Plan: The United States federal government should make Cuban

nationals eligible to play organized baseball in the United States

relations advantage

Scenario one is Cuba The plan restores US-Cuban relations forced defection
prevents mutual trust
Greller 2k (Matthew, JD from the American University Washington College of Law,

Give Me Your Tired, Your Poor, Your Fastball Pitchers Yearning for Strike Three: n1
How Baseball Diplomacy Can Revitalize Major League Baseball and United States-Cuba
Relations, 14 Am. U. Int'l L. Rev. 1647, Lexis)
[*1685] III. BASEBALL AND UNITED STATES-CUBA RELATIONS A. Early Baseball Diplomacy Almost a
century before Fidel Castro took power, the relationship between the
United States and Cuba bonded through baseball when American-educated Cuban
students and United States Marines brought baseball equipment to Cuba. n158 Since those first games in Cuba,
baseball became a common ground that continues to connect the Cuban and American people. n159 Despite this
common ground, however, rancorous political differences continue to stymie United States-Cuban relations, n160 and
keep the populations of the two nations apart. This enmity arose in early 1960, when the Cuban government
nationalized all United States business and commercial properties in Cuba. n161 That same year, the Castro
government banned Cuban ath [*1686] letes from competing in professional sports, n162 which effectively ended the
prominence of new Cuban-trained talent in MLB n163 until Arocha's defection. n164 Before Arocha's

defection, however, the United States made several attempts in the 1970s
to improve relations with Cuba through baseball. n165 These attempts
revealed the internal divisions and political differences within both MLB
and the United States government, which ultimately caused early Baseball
Diplomacy efforts to fail. n166 [*1687] Prior to issuing the 1977 Directive that forbids scouting
Cuban baseball players, former MLB Commissioner Bowie Kuhn promoted the idea of Baseball Diplomacy to the State
Department. n167 Kuhn's correspondence suggested that the Cubans desired to compete within

MLB, and that baseball could provide the appropriate medium for
promoting American values to the Cuban people. n168 Internal State Department
memoranda indicated that, much like the 1971 Ping-Pong Diplomacy with China,
n169 baseball games with Cuba could [*1688] forge a new relationship
with the Cuban people, n170 and remain distinct from the political
relations between Washington and Havana . n171 Despite Kuhn's efforts to organize games
in Cuba, n172 however, the State Department rejected the Baseball Diplomacy proposal. n17 3 Instead of
seizing the opportunity in the 1970s to improve United States-Cuba
relations through baseball, the high profile defections of Cuban players in
the 1990s allowed baseball to embitter bilateral relations . n174 [*1689] B.
United States-Cuba Relations After Arocha Rene Arocha's foray into MLB followed the
tenor of existing United States-Cuban relations. n175 The larger forces of
Cuba's struggling economy, n176 coupled with the appeal of lucrative
MLB salaries, n177 heavily influenced Arocha's defection and the desires
of other Cuban baseball players to defect. n178 This rebirth of a Cubantrained presence in MLB coincided with several external events that
drastically affected United States-Cuban relations. n179 Following the arrival of
these Cuban players, legislative developments in the United States hastened the collapse of the Cuban econ [*1690]
omy, n180 and subsequently encouraged further baseball defections. n181 [*1691] Unlike Jackie Robinson's'
pioneering entry into MLB, that eventually enabled societal changes regarding race relations, n182 the

legislative developments following Arocha's arrival additionally

aggravated the relations between the United States and Cuba. n183
Ultimately, by encouraging further defections, this legislation extended
animosity to the baseball diamond. n184 C. United States-Cuba Relations and the "El Duque"
Model Whether through direct or indirect methods, during the past forty years the United States repeatedly attempted
to depose Fidel Castro. n185 By defiantly retaining power, the Castro government infuriates the powerful Cuban-

American lobby n186 and the United States government because of its communist ideology, rampant human rights
[*1692] abuses, n187 and the visceral issue of confiscated American property. n188 After Arocha's

defection, the hostile relations between the United States and Cuba
further extended this bilateral animosity to the world of baseball by
producing the "El Duque" model. The poor economic conditions within Cuba, exacerbated by the
lack of Soviet assistance n189 and the strengthened United States embargo, n190 increased the allure of MLB's
skyrocketing salary structure n191 for Cuban baseball players. n192 To immediately obtain these ap [*1693] pealing
salaries or play in front of a Cuban-American crowd, n193 however, players must follow the "El Duque" model and
defect to a third country. n194 The internal Cuban and MLB policies, which stem from poor bilateral relations, leave
defecting Cuban players without any feasible alternatives to this mode of Cuban baseball player immigration. n195
Consequently, the "El Duque" model continues to taint the common ground

between the United States and Cuba because of its circuitous path around
the laws that compelled its creation. n196 Instead of continuing to allow
this method of immigration to make baseball yet another area that fuels
the burning animosity between the United States and Cuba, implementing
significant changes regarding the "El Duque" model can allow baseball to
bring the two nations closer together. n197 Recent developments indicate a willingness to
utilize baseball in this direction. n198 [*1694] D. A New Hope: United States-Cuba Relations The Oriole Way In
addition to other efforts that increased contacts with the Cuban people, n199 the exhibition games between the Orioles
and the Cuban National team illustrated baseball's power to bring the Cuban and American people closer together.
n200 Although both nations asserted that the games only represented

people-to-people contacts, and not an attempt to normalize relations,

n201 the potential exists for baseball to forge closer ties between the two
nations without abandoning their principles. n202 For such an effective
Baseball Diplomacy to occur, [*1695] however, MLB, the United States,
and Cuba must eliminate the problematic "El Duque" model that
exacerbates existing problems within MLB n203 and United States-Cuba
relations. n204

Cuba will co-op defection is THE issue preventing baseball

diplomacy
Greller 2k (Matthew, JD from the American University Washington College of Law,

Give Me Your Tired, Your Poor, Your Fastball Pitchers Yearning for Strike Three: n1
How Baseball Diplomacy Can Revitalize Major League Baseball and United States-Cuba
Relations, 14 Am. U. Int'l L. Rev. 1647, Lexis)
IV. EFFECTIVE BASEBALL DIPLOMACY: A DOUBLE PLAY FOR MLB AND UNITED STATES-CUBA RELATIONS

The drain of talent from Cuba to MLB provides a source of international

embarrassment to Cuban President, and baseball fan, Fidel Castro. n205 Castro's
distaste for these defections embitters United [*1696] States-Cuba
relations, and is strikingly similar to many MLB teams' distaste for the departure of free agent players to rival
teams. n206 While the original defectors did not represent Cuba's best talent, n207 the subsequent defections of
pitchers Osvaldo Fernandez and the Hernandez brothers illustrated that the top-tier players also desired to leave Cuba
for MLB. n208 To prevent further defections, the touring National Team suspended several players suspected of
defecting, and shuffled its roster to exclude some of the best players. n209 Many baseball scouts [*1697] claim that
this drastic rearrangement represents the beginning of Castro's effort to prevent further baseball defections to
America. n210 Rather than witness these players defect to the United States, several scouts believe that Castro will sell
the rights n211 to the players cleared for the 2000 Olympics to the Japanese League. n212

Preventing

talented Cuban baseball players from competing on the National Team,

or sending them to Japan, only balks at the possibility to improve the
relations between the United States and Cuba through Baseball
Diplomacy. n213 The recent changes in the embargo against Cuba
indicate the United States' willingness to seek greater contacts between
the people of these two nations. n214 Moreover, Fidel Castro's recent

international agreements recognize the importance of [*1698] forging

political and economic ties to ease Cuba's economic crisis. n215
Consequently, changes regarding Cuban baseball immigration can
provide the impetus for creating the greater contacts and economic ties
desired by both nations . n216 Thus, the incentive exists for Castro to permit
Cubans to compete in MLB if such a policy could both rectify the
deteriorating conditions of Cuban baseball, n217 and enable the peo
[*1699] ple-to-people contacts needed to energize the relationship
between the United States and Cuba. n218 Recent statements from
Cuban officials indicate a willingness by Cuba to allow its players to
compete in MLB, provided that any new arrangement respects Cuban socialist sports. n219 Continued
adherence to the "El Duque" model will only serve to intensify the many
problems that stem from this model. n220 Adhering to a four-step process, however, can
alleviate these problems, and create an effective Baseball Diplomacy to improve the quality of MLB and United StatesCuba relations.

Sports diplomacy is key for an effectiveness of Cuba relations

Goldberg 2k (The Washington Quarterly. Sporting Diplomacy.
http://www.twq.com/autumn00/goldberg.pdf)

No doubt there are other efforts to bring the United States closer to states of concern. Iranian president Mohammad
Khatami called for a crack in this wall of mistrust by urging a dialogue among academics, writers, artists, journalists,
and tourists. The United States is also pushing for more people-to-people

contacts with Cuba, such as air links and ex- changes of scholars and artists. Notwithstanding
the value that academic, scientific, artistic, and even military-to-military
exchanges have in bringing about cultural understanding among
participants, it is sport that receives the mass media coverage and involve
the broader publica precondition to broader policy changes (i.e., engagement)
with states of concern. Business exchanges may be laden with implications of economic reform, sports are
not perceived as a threat to the structure of society itself. The exposure of
secrets is not feared as it might be in military exchanges. Sports are a low
risk testing ground for gauging the publics reaction to another country
and, ultimately, for moving toward rapprochement. The most prominent
example of the role that sports can play in breaking down barriers is the
visit of the U.S. table tennis team to the PRC in 1971. Ping Pong diplomacy, followed a year
later by the visit of a U.S. basketball team, laid the groundwork for President Richard Nixons visit to China in 1972
and the eventual normalization of relations. The sports exchanges helped to challenge

stereotypes about Americans and Chinese and to open a new dialogue for
understanding, such as encouraging further people-to people contacts .
The role that sports played in evolving the U.S. relationship with China
suggests that it can also play a role in reaching out to todays rogue states.

Drilling and spills are inevitable in Cuba US-Cuba relations

solve disaster response and clean-up
Pinon & Muse 10 (Jorge and Robert, Visiting Research Fellow in the Cuba Research Institute at
Florida International University and Attorney with substantial experience in US-Cuba legal matters,
"Coping with the Next Oil Spill: Why US-Cuba Environmental Cooperation is Critical," The Brookings
Institute, Cuba Issue Briefing No. 2, May,

http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2010/0518_oil_spill_cuba_pinon/0518_oil_spill_cu
ba_pinon.pdf)

While the quest for deepwater drilling of oil and gas may slow as a result
of the latest calamity, it is un- likely to stop. it came as little surprise, for example, that
Repsol recently announced plans to move for- ward with exploratory oil drilling in Cuban territo- rial waters later this
year.1 As Cuba continues to develop its deepwater oil and natural gas

reserves, the consequence to the United states of a similar mishap

occurring in Cuban waters moves from the theoretical to the actual. The
sober- ing fact that a Cuban spill could foul hundreds of miles of
American coastline and do profound harm to important marine habitats
demands cooperative and proactive planning by Washington and havana
to minimize or avoid such a calamity. Also important is the planning
necessary to prevent and, if necessary, respond to incidents arising froam
this countrys oil industry that, through the action of currents and wind,
threaten Cuban waters and shorelines. While Washington is working to
prevent future di- sasters in U.s. waters like the Deepwater Horizon, its
current policies foreclose the ability to respond effectively to future oil
disasterswhether that disaster is caused by companies at work in Cuban waters, or is the result of companies
operating in U.s. waters. Context in April 2009, the Brookings institution released a comprehensive report on United
statesCuba rela- tions Cuba: a new Policy of Critical of Critical and Constructive engagement timed to serve as a
resource for policymakers in the new Administration. The report, which reflected consensus among a diverse group of
experts on U.s.-Cuba relations, was notable for its menu of executive Branch actions that could, over time, facilitate
the restoration of normal rela- tions between the United states and Cuba through a series of confidence-building
exercises in areas of clear mutual interest. The emphasis was on identify- ing unobjectionable, practical and realizable
areas of cooperation between the two countries. Among the initiatives recommended to the new obama
Administration were: Open a dialogue between the United States and Cuba, particularly on issues of mutual
concern, including migration, counter-nar- cotics, environment, health, and security. Develop agreements and
assistance with the government of Cuba for disaster relief and en- vironmental stewardship. Shortly after releasing its
report, Brookings and the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) co-hosted a new era for U.S.-Cuba Relations on Marine
and Coastal Resources Conservation, a conference high- lighting the importance and value of environmental
cooperation between Cuba and the United states. EDF has particular expertise in this area because it has been
working with Cuban scientists and envi- ronmental officials for over a decade to protect coral reefs, marine life and
coastal areas in their country. The joint Brookings/EDF conference identified areas of potential bilateral collaboration
aimed at protect- ing shared marine and coastal ecosystems in the gulf of Mexico, Caribbean sea and the Atlantic
ocean. The importance of cooperation on environmental is- sues stressed at

the conference is particularly relevant now in light of events like the

Deepwater Horizon oil spill and the basic facts of geography and their
rela- tion to threats to contiguous U.s. and Cuban marine areas. Cuba sits
at the intersection of the Atlantic ocean, Caribbean sea and gulf of Mexico
and thus shares marine waters with the United states, areas where oil and
gas deposits are about to be explored. Preserving that countrys marine biodiversity is critically
important because it constitutes the nat- ural heritage of the Cuban people. The health of Cubas ocean environment is
likewise important to the economies of coastal communities in the United states where significant numbers of fish
species that spawn in Cuban waters are carried by prevailing currents into U.s. waters and caught by commercial and
recreational fishermen. florida and the southeastern United states are situated in the downstream of those currents,
which bring snapper, grouper, tuna, swordfish (as well as manatee and sea turtles) to U.S. waters, but can serve
equally as vec- tors of Cuban spilled oil. The United states geological survey estimates that Cubas Economic Exclusive
Zone (EEZ), which includes the gulf of Mexico north Cuba fold and Thrust Belt, has over five billion barrels of oil and
8.6 billion cubic feet of natural gas undiscovered reserves.2 Like the United states, the size of Cubas oil and gas
reserves is both economically fortuitous and a measure of the threat it poses to the marine environment in addition to
spains Repsol, over the next few years international oil companies such as norways statoil-hydro, Brazils Petrobras
and others will be conducting exploratory work off Cubas north coast. it is only a matter of time before production
begins in earnest and the environmental risks rise exponentially. To respond effectively to an oil-

related marine acci- dent, any company operating in or near Cuban territorial waters will require immediate access to the expertise and
equipment of U.s. oil companies and their suppliers. They are best
positioned to provide immediately the technology and know-how needed
to halt and limit the damage to the marine envi- ronment. obviously, the

establishment of working relations between the United states and Cuba to

fa- cilitate marine environmental protection is the first step in the
contingency planning and cooperation that will be necessary to an
effective response and early end to an oil spill.

Cuba is a hotspot - relations are necessary for solving global

environmental collapse
Council on Hemispheric Affairs 9 ("The US and Cuba: an Environmental

Duo," Scoop World, June 15, http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/WO0906/S00198.htm)

The U.S. and Cuba: Destined to be an Environmental Duo?
With the support of the U.S., Cuba could become a model for sustainable
preservation and environmental protection on a global scale Through accidents
of geography and history, Cuba is a priceless ecological resource . The United States
should capitalize on its proximity to this resource-rich island nation by
moving to normalize relations and establishing a framework for
environmental cooperation and joint initiatives throughout the Americas. Cuba is the most
biologically diverse of all the Caribbean Islands. Since it lies just 90 miles
south of the Florida Keys, where the Atlantic, the Caribbean and the Gulf
of Mexico intersect, the U.S. could play a key role in environmental conservation as well as the region in
general. However, when it comes to environmental preservation, the Obama administration is obstructing progress
and hindering any meaningful cooperation with its current U.S.- Cuba policy. Climate change and

environmental degradation are two of the most pressing contemporary

issues. If President Obama is sincerely committed to environmental
sustainability, he must forge international partnerships to implement
this objective. Where better to begin than in the U.S.s own backyard,
where Cuba has a huge presence. Only then can Cuba and the United
States move forward to find joint solutions to environmental challenges.
Environmental Riches and Implications Cubas glittering white sand beaches, extensive coral reefs, endemic fauna and
diverse populations of fish compose the Caribbeans most biologically diverse island. Based on a per hectare sampling
when compared to the U.S. plus Canada, Cuba has 12 times more mammal species, 29

times as many amphibian and reptile species, 39 times more bird species,
and 27 times as many vascular plant species. Equally important, adjacent ocean
currents and the island nations close proximity, carry fish larvae into
U.S. waters, making protection of Cubas coastal ecosystems vital to
replenishing the U.S.s ailing fisheries. Therefore, preserving the marine resources of Cuba is critical to the economic
health of North Americas Atlantic coastal communities. The U.S. and Cuba also share an ancient deepwater coral
system that stretches up to North Carolina. The islands 4,200 islets and keys support important commercial reef fish
species such as snapper and grouper as well as other marine life including sea turtles, dolphins and manatees in both
countries. Fifty percent of its flora and 41 percent of its fauna are endemic,

signifying the importance of protecting the islands resources in order to

safeguard the paradisiacal vision that Christopher Columbus observed when landing on the island
in 1492. Oro Negro and Dinero The recent discovery of oil and natural gas reserves in the Florida straits in Cuban
waters has attracted foreign oil exploration from China and India, both eager to begin extraction. Offshore oil and gas
development could threaten Cubas and Floridas environmental riches. Together, Cuba and the U.S. can

develop policies to combat the negative results coming from the

exploitation of these resources. The increased extraction and refining of
oil in Cuba could have detrimental effects on the environmen t. Offshore drilling
is likely to increase with the discovery of petroleum deposits in the Bay of Crdenas and related areas.

Excavation increases the possibility of oil spills, which would in turn

destroy the surrounding ecosystem, including fisheries and coral reef
formations. The amount of pollutants released into the air from refining crude oil and the amount of wayward
oil residuals would also increase with drilling and extraction. Those conversant with the very sensitive habitat issues
are calling for immediate consultations aimed at anticipating what should be done. However the U.S.s enormous oil

usage and its development requirements will cultivate economic growth on the island. Washington

must
work with Cuba to create an ecological protection plan not only to
establish an environmentally friendly public image, but to make it a
reality as well. Degradation of the environment will deprive Cuba, in the long run, of one of its most
important sources of present and future revenue: tourism. Consequently, it is in the mutual interests of the U.S. and
Cuba to develop a cooperative relationship that will foster tourism and growth in a sustainable manner. Sustainability
through Collaboration In many parts of the country communism has inadequately acted as a seal to preserve elements
of Cubas past as the centralized government prohibited private development by not giving special permission. A
number of tourist resorts already dot the island, but Cuba has been largely exempt from mass tourist exploitation due
to frozen relations with the U.S. Although the island remains underdeveloped, Fidel Castro has used his unchecked
power to back policies, which have been heedless to environmental considerations, thus damaging some of the islands
pristine ecosystem that once defined the island. Roughly the size of Pennsylvania, Cuba is the largest Caribbean
island, and if preservation and conservation measures are planned and

carried out in a cognizant manner, it could become a paradigm for

sustainable development at the global level. The Obama administrations recent easing of
travel restrictions on Cuban Americans visiting relatives on the island could be of immense importance not only to
Cuban families, but also to the preservation of Cubas unique and increasingly threatened coastal and marine
environments. Such a concession on Washingtons part would mark a small, but still significant stride in U.S.-Cuba
relations, yet the travel restrictions still remain inherently discriminatory. The preposterous regulations that allow
only a certain category of Americans into Cuba signify only a meager shift in U.S. policy towards Cuba. The 50-yearold U.S. embargo against the island has resoundingly failed to achieve its purpose. Obamas modifications fall short of
what it will take to reestablish a constructive U.S.-Cuba relationship. Cubas tropical forests, soils, and maritime areas
have suffered degradation as a result of harmful policies stemming from a Soviet-style economic system. Cubas
economy could be reinvigorated through expanded tourism, development initiatives and an expansion of commodity
exports, including sugarcane for ethanol. U.S. policy toward Cuba should encourage environmental factors, thereby
strengthening U.S. credibility throughout the hemisphere. A n environmental partnership

between the U.S. and Cuba is not only possible, but could result in
development models that could serve as an example for environmental
strategies throughout the Americas. The U.S. has the economic resources
necessary to aid Cuba in developing effective policy, while the island
provides the space where sustainable systems can be implemented
initially instead of being applied after the fact. Cubas extreme lack of
development provides an unspoiled arena for the execution of exemplary
sustainable environmental protection practices. Waste Not, Want Not Although the

government of Cuba has established state-based agencies to develop sustainable environmental practices, the islands resources are left to be used at the
governments discretion. It is estimated that throughout Cuba, about 113.5 billion gallons of water contaminated with agricultural, industrial and urban
wastes are dumped into the sea annually and more than 3.27 billion gallons find their way into its rivers. As direct dumping of untreated industrial waste into
rivers, aquifers, and the sea is the norm, Cuban scientists estimate that this volume of industrial liquid waste pollutes roughly 486 gallons of clean water per
year. The majority of this contamination stems from four industries, all state owned and operated, nickel excavation, sugar refineries, oil refineries, and rice
farms. A 1994 Cuban press release disclosed that the Soto Alba nickel plant on the Moa Bay dumped more than 3.17 billion gallons of untreated liquid waste
into the sea every day. The waste contained 72 tons of aluminum, 48 tons of chromium, 15 tons of magnesium, and 30 tons of sulfuric acid. By way of
comparison, the treatment standards for wastewater in the U.S. limit the concentration of chromium to a maximum of 0.32 milligrams per liter, 12 times less
than the daily dumping into the Moa Bay by only one of the three nickel plants operating in the area. In the sugar industry, more than 15.85 billion gallons of
liquid waste are dumped into caves by the 151 operating sugar mills on the island creating the most enduring environmental problem. These alarming figures
highlight the precipitous position of Cubas environment. While Cuban citizens increasingly are aware of the importance of environmental conservation, the
government continues to exploit the islands resources for state use without hindrance of being environmentally sound. Environmentalists maintain that the
Cuban government must take responsibility for enforcing the environmental laws it has enacted and agreements it has signed. For Cubans and foreigners
alike, the beaches of Cuba constitute the principle tourist attraction in the country, but even these have not escaped wasteful government exploitation. The
famous beaches east of Havana have been the victims of sand removal for use by the Cuban government in the construction industry. In addition to coastal
destruction, like many of its Caribbean neighbors, Cuba faces deforestation, over-cultivation of land and compaction of soils due to the use of heavy farm
machinery and strip mining. These practices have resulted in high salinity in soils and heavy land erosion. Furthermore, poor water quality in freshwater
streams has affected the wildlife habitat, which is in turn influenced by runoff from agricultural practices, erosion due to deforestation, and sedimentation of
freshwater streams. Cuba must act in a responsible manner to stop environmental degradation and preserve its tourist industry as an early step to salvage its
inert economy. Beginning Concerns The environmental degradation that began during the colonial era has transcended time as a result of Castros political
and economic paradigm. Only in the last 40 years, with the development of the Commission for the Protection of the Environment and the Conservation of
Natural Resources (COMARNA), has Cuba begun to address growing environmental concerns. COMARNA consolidated all of the agencies with
environmental responsibilities, as a step towards giving them the power to influence all environmental issues. Although COMARNA was all-inclusive, it
lacked independent authority, so its activities achieved few tangible results. The sad fact was that the centralized agency only succeeded in aiding the state in
squandering resources. In reality, establishing the agency was a modest concession to ease environmental concerns, but the truth lingered that Cubas wealth
of natural resources remained under the auspices of the government. COMARNA acknowledged the appeals for conservation by the international community,
yet it allowed for the misuse of natural resources by the State. By way of example, the centralized Cuban agency built thousands of miles of roads for the
development of non-existent state agricultural enterprises and dams where there was hardly any water to contain. In 1981, Cuba enacted Law 33 in an
attempt to legitimize their environmental laws and regulations, yet Law 33 played only a miniscule role in guiding the extraction of natural resources and the
conservation of ecological life on the island. Lauded as a law ahead of its time, Law 33 purportedly covers all the regulations concerning the environment and
the protection and use of Cuban national resources, even though it produced few results. The statute includes a section comparing the wise use of natural
resources by communist countries versus the indiscriminate use of natural resources by the capitalistic world. In this regard, the document is more a piece of
political propaganda than a law meant to be rigorously enforced. Moreover it palls in comparison to international environmental protection guidelines and
has relatively limited significance within the country since the Cuban government is responsible for the operation of the bulk of the industries and is therefore
the principal polluter and consumer of natural resources. Thus Law 33 exonerates the Cuban government from enforcing stricter conservation standards by
making a system that looks efficient, but in reality may not be so. A closer analysis on Law 33 exposes its inherent lack of efficacy and applicability. Attempts
to Move Forward In 1994, Cuba developed the Ministry of Science, Technology and the Environment (CITMA) in order to absorb the tasks of the
unproductive COMARNA. CITMA attempts to steer the implementation of environmental policy, the rational use of natural resources, and the adoption of
sustainable development programs. Law 81 developed out of the necessity to give the Ministry a more sharply defined role in the government by replacing the
outdated Law 33. Law 81, the Law of the Environment, was enacted in 1997 and presents a comprehensive framework law that covers all aspects of the
environment ranging from air, water and waste, to historic preservation and coastal zone management. Although it details inspections and an enforcement

plan, the law is ultimately ineffective due to its overarching nature, which makes it difficult to enforce. Law 81 may replace a necessary revision of Law 33;
however, it remains vague in its enforcement procedures. For example, Law 81, Article 81 states that national resources will be used in accordance with the
provisions that their rational use will be assured, for which their quantitative and qualitative continuity will be preserved, recycling and recovery systems will
be developed, and the ecosystems to which they belong safeguarded. This portion of the provision elucidates the ambiguous nature of the law, as it continues
to delineate objectives without coming up with specific implementation strategies. In 1997, the Earth Summit, a conference sponsored by the United Nations
aimed at aiding governments in rethinking economic development and finding ways to halt the destruction of irreplaceable natural resources and pollution of
the planet was held in New York. At the Summit, Cuban officials were refreshingly blunt in acknowledging the environmental degradation present on their
island. In a pamphlet distributed at the conference, the Havana government stated that there have been mistakes and shortcomings, due mainly to
insufficient environmental awareness, knowledge and education, the lack of a higher management demand, limited introduction and generalization of
scientific and technological achievements, as well as the still insufficient incorporation of environmental dimensions in its policies. The authorities also
pointed to the insufficient development plans and programs and the absence of a sufficiently integrative and coherent judicial system, to enforce
environmental regulations. After the Earth Summit, Cuba designed and implemented a variety of programs, administrative structures, and public awareness
initiatives to promote sound environmental management and sustainable development. Although the conference spurred motivation in environmental
matters, Cuba still lacked the economic resources needed to support its share of environmental protection responsibilities due to the loss of its financial ties
with the former Soviet Union. The Earth Summit came after the fall of the Soviet Union and the tightening of the U.S. blockade against Cuba in 1992, which
resulted in a 35% retrenchment of the Cuban GDP. The Special Period, referring to the cut off of economic subsidies that had regularly come from the former
Soviet Union, witnessed a decrease in many environmentally damaging activities both by choice and by necessity. The end of aid from the Russia also resulted
in many decisions aimed at resuscitating the Cuban economy. The economic crisis increased pressure to sacrifice environmental protection for economic
output. Although development slowed due to economic concerns, the islands forests were particularly overworked for firewood and finished wood exports.
However, the crisis also provided the impetus for pursuing sustainable development strategies. The principle motivating such change has been a realization
that if Cuba does not preserve its environment, it will, at the very least, lose its attraction to tourists. Diverging Views Unlike the U.S., which still has never
ratified the Kyoto Protocol, Cuba signed the document in 1997, which calls for the stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level
that would prevent dangerous interference with the global climate system. This legally binding international agreement attempts to tackle the issue of global
warming and the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. The U.S., although a signatory of the Kyoto Protocol, has neither ratified nor withdrawn from the
Protocol. The signature alone is merely symbolic, as the Kyoto Protocol is non-binding on the United States unless ratified. Although in 2005 the United
States was the largest per capita emitter of carbon dioxide from the burning of fossil fuels, it experienced only a modest decline of 2.8 percent from 2007 to

2008. This

decline demonstrates that the U.S. has the framework to reverse

Cubas substandard environmental track record. By aiding Havana ,
Washington would be able to brand itself as an active conservationist.
Such a label would enable the U.S. to create a valuable ecological public
image in the international arena.

Cuban polyculture solves extinction

Coyne & Hoekstra 7 (Jerry, professor in the Department of Ecology and Evolution
at the University of Chicago & Hopi, Associate Professor in the Department of
Organismic and Evolutionary Biology at Harvard University. The New Republic, The
Greatest Dying, 9/24, http://www.truthout.org/article/jerry-coyne-and-hopi-ehoekstra-the-greatest-dying)
But it isn't just the destruction of the rainforests that should trouble us. Healthy ecosystems the world over provide
hidden services like waste disposal, nutrient cycling, soil formation, water

purification, and oxygen production. Such services are best rendered by

ecosystems that are diverse. Yet, through both intention and accident, humans have
introduced exotic species that turn biodiversity into monoculture. Fast-growing zebra mussels, for
example, have outcompeted more than 15 species of native mussels in North America's Great Lakes and have damaged
harbors and water-treatment plants. Native prairies are becoming dominated by single species (often genetically
homogenous) of corn or wheat. Thanks to these developments, soils will erode and become

unproductive - which, along with temperature change, will diminish agricultural

yields. Meanwhile, with increased pollution and runoff, as well as reduced forest cover, ecosystems will
no longer be able to purify water; and a shortage of clean water spells
disaster. In many ways, oceans are the most vulnerable areas of all. As overfishing
eliminates major predators, while polluted and warming waters kill off phytoplankton, the
intricate aquatic food web could collapse from both sides. Fish, on which so many humans depend, will be a
fond memory. As phytoplankton vanish, so does the ability of the oceans to absorb carbon dioxide and produce
oxygen. (Half of the oxygen we breathe is made by phytoplankton, with the rest coming from land plants.) Species
extinction is also imperiling coral reefs - a major problem since these reefs have far more than recreational value: They
provide tremendous amounts of food for human populations and buffer coastlines against erosion. In fact, the
global value of "hidden" services provided by ecosystems - those services, like waste disposal, that aren't bought and
sold in the marketplace - has been estimated to be as much as $50 trillion per year, roughly equal to the gross
domestic product of all countries combined. And that doesn't include tangible goods like fish and timber . Life as

we know it would be impossible if ecosystems collapsed. Yet that is where

we're heading if species extinction continues at its current pace.
Extinction also has a huge impact on medicine. Who really cares if, say, a worm in the
remote swamps of French Guiana goes extinct? Well, those who suffer from cardiovascular disease. The recent
discovery of a rare South American leech has led to the isolation of a powerful enzyme that, unlike other

anticoagulants, not only prevents blood from clotting but also dissolves existing clots. And it's not just this one species
of worm: Its wriggly relatives have evolved other biomedically valuable proteins, including antistatin (a potential
anticancer agent), decorsin and ornatin (platelet aggregation inhibitors), and hirudin (another anticoagulant).
Plants, too, are pharmaceutical gold mines. The bark of trees, for example, has given us quinine
(the first cure for malaria), taxol (a drug highly effective against ovarian and breast cancer), and aspirin. More than a

quarter of the medicines on our pharmacy shelves were originally derived

from plants. The sap of the Madagascar periwinkle contains more than 70 useful alkaloids, including
vincristine, a powerful anticancer drug that saved the life of one of our friends. Of the roughly 250,000 plant
species on Earth, fewer than 5 percent have been screened for pharmaceutical properties. Who knows what

life-saving drugs remain to be discovered? Given current extinction rates,

it's estimated that we're losing one valuable drug every two years. Our
arguments so far have tacitly assumed that species are worth saving only in proportion to their economic value and
their effects on our quality of life, an attitude that is strongly ingrained, especially in Americans. That is why
conservationists always base their case on an economic calculus. But we biologists know in our hearts that there are
deeper and equally compelling reasons to worry about the loss of biodiversity: namely, simple morality and
intellectual values that transcend pecuniary interests. What, for example, gives us the right to destroy other creatures?
And what could be more thrilling than looking around us, seeing that we are surrounded by our evolutionary cousins,
and realizing that we all got here by the same simple process of natural selection? To biologists, and potentially
everyone else, apprehending the genetic kinship and common origin of all species is a spiritual experience - not
necessarily religious, but spiritual nonetheless, for it stirs the soul. But, whether or not one is moved by such
concerns, it is certain that our future is bleak if we do nothing to stem this sixth

extinction. We are creating a world in which exotic diseases flourish but natural
medicinal cures are lost; a world in which carbon waste accumulates while food
sources dwindle; a world of sweltering heat, failing crops, and impure
water. In the end, we must accept the possibility that we ourselves are not
immune to extinction. Or, if we survive, perhaps only a few of us will remain, scratching out a grubby
existence on a devastated planet. Global warming will seem like a secondary problem when humanity finally faces the
consequences of what we have done to nature: not just another Great Dying, but perhaps the greatest dying of them
all.

Keystone species solve extinction

Mittermeier 11 (et al, Dr. Russell Alan Mittermeier is a primatologist, herpetologist and biological
anthropologist. He holds Ph.D. from Harvard in Biological Anthropology and serves as an Adjunct Professor at the State
University of New York at Stony Brook. He has conducted fieldwork for over 30 years on three continents and in more
than 20 countries in mainly tropical locations. He is the President of Conservation International and he is considered an
expert on biological diversity. Mittermeier has formally discovered several monkey species. From Chapter One of the book
Biodiversity Hotspots F.E. Zachos and J.C. Habel (eds.), DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-20992-5_1, # Springer-Verlag Berlin
Heidelberg 2011. This evidence also internally references Norman Myers, a very famous British environmentalist
specialising in biodiversity. available at:
http://www.academia.edu/1536096/Global_biodiversity_conservation_the_critical_role_of_hotspots)

Extinction is the gravest consequence of the biodiversity crisis, since it is

irreversible. Human activities have elevated the rate of species extinctions to
a thousand or more times the natural background rate (Pimm et al. 1995). What are the
consequences of this loss? Most obvious among them may be the lost opportunity for future resource use. Scientists have
discovered a mere fraction of Earths species (perhaps fewer than 10%, or even 1%) and understood the biology of even
fewer (Novotny et al. 2002). As

species vanish, so too does the health security of

every human. Earths species are a vast genetic storehouse that may harbor a cure for cancer,
malaria, or the next new pathogen cures waiting to be discovered. Compounds initially derived from wild
species account for more than half of all commercial medicines even more in developing nations (Chivian and
Bernstein 2008). Natural forms, processes, and ecosystems provide blueprints and inspiration for a growing array of
new materials, energy sources, hi-tech devices, and other innovations (Benyus 2009). The current loss of species has
been compared to burning down the worlds libraries without knowing the content of 90% or more of the books. With

loss of species, we lose the ultimate source of our crops and the genes we use to
improve agricultural resilience, the inspiration for manufactured products, and the basis of the
structure and function of the ecosystems that support humans and all life on Earth
(McNeely et al. 2009). Above and beyond material welfare and livelihoods, biodiversity contributes to security,
resiliency, and freedom of choices and actions (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 2005). Less tangible, but no less

important, are the cultural, spiritual, and moral costs inflicted by species extinctions. All societies value species for their
own sake, and wild plants and animals are integral to the fabric of all the worlds cultures (Wilson 1984). The road to
extinction is made even more perilous to people by the loss of the broader ecosystems that underpin our livelihoods,
communities, and economies(McNeely et al.2009). The loss of coastal wetlands and mangrove forests, for example,
greatly exacerbates both human mortality and economic damage from tropical cyclones (Costanza et al.2008; Das and
Vincent2009), while disease outbreaks such as the 2003 emergence of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome in East Asia
have been directly connected to trade in wildlife for human consumption(Guan et al.2003). Other consequences of
biodiversity loss, more subtle but equally damaging, include the deterioration of Earths natural capital. Loss of
biodiversity on land in the past decade alone is estimated to be costing the global economy $500 billion annually
(TEEB2009). Reduced diversity may also reduce resilience of ecosystems and the human communities that depend on
them. For example, more diverse coral reef communities have been found to suffer less from the diseases that plague
degraded reefs elsewhere (Raymundo et al.2009). As Earths climate changes, the roles of species and ecosystems will only
increase in their importance to humanity (Turner et al.2009). In many respects, conservation is local. People generally
care more about the biodiversity in the place in which they live. They also depend upon these ecosystems the most and,
broadly speaking, it is these areas over which they have the most control. Furthermore, we believe that all biodiversity is
important and that every nation, every region, and every community should do everything possible to conserve their living
resources. So, what is the importance of setting global priorities? Extinction is a global phenomenon ,

with impacts far beyond nearby administrative borders. More practically, biodiversity,
the threats to it, and the ability of countries to pay for its conservation vary around the world. The vast majority of the
global conservation budget perhaps 90% originates in and is spent in economically wealthy countries (James et
al.1999). It is thus critical that those globally exible funds available in the hundreds of millions annually be guided by
systematic priorities if we are to move deliberately toward a global goal of reducing biodiversity loss. The establishment
of priorities for biodiversity conservation is complex, but can be framed as a single question. Given the choice, where

should action toward reducing the loss of biodiversity be implemented rst ? The eld
of conservation planning addresses this question and revolves around a framework of
vulnerability and irreplaceability (Margules and Pressey2000). Vulnerability measures the risk to the
species present in a region if the species and ecosystems that are highly threatened are not protected now, we will not
get another chance in the future. Irreplaceability measures the extent to which spatial substitutes exist for securing
biodiversity. The number of species alone is an inadequate indication of conserva-tion priority because several areas can
share the same species. In contrast, areas with high levels of endemism are irreplaceable. We must conserve these places
because the unique species they contain cannot be saved elsewhere. Put another way, biodiversity is not evenly distributed
on our planet. It is heavily concentrated in certain areas, these areas have exceptionally high concentrations of endemic
species found nowhere else, and many (but not all) of these areas are the areas at greatest risk of disappearing because of
heavy human impact. Myers seminal paper (Myers1988) was the rst application of the principles of irreplaceability and
vulnerability to guide conservation planning on a global scale. Myers described ten tropical forest
hotspots

on the basis of extraordinary plant endemism and high levels of habitat

loss, albeit without quantitative criteria for the designation of hotspot status. A subsequent analysis added eight
additional hotspots, including four from Mediterranean-type ecosystems (Myers 1990).After adopting hotspots as an
institutional blueprint in 1989, Conservation Interna-tional worked with Myers in a rst systematic update of the
hotspots. It introduced two strict quantitative criteria: to qualify as a hotspot, a region had to contain at least 1,500
vascular plants as endemics ( > 0.5% of the worlds total), and it had to have 30% or less of its original vegetation (extent
of historical habitat cover)remaining. These efforts culminated in an extensive global review (Mittermeier
et al.1999) and scientic publication (Myers et al.2000) that introduced

seven new hotspots on the

basis of both the better-dened criteria and new data. A second systematic update (Mittermeier et al.2004) did
not change the criteria, but revisited the set of hotspots based on new data on the distribution of species and threats, as
well as genuine changes in the threat status of these regions. That update redened several hotspots, such as the Eastern
Afromontane region, and added several others that were suspected hotspots but for which sufcient data either did not
exist or were not accessible to conservation scientists outside of those regions. Sadly, it uncovered another region the
East Melanesian Islands which rapid habitat destruction had in a short period of time transformed from a biodiverse
region that failed to meet the less than 30% of original vegetation remaining criterion to a genuine hotspot.

Scenario two is Hemispheric Co-op US-Cuba relations dictate hemispheric policy the status quo
undermines co-op
Brookings 8 (The Brookings Institution. November. Rethinking. U.S.Latin American Relations: A
Hemispheric Partnership for a Turbulent World
http://www.brookings.edu/reports/2008/1124_latin_america_partnership.aspx)

U.S.-Cuban relations have disproportionately dominated U.S. policy

toward the LAC region for years. Tensions generated by U.S. policies
toward Cuba have affected the United States image in the region and have
hindered Washingtons ability to work constructively with other
countries. For this reason, addressing U.S. policy toward Cuba has implications
that go beyond the bilateral relationship and affect U.S. relations with the
rest of the LAC region more generally. Political change in Washington,
combined with recent demographic and ideological shifts in the Cuban
American community and recent leadership changes in Cuba itself, offer
a valuable opportunity to change course. Though the reforms enacted
recently in Cuba have thus far been mostly cosmetic, they could create
openings for grassroots political and economic activity. The removal of
restrictions on access to tourist facilities and on the purchase of mobile
telephones and computers may have an important psychological impact
and increase contact with the outside world. Also, the Cuban government
has recently lifted all wage caps, started to allow performance bonuses
for certain salaried professions, liberalized the sale of farming
equipment, and begun to lease idle state lands to increase agricultural
output. These reforms may improve labor incentives, purchasing power, and productivity. Economic
developments in Cuba will affect U.S.-Cuban relations. Today, the United States is Cubas fourth-largest trading
partner; in 2007, it sold the island $582 million worth of goods (including shipping costs). Cuba is currently exploring
its prospects for energy production in both sugarcane-based ethanol and offsh ore oil. Spanish, Canadian, Norwegian,
Brazilian, Indian, and other international oil companies have secured contracts to explore drilling possibilities off the
Cuban coast. If the ethanol and oil industries become fully operational in five to seven years, revenues of $3 billion to
$5 billion annually could significantly strengthen the Cuban economy and reduce the governments vulnerability to
external political pressure. With stable inflows of hard currency from oil sales, the Cuban government would have
more funds to use at its discretion, further eroding the effects of the U.S. embargo on trade with Cuba.

Demographic and ideological shifts in the Cuban American community in

the United States add to the prospects for reorienting U.S.-Cuban
relations. The Cuban American population is getting younger
demographically, and its priorities regarding Cuba have shifted from a
traditional hard line to a focus on the day-to-day existence of those living
on the island. According to 2007 polls by Florida International University, Cuban Americans are
increasingly opposed to current U.S. policy , particularly restrictions on family travel, caps

on remittances, and limitations on the sale of medical and other vital supplies to Cuba; 64 percent of those polled
support a return to the more liberal policies of 2003. The Cuban American community has historically played a central
role in U.S. domestic politics, with strong influence in the state of Florida. This shift in public opinion

may ease the path toward reorientation for policymakers in Washington.

The view of this Commission is that U.S. policy should be reframed to enable legitimate Cuban voices to shape a
representative, accountable, and sustainable transition to democracy. The Cuban people should be empowered to
drive sustainable change from within by facilitating the free flow of information and expanding diplomatic networks
to support human rights and democratic governance.

Cuba is a low-hanging fruit its a prerequisite to hemispheric

relations
Doherty 8 (Patrick, "An Obama Policy for Cuba," McClathy Newspapers, December
12,cuba.newamerica.net/publications/articles/2008/obama_policy_cuba_9301)
With his national security team in place, President-elect Barack Obama's foreign policy
principals will be immediately struck by how many complex and expensive challenges they will face. Iraq, Iran,
Pakistan, Afghanistan, Israel-Palestine and Russia, will all require enormous energy, all the tools in our foreign policy
toolbox, and will all take years to resolve, if they can be resolved. None of these crises will allow

President Obama to signal swiftly to the world the kind of changes he

proposes in American foreign policy. In contrast, U.S.-Cuba policy is lowhanging fruit:

though of marginal importance domestically, it could be changed immediately at little cost. At

present, that policy is a major black spot on America's international

reputation . For the rest of the world, our failed, obsolete and 50-year old
policy toward Cuba goes against everything that Obama campaigned for,
and the recent 185-3 U.N. vote to condemn the centerpiece of that policy ,
the embargo the 16th such vote in as many years

makes that clear. The entire world

believes our policy is wrong . And the world is right. The fact is that since Cuba stopped exporting
revolution and started exporting doctors and nurses, it ceased being a national security concern for the United States.
And yet we restrict travel to the island - unconstitutionally - and constrain Cuban-Americans in the amount of money
they can send to their families on the island. Moreover, the economic embargo hurts the Cuban people more than the
Cuban leadership, and our Helms-Burton legislation imposes Washington's will on
foreign businesses who wish to trade with Cuba, creating ill will in
business communities from Canada to Brazil. Our Cuba policy is also an
obstacle to striking a new relationship with the nations of Latin America .
Any 21st-century policy toward Latin America will have to shift from the Cold
War-era emphasis on right-wing governments and top-down economic adjustment to creating a
hemispheric partnership to address many critical issues: the revival of
militant leftism, the twin challenges of sustainability and inclusive
economic growth, and the rising hemispheric influence of Russia and
China. But until Washington ends the extraordinary sanctions that
comprise the Cuba embargo, Latin America will remain at arms-length,
and the problems in our backyard - Hugo Chavez, drugs, immigration,
energy insecurity - will simply fester.

Hemispheric relations curb organized crime

Brookings 8 (The Brookings Institution. November. Rethinking. U.S.Latin American Relations: A
Hemispheric Partnership for a Turbulent World
http://www.brookings.edu/reports/2008/1124_latin_america_partnership.aspx)
Crime and insecurity are growing scourges in the Western Hemisphere. The LAC region has only 9 percent of the
worlds population, yet it has 27 percent of global homicidesabout 140,000 a year. Crime, especially organized
crime, poses a serious threat to public security and undermines public institutions and the legitimate business sector.

Organized crime in the hemisphere today encompasses a variety of

criminal enterprises, including narcotics trafficking, money laundering,
alien smuggling, human trafficking, kidnapping, and arms and
counterfeit goods smuggling. The United States stands at the crossroads
of many of these illicit flows. Violent youth gangs, such as the Mara Salvatrucha, have a presence in

the United States. Some 2,000 guns cross the United StatesMexico border from north to south every day, helping to
fuel violence among drug cartels and with the army and police. About 17,500 persons are smuggled into the United
States annually as trafficking victims, and another 500,000 come as illegal immigrants. The United States remains
both a leading consuming country across the full range of illicit narcotics and a country with major domestic

production of methamphetamines, cannabis, and other synthetic narcotics. The

nations of the
Western Hemisphere have adopted a variety of international instruments
to tackle organized crime. Virtually every country in the Americas has ratified the 2000 UN
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. Most of the hemispheres countries have
also signed and ratified international agreements that deal with the
trafficking of persons, the smuggling of migrants, illicit firearms
trafficking, and the illicit drug trade. Yet a significant reduction in crime
in the hemisphere remains elusive. The narcotics trade remains at the
core of organized crime in the hemisphere. This is by far the most
lucrative of illegal trades, generating hundreds of billions of dollars a
year. Its immense cash flow, vast employment opportunities, and
sophisticated networks feed other kinds of criminal activity and allow
drug traffickers to adapt with extraordinary speed to governments
counternarcotics efforts. The drug trade is also singularly adept at corrupting judicial, political, and law
enforcement institutions. In Mexico, open war between the cartels and all levels of government has killed 4,000
people so far in 2008 aloneabout as many casualties as the United States has sustained in almost six years of war in
Iraq. This violence already threatens to spill into the United States and to destabilize Mexicos political institutions.
Because it lies at the core of regional criminal activity, this section focuses on the illegal drug trade. A

hemisphere-wide counternarcotics strategy encompassing consuming,

producing, and transshipment countries is required to combat not only
the illegal drug trade but also other forms of crime.

Latin America is a critical element of supporting Russian

organized crime
Bagley 1 (Bruce, GLOBALIZATION AND TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME: THE RUSSIAN MAFIA IN LATIN AMERICA
AND THE CARIBBEAN, School of International Studies at the University of Miami Coral Gables, November 15,
http://www.as.miami.edu/international-studies/pdf/Bagley%20GLOBALIZATION%202.pdf)
The purpose of this paper is to examine the scope and impact of the post-Cold War wave of Russian transnational organized crime in one
region of the global system: Latin America and the Caribbean. Although the evidence currently available in the public realm is

is, despite these limitations, sufficient to support the

conclusion that the linkages or strategic alliances between various
Russian organized crime groups and major transnational criminal
organizations in Latin America and the Caribbean in 2001 were already substantial and
expanding rapidly. Moreover, it raises the specter that, at least in some key countries in the region (e.g.,
Colombia, Mexico and Brazil), the alliances between home-grown and Russian criminal
organizations may provide domestic criminal and/or guerrilla groups with
access to the illicit international markets, money-laundering facilities and
illegal arms sources that could convert them into major impediments to economic growth and serious threats to
primarily journalistic and often anecdotal, it

democratic consolidation and long-run stability at home. Organized crime1 flourishes best in the contexts provided by weak states.2 In the
wake of the complete collapse of the Soviet Empire in 1991, the new Russian state that assumed power in Moscow was from the outset a
weak state and its institutional weakness led Russia, along with most of the other 14 independent states that emerged out of the former
Soviet Union (e.g., the Ukraine, Belarus, Georgia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Tajikistan and Kazakhstan), to become
hotbeds of organized crime over the decade of the 1990s.3 The

longstanding institutional weaknesses

of most states in Latin America and the Caribbean, in combination with the existence
of a highly lucrative underground drug trade in the Western hemisphere,
made the countries in that corner of the world system especially attractive
targets for Russian transnational criminal enterprises . The lack of transparency and effective
state monitoring in the banking systems of many Latin American and Caribbean nations left them particularly vulnerable to penetration by
Russian money launderers. Their

corrupt and ineffective law enforcement institutions

and judicial systems allowed Russian crime groups to operate outside of the
law with virtual impunity. Indeed, the dubious practice of a number of the states in the region (e.g., Dominica,
Panama, Uruguay and Paraguay) of selling citizenship literally provided an open invitation to Russian crime groups to establish
themselves in the hemisphere. As Tom Farer notes, when states are weak, but act as if they were strong ...spewing out laws and regulations

purporting to regulate, inhibit, and tax private activity... without the will or capacity to enforce the law, they inevitably create spaces or
niches between reality and legality that can be and frequently are exploited by organized crime.4

Russian organized crime causes a Russian economic and

political collapse
CSIS 98 (Center for Strategic and international Studies [William Webster, Arnaud De Borchgrave, Robert Kupperman, Erik
Peterson, Gerard Burke, Frank Cilluffo, Robert Johnston], Russian Organized Crime, Global Organized Crime Project,
www.russianlaw.org/roc_csis.pd)

If Russian Organized Crime (ROC) is left unchecked, Russia is in danger of

evolving into a criminal-syndicalist statea troika comprised of gangsters, corrupt gov- ernment
bureaucrats, and certain crooked and sometimes prominent businessmen who continue to accumulate vast amounts of
wealth by promoting and exploiting corruption and the vulnerabilities inherent in a society in transition. Expanding at a
dizzying pace, ROC is a major force in shaping the post-Soviet political, eco-

nomic, and social development of Russia. Virtually no sector of Russian

society is immune from the effects of ROC. r Government:Despite the turbulent electoral cycles
of Russian politics, ROC has been a constant force in shaping Russian politics in
two major ways. First, the inability of the Russian government to combat
ROC groups effectively is leading to a crisis of confidence in the political
institutions that presently govern the Russian state. Second, corrupt
government leaders are themselves frequently integral components of ROC
groups. Collectively, these developments weaken support for the democratic
experiment in Russia. r Economy: The market liberalization experiment in
Russia has been under- mined by the activities of ROC . Large quantities of Russias
natural resources are sold abroad by ROC groups, generating little return for the Russian public. ROC groups
also deprive the state of much-needed tax revenue. Moreover, the violent and
illicit extortion and intimidation tactics of ROC groups are a major deterrent
to urgently needed foreign investment. Due in large part to the ROC phenomenon, foreign
investment in China ($176 billion) has outstripped that in Russia 20:1.5 These problems seriously
jeopardize the privatization and liberalization of Russias economy . r
Banks:Further complicating the economic experiment in Russia is the systematic corruption within the financial community. Major Aleksandr Gro- mov of the
Russian tax police told a September 1994 conference of the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FINCEN) that
almost all Russian banks are corrupt. 6 Banks are central components of ROC activity

both as a primary target for extortion and as the main vehicle for extensive
money laundering. These activities are initiated on a transnational basis as evi- denced by the appearance of
ROC activity in Cyprus, the Caribbean islands, and other offshore banking centers the world over.

Russian economic collapse triggers and accesses every

scenario for conflict.
Oliker and Charlick-Paley 2 (Olga and Tanya, RAND Corporation Project Air Force, Assessing Russias
Decline, 2002, www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1442/)

The preceding chapters have illustrated the ways in which Russias decline affects that country and may evolve into
challenges and dangers that extend well beyond its borders. The political factors of decline may

make Russia a less stable international actor and other factors may increase
the risk of internal unrest. Together and separately, they increase the risk of conflict
and the potential scope of other imaginable disasters. The trends of regionalization,
particularly the disparate rates of economic growth among regions, combined with the politicization of regional economic
and military interests, will be important to watch. The potential for locale, or possibly ethnicity, to serve as a
rallying point for internal conflict is low at present, but these factors have the potential to feed into precisely the cycle
instability that political scientists have identified as making states in transition to democracy more likely to become
involved in war. These factors also increase the potential for domestic turmoil,

of

which further increases the risk of international conflict, for instance if Moscow seeks to
united a divided nation and/or demonstrate globally that its waning power remains something to be reckoned with.

Given Russias conventional weakness, an increased risk of conflict carries

with it an increased risk of nuclear weapons use , and Russias demographic
situation increases the potential for a major epidemic with possible
implications for Europe and perhaps beyond. The dangers posed by Russias
civilian and military nuclear weapons complex, aside from the threat of nuclear weapons use,
create a real risk of proliferation of weapons or weapons materials to
terrorist groups, as well as perpetuating an increasing risk of accident at
one of Russias nuclear power plants or other facilities . These elements touch upon key
security interests, thus raising serious concerns for the United States. A declining Russia increases the
likelihood of conflictinternal or otherwiseand the general deterioration that Russia has in common with
failing states raises serious questions about its capacity to respond to an emerging crisis. A crisis in large,
populous, and nuclear-armed Russia can easily affect the interests of the
United States and its allies. In response to such a scenario, the United States,
whether alone or as part of a larger coalition, could be asked to send military forces to the
area in and around Russia. This chapter will explore a handful of scenarios that could call for U.S.
involvement. A wide range of crisis scenarios can be reasonably extrapolated from the trends implicit in Russias decline.
A notional list includes: Authorized or unauthorized belligerent actions by Russia troops in trouble-prone Russian regions
or in neighboring states could lead to armed conflict. Border clashes with China in the Russian

Far East or between Russia and Ukraine, the Baltic states, Kazakhstan, or
another neighbor could escalate into interstate combat. Nuclear-armed
terrorists based in Russia or using weapons or materials diverted from
Russian facilities could threaten Russia, Europe, Asia, or the United States.
Civil war in Russia could involve fighting near storage sites for nuclear,
chemical, or biological weapons and agents, risking large-scale
contamination and humanitarian disaster. A nuclear accident at a power
plant or facility could endanger life and health in Russia and neighboring
states. A chemical accident at a plant or nuclear or nuclear-related facility could endanger life and health in Rusisa and
neighboring states. Ethnic pogrom in south Russia could force refugees into
Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and/or Ukraine. Economic and ethnic
conflicts in Caucasus could erupt into armed clashes, which would endanger
oil and gas pipelines in the region. A massive ecological disaster such as an
earthquake, famine, or epidemic could spawn refugees and spread illness
and death across borders. An increasingly criminalized Russian economy
could create a safe haven for crime or even terrorist-linked groups. From
this base, criminals, drug traders, and terrorists could threaten the people
and economies of Europe, Asia, and the United States. Accelerated Russian
weapons and technology sales or unauthorized diversion could foster the
proliferation of weapons and weapon materials to rogue states and nonstate
terrorist actors, increasing the risk of nuclear war.

Organized crime is the lifeblood of terrorism

Zaitseva 7 (Lyudmila, Center for International Security and Cooperation Visting

Fellow, "Organized Crime, Terrorism and Nuclear Trafficking," Strategic Insights,

Volume VI, Issue 5, August,
http://www.nps.edu/Academics/centers/ccc/publications/OnlineJournal/2007/Aug/zai
tsevaAug07.html)
The merging of international terrorist organizations with transnational
organized crime is one of the most serious threats that our society faces
today. The debate about these emerging alliances has been ongoing for some
time now.[1] Experts agree that there are clear overlaps between international
terrorist and organized crime networks . In her Congressional Testimony delivered in September

2005, Glenn E. Schweitzer stated that organized crime had entered a new phase of complicity with terrorist networks:

Terrorist and criminal organizations rely on the same global transportation,

communication, and financial infrastructures for illegal ploys. They take
advantage of the same breakdowns in authority and enforcement in states
under siege. They both seek increasing shares of the fortunes generated
from narco-trafficking and other crimes.[2] The most obvious example of
such linkages is narcotics smuggling operations in Central and South
America

where drug proceeds are used to finance terrorist activities .

The overlap between drug industry and terrorism, widely known as narcoterrorism, is most
pronounced in Colombia, where two major terrorist groups the Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the United Self-Defence Groups of Colombia (AUC) receive more than
half of their operational funding through cocaine production, taxation and
distribution.[3] The former Taleban regime in Afghanistan, which was providing sanctuary to al-Qaeda, had also
and Asia,

profited from the local opium and heroin trade. The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan in Central Asia and the Abu Sayyaf
Group in the Philippines have both been involved in drug trafficking.[4] Weapons smuggling, kidnappings and financial
crime have also been widely used by these and other terrorist groups to raise proceeds for their activities.

This internal link has evaded our security measures

hemispheric co-op key
Zaitseva 7 (Lyudmila, Center for International Security and Cooperation Visting

Fellow, "Organized Crime, Terrorism and Nuclear Trafficking," Strategic Insights,

Volume VI, Issue 5, August,
http://www.nps.edu/Academics/centers/ccc/publications/OnlineJournal/2007/Aug/zai
tsevaAug07.html)
The involvement of organized crime in the trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive material has been a subject of
concern ever since the problem of nuclear smuggling came to light in the early 1990s. There are many

reasons to fear such a connection, ranging from the financial means

available to organized crime syndicates and their capabilities to move
almost any illegal product across multiple international borders undetected,
to their growing links with terrorist networks. Indeed, resourceful criminal
organizations with well-established trafficking channels and infrastructures
seem to be ideally suited for either delivering nuclear fissile and other
radioactive material to the customer or trafficking weapons built with these
materials to their final destination. For example, since September 11, the U.S. authorities discover
each year more than ten underground tunnels used for smuggling narcotics and illegal immigrants into the United States
from both Mexico and Canada.[18] Some of the immigrants reportedly come from as far as Pakistan. Such underground
tunnels have also been used for smuggling people into the European Union.

There is nothing to stop

terrorists from exploiting this kind of vulnerabilities in border control in

pursuit of their causes. In case of nuclear smuggling, no sophisticated
radiation detection equipment installed at official border crossings would
prevent them from entering a country together with their dangerous
materials or weapons, if they chose to do so through an underground
tunnel.

Given the enormous profits organized crime makes from their traditional criminal activities, such as

can be tried as
a sideline activity, if the criminals believe it can be profitable . Today organized crime
narcotics or people smuggling, nuclear trafficking may not be its first choice.[19] Nevertheless, it

does not limit itself to single forms of illegal activity, but engages in multi-crime and deals in anything and everything that
can bring profit. Besides, criminal networks can resort to nuclear trafficking upon a specific order by a potential buyer. It
is the latter scenario that raises the biggest concern among international experts due to its high plausibility and low
chances of detection. First of all, a serious potential customer approaching a criminal

network with a demand for specific radioactive substances is likely to be

either a state with a clandestine nuclear program or a terrorist organization
bent on acquiring or building a nuclear weapon or a far less devastating, but much easier to make, radiological dispersal
device (RDD). Second, such customers typically have already established links to

organized crime and trafficking networks, stemming from their other illicit
activities, such as weapons deliveries and drug smuggling. They also have
sufficient financial resources to pay the supplier. Such a sophisticated demand-driven
smuggling model, which includes a network of front companies, corrupt officials in nuclear and law-enforcement
establishments, and professional smuggling networks, has been described in detail by Rensselaer Lee.[20] The expert
notes that the existing U.S. counter-proliferation efforts in Russia and other

affected states are not designed to counter such operations, which in any
case are likely to be well-concealed. Just how well one can conceal such
clandestine efforts, was demonstrated by the A. Q. Khan network discovered
in 2004, which had organized supply of nuclear technologies and fissile
material to several countries through a number of players and front
companies in Asia, Africa, Europe and the Middle East.[21] This example
makes it imperative to continue studying the involvement of organized
crime in the nuclear black market.

Nuclear weapons are easy to use makes nuclear terrorism

most likely scenario for mass destruction
TRAC, 13 Terrorism Research & Analysis Consortium (Nuclear Terrorism,
http://www.trackingterrorism.org/article/nuclear-terrorism)//SY

With the advent of WMD, the basic understanding of terrorism as a

phenomenon has moved from a political and psychological level to a real
threat of mass destruction and disruption. The news of terrorists searching
for nuclear weapons in Russia and Afghanistan coupled the threat emanating from
groups such as Al Qaeda and other groups has brought this threat to the forefront
of analysts attention. However, while there is a clear consensus about an
increased threat of nuclear and radiological terrorism in the post 9/11
period, there are also others who have tagged this threat as overrated nightmare since using and acquiring nuclear
capability may well be beyond the purview of a terrorist group. At a global level, any form of nuclear
terrorism could have a devastating effect when it leads to war or armed
conflict between two countries or among a group of nuclear powers. The
impact of a nuclear-terrorist act would be far greater when it would be
misconstrued as an attack by the enemy country. TYPES OF GROUPS LIKELY TO TRY
WMDS Scholars have broadly categorized non state terrorists as actors who can resort to a nuclear strike against a
national state. For example, Charles Ferguson and W C Potter have clubbed them into four groups: Apocalyptic groups
(e.g Aum Shinrikyo), Politico-Religious Terrorist groups (e.g, Hezbollah, Al Qaeda, Lashkar-e-Taiba) Nationalist and
Separatists groups (e.g. LTTE, Baloch Rebel group), and Single issue Terrorist (e.g eco-terrorist). OBTAINING WMDS

There are two imaginable ways for terrorists to get nuclear explosives. They
could build a radiological bomb or an improvised nuclear device or they
could seek to steal or buy a miniaturized nuclear weapon. Before dealing with the kind of
threat our civil society could face in a nuclear catastrophe triggered by
terrorists, it would be useful to discuss and understand various types and effects of nuclear weapon and material
used in it, on the human environment. A terrorist group or an individual lone-wolf
terrorist would not face serious technical barriers in creating a basic or a
crude nuclear device. With some degree of technical sophistication it would
be easier to build weapons which could maximize the damage on any given
environment, both civil and military.

baseball diplomacy advantage

Status quo visa policy destroys baseball diplomacy
Stephens 5 (Sarah, Director of the Center for Democracy in the Americas, "A Swing
and a Miss: Why Bush Won't Play Ball with Cuba," The Huffington Post, December 17,
www.huffingtonpost.com/sarah-stephens/a-swing-and-a-miss-why-bu_b_12457.html)
Not that it isnt a wonderful idea; it is. But Cubas participation in the tournament depended on the Bush Treasury Departments willingness to grant the players visas to enter the United States. And the chances of
Team Bush granting the visas were somewhere between negligible and nil. The Treasury spokeswoman, Molly Millerwise, stepped right up to the plate. She told The New York Times in an e-mail message that any "activities or
contracts that could result in financial flows" to Fidel Castro and his regime "would effectively work against the objective of the sanctions and be inconsistent with current U.S. foreign policy towards Cuba." The amen corner of the
Congressthe Florida representatives who represent the ever-shrinking population of wildly conservative Cuban exilespushed the Treasury hard to throw the Cubans out of the game before they ever got a chance to hear the National
Anthem over the P.A. system. Major League baseball promises to push back, but if experience is any guide, the Bush administration is shameless in its role as couturier to the political whims of the Miami Cubans. Its hard to imagine the
Cuban baseball team ever taking the field. There are larger lessons here worth remembering. First, our sanctionsmeant to isolate Cuba, economically and diplomaticallyare unilateral, and in a globalized economy
that means they cannot work. Excluding Cuban baseball players would never have brought the Castro regime to its knees in 1959, and that is significantly less likely now. I just returned from Cuba and
what most Americans dont know is how deeply invested other nations are in Cuba; they are busy doing business in Cuba and making contacts with average Cubans. The Spanish, the Canadians, and the Chinese are
drilling for oil off Cubas coast, and paying the government millions of dollars in fees for the right to enter into joint ventures. A Spanish firm I visited at the Port of Havana is working with Cuba to build an enlarged container facilityand
committing $140 million in private capitalbetting on greater and greater growth in the Cuban economy over the next decade. Venezuela is providing Cuba with 80,000 barrels of oil each day, with unusually favorable
financing arrangements, which keeps the Cuban economy going during these days of high oil prices. Canada and China are paying big bucks to participate in joint ventures for the extraction of nickel. Israel is involvedin
agriculture and hotels and the list goes on and on. All we are doing with our unilateral sanctions against Cuba is punishing Americans and average Cubanspunishing Cuban-American families who are denied the right to visit
their kin on the island, punishing American companies who are forbidden to participate in Cubas recapitalization, and punishing American values. It was, after all, our contacts, our visitors, our goods, and our influence
which are credited with helping win the day in Eastern Europe when the wall came down and those newly independent societies had to choose a future path for their governance and their people.

The Bush administration preaches the faith of economic engagement

everywhere else on the planet. Cuba is the only exception. The world is there, and
average Cubans appreciate the economic stimulus and the opportunity to meet new people traveling to their island.
this decision on baseball neglects the universally recognized
healing power of sport. Thirty years ago, when Richard Nixon sought to
open China to the west, he capitalized on a development called Ping Pong
Diplomacy. As the Smithsonian says, Blending statecraft and sport, table tennis
matches between American and Chinese athletes set the stage of Nixons
breakthrough with the Peoples Republic. In the 2004 Summer Games, North and
South Korean athletes marched together into the Olympic Stadium
behind a common flag at the opening ceremony in Athens. Cuban
Second,

athletes deserve similar recognition, and our nation and Cuba would
benefit a great deal from being able to pursue peaceful competition on
the baseball field. Sport has a unique capacity to do this.

Youd think the former

But President Bush prefers

boomerang diplomacy to ping-pong diplomacy. He would much
rather stop Cuban and U.S. athletes from playing baseball together to
owner of the Texas Rangers would understand this as well as anyone.

keep the archaic and ineffective embargo against Cuba intact, than risk
exposing our fellow citizens to an aspect of Cuba they would never
otherwise get a chance to see. America gets nothing from punishing
Cuba; the administration simply makes Castros ideological case against
us: we end up isolated and looking unsportsmanlike all at the same time.

Letting Cuban players in is key to the success of baseball

diplomacy key legitimacy test solves international
perception
Centre for US Foreign Policy 7 (The Backyard Blogspot is the official blog for
Libertas: The Centre for US Foreign Policy,"Iron Man Diplomacy," November,
thebackyardblog.blogspot.com/2007/11/iron-man-diplomacy.html)

The U.S. finally defeated Cuba this week! Do not panic you have not missed a major event in international relations.
Team U.S.A. beat Cuba in the final of the 37th World Baseball Cup this Sunday to record their first win since 1974. At
first glance, baseballs significance to U.S. foreign policy and inter-American relations may not be that evident,
particularly for many of us on this side of the Atlantic. A closer look reveals that sports play a

basic part in U.S. cultural diplomacy and an introduction to baseball has

been used as a means to generate cultural ties with other regions and
reduce negative stereotyping of the U.S. In the Western Hemisphere.
however, where there is a shared love for Americas national game,
bisbol diplomacy reveals a different undertone to U.S. policy . Cultural
diplomacy has aimed not only at mutual exchange and understanding, but
also to project a positive and superior image of the American way of life.
Attempts to demonstrate the universal appeal of the American way are
obfuscated by concurrent efforts to portray the exceptional nature of the
U.S. and its people. This familiar tension between American universalism
and exceptionalism has found its way into baseball . In August, the State Department
named the former Baltimore Orioles star, Cal Ripken, Jr. as their new public diplomacy envoy. In her introduction of
the appointment, the Undersecretary of State for Public Diplomacy (now working through her notice), Karen Hughes,
explained the role that Ripken would play in U.S. policy: Through their personal examples, our public

diplomacy envoys become leaders in America's effort to engage in a

positive and constructive dialogue with the world. Condoleeza Rice also added her
support for the personal contribution that Ripken could make to cultural diplomacy: He truly exemplifies America at
its best, our aspirations to be a better nation and to help build a better world. Ripken has, since retirement,
established business and philanthropic efforts to spread the global appeal of baseball. His personal qualities were not
the only draw for the State Department though. Baseball is Americas national pastime ,
Hughes added,

a sport that truly defines American culture. It is only fitting

that the face of our national pastime would be one of the faces that
America shows the world as our next public diplomacy envoy . Ripken was also
convinced of the role that he and his sport could play in representing the U.S.: I happen to think that sport
baseball, in particular is very magical. It can go across cultural lines. In the first few
months if his new post,

Ripken has already begun efforts in China to build a

bridge across such cultural lines. After bringing a Chinese delegation to his Baseball Academy in
Maryland, Ripken visited China earlier this month to introduce the game to young people across the country .
Such people-to-people connections were stressed as important to the
future peace and security of the world. Similar sporting links to China
have already proven to be important. The Nixon administration used
ping-pong diplomacy as an opening to establish normal relations with
China. Maos offer for the U.S. table tennis team to tour China would
inevitably prove a success for Chinese propaganda and cultural
diplomacy, but Nixons priority of rapprochement led him to accept this
opportunity to ease hostilities. Now, as the U.S. seeks to spread the
influence and appeal of its way of life among the Chinese people, the Bush
administration has turned to its own main sport. Opportunities to take a
similar approach to easing tensions with Cuba have always existed. The
support for a hard-line approach to Castro has perhaps been more
prevalent than it has with Communist China , but there have been a number of prominent
Americans that have sought engagement with Castro and the Cuban people. The differences between the U.S. and
Cuba have been stressed by the leaders of both countries, but their shared passion for baseball
invites a people to people approach. In 1975, after the normalisation of relations with China
and Team U.S.A.s last baseball World Cup victory, the U.S. baseball commissioner, Bowie Kuhn attempted to set up a
goodwill game between teams from the U.S. and Cuba. In his efforts to persuade Henry Kissinger to endorse this
fixture, he preempted Ripken in asserting baseballs magic value in projecting a positive image of the U.S.

Kissingers aides noted that

a baseball game could break the ice as it had done

with ping- pong diplomacy. The positive domestic and international

response to Kissingers moves in China would be evoked in a similar
symbolic act that could herald constructive engagement with Cuba . In the end
however, Kissinger was not interested in bridging the gap with Castro and Kuhn was forced to recognise that the
Secretary of State had problems larger than baseball. It was not until March 1999, that Major League Baseball finally
made it to Cuba. Despite much criticism, Ripkens Orioles played a Cuban All-Star team in Havana and Baltimore,
although the Iron Man himself was absent due to the death of his father (also an Orioles legend Cal Ripken, Sr.).

The lead-up to the historic occasion brought much media attention, but as
one Orioles fan site noted - it built only to the anti-climax that it all came
down to a baseball game. The games, it added, were far from an international arms-deal. In the end,
the Clinton administration was not prepared to radically alter the
framework of U.S.-Cuban relations and the people-to-people program
was never fully developed.
in reality ,

Small-scale private sports exchanges have continued to some degree, but

any major breakthrough in cultural engagement with Cuba will

require U.S. government involvement. The larger problems will

certainly deter many U.S. politicians from baseball diplomacy, but there
will always be those that opt for small steps to increase U.S. influence.
Major League Baseball is still eager, but this is probably due more to the pool of talent on the island that is currently
unavailable. For his part, Jos Serrano, a Democrat Congressman from New

York, has also introduced the Baseball Diplomacy Act to every Congress
since the 104th. The bills, which have sought to waive prohibitions on
Cuban nationals playing professional baseball in the U.S. and returning
with their salaries, have all failed to make it out of committee and the
current attempt in the 110th Congress, House Resolution 216, looks
doomed to a similar fate. In the White House, President Bush, as former owner of the Texas Rangers,
certainly shares Castros passion for the game. I never dreamed about being President, he once said, I wanted to be
Willie Mays. Bush has also remarked on the positive effect of foreign-born players in the

Major League that helped the U.S. understand people with different
cultures. Cal Ripken has already expressed openness to further assignments from Karen Hughes successor, but it
is unlikely that Bush will be sanctioning any baseball diplomacy with Cuba in his final year. The Bush
administration has clearly laid out its intentions to engage China, whilst
isolating Cuba, but the absence of sports diplomacy in Cuba may also be
explained, in part, by the interest in baseball itself. The intrinsic tension
in international relations between the universalism of shared humanity
and the particularism of national identities is also powerful in
international sports. Through sports individuals can share a common
interest and culture, but on the other hand, there is also a tendency
towards tribalism and competition along national boundaries. In China,
Ripken has been busy attempting to foster common human ties through a
new sporting interest across traditional cultural boundaries. Public
diplomacy cannot be an American monologue; Condoleeza Rice expressed, it must
be a dialogue with people from around the world. Despite this, the
baseball initiative in China is clearly a monologue. Not only does the Bush
administration seek to promote a common culture based upon the
American way of life, but it also endeavours to portray the U.S. as a proud
sporting nation that is exceptionally successful. As baseball already
transcends the divide with Cuba there exists only a rivalry that every
sports fan has experience of. The problem then lies in that since Team U.S.A.s 1974 victory, C uba
has dominated baseball. During this period they have won all but one World Cup and have taken gold in

all of the Pan-American Games and 3 of the 4 Olympic finals (baseball only became an official sport in 1992). The
American partisan will undoubtedly emphasise the college and minor league composition of Team U.S.A., but Cubans
will also stress that their national system has been amateur since 1961. It was only the introduction of the World
Baseball Classic last year that offered the prospect of both countries best teams playing each other. Successive

Cold War administrations understood the psychological importance of

demonstrating the superiority of the capitalist system over the socialist
system in every aspect. The symbolic importance of a clash between a top
U.S. and Cuban side had not been lost on Castro either. "One day, he declared,
when the Yankees accept peaceful coexistence with our country, we shall beat them at baseball too and then the
advantages of revolutionary over capitalist sport will be clear to all." As a national game imbedded in American
culture,

baseball commands more importance in victory and defeat than the

foreign games of ping-pong and soccer that have little domestic

following. Perhaps it was this thought that pushed the Bush
administration into initially refusing to grant the leading Cuban team
visa s to play in the World Baseball Classic tournament. The public backlash eventually encouraged them to make
an about face, but they were saved from any direct clash when Team U.S.A. failed to get out of the 2nd round. With the
Olympics in Beijing next year and another Baseball World Classic scheduled for 2009, there may be a widespread
feeling in the U.S. that their World Cup victory has marked a turn around. It was the supremacy of the U.S. team that
actually encouraged proponents of bisbol diplomacy in the Ford administration. Playing a game that they were likely
to win would, they believed, go well with Americans who are depressed by the regimented victories of the
Communists in Olympic games. A consolidation of Team U.S.A.s supremacy may prompt the next administration to
adopt baseball diplomacy in the region. The common theme of shared hemispheric experience and way of life
expounded by successive U.S. administrations has been drowned out in recent years by the rallying cries of an
alternative in Latin America. Aspirations of baseball glory are shared by Latin American people and leaders alike
and diplomacy will only be successful if there is a genuine dialogue with
both. The next U.S. administration could foster pan-Americanism
through a genuinely mutual baseball initiative that engages adversarial
governments in the region. The reputation of the U.S. has only suffered
from the Bush administrations policies of isolation and division . Baseball is
no arms agreement or more importantly in the Western Hemisphere it is no development agreement. However, if
the U.S. cannot even encourage interests and passions with Latin
America that they genuinely hold in common, it has no chance in
persuading the leaders and people of the region that it shares their
aspirations for a significant improvement in their standard of living.

Inaction on Cuba is the largest threat to US leadership

French 10 (Anya, Director of the US-Cuba Policy Institute, "Stiffing Havana," New
America Foundation, October 20,
cuba.newamerica.net/publications/articles/2010/stiffing_havana_38758)

In the high-stakes world of international diplomacy, bluffing is a seldomseen practice -- the stakes are simply too high to risk getting called out. But,
that's precisely what seems to have happened with the Obama
administration's stated policy of dtente toward Cuba. Havana is making
concessions, but Washington seems incapable of responding in kind. The
United States may be fumbling away its best chance at influencing Cuba in the
way that it has claimed to have wanted for decades. It was nearly one year ago that President Barack Obama delivered a
message to President Ral Castro via Spain's prime minister, Jos Luis Rodrguez Zapatero: "We understand that change
can't happen overnight, but down the road, when we look back at this time, it should be clear that now is when those
changes began," Obama said. "We're taking steps, but if they don't take steps too, it's going to be very hard for us to

continue." If Cuba proved willing to improve relations with the United States, Obama seemed willing to reciprocate.

Obama's conciliatory message may have been on Castro's mind as the Cuban
government began making improvements to its much maligned human
rights record this summer. More than 40 Cuban political prisoners have been released from jail in recent
months. Dozens more might soon follow as part of the government's unprecedented human rights dialogue with the
Cuban Catholic Church; it's the first such dialogue of its kind for the church, an institution that previously had been
treated with suspicion, if not hostility, by the Cuban government. The political changes have been paired with sweeping
labor and economic reforms that have, however belatedly, begun to liberalize the moribund economy: 10 percent of Cuba's
workforce will shift into the private sector by next year. The ball, clearly, is now in the United

States' court. But so far, the Obama administration has failed to respond to
the very concessions Washington has long demanded, and very recently promised to reward.
Rather than greet the changes, Obama has replied with mild skepticism. "I think that any release of political prisoners, any
economic liberalization that takes place in Cuba is positive, positive for Cuban people, but we've not yet seen the full
results of these promises," Obama told Hispanic media at the White House Tuesday.

Washington and

Havana remain locked in their 50-year dispute. The U.S. trade and travel
embargoes have only gotten tighter over the decades ; under President George W.
Bush, tensions threatened to reach a tipping point. Obama has called the
inherited status quo a failure, but most of the Bush policies remain in place
today. (Some in Washington argue that Obama has already made significant gestures to Havana by easing restrictions
on Cuban-American families' travel and remittances to the island last year. But that change was more a gesture to CubanAmericans in Miami -- where he campaigned on a promise to ease Bush's harsher restrictions on Cuban immigrant
families -- than it was any significant political concession to Havana.) The Obama administration should instead be
honoring the changes in Cuba by taking considerable steps of its own: A bold response by Washington

will put the spotlight back on Havana to continue with its reforms. Obama's
choice isn't between the status quo and a wholesale abandonment of the
embargoes: There are many ways to craft a foreign policy that could help
spur the economic growth needed to support the half-million new workers
in Cuba's fledging private sector. Only Congress can lift the Cuban travel ban entirely, but the
president possesses broad authority to allow some Americans to travel freely to the island. Cultural and academic trips to
Cuba by Americans are currently permitted under U.S. law, at the discretion of the federal government; the Obama

administration could easily broaden the definition of such "people-topeople" trips. That policy would trace its roots to the successful citizen diplomacy with the Soviet Union that
President Ronald Reagan championed during the Cold War. President Bill Clinton successfully enacted such a policy
toward Cuba during his time in office, but it was rolled back by Bush. But what if Obama chooses to do nothing or dithers
so long that this historic opportunity to influence Cuban reforms passes?

If the president fails to move

now, after Cuba has apparently acted in good faith to the offer of an
outstretched hand, his administration will lose credibility --not just in
Havana, but among global allies that will see the president's reversal as a
sign of weakness, incoherence, and even dishonesty . No one can say for sure, of course,
where Cuba's reforms will lead. But it's clear -- even to Fidel Castro in his most unguarded moments -- that the old model
just doesn't work anymore. Ral Castro's reforms, deeper and broader than the limited Cuban reforms of the 1990s, signal
that Havana is in search of a new system.

It may or may not be the model America would

choose, but if Washington wants to have any influence at this pivotal

moment, the time to engage Cuba is now.

Decline is inevitable reorientation of baseball diplomacy is key

to a smooth transition that restores American diplomatic
influence
Elias 10 (Robert, Professor of Law and Politics at the University of San Francisco,
The Empire Strikes Out: How Baseball Sold US Foreign Policy and Promoted the
American Way Abroad, p283-5)
Nevertheless, in 2007, foreign correspondent Stephen Kinzer worried about the future:
A seemingly invulnerable power that overreaches and suddenly suffers
defeat that expose its weakness and threaten its hegemonythat is the story of the US

as this fifth summer of [the Iraq] war begins. It is also...the story of Americas most successful sports team, the New York
Yankees. What is happening to them is also happening to President Bush, the Republican Party, and the US itself. Each
swaggered into the twenty-first-century with a triumphant airrich and secure, looking forward to [long-term]
dominance. Overconfidence lulled them into a false sense of security. Nowthey

are facing undreamed-of troublesBoth need to set a different course or

risk seeing their power slip away. As we consider these observations, now two years later, does the
apparent resurgence of the Yankees belie Kinzers concerns? Well see, but not likely. For nearly two hundred
years, baseball has instead aligned itself with conservative America and with
an increasingly aggressive US foreign, military, and globalization policy . It
has helped America prepare for battle and conduct wars and interventions,
and it has assorted underlings in the foreign policy establishment . Baseball has
promoted patriotism, masculinity, nationalism, and Americanism at home and helped manage the nations internal,
often race-based, colonization. Sometimes backed by an arrogant muscular Christianity, baseball engaged in a civilizing
mission abroad, enlighteningthe natives, and selling the American dream. Strategically combining softball and hardball
politics, baseball diplomacy helped drag other nations into the globalized world. Through these means,

organized baseball has served the nation while also advancing its own
fortunes. The relationship has brought baseball many benefits. It has been regarded as the national game for most of
American history. And many have gained financially from baseballs strong performance, especially team owners, who
have profited from the games special statusa monopoly exempt from antitrust regulations. Abroad, baseball has had the
protection of Americas armed forces, which have also helped to institutionalize the game in foreign lands. Even so,

the alliance between baseball and Americas foreign policy establishment

has produced a national pastime trade-off that has jeopardized the sports
independence and integrity. While wed hardly expect it to be purposely unpatriotic, MLB has instead
gone to the opposite extreme, adopting an often militaristic and jingoistic nationalism that sometimes makes baseball into
merely an expansion of the government armed forces. This blind patriotism has linked baseball

with policies that have put the game in a bad light. Aside from handcuffing
the sport, it may have implication for baseball fans. As David Voight has suggested,
Baseball leaders have either willingnly accepted or being forced into a
garrison-state mentalityforevor having to defend their claim to be the American sport. If [this]
requires baseball officials to stand by while politicians exploit the game to
support military policies, surely this must alienate fans who see this as
pandering to superpatriots and warmongers. Baseball has always prided itself on reflected the
best of American values, but the national pastime trade-off may be preventing it from doing so. As handmaiden
of US foreign policy, baseball can claim many successes. Like Americas own empire,
MLB has become a dynasty as well. The United States has become the sole superpower,
uncontested in military strength. It has transplanted its values, culture, and
products across the globe. As the saying goes, when Americas economy sneezes, the rest of the world
catches cold. Likewise, American baseballand MLB in particulardominates other baseball
playing peoples nations abroad, substantially controlling ballplayers and
institutions in other lands. By these measures, America and MLB have both hit home runs. Yet others
have assessed the US and major-league empires quite differently. Historians tell us the fall of Rome
followed a general malaise and structural weakness that grew over time.
According to sociologist Morris Berman, this describes contemporary America, where religion and
plutocracy are defeating reason and democracy. In his Dark Ages America, Berman diagnoses large-scale

processes of national collapse, such as an overextended self-destructive US foreign and military policy,
which mirrors the deterioration of everyday American livesdriven by infantile needs
and impulses fueled by schools that dont teach. News media that dont inform, obsessive shopping, mindless television,
knee-jerk reactionaries, religious zealots, the frenzied acceleration of work, and the erosion of community. As the
corporate consumerist juggernaut rolls on, robbing meaning from our lives, the factors that once propelled the growth of
the US empireextreme individualism and inequality, territorial economic expansion, and the pursuit of material wealth
are now becoming the nails in Americas collective coffin . Its a Darwinian society that
doesnt believe in Darwinism and an empire thats weaker than Americans might think. Much

of the world
dislikes a United States, and most Americans dont know or care. Berman
predicts that within a short time the nation will be marginalized , its global
hegemony replaced by that of China or the Europeans. Other social critics have reached
similar conclusions. They describe a state of affairs (irrespective of political party) with post-World War II origins (at the
latest), characterized by the creation of a US national security state in pursuit of foreign resources, with

commitments that would almost inevitably bring the nation to the breaking
point. History teaches us that if nations act soon enough, they have a choice.
They can loosen their grip on empire to save themselves, or they can hang
on till the bitter end. Rome made the wrong choice and perished. Britain chose more wisely and
survived. What will the United States do? Will the new administration of
President Barack Obama make any difference? Even if only a fraction of the
alarming signs of dynasty declines are true, then rather than hitting a home
run, Americas empire instead seems on the brink of striking out. How then, must
we asses an institutionMajor League Baseballwhose well-being has relied so long on its ties to the American empire, to
whose existence the sport has made no small contribution? According to anthropologist Alan Klein it could go either way:

MLB is poised at a crossroads which invites interpretations of empire both

aging and rekindled with vigor. There are those who view MLB as a colonizer, exploiting foreign

players, selling itself around the world, busily generating new markets, with little or no concern for local interests. This is
classic dependency theory in a baseball jersey. But as Klein also observes, The contrasting model has

MLB leading [baseballs] internationalization, with other countries

increasingly sharing power and finding ways to push their own national
agendas. In his book Growing the Game, Klein roots for the latter approach, offering some cautions but mainly
showing how MLB can and will maintain its domain. According to Klein, the hyper-globalization or testicular
globalization advocated by boosters such as Thomas Friedman seeks only to increase Americas economic dominance
over other nations. Klein contrasts that with tough love globalization, which avoids colonization and focuses on
rewarding merit wherever it emerges. Endorsing the latter course for MLB, Klein says

organized baseball must take a global view in which [it] grows by reducing
its globalization unselfishly, baseballs globalization can take a more benign
direction: It must [pursue] stewardship, not empire. In the long run,
imperial notions fail, because the center cannot hold . Klein sees progressive possibilities,
praising the Dodgers organization, for example, for being moral and not merely greedy : The racial
integration of baseball was built upon the same principles [as] globalization:
expansion of baseball was built upon the same principles [as] globalization:
expansion of boundaries, a relatively high degree of merit, and social
openness. Klein traces this from Branch Rickey through the OMalleys, and their forays first into new racial and
ethnic communities at home and then abroad to the Carribean, Japan, Korea, and Taiwan. Operating
overseas, according to Klein, is a matter of branding and getting a product
to mesh with another cultures myths. Its a matter of how does it fit into
the foreign culture? not play this game because were superior to you. Klein
believes MLB should market the sport more in the developing world (where people are still hungry for it) than in
developed nations. Globalization would best be promoted by adding major-league franchises abroad, and realigning MLB
to create a Pan American or Pacific Rim division.

The plan re-orients baseball diplomacy the prevents all

conflict escalation
Elias 10 (Robert, Professor of Law and Politics at the University of San Francisco,
The Empire Strikes Out: How Baseball Sold US Foreign Policy and Promoted the
American Way Abroad, p282-283)

If some success has been achieved in growing the game, then what does that mean? MLB has expanded and profited, yet
the sport of baseball has largely stagnated in the United States and abroad. Americans are no longer the worlds best
baseball players, and baseball has not become the worlds game. Baseballs export abroad has brought the American
dream to the few, but an American nightmare for others. And arguably, baseball hasnt even remained a national pastime
in America. In the best case, MLB has prevailed but only along a very narrow dimension and quite likely only tentatively.
In the worst case, assessed by more meaningful measures, the MLB empire has struck out or at least has two strikes
against it. Can we begin seeing baseball without looking through the dominant lens of the major leagues? Can

organized baseball reevaluate whats at stake and refocus itself toward the
value of the game instead of merely the value of its portfolio ? MLBs current direction
might be serving its own interests far less than its leaders might imagine. Is being the loyal servant of US foreign and
military policy good for organized baseball? As weve seen, MLB has pursued this alliance throughout its history, but isnt
it possible that the national pastime trade-off has outlived its usefulness? Was it perhaps overrated in the first place?
Albert Camus once wrote, The true patriot is one who gives his highest loyalty not to his country as it is, but to what it can
and ought to be. Thats a distinction that may be worth emphasizing at this point in American history. The United

States now faces not merely the usual internal conflicts over the state of the
nation and its role in the world. It also encourages a world, including its
closest allies, that largely rejects its foreign, military, and globalization
policiesnot to mention the fact that those policies undermine the fundamental principles of American democracy
and the US constitution. Isnt it perhaps time for MLB (and all of us) to reassess what constitutes a patriotic response to
these circumstances? Even from the practical perspective of merely salvaging America from the worst consequences (for
itself) of its overextended empire ,

a reorientation might be appropriate. Does MLB

really want to be viewed as the ugly American and remain linked with
whats often regarded as a rogue nation, whose policies and government
are widely hated around the world ? Perhaps MLB has more of a sense of this than we think.
While its deviations from American policy have been rare, two have
occurred recently, and both involved in Cuba. In 1998, MLB challenged
Americas Cuba policy and the Clinton White House when it arranged a
baseball series between the Baltimore Orioles and the Cuban national
team. Then in 2005, MLB confronted that policy

(and this time the Bush White House)

again, when it sought US entry for the Cuban team to play in the World Baseball Classic.

Conforming to

outdated Cold War politics wasnt in the best interest of MLB , and it might
begin to se this in other contexts too . What else could baseball do differently? It depends,
in part, on whether organized baseball will take the lead or will have to
pushed in a new direction. All baseball fans have a stake in resisting the games further commodification.
Baseballs meaning has increasingly been contrived from above and cynically foisted on a passive public, rather than
reflecting peoples lived experience and their interest in engaging with the sport rather than being its passive spectators.
Mike Marqusee holds out hope: the colonization of sport, like the corporate appropriation of the Third World gene bank,
can be challenged. But only if sports fans emerge from their nationalistic cocoons and begin making links across borders
of all kinds. And if organized baseball shuns these overtures? Perhaps we should heed former big-league pitcher Bill Lee,
who argued that fans have to storm the commissioners office as the peasants stormed the Bastille during the French
Revolution. They have to take control. Ralph Nader had it right: sports and not religion is now the opiate of the masses.
We have to shake ourselves out of that opiate-induced state and return the game to what it used to be. As with US-

Cuba relations, MLB might see reasons to challenge other parts of

conventional US foreign policy. It might recognized the value of using
baseball to try to rehabilitate the worlds negative view of America , but such effort

can succeed only where baseball is used for positive ends not for social control.

Will MLB remain part of

the problem of American empire and of US foreign and military policy, or

will it become part of the solution? How about promoting genuine baseball
diplomacy rather than thinly disguised gestures of self-interest? And why
not reconsider baseballs longstanding association with war and
militarism? Byron Price points out that baseball can serve as a balance to
reprieve from the adrenaline of warfare, rather than its intensification.
Merritt Clifton agrees: At some point, baseball rivalry might help replace
war[and] nationalism, with new recognition of ourselves as members of
a common species. MLB might reconsider its hoarding of the sport and try instead to genuinely spread the
game. Doing so would reap financial rewards in the long run, but in the short term it might be better offered as a gift:
Heres what baseball has given us. We hope you like it. Its part of America and its free. If MLB and the United States are
serious about exporting the American dream, then it should be made a common reality, not merely a rare jackpot for the
few. Roberto Gonzales Echevarria has written that

baseball contains within it forces that

oppose the advance of American-style capitalism[and] the magic of the

ritual of baseball prevents the game from being appropriated by one
culture of nation. Baseball ishuman and universaland now belongs to
countries and cultures that are not American. It could belong to many
more. Organized baseball might work to preserve and promote (rather than weaken and undermine) foreign leagues
in the Caribean, East Asia, and elsewhere, which would allow for other nations to build up their baseball without having
their players and fans lured away. As Peter Bjarkman has argued, baseballs salvation depends on the continued existence
of alternative baseball worldsindependent entities that can focus exclusively on their own grown and health as vibrant
national cultural institutions. Accordingly, if the United States isnt weakening clubs in other nations, then it becomes
more legitimate to patriotically support Americas teams. And domestically, MLB could begin to take more seriously its
revival as the national pastime. Rather than conceding to competing sports, it could more earnestly win back those
athletes (especially African Americans) and fans it has lostoffering a new and more progressive vision of itself in
American society. Sports sociologists have shown that a nations dominant games
reflect the society that supports them. Football first challenged baseball as the national game
during the late-nineteenth-century rise of American imperialism. Baseball survived this and subsequent threats but
eventually lost ground, especially in the Vietnam War era. Arguably, America has become a football society over the last
thirty years. Footballs violence and other machismo may best describe the culture America has become and the way it
projects itself into the world. It may be the genuine sport of the American Empire. Does baseball really want to reclaim
that distinction? In the house of American sports, baseball has found itself in an unfamiliar position: looking in, instead of
looking out. It still labors, however, to hold on to the national pastime label. Should it continue to do so, and if so, how?
In the early twenty-first century, performance-enhancing drugs might seem like baseballs greatest challenge . Yet

MLB reaction to Americas performance enhanced foreign policies may

matter as well. John Thorn has observed that sometimes baseballserves as a beacon,
revealing a path through the wilderness . And Tim Wendel writes about how baseball
offers an alternative, a way out of all this madness . Perhaps so. Ironically, for all that
baseball has done, historically, to parrot the sport redouble its efforts with a new dose of flag-waving patriotism? Should
baseball compte in that way with football to regain its status as the genuine national pastime? Or should it instead
recognize what it has lost, over the years, by playing that game? Of course there are limits to how a sport can shape a
nation. Even so, what kind of society does baseball really want to reflect?

It might do better by letting

football beat the war drums while baseball instead pushes the nation to live
up its deals.

Re-oriented diplomacy prevents great power wars

Jervis 09 (professor of international politics at Columbia University. (Robert, Unipolarity: A Structural Perspective,
World Politics Volume 61, Number 1, January 2009)

To say that the system is unipolar is not to argue that the unipole can get everything it
wants or that it has no need for others. American power is very great, but it is still subject
to two familiar limitations: it is harder to build than to destroy, and success usually
depends on others decisions. This is particularly true of the current system because of
what the U.S. wants. If Hitler had won World War II, he might have been able to maintain his system for some
period of time with little cooperation from others because all he wanted was to establish the supremacy of the Aryan
race. The U.S. wants not only to prevent the rise of a peer competitor but also to stamp out

terrorism, maintain an open international economic system, spread democracy

throughout the world, and establish a high degree of cooperation among countries that
remain juridically equal. Even in the military arena, the U.S. cannot act completely
alone. Bases and overflight rights are always needed, and support from allies, especially
Great Britain, is important to validate military action in the eyes of the American public.
When one matches American forces, not against those of an adversary but against the tasks at hand, they often fall short.
Against terrorism, force is ineffective without excellent intelligence. Given the international nature of the threat and the
difficulties of gaining information about it, international cooperation is the only route to success. The maintenance

of international prosperity also requires joint efforts, even leaving aside the danger that
other countries could trigger a run on the dollar by cashing in their holdings. Despite its
lack of political unity, Europe is in many respects an economic unit, and one with a
greater GDP than that of the U.S. Especially because of the growing Chinese economy,
economic power is spread around the world much more equally than is military power,
and the open economic system could easily disintegrate despite continued unipolarity. In
parallel, on a whole host of problems such as AIDS, poverty, and international crime
(even leaving aside climate change), the unipole can lead and exert pressure but cannot
dictate. Joint actions may be necessary to apply sanctions to various unpleasant and
recalcitrant regimes; proliferation can be stopped only if all the major states (and many
minor ones) work to this end; unipolarity did not automatically enable the U.S. to
maintain the coalition against Iraq after the first Gulf War; close ties within the West are
needed to reduce the ability of China, Russia, and other states to play one Western
country off against the others. But in comparison with the cold war era, there are fewer incentives today for
allies to cooperate with the U.S. During the earlier period unity and close coordination not only permitted military
efficiencies but, more importantly, gave credibility to the American nuclear umbrella that protected the allies. Serious
splits were dangerous because they entailed the risk that the Soviet Union would be emboldened. This reason for

avoiding squabbles disappeared along with the USSR, and the point is likely to generalize
to other unipolar systems if they involve a decrease of threats that call for maintaining
good relations with the superpower. This does not mean that even in this particular
unipolar system the superpower is like Gulliver tied down by the Lilliputians. In some
areas opposition can be self-defeating. Thus for any country to undermine American
leadership of the international economy would be to put its own economy at risk , even if
the U.S. did not retaliate, and for a country to sell a large proportion of its dollar holding
would be to depress the value of the dollar, thereby diminishing the worth of the
countrys remaining stock of this currency. Furthermore, cooperation often follows
strong and essentially unilateral action. Without the war in Iraq it is not likely that we would have seen the
degree of cooperation that the U.S. obtained from Europe in combating the Iranian nuclear program and from Japan and
the PRC in containing North Korea. Nevertheless, many of the American goals depend on persuading others, not coercing
them. Although incentives and even force are not irrelevant to spreading democracy and the free market, at bottom this
requires people to embrace a set of institutions and values . Building the world that the U.S. seeks is a

political, social, and even psychological task for which unilateral measures are likely to
be unsuited and for which American military and economic strength can at best play a
supporting role. Success requires that others share the American vision and believe that
its leadership is benign.

The alternative to multilateralism is unilateral militarism the

plan establishes a model for hemispheric diplomacy that
sustains US leadership
Grandin 10 (teaches history at New York University and is a member of the
American Academy of Arts and Sciences (Greg, Empire's Senescence: U.S. Policy in
Latin America, New Labor Forum, 19:1, Winter 2010, pg. 14-23)//SJF

Washingtons relations with Latin Americaparticularly in terms of the gap between what its policy toward the region is and what it could
beprecisely measure the degree to which domestic ideologies, narrow corporate and sectional interests, and a sclerotic political system are

the U.S. is deepening its

dependence on unstable policies in order to leverage its
dwindling influence in the hemisphere. It is easy to imagine an
improved U.S. diplomacy toward Latin America, designed not to advance a set of
hastening the decline of the United States as a global power. As a result,

altruistic ideals but merely to defend its interestsbroadly defined to mean stable politics and economies that are open to U.S. capital and

to achieve what those in the liberal wing of the foreign policy establishment have long advocated: a
maximization of U.S. soft power. Harvards Joseph S. Nye defines soft power as the
ability to get what you want through attraction rather than
coercion, through an enhanced understanding and utilization
of multilateral institutions, mutually beneficial policies, cultural
exchanges, and commercial relations.1 There are no immediate threats to the U.S. in Latin
commoditiesand

America. A majority of the regions political eliteeven most of its current govern- ing leftistsshare many of the same values the United
States claims to embody, even more so following the election of the first African-American president, who is wildly popular in Latin

there is no other place in the world that offers U.S. president

Obama the opportunity to put into place the kind of
intelligent foreign policy that he and his closest advisors, such as United
Nations (U.N.) ambassador Susan Rice, believe is necessary to stop the hemorrhaging
of U.S. prestigeone that would both improve Washingtons
ability to deploy its many competitive advantages, while
removing key points of friction. Heres what such a policy could look like: Washington would concede
America. As a result,
Barack

to longstanding Brazilian demands by reducing tariffs and subsidies that protect the U.S. agricultural industry, opening its market to
Brazilian com- modities, especially soy and sugar, as well as value-added ethanol. It would yield on other issues that have stalled the
proposed Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA), such as a demand for strident intellectual property rights enforcement, which
Brazil objects to because it would disadvantage its own pharmaceutical industry and hinder its ability to provide low-cost medicine to those
infected with the HIV virus. Such concessions would provide an incentive for Brasilia to take the lead in jumpstarting the FTAA, a treaty
that would ultimately benefit U.S. corporations, yet would be meaningless without Brazil, South Americas largest and most dynamic
economy. The U.S. would scale back its military operations in Colombiaincluding recent con- troversial plans to establish a series of
military bases which have raised strong criticisms from the governments of Chile, Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Venezuela.
Brazils president Luiz Incio Lula da Silvawho is entering the last year of his second and last termhas become the spokesperson for the
collective discontent, an indication of his countrys regional authority. In exchange for the U.S. dialing down its military presence, a soon-

Washington
would also drop the five-decade-old trade embargo on Cuba, thus burying a
Cold War relic that continues to tarnish the U.S. image. Normalizing
relations with Cuba would create an additional enticement for
Brazil to cooperate with the U.S., since its formidable agro-industry is beginning to invest in Cuba and
to-be post-Lula Brazil might find it convenient to tilt away from Venezuela and toward the United States.

is therefore well-placed to export to the U.S. market. Politically, Washington would formally recommit to a multilateral foreign policy, even
as it set up a de facto arrangement with Brazil to administer the region. This would mean demonstrating its willingness to work through the
Organization of American States (OAS). More importantly, it would mean leashing the quasi-privatized democracy promotion
organizationslargely funded by the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) and the Agency for International Development, and run
by the International Republican Institutethat have become vectors of trans- national, conservative coalition building throughout the
hemisphere. These groups today do overtly what the CIA used to do covertly, as NED's first president, Allen Weinstein, admittedthey fund
oppositional civil soci- ety groups that use the rhetoric of democracy and human rights to menace Left govern- ments throughout the
region, including the promotion of an aborted coup in Venezuela in 2002 and successful ones in Haiti in 2004 and Honduras in 2009.2
Similar destabilization efforts tried to topple Bolivias Evo Morales in 2008 but failed, at least partly because Brazil and Chile let it be known
that they would not accept those kinds of machinations in their backyards. It would be easy for the Obama administration to rein these
groups in, and to agree to Latin American demands to make their funding more transparent and their actions more accountable.
Washington would also take a number of other initiatives to modernize hemispheric diplomacy, including deescalating its failed War on
Drugs, as Latin Americas leading intellectuals and policymakersincluding many former presidentsare demanding; in the last few

months, both Mexico and Argentina have legalized some drug use and possession, including small quantities of cocaine and heroin.3 The
U.S. would renew its assault weapons ban, as Mexicobattered by over five thousand narcotics-related murders a year, many of them
committed with smuggled U.S. gunsis begging. It could also pass meaningful immigration reform, providing a path to U.S. citizenship for
the millions of undocumented Latin Americans, mostly from Mexico, Central America, the Caribbean, and the Andes, but also Brazil. Such a
move would go a long way toward improving relations with south- ern neighbors. It would also be good domestic politics for the Democrats,
guaranteeing the loyalty of the Latino vote in 2012 and moving Texas, by creating millions of new vot- ers, closer to swing-state status. It
could also provide progressives and the Democratic Party with a real wedge issue: Catholics, increasingly pulled into the con- servative
camp by issues such as abortion and gay rights, overwhelmingly favor immigration reform. Any one of the above steps would go far in
reestablishing U.S. legitimacy in Latin America. Taken together they could serve as a diplomatic revolution, one which would not weaken
U.S. power but consolidate it much the way the Good Neighbor Policy did, allowing Washington to project its power in the region through
stable multilateral mechanisms freed from the burdens of confrontation and militarism. A retooled FTAA, updated for the post-Great
Recession world and stripped of the ideologi- cal baggage of failed neoliberal globalization, might provide a blueprint for a sustainable

a
reinvigorated hemispheric diplomacy could serve as a model for
the rest of the world, a design for a practical twenty-first century
multilateralism, capable of responding to transnational
problemsboth those that concern liberals, such as climate change, poverty, and
migration, and those that concern conservatives, such as crime and terrorismwhile
regional economy, one that balances national development and corporate profit.4 And like the Good Neighbor Policy,

respecting, at least rhetorically, the sovereignty of individual nations. In short, the Western Hemisphere offers an unparalleled opportunity
to realize the vision of Barack Obamas September 2009 address to the United Nationshailed by many as a clarion call for a new
internationalismto, in his words, embrace a new era of engagement based on mutual interest and mutual respect. Its not going to
happen. Efforts to implement any one of the above policy changes would be blocked by powerful domestic interests. Take biofuels. The idea
to liberalize the U.S. agricultural marketand have the rhetoric of free trade somewhat match the realityis recommended by all
mainstream think tanks, including the Council on Foreign Relations and the Brookings Institution, as an important step to win back Brazil.
Obama recognizes the importance of Brazil, having nominated George W. Bushs outgoing assistant secretary of state for Latin America,
Thomas Shannonrespected in establishment circles as, according to the journal Foreign Policy, the most talented and successful
individual to serve as Washingtons envoy to Latin America in at least two decadesas its ambassador. Yet Shannons confirmation had
been threatened by Senator Chuck Grassley, representing the agro-industry state of Iowa, who objected to the then-nominees comment
during his confirma- tion hearings that removing a fifty-four-cent per gallon tariff on imported ethanol would be good for U.S. foreign
policy. The White House immediately declared that it had no plans to change tariff policy, and Grassley allowed the confirmation to
proceed.5 The White Houses quick buckling probably has to do with its fruitless attempt to win over Grassley for health care reform, a
further indicator of how foreign policy is held hostage by domestic politics. Similar obstacles stand in the way of other foreign policy
reforms. The Cuban lobby, along with the broader conservative Right, prevents a normalization of relations with Havana. Fear of the
National Rifle Association halts a renewal of the assault weapons ban. As to the War on Drugs, the Democratic Party is deeply committed
to Plan Colombia, the centerpiece of that war. It is, after all, a legacy of Bill Clintons foreign policy, and much of the $6 billion spent to
fight it thus far goes directly into the coffers of corporate sponsors of the Democratic Party like Connecticuts United Technologies and other
northeastern defense contractors (it was Bill Clinton who in 1997, acting on behalf of Lockheed Martin, lifted a twenty-year ban on hightech weapons sales to Latin America, kicking off an arms build-up, in which Colombia, Chile, and Brazil have taken the lead).6 As to
immigration reformalso recom- mended by influential establishment groups to improve U.S. standing in Latin America Obama, in
Mexico, said it would have to wait until next year. He has a near-filibuster-proof majority in the Senate and a large majority in the House,
yet he says there arent enough votes and there is not, by any means, con- sensus across the table.7 Obama could easily assemble a
majority coalition on this issuecomprised of business interests who want cheap labor, Hispanics, progressives, social justice Catholics, and
members of the labor movement (who long ago signaled their support for immigration reform)yet fear of a backlash fueled by a
contracting economy has led him to back- burner the issue. The same conditions that make Latin America the best venue in which to
modernize U.S. diplomacynamely that there is no immediate threat emerging from the region, no equivalent of North Korea or Iran on
the verge of acquiring a nuclear bomb, no insurgency bogging down U.S. troops as in Afghanistan, and no conflict threatening access to vital
resources (Washingtons main antagonist in the region, Venezuela, continues to sell most of its oil to the U.S.)also mean that there are no
real incentives for Obamas fledgling foreign policy coalition to expend political capital on trying to improve policy there. Analysts of the
American empirefrom Charles A. Beard in the 1930s to William Appleman Williams in the 1960s and 1970s have emphasized the U.S.s
unique ability to subsume competing economic, ideological, and sectional interests into a flexible and vital diplomacy in defense of a general
national interest, which has led America to unprec- edented global power.8 Yet nowconfronted with a sustained economic contraction,
the fallout from a disastrous overleveraging of military power in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the emergence of a post-Cold War, postneoliberal world with multiple power centersexpansion has given way to involution. The U.S. political system seems to be literally

Unable to
leverage its soft, smart power even in its own hemisphere,
Washington is ever more dependent on the military and
corporate mercenary forces that have transformed Colombia
into a citadel of U.S. hard power in the Andes. As a candidate, Obamareferring to
devouring itself from within, paralyzing the ability of foreign policymakers to adjust to a rapidly changing world.

Bushs decision to invade Iraqsaid he wasnt opposed to all wars, just stupid ones. Washingtons War on Drugs in Latin America is the
stupid- est war one can imagine. As the centerpiece of that war, Plan Colombiaa program, established by Bill Clinton and extended by
George W. Bush and Barack Obama, that has provided Colombia with billions of dollars of aid, mostly for the militarys counternarcotic and
counterinsurgent operationshas served to entrench paramilitary power, enrich pri- vate contractors (such as the Virginia-based
DynCorp), and turn more than four million Colombians into refugees.9 It has also fore- closed the possibility of a negotiated, regionally
brokered solution to the crisis and inflamed a conflict that has already once spilled beyond national bordersin March 2008, Colombian
troops launched a military raid into Ecuador to assassinate members of the insurgent Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia. And,
while it has not lessened narcotics exports to the United States, the drug war has spread the violence associated with the illegal narcotics
trade up through Central America and into Mexico, accounting for the staggeringly high number of homicides in the region. Much like the
wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, Washingtons militarization of the drug problem in Latin America has worsened what it sought to
solve, thus pro- viding an excuse for even more militarism. Thus Southcomwhich runs the Department of Defenses South American
operationsis expanding its presence in Colombia, recently brokering a deal that will give the U.S. military access to at least seven bases,

running from the Caribbean to the Andes. Colombia and the U.S. insist that this expansion is directed to ensure Colombias internal
security; but Brazils military is concerned that the bases give the U.S. the ability to project its power deep into South America. Colombia
serves as the anchor of a broader strategic shift on the part of the U.S., one that reflects its position as a declining hegemon. Throughout
much of the twentieth century, the U.S. confident of its ascension as a world powertreated Latin America largely as a unified region,
working through inter-American organizations set up via the Good Neighbor Policy and during World War II, such as the OAS and the Rio
Pact (a mutual defense treaty that became the model for NATO). When one or another country tried to break out of its dependent
relationship with the U.S.i.e., Cuba in the 1960s, Chile in the early 1970s, or Nicaragua in the 1980sthe U.S. took independent, often
covert steps either to isolate it or bring it back into the fold. Yet throughout the Cold War (and for about a decade following the Cold War),

today, the U.S. is

increasingly relying on a strategy of divide and rule. Washingtons relationship
Washington continued to view the region as a single administrative zone. But

with Colombia is the centerpiece of this new approach, and the Andean country functions as something like Latin Americas Israel: a heavily

unilateral
actions are encouraged by Washington in the name of national
security. Colombias reckless raid into Ecuador in 2008denounced by every South American countrywas endorsed not just by
militarized U.S. ally that allows Washington to project its power into a hostile region. Like Israel, its preemptive,

George W. Bush but by then- U.S. presidential candidates Hillary Clinton, John McCain, and Barack Obama. Like Israel, Colombias
security forces serve as a model and a resource for wars elsewhere. Admiral Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has
commented that many of us from all over the world can learn from what has happened with respect to the very successful develop- ments
of Plan Colombia, and suggested that it be franchised specifically to Afghanistan.10 Some of private military contractor Xesne
Blackwaterbest recruits are retired Colombian soldiers, trained for Middle East operations on Colombian military bases; before taking
control of the murderous Iraq Special Operations Forces, U.S. brigadier gen- eral Simeon Trombitas served in Colombia.11 Recently,
Colombian paramilitaries have been recruited as mercenaries by Honduran plantation owners, to protect their property in the wake of the
crisis unleashed by the coup.12 Colombia also boasts one of the most sophisticated intelligence apparatuses in its regionbolstered by
massive infusions of U.S. dollarscapable of carrying out not just widespread surveillance but covert operations, including attempts to
destabilize neighboring Venezuela.13 On the diplomatic circuit, an embassy posting in Colombia has become a way station toward a more
prominent role in the Great Game. Current ambassadors to Afghanistan and PakistanWilliam Wood and Anne Paterson, respectively
previously served as Bushs envoys to Colombia. Like Israel, Colombia inspires many who see it as an exemplar of how to balance
democracya place that offers relatively free elections, with three independent (at least in principle) branches of governmentand security.
Colombia is what Iraq should eventually look like, in our best dreams, writes influen- tial Atlantic contributor Robert Kaplan. Colombian
President Alvaro Uribe has foughtand is winninga counterinsurgency war even as he has liberalized the economy, strengthened
institutions, and improved human rights.14 The Council on Foreign Relations has put aside its earlier strong criticism of Plan Colombia
and now hails it as a success for having established a state presence in many regions previously con- trolled by illegal armed groups,
reestablishing elected governments, building and rebuilding public infrastructure, and reaffirming the rule of law. The Council
recommends a similar solution for violence-plagued Mexico and Central America.15 Throughout Latin America, a resurgent Right looks to
Colombia for inspira- tion and Uribe as its standard bearer, a backstop against Hugo Chvez-style populism. As Forrest Hylton has argued,
Uribes suc- cess at consolidating power rests on an alliance between death-squad paramilitarieswho have used Plan Colombia as a
cover to execute an enormous land grab and to establish their rule in the countrysideand drug traffickers who have decided to stop
fighting the state and become part of it. Medelln, the showcase city of Latin Americas New Right, has the eighth highest murder rate in the
world; Uribe himself has deep ties to both paramilitaries and drug cartels.16 Colombia also serves as an anchor to a new geopolitics, an
attempt by Washington to build a security corridor running from Mexico, through Central America, and into Colombia. Under the
auspices of such programs as the Merida Initiative, Plan Puebla-Panama, and the Security and Prosperity Partnership, the objective is to
integrate the regions trans- portation and communications infrastructure, energy production and distribution network, and, most
importantly, its military capacities. Call it top-down, transnational state forma- tion, an attempt to coordinate the regions intelligence
agencies, militaries, and police (as well as mercenary corporations like DynCorp), subordinated under the direction of the U.S. military.
Thomas Shannon, Bushs envoy to Latin America and now Obamas ambassador to Brazil, described it in a moment of candor as armoring

In other words, the U.S. is retrenching, pulling back from

efforts to preside over the entirety of Latin America, instead
consolidating its authority over a circumscribed territory, with a
deepening reliance on applied military power . This shift is
significant, and could unleash a period of heightened instability.
One consequence of Washingtons past strategy of treating Latin
America as a single unit was that inter-state conflicts were
contained; since the 1930s, most bloodletting was internally directed, aimed at trade unionists, peasant activists, intellectuals,
reformist politicians, and progressive religious leaders demanding a more equitable share of economic and political power. But
now, with a waning superpower banking its authority on
armoring one region in order to contain another, that might
be changingas evinced by Colombias 2008 raid into Ecuador and recent tensions caused by U.S. plans to expand its military
NAFTA.

footprint in the Andean country. As Adam Isacson, of the Center for International Policy, says of Washingtons new Colombian bases, the
U.S. is creating a new capability in South America, and capabilities often get used.17 Adding to the potential for instability is the
regrouping of the Right. Political scientist Miguel Tinker-Salas notes that for some time, the Right has been rebuilding in Latin America;
hosting conferences, sharing experiences, refining their message, working with the media, and building ties with allies in the United States.
This is not the lunatic right-wing fringe, but rather the mainstream Right with powerful allies in the middle-class that used to consider
themselves center, but have been frightened by recent Left electoral victories and the rise of social movements.18 This nascent reaction has
been buoyed by the June 2009 Honduran coup, which the right-wing sees as the first successful rollback of populism since the 2004
overthrow of Aristide, as well as by recent victories at the ballot box: in May, a conservative millionaire won the presidency in Panama. In
Argentina, Cristina Fernndezs center-left Peronist party has recently suffered a midterm electoral defeat and lost control of Congress. And
polls show that presidential elections coming up in Chile and Brazil will be close, possibly dealing further losses to progressives, containing

the South American Left to Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador, and the Central American Left to El Salvador and Nicaragua. Two broad arcs of
crises have defined U.S.-Latin American relations. The first began in the early nineteenth century and paralleled the first, youthful phase of
U.S. territorial and economic expansion. Latin American intellectuals, politicians, and nationalists reacted with increasing hostility toward
not only the growing influence of U.S. capitalwhich both displaced European economic interests and subordinated aspiring domestic
elitesbut toward ever more frequent and threatening military interventions: the Mexican-American War; the Spanish-American War; the
creation of Panama; and invasions and occupations throughout the Caribbean basin. The second round coincided with the advent of the
Cold War and marked the U.S.s maturity as a global power. It intensified with Eisenhowers over- throw of Guatemalas democratically
elected government in 1954, and continued with the 1959 Cuban Revolution and the series of right- wing coups in the 1960s and 1970s,
culminating with the violent repression of Central American insurgencies in the 1980s, which paved the way for the neoliberal restructuring

this time driven less by the

tendency toward expansion that marked the U.S.s global
ascension than by a frantic attempt to hold on to what it has left
as it enters its senescenceas domestic ideologues, unchecked
corporate power, and political paralysis quicken the U.S.s fall.
of the 1990s. It seems we are entering a third period of conflict

Visa policy already exists the plan is key to making it less

discriminatory
Kupfer Schneider 1 (Andrea. Associate Professor of Law, Marquette University. 12
Marq. Sports L. Rev. 473. Baseball Diplomacy)
The second issue raised by the intersection of Cuba, the United States, and baseball is less general in scope and less political in focus,
but perhaps far more important to the Cuban baseball community. This issue also deals with the hiring of Cuban defectors and focuses
on the MLB rules for hiring individual players from Cuba once they arrive in the United States. [*480] While Cuba has had a long
history of baseball excellence, n51 the focus on Cuban players is a relatively recent one . Cuban

baseball players,
as opposed to other foreign players in the United States , must defect from
Cuba in order to play. The politics of defection, let alone the drama that
often accompanies the defection, n52 sets these players apart from other
players in terms of how MLB treats them and how the United States
public views them. In 1977, MLB Commissioner Bowie Kuhn set forth the Kuhn Directive in which he outlined Major
League Baseball's position regarding players from Cuba. n53 The Kuhn Directive provided that United States teams could not recruit
from Cuba or negotiate with Cuban players who were in Cuba. The Kuhn Directive was not really implicated until 1991 when a Cuban
baseball player defected to the United States for the first time since Fidel Castro took power in Cuba. n54 Over the course of the next
decade, player defections would become a regular event. With each defection, MLB's handling of these players has continued to evolve.
MLB policy divides players into two groups for the purposes of recruiting them for teams. Under Major League Rule 3, legal residents
of the United States or Canada can only enter into employment contracts with a team after being subject to the amateur draft. n55 In

foreign
players may sign a contract with a team without ever entering the draft.
n56 Cuban players, however, are not treated the same as other foreign
players. If a Cuban player is a resident of the United States, he must
proceed through the amateur draft and alert all teams as to his presence
in the United States. Only those Cuban players who establish residency elsewhere (as in the cases of the two
other words, a United States resident can be a free agent only if he has been passed over in the draft. On the other hand,

Hernandez brothers discussed below) [*481] can become free agents. Furthermore, in order to establish this residency according to
MLB rules, the players must leave the United States if they have already arrived here. n57 Renee Arocha, who defected in 1991, started
the parade of players to the United States. When Arocha arrived, MLB held a special lottery draft for him. This draft basically gave him
free agency status and he was able to negotiate with a variety of teams. n58 In response to Arocha's defection, which apparently was
assisted by various sports agents, the Kuhn Directive was strengthened to forbid all major league teams from discussing and
negotiating with anyone in Cuba about signing a Cuban baseball player. n59 The next year, three more Cuban players made their way
to the United States. Alexis Cabreja, Osmani Estrada, and Ivan Alvarez all defected to Mexico while the Cuban National Team was
playing in Mexico and then crossed the United States border illegally. n60 Due to their illegal entry into the United States, the Office of
the Commissioner of Major League Baseball declared that the three players would be treated as immigrants arriving without
appropriate documentation. n61 The result was that the players would be forced to enter the amateur draft rather than be granted the
effective free agency which had been given to Arocha. n62 In 1995, Cuban pitching star Livan Hernandez defected when the Cuban
National Team was in Mexico. On the advice of his agent, Joe Cubas, Hernandez flew to Venezuela and then to the Dominican Republic
where he was granted political asylum. n63 Because of these geographic and legal maneuvers, Hernandez was not considered a legal
resident of the United States. He was, therefore, permitted to enter MLB as a free agent since he did not defect from Cuba directly to
the United States. n64 The monetary rewards of free agency were quickly apparent as Livan [*482] signed with the Florida Marlins for
a four-year contract at close to $ 4.5 million. n65 Two years later, Livan's half-brother, Orlando Hernandez, was able to enter MLB as a
free agent through similar maneuvering. Although Orlando's boat of Cuban refugees landed in the Bahamas and all on board were
interned, Orlando Hernandez was freed from the refugee camp and permitted to establish residency in Costa Rica with the help of
sports agent Joe Cubas. n66 Again, because Orlando was in Costa Rica legally, he was able to enter the United States and MLB as a free
agent with the ensuing financial rewards. In 1998, he signed for $ 6.6 million with the New York Yankees. n67 Although this pathway
to the United States and to free agency clearly benefited Orlando Hernandez, both the governments of the Bahamas and Costa Rica
responded negatively to his and his agent's maneuvers. By 1996, the Bahamian government had already enacted a repatriation
agreement with Cuba that stated Cuba would be notified about any Cuban refugees within seventy-two hours. n68 While Hernandez
was freed from the Bahamian detention center, the rest of the Cuban refugees were not; n69 even baseball players were being sent back

to Cuba. n70 After the latter Hernandez defection, both the Bahamas and Costa Rica began denying the majority of visa applications
from Cuba on the basis that their countries were being used merely as transit points on the way to the United States. n71 The primary
development over the course of the 1990s was that the best Cuban players and their agents learned how to circumvent MLB rules
placing Cuban defectors in the amateur draft so that these stars could sign as free agents with the team of their choice for far more
money. At the same time, MLB was narrowing these loopholes, making it more likely that Cuban players, in general, would face the
draft. Early in 2001, sports agent Joe Kehoskie tried to establish Dominican Republic residency for two Cuban players, Mayque
Quintero, and Evel [*483] Bastida who had also arrived here directly from Cuba. MLB ruled that since the two players lived in Tampa,
Florida, they were legal residents subject to the draft. When Kehoskie argued that the players were legally residents of the Dominican
Republic, MLB further explained that immigration law and baseball would not necessarily interpret the term "legal resident" in the
same way. n72 With this incident as background, Cuban pitcher Rolando Viera defected directly to the United States at the end of April
2001 and was immediately granted refugee status on his visa. Under MLB rules, Viera was subject to the draft. At the end of May,
Viera's attorneys filed a motion for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and emergency injunctive relief, trying to prevent MLB from
interfering with Viera's ability to act as a free agent. n73 His attorneys argued that Viera's choice of either entering the draft or leaving
the United States in order to establish residency elsewhere (and therefore jeopardizing his United States visa) would cause irreparable
harm. Viera had two primary arguments as to why he would suffer irreparable harm. First, forcing him to enter the draft would likely
result in him receiving less money than he could receive through free agency. Furthermore, Viera would be tied to a team for a certain
amount of time rather than have the ability to negotiate with a team of his choosing. If, in the alternative, he were to leave the United
States in order to avoid the draft, Viera would potentially lose his "parolee" status on his visa and have to jump several immigration
hurdles in order to re-enter the United States. n74 The

choice presented to Cuban players by

MLB, Viera argued, was discrimination on the basis of national origin .
n75 No other foreign player faces the choice between directly entering
and remaining in the United States, and thus being subjected to the draft,
or leaving the [*484] United States for a third country in order to
establish foreign residency, and thus not being subjected to the draft . Major

League Baseball filed an opposition to the temporary restraining order, arguing that the standard for injunctive relief had not been met.
n76 The court agreed. n77 Both the MLB brief and the Order focused on the technical aspects of the standard for the TRO rather than
the broader question of whether MLB is engaged in discrimination. The order denying the TRO stated that Viera should have filed a
complaint with the EEOC as required by Title VII. n78 Furthermore, the order agreed with the MLB argument that entering the draft
was not irreparable harm because any damage suffered by Viera would be monetary and, therefore, could be remedied at a later date.
n79 The choice that Viera had to make between leaving the country or joining the draft, the court held, was "speculative" rather than
"actual and imminent." n80 The TRO was denied on these procedural grounds rather than upholding the legitimacy of MLB rules.
Viera has since filed for partial summary judgment against MLB. n81 A ruling from the court is pending. The issue of the legality and
fairness of the MLB rules is really the far more interesting point that will be dealt with as the case progresses through the courts. Viera's
arguments are compelling when compared to the situations of other foreign-born players. None of the recently-arrived Japanese stars
signed by MLB teams were forced to go through the draft. n82 These players were free to come to the United States, be scouted,
negotiate for their contracts in the United States, and then reside here .

If Cuban players were treated like

other foreign players, they would have to apply for special work visas
after signing with a team. Because, however, Cubans are immediately
granted refugee status, MLB argues that at the moment when Cuban
players come to the United States, they [*485] establish legal residency.
n83 The irony is that the same immigration policy which benefits other
Cubans by granting them refugee status, harms the Cuban players. MLB argues
that it is not discriminating on the basis of national origin - the rules are the same for any player that establishes residency here.
However, MLB has not been able to point to any other examples of foreign players facing the same choice as Cuban players. MLB also
argues that the Hernandez brothers were able to enter into free agency because they established residency elsewhere first, apparently

To treat players differently

because of where their boat landed when they defected is the height of
arbitrary and disparate treatment. The goal - to live and play in the United
States - is the same for all of these Cuban players.
endorsing this method of avoiding the draft. Yet, MLB's argument is specious.