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This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision promulgated on April 24, 1985. Respondent
argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was otherwise as
when the decrees themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon their
1. Whether or not a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which are
not as to their publication;
2. Whether or not a publication shall be made in publications of general circulation.

The clause unless it is otherwise provided refers to the date of effectivity and not to the
requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not
mean that the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or in any other
date, without its previous publication.
Laws should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking,
all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. A
law without any bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class
legislation or as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect
the public interest eve if it might be directly applicable only to one individual, or some of the
people only, and not to the public as a whole.
All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a
condition for their effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication unless a different
effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.
Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all, since its purpose is to inform the public
of the content of the law.
Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that publication of laws must be made in the Official
Gazette, and not elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity. The Supreme Court is not
called upon to rule upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if it finds it impractical.
The publication must be made forthwith, or at least as soon as possible.


PITC is a gov't owned and controlled corporation duly organized to regulate trading between RP
and SOCPEC countries including PROC (pursuant to PD1071, LOI 444 & EO 133).PITC issued
an AO which requires that application for importation from PROC must be accompanied by a
viable and confirmed export program, such AO was not publish in OG. Petitioner withheld the
applications of private respondents for some requirements were not complied with PR filed for
prohibition and mandamus with TRO and PI against P. Private respondent judge granted the
petition and ordered the P to approved PR applications. Pursuant to the trade balancing measures
issued by Ramos, PITC amended the AO and published the same in the National Administrative
Whether or not the admin order issued by PITC were ineffective due to lack of publication in the
Until PITC's AO is published it is ineffective within the context of Art. 2 of NCC and the facts
that amendments to it were publish in the National Administrative Register does not cure the
defect related to its ineffectivity. Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if
their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law, pursuant to a valid delegation.



Ortigas & Co. sold to Emilia Hermoso a parcel of land located in Greenhills Subdivision, San
Juan with several restrictions in the contract of sale that said lot be used exclusively for
residential purposes, among others, until December 31, 2025. Later, a zoning ordinance was
issued by MMC (now MMDA) reclassifying the area as commercial. Private respondent (Ismael
Mathay III) leased the subject lot from Hermoso and built a single storey building for
GreenhillsAutohaus, Inc., a car sales company. Ortigas& Co. filed a petition a complaint which
sought the demolition of the constructed car sales company to against Hermoso as it violated the
terms and conditions of the Deed of Sale. Trial court ruled in favor of Ortigas& Co. Mathay
raised the issue to the Court of Appeals from which he sought favorable ruling. Hence, the
instant petition.

Whether or not the zoning ordinance may impair contracts entered prior to its effectivity.


Yes. The zoning ordinance, as a valid exercise of police power may be given effect over any
standing contract. Hence, petition is denied.

The petitioner and respondent were married and had four children. Lorna filed a petition for
declaration of nullity of their marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of
her husband. She alleged that he is emotionally immature and irresponsible. He was cruel and
violent. He was a habitual drinker. Whenever she tells him to stop or at least minimize his
drinking, her husband would hurt her. There was even a time when she was chased by a loaded
shotgun and threatened to kill her in the presence of their children. The children also suffered
physical violence. Petitioner and their children left the home. Two months later, they returned
upon the promise of respondent to change. But he didnt. She was battered again. Her husband
was imprisoned for 11 days for slight physical injuries. RTC declared their marriage null and
void. CA reversed RTCs ruling. Hence, this petition.
Whether or not the guidelines for psychological incapacity in the case of Republic vs CA &
Molina should be taken in consideration in deciding in this case.

Yes. In the Molina case, guidelines were laid down by the SC before a case would fall under the
category of psychological incapacity to declare a marriage null and void. This decision has force
and effect of a law. These guidelines are mandatory in nature. Petition denied.

The respondent, a Filipino was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in Rizal in 1987.
They lived together as husband and wife in Australia. In 1989, the Australian family court issued
a decree of divorce supposedly dissolving the marriage. In 1992, respondent acquired Australian
citizenship. In 1994, he married Grace Garcia, a Filipina, herein petitioner, in Cabanatuan City.
In their application for marriage license, respondent was declared as single and Filipino.
Since October 1995, they lived separately; and in 1996 while in Autralia, their conjugal assets
were divided. In 1998, petitioner filed Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the
ground of bigamy, claiming that she learned of the respondents former marriage only in
November. On the other hand, respondent claims that he told petitioner of his prior marriage in
1993, before they were married. Respondent also contended that his first marriage was dissolved
by a divorce decree obtained in Australia in 1989 and hence, he was legally capacitated to marry
petitioner in 1994. The trial court declared that the first marriage was dissolved on the ground of
the divorce issued in Australia as valid and recognized in the Philippines. Hence, this petition
was forwarded before the Supreme Court.

1. Whether or not the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson was proven.
2. Whether or not respondent has legal capacity to marry Grace Garcia.
The Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it. In
mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Article 26 of the Family Code allows the
former to contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is validly obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. A divorce obtained abroad by two aliens, may
be recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective laws. Therefore,
before our courts can recognize a foreign divorce, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as
a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.
In this case, the divorce decree between the respondent and Samson appears to be authentic,
issued by an Australian family court. Although, appearance is not sufficient; and compliance with
the rules on evidence regarding alleged foreign laws must be demonstrated, the decree was
admitted on account of petitioners failure to object properly because he objected to the fact that
it was not registered in the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City, not to its admissibility.
Respondent claims that the Australian divorce decree, which was validly admitted as evidence,
adequately established his legal capacity to marry under Australian law. However, there are two
types of divorce, absolute divorce terminating the marriage and limited divorce merely
suspending the marriage. In this case, it is not known which type of divorce the respondent
Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court may under some foreign statutes, still restrict
remarriage. Under the Australian divorce decree a party to a marriage who marries again before
this decree becomes absolute commits the offense of bigamy. This shows that the divorce
obtained by the respondent might have been restricted. Respondent also failed to produce
sufficient evidence showing the foreign law governing his status. Together with other evidences
submitted, they dont absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry according to the alleged
Case remanded to the court a quo. The marriage between the petitioner and respondent can not
be declared null and void based on lack of evidence conclusively showing the respondents legal
capacity to marry petitioner. With the lack of such evidence, the court a quo may declare nullity
of the parties marriage based on two existing marriage certificates.


Alice Reyes, the petitioner is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent Richard Upton
is a citizen of the United States. They were married in Hong Kong in 1972 and they established
residence in the Philippines. They had two children and they were divorced in Nevada, USA in
1982. The petitioner remarried in Nevada to Theodore Van Dorn. The private responded filed
against petitioner stating that the petitioners business is a conjugal property of the parties and
that respondent is declared with right to manage the conjugal property. Petitioner moved to
dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action is barred by previous judgment in the
divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court, where respondent acknowledged that they had no
community property as of June 11, 1982.

Whether or not the private respondent as petitioners husband is entitled to exercise control over
conjugal assets?
The petition is granted. Complaint is dismissed.
The policy against absolute divorce cover only Philippine nationals. However, aliens may obtain
divorce abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines provided they are valid according to
their national law.
From the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves marriage, the divorce in
Nevada released private respondent from the marriage between them with the petitioner. Thus,
pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would
have no standing to sue in the case as petitioners husband entitled to exercise control over
conjugal assets. He is estopped by his own representation before said court from asserting his
right over the alleged conjugal property.

Fe d. Quita, the petitioner, and Arturo t. Padlan, both Filipinos, were married in the Philippines
on may 18, 1941. They got divorce in san francisco on july 23, 1954. Both of them remarried
another person. Arturo remarried Bladinadandan, the respondent herewith. They were blessed
with six children. On April 16, 1972, when Arturo died, the trial court was set to declared as to
who will be the intestate heirs. The trial court invoking Tenchavez vs Escano case held that the
divorce acquired by the petitioner is not recognized in our country. Private respondent stressed
that the citizenship of petitioner was relevant in the light of the ruling in van Dorn v. Rommillo jr
that aliens who obtain divorce abroad are recognized in the Philippnes provided they are valid
according to their national law. The petitioner herself answered that she was an American citizen
since 1954. Through the hearing she also stated that Arturo was a Filipino at the time she
obtained the divorce. Implying the she was no longer a filipino citizen. The trial court
disregarded the respondents statement. The net hereditary estate was ordered in favor the Fe d.
Quita and Ruperto, the brother of Arturo. Blandina and the Padlan children moved for
reconsideration. On February 15, 1988 partial reconsideration was granted declaring the Padlan
children, with the exception of Alexis, entitled to one- half of the estate to the exclusion of
Ruperto Padlan, and the other half to Fe Quita. Private respondent was not declared an heir for
her marriage to Arturo was declared void since it was celebrated during the existence of his
previous marriage to petitioner. Blandina and her children appeal to the court of appeals thatthe
case was decided without a hearing in violation of the rules of court.
1.whether or not Blandinas marriage to Arturo is void.
2.whether or not Fe d. Quita be declared the primary beneficiary as surviving spouse of Arturo.
No. The marriage of Blandina and Arturo is not void. The citizenship of fe d. quita at the time of
their divorce is relevant to this case. The divorce is valid here since she was already an alien at
the time she obtained divorce, and such is valid in their countrys national law. Thus, fe d. quita
is no longer recognized as a wife of arturo. She cannot be the primary beneficiary or will be
recognized as surviving spouse of arturo.


FACTS:In 1927, Lorenzo Llorente, then a Filipino, was enlisted in the U.S. Navy. In 1937, he
and Paula Llorente got married in Camarines Sur. In 1943, Lorenzo became
an American citizen.In 1945, Lorenzo returned to the Philippines for a vacation. He discovered
that Paula was already living illicitly with Ceferino Llorente (brother of Lorenzo). Ceferino and
Paula even had a son.Lorenzo then refused to live with Paula. He also refused to give her
monetary support. Eventually, Lorenzo and Paula agreed in writing Lorenzo shall not criminally
charge Paula if the latter agrees to waive all monetary support from Lorenzo. Later, Lorenzo
returned to the United States.In 1951, Lorenzo filed a divorce proceeding against Paula in
California. Paula was represented by an American counsel. The divorce was granted and in 1952,
the divorce became final.Lorenzo returned to the Philippines. In 1958, Lorenzo married Alicia
Fortuno. They had three children.In 1981, Lorenzo executed his last will and testament where he
left all his estate to Alicia and their children (nothing for Paula). In 1983, he went to court for the
wills probate and to have Alicia as the administratrix of his property. In 1985, before the probate
proceeding can be terminated, Lorenzo died. Later, Paula filed a petition for letters of
administration over Lorenzos estate.The trial court ruled that Lorenzos marriage with Alicia is
void because the divorce he obtained abroad is void. The trial court ratiocinated that Lorenzo is a
Filipino hence divorce is not applicable to him. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court.
ISSUES: Whether or not Lorenzos divorce abroad should be recognized.
HELD: Yes. It is undisputed by Paula Llorente that Lorenzo became an American citizen in
1943. Hence, when he obtained the divorce decree in 1952, he is already an American citizen.
Article 15 of the Civil Code provides:
Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons
are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.
Since Lorenzo was no longer a Filipino, Philipine laws relating to family rights, duties, or status
are no longer applicable to him. Therefore, the divorce decree he obtained abroad must be
respected. The rule is: aliens may obtain divorces abroad, provided they are valid according to
their national law.
However, this case was still remanded to the lower court so as for the latter to determine the
effects of the divorce as to the successional rights of Lorenzo and his heirs.
Anent the issue on Lorenzos last will and testament, it must be respected. He is an alien and is
not covered by our laws on succession. However, since the will was submitted to our courts for
probate, then the case was remanded to the lower court where the foreign law must be alleged in
order to prove the validity of the will.

EDWARD Christensen died testate. The estate was distributed by Executioner Aznar according
to the will, which provides that: Php 3,600 be given to HELEN Christensen as her legacy, and
the rest of his estate to his daughter LUCY Christensen, as pronounced by CFI Davao.Opposition
to the approval of the project of partition was filed by Helen, insofar as it deprives her of her
legitime as an acknowledged natural child, she having been declared by Us an acknowledged
natural child of the deceased Edward in an earlier case.As to his citizenship, we find that the
citizenship that he acquired in California when he resided in Sacramento from 1904 to 1913, was
never lost by his stay in the Philippines, and the deceased appears to have considered himself as
a citizen of California by the fact that when he executed his will he declared that he was a citizen
of that State; so that he appears never to have intended to abandon his California citizenship by
acquiring another. But at the time of his death, he was domiciled in the Philippines.
What law on succession should apply, the Philippine law or the California law?

HELD:WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and the case returned to
the lower court with instructions that the partition be made as the Philippine law on succession

Petitioner Eduardo Cojuangco Jr. filed a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the ROC seeking
to set aside CAs decision, after it reversed a favorable decision of the RTC that ordered the
private respondents to pay him moral and exemplary damages, attorneys fees and costs of the
suit, and denied his Motion for Reconsideration.
Cojuangco, a known businessman-sportsman owned several racehorses which he entered in
sweepstakes races. Several of his horses won the races on various dates, and won prizes together
with the 30% due for trainer/grooms. He sent letters of demand for the collection of the prizes
due him but private respondents PCSO and its then chairman Fernando Carrascoso Jr.
consistently replied that the demanded prizes are being withheld on advice of PCGG.
Consequently, Cojuangco filed this case before the Manila RTC but before the receipt summons,
PCGG advised private respondents that it poses no more objection to its remittance of the
prized winnings. This was immediately communicated to petitioners counsel Estelito Mendoza

by Carrascoso but the former refused to accept the prizes at this point, reasoning that the matter
had already been brought to court.
The trial court ruled that the private respondents had no authority to withhold the subject
racehorse winnings since no writ of sequestration was issued by PCGG. Ordering the private
respondents to pay in solidum the claimed winnings, the trial court further held that, by not
paying the winnings, Carrascoso had acted in bad faith amounting to the persecution and
harassment of petitioner and his family. While the case was pending with the CA, the petitioner
moved for partial execution pending appeal to which the private respondents posed no objection
CA reversed the trial courts finding of bad faith, holding that the former PCSO chairman was
merely carrying out the instruction of the PCGG. It likewise noted that Carrascosos acts of
promptly replying to demands and not objecting to partial execution negated bad faith.

Whether or not the award for damages against respondent Carrascoso is warranted by evidence
of the law

Petitioner is only entitled to nominal damages. Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment
or simple negligence. It imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious
doing of a wrong, a breach of a known duty due to some motive or interest of ill will that
partakes of the nature of fraud. There is sufficient evidence on record to support Respondent
Courts conclusion that Carrascoso did not act in bad faith. His letters to PCGG indicated his
uncertainties as to the extent of the sequestration against the properties of the plaintiff. There is
also denying that plaintiff is a very close political and business associate of the former President
Marcos. Sequestration was also a novel remedy. Under these equivocalities, Carrascoso could
not be faulted in asking further instructions from the PCGG, on what to do and more so, to obey
the instructions given. Besides, EO2 has just been issued by President Aquino, freezing all
assets and properties in the Philippines (of) former President Marcos and/or his wifetheir close
friends, subordinates, business associates
The extant rule is that public officers shall not be liable by way of moral and exemplary damages
for acts done in the performance of official duties, unless there is a clear showing of bad faith,
malice or gross negligence. Attorneys fees and expenses of litigation cannot be imposed either,

in the absence of clear showing of any of the grounds provided therefor under the Civil Code.
The trial courts award of these kinds of damages must perforce be deleted.

In 1982, accused Manantan, being then the driver and person-in-charge of an automobile,
willfully and unlawfully drove and operated the same in a negligent, careless and imprudent
manner, without due regard to traffic laws without taking the necessary precaution to prevent
accident to person and damage to property, causing said automobile to sideswipe a passenger
jeep resulting to the death of Ruben Nicolas a passenger of said automobile. Manantan was
acquitted by the trial court of homicide through reckless imprudence without a ruling on his civil
liability. On appeal from the civil aspect of the judgment, the appellate court found petitioner
Manantan civilly liable and ordered him to indemnify private respondents Marcelino Nicolas and
Maria Nicolas P104,400 finding accused intoxicated of alcohol at the time of the accident.
Whether or not the acquittal extinguished the civil liability.
While the trial court found that petitioner's guilt had not been proven beyond reasonable doubt,
it did not state in clear and unequivocal terms that petitioner was not recklessly imprudent or
negligent. The trial court acquitted accused on reasonable doubt. Since civil liability is not
extinguished in criminal cases, if the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt, the Court of Appeals
had to review the findings of the trial court to determine if there was a basis for awarding
indemnity and damages.
This is the situation contemplated in Article 29 of the Civil Code where the civil action for
damages is "for the same act or omission." Although the two actions have different purposes, the
matters discussed in the civil case are similar to those discussed in the criminal case. However,
the judgment in the criminal proceeding cannot be read in evidence in the civil action to establish
any fact there determined, even though both actions involve the same act or omission. The reason
for this rule is that the parties are not the same and secondarily, different rules of evidence are
applicable. Hence, notwithstanding herein petitioner's acquittal, the Court of Appeals in
determining whether Article 29 applied, was not precluded from looking into the question of
petitioner's negligence or reckless imprudence. Decision affirmed.


Respondents Merlin Argos and Jaja Pineda are the general manager and commercial director,
respectively, of the Fragrances Division of the petitioner International Flavors and
Fragrances,Inc. (IFFI). The general managers reported directly to Hernan Costa, the appointed
managing director. Costa and respondents had serious differences. When the positions of the
general managers became redundant, respondents agreed to the termination of their services.
They signed a Release Waiver and Quitclaim. That same time, Costa issued a Personnel
Announcement which described respondents as persona non grata and urged the employees
not to have further dealings with them. Two Information were filed against Costa for the criminal
charge of libel. In addition, respondents filed a civil case for damages against Costa and
Petitioner Corporation (IFFI), in its subsidiary capacity as employer.
Whether or not private respondents could sue petitioner for damages based on subsidiary liability
in an independent civil action under Article 33 of the Civil Code, during the pendency of the
criminal libel cases against petitioners employee.
Article 33 of the Civil Code provides specifically that in cases of defamation, the injured party
may bring a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action.
Such civil action proceeds independently of the criminal prosecution and requires only a
preponderance of evidence. In Joaquin vs. Aniceto, 12 SCRA 308 (1964), the Court held that
Article 33contemplates an action against the employee in his primary civil liability. It does not
apply to an action against the employer to enforce its subsidiary civil liability, because such
liability arises only after conviction of the employee in the criminal case or when the employee is
adjudged guilty of the wrongful act in a criminal action and found to have committed the offense
in the discharge of his duties. Any action brought against the employer based on its subsidiary
liability before the conviction of its employee is premature.

Mondequillo vs Breva
The sheriff levied on a parcel of residential land located at PoblacionMalalag, Davao del Sur on
July 1988, registered in the name of Jose Mondequillo and a parcel of agricultural land located at
Dalagbong Bulacan, Malalag, Davao de Sur also registered in the latters name. A motion to
quash was filed by the petitioner alleging that the residential land is where the family home is
built since 1969 prior the commencement of this case and as such is exempt from execution,
forced sale or attachment under Article 152 and 153 except for liabilities mentioned in Article
155 thereof, and that the judgment sought to be enforced against the family home is not one of
those enumerated. With regard to the agricultural land, it is alleged that it is still part of the
public land and the transfer in his favor by the original possessor and applicant who was a
member of a cultural minority. The residential house in the present case became a family home
by operation of law under Article 153.
ISSUE: Whether or not the subject property is deemed to be a family home.
The petitioners contention that it should be considered a family home from the time it was
occupied by petitioner and his family in 1969 is not well-taken. Under Article 162 of the Family
Code, it provides that the provisions of this Chapter shall govern existing family residences
insofar as said provisions are applicable. It does not mean that Article 152 and 153 shall have a
retroactive effect such that all existing family residences are deemed to have been constituted as
family homes at the time of their occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family Code and are
exempt from the execution for payment of obligations incurred before the effectivity of the
Code. The said article simply means that all existing family residences at the time of the
effectivity of the Family Code, are considered family homes and are prospectively entitled to the
benefits accorded to a family home under the FC. The debt and liability which was the basis of
the judgment was incurred prior the effectivity of the Family Code. This does not fall under the
exemptions from execution provided in the FC.
As to the agricultural land, trial court correctly ruled that the levy to be made shall be on
whatever rights the petitioner may have on the land. Petition was dismissed.

Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigaodel Norte, Rodolfo G. Navarro filed a complaint on two
specific acts committed by respondent Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge Hernando Domagtoy
on the grounds of gross misconduct, ineffiency in offce and ignorance of the law.
It was alleged that Domagtoy solemnized marriage of Gaspar Tagadan and ArlynBorja on
September 27, 1994 despite the knowledge that the groom has a subsisting marriage with Ida
Penaranda and that they are merely separated. It was told that Ida left their conjugal home in
Bukidnon and has not returned and been heard for almost seven years. The said judge likewise
solemnize marriage of FlorianoDadoySumaylo and Gemma G. del Rosario outside his courts
jurisdiction on October 27, 1994. The judge holds his office and has jurisdiction in the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta Monica-Burgos, Surigaodel Norte but he solemnized the
said wedding at his residence in the municipality of Dapa located 40 to 50 km away.
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriages solemnized were void.
The court held that the marriage between Tagadan and Borja was void and bigamous there being
a subsisting marriage between Tagadan and Penaranda. Albeit, the latter was gone for seven
years and the spouse had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was dead, Tagadan did not
institute a summary proceeding as provided in the Civil Code for the declaration of presumptive
death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.
With regard to the marriage of Sumaylo and Del Rosario, the latter only made the written request
where it should have been both parties as stated in Article 8 of the Family Code. Their noncompliance did not invalidate their marriage however, Domagtoy may be held administratively

Graciana Geronimo died on June 2, 1987 without a will leaving neither descendants nor
ascendants. Ireneo Geronimo, the brother of the decedent, filed a petition for letter of
administration of the estate of Graciana Geronimo-Esman. On June 29, 1987, a petition was filed
be Ireneo Geronimo (petitioner) naming as one of the heirs oppositor Antonio Esman and
describing the latter as husband of the deceased. However, on April 4, 1988, an amended
Petition was filed by petitioner naming Esman as one of the surviving heirs and now describing
the latter as the live in partner of the deceased after finding that that there was no marriage
license number stated in the marriage contract. Petitioner allegedly contends that the marriage
between oppositor and the decedent was celebrated without a marriage license. Esman argued
that he was married to Graciana on January 7, 1955 in Pateros and were issued marriage license
no. 5038770.
Whether or not the marriage between Graciana Geronimo and Antonio Esman was valid where
one of the essential requisites-license- is absent?
Whether or not the husband has the capacity to inherit and administer the property of the
decedent in view of the discovery by the petitioner regarding the absence of the respondents
marriage license?
It is a known fact and it is of judicial notice, that all printed accountable forms of the
Government like the Marriage license come from the National Printing Office and are printed
with serial numbers. Serial numbers printed or used in a particular year are the same numbers
used in the succeeding years when the same forms are again printed for distribution. However,
the distributions of the serially-numbered forms do not follow the same pattern. This is exactly
what happened to Marriage license No. 5038770 which the appellant refused to acknowledge.
Thus, it appears that while marriage license No. 5038770 was requisitioned and received by the
Municipality of Pateros on October 9, 1953 thru the Office of the Provincial Treasurer of Rizal
and later used by Antonio Esman and Graciana Geronimo in their marriage on January 7, 1955,
another marriage license bearing the same number was also issued to the municipality of Pasig in
October 1959. Subsequently, still another marriage license bearing the same number was also
issued to the treasurer of Pasay City on June 29, 1976. At most, the evidence adduced by the
petitioner could only serve to prove the non-recording of the marriage license number but
certainly not the non-issuance of the license itself. Moreover, the non-indication of the license
number in the certified copies presented by the petitioner-appellant could not be deemed as fatal
vis--vis the issue of the validity of the marriage in question because there is nothing in the law
which requires that the marriage license number would be indicated in the marriage contract
itself.The instant petition is denied and the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed.


Herminia Borja-Manzano was the lawful wife of the late David Manzano having been married
on May 21, 1966 in San Gabriel Archangel Parish in Caloocan. They had four children. On
March 22, 1993, her husband contracted another marriage with Luzviminda Payao before
respondent Judge. The marriage contract clearly stated that both contracting parties were
separated thus, respondent Judge ought to know that the marriage was void and bigamous. He
claims that when he officiated the marriage of David and Payao, he knew that the two had been
living together as husband and wife for seven years as manifested in their joint affidavit that they
both left their families and had never cohabit or communicated with their spouses due to constant
ISSUE: Whether the solemnization of a marriage between two contracting parties who both have
an existing marriage can contract marriage if they have been cohabitating for 5 years under
Article 34 of Family Code.
Among the requisites of Article 34 is that parties must have no legal impediment to marry each
other. Considering that both parties has a subsisting marriage, as indicated in their marriage
contract that they are both separated is an impediment that would make their subsequent
marriage null and void. Just like separation, free and voluntary cohabitation with another person
for at least 5 years does not severe the tie of a subsisting previous marriage. Clearly, respondent
Judge Sanchez demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when he solemnized a void and
bigamous marriage.

Pepito Ninal was married with Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. They had 3 children
namely Babyline, Ingrid and Archie, petitioners. Due to the shot inflicted by Pepito to Teodulfa,
the latter died on April 24, 1985 leaving the children under the guardianship of Engrace Ninal. 1
year and 8 months later, Pepito and Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license.
They instituted an affidavit stating that they had lived together for at least 5 years exempting
from securing the marriage license. Pepito died in a car accident on February 19, 1977. After
his death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito and
Norma alleging that said marriage was void for lack of marriage license.
1. Whether or not the second marriage of Pepito was void?
2. Whether or not the heirs of the deceased may file for the declaration of the nullity of Pepitos
marriage after his death?
The marriage of Pepito and Norma is void for absence of the marriage license. They cannot be
exempted even though they instituted an affidavit and claimed that they cohabit for at least 5
years because from the time of Pepitos first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage
with Norma, only about 20 months had elapsed. Albeit, Pepito and his first wife had separated in
fact, and thereafter both Pepito and Norma had started living with each other that has already
lasted for five years, the fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not the
cohabitation contemplated by law. Hence, his marriage to Norma is still void.
Void marriages are deemed to have not taken place and cannot be the source of rights. It can be
questioned even after the death of one of the parties and any proper interested party may attack a
void marriage.

Facts :
Petitioner TomasaVda. de Jacob claimed to be the surviving spouse of deceased Dr. Alfredo E.
Jacob and wasappointed Special Administratix for the various estates of the deceased by virtue of
a reconstructed Marriage Contract betweenherself and the deceased.Respondent Pedro Pilapil on
the other hand, claimed to be the legally-adopted son of Alfredo, purportedly supported byan
Order issued by then Presiding Judge Jose L. Moya, CFI, Camarines Sur, granting the petition
for adoption filed by deceasedAlfredo in favor of Pedro Pilapil.Pedro sought to intervene during
the proceeding for the settlement of the estate of Alfredo, claiming his share of thedeceaseds
estate as Alfredo's adopted son and sole surviving heir. Pedro likewise questioned the validity of
the marriagebetween Appellant Tomasa and his adoptive father Alfredo.Appellant claims that the
marriage between her and Alfredo was solemnized by one Msgr. Florencio C. Yllana,
CBCP,Intramuros, Manila sometime in 1975. She could not however present the original copy of
the Marriage Contract stating that theoriginal document was lost when Msgr. Yllana allegedly
gave it to Mr. Jose Centenera for registration. In lieu of the original,Tomasa presented as
secondary evidence a reconstructed Marriage Contract issued in 1978. Several irregularities on
thereconstructed Marriage Contract were observed by the court such as: (1) no copy of the
Marriage Contract was sent to the localcivil registrar by the solemnizing officer; (2) a mere
thumbmark was purportedly placed by the late Alfredo Jacob on saidreconstructed marriage
contract on 16 September 1975 (date of the marriage), instead of his customary signature as
affixed intheir Sworn Affidavit; (3) inconsistencies in the circumstances and personalities
surrounding the lost Marriage Contract mentionedin the affidavit executed by Msgr. Yllana and
in the testimony admitted by the appellant; and (4) appellant admitted that there was no record of
the purported marriage entered in the book of records in San Agustin Church where the marriage
was allegedlysolemnized.Based on the evidence presented, the trial court ruled for defendantappellee Pilapil, sustaining his claim as the legallyadopted child and sole heir of deceased
Alfredo and declaring the reconstructed Marriage Contract as spurious and non-existent.The
Court of Appeals sustained the decision of the trial court.
Issue : Whether or not the marriage between the plaintiff TomasaVda. De Jacob and deceased
Alfredo E. Jacob was indeed valid .
Held :
Yes. The marriage between appellant and the deceased was valid.

Leouel, a First Lieutenant in the Philippine Army, met Julia in Iloilo. The two got married in
1986 before a municipal trial court followed shortly thereafter, by a church wedding. The couple
lived with Julias parents at the J. Bedia Compound. Julia gave birth to a baby boy in 1987 and
was named as Leouel Santos Jr. Occasionally, the couple will quarrel over a number of things
aside from the interference of Julias parents into their family affairs.
Julia left in 1988 to work in US as a nurse despite Leouels pleas to dissuade her. Seven months
after her departure, she called her husband and promised to return home upon the expiration of
her contract in July 1989 but she never did. Leouel got a chance to visit US where he underwent
a training program under AFP, he desperately tried to locate or somehow get in touch with Julia
but all his efforts were of no avail.
Leouel filed a complaint to have their marriage declared void under Article 36 of the Family
Code. He argued that failure of Julia to return home or to communicate with him for more than 5
years are circumstances that show her being psychologically incapacitated to enter into married
ISSUE: Whether their marriage can be considered void under Article 36 of the Family Code.
The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the
most serious cases of personal disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This condition must exist at the time
the marriage is celebrated.
Undeniably and understandably, Leouel stands aggrieved, even desperate, in his present
situation. Regrettably, neither law nor society itself can always provide all the specific answers
to every individual problem. Wherefore, his petition was denied.


Chi Ming Tsoi and Gina Lao Tsoiwas married in 1988. After the celebration of their wedding,
they proceed to the house of defendants mother. There was no sexual intercourse between them
during their first night and same thing happened until their fourth night. In an effort to have their
honeymoon in a private place, they went to Baguio but Ginas relatives went with them. Again,
there was no sexual intercourse since the defendant avoided by taking a long walk during siesta
or sleeping on a rocking chair at the living room. Since May 1988 until March 1989 they slept
together in the same bed but no attempt of sexual intercourse between them. Because of this,
they submitted themselves for medical examination to a urologist in Chinese General Hospital in
1989. The result of the physical examination of Gina was disclosed, while that of the husband
was kept confidential even the medicine prescribed. There were allegations that the reason why
Chi Ming Tsoi married her is to maintain his residency status here in the country. Gina does not
want to reconcile with Chi Ming Tsoi and want their marriage declared void on the ground of
psychological incapacity. On the other hand, the latter does not want to have their marriage
annulled because he loves her very much, he has no defect on his part and is physically and
psychologically capable and since their relationship is still young, they can still overcome their
differences. Chi Ming Tsoi submitted himself to another physical examination and the result was
there is not evidence of impotency and he is capable of erection.
ISSUE: Whether Chi Ming Tsois refusal to have sexual intercourse with his wife constitutes
psychological incapacity.
The abnormal reluctance or unwillingness to consummate his marriage is strongly indicative of a
serious personality disorder which to the mind of the Supreme Court clearly demonstrates an
utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance tot the marriage within the
meaning of Article 36 of the Family Code.
If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential marital
obligations and the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the
causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Furthermore, one of the essential
marital obligations under the Family Code is to procreate children thus constant non-fulfillment
of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity and wholeness of the marriage.

ZenaidaCortezaBobiles filed a petition to adopt Jason Condat who had been living with her
family since 4 months old. Salvador Condat, father of the child, and the social worker assigned
was served with copies of the order finding that the petition was sufficient in form and
substance. The copy was also posted on the bulletin board of the court. Nobody appeared to
oppose the petition. The judgment declared that surname of the child be changed to Bobiles.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition to adopt Jason should be granted considering only Zenaida
filed the petition.
The petition for adoption was filed when the law applicable was PD 603 (Child and Youth
Welfare Code), where such petition may be filed either of the spouses or both of them. After the
trial court rendered its favorable decision and while the case was pending on appeal in CA,
Family Code took effect where joint adoption of both spouses is mandatory.
Non-joinder is not a ground for the dismissal of an action or a special proceeding. The Family
Code will have retrospective application if it will not prejudice or impair vested rights. When
Zenaida filed the petition, she was exercising her explicit and unconditional right under said law
in force at the time and thus vested and must not be prejudiced. A petition must not be dismissed
by reason of failure to comply with law not yet in force and effect at the time. Furthermore, the
affidavit of consent attached by the husband showed that he actually joined his wife in adopting
Jayson. His declarations and subsequent confirmatory testimony in open court was sufficient to
make him a co-petitioner. Future of an innocent child must not be compromised by arbitrary
insistence of rigid adherence to procedural rules on the form of the pleadings.
Hence, Petition was denied.

Erlinda Matias (16) married Avelino Dagdag (20) on Sept. 1, 1975 and had two children. A week
after the wedding, Avelino started leaving his family without explanation. He would disappear
for months, suddenly reappear for a few months, then disappear again. During the times when he
was with his family, he indulged in drinking sprees with friends and would return home drunk.
He would force his wife to submit to sexual intercourse and if she refused, he would inflict
physical injuries on her. On October 1993, he left his family again and that was the last they
heard from him. Erlinda learned that Avelino was imprisoned for some crime,6 and that he
escaped from jail on October 22, 1985.7 A certification therefor dated February 14, 1990, was
issued by Jail Warden Orlando S. Limon. Avelino remains at-large. On July 3, 1990, Erlinda filed
with the RTC a petition for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity. Since Avelino could not be located, summons was served by
publication in the Olongapo News, a newspaper of general circulation. RTC rendered decision in
favor of Erlinda. CA affirmed the decision of RTC.
ISSUES: Whether or not Avelino is psychologically incapacitated.
No. it is evident that Erlinda failed to comply with the above-mentioned evidentiary
requirements. Erlinda failed to comply with guideline No. 2 which requires that the root cause of
psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically identified and sufficiently proven by
experts, since no psychiatrist or medical doctor testified as to the alleged psychological
incapacity of her husband. Further, the allegation that the husband is a fugitive from justice was
not sufficiently proven. In fact, the crime for which he was arrested was not even alleged. CAs
decision is set aside.

Leni Choa and Alfonso Choa got married in 1981. They have 2 children namely Cheryl Lynne
and Albryan. In 1993, Alfonso filed an annulment of his marriage to Leni. Afterwards, he filed
an amended complaint for the declaration of nullity of their marriage based on psychological
incapacity. The case went to trial and the trial court further held that Alfonso presented quantum
evidence that Leni needs to controvert for the dismissal of the case.
Alfonso claimed that Leni charged him with perjury, concubinage and deportation which shows
latters psychological incapacity because according to him it clearly showed that his wife not
only wanted him behind bars but also to banish outside the country.
Whether or not Alfonso Chua presented quantum evidence for the declaration of nullity of his
marriage with Leni on the ground of psychological incapacity.
The court held that documents presented by Alfonso during the trial of the case do not in any
way show the alleged psychological incapacity of his wife. The evidence was insufficient and
shows grave abuse of discretion bordering on absurdity. Alfonso testified and complained about
three aspects of Lenis personality namely lack of attention to children, immaturity, and lack of
an intention of procreative sexuality and none of these three, singly or collectively, constitutes
psychological incapacity.
Psychological incapacity must be characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence, and
incurability. It must be more than just a difficulty, a refusal or a neglect in the performance of
marital obligations. A mere showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities
does not constitute psychological incapacity.
Furthermore, the testimonial evidence from other witnesses failed to identify and prove root
cause of the alleged psychological incapacity. It just established that the spouses had an
incompatibility or a defect that could possibly be treated or alleviated through psychotherapy.
The totality of evidence presented was completely insufficient to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity more so without any medical, psychiatric or psychological examination.

In 1966, David and Sharon married each other. Theyve had four children since then. David then
found out that Sharon is irresponsible as a wife and as a mother because during the marriage
Sharon had extra-marital affairs with various other guys particularly with one Mustafa Ibrahim, a
Jordanian, with whom she had 2 children. She even married Ibrahim. David averred that Sharon
is psychologically incapacitated and David submitted the findings of Dr. Dayan which shows that
Sharon is indeed psychologically incapacitated. Dr. Dayan declared that Sharon was suffering
from Anti-Social Personality Disorder exhibited by her blatant display of infidelity; that she
committed several indiscretions and had no capacity for remorse, even bringing with her the two
children of Mustafa Ibrahim to live with petitioner. Such immaturity and irresponsibility in
handling the marriage like her repeated acts of infidelity and abandonment of her family are
indications of Anti-Social Personality Disorder amounting to psychological incapacity to perform
the essential obligations of marriage.
ISSUE: Whether or not PI has been proven.
Psychological incapacity is not proven in court in this case. The evidence is not sufficient. PI is
intended to the most serious cases of personality disorders which make one be incapable of
performing the essential marital obligations. Sharons sexual infidelity does not constitute PI nor
does it constitute the other forms of psychoses which if existing at the inception of marriage, like
the state of a party being of unsound mind or concealment of drug addiction, habitual
alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders the marriage contract voidable pursuant
to Article 46, Family Code. If drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality
should occur only during the marriage, they become mere grounds for legal separation
under Article 55 of the Family Code. These provisions, however, do not necessarily preclude the
possibility of these various circumstances being themselves, depending on the degree and
severity of the disorder, indicia of psychological incapacity. Sexual infidelity is not one of those
contemplated in law. Until further statutory or jurisprudential parameters are set or established,
SI cannot be appreciated in favor of the dissolution of marriage.

Brenda and Wilson first met sometime in 1980 when both of them were assigned at the
Malacaang Palace, she as an escort of Imee Marcos and he as a Presidential Guard of President
Ferdinand Marcos. They later on became sweethearts and got married and had 5 children. After
the EDSA revolution, both of them sought a discharge from the military service. He engaged to
different business ventures but failed. She always urged him to look for work so that their
children would see him, instead of her, as the head of the family and a good provider. Due to his
failure to engage in any gainful employment, they would often quarrel and as a consequence, he
would hit and beat her. He would even force her to have sex with him despite her weariness. He
would also inflict physical harm on their children for a slight mistake and was so severe in the
way he chastised them. Thus, for several times during their cohabitation, he would leave their
house. In 1992, they were already living separately. She did not want him to stay in their house
anymore so when she saw him in their house, she was so angry that she lambasted him. He then
turned violent, inflicting physical harm on her and even on her mother who came to her aid. She
sought for nullity of their marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. The Brenda
submitted herself to psychologist Natividad A. Dayan, Ph.D., for psychological evaluation. The
court a quo found Wilson to be psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations
mainly because of his failure to find work to support his family and his violent attitude towards
Brenda and their children. RTC granted the petition. CA reversed. Hence, this case.
Whether or not there is a need for personal medical examination of respondent to prove
psychological incapacity? Whether the totality of evidence presented in this case show
psychological incapacity.
Personal medical or psychological examination of respondent is not a requirement for a
declaration of psychological incapacity. Nevertheless, the totality of the evidence she presented
does not show such incapacity. Although SC is convinced that respondent failed to provide
material support to the family and may have resorted to physical abuse and abandonment, the
totality of these acts does not lead to a conclusion of psychological incapacity on his part. There
is absolutely no showing that his defects were already present at the inception of the marriage
or that they are incurable.


FACTS: This is a complaint by Lupo A. Atienza for Gross Immorality and Appearance of
Impropriety against Judge Francisco Brillantes, Jr. Complainant alleged that he has two children
with Yolanda De Castro with whom respondent Judge was cohabiting with. Complainant claimed
that respondent is married to one ZenaidaOngkiko with whom he has 5 children. Respondent
alleges that while he and Ongkiko went through a marriage ceremony (1965) before a Nueva
Ecija town Mayor, the same was not a valid marriage for lack of a marriage license. Upon
request of the parents of Ongkiko, respondent went through another marriage ceremony with her
in Manila. Again, neither party applied for a marriage license. Respondent claims that when he
married De Castro in civil rites in Los Angeles, California in 1991, he believed in all good faith
and for all legal intents and purposes that he was single because his first marriage was
solemnized without a license. Respondent also argues that the provision of Article 40 of the
Family Code does not apply to him considering that his first marriage took place in 1965 and
was governed by the Civil Code of the Philippines; while the second marriage took place in 1991
and governed by the Family Code.

ISSUE: Whether or not Article 40 of the Family Code is applicable to the case at bar.

HELD: Yes. Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the effectivity of the
Family Code on August 3, 1988 regardless of the date of the first marriage. Besides, under
Article 256 of the Family Code, said Article is given retroactive effect insofar as it does not
prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.
This is particularly true with Article 40, which is a rule of procedure. Respondent has not shown
any vested right that was impaired by the application of Article 40 to his case.
WHEREFORE, respondent is DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of all leave and
retirement benefits and with prejudice to reappointment in any branch, instrumentality, or agency
of the government, including government-owned and controlled corporations. This decision is
immediately executory.

Dr. Vicent Mercado was previously married with Thelma Oliva in 1976 before he contracted
marriage with Consuelo Tan in 1991 which the latter claims she did not know. Tan filed bigamy
against Mercado and after a month the latter filed an action for declaration of nullity of marriage
against Oliva. The decision in 1993 declared marriage between Mercado and Oliva null and
ISSUE: Whether Mercado committed bigamy in spite of filing the declaration of nullity of the
former marriage.
A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a subsequent one can
be legally contracted. One who enters into a subsequent marriage without first obtaining
such judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy. This principle applies even if the earlier union is
characterized by statute as void.
In the case at bar, Mercado only filed the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Oliva right
after Tan filed bigamy case. Hence, by then, the crime had already been consummated. He
contracted second marriage without the judicial declaration of the nullity. The fact that the first
marriage is void from the beginning is not a defense in a bigamy charge.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against

Soledad Domingo, married with Roberto Domingo in 1976, filed a petition for the declaration of
nullity of marriage and separation of property. She did not know that Domingo had been
previously married to Emerlindadela Paz in 1969. She came to know the previous marriage
when the latter filed a suit of bigamy against her. Furthermore, when she came home from Saudi
during her one-month leave from work, she discovered that Roberto cohabited with another
woman and had been disposing some of her properties which is administered by Roberto. The
latter claims that because their marriage was void ab initio, the declaration of such voidance is
unnecessary and superfluous. On the other hand, Soledad insists the declaration of the nullity of
marriage not for the purpose of remarriage, but in order to provide a basis for the separation and
distribution of properties acquired during the marriage.
Whether or not a petition for judicial declaration should only be filed for purposes of remarriage.
The declaration of the nullity of marriage is indeed required for purposed of remarriage.
However, it is also necessary for the protection of the subsequent spouse who believed in good
faith that his or her partner was not lawfully married marries the same. With this, the said person
is freed from being charged with bigamy.
When a marriage is declared void ab initio, law states that final judgment shall provide for the
liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of
the common children and the delivery of their presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had
been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings. Soledads prayer for separation of property
will simply be the necessary consequence of the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of their
marriage. Hence, the petitioners suggestion that for their properties be separated, an ordinary
civil action has to be instituted for that purpose is baseless. The Family Code has clearly
provided the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage, one of which is the separation of
property according to the regime of property relations governing them. WHEREFORE, the
instant petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of respondent Court dated February 7, 1992 and
the Resolution dated March 20, 1992 are AFFIRMED.

In 1989, private respondent Maria Victoria Lopez Tuason (Maria) filed a petition for annulment
or declaration of nullity of her marriage to petitioner Emilio R. Tuason (Tuason) on the ground of
psychological incapacity. Tuasons defense was that he and Maria initially had a normal
relationship but that this changed in 1982 when his wife did not accord the respect and dignity
due him as a husband but treated him like a persona non grata. After Maria rested her case, the
trial court scheduled the reception of Tuasons evidence. Two days before the scheduled hearing,
a counsel for petitioner moved for a postponement on the ground that the principal counsel was
out of the country and due to return on the first week of June. The court reset the hearing. But on
the new date, Tuason failed to appear. On Marias oral motion, the court declared Tuason to have
waived his right to present evidence and deemed the case submitted for decision on the basis of
the evidence presented. The RTC declared the marriage null and void and awarded custody of the
children to Maria on the ground of Tuasons psychological incapacity. The judgment was said to
be without prejudice to the application of the other effects of annulment as provided for under
Arts. 50 and 51 of the Family Code of the Philippines. While his counsel received a copy of the
decision, Tuason did not file any appeal. Afterwards, Tuason filed a "Motion for Dissolution of
Conjugal Partnership of Gains and Adjudication to Plaintiff of the Conjugal Properties." Maria
opposed the motion. Also on the same day, Tuason, through new counsel, filed with the trial
court a petition for relief from judgment of the decision of nullity. The RTC denied the relief
from judgment. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTCs order.
1. Whether or not the relief of judgment should be granted.
2. Whether or not theprosecurtor is required to intervene in all cases for annulment or
declaration of nullity.
No. Under Sec. 2 of Rule 38, a final and executory judgment or order of the Regional Trial Court
may be set aside, and relief from judgment granted, on the ground of fraud, accident, mistake or
excusable negligence. In addition, the petitioner must assert facts showing that he has a good,
substantial and meritorious defense or cause of action. If the petition is granted, the court shall
proceed to hear and determine the case as if a timely motion for new trial had been granted
therein. In the case at bar, the decision had already become final and executory when Tuason
failed to appeal during the reglementary period. Tuason however contends he was denied due
process when, after failing to appear on two scheduled hearings, the trial court deemed him to
have waived his right to present evidence and rendered judgment on the basis of the evidence for
Maria. He justifies his absence at the hearings on the ground that he was then "confined for
medical and/or rehabilitation reasons." The records, however, show that the former counsel of
Tuason did not inform the trial court of this confinement. And when the court rendered its
decision, the same counsel was out of the country for which reason the decision became final and
executory as no appeal was taken therefrom. The failure of petitioners counsel to notify him on
time of the adverse judgment to enable him to appeal therefrom is negligence which is not

excusable. Notice sent to counsel of record is binding upon the client. Similarly inexcusable was
the failure of his former counsel to inform the trial court of Tuasons confinement and medical
treatment as the reason for his non-appearance at the scheduled hearings. Tuason has not given
any reason why his former counsel, intentionally or unintentionally, did not inform the court of
this fact. Because of the danger of collusion, in all cases for annulment, declaration of nullity of
marriage and legal separation, the prosecuting attorney or fiscal is ordered to appear on behalf of
the state for the purpose of preventing any collusion between the parties and to take care that
their evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. If the defendant spouse fails to answer the
complaint, the court cannot declare him or her in default but instead, should order the
prosecuting attorney to determine if collusion exists between the parties. The prosecuting
attorney or fiscal may oppose the application for legal separation or annulment through the
presentation of his own evidence, if in his opinion, the proof adduced is dubious and fabricated.
The facts in the case at bar do not call for the strict application of Articles 48 and 60 of the
Family Code. For one, Tuason was not declared in default by the trial court for failure to answer.
Tuason filed his answer to the complaint and contested the cause of action alleged by Maria. He
actively participated in the proceedings below by filing several pleadings and cross-examining
the witnesses of private Respondent. It is crystal clear that every stage of the litigation was
characterized by a no-holds barred contest and not by collusion. The role of the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal in annulment of marriage and legal separation proceedings is to determine
whether collusion exists between the parties and to take care that the evidence is not suppressed
or fabricated. Tuasons vehement opposition to the annulment proceedings negates the
conclusion that collusion existed between the parties. There is no allegation by Tuason that
evidence was suppressed or fabricated by any of the parties. Under these circumstances, we are
convinced that the non-intervention of a prosecuting attorney to assure lack of collusion between
the contending parties is not fatal to the validity of the proceedings in the trial court.


FACTS: Concepcion Alanis filed a complaint on October 1979, for the Declaration of Nullity
of Marriage between her erstwhile husband Enrico Pacete and one Clarita de la Concepcion,
as well as for legal separation between her and Pacete, accounting and separation of property.
She averred in her complaint that she was married to Pacete on April 1938 and they had a child
named Consuelo; that Pacete subsequently contracted a second marriage with Clarita de la
Concepcion and that she learned of such marriage only on August 1979. Reconciliation between
her and Pacete was impossible since he evidently preferred to continue living with Clarita. The
defendants were each served with summons. They filed an extension within which to file an
answer, which the court partly granted. Due to unwanted misunderstanding, particularly in
communication, the defendants failed to file an answer on the date set by the court. Thereafter,
the plaintiff filed a motion to declare the defendants in default, which the court forthwith granted.
The court received plaintiffs evidence during the hearings held on February 15, 20, 21, and 22,
1980. After trial, the court rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiff on March 17,1980.
Whether or not the RTC gravely abused its discretion in denying petitioners motion for
extension of time to file their answer, in declaring petitioners in default and in rendering its
decision on March 17, 1980 which decreed the legal separation of Pacete and Alanis and held to
be null and void the marriage of Pacete to Clarita.
The Civil Code provides that no decree of legal separation shall be promulgated upon a
stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment. In case of non-appearance of the defendant, the
court shall order the prosecuting attorney to inquire whether or not collusion between parties
exists. If there is no collusion, the prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the State in order to
take care that the evidence for the plaintiff is not fabricated. The above stated provision calling
for the intervention of the state attorneys in case of uncontested proceedings for legal separation
(and of annulment of marriages, under Article 88) is to emphasize that marriage is more than a
mere contract. Article 103 of the Civil Code, now Article 58 of the Family Code, further
mandates that an action for legal separation must in no case be tried before six months shall
have elapsed since the filing of the petition, obviously in order to provide the parties a cooling
- off period. In this interim, the court should take steps toward getting the parties to reconcile.
The significance of the above substantive provisions of the law is further or underscored by the
inclusion of a provision in Rule 18 of the Rules of Court which provides that no defaults in
actions for annulments of marriage or for legal separation. Therefore, if the defendant in an
action for annulment of marriage or for legal separation fails to answer, the court shall order the
prosecuting attorney to investigate whether or not a collusion between the parties exists, and if
there is no collusion, to intervene for the State in order to see to it that the evidence submitted is
not fabricated.


Francisco Comille and his wife ZosimaMontallana became the registered owners of Lot No. 437A located at Balintawak St. and Rizal Avenue in Dipolog City, Zamboangadel Norte in January
1956. Zosima died in 1980 hence Francisco and his mother in law executed a deed of
extrajudicial partition with waiver of rights, where the latter waived her share consisting of of
the property in favor of Francisco. Since Francisco do not have any children to take care of him
after his retirement, he asked Leticia, his niece, Leticias cousin, Luzviminda and CirilaArcaba,
the petitioner, who was then a widow and took care of Franciscos house as well as the store
According to Leticia, Francisco and Cirila were lovers since they slept in the same room. On the
other hand, ErlindaTabancura, another niece of Francisco claimed that the latter told her that
Cirila was his mistress. However, Cirila defensed herself that she was a mere helper who could
enter the masters bedroom when Francisco asked her to and that Francisco was too old for her.
She denied having sexual intercourse with Francisco. When the nieces got married, Cirila who
was then 34 year-old widow started working for Francisco who was 75 year old widower. The
latter did not pay him any wages as househelper though her family was provided with food and
lodging. Franciscos health deteriorated and became bedridden. Tabancura testified that
Franciscos only source of income was the rentals from his lot near the public streets.
In January 1991, few months before Francisco died, he executed a Deed of Donation Inter
Vivos where he ceded a portion of Lot 437-A composed of 150 sq m., together with his house to
Cirila who accepted the same. The larger portion of 268 sq m. was left under his name. This
was made in consideration of the 10 year of faithful services of the petitioner. AttyLacaya
notarized the deed and was later registered by Cirila as its absolute owner. In Octoer 1991,
Francisco died and in 1993, the lot received by Cirila had a market value of P57,105 and
assessed value of P28,550. The decedents nephews and nieces and his heirs by intestate
succession alleged that Cirila was the common-law wife of Francisco.
ISSUE: Whether or not the deed of donation inter vivos executed by Francisco in Arcabas favor
was valid.
The court in this case considered a sufficient proof of common law relationship wherein donation
is not valid. The conclusion was based on the testimony of Tabancura and certain documents
bearing the signature of CirilaComille such as application for business permit, sanitary permit
and the death certificate of Francisco. Also, the fact that Cirila did not demand her wages is an
indication that she was not simply a caregiver employee.
Cohabitation means more than sexual intercourse, especially when one of the parties is already
old and may no longer be interested in sex at the very least, cohabitation is a public assumption
of men and women holding themselves out to the public as such.

Hence, the deed of donation by Francisco in favor of Cirila is void under Art. 87 of the Family

Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM) obtained P50,300,000.00 loan from petitioner Ayala
Investment and Development Corporation (AIDC). Respondent Alfredo Ching, EVP of PBM,
executed security agreements on December 1980 and March 1981 making him jointly and
severally answerable with PBMs indebtedness to AIDC. PBM failed to pay the loan hence
filing of complaint against PBM and Ching. The RTC rendered judgment ordering PBM and
Ching to jointly and severally pay AIDC the principal amount with interests. Pending the appeal
of the judgment, RTC issued writ of execution. Thereafter, Magsajo, appointed deputy sheriff,
caused the issuance and service upon respondent spouses of the notice of sheriff sale on 3 of their
conjugal properties on May 1982. Respondent spouses filed injunction against petitioners on the
ground that subject loan did not redound to the benefit of the said conjugal partnership. CA
issued a TRP enjoining lower court from enforcing its order paving way for the scheduled
auction sale of respondent spouses conjugal properties. A certificate of sale was issued to AIDC,
being the only bidder and was registered on July 1982.
ISSUE: Whether or not the debts and obligations contracted by the husband alone is considered
for the benefit of the conjugal partnership and is it chargeable.
The loan procured from AIDC was for the advancement and benefit of PBM and not for the
benefit of the conjugal partnership of Ching. Furthermore, AIDC failed to prove that Ching
contracted the debt for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains. PBM has a personality
distinct and separate from the family of Ching despite the fact that they happened to be
stockholders of said corporate entity. Clearly, the debt was a corporate debt and right of recourse
to Ching as surety is only to the extent of his corporate stockholdings.
Based from the foregoing jurisprudential rulings of the court, if the money or services are given
to another person or entity, and the husband acted only as a surety orguarantor, that contract
cannot, by itself, alone be categorized as falling within the context of obligations for the benefit
of the conjugal partnership. The contract of loan or services is clearly for the benefit of the
principal debtor and not for the surety or his family. Ching only signed as a surety for the loan
contracted with AIDC in behalf of PBM. Signing as a surety is certainly not an exercise of an
industry or profession, it is not embarking in a business. Hence, the conjugal partnership should
not be made liable for the surety agreement which was clearly for the benefit of PBM.
The court did not support the contention of the petitioner that a benefit for the family may have
resulted when the guarantee was in favor of Chings employment (prolonged tenure, appreciation
of shares of stocks, prestige enhanced) since the benefits contemplated in Art. 161 of the Civil
Code must be one directly resulting from the loan. It must not be a mere by product or a spin off
of the loan itself.

The sale of a conjugal property requires the consent of both the husband and the wife. The
absence of the consent of one renders the sale null and void, while the vitiation thereof makes it
merely voidable. Only in the latter case can ratification cure the defect. Over the objection of
private respondent Gilda Corpuz and while she was in Manila seeking employment (with the
consent of her husband), her husband sold to the petitioners-spouses Antonio and
LuzvimindaGuiang one half of their conjugal peoperty, consisting of their residence and the lot
on which it stood. Upon her return to Cotabato, respondent gathered her children and went back
to the subject property. Petitioners filed a complaint for trespassing. Later, there was an amicable
settlement between the parties. Feeling that she had the shorter end of the bargain, respondent
filed an Amended Complaint against her husband and petitioners. The said Complaint sought the
declaration of a certain deed of sale, which involved the conjugal property of private respondent
and her husband, null and void.

ISSUE: Whether or not contract without the consent of wife is void

Yes. Art 124 of the FC rules that In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable
to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole
powers of administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance
which must have the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the
absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. Respondents
consent to the contract of sale of their conjugal property was totally inexistent or absent. The
nullity of the contract of sale is premised on the absence of private respondents consent. To
constitute a valid contract, the Civil Code requires the concurrence of the following elements:
cause, object, and consent, the last element being indubitably absent in the case at bar. A void
contract cannot be ratified .Neither can the amicable settlement be considered a continuing
offer that was accepted and perfected by the parties, following the last sentence of Article 124.
The order of the pertinent events is clear: after the sale, petitioners filed a complaint for
trespassing against private respondent, after which the barangay authorities secured an amicable
settlement and petitioners filed before the MTC a motion for its execution. The settlement,
however, does not mention a continuing offer to sell the property or an acceptance of such a
continuing offer. Its tenor was to the effect that private respondent would vacate the property. By

no stretch of the imagination, can the Court interpret this document as the acceptance mentioned
in Article 124.

Petitioner, Thelma A. Jader-Manalo made an offer to buy the properties of the respondents from
the husband of Norma Fernandez C. Camaisa, respondent EdilbertoCamaisa. After some
bargaining, petitioner and Edilberto agreed upon the purchase price and terms of payment. The
agreement handwritten by the petitioner was signed by Edilberto, with assurance from him that
he would secure his wifes consent. Petitioner was later on surprised when she was informed that
respondent spouses were backing out of the agreement. Hence, she filed a complaint for specific
performance and damages.
Whether or not the husband may validly dispose of a conjugal property without the wife's written
Under Art. 124 of the Family Code: In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise
unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may
assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or
encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or the written consent of the other
spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent the disposition or encumbrance shall be
The properties subject to the contract in this case were conjugal; hence, for the contracts to sell to
be effective, the consent of both husband and wife must be obtained. Respondent Norma
Camaisa did not give her written consent to the sale. Even granting that respondent Norma
actively participated in negotiating for the sale of the subject properties, which she denied, her
written consent to the sale is required by law for its validity. She may have been aware of the
negotiations for the sale of their conjugal properties, however that is not sufficient to demonstrate

FACTS: Private respondent Angelina Mejia Lopez (plaintiff below) filed a petition for
PROPERTIES, FORFEITURE, ETC., against defendant Alberto Lopez and petitioner Imelda
Relucio. In the petition, private-respondent alleged that sometime in 1968, defendant Lopez,
who islegally married to the private respondent, abandoned the latter and their four
legitimatechildren; that he arrogated unto himself full and exclusive control and administration
of theconjugal properties, spending and using the same for his sole gain and benefit to the
totalexclusion of the private respondent and their four children; that defendant Lopez, after
abandoning his family, maintained an illicit relationship and cohabited with herein petitioner
since 1976. A Motion to Dismiss the Petition was filed by herein petitioner on the ground that
privaterespondent has no cause of action against her. Respondent Judge denying petitioner
Relucios Motion to Dismiss on the ground that she is impleaded as a necessary or indispensable
party because some of the subjectproperties are registered in her name and defendant Lopez, or
solely in her name . MR denied . CA likewise denied. Hence this petition.
ISSUE: Whether petitioners inclusion as party defendant is essential in the proceedings for
acomplete adjudication of the controversy.

HELD: NO .The first cause of action is for judicial appointment of respondent as administratrix
of the
conjugal partnership or absolute community property arising from her marriage to
Alberto J. Lopez.Petitioner is a complete stranger to this cause of action. The administration of
the property of themarriage is entirely between them, to the exclusion of all other persons.
Respondent allegesthat Alberto J. Lopez is her husband. Therefore, her first cause of action is
against Alberto J.Lopez. There is no right-duty relation between petitioner and respondent that
can possiblysupport a cause of action. The second cause of action is for an accounting by
respondent husband. The accounting of conjugal partnership arises from or is an incident of
marriage. Petitioner has nothing to do with themarriage between respondent Alberto J. Lopez.
Hence, no cause of action can exist against petitioner onthis ground. The third cause of action is
essentially for forfeiture of Alberto J. Lopez share in property co owneby him and petitioner. It
does not involve the issue of validity of the co-ownership between Alberto J.Lopez and
petitioner.The respondent also sought support. Support cannot be compelled from a stranger.
Finally, as to the moral damages, respondents claim for moral damages is against Alberto J.
Lopez, not petitioner.If petitioner is not a real party in interest, she cannot be an indispensable
party. An indispensableparty is one without whom there can be no final determination of an
action. Petitioners participation in Special Proceedings M-3630 is not indispensable. Certainly,
the trial court can issue a judgment ordering Alberto J. Lopez to make an accounting of his
conjugal partnership with respondent, and give support to respondent and their children, and
dissolve Alberto J. Lopez conjugal partnership with respondent, andforfeit Alberto J. Lopez
share in property co -owned by him and petitioner. Such judgment would beperfectly valid and
enforceable against Alberto J. Lopez. Nor can petitioner be a necessary party in Special
Proceedings M-3630. A necessary party asone who is not indispensable but who ought to be
joined as party if complete relief is to beaccorded those already parties, or for a complete
determination or settlement of the claim subjectof the action. In the context of her petition in the
lower court, respondent would be accordedcomplete relief if Alberto J. Lopez were ordered to
account for his alleged conjugal partnershipproperty with respondent, give support to respondent
and her children, turn over his share in theco-ownership with petitioner and dissolve his conjugal
partnership or absolute communityproperty with respondent.WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS
the petition and REVERSES the decision of the Court of Appeals. The Court DISMISSES
Special Proceedings M-3630 of the Regional Trial Court, Makati Branch as against petitioner.

Dr. Ernesto Jardelaza suffered stroke that rendered him comatose. Gilda, wife of the latter, filed
a petition in RTC Iloilo to be allowed as sole administrator of their conjugal property and be
authorized to sell the same as her husband is physically incapacitated to discharge his functions.
She further contest that such illness of the husband necessitated expenses that would require her
to sell their property in Lot 4291 and its improvement to meet such necessities. RTC ruled in
favor of Gilda contending that such decision is pursuant to Article 124 of FC and that the
proceedings thereon are governed by the rules on summary proceedings.
The son of the spouses, Teodoro, filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the petition
made by her mother was essentially a petition for guardianship of the person and properties of
his father. As such it cannot be prosecuted in accordance with the provisions on summary
proceedings instead it should follows the ruled governing special proceedings in the Revised
Rules of Court requiring procedural due process particularly the need for notice and a hearing on
the merits. He further reiterated that Chapter 2 of the FC comes under the heading on
Separation in Fact Between Husband and Wife contemplating a situation where both spouses
are of disposing mind. Hence, he argued that this should not be applied in their case.
During the pendency of the motion, Gilda sold the property to her daughter and son in law.
Upon the appeal by Teodoro, CA reversed the decision of the lower court.
ISSUE: Whether or not Gilda as the wife of a husband who suffered stroke, a cerebrovascular
accident rendering him comatose, without motor and mental faculties, may assume sole powers
of administration of the conjugal property and dispose a parcel of land with improvements.
SC ruled in favor of Teodoro. The rule on summary proceedings does not apply to cases where
the non-consenting spouse is incapacitated or incompetent to give consent. In this case, trial
court found that subject spouse was incompetent who was in a comatose condition and with a
diagnosis of brain stem infract. Hence, the proper remedy is a judicial guardianship proceeding
under the Revised Rules of Court. The law provides that wife who assumes sole powers of
administration has the same powers and duties as a guardian. Consequently, a spouse who
desires to sell real property as administrator of the conjugal property, must observe the procedure

for the sale of the wards estate required of judicial guardians, and not the summary judicial
proceedings under FC. SC further held that such incapacity of the trial court to provide for an
opportunity to be heard is null and void on the ground of lack of due process.

Facts: Respondent Romeo Jaring was the lessee of a 14.5 hectare fishpond in Bataan for a period
of 5 years ending on September 12, 1990. On June 19, 1987, he subleased the fishpond for the
remaining period of his lease to the spouses Placido and PuritaAlipio and the spouses Bienvenido
and Remedios Manuel for an amount of Php 485,600.oo payable in 2 installments in the amount
of Php 300,000.00 and 185,600.00 respectively. The 2nd installment will fall due on June 30,
1989. The 1st installment was duly paid but the 2nd installment was only partially fulfilled
leaving a balance of Php 50,600.00. The sub lessees failed to settle the remaining balance despite
repeated demands. This prompted privaterespondentJaring to file a complaint on Oct. 13,
1989 against theAlipio and Manuel spouses in the RTC Bataan for the collection of the said
amount and prayed in the alternative, the rescission of the sublease contract in case of failure to
pay. However, prior to the institution of the complaint, on Dec. 1, 1988, one of the sub lessees,
PlacidoAlipio, died. His wife, Purita moved to dismiss the complaint citing Rule 3 Sec 21 of the
1964 Rules of Court which states that in an action for recovery of money, debt or interests and
the defendant dies before the CFI renders the final judgment, the case shall be dismissed and
prosecuted in the manner especially provided in these rules. This rule was however amended, so
that in Rule 3 Sec 20 of the 1997 Rules of Civil procedure, it states that there is no longer need to
dismiss, that the case will be allowed to continue until entry of final judgment and that the claims
will then be pursued in the manner provided by the rules on prosecuting claims against theestate
of a deceased person. The RTC however, denied petitionersmotion while the Manuel spouses
were defaulted for failure to file an answer. The RTC rendered a decision ordering the petitioner
and the Manuel spouses to pay the unpaid balance of Php 50,600 plus Php 10,000.00 for attys
fees and cost of suit.
Petitioner Alipio appealed to the CA but her appeal was also dismissed by the said appellate
court citing the cases (1) Climaco vs. Siy-Uy - that the rule invoked by petitioner does
not apply where there are another defendants against whom the action is instituted; and (2)
Imperial insurance Ins. vs. David that where a husband and wife bound themselves jointly and
severally, in case of death, the liability of the surviving spouse is independent and separate so
that she may be sued for the whole debt.
Hence, petitioner Alipio, filed a petition for review on certiorari questioning the applicability of
the above 2 cases.

Issue: Whether or not a creditor can sue the surviving spouse for the collection of a debt which is
owed by the conjugal partnership of gains or whether such claims must be filed in proceedings
for the settlement of the estate of the decedent
Held: Petitioner and her late husband and the Manuel spouses signed the sublease contract
binding themselves to pay the rentals stipulated which under Art. 161 of the Civil Code will
make the conjugal partnership liable. However, when petitioners husband died, the conjugal
partnership of gains was automatically dissolved thus all debts chargeable to it are to be paid in
the intestate of testate proceedings of the deceased spouse. And even when there is no liquidation
that has been made, this would not mean that the conjugal partnership of gains continues to exist
in order to pursue the claim against the surviving spouse alone. The creditor under Sec 6 Rule 78
of the Revised Rules of Court can have the remedy ofapplying in court for letters of
administration in his capacity as the principal creditor.
SC ruled that the 2 cases cited by the CA do not apply in this case because such cases are based
on different sets of facts not similar to the case herein. Private respondent cannot maintain the
present suit against petitioner. The proper remedy is to file a claim against the Alipios in a
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased husband.
SC also ruled that the CA decision ordering payment of the balance does not specify whether it is
to be paid jointly or solidarily. ApplyingArt 1207 of the Civil Code, the obligation of petitioner
and the Manuel spouses is presumed to be only JOINT, i.e. the debt is divided into as many equal
shares as there are debtors, each debt being considered distinct from one another. SC therefore
grants the petition and orders the Manuel spouses to pay Php 25,300.00 plus Php 10,000.00 for
attys fees and cost of suit. The complaint against petitioner was dismissed without prejudice to
the filing of claim byprivate respondent in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the
deceased husband.

In 1969 SPO4 Santiago Cario married Susan NicdaoCario. He had 2 children with her. In
1992, SPO4 contracted a second marriage, this time with Susan Yee Cario. In 1988, prior to his
second marriage, SPO4 is already bedridden and he was under the care of Yee. In 1992, he died
13 days after his marriage with Yee. Thereafter, the spouses went on to claim the benefits of
SPO4. Nicdao was able to claim a total of P140,000.00 while Yee was able to collect a total of
P21,000. In 1993, Yee filed an action for collection of sum of money against Nicdao. She wanted
to have half of the P140k. Yee admitted that her marriage with SPO4 was solemnized during the

subsistence of the marriage b/n SPO4 and Nicdao but the said marriage between Nicdao and
SPO4 is null and void due to the absence of a valid marriage license as certified by the local civil
registrar. Yee also claimed that she only found out about the previous marriage on SPO4s
ISSUE: Whether or not the absolute nullity of marriage may be invoked to claim presumptive
HELD: The marriage between Nicdao and SPO4 is null and void due the absence of a valid
marriage license. The marriage between Yee and SPO4 is likewise null and void for the same has
been solemnized without the judicial declaration of the nullity of the marriage between Nicdao
and SPO4. Under Article 40 of the FC, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be
invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void. Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to
be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for
said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring the previous
marriage void. However, for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to
declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to the
determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution
of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of
marriage even after the death of the parties thereto, and even in a suit not directly instituted to
question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. In
such instances, evidence must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of
grounds rendering such a previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be limited solely
to an earlier final judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage void.
The SC ruled that Yee has no right to the benefits earned by SPO4 as a policeman for their
marriage is void due to bigamy; she is only entitled to properties, money etc owned by them in
common in proportion to their respective contributions. Wages and salaries earned by each party
shall belong to him or her exclusively (Art. 148 of FC). Nicdao is entitled to the full benefits
earned by SPO4 as a cop even if their marriage is likewise void. This is because the two were
capacitated to marry each other for there were no impediments but their marriage was void due
to the lack of a marriage license; in their situation, their property relations is governed by Art 147
of the FC which provides that everything they earned during their cohabitation is presumed to
have been equally contributed by each party this includes salaries and wages earned by each
party notwithstanding the fact that the other may not have contributed at all.


Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married in 1971 and begotten 5 children. Valdez
filed a petition in 1992 for a declaration of nullity of their marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the
Family Code, which was granted hence, marriage is null and void on the ground of their mutual
psychological incapacity. Stella and Joaquin are placed under the custody of their mother while
the other 3 siblings are free to choose which they prefer.
Gomez sought a clarification of that portion in the decision regarding the procedure for the
liquidation of common property in unions without marriage. During the hearing on the
motion, the children filed a joint affidavit expressing desire to stay with their father.
ISSUE: Whether or not the property regime should be based on co-ownership.
The Supreme Court ruled that in a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property
relations of the parties are governed by the rules on co-ownership. Any property acquired during
the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party who
did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall be considered as having contributed
thereto jointly if said partys efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family.

Miguel Palang contracted marriage with Carlina in Pangasinan on 1949. He left to work in
Hawaii a few months after the wedding. Their only child Herminia was born in May 1950. The
trial court found evident that as early as 1957, Miguel attempted to Divorce Carlina in Hawaii.
When he returned for good in 1972, he refused to lived with Carlina and stayed alone in a house
in PozzorubioPangasinan.
The 63 year old Miguel contracted a subsequent marriage with 19 year old ErlindaAgapay,
herein petitioner. 2 months earlier, they jointly purchased a parcel of agricultural land located at
BinalonanPangasinan. A house and lot in the same place was likewise purchased. On the other
hand, Miguel and Carlina executed a Deed of Donation as a form of compromise agreement and
agreed to donate their conjugal property consisting of 6 parcels of land to their child Herminia.
Miguel and Erlindas cohabitation produced a son named Kristopher. In 1979, they were
convicted of concubinage upon Carlinas complaint. 2 years later, Miguel died. Carlina and her
daughter instituted this case for recovery of ownership and possession with damages against
petitioner. They sought to get back the land and the house and lot located at Binalonan allegedly
purchase by Miguel during his cohabitation with petitioner. The lower court dismissed the
complaint but CA reversed the decision.
ISSUE: Whether the agricultural land and the house and lot should be awarded in favor of
The sale of the riceland on May 17, 1973, was made in favor of Miguel and Erlinda. However,
their marriage is void because of the subsisting marriage with Carlina. Only the properties
acquired by both parties through their actual joint contribution shall be owned by them in
proportion to their respective contributions. It is required that there be an actual contribution. If
actual contribution is not proved, there will be no co-ownership and no presumption of equal
Erlinda established in her testimony that she was engaged in the business of buy and sell and had
a sari-sari store. However, she failed to persuade the court that she actually contributed money to
but the subjected riceland. When the land was acquired, she was only around 20 years old
compared to Miguel who was already 64 years old and a pensioner of the US Government.
Considering his youthfulness, its unrealistic how she could have contributed the P3,750 as her
share. Thus, the court finds no basis to justify the co-ownership with Miguel over the same.

Hence, the Riceland should, as correctly held by CA, revert to the conjugal partnership property
of the deceased and Carlina.
It is immaterial that Miguel and Carlina previously agreed to donate their conjugal property in
favor of Herminia. Separation of property between spouses during the marriage shall not take
place except by judicial order or without judicial conferment when there is an express stipulation
in the marriage settlements. The judgment resulted from the compromise was not specifically for
separation of property and should not be so inferred.
With respect to the house and lot, AttySagun, notary public who prepared the deed of
conveyance for the property revealed the falshood of Erlindas claim that she bought such
property for P20,000 when she was 22 years old. The lawyer testified that Miguel provided the
money for the purchase price and directed Erlindas name alone be placed as the vendee.
The transaction made by Miguel to Erlinda was properly a donation and which was clearly void
and inexistent by express provision of the law because it was made between persons guilty of
adultery or concubinage at the time of the donation. Moreover, Article 87 of the Family Code,
expressly provides that the prohibition against donation between spouses now applies to
donations between persons living together as husband and wife without a valid marriage, for
otherwise, the condition of those who incurred guilt would turn out to be better than those in
legal union.

Petitioner spouses Augusto and Maria Hontiveros filed a complaint for damages against private
respondents Gregorio Hontiveros and TeodoraAyson. The petitioners alleged that they are the
owners of a parcel of land in Capiz and that they were deprived of income from the land as a
result of the filing of the land registration case. In the reply, private respondents denied that they
were married and alleged that Gregorio was a widower while Teodora was single. They also
denied depriving petitioners of possession of and income from the land. On the contrary,
according to the private respondents, the possession of the property in question had already been
transferred to petitioners by virtue of the writ of possession. Trial court denied petitioners
motion that while in the amended complaint, they alleged that earnest efforts towards a
compromise were made, it was not verified as provided in Article 151.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court can validly dismissed the complaint due to lack of efforts
exerted towards a compromise as stated in Article 151.

SC held that the inclusion of private respondent TeodoraAyson as defendant and Maria
Hontiveros as petitioner takes the case out of the scope of Article 151. Under this provision, the
phrase members of the same family refers to the husband and wife, parents and children,
ascendants and descendants, and brothers and sisters whether full or half-blood. Religious
relationship and relationship by affinity are not given any legal effects in this jurisdiction.
Teodora and Maria as spouses of the Hontiveros are regarded as strangers to the Hontiveros
family for purposes of Article 151.

FACTS: This is a case of an action for reconveyance of a parcel of land and an apartment.
Teodora Guerrero died and left a parcel of land and an apartment. Her husband Martin Guerrero
adjudicates the said land to him and consequently sold to Teodora Domingo. The nephews and
nieces Tison et al seek to inherit by right of representation from the property disputed property
presenting documentary evidence to prove filial relation. The respondent contended that the

documents/evidence presented is inadmissible for being hearsay since the affiants were never
presented for cross-examination.
Whether or not the evidence presented is hearsay evidence and is inadmissible.
The evidence submitted does not conform to the rules on their admissibility; however the same
may be admitted by reason of private respondent's failure to interpose any timely objection
thereto at the time they were being offered in evidence. It is elementary that an objection shall be
made at the time when an alleged inadmissible document is offered in evidence; otherwise, the
objection shall be treated as waived, since the right to object is merely a privilege which the
The primary proof that was considered in ascertaining the relationship between the parties
concerned is the testimony of Corazon DezollerTison to the effect that TeodoraDezoller Guerrero
in her lifetime, or sometime in 1946, categorically declared that the former is Teodora's niece.
Such a statement is considered a declaration about pedigree which is admissible, as an exception
to the hearsay rule, under Section 39, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, subject to the following
conditions: (1) that the declarant is dead or unable to testify; (2) that the declarant be related to
the person whose pedigree is the subject of inquiry; (3) that such relationship be shown by
evidence other than the declaration; and (4) that the declaration was made ante litem motam, that
is, not only before the commencement of the suit involving the subject matter of the declaration,
but before any controversy has arisen thereon.

Facts: On 15 November 1985, a complainant for sum of money was filed by the International
Corporate Bank, Inc. against Sacoba Manufacturing Corp., Pablo Gonzales Jr., and Tomas
Gonzales who, in turn, filed a third party complaint against Alfa Integrated Textile Mills (ALFA),
Ramon C. Lee (ALFA's president) and Antonio DM. Lacdao (ALFA's vice president) on 17
March 1986. On 17 September 1987, Lee and Lacdao filed a motion to dismiss the third party
complaint which the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 58 denied in an Order dated 27 June
1988. On 18 July 1988, Lee and Lacdao filed their answer to the third party complaint.
Meanwhile, on 12 July 1988, the trial issued an order requiring the issuance of an alias summons
upon ALFA through the DBP as a consequence of Lee and Lacdao's letter informing the court
that the summons for ALFA was erroneously served upon them considering that the management
of ALFA had been transferred to the DBP. In a manifestation dated 22 July 1988, the DBP
claimed that it was not authorized to receive summons on behalf of ALFA since the DBP had not
taken over the company which has a separate and distinct corporate personality and existence.
On 4 August 1988, the trial court issued an order advising Sacoba Manufacturing, et. al. to take
the appropriate steps to serve the summons to ALFA. On 16 August 1988, Sacoba
Manufacturing, et. al. filed a Manifestation and Motion for the Declaration of Proper Service of
Summons which the trial court granted on 17 August 1988.
On 12 September 1988, Lee and Lacdao filed a motion for reconsideration submitting that the
Rule 14, section 13 of the Revised Rules of Court is not applicable since they were no longer
officers of ALFA and Sacoba Manufacturing, et. al. should have availed of another mode of
service under Rule 14, Section 16 of the said Rules, i.e., through publication to effect proper
service upon ALFA. On 2 January 1989, the trial court upheld the validity of the service of
summons on ALFA through Lee and Lacdao, thus, denying the latter's motion for reconsideration
and requiring ALFA to file its answer through Lee and Lacdao as its corporate officers. On 19
January 1989, a second motion for reconsideration was filed by Lee and Lacdao reiterating their
stand that by virtue of the voting trust agreement they ceased to be officers and directors of
ALFA, hence, they could no longer receive summons or any court processes for or on behalf of
ALFA. In support of their second motion for reconsideration, Lee and Lacdao attached thereto a
copy of the voting trust agreement between all the stockholders of ALFA (Lee and Lacdao
included), on the one hand, and the DBP, on the other hand, whereby the management and
control of ALFA became vested upon the DBP. On 25 April 1989, the trial court reversed itself
by setting aside its previous Order dated 2 January 1989 and declared that service upon Lee and
Lacdao who were no longer corporate officers of ALFA cannot be considered as proper service
of summons on ALFA. On 15 May 1989, Sacoba Manufacturing, et. al. moved for a
reconsideration of the Order which was affirmed by the court in is Order dated 14 August 1989
denying Sacoba Manufacturing, et. al.'s motion for reconsideration.

On 18 September 1989, a petition for certiorari was belatedly submitted by Sacoba

Manufacturing, et. al. before the Court of Appeals which, nonetheless, resolved to give due
course thereto on 21 September 1989. On 17 October 1989, the trial court, not having been
notified of the pending petition for certiorari with the appellate court issued an Order declaring
as final the Order dated 25 April 1989. Sacoba Manufacturing, et. al. in the said Order were
required to take positive steps in prosecuting the third party complaint in order that the court
would not be constrained to dismiss the same for failure to prosecute. Subsequently, on 25
October 1989 Sacoba Manufacturing, et. al. filed a motion for reconsideration on which the trial
court took no further action. On 19 March 1990, after Lee and Lacdao filed their answer to
Sacoba Manufacturing, et. al.'s petition for certiorari, the appellate court rendered its decision,
setting aside the orders of trial court judge dated 25 April 1989 and 14 August 1989. On 11 April
1990, Lee and Lacdao moved for a reconsideration of the decision of the appellate court which
resolved to deny the same on 10 May 1990. Lee and Lacdao filed the petition for certiorari. In
the meantime, the appellate court inadvertently made an entry of judgment on 16 July 1990
erroneously applying the rule that the period during which a motion for reconsideration has been
pending must be deducted from the 15-day period to appeal. However, in its Resolution dated 3
January 1991, the appellate court set aside the aforestated entry of judgment after further
considering that the rule it relied on applies to appeals from decisions of the Regional Trial
Courts to the Court of Appeals, not to appeals from its decision to the Supreme Court pursuant to
the Supreme Court's ruling in the case of Refractories Corporation of the Philippines v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 176 SCRA 539 [1989].
Whether the execution of the voting trust agreement by Lee and Lacdao whereby all their
shares to the corporation have been transferred to the trustee deprives the stockholder of their
positions as directors of the corporation.
Whether the five-year period of the voting trust agreement in question had lapsed in 1986
so that the legal title to the stocks covered by the said voting trust agreement ipso facto reverted
to Lee and Lacdao as beneficial owners pursuant to the 6th paragraph of section 59 of the new
Corporation Code.
Whether there was proper service of summons on ALFA through Lee and Lacdao, to bind
1. Lee and Lacdao, by virtue of the voting trust agreement executed in 1981 disposed of all their
shares through assignment and delivery in favor of the DBP, as trustee. Consequently, Lee and
Lacdao ceased to own at least one share standing in their names on the books of ALFA as
required under Section 23 of the new Corporation Code. They also ceased to have anything to do
with the management of the enterprise. Lee and Lacdao ceased to be directors. Hence, the
transfer of their shares to the DBP created vacancies in their respective positions as directors of
ALFA. The transfer of shares from the stockholders of ALFA to the DBP is the essence of the
subject voting trust agreement. Considering that the voting trust agreement between ALFA and
the DBP transferred legal ownership of the stocks covered by the agreement to the DBP as

trustee, the latter because the stockholder of record with respect to the said shares of stocks. In
the absence of a showing that the DBP had caused to be transferred in their names one share of
stock for the purpose of qualifying as directors of ALFA, Lee and Lacdao can no longer be
deemed to have retained their status as officers of ALFA which was the case before the execution
of the subject voting trust agreement. There is no dispute from the records that DBP has taken
over full control and management of the firm.
2. The 6th paragraph of section 59 of the new Corporation Code reads that "Unless expressly
renewed, all rights granted in a voting trust agreement shall automatically expire at the end of the
agreed period, and the voting trust certificates as well as the certificates of stock in the name of
the trustee or trustees shall thereby be deemed cancelled and new certificates of stock shall be
reissued in the name of the transferors." However, it is manifestly clear from the terms of the
voting trust agreement between ALFA and the DBP that the duration of the agreement is
contingent upon the fulfillment of certain obligations of ALFA with the DBP. Had the five-year
period of the voting trust agreement expired in 1986, the DBP would not have transferred an its
rights, titles and interests in ALFA "effective June 30, 1986" to the national government through
the Asset Privatization Trust (APT) as attested to in a Certification dated 24 January 1989 of the
Vice President of the DBP's Special Accounts Department II. In the same certification, it is stated
that the DBP, from 1987 until 1989, had handled s account which included ALFA's assets
pursuant to a management agreement by and between the DBP and APT. Hence, there is
evidence on record that at the time of the service of summons on ALFA through Lee and Lacdao
on 21 August 1987, the voting trust agreement in question was not yet terminated so that the
legal title to the stocks of ALFA, then, still belonged to the DBP.
3. It is a basic principle in Corporation Law that a corporation has a personality separate and
distinct from the officers or members who compose it. Thus, the role on service of processes on a
corporation enumerates the representatives of a corporation who can validly receive court
processes on its behalf. Not every stockholder or officer can bind the corporation considering the
existence of a corporate entity separate from those who compose it. The rationale of the rule is
that service must be made on a representative so integrated with the corporation sued as to make
it a priori supposable that he will realize his responsibilities and know what he should do with
any legal papers served on him. Herein, Lee and Lacdao do not fall under any of the enumerated
officers. The service of summons upon ALFA, through Lee and Lacdao, therefore, is not valid.
To rule otherwise will contravene the general principle that a corporation can only be bound by
such acts which are within the scope of the officer's or agent's authority.

Spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian were owners of various properties located in
Laguna. Isabel died in 1982 while his husband died in 1989. Vicentes sister and nephew filed a
complaint for the issuance of letters of administration of Vicentes estate in favor of the nephew,
herein private respondent. The petitioner, Marissa Benitez-Badua, was raised and cared by the
deceased spouses since childhood, though not related to them by blood, nor legally adopted. The
latter to prove that she is the only legitimate child of the spouses submitted documents such as
her certificate of live birth where the spouses name were reflected as her parents. She even
testified that said spouses continuously treated her as their legitimate daughter. On the other
hand, the relatives of Vicente declared that said spouses were unable to physically procreate
hence the petitioner cannot be the biological child. Trial court decided in favor of the petitioner
as the legitimate daughter and sole heir of the spouses.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners certificate of live birth will suffice to establish her
The Court dismissed the case for lack of merit. The mere registration of a child in his or her
birth certificate as the child of the supposed parents is not a valid adoption. It does not confer
upon the child the status of an adopted child and her legal rights. Such act amounts to simulation
of the child's birth or falsification of his or her birth certificate, which is a public document.
It is worthy to note that Vicente and brother of the deceased wife executed a Deed of ExtraJudicial Settlement of the Estate of the latter. In the notarized document, they stated that they
were the sole heirs of the deceased because she died without descendants and ascendants. In
executing such deed, Vicente effectively repudiated the Certificate of Live Birth of the petitioner
where it appeared thathe was the petitioners father.

William Liyao Jr., the illegitimate son of the deceased, as represented by her mother (Corazon),
filed a petition ordering Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao, Pearl L. Tan, Tita L. Tan and Linda Liyao to
recognize and acknowledge the former as a compulsory heir of the deceased and to be entitled to
all successional rights. Liyao Jr. was in continuous possession and enjoyment of the status as the
child of the deceased having been recognized and acknowledged as such child by the decedent
during his lifetime. There were two sides of the story. Corazon maintained that she and the
deceased were legally married but living separately for more than 10 years and that they
cohabited from 1965 until the death of the deceased. On the other hand, one of the chidren of the
deceased stated that her mom and the deceased were legally married and that her parents were
not separated legally or in fact.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner can impugn his own legitimacy to be able to claim from
the estate of the deceased.
Impugning the legitimacy of the child is a strictly personal right of the husband, or in exceptional
cases, his heirs for the reason that he was the one directly confronted with the scandal and
ridicule which the infidelity of his wife produced and he should be the one to decide whether to
conceal that infidelity or expose it in view of the moral and economic interest involved. Hence,
it was then settled that the legitimacy of the child can only be impugned in a direct action
brought for that purpose, by the proper parties and within the period limited by law.
Furthermore, the court held that there was no clear, competent and positive evidence presented
by the petitioner that his alleged father had admitted or recognized his paternity.

Facts: The case involves two illegitimate children who having been born in a lawful wedlock;
claim to be the illegitimate children of the decedent, Juan G. Dizon in order to enforce their
respective shares in the latters estate under the rules on succession.Danilo B. de Jesus and
Carolina Aves de Jesus got married on August 23, 1964 and during this marriage, herein
petitioners, Jacqueline A. de Jesus and Jinkie Christie A. de Jesus were born.However, in a
notarized document dated June 07, 1991, Juan G. Dizon acknowledged Jacqueline and Jinkie de
Jesus as being his own illegitimate children by Carolina Aves de Jesus. Subsequently, on the
following year, Juan G. Dizon died intestate leaving behind a considerable amount of assets.
Thus, on the strength of his notarized acknowledgment, herein petitioners filed a complaint for
Partition with Inventory and Accounting of the Dizon estate. On the other hand,
herein respondents, the surviving spouse and legitimate children of the decedent Juan G. Dizon,
including the corporations of which the deceased was a stockholder, sought the dismissal of the
case. They argued that the complaint, even while denominated as being one for partition, would
nevertheless call for altering the status of petitioners from being the legitimate children of the
spouses Danilo de Jesus and Carolina de Jesus to instead be the illegitimate children of Carolina
de Jesus and deceased Juan Dizon. But, the trial court denied their motion to dismiss as well as
their motion for reconsideration, which prompted the respondents to elevate the issue before the
Court of Appeals but still the latter upheld the decision of the lower court and ordered that case
be remanded for further proceedings. Years later, respondents, notwithstanding with their
submission of their answers and several motions, they filed an omnibus motion for the dismissal
of the complaint. They contend that the action instituted was, in fact, made to compel the
recognition of petitioners as being the illegitimate children of decedent Juan G. Dizon and that
the partition sought was merely an ulterior relief once petitioners would have been able to
establish their status as such heirs. They also asserted that an action for partition was not an
appropriate forum to ascertain the question of paternity and filiation because the same could only
be taken up in an independent suit or proceeding. And at this instance, the trial court favored
with the respondents and therefore dismissed the complaint of the petitioners for lack of cause of
action and being improper.
Issue: Whether petitioners are indeed the acknowledged illegitimate offspring of the decedent.
Ruling: The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is established by (1) the
record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2) an admission of
legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the
parent concerned. In the absence thereof, filiation shall be proved by (1) the open and continuous

possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2) any other means allowed by the Rules of
Court and special laws. The due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a
statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of
acknowledgment of the child, and no further court action is required. In fact, any authentic
writing is treated not just a ground for compulsory recognition; it is in itself a voluntary
recognition that does not require a separate action for judicial approval. Where, instead, a claim
for recognition is predicated on other evidence merely tending to prove paternity, i.e., outside of
a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record or an authentic writing, judicial
action within the applicable statute of limitations is essential in order to establish the childs
However, based on the records presented, they showed that petitioners were born during the
marriage of their parents. The certificates of live birth would also identify jde Jesus as being their
There is perhaps no presumption of the law more firmly established and founded on sounder
morality and more convincing reason than the presumption that children born in wedlock are
legitimate. This presumption indeed becomes conclusive in the absence of proof that there is
physical impossibility of access between the spouses during the first 120 days of the 300 days
which immediately precedes the birth of the child due to (a) the physical incapacity of the
husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife; (b) the fact that the husband and wife are living
separately in such a way that sexual intercourse is not possible; or (c) serious illness of the
husband, which absolutely prevents sexual intercourse. Quite remarkably, upon the expiration of
the periods set forth in Article 170, and in proper cases Article 171, of the Family Code (which
took effect on 03 August 1988), the action to impugn the legitimacy of a child would no longer
be legally feasible and the status conferred by the presumption becomes fixed and unassailable.
In an attempt to establish their illegitimate filiation to the late Juan G. Dizon, petitioners, in
effect, would impugn their legitimate status as being children of Danilo de Jesus and Carolina
Aves de Jesus. This step cannot be aptly done because the law itself establishes the legitimacy of
children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents.
Jurisprudence is strongly settled that the paramount declaration of legitimacy by law cannot be
attacked collaterally, one that can only be repudiated or contested in a direct suit specifically
brought for that purpose. Indeed, a child so born in such wedlock shall be considered legitimate
although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as
having been an adulteress.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing disquisitions considered, the instant petition is DENIED.

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