25

20

15

10

259

258

257

90

The term lgov is an even greater challenge for the translator than its predecessor
nhsiv. On some occasions I have had to follow the lead of Festugi`ere in leaving it
transliterated.
At Tht. 206c67 Plato says that the word lgov has three meanings. This forms the
basis for the passage here. For (a) see 206d12, i.e. the outward expression of language
through words (cf. the lgov proforikv in later Stoic thought). For (b) see 206e7,
207c36, etc.; this refers to discursive analysis. For (c) see 208c7, 208d6, 209a5; this
refers to the process of distinguishing a concept from others so that it is distinctive.
I use form of cognition as a way of translating gnsiv, used here as the generic term
for any kind of knowledge.

Now that we have determined what the term intuitive knowledge

means, let us examine the term logos both as to what it is and in what
way it is naturally connected with intuitive knowledge.257
The [term] logos is also found in the Theaetetus, and there it is used in
three ways, (a) as the expression [of thought], (b) as the traversal [of the
object] through its elements, and (c) as that which supplies the differentiation of each object in relation to others.258 But all these interpretations
of the term have to do with [processes of] composition and distinction
and so are unsuitable for the comprehension of the always existent. It
is their nature to grasp the similar by means of the similar, whereas the
always-existent is simple and undivided, raised above everything that is
opposed to these [two characteristics].
Again, the [term] logos is used in another way as [in the distinction
between] (a) opinative (doxastikos) logos, (b) scientific (epistemonikos) logos
and (c) intellective (noeros) logos. Since opinion (doxa) and discursive reasoning (dianoia) and intellect (nous) are found within us I mean in this
context intellect as the summit of discursive reasoning and since our
entire essential nature is logos, we must observe the logos differently in
each of these [forms of cognition]. But (a) opinion is unable to be linked to
the intuitive knowledge of the active Intellect. In fact quite the opposite
is the case: it has been yoked together with the irrational form of cognition (28a23).259 Nor (b) does discursive reason, to the extent that
it advances to multiplicity and division, have the ability to proceed to
Intellect, but quite the opposite is the case: it shies away from intellective indivisibility through the variegated nature of its reasonings. The
option that remains (c), therefore, is that what is highest in the soul and

266

265

264

263

262

261

260

91

Proclus here refers again to the Divided line, as he did above at 228.4.
Literally when it moves itself around the intelligible.
I.e. in the discursive process. The verb here, pizw, literally means to squeeze.
Or, if kfanwn is read with some of the manuscripts, because he [Plato] wishes to cast
light on our intellect and the intelligible nature.
From this conclusion it is clear that we have to translate logos in 28a1 as Proclus
understands it by means of a term indicating an active cognitive faculty close to intellect
but not to be identified with it. I have opted for reason when the text is cited above
in 240.13, but it is just an approximation.
Proclus unusually uses the plural of nhsiv here.
Cf. the similar formulation above at 245.6 using the term qrov, all at the same time
or all together.

most resembling unity in [the exercise of] discursive reason is established

in the intuitive knowledge of the particular intellect and is linked to it
through affinity (sungeneia). This, then, is the logos [in our passage], the
faculty in us that knows the intelligibles, of which Socrates in the Republic stated that it was the activity of intuitive knowledge (511d8), just as
he called discursive reason the form of cognition of the intermediates
between intelligibles and objects of opinion (511d45).260 Now if the
activity of this [highest part of the soul] is intuitive knowledge, the logos
[spoken about here] would be an intellect, of which he subsequently
says that it comes to exist in the soul when it is cognitively concerned
with the intelligible realm (37a6, c2),261 just as is the case with knowledge (37c2), except that knowledge is a more variegated activity, which
presses a diversity of objects hard by means of other objects,262 whereas
intellect is a simpler activity, contemplating the existents with its own
direct vision.
This highest and most undivided part of ours Plato has in the present
context called logos because it shines light263 on our intellect and the
intelligible nature.264 Indeed, whenever the soul distances itself from
imagination and opinion and cognition that is variegated and indeterminate and ascends to its own partlessness, in virtue of which it has been
rooted in the particular Intellect, and in its ascent it connects its own
activity with the intuitive knowledge of that Intellect, it is then that,
together with that Intellect, it knows the always-existent. This activity,
however, is both single and double, involving both sameness and differentiation in its [acts of] intuitive knowledge.265 In fact it is precisely then
that the intuitive knowledge of the soul is better able to see all [things]
at the same time,266 and comes closer to the eternal realities, so that it
too grasps the intelligible together with the Intellect and becomes active
like a lesser light acting together with a greater one. In fact the logos in
us insinuates itself in the intuitive knowledge of the Intellect, and so the
intelligible becomes grasped by intuitive knowledge together with

[the] simplicity [of intuitive knowledge]. It knows each thing at once and
as something simple, but does not know all things at once. Rather, it
moves from the one to the other, even though in the process it knows
each object of its knowledge as a single and simple thing.

Detailed explanation of meta logou: 246.10248.6

Five basic principles of natural philosophy

On the Timaeus of Plato: Book 2

20

15

10

247

30