debtor to the Creditor of the Thing or Quantity Selected

In this case we have extinction of the obligation due to its fulfillment.
Examples: A delivers to B the 2004 Peugeot 206 vehicle he owes him.
A delivers to B the 100 kilos of Tripoli apples he owes him.
C. Dispatching the Thing or Quantity Owed to a Different Location than

the One Agreed Following the Creditors Request
In this case the obligation becomes specified from the time it was
delivered for dispatch to the person responsible for its transportation (Art.
290, 2 CC).
At this point it should be emphasized that it is not sufficient for the
delivery to be shipped to just any location; the location of its destination
must be different from the location initially agreed as the place of
performance.
Examples: A owed B a 2004 Peugeot 206 vehicle which he was supposed to
deliver to him in Athens. Before the delivery of the vehicle, B asked A to send it
192
to him in Patras. From the time the vehicle was loaded in order to be shipped from
Athens to Patras, the obligation was specified and thereafter focused on the
particular vehicle that was loaded in order to be transported. This means that if on
the way and up until the time the vehicle is delivered to B it gets destroyed by
a chance event, A is not obliged to provide B with another vehicle.
A owed B 100 kilos of Tripoli apples which he was supposed to deliver to him
in Athens. If B, before they were delivered, asked A to deliver them to him in
Halkis, from the moment the apples were loaded for the purpose of transportation
from Athens to Halkis the obligation was specified and thereafter focused on the
specific apples loaded for transportation now the only ones due.
If, of course, it was mentioned in the original agreement that the place of
performance would be Patras (in the case of the car) or Halkis (in the case of the
apples), no specification of the obligation occurs from the moment the car or the
apples were loaded in order to be transported from Athens to Patras and to Halkis
respectively. The reason for this is that in this instance the obligation is not
implemented in a location other than the one it was supposed to have been.
D. Separation by the Debtor of the Thing/Quantity Due for Delivery and

Creditors Default in Acceptance
In this instance for specification to take place the following two
conditions need to concur (Art. 290, 1 CC):
a. Separation from the genus of a thing or quantity to be furnished
resulting from a unilateral act on behalf of the debtor who has the right of
choice.
b. The creditor needs to be in default2 regarding the acceptance of the
delivery of the thing or quantity owed to him.
Examples: A owed B a 2004 Peugeot 206 vehicle and they had agreed that on
May 15 B would go to As shop to get it. On that day A had indeed a 2004
Peugeot 206 vehicle ready for delivery, but B did not go to pick it up. From that
time on B (the creditor) is in default and the obligation has thus become specified.
The vehicle owed to him thereafter is the specific vehicle A had prepared for B.
This implies that, if subsequently on account of a chance event the specific vehicle
gets destroyed, A has no obligation to furnish another car to B.
A owed B 100 kilos of Tripoli apples and the two of them had agreed that on
July 20 B would go to As store to pick them up. On that date, however, while B
had the apples in cases ready for pick up, B did not show up. From that time on B
is in default and the obligation has thus become specified or concretized.
2
The creditor is in default if he does not accept the performance (appropriate and in deed)
offered to him (Art. 349, 1 CC). See below Part Four, Ch. B, IV.
LAW OF OBLIGATIONS
193
Thereafter only the specific apples A had prepared for delivery are due.
Consequently, if later on the specific apples get destroyed by a chance event, A is
not obliged to furnish other apples to B.
E. Destruction of the Entire Genus Except for the Thing or Quantity Owed
This is a rare instance which can be encountered in generic obligations
of the limited genus.
Examples: A sold B a Peugeot 206 vehicle from those he had in his lot. But
before the fulfillment of the car dealers obligation, a fire broke out destroying all
the Peugeot 206 vehicles in As lot, minus one. In this instance the obligation
becomes specified and thereafter only the remaining specific vehicle is due.
A sold B 1,000 kilos of grain from the grain he kept in his barn. But before the
fulfillment of the farmers obligation, a flood destroyed all the grain in As barn,
minus 1,000 kilos. In this instance the obligation becomes specified and is thus
focused on the remaining 1,000 kilos of grain.
II. ALTERNATIVE OBLIGATION

1. The Concept of Alternative Obligation
Alternative obligation (obligatio alternativa) is the obligation where
two or more performances are due but only one will be rendered (Art. 305
CC).
Examples: A agrees with B to lease to him either car x or car y.
A agrees with B to sell him either car x or car y.
The obligation is also alternative if only one performance is due but

there is an option as to other particulars, such as, for example, the place,
time, or mode of the performance.
Examples: The car A must furnish to B will be furnished either in Athens or in
Lamia (place of performance).
The car A must furnish to B will be delivered either on March 1st or on May 1st
(time of performance).
B will pay for the car he buys from A either in cash or in installments (manner
of performance).
194
2. Simplification of the Alternative Obligation

Simplification of the alternative obligation means that the obligation is
limited to one of the alternative performances due.
A. The alternative obligation is simplified in the following ways:
a. Option
The option is exercised with a declaration of the one party to the other.
This declaration is irrevocable and may not be subject to condition or timeclause. The right of option belongs to the creditor or the debtor depending
on the agreement of the parties. However, in case the parties have not
agreed, it belongs to the debtor (Art. 305 CC).
b. Fulfillment of performance
The obligation is also specified if performance has been effected, in
which case the obligation is also extinguished.
c. Subsequent agreement between creditor and debtor
With a subsequent agreement between creditor and debtor it is
specified which of the two alternative performances will be chosen.
d. Impossibility of performance
When one of the two or all but one of the alternative performances due
become impossible on account of a chance event, the obligation is focused
on the remaining one.
B. The practical significance of the simplification of the obligation is
that, following simplification, in case of destruction by chance event of the
one obligation now owed, the debtor is released, i.e. the creditor bears the
risk of chance destruction. Needless to say that prior to simplification, in
case of chance destruction of one of the alternative obligations, the debtor is
still responsible for the other.
3. Alternative Faculty
In the alternative faculty (facultas alternativa) only one performance is
due but the debtor may furnish another in its place and thus be released from
all legal obligations.
LAW OF OBLIGATIONS
195
Example: A owes B a motorcycle but they have agreed that at the time of
performance A may furnish the cash value of it instead.
4. The Difference between Alternative Obligation and Alternative Faculty

In the alternative obligation two or more performances are owed out of
which only one will be furnished, e.g. A owes B either car x or car y.
If, up until the time the performance is implemented and before
simplification occurs, one of the performances due is destroyed by chance
event, the remaining ones are due, e.g. if by chance car x is destroyed, car y
is due.
In the alternative faculty only one performance is owed but the debtor
has the option to furnish another one instead, e.g. A owes to furnish car x to
B but retains the option of furnishing car y instead.
In case of destruction by chance event of the performance due, i.e. if by
chance car x gets destroyed, A has no obligation vis--vis B to furnish car y.
III. MONETARY OBLIGATION
1. The Concept of Monetary Obligation and Money
Monetary obligation is the obligation where the thing due is a sum of
money, e.g. A owes B 3,000 euros. In order for the monetary obligation to
be understood, we need to refer to the concept of money.
There are two kinds of money: money in the broad sense of the term
(lato sensu) and money in the strict sense of the term (stricto sensu).
A. Money in the Broad Sense of the Term
Money in the broad sense of the term is defined as the movable things
used in transactions as a means of exchange of commodities and the
measure of their value.3
More specifically:
By means of exchange of commodities we understand that money is the
exchange given or received in order to acquire or dispose of a certain
commodity.
See K. Christodoulou, The Monetary Obligation, 1999, p. 86 et seq.
196
By measure of the commodities value we understand that the value of

the commodities is measured in money.
In the broad sense of the term money signifies all currency, local as
well as foreign, plus accounting, plastic, and electronic money.
More specifically:
By accounting money4 we understand the check, the draft, the order
for money transfer from one account to the other, the deposit of money by
the debtor to the account of the creditor, etc. Today this is the means of
payment used increasingly in the most important transactions. It is accurate
to say that the use of accounting money facilitates the transactions and
accelerates their pace. Moreover, it minimizes the risk of loss or theft of
traditional currency.
By plastic money5 we understand the credit cards. With these credit
cards one can purchase goods or services without making payment in cash.
Instead, the debtor signs a slip. The obligation assumed by the owner of the
credit card is towards the issuer of the credit card to whom he subsequently
pays, the total amount or in installments, all the sums indicated in the slips
he has signed with the interest agreed upon and the agreed upon
commission, usually an annual fee.
The electronic money6 has the characteristics of accounting money
and of plastic money. It works as follows: the Bank with which a person
has an account issues him a plastic card with an electronically sensitized
magnetic strip which he may use to make payments to all the business
equipped by the issuing Bank with the appropriate equipment for the use of
this system. In this fashion the Bank account of the owner of this type of
card is charged and the Bank account of the business from which the person
made purchases by using this card is credited accordingly.
See G. Kallimopoulos, The Law of Money, 1993, p. 44 et seq.

See El. Charyssi Stamou, The Credit Card, 1984; Kallimopoulos, op. cit., p. 61 et seq.; S.
Psychomanis, Bank Law The Law of Bank Contracts, Vol. I, 5th ed., 2001, p. 69 et seq.
6
See Kallimopoulos, op. cit., p. 71 et seq.; Psychomanis, op. cit., p. 71 et seq.
In the USA these cards are often called Check Cards because they act as checks and the
debit slips are cashed against the owners account in the Bank the way a check would be. See,
for example, the Washington Mutual Check Card Debit (Translators note).
5
LAW OF OBLIGATIONS
197
B. Money in the Strict Sense of the Term

Money in the strict (narrow) sense of the term is the currency of a
country (e.g. in Greece it is the euro) and it is compulsory for this currency
to be accepted in all transactions.7 This means that the debtor is obliged to
make payment in this currency and the creditor to accept the same under
penalty of being considered in default.
2. The Value of Money
The basis of currency is the currency unit which in Greece was the
drachma since 1833. However, since January 1, 2002 the drachma has been
replaced by the euro.8
Money has a nominal value, an external or exchange rate value, an
inner value (its value as metal), a purchase value, and a real or current value.
More specifically:
Nominal value is the number of currency units printed on the currency
(banknote or coin). This value is immutable and it is the only value taken
into consideration for the payment of debts, regardless of how the inflation
index has affected the real value of money (upwards or downwards).
Example: A loaned 1,500 euros to B and the latter must repay him the loan in two
years. Consequently, after the completion of two years B owes to pay back 1,500
euros to A (with or without interest, according to their agreement) regardless of
whether at the time of performance the euro has gone up or down in real value.
External or exchange rate value is the relationship of the currency with

foreign currency (one or more). The exchange rate value of the currency is
variable and depends on the equivalency the domestic currency has with the
foreign currency at any given moment.
By inner value of the currency (its value in metal) we understand the
value of the material the currency is made of. As such only the coins have
inner value.
Since January 1, 2002 the euro is the common currency of twelve member states of the
European Union (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain).
8
In Greece the drachma was established as currency unit by the RoyD of February 8/22,
1833. It replaced the phoenix of Governor Ioannis Capodistrias. In this regard see A. Gazis,
in ERMAK, Introduction to Arts. 291-292, No 9.
198
Purchase value is the equivalency the currency has vis--vis the

various goods.
Example: Today five euros buy a certain item. After some time, for the purchase
of the same item one may need more or less euros.
Real or current value is the value determined on the one hand by the
purchase power of the currency and on the other hand by the exchange rate.
This value is not stable. It is determined by the law of demand and supply.
3. The Introduction of the Euro as the Legal Currency of Greece9
A. General
The accession of Greece to the Economic and Monetary Union and the
introduction to our country of the single currency, the euro (since January 1,
2001 in its logistic form and since January 1, 2002 in the physical form in
which it circulated), signals a new era for the Greek economy. The single
currency greatly facilitates transactions within the eurozone because it does
away with the cost of exchange of national currencies and the risk from the
fluctuation of the between them correspondence. But, mainly, it needs to be
emphasized that with the single currency the eurozone now plays an
important role in the international economic scene and contributes to the
consolidation of global economic stability.
B. The Institutional Framework of the Economic and Monetary Union
The institutional framework for the creation of the Economic and
Monetary Union was set up in 1992 with the provisions of the Treaty on the
European Union (Treaty of Maastricht) which modified the Treaty of the
European Community.10 It was planned that this economic and monetary
reform would be implemented in three stages.11
9
Regarding the euro, see Union of Greek Banks (ed.), Adjustments and Repercussions on the
Greek Bank Sector of the Economic and Monetary Union and the Introduction of the Euro,
1998; Ap. Georgiadis - Th. Liakopoulos, Euro and the Law, 1999; Union of Greek Banks
(ed.), The Euro and Us, 2000; N. Moussis, European Union, 9th ed., 2001, p. 119 et seq.
10
See Articles 98-124 of the Treaty of the European Community under title VII Economic
and Monetary Policy.
11
The first stage (July 1, 1990 Dec. 31, 1993) included mainly the lifting of restrictions in
the movement of capital within the European Union. The second stage (Jan. 1, 1994 Dec.
31, 1998) signals the establishment of the European Monetary Institute (EMI) the main goal
of which is to establish a unified monetary policy in the eurozone. It is important to
LAW OF OBLIGATIONS
199
For the operation of the Economic and Monetary Union two institutions
were created: the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) and the
European Central Bank (ECB).12
More specifically:
The primary goal of the European System of Central Banks, which
includes the European Central Bank and the national central banks of all the
member states of the European Union,13 is to maintain price stability.14 The
European Central Bank issues the regulations and makes the decisions that
are necessary for carrying out the tasks entrusted to it by the European
System of Central Banks.15
The national central banks operate according to the set of directions
given to them by the European Central Bank.16 However, at this point it
should be particularly emphasized that the European Central Bank has the
exclusive right to authorize the issuance of banknotes in euro within the
European Union. The European Central Bank and the national central banks
may issue such banknotes. Regarding coins in euro, the member states may
issue them but their quantity is subject to approval by the European Central
Bank.17
Especially as regards the monetary policy of the eurozone,18 this is
carried out by the eurosystem which is composed of the Central European
Bank and the twelve national central banks of the eurozone countries. Its
main goal is to maintain price stability.19
emphasize that during this stage begins the implementation of the process of smooth
functioning of the ecu clearing system for the fifteen member states. The third stage began on
January 1, 1999 with the adoption of the unified currency of the euro by the eleven member
states of the European Union which applied and fulfilled the requirements. These states were
Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands,
Portugal, and Spain. Greece adopted the euro on January 1, 2001.
12
See Art. 8 Treaty of the European Community.
13
14
15
16
The Central European Bank whose headquarters are in Frankfurt is in constant
collaboration with the national central banks.
17
18
The eurozone is the set of member states of the European Union which have accepted the
euro.
19
200
C. Legal Framework for the Euro

a. The most important provisions regarding the euro are contained in
two Regulations.20 They are EC Council Regulations No 1103/1997 of June
17, 1997 and No 974/1998 of May 3, 1998, which constitute the legal
framework for the establishment of the euro as the single European
currency.21
Council Regulation (EC) No 1103/1997 regarding certain provisions
related to the introduction of the euro, put in force on June 20, 1997, aims at
regulating certain necessary topics connected with the transition to the
single currency system. With this Regulation the following were basically
established: (1) Beginning January 1, 1999, the euro replaces the official
accounting unit ECU on a one to one basis.22 (2) The principle of the
continuity of contracts is established, meaning that the introduction of the
euro does not alter the terms of the legal transaction nor does it give the
contracting parties the right to invoke this change in order to avoid fulfilling
their contractual obligations.23 (3) Matters concerning the conversion in euro
of sums expressed in the national currencies of the member states24 are
established.
Council Regulation (EC) No 974/1998 regarding the introduction of the
euro, which was put in force on January 1, 1999, regulates specific
legislative matters and determines the time frame for the introduction and
establishment of the euro as the single currency. With this Regulation it was
determined that when on January 1, 2002 the euro banknotes and coins
would be put into circulation, they would constitute legal currency in all
fifteen participating member states25 and their use would be compulsory.26
The same Regulation also stated that when in a legal transaction there is
20
Regarding the binding character of the Regulations, see above Introduction to Law, Ch. C,
V, 2.
21
See Georgiadis - Liakopoulos, op. cit., pp. 9 et seq., and 83 et seq.; Christodoulou, op. cit.,
p. 220 et seq. ; Union of Greek Banks (ed.), The Adjustments op. cit., p. 14 et seq.
22
See Art. 2 of Council Regulation (EC) 1103/1997.
23
See Art. 3 of Council Regulation (EC) 1103/1997.
24
See Art. 4 of Council Regulation (EC)1103/1997.
25
Participating member states are the twelve member states that belong to the eurozone (see
above footn. 18).
26
See Arts. 10 and 11 of Council Regulation (EC) No 974/1998. In Greece the system of
mandatory circulation of currency has been in force since 1932 (L. 5422/1932, as modified
by L. 362/1945, L. 128/1975, and L. 1083/1980). This means that the banknotes could not be
exchanged in the Bank of Greece with the equivalent in gold or foreign currency.
LAW OF OBLIGATIONS
201
reference to national monetary currency units, such reference will be

considered made to the euro according to the corresponding exchange rate.27
b. In Greece the first law dealing with matters that follow the
introduction of the euro is L. 2842/2000 entitled Additional Measures for
the Application of Council Regulations (EC) Nos 1103/1997, 974/1998, and
2866/1998, as Operative with Regards to the Introduction of the Euro. With
this law additional measures are taken for the application of the Regulations
referred therein, special provisions for the introduction of the euro in Greece
are enacted and issues of immediate priority in this regard are regulated.28
Article 1 of L. 2842/2000 stipulates the following: (1) From January 1,
2001 the euro replaces the drachma as the national currency of Greece. (2)
As a means of payment of obligations the euro is always considered at its
nominal value. This last clause incorporates the principle of nominalism
according to which money in the strict sense of the term is always
considered at its nominal value.29
The same law also regulates the conversion of drachmas into euros and
refers to the rounding up which in principle is regulated by the relevant
provisions of Council Regulation (EC) No 1103/1997.
Follows L. 2948/2001 entitled Circulation of Banknotes and Coins in
Euro and Tax Regulations for the Introduction of the Euro. This law
attempts to adjust Greek legislation to Community rules regarding the
circulation of banknotes and coins in euro.30
Article 1 of L. 2948/2001 stipulates that beginning January 1, 2002, the
banknotes and coins of euro are put in circulation. The same law stipulates
that, whereas the banknotes in euro are issued by the European Central Bank
or the national central banks upon approval of the European Central Bank,
the right to issue metallic coins in euro, of any value, belongs to the state of
Greece.31 Finally, this law regulates tax matters which emerged with the
introduction of the euro on January 1, 2002.
27
See Art. 14 of the Council Regulation (EC) No 974/1998.

See Introductory Report of L. 2842/2000, in I. Nikolaidis, Legislation of the Economic and
Monetary Union EURO, 2001, p. 358 et seq.
29
In Greece the principle of nominalism was already in force since 1932 (see Art. 1, 2 L.
5422/1932, and Art. 2 L. 362/1945) and according to it the drachma, as a means of payment
of obligations, was taken at its nominal value, i.e. drachma = drachma.
30
See Introductory Report of L. 2948/2001, in KNoB, 2001, p. 2949.
31
The exercise of this right continues to be governed by the provisions of Article 3 of the
Charter of the Bank of Greece having the validity of law (L. 3424/1927, as later modified)
which provides for the issuance of the coins to be put into circulation exclusively by the
28
202
4. Rules Applying to the Monetary Obligation

The monetary obligation is a value debt because the money due is not
due as a material thing but as thing representing a certain economic
value.32
As debt the monetary obligation is regulated by special rules the most
important of which are the following:
A. In monetary obligations impossibility of performance is not
conceivable. Money will always be available for the payment of an
obligation. If the debtor has no money, he is not released from the obligation
to make payment.
B. Unless otherwise agreed between creditor and debtor, the monetary
obligations are obligations payable at the creditors domicile (Art. 321 CC).
C. In monetary obligations in case of debtors default,33 the creditor has
the right to claim default interest without having to prove prejudice (Art.
345 CC).
D. Only for monetary obligations is it possible to issue bills of
exchange, bills to order, checks.
5. Payment of Monetary Obligations
A. Debt in National Currency
In the case of debt in national currency, i.e. in euro, according to the
principle of nominalism the debtor is obliged to pay the amount of euros he
owes, regardless of whether the euro has in the meantime been devalued or
gone up in value.
Example: A leased his apartment to B for three years for 350 euros per month.
According to the principle of nominalism, B has to pay the 350 euros monthly for
the entire three year period, regardless of whether the rental value of the
immovable property (already at the expiration of the first year) is much greater
due to inflation.
The principle of nominalism is quite unfair especially at times of

financial crisis. However, the principle of good faith in the fulfillment of the
Bank of Greece and for the relevant expenses to be charged to the budget of the Ministry of
Finance (see Introductory Report of L. 2948/2001, op. cit.).
32
Money due includes the logistic, plastic, and electronic money.
33
The debtor is in default when, due to fault of his own, he delays the fulfillment of a
performance that has fallen due (Art. 340 et seq. CC). See below Part Four, Ch. B, II.
LAW OF OBLIGATIONS
203
performance takes precedence. The court may, by applying the principles of

good faith, make an adjustment of the monetary obligation due.34
Examples of adjustment of monetary obligations may be found in
jurisprudence in the cases of rental agreements of immovable property.35
B. Debt in Foreign Currency
In the case of monetary obligation in foreign currency payable in
Greece the debtor, if not otherwise agreed, has the right to make the
payment in national currency, i.e. in euro, based on the current exchange
rate of the foreign currency at the time and place of performance (Art. 291
CC).
In this instance it is the case of alternative faculty which the debtor has
only if it was not otherwise agreed, i.e. that the payment will be made in
physical foreign currency.
IV. OBLIGATION TO PAY INTEREST
1. The Concept of Interest
Interest is that which is paid in exchange for the use of capital (usura).
The capital consists of money or other fungible things.
The interest is of the same nature as the capital.
Examples: A loaned money to B, i.e. the principal is monetary. The interest
owed by B is also money.
A loaned grain to B, i.e. the principal is grain. The interest owed by B is also
grain.
34
See G. Balis, Law of Obligations, 3d ed., 1969, para. 17, No 2, p. 70 et seq. ; Stathopoulos,
op. cit., p. 230 et seq.; P. Filios, Law of Obligations, General Part, 2nd ed., 1996, p. 89 et
seq.; Kallimopoulos, op. cit, pp. 168 et seq. and 365 et seq.
35
See AP 927/1982, in NoB 31 (1983), 214; AP 351/1985, in NoB 33 (1985), 1188; AP
481/1990, in NoB 39 (1991), 921; AP 382/1997, in NoB 46 (1998), 513; Athens Court of
Appeals 3260/1982, in NoB 30 (1982), 938; Athens Court of Appeals 5227/1994, in NoB 43
(1995), 734; Athens Court of Appeals 11145/1996, in Rev. Law of Apt. Buildings (1998), 92;
Athens Court of First Instance 2898/1993, in NoB 42 (1994), 1016; Thessaloniki Court of
First Instance 6259/1993, in NoB 42 (1994), 94; Athens One-member Court of First Instance
8440/1995, in ArcN (1997), 800; Piraeus One-member Court of First Instance 19/1996, in
Arm. (1995), 628; Piraeus One-member Court of First Instance 567/1996, in Arm. (1996),
719.
204
Interest is a secondary obligation. This means that it cannot exist unless

a main obligation exists, i.e. an obligation regarding principal. The
derivative obligation of interest follows the fate of the main obligation of the
principal.36
The interest rate, i.e. the percentage of principal due as interest for a
certain period of time, is the measure of the amount of interest due.
2. Types of Interest
There are three kinds of interest:
-
Contractual interest
Legal interest
Discount interest
More specifically:
A. Contractual Interest (Interest by Agreement)
Contractual interest is the interest stemming from an agreement, i.e. the
interest agreed upon by the contacting parties. However, the relevant
agreement of the parties must be within the bounds of the law because only
then is the interest legitimate.
In principle,37 the upper limit of permissible interest rate is determined
by the European Central Bank.38
If not otherwise agreed, the contractual interest is due annually.
If the interest rate agreed upon exceeds the upper limit permitted by
law, the contract is null and void as regards the excess (Art. 294 CC), i.e.
the contract remains valid and only the lawful interest rate is due.
Example: A loaned B 1,500 euros at the interest rate of 40%. The loan contract
concluded between A and B is not null and void in its entirety but only as regards
36
Of course, it is possible to have a monetary obligation for the principal without a secondary
one for interest. This is the case of loan without interest.
37
Naturally, both the contracting parties and the competent authorities (e.g. the Council of
Ministers regarding the determination of contractual, legal, and non-banking interest rates
charged on account of delay) may set a different basis for the determination of interest rates
(See Art. 3, para. 2 of L. 2842/2000 and the Introductory Report of the Law in question under
Art. 3, op. cit.).
38
Since June 6, 2003 the upper limit for contractual interest rate is set at 8% annually (Board
of Directors decis. of the European Central Bank, June 5, 2003).
LAW OF OBLIGATIONS
205
the part agreeing on an interest rate higher than the lawful. The loan contract
remains valid but the interest rate due is only the highest permitted by law.
B. Legal Interest
Legal interest is the interest determined by law.
The most common case of legal interest is the default interest, i.e. the
interest due by the defaulting debtor of a monetary obligation (Art. 345
CC).39
The legal interest rate is determined at 2% higher than the upper limit
of contractual interest rate.40
Example: A owed B the amount of 1,500 euros due and payable on May 15, 2004.
To this day A has not made any payment to B, even though his delay in
performance cannot be attributed to any extraordinary reason for which he could
be excused. On account of this delay A owes B interest on the principal for the
time beginning on May 16, 2004 to date. The interest will be computed at the
lawful limit which was in force each year.
C. Discount Interest
Discount interest is the amount corresponding to the profit of the
creditor in case of an early payment of the debt.
Example: A owed B the amount of 3,000 euros which he had to pay back on June
15, 2005. If A were to pay off his debt on December 15, 2004, B, who would thus
have the 3,000 euros back six months earlier, could use it mainly by loaning it at
an interest. Consequently, on June 15, 2005, other than the 3,000 euros, B would
also have the interest this amount would bring for six months. This extra amount
of money, corresponding to the interest of 3,000 euros for six months, is the
discount interest.
According to the law, the debtor paying off his debt earlier than the
appointed time is not entitled to deduct the discount interest unless the
creditor has agreed to it or it results from the law (Art. 324, 2 CC).41
39
There is also the category of legal interest in the narrow sense of the term, which is the
interest on debts due to the state and the lis pendens interest (Art. 346 CC), i.e. the interest
due by the defendant (in case of action taken against him on account of a monetary debt) as
from the notification of the writ initiating legal proceedings.
40
Since June 6, 2003 the upper limit of interest rate for legal interest is set at 10% annually
maximum (Board of Directors, decis. of the European Central Bank , June 5, 2003).
41
In Article 1227 of the Greek Civil Code an exception to this rule is provided: a pledger,
who retrieves the movable thing prior to the time the pledge agreement matures on account of
206
This provision, of course, is being criticized as contrary to the principle

of favoring the debtor.
3. Compound Interest
Compound interest is the computation of interest on the combined
original principal and interest accrued, i.e. interest on interest (usurae
usurarum). Because the agreements regarding compound interest are
dangerous, the law (Art. 296, 1 CC) allows them only under the following
circumstances:
-
the interest due must be of at least one whole year;

the agreement between creditor and debtor regarding such
compound interest must be concluded ex post facto, i.e. after
the end of the year.
If one of the above conditions is absent, the agreement is null and void.
Exceptionally, according to express provision of the law (Art. 296, 2
CC), savings and credit institutions as well as banks may determine in their
charter or agree in advance that uncollected interest accrued on deposits will
be deemed a new interest-bearing deposit.
Example: On January 15, 2004 A loaned to B the amount of 1,500 euros for two
years at the interest rate of 8%.
On January 16, 2006 B would pay back to A the amount of 1,500 euros plus the
interest of two years, i.e. 240 euros (120 euros per year). Thus, the total of Bs
payment would be 1,740 euros.
If after the expiration of the first year A and B agree to compound interest, Bs
payment on January 16, 2006 will be 1,750 euros. This is because on January 16,
2005 Bs debt will be 1,500 euros for the principal plus 120 euros for the interest,
a total of 1,620 euros; but on January 16, 2006, on account of the agreement to
compound interest, the debt will be 1,620 euros for the principal plus 129.60 for
the interest, a total of 1,749.60 euros (that is, in the second year the interest will be
computed on a principal of 1,620 euros).
the creditors violation of his obligations stemming from said agreement, may deduct the
discount interest. Also the banks are allowed to deduct discount interest if they are paying
bills of exchange or notes to order prior to maturity. That is, in this case the bank gives the
bearer of the bill of exchange or the note to order the amount of his claim minus the amount
of interest corresponding to the time period between the point of prepayment and of maturity
of the title (Art. 48, para. 2 of L. 5325/1932).
LAW OF OBLIGATIONS
207
V. OBLIGATION TO COMPENSATE
1. The Concept
Obligation to compensate is the obligation whose performance consists
in furnishing reparations to the party that was harmed for the prejudice
caused to him. The purpose of compensation is not to impose sanctions on
the culprit but to provide the injured party with a counterweight capable of
balancing out the prejudice caused to him.
The sum total of the rules regulating the obligation to compensate
different as the reasons for the generation of such obligations may be is
called system of civil liability or general law of compensation.42
2. Conditions for the Obligation to Compensate
The conditions for the obligation to compensate are:
-
Damage
Legal grounds for liability
Causal relation between the damage and the grounds for
liability
Before examining separately each of the conditions for the obligation to

compensate, it should be pointed out that the relevant rules are not grouped
together. They are spread out in different sections of the Greek Civil Code
as well as in special statutes.
A. Damage
a. Concept and types of damage
Damage (damnum) is the loss a person suffers in material or intangible
goods. Damage may be property related or non-material, moral damage.
Property damage is the damage a person suffers damage assessed in
money when his material assets are harmed, e.g. destruction of a thing.
Non-property damage or moral damage is the grief caused to a
person. This damage, which cannot be assessed in money, may be caused to
42
Civil liability is different from criminal liability. In the case of criminal liability the culprit
is subject to public punishment according to the provisions of the criminal law. That is, in the
case of criminal act the punishment constitutes a sanction imposed on the culprit. See below
Part Two, Ch. A, I.
208
a person when his non material goods are offended, i.e. his personality on
account of slander or defamation. The reason for restituting moral damage
is to alleviate the emotional pain of the party that was harmed and to
comfort him psychologically.
Pain and suffering is one form of moral damage. It is the pain a
person feels when another persons good is offended. For example, when a
person is killed, the victims family experiences such suffering.
As long as the conditions for creating civil liability exist, property
damage is always restituted, whereas the non-property damage is satisfied
with an allotment of money43 only when the law so stipulates. Such are the
cases of offense against the personality (Art. 59 CC) or of any other
unlawful act (Art. 932 CC).
Sometimes the prejudice to non-material things generates both material
damage and moral damage.
Examples: When a medical doctor is defamed, his property damage consists in
the loss of income for the doctor on account of the defamation, whereas his
moral damage consists in the grief the doctor experiences.
When a worker is injured, his property damage consists in his medical expenses
and the income he eventually lost on account of his hospitalization. His moral
damage consists in the emotional pain he suffered because of the injury.
b. Types of property damage

Property damage is basically distinguished in positive damage
(quantum abest) and loss of profit (quantum lucrari potui, or lucrum
cessans). Positive damage is the reduction of the assets of the injured party.
Loss of profit is the profit one expects with certainty, according to the
normal course of events or the special circumstances and particularly
according to the preparatory measures the parties may have taken.
Usually it is easy to prove positive damage. However, loss of profit, the
profit that would have materialized had the harmful event not taken place, is
determined hypothetically on the basis of objective criteria.
Example: Due to As fault damage is caused to Bs cab resulting in his having to
leave the vehicle at the car repair shop for five days to get it fixed. The expenses
for the repair of the cab are the positive damage, whereas loss profit is what B
would have made if he had been working his cab during the five days the vehicle
was being repaired at the car repair shop.
43
Moral damage may be also compensated by non-monetary means, such as by retraction,

public apology, or a publication. See above General Principles, Part One, Ch. B, III, 1, B, d.
209
LAW OF OBLIGATIONS
B. Legal Grounds for Liability

a. Legal grounds for liability exist when the cause of the damage, the
damage causing event, creates liability for compensation according to the
law. The most important legal grounds for liability are the following:
aa. Contractual liability
The liability due to breach of legal obligations may originate in a
juridical act or in the law. It may consist in impossibility of performance due
to fault, debtors default, or improper performance (Arts. 330 et seq., 335 et
seq., 340 et seq., 362 et seq., 380 et seq., 383 et seq. CC).
In the case of breach of legal obligations due to fault, the debtor owes
henceforth compensation in lieu of the original performance or in addition to
it.
bb. Delictual liability
Liability from delict/tort is created when the prejudice to another is
caused illegally and through the injuring partys fault. In this case the
obligation of the injuring party is to compensate the injured (Art. 914 et seq.
CC).44
cc. Precontractual liability (or liability arising from negotiations)

Liability arising during negotiations exists when the injuring party
through fault of his own causes prejudice to the other party. This type of
behavior during negotiations (culpa in contrahendo) makes the injuring
party liable to compensate the injured party (Art. 197 et seq. CC).45
dd. Liability arising directly from contractual obligation to compensate
Liability arising directly from contractual obligation to compensate
exists when the debtor independently assumes the obligation to restitute the
damage third parties will incur from a concrete event in the future. In this
case the payment of compensation is the content of the contract.
This type of liability is exemplified in the insurance contract where the
insurance company undertakes to cover the damage the insured will suffer in
case of occurrence of the risk against which he is insured.
See below Part Three, Ch. B, I, 4.
45
See above General Principles, Part Three, Ch. C, VI, 2, A.
44
210
b. In principle, the legal grounds for liability presuppose unlawful act

on behalf of the injuring party resulting from fault of his. Unlawful is the act
which conflicts with the legal order.46 Also, the wrongful act needs to be the
result of the injuring partys fault.47
The Greek legal system adopts the fault principle meaning that the
culprit is liable only when he is at fault (subjective liability). Exceptionally,
in certain cases the culprit is liable even when he is not at fault (objective
liability).48
C. Causal Relation
Liability for compensation exists when there is causal relation between
the legal grounds for liability and the damage, that is, when the legal
grounds for liability constitute the cause of the damage and the damage
occurs as an effect thereof. Whether such causal relation exists in any
particular case is a factual matter to be decided by the court.
Regarding the causal relation, several theories have been advanced.49
The theory of the adequate cause (causa adequata) is considered the most
accurate. According to it, adequate cause exists when the liability causing
event is capable in the normal course of events of leading to the damage
it led.50
Examples: While driving his car, A hit and injured pedestrian B, an attorney,
who was legally crossing the street at the intersection. B was urgently taken to the
hospital where he stayed for two weeks. This resulted in medical expenses for B
and loss of income due to his inability to work. In this case there is adequate
causal relation between the injury and the damage B suffered because, in the
general course of events, the injury of a person (which is the liability generating
event) does cause increase of expenses and decrease of income. Consequently, A
is liable and must compensate B.
46
See below Part Two, Ch. B, II.

See below Part Two, Ch. B, III.
48
See below Part Two, Ch. A, III, 1, B.
49
See A. Litzeropoulos, in ERMAK, Arts. 297-300, No 39 et seq.; the same, Elements of the
Law of Obligations, 1960, p. 980; Stathopoulos, op. cit., p. 175 et seq.; the same, in
Georgiadis Stathopoulos, Commentary on the Civil Code, Arts. 297-298, No 41 et seq.;
Filios, op. cit., p. 300 et seq.; Ap. Georgiadis, Law of Obligations, op. cit., p. 139 et seq.; Ast.
Georgiadis, Law of Obligations, General Part, Vol. I, 4th ed., 2003, p. 128 et seq.; I.
Spyridakis, Manual of Civil Law, General Law of Obligations, 3d ed., 2004, p. 143 et seq.
50
It is argued that this theory is founded on Article 298, 2 of the Greek Civil Code. See
Litzeropoulos, in ERMAK, Introduction to Arts. 297-300, No 43a.
47
LAW OF OBLIGATIONS
211
A, an honest and sensitive person, upon hearing that in x Home for the Elderly
the patients suffer due to bad management by the Board of Directors, had a stroke.
In this case there is no adequate causal relation between the bad management of
the Board of Directors and As stroke because, in the normal course of events, the
information of bad management on the part of the Board of Directors of a Home
for the Elderly does not cause a stroke. Consequently, the Home for the Elderly
has no liability to compensate A.
3. Computation of Benefits in the Assessment of Damage

The reason for paying damages is to restitute the damage which
actually occurred. Consequently, in order to properly assess the
compensation due, it is necessary to subtract any profit the injured party
eventually derived from the damage.
Examples: A burnt the house of B. However, certain building materials were left
over. For the assessment of the damages A owes to B, the value of the residual
will be taken into account and the resale value of the building materials will be
subtracted from the payment for damages due.
A killed two of Bs sheep. For the assessment of the damages A will have to pay
to B the amount of money A derived from the sale of the sheep skin and meat will
be subtracted.
However, the benefit of the injured party due to chance or

extraordinary event is not taken into account in the assessment of the
damage.
Example: A tore down Bs house. During the excavation, B found in the
foundations of the house a box filled with golden coins. Bs benefit is due to a
chance event; consequently, it is not taken into account in the computation of the
amount A owes to pay to B for damages.
4. Damage Due to Concurrent Fault of the Injured Party

In certain cases the injured party is co-responsible for the damage he
suffered, i.e. there is concurrent fault and, consequently, the court may
either refrain from granting compensation for damages or reduce the
amount due (Art. 300 CC).
For this to happen the following conditions need to concur:
there must be liability to compensate
212
the injured party must have contributed to the damage or its

extent
there must exist causal relation
More specifically:
A. Liability to Compensate
It is necessary for the liability to compensate to exist because only then
is there reason for reduction or abstaining from granting the compensation
due to concurrent fault on behalf of the injured party. It is irrelevant whether
the liability of the injuring party is subjective (based on fault of his own) or
objective (liability regardless of fault).
B. Contribution of the Injured Party to the Damage or Its Extent
It is sufficient to verify that the injured party behaved in a way contrary
to what is dictated by the circumstances regarding the safeguarding of his
own interests.51
In principle, the contribution of the injured party to the damage is due
to fault of his own. However, he may be liable even for actions that are not
due to his fault but for which he is liable anyway (e.g. in the case of
objective responsibility).
Example: Bs dog began barking and chasing A. The latter got angry and killed
the dog. B has sustained damage. However, for the assessment of his damage Bs
own responsibility as the possessor of an animal will also be taken into
consideration (Art. 924 CC).
Actions or omissions which according to the law render the injured

party co-responsible are the following:
a. Action of the injured party contributing to the occurring of the damage
Example: While driving his car, A injured pedestrian B while the latter was
crossing the street running, even though the traffic light for pedestrians was red.
51
See Litzeropoulos, in ERMAK, Art. 300 No 15; Michailidis Nouaros, Law of Obligations,
1959, p. 41; Stathopoulos, op. cit., p. 200 et seq.; Ap. Georgiadis, op. cit., p. 156 et seq.; Ast.
Georgiadis, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 163 et seq..
LAW OF OBLIGATIONS
213
b. The action of the injured party must have contributed to the extent of the
damage
Example: A injured B and the latter had to have a cast put on his right leg for
twenty days. After twelve days B removed the cast which resulted in the
worsening of his condition, now requiring the replacement of the original cast by a
new one to stay in place for another twenty days.
c. Omission of the injured party to avert the damage

Example: A, although anticipating that the fire which had broken out in the store
next door might burn his own premises, was negligent and did not call the Fire
Department thinking that, even if his store were to catch fire, he would be
compensated for the damage by the insurance company. The fire eventually
spread to Bs store and destroyed it.
d. Omission of the injured party to limit the damage

Example: A injured B and caused a fracture to his hand. B, who refused to
undergo a necessary and risk-free surgical procedure in a timely fashion
(believing that his injury would heal with time), caused himself significant
disability.
e. Omission of the injured party to draw the obligors attention to the risk of
unusually great damage which the obligor neither knew nor was required to
know.
Example: A entrusted B with the safekeeping of a briefcase containing a large sum
of money but omitted to make B aware of the briefcases content, and
consequently warn him to be particularly careful with it so that unusually serious
damage might be averted.
C. Causal Relation
A causal relation needs to exist between the behavior of the injured
party and the damage, i.e. the action of the injured party must, in the normal
course of events, contribute to the damage or its extent.
When determining the amount of damage the debtor owes to pay to the
injured party, the court may freely assess the specific circumstances. The
determination of the reparations due will be made in accordance with certain
criteria, such as the gravity of the fault of each of the parties (the injuring
and the injured).
214
5. Types of Compensation
There are two types of compensation, monetary and in kind (in natura).
Monetary compensation is the one that can be assessed in money.
Compensation in kind (in natura) is the one creating a new situation
equivalent to that which existed before the damage causing event.
According to the Greek Civil Code (Art. 297, 1), monetary compensation is
the rule.
Example: A who destroyed Bs TV set must pay him for the value of the TV set
(monetary compensation) and not buy him a replacement TV set (compensation in
natura).
Exceptionally, it is possible for the court, upon assessment of the

particular circumstances, to order restoration of the status quo ante, i.e.
compensation in natura, as long as this type of compensation does not
conflict with the interests of the creditor.
For the court to rule in favor of compensation in natura the following is
needed:
- the filing of a petition by the creditor or the debtor
- the existence of special circumstances calling for it
Example: A, a plumber, went to Bs house in order to repair the pipes of the
central heating system and accidentally he destroyed a heating element. Following
the plumbers petition, the court, instead of ordering the payment of monetary
compensation to B for the damages he sustained due to the destruction of his
heating element, may allow A (the plumber) to replace the broken unit paying for
it out of his own pocket.
CHAPTER B
TYPES OF OBLIGATIONS ACCORDING TO THEIR SUBJECT
I. GENERAL
The usual type of obligation has one creditor and one debtor. But there
are obligations with a plurality of parties (creditors or debtors) called multiparty obligations.
Examples: A and B, co-owners of an apartment, donate it to C (more debtors).
A donates his car to B and C (more creditors).
A and B, co-owners of a piece of land, donate it to C and D (more creditors and
more debtors).
There are several kinds of multi-party obligations: the divisible

obligation, the joint and several obligation, and the indivisible obligation.
II. DIVISIBLE OBLIGATION
1. The Concept
An obligation is divisible when the performance may be divided in
several uniform parts.
2. Distinctions
The divisible obligation may be passive or active.
A. Passive Divisible Obligation
Passive divisible obligation exists when, in the case of many debtors,
each debtor is liable only for the part of the performance corresponding to
him. If the law or the contract do not stipulate otherwise, each debtor is
responsible to furnish an equal share.
216
Example: A and B, engineers, rented the apartment of C for office space for 800
euros per month. Assuming that it is not otherwise stipulated in the lease contract
regarding their obligations (for example, that A will be liable for 2/3 of the rent
and B for 1/3), each is responsible for 400 euros.
B. Active Divisible Obligation

Active divisible obligation exists when, in the case of many creditors,
each creditor is entitled only to the part of the performance corresponding to
him. If the law or the contract do not stipulate otherwise, each creditor is
entitled to receive an equal share.
Example: A and B, co-owners of a car, sold it to C for 8,000 euros. Each of the
creditors has the right assuming it is not otherwise stipulated in the sale contract
(such as, for example, that A is entitled to 2/3 and B to 1/3) to demand 4,000
euros from C.
III. JOINT AND SEVERAL OBLIGATION

1. The Concept
The obligation where there are several debtors or creditors is divisible,
unless it is otherwise agreed in the contract or stipulated by law (e.g. Art.
926 CC).1 Consequently, the rule is that the multi-party obligation is
divisible, i.e. that it is apportioned among the many creditors or debtors
(Art. 480 CC). What may be differently stipulated in the contract or stated in
the law is that the obligation is joint and several (obligatio in solidum).
Joint and several obligation is the obligation where either each of the
many debtors has an obligation against the creditor to effect the whole
performance, but the creditor may claim it only once, or each of the many
creditors is entitled to demand the whole performance from the debtor, but
the debtor is obliged to fulfill the performance only once.
2. Distinctions
There are two types of joint and several obligations, passive and active.
Article 926 of the Greek Civil Code stipulates that, if an act in which several persons
engaged in common has caused prejudice or if for one and the same act more than one person
is responsible, all are liable for the whole.
LAW OF OBLIGATIONS
217
A. Passive Joint and Several Obligation

The joint and several obligation is passive when, in case of plurality of
debtors for one and the same performance, each debtor is obliged to furnish
it in its entirety, though the creditor may claim it only once (Art. 481 CC).
The creditor may demand performance from any debtor he chooses,
either in part or in whole, but until the performance is furnished in its
entirety, all debtors remain liable (Art. 482 CC).
If one of the co-debtors fulfills the obligation, the others are released
vis--vis the creditor (Art. 483, 1 CC). The co-debtor who fulfilled the
obligation has right of recourse against the other co-debtors and is
subrogated to the rights of the creditor (Art. 488 CC), i.e. he is entitled to
demand from each of the other co-debtors the part of the obligation
corresponding to him.
If a different apportionment does not follow from the contract, the codebtors are liable in equal shares (487, 1 CC).
Finally, it should be noted that, whatever the co-debtor who fulfilled
the obligation is unable to collect from another co-debtor shall be borne by
all the co-debtors, including himself, in the same proportion (Art. 487, 2
CC).
Example: Businessman E bought from brothers A, B, and C 1,500 kilos of oil and
it was agreed that either A, or B, or C is obliged to furnish the performance in its
entirety, i.e. to give the 1,500 kilos of oil to E but that this should be effected only
once. If A furnishes the 1,500 kilos of oil to E, he (A) then has right of recourse
against B and C, i.e. he has the right to demand from each one of them 500 kilos
of oil. In the event that B does not furnish the 500 kilos he owes, A and C will
have to furnish 250 kilos of oil each (i.e. the part of Bs unfulfilled obligation will
burden A and C in the same proportion).
B. Active Joint and Several Obligation

The joint and several obligation (or joint and several claim) is active
when, in the case of plurality of creditors for one and the same obligation,
each creditor is entitled to demand it in its entirety but the debtor is
responsible to make payment only once (Art. 489 CC).
The debtor, at his option, may furnish the performance to any of the
creditors (Art. 490 CC).2
2
If, however, one of the creditors has initiated legal proceedings against the debtor, the
debtor has the obligation to furnish the performance to him (Art. 490 CC).
218
Against the creditor who collected, the other co-creditors have right of
recourse, i.e. they have the right to demand their share of the fulfilled
obligation.
Unless a different arrangement emerges from the relationship, in their
internal relations the many creditors are entitled to an equal share (Art. 493
CC).
Example: A and B, co-owners in equal shares of a vehicle, sold it to C for 8,000
euros and agreed that either A or B may demand payment of the entire sum from
C but that this should be effected only once. C, at his option, may make payment
of the entire sum to either A or B. If C pays the full amount to A (8,000 euros), B
has right of recourse against A for his (Bs) share, i.e. for 4,000 euros.
IV. INDIVISIBLE OBLIGATION

1. The Concept
An obligation is indivisible if its performance cannot be divided in
many uniform parts.
2. Distinctions
The indivisible obligation may be passive or active.
A. Passive Indivisible Obligation
The indivisible obligation is passive when there are many debtors. In
the case of passive indivisible obligation, are applicable the provisions of
Article 494, para. 1 of the Greek Civil Code regarding joint and several
obligation, i.e. each of the debtors is liable to implement the entire
obligation but the creditor is entitled to demand it only once.
Example: A and B, co-owners of a vehicle, sell it to C. Each of the debtors (A and
B) is obliged to furnish the vehicle to C but C is entitled to demand the vehicle
only once from either A or B.
B. Active Indivisible Obligation

The indivisible obligation is active when there are many creditors. In
the case of active indivisible obligation (and assuming that it does not
follow from the transaction or from the law that the obligation is joint and
several), the debtor is obliged to furnish the performance to all the creditors
LAW OF OBLIGATIONS
219
jointly and each creditor may demand that performance be effected to all the
creditors jointly (Art. 495, 1 CC).
Example: A and B bought a painting from C. The latter is obliged to furnish the
painting to A and B jointly. Moreover, either A or B may demand from C to fulfill
his obligation to both A and B.
PART TWO
CIVIL LIABILITY
CHAPTER A
THE CONCEPT AND DISTINCTIONS OF CIVIL LIABILITY
I. GENERAL
In the broad sense of the term liability denotes all the unfavorable
consequences a person suffers when he offends an equitable good protected
by law.1 Depending on whether the consequences are civil, criminal, or
disciplinary we have civil liability, criminal liability, and disciplinary
liability.
Civil liability denotes the obligation (resulting from a number of
reasons) to restitute the damage caused to a person.
Criminal liability signifies the public penalty (e.g. short or long term
imprisonment) imposed to the culprit of a crime for purposes of satisfying
the offended legal order.
Disciplinary liability points to the disciplinary penalty (reprimand, fine,
temporary termination of the employment contract) imposed on the offender
of the rules of public service or private business laid down for the purpose
of the efficient operation of the latter.
At times it is possible for the civil, criminal, and disciplinary liability to
concur.2
1
2
See Stathopoulos, op. cit., p. 41.

See below Part Three, Ch. B, I, 3.
222
II. THE CONCEPT OF CIVIL LIABILITY

As was earlier mentioned, civil liability is the responsibility to make
reparations for the damage caused to another person.
The sum total of the rules regulating this obligation (resulting from
different reasons) to restitute the damage caused to a person constitutes the
system of civil liability or the general law of compensation.3
III. TYPES OF CIVIL LIABILITY
The types of civil liability are:
-
Subjective and objective

Contractual and extra-contractual
1. Subjective and Objective Liability

A. Subjective Liability
The liability is subjective when it is based on the injuring partys fault.
In contemporary Greek civil law civil liability is based on the principle of
fault, i.e. for a person to be liable for damages, the prejudice caused to
another must have come through the obligors own fault. The Greek Civil
Code establishes the fault principle regarding contractual responsibility
(Art. 330 CC), delictual responsibility (Art. 914 CC), and precontractual
responsibility, i.e. responsibility arising during the stage of negotiations
(Art. 198 CC).
B. Objective Liability
Civil liability is objective when certain persons are liable for damages
regardless of fault of their own.
Exceptionally, in certain cases the law accepts the liability of some
persons regardless of fault on their part, e.g. liability of the legal person for
actions or omissions of its legal representatives (Art. 71 CC),4 liability for
the actions of the person one employs (underling) to fulfill a performance
3
See A. Litzeropoulos, in ERMAK, Introduction to Arts. 297-300, No 3; Ap. Georgiadis, in

Georgiadis Stathopoulos, Commentary on the Civil Code, Introductory comments on Arts.
914-938, No 4. See also above Part One, Ch. A, V, 1.
4
See above General Principles, Part One, Ch. C, III, F.
LAW OF OBLIGATIONS
223
(Arts. 334 and 922 CC), liability for the prejudice caused to a third party by
the possessor of an animal (Art. 924, 1 CC), liability of the employer in case
of work related accident (L. 551/1915).5
2. Contractual and Extra-contractual Liability
A. Contractual Liability
Contractual liability is the liability arising from the non-performance of
a preexisting obligation.
The contractual liability is secondary (derivative), i.e. it presupposes an
already existing obligational relation between the parties. In those cases the
injuring party was already a debtor to the injured party and, following the
breach of contract on the part of the former (which may result from delayed
furnishing of the thing due as in debtors default or its intentional
destruction as in impossibility of performance ), he owes damages either
in addition to the original performance or damages only.
Example: A, who on August 15 owed to furnish a vehicle to B on account of sale,
intentionally destroyed it on July 10 of the same year. Consequently, on August
15, through fault of his own, A was faced with impossibility of performance in
which case he was liable to compensate B. The relation between A and B existed
already from the time they concluded the sale contract, but As responsibility to
pay damages to B emerged later on, when A was faced with impossibility of
performance.
B. Extra-contractual Liability
Extra-contractual liability is the liability which stems directly from the
law, i.e. delictual liability, or liability generated during the stage of
negotiations (precontractual liability).
The extra-contractual liability is primary. This means that the
obligational relation between the two parties (the obligor and the obligee) is
generated now for the first time in the form of liability for compensation,
provided that the conditions of the law concur.
The most important case of extra-contractual liability is the liability for
tort/delict (delictual liability), i.e. the liability stemming from an unlawful
act of the liable party which came about through his fault. In delictual
liability the obligation to compensate is created now for the first time as a
5
See also above Introduction, Ch. A, III, 4.
224
result of the tort/delict (i.e. the unlawful act which came about through the
liable partys fault). Prior to the tort, there was no bond between the parties,
the injuring and the injured.
Example: A injured B with his car. A is liable to compensate B. The relationship
between A and B was created for the first time after the injury.
CHAPTER B
CONDITIONS FOR CIVIL LIABILITY
I. GENERAL
The Greek Civil Code does not regulate the matter of civil liability in
one single chapter. However, the concept of civil liability is a uniform one,
regardless of the grounds on which it is based breach of previously
existing contract (contractual liability), tort/delict (delictual liability), stage
of negotiations (precontractual liability).
For civil liability to be created the following conditions need to concur:
-
unlawful behavior of the injuring party

fault of the injuring party1
II. UNLAWFUL BEHAVIOR
1. The Concept
Unlawful behavior of the injuring party, which may consist in action or
omission, is the behavior disapproved by the legal order.
More specifically:
In the case of contractual liability, the unlawful behavior consists in the
breach of contract; in the case of liability from tort/delict, in the violation of
the law, e.g. injuring a person; and in the case of liability arising during the
stage of negotiations, in the violation of the dictates of good faith (bona
fides).
There is also liability without fault (objective liability). See above Ch. A, III, 1, B.
226
2. Reasons for Waiving the Unlawful Character of the Act

The unlawful character of the act may be waived if certain conditions
concur. The most important reasons for waiving the unlawful character of
the behavior are the following:
A. Self-redress
Self-redress is the self-sustained act of the obligee aiming at the
satisfaction of his claim when the assistance of the authorities cannot arrive
in time and, due to the delay, said satisfaction may be frustrated or become
considerably more difficult (Art. 282 CC).2
B. Self-defense
Self-defense is the act of defense permissible to one in order to avert
present and unlawful attack on himself or a third party (Art. 284 CC).3
C. State of Necessity
State of necessity exists in the case of destruction of a thing belonging
to another when this is necessary in order to avert imminent danger
threatening the person who caused the destruction or a third party with a
disproportionately greater damage (Art. 285 CC).4
D. Consent of the Injured Party
The consent of the injured party does not always waive the unlawful
character of the act of a third party.
In case of prejudice to property assets, the consent of the injured party
waives the unlawful character of the act of another only when it refers to a
property asset in which the social order as a whole is not interested.5
Examples: B, with As consent, destroyed the vehicle of the former. As consent
waives the unlawful character of Bs act.
B, with As consent, destroyed a unique piece of art or a building scheduled for
preservation owned by A. The consent of A does not waive the unlawful character
2
See above General Principles, Part Two, Ch. E, II, 1.

See above General Principles Part Two, Ch. E, II, 2.
4
See above General Principles, Part Two, Ch. E, II, 3.
5
See P. Kornilakis, Abridged Special Law of Obligations, 2000, p. 360; Ast. Georgiadis, op.
cit., Vol. I, p. 77.
3
227
LAW OF OBLIGATIONS
of Bs act because the social order as a whole is interested in the work of art or in
the building scheduled for preservation.
In case of prejudice to the personality, the consent of the injured party

waives the unlawful character of the act only when the act is not contrary to
good morals.6
Examples: A, who suffered from terminal illness, asked B to put him to death.
Bs act (killing a person) is contrary to good morals and As consent cannot
waive its unlawful character.
Patient A gave his consent to the surgeon to surgically remove one of his lungs
so that his life might be saved. In this case the patients consent does waive the
unlawful character of the act of removing an organ of his body.
III. FAULT
1. The Concept
Fault is the psychological predisposition of the culprit towards the
unlawful result disapproved by the legal order.
The concept of fault includes two elements: the psychological, which
consists in the assessment of whether there exists a causal relation between
the will of the culprit and the effect of his act, and the normative, which
consists in the assessment of whether the culprit possessed the mental health
and maturity to realize the unlawful character of his act, i.e. whether he
could be considered mentally competent.7
Hence, for an unlawful act to be considered as originating in fault, on
the one hand there must be a psychological bond between it and the culprit
(intent or negligence) and on the other hand it must be possible for the
unlawful act to be imputed to the culprit personally. We will subsequently
examine the capacity for delictual liability and the degrees of fault.
2. Capacity for Delictual Liability
Capacity for delictual liability exists when the culprit possesses the
appropriate mental health and maturity to realize the unlawful character of
his act.
See Kornilakis, op. cit., p. 360; Ast. Georgiadis, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 77 et seq.
See G. Michailidis Nouaros, in ERMAK, Art. 330, No 2; G. Balis, General Principles, 8th
ed., 1961, para. 175, p. 457 et seq.; Ast. Georgiadis, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 79.
7
228
In principle, all persons have the capacity to be generally responsible.

The law defines negatively the capacity to be held liable for delict and only
states who is incapable of being held liable.8
Incapable of delictual liability are the following:
A. The minor who has not completed the tenth year of age (Art. 916
CC).
B. The person who, at the time the damage was inflicted, was not
conscious of his acts or was in a state of psychological or mental disturbance
decisively limiting the functioning of his reason and will (Art. 915, 1 CC). 9
C. The minor who has completed the tenth but not the fourteenth year
of age, if it is proved that he acted without discretion (Art. 917, 1 CC).10
D. The deaf-mute when it is proved that he acted without discretion
(Art. 917, 2 CC).
3. Degrees of Fault
There are two degrees of fault: intention (willful conduct, dolus) and
negligence (culpa).11
A. Intention
In Greece the definition of intention (willful conduct, dolus) is not
given in the Civil but in the Criminal Code. According to Article 27 of the
Greek Criminal Code, intention exists when a person wills the results
generated by an act deemed punishable by law, or knows that his own act
may produce such results, and accepts it.
8
See above General Principles, Part Three, Ch. C, II, 2.

The person who at the time the damage was inflicted had brought himself to such a
condition by the use of alcohol or other similar substances (e.g. drugs), is liable for the
damage, unless he was reduced to this condition without fault on his part (Art. 915, 2 CC).
10
Without discretion means that the person was not able to evaluate the unlawful character
of his act. See above General Principles, Part Three, Ch. C, II, 2, footn. 4.
11
Beyond intention and negligence are the chance events (casus) which are distinguished in
ordinary chance events (chance events in the strict sense) and events of force majeur (vis
major). Ordinary chance events are those which do not usually generate liability for the
injuring party. Only exceptionally can the injuring partys liability extend to chance events as
well. Events of vis major are the events which are either impossible to be averted by human
powers or whose prevention appears considerably harder than that of ordinary chance events
(chance events in the strict sense). For more, see Stathopoulos, op. cit., p. 120 et seq.; Ap.
Georgiadis, op. cit., p. 247; Ast. Georgiadis, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 92 et seq.
9
229
LAW OF OBLIGATIONS
From the above definition it follows that there are two kinds of
intentions: immediate and eventual.
a. Immediate intention
The intention is immediate when the culprit sought the unlawful result.
Examples: A, who had an old enmity with B, set his (As) house on fire in order
to destroy it.
A broke Bs TV set in order to get back at him.
b. Eventual intention
Eventual intention exists when the culprit did not seek the unlawful
result but anticipated it as possible and accepted it.
Example: A, wanting to burn down Bs house, set it on fire even though he
anticipated the possibility that Bs bedridden mother might be in it. As regards the
destruction of the house, A had immediate intention but as regards the death of
Bs mother, should such event occur, he had eventual intention.
B. Negligence
Negligence exists when the care required in the carrying out of business
is missing. This definition of negligence is given in Article 330, para. 2 of
the Greek Civil Code.
There are two basic kinds of negligence, gross and slight.
a. Gross negligence
Gross negligence (culpa lata) exists when the behavior of the culprit
falls short by much of the normal behavior of the average diligent person.
Example: A, who had undertaken to send to Bs house a dinnerware set of
expensive porcelain the latter had purchased from his store, took no precaution in
packaging it properly and as a result several plates got broken during
transportation.
b. Slight negligence
Slight negligence (culpa levis) exists when the culprit does not
exhibit the behavior the average diligent man exhibits in transactions.
Not infrequently slight negligence is simply referred to as negligence in many English

speaking countries (Translators note).
230
Example: A sold B a car. While the car had not yet been delivered to its new
owner, A left one of the windows fairly open which resulted in the theft of the car
by a burglar who easily broke into it from the open window. If A had been careful
and closed all the windows, the way an average diligent man would, the car would
not have been stolen.
Sometimes it is difficult to distinguish between gross and slight

negligence. It is up to the court to assess in concreto when the deviation
from the behavior of the average diligent person in transactions is so
significant as to constitute gross negligence.
CHAPTER C
LIABILITY FOR THE ACTS OF THIRD PARTIES
(LIABILITY FOR THE ACTS OF AN UNDERLING)
I. GENERAL
Every person is liable for his own acts, as a rule the ones due to his
fault (subjective liability) and exceptionally those for which he is not at fault
(objective liability). The law stipulates in which cases one is liable for the
acts of a third party.
The most important case of liability for the acts of a third party is when
one is liable for the acts of the underlings he uses, provided he has chosen to
use an underling out of his own free will. This is the so-called liability for
the acts of an underling.
Liability for the acts of an underling exists when a person (the
principal) out of his own free will uses another person (the underling) to
carry out his business.
The liability for the acts of an underling is stipulated by law because
the person who uses such a go-between on the one hand draws benefits
from his services and on the other hand is clearly the financially stronger
party.
In the Greek Civil Code the articles dealing with this type of liability
are Articles 334 and 922.
Article 334 is the article covering the damages caused by the underling
during the fulfillment of the performance. In order for article 334 to be
applicable, an obligational relation between the principal and the party who
suffered the damage needs to have previously existed. The principal who is
liable for the third partys fault is the debtor and the party who sustained the
damage the creditor.
232
Example: Plumber A sent his assistant B to the house of C to change a heating

element. In the process of replacement, B pierced a pipe in the central heating
system of the apartment complex. According to Article 334 of the Greek Civil
Code, A is liable for the damage B caused to C because between A and C there
already existed an obligational relation, an agreement for the specific repair.
Article 922 covers the case of damages caused by an unlawful act of

the underling whose services the principal used in carrying out his
performance.
Example: B, assistant to plumber A, on his way to Cs house for the above
mentioned repair, hit and injured with his motorcycle pedestrian K. According to
the Greek Civil Code, A is responsible for the injury of K because the damage was
caused by underling B while carrying out the principals (As) business.
II. CONDITIONS FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF LIABILITY

For the principal to be liable for the actions of his underling the
following conditions need to concur:
1. Use of an intermediary person by the principal who has made this
choice out of his own free will. The relationship between principal and
underling is usually a contractual one (e.g. employment contract, contract
for work, mandate), though it is not impossible to be merely a relationship
of friendship.
2. Damage caused by the intermediary during the fulfillment of the
performance or while he was carrying out the principals business,
assuming of course that a causal relation exists between the activity of the
intermediary that caused the damage and the duties assigned to him by the
principal. It is disputed whether causality should be considered lifted merely
on account of the fact that the damage occurred on the occasion or apropos
of the fulfillment of the performance or the carrying out of the principals
business. 1 2
1
See Litzeropoulos, Elements of the Law of Obligations, op. cit., p. 82; G. Michailidis
Nouaros, in ERMAK, Art. 334. No 36 et seq.; Stathopoulos, op. cit., pp. 144 and 147; the
same, in Georgiadis Stathopoulos, Commentary on the Civil Code, Art. 334, No 27 and Art.
922, No 33; Ast. Georgiadis, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 106 et seq. and 111. But see also the
following authors who claim that there is no responsibility for the principal from the
underlings act if the damage was caused by the underling on the occasion or apropos of the
fulfillment of the performance or the carrying out of another service: Balis, Law of
LAW OF OBLIGATIONS
233
Examples: In the above mentioned example, as was stated earlier, according to

Article 334 of the Greek Civil Code, the plumber is liable for the damage his
assistant caused during the replacement of the heating element. But, if during the
repair B fights with C and injures him, A is not responsible.
In the same example, as was mentioned earlier, according to Article 922 of the
Greek Civil Code, A is responsible for the injury B caused to K. But if, while B is
on his motorcycle on his way to Cs house for the repair, he meets and fights with
a friend whom he injures out of revenge, A is not responsible.
3. The damage must be due to the underlings fault.3 Fault of the

principal is not required since his liability is objective.
III. CONSEQUENCES OF THE LIABILITY
As long as the above mentioned conditions concur, the principal is
liable for the fault of his underling as if it were his own fault.
More specifically:
-
If during the fulfillment of the performance the underling caused

prejudice to the creditor, according to the Article 334 of the Greek
Civil Code, the obligor (the principal) has to compensate the
creditor.
If while carrying out the principals business, the underling caused
prejudice to a third party through an unlawful act of his, the
Obligations, op. cit., para. 46, p. 177; P. Zepos, Law of Obligations, Vol. I, 2nd ed., 1955, p.
520; the same, Law of Obligations, Vol. II, 1953, p. 774; Filios, Law of Obligations, General
Part, op. cit., p. 264; the same, Manual of the Law of Obligations, Special Part, Vol. II/2, 4th
ed., 1998, p. 89 et seq.
2
The limits of the principals liability for the underlings fault depend on whether the rules of
the causal relation are applied broadly or narrowly (see Michailidis Nouaros, in ERMAK,
Art. 334, No 40).
3
It is a matter of dispute whether in the case of Article 922 of the Greek Civil Code fault of
the underling is required. Are in favor: Balis, General Principles, op. cit., para. 173, p. 453;
Zepos, Law of Obligations, Vol. II, op. cit., p. 774; Stathopoulos, op. cit., p. 142; the same, in
Georgiadis Stathopoulos, Commentary on the Civil Code, Art. 922, No 23; Kornilakis, op.
cit., p. 380; Filios, Manual of the Law of Obligations, Special Part, op. cit., Vol. II/2, p. 90 et
seq; Ap. Georgiadis, op. cit, p. 628; Ast Georgiadis, op. cit.,Vol. I, p. 110 et seq. Is against:
Michailidis Nouaros for whom the unlawful character of the act is sufficient (in ERMAK,
Art 334, No 5).
234
principal has to compensate the third party according to the Article

922 of the Greek Civil Code.
However, alongside the principals own liability, it is possible for the
underling to be liable as well, naturally only if his act constitutes an
unlawful act, since the underling has no preexisting contractual bond with
the creditor.
Hence, it is possible for the obligee to have two claims: one against the
principal and one against the underling.4 But he will be compensated only
once, i.e. not both from the principal and from the underling.
In view of the fact that the principal and the underling are connected
with a bond, usually contractual (e.g. employment contract, mandate), the
principal who compensated the injured party (either creditor or third party)
may in turn exercise the right of recourse against the underling demanding
from him compensation for breach of contract.5
If, however, the compensation to the injured party is paid by the
underling, the latter has no right of recourse against the principal.
Principal and underling are liable jointly and severally (in solidum) according to the Articles
481 and 926 of the Greek Civil Code. See above Part One, Ch. B, III.
5
If the principal and the underling are bound by an employment contract, Article 652 of the
Greek Civil Code is applicable; if they are bound by a contract of mandate, Article 714 of the
Greek Civil Code is applicable.
PART THREE
GENERATION OF THE OBLIGATION
Obligations result from juridical acts, torts/delicts, and the law.
However, for methodological purposes, we distinguish them in contractual
and extra-contractual as far as their source of origin is concerned.
Contractual obligations are those stemming from juridical acts, whereas
extra-contractual those stemming from tort, unjust enrichment, management
of anothers affairs (negotiorum gestio), etc.
CHAPTER A
CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS
I. GENERAL
Contractual obligations result from legal transactions (unilateral
juridical acts or contracts). The rule is that for an obligation to be generated
there needs to be a contract. This follows from Article 361 of the Greek
Civil Code according to which to create or amend an obligation a contract is
required, unless the law has a different provision.
The law does have a different provision, i.e. that a contract is not
required for the generation of an obligation, in certain rare cases, such as,
for example, in the establishment of a foundation1 or the drawing up of a
will. Concerning the amendment or termination of an obligation there are
also some rare cases where a unilateral juridical act suffices.2
See above General Principles, Part One, Ch. C, V, 1.

For the amendment of an obligation a unilateral juridical act suffices in cases such as, for
example, the declaration of option in an alternative obligation. For the termination of an
2
236
II. THE PRINCIPLE OF THE FREEDOM OF CONTRACTS

Article 361 of the Greek Civil Code establishes the freedom of
contracts which reflects the principle of the autonomy of the will. According
to the principle of the freedom of contracts, every person is free not only to
decide if and with whom he will conclude a contract but also to determine
the content of the contract.
The principle of the freedom of contracts is subject to the following
limitations:
1. With regard to the freedom of concluding a contract, sometimes one
is compelled to conclude a contract as, for example, in the case of forced
contracts.3
Examples: Such are the forced contracts concluded between every applicant and
the public utility companies of water, electricity, telephone, etc.
2. With regard to the content of the contract limitations, they are

imposed by the rules of mandatory law (Arts. 3 and 174 CC), good morals
(Art. 178-179 CC), and the general terms of transactions.4
Examples: Such are the contracts of adhesion (or accession)5 a person concludes
with various companies having a monopoly, e.g. with the electric company or the
telephone company.
III. TYPES OF CONTRACTS

The most important distinctions of contracts are the following:
obligation a unilateral juridical act suffices in cases such as, for example, the termination of
an employment contract.
3
See above Introduction, Ch. A, III, 1; see also below Part Three, Ch. A, III, 5.
4
The general terms of transactions are determined unilaterally by one of the contracting
parties, the strongest, which is companies having a monopoly such as the electric company,
the telephone company, or the water utilities company. Regarding the general terms of
transactions, see N. Deloukas, The General Terms of Transactions, 1952; M. Karassis,
General Terms of Transactions, 1992; G. Mentis, General Terms of Transactions in
Consumer and Commercial Contracts, 2000. See also Art. 2, L. 2251/1994, as was later on
modified, regarding the protection of the consumer. Moreover, see M. Stathopoulos A.
Chiotellis M. Avgoustianakis, European Community Civil Law, I, 1995, p. 79 et seq.; K.
Delouka Igglesi, Greek and European Community Law of the Consumer, 1998, p. 62 et
seq.; I. Karakostas, Consumer Protection L. 2251/1994, p. 61 et seq.
5
See below Part Three, Ch. A, III, 5.
237
LAW OF OBLIGATIONS
1. Formal and Informal6

A. The Formal Contract
A contract is formal when for its conclusion it is required that certain
formalities be observed, e.g. it is required for the contract to be in writing.
The Greek Civil Code establishes the principle of informality of
contracts (Art. 158 CC). Only exceptionally do contracts require the
observance of form.
For a contract requiring form to be concluded in some cases a written
document is sufficient, e.g. for the contract of the guarantee,7 whereas in
other cases a notarial deed is needed, e.g. for the transfer of ownership on an
immovable.
B. The Informal Contract
A contract is informal when for its conclusion no form is required, e.g.
employment contract, lease of a thing contract.
2. Reciprocal and Unilaterally Obliging Contracts8
A. Reciprocal Contract
A contract is reciprocal when it generates rights and duties for both

contracting parties, e.g. sale, or lease of a thing.
B. Unilaterally Obliging Contract
A contract is unilaterally obliging (or unilaterally charging) when it

creates rights for the one party and obligations for the other, e.g. donation.
6
See above General Principles, Part Three, Ch. B, IV.

See below Part Eight, Ch. B, XII.
8
See above General Principles, Part Three, Ch. B, I, 2.
In translating the Greek word amfoterovaris () into English, the term
bilateral is also occasionally used to define reciprocal. This may be a less precise rendition
as the term is traditionally reserved for international treaties. To be noted, however, that the
Roman law terminology negotia bilateralia would favor this transaltion (Translators note).
For such one-sided contracts, the term unilateral is at times used instead of unilaterally
obliging. Still, it may be more accurate to refer to them as unilaterally obliging. After all
they too have two sides, two parties, but the contractual obligation burdens only one of them.
In this regard see also the remarks of M. Stathopoulos, Contract Law in Hellas, 1995, p. 42
(in English); but consider the Latin term negotia unilateralia as well (Translators note).
7
238
3. Gratuitous and Onerous Contracts9

A. Gratuitous Contracts
A contract is characterized as gratuitous when the performance on the
part of one party is not linked to quid pro quo considerations, such as, for
example, donation, mandate, etc.
B. Onerous Contracts
Onerous contract is the contract where the performance on behalf of
one party is counterweighed by a performance on behalf of the other, e.g.
sale, lease of a thing.
4. Consensual and Delivery Contracts
A. Consensual Contracts
A contract is consensual (solo consensu) when for its conclusion all
that is needed is the consensus of the parties, e.g. sale, employment contract,
etc.
In the event that a contract calls for material delivery, such delivery
constitutes the fulfillment of the obligation due by the debtor.
B. Delivery Contracts
A contract is called delivery contract when for the generation of the
obligation it is necessary for the thing due to be materially delivered to the
other party, e.g. loan,10 loan for use,11 deposit.12
5. Forced Contracts and Contracts of Adhesion (or Accession)
A. Forced Contracts
Forced contract is the contract where the one contracting party is
compelled to conclude the contract if the other party applies for it, i.e. the
former does not have the possibility to refuse the conclusion of the contract.
See above General Principles, Part Three, Ch. B, II.

See below Part Eight, Ch. B, IX.
11
See below Part Eight, Ch. B, X.
12
See below Part Eight, Ch. B, XI.
10
LAW OF OBLIGATIONS
239
Example: Such are the contracts that the companies of utilities conclude with
anyone applying to them (the electrical, telephone, and water utilities companies
which provide services to the public).
A contract also becomes forced in case the duration of an otherwise

non-forced contract is compulsorily extended, e.g. when the leases on
immovables are compulsorily extended by law.
B. Adhesion (or Accession) Contracts
Contract of adhesion (or accession) is the contract where one of the
parties, although free to conclude or not to conclude a contract, when
deciding to conclude it, he does not have the right to discuss its terms with
the other contracting party.
The content of a contract of adhesion is determined by one of the
contracting parties, the stronger (usually an organization, a public utilities
company, a bank, or generally any business having a monopoly). For this
purpose the contracts customarily used are printed, standardized contracts.
Example: The contracts with the telephone, electric, or water utilities companies
are of this type.
In the contract of adhesion the other contracting party has the right to
accept or not accept the proposed contract, i.e. to adhere or not adhere to it,
but he does not have the flexibility to negotiate its terms.13
In reality, of course, the other contracting party is always compelled to
adhere, otherwise he will be unable to enjoy the services of the various
companies having monopoly, i.e. he will not have telephone services,
electricity, water, etc.
One and the same contract may be at once forced and adhesion (or
accession) contract, i.e. forced contract for the one contracting party, the
organization or the public utilities company, and contract of adhesion (or
accession) for the other contracting party, e.g. the customer.
6. Mixed (Compound) Contracts
A contract is mixed (compound) when it contains elements of more
than one type of nominate contracts.
13
They are the so-called general terms of transactions dictated by the social and economic
development (see above footn. No 4). The standardization of the terms of transactions greatly
facilitates transactions.
240
Examples: A rents his apartment to B and B assumes the obligation to give

private lessons of English to A (it is a mixed contract because it contains elements
of two types of contracts: lease contract and employment contract).
A leases his excavation equipment to B with the additional agreement that the
person who will be using it is A (this too is a mixed contract because it contains
elements of two types of contracts: lease of a thing contract and employment
contract). Several theories have been advanced regarding mixed contracts.14
7. Contracts in Favor of or Burdening a Third Party

A. Contracts in Favor (or for the Benefit) of a Third Party
a. The concept of the contract in favor of a third party
Contract in favor of another party is the contract through which the
contracting parties agree that a certain result will occur in favor of a third
party who is not a party to the contract (Arts. 410 et seq. CC).
In the contract in favor of a third party there are the following persons:
the party undertaking to fulfill the performance vis--vis a third party who is
not a party to the transaction (promisor), the recipient of that promise
(promisee), and the third party vis--vis whom it was agreed that the
performance will be fulfilled.
Examples: A takes a life insurance with insurance company B in favor of his
son T. This means that, in the case of As death, the insurance company has the
obligation to pay the insurance proceeds to insured T, As son. In this example,
the insurance company B is the promisor, A is the promisee, and T is the third
party who will benefit from the contract.
A agrees with professor K that the latter will give English lessons to C who is
As daughter. In this example K is the promisor, A is the promisee, and C is the
third party who will benefit from the contract.
b. Distinctions of the contracts in favor of a third party

The contracts in favor of a third party are distinguished in genuine and
non-genuine.
The contract in favor of a third party is genuine when the third party
acquires a direct and autonomous right to claim performance from the
promisor (Art. 411 CC).
14
See G. Shinas, Mixed Contracts, 1962; Stathopoulos, op. cit., p. 269 et seq.; Ap.
Georgiadis, op. cit., p. 59 et seq.; Ast. Georgiadis, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 267 et seq.
LAW OF OBLIGATIONS
241
The contract in favor of the third party is non-genuine when only the
promisee, not the third party, has the right to demand fulfillment of the
performance (Art. 410 CC).
c. Relations between the parties
The contract in favor of a third party creates the following relations
among the parties:
aa. Relation between the promisor and the promisee
The relation between the promisor and the promisee, the so-called
cover relation, may be any contractual relation, e.g. insurance contract,
employment contract.
bb. Relation between the promisor and the third party
The relation between the promisor and the third party, the so-called
performance relation, is non contractual. The promisor merely assumes the
obligation vis--vis the promisee to furnish the performance due to a third
party.
cc. Relation between the promisee and the third party
The relation between the promisee and the third party, the so-called
inner or value relation, constitutes the cause for which the third party is
entitled to collect from the promisor. This relation may be donation, loan
pay off, loan contract, etc.
Example: A deposits a sum of money with Bank T in favor of B. The reason for
this deposit may be that A owes this amount of money to B or that A loans this
sum of money to B, or that he wishes to give it to him as a gift.
B. Contracts Burdening a Third Party

Contracts burdening a third party are the contracts by which the one
contracting party promises to the other that a third party, who is not a party
to the contract, will furnish a performance (Art. 415 CC).
Example: A agrees with B that C will pay him (B) an amount of money.
Contracts burdening a third party are not valid, i.e. they are not binding
for the third party. Such contracts binding a third party would be contrary to
the principles of freedom and equality because no one may be burdened
242
with obligations from contracts concluded by others nor may one become
liable without his consent.
However, a contract burdening a third party is valid between the
contracting parties in one of the following senses:
-
The promisor will make attempts to persuade the third party to

proceed with fulfillment of the performance, without however being
liable if he does not succeed in this.
The promisor assumes the responsibility to compensate the
promisee if the third party does not fulfill the performance.
According to an interpretive rule laid down by law, the person who

promised that a third party will fulfill a certain performance, unless a
different conclusion may be drawn from the contract, will be liable for
damages if the third party refuses to fulfill the performance (Art. 415 CC).
8. Regulated (or Nominate) and Non-regulated (or Innominate) Contracts
A. Regulated (or Nominate) Contracts
Regulated or nominate contracts are the contracts which are regulated
either by the Greek Civil Code in the Special Part of the Law of
Obligations (e.g. donation, sale, lease of a thing, employment contract,
loan15) or by special statutes, such as, for example, the leasing contract,
the time-sharing contract, etc.16
B. Non-Regulated (or Innominate) Contracts17
Non-regulated or innominate contracts are the contracts which are not
specifically regulated in the Civil Code but are the product of transaction
practices. In the case of such contracts are applicable by analogy the
provisions on similar regulated contracts. If there are no similar regulated
contracts, one has recourse to the rules applicable to all contracts.
Examples: A concludes a contract of publishing books with publisher B.
A and B who deal with similar products conclude a contract by which they
mutually undertake the obligation not to open similar types of stores in the same
area.
15
See below Part Eight, Ch. B.

See below Part Eight, Ch. C.
17
See below Part Eight, Ch. D.
16
CHAPTER B
EXTRA-CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS
Extra-contractual obligations are the obligations which are not
generated by juridical acts but stem directly from the law. That is, these
obligations are created when the conditions of the law concur.
The most important sources of extra-contractual obligations are:
unlawful acts, unjust enrichment, and management of anothers affairs
(negotiorum gestio).
I. OBLIGATIONS FROM UNLAWFUL ACTS
1. General
Obligations from unlawful acts are the obligations for damages a
person is liable for when he caused prejudice to another through an unlawful
and due to fault act of his.
Regarding the concept of the unlawful act there is some confusion.
The foundational rule is that of Article 914 of the Greek Civil Code stating
that whoever causes prejudice to another unlawfully and through fault of his
own, shall be liable for compensation. However, this definition, which
appears in the Greek Civil Code under the subtitle the concept, is placed in
the chapter entitled Unlawful Acts. But according to the prevailing view,
Article 914 gives the definition of civil offense (tort/delict) and not of
unlawful act.1
See Litzeropoulos, op. cit., p. 334 ; Michailidis Nouaros, op. cit., p. 231; Stathopoulos,
op. cit., p. 295 et seq. ; Ap. Georgiadis, in Georgiadis Stathopoulos, Commentary on the
Civil Code, Introd. to Arts. 914-938, No 1. However, it has also been argued that the terms
unlawful act and tort/delict are identical. See Filios, Manual of the Law of Obligations,
Special Part, II/2, op. cit., p. 3 et seq.; Ast. Georgiadis, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 341 et seq.
244
Unlawful act is every act contrary to the law, whereas tort/delict is the
act which is unlawful and due to fault; it results in prejudice to the equitable
goods of a person and generates an obligation for compensation.
Every tort is also an unlawful act, but every unlawful act is not
necessarily a tort. Consequently, it is more accurate to talk about obligations
stemming from tort/delict and not from unlawful acts.
2. Types of Offenses in General
Generally speaking there are three types of offenses: civil, criminal,
and disciplinary.
Civil offense (tort/delict), as was already mentioned, is the unlawful
and due to fault act of a person causing prejudice to the equitable goods of
another and generating the obligation to compensate.
Criminal offense is the unlawful and due to fault act defined as such by
law and punished by public sentence (e.g. short or long term imprisonment).
While in the civil offense there is an obligation for the injuring party to pay
damages, in the criminal offense the culprit is punished with a public
sentence.2
Disciplinary offense is the violation of the rules governing a public
service or a private enterprise by the person subject to them. The
disciplinary offense is punishable by disciplinary sanctions, such as
reprimand, fine, or temporary termination of the employment contract.
3. Civil, Criminal, and Disciplinary Offense: Relationship
An act may be all three at once: civil, criminal, and disciplinary
offense.
Example: A, an employee of the company E, injured his co-worker B at work. In
this case A has to pay damages to B (civil liability), is subject to criminal
sentencing (criminal liability), and is also subject to disciplinary sanctions because
with his action he disturbed the order and safety of the company (disciplinary
liability). That is, the injury of B is at the same time a civil, criminal, and
disciplinary offense.
There are cases where an offense is at the same time both a civil and a
criminal offense.
2
The goals of civil and criminal liability are different. Civil liability aims at satisfying the
private interest, whereas criminal liability serves the public interest. See above Part Two, Ch.
A, I.
LAW OF OBLIGATIONS
245
Example: A stole Bs car. On the one hand A owes to compensate B for the
damage he caused him and on the other hand he is subject to punishment
according to the Criminal Code.
Other times an offense may only be criminal, as it happens with the

attempt to injure someone. In this case, although there is criminal liability,3
there is no civil liability because no prejudice was caused to the other.
Or there may be civil offense which, however, does not entail criminal
liability as, for example, in the case of damage to anothers property due to
negligence. Here the culprit will have to pay for the damage he caused but
the Criminal Code does not punish the damage to anothers property which
is due to negligence.4
Finally, in yet other cases the offense may only be disciplinary, e.g.
smoking at work in an area where it is strictly prohibited.
4. Delictual Liability
A. General
Delictual liability5 is primary, i.e. it creates an obligational relation for
the first time. The obligation created is for damages to the injured party, if
the conditions required for delictual liability concur.
In the obligation born from delictual liability the injuring party is the
debtor and the injured party the creditor. The object of the obligation is the
duty of the injuring party to indemnify the injured.
B. Conditions Required for Delictual Liability
For delictual liability to be generated the following conditions are
necessary:
-
Unlawful behavior
Fault
Damage
Causal relation
See Arts. 42 et seq. CrC.

The Criminal Code only punishes the damage to anothers property which is done
intentionally (Art. 381 CrC).
5
Delictual liability is part of the extra-contractual liability. For its difference from contractual
liability, see above Part Two, Ch. A, III, 2, B.
4
246
More specifically:
a. Unlawful behavior
Unlawful behavior is the behavior which is disapproved by the law and
the social order.6
b. Fault
Fault is the psychological disposition of the culprit vis--vis the
unlawful result which is disapproved by the law and the social order.7
c. Damage
Damage is the prejudice a person suffered in his equitable goods,
material or intangible.8
d. Causal relation
A causal relation between the legal grounds for liability and the damage
is needed.9 In the case of delict, what constitutes grounds for liability is the
unlawful and due to fault act of a person having the capacity for delictual
liability.
C. Results of the Delictual Act
The result of a delictual act is that the injuring party has the obligation
to pay for the damages caused to the injured party by his act.10
Material damage is always restored.11 At times, however, non material
damage (moral damage) is also restored when provided by law.12
Monetary compensation for moral damage13 is awarded to the person
whose non material assets were offended, such as physical integrity, health,
honor, or freedom.14
6
See above Part Two, Ch. B, II.

See above Part Two, Ch. B, III.
8
See above Part One, Ch. A, V, 2, A.
9
See above Part One, Ch. A, V, 2, C.
10
Regarding the type of compensation, see above Part One, Ch. A, V, 5.
11
See above Part One, Ch. A, V, 2, A, b.
12
See above Part One, Ch. A, V, 2, A, a.
13
The monetary compensation for pain and suffering is independent. It is sought regardless
of the compensation for property damage.
14
For more see Ap. Georgiadis, in Georgiadis Stathopoulos, Commentary on the Civil
Code, Art. 932; Kornilakis, op. cit., p. 431 et seq.; Filios, op. cit., Vol. II/2, p. 123 et seq.
7
LAW OF OBLIGATIONS
247
It is specifically provided by law that, in the case of a persons death,

this type of monetary compensation may be awarded to the family of the
victim on account of their pain and suffering.15
II. OBLIGATIONS FROM UNJUST ENRICHMENT
1. General
Unjust enrichment, i.e. enrichment which is not justified, is a source of
obligations. The obligations due to unjust enrichment are obligations
generated directly by the law, the same as the obligations from delictual act.
Unjust enrichment exists when a person has become richer from the
assets of another or to the detriment of another and there are no legal
grounds for it (Art. 904, 1, 1 CC).16
2. Conditions for Unjust Enrichment
For an obligation from unjust enrichment to arise, the following need to
concur:
-
15
The enrichment of a person

The enrichment must come about from the property or to the
detriment of the creditor
There must be causal relation between the enrichment of the one and
the impoverishment of the other
The enrichment must be unjustifiable, i.e. it must have come about
without just or lawful cause
In line with contemporary tendencies, the concept of the family has been broadened to
include all the persons connected to the deceased through family and love bonds. It is left to
the court to determine whether such bonds exist. See I. Spyridakis, Comment on the Athens
Court of Appeals 618/1976, in NoB 24 (1976), p. 725; Ap. Georgiadis, in Georgiadis
Stathopoulos, Commentary on the Civil Code, Art. 932, No 17; P. Agallopoulou, The Legal
Consequences of Cohabitation, in NoB 37 (1989), p. 870.
16
Every enrichment at the expense of another, is not necessarily unjustified. For example, the
profit of the businessman is not unjustified, provided that it does not exceed the limits for
resale profit set by law.
248
More specifically:
A. Enrichment of a Person
Enrichment of a person means the improvement of his financial
situation. This may result either from an increase of his assets (e.g. the
acquisition of the ownership of a thing) or from the avoidance of reduction
of his property (e.g. saving the expenses he would have otherwise incurred,
if he did not have the free use of the other persons thing).
B. Enrichment from the Property or to the Detriment of the Other
a. Enrichment that came about from another persons property means
that property assets were channeled from one person to the other, i.e. that
while one persons property was increasing, the others was decreasing.
Example: A transfers the ownership of his land to B.
b. Enrichment that came about to the detriment of another means that,

whereas there is increase in the assets of one person, the other loses the
opportunity to increase his own.
Example: A uses an immovable of Bs as his workshop without paying rent. In
this case As assets increase because his earnings are not reduced by rent
payments for the workshop, whereas Bs assets decrease by the amount of rent he
would have otherwise received if he were renting out his property.
C. Causal Relation between Enrichment and Impoverishment

There needs to be a causal relation between the enrichment of the one
and the decrease of the assets of the other (direct decrease or lack of
increase).
Examples: A paid 1,500 euros to B. In this case there is causal relation between
the enrichment of the one and the impoverishment of the other.
A, who built a luxury hotel in an area and landscaped the surroundings, caused
the increase in value of the nearby properties. In this case, however, there is no
causal relation between the enrichment of the neighbors and the expenses A
incurred by building his hotel and landscaping the surroundings.
D. Lack of Legal Grounds for the Enrichment

In order for a claim of unjust enrichment to arise, the enrichment must
be unjustifiable, i.e. be without a lawful or just cause.
LAW OF OBLIGATIONS
249
In the Greek Civil Code (Art. 904, 1, 2) the following cases of unjust
enrichment are mentioned indicatively:
a. Payment that was not due
To make a payment that was not due is to make a payment for nonexisting debt.
Example: A pays 1,500 euros to B thinking that he owes this money to him,
whereas in reality As father had already paid off that debt.
b. Payment for a consideration that did not materialize

To make a payment for a consideration that did not materialize is to
make a payment for a consideration which was anticipated to follow (as
cause for the payment) but never did.
Example: A, thinking that he would buy an immovable from B, gave him the
amount of 3,000 euros at the time the promissory contract for the sale was
concluded. However, the sale contract between A and B was never concluded in
which case the sum of 3,000 euros should have been returned to A since the cause
for which the payment was made did not materialize. But B never returned the
3,000 euros to A.
c. Payment for cause no longer existing

Payment for a cause which ceased to exist is the payment furnished for
a once valid cause which later on ceased to exist (expired cause).
Example: A gave 1,000 euros to B as an earnest for the fulfillment of a lease
contract on an immovable that B was to rent out to A. The lease contract was
fulfilled, at which point the money A had given to B as an earnest should have
been returned to him since the cause for which the payment was made had ceased.
But B never returned this money to A.
d. Payment for illegal cause

Payment for illegal cause is the payment made for a cause clashing
with the provisions of the law.
Example: A loaned B a sum of money at an interest rate exceeding the permissible
upper limit. In this case A became unjustifiably enriched from Bs property in the
amount of the excess of the permissible upper limit for interest rates.
250
e. Payment for immoral cause

Payment for immoral cause is the payment clashing with the good
morals of society.
Example: A gave B an amount of money to defame physician C.
A gave B a sum of money to break in Cs house.
3. Legal Consequences of Unjust Enrichment

The legal consequences of unjust enrichment consist in that the
beneficiary has the obligation to return the enrichment.
In the obligation from unjust enrichment the beneficiary is the debtor
and the creditor is the one whose property was decreased to the extent that
the debtors property was increased. The object of the beneficiarys
obligation is to return the enrichment to the person who was prejudiced (Art.
908 CC).
More specifically:
If possible, the beneficiary of the enrichment must return the very same
object of the enrichment he received.
If it is not possible to return the thing itself, either due to the nature of
the thing (e.g. the enrichment consists in the use of anothers thing or in the
rendering of services) or for different reasons (e.g. the thing was consumed
or mixed with things belonging to the beneficiary, such as building on
someone elses land), the beneficiary is obliged to return the value of the
enrichment.
In case the original enrichment of the beneficiary is no longer present,
but monetary value has taken its place (such as, for example, when payment
was received from the sale of the thing, or the insurance company paid
compensation for the things destruction), the beneficiary is liable to return
the replacement.
The question is whether replacement is due if, in the event of sale, the
monetary value received is higher than the value of the item. This will
happen, for example, if the beneficiary, due to his personal skills, managed
to sell the item at a considerably high price. The issue is disputed.17
17
In this regard, see Stathopoulos, in Georgiadis Stathopoulos, Commentary on the Civil

Code, Art. 908, No 13; the same, in op. cit., p. 344 et seq.
LAW OF OBLIGATIONS
251
Finally, it should be noted that the obligation of the holder to return the
enrichment is extinguished if he is no longer richer at the time of service of
a summons instituting legal proceedings (Art. 909 CC).
4. Cases of Exclusion of the Claim for Unjust Enrichment
There are certain cases where the recovery of unjust enrichment is
precluded. They are the following:
A. Payment of Non-due Debt with Knowledge of the Facts
The claiming back of what was not due is excluded if the person
receiving the payment proves that the payer was aware of the non-existence
of the debt (Art. 905, 1 CC).
Example: Although A knew that he owed nothing to his friend B who was
burdened by many debts, he gave him 8,000 euros in order to help him pay off his
debts. If later on A claims the 8,000 euros from B, his lawsuit will be rejected
because B can prove that A gave him the money fully cognizant of the fact that he
did not owe it to him.
B. Payment of Non-due Debt Made out of Special Moral Duty or Reasons of

Propriety
The claiming back of what was not due is excluded if the payment was
made on account of a special moral duty or for reasons of propriety.
Examples: A paid the amount of 20,000 euros to his sister as a dowry believing
that he is under legal obligation to provide her with a dowry.
A pays maintenance to his poor uncle believing that he has the legal obligation
to do so.
A gave his friend a wedding present worth 1,000 euros.
In the first two cases, if A finds out later on that he is not legally bound by
such obligations (to provide a dowry to his sister or maintenance to his uncle), he
may not claim back what he paid because the payment was made out of a special
moral duty.
In the third case, once again he may not claim back the gift because it was
given for reasons of propriety.
252
C. Payment for Immoral Cause

Payment made for immoral reasons may not be claimed back if the
immorality attaches to the payer exclusively or it includes the payer as
well.18 On the contrary, the payer may claim back the payment, if the
immoral cause concerns only the recipient.
Examples: The sum of money A gave to B to defame C may not be claimed
back because the immoral cause concerns the payer as well.
On the contrary, the sum of money A gave to B so that he would not commit
burglary may be claimed back because the immoral cause concerns only the
recipient.
III. OBLIGATIONS FROM MANAGEMENT

OF ANOTHERS AFFAIRS
1. General
Management of anothers affairs (negotiorum gestio) exists when a
person, without having the right or the obligation to do so, manages another
persons affairs according to the actual or presumed will19 of the principal of
the affairs (Art. 730, 1 CC).
Examples: A, without prior agreement with his neighbor B, pays his electricity
bill while the latter is on vacation so that there wont be an electricity shut off in
Bs house.
A calls the Fire Department to extinguish the fire that broke out in Bs
apartment during the absence of the latter.
2. Consequences of Managing Anothers Affairs

Managing anothers affairs generates obligations between the principal
of the affair and the manager of anothers affair which stem from the law.
18
Art. 907, para. 1 of the Greek Civil Code excludes the possibility of claiming back the
unjust enrichment when the immoral cause also includes the payer. However, according to
the prevailing view, exclusion exists also in the case where the immoral cause concerns only
the payer (see Litzeropoulos, op. cit., p. 393; Stathopoulos, in Georgiadis Stathopoulos,
Commentary on the Civil Code, Art. 907, No 5).
19
The presumptive will of the principal will be taken into consideration only when there is no
actual will. Presumptive will is the will the principal would have had, if he knew the
circumstances at the time of the management of his affairs.
LAW OF OBLIGATIONS
253
More specifically:
The manager of anothers affairs is obliged:
A. To conduct the other persons affairs in the interest and according to
the actual or presumptive will of the principal (Art. 730, 1 CC).
B. To inform the principal, when he is able to do so, that he undertook
the management and, if there is no danger from the postponement, to wait
for his instructions (Art. 733 CC).
C. To render account to the principal regarding the affair he managed
(Art. 734 CC).
D. To restitute to the principal what was acquired by reason of the
management (Art. 734 CC).
The principal of the affair is obliged:
A. To render to the manager the expenses he incurred while conducting
the principals business (Art. 736 CC).
B. To compensate the manager for the prejudice he suffered while
conducting the principals business (Art. 736 CC).
PART FOUR
DEVELOPMENT OF THE OBLIGATION
The obligation usually develops normally from birth to extinction.
Sometimes, however, anomalies occur during its course.
In the first chapter of this segment we will discuss the normal
development of the obligation, in the second the abnormal, and in the third
the special principles governing reciprocal contracts.
CHAPTER A
NORMAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE OBLIGATION
I. WAY OF FULFILLING THE PERFORMANCE
1. Fulfillment of Performance in Good Faith
A. General
As was already mentioned,1 one of the fundamental principles of the
law of obligations is the principle of good faith (bona fides). Article 288 of
the Greek Civil Code stipulates that the debtor is obliged to fulfill the
performance as good faith requires, taking also into account the business
usage.
See above Introduction, Ch. A, III, 2.
256
More specifically:
Good faith is the directness and honesty required in transactions. Every
party is obliged to act as an honest, fair, and sociable human being. Thus
described good faith corresponds to objective good faith.2
Business usage is the sum total of practices prevailing in the business
world. Business usage does not constitute an independent criterion of the
behavior of the transacting party; it simply plays an auxiliary role. This
means that for the court to determine when there is fulfillment of the
performance in good faith on the part of the debtor, the prevailing business
usage is also taken into consideration as long as it does not clash with social
morality. In case the business usage leads to a solution unacceptable by
good faith, the court follows solely the principles of objective good faith,
given the fact that the latter is superior.3
Examples: A neon sign hung by the tenant in the front of the store is a business
usage acceptable by social morality.
The sale of merchandise at inflated prices during periods of want is a business
usage clashing with social morality.
B. Extent of the Application of the Fulfillment of Performance in Good

Faith
Article 288 of the Greek Civil Code referring to the good faith
fulfillment of the performance has general application. This means that it is
applicable to all obligations, regardless of whether they are generated by a
juridical act or by the law.4
Although the letter of Article 288 refers only to the debtor, it is
accepted that it is binding for the creditor as well. That is, all transacting
See above Introduction, Ch. A, III, 2.

See Balis, Law of Obligations, op. cit., para. 5, p. 21; A. Tsirintanis, in ERMAK, Art. 288,
No 30 et seq.; Litzeropoulos, Elements of the Law of Obligations, op. cit., p. 132; N.
Papantoniou, Good Faith in Civil Law, 1957, p. 107 et seq.; Stathopoulos, op. cit., p. 89 et
seq.; the same, in Georgiadis Stathopoulos, Commentary on the Civil Code, Art. 288, No 6;
Ast. Georgiadis, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 6 et seq.
4
See Stathopoulos, op. cit., p. 86 et seq.; the same, in Georgiadis Stathopoulos,
Commentary on the Civil Code, Art. 288, No 31; Ap. Georgiadis, op. cit., p. 178; Ast.
Georgiadis, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 8 et seq.
3
LAW OF OBLIGATIONS
257
parties have the obligation to show good faith in the fulfillment of their
respective performances.5
Finally, it should be noted that the provision of Article 288 is
mandatory law. 6 7 Consequently, the application of the principle of good
faith may not be set aside beforehand, either by a waiver on behalf of one
party or even by agreement between the parties.
C. Consequences of the Application of Good Faith in the Fulfillment of
Performance
The principle of good faith in the fulfillment of the performance
sometimes broadens the debtors obligations and other times it narrows
them.
More specifically:
The debtors obligations are broadened when he is burdened with
additional obligations, such as the obligation to notify the creditor in case of
destruction of the thing owed, the obligation for loyalty the employee has
vis--vis his employer, the obligation of the employer to protect the health
and physical well being of the employee, etc.
The debtors obligations are narrowed down when it is required for the
creditor to show leniency regarding the exact performance of the obligation.
The limits of such leniency may refer to the quantity or quality of the
performance, the time or place of it, etc.
Finally, there are cases when the good faith required in business may
free the debtor altogether from the obligation to furnish the performance
because of moral impossibility to perform (e.g. when an actor, just prior to
the beginning of the play, is suddenly informed of his fathers death, in
which case there is moral impossibility for him to play his role).
See Balis, op. cit., para. 5, p. 16; Zepos, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 157; Tsirintanis, in ERMAK, Art.
288, No 6; Stathopoulos, op. cit., p. 90; the same, in Georgiadis Stathopoulos, Commentary
on the Civil Code, Art. 288, No 12; Ast. Georgiadis, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 9 et seq.
6
Regarding the notion of the rules of mandatory law, see above Introduction to Law, Ch. E,
II, 2.
7
See Balis, op. cit, para. 5, p. 21; Zepos, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 156; Tsirintanis, in ERMAK, Art.
288, No 11; Stathopoulos, op. cit., p. 91; the same, in Georgiadis Stathopoulos,
Commentary on the Civil Code, Art. 288, No 28; Ap. Georgiadis, op. cit., p. 180; Ast.
Georgiadis, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 10.
258
2. Partial Fulfillment of Performance

The debtor does not have the right to furnish partial performance of the
obligation due (Art. 316 CC). Consequently, the creditor has no obligation
to accept partial performance of the obligation. In case the debtor offers
partial fulfillment of the performance, the creditor may decline to accept it
without being considered in default regarding the part offered; the debtor on
the other hand will be in default 8 regarding the entire performance.
Example: A owed B 1,000 kilos of grain which he was supposed to deliver on
May 5th. A offered B 700 kilos on May 5th and promised to furnish the remaining
300 later on. B is entitled to decline the offer of 700 kilos in which case A is in
default for the entire performance, i.e. for the 1,000 kilos.
But the creditor may not decline the partial fulfillment of the
performance when such behavior on his part clashes with the principles of
good faith during performance.9 This will happen if, for example, the part
that was not furnished is insignificant by comparison to the part that was
furnished.
Example: A, who on May 5th owed to furnish B 1,000 kilos of grain, delivers 995
kilos on May 5th and promises to deliver the remainder shortly after. In this case B
is not entitled to decline to accept the 995 kilos of grain under the pretext that 5
kilos are missing because such behavior clashes with the principle of good faith.
However, in view of the fact that the provision of article 316 of the
Greek Civil Code, forbidding partial fulfillment of the performance, is nonmandatory law (jus dispositivum),10 in accordance with the principle of the
freedom of contracts it may be agreed between the parties (Art. 361 CC)11
that partial fulfillment on behalf of the debtor is permitted.
Lastly, it should be noted that, from the provision of law in Article 316
of the Greek Civil Code which forbids partial fulfillment of the performance
only for the debtor but does not mention anything about the creditor, it
follows that the creditor, since he is entitled to claim the entire performance,
may, if he wishes, claim the partial one as well.
8
Regarding the consequences of the debtors default, see below Part Four, Ch. B, II, 2.
See Balis, op. cit., para. 37, p. 137; Litzeropoulos, op. cit., p. 149; Agg. Georgiadi, in
Georgiadis Stathopoulos, Commentary on the Civil Code, Art. 316, No 2; Filios, Law of
Obligations, General Part, op. cit., p. 103; Ast. Georgiadis, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 23 et seq.
10
Regarding the concept of the rules of jus dispositivum, see above Introduction to Law, Ch.
E, II, 2.
11
See above Part Three, Ch. A, II.
9
LAW OF OBLIGATIONS
259
3. Fulfillment of Performance by a Third Party

A. General
The performance may be fulfilled by a third party, something which
results in releasing the debtor (Art. 317 CC).
Third party is any person who, in order to see the debtor released from
his obligation, pays the latters debt to the creditor in his (the third partys)
own name.
The persons that the debtor employs for the fulfillment of his
performance, and consequently act in his name, are not third parties. This is,
for example, the case with the representative (ex lege, or voluntary) or with
the underling assisting the debtor with the fulfillment of his performance.
B. Cases where Performance by a Third Party is Precluded
A third party cannot pay the debt of another in the following cases:
a. If the creditor has an interest in the debtor paying the debt in person
(Art. 317 CC). Naturally, in monetary debts there is no such interest in
fulfillment of the performance in person.
Examples: A has agreed with B that the latter should teach him English.
A has agreed with surgeon B that the latter should operate on him.
In the above cases A clearly has an interest in the debtors fulfilling the obligation
in person.
b. When both debtor and creditor agree on the rejection of the

fulfillment of the performance by a third party. If only the debtor is opposed
to the third party fulfillment, the creditor is not obliged to also reject the
fulfillment by a third party. The law only gives him the right to reject it (Art.
318 CC).
C. Consequences of Fulfillment of Performance by a Third Party
Fulfillment of the performance by a third party results in the extinction
of the obligation provided that it fully corresponds to the object and content
of the performance due and was made with the intention to fulfill the
performance in question.
260
In cases where performance by a third party is not precluded by law, if

the creditor rejects such performance, he is considered in default.12
Whether the third party who made payment on behalf of the debtor may
have recourse against the debtor and seek to recover what he paid is decided
by the internal relation binding them. If, for example, the third party acted as
manager of anothers affairs, or as the debtors mandatary,13 he may recover
from the debtor, now released from the obligation, what he paid.
II. PLACE OF FULFILLMENT OF THE PERFORMANCE
Place of fulfillment of the performance is the place where the debtor
owes to furnish his performance and the creditor owes to accept it.
Regarding the determination of the place of performance the Greek Civil
Code stipulates the following:
1. The place of fulfillment of the performance is determined by the
legal transaction (Art. 320, 1 CC). According to the principle of the
freedom of contracts (Art. 361 CC), the contracting parties are free to
determine the place where the performance will be furnished.
Example: A sells his car to B and it is agreed that the place where A will deliver
the car to B is the garage in which it is parked.
2. If the place of performance is not specified in the legal transaction, it

may be deduced from the circumstances, especially from the nature of the
obligational relation (Art. 320, 1 CC).
Examples: A agrees with B that the latter will provide care for her bedridden
mother. From the nature of the employment contract it is deduced that the place of
fulfillment of the performance is the residence of As mother.
A is hired as a worker in Bs factory. From the nature of the employment
contract it is obvious that Bs factory is the place of performance for A.
3. If the place of fulfillment of the performance is neither explicitly

agreed upon nor deduced from the legal transaction, we distinguish between
monetary and non monetary performance.
A. If the debt is non-monetary, the place of performance is the place of
the debtors domicile at the time of the generation of the obligation (Art.
12
13
See below Part Four, Ch. B, IV.

See above Part Three, Ch. B, III, and below Part Eight, Ch. B, VIII.
LAW OF OBLIGATIONS
261
320, 1 CC). But if the obligation is derived from the exercise of the debtors
profession, then the performance must be furnished at the place of the
debtors professional establishment instead of the place of his domicile (Art.
320, 2 CC).
Domicile is not only the main and permanent place where the debtor
has settled but also the building where he lives or exercises his profession.
In case there is no such place, the place where the debtor resides is taken
into consideration.
Example: A who lives in Athens sells his car to B who lives in Corinth. A is
supposed to furnish the car to B two months after the conclusion of the sale. If no
place of performance has been agreed between A and B for the delivery of the car,
the vehicle will be furnished in Athens even if in the meantime A has moved to
Nafplion.
B. If the performance is monetary, the debtor needs to furnish it at the

place where the creditor has his domicile at the time of payment (Art. 321, 1
CC). If the claim of the creditor has arisen from the exercise of his
profession, the monetary performance must be furnished at the place of the
creditors professional establishment (Art. 321, 2 CC).
Example: A owes B 1,500 euros due and payable on the 15th of December. If there
is no agreement between A and B as to the place of payment, A is obliged to make
the payment at the domicile or the professional establishment B will have on the
15th of December.
III. TIME OF FULFILLMENT OF THE PERFORMANCE

The time the performance must be fulfilled is the time at which the
debtor is obliged and entitled to fulfill the performance and the creditor,
respectively, is entitled and obliged to accept it. That is, time of performance
is the time past which the performance will be considered past due.
Regarding the determination of the time of performance the Greek
Civil Code stipulates the following:
1. The time of performance may be determined by the contract the
parties have concluded (Art. 323 CC). The parties are free, according to the
principle of the freedom of contracts (Art. 361 CC), to set the time of
performance.
Example: A buys a car from B and they agree that B will deliver the car on the
15th of September.
262
2. If there is no such contractual provision, the time of performance

may be deduced from the circumstances and especially from the nature of
the obligational relation (Art. 323 CC).
Example: A hires B as an employee in his business without agreeing with him
anything about the time his services are due. However, it is deduced from the
nature of the employment contract that B must offer his services during the
regular hours of operation of the business.
3. Occasionally, the time of performance stems directly from a

provision of the law.
Examples: If a contract for the lease of a thing was concluded without a
provision as to when the rent is due, according to Article 595, para. 2 of the Greek
Civil Code, it will be due at the expiration of the lease.
If an employment contract was concluded without a provision as to when the
salary is due and payable, according to Article 655, para. 1 of the Greek Civil
Code it is due after the performance of the work.
4. If the time of performance cannot be deduced from the contract, the

circumstances, or the law, according to the provision of Article 323 of the
Greek Civil Code, the performance is to be fulfilled forthwith.
Forthwith, in the strict sense of the term, means without any delay,
that is, the creditor may demand performance from the debtor immediately
after the generation of the obligation. However, the true meaning of the term
forthwith will be found once we use the yardstick of good faith and
business usage. Consequently, the word forthwith means that the debtor
must immediately begin preparatory actions towards the fulfillment of the
performance and furnish it within a reasonable time.14
Examples: A commissions B, a civil engineer, to build a single family house on
her land without agreeing with him when the building should be completed. B
must start carrying out the work at once and produce the agreed work within a
reasonable time.
A gives a piece of fabric to B, who is a tailor, to make him a suit; but he makes
no agreement as to when it should be finished. B must begin working on it
immediately and deliver it within a reasonable time.
14
See Balis, op. cit., para. 42, p. 163; P. Zepos, in ERMAK, Art. 323, No 6; Litzeropoulos,
Elements of the Law of Obligations, op. cit., p. 144; Agg. Georgiadi, in Georgiadis
Stathopoulos, Commentary on the Civil Code, Arts. 323-324, No 17 et seq.; Stathopoulos, op.
cit., p. 359 et seq.; Ast. Georgiadis, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 40 et seq.
263
LAW OF OBLIGATIONS
IV. RIGHT OF RETENTION

1. The Concept
Right of retention (jus retentionis) is the right of the debtor against the
creditor, who also has a related claim against the former which is past due,
to withhold his performance until the creditor fulfills his own (Art. 325 CC).
2. Conditions for the Exercise of the Right of Retention
For the exercise of the right of retention certain conditions need to
concur:
A. Claim of the Creditor
The claim of the creditor, which may have as its object any kind of
performance, must be past due.
B. Counter Claim of the Debtor
The counter claim of the debtor must also be past due at the time of the
exercise of the right of retention.
C. Relation between the Reciprocal Claims
The law does not determine when there is reciprocity of the two claims.
Consequently, this is a factual matter which will be assessed by the court in
every particular instance. However, it is accepted that relatedness is present
in the following instances:
a. When the reciprocal claims stem from the same legal relation.
Example: A has concluded with B an employment contract. B is in default
regarding the payment of As wages. A is entitled to refuse to perform his services
to B until the latter pays the employees past due wages (retention of services).
b. When a person is bound to furnish a thing on which he has a counter

claim for expenses incurred in connection with it or for the damage he
suffered from it (Art. 326 CC).
Examples: A leased his apartment to B and the tenant incurred expenses in
repairing the premises. In the event that A brings action against B for return of the
leased premises, B may refuse performance if A does not reimburse him for the
expenses he incurred.
264
A leased an old, single family home to B. During the lease period, part of the
roof of the house collapsed resulting in damaging the tenants furniture. In case A
brings action against B for return of the leased premises, B may refuse to do so if
A does not compensate him for the damage he suffered.
c. When the reciprocal claims originate in the same social relation.15

Examples: A loaned his classmate B a book for a few days. After several days,
B loaned 50 euros to A for two days. When after two months A asked B to return
him the book, B may refuse to do so until A returns to him the 50 euros he had
borrowed from him.
During a reception A took Bs fur coat by mistake, leaving B her (As) own coat
which B necessarily took. When the next day A asks B to return her the coat, A
may refuse to do so until B also returns As coat to her.
3. Way of Exercising the Right of Retention

The right of retention may be exercised in court or out of court. Out of
court the right of retention is exercised by way of the debtors response to
the creditors call upon the debtor to perform.16 In court the right of
retention is exercised by a postponement plea advanced by the debtor.
4. Consequences of the Exercise of the Right of Retention
The consequences of the exercise of the right of retention are that the
fulfillment of the debtors past due performance is postponed until the
creditor fulfills his own.
If the debtor exercises his right of retention in court by way of opposing
a plea, the court will rule against the defendant debtor on condition of
simultaneous performance of the creditors performance to the debtor (Art.
329 CC).
15
See Balis, op. cit., para. 43, p. 167; Zepos, in ERMAK, Art. 325, No 8; Litzeropoulos,
Elements of the Law of Obligations, op. cit., p. 215; Michailidis Nouaros, Law of
Obligations, op. cit., p. 123; Agg. Georgiadi, in Georgiadis Stathopoulos, Commentary on
the Civil Code, Art. 325, No 17; Stathopoulos, op. cit., p. 372 et seq.; Ap. Georgiadis, op. cit.,
p. 194; Ast. Georgiadis, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 46; Filios, op. cit., p. 104.
16
For the concept of the call upon the debtor to perform (interpellatio), see below Part Four,
Ch. B, II, 1, E.
CHAPTER B
ANOMALOUS DEVELOPMENT OF THE OBLIGATION
In certain cases the obligation does not develop normally so as to lead
to fulfillment of performance. The anomalous development of an obligation
is manifested in the following ways:
-
Impossibility of performance
Debtors default
Improper performance (malperformance)
Creditors default
I. IMPOSSIBILITY OF PERFORMANCE
1. The Concept and Types of Impossibility of Performance

Impossibility of performance exists when the debtor is not in a position
to fulfill the performance he owes. The main distinctions of the
impossibility of performance are the following:
A. Impossibility of Performance Arising from Fault and not Due to Fault
a. Impossibility arising from fault
The impossibility of performance arises from fault if it is due to a fact
for which the debtor is responsible.
Example: A was under the obligation to furnish a car to B which, however, A had
destroyed prior to delivery.
b. Impossibility not due to fault

The impossibility of performance is due to a fact for which the debtor is
not responsible.
266
Example: A was under the obligation to furnish a car to B which, however, prior
to delivery was accidentally destroyed by fire.
B. Initial and Supervening Impossibility of Performance

a. Initial impossibility of performance
The impossibility of performance is initial when it exists at the time of
the generation of the obligation.
Example: A sells B his car which is already totally destroyed.
b. Supervening impossibility of performance

The impossibility of performance is supervening when it occurred after
the generation of the obligation but prior to the fulfillment of the performance.
Example: A sold B his car which he was supposed to deliver one month later.
However, As car got destroyed after the conclusion of the sale and prior to the
time of delivery.
C. Subjective and Objective Impossibility of Performance

a. Subjective impossibility of performance
The impossibility of performance is subjective when the performance is
impossible only for the debtor.
Example: A hires B to teach him Spanish but B does not know any Spanish
himself.
b. Objective impossibility of performance

The impossibility of performance is objective when the performance is
impossible for all.
Example: A sells B a piece of land in the planet Mars.
D. Total and Partial Impossibility of Performance

a. Total impossibility of performance
The impossibility of performance is total when the entirety of the
performance owed is impossible.
Example: A sold B his television set which, however, prior to delivery got totally
destroyed by fire.
LAW OF OBLIGATIONS
267
b. Partial impossibility of performance

The impossibility of performance is partial when only part of the
performance cannot be furnished.
Example: A sold B two very valuable paintings he had in his home. Before
delivery, however, one of the two paintings got destroyed due to As negligence.
E. Natural, Legal, Economic, and Moral Impossibility of Performance

a. Natural impossibility of performance
The impossibility of performance is natural, when the performance
cannot be fulfilled on account of reasons pertaining to the natural condition
of the object due.
Example: A was under the obligation to furnish B a car which, however, got
burned prior to delivery.
b. Legal impossibility of performance

The impossibility of performance is legal when the performance is
prevented on legal grounds.
Example: A sold B an item which is outside the realm of transactions (res extra
commercium),1 for example, a public square.
c. Economic impossibility of performance

The impossibility of performance is economic when the performance is
materially possible but would entail an exorbitant expenditure on the part of
the debtor to fulfill it.2
Things outside the realm of transactions (res extra commercium) are the things that are
common to all, the things for common use, and the things destined to serve public, municipal,
communal, or religious purposes (Art. 966 CC). See below Property Law, Part One, Ch. A,
II, 6.
2
It is disputed whether the economic and moral impossibility of performance constituting
impossibility of performance not due to fault result in complete release of the debtor (in favor
of this view, Balis, op. cit. para. 47, p. 179 et seq.; Litzeropoulos, op. cit., p. 193 et seq. ;
Zepos, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 129 et seq.; Michailidis Nouaros, op. cit., p. 152 ; Ast. Georgiadis,
op. cit., Vol. I, p. 287 et seq.); or whether in this case the debtor is entitled to refuse
performance in the context of bona fides (in favor of this view, A. Gazis, in ERMAK, Arts.
335-348, No 30; Filios, op. cit., p. 201 et seq.); or, finally, whether it should be left to the
court to decide if there is impossibility of performance in the specific situation (in favor of
268
Example: A owed to furnish B a piece of jewelry which fell to the bottom of the
sea.
d. Moral impossibility of performance

The impossibility of performance is moral when the performance is
possible objectively speaking but clashes with the conscience or emotions of
the debtor.3
Example: Actor A, shortly before appearing in a performance, was informed of the
sudden death of his father.
2. Consequences of the Impossibility of Performance

To assess the consequences of the impossibility of performance we
must distinguish between the cases where it arises from fault of the debtor
and those where it does not.4
A. Impossibility of Performance Arising from Fault of the Debtor
If the impossibility of performance arising from fault of the debtor is
total, he is liable to compensate the creditor for the prejudice caused him by
the non-fulfillment of performance (Arts. 335 and 362 CC).
The compensation owed by the debtor includes the positive damage
caused to the creditor (quantum abest) as well as his lost profit (quantum
lucrari potui, or lucrum cessans), i.e. the profit he would have had if the
performance had been fulfilled.5
In case of partial impossibility of performance arising from fault, the
debtor is obliged to fulfill the part of the performance which is still possible
and pay damages for the part of the performance which is impossible.
this view, Stathopoulos, op. cit., p. 427; the same, in Georgiadis Stathopoulos, Commentary
on the Civil Code, Arts. 335-336, No 7 et seq.).
3
See above footn. 2.
4
For the consequences of the impossibility of performance in reciprocal contracts, see below
Part Four, Ch. C, III.
5
See above Part One, Ch. A, V, 2, A, b.
LAW OF OBLIGATIONS
269
Example: A owed B an old dining room set and an old living room set. Before
delivery of the furniture, the dining room set got destroyed on account of As
fault. A has the obligation to deliver the living room set to B and pay him
damages for the dining room set which was destroyed due to his (As) fault.
However, if the creditor does not have an interest in the partial

performance, he has the right, within a reasonable time from the time of the
offer or the invitation of the debtor, to decline such partial performance
altogether and consider the impossibility as total (Art. 337 CC). That is, in
this case he will claim damages as if the performance were impossible in its
entirety.
Example: A owed B, who is a collector of old books, an old twelve volume
encyclopedia which can no longer be found in the market. Before delivery, and
through As fault, three of the volumes of the encyclopedia were destroyed. B
who no longer has an interest in getting the remaining nine volumes since the
encyclopedia would thus be incomplete after informing the debtor about this in
a timely fashion, has the right to decline the nine volumes and regard the
impossibility as total. In this case B will seek to be compensated for impossibility
of performance regarding all twelve volumes of the encyclopedia.
B. Impossibility of Performance Not Due to Fault

The impossibility of performance which is not due to fault may be total
or partial.
If the impossibility of performance is total, the debtor is released from
the obligation to furnish the performance (Arts. 336 and 363 CC) but has
the following collateral obligations vis--vis the creditor:
aa. to inform the creditor of the impossibility as soon as he is informed
of it himself (Art. 336, 2 CC). Otherwise he owes him compensation for the
damage he suffered from failure to inform him;
bb. to yield the eventual surrogate or substitute to the creditor (Art. 338
CC). Surrogate (surrogatum) is anything that has devolved upon the debtor
as a result of the impossibility of performance.
Example: A owed B a specific car. However, due to a chance event, this car got
destroyed prior to delivery to B. In this case A is released from the obligation to
deliver the car to B but is under the obligation to inform him of the incident as
270
soon as he is informed of it himself and to pay B the insurance proceeds6 he

collected from the insurance company with which the car was insured.

In case of partial impossibility of performance, the debtor is released
from his obligation to perform as regards the part which became impossible
to furnish, but is liable to perform as regards the part which may still be
furnished.
In case of partial impossibility, not due to the debtors fault, the debtor
is additionally responsible to inform the creditor in a timely fashion and to
furnish him the surrogate which has possibly devolved upon him as a result
of the partial impossibility of performance.
Example: A owed B two specific cars. Before delivery, one of the cars got
destroyed due to a chance event (e.g. fire). A is released from the obligation to
furnish the destroyed car but he is responsible to do the following two things: to
inform the creditor of the impossibility of performance regarding the one car and
to pay to him the insurance proceeds he collected from the insurance company
with which the destroyed car was insured.
II. DEBTORS DEFAULT

1. The Concept and Conditions for the Debtors Default
A debtor is in default when due to fault of his own he delays the
fulfillment of a possible and past due performance.
For the debtor to be in default the following conditions need to concur
(Arts. 340-342 CC):
A. Valid Obligational Relation
The performance due must result from a valid obligational relation.
B. Possible Performance
The performance due must be possible. If the performance is
impossible, the provisions of the law for impossibility of performance are
applicable.
6
Insurance proceeds consist in the sum paid to the insured by the insurance company if the
risk against which he was insured materialized.
LAW OF OBLIGATIONS
271
C. Past Due Performance

The performance must have fallen due, i.e. the time for its fulfillment
must have arrived without the performance having yet been furnished.
D. Actionable Performance
The performance must be actionable, i.e. it must not be subject to
postponement plea, such as, for example, the plea of retention,7 or the plea
of the unperformed contract (exceptio non adimpleti contractus).8
Example: Shopkeeper A refuses to deliver to customer B the television set he
repaired for him, if the latter does not pay for the repairs. In this case where at the
time of performance the debtor (A) advances against the creditor (B) the plea of
retention, the obligation although already past due is not actionable.
E. Call upon the Debtor to Perform

According to Article 340 of the Greek Civil Code the creditor needs to
call upon the debtor to perform, i.e. to invite the debtor to proceed with
fulfillment of his performance (interpellatio).9 The purpose of this warning
is to create in the debtor the certainty as to when exactly the creditor expects
performance.
Such warning given either judicially (e.g. action compelling the
debtor to perform10) or extrajudicially (e.g. a letter of demand) must be
given only after the performance has become actionable. The performance is
deemed actionable even in the case of contracts where, because no time for
the performance has been agreed, it is due forthwith.11
See above Part Four, Ch. A, IV.

See below Part Four, Ch. C, II.
9
The right to call upon the debtor to perform is a condition forming, or constitutive, right
(regarding condition forming rights, see above General Principles, Part Two, Ch. A, II, 2,
B). The call upon the debtor to perform is a quasi juridical act, i.e. its results follow
regardless of the will of the person engaging in it. See Gazis, in ERMAK, Art. 340, No 4;
Balis, General Principles, op. cit., para. 32, p. 107; Michailidis Nouaros, op. cit., p. 160;
Stathopoulos, in Georgiadis Stathopoulos, Commentary on the Civil Code, Art. 340, No 12;
the same, General Law of Obligations, op. cit., p. 433; Filios, op. cit., p. 214; Ap. Georgiadis,
op. cit., p. 269; Ast. Georgiadis, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 68.
10
For the concept of the action to perform (or compelling the debtor to perform), see above
General Principles, Part Two, Ch. B, II, B.
11
See above Part Four, Ch. A, III, 4.
8
272
Example: A, a building contractor, must deliver to B the house he has undertaken

to build for him for which no time of performance had been specified in the
agreement. After a reasonable amount of time since the conclusion of the
agreement, B calls upon A to perform demanding that the house be delivered on
October 15. If A, despite the warning, does not deliver the house on October 15,
he is in default, unless he proves that the delay was not due to his fault.
The debtor does not need to be called to perform regarding the

fulfillment of his performance if a specific date has been agreed. In this case
the mere elapse of the fixed date puts the debtor in default (Art. 341, 1 CC).
Example: A owes to deliver a car to B on May 15. In this case a call to the debtor
to perform is not necessary. Consequently, if on May 15 A does not deliver the car
to B, he is in default.
F. Fault of the Debtor

The debtor must be at fault for the delay. If the delay in performance is
due to an event regarding which the debtor is not responsible (e.g. serious
illness of the debtor, error of the debtor not due to his fault as to the
existence or extent of the debt), he is not in default (Art. 342 CC).
2. Consequences of the Debtors Default
The consequences of the debtors default are the following:12
A. Compensation
a. When the debtor is in default, in addition to the delayed performance
which he continues to owe, he also owes compensation for the prejudice he
caused to the creditor on account of the delay (Art. 343, 1 CC). The
compensation needs to cover the creditors positive damage as well as his
loss of profit.13
Example: A owed to deliver a car to B and it was agreed that the car would be
delivered on May 15. B, who was counting on the car, planned a business trip with
it for May 20. A did not deliver the car to B on the date agreed upon and, in order
for B to go ahead with his planned trip, he had to rent a car. In this case A, in
12
Regarding the consequences of default in the fulfillment of performance on the part of one
of the contracting parties in reciprocal contracts, see below Part Four, Ch. C, IV.
13
For the concepts of positive damage and loss of profit, see above Part One, Ch. A, V, 2, A,
b.
LAW OF OBLIGATIONS
273
addition to the car he owes to B, also owes him compensation for his expenses
resulting from the delay in delivering the car.
b. If the delayed performance is monetary, the compensation is

determined as follows:
aa. The defaulting debtor, in addition to the monetary performance, is
always liable for default interest14 without it being necessary for the creditor
to prove prejudice (Art. 345, 1 CC).
bb. The defaulting debtor is bound to pay compensation to the creditor
for further positive damage, if the latter can prove that he suffered such
damage (Art. 345, 2 CC); but no compensation for loss of profit is due.
B. Intensification of the Debtors Liability
The liability of the debtor is intensified during the period he is in
default. For as long as the default lasts, the debtor is liable not only for
negligence (any negligence) but also for chance events (casus),15 unless he
proves that the prejudice would have occurred even if the performance were
fulfilled on time (Art. 344 CC).
Consequently, if during the period of the debtors default the thing
owed gets destroyed by chance, the debtor is liable. The debtor is released
only if he proves that the damage would have occurred even if the
performance had been fulfilled in a timely fashion.
Example: A owed B a computer and they had agreed that he would deliver it to
him on June 15. A defaulted and during the period of his default the computer he
was supposed to deliver to B got burned due to a fortuitous event (e.g. fire). In this
case A is not released from his obligation vis--vis B whom he must compensate
for the impossibility of delivery of the computer. However, if during the period of
As default Bs store, where the computer would have been installed, got totally
destroyed by fire, A is released because the computer would have been destroyed
even if it had been delivered on time.
3. Debtors Default Lifted

The debtors default is lifted when its consequences no longer exist.
The debtors default may be lifted in the following ways:
14
15
Regarding the rate for default interest, see above Part One, Ch. A, IV, 2, B.
Regarding chance events, see above Part Two, Ch. B, III, 3, footn. 11.
274
A. By fulfillment of all of the debtors obligations, i.e. not only of his

obligation to effect performance, but also of his obligation to pay for
damages or in case of monetary debts for the interest due.
B. By agreement between creditor and debtor that the above mentioned
consequences are being lifted.
C. By subsequent default of the creditor, i.e. by the creditors refusal to
accept the debtors effective and appropriate performance.
III. IMPROPER PERFORMANCE
Improper performance (malperformance) of the obligation exists when
the debtor, without there being a case of impossibility of performance or
default, implements a bad performance.
Examples: A delivered to B a brand new car which, however, is defective, e.g.
its breaks do not work.
A owed B an electrical appliance. At delivery A gave B the wrong instructions
for its operation which resulted in the damage of the appliance due to improper
use.
The Greek Civil Code has no provisions for improper performance. To

cover the existing vacuum in the law we apply by analogy the provisions for
impossibility of performance and debtors default.16
In the case of improper fulfillment of the performance we need to
distinguish between the following:
1. If the improper fulfillment of the performance is due to debtors
fault, the debtor continues to be liable for the appropriate fulfillment of the
performance, naturally assuming that this is possible (i.e. he must lift the
improperness). But he must also compensate the creditor for the prejudice
the latter sustained due to the improper fulfillment of the performance.
2. If the improper performance of the obligation is not due to fault, the
debtor continues to be liable for the proper fulfillment of the performance,
naturally assuming that this is possible (i.e. he must lift the improperness).
16
See Zepos, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 594 ; Litzeropoulos, op. cit., p. 211; Michailidis Nouaros,
op. cit., p. 167 ; Stathopoulos, in Georgiadis Stathopoulos, Commentary on the Civil Code,
Introd. to Arts. 335-348, No 25; the same, General Law of Obligations, op. cit., p. 442 et
seq.; Filios, op. cit., p. 226 ; Ap. Georgiadis, op. cit., p. 279 et seq.; Ast. Georgiadis, op. cit.,
Vol. II, p. 79 et seq.; Spyridakis, op. cit., p. 254 et seq.
275
LAW OF OBLIGATIONS
However, he is not responsible to compensate the creditor for the damage he

suffered due to improper fulfillment of the performance.
IV. CREDITORS DEFAULT
1. The Concept and Conditions for the Creditors Default
When the creditor does not accept the performance offered to him, he is
in default (Art. 349, 1 CC).
For a creditor to be in default the following conditions need to concur:
A. Performance Must be Offered
The debtor must offer the performance he owes to the creditor.
Example: On October 15 A owes to deliver to B 1,000 kilos of grain. Indeed, on
October 15 A offers 1,000 kilos of grain to B.
B. Performance Must be Possible

The performance offered by the debtor must be possible. Otherwise, it
would be a case of impossible performance.
C. Performance Must be Furnished in Deed (by Action)
The offer that the debtor makes to the creditor must be furnished in
deed, i.e. by action and not simply verbally (Art. 349, 2 CC). An offer is an
offer in deed when the debtor is in total readiness to fulfill the performance
and the only thing missing is the creditors acceptance.17
Example: A called plumber B to repair the pipes in his house. Bs offer is an offer
in deed if he comes to As house with all the appropriate tools for the repair.
Exceptionally, the creditor is considered in default even without an

offer in deed in the following cases:
1. If the creditor has declared beforehand that he is not going to accept
the performance (Art. 350 CC).
17
See I. Kapodistrias, in ERMAK, Art. 349, No 4; Balis, op. cit., para. 61, p. 230; A. Kritikos,
in Georgiadis Stathopoulos, Commentary on the Civil Code, Art. 349, No 7; Stathopoulos,
op. cit., p. 452 et seq.; Ap. Georgiadis, op. cit., p. 293; Filios, op. cit., p. 233 et seq.; Ast.
Georgiadis, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 90 et seq.
276
Example: A owes to deliver to B 1,000 kilos of grain on October 15. Before the
15th of October, B calls A and lets him know that he will not accept the offer of
the 1,000 kilos of grain.
2. If the creditor, although invited by the debtor, does not proceed with
the required action or co-operation without which the debtor cannot fulfill
his performance (Art. 351, 1 CC). An invitation is not required regarding the
action that must be undertaken by the creditor if a fixed date has been
agreed (Art. 351, 2 CC).
Examples: A owes B 1,000 kilos of grain and they have agreed that delivery will
take place in Bs barn. A has notified B of the impending delivery but the latter
does not open the door of the barn, in which case A cannot fulfill his performance.
A has agreed to reupholster Bs living room furniture using a fabric B would
provide. A asked B to give him the fabric but she did not. In this case A is unable
to proceed with implementation of his performance.
In the above examples, if a fixed date had been agreed regarding the action
required on the part of the creditor, invitation would not have been necessary. If,
for example, the 15th of October and the 10th of June had been agreed as delivery
dates for the grain and the fabric respectively, the mere elapse of those dates puts
the creditor in default.
D. Appropriate Performance
The offer of the performance must be appropriate (Art. 349, 2 CC). The
offer is appropriate when from the point of view of quantity and quality it
corresponds with the content of the performance due and when the
performance is fulfilled in the right time and place.18
Example: On October 15 A is obliged to deliver to B 1,000 kilos of top quality
grain from the stock of grain he has in his barn. On the appointed date A is indeed
in his barn ready to deliver the 1,000 kilos of top quality grain to B.
E. Not Acceptance of the Performance Offered

The creditor is in default if he does not accept the performance offered
to him (Art. 349, 1 CC).
18
See Kapodistrias, in ERMAK, Art. 349, No 5; Balis, op. cit., para. 61, p. 231; Kritikos, op.
cit., Art. 349, No 8 et seq.; Stathopoulos, op. cit., p. 453 et seq .; Ap. Georgiadis, op. cit., p.
293 et seq.; Ast. Georgiadis, op. cit., p. 93 et seq.
LAW OF OBLIGATIONS
277
Example: Although on October 15 A waits for B at his barn in order to deliver the
1,000 kilos of grain he owes to him, B does not go to pick up the grain, or goes
but refuses to pick it up.
2. Consequences of the Creditors Default

The consequences of the creditors default are the following:
A. Reduction of the Debtors Liability
While the creditor is in default the debtor still owes him the
performance. However, the debtors liability is reduced for as long as the
creditor is in default and he is only liable for willful and grossly negligent
conduct (Art. 355 CC). Consequently, during the time of the creditors
default the debtor is liable for the damage or destruction of the performance
only if this results from intention (dolus) or gross negligence (culpa lata).
On the contrary, if during this period damage or destruction to the
performance took place due to slight negligence (culpa levis)19 on the part of
the debtor, the latter is released.
B. Creditors Obligation to Pay for Expenses
a. The debtor is entitled to demand from the defaulting creditor all the
additional expenditures he had to incur for the ineffectual offer of the
performance (Art. 358 CC).
Example: A, who owed B 1,000 kilos of grain to be delivered to the latters barn,
paid for the transportation of the grain to the barn. Since B was not there, or did
not open the barn door for him, A is entitled to demand from B the freight charges
he incurred.
b. The debtor is entitled to demand from the defaulting creditor all he

spent for safeguarding and maintenance of the thing owed during that
period (Art. 358 CC).
Example: A owed B 1,000 kilos of grain to be delivered to the latters barn. The
barn door, however, was locked. As a result, A had to take the grain to another
storage place and pay a certain amount of money for safeguarding. A is entitled to
demand from B the expenses he incurred for the safeguarding of the grain.
19
It is for the court to assess when the negligence is slight. The court will decide in every
particular case if there is slight or gross negligence. See above Part Two, Ch. B, III, B.
278
3. Creditors Default Lifted

The creditors default may be lifted in the following ways:
A. By a declaration on the part of the creditor that he accepts the
performance. If the debtor either does not wish or due to fault of his own
can no longer fulfill the performance, he is then in default himself.
B. By agreement between the creditor and the debtor to this effect (i.e.
that the consequences of the creditors default are lifted).
C. By a declaration of the debtor that he revokes the offer to perform.
CHAPTER C
PRINCIPLES APPLYING TO RECIPROCAL CONTRACTS
I. GENERAL
A contract is reciprocal when it generates rights and obligations for
both parties.1 In the reciprocal contract each party is at once debtor and
creditor because two performances are due in the opposite direction. These
performances, each called vis--vis the other counter performance, form an
organic whole because each is the reason for and the end of the other, i.e.
they are closely interdependent.
Examples: A sells a car to B in order to receive from him the agreed amount of
money and, respectively, B pays A the agreed amount of money so that the latter
may transfer the ownership and deliver the car to him (B).
A rents his apartment to B in order to receive the agreed amount of rent and B
assumes the obligation to pay the amount of rent agreed in order to have the use of
As apartment.
Because of the interdependency of the two performances, the reciprocal

contracts are governed by special principles.
II. PLEA OF THE UNPERFORMED CONTRACT
(EXCEPTIO NON ADIMPLETI CONTRACTUS)
1. The Concept
The reciprocal contracts are governed by the rule that both parties are
obliged to perform their respective obligations simultaneously.2
Consequently, each contracting party, when asked by the other (either via
1
2
See above Part Three, Ch. A, III, 2.

This rule follows a contrario from Art. 374, 1 CC.
280
legal action or extra-judicially) to effect performance, has the right to

oppose the plea of the unperformed contract (exceptio non adimpleti
contractus) and refuse fulfillment for as long as the other party does not
fulfill, or offer to fulfill, his own performance (Art. 374, 1 CC).
The plea of the unperformed contract cannot be opposed when one of
the contracting parties is obliged to fulfill his performance first. The
obligation to be the first to fulfill may result either from the agreement of
the parties or from the law.
Examples: In a sale on credit the seller is obliged to deliver the sold item
immediately whereas the buyer, according to the credit agreement, is obliged to
pay later (obligation to be the first to fulfill resulting from the agreement of the
parties).
In a contract for work the contractor is obliged to be the first to fulfill his
obligation of performing the work whereas, according to Art. 694, 1 of the Greek
Civil Code, the master of work is obliged to pay the contractors remuneration at
the time of delivery of the work (obligation to be the first to fulfill resulting from
the law).
2. Consequences of Opposing the Plea of the Unperformed Contract

The result of opposing the plea of the unperformed contract is that the
party opposing this plea is obliged to fulfill his own performance, provided
that the other contracting party will simultaneously fulfill the counter
performance for which he is responsible.
Example: A sold B a car for 6,000 euros. If A and B have not otherwise agreed,
money and vehicle must change hands simultaneously. In case B demands for the
vehicle to be delivered without him paying or offering to pay the 6,000 euros
simultaneously, A is entitled to refuse delivery of the car as long as B does not
pay or offer to pay the 6,000 euros. The result of As opposing the plea of the
unperformed contract is for B to be obliged to pay A the 6,000 euros, provided
that A proceeds with simultaneous delivery of the car to B.
3. Difference between the Plea of the Unperformed Contract and the

Right of Retention
The plea of the unperformed contract resembles the plea of retention.
Their main difference consists in this:
The plea of the unperformed contract is opposed when the two
complementary and in opposite direction running claims arise from a
LAW OF OBLIGATIONS
281
reciprocal contract, whereas the plea of retention is opposed even when the
two claims simply arise from the same social relation.
III. IMPOSSIBILITY OF PERFORMANCE
In the case of reciprocal contracts there are special provisions regarding
the impossibility of performance. This is so because, as was already
mentioned, each party is at the same time debtor as to his own performance
and creditor as to the performance of the other, i.e. the counter performance.
In the Greek Civil Code the cases of impossibility of performance, both
due to fault and regardless of fault, are specially regulated. If the
impossibility of performance is due to fault, we distinguish between
impossibility of performance due to the debtors fault and impossibility of
performance due to the creditors fault.
1. Impossibility of Performance not Due to Fault
If the impossibility of performance on behalf of one of the contracting
parties is not due to fault, the other contracting party is also released from
the obligation to counter perform. If the counter performance has already
been furnished, it may be recovered in accordance with the provisions
governing unjust enrichment (Art. 380, 1 CC).
Example: A sold B a painting for 2,000 euros. Before delivery of the painting, a
chance event, e.g. fire, destroyed it. A is released from his obligation to deliver the
painting but B is also released from his obligation to pay the amount of 2,000
euros. In case B had paid in advance, he may recover pursuant to the provisions
governing unjust enrichment.
Exceptionally, the creditor of an impossible performance is not

released from his obligation to counter perform if he has laid claim on the
surrogate, i.e. the benefits that the debtor has derived from the event causing
the impossibility of performance (Art. 380, 2 CC).
Example: If in the above example B claims from A the insurance proceeds
collected by the latter from the insurance company with which the painting was
insured, B is obliged to furnish his counter performance to A.
282
Naturally, if the value of the surrogate is lesser than the value of the
counter performance, there should be a corresponding reduction in the value
of the counter performance due.3
2. Impossibility of Performance Due to Fault
In the case of impossibility of performance due to fault we distinguish
between impossibility of performance due to the debtors or the creditors
fault.
A. Impossibility of Performance Due to Debtors Fault
If the impossibility of performance is due to the debtors fault,
according to Article 382 of the Greek Civil Code, the creditor may at his
discretion exercise one of the following alternative rights:
a. The right to seek the mutual release of the parties from their
respective obligations in accordance with the Article 380 of the Greek Civil
Code. That is, since the performance of the debtor is impossible and can in
no way be furnished, the creditor is entitled to consider that he is equally
released from the obligation to furnish the counter performance he owes. Of
course, if he has already implemented his counter performance, he is entitled
to recover it by virtue of the provisions governing unjust enrichment. But if
the creditor, instead of mutual release, demands the surrogate, then he is
obliged to furnish his counter performance.4
b. The right to seek compensation from the debtor for the damage he
has suffered5 as a result of the impossibility of performance. In this case, of
course, he is obliged to furnish the counter performance he owes.6
3
See Michailidis Nouaros, in ERMAK, Art. 380, No 31; Balis, op. cit., para. 82, p. 291;
Stathopoulos, in Georgiadis Stathopoulos, Commentary on the Civil Code, Art. 380, No 1;
the same, General Law of Obligations, op. cit., p. 470; Filios, op. cit., p. 411; Ap. Georgiadis,
op. cit., p. 311; Ast. Georgiadis, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 117. The opposite view, i.e. that the
creditor who lays a claim on the surrogate may not reduce his counter performance
accordingly, is held by Zepos, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 541, footn. 1, and Litzeropoulos. op. cit., p.
278.
4
For the computation of the value of the counter performance in case the surrogate is of
lesser value than the counter performance, see above footn. 3.
5
The compensation covers not only the positive damage but also the loss of profit that the
creditor suffered.
6
Regarding the way the damage is computed, several theories have been advanced. See
Michailidis Nouaros, in ERMAK, Introduction to Arts. 380-387, No 18 et seq.; Balis, op.
cit., para. 84, p. 297; Zepos, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 545; Litzeropoulos, op. cit., p. 283;
LAW OF OBLIGATIONS
283
c. The right to rescind the contract.7 Rescission entails the extinction of

the obligations to perform generated by the contract and the parties are
mutually obliged to restitute the performances that have been received on
the basis of the provisions governing unjust enrichment (Art. 389, 2 CC).
The creditor exercising the right of rescission may in addition petition
from the court and be granted reasonable (reduced) compensation8 for
the prejudice he may have suffered from the non performance of the
contract (Art. 387, 1 CC).
Example: A sold a painting to B for 2,000 euros. Prior to delivery, the painting got
destroyed due to As fault. In this case B may, at his discretion, exercise one of
the following three rights the law accords him:
seek mutual release, i.e. seek to be released from the obligation to pay the
money he owes. If he has paid in advance, he may seek to recover by virtue of the
provisions governing unjust enrichment. But if B demands the surrogate, e.g. the
insurance proceeds, he is obliged to pay A the 2,000 euros (the buyers counter
performance may be reduced if the surrogate is of lesser value);
seek compensation for the damage he sustained, in which case he is obliged to
counter perform vis--vis A, i.e. pay the latter the 2,000 euros;
rescind the contract, in which case he is released from his obligation to counter
perform vis--vis A. If B has paid in advance, he may seek to recover from A by
virtue of the provisions governing unjust enrichment. In the case of rescission B
may also seek reasonable (reduced) compensation.
B. Impossibility of Performance Due to Creditors Fault

If the impossibility of performance is due to the creditors fault,
according to the provision of Art. 381, 1 CC, the debtor is released, whereas
the creditor is still liable for his counter performance. However, from the
counter performance due is subtracted all that the debtor benefits or, through
fault of his own, neglects to benefit from the release.
Stathopoulos, in Georgiadis - Stathopoulos, Commentary on the Civil Code, Art. 382, No 10
et seq.; the same, General Law of Obligations, op. cit., p. 472 et seq.; Filios, op. cit., p. 414 et
seq.; Ap. Georgiadis, op. cit., p. 315 et seq.; Ast. Georgiadis, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 123 et seq.
Spyridakis, op. cit., p. 300 et seq.
7
The right of rescission is a condition forming, or constitutive, right exercised by unilateral
declaration of the beneficiary to the other contracting party (Art. 390 CC).
8
Reasonable compensation is the reduced compensation granted by the court to the creditor
for the damage he may have suffered due to the non fulfillment of the performance he was
entitled to as a result of the contract. See Stathopoulos, in Georgiadis Stathopoulos,
Commentary on the Civil Code, Arts. 297-298, No 71 and Art. 387, No 3.
284
Example: A sold B a painting for 2,000 euros. Prior to delivery, B visited As

gallery and accidentally spilled paint over the painting destined for him, thus
destroyning it. A is released from the obligation to furnish B the painting but B
continues to owe the 2,000 euros to A. If the painting was insured and, following
the destruction, A received the proceeds of the insurance, B will subtract that sum
from the sum of 2,000 euros he owes to A.
IV. DEFAULT BY ONE OF THE PARTIES

If the debtor is in default, in addition to the performance due, he is
obliged to compensate the creditor for the damage he suffered because of
the delay (Art. 343, 1 CC).9
But in reciprocal contracts, if one of the parties is in default as regards
the performance due, according to Art. 383, 1 of the Greek Civil Code, the
other contracting party is entitled to set a reasonable time for the fulfillment
of the performance, declaring at the same time that past that time he will
reject it.
In case the time period expires and no performance has taken place,
according to Art. 383, 2 of the Greek Civil Code, the party who placed the
other under notice, being no longer entitled to demand fulfillment of the
performance, may at his discretion exercise one of the following alternative
rights:
1. The right to seek compensation for non performance.10
2. The right to rescind the contract and also seek reasonable (reduced)
compensation.11
Example: A sold B a vehicle for 8,000 euros. Through As fault the delivery of the
car got delayed and A defaulted. B is entitled to demand delivery of the car and
compensation. If he prefers, he may set a reasonable time for A to deliver him the
car, declaring at the same time that, past that time, he will refuse performance. If
the period set elapses and performance has not been fulfilled, B is entitled either
to seek compensation for non performance of the sale contract, or to rescind the
contract demanding additionally reasonable compensation.
Exceptionally, there is no need to set a reasonable time to the defaulting

party as regards the performance due in the following cases:
9
See above Part Four, Ch. B, II, 2.

For the way of computing the damage, several theories have been advanced. See above
footn. 6.
11
See above footn. 8.
10
LAW OF OBLIGATIONS
285
if, judging from his whole attitude, it can be assessed that it would
be pointless to set him a time limit;
Example: A, who must deliver to B the car he sold him, declared in no uncertain
terms that he is not going to do so.
if on account of the delay the other contracting party no longer has

an interest in the fulfillment of the performance.
Example: A, who on December 15 owed to deliver to B heating oil for his

house, defaulted. B, who needed the delivery to be done immediately, so that he
could heat his house, purchased heating oil from another supplier and was no
longer interested in As fulfillment of his contractual obligation.
V. IMPROPER FULFILLMENT OF THE PERFORMANCE

In the case of reciprocal contracts there are no provisions in the law for
improper or not duly fulfilled performance. There is, then, a vacuum
(lacuna) in the law which will be filled by analogy of law,12 i.e. application
by analogy of the provisions governing the reciprocal contracts regarding
impossibility of performance and default of one of the parties.
VI. UNFORESEEABLE CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES
1. General
The inviolability of contracts (pacta sunt servanda) is a fundamental
principle of the law of obligations.13 However, in exceptional cases this
principle cannot be adhered to. This happens when the circumstances on
which the parties based the conclusion of a reciprocal agreement changed
later on due to exceptional and unforeseeable reasons so that the fulfillment
of the performance by the debtor taking also into consideration the counter
performance now became exceedingly onerous.
The Greek Civil Code contains an express provision (Art. 388)
according to which it is possible for the contract to be dissolved or for the
12
See above Ch. B, III.

See I. Sakketas, in ERMAK, Art. 388. No 1; Litzeropoulos, op. cit., p. 298; Stathopoulos, in
Georgiadis Stathopoulos, Commentary on the Civil Code, Art. 388, No 1; the same,
General Law of Obligations, op. cit., p. 502 et seq.; Ap. Georgiadis, op. cit., p. 339; Ast.
Georgiadis, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 131.
13
286
performance to be readjusted due to an unforeseeable change of

circumstances.14
This pioneer clause of Article 388 constitutes a special expression of
the principle of good faith governing the law of obligations, namely that of
Article 288 CC.15
2. Conditions for the Application of Article 388 of the Greek Civil Code
For Article 388 of the Greek Civil Code to apply, the following
conditions need to concur:
A. The contract must be a reciprocal one.
B. A change in circumstances must have taken place, i.e. a change in
those circumstances on which, taking into consideration good faith and
business usage, the parties based the conclusion of their contract.
C. The change in circumstances must have occurred after the
conclusion of the contract.
D. The change in circumstances must be due to causes that are
exceptional and unforeseen.
E. The performance of the indebted party, especially considering the
counter performance, must have become exceedingly onerous.
3. Legal Consequences of the Application of Article 388 of the Greek
Civil Code
If the conditions for the application of Article 388 of the Greek Civil
Code concur and the party for whom the fulfillment of the performance has
become exceedingly burdensome files a petition to this effect before the
14
According to the prevailing view, Article 388 contains a rule of mandatory law. (See A.
Gazis, Waiver of the Claim of Article 388 CC, in NoB 23 (1975), 705 et seq.; Papantoniou,
Good Faith, op. cit., p. 180 et seq.; K. Xypolias, The Mandatory Character of Article 388
CC, in NoB (1984), 1684 et seq.; Stathopoulos, in Georgiadis Stathopoulos, Commentary
on the Civil Code, Art. 388, No 5; Filios, op. cit., p. 438; Ast. Georgiadis, op. cit., Vol. II, p.
138). A different view holds that Article 388 contains a rule of non-mandatory law (See
Sakketas, in ERMAK, Art. 388, No 53; Zepos, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 567).
15
See Stathopoulos, in Georgiadis Stathopoulos, Commentary on the Civil Code, Art. 388,
No 2; the same, General Law of Obligations, op. cit., p. 504; Filios, op. cit., p. 437; Ap.
Georgiadis, op. cit., p. 341; Ast. Georgiadis, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 138.
LAW OF OBLIGATIONS
287
court,16 the latter may, at its discretion, order the adjustment of the one
performance to the appropriate measure or the dissolution of the contract
(totally or partially, as to its still unfulfilled part).
In case the court rules in favor of the dissolution of the contract, the
reciprocal obligations to perform stemming from the agreement are
extinguished and the parties are mutually obliged to return the performances
received in accordance with the provisions governing unjust enrichment.
Example: A, a car dealer, sold B a car to be imported from abroad at the price of
10,000 euros. Before the car was brought into the country, the import tax tripled.
Thus, A would not only lose any profit he would have otherwise made from the
sale of the vehicle but also suffer positive damage. Consequently, A asks B to pay
an additional sum of money. If B refuses to do so, A may petition the court to
readjust the sale price of the car or dissolve the sale contract altogether.
16
The right of the contracting party is exercised before the courts (e.g. by filing a lawsuit).
For the adjustment of the performance or the dissolution of the contract a court decision is
required.
PART FIVE
REINFORCEMENT OF THE OBLIGATION
CHAPTER A
GENERAL
To reinforce the obligation means to provide the creditor with various
means securing the satisfaction of his claim.
The obligation is reinforced either by real securities (rights in rem) or
by personal securities (rights in personam).
Real securities are the pledge and the mortgage.1 The pledge (which is
constituted on movables) and the mortgage (which is constituted on
immovables) provide the creditor with security in case his claim monetary
or that can be assessed in monetary terms against the debtor was not
satisfied when the performance fell due. This security consists in the
creditors preferential satisfaction2 from the proceeds3 of the auction sale of
the pledged movable or the mortgaged immovable (Arts. 1209 et seq., and
1257 et seq. CC).
Personal security is the guarantee (Art. 847 et seq. CC). Guarantee is
the contract by which one of the parties, the guarantor, assumes the
responsibility vis--vis the other party, the creditor, that the performance
owed to the latter by the principal debtor will be fulfilled.4
See below Property Law, Part Five.

Privileged satisfaction of the creditor means that the claim of the creditor holding the
security is satisfied before the claims of the other creditors.
3
Auction proceeds are the proceeds from the sale of a thing (movable or immovable) in a
public auction.
4
2
290
The obligation, however, may also be reinforced by way of earnest

(arrha) and penalty clause (stipulatio poenae). Earnest and penalty clause
are accessory contracts to another principal contract and aim at reinforcing
the position of the creditor of the principal contract.
CHAPTER B
EARNEST
Earnest (or earnest contract) is the accessory contract1 where one of
the parties gives the other an object (also called earnest), usually a sum of
money, with the following understanding:
If the principal contract is not implemented through fault of the

party giving the earnest, the holder of the earnest keeps it without
having to prove that he suffered prejudice (Art. 403, 1 CC).
If the principal contract is not implemented through fault of the
holder of the earnest, the latter needs to return it doubled (Art. 403,
1 CC).
Finally, it needs to be noted that liability for further compensation

by the party responsible for the non implementation of the contract is not
excluded, assuming of course that the person seeking such compensation
can prove the damage (Art. 403, 2 CC).
Example: A leased an apartment of his to B with the agreement that the premises
would be delivered (to B) fifteen days after the conclusion of the rental agreement.
As was indicated in the previous chapter, in the Roman law the word for earnest was arrha.
But neither the Latin word arrha nor the Ancient Greek word arrabon () are the
original terms; both are derived from the Hebrew erabon ( )meaning pledge, guarantee.
See G. Petropoulos, History and Introduction to Roman Law, 2nd ed., 1963, p. 834. See also
R. Alcalay, Complete Hebrew-English Dictionary (Translators note).
1
Because the earnest agreement is an accessory contract, it presupposes a valid principal
contract. If the principal contract is null and void, the earnest contract is also null and void.
Moreover, the accessory character of the earnest agreement dictates that, if the principal
contract is subject to constitutive form, the same form needs to be observed for the earnest
agreement (e.g. the earnest contract stipulating that something is given as earnest for the
purchase of real estate property is subject to the same notarial deed form as the principal
contract of the sale of an immovable).
292
To secure the lease contract, which is the principal contract, B gave A 350 euros
as earnest. If after the elapse of fifteen days the lease contract is not implemented
through fault of the lessee, B loses the 350 euros and A keeps the earnest money
he was holding. If, however, after the elapse of fifteen days the lease contract is
not implemented through fault of the lessor, A is obliged to return to B double the
amount of the earnest money, i.e. 700 euros.
CHAPTER C
PENALTY CLAUSE
Penalty clause (stipulatio poenae) is the accessory agreement1 whereby
one of the parties promises the other to give him an object, usually a sum of
money, if the former does not fulfill or does not properly fulfill the
performance he owes.
The term penalty clause signifies both the accessory agreement
regarding such promise and the fulfillment of the relevant performance
itself.
If a penalty clause has been agreed for the case of non fulfillment of the
performance, the creditor who claims the penalty may not also seek
fulfillment of the principal performance (Art. 406, 1 CC).
If a penalty clause has been agreed for the case of non proper
fulfillment, and especially delayed fulfillment of the principal performance,
in addition to the penalty, the creditor is also entitled to demand the
fulfillment of the performance (Art. 407, 1 CC).
At this point it needs to be noted that, whether the penalty clause is
agreed for the case of non fulfillment or non proper fulfillment of the
principal performance, the penalty is due even if the creditor has not
suffered any prejudice (Art. 405, 2 CC). In case the creditor also proves
further damage not covered by the penalty, in addition to the penalty he is
Because the penalty clause agreement, just like the earnest agreement, is an accessory
contract, it presupposes a valid principal contract. If the principal contract is null and void,
the penalty clause contract is also null and void; and, as was mentioned apropos of the earnest
contract, if for the principal contract constitutive form is required, the penalty clause
agreement must be vested the same form.
Although this holds true as far as the Greek language is concerned, in English only the
clause contained in an agreement specifying a penalty for its violation is referred to as
penalty clause; the sum to be paid in case of non fulfillment or not proper fulfillment of the
relevant performance is simply called penalty (Translators note).
294
entitled to receive further compensation for such damage (Arts. 406, 2 and
407, 2 CC).
Examples: A sells B a television set to be delivered on September 10 and agrees
with him that, if the TV set is not delivered on that date, A will pay B the amount
of 800 euros (penalty clause agreed for the case of non fulfillment of the principal
performance). If indeed the TV set is not delivered on September 10, A must pay
B the penalty of 800 euros. In this case, since B received the 800 euros, he no
longer has the right to demand delivery of the TV set. In the event B proves that,
from the non fulfillment of the principal performance, he suffered further damage,
he is entitled to demand additional compensation from A.
Contractor A sells B an apartment which will be ready for delivery on October
15. A and B further agree that, if the apartment is not ready by that date, A will
pay B 50 euros for each day delivery is delayed (penalty clause agreed for the case
of non proper fulfillment of the principal performance). If A indeed does not
deliver the apartment on October 15, he is liable to pay B 50 euros per day for
each day delivery is delayed, while B, naturally, reserves the right to demand
delivery of the apartment. In the event B proves that, from the delay in delivery of
the apartment he suffered further damage, he may demand additional
compensation from A.
Finally, it should be noted that, if the penalty agreed is excessive

(disproportionately high), the court may reduce it to the appropriate measure
at the debtors request (Art. 409 CC).
PART SIX
TRANSFER OF THE OBLIGATION
CHAPTER A
GENERAL
An obligation may be transferred by way of general or special
succession.
General succession occurs when the estate as a whole is being
transferred through a single act. The succession is general in the case of
hereditary succession.1
Special succession occurs when one or more assets are being
transferred each by a separate act. The special succession may be active or
passive.
The special succession is active when it is the creditors claim that is
being transferred. This transfer is effected by way of assignment of the
claim to another party.
The special succession is passive when it is the debtors obligation that
is being transferred. This transfer is effected by way of assumption of debt.
The following chapters will deal with both of these contracts: the
contract of assignment of claim and the contract of assumption of debt.
See below Succession Law, Introduction, III.
CHAPTER B
ASSIGNMENT OF CLAIM
I. THE CONCEPT AND CONDITIONS FOR ASSIGNMENT
Assignment of a claim is the contract through which the creditor
(assignor) transfers to a third party (the assignee) the claim he has against
the debtor.
The conditions for valid assignment of a claim are:
1. Conclusion of the Assignment Contract
The assignment contract is concluded between the assignor (the old
creditor) and the assignee (the new creditor). The consent of the debtor is
not required for the conclusion of this contract (Art. 455 CC).
The assignment contract does not require any particular constitutive
form. Consequently, it may be concluded even verbally.
Example: C owes A 600 euros. A (the assignor), who has debts vis--vis B,
concludes a contract of assignment with B whereby he transfers to him the 600
euros claim he has against debtor C. The consent of C is not required.
2. Assignable Claim
In principle, all claims may be assigned. However, there also exist
claims which are not assignable.
The following claims are not assignable:
A. The claims which are not subject to attachment (Art. 464 CC).1 Such
are, for example, the claims for maintenance which stem from the law,2 the
claims for wages, pensions, and insurance benefits.
1
See Art. 982 CCPr.
LAW OF OBLIGATIONS
297
B. The claims which, by reason of the nature of the performance, are

closely bound up with the person of the creditor (Art. 465 CC).
Example: A, who runs a school for foreign languages, hires B as an English
teacher in his establishment. A cannot assign the claim for services he has against
B (to teach the English language) to C who also runs a school for foreign
languages because the personal factor is predominant in the performance of the
task.
C. The claims that the creditor and the debtor have agreed to consider
non assignable (Art. 466, 1 CC).
3. Notification
Through the assignment contract the claim is transferred from the
assignor to the assignee. However, for the debtor the assignment becomes
effective only after he is notified in this regard,3 i.e. after the assignment was
made known to him (Art. 460 CC).
Either the assignor or the assignee may so notify the debtor. No special
form is required for the notification. Even verbal notification brings about
the legal effects of the assignment.
Before notification, the debtor is obliged to make payment to the
assignor. After notification, the debtor is released only if he makes payment
to the assignee.
If despite notification the debtor makes payment to the assignor (after
the notification), he will be obliged to also make payment to the assignee. In
this case, of course, he may recover what he paid to the assignor by virtue of
the provisions governing unjust enrichment.
Example: A (the assignor) transfers to B (the assignee) a claim for 600 euros he
has against C (the debtor). Before notification, C is obliged to make payment to A.
After notification, C is obliged to make payment to B. If after notification C
makes payment to A, he will be obliged to make payment to B as well but in this
2
Such is, for example, the claim for maintenance one spouse has vis--vis the other in case
there has been interruption of the conjugal life and the spouses no longer live together (Art.
1391 CC). The same holds in the case of alimony due on account of divorce (Art. 1442 CC),
or in the case of reciprocal maintenance claims between ascendants and descendants (Art.
1485 et seq. CC).
3
The notification is a quasi juridical act meaning that its legal effects occur because it is so
stipulated by law and not because of the will of the party who gave it (see Kritikos, in
Georgiadis Stathopoulos, Commentary on the Civil Code, Art. 460, No. 14; Stathopoulos,
op. cit., p. 598; Ap. Georgiadis, op. cit., p. 417; Ast. Georgiadis, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 201).
298
case he may recover what he paid to A by virtue of the provisions governing

unjust enrichment.
II. LEGAL EFFECTS OF THE ASSIGNMENT

The conclusion of the assignment contract and the notification of the
debtor in this regard signal the transfer of the claim from the assignor to the
assignee4 and the interruption of every bond between assignor and debtor.
The debtor now has vis--vis the assignee the same obligations he had vis-vis the assignor (Art. 462 CC).5
The special succession which occurs with the assignment does not
change the content of the claim transferred. The claim is transferred to the
assignee with all the advantages and disadvantages it had before the
transfer.6
The Greek Civil Code regulates by special provisions the responsibility of the assignor vis-vis the assignee regarding both the existence of the claim (veritas) and the solvency of the
debtor (bonitas) (Arts. 467-469 CC).
5
Regarding the defenses the debtor may propound against the assignee, Art. 463, para. 1 of
the Greek Civil Code stipulates that he may oppose all the pleas he had against the assignor
prior to notification.
6
Along with the claim, are also transferred all the accessory rights to it, such as mortgages,
pledges, and guarantees (Art. 458 CC). The same holds for the arrears of interest due (Art.
459 CC).
CHAPTER C
ASSUMPTION OF DEBT
I. THE CONCEPT
Assumption of debt is the contract between the creditor and a third
party (the assumer), without the consent of the original debtor, through
which the third party assumes the debt of the former debtor.
The assumption of debt may be either privative or cumulative. The
question whether the assumption of debt is privative or cumulative is a
matter of interpretation of the contract. However, if it does not follow from
the contract what the parties willed, the assumption of debt is cumulative
(Art. 477 CC).
II. PRIVATIVE ASSUMPTION OF DEBT
The assumption of debt is privative when the assumer (new debtor)
replaces the former debtor and the latter is released (Art. 471 CC). For the
valid conclusion of such contract, no special form is required.
The privative assumption of debt constitutes special succession;
therefore, the debt is transferred to the new debtor (assumer) the way it
was vis--vis the original debtor at the time of the assumption,1 i.e. with the
advantages and disadvantages it had at the time the contract for the
assumption of debt was concluded.2
The assumer (new debtor) may oppose pleas against the creditor from the original debtorcreditor relation (Art. 473, 1 CC).
2
Rights which are accessory to the claim vis--vis the former debtor continue to exist even
after the assumption of debt (Art. 475, 1, 1 CC), such as, for example, the claim for interest.
An exception to this rule is provided regarding the securities given in reinforcement of the
300
Example: A owes B 1,500 euros. C, the assumer, who is As friend, agrees with
B to assume As debt, thus releasing the latter of the obligation to pay back his
debt to B.
III. CUMULATIVE ASSUMPTION OF DEBT

1. General
The assumption of debt is cumulative when the assumer undertakes
the obligation to pay a debt which is not his own but the former debtor is not
released. For the valid conclusion of a cumulative assumption of debt no
special form is required.
The cumulative assumption of debt does not constitute special
succession. We simply have a new debtor who is liable for the obligation,
alongside the former debtor. In this case the creditor has two debtors, each
one liable for the whole of the debt. Consequently, cumulative assumption
of debt gives rise to joint and several obligation (obligatio in solidum).3
Example: A owes B 600 euros and C (the assumer) agrees with B to undertake
the obligation to pay the original debtors debt without the latter (A) being
released from his obligation.
2. Case of Transfer of Patrimonium or Enterprise in Its Entirety

A special case of cumulative assumption of debt with great practical
significance is the transfer of a patrimonium or an enterprise as a whole.4
According to Article 479 of the Greek Civil Code, if a patrimonium5 or
an enterprise6 has been contractually transferred in its entirety, the acquirer
obligation (i.e. guarantees, pledges, or mortgages) which are maintained only if the guarantor
or the owner of the pledged or mortgaged immovable consents (Art. 475, 1, 2 CC).
3
See above Part One, Ch. B, III, 2, A.
4
See G. Arhaniotakis, Transfer of Patrimonium or Enterprise, 1997.
5
In the general sense of the term, patrimonium means the sum total of rights and
obligations which are amenable to assessment (see, Balis, General Principles, op. cit., para.
182, p. 476 et seq; Kritikos, in Georgiadis Stathopoulos, Commentary on the Civil Code,
Art. 479, No 11; Ast. Georgiadis, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 236). However, in the Article 479 of the
Greek Civil Code the term patrimonium means only the assets, i.e. what remains after the
obligations have been met (see Kritikos, op. cit., Art. 479, No 11; Stathopoulos, op. cit., p.
647; Ap. Georgiadis, op. cit., p. 446; Ast. Georgiadis, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 236 et seq.).
6
Enterprise is the sum total of things, rights, and real situations (e.g. immovables, movables,
claims, clientle, good reputation, trade secrets) which have been organized by their bearer to
an economic entity, either under the name of a natural person or under the title of a legal
LAW OF OBLIGATIONS
301
shall be liable towards the creditors of the transferor for the debts of the
patrimonium or the enterprise up to the value of the assets of the property
transferred. The liability of the transferor continues to exist.
Consequently, in the case of transfer of a patrimonium or an enterprise,
between the transferor and the assumer a relation of passive joint and
several obligation is formed. With regards to the debts of the patrimonium
or the enterprise the liability of the former debtor (the transferor) is
unlimited,7 whereas the liability of the new debtor (the acquirer) is limited to
the amount of the assets transferred.
person (See Michailidis Nouaros, op. cit., p. 324; Kritikos, op. cit., Art. 479, No 12;
Stathopoulos, op. cit., p. 649; Ap. Georgiadis, op. cit., p. 447).
7
That is, the liability of the original debtor is not limited to the assets he will have control
over after the transfer but extends to whatever assets he may have control over in the future.
PART SEVEN
EXTINCTION OF THE OBLIGATION
Extinction of the obligation is its coming to an end. The obligation
naturally comes to an end with the fulfillment of the performance. But
fulfillment of the performance, otherwise known as payment, is not the only
way for an obligation to be extinguished. There are several other ways the
most important of which are other performance in lieu of payment, deposit
with a public body, set off, and release of debt.
CHAPTER A
PAYMENT
I. THE CONCEPT
Payment is the fulfillment of the obligation (Art. 416 CC). As was
already mentioned, payment is the natural way of extinction of the
obligation.
II. CONDITIONS FOR VALID PAYMENT
The conditions for valid payment1 are the following:
1
The question of the legal nature of payment is a disputed matter. It is more accurate to view
payment as a material act, in which case for payment to bring about the extinction of the
obligation it is not necessary for the conditions of valid conclusion of a juridical act to
concur, such as capacity to conclude a juridical act, etc. (See Balis, Law of Obligations, op.
cit., para. 114, p. 379 et seq.; Zepos, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 421; I. Karakatsanis, in Georgiadis
Stathopoulos, Commentary on the Civil Code, Art. 416, No 5 et seq; Stathopoulos, op. cit., p.
387 et seq; Filios, op. cit., p. 110; Ap. Georgiadis, op. cit., p. 458).
304
1. Payment by the Debtor

In principle, the performance is fulfilled by the debtor. Exceptionally,
payment may also be effected by third parties (Arts. 317-318 CC).2
Upon payment the debtor is entitled to a written release (receipt)3 and,
if the debt is paid in full, he may claim the document that established the
debt in the first place, e.g. the letter of exchange (Art. 424, 1 CC).
2. Payment to the Creditor
In principle the payment of the debt must be made to the creditor (Art.
417, 1 CC). Exceptionally, however, it is possible for payment to be made to
another: the person whom the creditor himself has authorized4 (e.g. who has
power of attorney to collect), or the person appointed by a court decision
(e.g. who is appointed by the court to be the tutor of a minor), or the person
who is authorized by law to receive such payment (e.g. the parents of a
minor exercising the parental care over him).
3. Appropriate Payment
Payment must be that which is appropriate, i.e. the debtor must supply
exactly what is owed.
Example: A sells B a SONY color TV set. The payment is appropriate when the
seller delivers to B the color TV set manufactured by SONY.
See above Part Four, Ch. A, I, 3.

The expenses for the issuance of the written release are borne by the debtor, if it has not
been differently agreed by the contracting parties (Art. 425 CC).
4
The bearer of a written release issued by the creditor shall be deemed authorized to collect
unless there are circumstances, known to the paying debtor, from which the opposite is
deduced (Art. 426 CC).
3
CHAPTER B
I. CONCEPT AND CONDITIONS FOR FURNISHING
Other performance in lieu of payment (datio in solutum) is the
performance effected by the debtor following an agreement between creditor
and debtor that such performance will bring about the extinction of the
obligation (Art. 419 CC).
The conditions for other performance in lieu of payment are the
following:
1. Previously existing obligation.
2. Furnishing of a performance which is other than the one originally
owed.
3. Agreement to this effect between creditor and debtor which is
concluded simultaneously with the furnishing of the other (new)
performance.
Example: A owes B 1,500 euros. At the time of the fulfillment of the performance
A proposes to B to give him a painting instead of the money, thus bringing about
the extinction of the original obligation. If B agrees to it, the original obligation is
indeed extinguished. If, however, B does not agree to it, the original obligation is
not extinguished and A still owes B 1,500 euros.
II. CONSEQUENCES OF FURNINSHING OTHER PERFORMANCE

IN LIEU OF PAYMENT
When the debtor effects a performance to the creditor other than the
one originally owed and the creditor accepts it, the legal consequences are
the same as those of payment.
CHAPTER C
DEPOSIT WITH A PUBLIC BODY
I. CONCEPT AND CONDITIONS
FOR DEPOSIT WITH A PUBLIC BODY
In certain cases the debtor is entitled to proceed with deposit of the
thing owed with a public body (i.e. a service empowered to receive such
deposits), thus being released from his debt.
For a contractual obligation to be extinguished by way of deposit with a
public body the following conditions need to concur:
1. Legitimate Reason for Deposit
Legitimate reasons for deposit are the following:
A. Creditors default (Art. 427 CC).1
Example: A had to pay B 1,000 euros on May 15. However, when on said date A
went to offer B the amount due, the latter refused to receive it. Thus, B is now in
default.
B. Debtors impossibility to safely fulfill his obligation for reasons

connected with the person of the creditor (Art. 434, 1 CC).
Example: A had to pay B 1,000 euros on May 15. When on said date A went to
Bs residence to pay his debt, he was informed that B had left on a trip abroad
before quite some time and had not appointed any representative.
C. Debtors impossibility to safely fulfill his obligation on account of

his reasonable uncertainty as to the person of the creditor (Art. 434, 1 CC).
Regarding creditors default, see above Part Four, Ch. B, IV.
LAW OF OBLIGATIONS
307
Example: A had to pay B 1,000 euros on May 15. When on said date A went to
Bs residence to pay his debt, he found out that B had died and, on account of the
fact that his will had been challenged, there was uncertainty as to who his heir
was.
2. Thing Capable of Deposit

Things capable of deposit are money (Art. 427 CC), negotiable
instruments (e.g. letters of exchange, checks, shares), and movable
valuables, i.e. things of small volume and great value (jewelry, precious
stones, etc.).2
If the thing owed is a movable thing not capable of deposit, e.g. a piece
of machinery or a piece of furniture, the debtor, after notifying the creditor,
may sell the thing in a public auction and then deposit the proceeds of the
sale with a public body (Art. 428, 1 CC).3
3. Deposit with the Appropriate Authority
The public deposit needs to be deposited with the competent Authority
of the place where the performance is to be furnished (Art. 430, 1 CC).
Competent Authority for public deposit is the Deposits and Loans
Fund4 and all its local branches. Where no branches of the Deposits and
Loans Fund exist, the deposits are deposited with the Deposits Department
of the local Treasury Offices.
The debtor is bound to notify the creditor about the deposit without
delay due to his fault (Art. 430, 2 CC).
The expenses incurred in the case of public deposit or sale in public
auction of a thing not capable of deposit are borne by the creditor as long as
the debtor has not withdrawn the thing deposited (Art. 435 CC).
II. LEGAL EFFECTS OF PUBLIC DEPOSIT
The legal effects of deposit with a public body are the following:
See Art. 2, PrD of Sept. 30, 1926/Jan. 3, 1927 On Constituting and Returning Deposits and
Consignments with the Deposits and Loans Fund.
3
See above Part Five, Ch. A, footn. 3.
4
See LegD of March 21/Apr. 13, 1926 On the Organization of the Deposits and Loans
Fund, as later modified.
308
1. The obligation is extinguished as if payment by the debtor had been

effected at the time of the deposit (Art. 431 CC).
2. The creditor acquires the right to claim from the competent
Authority the thing deposited in his favor at any time (Art. 432, 1 CC).
CHAPTER D
SET OFF
I. CONCEPT AND TYPES OF SET OFF
Set off (compensatio) is the extinction of two reciprocal claims
between two parties, to the degree to which they overlap, effected by way of
computation that takes both into account.
Example: A owes B 1,000 euros from a loan and B owes A 600 euros from rent. B
has the right to set off his claim against the claim of A with the following result:
Bs claim against A is considered paid by 600 euros. Consequently, henceforth
As debt towards B amounts to 400 euros.
There are two kinds of set off: voluntary or contractual and involuntary
or unilateral.
1. Voluntary or Contractual Set off
The voluntary or contractual set off is not regulated by the Greek Civil
Code. It is agreed between the contracting parties by virtue of the freedom
of contracts (Art. 361 CC). Consequently, the voluntary or contractual set
off is possible even if the conditions for involuntary or unilateral set off laid
down by the Greek Civil Code are not met.
2. Involuntary or Unilateral Set off
Involuntary or unilateral set off is the set off provided for by the law
(Art. 440 et seq. CC) and it is compulsorily imposed by the one party to the
other by a unilateral declaration provided that certain conditions concur.
310
II. CONDITIONS FOR INVOLUNTARY OR UNILATERAL SET OFF

The conditions necessary for involuntary or unilateral set off are:
1. Reciprocal Claims
Two claims are reciprocal when the debtor of the one is at the same
time the creditor of the other.
Example: A owes B 1,000 euros and B owes A 500 euros. A is towards B at once
the debtor of 1,000 euros and the creditor of 500 euros. Respectively, B is towards
A the debtor of 500 euros and the creditor of 1,000 euros.
2. Existing and Valid Claims

The claims in question must exist and be valid. Consequently, there can
be no set off if one of the claims is non existent or null and void.
3. Claims of the Same Kind
The claims are of the same kind when the objects of their performances
are of the same type, i.e. they have the same traits.
Examples: A owes B 1,000 euros and B owes A 500 euros. The two claims are
of the same kind because both parties owe money.
A owes to deliver a TV set to B by reason of sale and B owes 800 euros to A
from a loan contract he had concluded with him. In this case the two claims are
not of the same kind.
4. Past Due Claims

According to the provision of Article 440 of the Greek Civil Code, the
two claims must be past due. However, it is accepted that it is sufficient for
one of the claims to have fallen due, that of the party declaring the set off,
without it being necessary for his own debt to have also fallen due. The
reason for this is because he is free, if he so wishes, to furnish his
performance even before the time at which it is due (Art. 324, 1 CC).1
Example: On June 15 A owes to pay B the amount of 1,000 euros for the washer
he had bought from him (from B). On September 10 of the same year B owes to
1
See Litzeropoulos, op. cit., p. 421; Michailidis Nouaros, op. cit., p. 271; Stathopoulos, op.
cit., p. 547; Ast. Georgiadis, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 281.
LAW OF OBLIGATIONS
311
pay A 500 euros from a loan he had concluded with him. Beginning June 16 B has
a past due claim against A. Thus, on July 10 B may declare a set off against A
even though his own (Bs) debt, the one to be offset against his claim, is not yet
past due.
5. Set off not to be Prohibited

The set off is prohibited either when the parties have agreed to waive
such right (Art. 450, 2 CC), or when it is prohibited by law.
According to the law, there can be no offsetting against claims
stemming from delict intentionally committed (Art. 450, 1 CC) or against
claims not subject to attachment (Art. 451 CC).2
6. Declaration of Set off
For the set off to be effected the interested party, i.e. the party who has
a past due claim against the other, must invoke it by way of declaration to
the other party (Art. 441, 1 CC).3
III. EFFECTS OF INVOLUNTARY OR UNILATERAL SET OFF
The declaration of set off brings about the extinction of the reciprocal
claims to the extent that they overlap as from the time they coexisted (Art.
441, 2 CC).
Example: A owes B 1,000 euros and B owes A 800 euros. With the set off As
claim will be fully extinguished whereas Bs claim will be extinguished by 800
euros, i.e. henceforth A will owe B only 200 euros.
Claims not subject to attachment are, for example, the claims for maintenance, wages,
pensions, etc. (see above Part Six, Ch. B, I, 2, A).
3
The right of offsetting is a condition forming, or constitutive, right and may be exercised
by a unilateral, non formal declaration of will of the party invoking the set off. Such
declaration is addressed to the other party and may be exercised extra-judicially or judicially
(see K. Polyzogopoulos, in Georgiadis Stathopoulos, Commentary on the Civil Code, Art.
442, No 1 et seq.; Stathopoulos, op. cit., p. 549; Filios, op. cit., p. 133 et seq.; Ap. Georgiadis,
op. cit., p. 500).
CHAPTER E
RELEASE OF DEBT
Release of debt is the contract concluded between creditor and debtor
to the effect that the creditor waives his claim against the debtor.
The legal consequence of such a contract is that the obligation gets
extinguished (Art. 454 CC).
Example: A owes B 500 euros from a loan. With a subsequent agreement between
A and B the latter waives his claim against A because, for example, he wants to
forgive the debt.
PART EIGHT
REGULATION OF IMPORTANT CONTRACTS
CHAPTER A
GENERAL
As was already mentioned, one of the fundamental distinctions of
contracts is in regulated (or nominate) contracts and non-regulated (or
innominate) ones.
More specifically:
Regulated or nominate contracts are the contracts which are regulated
either by the Greek Civil Code in the Special Law of Obligations section
(e.g. sale, donation, lease of a thing), or by special laws (e.g. leasing, timesharing).
Non-regulated or innominate are the contracts which are not regulated
either by the Greek Civil Code or by special laws, e.g. the contract of
franchising.
In the following chapters we will deal with the most important
contracts that are regulated by the Civil Code, the most popular in the realm
of modern transactions contracts that are regulated by special laws, and,
finally, following a presentation of general remarks regarding the
innominate contracts, we will deal with the contract of franchising which we
consider one of the most widespread innominate contracts of our times.
CHAPTER B
THE MAIN CONTRACTS REGULATED BY THE CIVIL CODE
Due to the exceedingly important role that the contracts regulated by
the Civil Code play in the world of modern transactions, it was deemed
necessary to devote a summary discussion to the most important of them.
I. DONATION
1. The Concept and Features of Donation
A. The Concept
Donation (donatio) is the contract whereby the one contracting party,
the donor, assumes the obligation to give to the other contracting party, the
donee, a property item out of liberality.
Example: A promises to give B a TV set without any quid pro quo and B accepts
the offer.
B. Features
Donation is a contract because for its conclusion the donees
acceptance is required. It is a unilaterally obliging contract because it
generates obligations only for the donor. It is also a gratuitous contract
because there is no agreement for a quid pro quo.
2. Conclusion of the Donation Contract
Donation is a contract subject to formal requirements because for its
conclusion a notarial document is needed. Exceptionally, the donation of a
movable thing for which no notarial document was executed becomes valid
once the donor delivers the thing to the donee (Art. 498, 2 CC).
315
LAW OF OBLIGATIONS
3. Obligations of the Donor

According to Article 496 of the Greek Civil Code the donor is bound to
furnish to the donee an object of patrimonial value without any counterpart
(quid pro quo).
The donor, however, is entitled to refuse the fulfillment of the donation
if, in view of his other debts, such fulfillment would endanger his own
maintenance or the maintenance he owes to third parties by virtue of the law
(Art. 501 CC).
4. Revocation of the Donation
The donor is entitled to revoke the donation for certain serious reasons
(Arts. 505 et seq. CC) such as, for example, if the donee through grave fault
of his proved ungrateful vis--vis the donor or his spouse or a close relative
of the donors, especially if he has violated his obligation to provide
maintenance to the donor.
The right of revocation of the donation may not be waived in advance.
Finally, it should be noted that revocation is precluded if the donation
was made out of special moral duty or for reasons of propriety.
II. SALE
1. The Concept and Features of Sale
A. The Concept
Sale is the contract whereby one of the contracting parties, the seller
(venditor), undertakes the obligation to transfer the ownership of a thing or
right and to deliver the thing to the other contracting party, the buyer
(emptor), who assumes the obligation to pay the agreed price (pretium).1
B. Features
Any thing, movable or immovable, and any right (e.g. the right to
intellectual property, the right to a patent) may be the object of sale.
1
Many important matters regarding the sale of goods are regulated by L. 2251/1994 On
Consumer Protection. See E. Alexandridou, The Law of Consumers Protection: Greek and
Community Law, 1996; K. Delouka Igglesi, The Consumers Law: Greek and Community
Law, 1998; I. Karakostas, The Protection of the Consumer Law 2251/1994, 2002; Ap.
Georgiadis, Law of Obligations, Special Part, Vol. I, 2004, p. 123 et seq.
316
The price to be paid must consist in money. If it has been agreed that a
thing other than money will be furnished, it is no longer a contract of sale
but of exchange.2
Example: A agrees with B to transfer to him the ownership of his apartment and to
deliver the apartment to him for 50,000 euros.
Sale is a reciprocal contract because it generates rights and duties for

both contracting parties. Moreover, it is an onerous contract because a quid
pro quo is agreed.
2. Conclusion of the Sale Contract
The contract of sale is not subject to any particular form. Only
exceptionally is it subject to form in the special cases provided for by the
law. Such is, for example, the case of sale of an immovable.
The contract of sale generates a number of obligations for the
contracting parties. Specifically:
A. Obligations of the Seller
a. Principal obligations
The seller has the following two principal obligations:
aa. To transfer the ownership of the thing or right sold free of defects
in title. Defect in title is every right of a third party over the sold item, e.g.
pledge, mortgage (Art. 514 CC).3
bb. To deliver the thing sold which at the time of delivery must have
the conceded qualities4 and be free of material defects (Art. 534 CC).
See below Ch. B, III.

The term used for defect in title in the text of the Greek original (the same as in the Greek
Civil Code) is legal defect (Translators note).
3
Pledge and mortgage are rights in rem (the pledge concerns a movable thing and the
mortgage an immovable) granting the owner the privilege of preferential satisfaction of his
claim from the value of the encumbered thing (Arts. 1209 et seq. and 1257 et seq. CC). See
below Property Law, Part Five.
4
L. 3043/2002 replaced the earlier term agreed qualities by the term conceded qualities on
the grounds that the new term was considered more accurate (see Introductory Report of L.
3043/2002, in Critical Review of Legal Theory and Praxis, 2001/1, p. 302 et seq.).
LAW OF OBLIGATIONS
317
Conceded qualities are the qualities specifically agreed between the

seller and the buyer for the thing to have.
Example: A, a building contractor, sold an apartment to B and agreed with him
that the apartment would have exceptionally good insulation.
Material defect is every imperfection regarding the constitution or

condition of the thing which diminishes its value or usefulness.
Examples: - A sells B a car with brakes that are not working.
- A sells B a number of books with defective print.
b. Collateral obligations
In addition to the principal obligations, the seller has certain collateral
obligations, some of which are stipulated by law, others provided for in the
agreement of the parties, and yet others derived from the principle of the
fulfillment of obligations in good faith.
Obligations stemming from the law are, for example, the sellers
obligation to inform the buyer of the legal relations of the thing or to deliver
to him the pertinent documents he has in his possession which prove the
right over the thing in question.
Obligations stemming from good faith are obligations such as, for
example, to safeguard the thing sold, or to properly package it, or the
obligation to provide instructions for its use, or the obligation for repair and
maintenance of the thing during a certain time.
B. Obligations of the Buyer
a. Principal obligations
The principal obligation of the buyer is to pay the agreed price.
The buyer, the same as the seller, also has various collateral obligations
which are either stipulated by law5 or provided for in the parties agreement
or stem from the principle of the fulfillment of obligations in good faith.
5
It is doubtful whether the buyer has the obligation to receive the thing. According to the
view considered more accurate, he does not have the obligation to receive the thing (see
Gazis, in ERMAK, Art. 513, No 111 et seq.; P. Filios, Law of Obligations, Special Part, Vol.
I/1, 5th ed., 2002, p. 22; Kornilakis, Abridged Special Law of Obligations, 2000, p. 85 et seq.).
For the opposite view (i.e. that the buyer is obliged to receive the thing sold), see Zepos, Law
318
Obligations provided for by the law are, for example, the obligation to
pay the expenses related to receiving the thing sold or to dispatching it to a
place other than the place of performance.
Obligations stemming from the principle of good faith are the timely
notification of the seller regarding eventual defects, the obligation to
safeguard and return the defective thing to the seller, etc.
4. Non-fulfillment of the Obligations of the Parties
A. Non-fulfillment of the Obligations of the Seller
a. Liability for defect in title
aa. The content of the liability
The sellers liability for defect in title is the liability for unperformed
contract. This is so because transfer of ownership of the thing or right which
is sold with defect in title is in violation of the principal obligations of the
seller.
According to Article 516 of the Greek Civil Code, in case of defect in
title, the buyer has the same rights as the creditor in reciprocal contracts,
especially in the cases of debtors default or impossibility of performance
due to debtors fault.
bb. Release from liability
The liability of the seller for defects in title existing at the time of the
conclusion of the sale is precluded if the buyer was aware of them (Art. 515,
1 CC). However, in case of existing mortgage, prenotice of mortgage,
attachments, or pledge, the seller is responsible even if the buyer had
knowledge of them (Art. 515, 2 CC).
of Obligations, op. cit., Vol. II, para. 3 III, p. 67; K. Kafkas D. Kafkas, Law of Obligations,
Special Part, Vol. A, 5th ed., 1974, Art. 513, para. 3a, p. 73; Ch. Verveniotis, in Georgiadis
Stathopoulos, Commentary on the Civil Code, Art. 516, No 53; Ap. Georgiadis, Law of
Obligations, Special Part., Vol. I, 2004, p. 54 et seq.
LAW OF OBLIGATIONS
319
b. Liability for material defects or lack of conceded qualities

aa. Introductory
The liability of the seller for material defects and lack of conceded
qualities regarding the thing sold is regulated in Articles 534-561 of the
Greek Civil Code.
Before referring to the above mentioned provisions of the Civil Code, it
should be noted that L. 3043/2002 on the sellers liability for material
defects or lack of conceded qualities drastically modified the above Articles
of the Civil Code in order for the Greek law to be streamlined with the
substantive provisions of Directive EC/1999/44 of the European Parliament
and of the Council regarding certain aspects of the sale of consumer goods
and associated guarantees.6
bb. Conditions for the generation of liability
The law stipulates by special provision (Art. 535 CC) that the
obligation to furnish the thing sold free of material defects and with the
proper conceded qualities is not considered fulfilled if the thing does not
correspond to the contractual agreement. Subsequently, various criteria are
provided to help establish the lack of correspondence between the thing
furnished and the thing agreed upon in the sale contract. These criteria are
noted indicatively and are the following:
-
when the thing delivered does not correspond to the thing described
by the buyer or to the sample or example the buyer had presented
to the buyer;
when the thing sold is not good for the purpose of the specific
contract and in particular for the special use aimed at in accordance
with the contracts purpose;
when the thing is not good for the use that things of the same kind
are usually intended;
when the thing does not correspond to the quality or effectiveness
the buyer reasonably expects from things of the same kind, in view
also of the public statements made by the seller, producer, or his
representative, especially in the context of the relevant
L. 3043/2002 constitutes the first major modification of the rules of the Law of Obligations
(see Introductory Report of L. 3043/2002, op. cit., p. 297 et seq., especially p. 298). See in
this regard P. Papanikolaou K. Roussos K. Christodoulou A. Karabatzos, The New Law
of the Sellers Liability, 2003.
320
advertisements or commendations, unless the seller had no

knowledge of such statements and was in no way obliged to know
about them.
In order for the buyer to prove the lack of correspondence between the
thing agreed upon and the thing furnished suffices to show that one of the
four above mentioned criteria is present.7 However, it is possible for the
buyer to prove the lack of correspondence between the two even if none of
the above criteria is present since their enumeration in Article 535 of the
Greek Civil Code is only indicative.
At this point it should be added that the cases of defective installation
of the thing are equivalent to the cases where the thing furnished does not
correspond with the sale contract (Art. 536 CC).8
cc. The content of liability
In case of material defects or absence of conceded qualities at the time
the risk passes to the buyer,9 the seller is liable regardless of fault.
In case of liability of the seller for material defects or lack of conceded
qualities, the buyer has the following rights exercised as alternatives (Art.
540 CC):10
-
to demand, at no cost to himself, the remedying of the defects or

the replacement of the thing sold, unless this would be impossible
or require disproportionate expenses;
to reduce the purchase price;
to rescind the contract unless the material defect is minor.
See Introductory Report of L. 3043/2002, op. cit., p. 303; Filios, op. cit., p. 41 et seq.; Ap.
Georgiadis, op. cit., p. 87;
8
See Papanikolaou et al., op. cit., p. 339 et seq.
9
The risk passes to the buyer of the thing sold at the time of delivery, if the thing is movable
(Art. 522, 1 CC), and, in the case of immovables, either at the time of delivery or of
transcription, if the latter preceded the former (Art. 522, 2 CC).
10
The term as alternatives means that the buyer may exercise any of these rights he chooses
without there being a hierarchical order determining that one has priority over the other (see
Filios, op. cit., p. 55; I. Spyridakis, Manual of Civil Law, Special Law of Obligations, 2nd ed.,
2004, p. 29; Ap. Georgiadis, op. cit., p. 113).
LAW OF OBLIGATIONS
321
At this point the following should be added:

According to Article 543 of the Greek Civil Code, the buyer has the
option, instead of the rights granted to him by Article 540, to ask for
compensation by reason of non performance of the contract.
The same Article (543 CC) grants the buyer, cumulatively with the
other rights, the right of compensation for damages not otherwise covered,
e.g. the damage he suffered from the delay.11
If the buyer accepted the thing sold without reservations and was aware
of the defects or the lack of conceded qualities, he is deemed to have
accepted it (Art. 545 CC).
The rights of the buyer on account of material defects or lack of
conceded qualities are subject to a five year prescription for immovables and
a two year prescription for movables (Art. 554 CC).
dd. Release from liability
The only case the seller is not liable for material defects or lack of
conceded qualities is when the buyer at the time of the conclusion of the
contract knew that the thing sold does not correspond to the contract or
when this is due to material provided by the buyer himself (Art. 537, 1
CC).12
ee. Guarantee for the thing sold
Article 559 of the Greek Civil Code13 refers to the guarantee for the
thing sold provided by the seller or a third party and reads as follows:
If the seller or a third party provides a guarantee14 for the thing sold,
the buyer has against the guarantor all the rights stemming from the
declaration of the guarantee according to the terms contained in it and the
11
The liability for compensation is objective, i.e. independent of fault, in the case of
conceded qualities (Art. 543, 1 CC), whereas it is subjective, i.e. it requires fault, in the case
of material defects (Art. 543, 2 CC). See Introductory Report L. 3043/2002, op. cit., p. 305 et
seq.; Filios, op. cit., p. 55 et seq.; Ap. Georgiadis, op. cit., p. 111 et seq.).
12
A presumption is established by special provision of the law that the material defects or
lack of conceded qualities discovered within six months from delivery of the thing sold was
present at the time of delivery, unless this is incompatible with the nature of the thing sold or
with the nature of the material defect or the lack of conceded qualities (Art. 537, 2 CC).
13
This provision was added by L. 3043/2002.
14
Regarding the guarantee given to the consumer, see Art. 3 of L. 3043/2002 which replaced
paras. 3-5 of Art. 5 of L. 2251/1994; see Filios, op. cit., p. 59 et seq.; Papanikolaou et al., op.
cit., p. 533 et seq.; Ap. Georgiadis, op. cit., p. 118 et seq.
322
relevant advertisement, without at the same time losing any of the rights
conferred to him by the law.
The term guarantee in the above Article is not used in the same way
the Greek Civil Code uses it in Article 847 et seq.15 The meaning of the term
guarantee in Article 559 is that the obligational liability of the seller is
reinforced in the sense that it includes all that was declared in the guarantee
or the relevant advertisement.16 In other words the guarantee given to the
buyer at the time of the conclusion of the sale and the statements made in
the relevant advertisement generate legal binding. If the seller violates them,
the buyer has the rights stemming from the terms of the guarantee in
addition to the rights conferred to him by law.17
B. Non-fulfillment of the Obligations of the Buyer
If the buyer violates his principal obligation, which is to pay the price,
he is liable according to the general provisions of the law for nonperformance of a reciprocal contract.18
III. EXCHANGE
Exchange is the contract whereby the one contracting party assumes the
obligation to transfer to the other the ownership of a thing or right and to
deliver the thing; on his part the other contracting party assumes the
obligation to transfer to the first (as a quid pro quo) the ownership of
another thing or right and to deliver it. In the exchange contract both
performances regard a thing or a right.
Example: A agrees with B to transfer to him the ownership of a TV set and deliver
it to him and B agrees with A to transfer to him the ownership of a stereo unit (and
deliver it to him) in exchange.
The exchange is a reciprocal and onerous contract not subject to any

particular form. Form is observed only if required by law, e.g. for the
exchange of an immovable.
For the exchange, the law stipulates that provisions relating to the sale
are also applicable mutatis mutandis to the exchange. Each of the
15

See Introductory Report of L. 3043/2002, op. cit., p. 307.
17
See Introductory Report of L. 3043/2002, op. cit., p. 308.
18
See Kornilakis, op. cit., p. 98.
16
323
LAW OF OBLIGATIONS
contracting parties is considered as seller regarding the performance he

owes and as buyer regarding the performance due to him.
IV. LEASE OF A THING
1. The Concept and Features of the Lease of a Thing
A. The Concept
Contract of lease of a thing is the contract according to which the one
contracting party (lessor) undertakes the obligation to yield to the other
contracting party (lessee) the use of a thing (leased object) for as long as the
lease contract lasts and pay the lessor the agreed rent. The object of such
lease may be either a movable or an immovable.
Example: A (lessor) leases an apartment of his to B (lessee) for one year and the
rent agreed is 300 euros per month.
B. Features
The lease of a thing is a reciprocal contract because it generates rights
and obligations for both parties. It is also an onerous contract because it
requires a counter performance.
2. Conclusion of the Lease of a Thing Contract
The lease of a thing is a contract for the valid conclusion of which no
particular form is required. If a written document is executed for its
conclusion, it is good only for evidential purposes.19
The obligations of the parties in a contract of lease of a thing are the
following:
19
See above General Principles, Part Three, Ch. C, VII, 2, A, b. For special types of leases,
see Ap. Georgiadis, op. cit., p. 397 et seq.
324
A. Obligations of the Lessor

a. Principal obligation
The principal obligation of the lessor is to yield to the lessee the leased
thing in a timely fashion. Additionally, the thing needs to be suitable for the
agreed use and to remain suitable throughout the term of the lease.
The leased thing must have the agreed qualities and be free of material
defects20 or defects in title that would obstruct the agreed use in part or in
whole.21
In the case of lease of a thing the meaning of defect in title is different
from that in sale. In the lease of a thing it is not sufficient for a third party to
have a right over the leased thing, as is the case in sale; it is further
necessary for the agreed use of the leased thing to become impossible, in
part or in whole, by reason of that right (Art. 583, 1 CC).
Example: A leases an apartment to B which, however, is occupied by C who had
leased the same premises earlier.
In case of defect in title, material defect, or lack of agreed qualities, the

lessee has the following alternative rights (Art. 576 et seq. CC):22
-
he may demand reduction or non-payment of the rent;

he may demand compensation by reason of the unperformed
contract;
he may proceed with removal of the defect or remedy the missing
agreed qualities and ask to be reimbursed for the expenses;
he may terminate23 the lease, i.e. unilaterally declare to the lessor
that he intends to do so.
In case the lessee accepted the thing without reservation while being
aware of the defect or the lack of agreed qualities, the lessor is not liable for
the defect or the lack of agreed qualities (Art. 581 CC).
20
Regarding the concepts of agreed qualities and material defects, see above Ch. B, II, 3,
A, a, bb,
21
See Arts. 576 and 583 et seq. CC.
22
According to the Greek Civil Code the lessors liability is the same for material defects,
defects in title, and lack of agreed qualities. See Filios, op. cit., p. 155 et seq.; Ap. Georgiadis,
op. cit., p. 347 et seq.
23
Termination is a condition forming, or constitutive, right of the lessee exercised by way
of a unilateral declaration that the lessee addresses to the lessor.
LAW OF OBLIGATIONS
325
Aside from the principal obligations, the lessor also has collateral
obligations, such as, for example, to pay for the encumbrances and taxes of
the thing, to reimburse the lessee for expenses he incurred in connection
with the leased thing, etc.
B. Obligations of the Lessee
The principal obligation of the lessee is to pay the agreed rent.
Aside from his principal obligation, the lessee also has several
collateral obligations, such as, for example, to treat the leased thing with
care and according to the terms of the lease agreement, to inform the lessor
in a timely fashion of defects in the leased thing which surfaced during the
term of the lease or of the rights third parties exercise over it without being
entitled to do so, to return to the lessor the leased thing at the end of the term
in the same condition it was given to him (naturally, without any liability on
the part of the lessee for wear and tear or changes in the leased thing due to
the use that was agreed upon).
If the lessee does not fulfill his obligations, the lessor is entitled to
terminate the lease contract and in addition demand compensation (Art. 594
et seq. CC).
4. Termination of the Lease
A. Lease of a Thing for a Fixed Term
The lease of a thing which was agreed for a fixed period of time expires
when the agreed term ends without any further formality (Art. 608, 1 CC).
B. Lease of a Thing for an Indefinite Period
The lease of a thing which was agreed for an indefinite period ends
with a termination notice given by either of the contracting parties (Art. 608,
2 CC),24 i.e. with a unilateral statement the one of the parties addresses to
24
Art. 609 of the Greek Civil Code decrees the minimum of the different time periods which
need to elapse for the respective termination notices to take effect.
326
the other letting the latter know of the declarants intent to terminate the
lease. The effect of the termination is only for the future.
V. EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT
1. The Concept and Features of the Employment Contract
A. The Concept
Employment contract, or contract for services, is the contract whereby
one of the parties, the employee, undertakes to provide services to the other
contracting party, the employer, and the latter assumes the obligation to pay
the employee the agreed wages (Art. 648, 1 CC).
Example: A hires B as an employee in his business for one year with a monthly
salary of 800 euros.
B. Features
The employment contract, which is a reciprocal and onerous contract,
may involve either dependent work or independent services.
Contract of dependent employment is the contract for services where
the employee is obliged to conform to the instructions and orders given by
the employer as regards his work and tolerate his control in carrying it out.
In other words, the services provided are subject to the employers control
while they are carried out.
Contract of independent services is the contract whereby the employee
retains his initiative and the freedom to determine by himself the conditions
of his work without being subject to the employers control in carrying out
his services.25
The provisions of the Greek Civil Code concerning the employment
contract include all types of employment contracts.
Specifically, for the regulation of the contract of dependent
employment the provisions of labor law are applicable and those of the Civil
Code apply only supplementally to cover any vacuum in the special labor
legislation.
25
See A. Karakatsanis S. Gardikas, Individual Labor Law, 5th ed., 1995, p. 124; Th.
Koniaris, Labor Law in Hellas, 2002, p. 97 et seq. (in English).
LAW OF OBLIGATIONS
327
2. Conclusion of the Employment Contract

The employment contract is an informal contract and no specific form
is required for its valid conclusion.
If a written document has been executed at the time of its conclusion, it
only has evidential value.26 Written form is required (and is constitutive of
the employment contract) only exceptionally with regard to certain kinds of
contracts, such as those for public service.
In the employment contract the obligations of the parties are the
following:
A. Obligations of the Employee
The main obligation of the employee is to carry out his services in
person (unless otherwise provided in the agreement or follows from the
circumstances) and to do so diligently, being liable for the damage caused to
the employer due to the employees fault willful conduct or negligence
(Art. 652, 1 CC).
Aside from his principal obligation, the employee also has collateral
obligations stemming from the law, the contract, or the principle of good
faith in the fulfillment of performance.
One collateral obligation stemming from the law is, for example, the
employees obligation to work, if need be, beyond the agreed or customary
work schedule, provided that he is able to do so and that his refusal is not
contrary to good faith. Naturally, for this additional work the employee has
the right to receive additional compensation.
One collateral obligation stemming from the principle of good faith is
the employees obligation for loyalty. Loyalty aims at the protection of the
employers interests and this is what the employee owes to his employer.
One aspect of this loyalty is the confidentiality demanded of the employee
regarding trade secrets, the need to abstain from competition with the
employer, etc.
26
See above General Principles, Part Three, Ch. C, VII, 2, A. b.
328
B. Obligations of the Employer

According to Article 653 of the Greek Civil Code, the main obligation
of the employer is to pay the employee his wages (agreed or customary).
The employer also has certain collateral obligations stemming from the
law, the contract, or the principle of good faith regarding the fulfillment of
performance.
Collateral obligations for the employer stemming from the law are, for
example, the maintenance of safety and health standards in the work place,
the granting of days off, the issuance of certificates regarding the rendering
of services, the provision of health care for the employee who has been
hired by the employer as a live-in, etc.
Collateral obligations for the employer stemming from the principle of
good faith in the fulfillment of performance are, for example, the obligation
to provide work to the employees, to treat them equally, etc.
4. Termination of the Employment Contract
Regarding the termination of the employment contract we need to
distinguish between employment contract for a fixed term and employment
contract for an indefinite period.
A. Employment Contract for a Fixed Term
The employment contract for a fixed term is ipso jure terminated at the
expiration of the term for which it has been concluded (Art. 669, 1 CC).
Exceptionally, either party may terminate the employment contract on
serious grounds, i.e. for an important reason (Art. 672 CC).27
The law does not specify what constitutes important reason. However,
it is being accepted that important reason constitute all the events which,
under the specific actual circumstances, create such an unpleasant situation
for the party invoking them that it is impossible to expect the party in
question to remain in the contractual relationship.28
27
This is the case of the so-called extraordinary termination (summary termination). See
Koniaris, op. cit., p. 157.
28
See Karakatsanis Gardikas, op. cit., p. 528.
329
LAW OF OBLIGATIONS
We mention indicatively the following examples constituting important

reason for the employer: the fact that the employee has committed a
criminal act or that he repeatedly misses work. Likewise, examples
constituting important reason for the employee are: the employers offensive
behavior or his omission to maintain the necessary standards for the safety
and health of the employees.
B. Employment Contract for an Indefinite Period
According to the provision of Article 669, para. 2 of the Greek Civil
Code, a contract of employment the term of which has not been fixed shall
terminate upon termination notice on the part of either party.
At this point it should be mentioned that the termination of the
employment contract for dependent services which is for an indefinite
period is regulated by special labor laws.29 Consequently, the provision of
Article 669, para. 2 is applicable only in the case of employment contracts
for independent services.
C. Death of the Employee
Due to its personal character, the employment contract is terminated
upon the death of the employee regardless of whether its term was fixed or
not (Art. 675 CC). The death of the employer brings about the termination
of the contract for services only if the parties aimed mainly at the person of
the employer.
VI. CONTRACT FOR WORK
1. The Concept and Features of the Contract for Work
Contract for work is the contract where the one contracting party
(contractor) undertakes the obligation to carry out a work and the other
party (master of work) is obliged to pay the agreed fee (Art. 681 CC). By
work we mean the result of human activity which may and may not be
material.
29
The law provides for two different types of termination, with and without notice. They
differ as to the scope of their implementation, their terms, and consequences. See
Karakatsanis Gardikas, op. cit., p. 535 et seq.
330
Examples: A assigns to B the project of building a house on his (As) land for
100,000 euros.
A assigns to B the project of sculpting a bust.
The contract for work is a reciprocal and onerous contract.

2. Conclusion of the Contract for Work
In principle the contract for work is a contract for the conclusion of
which no particular form is required. Only exceptionally, according to
special statutes, is a written document required for the valid conclusion of a
contract for work such as, for example, in the case of the contract for
carrying out public works.
The contract for work generates the following obligations for the
parties:
A. Obligations of the Contractor
The principal obligation of the contractor is to carry out the work he
has undertaken in a timely fashion and to deliver it free of defects.
For the liability of the contractor in case he defaults in his principal
obligation, we need to distinguish between the following:
-
30
If the contractor delays the commencement of the work, or if,

without it being the fault of the master, he delays the performance
of it, the master of work may rescind the contract30 and not have to
wait for the expiration of the term set for delivery (Art. 686, 1 CC).
If the work performed is defective, we need to distinguish between
substantial and insubstantial defects: if the defects are
insubstantial, the master of the work may demand that they be
remedied or that the contractors remuneration be reduced (Art. 688
CC). If the defects are substantial and render the work useless or if
the work lacks the agreed qualities, the master of work has one of
the following three rights: he may demand that they be remedied,
See above Part Four, Ch. C, III, footn. 7.
LAW OF OBLIGATIONS
331
or reduce the contractors remuneration, or rescind the contract

(Art. 689 CC).
If the defects are due to the contractors fault, the master of work,
instead of rescission or reduction of the contractors fee, has the
right to claim damages for non-performance of the contract (Art.
690 CC).
Aside from his principal obligation, the contractor also has collateral
obligations, such as to use the material supplied to him by the master of
work with care, to give account as regards the same, and to return any
remaining material to the master of work (Art. 685, 1 CC).
B. Obligations of the Master of Work
The main obligation of the master of work is to pay the agreed fee.
The masters collateral obligations are to supply the contractor with the
material needed for the performance of the work and to accept and approve
the completed work.31
4. Termination of the Contract for Work
The completion and delivery of the work by the contractor and,
respectively, the payment of the agreed fee by the master of work signals the
termination of the contract for work.
31
Regarding the acceptance and approval of the work, there is divergence of opinions. We
consider more accurate the view that, as it follows from Articles 692, 693, and 698 of the
Greek Civil Code, the master of work is bound to accept and approve the work (thus Zepos,
op. cit., Vol. II, p. 391; Kafkas K. Kafkas D., op. cit., Vol. A, Arts. 681-682, para. 6a, p. 79
et seq.; A. Kardaras, in Georgiadis Stathopoulos, Commentary on the Civil Code, Art. 681,
No 42). The opposite view holds that the master of work is not bound to accept and approve
the work (thus I. Deliyannis, in ERMAK, Art. 681, No 94 et seq.; I. Deliyannis P.
Kornilakis, Special Law of Obligations, Vol. II, 1992, p. 66 et seq.; P. Filios, Law of
Obligations: Special Part, Vol. I/2, 4th ed., 1997, p. 137 et seq.).
332
The Greek Civil Code also has provisions for special grounds for the
termination of the contract for work, such as the masters right to terminate
the contract and the contractors death (Arts. 700-701 CC).
5. The Difference between Employment Contract and Contract for Work
The contract for work differs from the employment contract in the
following: in the contract for work the contracting parties aim at the result of
the work, i.e. the production of the agreed work, whereas in the employment
contract they aim at furnishing the performance, i.e. at the employees work
as such.
VII. BROKERAGE
1. The Concept of Brokerage
Brokerage is the contract whereby the one contracting party (who
roughly corresponds to the mandator) promises to pay a fee to the other
contracting party, the broker, for the latters mediation or pointing out of an
opportunity for the conclusion of a contract32 which is of interest to the
mandator (Art. 703 CC).
Example: A promises to pay a certain fee to B if the latter points out to him a
single family dwelling for sale in the Plaka area the size of 500 sq. m.
2. Conclusion of the Brokerage Contract

Brokerage is an informal contract meaning that for its valid conclusion
no special form needs to be observed, even if it aims at the conclusion of a
contract subject to form, such as the sale of an immovable.
Brokerage is a unilaterally obliging contract because it only generates
obligations for one of the contracting parties, the mandator, whereas the
other contracting party, the broker, is not obliged by the contract to offer his
mediation. However, it is possible for brokerage to become a reciprocal
contract if the broker assumes the obligation to mediate or point out an
32
Commercial brokerage is subject to special statutory regulation (see L. 308/1976 On

Brokers in Civil Contracts).
333
LAW OF OBLIGATIONS
opportunity.33 The issue whether it is the one or the other will be judged in
concreto based on the will of the parties or the purpose of the contract.
VIII. MANDATE
1. The Concept and Features of Mandate
A. The Concept
Mandate is the contract in which the one contracting party (mandatary)
undertakes the obligation to conduct, free of charge, the affair of the other
contracting party (mandator). The delegated affair may be of any kind (Art.
713 CC).
Examples: - A agrees with B to transport, free of charge, the furniture of the latter
from his old office to the new one.
- A agrees with B to find for him, free of charge, the bibliography that the latter
needs for his research.
B. Features
Mandate is a unilaterally obliging contract because the one party, the
mandator, acquires rights from it and the other, the mandatary, acquires
duties. Moreover, it is a gratuitous contract because it is carried out without
a counter performance.
2. Conclusion of the Mandate Contract
The mandate is an informal contract in the sense that for its valid
conclusion no particular form needs to be observed.34
33
See I. Sakketas, in ERMAK, Art. 703, No. 1 et seq.; M. Karassis, in Georgiadis

Stathopoulos, Commentary on the Civil Code, Art. 703, No. 3.
34
Regarding the question as to whether the form of a notarial document is required for the
mandate aiming at the purchase of an immovable, according to Article 369 of the Greek Civil
Code, different views are held. See G. Shinas, Elements of Civil Law, Vol. C, p. 47 et seq.; G.
Tambakis, in Georgiadis Stathopoulos, Commentary on the Civil Code, Art. 369, No 16; M.
Karassis, in Georgiadis Stathopoulos, Commentary on the Civil Code, Art. 713, No 5. We
consider more accurate the view holding that no notarial document is required for the
mandate aiming at the purchase of an immovable.
334

A. Obligations of the Mandatary
The main obligation of the mandatary is to conduct the affair entrusted
to him. Aside from this obligation, he is bound by law to provide
information to the mandator regarding the affair entrusted to him, render
account to the mandator upon termination of the mandate, and restore to the
mandator everything that he has received for (or acquired from) the carrying
out of the mandate (Arts. 718-719 CC).
B. Obligations of the Mandator
The mandator is not obliged to remunerate the mandatary. However,
he is obliged to pay for the expenses the latter incurred in carrying out the
mandate, to reimburse the mandatary for all that he spent in the course of the
regular conducting of the affair, and to restitute any damage the mandatary
suffered while carrying out the mandate, provided it was not due to his own
fault (Arts. 721-723 CC).
4. Termination of the Mandate
The mandate ends with the carrying out of the affair for which it was
given. Other reasons leading to termination are the revocation of the
mandate on the part of the mandator at any time (Art. 724 CC),35 the
termination by the mandatary at any time (Art. 725, 1 CC), the death of
either the mandator or the mandatary, the placement of either under judicial
assistance, or the bankruptcy of either, unless otherwise agreed (Art. 726, 1
CC).
IX. LOAN
1. The Concept and Features of the Loan
A. The Concept
Loan is the contract by which one of the contracting parties (lender)
transfers to the other (borrower) the ownership of money or other fungible
35
The revocation is exercised the same way as the termination, i.e. by way of a unilateral
declaration of the one of the contracting parties to the other.
335
LAW OF OBLIGATIONS
things and the latter undertakes the obligation to return other things of the
same quantity and quality (Art. 806 CC).36
The object of the loan contract is money or other fungible things.37
Examples: A transfers to B the ownership of 1,500 euros and B assumes the
obligation to return 1,500 euros to A after a certain period of time.
A transfers to B the ownership of 1,000 kilos of top quality grain and B assumes
the obligation to return to A 1,000 kilos of top quality grain after a certain period
of time.
B. Features
The loan contract may be with or without interest. The interest-free
loan is a unilaterally obliging contract. By contrast, the loan with interest is
a reciprocal contract because the borrower, aside from the return of the loan,
is obliged to pay the agreed interest to the lender as a quid pro quo for the
use of the money or fungibles loaned to him. Moreover, the loan is a
delivery contract.38
2. Conclusion of the Loan Contract
The loan contract is not subject to any particular form because no
particular form is required for its valid conclusion. However, because loan is
also a delivery contract, aside from the lenders promise to give the loan, it
is necessary for the money or other fungibles to be transferred and delivered
to the borrower.
X. LOAN FOR USE
1. The Concept and Features of the Loan for Use
A. The Concept
Loan for use is the contract whereby one of the parties (lender for use)
yields to the other (borrower for use) the use of a thing without a reward and
36
Regarding bank loans, see S. Psychomanis, Bank Law, 5th ed., 2001, p. 274 et seq.; N.
Rokas, Elements of Bank Law, 2002, p. 71 et seq.
37
According to Article 950 of the Greek Civil Code, fungible things are those movables
which in the transactions are usually determined by number, measure, or weight, e.g. grain,
fuel, fruit, marble etc. See below Property Law, Part One, Ch. A, II, 2.
38
It is also being argued that the loan contract is a solo consensu contract. See P. Filios, Law
of Obligations: Special Part, Vol. I/2, 4th ed., 1997, p. 55 and the footnotes thereat.
336
the borrower for use undertakes the obligation to return the thing after the
expiration of the contract (Art. 810 CC).
The object of the loan for use contract is the use of a thing, movable or
immovable.
Examples: A allows B to use his apartment.
A allows B to use his car.
B. Features
The loan for use is a unilaterally obliging, delivery, and gratuitous
contract.
2. Conclusion of the Loan for Use Contract
The loan for use is an informal contract because no particular form is
required for its conclusion, even when the thing loaned for use is an
immovable. However, because the loan for use is also a delivery contract, it
is required for the thing loaned for use to be delivered to the borrower by the
lender.
A. Obligations of the Lender for Use
The main obligation of the lender for use is to yield the use of the thing.
The lender for use is liable for defects in the thing only if he has
fraudulently concealed them (Art. 812 CC).
B. Obligations of the Borrower for Use
The borrower for use is not liable for counter performance vis--vis the
lender. His only obligations are to pay the expenses usually required for the
maintenance of the thing and to return it at the expiration of the contract.
The borrower for use may not make use of the thing in a way different
from the one agreed upon nor may he yield its use to another without the
lenders permission (815 CC).
LAW OF OBLIGATIONS
337
4. Expiration of the Contract of Loan for Use

Regarding the expiration of the contract of loan for use we need to
distinguish between contract for a fixed term and contract for an indefinite
period of time.
A. Loan for Use for a Fixed Term
If a fixed term has been agreed, the loan for use terminates upon the
expiration of that date.
Exceptionally, the lender for use may demand the thing from the
borrower for use prior to the expiration of the contract in the following
cases (Art. 817 CC):
-
if the borrower makes use of the thing in a way contrary to the

terms of the contract;
if by the use the borrower makes of the thing he has caused its
deterioration;
if the borrower has yielded the thing to a third party without
permission to do so;
if the lender has an urgent and previously unforeseeable need to use
the thing himself.
B. Loan for Use for an Indefinite Period

If the duration of the contract has not been fixed, the loan for use
terminates as soon as the borrower made use of the thing or when the time
period during which he could make use of it elapsed (Art. 816 CC).
C. Death of the Borrower for Use
A loan for use terminates ipso jure upon the death of the borrower (Art.
818 CC).
5. Difference between Loan for Use and Loan
The loan for use differs from the loan in that, whereas in the loan for
use the borrower has to return the very same thing loaned to him, in the loan
he has to return other things of the same quantity and quality.
338
6. Difference between Loan for Use and Lease of a Thing

The loan for use differs from the lease of a thing in that, whereas in the
loan for use contract the use of the thing is loaned without a quid pro quo, in
the lease of a thing contract there is a quid pro quo.
XI. DEPOSIT
1. The Concept and Features of Deposit
A. The Concept
Deposit is the contract whereby the one contracting party (depositary)
takes delivery from the other party (depositor) of a movable thing for
safekeeping with the obligation to return it upon demand (Art. 822 CC).
A fee may be demanded only if this has been agreed or follows from
the circumstances.
Only movable things may be the object of deposit.
Example: A deposits a jewelry box with B for safekeeping.
B. Features
The contract of deposit is a unilaterally charging and a delivery
contract; it is also a gratuitous contract. However, if a fee has been agreed
upon, it becomes a reciprocal contract because rights and obligations are
generated for both parties.
2. Conclusion of the Contract of Deposit
The contract of deposit is an informal contract because no particular
form is required for its valid conclusion. Nonetheless, because it is a
delivery contract, it is necessary for the depositor to deliver to the depositary
the thing given for safekeeping.
A. Obligations of the Depositary
The main obligation of the depositary is to safeguard the thing
entrusted to him. The depositary is not entitled to use the thing without the
LAW OF OBLIGATIONS
339
depositors permission nor does he have the right to deposit it with a third
party (Art. 824 CC).
B. Obligations of the Depositor
The depositor does not owe the depositary any remuneration unless
otherwise agreed. However, he must reimburse him for expenses he incurred
for the safekeeping of the thing deposited. Moreover, the depositor must
compensate the depositary for damages the latter may have sustained on
account of the deposit, unless the damage is not the result of the depositors
fault (Art. 826 CC).
4. Termination of the Contract of Deposit
Regarding the termination of the contract of deposit we need to
distinguish between deposit for safekeeping for a fixed term and deposit for
an indefinite period.
A. Deposit for a Fixed Term
If the term for the safekeeping is fixed, the contract ends at the
expiration of the time period agreed.
Exceptionally, the law allows the depositary to return the thing before
the elapse of the time period agreed for the safekeeping, if unforeseeable
events make it impossible for the depositary to further keep the thing safely
without prejudice to himself (Art. 828, 1 CC).
Also, upon the depositors demand, the depositary is bound to return
the thing even if the time period set for the safekeeping has not elapsed (Art.
827 CC).
B. Deposit for an Indefinite Period
If in the contract of deposit no term has been fixed for the safekeeping,
the depositary may return the thing at any time (Art. 828, 2 CC).
340
XII. GUARANTEE
1. The Concept and Features of the Guarantee
A. The Concept
Guarantee is the contract whereby the one contracting party
(guarantor) assumes the responsibility vis--vis the other (creditor) that the
principal debtors payment will be effected (Art. 847 CC).39
Example: A (principal debtor) owes B (creditor) 100,000 euros by reason of
purchase of an immovable from him. B, in order to secure his claim against A,
concludes a contract of guarantee with C (guarantor) who undertakes the
obligation to pay B the amount of 100,000 euros if A fails to make the payment.
B. Features
The contract of guarantee is concluded between creditor and guarantor
without it being necessary for the principal debtor to agree.
The contract of guarantee is an accessory contract. Consequently, for it
to be valid it is necessary for the principal obligation to be valid. If the
principal obligation is null and void, the contract of guarantee is also null
and void.
If in the previous example the contract of sale of the immovable which was
concluded between A and B is null and void because no notarial document was
executed, the contract of guarantee between B and C is also null and void.
2. Conclusion of the Contract of Guarantee

The contract of guarantee is a formal contract because for its valid
conclusion a written document is necessary (either a private document or a
notarial deed). The lack of a written document may be remedied if the
guarantor has satisfied the debt (Art. 849 CC).
3. The Operation of the Contract of Guarantee
When sued by the creditor to pay the debt, the guarantor may refuse
payment until the creditor has carried out forcible execution40 on the
39
For the contract of guarantee and the letters of guarantee given by banks to the creditors of
their clients, see Psychomanis, op. cit., pp. 73 et seq. and 333 et seq.; Rokas, op. cit., p. 97 et
seq.
LAW OF OBLIGATIONS
341
property of the debtor and this has proved fruitless. It is the case of the plea
of prior execution, a benefit granted to the guarantor for his own protection
(Art. 855 CC) to force the creditor to attempt forcible execution against the
property of the principal debtor first.
If the guarantor is not entitled to oppose the plea of prior execution,41
e.g. because he has waived such right, the creditor may bring action against
the guarantor without having first attempted to levy execution on the
property of the principal debtor.
4. Differences between the Contract of Guarantee and Cumulative
Assumption of Debt
The contract of guarantee resembles the cumulative assumption of
debt42 because in both cases a third party undertakes the obligation to pay
the debtors debt.
However, there are major differences between the two types of
contracts the most important of which are the following:
1. The guarantor is liable vis--vis the creditor only secondarily and, if
the creditor brings action against him, he has the right to oppose the plea of
prior execution. By way of contrast, in the cumulative assumption of debt
the third party has a primary obligation to make payment (joint and several
obligation) and the creditor may take action against him directly, without
having to turn against the principal debtor first.
2. For the valid conclusion of the contract of guarantee a written
document is required, whereas the cumulative assumption of debt is a
transaction subject to no formal requirement.
40
See above General Principles, Part Two, Ch. E, I, 5.

The guarantor does not have the plea of prior execution in the cases enumerated in Article
857 of the Greek Civil Code.
42
See above Part Six, Ch. C, III.
41
CHAPTER C
MAIN CONTRACTS IN CONTEMPORARY TRANSACTIONS
REGULATED BY SPECIAL LAWS
I. GENERAL
Other than the contracts which are regulated in the Special Part of the
Law of Obligations, new types of contracts have emerged in the world of
contemporary transactions some of which are regulated by special laws. In
what follows we will discuss briefly four such contracts which have known
a remarkable popularity in Greece in recent years. They are the contracts of
leasing, time-sharing, factoring, and forfaiting, the last being a contract very
similar to factoring.
II. THE LEASING CONTRACT1
1. General
The contract of leasing first appeared in the USA in 1952 and today it
is widely used throughout the world. In Greece it was regulated by L.
1665/1986 and it is this same law which, after being modified,2 regulates the
contract of leasing in this country to this day.
In Greece the institution of leasing has recently known a rapid
development which increases impressively year after year.
1
Regarding the leasing contract, see Ap. Georgiadis, New Types of Contracts in
Contemporary Economy, 4th ed., 2000, p. 33 et seq.; P. Mazis, Leasing, 2nd ed., 1999; P.
Malakos, Franchising-Leasing, 1991; P. Paparseniou, The Leasing Contract, 1994; G.
Lazaridis, Contemporary Forms of Financing, 1997, p. 23 et seq.; Ap. Georgiadis, Law of
Obligations, Special Part, op. cit., p. 492 et seq.
2
L. 1665/1986 was mainly modified by L. 2367/1995 but also by subsequent laws (L.
2520/1997, L. 2682/1999, and L. 3091/2002).
LAW OF OBLIGATIONS
343
2. The Concept and Features of Leasing

A. The Concept
Leasing is the contract whereby the one contracting party (lessor)
undertakes the obligation to yield for a certain period of time to the other
contracting party (lessee) the use of a thing (leased thing) to be used
exclusively for the lessees professional purposes, while offering the latter
the possibility of either purchasing the thing by a unilateral declaration to
the lessor at the end of the term, or renewing the contract for a specific
period of time.3
B. Features
The characteristics of this contract, which is a reciprocal, onerous, and
compound contract,4 are the following:
a. Only a corporation which has been set up for the sole purpose of
conducting such leasing business may be the lessor.
b. For such leasing companies to be formed special permission from
the Bank of Greece is required. Moreover, such leasing corporations are
required to have a capital amounting to one half of the minimum capital
required for setting up a banking corporation.5 These corporations, known as
leasing corporations, are under the supervision and control of the Bank of
Greece.6
c. Only an enterprise or a businessman may be the lessee.7
The law regulating the leasing contract in Greece has termed it financial leasing contract
(hrimatodotiki misthosi/ ), possibly because it mainly regulates the
simple version of leasing where the aspect of indirect financing (of the lessee) is prominent.
This term has subsequently been used in several legal writings in the English language.
However, the correct English term for this type of contract is simply leasing (Translators
note).
3
See Art. 1, para. 1 L. 1665/1986.
4
The leasing contract has the features of the following contracts: lease of a thing, mandate,
assignment of a claim, and option contract (see Ap. Georgiadis, New Types of Contracts in
Contemporary Economy, op. cit., p. 67 et seq.; Paparseniou, op. cit., p. 52).
5
Naturally, for setting up a leasing corporation it is necessary for all the other conditions
required by law for the formation of any corporation to be met. See L. 2190/1920 on
corporations, as later modified.
6
See Art. 2, para. 6, L. 1665/1986.
7
Any natural or legal person of private or public law operating a business may conclude a
leasing contract.
344
d. The object of leasing is the yielding of the use of a movable8 or

immovable,9 10 or both, provided that they are intended exclusively for the
professional purposes of the lessee.
e. The duration of the leasing contract is always fixed and the parties
may not agree on a duration which is less than three years regarding
movable things, five years regarding aircrafts, and ten years regarding
immovables.11 In case a shorter duration is agreed, the minimum duration
stipulated by law will apply.
f. At the expiration of the leasing contract the lessee is entitled to either
purchase the leased thing or renew the leasing contract for a fixed
duration.12
3. Usefulness of the Leasing Contract
The fact that the leasing contract has become so widely spread
throughout the world is due to the many advantages it offers the enterprise
or businessman concluding it. The most important of them are the
following:
A. It affords the businessman the possibility to upgrade and expand the
equipment of his enterprise or business without having to lay out his own
capital which is thus freed to be invested elsewhere.
B. It offers the businessman tax benefits not only in the sense that the
leasing contract as such is favorably treated by the tax laws, but also
because the rent paid by the lessee falls in the category of business
expenses and, as such, can be deducted from his gross income.
8
By movables we also understand aircrafts, but ships and other sea vessels are excluded (Art.
1, para. 3 L. 1665/1986).
9
Article 11 of L. 2367/1995, which modified L. 1665/1986, extended this form of leasing to
immovables as well (see Ap. Georgiadis, The Leasing of Immovables, in NoB 44 (1996), p.
744 et seq.; D. Agapitidou Alogoskoufi / Ch. Dimitriou, Extending Leasing to Immovables,
1995).
10
The term immovables includes agrarian lots, horizontal and vertical real estate properties
with buildings erected on them, along with the percentage of land corresponding to each
building computed on the basis of the buildable space of the terrain (Art. 1, para. 3 L.
1665/1986, as modified by Art. 27, para. 2, L. 2682/1999). See Ap. Georgiadis, New Types of
Contracts, op. cit., p. 38 et seq.
11
See Art. 3, para. 1 L. 1665/1986.
12
It is the case of an option contract meaning that at the expiration of the leasing contract the
lessee has the right to either buy the leased thing or renew the lease for a fixed period of time
by a unilateral declaration of his (as regards the option contract, see Ap. Georgiadis, The
Option Contract and the Right of Option, 1970).
LAW OF OBLIGATIONS
345
C. It helps the businessman avoid borrowing since the rent due may be
paid from the income yielded by the operation of the business.
4. Conclusion of the Leasing Contract
A. Form
The contract of leasing is a formal transaction because for its valid
conclusion it is necessary that it be drawn in writing (private document) and
this form is constitutive.13 Specifically, in the case of immovables the
document needs to be vested notarial form.14
In practice there are standardized forms for the contracts of leasing.
They are prepared in advance, usually by the leasing corporation which also
determines what the general terms of the contract will be.15 Such terms are,
for example, the lessees obligation to pay the rent, make good use of the
leased thing, and insure the leased thing.
The special terms of the leasing contract are spelled out in the so
called annex which constitutes an inseparable part of the leasing contract.
B. Publicity
According to the law,16 the leasing contract is also subject to publicity.
This is secured by the legal requirement to enter it in a special public
register kept both at the Court of First Instance of the seat or domicile of the
lessee and at the Athens Court of First Instance.17 Especially regarding
immovables and aircrafts, a double system of publicity is thus established:
on the one hand they need to be entered in the special public register kept at
the Athens Court of First Instance and on the other they need to be recorded
in the public books of recordation18 of the area where the leased immovable
is located or, in the case of aircrafts, in the aircraft registry.
13
See Art. 4, para. 1 L. 1665/1986.

See Art. 1, para. 3 in conjunction with Art. 4, para. 1 L. 1665/1986.
15
When standardized contract terms are used, Art. 2 of L. 2251/1994 for the protection of the
consumers is applicable.
16
See Art. 4, para. 2 L. 1665/1986.
17
See Art. 5 LegD 1038/1949.
18
See Art. 1, para. 3 L. 1665/1986. As regards transcription, see Arts. 1192-1208 CC.
14
346
5. The Operation of the Leasing Contract

A. General
Leasing is a trilateral contract.19 At this point it should be noted that we
will here discuss only its most ordinary form, the simple leasing (financial
leasing).20
To make this type of contract better understood we cite the following
example:
Example: Businessman A, who needs certain goods (e.g. medical instruments,
office equipment), goes to supplier P who sells such merchandise and negotiates
with him the price and specifications. Subsequently, A addresses himself to the
leasing company X which purchases for him the merchandise in question from
supplier P and then leases them out to A through a leasing contract (to be noted
that the corporation has previously directed P to deliver the merchandise directly
to A).

a. Relationship between lessor and lessee
As was already mentioned, the leasing contract differs from the simple
contract of lease of a thing in the sense that it is a compound contract which
also has the characteristics of other contracts.21 Consequently, there are
particularities in the relation between lessor and lessee.
More specifically:
aa. The selection of the thing to be bought by the lessor, and
subsequently become the object of the lease, is made by the future lessee.
bb. The lessee is obliged to pay the agreed rent to the lessor at the time
periods agreed upon, usually every three or six months.22
cc. During the entire duration of the contract, the lessee is obliged to
maintain the thing leased suitable for the agreed use and bear all the
relevant expenses.
19
See Georgiadis, New Types of Contracts., op. cit., p. 26; Paparseniou, op. cit., p. 23 et
seq.
20
Other types of leasing are the operating leasing, the lease back leasing, and the
leveraged leasing.
21
See above Part Three, Ch. A, III, 6.
22
See Georgiadis, op. cit., p. 54.
LAW OF OBLIGATIONS
347
dd. The lessee is liable for chance damage, destruction, or loss of the
thing leased. Consequently, in case of damage, the lessee is obliged to
repair it at his expense and in case of destruction or loss to replace it with
another of equal value without being released from his obligation to
continue paying rent.
ee. The lessee is obliged to insure the thing against the risk of chance
destruction or deterioration.
ff. The lessor assigns to the lessee the claims he has against the
supplier from the sale contract.
gg. Finally, what is characteristic of this type of leasing contract is that
there is an agreement between the lessor and the lessee that, at the
expiration of the leasing contract, the latter has the right to either purchase
the thing leased or renew the leasing contract for a fixed period of time.
b. Relationship between lessor and supplier
The lessor-supplier relation is basically that of a sale contract.
However, in this sale transaction two special terms are agreed upon: one,
that the delivery of the purchased items will be made to the lessee, and two,
that the leasing corporation assigns to the lessee all the claims it has against
the supplier for non fulfillment or improper fulfillment of the performance.
c. Relationship between lessee and supplier
The lessee does not have a contractual relation with the supplier
(seller). However, because, as was already mentioned, the leasing company
has assigned to him the claims it has against the supplier, the lessee may
demand from the supplier and even force him to fulfill his contractual
obligations.
6. Termination of the Leasing Contract
The ways for a leasing contract to be terminated are the following:
A. Expiration of the time period for which the leasing contract was
agreed, provided that the lessee did not exercise the right granted to him by
the leasing contract to renew the lease.
B. Purchase of the leased thing by the lessee, according to the right
granted to him by the leasing contract at the time of conclusion of the
transaction.
348
C. Termination of the leasing contract23 on the part of the leasing

company before the expiration of the contract, if the lessee does not fulfill
his contractual obligations.
D. Bankruptcy24 of the lessee naturally, only if he is a merchant.25
III. THE TIME-SHARING CONTRACT26
1. General
The institution of time-sharing first appeared in France in the beginning
of the Sixties and in a short time it spread all over the world.
The expansion of time-sharing contracts in the international tourist
market was the reason why the Greek legislator was led to regulate this
contract by law (L. 1652/1986)27 in order for the country to remain
competitive in the area of tourism which is of primordial importance to its
national economy.
2. The Concept and Features of Time-sharing
A. The Concept
Time-sharing contract is the contract whereby the one contracting party
(lessor) undertakes the obligation to yield yearly to the other contracting
party (lessee) the use of housing for tourist purposes along with the
23
Regarding the concept of termination of a contract, see above Part Eight, Ch. B, IV, 4.
Bankruptcy is the condition into which a merchant lapses, following a court ruling, when
he stops making payments on his commercial debts. See Arts. 525-707 of ComN and EmergL
635/1937 On Certain Provisions of Bankruptcy Law.
25
This is expressly stipulated by the law (Art. 4, para. 3 L. 1665/1986).
26
See Ap. Georgiadis, Multi-ownership or Time-divided Ownership, in Essays in Honor of
K. Vavouskos, Vol. B, 1990, p. 41 et seq.; Ap. Georgiadis, Property Law, Vol. I, 1991, p. 680
et seq.; P. Paparseniou, Community Directives and Citizens Rights, 2002, p. 235 et seq.; Chr.
Themeli, The Contract of Time-sharing, 2003; D. Stamatiadis, The Contract of Time-sharing,
2003; A. Efthymiatou Poulakou, Time-sharing in Tourism, 2003; Ap. Georgiadis, Law of
Obligations, Special Part, op. cit., p. 521 et seq.
27
L. 1652/1986 was modified and completed by PrD 182/1999 which streamlined the Greek
law with the stipulations of Directive 94/47/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of October 26, 1994 On the protection of purchasers in the respect of certain aspects
of contracts relating to the purchase of the right to use immovable properties on a time-share
basis. Subsequently, Arts. 2, 4, and 11 of PrD 182/1999 were modified by PrD 293/2001.
24
LAW OF OBLIGATIONS
349
therewith connected services for a fixed period of time, as per the contractual
agreement, and the lessee undertakes the obligation to pay the agreed rent.28
Example: Hotel business X concludes a time-sharing contract with A and yields to
him the use of an apartment from July 8 to July 18 every year for forty years in
return for rent payable up front or in installments.
B. Features
The features of the time-sharing contract, which is a reciprocal,
onerous, continuous,29 and compound30 contract, are the following:
a. The lessor is a hotel owner or a tourist enterprise.
b. The object of the contract is on the one hand the yielding of the use
of housing for tourist purposes and on the other hand the provision of the
therewith connected services.
More specifically:
-
L. 1652/1986 determines what is to be understood by housing for

tourist purposes: hotel units and generally tourist installations
operating with a permit from the Greek Organization of Tourism
(EOT) and having been placed under the above mentioned law by
a decision of the Secretary General of the Greek Organization of
Tourism.31
When the law talks about therewith connected services it means
the services customarily provided for any housing for tourist
purposes, i.e. electricity, water, sewer, air condition, cleaning of the
room or the apartment by the staff, etc.
c. According to an express stipulation of the law,32 the duration of the

time-sharing contract is set for a period of time extending from three to sixty
years. Consequently, the law determines the lowest and the upper limit of its
possible duration.
28
See Art. 1, para. 1, subapara. 1 L. 1652/1986.

It is the case of a continuous (or standing) contract with non-continuous performance since
the yielding of the use of the housing and the therewith connected services is for certain fixed
periods of time which are repeated yearly (see Themeli, op. cit., p. 49 et seq.).
30
See Themeli, op. cit., p. 51 et seq.
The initials EOT are the abbreviation of the Greek term for Greek Organization of Tourism,
Ellinikos Organismos Tourismou/ (Translators note).
31
See Art. 1, para. 1, subpara. 2 L. 1652/1986.
32
See Art. 1, para. 1, subpara. 3 L. 1652/1986, as replaced by Art. 2, para. 3 PrD 182/1999.
29
350
d. The time-sharing contract continues to be binding after succession

(general or specific) and this holds for both the lessor and the lessee.33
e. The lessee has the right to sublease the premises or to yield the use of
the housing he has leased to third parties for one or more time periods.34
f. The rent, which is payable either in full or in installments, may also
be agreed in foreign currency if the lessee happens to be permanent resident
of a foreign country or has his business headquarters abroad.35
g. It is indispensable for the rules regulating the lessor-lessee
relationship to be attached to the time-sharing contract and become annexed
to it.36
h. Finally, it should be noted that, regarding securities for the financing
of the lessor, L. 1652/1986 provides the possibility of substituting bank
letters of guarantee, which the lessor can give to his creditors, for the old
method of securities, which were almost exclusively based on real securities
on immovables. 37
3. Usefulness of the Time-sharing Contract
Although the system of the time-sharing contract does not do away
with the transactions associated with the classical forms of tourism, it makes
it possible for the consumer to secure yearly at low cost and at prices which
are not subject to increase a permanent vacation residence during a limited
period of time for many years.
This type of vacation is even more enticing given the fact that, through
the Organizations of Time-sharing Exchange, it is possible to exchange the
vacation residence, for one or more uses, with that of another lessee
worldwide.38 In this fashion the disadvantage of monotony linked with this
type of choice for a vacation spot is eliminated.
4. Conclusion of the Time-sharing Contract
The time-sharing contract is a formal transaction because for its valid
33

See Art. 2, para. 2 L. 1652/1986.
35
See Art. 1, para. 3 L. 1652/1986.
36
See Art. 3, para. 2 in conjunction with Art. 2, para. 2 Decis. Deput. Minist. Nation. Econ.
No A 9953/DIONOSE()/1789/1987.
37
See Art. 3, para. 1 L. 1652/1986.
38
The main two international organizations for time-sharing exchange are the Resort
Condominiums International Inc. (RCI) and the Interval International.
34
LAW OF OBLIGATIONS
351
conclusion a notarial deed and transcription of it are required as constitutive

form.39 Moreover, it is necessary for the lessor to notify the Greek
Organization of Tourism40 (EOT) of the conclusion of such transaction.
5. Obligations and Rights of the Parties
Before referring to the obligations and rights of the contracting parties,
it is necessary to mention that, according to an explicit stipulation of PrD
182/1999,41 in time-sharing contracts the provisions of the Greek Civil Code
regarding the lease of a thing apply to matters which are not regulated by L.
1652/1986 or PrD 182/1999.
A. Obligations and Rights of the Lessor
a. Obligations of the lessor
Before the conclusion of a time-sharing contract, the lessor is under the
obligation to provide information. More specifically, the lessor must deliver
a supplementary document42 to every person inquiring about the immovable
or immovables on which the right of use under time-sharing terms is to be
acquired. This document, other than the general description of the
immovable or immovables in question, must furnish brief and exact
information about at least certain facts that the lessee should be aware of
before concluding the time-sharing contract.43
After the conclusion of the contract, the main obligations of the lessor
are the following:44
aa. to notify the Greek Organization of Tourism in writing regarding
the conclusion of the time-sharing contract;
bb. to deliver the leased premises to the lessee for the agreed use;
39
See Art. 1, para. 2 L.1652/1986.

See Art. 4, para. 1 L. 1652/1986.
41
See Art. 8 PrD 182/1999.
42
See Art. 3 PrD 182/1999.
43
These facts are mentioned in the annex attached to PrD 182/1999 and are, among others,
the ID and domicile of the contracting parties, the accurate description of the immovable, the
services for the common areas, the common areas installations, the general rules of
organization, cleaning and maintenance of the immovable, and the price agreed to be paid
(see Art. 9, PrD 182/1999).
44
See Art. 4 L. 1652/1986 and Art. 2, para. 2 Decis. Deput. Minist. Nation. Econ. No A
9953/DIONOSE/1789/1987.
40
352
cc. to maintain the leased premises, the common areas, and in general
all the installations of the tourist unit in good working condition;
dd. to maintain the staff needed to cover the demands of full occupancy
of the tourist unit;
ee. to repair at once any damages as well as all wear and tear and to
renew regularly all types of equipment used in the unit;
ff. to pay the taxes, dues, and all other fees owed to the state, the
Organizations of Local Government (OTA), or third parties, and to pay the
various bills for all types of utilities (electricity, telephone, etc.), as well as
all the financial obligations stemming from the operation of all the
installations of the unit.
b. Rights of the lessor

The rights of the lessor which arise in case the lessee does not fulfill his
obligations are mainly the following:
aa. the right to terminate the contract in case of bad use of the leased
premises (Art. 594 CC) or of non payment of the whole or part of the rent
(Art. 597 CC);
bb. the right to seek damages from the lessee if the latter: a) failed to let
him know of defects which showed up during the lease (Art. 589 CC); b)
neglects the obligation to use the leased premises diligently (Art. 594 CC);
or c) does not behave appropriately towards the other tenants (Art. 594
CC).
B. Obligations and Rights of the Lessee
a. Obligations of the lessee
The main obligations of the lessee are the following:45
aa. to pay the agreed rent;
bb. to use the leased premises and the common areas with diligence and
to behave properly towards the other tenants;
cc. to notify the lessor in a timely fashion of the defects of the leased
premises that showed up during his stay;
The Greek term for Organizations of Local Government is Organismoi Topikis
Aftodioikisis/ (Translators note).
45
See Arts. 574, 589, 594, 599 CC; Art. 1, para. 1 L. 1652/1986; Art. 3, para. 1, and Arts. 5
and 6 Decis. Deput. Minist. Nation. Econ. No A 9953/DIONOSE/1789/1987.
LAW OF OBLIGATIONS
353
dd. to pay his share of expenses for the operation of the unit;
ee. to return the leased premises to the lessor at the end of every period
of use as well as after the expiration of the time-sharing agreement.
b. Rights of the lessee46
aa. The lessee has the right to rescind the contract without providing
any reason within ten calendar days from delivery to him of the copy of the
time-sharing contract or the binding agreement to conclude such timesharing contract.47
bb. The right to terminate the contract on account of the fact that the
text of the contract did not provide him with the required by PrD 182/1999
necessary information (e.g. the ID of the contracting parties, precise
description of the immovable, price, information as regards the rights of
termination and rescission); this right must be exercised by the lessee within
three months from the time of delivery to him of a copy of the contract.48
cc. After the elapse of the three months period granted to the lessee to
terminate the time-sharing contract, he still has the right to rescind it within
ten days from the day following the expiration of the above mentioned three
month time period in case the time-sharing contract indeed does not contain
the necessary information stipulated by PrD 182/1999.49
dd. The lessee has the following rights in case the lessor does not fulfill
his obligations:
aaa. the claim to pay less or no rent or seek damages in case the leased
premises have defect in title (legal defect) or there are either material
defects or lack of agreed qualities (Arts. 583 and 576 CC);
bbb. the right to terminate the contract on account of non delivery of the
agreed use or because the use of the leased premises poses a threat to the
lessees health (Arts. 585 and 588 CC).
6. Protection of the Rights of the Lessee
The General Assembly of the Lessees50 is the organ appointed for the
protection of the rights of the lessees. Every lessee in a time-sharing contract
46
See Themeli, op. cit., p. 98 et seq.

See Art. 4, para. 1 (a) and (b) of PrD 182/1999, as amended by Art. 2 of PrD 293/2001.
48
See above footn. 47.
49
See Art. 4, para. 1 (c) PrD 182/1999.
50
See Art. 7 Decis. Deput. Minist. Nation. Econ. No A 9953/DIONOSE/1789/1987.
47
354
contract has the right to be part of the General Assembly of the Lessees.
The General Assembly of the Lessees is entitled to select a natural or
legal person as manager entrusted with the following:
-
to oversee the compliance with the terms of the contract by the

lessor;
to secure on behalf of the General Assembly the good and
continuous operation and management of the leased premises, the
shared areas, and the installations of the tourist unit.
7. Control of the Time-sharing Contracts and Imposition of Sanctions

The Greek Organization of Tourism (EOT) has the right to check on
the implementation of the time-sharing contracts and on the annexed rules
regulating the lessor-lessee relationship as to their conformity with L.
1652/1986, the relevant Ministerial Decision,51 and all the executory acts
connected with L. 1652/1986.
In case the lessor does not fulfill his contractual obligations or any
obligations he has according to the hotel legislation, the Greek Organization
of Tourism imposes sanctions,52 each time weighing in concreto the
consequences of the sanctions for the lessees and for the tourist image of the
country as a whole.
If there are serious violations of the obligations of the lessor53 and the
usual sanctions54 prove ineffective, it is possible for the Greek Organization
of Tourism to impose either temporary or final revocation of the decision to
grant a hotel unit time-sharing status.55
51
See Art. 4, para. 1, subpara. 2 L. 1652/1986 in conjunction with Art. 4, para. 1 Decis.
Deput. Minist. Nation. Econ. No A 9953/DIONOSE/1789/1987.
52
The provision for these sanctions are in L. 642/1977 (see Art. 4, para. 2 Decis. Deput.
Minist. Nation. Econ. No A 9953, op. cit.).
53
These are the obligations of the lessor as defined in the rules regulating the lessor-lessee
relationship (see Art. 2, para. 2 Decis. Deput. Minist. Nation. Econ. No A 9953, op. cit.).
54
What is understood by usual sanctions is the sanctions imposed by L. 642/1977.
55
See Art. 6 L. 1652/1986 in conjunction with Art. 4, para. 3 Decis. Deput. Minist. Nation.
Econ. No A 9953, op. cit.
LAW OF OBLIGATIONS
355
IV. THE FACTORING CONTRACT56

1. General
The factoring contract which first appeared in the USA at the end of the
nineteenth century and became rapidly wide spread internationally was
regulated in Greece in 1990 by L. 1905/1990. Today it is still this same law
which, along with the modifications it underwent (through L. 2232/1994 and
L. 2367/1995), regulates the factoring contract in this country.
At this point it is important to note that in Greece the institution of
factoring, which was put to use in 1995, has undergone considerable
development during the last several years. This is due to the fact that the
business world has recognized the benefits it offers. It is anticipated that in
the years to follow the institution of factoring will develop at an even faster
pace.
2. The Concept and Features of the Factoring Contract
A. The Concept
The contract of factoring is concluded between one party whose main
occupation is to be the supplier of goods or services and another party who
is a factor, (i.e. agent) of business claims. The factor undertakes the
obligation (for a fee and for the agreed period of time) to offer the supplier
services associated with the follow up and receiving payment for one, part
of, or the totality of claims the latter has against his clients from goods sold
or services rendered to them.57
56
Regarding the factoring contract, see Chr. Themeli, Factoring: Towards a New
Phenomenon of Conducting Business, in Scientific Seniority Board of the Thessaloniki Bar
of Attorneys (...), 1985, p. 153 et seq.; P. Malakos, New Financing Institutions:
Factoring Forfaiting, 2nd ed., 1990; Ap. Georgiadis, New Types of Contracts, op. cit., p.
115 et seq.; V. Vathis, The Factoring Contract, 1995; S. Psychomanis, The Factoring
Contract: A Contract of Administering Business Claims, 1996; G. Lazaridis, Contemporary
Forms of Financing, op. cit., p. 79 et seq.
57
See Art. 1, para. 1 L. 1905/1990.
356
B. Features
The characteristics of the factoring contract, which is a reciprocal,
onerous, compound,58 and continuous (or standing) contract,59 are the
following:
a. Only banks which have their headquarters in Greece and operate
legally in this country may practice factoring. Factoring may also be
practiced by corporations which have been set up precisely for this
purpose.60
b. For setting up those special corporations, known as factoring
corporations,61 a special permit issued by the Bank of Greece is required and
their capital may not be smaller than one fourth of the minimum capital
required for setting up banking corporations. These corporations are under
the supervision and control of the Bank of Greece.62
c. The factoring contract contains especially the following:
aa. the assignment63 to the factor on the part of the supplier of the
latters claims against his clients;
bb. the authorization of the factor by the supplier to receive payment
for the latters claims;
cc. the factors financing of the supplier by way of paying him his
claims in advance;
dd. the factors follow up (from an accounting and legal point of view)
of the suppliers claims against the clients of the latter;
ee. coverage, in part or in whole, on the part of the factor of the credit
risk the supplier runs.64
d. The relation created between factor and supplier is a continuous one
because the claims assigned to the factor or the claims which the supplier
58
It is a compound contract because it contains elements of several other contracts (see

Georgiadis, op. cit., p. 134 et seq.; Psychomanis, op. cit., p. 160 et seq.).
59
It is a continuous (or standing) contract because the fulfillment of the performance
necessarily spreads over a long period of time (see Psychomanis, op. cit., p. 175 et seq.).
60
See Art. 4, para. 1 L. 1905/1990.
61
It goes without saying that for a factoring corporation to be set up all the requirements of
the law concerning all corporations need to also be met (see above, footn. 5).
62
See Art. 4, para. 2 L. 1905/1990.
63
Regarding the assignment of a claim, see Arts. 455 et seq. of the Greek Civil Code. For a
discussion on assignment, see above Part Six, Ch. B.
64
See Art. 1, para. 1 L. 1905/1990.
LAW OF OBLIGATIONS
357
authorizes the factor to collect concern both already existing claims the
supplier has against his clients and claims to be born in the future.65
3. Usefulness of the Factoring Contract
Factoring offers the supplier a number of services: it makes available to
him immediate liquidation of his business claims, their effective
management and satisfaction, assessment of the credit worthiness of his
current clients as well as of future ones, coverage for the credit risk the
supplier takes with his clients, and advisory services in matters of
management of the operating capital.
4. Types of Factoring Contracts
The most important distinction of factoring contracts is the distinction
between genuine and non-genuine. The difference between these two types
is the following:
In the genuine factoring contract the factor undertakes the risk of the
debtors insolvency, whereas in the non-genuine one the risk of the debtors
solvency remains with the supplier. 66 67
5. Conclusion of the Factoring Contract
The factoring contract is a formal transaction because for its valid
conclusion a written document68 is required as constitutive form.
In practice the factoring contracts come in standardized forms, drawn
by the factoring corporation. In these forms are mentioned the specific type
of factoring contract (whether it is of the genuine or the non-genuine type),
the fee of the factor, and the other terms of the agreement.69
However, in order for the factoring contract to be binding for the
debtor-client, the latter needs to be notified in writing70 by the supplier or the
65

See Georgiadis, op. cit., p. 124; Vathis, op. cit., p. 25 et seq.; Psychomanis, op cit., p. 47 et
seq.
67
Other distinctions of the factoring contract are domestic and international factoring, bulkinhouse factoring, and confidential factoring. As regards the types of factoring contracts, see
Georgiadis, op. cit., p. 124 et seq.; Vathis, op. cit., p. 25 et seq.; Psychomanis, op. cit. p. 47 et
seq. and 244 et seq.
68
See Art. 1, para. 1 L. 1905/1990.
69
70
According to Art. 2, para. 2 L. 1905/1990 any written notice is considered notification.
66
358
factor. Consequently, only after such written notification is the debtor

obliged to make payments to the factor. Before notification, he is obliged to
make payments to the supplier.
6. The Operation of the Factoring Contract
A. General
The factoring contract, the same as the leasing contract, is a trilateral
contract.71
To make it better understood we cite the following example:
Example: Merchant A (supplier of goods or services), who either sold
merchandise or offered services to his clients, has claims against them for various
amounts of money. In order for A to be able to receive payment for his claims
immediately and rid himself of the preoccupation with procedural matters, the
assessment of the credit worthiness of his clients, and the follow up of their
financial standing, he concludes a factoring contract with bank T or with factoring
corporation F. The result of this contract is that the factor (i.e. the bank or the
factoring corporation) undertakes the task to secure payment from As clients, to
finance the merchant by making payment to him of his claims in advance, and to
provide several kinds of services to him. But this factoring contract is only
binding for the clients if they have been notified in writing either by the factor or
by the supplier himself. This means that only following such notification is the
client obliged to fulfill his performance to the agent. Before notification, the
clients are only obliged to furnish their performance to the supplier.

a. Relationship between factor and supplier
The most important obligations for the contracting parties in the
factoring contract are the following:
The factor undertakes the obligations:
aa. to receive payment of the suppliers claims from the client or
clients;
bb. to finance the supplier by paying him in advance the claims he has
against his clients;
71
LAW OF OBLIGATIONS
359
cc. to carry out the services he agreed upon with the supplier, e.g.
management, bookkeeping, legal follow up of the suppliers claims against
his clients, etc.
The supplier on his part has the following obligations:
aa. to assign to the factor the claims mentioned in the factoring contract
they concluded;
bb. to pay the factor the agreed fee;
cc. not to enter into another factoring contract with another agent
regarding the same claims.72
b. Relationship between factor and debtor-client
The relation between factor and debtor-client is created only after the
latter has been notified in writing about the factoring contract either by the
factor or by the supplier. Prior to such notification, there is no relationship
between factor and debtor-client. Following notification,73 the factor takes
the place of the supplier, i.e. he becomes the creditor and from that point on
payments should be made to him alone.
c. Relationship between supplier and debtor-client
The relation between supplier and debtor-client may be sale, contract
for work, employment contract, etc.74
7. Duration and Expiration of the Factoring Contract
The law has no provisions as regards minimum duration of the
factoring contract. Consequently, it may be agreed that the duration is fixed
or indefinite. Next, we will distinguish between termination of a factoring
contract for a fixed term and for an indefinite period.
72
See Art. 3, para. 3 L. 1905/1990.

In this case the provisions for assignment of a claim are applicable (Arts. 455 et seq. CC).
74
Depending on what type of contract underlies the supplier/debtor-client relationship, the
relevant provisions of the law will be applicable, i.e. if it is sale, the provisions of the law
regulating sale (Arts. 513 et seq. CC), if it is contract for work, the provisions of the law
regulating the contract for work (Arts. 681 et seq. CC), etc.
73
360
A. Factoring Contract for a Fixed Term

In case a fixed time has been agreed for the factoring contract, the
contract ends after the elapse of the fixed time period. It is possible,
however, for the contract to end earlier by way of extraordinary (summary)
termination75 initiated by either party if important cause exists. For
example, for the factor important cause exists if the supplier has
misrepresented his true financial situation.76
B. Factoring Contract for an Indefinite Period
If the factoring contract is of indefinite duration, any of the contracting
parties may terminate the contract upon notice,77 i.e. he may upon notice
cause the contract to be terminated after the elapse of a certain period of
time78 from the time the contracting party to whom the notice is addressed
takes cognizance of it.
V. THE FORFAITING CONTRACT79
1. The Concept of the Forfaiting Contract
The forfaiting contract is regulated by the same law, L. 1905/1990,
which regulated the factoring contract. This is so because factoring and
forfaiting are basically aspects of one and the same institution differing only
in their practices and the type of claims assigned to the agent to pursue.80
The contract of forfaiting was first used by Swiss banks during the
Second World War. Its special feature is that the banks or the special
75
See Psychomanis, op. cit., pp. 177 and 241 et seq. Regarding the concept of extraordinary
or summary termination, see I. Karakatsanis, in Georgiadis Stathopoulos, Commentary on
the Civil Code, Introductory Remarks on Arts. 416-454, No 22 et seq.
76
See Psychomanis, op. cit., p. 177.
77
Regarding the concept of termination upon notice (ordinary termination), see Karakatsanis,
op. cit., No 19 et seq.
78
See Psychomanis, op. cit., p. 177.
79
See Introductory Report of L. 1905/1990 On the Contract of Factoring and Other
Provisions, Art. 1.
80
See Malakos, New Financing Institutions, op. cit.; Chr. Chrysanthis, Forfaiting: The
Financing of Exports, 1991; Georgiadis, New Types of Contracts, op. cit., p. 165 et seq.;
Psychomanis, Factoring, op. cit., p. 260 et seq.; Lazaridis, Contemporary Forms of
Financing, op. cit., p. 101 et seq.
LAW OF OBLIGATIONS
361
factoring corporations81 make advance payment to the supplier of claims

which are usually of the type of negotiable instruments (e.g. bills of
exchange, checks to order) and embody export claims without recourse for
payment against the exporter, in case the claim is not satisfied by the
importer.
For the security of the agent (forfaiter) the claims for which he makes
advance payment are guaranteed by a bank which is credit worthy.82
2. The Operation of the Forfaiting Contract
The forfaiting contract, which is a way of financing exports, is also a
trilateral contract.
To facilitate its comprehension we cite the following example:
Example: Exporter E concludes a forfaiting contract whereby he sells and assigns
to forfaiter P claims he has against importer O in the form of bills of exchange. In
case forfaiter P is unable to get importer O to pay for these claims, he does not
have recourse for payment against E and cannot demand fulfillment of the
performance from him.
81
See above Ch. C, IV, 2, B.

Regarding the differences between factoring and forfaiting, see Georgiadis, op. cit., p. 168
et seq.; Psychomanis, op. cit., p. 267 et seq.
82
CHAPTER D
NON-REGULATED OR INNOMINATE CONTRACTS
I. GENERAL
The principle of freedom of contracts allows the contracting parties to
form different types of contracts. In those contracts, which are called non
regulated or innominate contracts, aside from the rules of the General Law
of Obligations, apply by way of analogy the provisions of either the Special
Law of Obligations or of special laws.
Some of the non regulated (or innominate) contracts appear very
frequently in the world of transactions, so much so that they are
characterized as contracts standardized in the transactions.1 Such typical
standardized contracts are, for example, the credit letter, the contract
between attorney and client or physician and patient, the franchising
contract, the consulting contract (business or professional consulting), the
credit card contract, etc.
Since from all the above mentioned innominate contracts franchising is
the most widespread in our times, we have selected it for our discussion,
summary as this discussion may be.
See Georgiadis, New Types of Contracts, op. cit., p. 11.
LAW OF OBLIGATIONS
363
II. THE FRANCHISE CONTRACT2

1. General
The franchise contract was first practiced in the USA at the end of the
nineteenth century when the first network of franchising was organized by
Singer, the sewing machines company, for the distribution of its products.
Subsequently, franchising was spread to many other types of business: cars,
hotels, gas stations, etc.
In Europe the rate of development of franchising was guarded at first;
but since the Eighties the European enterprises began showing an increasing
interest in the development of this type of contract.
In Greece franchising has been used for a number of years but it began
developing rapidly only since 1993.
2. The Concept and Features of Franchising
A. The Concept
Franchising is a contract concluded between two enterprises one of
which (franchisor) undertakes the obligation to yield to the other
(franchisee) for a financial gain (immediate or long term) the right to exploit
the franchise package for the purpose of merchandising certain types of
products and/or services.
B. Features
a. Franchise package is the sum total of rights of industrial or
intellectual property concerning trade marks3 and trade names,4 distinctive
Regarding franchising, see Chr. Themeli, The Franchise Contract, in Essays in Honor of
K. Vavouskos, Vol. B, 1989, p. 85 et seq.; El. Soufleros, The Franchise Contract in Greek
and Community Law of Competition, 1995 (reprint of the 1989 ed.); P. Malakos, Franchising
Leasing, op. cit.; D. Kostakis, Franchising: A Legal and Enterpreneurial Dimension, 2nd
ed., 2002; Georgiadis, New Types of Contracts, op. cit., p. 193 et seq.; Lazaridis,
Contemporary Forms of Financing, Vol. 2, Franchising, 2000.
3
Trade mark is a distinctive symbol (capable of graph representation) which identifies
particular products or services of a trader to the general public, thus distinguishing them from
other similar products or services (Art. 1 L. 2239/1994), such as for example, Lacoste,
Adidas.
4
Trade name is the name under which the merchant conducts his trade. Distinctive title is a
name or representation used in transactions to specify the place where a business operates
364
titles of enterprises, utility models, designs, rights on technical expertise

(know-how),5 and patents6 as regards the resale of products or the offering
of services to the final users.7
b. The franchise contract includes obligations regarding:
aa. the use of the common trade name or distinctive title and the
uniform appearance of space and means of transportation under the
franchise contract;
bb. the sharing by the franchisor of his technical expertise (know-how)
with the franchisee;
cc. the continual supply on the part of the franchisor of commercial and
technical support to the franchisee during the time of duration of the
franchise contract.
Example: Clothing business A grants to business B the right to operate the
franchise package of the former with the purpose of reaching new markets with its
products.
c. The franchise contract is a reciprocal, onerous contract, a contract of

adhesion (or accession) and a compound contract.8 It is also a frame type
of contract because it only regulates the basic rights and obligations of the
contracting parties.9
d. The franchise contract, as was already mentioned, is a non regulated
or innominate contract because it is not governed by a specific law. For the
(store or, more generally, enterprise), such as for example, restaurant The Three Brothers,
hotel Olympus.
5
Technical expertise (know-how) is the sum total of practical information stemming from the
experience of the grantor which is not protected by a patent.
6
Patents are granted by the Organization of Industrial Property (in Greek O.B.I.
{Organismos Viomihanikis Idioktisias/ }) when it is
proven that they constitute an invention, i.e. a new creation involving inventive activity and
capable of industrial application (Art. 5, L. 1733/1987).
7
See I. Voulgaris, Franchise Agreements as they Result from the International Legal
Practice and Operate in International Transactions, in NoB 46 (1998), p. 897 et seq.,
especially p. 904 et seq. The Commission Regulation (EEC) No 4087/1988 of November 30,
1988 (On the application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to categories of franchise
agreements), which was valid until May 31, 2000, defined the concept of franchise
package in Art. 1, para. 3a.
8
See Soufleros, op. cit., p. 106 et seq.; Georgiadis, op. cit., p. 235 et seq.
9
For the fulfillment of the obligations stipulated in the franchise contract it is necessary to
conclude a series of specific contracts as regards, for example, the supply of raw material,
measures for the promotion of sales, etc. See Soufleros, op. cit., p. 57 et seq.; Georgiadis, op.
cit. p. 205 et seq.
LAW OF OBLIGATIONS
365
operation of this contract the provisions of the Greek Civil Code apply and,
by analogy, the provisions of PrD 219/1991 as regards the commercial
representatives, L. 703/1977 as regards the protection of free competition,
and L. 2251/1994 as regards the consumers protection.
Since May 31, 2000, Commission Regulation (EEC) No 4087/1998 of
November 30, 1998, which used to govern the franchise contract, no longer
applies.10 Beginning January 1, 2000 the new Commission Regulation (EC)
No 2790/1999 of December 22, 1999, On the application of Article 81(3)
of the Treaty to categories of vertical agreements and concerted practices,
which entered into force on June 1, 2000, applies.11
The Commission Regulation (EC) No 2790/1999 of December 22,
1999 has no definitions regarding franchising or special provisions
regarding the relevant contracts. This regulation only indirectly concerns
franchising because it refers to certain categories of vertical agreements
regarding the supply and sale of goods or services.12
Regarding franchising it should be noted, however, that the European
Federal Franchise has set up a European Code of Ethical Conduct which
was also adopted by the Franchise Association of Greece. Even though this
Code is not legally binding, nonetheless it sets up standards of proper
behavior for all those dealing with franchising.13
3. Advantages and Disadvantages of the Franchise Contract
The franchise contract has several advantages and disadvantages for the
contracting parties.
More specifically:
A. Advantages
a. Advantages for the franchisee
The advantages for the franchisee are the following:
aa. He retains the legal and managerial autonomy of his business.
bb. He makes use of the technical expertise (know-how) of the
franchisor.
10
See Art. 12, para. 1 Commission Regulation (EC) No 2790/1999 of December 22, 1999.
See Art. 13 Commission Regulation (EC) No 2790/1999 of December 22, 1999.
12
13
See Kostakis, op. cit., p. 659 et seq.
11
366
cc. He needs less capital than he would have otherwise needed if he

were to start his own business.
dd. He gets technical and managerial support from the franchisor.
ee. He buys merchandise (raw material, ready made or partially ready
made products) at better prices through the mass markets of the
franchisor.
ff. He improves his credit standing in the business world which
positively affects his ability to get financing and helps him in other
commercial matters.
b. Advantages for the franchisor
The advantages for the franchisor are the following:
aa. Franchising allows the franchisor to increase the number of the
distribution outlets of the products or services of his business without
committing his capital.
bb. He has a better return on his capital.
cc. He broadens the network of his sales or services internationally
without getting involved in procedures or incurring as many expenses as
he would have otherwise incurred if he were to seek work permits etc. for
the operation of his business abroad.
dd. His name and reputation increase with the rapid expansion of a
known network of distribution, something which strengthens his
competitive status in the market.
B. Disadvantages
a. Disadvantages for the franchisee
The disadvantages for the franchisee are the following:
aa. He is very dependent on the franchisor.
bb. His initiative is limited because he is obliged to follow the detailed
instructions of the franchisor.
cc. His commercial success depends mainly on the entrepreneurial
policy of the grantor. If, in other words, the commercial name of the
franchisor ceases to be as reputable as it used to be, due to bad
management of the business on the part of the franchisor, this will also
immediately affect the image of the franchisee in the market.
LAW OF OBLIGATIONS
367
dd. The clauses which are usually included in the franchise contract
mainly aim at protecting the interests of the franchisor, thus imposing
obligations and limitations to the franchisee.
b. Disadvantages for the franchisor
The disadvantages for the franchisor are the following:
aa. Because of the fact that the selection of the franchisee is hard, this
type of collaboration is not immune to the risk of failure.
bb. It is difficult for the grantor to exercise the necessary control for the
correct application of the instructions given by him to the franchisee.
cc. The franchisors share in the profit from the sale of the products or
services via franchising is less than it would have otherwise been had he
opened his own branches.
4. Types of Franchising
Depending on the object of the transaction, there are four types of
franchising: i) distribution franchising; ii) franchising of services; iii)
production or industrial franchising; and iv) mixed franchising.
More specifically:
A. Distribution Franchising
Distribution franchising is the most common type of franchising and
refers to the sale by the franchisee to the final consumers (i.e. retail sale) of
one or more products of a certain category inside a store carrying the
distinctive title of the franchisor.14
This type of franchising may be found in food items (e.g. Leonidas
chocolates, Coffea coffee), clothing items for women, men or children, (e.g.
Benetton, Kooka, Springfield, Alouette), furniture (e.g. Ikea, Neoset),
photographic equipment (e.g. Quick Foto), etc.
B. Franchising of Services
During the last several years the franchising of services is on the rise. It
consists in the offering of services on the part of the franchisee to the final
consumers, services which carry the distinctive title, trade name, or even the
14
See Soufleros, op. cit., p. 13.
368
trade mark of the franchisor. Moreover, they are services which are rendered
according to the instructions given to the franchisee by the franchisor.15 The
franchising of services may be found in the restaurant and fast food business
(e.g. Mc Donalds, Applebees, TGI Fridays), in the hotel business (e.g.
Hilton, Novotel, Holiday Inn), in the car rental business (e.g. Hertz, Avis),
etc.
C. Production or Industrial Franchising
In production or industrial franchising the franchisor yields to the
franchisee the license to manufacture or alter certain products according to
the instructions of the former and then sell them with the franchisors trade
mark.16 Typical examples of this are the cases of bottling services and sale
of non alcoholic beverages such as Coca-Cola, Schweppes, Seven-Up, etc.
D. Mixed Franchising
The mixed franchising has elements of distribution franchising and
services franchising, i.e. it combines the sale of products and the therewith
connected services.17 The franchising of cars may be a good example of
such mixed franchising because it combines the sale of cars with services
for their repair and maintenance; the same holds for the franchising of
cosmetics which combines the sale of cosmetic products with the services of
a beautician.
5. Conclusion of the Franchise Contract
Even though it is not required by law for the franchise contract to be in
writing, the written form for the franchise contract is mandated by rules of
law (Greek and Community) pertaining to competition.18
In practice, for the conclusion of a franchising contract a standardized
document drafted by the franchisor is used which defines the rights and
obligations of the contracting parties.
15
See Soufleros, op. cit., p. 13 et seq.

See Soufleros, op. cit., p. 14 et seq.
17
See Soufleros, op. cit., p. 15.
18
See Soufleros, op. cit., p. 23; Georgiadis, op. cit., p. 222.
16
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369
6. Main Obligations of the Parties

A. Main Obligations of the Franchisor
The main obligations of the franchisor are the following:
a. To yield to the franchisee the use and exploitation of the franchise
package.19
b. To integrate the franchisee to the franchising system by providing
him with the necessary technical support as well as the necessary
training.
c. To furnish to the franchisee the products agreed upon in the
contract.
d. To see to it that the franchisee is constantly supplied with advice
regarding technical, financial, and organizational matters.
e. To undertake the advertising of the products mentioned in the
franchise contract.
f. To determine the territory within which the franchisee shall conduct
his sales business.
B. Main Obligations of the Franchisee
The main obligations of the franchisee are the following:
a. To pay the franchisor the entry fee (i.e. the price for having obtained
access to the franchising system).
b. To pay to the franchisor periodically a percentage from his profits
according to the number of sales (franchise fee, royalties).
c. To actively promote the sales through his personal work and the use
of all other means the franchisor supplies him with.
d. To share the expenses for advertising and organizing training
programs.
e. To comply with the organizational principles of the system and
especially to conform to the principles of uniformity, meaning that
the composition, preparation, and characteristics of the product must
be the same.
f. To get these products exclusively from the franchisor or a third
party connected with the franchisor.
19
For the notion of the franchise package, see above Ch. D, II, 2, B, a.
370
g. To honor the trust placed in him by the franchisor, meaning to

follow his instructions and mandates, not to engage in unfair
competition against him, and to keep the secrets of the trade.
7. Termination of the Franchise Contract
The franchise contract may be of fixed or indefinite duration. We will
proceed to examine how the franchise contract is terminated depending on
whether it is for a fixed term or for an indefinite period.
A. Franchise Contract for a Fixed Term
The franchise contract for a fixed term is terminated at the expiry of the
agreed time period. But each of the contracting parties may also terminate it
earlier by way of extraordinary termination (summary termination) if there
is important cause. Important cause exists not only in case of breach of
contract due to the other contracting partys fault20 but even regardless of
fault, as for example in case of severe deterioration of the financial status of
one of the parties.
B. Franchise Contract for an Indefinite Period
The franchise contract for indefinite duration may be terminated either
upon notice (ordinary termination) or by way of extraordinary termination
(summary termination).
More specifically:
-
20
Regarding termination upon notice, it should be noted that it does

not call for the presence of any essential conditions. Nonetheless,
the termination upon notice should not be untimely,21 i.e. the
For the franchisor examples of important cause due to fault of the franchisee are the
following: the latters not abiding by the instructions of the franchisor; his breach of contract
as regards the prohibition to engage in unfair competition; refusal to pay the franchisor the
quid pro quo due to him as per the agreement.
For the franchisee examples of important cause due to fault of the franchisor are the
following: the breach of contract on the part of the franchisor as regards his obligation to
supply the franchisee with technical and commercial support or to equip him with defect free
products.
21
Regarding the minimum duration of the franchise contract, see Soufleros, op. cit., p. 131 et
seq.; Georgiadis, op. cit., p. 240 et seq. See also Ap. Georgiadis, The Anomalous Evolution
LAW OF OBLIGATIONS
371
franchise contract should not be terminated before the amortization

of the beneficiarys investments. Thus, in case one of the
contracting parties terminates the franchise contract untimely, he is
liable to pay damages to the other.22
Regarding extraordinary termination, what was already mentioned
earlier about the franchise contract for a fixed term also holds here.
C. Legal Consequences of the Termination of the Franchise Contract

a. Termination of the franchise contract, whatever the method it was
terminated by, results in the following: the franchisee needs to return to the
franchisor the items the latter had supplied him with and cease making use
of the rights granted to him during the agreement.
b. Liability for damages23 exists only in the following cases:
aa. In case of untimely termination upon notice, the party who initiated
such termination may be liable for damages to the other contracting party.
bb. In case of extraordinary termination, the party who, by his
inappropriate behavior, caused this termination to be initiated may be
liable for damages vis--vis the other contracting party.
of the Franchise Contract, in Commercial Law Review, 1996, p. 247 et seq. and especially p.
250 et seq.
22
See Themeli, The Franchise Contract, op. cit., p. 118.
23
Regarding the eventual claim for damages on the part of the franchisee for loss of clientle
and increase of the so-called good will of the store, see Themeli, op. cit., p. 119; Soufleros,
op. cit., p. 170 et seq.; Georgiadis, New Types of Contracts, op. cit., p. 252 et seq.
4. Property Law
INTRODUCTION
1. Property Law is the law containing the provisions which regulate
real rights, i.e. the relationship of persons to things. According to Article
973 of the Greek Civil Code, real rights are the rights granting absolute and
against all (erga omnes) power over the thing. It follows from the above
definition that:
A. The real right is an immediate right, i.e. a right granting its bearer
direct power over the thing without any third party intervention.
Example: The owner of a farm may sow it, clear it, collect its fruit, sell it, etc.
B. A real right gives the holder not only immediate but also absolute
power, meaning that he is entitled to pursue his right against all (erga
omnes) and demand that his right be respected by all.
Example: The owner of a farm has the right to sue anyone who offends his right of
ownership by trespassing on his property or evicting the rightful owner from it.
2. Article 973 of the Greek Civil Code restrictively lists the real rights
that may exist (numerus clausus). They are: ownership, servitudes (personal
and real), pledge, and mortgage.1
Ownership differs from the other real rights (which are called limited
real rights) mainly with regard to the extent of its content. The reason for
1
To be noted, however, that apart from the real rights enumerated in the Greek Civil Code,
other real rights have also been introduced to the legal system of the country by special
legislation. The most important of them are the real rights on a mine, i.e. the rights conferred
to the holder independently of the right of ownership of the land to extract and exploit
minerals; the real right conferred to the state to own therapeutic springs, a right equally
independent of the ownership of the ground where said springs are located; and the right of
the state to be given preferential consideration in the case of sale of an immovable which is
useful to society as a whole, such as for example, a private forest. See Ap. Georgiadis,
Property Law, Vol. I, 1991, p. 51 et seq.
374
this is that only ownership has the element of universality, i.e. it includes all
powers over the thing. The content of the other real rights is specifically
determined by law, given the fact that each of them affords different benefits
to the holder.
Possession, even though not a real right (it rather constitutes a real
condition), belongs to Property Law because it is considered a sui generis
right over a thing.2
See Ap. Georgiadis, op. cit., Vol. I, 1991, p. 141 et seq.
PART ONE
THINGS
Since real rights regulate the relationship of persons over things, it is
necessary on the one hand to define things as objects of property rights and
on the other hand to distinguish between the various categories of things.
CHAPTER A
I. THE CONCEPT
Thing is every corporeal, impersonal, self-existent object susceptible of
appropriation by man. It follows from the above definition that the
conceptual elements of the thing are:
1. Corporeal object: the term corporeal object means that the thing has
a corporeal existence. Incorporeal objects, such as products of the intellect,
are not things. The law provides for an exception as regards natural forces
and energies stating expressly that they are considered as things: Shall also
be deemed things the natural forces or energies, particularly the electric
current and the heat, in so far as such forces are subject to control when
concentrated within a delimited space (Art. 947, 2 CC). At this point it
should be noted that to delimit power in a certain space means to confine it
in a certain network (e.g. of production, of accumulation, etc.)
2. Impersonal object: in order to understand what we mean by
impersonal object suffices to state that the human being (as a whole as well
as his organs), when alive, may not constitute a thing. However, once the
person is dead, his body or its parts may become things, thus becoming the
376
object of rights (e.g. the corpse may be used in an anatomy laboratory; parts
of it may be transplanted, etc.).
3. Self-existent object: by self-existent object is understood that the
object has an existence of its own. For example, a painting or sculpture
which is the work-in-progress of the artist (the painter or the sculptor) is not
a self-existent object.
4. Object susceptible of appropriation by man: by susceptible of
appropriation by man we mean that the object should be such that man can
exercise possession over it. When this is the case is a matter determined by
the views prevailing in transactions. However, the air, the sea, the stars, etc.
are not susceptible of appropriation.
II. DISTINCTIONS
1. Movables and Immovables
According to Article 948 of the Greek Civil Code, immovable things
are the ground and its component parts, e.g. an apartment in an apartment
complex, a farm.
The Greek Civil Code gives no definition of movables. It simply states
in Article 948 that movables are all the things which are not classified as
immovables, e.g. a car, a book, a piece of machinery.
2. Fungibles and Non-fungibles
According to Article 950 of the Greek Civil Code, fungible things are
only those movables which in transactions are usually determined by
number, measure or weight, e.g. eggs, cans, fabric, wheat, oil.
Non-fungible things are the immovables and those movables which in
transactions are not determined by number, measure or weight, e.g. a
painting, a sculpture.
3. Consumables and Non-consumables
According to Articles 951-952 of the Greek Civil Code, consumables
are those movables the intended use of which consists in their consumption
or alienation, e.g. coins, food items, drinks, etc.
Non-consumables are the immovables and those movables the intended
use of which does not consist in their consumption or alienation, e.g. the
furniture and carpets of a house, the books of a bookcase.
PROPERTY LAW
377
4. Principal and Dependent

Of two things the one which is self-existent and has an autonomous
function is the principal thing. By contrast, dependent is the thing which
depends on the principal thing or serves it.
Examples: The apartment is the principal thing, whereas the furniture inside the
apartment constitutes the dependent things. In a battery operated CD player, the
CD player is the principal thing and the batteries are the dependent things.
The dependent things are distinguished in component parts and

accessories.
5. Component Parts and Accessories
A. Component Parts
Component part is the part of a thing which cannot be removed from
the principal thing without suffering damage itself or causing damage to the
principal thing or without changing the substance or intended use of either
(Art. 953 CC).
Examples: The buildings par rapport to the ground; the doors, the windows, and
other materials used for constructing a building; the motor and the wheels of a car.
If, however, certain things have been attached to the ground only for
temporary purposes, they do not become component parts of it (Art. 955, 1
CC), e.g. the sheds of a construction crew, the platforms set up for a public
event.
The legal consequence of characterizing a thing as component part is
the following: since it is insusceptible of separate real rights, its status
follows that of the principal thing. For example, if the apartment is sold, so
are its doors and windows.
B. Accessories
Accessory is a movable thing which, without being a component part of
the principal thing, is destined to continuously serve its economic purpose
and has already been placed with regard to the principal thing in a space
relationship appropriate to its destination (Art. 956 CC).
Examples: The oars par rapport to the boat, the key to the apartment, the bag to
the wheat, the barrel to the wine.
378
The Greek Civil Code stipulates the following in Articles 959-960:

-
In the case of a building constructed for the purpose of serving

permanently an industrial enterprise, the machines, utensils, and
tools destined for use in the enterprise shall be deemed accessories
of the building.
The utensils, tools, and cattle destined for the economic
exploitation of an agricultural immovable are considered its
accessories.
From a legal standpoint the practical significance of characterizing a

thing as accessory is that, unlike what happens with component parts, the
accessory may be subject to separate real rights.
Example: The owner of an agricultural property may sell the animals of the farm,
which are placed in it and destined for its economic exploitation, independently of
the immovable.
In case of doubt, however, i.e. if the parties were not specific in their
agreement, the legal transaction dealing with a real right on the principal
thing shall include the accessory (Art. 958 CC).
Example: If the ownership of a farm was transferred by reason of sale, so is the
ownership of the water pump situated inside.
6. Things out of Commerce (res extra commercium)

Things out of commerce (or out of the realm of transactions) are the
things which are common to all, those of common use, and those dedicated
to serve public, municipal, communal, or religious purposes (Art. 966 CC).
More specifically:
A. Things common to all are the things which belong to all men (e.g.
the air, the sea) and, consequently, cannot be subject to private transactions.
B. Things of common use are the things which are destined to be used
by all men. Article 967 of the Greek Civil Code mentions the following as
things of common use: freely and perpetually running water, roads, public
squares, the seashore, harbors and roadsteads, the banks of navigable rivers,
large lakes and their shores.
C. To the category of things extra commercium dedicated to serve
public purposes belong such things as state-owned buildings housing
governmental offices, hospitals, etc.
PROPERTY LAW
379
D. Things extra commercium dedicated to serve municipal or

community purposes are the buildings owned by the municipalities or
communities which house municipal or communal offices, schools,
orphanages, hospitals, etc.
E. Finally, things extra commercium dedicated to serve religious
purposes are the churches, the monasteries, etc.
PART TWO
POSSESSION
CHAPTER A
THE CONCEPTS OF POSSESSION AND DETENTION
I. THE CONCEPT OF POSSESSION
Usually, the person having the right of ownership also has the physical
control of the thing owned (e.g. A is the owner of the farm and also has
physical control of it). Occasionally, however, it happens that the physical
control of the thing is removed from the rightful owner (e.g. A is the owner
of the farm but B has trespassed on it).
This real condition of physical control over a thing with the intent on
the part of the person possessing it to behave as the owner is called
possession (possessio). The Greek law gives possession an autonomous
place in the legal system for the sake of the safety of transactions.
Possession is ones exercise of physical control over a thing with the
intent to own it (Art. 974 CC).
It follows from the above definition that the two elements necessary for
a person to acquire possession over a thing are:
1. Physical control over the thing (the element of corpus).
2. The persons intention to possess the thing as its owner (the element
of animus).
Example: The person who unlawfully evicted the owner of an immovable from the
premises and settled in it himself is the possessor of the immovable; the same
holds true if the person stole a camera and is now in possession of that movable.
382
II. THE CONCEPT OF DETENTION

If a person exercises physical control over a thing without the intent to
own it, we have detention (detentio). For example, the tenant of an
immovable or the depositary with whom a movable is deposited have
detention of the thing.
CHAPTER B
ACQUISITION, LOSS, AND PROTECTION OF POSSESSION
I. ACQUISITION OF POSSESSION
The acquisition of possession is distinguished in original and
derivative.
The acquisition of possession is original when it is effected without the
previous possessors will or regardless of it. This, for example, is the way
possession is acquired by the person who seizes a derelict object, the
fisherman who catches a fish, the thief of a movable object, the individual
who trespasses on a property.
Derivative acquisition is the acquisition of possession which is based
on the preexisting possession of another person and takes effect with the
latters consent. In other words, the person to whom the possession of a
thing is yielded voluntarily by the former possessor acquires it derivatively.
For example, A sells B his farm or he sells him his car and delivers it to him.
II. LOSS OF POSSESSION
The possession is lost as soon as the physical control over the thing
ceases (e.g. As watch is dropped in the sea) or the possessor expresses a
contrary volition towards the thing possessed (e.g. A leaves the magazine in
the bus because he no longer wants it). There is no change in possession if
PROPERTY LAW
383
the physical control over the thing is lost by an event which is temporary in
nature.
III. PROTECTION OF POSSESSION
Although possession is not a real right but an actual condition, the law
protects it from certain breaches.
According to Article 984, para. 1 of the Greek Civil Code possession is
offended if the possessor is either disturbed in the exercise of his right of
possession (e.g. A passes daily through Bs farm without the latters
consent) or evicted from it (e.g. A steals Bs computer), provided that such
acts are unlawful and without the possessors consent.
Possession is protected by the right of self-rule (private justice) or the
right to bring legal action.
More specifically:
1. The protection of possession by self-rule consists in the possessors
right on the one hand to repulse by force every disturbance or threatened
eviction from possession, and on the other hand to retrieve forcibly the thing
that was dispossessed illegally and without his consent (Art. 985 CC).
2. Legal protection consists in the legal actions for restoration of
possession, in case of eviction (Art. 987 CC et seq.), and for cessation of the
disturbance, in case of disturbance of possession (Art. 989 et seq.),
depending on whether the possessor was evicted from his possession or
whether, without being evicted, he was disturbed in the exercise of his right
to possess.
PART THREE
OWNERSHIP
CHAPTER A
THE CONCEPT OF OWNERSHIP
I. Ownership is the real right affording the owner all powers over the
thing (i.e. use, enjoyment of the fruits and profits, sale) and precluding any
infringement of a third party thereon without the owners consent.
II. Usually the owner of a thing also has physical control over it with
ownership, possession, and mere detention converging in the same person.
Examples: A lives in his apartment or A cultivates his farm. In these cases A is all
of the above: owner, possessor, and detentor.
But in case the owner does not have physical control over the thing,
one of the following may be happening:
1. If the owner has entrusted the exercise of the physical control to
another who exercises it in the name of the former, the person who granted
this power is the owner and possessor, whereas the person who exercises it
is the detentor.
Example: A, the owner of an apartment, leases it to B. In this case A is the owner
and possessor, whereas B is the detentor.
2. If the owner did not entrust the physical control to another to

exercise it in the owners name, then it is the case where owner, possessor,
and detentor are three different persons.
Example: B trespassed on As farm and leased it to C. In this case A is the owner,
B the possessor, and C the detentor.
CHAPTER B
TYPES OF OWNERSHIP
I. FULL OWNERSHIP
Full ownership is the ownership which grants its one and sole owner
exclusive right over the thing and gives him all the powers over it (Art. 1000
CC).
Examples: A is the owner of an apartment; B is the owner of a car.
II. BARE OWNERSHIP

Bare ownership (nuda proprietas) exists when a thing is burdened with
usufruct (ususfructus).1 In other words bare ownership is the ownership
which is stripped of the original plenitude of full ownership and where the
owner only has the right to dispose of the thing.
Example: A transfers to his son B the bare ownership of one of his apartments and
keeps the usufruct for himself. This implies that A has the right to use and lease
the apartment, whereas B has the right to sell it.
III. CO-OWNERSHIP
Co-ownership is the ownership belonging to several owners in
undivided ideal shares (Art. 1113 CC)2. Co-ownership is governed by
Articles 785-805 of the Greek Civil Code.
1
Regarding usufruct, see below Part Four, Ch. A, II, 2, A.

In countries belonging to the Anglo-Saxon legal tradition there is a distinction between
joint tenancy, where upon the death of one co-owner his interest passes on to the surviving
joint tenant(s), and tenancy in common, where no right of survivorship exists when one
tenant in common dies. The form of co-ownership known in the Greek law is of the type of
2
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Examples: A and B are co-owners of an immovable by 50% undivided ideal

shares each.
A, B, C, and D inherited a farm from their father. These co-heirs are co-owners
of the farm by 25% undivided ideal shares each.
IV. OWNERSHIP OF A STOREY OR HORIZONTAL OWNERSHIP

The ownership of a storey or horizontal ownership (Arts. 1002 and
1117 CC and L. 3741/1929)3 is a special type of ownership.
It involves the following:
a. Exclusive individual ownership of a storey in a building or of an

apartment in a storey.
b. Compulsory undivided co-ownership by proportional shares over the
common parts of the whole immovable (e.g. land, external walls, stairs).
Example: Building constructor A constructs an apartment building of twenty five
apartments on a piece of land of 1,500 square meters. Each buyer becomes: (a) the
exclusive owner of the purchased apartment, and (b) the co-owner, along with the
other apartment owners, of the land on which the apartment building was erected
as well as of the other parts of the immovable (external walls, stairs, elevator,
etc.).
tenancy in common. The joint tenancy type is unknown to Greece. See the relevant
comments of Y. Karibali-Tsiptsiou, Property and Trust Law in Hellas, 2003, p. 159 (in
English).
3
See also LegD 1024/1971 On Divided Ownership on Buildings Erected on Uniform Land
and L. 1562/1985 On Constructing Co-owned Immovables and the Modification of Articles
of CCPr. Regarding Partition and Other Provisions. In this regard, see Georgiadis, op. cit., p.
659 et seq.; I Spyridakis, Property Law, Vol. B/1, 2001, p. 404 et seq.; I Spyridakis, The Law
of Horizontal and Vertical Ownership, 1996; F. Tsetsekos, Horizontal and Vertical
Ownership (Separate Ownership), 2002.
Interestingly, the institution of horizontal ownership, which was unknown to the Roman
law, was not unknown to the ancient Greek law and the Hellenistic law; moreover, it
constituted part of the custom law practiced in certain islands of Greece during the Turkish
occupation (see G. Petropoulos, op. cit., pp. 631-632). To be further noted that L. 3741/1929,
which first introduced the institution of horizontal ownership in Greece before the
introduction of the Greek Civil Code, remained in force even afterwards (Translators note).
388
BASIC CONCEPTS OF GREEK CIVIL LAWLAW
V. VERTICAL OWNERSHIP
Vertical ownership is the separate ownership of one (or part of one) or
more self-existent and independent buildings erected on a single building
plot. It is governed by LegD 1024/1971.4
Vertical ownership involves the following:
a. Exclusive ownership of one (or part of one) of at least two selfexistent buildings.
b. Compulsory co-ownership, by proportional shares, over the uniform
land and the other common use areas which may exist.
Example: A and B bought a piece of land together and each built a single family
home on it.
CHAPTER C
According to Article 1000 of the Greek Civil Code the owner of a
thing, as long as this does not violate the law or infringe upon the rights of a
third party, may dispose of it at will and exclude any action thereon on the
part of others.
However, ownership is subject to restrictions imposed by law or by the
rights of third parties.
I. RESTRICTIONS OF OWNERSHIP IMPOSED BY LAW
Restrictions of ownership which are imposed by law are found either in
the Greek Civil Code or in special statutes.
1. In the Greek Civil Code a series of articles (1003-1032) which refer
to neighbor law oblige the owner of a thing to either omit certain actions
on the thing or to tolerate actions of others on it.
Examples: It is prohibited for the owner of an immovable to construct or
maintain installations harmful to the neighboring immovable or to excavate his
4
In the case of vertical ownership are supplementally applicable Arts. 1002 and 1117 of the
Greek Civil Code and L. 3741/1929. See Georgiadis, op. cit., p. 467 et seq.; Spyridakis,
Property Law, op. cit., p. 413 et seq.; Tsetsekos, op. cit.
PROPERTY LAW
389
side of the building to such depth as to cause reason for concern over the safety of
the foundations of the neighboring immovable (obligations for omission of acts on
the part of the owner).
The owner of an immovable is obliged to tolerate the emissions of smoke, smog,
or other influences coming from the neighboring immovable, to the extent that
they do not substantially harm the use of the immovable affected or stem from the
type of use which is common to the area where the immovables are situated
(obligation imposed on the owner to exercise tolerance).
2. Special laws impose restrictions of ownership for reasons of general

public interest, such as the rules of the General Construction Regulation, the
laws for the protection of public order and security, public health,
archeological sites and treasures, etc.
The greatest restriction of ownership is the restriction due to
compulsory expropriation in the public interest after due compensation. The
institution of compulsory expropriation is governed by the Constitution of
Greece (Art. 17) and by a special law.5
II. RESTRICTIONS OF OWNERSHIP FROM THIRD PARTY RIGHTS
Third party rights imposing restrictions on ownership are the limited
real rights, i.e. the servitudes, the pledge, and the mortgage.
Examples: A, the owner of a farm, has granted the owner of the neighboring
immovable (whoever that person may be at any particular time) the real servitude
of crossing his land (right of way).
A, the owner of an apartment, has provided bank T with the security of a
mortgage on his apartment on account of the fact that he has borrowed the amount
of 30,000 euros from the bank.
See LegD 797/1971 On Compulsory Expropriation.
CHAPTER D
ACQUISITION OF OWNERSHIP
I. GENERAL
The ways of acquisition of ownership are derivative (acquisitio
derivativa) and original (acquisitio originaria).
Derivative acquisition of ownership is the acquisition based on a
previously existing right of ownership. We have derivative acquisition of
ownership when the ownership is transferred by way of contract or
succession.
Original acquisition of ownership is the acquisition which is not based
on the right of another. We have original acquisition of ownership in cases
such as the following: acquisitive prescription (usucapio), occupancy of a
derelict thing belonging to no one (res nullius), finding of a lost and
unclaimed thing, etc.
II. DERIVATIVE ACQUISITION OF OWNERSHIP
From the several ways of derivative acquisition of ownership we will
refer to the most important among them which is the transfer of ownership
by way of contract.
The Greek Civil Code distinguishes between transfer of ownership of
immovables and of movables.
1. Transfer of Ownership of Immovables
According to Article 1033 of the Greek Civil Code, for an immovable
to be transferred an agreement between the owner and the acquirer is
required stipulating that the ownership is being transferred to the latter for a
lawful cause. The agreement in question needs to be vested notarial deed
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form and recorded in the land conveyance records of the district in which
the immovable is located (transcription).
As is obvious from the above provisions of the law, for the transfer of
the ownership of immovables the following conditions need to concur:
A. The transferor must be the owner of the immovable transferred.
B. There must be an agreement between transferor and acquirer that
the ownership is transferred to the latter. This agreement constitutes the
contract of transfer of ownership.
C. The agreement needs to be vested the form of a notarial deed.
D. The agreement regarding the transfer of ownership needs to be
based on a lawful cause, e.g. sale, donation, parental granting, etc. This is so
because the contract of transfer of ownership is a causal juridical act.1
E. For the transfer of the immovable to be complete, the notarial act
through which the transfer agreement was executed needs to be transcribed,
i.e. recorded in the land conveyance records situated in the district where the
immovable is located.2
At this point it should be mentioned that delivery of possession is not
required; only recordation. Up until the transaction is recorded, it does not
bring about its intended results of transfer of ownership. The transfer of
ownership of an immovable takes effect only from the moment the
transaction is transcribed.3
In recent times parental granting in Greece (known as gonike parohe/ ) is

frequently practiced in connection with immovables which are transferred from parent to
child as opposed to being inherited by the children after their parents death due to certain
tax advantages it affords. In this case what usually happens is this: the parent transfers the
bare ownership of an immovable to his children and, upon his death, the usufruct he had
retained for himself gets automatically joined with the bare ownership, thus providing his
descendants with full ownership. However, parental granting is by no means limited to such
transactions and may well include all types of grants given by parents to children, e.g. to help
them with the expenses for their studies, their professional establishment, etc. See below
Family Law, Part Three, Ch. B, (Translators note).
1
A juridical act is causal when its validity depends on the existence and validity of a lawful
cause (justa causa).
2
Transcription consists in making an entry of the summary of the act that needs to be
recorded in the land conveyance records by chronological order of submission (Arts. 1192 et
seq. CC). See below Part Six, Ch. A, I.
3
According to L. 2664/1998 (Art. 1, para. 3), when the land registry takes effect, it will
replace the currently existing person-centered system of recording the transfer of ownership
regarding immovables and the constitution of mortgages in the areas where the new landcentered system will be introduced. See below Part Six, Ch. B, I.
392
Example: In the morning of October 10 A transferred an apartment of his to B and

the transaction was vested the notarial deed form. In the afternoon of the same day
A transferred the same apartment to C and once again the transaction was vested
the notarial deed form. From the two buyers the person who will acquire
ownership over As apartment is the one who will be the first to record the sale in
the land conveyance records. It is irrelevant who signed the sale contract first or
who got the keys to the apartment first.
2. Transfer of Ownership of Movables

A. The General Rule
According to Article 1034 of the Greek Civil Code, for the transfer of
ownership of movables it is necessary for the owner to deliver possession of
the thing transferred to the acquirer and for the two of them to agree as to
the transfer of ownership.
From the above provisions of the law it follows that for the ownership
of a movable to be transferred the following conditions need to concur:
a. The transferor must be the owner of the thing transferred.
b. There must be an agreement between transferor and acquirer. This
agreement is an informal contract, i.e. it is not subject to any particular form.
It is also a non causal agreement, i.e. the transfer of ownership is effective
regardless of the underlying cause.
c. The owner needs to deliver possession of the thing to the transferee.
Example: A agrees with B that he will transfer the ownership of his computer to
him and proceeds to materially deliver the computer to B. The transfer of
ownership is valid even if the parties had not previously agreed on the reason for
which this transfer would be made (i.e. sale, donation, etc.).
B. The Exception to the Rule (Transfer of Movable by Non-owner)

For the sake of maintaining a level of safety in transactions as far as
movables are concerned, the legislator in the Article 1036 of the Greek Civil
Code introduced an exception to the above mentioned general rule that the
transferor needs to be the owner of the thing transferred. The exception is
that the transferor of a movable does not have to be the owner of the thing.
Here Greek law reflects the familiar from Roman law civilian maxim nemo plus juris ad
alium transfere potest quam ipse habet, i.e. no one can transfer a greater right than one has
(Translators note).
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According to Article 1036 of the Greek Civil Code in the case of sale
of a movable thing in conformity with the provisions of Article 1034, the
acquirer becomes the owner of the thing sold even if the transferor is not the
owner of it, unless the former at the time of delivery of possession acted in
bad faith.
Consequently, for the ownership of a movable to be transferred by a
non-owner, the following conditions need to concur:
a. The transferor must not be the owner of the thing transferred.
b. An agreement of transfer of ownership between the parties needs to
exist.
c. The possession of the thing transferred must be delivered to the
acquirer by the transferor and said delivery must be accomplished
materially.
d. The acquirer needs to act in good faith.
In this case good faith is either the conviction that the transferor is the
owner or the lack of knowledge that he is not, provided that such lack of
knowledge is not due to error resulting from gross negligence.4
Example: A gave B a CD player as a loan for use and B sold it to C. If C did not
know that B was not the owner, nor did he ignore this fact due to gross negligence
(i.e. if C acted in good faith), he acquires ownership over the CD player. On the
contrary, if C acted in bad faith (i.e. if he knew that B was not the owner or
ignored the matter out of gross negligence), he does not acquire the ownership of
it.
An exception to this, which implies that we thus return to the general

rule, exists when the rightful owner of the transferred movable has lost
possession of it by way of theft or loss (Art. 1038 CC).5
Examples: If A stole a camera from B and sold it to C, the latter does not
acquire the ownership of it because the thing was stolen.
If B picks up a camera in the street which had fallen off As briefcase without
the latter having noticed that he dropped it (i.e. if the camera is a lost object) and
B subsequently sells it to C, the latter does not acquire ownership over it because
the owner was deprived of its possession by way of loss.
It is the case of subjective good faith. See above Law of Obligations, Introduction, Ch. A,
III, 2.
5
Loss exists when an owner lost the possession of the thing owned without his will (see
below Part Three, Ch. D, III, 3).
394
However, if the stolen or lost things are money, titles to bearer (e.g.
shares to bearer in a corporation, lottery tickets, etc.), or things sold in a
public auction or in a fair or in the market, then the buyer does acquire
ownership of them if he acts in good faith (Art. 1039 CC).
Examples: A stole from Bs office 1,500 euros and gave the money to his
creditor C in order to pay off his debt. If C was in good faith, he does acquire the
ownership of the money.
A stole from Bs office 10 shares to bearer in the corporation X and sold them to
C. If C was in good faith, he acquires the ownership of the shares.
A stole a piece of jewelry from B and sold it to C, owner of a jewelry store. D
bought that piece of jewelry from Cs store. C did not become the owner of the
jewel, even if he was in good faith, because the thing was stolen. Nonetheless, D,
if she was in good faith, did acquire ownership of the jewel because she bought it
in a jewelry store, i.e. a place where things of this type are usually sold. D would
not have acquired ownership, if she had bought that piece of jewelry at the
florists or at the dry cleaners.
III. ORIGINAL WAYS OF ACQUISITION OF OWNERSHIP

There is a variety of original modes of acquisition of ownership. Here
we will refer to the acquisitive prescription, which is the most important of
all, and two more: occupancy of a thing belonging to no one (res nullius),
and finding of a lost object.
1. Acquisitive Prescription
Acquisitive prescription (usucapio) is a way of acquiring ownership
over a thing, movable or immovable, following the elapse of a designated
period of time during which the person must have the thing in question in
his possession with the intent to own it.
The reasons for the institution of acquisitive prescription are the
following: for a number of years the possessor has been putting the thing to
use and maximizing its utility; additionally, third parties to whom the
impression had thus been given that the possessor is also the owner would
have been deceived if acquisitive prescription were not recognized.
There are two kinds of acquisitive prescription, ordinary and
extraordinary (longi temporis praescriptio and longissimi temporis
praescriptio).
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A. Ordinary Acquisitive Prescription

The prerequisites for ordinary acquisitive prescription are the
following: thing susceptible of acquisitive prescription; possession of the
thing; good faith; lawful title; and the elapse of a certain period of time (Art.
1041 CC).
More specifically:
a. Thing susceptible of acquisitive prescription
In principle, all things are susceptible of acquisitive prescription. There
are, however, things insusceptible of it or excluded from it:
Things insusceptible of acquisitive prescription are the things out of
commerce (res extra commercium), as stipulated in Article 1054 of the
Greek Civil Code, i.e. the things common to all (e.g. the air), the things
destined for common use, and the things dedicated to serve public,
municipal, communal, or religious purposes.
Things excluded from acquisitive prescription are the things the law
excludes for special reasons. Such things are the state-owned immovables,
the municipality- or community-owned immovables, the immovables
belonging to the church, and the things belonging to persons that are under
parental care, tutelage, or judicial assistance.6
b. Possession of the thing
Possession of the thing needs to exist throughout the time period
designated for acquisitive prescription.
c. Good faith
The possessor is in good faith when without gross negligence he is
convinced that he has acquired ownership (Art. 1042 CC).7
d. Lawful title
Lawful title is every legal fact generally and in the abstract recognized
by law as a means of acquiring ownership (e.g. contract transferring the
ownership of a movable or an immovable) but which in the particular case
did not confer ownership to the acquirer of the thing due to a certain defect.
6
7
See Georgiadis, op. cit., p. 414 et seq.; Spyridakis, op. cit., p. 625.
Here too it is the case of subjective good faith (see above p. 393, footn. 4).
396
Example: A sold B a farm and complied with all the provisions of the law, i.e. he
sold it with a contract vested the notarial deed form and properly transcribed. If A,
however, was not the owner of the farm, e.g. because he had simply believed that
he had inherited it from his uncle, no transfer of ownership to B may take effect as
far as immovables are concerned. The defect in this case is the fact that A, the
transferor, was not the owner of the thing transferred to B, the acquirer.
e. Elapse of a designated period of time

The designated period of time for acquisitive prescription is three years
for movables and ten for immovables.
B. Extraordinary Acquisitive Prescription
The prerequisites for extraordinary acquisitive prescription are the
following:
a. thing susceptible of acquisitive prescription by possession;
b. possession of the thing;
c. elapse of a twenty year period regardless of whether the thing is
movable or immovable.
2. Occupancy of a Thing Belonging to No one (res nullius)
According to an express provision of the Greek Civil Code (Art. 1075)
the person who takes possession of a derelict thing which belongs to no one
becomes its owner.
A thing is derelict if no one has the right of ownership over it. Things
are derelict either because they never had an owner (wild animals while
living in their natural habitat) or because they were abandoned by their
owner with the intent on his part to waive his right of ownership over them.
It is the case of abandoned movables. For example, A after having read the
magazine he bought before going into the restaurant, left it on the chair upon
leaving.
There are no immovables belonging to no one because ipso jure they
belong to the state (Art. 972 CC).
3. Finding of a Lost Thing
A thing is lost when it went out of the sphere of the owners possession
involuntarily. For example, A forgot the book he was reading on the chair of
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the restaurant; or, while B was walking in the street, a piece of jewelry fell
off her purse.
While for the acquisition of ownership over a derelict thing suffices for
the acquirer to take it in his possession, for the acquisition of ownership
over a lost thing more conditions need to concur.
According to Articles 1081 et seq. of the Greek Civil Code the person
who found a lost thing needs to notify without delay due to his fault the one
who lost it or, if this is difficult, the police authorities. If the owner is found,
the finder has every right to demand from him reimbursement for all the
necessary expenses he incurred for the safekeeping or maintenance of the
thing or for searching for the person having a right over it. The finder is also
entitled to a reward.
However, if one year elapses from the time of notification of the police
authorities and the owner of the thing is not found, the finder acquires
ownership of the lost and unclaimed movable.
CHAPTER E
LOSS OF OWNERSHIP
The owners right over a thing owned may be lost either with or
without the owners will, (voluntarily or involuntarily).
1. The ownership is lost voluntarily in case of transfer of the thing (e.g.
sale, donation) as well as in case of abandonment of a movable thing.
2. The ownership is lost without the owners will, i.e. involuntarily, in
case of physical destruction of the thing, if the thing became out of
commerce, as well as in case the ownership of the thing passed to another
by way of acquisitive prescription.
CHAPTER F
PROTECTION OF OWNERSHIP
I. GENERAL
The offenses against ownership may be total, i.e. removal or
withholding of the thing, or partial, i.e. preventing the owner from
exercising his power over the thing without, however, removing the thing
from him or retaining it.
Examples: A, the owner of a farm which he had not visited for some years, goes
there one day and discovers that B had fenced it and built a small house in it
where he resided along with his family (total offense against As ownership).
A is the owner of a farm in which there is a well. His neighbor B, without As
permission, enters the farm and draws water from the well whenever he needs to
do so (partial offense against As ownership).
II. MEANS OF PROTECTION

Ownership is protected both by way of self-rule (private justice) and by
way of legal action.
1. With regard to protection via self-rule, the General Principles of
Civil Law (Arts. 282-284 of the Greek Civil Code) are applicable, i.e. selfredress and self-defense.
2. The legal protection of ownership includes the revendicatory action
(rei vindicatio) and the negatory action (actio negatoria).
More specifically:
A. The revendicatory action is a remedy applied in case the offense of
ownership took the form of eviction or withholding of the thing owned
(Arts. 1094 et seq. CC). It is brought by the dispossessed owner against the
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399
possessing non-owner or detentor and aims at the recognition of his right of

ownership and the restitution of the thing to him.
B. The negatory action is an action brought by the owner against any
person interfering with his ownership in ways that fall short of eviction or
withholding of the thing owned (Art. 1108 CC). The negatory action is
brought by the owner against the person disturbing his ownership and aims
at securing a judgment ordering the suppression of the interference and an
injunction for the future.
PART FOUR
SERVITUDES
CHAPTER A
THE CONCEPT AND DISTINCTIONS
I. THE CONCEPT
Servitude (servitus) is the limited real right allowing the owner to draw
some benefits from the substance of the thing.
II. DISTINCTIONS
There are two kinds of servitudes: Predial (or real) and personal.
1. Predial (or Real) Servitudes
Predial (or real) servitude is the limited real right acquired on a certain
immovable for the benefit of the person who at any given time is the owner
of another immovable with the purpose of securing an advantage to the
latter (Art. 1118 CC). The subject of the right of servitude is the person who
at any given time is the owner of the dominant immovable.
It follows from the above definition that:
A. Real servitude may only exist on anothers immovable. It is not
possible to have real servitude on a movable thing. The persons immovable
on which the servitude is constituted is called the servient tenement
(praedium serviens).
Regarding the easement of common law which is similar to the real servitudes of Greek
property law, see Karibali Tsiptsiou, op. cit., p. 157 (Translators note).
402
B. Real (predial) servitude is not constituted in favor of a specific

person but of the person who at any given time is the owner of the other
immovable. The immovable in favor of which the servitude exists is called
the dominant tenement (praedium dominans).
C. The servitude offers a certain benefit to the person who at any given
time is the owner of the dominant immovable.
In the Greek Civil Code are mentioned indicatively some real
servitudes such as the right of way, the right of conveyance, drainage,
drawing up water, grazing, etc. (Art. 1120 CC).
Example: Of two neighboring farms, A and B, only farm A has access to the main
road. It is possible to constitute real servitude, and more specifically the servitude
of the right of way, in favor of the person who at any given time is the owner of
farm B (the dominant immovable), so that the latter may pass through property A
(the servient immovable) and reach the main road. If todays owner of farm B,
Mr. X, sells his farm to Mr. Y, the servitude of the right of way will be transferred
to the new owner along with the ownership of the immovable sold.
2. Personal Servitudes
Personal servitude is the limited real right on a thing constituted in
favor of a certain person securing various advantages to him. In personal
servitudes the subject is a specific person, natural or legal.
Personal servitudes are the usufruct, the habitation, and the limited
personal servitudes.
A. Usufruct
Usufruct (ususfructus) is the limited real right of making use and
enjoying the fruits or profits of a thing belonging to another, provided that
the substance of the thing remains unaltered (Art. 1142 CC).
The subject of usufruct is always a specific person called the
usufructuary.
The thing given in usufruct may be movable or immovable. However, it
is also possible for a right to be given in usufruct (e.g. the right to
intellectual property).
The fact that the usufructuary may make full use and enjoy the fruits
and profits of the thing results in stripping the ownership of those powers.
This is the case of agrarian immovables which are deprived of the necessary access to a road
and are commonly called blind immovables (Translators note).
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403
Thus, the owners right gets limited to the alienation of the thing.1 The
owner whose powers are stripped in this fashion due to the existence of the
servitude of usufruct is called bare owner.2
Example: A, who is the owner of an apartment, gives his apartment in usufruct to
his son B. As a result of the constitution of the usufruct B, the usufructuary, has
the right to use the apartment (i.e. live in it) and enjoy its fruits or profits (i.e.
lease it), whereas the father, the bare owner, only has the right to sell it.
The meaning of the rule of law stipulating that the substance of the
thing must be preserved unaltered is that the usufructuary must preserve the
economic function that the thing had at the time of the constitution of the
usufruct.3
Example: If A has the usufruct of an immovable which is used as a clinic, he
cannot change the function of the immovable by turning it to a private school.
B. Habitation
Habitation (habitatio) is the limited real right allowing the beneficiary
to occupy anothers building, or an apartment therein, as a home (Art. 1183
CC).
The beneficiary of a habitation may use the immovable belonging to
another or an apartment therein solely for the purpose of residing in it; not
as an office space. The person entitled to habitation has the right to inhabit
the immovable along with his family and the domestic staff corresponding
to his social standing (Art. 1184 CC).
Only a natural person may be the subject of habitation.
Example: A, the owner of an apartment, constitutes habitation on his apartment in
favor of his grandson B, i.e. he allows his grandson and his family to live in it
until the time of the grandsons death.
The acquisition of usufruct or bare ownership through an act inter vivos or mortis causa is
a transaction subject to taxation; so is the exercise of the usufruct when it yields an income.
See M. Karassis, in Georgiadis Stathopoulos, Commentary on the Civil Code, Art. 1142,
No 34 et seq.
2
See above Part Three, Ch. B, II.
3
See M. Karassis, op. cit., Art. 1148, No 3.
404
C. Limited Personal Servitudes

Limited personal servitude is the limited real right on an immovable
owned by another which gives some power or benefits to a specific person
(Art. 1188, 1 CC).
The content of these personal servitudes may be the same as that of any
predial (real) servitude (Art. 1188, 2 CC).
Example: Of two neighboring immovables, A and B, only A has access to the
main road. In order for Mr. X, the current owner of immovable B, to gain access
to the main road, a personal servitude to this effect is constituted in his favor
whereby, by passing through a specific section of immovable A, Mr. X can reach
the main road. If the servitude of the right of way is constituted in favor of only
one specific person, as is the case in this example where the beneficiary is Mr. X,
the current owner of immovable B, it is a limited personal servitude. Naturally, if
the servitude were to be constituted in favor of the person who would be the
owner of immovable B at any given time, then it would be a real servitude.
CHAPTER B
CONSTITUTION OF SERVITUDES
For the constitution of servitudes we need to distinguish between
predial (or real) and personal servitudes.
I. PREDIAL (OR REAL) SERVITUDES
Predial or real servitudes are constituted by a juridical act or by
acquisitive prescription (Art. 1121 CC).
1. Constitution of Servitude by Juridical Act
The term juridical act in the above definition of the law includes both
the juridical act inter vivos and the juridical act mortis causa, i.e. the will.
For a predial (real) servitude to be constituted by a transaction inter
vivos it is necessary for the conditions required for the transfer of an
immovable to concur. Specifically, the following are required:1
The person establishing the servitude must be the owner of the
dominant tenement; an agreement between the owner of the dominant and
the owner of the servient tenement needs to exist; lawful cause for the
establishment of the servitude is required; the transaction must be executed
in notarial deed form; the document must be transcribed (application by
analogy of Art. 1033 CC).
2. Constitution of Servitude by Acquisitive Prescription
For a predial (real) servitude to be constituted by means of acquisitive
prescription there need to concur by analogy the same conditions required
for the acquisition of ownership over an immovable by acquisitive
1
See Georgiadis, op. cit., Vol. II, 1993, p. 23 et seq.
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BASIC PRINCIPLES OF GREEK CIVIL LAW
prescription, ordinary or extraordinary (application by analogy of Arts.

1041-1043 CC).2
II. PERSONAL SERVITUDES
1. Usufruct
Usufruct is constituted by means of a juridical act or by acquisitive
prescription (Art. 1143 CC).
A. Constitution by Juridical Act
The term juridical act in the above definition of the law includes both
the contract inter vivos and the juridical act mortis causa, i.e. the will.
For the constitution of usufruct by means of a contract, the provisions
referring to the acquisition of ownership are applicable by analogy.3
Specifically:
For the constitution of usufruct on a movable, two things are required:
agreement between the owner and the usufructuary that the use and
enjoyment of the fruits or profits of the thing are transferred to the latter, and
delivery of possession (application by analogy of Article 1034 of the Greek
Civil Code).
For the constitution of usufruct on an immovable the following are
required: the person giving an immovable in usufruct needs to have
ownership over it; the agreement between the parties must have a lawful
cause; the agreement should be executed in notarial deed form; the
agreement should be transcribed (application by analogy of Art. 1033 CC).
B. Constitution by Acquisitive Prescription
For the constitution of usufruct by acquisitive prescription the person
possessing the thing needs to possess it with the intent to behave towards it
as if he were the usufructuary. For the rest, the conditions for the acquisition
of ownership by acquisitive prescription (ordinary or extraordinary) need to
concur by analogy (application by analogy of Arts. 1041-1043 CC).4
2
See above Part Three, Ch. D, III, 1.

See Georgiadis, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 56 et seq.
4
See above Part Three, Ch. D, III, 1.
3
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407
2. Habitation
For the constitution of habitation the provisions on usufruct on
immovables are applicable by analogy, provided they are compatible with
the nature of habitation (Art. 1187 CC).
3. Limited Personal Servitude
For a limited personal servitude to be constituted the provisions on
predial servitudes are applicable by analogy, provided they are compatible
with the nature of personal servitudes (Art. 1191 CC).
CHAPTER C
EXTINCTION OF SERVITUDES
Regarding the extinction of servitudes we also need to distinguish
between predial (or real) and personal servitudes.
I. PREDIAL (OR REAL) SERVITUDES
The reasons for extinction of a real servitude are the renunciation of it
by the beneficiary (Art. 1134, 1 CC), the total destruction of the dominant or
the servient tenement (Art. 1135 CC), the impossibility of exercising the
servitude (Art. 1136 CC), the non-use of it for twenty years (Art. 1138, 1
CC),1 and the merging of ownership on the two tenements, the dominant and
the servient, in the same person (Art. 1137 CC).
II. PERSONAL SERVITUDES
1. Usufruct
The reasons for the extinction of a usufruct are the following: death2 of
the usufructuary, unless otherwise stipulated (Art. 1167, 1 CC);3 dissolution
of the legal person (Art. 1167, 2 CC); renunciation of it by the usufructuary
1
Regarding the non-use of a servitude for twenty years, see Georgiadis, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 47
et seq.; E. Dakoronia, in Georgiadis Stathopoulos, Commentary on the Civil Code, Arts.
1138-1141, No 2 et seq.
2
The judicial declaration of an absentee as a missing person is equal to death (see Ap.
Georgiadis, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 78).
3
Regarding the rule in Art. 1167, 1 CC that the extinction of servitude with the death of the
usufructuary constitutes non-mandatory law, many objections have been raised. See Ap.
Georgiadis, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 78 et seq.; K. Roussos, in Georgiadis Stathopoulos,
Commentary on the Civil Code, Art. 1167, No 7 et seq.
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PROPERTY LAW
(Art. 1169 CC); merging of ownership and usufruct in the same person (Art.
1168 CC); destruction of the encumbered thing; impossibility of exercising
the usufruct; twenty years of non-use (Art. 1170 CC).
2. Habitation
For the extinction of habitation the provisions regarding usufruct on
immovables are applicable by analogy, provided that they are compatible
with the nature of habitation (Art. 1187 CC).
3. Limited Personal Servitudes
For the extinction of a limited personal servitude the provisions on
predial (real) servitudes are applicable, provided that they are not
incompatible with the nature of habitation (Art. 1191 CC). However, it is
necessary to emphasize here that, if the limited personal servitude is non
transferable, it is extinguished upon the death of the beneficiary or when the
legal person, in favor of which it was constituted, ceases to exist, i.e. upon
its dissolution (Art. 1190 CC).
CHAPTER D
PROTECTION OF SERVITUDES
I. In case of offense of the rights of predial or limited personal
servitudes, which may consist in eviction or interference with their exercise,
they are protected by a special action called confessory action (actio
confessoria) which is brought by the beneficiary against the offender (Arts.
1132 and 1191 CC).
II. In case of offense of the rights of usufruct or habitation, the
provisions of the law for the protection of the right of ownership apply by
analogy. Consequently, a ususfruct or habitation beneficiary has the
revindicatory action, in case he is evicted from the possession or detention
of the thing, and the negatory action (in case the exercise of his right is
disturbed and interfered with (Arts. 1173 and 1187 CC).
PART FIVE
REAL SECURITY RIGHTS
The Greek Civil Code establishes two rights of real security: the
pledge, which is constituted on a movable, and the mortgage, which is
constituted on an immovable.
The pledge and the mortgage are limited real rights securing the
creditors claim (monetary or that can be assessed in money) by means of
preferential satisfaction if the pledged movable or mortgaged immovable are
sold in public auction because the debtor does not fulfill his performance at
the time it falls due.
CHAPTER A
PLEDGE
I. THE CONCEPT
Pledge is the limited real right established on anothers movable to
secure the creditors claim (monetary or that can be assessed in money) by
means of preferential satisfaction in case the pledged thing is sold in public
auction because the debtor does not fulfill his performance at the time it falls
due (Art. 1209 CC).
II. FEATURES
The pledge has the following features:
412
1. Only movables may be the object of the right of pledge. Usually the
pledged movable belongs to the debtor. However, it may also belong to
someone else who offers it in order to assist the debtor.
The thing given in pledge must be within the realm of transactions, i.e.
it must belong to the category of things that can be sold and bought.
2. Pledge is a real right aiming at securing a claim, i.e. it is an
accessory right. Consequently, if the principal claim is null and void, so is
the constitution of the pledge.
3. The right of pledge aims at the preferential satisfaction of the
creditor from the auction proceeds of the thing pledged. In other words, if
the claim is past due and the debtor does not furnish his performance, the
right of pledge allows the creditor to satisfy his claim preferentially (i.e.
before the other creditors are satisfied) by selling the thing in public auction.
Agreements made before the secured claim is due and payable stipulating
that, if the creditors claim is not satisfied in a timely fashion, he acquires
the ownership of the thing, or that the creditor is exempt, in whole or in part,
of the requirement to follow the process of public auction, are null and void
(Art. 1239 CC).
Example: A borrowed from B interest-free the amount of 2,000 euros and gave A
his golden watch worth 4,000 euros for security. A also borrowed from C interestfree the amount of 1,500 euros without securing the second lenders claim with a
pledge. Because A did not pay off his debts, B caused the thing pledged to be sold
in public auction and, after deducting the expenses, the proceeds of the auction
amounted to 2,500 euros. How will B and C be satisfied? B will be satisfied
preferentially and receive the amount of 2,000 euros; then C will be called to
receive the remainder. In case there are no other creditors except for the creditor
who has the security of pledge, what is left will go to A.
III. TYPES OF PLEDGE1

The pledge may result from a private agreement or from the provisions
of the law. The pledge resulting from an agreement may be of the type of
common pledge, governed by provisions of the Greek Civil Code, or of the
type of pledge by registration (fictitious pledge), governed by L. 2844/2000.
In the discussion that follows we will refer briefly to the above mentioned
three types of pledge.
See Ap. Georgiadis, On Securing Credits, 2001, p. 526 et seq.
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413
1. Common Pledge
Common pledge is the pledge the constitution of which requires on the
one hand an agreement between the parties in notarial deed form, or in the
form of a private document bearing an officially ascertained date, and on the
other hand delivery of the thing pledged to the creditor. Articles 1209-1256
of the Greek Civil Code apply to the common pledge.
2. Fictitious Pledge (Pledge by Registration)
Fictitious pledge (pledge by registration) is the type of pledge resulting
from the parties agreement but not requiring delivery of the thing pledged;
only the recordation of the agreement in special public records. The pledge
by registration is mentioned in Article 1214 of the Greek Civil Code.
However, up until L. 2844/2000 entered into force, this Civil Code
provision was inactive. Nonetheless, special laws did exist establishing
pledges by registration (e.g. the agrarian pledge, the vehicular pledge, the
tobacco pledge, the cinematographic pledge, etc.).
L. 2844/2000 established and regulated the pledge by registration, i.e.
the pledge without delivery of possession of the thing and based solely on
the written agreement between pledger and creditor which is recorded in
special public records (Art. 3, para. 1, L. 2844/2000). This law, which
entered into force on October 13, 2001,2 also abrogated all the provisions of
special laws constituting pledges on movables without delivery in favor of
certain types of creditors and claims (Art. 20, L. 2844/2000).
3. Legal Pledge
Legal pledge is the pledge which is constituted without the parties
agreement but ipso jure by the operation of the law. For example, the lessor,
in order to secure his claim against the lessee for arrears in rent, has by law
(legal pledge) a lien on the movables brought into the premises by the latter
(Art. 604 CC). The same is true of the hotel owner, in order to secure his
claim for rent against the guest, i.e. he has by law (legal pledge) a lien on the
items brought into the hotel room by the guest (Art. 838 CC). The
provisions governing a pledge constituted by agreement shall also be
applicable by analogy to the legal pledge (Art. 1246 CC).
2
L. 2844/200 was modified by L. 2915/2001 and entered into force on October 13, 2001 (see
PrD 74/2001 and PrD 253/2001).
CHAPTER B
COMMON PLEDGE
I. THE CONCEPT
Common pledge is the pledge for the constitution of which delivery
of the thing to the creditor by the pledger is required and agreement between
the parties that the creditor takes the thing in pledge. The agreement needs
to be vested the form of a notarial deed or a private document with officially
ascertained date. Moreover, the claim must be defined and the thing pledged
described (Art. 1211 CC).
II. CONSTITUTION OF THE PLEDGE
For the common pledge to be constituted the following are required:
1. Ownership of the thing pledged by the pledger, i.e. the person giving
the thing in pledge.1
2. Agreement between the owner of the thing, i.e. the pledger, and the
creditor.
3. The agreement needs to take the form of either a notarial deed or a
private document bearing an officially ascertained date.2
4. Delivery of the thing pledged to the creditor by the pledger.
Article 1215 of the Greek Civil Code provides an exception to this rule because it stipulates
that, if the pledger is not the owner of the thing pledged, the right of pledge is acquired under
the same conditions as the right of ownership on a movable is acquired by the non-owner (i.e.
by way of application by analogy of the provisions of Art. 1036 et seq. CC).
2
A document may acquire an officially ascertained date in several ways. The most common
way is by getting the document certified at the office of a notary public. In this case the
official date of the document is the date of its certification by the notary public.
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415
III. RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF THE CREDITOR

SECURED BY PLEDGE
1. Rights
The rights of the creditor whose claim is secured by pledge are the
following:
A. He has the possession of the thing pledged (Art. 1211 CC).
B. He is entitled to reimbursement for the expenses he incurred for
improvement or maintenance of the thing (Art. 1225 CC).
C. From the time the creditors claim became due and payable he is
entitled to sell the thing in public auction in order to satisfy his claim from
the proceeds of the sale (Art. 1237 CC). This is the most important right the
creditor has.
2. Obligations
The obligations of the creditor whose claim is secured by pledge are the
following:
A. The creditor has the obligation to safeguard the thing. Without the
owners consent, the creditor does not have the right to use the thing
pledged (Art. 1224 CC).
B. The creditor must restitute the thing pledged to the pledger when his
debt is paid off (Art. 1232 CC). This is the most important obligation the
creditor has.
IV. CONSTITUTION OF MORE THAN ONE RIGHT OF PLEDGE
ON THE SAME THING
It is possible for one and the same thing to be the object of more than
one pledge in order to secure more than one claim of the same creditor or of
different creditors.
The thing pledged may be delivered to a third party or to one of the
several creditors.
Example: On a painting owned by A more than one pledge were constituted in
favor of his creditors B, C, and D. The painting may be delivered either to one of
the three creditors or to a third party, e.g. to T.
416
The right of pledge that was constituted first is the strongest of all. This
means that, in case of forcible execution resulting in sale of the thing in
public auction, the proceeds of the auction, after deducting the expenses of
the execution, are used to satisfy the creditors by order of priority
determined by the date of constitution of each pledge (Art. 1250 CC).
Example: On May 1st, A, the owner of a painting, constituted a right of pledge on
it in favor of his creditor B to whom he owed 2,000 euros. On the same painting A
constituted a second right of pledge on July 1st of the same year in favor of his
creditor C to whom he owed 1,500 euros, and on August 1st of the same year he
constituted yet another right of pledge in favor of his creditor D to whom he owed
1,000 euros. Because A did not pay any of his debts, his painting was sold in
public auction and, after deducting the amount of the expenses of the execution,
the proceeds of the auction sale amounted to 3,000 euros. Creditor B will be fully
satisfied, creditor C will receive 1,000 euros, and creditor D will not receive
anything. If the sale of the painting were to yield 4,000 euros, B and C would be
fully satisfied and D would receive 500 euros. If the sale of the painting were to
yield 5,000 euros, all three creditors would be fully satisfied and the remaining
500 euros would satisfy other creditors of A, if any, or be given to A himself as
the remainder.
V. EXTINCTION OF THE RIGHT OF PLEDGE

A right of pledge may be extinguished in the following ways:
1. By extinction of the claim for the sake of which it was constituted
(Art. 1243, 1 CC). A claim is extinguished by payment, other performance
in lieu of payment, public deposit, etc.
2. By restitution of the thing pledged to the pledger by the creditor (Art.
1243, 2 CC).
3. By the creditors unilateral declaration to the pledger or the owner
of the thing pledged that he renounces his right of pledge (Art. 1243, 3 CC).
4. By the merging of the right of ownership and the right of pledge in
the same person (Art. 1243, 4 CC).
This is the so-called hyperocha of the Roman law meaning surplus (from the Greek word
hyperoche/). See Petropoulos, op. cit., p. 771 (Translators note).
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417
VI. PROTECTION OF THE RIGHT OF PLEDGE

If the creditor having the right of pledge is offended, he is protected in
the same way the owner is protected: with the revendicatory action, in case
the offense consists in removal or withholding of the thing pledged, and
with the negatory action, in case the offense consists in infringement on his
right (Art. 1236 CC).
CHAPTER C
FICTITIOUS PLEDGE (PLEDGE BY REGISTRATION)
I. THE CONCEPT
As was already mentioned, the constitution of fictitious pledge on a
movable thing, i.e. pledge without delivery of its possession, is possible
following a written agreement between creditor and pledger.
II. LIMITATIONS IN THE CONSTITUTION OF FICTITIOUS PLEDGE
L. 2844/2000 set certain limitations for the constitution of fictitious
pledge. These limitations pertain to the types of persons capable of
concluding this type of contract, the types of claims secured, and the types
of things given in pledge.1
More specifically:
1. Regarding the contracting parties, both the creditor taking a thing in
pledge and the pledger must be either enterprises or businessmen.2
2. Regarding the claims secured by such pledge, it is expressly stated in
the law that the security is granted for the needs of the enterprise or the
business of the debtor.3
3. Finally, as regards the types of things given in pledge, all movables
may be pledged in this fashion except for money, negotiable instruments,
household items, and movables susceptible of independent mortgage, such
as ships and aircrafts.4
1
See Ap. Georgiadis, On Securing Credits, op. cit., p. 550 et seq.

See Art. 1, para. 1 L. 2844/2000.
3
See above footn. 2.
4
2
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419
III. ADVANTAGES OF FICTITIOUS PLEDGE

The pledge without delivery has several advantages. For example:
1. The pledger, by staying in possession of the movables given in
pledge (usually either things that are incorporated in his business, such as
machinery, or things that are valuable for the operation of the business), is
not forced to suspend operations.
2. The creditor, by leaving the movable things in the pledgers
possession, does not have to incur expenses for their safeguarding.
3. With the publicity system established by L. 2844/2000 transparency
is guaranteed which strengthens the security of transactions because it
provides with stable and just criteria, basically regarding the time of the
constitution of a pledge, thus offering a solution to the issue of priority
among several creditors with claims that are secured by pledge.
IV. CONSTITUTION OF FICTITIOUS PLEDGE
For a fictitious pledge to be constituted the following conditions need
to concur:
1. ownership of the thing pledged by the pledger; 5
2. agreement between the owner of the thing pledged and the creditor;
3. written document for the parties agreement;6
4. publication of the pledge, i.e. recordation of the written document of
the pledge agreement in the special public records kept at the registry of
pledges7 which is located at the creditors place of domicile or
headquarters.8
In the case of fictitious pledge (pledge by registration) the Article 1215 of the Greek Civil
Code applies by analogy, as follows from the combination of Arts. 6, para. 3, and 8, para. 1
L. 2844/2000 (see above Ch. B, II, footn. 1). See Georgiadis, op. cit., p. 552.
6
See Arts. 1, para.1, and 3, para.1 L. 2844/2000. The signature of the parties is certified by
the registrar of pledges, unless earlier certified by the police authorities, other public service,
or by a notary public (see Art. 3, para. 1, subpara. 2 L. 2844/2000).
7
Registry of pledge offices will be instituted by a PrD issued upon proposal of the Minister
of Justice. Until such offices are instituted, according to Art. 3 L. 2844/2000, the recordation
will be made at the office of the land deed conveyance records or at the land registry (Art. 19,
para. 1 L. 2844/2000).
8
If the creditor does not have his domicile or headquarters in Greece, the registration is made
at the office of the Athens registry of pledges (Art. 3, para. 1, subpara. 3 L. 2844/2000).
420
V. DURATION OF FICTITIOUS PLEDGE

The right of fictitious pledge is extinguished after ten years from the
time of its recordation in the special public book. It is possible, however, for
it to be renewed for another ten years.9
VI. PRIORITY AMONG CREDITORS OF FICTITIOUS PLEDGES
If several fictitious pledges have been constituted on the same thing,
the time of their recordation in the special public registry determines their
order of priority.10 In other words, what holds for real securities in general,
i.e. that the order of priority is determined by the chronological order of the
recordation of the relevant acts (prior tempore potior jure),11 also holds for
the pledge by registration. Pledges registered on the same day are
considered of equal rank and the creditors are satisfied pro rata.12
VII. SPECIAL OBLIGATIONS OF THE PLEDGER
In view of the fact that in the fictitious pledge the thing pledged
remains in the hands of the pledger, L. 2844/2000 provides for some special
obligations for the pledger. Specifically, the pledger has the following
obligations:
1. To allow the creditor to check on the thing pledged regarding its
existence or condition every six months on a regular basis as well as when
there is important reason for it.13
2. Not to transfer the ownership of the thing pledged and not to give it
to a third party for any reason without the creditors consent.
3. Not to move the thing pledged to another place or change its use
without the consent of the creditor.
See Art. 4, para. 1 L. 2844/2000.

See Art. 6, para.1, subpara. 2 L. 2844/2000.
11
See Arts. 1217, 1272, and 1300 CC.
12
See Art. 6, para. 1, subapara. 2 L. 2844/2000. It is possible for the rank of the creditors to
be changed following a written agreement between two or more secured creditors subject to
the provisions for publication stipulated in Art. 3 of L. 2844/2000 (see Art. 6, para. 2 L.
2844/2000).
13
The inspection is done by a process-server (marshal) appointed by the creditor (Art. 7,
para. 1, subpara. 2 L. 2844/2000).
10
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421
In case of substantial violation of the above on the part of the pledger,

the creditor may call the debt due and payable by notifying the pledger
accordingly.14
VIII. SUPPLEMENTAL AND BY ANALOGY APPLICATION
OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE GREEK CIVIL CODE
The fictitious pledge (or pledge by registration) is governed by L.
2844/2000. However, according to a special express provision of the law,15
any vacuum (lacuna) not covered by it is covered by the Articles of the
Greek Civil Code concerning the common pledge and the mortgage, applied
supplementally and by analogy.16
14
See Art. 7, para. 3 L. 2844/2000.

See Art. 8 L. 2844/2000.
16
See Georgiadis, op. cit., p. 559 et seq.
15
CHAPTER D
MORTGAGE
I. THE CONCEPT
Mortgage is the limited real right (right in rem) established on anothers
immovable to secure the creditors claim (monetary or that can be assessed
in money) by means of his preferential satisfaction from the auction sale
proceeds when the debtor does not fulfill his obligation at the time it falls
due and the mortgaged immovable is sold in public auction (Art. 1257 CC).
II. FEATURES
The features of the mortgage are the following:
1. In principle, the right of mortgage is constituted only on
immovables.1 Usually, the immovable over which the right of mortgage is
constituted belongs to the debtor. However, it is possible for the immovable
to belong to a third party who, wishing to assist the debtor, offers an
immovable of his own to be mortgaged in order to secure the creditors
claim against the debtor.
The immovable on which the right of mortgage is constituted must
belong to the category of immovables which can be sold, i.e. it should not be
a thing outside the realm of transactions.
2. The right of mortgage is created to secure a claim, i.e. it is an
accessory right to the claim secured. Consequently, if the main obligation is
null and void, so is the establishment of the mortgage.
Exceptionally, ships and sea-vessels may be mortgaged (Article 195 et seq. of the Code of
Private Maritime Law). See Ap. Georgiadis, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 133.
423
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3. The right of mortgage aims at providing the creditor with a

preferential satisfaction of his claim from the auction sale proceeds of the
immovable sold in this fashion. In other words, if the debtor does not pay
his debt when it falls due, the right of mortgage allows the creditor to be
satisfied preferentially from the sale of the mortgaged immovable in a public
auction.
Example: A has four creditors and he owes B the amount of 30,000 euros, C the
amount of 6,000 euros, D the amount of 15,000 euros, and E the amount of 9,000
euros. A has an immovable worth 60,000 euros. If A does not pay any of his debts
and none of his creditors has a mortgage on his immovable, in case of sale of As
immovable by public auction, all of his creditors will be satisfied proportionally.
For example, if the auction sale proceeds, after deduction of the expenses, amount
to 30,000 euros, proportional satisfaction of the creditors means that B will
receive 15,000 euros, C 3,000 euros, D 7,500 euros, and E 4,500 euros. But if B
had a mortgage on As immovable, he will be satisfied preferentially, i.e. he will
in this case take all of the auction sale proceeds, 30,000 euros. If D had a
mortgage on As immovable, his claim will be satisfied in full, i.e. he will receive
15,000 euros, and the rest of the creditors will be satisfied proportionally from the
remaining 15,000 euros.
III. CONSTITUTION OF A MORTGAGE

For the right of the mortgage to be created two things are required: title,
i.e. the legal ground conferring to the creditor the right to acquire a
mortgage, and recordation of it in the public books of mortgages (Art. 1260
CC).
More specifically:
1. Title for the Constitution of a Mortgage
Title is the legal ground which confers to the creditor the right to
acquire a mortgage.
According to Article 1261 of the Greek Civil Code, titles granting the
creditor the right to acquire a mortgage are the law, a court decision, and the
private will.
A. According to Article 1262 of the Greek Civil Code, title by law to
acquire a mortgage belongs to creditors such as the following: the state on
the immovables of its debtors for claims relating to arrears in taxes; the
persons placed under parental care or tutelage on the immovables of their
parents or tutors for claims stemming from the management of their
424
property by the latter; each spouse for his claim on the increments, i.e. claim
concerning increases in the assets of the other spouse according to Article
1400 of the Greek Civil Code,2 etc.
B. Title by court judgment is conferred by final non appealable court
decisions ordering payment of a sum of money or adjudicating a claim that
can be assessed in monetary terms (Art. 1263 CC).
C. Title by private will is conferred by the debtor or a third party in
favor of the debtor. However, for a mortgage by private will to be
constituted the following need to concur:
a. The grantor of the mortgage must be the owner of the immovable
(Art. 1265 CC).
b. The right of mortgage must be granted by way of a unilateral
declaration before a notary public. The immovable to be mortgaged
should be identified in this declaration (Art. 1266 CC).
2. Recordation of the Title in the Mortgage Records
Recordation of the title in the mortgage records means the recordation
of the mortgage in a special public book, the book of mortgages, kept at the
registry office of land deeds of the district in which the immovable is
situated (Art. 1268 CC).
Each recordation of a mortgage must be precisely determined, both in
terms of the claim it is relevant to and in terms of the immovable on which
the right of mortgage is established.
IV. DEBTORS RIGHTS OF THE CLAIM SECURED BY MORTGAGE
The debtor whose debt is secured by mortgage has the following rights:
1. The right to full use and usufruct of the mortgaged immovable. This
means that he is entitled to use the immovable himself, lease it, transfer it,
etc.3
2. The right to demand a reduction of the amount of the claim secured
by mortgage to the appropriate level (Art. 1269, 3 CC).
3. The right to demand for the mortgage to be limited to a lesser
number of his immovables than were originally included in the constitution
2
See below Family Law, Part One, Ch. D, II, 2.

See A. Kritikos, in Georgiadis Stathopoulos, Commentary on the Civil Code, Art. 1257,
No 5 et seq.
3
PROPERTY LAW
425
of the mortgage, i.e. to as many immovables as are necessary to secure the

creditors claim (Art. 1270 CC).
V. CREDITORS RIGHTS OF THE CLAIM SECURED BY MORTGAGE
The rights of the creditor of a claim secured by mortgage are the
following:
1. In case his claim is not satisfied, he may demand the sale of the
mortgaged immovable by public auction in order for his claim to be
preferentially satisfied from the auction sale proceeds. This is the most
important right of the creditor.
2. He also has the right to avert the deterioration of the mortgaged
immovable (Arts. 1284, 1299 CC).
3. Finally, he has the right to insure the mortgaged immovable at the
debtors expense (Arts. 1285-1286 CC).
VI. MORE MORTGAGES ON THE SAME IMMOVABLE
According to express provision of the Greek Civil Code (Art. 1290),
granting a mortgage on an immovable does not deprive the owner of the
right to constitute further mortgages in favor of other creditors on the same
immovable. In case of multiple mortgages encumbering the same
immovable, there is ranking of mortgages according to the time each of
them was recorded (Art. 1272 CC). The priority among the various
mortgagees is determined according to the chronological order of
recordation of each mortgage (prior tempore potior jure). Consequently, in
forcible execution this order also determines the order of preferential
satisfaction of the various creditors from the proceeds of the auction sale
(Arts. 1300 CC). Mortgages recorded on the same day are considered of
equal rank and the creditors are satisfied pro rata (Art. 1301 CC).
Example: A has several creditors. He also has an immovable worth 65,000 euros.
From As creditors, B to whom A owes the amount of 15,000 euros has
established 1st mortgage on the debtors immovable; C to whom A owes the
amount of 25,000 euros has established a 2nd mortgage on the same immovable,
and D to whom A owes the amount of 10,000 euros has established a 3d mortgage
on the same immovable. In case A does not pay any of his debtors and his
immovable which is sold in public auction yields 45,000 euros (after deducting
the execution costs), creditors B and C will be satisfied in full, whereas creditor D
only in part.
426
In the same example, if the immovable yields 60,000 euros net, all three creditors
secured by mortgage will be satisfied in full and the remaining 10,000 euros will
either be proportionally distributed among the debtors other creditors, if any, or
given to A in replacement of the thing.
VII. THE LIFTING OF A MORTGAGE

Lifting of a mortgage means the extinction of the right of mortgage
plus its deletion, i.e. the cancellation of its recordation.
More specifically:
1. Extinction
Extinction is the obliteration of the right of mortgage. There are several
reasons why the right of a mortgage may be extinguished: extinction of the
claim that the mortgage used to secure (Art. 1317 CC), which may be
effected by way of payment, other performance in lieu of payment, set off,
etc.; total disappearance of the mortgaged immovable (Art. 1318, 1 CC);
renunciation of the right of mortgage by the creditor (Arts. 1318, 2 and 1319
CC); sale of the mortgaged immovable in public auction and payment of the
proceeds of the auction (Art. 1318, 3 CC); merging of the right of ownership
and the right of mortgage in the same person (Art. 1321 CC), etc.
2. Deletion
Deletion of mortgage is the act of the registrar of mortgages by which
he strikes out the recordation of the mortgage in the public record of
mortgages. Extinction of the right of mortgage by itself does not suffice to
lift the mortgage; it needs to be accompanied by deletion of its recordation
in the public books. Deletion may be done in the following ways:
1. With the consent of the creditor secured by mortgage (Art. 1324
CC).
2. With a final non appealable court decision ordering the deletion
(Arts. 1324 and 1327 CC).
3. At the request of the highest bidder in case of extinction of the
mortgage by way of sale of the mortgaged immovable in a public auction
(Art. 1005, para. 3, subpara. 2 CCPr.).
Upon deletion the lifting of the real security of mortgage is finalized.
CHAPTER E
PRENOTICE OF MORTGAGE
I. THE CONCEPT
Prenotice of mortgage is a temporary mortgage which may be turned to
permanent.
Prenotice of mortgage is mortgage under the suspensive condition on
the one hand of the final non appealable court decision which would
adjudicate to the creditor the claim for the security of which this
preliminary mortgage was granted, and on the other hand of the timely
conversion of the prenotice of mortgage to mortgage.
Prenotice of mortgage solely confers a priority right for the acquisition
of a mortgage (Art. 1277, 1 CC). Before its conversion to mortgage, the
prenotice of mortgage does not bring about the results of real security.
However, after the adjudication of the claim to the creditor by a final non
appealable judgment, the prenotice of mortgage is converted to mortgage
which is deemed established as from the date of establishment of the
prenotice of mortgage (1277, 2 CC).
II. CONSTITUTION OF PRENOTICE OF MORTGAGE
The requirements for establishing prenotice of mortgage are lawful title
for prenotice of mortgage and recordation of it in the mortgage records.
428
1. Title Required for the Constitution of Prenotice of Mortgage

The court judgment issued through the procedure of provisional
remedies constitutes title for establishing prenotice of mortgage.1
2. Recordation of the Title
Just like a mortgage, the prenotice of mortgage is recorded in the public
mortgage records kept in the district where the immovable is located (Art.
1276 CC).
III. CONVERSION OF PRENOTICE OF MORTGAGE TO MORTGAGE
For the conversion of prenotice of mortgage to mortgage the following
is required:
1. Final non appealable court decision adjudicating the claim to the
creditor who has been secured by such real security (Art. 1277, 2 CC).
2. Conversion of the prenotice of mortgage to mortgage which needs to
take place within ninety days as from the time the decision has become final
non appealable. If the creditor does not act within this time frame, the right
of prenotice of mortgage is extinguished (Art. 1323, 2 CC).
At this point it needs to be noted that, when the prenotice of mortgage
is converted to mortgage, the mortgage is deemed established as from the
date of establishment of the prenotice of mortgage (Art. 1277, 2 CC).
Example: On the immovable of debtor A the following real securities have been
established by his creditors: a mortgage by B for a claim for 15,000 euros
established on January 5, 2004; a prenotice of mortgage by C for a claim for
30,000 euros established on February 10, 2004; and a mortgage by D for a claim
for 20,000 euros established on March 15, 2004. On September 15, 2004 Cs
prenotice of mortgage was converted to mortgage. The rank of mortgages now is
as follows: first mortgage in favor of B, second mortgage in favor of C, and third
mortgage in favor of D.
IV. LIFTING OF THE PRENOTICE OF MORTGAGE

A prenotice of mortgage is lifted by extinction and deletion.
See Art. 1274 CC in conjunction with Arts. 682 et seq. and 706 CCPr. See Ap. Georgiadis,
Property Law, Vol. II, op. cit., p. 180.
PROPERTY LAW
429
1. Extinction
A prenotice of mortgage is lifted not only for the reasons a mortgage is
lifted but also with the revocation of the court judgment ordering it, as well
as if the prenotice of mortgage was not converted into mortgage within
ninety days as from the date the court decision adjudicating the claim to the
creditor became final non appealable (Art. 1323 CC).
2. Deletion
Deletion is the act of the registrar of mortgages by which a prenotice of
mortgages is stricken out of the books of recordation. The reason for this
requirement is because the extinction of the right to prenotice of mortgage
needs to be accompanied by deletion of its recordation.
The prenotice of mortgage may be deleted in the following ways:
A. with the consent of the creditor (Art. 1330, 1 CC);
B. if a court decision is produced revoking the decision which had
earlier ordered the recordation of prenotice of mortgage or ordering
its deletion (Art. 1330, 2 CC);
C. if ninety days elapsed from the date of the final non appealable
decision adjudicating the creditors claim and the prenotice of
mortgage was not converted into mortgage (Art. 1330, 3 CC).
PART SIX
THE PUBLICITY OF REAL RIGHTS
REGARDING IMMOVABLES
The need for protection of transactions regarding immovables and for
respect of the real rights over them, has dictated the publicity of real
transactions concerning immovables.
The two basic systems of publicity in the transactions concerning
immovables are:
A. The system of formal publicity of the public books of recordation
(subjective system).
B. The system of substantive publicity of the land registry (objective
system).
CHAPTER A
THE SYSTEM OF THE PUBLIC BOOKS OF RECORDATION
I. THE OPERATION OF THE SYSTEM
In todays Greece the principle of publicity is served by the system of
the public books of recordation where the transactions establishing,
transferring, and abolishing the right of ownership or servitudes on
immovables are transcribed. The recordation of such transactions is done at
the recordation office of the district where the immovable is located (Art.
1192 et seq. CC).1
1
Regarding mortgage (establishment, transfer, change, and extinction), the Greek Civil Code
(Arts. 1260, 1268 et seq., 1300 et seq., and 1333 et seq.) requires for it to be recorded in
special books, the books of mortgages.
432
The time of recordation determines the temporal priority of the changes

effected in real rights (Art. 1194 CC).
According to an express rule of the Greek Civil Code (Art. 1198),
without recordation in the cases where it is required, no transfer of
ownership on an immovable or the constitution, transfer, and abolition of a
real right on it may be effected.2
The books of recordation are public and accessible to anyone wishing
to consult them (Art. 1200 CC).
The recordation system is a person-centered system because it is based
on an individual recordation roll, accessible through an alphabetical index,
which reflects the real transactions concluded by persons on immovables.
Example: If A wishes to sell an immovable of his to B, the latter must conduct a
search regarding the legal status of the immovable. To do this he needs to go to
the recordation office of the district where the immovable is located and look up
As name in the general alphabetical index of the persons having executed real
transactions associated with immovables. This will refer him to the index of the
individual recordation roll of real transactions on immovables entered into by the
seller in question and subsequently to the books of recordation where all related
notarial deeds are kept.
II. THE DISADVANTAGES OF THE SYSTEM

The system of the public books of recordation does not secure the
substantive publicity of real rights on immovables. The reason for this is that
it is possible for the same immovable to have been transferred more than
once by persons not mentioned in the section of the individual recordation
roll that the interested party is investigating. Besides, for a real transaction
to be recorded no substantive search of the titles presented is required.
Consequently, it is not certain that the seller is indeed the owner of the
immovable or has the right to dispose of it. Thus, for the search of titles it is
customary for the interested party to go back twenty years (through a series
of transfers) in order to cover the time period required for extraordinary
acquisitive prescription.
See above Part Three, Ch. D, II, 1, E.
CHAPTER B
THE SYSTEM OF LAND REGISTRY
I. THE OPERATION OF THE SYSTEM
In the system of land registry the interested party conducts his search of
the titles through an index of the immovables themselves.
The land registry system is land-centered. There is an index of
immovables where every immovable appears under a National Land
Registry code number. To every immovable corresponds a section in the
land registry book where all the real right changes concerning the specific
immovable are registered.1
Greek L. 2664/1998 provides for gradual introduction of the National
Land Registry system to the lands which each time are being placed under
it.2 According to Article 1, para. 1 of L. 2664/1998, as modified by Article
2, para. 1 of L. 3127/2003, the National Land Registry system consists of a
system of legal, technical, and other additional information organized on a
land-centered basis regarding immovables throughout the state.
More specifically:
In the land registry are recorded legal and technical information aiming
at a precise determination of the boundaries of the immovables and the
publicity of the rights and encumbrances that need to be recorded in land
registry books, so that public faith may be secured and parties who in good
1
See Art. 10 et seq. L. 2664/1998, as modified by Art. 2, paras. 6 et seq. L. 3127/2003.

Regarding the land registry, see P. Mattheou, The National Land Registry: Legal Dimensions,
2000.
2
The only area of Greece in which a land registry system had earlier been at work is the
island group of Dodecanese. In Rhodes, Kos, and the Municipality of Porto-Lago in Leros the
land registry system had been introduced since the Italian occupation and was preserved by
L. 510/1947.
434
faith conclude transactions after having consulted such public registers3 may
be protected.
Since the law on National Registry entered into force, in each of the
lands where the land registry system was introduced (according to L.
2308/1995) the previously existing systems of public recordation of the real
transactions and of the constitution of mortgages is replaced by the new
system (Art. 1, para. 3 of L. 2664/1998).
II. THE PRINCIPLES OF THE LAND REGISTRY SYSTEM
The land registry is governed by the following principles:4
A. The principle of land centered organization of the information
concerning the land; this requires the drawing up of diagrams of the land,
keeping record of them, and constantly updating them.
B. The principle of exercising control over the legality of the titles and
other necessary prerequisites before accepting an application for registration
in the land registry books. Consequently, the content of the land registry is
presumed accurate. This presumption is non-rebuttable as far as the first
registration5 is concerned and rebuttable as to the subsequent ones.6
C. The principle of securing the order of registrations in the land
registry according to the time of submission of the relevant applications
(principle of temporal priority, prior tempore potior jure).
D. The principle of publicity of the land registry books.
E. The principle of securing public trust, so that everyone transacting in
good faith and counting on the registrations made in the land registry books
may be protected.
F. The principle of suitability of the land registry as a system lending
itself to the registration of other additional types of information at any time
in the future (principle of openness of the land registry).
See Art. 1, para. 2 L. 2664/1998.

See Art. 2 L. 2664/1998.
5
See Art. 7 L. 2664/1998. See L. Kitsaras, The First Recordings in the National Land
Registry, 2001.
6
See Art. 8 L. 2664/1998, as modified by Art. 2, para. 5 L. 3127/2003.
4
5. Family Law
INTRODUCTION
I. THE CONCEPT OF FAMILY LAW AND FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS
Family law is the sum total of the rules of law regulating family
relationships. By the term family relationships we mean the relationships
created in the context of the family.
In the Greek Civil Code there is no definition of the term family. It is,
however, widely accepted that the term means the legal family, i.e. the
family based on marriage.
The natural family, i.e. the family based on cohabitation, is not
regulated in the Greek Civil Code. More specifically, it should be mentioned
that, in view of the fact that cohabitation is considered a real condition, not
regulated by the Civil Code, the law has no provisions concerning the
relationships between cohabitants. Nonetheless, both the jurisprudence and
the scholars specializing in issues of family law try to give solutions to the
various problems that emerge.1 However, as far as the legal consequences of
cohabitation regarding the children born out of such unions, the Greek Civil
Code has provisions concerning the acknowledgement of children born out
of wedlock.2
Another type of family is the adoptive family based on adoption. A
special chapter of the Greek Civil Code refers to this type of family (Arts.
1542-1588 CC).
See P. Agallopoulou, Cohabitation and One-parent Families According to Greek Law, in

International Family Law, March 2003, pp. 24 et seq. (in English).
2
See below Part Two, Ch. C, III, 2.
436
II. REFORMS OF GREEK FAMILY LAW

The Greek family law, which was outdated even at the time of its
inception, has undergone significant reforms in the last twenty years. The
radical reforms which took place in this branch of Civil Law were
absolutely necessary for the law to accurately reflect the social conditions of
modern times. Besides, it should not be overlooked that during the last
several years nearly all the European legal systems were also reformed.
Today, Greek family law constitutes one of the most avant-garde European
legal systems of family law with an emphasis on the equality of the sexes
and the respect of the personality of each and every member of the family.
The following laws have significantly reformed Greek family law:
1. L. 1250/1982 which established the civil marriage alongside the
religious one.
2. L. 1329/1983 which, in addition to establishing the equality of sexes,
following the constitutional imperative, also made other changes in the
Greek Civil Code, especially as regards family law.3
3. L. 2447/1996 which radically restructured the institutions of
adoption and tutelage, replaced the antiquated institutions of judicial
interdiction and judicial supervision by the contemporary institution of
judicial assistance, and introduced the institution of foster care for children
under age. At this point it is worth mentioning that L. 2447/1996 also
established in the courts which rule on matters of substance a special
division having exclusive competence in all cases of family law. Moreover,
it instituted in every Court of First Instance a social service to assist this
special division of the court with its work through specialized organs acting
as an interdisciplinary team.
4. L. 3089/2002 on medically assisted human reproduction which
regulates the conditions under which medically assisted reproduction may
take place and its consequences in matters of descent.
III. THE CHARACTERISTICS OF FAMILY LAW
1. The main characteristic of the rules of family law is that many of
them constitute mandatory law (jus cogens) or law of public order. Thus, for
See above General Principles, Introduction, II.
FAMILY LAW
437
example, it is not possible to agree on new grounds for divorce or give the
concept of parental care a different content.
2. Another characteristic of many of the rules of family law is that they
are formal, i.e. they require compliance with certain form. This is, for
example, the case as regards the solemnization of marriage (religious or
civil), the acknowledgement of a child born out of wedlock, the adoption
etc.
3. Moreover, family law has a certain ethnic character because it is
closely related to the traditions of the people. In recent years, however, this
trait constantly diminishes, due to the fact that the basic rules of family law
tend to become almost uniform in all European countries.4
Regarding the traits of family law, see G. Michailidis Nouaros, in ERMAK, General
Introduction to Family Law; A. Gazis, Introductory remarks to family law, in Georgiadis
Stathopoulos, Commentary on the Civil Code, Vol. VII.
PART ONE
MARRIAGE
Marriage is a sui generis contract between two heterosexual persons
resulting in legal consequences.
Before referring to the conditions required for marriage, we would like
to mention that marriage is often preceded by an agreement to marry, the
engagement.
Engagement is the agreement for a future marriage which does not give
rise to legal action aiming at compelling the other party to fulfill his
performance (Art. 1346, 1 CC). In other words it is the case of an imperfect
or natural obligation.1
CHAPTER A
REQUIREMENTS FOR VALID MARRIAGE
The requirements for valid marriage are distinguished in positive
requirements and impediments.
I. POSITIVE REQUIREMENTS
The following are positive requirements for valid marriage:
1. Sex Difference
The parties to a marriage must be respectively male and female. It is
prohibited to persons of the same sex to contract marriage.
1
See above Law of Obligations, Introduction, Ch. B, IV.
440
2. Legal Age
The parties to a marriage must have completed eighteen years of age
(Art. 1350, 2, 1 CC). Exceptionally, parties under eighteen may contract
marriage, if the court estimates that there is important cause for it and grants
them special permission to this effect (Art. 1350, 2, 2 CC). For example,
pregnancy constitutes important cause.
3. Capacity to Conclude Marriage
According to Article 1351 of the Greek Civil Code, persons who may
not conclude marriage are:
A. those under privative judicial assistance in whole;
B. those under privative judicial assistance in part to whom marriage is
specifically forbidden;2
C. those who, according to Article 131 of the Greek Civil Code, are
temporarily incapacitated to conclude juridical acts.3
II. IMPEDIMENTS
The impediments to contracting marriage are the following:
1. Previously Existing Marriage
As expressly stated in Article 1354 of the Greek Civil Code, it is
prohibited to contract marriage before the previously existing marriage is
irreversibly dissolved or annulled.
2. Blood Relationship4
Marriage between certain relatives related by blood (consanguinity) is
prohibited. Such is the case of blood relatives in lineal relationship without
2
A person under concurrent judicial assistance, in whole or in part, which extends to

marriage, may contract marriage only with the consent of his judicial assistant (Art. 1352, 1
CC). If the latter refuses to consent, the court may, after hearing him, give permission for the
marriage to be concluded provided that this is in the interest of the person under judicial
assistance (Art. 1352 CC).
3
Regarding temporary incapacity to conclude juridical acts, see above General Principles,
Part Three, Ch. C, II.
4
See below Part Two, Ch. B.
FAMILY LAW
441
any limitation and in collateral relationship up until the fourth degree

included (Art. 1356 CC), i.e. up to the degree of first cousins.
3. Relationship by Marriage Alliance5
Contracting marriage is prohibited between relatives by marriage
alliance (affinity) in lineal relationship without any limitation and in
collateral relationship up until the third degree included (Art. 1357 CC), i.e.
marriage with the spouses parent or sibling. At this point it should be noted
that the relationship by marriage alliance persists even after the dissolution
or annulment of the marriage it was created by (Art. 1462, 2 CC).
4. Relationship Resulting from Adoption
Contracting marriage is prohibited between the person who adopted
and his descendants and the person who was adopted (Art. 1360, 1 CC).6 At
this point it should be noted that the impediment persists even after the
dissolution of the adoption (Art. 1360, 2 CC).
See below Part Two, Ch. B.

After the reform of the Greek Civil Code by L. 2447/1996, the impediment of Article 1360
of the Civil Code only refers to the case of adoption of adults. Because in the case of the
adoption of a minor, Articles 1356 and 1357 are applicable, i.e. the impediment exists by
virtue of the existence of prohibited degree of family relationship (blood relationship or
relationship by marriage alliance) with the relatives of the adoptive parent in view of the fact
that, according to Article 1561, 1 of the Civil Code, the adopted child is fully integrated in
the family of the adoptive parent. The impediment to marriage on account of blood
relationship or relationship by marriage alliance continues to exist with the natural family of
the adopted (Art. 1561, 1 CC). See Th. Papachristou, Manual of Family Law, 2nd ed., 1998,
pp. 36 et seq.; K. Panagopoulos, Family Law, 1998, p. 22 et seq.; P. Filios, Family Law, Vol.
I, 2003, p. 67; Th. Papachristou, in Georgiadis Stathopoulos, Commentary on the Civil
Code, Arts. 1561-1562, No 3 et seq.
6
CHAPTER B
FORMALITIES RELATING TO CONTRACTING MARRIAGE
I. DECLARATIONS OF THE WILL
To contract marriage the agreement of the future spouses is necessary
as well as compliance with certain form.
The will of the parties contracting marriage needs to have been shaped
freely and be free of defects, i.e. not to be the outcome of error in the
identity of the person or to result from threat.
Regarding the respective declarations of the will, they must be made in
person and not be subject to condition or time-clause (Art. 1350, 1 CC).
II. FORMALITIES RELATING TO THE CEREMONY OF MARRIAGE
The declarations of will of the future spouses are subject to form.
L. 1250/1982 established two types of marriage ceremonies of equal
validity: religious and civil. In other words the parties may choose either the
one or the other.
1. Marriage by Religious Ceremony
In the religious marriage the declarations of will of the future spouses
are made before the religious official.
The constitutive form in the marriage by religious ceremony consists in
the solemnization of the marriage before a priest of the Greek Orthodox
Church or by a religious official of another doctrine or religion known1 in
Greece (Art. 1367, 1 CC).2
1
What is meant by religion or doctrine known in Greece is that such teaching or worship
must be open, i.e. have some form of publicity which renders them literally known. See M.
Stathopoulos, in Georgiadis Stathopoulos, Commentary on the Civil Code, Art. 1367, No.
FAMILY LAW
443
Regarding marriage between parties belonging to different doctrines or

religions, the marriage ceremony is performed according to the doctrine or
religion of each of the parties contracting marriage, if such doctrines or
religions are recognized3 in Greece (Art. 1371 CC).
Finally, for evidential purposes as to the conclusion of the marriage, the
religious official is obliged to draw up the relevant act following the
marriage ceremony (Art. 1367, 3, 2 CC).
2. Civil Marriage
In the civil marriage the simultaneous declarations of the future spouses
are made publicly and solemnly in the presence of two witnesses and are
addressed to the Mayor or the President of the Community (or their legal
representative) of the place where the civil marriage is solemnized.
Immediately after the civil marriage ceremony, the Mayor or President of
the Community (or their legal representative) must draw up the relevant act
(Art. 1367, 2 CC).
Finally, it should be mentioned that, according to Article 1367, para. 3,
subpara. 3 of the Greek Civil Code, the civil marriage ceremony does not
preclude the solemnization of the same marriage in a religious ceremony. It
would be fair to equally accept that the opposite is also possible, i.e. that,
after the religious ceremony, a civil ceremony may follow.4
16; Papachristou, Manual of Family Law, op. cit., p. 41; E. Kounougeri Manoledaki,
Family Law, Vol. 1, 3d ed., 2003, p. 105.
2
The requirements for the religious ceremony are determined by the canon and rites of the
doctrine or the religion according to which the marriage ceremony is performed, provided
that they are not contrary to the rules of public order (Art. 1367, 3, 1 CC).
3
In view of the religious freedom guaranteed by the Greek Constitution (Art. 13), it should
be accepted that a doctrine or religion is considered recognized when it is known. See
Stathopoulos, in Georgiadis Stathopoulos, Commentary on the Civil Code, Art. 1371, No.
1; G. Koumantos, Family Law, Vol. I, 1988, p. 63.
4
See Koumantos, op. cit., p. 68; Stathopoulos, in Georgiadis Stathopoulos, Commentary on
the Civil Code, Art. 1367, No 23; Papachristou, op. cit., p. 43; Kounougeri Manoledaki, op.
cit., p. 107 and the citations thereat.
CHAPTER C
DEFECTIVE MARRIAGE
There are three types of defective marriage: the non-existent, the null
and void, and the voidable.
More specifically:
Non-existent is the marriage for which neither of the two formalities
stipulated by Article 1367 of the Greek Civil Code, the religious or the civil,
were observed (Art. 1372, 2 CC).
Null and void is the marriage which was contracted either in the
absence of a positive requirement or despite the existence of an impediment
(Art. 1372, 1 CC). Contrary to the general rule that the nullity of a juridical
act does not have to be pronounced by a court judgment,1 for a marriage to
be considered null and void a court judgment is necessary (Art. 1376 CC).
There are no provisions for prescription of the action to annul.
Voidable is the marriage in the following cases: a) on account of error
in the identity of the person of the other spouse (Art. 1374, 1 CC), such as,
for example, in the case where A by mistake marries the twin sister of the
woman with whom he had agreed to get married; b) on account of threat
(Art. 1375, 1 CC).
For a voidable marriage to be annulled a court judgment is required.
The action to annul the marriage may be lodged solely by the spouse who
was in error or under threat but not by his heirs (Art. 1378, case 2 CC).2 The
relevant action prescribes after six months from the time the institution of
legal proceedings was possible and at any rate three years after the
conclusion of the marriage (Art. 1380 CC).
1
See above General Principles, Part Three, Ch. E, II.

The rule is that in such cases the heirs may also sue to annul. (See above General Principles,
Part Three, Ch. E, III). The case of voidable marriage where they may not is the exception.
2
CHAPTER D
THE RESULTS OF THE MARRIAGE FOR THE SPOUSES
I. PERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS
The Greek Civil Code regulates the following aspects of the spouses
personal relationships:
1. Obligation to Cohabit
The spouses have the reciprocal obligation to cohabit. This obligation
includes the obligation of mutual fidelity, respect, and assistance. This
claim, however, should not be exercised in an abusive manner, given the
fact that even after the marriage each spouse retains the right to develop his
personality freely (Art. 1386 CC).
2. Running the Conjugal Life
The spouses need to decide jointly on every matter arising from their
conjugal life. Nonetheless, the way their conjugal life is run should not
affect the professional activity of either of the spouses or violate the sphere
of their personality (Art. 1387 CC).
3. The Spouses Surname
Marriage does not alter the surname of the spouses as far as their legal
relationships are concerned (Art. 1388, 1 CC). Each spouse necessarily
retains his surname even after the marriage.
This rule is mandatory law (jus cogens) and every contrary agreement
to this effect is null and void. Up until L. 1329/1983 entered into force, the
wife was taking the husbands last name but the law in question changed
this in order for Greek family law to reflect the constitutional principle of
446
the equality of sexes. Besides, the repeated changes of the wifes surnames
(with marriage, divorce, an eventual second marriage, etc.) complicated
transactions.1
But in their social relationships each spouse, with the others consent,
may use the other spouses surname or add it to his own (Art. 1388, 2 CC).
4. Joint Contribution to the Needs of the Family
The spouses are obliged to contribute jointly to the needs of the family,
each according to his means (Art. 1389 CC). Family needs include the
mutual obligation to provide for each others maintenance, their common
obligation to provide for the maintenance of the children, and more
generally the obligation to contribute to the management of their common
household (Art. 1390 CC).
Each spouse may contribute to the family needs in the following ways:
a) by his income which he may derive from his work or the management of
his assets consisting of movables or immovables; b) by his assets, such as
for example by offering one of his immovables to serve as the family
residence; c) by his personal work which may be either housework or
assistance with the profession of the other spouse.2
II. PROPERTY RELATIONSHIPS
1. The Autonomy of Assets
A basic principle of the Greek Civil Law is that each spouses assets
are separate and autonomous (Art. 1397 CC). Marriage does not alter the
spouses patrimonial status of separateness and autonomy of assets. This
implies that it does not create community property. Each spouse maintains
and freely administers not only the assets he had prior to the marriage but
also those he acquired after it.
The one limitation to the separateness and autonomy of the couples
assets introduced by the Greek Civil Code is the claim to participate in the
increments following the dissolution or annulment of the marriage.
See Introductory Report of L. 1329/1983, No 39, in I. Spyridakis, Civil Code, 2003, p. 792.
For the determination of the contribution of each spouse to the needs of the family, see
Kounougeri Manoledaki, op. cit., p. 212 et seq; Papachristou, op. cit., p. 82 et seq.
2
FAMILY LAW
447
2. Claim to Participate in the Increments

By claim to participate in the increments (increase in the assets of the
other spouse) we mean that each spouse, after the dissolution or annulment
of the marriage,3 the same as in the case of separation that lasted at least
three years, is entitled to claim4 from the other spouse5 part of the assets
accumulated during marriage, provided of course that he is able to prove
that this increase of assets is also due to his own contribution (Art. 1400, 1
and 2 CC).
What each spouse acquired from donation, inheritance, legacy, or the
proceeds from the disposal of such acquisitions is not considered an increase
of assets during marriage (Art. 1400, 3 CC).
Example: If A, the husband, at the time of his marriage with B had assets
amounting to 150,000 euros and at the time of the dissolution of their marriage his
assets amounted to 500,000 euros, his wife B is entitled to a share in the increase
of the husbands property by 350,000 euros to the extent of her contribution.
However, because it is difficult to prove the contribution of the one

spouse to the assets of the other, the Greek Civil Code establishes a
rebuttable presumption by which such contribution is limited to one third
() of the increase. But, given the fact that, as was already mentioned, such
presumption is rebuttable, if it is proved that the contribution was greater,
the claim will also be higher. If, on the contrary, it is proved that the
contribution was lesser or that there was no contribution, the claim will be
limited accordingly or disallowed altogether (Art. 1400, 1, 2 CC).
Finally, the meaning of the term contribution to the increase of the
assets of the other spouse needs to be clarified. Article 1400, para. 1,
subpara. 1 of the Greek Civil Code intentionally adds to the word
contribution the qualifier in whatever manner in order to include all
manners of contributing such as, for example, by making a payment towards
the purchase of a movable or immovable by the other spouse, by paying for
3
The marriage is dissolved either by reason of death of one of the spouses or by reason of
divorce. See below Part One, Ch. E.
4
In case of death of one of the spouses, the claim to the increment of the assets accumulated
during marriage does not arise to the benefit of the heirs of the deceased spouse (Art. 1401, 1
CC).
5
If the marriage is dissolved by reason of death of the spouse who is under the obligation to
share the increments to his property, the surviving spouse may exercise the claim in question
against the heirs of the deceased (see Kounougeri Manoledaki, op. cit., p. 267;
Papachristou, op. cit., p. 99).
448
the remodeling of the spouses immovable, by paying the spouses debts, by

offering ones services free of charge to the other spouses business, by
doing housework, by giving professional advice, etc.
3. Community Property
For their property relationships the spouses may alternately choose the
system of community property (Arts. 1403-1416 CC).
More specifically:
Either before or during the marriage, the spouses may elect the system
of community property by concluding a contract to this effect and
subjecting it to the form of notarial deed.6 This means that they establish for
their assets a system of community in equal shares without the right of
disposal by either of his undivided share (Art. 1403, 1 CC). In other words
the spouses create a joint property which belongs to both of them in
undivided shares. This joint property may consist of the totality of the
spouses assets or only of what they will acquire during marriage.
Joint ownership ceases to exist in the following instances:
A. Ipso jure with the dissolution or annulment of the marriage as well
as when one of the spouses is declared a missing person (absentee)7 or
bankrupt8 and the relevant court judgment becomes final non appealable
(Art. 1411, 1 CC).9
The reason for placing the term community property in quotation marks is to indicate that
here the term is used in its literal sense and is not identical to the homonymous legal
institution in certain states of the USA, such as California, from which the Greek law of the
joint ownership of the spouses differs in several respects (Translators note).
6
The community property contract is valid against third parties only following its
recordation in a special public register kept in the Athens Court of First Instance (Art. 1403, 2
CC in conjunction with PrD 411/1989).
7
See above General Principles, Part One, Ch. B, I, 4.
8
Only the merchant who has stopped making payments may be declared bankrupt by a court
ruling.
9
See Koumantos, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 238; I. Deliyannis A. Koutsouradis, Family Law, Vol.
II, 1987, p. 158; Kounougeri Manoledaki, op. cit., p. 296 et seq.; Th. Papachristou, in
Georgiadis Stathopoulos, Commentary on the Civil Code, Arts. 1411-1413, No 8.
According to a different view (I. Spyridakis, Family Law, 1984, p. 146), especially for the
case of declaration of a person as missing, the court ruling must be irreversible (i.e. not just
final non appealable).
FAMILY LAW
449
B. By an agreement between the spouses which needs to be vested the

form of a notarial deed (Art. 1412 CC).
C. By a court judgment following a lawsuit filed by one of the spouses
in certain cases specified by law (Art. 1413 CC).
CHAPTER E
DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE
I. GENERAL
Marriage is dissolved with the death of one of the spouses or with
divorce. As was already mentioned, the declaration of one as a missing
person does not automatically entail dissolution of the marriage; it only
constitutes grounds for divorce.1
II. DIVORCE
Divorce is the dissolution of the marriage by court ruling when both
spouses are still alive.
1. Types of Divorce
In the Greek Civil Code there are two types of divorce: by mutual
consent (uncontested) and contested.
A. Divorce by Mutual Consent (Uncontested)
a. Prerequisites
The prerequisites for divorce by mutual consent, which was introduced
by L. 1329/1983, are the following (Art. 1441 CC):
aa. The marriage must have lasted at least one year.
bb. The agreement of the spouses to an uncontested divorce needs to be
declared by them before the court in person or by specially authorized
1
See above General Principles, Part One, Ch. B, I, 4, D.
451
FAMILY LAW
representatives in the course of two hearings separated from each other by a

period of at least six months.
cc. If there are minor children, a written agreement of the spouses
settling matters of the parental care over the children and of the parents
visitation rights with them needs to be submitted to the court.
b. Procedure
The spouses submit a joint petition to the competent court, which is the
One-member Court of First Instance2 of the last joint residence of the
spouses3 or of the domicile or residence of one of the spouses.4
The marriage is dissolved when the court ruling5 granting the divorce
becomes irreversible.6
B. Contested Divorce
a. Grounds for Divorce
Following the amendment of the Greek Civil Code by L. 1329/1983,
there are only two grounds for divorce: the declaration of one of the spouses
as a missing person and major breakdown of the matrimony.
aa. Declaration of one of the spouses as a missing person: in case one
of the spouses has been declared a missing person, the other may file for
divorce (Art. 1440 CC). In this case the court procedure is only a formality
See X. Skorini Paparrigopoulou, in Georgiadis Stathopoulos, Commentary on the Civil

Code, Art. 1441, No 26; Kounougeri Manoledaki, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 485; Papachristou,
Manual of Family Law, op. cit., p. 152.
3
See Art. 39 CCPr.
4
See Arts. 22 and 23 CCPr.
5
Irreversible is the court decision which is not subject to any recourse, including cassation
review.
6
The court decides according to the procedure followed in cases of voluntary (ex parte)
jurisdiction (Art. 739 CCPr.).
Major breakdown is the literal translation of the term ishyros klonismos (
) used by the Greek legislator. In the English language the term often used for this
type of failure of the marriage is irretrievable breakdown. See, for example, Gerhard
Robbers, An Introduction to German Law (Translated into English by Michael Jewell),
Nomos/Ant. N. Sakkoulas, 3d ed., 2003, p. 287; also Kate Standley (writing on the British
law), Family Law, MacMillan, 1993, p. 84 (Translators note).
452
because the court is bound by the judgment declaring the spouse a missing
person.7
bb. Major breakdown: according to Article 1439, para. 1 of the Greek
Civil Code, each of the spouses may file for divorce when, on account of a
reason attributed to the person of the defendant or both spouses, the
matrimony has suffered such major breakdown, that continuation of the
conjugal relationship would be intolerable to the plaintiff.
As is gathered from the above Article, suffices for the conjugal
relationship to have undergone major breakdown. It is not necessary for
one or both spouses to be at fault. Such is, for example, the case when
serious financial problems have surfaced or problems of physical or mental
health for one of the spouses or both. The degree of breakdown of the
conjugal relationship needs to be such that continuation of the conjugal
relationship is deemed intolerable by the spouse petitioning the divorce.
The concept major breakdown of the matrimony rendering the
continuation of the conjugal relationship intolerable is an abstract legal
concept. Consequently, it is up to the court to decide whether the specific
facts brought before the bench constitute such serious impairment of the
matrimonial bond that continuation of the marriage would be intolerable to
the petitioner.
To facilitate the evidence of such facts strongly impairing the
continuation of the conjugal relationship, the Greek Civil Code (Art. 1439,
2) establishes four reasons8 which constitute rebuttable presumptions9
regarding the existence of major breakdown. They are:
-
bigamy, i.e. contracting a marriage without having previously

dissolved or annulled the existing marriage;
adultery, i.e. physical sexual relationship of one of the spouses with
a third party of either gender;
abandonment of the plaintiff, i.e. interruption of the conjugal
relationship without good reason;
plotting against the plaintiffs life by the defendant, i.e.
externalization of the intention of one spouse to kill the other.
See Skorini Paparrigopoulou, op. cit., Art. 1440, No 5; Kounougeri Manoledaki, op. cit.,
Vol. I, p. 399; Papachristou, op. cit., p. 154.
8
Before the amendment of the Greek Civil Code by L. 1329/1983, these reasons constituted
grounds for divorce due to ones fault.
9
A presumption is rebuttable if it can be rebutted by the opposing partys proof to the
contrary.
FAMILY LAW
453
Regarding major breakdown it should be noted that, according to

Article 1439, para. 3 of the Greek Civil Code, if the spouses have been
continually estranged for a period of at least four years, the presumption is
non-rebuttable.10 The four year period is considered complete even if during
that time there might have been brief interruptions of the estrangement in an
attempt by the spouses to reestablish the conjugal relationship. The
lawmaker adopted this solution in order to facilitate the dissolution of
marriages which, after four years of estrangement, are in actuality defunct.
b. Procedure
The court competent to rule on a contested divorce is the Multi-member
Court of First Instance11 of the place of the last joint residence of the
spouses12 or of the domicile or residence of the defendant.13 14
2. The Results of Divorce
The marriage ceases to exist as soon as the court decision becomes
irreversible.
Once the marriage is dissolved there is no longer obligation for
cohabitation. If co-ownership had been established,15 it is dissolved and the
claim of sharing in the increments arises.16 Moreover, a claim to
maintenance is born if certain conditions concur.
More specifically:
The claim of one of the former spouses to maintenance presupposes on
the one hand the claiming spouses inability to secure his own maintenance,
even if he were to spend his principal, and on the other hand the ability of
the other former spouse to provide such maintenance.
In addition to those general preconditions, the former spouse entitled to
maintenance must also be unable to exercise a suitable profession on
account of his age, health, or the need to care for a minor child, or on
10
A presumption is non-rebuttable if it cannot be rebutted by any proof to the contrary.

See Art. 18 No 1 CCPr.
12
See Art. 39 CCPr.
13
See Arts. 22 and 23 CCPr.
14
The procedure followed in the case of contested divorce is the special procedure on marital
disputes (Art. 592, 1 CCPr.).
15
See above Part One, Ch. D, II, 3.
16
See above Part One, Ch. D, II, 2.
11
454
account of his inability to find stable work or his need for professional
training. Finally, it is possible for maintenance to be granted to the divorced
spouse for reasons of equity (aequitas).17
17
A most recent law on social security matters (L. 3232/2004) has further established (Art. 4)
that, in case of death of the former spouse who was under the obligation to pay maintenance,
even if said spouse had been remarried, the divorcee or the divorced man is entitled to receive
a portion of his or her pension drawn from the state or other social security organizations
under certain strict conditions. The criteria used to establish these conditions take into
consideration the divorcees or the divorced mans age and economic status, his or her ability
to generate income, the number of years the marriage had lasted, the reason for which it was
dissolved etc. Such pioneering reforms touching upon family law are in line with the social
spirit permeating the recent reforms in Greek family law and further point to its avant-garde
character (See above Family Law, Introduction).
PART TWO
AND KINSHIP
CHAPTER A
I. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS
The rapid development of medical methods towards providing
assistance with human reproduction has led the Greek legislator to pass a
law regulating the matter. It is L. 3089/2002 entitled, Medical Assistance in
Human Reproduction.1
This law is founded on the one hand on Article 5, para. 1 of the Greek
Constitution and on the other hand on the Treaty of the Council of Europe
on Human Rights and Biomedicine which was ratified by Greece by L.
2619/1998.
Specifically as regards the Greek Constitution, Article 5 states that each
person has the right to develop his personality freely. All individual rights
not mentioned in special laws are based on this general constitutional
principle. Consequently, the right to human reproduction by medically
assisted methods, which constitutes an alternative way of procreating, is
founded on Article 5 since the Constitution clearly protects all individual
forms of freedom including the freedom of having a family.
See P. Agallopoulou A. Koutsouradis (eds.), Medical Assistance in Human Reproduction:

L. 3089/2002 (Preliminary Proceedings/Discussion in the Parliament), 2004.
456
Law 3089/2002 introduced a special chapter to the Greek Civil Code

regarding the conditions under which the various methods of medically
assisted human reproduction are permitted. The same law also amended the
chapter of the Greek Civil Code regarding descent.2
According to the above law, all the medically assisted methods
practiced for the purpose of human reproduction are permitted. Married and
unmarried couples and even single women have the right to employ
medically assisted methods to procreate.
Moreover, it should be mentioned that medically assisted human
reproduction is even permitted post mortem and the same holds for the
reproduction by way of intervention of a surrogate mother. However, the
conditions required in these cases are stricter.
II. GENERAL CONDITIONS FOR MEDICALLY ASSISTED
HUMAN REPRODUCTION TO BE ALLOWED
According to Articles 1455 and 1456 of the Greek Civil Code, the
necessary conditions for the use of medically assisted methods in human
reproduction are the following:
1. It should be impossible for the person wishing to have a child to
procreate in the natural way; or the reason for abstaining from natural
reproduction should be to avoid the transmission to the child of a grave
genetic disease.
2. Medically assisted methods for human reproduction are only allowed
up to the reproductive age of the medically assisted person.
3. The persons desiring to use such medically assisted methods for
human reproduction must give their consent3 in writing. In the case of an
unmarried woman, her consent as well as the consent of the male she
cohabits with, if this happens to be the case, need to be vested the form of a
notarial deed.
2
See Kounougeri Manoledaki, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 1 et seq. ; P. Filios, Family Law, Vol. II,
2004, p. 40 et seq.; P. Agallopoulou, Medically Assisted Human Reproduction in Greece,
in International Family Law, March 2004, p. 33 et seq. (in English).
3
The consent is revoked in the same way it was given up until the time the semen or the
fertilized ova is transferred to the female body. Subject to the exception of Article 1457
concerning post mortem medically assisted human reproduction the consent is considered
revoked if one of the parties who had given their consent dies before the transfer takes place
(Art. 1456, 2 CC).
FAMILY LAW
457
4. The persons are not allowed to choose the gender of the child unless
this is done to avoid a serious gender-related disease.
5. Human reproduction by way of cloning is prohibited.
III. SPECIAL CONDITIONS REQUIRED FOR POST MORTEM
According to Article 1457 of the Greek Civil Code, after the death of
the husband or the steady partner with whom the woman was cohabiting,
medically assisted human reproduction is only possible by court
authorization4 if the following conditions concur:
1. If the husband or the steady partner with whom the woman was
cohabiting suffered from a disease linked to the hazard of sterility or if he
was in mortal danger.
2. If the husband or the steady partner with whom the woman was
cohabiting had given his consent to such post mortem medically assisted
human reproduction in the form of a notarial deed.
It is also necessary to mention at this point that such post mortem
medically assisted human reproduction may not take place earlier than six
months after the mans death or later than two years after his death.
IV. SPECIAL CONDITIONS
FOR MEDICALLY ASSISTED HUMAN REPRODUCTION
IN THE CASE OF USE OF A SURROGATE MOTHER
Article 1458 of the Greek Civil Code also allows for fertilized ova to be
transferred to the body of a third female. The requirements for medically
assisted human reproduction by way of using a surrogate mother5 are the
following:
4
The court competent to issue such authorization is the One-member Court of First Instance
(Art. 740 CCPr.) of the place where the petitioning woman habitually resides. The court
decides according to the procedure followed in cases of voluntary jurisdiction (jurisdiction ex
parte) (Art. 739 CCPr.). If the court estimates that publicity would be detrimental to the
good morals or that there exist special reasons on account of which it is imperative to
protect the private or family life of the parties, it may order the hearing to take place behind
closed doors (Art. 799 CCPr.).
5
It seems that in English by the term surrogate motherhood the following two things are
usually understood: a) partial surrogacy, which involves insemination of the surrogate
458
1. Written agreement between the persons who intend to procreate and

the woman who will carry out the pregnancy without any quid pro quo. If
the surrogate mother is married, her spouse also needs to consent.
2. Petition by the woman who wishes to have a child by medically
assisted human reproduction of this type before a court.
3. Judicial authorization6 to this effect which is granted if the
petitioning woman is medically incapable of carrying out a pregnancy and
the surrogate mother, in view of her overall health condition, is capable of
doing so.
4. The ova transferred to the surrogate mother who will carry out the
pregnancy must be either those of the woman petitioning the authorization
or of a third woman. It is not possible, however, for the woman who will
carry out the pregnancy to be impregnated by fertilized ova of her own.
In addition to the above mentioned conditions it should also be noted
that according to Article 8 of L. 3089/2002 which, however, has not been
inserted in the Greek Civil Code both the commissioning or intended
mother and the surrogate mother must have their domicile in Greece. This
clause has been included in order to eliminate the possibility of tourism for
procreative purposes.
mother, i.e. the mother who will carry out the pregnancy, by the sperm of the commissioning
or intended father, and b) full surrogacy which entails in vitro fertilization of the surrogate
mother using egg and sperm of the commissioning or intended parents (see Surrogate
Motherhood: International Perspectives, R. Cook & Slater (eds.), Oxford, Portland, Oregon,
2003, p. 1). The Greek law establishes a different distinction between the possible types of
surrogate motherhood permitting only the first one: i) surrogate motherhood where the third
woman carrying out the pregnancy is being impregnated by reproductive material (sperm and
ova) that is not her own (it could belong either to the intended father/mother or to a third
party donor); and ii) surrogate motherhood not permitted according to the Greek law
where the surrogate mother, in addition to carrying out the pregnancy, would also be using
her own ova in the process. The first type of surrogacy is often referred to in the Greek
language as parenthetic motherhood (parentheti mitrotita/ ), whereas
for the second, the non-permitted one, the term surrogate motherhood (hypokatastati
mitrotita/ ) is reserved.
6
What was earlier said about the court proceedings in the case of issuance of a court
authorization for post mortem medically assisted human reproduction (footn. 4) also holds in
this case.
FAMILY LAW
459
V. THE ANONYMITY OF THE PERSONS WHO HAD OFFERED

THEIR SPERM OR FERTILIZED OVA
With the Article 1460 of the Greek Civil Code the anonymity of third
persons having offered their sperm or fertilized ova is guaranteed.
Nonetheless, the medical information concerning third party donors is
preserved in a confidential archive without indication of the persons
identity. The only party to whom access to this archive is permitted is the
child and this only for medical reasons concerning his person.
According to this same Article, the identity of the child and of the
childs parents is not disclosed to third party donors of sperm or fertilized
ova. This anonymity was established in order to protect both sides from
eventual mutual future interventions of the two families, the biological and
the social.
VI. THE FATE OF EXCESS FROZEN SPERM OR FERTILIZED OVA
According to Article 1459 of the Greek Civil Code, the persons having
recourse to methods of medically assisted human reproduction decide
beforehand by a joint written declaration before their physician or the person
in the Medical Center who is responsible for such matters what the fate of
their unused frozen sperm or fertilized ova will be. Such reproductive
material may:
-
be offered without a quid pro quo to other candidates for medically

assisted human reproduction chosen by the physician or the person
in the Medical Center responsible for such matters;
be used without a quid pro quo for research or treatment purposes;
be destroyed.
In case there is no joint declaration of the interested parties as to the

fate of cryo-preserved sperm or fertilized ova, they are preserved for five
years from the time this reproductive material was received or fertilized,
after which time they are either used for research or treatment purposes or
they are destroyed. As regards non cryo-preserved ova, they are destroyed
after the elapse of fourteen days since insemination.
CHAPTER B
KINSHIP
Kinship is the relationship connecting two or more persons to each
other. There are two kinds of kinship: by blood (consanguinity) and by
marriage alliance (affinity).
The kinship by blood is distinguished in lineal and collateral.
Lineal blood relationship is the relationship connecting two persons
one of which is issued from the other (Art. 1461, 1 CC), e.g. parent-child.
Collateral blood relationship exists between two persons who descend
from a common ancestor (Art. 1461, 2 CC), e.g. siblings.
The degree of relationship between the parties is determined by the
number of births connecting these persons (Art. 1461, 3 CC).
Example:
A
B
D
C
E
A = father
B, and C = As children,
i.e. siblings
D and E = As grandchildren
and each others first cousins.
B is related to both A and D by lineal blood relationship of the 1st degree. He is

also related to C by collateral blood relationship of the 2nd degree and to E by
collateral blood relationship of the 3d degree.
D is related to A by lineal blood relationship of the 2nd degree. He is also related
to C and E by collateral blood relationship (of the 3d and 4th degree respectively).
Relationship by marriage alliance is the relationship between one

spouse and the blood relatives of the other spouse (Art. 1462, 1 CC).
FAMILY LAW
461
Example: If A and B are husband and wife and B has parents and siblings, As
relatives by marriage alliance are the parents and siblings of B.
In the relationship by marriage alliance the degree of relatedness is also

determined by the number of births connecting the persons with each other
(Art. 1462, 2 CC).
Example:
P1
M1
P2
M2
A and B = husband and wife.

P1 and M1 = As parents
P2 and M2 = Bs parents
D and E = As siblings
F and G = Bs siblings
A is related to P2 and M2 by lineal 1st degree relationship by marriage alliance.

He is also related to F and G by collateral 2nd degree relationship by marriage
alliance.
Respectively, B is related to P1 and M1 by lineal 1st degree relationship by
marriage alliance. She is also related to D and E by collateral 2nd degree
relationship by marriage alliance.
Finally, as was already noted,1 it should be made clear that the

relationship by marriage alliance continues to exist even after the dissolution
or annulment of the marriage it was created by (Art. 1462, 2 CC). There is
also artificial kinship created by adoption.2
1
2
See above Part One, Ch. A, II, 3.

See below Part Five.
CHAPTER C
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIP
I. ESTABLISHMENT OF MATERNAL DESCENT
The relationship of a person with the mother and her relatives is
established by the fact of the persons birth (Art. 1463, 1 CC).
In case of medically assisted human reproduction, if the pregnancy was
carried out by another woman, the presumption is that the mother of the
child is the woman who intended to have the child and who, in accordance
with the conditions set forth by Article 1458 of the Greek Civil Code,1 has
obtained the relevant court authorization to have a child by this method (Art.
1464, 1 CC).
This presumption is rebuttable and may be overturned by an action
contesting maternity2 brought within six months from the time of birth either
by the presumed mother or by the surrogate mother, if it is proved that the
child was issued biologically from the latter (Art. 1464, 2, 1 CC). Following
the irreversible court decision accepting the contestation of maternity action,
the childs mother is the surrogate mother who is deemed to be his mother
retroactively from the time of birth (Art. 1464, 3 CC).
II. ESTABLISHMENT OF PATERNAL DESCENT
The relationship of a person with the father and his relatives is deduced
from the mothers marriage to the father or established by way of
acknowledgment (voluntary or through a court ruling) of the child as the
fathers own (Art. 1463, 2 CC).
1
See above Family Law, Ch. A, IV.

Competent court is the Multi-member Court of First Instance (Art. 18 CCPr.) applying the
proceedings governing relations between parents and children (Art. 614, 1, 1 CCPr.).
2
FAMILY LAW
463
More specifically:
1. Presumption of Paternity
Article 1465, para. 1 of the Greek Civil Code stipulates that a child
born during the mothers marriage or within three hundred days from its
dissolution or annulment is presumed to have as father the mothers
husband.3
This clause establishes the presumption of paternity which, however, is
rebuttable and may be reversed by court judgment4 if it is proved that the
mother did not conceive from her husband or that during the critical time for
conception it was absolutely impossible for her to conceive from him (Art.
1467 CC).
A child born from artificial insemination which took place post mortem
is also considered born in marriage, provided that the required by Article
1457 of the Greek Civil Code court authorization exists (Art. 1465, 2 CC).5
2. Acknowledgement of Paternity
If a child is born out of wedlock, the parentage with the father is
established through acknowledgement of the child by the father as his own.
In case there is no acknowledgement by the father, no relationship
between the child and his biological father exists.
A. Ways of Acknowledgment of Paternity
The acknowledgement of paternity may be effected voluntarily or
judicially (by court decision).
Specifically:
a. Voluntary acknowledgment
The acknowledgment is voluntary if it is done by the father or his
parents in case the father is deceased or incapable of concluding juridical
If the child was born after the elapse of three hundred days as from the dissolution or the
annulment of the marriage, the burden of proof regarding the husbands paternity falls on the
party arguing in favor of the paternity. The same holds if the artificial insemination took
place post mortem, despite the lack of court authorization to this effect (Art. 1465, 3 CC).
4
Concerning the contestation of paternity, see Arts. 1469-1472 and Arts. 614 et seq. CCPr.
5
See above Family Law Ch. A, III.
464
acts provided that the mother also consents to it (Art. 1475, para. 1,
subpara. 1 and para. 3 CC).
In the case of an unmarried woman who had recourse to medically
assisted human reproduction, the consent of the man with whom she
cohabits, given before a notary public (Art. 1456, 1, 2 CC), holds as
voluntary acknowledgment on his part of the child as his own (Art. 1457, 2,
1, CC). The respective consent of the woman, given by way of notarial
document, also holds as her consent to the voluntary acknowledgment (Art.
1475, 2, 2 CC).
The voluntary acknowledgement by the father or his parents is done by
a declaration before a notary public or by testament (Art. 1476, 1 CC). The
declarations pertaining to acknowledgement and consent need to be made in
person, may not be dependent on condition or time-clause, and are
irrevocable (Art. 1476, para. 3 and 4 CC).6
b. Judicial acknowledgment
In case either the father has not voluntarily acknowledged the child as
his own or the mother has not consented to it, the mother, the child, or the
father of the child born out of wedlock may file an action and demand from
the court to rule to this effect (Art. 1479 CC).
If medically assisted human reproduction is conducted with
reproductive material of a third party donor, judicial acknowledgement is
precluded even if the identity of the party is or later on becomes known (Art.
1479, 2 CC).7
B. The Results of Acknowledgment
In the case of a childs acknowledgment by the father as his own (either
by voluntary or judicial acknowledgment), unless the law provides
otherwise,8 the child has in all matters the status of a child born in marriage
vis--vis both parents and their relatives.
The Greek Civil Code allows for contestation of the acknowledgment of a child as ones
own if such acknowledgement was effected by a person other than the childs biological
father (Art. 1477 CC).
7
The anonymity of third persons having offered their sperm or fertilized ova is guaranteed.
See above Ch. A, V.
8
The law makes different provisions regarding the last name and the parental care. See below
Part Three, Ch. A, II, and Ch. E, V.
PART THREE
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PARENTS AND CHILDREN
From the kinship relationship between parents and children stem many
consequences.
CHAPTER A
THE CHILDS SURNAME
The determination of the childs surname varies depending on whether
the child was born during the marriage or out of wedlock.
I. THE SURNAME OF CHILDREN BORN DURING MARRIAGE
Regarding the childrens surname the Greek Civil Code (Art. 1505, 1)
stipulates the following: the parents are obliged to determine their childrens
surname by a joint irrevocable declaration made prior to the marriage,
either before a notary public or before the functionary who will perform the
marriage.
The surname thus determined needs to be the same for all the children
and it may be the surname of either parent or a combination of the two (Art.
1505, 2 CC).
If the parents omit to declare the surname they wish for their children to
have, the latter will take the fathers surname (Art. 1505, 3 CC).
II. THE SURNAME OF CHILDREN BORN OUT OF WEDLOCK
In case a child is born out of wedlock, the child takes the surname of the
mother (Art. 1506, 1 CC). Should there subsequently be acknowledgement
466
of the child by the father as his own, either voluntarily or judicially,1 the
adult child or the childs parents if the child is under age have the right
to add the paternal surname to the childs surname (Art. 1506, 3 CC).
See above, Part Two, Ch. C, II, 2, A.
CHAPTER B
SPECIAL OBLIGATIONS
I. OBLIGATION FOR ASSISTANCE, AFFECTION, AND RESPECT
Parents and children are under the obligation of mutual assistance,
affection, and respect (Art. 1507 CC). Both minors and adult children are
under the same obligation.
II. OBLIGATION TO RENDER SERVICES
As long as the child lives in the parents household and is brought up or
provided for by them, he is under the obligation to offer services
commensurate to his own abilities and living conditions as well as to the
living conditions of his family regarding the management of the household
or the practice of the parents profession (Art. 1508 CC). Both minors and
adult children are under the same obligation regardless of whether they were
born in the marriage or out of wedlock.
III. PARENTS GRANTS TO THEIR CHILDREN
Grants of parents to their children are the grants given by the parents to
their children for the sake of creation or maintenance of financial or family
self-sufficiency or for the commencement or continuation of the exercise of
their profession (Art. 1509 CC). Such grants may be given to children under
age as well as to adult children. At this point it should be noted that the law
does not make it a legal obligation for the parents to grant financial assets to
their children.1
1
See Koumantos, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 165; Kounougeri Manoledaki, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 239
et seq. ; Papachristou, op. cit., p. 264; Filios, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 138 et seq.
468
The parents grants to their children are subject to favorable tax

treatment given the fact that the tax imposed on them is only one half of
what it would have otherwise been (e.g. if it were a donation), up to a
certain amount for each of the parents separately. This amount goes up if
one of the parents is deceased.2
IV. MUTUAL OBLIGATION FOR MAINTENANCE
The Greek Civil Code expressly states that ascendants and descendants
are under the reciprocal obligation to provide maintenance (Arts. 1485 et
seq. CC) when certain conditions are met.
One basic condition is the state of destitution of the obligee and the
state of affluence of the obligor.
More specifically:
One is considered destitute, and consequently entitled to receive
maintenance, when one is unable to provide for himself from his assets or
from his personal work which is appropriate to his age, condition of health,
and other living conditions (Art. 1486, 1 CC).
One is considered affluent when one is able to provide maintenance to
another without endangering his own sustenance (Art. 1487, 1 CC).
Consequently, the affluent child is obliged to provide maintenance to
his destitute parent, and the affluent parent is obliged to provide
maintenance to his destitute adult child.
As far as children under age are concerned, the above mentioned rule is
not applicable because Article 1486, para. 2 of the Greek Civil Code
expressly stipulates that a child under age, even if he owns property, is
entitled to maintenance by his parents, as long as the income he derives
from his own property or from his work does not suffice for his
maintenance.
Moreover, regarding children under age, the rule that maintenance by
the obligor is not due if this endangers the obligors own sustenance is not
applicable and the parent is obliged to provide maintenance to the child
2
See Art. 2 L. 1329/1983 in conjunction with Art. 34, L. 2961/2001, as said law was
modified by Art. 12, para. 6 L. 3091/2002. According to Article 34 (under B) of L.
2961/2001 in conjunction with Art. 44, para. 1 of the same law, as modified by Art. 12, para.
7 of L. 3091/2002, the parents grant to a child is subject to the amount of the tax due in
donations up to the amount of 90,000 euros for each parent separately. This amount is raised
to 130,000 euros if one of the parents is deceased.
FAMILY LAW
469
anyway, unless the child may turn to another obligor (e.g. grandfather or
grandmother) or if he may provide for himself from his own assets (Art.
1487, 2 CC).
CHAPTER C
PARENTAL CARE
I. THE CONCEPT
Parental care is an office1 which includes several particular rights and
obligations and is exercised in the interest of the child who is a minor. More
specifically, it includes the care of the childs person, the management of
his assets, and his representation in any matter or transaction or litigation
concerning the childs person or property (Art. 1510, 1, 2 CC).
The care of the childs person especially includes his upbringing,
supervision, education and instruction, as well as the determination of the
place of his residence (Art. 1518, 1 CC).
II. BEGINNING OF PARENTAL CARE
Parental care begins at the moment of the childs birth (a live birth)
assuming of course that at least one of the parents is alive. In case the
mother had died before delivery was completed and the father had
predeceased, the child is placed under tutelage (Art. 1589 CC).
We translate the term merimna () of the Greek Civil Code literally, i.e. as care (see
Liddell-Scott, Greek-English Lexicon) in hopes of staying closer to the spirit of the Greek
lawmaker. To be noted that the German lawgiver also uses the German equivalent of the
word care (Sorge) whereas the term used in many European or International instruments is
parental responsibility (see, for example, Hague Convention of October 19, 1996, Council
of Europe White Paper of January 15, 2002, Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of
November 27, 2003, etc.). In the American legal scene the term employed to denote the
childs care by the parents on a day-to-day basis as well as regarding the major decisions
taken by them for the child is child custody (http://public.findlaw.com) (Translators note).
1
See P. Agallopoulou, in Georgiadis Stathopoulos, Commentary on the Civil Code, Art.
1510, No 10.
FAMILY LAW
471
III. THE EXERCISE OF PARENTAL CARE DURING MARRIAGE

During marriage the parental care is exercised by both parents jointly.
This means that they need to reach their decisions jointly regarding every
measure concerning the personal or property status of their child (Art. 1510,
1, 1 CC).
IV. THE EXERCISE OF PARENTAL CARE IN CASE OF DIVORCE,
ANNULMENT, OR INTERRUPTION OF CONJUGAL LIVING
1. General
In case of divorce, annulment of marriage, or interruption of the
conjugal life the court, having a wide range of possibilities regarding the
regulation of the matter of exercise of the parental care, may adopt various
solutions (Arts. 1513-1514 CC).
2. Ways of Dealing with the Issue of the Exercise of Parental Care
The guideline for the courts in deciding on the exercise of parental care
is the interest of the child (Art. 1511, 2 CC). For the interest of the child to
be more specifically determined several criteria are used: the respect due to
each of the parents as equals; the bonds between the child and his parents or
siblings; the agreements that exist between the parents regarding the care
and management of the childs property; the taking into consideration of the
childs own opinion depending on the latters maturity (Art. 1513, 2 and Art.
1511 CC).2
According to Articles 1513-1514 of the Greek Civil Code, the court has
several ways in which to regulate the matter of exercise of parental care.3
More specifically:
A. Granting the Exercise of Parental Care to one of the Parents
As is gathered from many court decisions, the exercise of parental care
is in principle granted to one of the parents. Usually it is granted to the
2
See P. Agallopoulou, in Georgiadis Stathopoulos, Commentary on the Civil Code, Art.

1511, No 22 et seq., and Arts. 1513-1514, No 34 et seq.
3
Regarding the court competent for the adjudication of differences on the issue of the
exercise of parental care, see Agallopoulou, op. cit., Arts. 1513-1514, Nos 21, 25 et seq., and
45 et seq., along with the citations thereat.
472
mother. However, nowadays many courts decide that in certain cases the
father appears to be better suited than the mother to raise his child who is a
minor.
B. Granting the Exercise of Parental Care to both Parents Jointly
The exercise of parental care may be granted to both parents jointly
provided that, in addition to the general condition of considering the interest
of the child, the following two conditions concur: it has been earlier agreed
between the parents that this would be the case, and the parents have
determined the location of the childs domicile.
C. Distributing the Exercise of Parental Care between the Parents
The court has the right to distribute the exercise of parental care
between the parents. The distribution may be effected on the basis of
functions of the parental care office or of time.
Distribution pertaining to functions of the office of parental care means
that certain functions are granted to one parent and the rest to the other, e.g.
one parent may be in charge of the childs education and the other of all the
rest.
Distribution pertaining to time means that the exercise of parental care
rotates, e.g. during fall and winter it is exercised by the mother and during
spring and summer by the father.
D. Granting the Exercise of Parental Care to a Third Party
If in the courts opinion both parents are unsuitable to exercise the
parental care, it may be granted to a third party who, according to Article
1589, is a tutor in which case the provisions on tutelage are applicable (Arts.
1589 et seq. CC).
V. THE EXERCISE OF PARENTAL CARE
OF CHILDREN BORN OUT OF WEDLOCK
In the case of children born out of wedlock we need to distinguish:
1. If the child has not been acknowledged by the father as his own, the
exercise of the parental care belongs to the mother (Art. 1515, 1, 1 CC).
473
FAMILY LAW
2. In case of voluntary acknowledgement, the father also takes part in

the parental care which, however, he may exercise only if the mothers
parental care has ceased or she is unable to exercise it (Art. 1515, 1, 2 CC).
In case of judicial acknowledgement where the father had contested the
action lodged against him, he may not take part in the parental care or
replace the mother in the exercise thereof (Art. 1515, 3, 1 CC).
VI. THE CESSATION OF PARENTAL CARE
Parental care ceases with the childs coming of age, the death or the
declaration of either the child or both parents as missing persons, as well as
with the forfeiting of the office by both parents (Art. 1538 CC).
PART FOUR
TUTELAGE OF MINORS
A minor is under tutelage when neither of his parents has or is able to

exercise the parental care (Art. 1589 CC).1
The organs of the tutelage are: the tutor, the supervisory council, and
the court (Art. 1590 CC).
The tutor is always appointed by the court (Art. 1592, 1, 1 CC) and his
task consists in taking care of the minor, managing his property, and
representing him in every litigation and transaction concerning his person or
property (Art. 1603 CC).
The supervisory council is composed of three to five members, all of
which are relatives or friends of the minors parents, and its task consists in
supervising the actions of the tutor (Art. 1634 et seq. CC).
The court, which is the special division for family cases of the Court of
First Instance, appoints and terminates the tutor and the members of the
supervisory council, and grants permission regarding certain acts of the tutor
(Arts. 1591, 1623, 1624, 1625, 1651 CC).
We use the word tutelage following the Romanist tradition (tutela). To be noted, however,
that in other countries the term guardianship is usually used for this concept (Translators
note).
1
Regarding tutelage, see K. Pantelidou, in Georgiadis Stathopoulos, Commentary on the
Civil Code, Introductory remarks on Arts. 1589-1654 and interpretation of the Arts. 15891612, 1627-1629, and 1632-1651, along with the citations thereat; K. Roussos, in Georgiadis
Stathopoulos, Commentary on the Civil Code, Arts. 1613-1615, 1617-1625, and 1630,
along with the citations thereat; A. Pouliadis, in Georgiadis Stathopoulos, Commentary on
the Civil Code, Art. 1616 and the citations thereat; A. Vossinakis, in Georgiadis
Stathopoulos, Commentary on the Civil Code, Arts. 1626, 1631, 1652-1654 and the citations
thereat.
PART FIVE
ADOPTION1
The adoption of a minor is a legal act through which every bond with
the childs biological family is severed and the child gets fully integrated in
the family of the adoptive parent (Art. 1561, 1 CC). Adoption creates an
artificial kinship between the adopted and his descendants and the adoptive
parent (or parents) and all of their relatives (Art. 1561, 2, 3 CC).
Adoption always requires a court decision and is regulated by Articles
1542-1588 of the Greek Civil Code.
The Greek Civil Code, after it was modified by L. 2447/1996, basically
regulates the adoption of a minor.
Adoption of an adult is only exceptionally allowed and only when the
adopted is a relative of the adoptive parent by blood or marriage alliance up
to the fourth degree (Art. 1579 CC). In fact, in this case, i.e. in the case of
adoption of an adult, the artificial kinship thus created only links the adopted
and his descendants to the adoptive parent. No relationship is created
between the adopted and the relatives of the adoptive parent and vice versa
(Art. 1585 CC).
Regarding adoption, see Th. Papachristou, in Georgiadis Stathopoulos, Commentary on

the Civil Code, Introductory remarks to Arts. 1542-1588 followed by an interpretation of the
same Arts. and the citations thereat.
PART SIX
FOSTER CARE
L. 2447/1996 introduced the institution of foster care1 for minors.
Foster care is the exercise of actual care over a minor by third parties (foster
parents or foster families). The foster parents undertake the actual care of a
minor either because they were entrusted with it by the biological parents or
the tutor, or because they were entrusted with it by a court decision (Art.
1655 CC).
However, it should be noted at this point that the legal relations
between the minor under foster care and his biological family or tutor
remain unaltered unless otherwise provided by law (Art. 1655 CC).
Articles 1655-1665 of the Greek Civil Code refer to the regulation of
the institution of foster care for minors.
See X. Skorini Paparrigopoulou, in Georgiadis Stathopoulos, Commentary on the Civil

Code, Arts. 1655-1665 and the citations thereat.
PART SEVEN
JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE
L. 2447/1996 replaced the outdated institutions of judicial interdiction
and judicial supervision by the new, contemporary institution of judicial
assistance for the protection of adults.1
The basic characteristics of the institution of judicial assistance are the
following:
I. The court is given a broad range of alternatives in order to better
adjust the institution of judicial assistance to the particular needs of the
person in each individual case.
II. The personality and dignity of the person placed under judicial
assistance is effectively protected.
Articles 1666-1688 of the Greek Civil Code regulate matters pertaining
to judicial assistance.2
Regarding judicial assistance, see A. Koutsouradis Agg. Georgiadi, Protective Institutions

of Civil Law, 2002, p. 45 et seq.; A. Koutsouradis, in Georgiadis Stathopoulos,
Commentary on the Civil Code, Introductory remarks on Arts. 1666-1688 and interpretation
of Arts. 1666-1668 and 1687-1688; Agg. Georgiadi, in Georgiadis Stathopoulos,
Commentary on the Civil Code, Arts. 1669-1686 and the citations thereat.
2
Reference to the institution of judicial assistance has been made earlier (see General
Principles, Part Three, Ch. C, II, 3).
PART EIGHT
JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION OF ANOTHERS AFFAIRS
L. 2447/1996 replaced the institution of tutelage of absent persons
by the broader institution of judicial administration of anothers affairs
regulated in Articles 1689-1694 of the Greek Civil Code.1
The purpose of this institution is to protect those adults who on
account of their absence are unable to take care of their personal affairs.
The court, following a petition on the part of anyone having a
justified interest in the matter but also on its own motion (ex officio), may
appoint an administrator for the management of the estate of absent adults
whose place of residence is either unknown or known but they are prevented
from returning in order to take care of their affairs in person. It may also be
the case that, although such persons may have appointed a representative,
the circumstances are such that it is deemed necessary to have him replaced
(Art. 1689 CC).
Regarding the way in which the institution of administration of
anothers affairs functions, the Greek Civil Code stipulates that the rules
governing the tutelage of minors are applicable by analogy (Art. 1693 CC).
See A. Koutsouradis Agg. Georgiadi, Protecetive Institutions of the Civil Law, op. cit., p.
195 et seq.; A. Koutsouradis, in Georgiadis Stathopoulos, Commentary on the Civil Code,
Arts. 1689-1694.
6. Succession Law
INTRODUCTION
I. THE CONCEPT OF SUCCESSION LAW
Succession law is the sum total of rules regulating the fate of a persons
property after his death. Consequently, the main aim of succession law is to
secure the continuity of economic life after a persons death.
In Greece each person is of course free to regulate matters related to his
inheritance as he wishes by drawing up a will, provided that he does not
neglect to leave a percentage of his assets to certain persons closely related
to him. In case a person does not have a will, the law stipulates the order (as
well as the percentage) of those having a right to inherit from the property of
the deceased.
II. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF TAXING THE INHERITANCE
The inheritance tax, computed on a scale according to the amount
inherited and the degree of relationship to the deceased, reflects the social
spirit permeating succession law.
The social significance of inheritance tax comes into view with the
participation of the state in the inherited assets. The state, other than being
called to be an heir in the sixth rank of the intestate succession, also
participates through the inheritance tax in every inheritance exceeding the
tax free limit established by law.1
Matters pertaining to the taxation of inheritance are regulated by the following laws: L.
2961/2001 and L. 3091/2002.
480
III. BASIC TERMS OF SUCCESSION LAW

Before referring to the rules regulating the fate of the assets of the
deceased after his death, we consider it necessary to clarify the meaning of
several basic terms of succession law.
1. Succession is the transfer of the property of the deceased to one or
more heirs. Depending on whether succession is based on a will or on the
provisions of the law, it is distinguished in testamentary and intestate.
Contracts concerning the succession of a living person are prohibited.
This clearly follows from the provision of Article 368, para. 1 of the Greek
Civil Code according to which A contract referring to the passing of the
inheritance of a living person in part or in whole whether concluded with
such person or with a third party, is null and void.2
2. Subjects of the succession are the principal and the heir.
Principal is every natural person who died or was declared missing3
and whose property is to be distributed among his heirs.
Heir is the general, the universal successor of the principal (successio
in universum jus). Only the person natural or legal who existed at the
time of the principals death may become an heir. As far as natural persons
are concerned, suffices for that person to be at least conceived at the time of
the death of the principal (Art. 1711, 1 CC).4
The heir differs from the legatee because the latter acquires a specific
property benefit, i.e. he is a specific and not a universal heir of the deceased
principal.5
3. The object of succession is the inheritance as a whole (estate). Estate
is the sum total of all the transferred property assets.
Succession right is the right of the heir to the principals estate as a
whole.
4. Transfer and acquisition of the estate. Upon the death of the
principal, his property as a whole (estate) is transferred to and acquired by
the heirs (one or many).6
See E. Zervogianni, On Some Aspects of Inheritance Contracts, in Revue Hellnique de

Droit International, 2003/1, pp. 167 et seq.
3
See above General Principles, Part One, Ch. B, I, 4.
4
A child may be an heir even if he was born through post mortem artificial insemination
(Art. 1711, 2 CC). See N. Psouni, Law of Succession, Vol. I, 2004, p. 52 et seq.
5
See below Part Five, Ch. B.
6
See below Part Four, Ch. A.
PART ONE
TESTAMENTARY SUCCESSION
CHAPTER A
THE CONCEPT AND FEATURES OF THE WILL
Will is the unilateral, non addressable, mortis causa juridical act
through which the testator regulates matters pertaining to his succession as
well as certain family relationships.
The will is drawn up by the testator in person and is freely revocable
(Arts. 1716 and 1763 et seq. CC). More than one person may not draw up a
will in the same document (Art. 1717 CC).1
For the will to be valid it is necessary for one of the formal
requirements set forth by the Greek Civil Code to be observed.
Consequently it should be noted that the will, other than being a
unilateral, non-addressable, mortis causa juridical act, it is also a strictly
formal and not subject to representation act (Art. 1716 CC).
See Ap. Georgiadis, in Georgiadis Stathopoulos, Commentary on the Civil Code, Arts.
1716-1717; I. Spyridakis, Succession Law, 2002, p. 35 et seq.; P. Filios, Succession Law,
Special Part, 5th ed., 2003, p. 89 et seq.
CHAPTER B
DRAWING UP A WILL
I. CAPACITY TO DRAW UP A WILL
According to Article 1719 of the Greek Civil Code, the following are
incapable of making a will:
1. The minors.
2. Those placed under privative judicial assistance in whole, thus being
unable to conclude any juridical act, or those who have been expressly
deprived of the capacity to draw up a will.1 2
3. Those who at the time of the drawing up of the will are not conscious
of their actions or are in a state of psychological or mental disturbance
decisively limiting the functioning of their volition.
A will drawn up by a person incapable of drawing up a will is null and
void (Art. 1718 CC).
II. TYPES OF WILLS
In the Greek law there are two basic types of wills: ordinary and
extraordinary.
Regarding judicial assistance, see above General Principles, Part Three, Ch. C, II, 3 and
Family Law, Part Seven.
2
The incapacity of the persons placed under judicial assistance begins from the moment the
petition to place the person under judicial assistance was filed with the court or the
procedural act for the introduction of the case for discussion before the court on the courts
initiative was drafted by the persons having by law the authority to do so, provided that on
the strength of the above the subsequent court ruling ordered the placement of the person in
question under judicial assistance (Art. 1719, 2 CC).
SUCCESSION LAW
483
The ordinary wills are of the following three kinds: holographic, public,
and secret.
Extraordinary wills are the wills drawn up at sea (aboard a vessel),
during a military campaign, and during a blockade.
1. Ordinary Wills
A. The Holographic Will
A holographic will (testamentum olographum) is handwritten3 by the
testator in its entirety, dated, and signed by him. The date must indicate the
year, month, and day of the drawing up of the will (Art. 1721, 1 CC).
Simple additions on the margin or in post-script form must be signed
by the testator. Deletions, erasures, or other external defects will be
evaluated by the court and may bring about the nullity of the will (Art. 1721,
4 CC).
The holographic will is not subject to any other formality (Art. 1721, 2
CC). The will which was written by the hand of the third party or typed is
not valid as holographic. The holographic will may be deposited with a
notary public for safekeeping (Art. 1722 CC) but this does not constitute a
required formality for its validity.
The person unable to read a written document cannot draw up a
holographic will (Art. 1723 CC).
B. The Public Will
The testator who intends to draw up a public will orally states his
wishes before a notary public in the presence of three witnesses or another
notary public and one witness (Art. 1724 CC).
The notary public writes them down and composes the relevant notarial
deed following the formalities required by law.4 Then, after reading it aloud
to the testator and the other assisting parties, the will gets signed by the
testator and them (Art. 1733 CC).
A handicapped testator who has learned to write with his foot or mouth is not excluded from
drawing up a holographic will (see N. Papantoniou, Succession Law, 5th ed., 1989, p. 216,
footn. 1; Ap. Georgiadis, in Georgiadis Stathopoulos, Commentary on the Civil Code, Art.
1721, No 7).
4
See Arts. 1725-1737 of the Greek Civil Code.
484
As is evident from Article 1730 of the Greek Civil Code, since the
public will requires an oral declaration of the testator before a notary public,
a mute or deaf mute person cannot draw up a public will.
C. The Secret Will
For a secret will to be drawn up it is necessary for the testator to hand
to the notary public a document, in the presence of three witnesses or a
second notary public and one witness, while orally stating to him that the
document in question contains his last wishes (Art. 1738 CC).
Consequently, two documents are necessary for the secret will:
a. the document delivered by the testator to the notary public, and
b. the document drawn up by the notary public on the former.
The delivered document5 which contains the last wishes of the testator
(or the envelope in which such document is placed) gets sealed by the notary
public and, following the inscription thereon of the testators name and
surname and of the time the delivery was made, gets signed by the testator
and the other assisting parties (Arts. 1741-1742 CC).
Subsequently, in the presence of the assisting parties and according to
the formalities specified by law, the notary public draws up a deed which he
attaches to the document delivered to him after noting on the latter the
number of the notarial deed attached (Art. 1743 CC).
2. Extraordinary Wills
Extraordinary will is the will which is drawn up while the testator is
under extraordinary circumstances and is unable to secure the regular
conditions required for making a public will. The law provides for three
kinds of extraordinary wills: a) those drawn up in a sea-vessel during a
voyage (Arts. 1749-1752 CC); b) those drawn up by military personnel
during a military campaign, blockade, siege, or captivity (Arts. 1753-1756);
and c) those drawn up by persons who find themselves in a blockade due to
an epidemic or other extraordinary circumstances (Art. 1757 CC).
This document may be drawn up either by the testator himself or by a third party, may be
handwritten or typed, but in any case it needs to contain the testators signature (Art. 1740
CC).
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485
However, because extraordinary wills are only permitted under

extraordinary circumstances, their validity is of limited duration.
Specifically, the extraordinary will is considered as not having been drawn
up if three months have elapsed since the extraordinary circumstances which
permitted the making of such will have ceased for the testator and the latter
is still alive (Art. 1758, 1 CC). In this case the nullity is supervening (ex post
facto).6 7
Naturally, it goes without saying that the testator who finds himself
under extraordinary circumstances may, if he wishes, draw up a holographic
will instead of an extraordinary one.
See above General Principles, Part Three, Ch. E, II, 3, A, b.

Regarding the extraordinary wills, see K. Christodoulou, in Georgiadis Stathopoulos,
Commentary on the Civil Code, Introductory remarks and interpretation of Arts. 1749-1762.
7
CHAPTER C
REVOCATION OF THE WILL
I. THE CONCEPT
Revocation of the will means that its validity is lifted by an act of the
testator. The revocation may be explicit or tacit, whole or partial.1
The law provides for general and specific ways of revoking a will.
II. GENERAL WAYS OF REVOKING A WILL
Every will may be revoked by the following ways:
1. By explicit declaration to this effect contained in a subsequent will
(Art. 1763, 1 CC).
2. By a declaration made before a notary public in the presence of
three witnesses (Art. 1763, 2 CC).
3. By the drawing up of a subsequent will the content of which cancels
the previous will either in whole or in part or to the extent that it contradicts
it (Art. 1764, 1 CC).
III. SPECIAL WAYS OF REVOKING A WILL
Other then the above mentioned general ways of revoking a will, the
Greek Civil Code provides for special ways by which to revoke the
holographic and secret will.
Regarding the revocation of wills, see Papantoniou, op. cit., p. 308 et seq.; K. Pantelidou,
in Georgiadis Stathopoulos, Commentary on the Civil Code, Introductory remarks and
interpretation of Arts. 1763-1768; Spyridakis, op. cit., p. 134 et seq.; Filios, op. cit., p. 133 et
seq.
SUCCESSION LAW
487
Regarding the holographic will, it is stipulated that it may be revoked if

the testator destroys the document of the will with the intention of revoking
it or attempts such changes in it which usually lead to the conclusion that
one wished to revoke the written document (Art. 1765, 1 CC).
Regarding the revocation of the secret will, it is stipulated that it is
considered revoked if the testator retrieves from the notary public the
document he had previously delivered to him with the declaration that it
contains his last will (Art. 1766, 1 CC).
CHAPTER D
PUBLICATION OF THE WILL AND
DECLARATION OF THE HOLOGRAPHIC WILL AS AUTHENTIC
I. PUBLICATION OF THE WILL
Publication of the will means that its content is officially announced to
the public by the competent court or the competent consular authority.
The condition for such publication is that the person having in his
possession a will presents or sends it to the competent court1 or consular
authority,2 as soon as he is informed of the testators demise.
Subsequently, the court makes the will public, i.e., after reading it
before the audience it registers its entire content in the court minutes.3 The
publication of a will by the consular authorities is done by the consul who
prepares a report and signs it; in the case of a holographic will, this report is
also signed by the person producing the will to the consul.4
It should be noted that in any One-member Court of First Instance and
any consular office a special book of wills is kept where they are recorded.
In the Athens Court of First Instance a book is kept in which the wills of all
1
Competent court to publish a public or secret or extraordinary will is the One-member

Court of First Instance of the district where the notary public who drafted the will or with
whom it was deposited has his seat (Arts. 740, 1 and 807, 1, 1 CCPr. in conjunction with Art.
1769, 1, 2 CC). For the publication of the holographic will competent court is the Onemember Court of First Instance where the will is presented to be published (Arts. 740, 1 and
807, 1, 1 CCPr.).
2
If the public will has been drafted at the offices of a consular authority or if the secret or
extraordinary will have been deposited with a consular authority, said consular authority is
competent to publish those wills. The consular authorities are also competent to publish the
holographic wills produced to them (Art. 807, 2 CCPr.).
3
See Arts 1771 CC and 807-808 CCPr.
4
See Art. 808, 2 CCPr.
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489
the First Instance Courts of Greece and of all the consular authorities of the
country are kept.5
Finally, it should be noted that the omission to publish a will does not
affect its validity (Art. 1779 CC).
II. DECLARATION OF THE HOLOGRAPHIC WILL AS AUTHENTIC
The person who petitions the publication of a holographic will by the
court may also petition the declaration of it as authentic. The court, after
hearing three witnesses certifying the authenticity of the handwriting and the
signature of the testator, declares the will authentic (Arts. 1776-1777 CC).6
See Arts. 1778 CC and 809 CCPr.

See Papantoniou, op. cit., p. 325 et seq.; Filios, op. cit., p. 105 et seq. and the citations
thereat.
6
CHAPTER E
THE CONTENT AND INTERPRETATION OF THE WILL
I. THE CONTENT OF THE WILL
As is well known, the will contains the last wishes of a person. Such
last wishes, however, are not always or not exclusively connected with the
devolution of the property of the deceased to persons that are dear to him.
With the will it is possible for a person to make various declarations of
his volition, such as establishment of a foundation, voluntary
acknowledgment of a child born out of wedlock as his own, revocation of a
previously drawn will, etc.
II. THE INTERPRETATION OF THE WILL
Many times issues arise regarding the interpretation of wills. In view of
the fact that every effort needs to be made in order to discover the true
volition of the testator, other than the general provision of Article 173 of the
Greek Civil Code referring to the interpretation of the declaration of will in
general,1 succession law contains several interpretive rules.
It is worthwhile to refer to a few of them which are probably the most
typical ones:
1. If the testator in his will, without furnishing any more precise
designation, makes mention of his intestate successors, his lawful heirs,
or his relatives, are considered beneficiaries those who at the time of the
devolution of the inheritance would be his intestate heirs called to inherit in
proportion to their share in the estate (Art. 1790 CC).
1
See above General Principles, Part Three, Ch. D, I. Specifically with regards to the
interpretation of wills, see Papantoniou, op. cit., p. 334 et seq.; Filios, op. cit., p. 149 et seq.
along with the citations thereat.
SUCCESSION LAW
491
2. If the designation of the beneficiary made by the testator fits more

than one person and it is not possible to ascertain whom he had in mind, all
such persons shall be deemed beneficiaries in equal shares (Art. 1793 CC).
Example: K, who had neither a wife nor close relatives, had stated in his testament
that he wishes for his nephew George to be the beneficiary. However, he
happened to have three nephews taking good care of him, all of which were
named George. By way of interpretation all three nephews will be considered
beneficiaries in equal shares.
3. If only one heir has been instituted but on a limited portion of the
estate, the remainder devolves according to the rules of intestate succession
(Art. 1801, 1 CC).
Example: K had stated in his will that he wished for his brother A to inherit 50%
of the estate. It follows by way of interpretation that for the remaining 50% the
rules of intestate succession will apply.
CHAPTER F
NULL AND VOID AND VOIDABLE WILLS
I. NULL AND VOID WILLS
According to Article 180 of the Greek Civil Code the null and void
juridical act is considered as if it had never been concluded. In the case of a
will it is considered as not having been drawn up and whoever has a
justified interest may invoke its nullity. That is, it is not required for the null
and void will to be declared as such by a court ruling.1
1. A will is null and void right from the start (ab initio) in the following
cases:
a. if it has been drawn up by a person incapable of making a will;
b. if the form required by law was not observed;
c. if its content is defective, such as for example when a disposition of
the will is illegal or against morality (boni mores) or when it contains an
incomprehensible condition, etc.
2. However, a will which is valid in the beginning may become
subsequently invalid, in its entirety or regarding a particular disposition, in
the following cases:
a. if the will was revoked;
b. if, in case of an extraordinary will, three months have elapsed from
the time the circumstances for an extraordinary testament have ceased for
the testator and he is still alive;
c. if, on account of error, fraud, or threat of the testator, the will has
been declared null and void by the court;
See Papantoniou, op. cit., p. 293; Filios, Succession Law, op. cit., p. 190 et seq.
493
SUCCESION LAW
d. if the person named as the beneficiary in the will could not inherit
because, for example, he renounced the inheritance.
II. VOIDABLE WILL
A will is voidable by reason of error, fraud, or threat. As was already
mentioned, the voidable juridical act does produce its legal effects but may
be declared null and void by a court ruling.2
At this point we should mention a significant deviation from the
general principles governing juridical acts.
The Greek Civil Code stipulates in Article 143 that, if the law does not
provide otherwise, the error referring exclusively to the reasons leading up
to the shaping of the will is not substantial (falsa causa non nocet).
Consequently, the declaration of will based on error in the reasons leading
up to the shaping of the will is not voidable.
Regarding testaments, however, the law provides otherwise when
stipulating that, if the testator was in error regarding the reasons leading up
to the shaping of the will and said reasons in the absence of which the
testator would not have made the provisions he made are mentioned in the
testament in reference to the past, the present, or the future, the testament is
voidable (Art. 1784 CC).
Example: K, believing that his brother A, who had settled in Australia many years
ago, is no longer living, states the following in his will: Since today that I am
drawing up my will my only brother A to whom I owe a lot is no longer living, I
name as beneficiary my friend F. If, after Ks death, his brother shows up, he
may demand for Ks will to be declared null and void. This is so because, as can
be seen from the text of the testament, K would not have named his friend F as the
beneficiary, if at the time he was drawing up his will he knew that his brother was
alive.
See above General Principles, Part Three, Ch. E, III.
CHAPTER G
THE EXECUTOR OF THE WILL
The testator may appoint in his will one or more natural or legal
persons who will see to it that the dispositions of the testament are executed
(Art. 2017, 1 CC).
The office of the executor of the will begins from the time of his
acceptance of the office (Art. 2019, 1 CC). At this point it should be
mentioned, however, that the appointment of an executor is null and void if
at the time he accepted the office he was fully incapable or limitedly capable
to conclude juridical acts (Art. 2018 CC).
The executors task is to implement the dispositions of the will (Art.
2020, 1 CC).
In the performance of his duties the executor is obliged to behave with
diligence and is responsible vis--vis the heir according to the provisions
governing mandate for any prejudice caused to the succession by virtue of
his fault, even if it is due to slight negligence.1 In case he has assumed the
management of the succession, he is also obliged to render account (2023, 1,
2 CC).
The executor may demand reimbursement for everything he spent in
order to implement the dispositions of the will as well as compensation for
any damage he suffered without fault on his part in the performance of his
duties, according to the provisions governing mandate.2
To be noted that, despite resemblance in terminology, there are fundamental differences

between the Greek and the Anglo-American office of the executor of the will (Translators
note).
1
See Art. 2023, 1, 1 CC in conjunction with Art. 714 CC.
2
See Arts. 722 and 723 CC.
PART TWO
SUCCESSION BY VIRTUE OF THE LAW
(OR INTESTATE SUCCESSION)
CHAPTER A
GENERAL REMARKS
Succession by virtue of the law or intestate succession is the one which
takes place when either there is no testament or the devolution by testament
has been frustrated in whole or in part (Art. 1710, 2 CC).1
It is possible for a person to be succeeded both by testamentary and
intestate succession. This happens if only part of the deceaseds estate was
disposed of through the will, in which case the non disposed part will
devolve to the intestate heirs.
The intestate succession is effected by ranks and stirpes.
In the Greek Civil Code there are six ranks of intestate succession.
The relatives of the deceased belong to the first four ranks. The basic
principle of the rank system is that a relative of the next rank is not called to
inherit as long as there is another relative in the preceding rank (Art. 1819
CC). For example, a relative of the second rank is not called as long as there
is a relative of the first rank.
Within one and the same rank the relatives inherit per stirpes. This
means that the closer relative to the deceased excludes his descendants in
the same stirp (Arts. 1813, 1, 2; 1814, 3; 1816, 3 CC). If, for example, K has
three sons and five grandchildren, as long as at the time of his death all three
of his sons are alive, only they shall inherit to the exclusion of the
grandchildren. But if one of Ks sons had predeceased K, the sons children,
1
Regarding the traits of intestate succession, see N. Papantoniou, in ERMAK, Introductory

remarks to Arts. 1813-1824; Psouni, op. cit., p. 213 et seq.
496
i.e. Ks grandchildren, will take their fathers place in the intestate

succession.
The surviving spouse, if he/she is called along with relatives of the first
four ranks, receives a fixed percentage. In case there are no relatives in the
first four ranks, the surviving spouse is called in the fifth rank and receives
the entire estate.
If there are neither relatives nor surviving spouse, the state is called in
the sixth rank.
CHAPTER B
RANKS OF INTESTATE SUCCESSION AND SURVIVING SPOUSE
I. FIRST RANK
In the first rank of intestate succession the descendants are called to
of the estate and the surviving spouse to . In case there is no surviving
spouse, the entire estate devolves to the descendants in equal shares (Art.
1813, 1, 1; 1820, 1 CC).
Descendants are the children, grandchildren, great grandchildren etc. of
the deceased. The closer descendant excludes the more remote of the same
stirp (Art. 1813, 1, 2 CC).
In the place of the descendant who is not living at the time of the
devolution of the estate, i.e. at the time of the principals death, enter the
descendants who, through the deceased descendant, are related to the
principal. This is succession per stirpes (Art. 1813, 2 CC).
The children inherit in equal shares (Art. 1813, 3 CC).
Example:
K
A
D
B
E
K = the principal
S = the principals spouse
A, B, and C = the principals children
D, E, F, and G = the principals grandchildren
C
F
At the death of K, if his children are all living, they inherit of the estate (in
equal shares) and the surviving spouse of the estate. In case C is not living at
the time of the principals death, Cs children enter in his place and inherit per
stirpes, i.e. F and G split their fathers share. Since C would get of the estate (i.e.
498
divided by 3) each of Cs two children would inherit . As regards the children

of A (D and E), they will not be entitled to any share if their father is living.
II. SECOND RANK

In the second rank of intestate succession are called together the
deceaseds parents, siblings, and the children or grandchildren of
predeceased siblings (Art. 1814, 1 CC). The parents and siblings1 inherit in
equal shares whereas the descendants of predeceased siblings inherit per
stirpes (Art. 1814, 2 CC). The surviving spouse inherits of the estate
when called in intestate succession along with the relatives of the second
rank (Art. 1820, 1 CC). If there is no surviving spouse, the inheritance
devolves to the relatives of the second rank.
Example:
P
B
K, S
K = the principal
S = the principals spouse
P and M = the principals parents
A and B = the principals siblings
C, D, and E = the principals nephews
and nieces
After Ks death the surviving spouse inherits of the estate. P, M, A, and B, if

they are alive at the principals death, inherit each (i.e. after the spouses share
was taken, the remaining of the estate is divided in four equals shares). If at the
time of Ks death P is not alive, the is divided in equal shares between the other
three relatives, the mother and the two siblings (M, A, and B). If A had
predeceased K, As share is divided between his children C and D in equal shares.
For example, if As share were , each of his children will receive 1/16 of the
estate. E does not receive anything if at the time of Ks death B (the father of E) is
alive.
Half-brothers and half-sisters, if called along with parents or full brothers and full sisters or
with children and grandchildren of full brothers and full sisters, are entitled to of what the
share of a full brother or full sister would be. Their descendants, i.e. the children and
grandchildren of predeceased half-brothers and half-sisters, will also receive half the portion
they would have otherwise been entitled to receive if they were issued from full brothers and
full sisters (Art. 1815 CC).
499
SUCCESSION LAW
III. THIRD RANK

In the third rank of the intestate succession are called the grandfathers
and grandmothers of the principal and from among their descendants their
children and grandchildren, i.e. uncles and first cousins of the deceased (Art.
1816, 1 CC). If at the time of devolution of the estate the grandparents on
both sides are alive, only they inherit and they inherit in equal shares. If at
the time of devolution the grandfather/grandmother from either the paternal
or the maternal side is not alive, in the place of the deceased enter his
children and grandchildren (Art. 1816, 2, 2 CC).
The surviving spouse receives of the estate inheriting in intestacy
along with the relatives of the third rank (Art. 1820, 1 CC). In case there is
no surviving spouse, the inheritance is divided among those called in the
third rank.
Example:
P1
M1
K, S
P2
M2
K = the principal
S = the principals spouse.
A and B = the predeceased
parents of K (for, otherwise,
they would inherit in the second
rank).
P1, M1, P2, and M2
= the
pri ncipals grandfathers and
grandmothers.
D, E, and F = the principals
uncles
L and M (Ds children) = Ks
first cousins.
After Ks death, the surviving spouse inherits . If all four of the grandparents are
living, they inherit each, i.e. of the estate after the surviving spouses share
was taken divided in four equal shares. If P1 has predeceased, his share of
devolves in equal shares to his children, D and E, (i.e. 1/16 each) who are Ks
uncles. If both P1 and D have predeceased, then P1s share is divided as follows:
1/16 to E and 1/32 each to the children of D (L and M) who are the principals
first cousins.
500
IV. FOURTH RANK

In the fourth rank of intestate succession are only called the principals
great grandfathers and great grandmothers who are alive at the time of
devolution. They all inherit in equal shares regardless of line (Art. 1817
CC). The surviving spouse inherits of the estate (Art. 1820, 1 CC).
V. FIFTH RANK
If there are no relatives in the first, second, third, and fourth rank, the
surviving spouse is called as an intestate heir to the entire estate (Art. 1821
CC).
VI. SIXTH RANK
If at the time of devolution of the estate there are neither relatives who
are called by law (first to fourth rank) nor surviving spouse, the estate
devolves to the state (Art. 1824 CC).
VII. THE SURVIVING SPOUSE
As was already mentioned, the surviving spouse is called to be an heir
in intestacy with the relatives of the first rank to and with the relatives
of the other ranks to of the estate (Art. 1820, 1 CC). In addition, the
surviving spouse, regardless of the rank in which he/she is called, takes as
an extra portion (praelegatum) the furniture, utensils, clothes, and similar
household items used either exclusively by the surviving spouse or by both
spouses while the deceased was alive (Art. 1820, 2 CC). However, if
children of the deceased spouse survive, their needs are also taken into
consideration, to the extent that this is required by special circumstances for
purposes of equity (Art. 1820, 3 CC).
CHAPTER C
COLLATION
I. THE CONCEPT
The institution of collation (collatio) allows for certain grants the
deceased made to his descendants during his lifetime to be taken into
consideration and computed at the time of the distribution of the estate
among the heirs in order to secure an equitable determination of each
descendants share. In principle, collation takes place only in intestate
succession and only among the descendants of the principal. The grants that
may be collated are restrictively enumerated in the Greek Civil Code. They
are the following (Art. 1895, 1 CC):
1. Any donation or grant out of liberality the principal made to his
descendants during his lifetime.
2. Any expense the principal incurred during his lifetime for the
professional training and education of his descendants, if the amount
exceeded the amount commensurate with the principals economic standing.
Collation is not mandatory. There is no obligation for collation if the
principal, when giving the grant or incurring the expenditure for his
descendant, expressly excluded it from collation (Art. 1895, 2 CC).
II. THE WAY COLLATION IS EFFECTED
Collation is effected by adding the value of the grant for which there is
obligation to collate to the estate to be distributed among the descendants
and subsequently deducting its value from the share of the descendant who
is under the obligation to set off (Art. 1899, 1 CC).
502
More specifically:
For collation to be effected the following steps are taken:
1. The estate to devolve to the descendants is assessed in monetary
terms after deducting from it the share of the surviving spouse. The value of
the estate is the value of the gross assets, i.e. prior to deducting the debts of
the inheritance at the time of the principals demise.1
2. To this value is added the value of the grants to be collated.2 For the
determination of the grants value is taken into account the value they had at
the time they were effected (Art. 1899, 2 CC).3 In this fashion the so-called
fictitious estate is established.
3. The value of the shares of the descendants in monetary terms is
computed on the basis of this fictitious estate. In other words the total
amount of the fictitious estate is divided by the number of shares of the
descendants, as determined by the rules of intestate succession. In this
calculation the surviving spouses share is not computed since it has already
been deducted.
4. From the value of the fictitious share of the descendant is
subsequently deducted the value (in monetary terms) of the grant he is
obliged to set off by virtue of the provisions of the law on collation. The
remainder constitutes the assessment in monetary terms of the value of the
descendants share.
Example: K (the principal) had a spouse (S) and three children (A, B, and C). The
value of his estate was 300,000 euros. According to the rules of intestate
succession (first rank), the wife is called to , i.e. 75,000 euros, and the children
to the remaining (225,000 euros), i.e. 75,000 euros each child. If K in his
lifetime had given grants to his children (45,000 euros to A as a grant, 30,000
euros to B as a donation, and 15,000 euros to C as a grant), the following will
happen: in view of the fact that collation takes place only among descendants, the
share of the surviving spouse, i.e. 75,000 euros, will be deducted outright.
Subsequently, the value of the estate will be computed as follows: (300,000
75,000) + 45,000 + 30,000 + 15,000 = 315,000 euros. According to the fictitious
value of the estate resulting from the above calculation, i.e. the value of 315,000
euros, the share of each of the three descendants is 105,000 euros (315,000: 3).
1
M. Avgoustianakis, in Georgiadis Stathopoulos, Commentary on the Civil Code, Arts.

1899-1900, No 9; Filios, Succession Law, Special Part, op. cit., p. 83 et seq.
2
The time crucial for the assessment of the value of the estate is the time of the principals
death. See Papantoniou, op. cit., p. 403; Avgoustianakis, op. cit., Arts. 1899-1900, No 10.
3
See Papantoniou, op. cit. p. 403; Filios, op. cit., p. 84 et seq..
SUCCESSION LAW
503
However, since A had already received a grant amounting to 45,000 euros, he will
receive only 60,000 euros from the principals estate (105,000 45,000). B, who
had received 30,000 euros as a donation, will receive 75,000 euros from the
principals estate (105,000 30,000). Finally, C, who had already received 15,000
euros as a grant, will get 90,000 euros from the estate (105,000 15,000).
PART THREE
FORCED HEIRSHIP
CHAPTER A
CONCEPT, RANKS, AND PERCENTAGE OF FORCED SHARE
I. THE CONCEPT OF FORCED HEIRSHIP
Forced heirship is the right to inheritance provided for by law to certain
persons closely related to the deceased (descendants, parents, surviving
spouse), even against the principals will. Such heirs are called forced heirs
or heirs by law.
II. RANKS OF FORCED HEIRSHIP
In forced heirship there are two ranks of heirs (Art. 1825, 1, 1 CC).
In the first rank belong the descendants of the deceased. It should be
noted that, just as it happens in intestate succession, the closer relative
excludes the more remote one. In other words, in the first rank of forced
heirs we have succession per stirpes. Consequently, the grandchild of the
deceased becomes an heir only when the principals child, i.e. the father or
the mother of the grandchild, has predeceased or been disqualified.
In the second rank belong the parents of the deceased. The parents are
called to become forced heirs only if there are no descendants.
The surviving spouse is always called to inherit as a forced heir, i.e.
both in the first and in the second rank.
506
Example:
P
M
K, S
B
D
C
E
K = the principal
S = the principals spouse.
P and M = the principals parents
(father and mother)
A, B, and C = the principals children
D and E (i.e. Bs children) = the
principals grandchildren
Forced heirs of K are his wife S and his children A, B, and C. If B had
predeceased the principal, his children D and E (Ks grandchildren) take his place.
P and M, the parents of K, are only called to forced heirship if, at the time of Ks
death, there are no children or grandchildren. Ks surviving spouse S is always
called to forced heirship.
III. THE FORCED HEIRSHIP SHARE

According to Article 1825, para. 1, subpara. 2 of the Greek Civil Code,
the forced heirship share (pars legitima) is of the intestate succession
share.1
Example: K who had a wife, S, and three children, A, B, and C, left his entire
estate to X. S , the same as A, B, and C , are entitled to their forced share which is
of their intestate share. If S, A, B, and C were to inherit K in intestacy, they
would receive the following: S: , A: , B: , and C: since they all belong to
the first rank of intestate succession. Consequently, their forced share is each
(i.e. : 2).
For the determination of the forced heirship share see Arts. 1830 et seq. CC.
CHAPTER B
DISINHERITANCE
For a number of reasons provided by the law, it is possible for the
testator to deprive the forced heir from his share, i.e. to disinherit him (Art.
1839 CC).1
Disinheritance (exheredatio) is effected through the will and can only
be based on certain grounds specified by the Greek Civil Code. Such
grounds may refer to the descendants, the ascendants, and the surviving
spouse.
The testator may disinherit his descendant on grounds such as the
following: if, for example, the latter made an attempt on the life of the
testator, if he intentionally caused him bodily injuries, if he maliciously
neglected his lawful obligation for maintenance vis--vis the testator, if he
leads a dishonorable and immoral life against the testators will (Art. 1840
CC).
The testator may disinherit his parent if, for example, the latter made
an attempt on the life of the testator or if he maliciously neglected his lawful
obligation for maintenance vis--vis the testator (1841 CC).
The testator may disinherit his spouse if at the time of his death he was
entitled to bring action for divorce against said spouse, due to the latters
fault (Art. 1842 CC).
The grounds for disinheritance need to exist at the time of the drawing
up of the will and be mentioned therein (Art. 1843, 1 CC).
See Papantoniou, op. cit., p. 100 et seq.; R. Liossi, in Georgiadis Stathopoulos,

Commentary on the Civil Code, Arts. 1839-1845; I. Spyridakis, Disinheritance, 1998; Filios,
op. cit., p. 359 et seq. ; Psouni, op. cit., p. 119 et seq.
PART FOUR
ACCEPTANCE AND RENUNCIATION OF THE INHERITANCE
AND UNWORTHINESS OF HEIR
CHAPTER A
DEVOLUTION AND ACQUISITION OF INHERITANCE
I. THE CONCEPT OF DEVOLUTION OF INHERITANCE
The succession devolves at the time of the principals death and the
heir acquires the right to it ipso jure upon devolution (Art. 1846 CC). The
time of devolution of the inheritance is the time of the death of the principal
(Art. 1711, 3 CC).
II. ACCEPTANCE OF INHERITANCE
In view of the fact that the heir may renounce the succession within a
given period of time, his right of succession becomes definitive when he
accepts the succession. Acceptance is the explicit or implicit declaration of a
person that he wishes to be an heir. The act of acceptance is a unilateral,
informal, and irrevocable juridical act (Art. 1857, 1 CC).
A typical case of explicit acceptance of the inheritance is when the heir
or the legatee inherits the right of ownership or any real right on an
immovable. This is so because the acceptance of the inheritance or legacy
pertaining to the acquisition of ownership or any real right on an
immovable needs to be transcribed1 (Art. 1193, 1 CC). In this case it is
See above, Property Law, Part Six, Ch. A, I.
510
obvious that the acceptance by the heir or the legatee needs to result from a
public document (Art. 1195, 1 CC).
Implicit acceptance exists when the heir neglects to renounce the
succession within the four month time period set for renunciation.
III. RENUNCIATION OF INHERITANCE
The renunciation of inheritance (repudiatio) takes place within a time
period of four months as from the time the heir became aware of the
devolution and the reason thereof. It is done by way of declaration to the
court clerk of the competent for the succession court (Arts. 1847, 1, 1 and
1848, 1, 1 CC).2
The consequence of renunciation is that the succession devolves on the
person who would have been called if the heir who renounced it were not
alive at the time of the death of the principal (Art. 1856, 2 CC). The
devolution is considered to have been effected at the time of the death of the
principal (Art. 1856, 3 CC).
The state may not renounce the succession devolved on it by reason of
intestacy (Art. 1848, 2 CC).
Finally, it should be mentioned that partial acceptance or renunciation
of the inheritance is prohibited.3 But in case an heir is called to more than
one share, either on the same or on different grounds (e.g. both from
testamentary and intestate succession), he may accept or renounce each of
them separately unless the testator has directed differently (Art. 1853 CC).
IV. ACCEPTANCE OF INHERITANCE
WITH THE BENEFIT OF INVENTORY
The fact that succession is universal (successio in universum jus)
implies that the heir is liable even with his own patrimonium for the debts
and charges of the succession (Art. 1901, 1 CC).
However, the law (Art. 1904, 1 CC) allows for the heir to accept the
succession under the benefit of inventory (beneficium inventarii). This
2
Court competent for the succession (succession court) is the court of the last domicile of the
principal and, if this cannot be proved, of his last residence; if no residence in Greece can be
proved, competent court is the Court of Athens (Art. 120 of the Introductory Law to the
Greek Civil Code). See P. Filios, Succession Law, General Part, 5th ed., 2003, p. 78 et seq.
3
This follows from Art. 1851, para. 2 of the Greek Civil Code. See Ast. Georgiadis, in
Georgiadis Stathopoulos, Commentary on the Civil Code, Arts. 1849-1851, No 32 et seq.
SUCCESSION LAW
511
means that the liability of the heir is limited to the net value of the estate
(liability cum viribus hereditatis). Following the acceptance of a succession
under the benefit of inventory, the rights and obligations of such succession
are separated from the patrimonium of the heir and form a separate and
distinct entity (Art. 1905 CC).4
The state5 and certain natural persons who are fully incapable or
limitedly capable to conclude juridical acts (such as, for example, the
minors, persons under judicial assistance etc.) always accept an inheritance
under the benefit of inventory (Art. 1912 CC).
See K. Pantelidou, in Georgiadis Stathopoulos, Commentary on the Civil Code,

Introductory remarks and interpretation of Arts. 1901-1912; Psouni, op. cit., p. 95 et seq.
5
According to Art. 118, para. 1 of the Introductory Law to the Greek Civil Code, the state is
always considered as accepting an inheritance under the benefit of inventory.
CHAPTER B
UNWORTHINESS OF HEIR
In certain cases, restrictively specified by law, a person may be
declared unworthy to inherit the deceased by a court ruling.1 This happens
when the heir through his behavior offended the principals life, honor or
freedom to dispose of his estate (Art. 1860 CC).
Both the heir by testament and the intestate heir may be declared
unworthy. The same holds for the forced heir, the legatee, or the
fideicommissary.2 Not only natural persons may be declared unworthy but
legal persons as well to the extent that they are liable for the unlawful acts of
their organs.3
When the court ruling declaring the unworthiness of the heir becomes
final non appealable, the devolution on the disqualified heir is considered as
never having occurred (Art. 1863, 1 CC). The succession devolves on the
person who would have been called if the unworthy heir were not alive at
the time of the devolution of the succession (Art. 1863, 2 CC). The
devolution is deemed to have taken place at the time of the principals death
(Art. 1863, 3 CC).
The action to declare an heir unworthy is lodged by the person who has a lawful interest in
the disqualification of the unworthy heir (Art. 1862, 1 CC). See M. Stathopoulos, in ERMAK,
Introductory remarks and interpretation of Arts. 1860-1864; Psouni, op. cit., p. 177 et seq.
and the citations thereat.
2
See Art. 1862, para. 2 and Art. 1864 of the Greek Civil Code.
3
See P. Christakakou, in Georgiadis Stathopoulos, Commentary on the Civil Code,
Introductory remarks to Arts. 1860-1864, No 10 and the references cited thereat.
PART FIVE
WAYS FOR PERSONS OTHER THAN THE HEIRS
TO DRAW BENEFITS FROM THE ESTATE
CHAPTER A
FIDEICOMMISSARY SUBSTITUTION OF HEIR
(OR FIDEICOMMISSION)
I. THE CONCEPT
As defined in Article 1923, para. 1 of the Greek Civil Code,
fideicommissary substitution of heir or fideicommission exists when the
testator imposes on the heir the duty to surrender the succession he received
or part thereof to another, after an event or time period.
The fideicommission may be instituted only by a will.
Examples: Testator K bequeathed his estate to his daughter A but he also
stipulated that his estate would devolve on her son (his grandson) after As death.
The testator bequeathed his estate to his brother C but he also stipulated that his
estate would devolve on his grandson E when the latter reaches majority.
For the terminology used in this section it should be mentioned that the English terms are
basically derived from the Latin word fideicommissum-(pl) fideicommissa which under
Roman law signified that the testator, by placing his trust in his heir, directed him to transfer
the inheritance to a third person at a given time or upon a stated condition. The person trusted
by the commissioning principal to effect such transfer was the fiduciarius, the transferred
inheritance the fideicommissum, and the third person who would thus become the beneficiary
by substitution the fideicommissarius. See Petropoulos, op. cit., p. 1501 and Websters Third
New International Dictionary, 3d unabridged edition (Translators note).
514
The initial heir who needs to surrender the estate all or part of it to
the substitute heir is called fiduciary (burdened heir), whereas the second
heir is called fideicommissary.
II. TIME OF DEVOLUTION OF THE FIDEICOMMISSION
Time of devolution of the fideicommission is the time at which the
designated by the testator event or point in time came to pass.
In case the testator did not specify such time or event, the time of
devolution of the fideicommission is the time of the testators death (Art.
1935, 1 CC).
If a child is born following post mortem artificial insemination and his
father in his will has designated him to be his heir, the child is not
considered heir by fideicommissary substitution. According to Article 1711,
para. 2 of the Greek Civil Code, the fathers inheritance will devolve upon
the child as the deceaseds heir (Art. 1924 CC).1
Up until the time that the estate devolves on the fideicommissary, the
fiduciary or burdened heir may dispose of the assets only if it is required
by the rules of ordinary administration or if the fideicommissary consented
to it.2
These limitations are not applicable if the fideicommissary has been
instituted on whatever shall be found in the succession at the time of its
devolution on him or if the testator has allowed the fiduciary (burdened
heir) to freely manage the succession (Art. 1939 CC).
As soon as the succession devolves on the fideicommissary he may
accept or renounce it following the relevant provisions of acceptance or
renunciation of the will by the heir (Art. 1940 CC).
If the devolution of the fideicommission is frustrated, for example
because the fideicommissary renounced it or was declared unworthy or died
before the devolution, the succession stays with the fiduciary (burdened
heir).3
See Psouni, op. cit., p. 58.

See Arts. 1937, 2 CC and 818 CCPr.
3
See K. Roussos, in Georgiadis Stathopoulos, Commentary on the Civil Code, Art. 1936,
No 1.
2
CHAPTER B
LEGACY
I. THE CONCEPT
Legacy is the specific property benefit one acquires through a will (Art.
1714 CC).
Examples: K appointed his son A and his daughter B as his heirs and left his
library to his nephew C as a legacy.
K appointed his son A as his heir and left two of his paintings to his friend F as
a legacy.
Legacy may be instituted only by testament. The person who benefits

from the legacy is called legatee whereas the person who is obliged to give
the property benefit to the legatee is called burdened heir.
Time of devolution of the legacy is the time of death of the testator (Art.
1997, 1 CC).
II. ACCEPTANCE AND RENUNCIATION OF LEGACY
The acceptance and renunciation of a legacy are effected by way of a
declaration to the burdened heir. The declaration takes place only after the
devolution of the legacy, is not susceptible to condition or time-clause, and
must concern the entire legacy (Art. 2001, 2 CC). This declaration has no
special time frame within which it should be made and is not subject to
form. Form is required, and in fact the form of a public document, if the
legacy consists in transferring to the legatee the ownership of an immovable
or any other real right on an immovable.
516
If the legatee accepts the legacy, his right becomes definitive. In case
the legatee renounces the legacy, the granting of the legacy to him is
frustrated.
III. THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN HEIR AND LEGATEE
The basic difference between heir and legatee is that the heir is
universal heir to the deceased whereas the legatee specific. This is so
because the heir receives the entire estate whereas the legatee receives only
a certain item or items.
CHAPTER C
CHARGE (MODUS)
Charge (modus) is the obligation to carry out a certain performance
imposed by the testator on the heir or the legatee (Art. 1715 CC).
The types of performance imposed on the heir or the legatee may vary
in content.1
Example: The testator may impose on the heir to give yearly a certain amount of
money to a foundation in his birthplace which cares for the physically challenged
or to arrange for a poetry collection of his to get published.
See Papantoniou, op. cit., p. 160. Ap. Georgiadis, in Georgiadis Stathopoulos,

Commentary on the Civil Code, Art. 1715 and the citations thereat.
CHAPTER D
DONATION MORTIS CAUSA
Donation mortis causa is the donation agreed under the suspensive
condition either that the donor will predecease the donee or that donor and
donee will die simultaneously without in the meantime the donee having the
enjoyment of the things donated (Art. 2032 CC).1
A notarial deed is always required for the donation mortis causa,
regardless of whether the thing donated is movable or immovable (Arts.
2032 and 498 CC). When the thing donated mortis causa is an immovable
or a real right on an immovable, transcription is also necessary (Art. 1192, 1
CC).
The donation mortis causa is freely revocable by the donor (Art. 2033,
1 CC). The declaration of revocation is effected by notarial deed of which
the donee is notified. If the revocation concerns an immovable, it should
also be transcribed (Art. 2033, 2 CC).
See in this regard Agg. Georgiadi, in Georgiadis Stathopoulos, Commentary on the Civil
Code, Introductory remarks and interpretation of Arts. 2032-2035; Spyridakis, op. cit., p. 635
et seq.; Filios, Succession Law, Special Part, op. cit., p. 367 et seq.
PART SIX
CERTIFICATE OF HEIRSHIP
CHAPTER A
THE CONCEPT
The certificate of heirship is a certificate issued by the succession
court1 which determines the heir(s) of the deceased and their share in the
inheritance. The certificate of heirship also mentions the fideicommissary,
the legatee, and the executor of the will.2
The certificate of heirship is issued following a petition to this effect
submitted to the succession court by the heir, the fideicommissary, the
legatee, or the executor of the will.3
The court, however, issues the certificate of heirship to the petitioner
only if it considers that the facts mentioned in the petition have been proved
(Art. 1961, 1 CC).
The certificate of heirship is issued by the clerk of the court of
succession.4
See above Part Four, Ch. A, III, footn. 2.

See Arts. 1956 and 1961 CC and Art. 819 CCPr.; See also N. Klamaris, in Georgiadis
Stathopoulos, Commentary on the Civil Code, Introductory remarks to Arts. 1956-1966 and
interpretation of the Arts. 1956-1961, along with the citations thereat; Spyridakis, op. cit., p.
461 et seq. and the citations thereat.
3
4
2
CHAPTER B
CONSEQUENCES OF ISSUANCE
OF THE CERTIFICATE OF HEIRSHIP
The certificate of heirship creates a presumption that the heir, or the
fideicommissary, or the legatee, or the executor of the will mentioned
therein have the rights stated in it and that they are not limited by provisions
other than those referred to in the certificate in question.1 This presumption
is rebuttable, i.e. it may be disproved by evidence to the contrary produced
by every interested party.
Every juridical act of the person named in the certificate of heirship as
heir, fideicommissary, legatee, or executor of the will, which is concluded
with a third party or of a third party with the above is valid in favor of
the third party to the extent that the above mentioned presumption is valid;
unless the third party knew about the inaccuracy of the certificate of
heirship, or about the existence of a petition seeking its surrender to the
court, or its declaration as invalid, or its revocation or modification.2
See Art. 821 CCPr. and see L. Kitsaras, in Georgiadis Stathopoulos, Commentary on the
Civil Code, Arts. 1962-1966 and the citations thereat.
2
See Arts. 1963 CC and 822 CCPr.
PART SEVEN
JUDICIAL LIQUIDATION OF SUCCESSION
With the judicial liquidation of the succession which is ordered by the
court following a petition by the creditor of the succession (Art. 1913, 1
CC), the succession is ipso jure separated from the personal patrimonium of
the heir and forms a separate group under the administration of a liquidator
(Art. 1914 CC).
The institution of judicial liquidation of the succession on the one hand
protects the creditors of the inheritance from acts of the heir or of his
personal creditors, and on the other hand safeguards the proportionate
satisfaction of the creditors in case the assets of the estate do not suffice to
pay them off.1
See N. Nikas, in Georgiadis Stathopoulos, Commentary on the Civil Code, Arts. 19131922; Spyridakis, op. cit., p. 545 et seq.; P. Filios, Succession Law, General Part, op. cit., p.
156 et seq. and the citations thereat.
PART EIGHT
VACANT SUCCESSION
The succession is considered vacant (hereditas jacens) if the heir is
unknown or if it is uncertain whether he accepted the succession or not. In
this case the succession court1 appoints a curator to the vacant succession
following a petition by the party having a lawful interest or even ex officio
(Art. 1865, 1 CC).2
The institution of vacant succession aims at avoiding the uncertainty as
to the identity of the heir.3
The curator of a vacant succession represents the heir and administers
the estate (Art. 1866, 1 CC).
See above Part Four, Ch. A, III, footn. 2.

See A. Pelleni, in Georgiadis Stathopoulos, Commentary on the Civil Code, Arts. 18651970; Spyridakis, op. cit., p. 431 et seq., Filios, Succession Law, General Part, op. cit., p. 80
et seq. and the citations thereat.
3
See Papantoniou, op. cit., p. 169.
2
Index
Absentia, 42 et seq., 172, 451 et

seq.
Absentee (see Missing person)
Abuse (see Right)
Acknowledgement of paternity
(see also Presumption)
- judicial, 464
- results of, 464
- voluntary, 463 et seq.
Acquisitive prescription
- extraordinary, 396
- ordinary, 394 et seq.
Act
- juridical (see Juridical act)
- material, 105
Action
- bringing/lodging an, 90
- condition forming
/constitutive, 79
- confessory (actio confessoria),
409
- declaratory, 78
- negatory (negatoria), 399
- to perform, 79
- revendicatory (rei vindicatio),
398 et seq.
Adoption, 35, 45, 119, 435, 441,
461, 475
Affinity (see Kinship by marriage
alliance)
Age
- to adopt, 45
- computation of, 115
- to conclude employment
contract as employee, 45, 119
- to conclude juridical acts, 115,
118 et seq.
- to conclude juridical acts for
benefits only, 119
- to conclude juridical acts as

representative of another, 119
- to consent to adoption, 45, 119
- for delictual liability, 110 et
seq.
- to dispose of earnings or
allocation, 119
- of majority, 34, 115
- to marry, 120, 440
Analogy (see Interpretation)
Annulment
- of juridical act, 151
- of marriage, 148, 444
Appeal
- court of (see Court)
- legal proceeding of, 91
Approval (ratification)
- comparison with consent, 175
- in falsus procurator, 175 et seq.
- in self-contracting, 177
Artificial insemination (see
Medically assisted human
reproduction)
Assignment of claim
- conditions for, 296 et seq.
- legal effects of, 298
- non assignable claims, 296 et
seq.
- notification of debtor, 297
Association, 63 et seq.
(see also Registration)
Assumption of debt
- cumulative, 300
- difference from guarantee, 341
- privative, 299 et seq.
- transfer of patrimonium or
enterprise as a whole, 300 et
seq.
Attachment, 92
Auction
524
- concept, 92
- cases of, 412, 416, 423, 425, et
seq.
Bare ownership (see Ownership)
Bonitas, 298 (see also Veritas)
Books/Records (see Public
Books/Records)
Breakdown of matrimony (see
Marriage)
Brokerage, 332
Burdened heir (see Heir)
Business usage, 3, 125, 136, 145 et
seq., 181, 256, 262
Call upon the debtor to perform
(interpellatio), 271
Capacity
- for concluding a juridical act,
59 et seq., 60 et seq., 109
- full, 115
- limited, 118 et seq., 168
- for delictual liability, 60, 61 et
seq., 110 et seq., 227 et seq.
- legal, 37, 39, 59, 110
Care (parental) (see Parental care)
Cassation
- court of, 89 (see also Court)
- review, 89
Causal relation, 210 et seq., 213,
246, 248
Certificate of heirship, 519 et seq.
Charge (modus), 516
Citizenship, 45
Civil Law
- branches of,
- Family Law, 435 et seq.
- General Principles, 33 et seq.
- Law of Obligations, 179 et
seq.
- Property Law, 373 et seq.
- Succession Law, 479 et seq.
- history of, 34
- meaning of term, 33
- usefulness of, 35
Civil partnership
INDEX
- concept, 71
- conditions for acquisition of
legal personality, 71
Claim
- concept, 77
- for damages (see Damage)
- to maintenance, 453 et seq. (see
also Maintenance)
- for moral damage (see moral
damage under Damage)
- to participate in the increments,
447
- prescribed claim (see
natural/imperfect obligation
under Obligation)
- prescription of, 97 et seq. (see
also Prescription)
- relationship with legal action,
78
- relationship with right, 77 et
seq.
Cohabitation, 435, 456, 457
Cloning, 457
Collation, 501 et seq.
Community property, 448 et seq.
(see also co-ownership under
Ownership)
Compensation
- for damages (see Damage)
- in kind (in natura), 214
- monetary, 214
- reasonable, 95, 283, 284
Compulsory expropriation, 389
Concurrent fault, 211 et seq.
Condition
- difference from term, 162
- elements of, 153
- function of, 157 et seq.
- genuine, 153
- impacting the juridical act with
nullity, 156 et seq.
- juridical acts insusceptible of,
155 et seq., 442, 464
- non-genuine, 154
- resolutory, 155, 158 et seq.,
160, 161
INDEX
- suspensive, 154 et seq., 157 et

seq., 160 et seq.
- various types of, 154 et seq.
Consanguinity (see Kinship by
blood)
Consent (see also Approval)
- to childs acknowledgment, 464
- to adoption (see Adoption)
- of the judicial assistant, 114,
122 et seq.
- to medically assisted human
reproduction, 456, 457, 458
- to minors employment as an
employee, 119, 175
Contract
- accessory, 291, 293, 340
- adhesion/accession , 180 et seq.,
236, 239 et seq.
- burdening a third party, 241 et
seq.
- concept, 106, 136 et seq.
- concerning the succession of a
living person, 480
- conclusion of final
- offer, 138
- acceptance, 138 et seq.
- consensual (solo consensu), 238
- continuous/standing, 349, 356
- delivery, 238, 336, 338
- exploitative, 144
- forced, 180, 236, 238 et seq.
- formal, 237, 314, 340, 345, 357,
360
- freedom of (see Principle)
- gratuitous (causa donandi),
238, 314, 333, 336, 338, 517
- in favor of a third party, 240 et
seq.
- informal, 180, 237, 316, 322,
323, 327, 330, 332, 333, 335,
336, 338, 392
- mixed/compound, 239 et seq.,
343, 349, 356, 364
- non regulated/innominate, 242,
313, 362 et seq.
525
- onerous (quid pro quo), 238,

316, 322, 323, 326, 329, 343,
349, 356, 360, 364
- reciprocal, 107, 237, 279 et
seq., 316, 322, 323, 326, 329,
335, 338, 343, 349, 356, 364
- regulated/nominate, 242, 313,
314 et seq.
- self-contracting, 175 et seq.
- trilateral, 346, 358, 361
- unilaterally obliging (charging),
107, 237, 314, 332, 333, 336,
338
Court
- decision (judgment/ruling)
- final non appealable, 43, 65,
67, 424, 426, 427, 428, 429,
448, 512
- irreversible, 43, 440, 448,
451, 453, 462
- judicial decisions
(jurisprudence), 25 et seq.
- distinctions of civil
- of appeal(s), 88
- of cassation (Areios Pagos),
89
- first instance, 87
- justice(s) of the peace, 88
- multi-member court(s) of first
instance, 88
- one-member court(s) of first
instance, 88
Cover relation, 241 (see also Value
relation)
Creditor
- concept, 185
- default of, 275 et seq.
- in guarantee, 340
Culpa lata (see Negligence)
Culpa levis (see Negligence)
Curator, 522
Custody of a child (see Parental
care)
Custom, 16, 19 et seq.
526
Damage
- claim for
- in abusive exercise of a right,
85
- in concurrent fault, 211 et seq.
- in debtors default, 272 et
seq., 282
- in delictual liability (see
Liability)
- in error, 126, 135
- in fraud, 129
- in impossibility of
performance, 268 et seq., 282
- in improper performance
(malperformance), 274, 285
- in lack of power of attorney,
175
- in management of anothers
affairs (negotiorum gestio),
253
- in private justice (self-rule)
cases
- self-defense, 95
- self-redress, 94
- state of necessity, 95 et
seq.
- in protection of the legal
person, 62
- in protection of natural
persons, 50, 52, 54
- in stage of negotiations, 136
et seq.
- in specific contracts
- contracts burdening a third
party, 242
- deposit, 339
- earnest, 291
- franchise contract, 371
- lease of a thing, 324
- leasing contract, 347
- mandate, 334
- penalty clause, 294
- sale, 320
- time-sharing, 352
- in stage of pendency of
condition, 158, 159
- in threat, 131
INDEX
- computation of benefits in the

assessment of, 211
- concept, 207 et seq., 246
- types of,
- moral, 51, 52, 62, 207, 246
- pain and suffering, 208, 247
- property, 207, 246
- lost profit, 208
- positive damage, 208
Data, personal (see Personal data)
Date certain (ascertained), 413,
414, 419 (see also Document)
Debt
- assumption of (see Assumption
of debt)
- release of (see Release of debt)
Debtor
- concept, 185
- default of, 270 et seq.
- fault of, 272, 282
Decision (see Court; see also
European Union/European
Community Law)
Default
- creditors, 275 et seq.
- debtors, 270 et seq.
- by one of the parties in
reciprocal contracts, 284 et seq.
Defect
- liability for, 318 et seq., 324 et
seq.
- in title, 316, 324, 353
- material, 316, 324
Defendant, 79, 90
Defendants plea (see Plea)
Delict/tort (see Offense)
Delictual liability (see Liability)
Deposit
- conclusion of, 338
- obligations of the parties, 338 et
seq.
- termination of, 339
Deposit with a public body
- effects of, 307 et seq.
- reasons for, 306 et seq.
Dereliction (see Finding of a lost
thing)
INDEX
Descent
- maternal,
- by birth, 462
- by medically assisted human
reproduction, 462
- paternal,
- acknowledgment of
paternity
- judicial, 464
- voluntary, 463 et seq.
- presumption of, 463
Detention, 382
Disinheritance, 507
Divorce
- contested, 43, 451 et seq.
- by mutual consent, 450 et seq.
- results of, 453 et seq., 471 et
seq.
Document,
- drawn upon declaration before
public authority, 141 et seq.
- cases of
- the parents re the
childrens surname, 465
- renunciation of
inheritance, 510
- notarial, 141
- cases of
- cohabitors consent for
artificial insemination,
456
- cohabitors or spouses
consent for post mortem
artificial insemination,
457
- constitution of
community property
between spouses, 448,
449
- donation inter vivos, 314
- donation mortis causa,
517
- establishment of
foundation, 68
- constitution of mortgage,
424
527
- constitution of pledge,
414
- constitution of servitudes,
405, 406
- public will, 483
- secret will, 484
- self-contracting, 177
- conclusion of timesharing contract, 350
- transfer of ownership on
immovables, 391
- private, 140
- of ascertained date (see Date
certain)
- electronic, 140
- facsimile, 140
- teletype, 140
- written document
- re constitution of
association, 64
- re civil partnership, 71
- re factoring, 357
- re fictitious pledge, 419
- re franchise, 368
- re constitution of fund
raising committee, 70
- re guarantee, 340
- re leasing, 345
- in parents agreement re
children in divorce,
451
- in parents agreement with
surrogate mother, 458
- re holographic will, 483
Dolus (see Intention)
Domestic law, 4 et seq.
Domicile
- concept, 47, 105
- difference from residence, 49
- legal/obligatory, 48
- as place of performance, 260 et
seq.
- special, 48
- voluntary, 48
Donation
- inter vivos, 314 et seq.
- mortis causa, 517
528
Dowry (abolished institution), 34

Earnest/earnest contract, 291 et
seq.
Easement (see Servitude)
Embryo (see Nasciturus)
Employment contract
- difference from contract for
work, 332
- for a fixed term, 328 et seq.
- for an indefinite period, 329 et
seq.
- obligations of the employee,
327
- obligations of the employer,
328
- termination of, 328 et seq.
Engagement, 439
Equality of sexes, 34, 45, 436, 445
et seq.
Error
- as to the declaration of the will,
133 et seq.
- essential, 133 et seq.
- non essential, 134
- leading to the annulment of
marriage, 444
- in the reasons leading up to the
shaping of the will, 124 et seq.,
442, 493
- essential, 125 et seq.
- non essential, 126 et seq
Euro, 198 et seq.
European Union/European
Community Law
- primary community law, 9 et
seq., 22
- secondary/derivative
community law
- decisions, 15, 24
- directives, 13 et seq., 22 et
seq.
- regulations, 13, 22
- recommendations and
opinions, 15
INDEX
Evidence, 91
Exchange, 322 et seq.
Extinction
- of obligation (see Obligation)
- of a right (see Right)
Extra portion (praelegatum), 500
Factoring contract
- concept, 355
- conclusion of, 357 et seq.
- duration and expiration of, 359
- operation of, 358 et seq.
- relationship among the parties,
358 et seq.
- types of, 357
- usefulness of, 357
Family
- adoptive, 435, 475
- foster, 35, 436, 476
- legal, 435
- natural, 435
- right (see Right)
Fault
- concept, 227
- concurrent (see Concurrent
fault)
- degrees of
- intention/willful conduct,
228 et seq.
- negligence, 229 et seq.
Fideicommissary, 514
Fideicommission, 513 et seq.
Fiduciary, 514 (see also burdened
heir)
Force majeure (vis major), 100,
228
Forced heir, 505 et seq.
Forced heirship, 505
- ranks of, 505 et seq.
- share of (pars legitima), 506
Forcible execution, 92
Forfaiting contract, 360 et seq.
Form
- constitutive, 139 et seq.
- evidential, 142
Foster care, 35, 436, 476
INDEX
Foundation, 68 et seq.
Franchise contract
- advantages and disadvantages,
365 et seq.
- concept, 363
seq.
Fraud, 127 et seq., 493
Fund raising committee, 70 et seq.
Gender, 45, 439, 457
Good faith (bona fides)
- concept, 3
- objective, 83, 125, 136, 145,
147, 176, 181 et seq., 225, 255
et seq., 258, 262, 286, 317, 318,
327 et seq.
- principle of (see Principle)
- subjective, 181, 393, 394, 395
Good morals (boni mores), 2, 83 et
seq., 130, 143 et seq., 150, 182,
227, 236, 250, 492
Government Gazette, 17 et seq.,
69, 71
Guarantee
- difference from cumulative
assumption of debt (see
Assumption of debt)
- operation of, 340
Guardianship (see Tutelage of
minors)
Habitation (see Servitude)
Health, 46
Heir
- burdened, 515
- difference from legatee, 516
- fideicommissary substitution of
(see Fideicommission)
- forced (see Forced heir)
- general/universal, 480
- unworthiness of, 512
Heirship
- certificate of
529
- concept, 519
- consequences of issuance, 520
(see also Presumption)
- forced (see Forced heirship)
Hellenic Data Protection Authority
(see Personal data)
Honor, 46
Immovable (see Thing)
Important reason/cause, 25, 143 et
seq., 143, 328, 360, 370, 420, 440
Impossibility of performance
- arising from fault, 265, 268 et
seq., 282 et seq.
- consequences in general, 268 et
seq.
- consequences in reciprocal
contracts, 281 et seq.
- not due to fault, 265 et seq.,
269, 281 et seq.
- types of
- economic, 267
- initial, 266
- legal, 267
- moral, 268
- natural, 267
- objective, 266
- partial, 267
- subjective, 266
- supervening, 266
- total, 266
Incapacity
- for concluding juridical acts
- full
- absolute, 115 et seq.
- relative, 116 et seq.
- limited, 118 et seq.
- for delictual liability, 110, 227
et seq.
Industrial property, 53, 363 et seq.
Inheritance (see Succession)
Intellectual property, 8, 53, 105,
363 et seq.
Intention (willful conduct/dolus)
- eventual, 229
- immediate, 229
530
Interest
- compound, 206
- concept, 203 et seq.
- contractual, 151, 204
- discount, 205
- legal, 205
- rate of, 204, 205
International
- law
- branches of, 8
- generally accepted rules of, 20
et seq.
- treaties (ratified), 21
Interpellatio (see Call upon the
debtor to perform)
Interpretation,
- of juridical acts
- condition forming/
constitutive, 147
- objective, 146
- subjective, 145
- supplemental, 146 et seq.
- of rules of law
- authentic, 28 et seq.
- scientific, 29
- literal, 29
- rational, 29 et seq.
- teleological, 30 et seq.
- corrective, 31
- supplemental (by
analogy), 31 et seq.
- of the wills, 490 et seq.
Intestate succession (see
Succession)
Judicial administration of anothers
affairs, 478
Judicial assistance
- combination of privative and
concurrent, 114, 123
- concept, 35, 111 et seq., 477
- concurrent, 114, 122
- lifting of, 115
- privative, 113 et seq., 116, 121
et seq.
- procedure, 112
INDEX
Judicial decisions/jurisprudence
(see Court)
Judicial interdiction (abolished
institution), 35, 111, 436, 477
Judicial supervision (abolished
institution), 35, 111, 436, 477
Judicial liquidation of succession,
521
Juridical act
- capacity for concluding (see
Capacity)
- conditions for conclusion, 109
et seq.
- content of, 142 et seq.
- contract (see Contract)
- difference from material act,
105
- difference from quasi juridical
act, 104
- exploitative, 144
- formal, 68, 108, 481
- gratuitous, 107
- informal, 108, 171
- interpretation of (see
Interpretation)
- inter vivos, 108
- of a legal person, 60 et seq.
- mortis causa, 108, 481
- null and void
- difference between null and
void and voidable, 152
- types of nullity (see Nullity)
- onerous, 107
- quasi, 104, 271, 297
- unilateral, 106, 135 et seq., 169,
176, 235, 481, 509
- voidable, 125, 128, 130, 134,
151 et seq.
Jurisprudence (see Court)
Kinship
- by adoption (artificial), 461,
475
- by blood (consanguinity), 47,
460
INDEX
- by marriage alliance (affinity),

47, 460 et seq.
Land Registry
- operation of, 391, 433
- principles of, 434
Law
- difference from custom, 2
- difference from morality, 1 et
seq.
- divisions of, 4 et seq.
- enters into force, 17 et seq.
- of the European Union/
Community (see European
Union/Community Law)
- formal, 16
- interpretation of (see
Interpretation)
- mandatory (jus cogens), 28, 98,
180, 257, 390 et seq., 414 et
seq., 436, 445, 450 et seq., 481
et seq., 501 et seq.,
- non-mandatory (jus
dispositivum), 28, 180, 190,
258, 260 et seq., 261 et seq.
501
- repeal of, 18
- retroactive effect of, 19
- sources of, 16 et seq.
- substantive, 16
- vacuum in (see Vacuum)
Lease of a thing
- conclusion of contract, 323
- difference from loan for use,
338
seq.
- termination of contract
- for a fixed term, 325
- for an indefinite period, 325 et
seq.
Leasing
- concept, 343
- operation of, 346 et seq.
531
- relationship among the parties

(lessor-lessee-supplier), 346 et
seq.
Legacy
- acceptance and renunciation of,
515
- concept, 515
- difference from heirship, 516
Legal
- action (see Action)
- capacity (see Capacity)
- person (see Person)
- personality (see Personality)
- presumption (see Presumption)
- relation, 73
- remedies, 92
- representation (see
Representation)
Legal interdiction (abolished
institution), 111
Legal person
- administration of, 60
- capacity of
- for delictual liability, 61 et
seq.
- to conclude juridical acts, 60
et seq.
- of civil law (see Association,
Foundation, Fund raising
committee, Civil partnership)
- of commercial law, 58
- dissolution of, 63, 67, 70, 71
- formation of, 59, 64, 68 et seq.,
70, 71
- legal capacity of, 59
- liquidation of, 63, 68
- of mixed nature, 58
- protection of, 49, 62
- of public law, 57 et seq.
- seat of, 60, 64, 69
- title of, 60, 64
Lessee
- in lease of a thing, 323
- in leasing contract, 343
- in time sharing contract, 348 et
seq.
532
Lessor
- in lease of a thing, 323
- in leasing contract, 343
- in time-sharing contract, 348
Liability
- civil
- capacity for (see Capacity)
- concept, 183, 209, 223 et seq.
- contractual, 183, 209, 223
- re acts of an underling, 231
et seq.
- re anomalous development
of the obligation, 265 et
seq.
- re normal development of
the obligation, 255 et seq.
- extra-contractual, 223 et seq.,
243 et seq.
- for the acts of an
underling, 231 et seq.
- from delictual acts, 61 et
seq., 85, 184, 209, 225 et
seq., 245 et seq.
- from negotiorum gestio,
252 et seq.
- from unjust enrichment,
184, 247 et seq.
- joint and several, 62, 216 et
seq., 234
- of legal persons (see Legal
person)
- objective, 184, 210, 222
- pre-contractual (stage of
negotiations), 136 et seq.,
183, 209
- subjective, 184, 210, 222
- criminal, 221
- disciplinary, 221
Liquidator in succession law, 521
Litigation (steps in), 89 et seq.
Loan, 334 et seq.
Loan for use
- difference from lease of a thing,
338
INDEX
- difference from loan, 337

- expiration of contract, 337
- obligations of the parties, 336
Maintenance
- children/parents (mutual), 468
et seq.
- in re disinheritance, 507
- to former spouse, 453 et seq.
Management of anothers affairs
(negotiorum gestio), 252 et seq.
Mandate
- concept, 333
- obligations of the parties,
334
- termination of, 334
Mandatory rule of law (jus cogens)
(see Law)
Marriage
- civil, 34, 46, 443
- defective, 444
- dissolution of (see also
Divorce)
- death, 450
- divorce
- contested, 451 et seq.
- by mutual consent, 450 et
seq.
- formalities, 46, 442 et seq.
- impediments, 440 et seq.
- major breakdown, 452
- non existent, 444
- null and void, 444
- religious, 46, 442 et seq.
- requirements (positive), 439 et
seq.
- results
- for the children, 465 et seq.
- for the spouses
- personal, 445 et seq.
- property, 446 et seq.
- voidable, 444
Material damage (see Damage)
Maternity/maternal descent
- concept, 462
INDEX
- in medically assisted human

reproduction, 462
- presumption of (see
Presumption)
Medically assisted human
reproduction, 35, 455 et seq.
Memory of the deceased (see
Right)
Messenger, 165
Missing person
- conditions, 42
- consequences, 43, 448, 450,
451 et seq., 480
- process of declaration, 42 et
seq.
- reappearance of, 44
Monetary obligations
- concept, 195
- payment of, 202 et seq.
- rules applying to, 202
Money
- in the broad sense, 195 et seq.
- accounting, 196
- electronic, 196
- plastic, 196
- euro (see Euro)
- in the strict sense, 196 et seq.
- value of, 197
Moral damage (see Damage)
Moratorium, 100
Mortgage
- constitution of
- title for, 423 et seq.
- public recordation of, 424
- lifting of
- deletion, 426
- extinction, 426
- prenotice of (see Prenotice)
Name (see also Surname)
- assumed, 51
- of children, 44 et seq., 465 et
seq.
- of spouses, 45, 445
- right to a, 51 et seq.
Nasciturus, 39 et seq., 480
533
Natural person
- beginning of, 39
- end of, 40
- presumption of death, 41
- properties of, 44 et seq.
- protection of, 49 et seq.
Negligence
- gross (culpa lata), 229
- slight (culpa levis), 229 et seq.
Negotiations (see Liability)
Non-mandatory rule of law (jus
dispositivum) (see Law)
Nullity of the juridical act
- absolute, 150
- concept, 148
- difference from inoperative,
149
- difference from voidable, 152
- full, 150
- initial, 149
- partial, 150
- relative, 150
- the special case of decision of
the Meetings of the Members
of the association, 148
- the special case of marriage,
148, 444
- supervening, 149, 485
Numerus clausus of real rights, 373
Obligation
- alternative, 193 et seq.
- difference from alternative
faculty, 195
- simplification of, 194
- contractual, 235 et seq.
- development of
- anomalous, 265 et seq.
- normal, 255 et seq.
- divisible, 215 et seq.
- extinction of (see Payment by
debtor, Deposit with a public
body, Other performance in
lieu of payment, Payment by a
third party, Release of debt,
Set off)
534
- extra-contractual
- from negotiorum gestio (see
Management of anothers
affairs)
- from unjust enrichment (see
Unjust enrichment)
- from unlawful acts, 243 et
seq.
- generic, 189 et seq.
- indivisible, 218 et seq.
- joint and several (in solidum),
62, 216 et seq., 300 et seq.
- monetary (see Monetary)
- multi-party, 215
- natural/imperfect, 187, 439
- reinforcement of, 289 et seq.
- specific, 189
- transfer/disposition of
- general (succession), 295, 480
et seq.
- special
- assignment of claim, 296
et seq. (see also
Assignment)
- assumption of debt, 299 et
seq. (see also
Assumption)
Offense
- civil (tort/delict), 244
- capacity for (delictual
liability), 60, 110, 227 et
seq.
- conditions for delictual
liability, 245 et seq.
- results of, 246 et seq. (see
also Damage)
- criminal, 244
- disciplinary, 244
Other performance in lieu of
payment, 305
Ownership
- acquisition of
- derivative, 390 et seq.
- immovables, 390 et seq.
- movables, 392 et seq.
- original
INDEX
- by acquisitive
prescription, 394 et seq.
- by finding a lost thing,
396 et seq.
- by occupancy of a derelict
thing, 393, 396
- bare, 386
- co- (joint), 386 et seq. (see also
Community property)
- full, 386
- horizontal (of a storey or
apartment), 387
- loss of, 397
- restrictions of
- by law, 388 et seq.
- from third party rights, 389
- right of, 74
- vertical, 387
Pain and suffering (see Damage)
Parent-children relationship
- special mutual obligations, 467
et seq.
- parental grants (see Parental
grants)
- childs surname, 465 et seq.
Parental care
- cessation of, 473
- concept, 470
- beginning of, 470
- exercise of
- over children born out of
wedlock, 472 et seq.
- in case of divorce, annulment,
or interruption of conjugal
living, 471 et seq.
- during marriage, 471
Parental grants, 391, 467 et seq.,
501 (see also Tax)
Parental responsibility (see
Parental care)
Paternal descent (see Descent)
Payment
- by debtor, 304
- by third party, 259 et seq., 304
INDEX
- other performance in lieu of,

305
Penalty clause (stipulatio poenae),
293 et seq.
Performance
- impossibility of (see
Impossibility of performance)
- improper /defective
/malperformance, 274, 285
- place of, 260 et seq.
- plea of unperformed contract
(exceptio non adimpleti
contractus), 279 et seq.
- time of, 261 et seq.
- way of fulfilling
- in good faith, 256 et seq.
- partial, 258
- by a third party, 259 et seq.
Person (see Legal person/Natural
person)
Personal data, 54 et seq.
Personality
- concept of, 49 et seq.
- right to ones (see Right)
Plaintiff, 79, 90
Plea
- defendants, 79, 90, 97
- of prior execution, 341
- of right of retention, 264
- of the unperformed contract
(exceptio non adimpleti
contractus), 279 et seq. (see
also Performance)
Pledge
- common, 413, 414 et seq.
- fictitious/by registration, 413,
418 et seq.
- legal, 413
Possession
- acquisition of, 382
- in acquisitive prescription, 395,
396
- loss of, 382 et seq.
- protection of, 383
535
Post mortem artificial

insemination, 457, 480, 514
Power of attorney (see also
Representation)
- form of, 171
- lack of (falsus procurator), 174
et seq.
- self-contracting, 176 et seq.
- transactions after termination
of, 173 et seq.
- types of, 170
- ways of granting, 169 et seq.
Praelegatum (extra portion), 500
Prenotice of mortgage
- constitution of
- title for, 428
- recordation of, 428
- lifting of, 428 et seq.
Prescription
- acquisitive (see Acqusitive
prescription)
- beginning of, 98 et seq.
- difference from extinction, 102
- interruption of, 101
- prescribed claims (see natural/
imperfect obligation under
Obligation)
- suspension of
- absolute, 99 et seq.
- of completion, 100 et seq.
- period of, 98
Presumption
- of accuracy of registrations in
the land registry, 434
- of contribution to the increment,
447
- of death, 41, 43
- of heirship with certificate of
heirship, 520
- of major breakdown in
matrimony, 452 et seq.
- of maternity, 462
- of paternity, 463
- of simultaneous death, 41 et
seq.
536
Principles (of Greek Civil Law)

- autonomy of assets in
matrimony, 446
- autonomy of private will, 180 et
seq.
- equality of sexes, 34, 45, 436
- favoring the debtor/ feebler
party, 182 et seq.
- forced heirship, 505 et seq.
- freedom of contracts, 180, 236
- good faith (bona fides), 181 et
seq., 202, 255 et seq., 317, 328
(see also Good faith)
- informality of juridical acts,
108, 139, 180, 237 (in
conjunction with the
limitations under Document)
- inviolability of contracts (pacta
sunt servanda), 285 et seq.
- liability, 183 et seq., 209 et seq.,
222 et seq.
- numerus clausus of real rights,
373
- publicity of real rights, 431 et
seq.
- religious freedom, 46
- testamentary freedom, 479 (in
conjunction with the limitations
under Forced heirship)
Promise
- to conclude a contract, 137
- to marry (see Engagement)
Property
- community (see Community
property)
- damage (see Damage)
- intellectual (see Intellectual
property)
- industrial (see Industrial
property)
Provisional remedies, 92, 428
Public Books/Records of
Transcription
- cases of transcription
- re acceptance of inheritance
or legacy pertaining to the
INDEX
acquisition of any real right

on immovables, 509
- re donation mortis causa (and
its revocation), 517
- re mortgages (in the special
books of mortgages), 424,
426, 431
- re pledge by registration, 413,
419 (see also Registration)
- re sale of immovables, 391,
431 et seq.
- re servitudes, 405 et seq.
- re time-sharing contracts,
350
- disadvantages of, 432
- operation of, 431
Quality
- agreed, 324
- conceded, 317 et seq.
Quasi juridical act (see Juridical
act)
Reasonable compensation (see
Compensation)
Recourse (right of) (see Right)
Registration
- of associations, 65
- of births/deaths, 40, 41, 45
- of civil partnership, 71
- of community property, 448
- of fictitious pledge, 413, 419
(see also Public Books/
Records)
- of leasing contract, 345
Registry of Pledge Offices, 419
Release of debt, 312
Religion, 46
Remedy
- legal (see Legal remedies)
- provisional (see Provisional
remedies)
Rent, 323, 325, 346, 349, 352, 413
Representation (see also Power of
attorney)
- active, 166
INDEX
- concept, 165
- conditions of, 167 et seq.
- declaration of will not
susceptible to, 167 et seq., 442,
464, 481
- difference from messenger, 165
- direct, 166
- indirect, 166
- of the person under judicial
assistance, 113 et seq., 116
- legal, 167
- of children under the
parental care, 116, 121, 470
- passive, 166
- in self-contracting (see Selfcontracting)
- voluntary, 167
Rescission, 283, 284, 320, 330,
331, 353
Residence, 49 (see also Domicile)
Retention (right of)
- consequences of, 264
- difference from plea of the
unperformed contract, 280 et
seq.
- way of exercise, 264
Retroactive effect of law (see Law)
Right
- absolute (erga omnes), 75 et
seq.
- abuse/abusive exercise of, 83 et
seq.
- accessory
- pledge, 412
- mortgage, 422
- acquisition of, 80
- change of, 80 et seq.
- concept, 73
- condition forming/
constitutive, 76, 271
- difference from claim, 77, 102
- exercise of, 82
- extinction of, 77, 102, 126, 128,
131, 134, 161, 164 et seq.
- family, 74 et seq.
- loss of, 81
537
- to the memory of the deceased,

51
- of mixed nature, 75
- to a name (see Name)
- obligational, 74
- of ownership (see Ownership)
- personal, 74 et seq.
- to personal data, 54 et seq.
- to ones personality, 49 et seq.,
74, 77
- power conferring/ to claiming,
75 et seq.
- to products of ones intellect, 53
et seq., 75, 375
- property, 74
- protection of
- judicial, 86 et seq.
- self-rule (private justice)
- self-defense, 94 et seq., 226,
383, 398
- self-redress, 93 et seq., 226,
383, 398
- state of necessity, 95 et seq.,
226
- real, 74, 373 et seq.
- real security, 411 et seq.
- of recourse, 217 et seq., 234
- relative, 76
- of retention (see Retention)
- succession, 74, 480
Sale
- concept, 315
- guarantee for thing sold, 321 et
seq.
- liability of the parties, 318 et
seq.
seq.
- rescission (see Rescission)
Self-contracting, 176 et seq.
Self-rule (private justice)
- self-defense, 94 et seq., 226,
383, 398
538
- self-redress, 93 et seq., 226,

383, 398
- state of necessity, 95 et seq.,
226
Servitude
- concept, 401
- constitution of, 405 et seq.
- extinction of, 408 et seq.
- personal
- habitation, 403, 407, 409
- limited, 404, 407, 409
- usufruct, 386, 402 et seq.,
406, 408 et seq., 409
- predial (real), 401 et seq., 405
et seq., 408, 409
- protection of, 409
Set off
- concept, 309
- types of
- involuntary, 309
- voluntary, 309
Simulation
- absolute, 132
- relative, 132
Sources of Law (see Law)
Specification/concretization of
generic obligation (see Obligation)
State of necessity, 95 et seq., 226
Substitute (surrogatum) 269 et
seq., 281 et seq.
Succession/Inheritance
- acceptance of, 509 et seq.
- acceptance with the benefit of
inventory, 510 et seq.
- devolution of, 509
- intestate, 480, 495 et seq.
- judicial liquidation of, 521
- by ranks, 495, 497 et seq.
- renunciation of, 510
- right of (see Right)
- per stirpes, 495, 497 et seq.
- testamentary, 481 et seq.
- vacant, 522
Supervisory council, 474 (see also
Tutelage of minors)
Supplier
INDEX
- in factoring, 355, 358

- in leasing, 347
Surname
- of children, 465 et seq.
- of spouses, 445 et seq.
Surrogate mother, 457 et seq.
Surrogatum (see Substitute)
Surviving spouse, 497 et seq., 505
Tax
- in arrears to the state, 423
- benefits in leasing, 344
- of inheritance, 479
- re the leased thing, 325
- of parental grants, 391, 468
- in usufruct, 403
Tenement
- dominant, 402
- servient, 401
Term
- as additional clause to juridical
act
- difference from condition,
162
- resolutory, 162
- suspensive, 162
- as determination of time, 162 et
seq.
- as term of extinction (see
Extinction)
Testamentary succession (see
Succession
Thing
- accessories, 377 et seq.
- belonging to no one/derelict
(res nullius), 396
- component part, 377
- consumable, 376
- dependent, 377
- fungible, 376
- immovable, 345, 376, 377, 390
et seq., 395 et seq., 401, 402,
405 et seq., 411, 422 et seq.,
427 et seq., 431
- lost, 396 et seq.
INDEX
- movable, 345, 376, 377, 392 et

seq., 395 et seq., 402, 411 et
seq.
- non-consumable, 376
- non-fungible, 376
- out of commerce (res extra
commercium), 378 et seq.
- principal, 377
Threat, 129 et seq., 442, 444, 492
et seq.
Time-sharing contract
- conclusion of, 350 et seq. (see
also Public Books/Records of
Transcription)
- protection of the rights of the
lessee, 353 et seq.
- rights and obligations of the
parties, 351 et seq.
- usefulness of, 350
Title (see Mortgage, Prenotice of
mortgage)
Tort/delict (civil offense) (see
Offense)
Transcription, 391 (see also Public
Books/Records of)
Treaty (international) (see
International)
Tutelage of absent persons
(abolished institution), 478
Tutelage of minors, 35, 100, 474
Tutor, 474
Underling (see also Liability)
- conditions for liability, 232 et
seq.
- consequences of liability, 233 et
seq.
Unforeseeable change of
circumstances, 285 et seq.
Unilateral act (see Juridical act)
Unjust enrichment
- cases of exclusion of the claim
for, 251 et seq.
- consequences of, 250 et seq.
539
- obligation from (see Obligation)

Unworthiness of heir, 512
Usufruct (see Servitude)
Vacant succession (hereditas
jacens), 522
Vacuum in the law (lacuna), 25,
32, 274, 285, 421
Value relation, 241 (see also Cover
relation)
Veritas, 298 (see also Bonitas)
Vis major (see Force majeure)
Voidable juridical act
- cases of, 125 et seq., 128 et
seq., 130, 134, 151, 444, 493
- difference from null and void,
152
- extinction of right to annul, 126,
128, 130 et seq., 134, 151 et
seq., 444
Wages, 61, 73, 99, 328
Will (Testament)
- content of, 490
- error as to the reasons leading
up to the shaping of the will,
493
- executor of, 494
- extraordinary, 480, 484 et seq.
- interpretation of, 490 et seq.
- null and void, 492 et seq.
- ordinary
- holographic, 483, 486 et
seq., 488, 489
- public, 483 et seq., 487, 488
- secret, 484, 486 et seq., 488
- publication of, 488 et seq.
- revocation of, 486 et seq.
- voidable, 493
Will (Volition)
- to conclude juridical acts, 124
- convergent with declaration
- error as to declaration, 133 et
seq.
- simulation, 131 et seq.
- declaration of, 134 et seq.
540
- defects of,
- error as to the reasons leading
up to the shaping of, 124 et
seq., 493
- fraud, 126 et seq.
- threat, 129 et seq.
Work contract
- difference from employment
contract, 332 (see also
Employment contract)
- obligations of the parties,
330 et seq.
INDEX

Basic Concepts of Greek Civil Law PDF

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PENELOPE AGALLOPOULOU

Youlika Kotsovolou Masry, LL.B., Ph.D.

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced,

Title of the Greek original and authors name:

Ant. N. Sakkoulas Publishers

Cover design based on a painting by Paul Klee (Italian Town, 1928)

BASIC GREEK BIBLIOGRAPHY

THE CONCEPT OF LAW

DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

BRANCHES OF DOMESTIC LAW

BRANCHES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

1. Public International Law

4. Law of the European Union (or European Community Law)

1. Concept and Distinctions

THE GENERALLY ACCEPTED RULES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

THE RATIFIED BY LAW INTERNATIONAL TREATIES

THE RULES OF LAW OF THE EUROPEAN UNION (OR EC LAW)

JUDICAL DECISIONS (JURISPRUDENCE)

THE WORK OF LEGAL SCHOLARS

1. Rules of Law that are General

(or Public Policy)

INTERPRETATION OF THE RULES OF LAW

2. General Principles of Civil Law

THE MEANING OF THE TERM CIVIL LAW

THE HISTORY OF THE GREEK CIVIL CODE

USEFULNESS OF THE KNOWLEDGE OF CIVIL LAW

THE CONTENT OF THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL LAW

LEGAL CAPACITY (OR CAPACITY TO HOLD RIGHTS AND ASSUME

BEGINNING AND END OF NATURAL PERSONS

1. Beginning of the Natural Person

3. Evidence Regarding the Beginning and

PROPERTIES AND STATUS OF THE NATURAL PERSON

THE PROTECTION OF PERSONS

1. Protection of the Personality

1. Legal Persons of Public Law

LEGAL PERSONS OF CIVIL LAW

THE FUND RAISING COMMITTEE

THE CIVIL PARTNERSHIP

THE CONCEPTS OF LEGAL RELATION AND RIGHT

1. Property, Personal, and Mixed

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RIGHT AND CLAIM

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CLAIM AND LEGAL ACTION

1. Legal Action in the Substantive Sense of the Term

THE DEFENDANTS PLEA

1. Loss of a Right with the Consent of the Bearer

THE EXERCISE OF A RIGHT

THE ABUSE OF A RIGHT

SELF-RULE OR PRIVATE JUSTICE

THE JURIDICAL ACT

ACTS NOT CONSTITUTING A JURIDICAL ACT

A. Quasi Juridical Acts

UNILATERAL JURIDICAL ACTS AND CONTRACTS

1. Unilateral Juridical Acts

GRATUITOUS AND ONEROUS JURIDICAL ACTS

1. Gratuitous Juridical Acts

JURIDICAL ACTS INTER VIVOS AND MORTIS CAUSA

FORMAL AND INFORMAL JURIDICAL ACTS

1. Formal Juridical Acts

CAPACITY FOR CONCLUDING A JURIDICAL ACT

B. Fully Incapable of Concluding Juridical Acts

WILL TO CONCLUDE A JURIDICAL ACT

WILL FREE OF DEFECTS