1

PartI
1.VALIAOv. REPUBLIC
GRNo. 170757, 28November 2011
PERALTA,J.:
FACTS:
PetitionersValiao filed forthe registration their parcel of land (Lot No.
2372) whichthey acquired fromtheir uncle in 1947. The Solicitor General and
privateoppositors, Zafra andYusay, opposed said registration on the
followinggrounds: (1) the land appliedfor has not been declared alienable
anddisposable; (2) there was no proof thatthe applicants had in open,
continuous,exclusive and notorious possession of theland in question since
June 12, 1945or prior thereto. In the petitionersdefense, they alleged that
the possessionof their uncle since 1916 until 1966had been open, continuous
anduninterrupted; thus, converting the said land intoa private land.
Issue:Whether or not Lot No. 2372 is an alienable land of the PublicDomain
under theRegalian Doctrine.
HELD:
No,Lot No. 2372 isinalienable.
Underthe Regalian doctrine,all lands of the public domain belong to
the State. Alllands not appearing tobe clearly within private ownership are
presumed tobelong to the State.Accordingly, public lands not shown to have
beenreclassified or released asalienable agricultural land or alienated to a
privateperson by the State,remain part of the inalienable public domain.
Propertyof the public domainis beyond the commerce of man and
not susceptible ofprivate appropriation andacquisitive prescription.
Occupation thereof in theconcept of owner no matterhow long cannot ripen
into ownership and beregistered as a title. To prove thatthe
<a></a>landsubject of an application for registration isalienable, the
applicant mustestablish the existence of a positive act of thegovernment,
such as apresidential proclamation or an executive order. Theapplicant may
also securea certification from the government that the<a></a>landclaimed
to have been possessed for the required numberof y<a>earsis alienable and
disposable.</a>
Inthis case, no such evidencewas offered by the petitioners to show
that the <a></a>landinquestion has been classified as alienable and
disposable<a></a>landof the <a></a>public domain. In the
absenceofincontrovertible evidence to prove that the subject property
isalreadyclassified as alienable and disposable, Lot 2372 is still an
inalienablepublicdomain.
2(Charleen)
3(Gina)
FERNANDAARBIASvs. THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
G.R.No.173808
September 17, 2008
CHICO-NAZARIO,J
Facts:
On12March 1993, Lourdes T. Jardeleza (Jardeleza) executed a Deed of
Absolute Salesellingto petitioner a parcel of unregistered land situated at
Poblacion,Estancia,Iloilo, for the sum of P33,000.00. According to the Deed,

the subjectpropertywas residential and consisted of 600 square meters, more

or less.
Threeyears thereafter, on 17 June 1996,petitioner filed with the RTC a
verifiedApplication for Registration of Titleover the subject property. She
attached toher application the Tracing Clothwith Blue Print copies, the Deed
of AbsoluteSale involving the subjectproperty, the Surveyors Certification, the
TechnicalDescription of the land,and Declaration of Real Property in the name
ofpetitioner and her spouse Jimmy.
Thereafter,the respondent filed anOpposition to petitioners application for
registrationof the subject property.In its Brief, respondent questioned the
failure ofpetitioner to prove thecontinuous, open, exclusive and notorious
possession bytheirpredecessor-in-interest.
Issue:
Whetherornot the petitioner has proved that the subject land is an alienable
land.
Held:
No.Underthe Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the
State,andthe State is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land
andchargedwith the conservation of such patrimony. This same doctrine also
statesthatall lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private
ownershiparepresumed to belong to the State. Hence, the burden of proof in
overcomingthepresumption of State ownership of lands of the public domain
is on thepersonapplying for registration. The applicant must show that the
land subjectof theapplication is alienable or disposable.
Section14,paragraph 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 states the
requirementsnecessary fora judicial confirmation of imperfect title to be
issued. The applicantforregistration under said statutory provision must
specifically prove:1)possession of the subject land under a bona fide claim of
ownership from12June 1945 or earlier; and 2) the classification of the land as
an alienableanddisposable land of the public domain.
Inthecase at bar, petitioner miserably failed to discharge the burden
ofproofimposed on her by the law. The Deed of Sale did not state the duration
oftimeduring which the vendor (or her predecessors-in-interest) possessed
thesubjectproperty in the concept of an owner. Well-settled is the rule
thattaxdeclarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership or
oftheright to possess land when not supported by any other evidence. The
SurveyPlanand Technical Description of the subject property submitted
bypetitionermerely plot the location, area and boundaries thereof.
Fortheoriginal registration of title, the applicant must overcome
thepresumptionthat the land sought to be registered forms part of the
publicdomain. Unlesspublic land is shown to have been reclassified or
alienated to aprivate personby the State, it remains part of the inalienable
public domain.Indeed,occupation thereof in the concept of owner, no matter
how long, cannotripeninto ownership and be registered as a title. To
overcome suchpresumption,incontrovertible evidence must be shown by the
applicant. Absentsuch evidence,the land sought to be registered remains
inalienable.
4(Zhon)
5(May Ann)

6(Rhea B.)
7(Angel)
8(Janine)
9. Cruzvs Secretary ofDENR
GR.No. 135385, Dec.6, 2000
FACTS:
Petitioners Isagani CruzandCesar Europa filed a suit for prohibition
and mandamus as citizensandtaxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of
certain provisions ofRepublicAct No. 8371, otherwise known as the Indigenous
Peoples Rights Act of1997(IPRA) and its implementing rules and regulations
(IRR). The petitionersassailcertain provisions of the IPRA and its IRR on the
ground that theseamount toan unlawful deprivation of the States ownership
over lands of thepublicdomain as well as minerals and other natural
resources therein, inviolation ofthe regalian doctrine embodied in section 2,
Article XII of the Constitution.
ISSUE:
Dotheprovisions of IPRA contravene the Constitution?
HELD:
No,theprovisions of IPRA do not contravene the Constitution. Examining
theIPRA,there is nothing in the law that grants to the ICCs/IPs ownership
overthenatural resources within their ancestral domain. Ownership over
thenaturalresources in the ancestral domains remains with the State and
therightsgranted by the IPRA to the ICCs/IPs over the natural resources
intheirancestral domains merely gives them, as owners and occupants of the
landonwhich the resources are found, the right to the small scale
utilizationofthese resources, and at the same time, a priority in their
largescaledevelopment and exploitation.
Additionally,ancestrallands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands of
the publicdomain. Theyare private lands and belong to the ICCs/IPs by native
title,which is a conceptof private land title that existed irrespective of any
royalgrant from theState. However, the right of ownership and possession by
theICCs/IPs of theirancestral domains is a limited form of ownership and does
notinclude the rightto alienate the same.
10(Lou)
Secretaryof DENR vs. Yap (568 SCRA 164) G.R. No. 167707 (8October
2008)
Facts:On November 10, 1978, then President Ferdinand Marcos
issuedProclamation No. 1801 declaring Boracay Island, amongother islands,
caves and peninsulas in the Philippines, as touristzones and marine
reserves under the administration of the PhilippineTourism Authority (PTA).
President Marcos later approved the issuanceof PTA Circular 3-82 dated
September 3, 1982, toimplement Proclamation No. 1801.
On July14, 1999, the RTC rendered a decision in favor ofrespondentsclaimants.
The RTC upheldrespondents-claimants right to have their occupied lands
titled in their name.The Office of the Solicitor General moved for
reconsideration but itsmotion was denied. The Republic then appealed to the
CA. On December9, 2004, the appellate court affirmed in toto the RTC

decision.The CA held that respondents-claimants could not be prejudiced by a

declarationthat the lands they occupied since time immemorial were part of a
forestreserve. Again, the OSG sought reconsideration but it was
similarlydenied. Hence, the present petition under Rule 45.
G.R.No. 173775
On May22, 2006, during the pendency of G.R. No. 167707, President
GloriaMacapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 1064[26] classifying
BoracayIsland into four hundred (400) hectares of reserved forest land
(protectionpurposes) and six hundred twenty-eight and 96/100 (628.96)
hectares ofagricultural land (alienable and disposable). The Proclamation
likewiseprovided for a fifteen-meter buffer zone on each side of the center
line ofroads and trails, reserved for right-of-way and which shall form part of
thearea reserved for forest land protection purposes.
On November21, 2006, this Court ordered the consolidation of the two
petitions (G.R.No. 167707 and G.R. no. 173775) as they principally
involve thesame issues on the land classification of Boracay Island.
Respondents-claimants allegedthat they themselves, or through their
predecessors-in-interest, had been inopen, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation in Boracaysince June 12, 1945, or earlier
since time immemorial. They declared theirlands for tax purposes and paid
realty taxes on them. Also they alleged thatthe proclamation and its
implementing circulars did not place Boracay beyondthe commerce of men
and was classified as a tourist zone, it was susceptible ofprivate ownership.
Under Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 141,otherwise known as
the Public Land Act, they had the right to have the lotsregistered in their
names through judicial confirmation of imperfect titles.
TheOffice of the Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the
petition:Because Boracay Island was an unclassified land ofthe public
domain. It formed part of the mass of lands classified aspublic forest, which
was not available for disposition pursuant to Section 3(a)of Presidential
Decree (PD) No. 705 or the Revised Forestry Code, asamended. The OSG
maintained that respondents-claimants relianceon PD No. 1801 and
PTA Circular No. 3-82 was misplaced. Theirright to judicial confirmation of
title was governed by CA No. 141 and PD No.705. Since Boracay Island had
not been classified asalienable and disposable, whatever possession they had
cannot ripen intoownership.
Issue/s:W/N Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82converted
Boracay into an agricultural land.
Held:No.
Privateclaimants cannot rely on Proclamation No. 1801 as basis for
judicialconfirmation of imperfect title. The proclamation did not
convert Boracayinto an agricultural land. ProclamationNo. 1801 or PTA
Circular No. 3-82 did not convert the whole ofBoracay into an agricultural
land. There is nothing in the law or theCircular which made Boracay Island an
agricultural land. Thereference in Circular No. 3-82 to private lands and areas
declared as alienableand disposable does not by itself classify the entire
island asagricultural.
Therefore,Proclamation No. 1801 cannot be deemed the positive act
needed toclassify Boracay Island as alienable and disposable land.
IfPresident Marcos intended to classify the island as alienable and disposable
orforest, or both, he would have identified the specific limits of each,

asPresident Arroyo did in Proclamation No. 1064. This was not done
inProclamation No. 1801.
TheWhereas clauses of Proclamation No. 1801 also explain the rationale
behind thedeclaration of Boracay Island, together with other islands, caves
andpeninsulas in the Philippines, as a tourist zone and marine reserve to
beadministered by the PTA to ensure the concentrated efforts of thepublic
and private sectors in the development of the areas tourism potentialwith
due regard for ecological balance in the marine environment. Simplyput, the
proclamation is aimed at administering the islands for tourismand
ecological purposes. It does not address the areas alienability.
Privateclaimants continued possession under Act No. 926 does not
create a presumptionthat the land is alienable. Privateclaimants also
contend that their continued possession of portionsof Boracay Island for the
requisite period of ten (10) yearsunder Act No. 926 ipso facto converted the
island into privateownership. Hence, they may apply for a title in their name.
Exceptfor lands already covered by existing titles, Boracay was an
unclassified landof the public domain prior to Proclamation No.
1064. Such unclassifiedlands are considered public forest under PD
No. 705. TheDENR and the National Mapping and Resource
InformationAuthority certify that Boracay Island is an unclassifiedland of the
public domain.
WHEREFORE,judgment is rendered as follows:
1.The petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 167707 is GRANTED andthe Court of
Appeals Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 71118 REVERSED AND SETASIDE.
2.The petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 173775 is DISMISSED forlack of merit.
SOORDERED.
Syllabus: Natural Resources; Public Lands; Regalian Doctrine; Words
and Phrases;The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the
public domain belong tothe State, that the State is the source of any
asserted right to ownership ofland and charged with the
conservation of such patrimony, a doctrineconsistently adopted
under the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitution; Prior toProclamation
No.1064 of May 22, 2006, Boracay Island had never been
expresslyand administratively classfified under any of the grand
divisions of land.Boracay was an unclassified land of the public
Domain. --- The1935 Constitution classified lands of the public domain into
agricultural,forest or timber. Meanwhile, the 1973 Constitution provided the
followingdivisions: agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential,
resettlement,mineral, timber or forest and grazing lands and such other
classes as may beprovided by law, giving the government great leeway for
classification. Thenthe 1987 Constitution reverted to the 1935 Constitution
classification with oneaddition: national parks. Of these, only agricultural
lands may be alienated.Prior to Proclamation No. 1064 of May 22, 2006,
Boracay Island had never beenexpressly and administratively classified under
any of these grand divisions.Boracay was an unclassified land of the public
domain. The Regalian Doctrinedictates that all lands of the public domain
belong to the State, That theState is the source of any asserted right to
ownership of land and charged withthe conservation of such patrimony. The
doctrine has been consistently adoptedunder the 1935, 1973, and 1987
Constitutions.

TheRegalian doctrine was first introduced in the Philippines through

the Laws ofthe Indies and the Royal Cedulas, Which laid the
foundation that "alllands that were not acquired from the
Government, either by purchase or bygrant, belong to the public
domain." -- Ourpresent land law traces its roots to the Regalian Doctrine.
Upon the Spanishconquest of the Philippines, ownership of all lands,
territories andpossessions in the Philippines passed to the Spanish Crown.
The Regaliandoctrine was first introduced in the Philippines through the laws
of the Indiesand the Royal Cedulas, which laid the foundation that "all lands
that werenot acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by grant,
belong to thepublic domain."
NOTES:
Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands not otherwise appearing to be
clearlywithin private ownership are presumed to belong to the State -- unless
publicland is shown to have been reclassified as alienable or disposable to a
privateperson by the State, it remains part of the inalienable public domain.
(Republicvs. Jacob, 495 SCRA 529(2006))
Underthe Regalian doctrine, all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly
withinprivate ownership are presumed to belong to the State -- applicants
forconfirmation of imperfect title must therefore, prove the following: (a)
thatthe lands of the public domain; and, (b) that they have been in
open,continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the
sameunder a bona fide claim of ownership either since time immemorial or
since June12,1945 lies in the presumption that the land applied for pertains
to theState, and that the occupants or possessor claim an interest thereon
only byvirtue of their imperfect title as continuous open and notorious
possession.(Republicvs. Candy Maker, Inc., 492 SCRA 272 (2006))
Historyof Public Land Dispostition
TheRegalian principle traces its roots:
Uponthe Spanish conquest of the Philippines, ownership of all lands,territories
and possessions in thePhilippines passed to the Spanish Crown.The Regalian
doctrine was first introduced in the Philippines throughthe Laws of the Indies
and the Royal Cedulas, which laid thefoundation that all lands that were not
acquired from the Government, either bypurchase or by grant, belong to the
public domain.
The Lawsof the Indies was followed by the Ley Hipotecaria orthe Mortgage
Law of 1893. The Spanish Mortgage Law providedfor the systematic
registration of titles and deeds as well as possessoryclaims.
TheRoyal Decree of 1894 or the Maura Law partly amended the
SpanishMortgage Law and the Laws of the Indies. It established
possessoryinformation as the method of legalizing possession of vacant
Crown land, undercertain conditions which were set forth in said decree.
UnderSection 393 of the Maura Law, an informacion posesoria orpossessory
information title, when duly inscribed in the Registry ofProperty, is converted
into a title of ownership only after the lapse of twenty(20) years of
uninterrupted possession which must be actual, public, andadverse, from the
date of its inscription. However, possessory informationtitle had to be
perfected one year after the promulgation of the Maura Law, oruntil April 17,
1895. Otherwise, the lands would revert to the State.
Privateownership of land could only be founded on royal concessions which
tookvarious forms, namely: (1) titulo real or royal grant;(2) concesion especial
or special grant; (3) composicioncon el estado or adjustment title; (4) titulo

de compra ortitle by purchase; and (5) informacion posesoria or

possessoryinformation title.
AmericanRule:
The Philippine Bill of 1902: lands of the public domain in the Philippine
Islands were classified into three (3) grand divisions, to wit:
agricultural, mineral, and timber or forest lands. The act provided for,
among others, the disposal of mineral lands by means of absolute
grant (freehold system) and by lease (leasehold system). It also
provided the definition by exclusion of agricultural public lands.

On February 1, 1903, the Philippine Legislature passed Act No. 496,

otherwise known as the Land Registration Act. The act established a
system of registration by which recorded title becomes absolute,
indefeasible, and imprescriptible. This is known as the Torrens system.

On October 7, 1903, the Philippine Commission passed Act No. 926,

which was the first Public Land Act. The Act introduced the homestead
system and made provisions for judicial and administrative
confirmation of imperfect titles and for the sale or lease of public lands.
It permitted corporations regardless of the nationality of persons
owning the controlling stock to lease or purchase lands of the public
domain. Under the Act, open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural lands for the next ten (10)
years preceding July 26, 1904 was sufficient for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title.

On November 29, 1919, Act No. 926 was superseded by Act No.
2874, otherwise known as the second Public Land Act. This new, more
comprehensive law limited the exploitation of agricultural lands to
Filipinos and Americans and citizens of other countries which gave
Filipinos the same privileges. For judicial confirmation of title,
possession and occupation en concepto dueo since time immemorial,
or since July 26, 1894, was required.

After the passage of the 1935 Constitution, CA No. 141 amended Act
No. 2874 on December 1, 1936. To this day, CA No. 141, as
amended, remains as the existing general law governing the
classification and disposition of lands of the public domain other than
timber and mineral lands, and privately owned lands which reverted to
the State.

Section 48(b) of CA No. 141 retained the requirement under Act No.
2874 of possession and occupation of lands of the public domain since
time immemorial or since July 26, 1894. However, this provision was
superseded by Republic Act (RA) No. 1942, which provided for a simple
thirty-year prescriptive period for judicial confirmation of imperfect
title. The provision was last amended by PD No. 1073, which now
provides for possession and occupation of the land applied for since
June 12, 1945, or earlier.

The issuance of PD No. 892 on February 16, 1976 discontinued the use
of Spanish titles as evidence in land registration proceedings. Under
the decree, all holders of Spanish titles or grants should apply for
registration of their lands under Act No. 496 within six (6) months from
the effectivity of the decree on February 16, 1976. Thereafter, the
recording of all unregistered lands shall be governed by Section 194
of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Act No.
3344.

On June 11, 1978, Act No. 496 was amended and updated by PD No.
1529, known as the Property Registration Decree. It was enacted
to codify the various laws relative to registration of property. It governs
registration of lands under the Torrens system as well as unregistered
lands, including chattel mortgages.

11(Jess)
12(Diane)
HEIRSOF MARIO MALABANAN, (Represented by Sally A. Malabanan),
Petitioners,vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
G.R.No. 179987 April 29, 2009
Thepetition, while unremarkable as to the facts, was accepted by the Court
enbanc in order to provide definitive clarity to the applicability and scopeof
original registration proceedings under Sections 14(1) and 14(2) of
theProperty Registration Decree
(PDNo. 1529)
FACTS:
On20 February 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for land
registrationcovering a parcel of land identified as Lot9864-A, Cad-452-D,
Silang Cadastre,situated in Silang Cavite. Malabanan claimed that he had
purchased the propertyfrom Eduardo Velazco, and that he and his
predecessors-in-interest had been in open,notorious, and continuous
adverse and peaceful possession of the land for morethan thirty (30)
years. Malabanan and Aristedes Velazco, testified atthe hearing. Velazco
testified that the property was originally belonged to a22 hectare property
owned by his great-grandfather, Lino Velazco.
TheRepublic of the Philippines likewise did not present any evidence to
controvertthe application.
Malabananpresented evidence during trial a Certification dated 11 June 2001,
issued bythe CENRO-DENR, which stated that the subject property was
verified to bewithin the Alienable or Disposable land per Land
Classification Map No.3013 established under Project No. 20-A and approved
as such under FAO 4-1656 onMarch 15, 1982.
On3 December 2002, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of Malabanan. The
Republicappealed to the Court of Appeals. CA reversed the decision and
dismissed theapplication of Malabanan. Malabanan died while the case was
pending with theCA; it was his heirs who appealed the decision of the
appellate court.
ISSUE:
Whetheror not Malabanan has acquired ownership over the subject property
under Section48(b) of the Public Land Act.
HELD:
No.Evidence of petitioners is insufficient to establish that Malabanan
hasacquired ownership over the subject property under Section 48(b) of the
PublicLand Act. There is no substantive evidence to establish that
Malabanan orpetitioners as his predecessors-in-interest have been
in possession of theproperty since 12 June 1945 or earlier.
Neithercan petitioners properly invoke Section 14(2) as basis for registration.
Whilethe subject property was declared as alienable or disposable in 1982,

there isno competent evidence that is no longer intended for public use
service or forthe development of the national evidence, conformably with
Article 422 of theCivil Code. The classification of the subject property as
alienable and disposableland of the public domain does not change its status
as property of the publicdominion under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code.
Thus, it is insusceptible toacquisition by prescription.
DOCTRINES:
CommonwealthAct No. 141 (Public Land Act) governed the classification and
disposition oflands of the public domain. The President is authorized, from
time to time, toclassify the lands of the public domain into alienable and
disposable, timber,or mineral lands. Alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain arefurther classified according to their uses into (a)
agricultural; (b)residential, commercial, industrial, or for similar productive
purposes; (c)educational, charitable, or other similar purposes; or (d)
reservations fortown sites and for public and quasi-public uses.
Section11 of the Public Land Act acknowledges that public lands suitable
foragricultural purposes may be disposed of by confirmation of imperfect
orincomplete titles through judicial legalization.
Section48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by P.D. No. 1073, supplies
the detailsand unmistakably grants that right, subject to the requisites stated
therein:
Sec.48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of
thepublic domain or claiming to own any such land or an interest therein,
butwhose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the
Court ofFirst Instance of the province where the land is located for
confirmation oftheir claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor,
under theLand Registration Act, to wit:
(b)Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have
been in open,continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable anddisposable lands of the public domain,
under a bona fide claim of acquisitionof ownership, since June 12,
1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filingof the application
for confirmation of title except when prevented by waror force majeure.
These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed allthe conditions
essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to acertificate of title
under the provisions of this chapter.
Twosignificant amendments were introduced by P.D. No. 1073. First, the
termagricultural lands was changed to alienable and disposable lands of
thepublic domain.
UnderSection 9 of the Public Land Act, agricultural lands are a mere subset
oflands of the public domain alienable or open to disposition. Evidently,
alienableand disposable lands of the public domain are a larger class
than onlyagricultural lands.
Second,the length of the requisite possession was changed from possession
for thirty(30) years immediately preceding the filing of the application to
possessionsince June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Itbears further observation that Section 48(b) of Com. Act No, 141 is
virtuallythe same as Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.
SECTION14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper
Court of FirstInstance an application for registration of title to land, whether
personallyor through their duly authorized representatives:

10

(1)those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have

been inopen, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation
ofalienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide
claimof ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
Notwithstandingthe passage of the Property Registration Decree and the
inclusion of Section14(1) therein, the Public Land Act has remained in effect.
Bothlaws commonly refer to persons or their predecessors-in-interest who
have beenin open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation ofalienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a
bona fide claimof ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
Theopening clauses of Section 48 of the Public Land Act and Section 14 of
theProperty Registration Decree warrant comparison:
Sec.48 [of the Public Land Act]. The following described citizens of
thePhilippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any
suchland or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been
perfected orcompleted, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the
province wherethe land is located for confirmation of their claims and the
issuance of acertificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to
wit:
xxx
Sec.14 [of the Property Registration Decree]. Who may apply. The following
personsmay file in the proper Court of First Instance an application
forregistration of title to land, whether personally or through their
dulyauthorized representatives:
Itis indeed the Public Land Act that primarily establishes the
substantiveownership of the possessor who has been in possession of the
propertysince 12 June 1945.
Section14(a) of the Property Registration Decree recognizesthe
substantive right granted under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act,as
well provides the corresponding original registration procedure for thejudicial
confirmation of an imperfect or incomplete title.
Thereis another limitation to the right granted under Section 48(b). Section
47 ofthe Public Land Act (amended by Rep. Act No. 9176 in 2002) limits
theperiod within which one may exercise the right to seek registration
underSection 48.
Section47. The persons specified in the next following section are hereby
grantedtime, not to extend beyond December 31, 2020 within which to
avail of thebenefits of this Chapter: Provided, That this period shall apply
only wherethe area applied for does not exceed twelve (12) hectares:
Provided, further,That the several periods of time designated by the President
in accordance withSection Forty-Five of this Act shall apply also to the lands
comprised in theprovisions of this Chapter, but this Section shall not be
construed asprohibiting any said persons from acting under this Chapter at
any time priorto the period fixed by the President.
Thesubstantive right granted under Section 48(b) may be availed of only until
31December 2020. The OSG has adopted the position that for one to acquire
theright to seek registration of an alienable and disposable land of the
publicdomain, it is not enough that the applicant and his/herpredecessors-ininterest be in possession under a bona fide claim ofownership since 12 June
1945; the alienable and disposable character of theproperty must
have been declared also as of 12 June 1945.
Followingthe OSGs approach, all lands certified as alienable and disposable
after 12June 1945 cannot be registered either under Section 14(1) of the

11

PropertyRegistration Decree or Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act as

amended.
Discussedin Naguit. adopting the OSGs view, that all lands of the
publicdomain which were not declared alienable or disposable before June 12,
1945would not be susceptible to original registration, no matter the length
ofunchallenged possession by the occupant. Such interpretation renders
paragraph(1) of Section 14 virtually inoperative and even precludes the
government fromgiving it effect even as it decides to reclassify public
agricultural lands asalienable and disposable. The unreasonableness of the
situation would even beaggravated considering that before June 12, 1945,
the Philippines was not yeteven considered an independent state.
[T]hemore reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it merely
requiresthe property sought to be registered as already alienable
and disposable at thetime the application for registration of title is
filed.
Petitionersmake the salient observation that the contradictory passages from
Herbieto areobiter dicta since the land registration proceedings therein is
void abinitio in the first place due to lack of the requisite publication of
thenotice of initial hearing.
Theapplication therein was ultimately granted, citing Section 14(2).
Theevidence submitted by petitioners therein did not establish any mode
ofpossession on their part prior to 1948, thereby precluding the
applicationof Section 14(1). It is not even apparent from the decision whether
petitionerstherein had claimed entitlement to original registration following
Section14(1), their position being that they had been in exclusive possession
under abona fide claim of ownership for over fifty (50) years, but not before
12 June1945.
TheCourt in Naguit offered the following discussion concerning Section14(2)
Prescriptionis one of the modes of acquiring ownership under the Civil Code.
There is aconsistent jurisprudential rule that properties classified as alienable
publicland may be converted into private property by reason of open,
continuous andexclusive possession of at least thirty (30) years.[[31]] With
such conversion,such property may now fall within the contemplation of
private lands underSection 14(2), and thus susceptible to registration by
those who have acquiredownership through prescription. Thus, even if
possession of the alienablepublic land commenced on a date later than June
12, 1945, and such possessionbeing been open, continuous and exclusive,
then the possessor may have theright to register the land by virtue of Section
14(2) of the PropertyRegistration Decree.
Theobiter in Naguit cited the Civil Code provisions on prescription as
thepossible basis for application for original registration under Section
14(2).Specifically, it is Article 1113 which provides legal foundation for the
application.It reads:
Allthings which are within the commerce of men are susceptible of
prescription,unless otherwise provided. Property of the State or any of its
subdivisionsnot patrimonial in character shall not be the object of
prescription.
Thecritical qualification under Article 1113 of the Civil Code is
thus:[p]roperty of the State or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial
incharacter shall not be the object of prescription. The identification
whatconsists of patrimonial property is provided by Articles 420 and 421
Art.420. The following things are property of public dominion:

12

(1)Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents,
portsand bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and
others ofsimilar character;
(2)Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are
intendedfor some public service or for the development of the national
wealth.
Art.421. All other property of the State, which is not of thecharacter stated in
the preceding article, is patrimonial property
Itis clear that property of public dominion, which generally includes
propertybelonging to the State, cannot be the object of prescription
Landsof the public domain, whether declared alienable and
disposable or not, areproperty of public dominion and thus
insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.
Article422 of the Civil Code states that [p]roperty of public dominion, when
nolonger intended for public use or for public service, shall form part of
thepatrimonial property of the State.
Accordingly,there must be an express declaration by the State that
the public dominionproperty is no longer intended for public service
or the development of thenational wealth or that the property has
been converted into patrimonial.
Shouldpublic domain lands become patrimonial because they are declared as
such in aduly enacted law or duly promulgated proclamation that they are no
longerintended for public service or for the development of the national
wealth, wouldthe period of possession prior to the conversion of such
public dominion intopatrimonial be reckoned in counting the
prescriptive period in favor of thepossessors? - We rule in the
negative.
Asthe application for registration under Section 14(2) falls wholly within
theframework of prescription under the Civil Code, there is no way that
possessionduring the time that the land was still classified as public dominion
propertycan be counted to meet the requisites of acquisitive prescription and
justifyregistration.
Section14(1) mandates registration on the basis of possession, while
Section 14(2)entitles registration on the basis of
prescription.Registration under Section 14(1) is extended under the
aegis of the PropertyRegistration Decree and the Public Land Act
while registration under Section14(2) is made available both by the
Property Registration Decree and the CivilCode.
Registrationunder Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act as amended
by Rep. Act No. 1472 isbased on thirty years of possession alone
without regard to the Civil Code,while the registration under Section
14(2) of the Property Registration Decreeis founded on
extraordinary prescription under the Civil Code.
Whetherunder ordinary prescription or extraordinary prescription, the period
ofpossession preceding the classification of public dominion lands as
patrimonialcannot be counted for the purpose of computing prescription. But
after theproperty has been become patrimonial, the period of prescription
begins to runin favor of the possessor.
Oncethe possessor automatically becomes the owner of the converted
patrimonialproperty, the ideal next step is the registration of the property
under theTorrens system. It should be remembered that registration of
property is not amode of acquisition of ownership, but merely a mode of
confirmation of ownership.

13

(1)In connection with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree,

Section48(b) of the Public Land Act recognizes and confirms that those
who bythemselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in
open,continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
alienable anddisposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim
of acquisitionof ownership, since June 12, 1945 have acquired ownership of,
and registrabletitle to, such lands based on the length and quality of their
possession.
(a)Since Section 48(b) merely requires possession since 12 June 1945 and
doesnot require that the lands should have been alienable and
disposable during theentire period of possession, the possessor is
entitled to secure judicialconfirmation of his title thereto as soon as it is
declared alienable anddisposable, subject to the timeframe imposed by
Section 47 of the Public LandAct.
(b)The right to register granted under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Actis
further confirmed by Section 14(1) of the Property RegistrationDecree.
(2)In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration
Decree,consider that under the Civil Code, prescription is recognized as a
mode ofacquiring ownership of patrimonial property. However, public domain
landsbecome only patrimonial property not only with a declaration that these
arealienable or disposable. There must also be an express government
manifestationthat the property is already patrimonial or no longer retained
for public serviceor the development of national wealth, under Article 422 of
the Civil Code. Andonly when the property has become patrimonial can the
prescriptive period forthe acquisition of property of the public dominion begin
to run.
(a)Patrimonial property is private property of the government. The person
acquiresownership of patrimonial property by prescription under the Civil
Code isentitled to secure registration thereof under Section 14(2) of
theProperty Registration Decree.
(b)There are two kinds of prescription by which patrimonial property may
beacquired, one ordinary and other extraordinary. Under ordinary
acquisitiveprescription, a person acquires ownership of a patrimonial property
throughpossession for at least ten (10) years, in good faith and with just
title.Under extraordinary acquisitive prescription, a persons uninterrupted
adversepossession of patrimonial property for at least thirty (30) years,
regardlessof good faith or just title, ripens into ownership.

13(April)
14(Daniel Eblahan)
Legardav. Saleeby
GRno. L-8936, Oct 2, 1915
Johnson,J.:
Facts:
Consuelo Legarda and her husband owned a lot in Ermita adjoining the
lot of N.MSaleeby separated by a stone wall located on her side. The wall was
not a jointwall. On March 2 1906, Consuelo petitioned the Court of Land
Registration toregister their lot and the court allowed them. In the original
certificate andtitle issued to them, provided by the Torrens system, the wall
was included. OnMarch 25, 1912 N.M Saleeby also petitioned the Court of
Land Registration toregister his lot and was also allowed. The wall was also
included in hisoriginal certificate and title. The spouses discovered this error
andpetitioned the Court of Land Registration to adjust and correct it. The
courtdenied them because they did not object to the error when the
defendantregistered his lot.

14

Issue:
Whether N.M. Saleeby owns the wall and the land occupying said wall
Held:
No, the Court disagreed with the reason of the lower court that the
plaintiffsdid not object to the registration of Saleeby. The Court argued that
shouldthis be the case, the plaintiffs would always be on alert if another
personregisters the property and should immediately oppose. The Court
declared thatif the holder of the certificate cannot rest secure in the
registered title,the purpose of the Torrens system is defeated and nothing is
gained by theregistration. The Torrens system intended to quiet title, putting
a stop to anyquestion of the legality of the title.
In this case, the Court decided to award theplaintiffs the property
because they were the once who acquired and registeredit first and complied
with the requirements of the law. The defendant cannotraise the defense that
he is an innocent purchaser, because the presumptionthat he has examined
every instrument affecting the title is irrebutable. Thedefendant should have
taken notice that the property was registered to theplaintiffs six years before
he did. The title, once registered, is notice tothe whole world. All persons
must take notice.
Significance:
The purpose of the Torrens system is to quiet the title of a land registered
under said system. Once registered it is notice to the whole world and shall
be conclusive upon and against all persons, including the Government and all
the branches thereof, whether mentioned by name in the application, notice,
or citation, or included in the general description "To all whom it may
concern."
15(Melodia)
16(Mel)
CASTILLO VS ESCUTIN
G.R. No. 171056 13 March 2009
Ponente: Chico-Nazario, J:
FACTS:
Petitioner Dinah Castillo is a judgement creditor of certain Raquel K.
Moratilla (Raquel), married to Roel Buenaventura. In the course of her search
for properties to satisfy the judgement in her favor, petitioner discovered that
Raquel, her mother Urbana Kalaw (Urbana), and sister Perla K. Moratilla
(Perla), co-owned Lot 13713, a parcel of land consisting of 15,000 square
meters, situated at Brgy. Bugtong na pulo, Lipa City, Batangas, and covered
by Tax Declaration No. 00449.
Petitioner upon verifying the ownership of the said lot was able to
secure an Order issued by the Department of Agrarian Reform approving the
application of Summit Point Golf & Country Club, Inc. for conversion of several
agricultural landholdings, including Lot 13713. She was able to get from the
Office of the City Assessor, Lipa City, a Certification stating that Lot 13713,
covered by Tax Declaration No. 00554-A, was in the name of co-owners
Raquel, Urbana, and Perla; and a certified true copy of Tax Declaration No.
00554-A itself. Lastly, the Register of Deeds of Lipa City issued a Certification
attesting that Lot 13713 in the name of co-owners Raquel, Urbana, and Perla,
was not covered by a certificate of title, whether judicial or patent, or subject
to the issuance of a Certificate of Land Ownership Award or patent under the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program.
Only thereafter did petitioner proceed to levy on execution Lot 13713,
and the public auction sale of the same was scheduled on 14 May 2002.
Before the scheduled public auction sale, petitioner learned that Lot 13713
was inside the Summit Point Golf and Country Club Subdivision owned by
Summit Point Realty and Development Corporation (Summit Realty). The

15

public auction still pushed through and Petitioner bought Raquels 1/3 proindiviso share in Lot 13713. When petitioner attempted to pay real estate
taxes for her 5,000-square-meter share in Lot 13713, she was shocked to find
out that her Tax Declaration No. 00942-A was cancelled. Lot 13713 was said
to be encompassed in and overlapping with the 105,648 square meters
parcel of Land known as Lot 1-B, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. 129642 and Tax Declaration No. 00949-A, both in the name ofFrancisco
Catigbac (Catigbac). On 25 July 2002, TCT No. 129642 in the name of
Catigbac was cancelled and TCT No. T-134609 in the name of Summit Realty
was issued in its place. Petitioner then filed a complaint before the Office of
the Ombudsman to charge the officials privy on the disputed property. She
averred that: (1) The supposed Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Summit
Realty executed on 22 July 2002 by Leonardo Yagin as Catigbacs attorney-infact, did not express the desire of Summit Realty, as vendee, to purchase Lot
1-B or indicate its consent and conformity to the terms of the Deed. (2) That
being a corporation, Summit Realty could not only act through its Board of
Directors. (3) That Catigbac had long been dead and buried. Thus, petitioner
argued, Yagin no longer had authority to execute on 22 July 2002 the Deed of
Absolute Sale of Lot 1-B in favor of Summit Realty, making the said Deed null
and void ab initio. (4) That the Special Power of Attorney dated 6 February
1976 granted Yagin the right to sue on behalf of Catigbac, yet it was Summit
Realty which instituted LRC Case No. 00-0376, and Yagin had no participation
at all in said case. (5) Lastly, petitioner questioned why, despite the
cancellation of TCT No. 129642 in the name of Catigbac and the issuance in
its place of TCT No. T-134609 in the name of Summit Realty, it was the former
cancelled title which was used as basis for cancelling petitioners Tax
Declaration No. 00942-A. Tax Declaration No. 00949-A was thus issued in the
name of Catigbac instead of Summit Realty.
On April 28, 2004, in a joint resolution of the office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon gave more credence to respondent Escutin defenses
as opposed to petitioners charges against him and in same resolution the
Office of the Ombudsman declared that there was no basis to hold
respondents Mistas and Linatoc administratively or criminally liable.
On June 20, 2005, petitioner sought recourse from court of appeals by
filing petition for review under Rue 43 of Rules of Court challenging the April
28, 2004 and June 20, 2005 joint resolution of the ombudsman. On October
18, 2005, the court of appeals rendered its decision finding no reason to
administratively or criminally charge respondents.
ISSUE:
The Honorable Court of Appeals patently erred in affirming the
cancellation of the Tax Declaration 00942-A of petitioner.
HELD:
The Supreme Court clarified that the Title is different from a
Certificate of Title. Title is generally defined as a lawful cause or ground of
possessing that which is ours. It is which the foundation of ownership of
property, real or personal. Title, therefore, maybe defined briefly as that
which constitutes a just cause of exclusive possession, or it is the foundation
of ownership of property. Certificate of Title on the other hand is a mere
evidence of ownership; it is not the title to the land itself. Under the torrens
system, a certificate of title maybe original certificate of title which
constitutes a true copy of the decree of registration; or a transfer certificate
title, issued subsequent to original registration. The cancellation of
petitioners Tax Declaration No. 00942-A was not because of a new owners
duplicate of TCT No. 181 but the fact that Lot 1-B which encompassed the
5,000 square meters of petitioner lay claim to was already covered by TCT
181 and subsequently TCT 129642 under the name of Summit Realty which
was acquired thru sale from Mr. Catigbac. A certificate of title issued is an
absolute and indefeasible evidence of ownership of the property in favor of

16

the person whose name appears therein. It is binding and conclusive upon
the whole world.
17(Rocky)
Philippine National Bank vs.Court of Appeals, 153 SCRA 435
FACTS: Thesubject of the action is 30 parcels of land which they claim to be
the conjugalproperty of the spouses Donata Montemayor and Clodualdo Vitug
of which theyclaim a share of 2/11 of 1/2 thereof. They assailed the mortgage
to the PNB andthe public auction of the properties as null and void. They
invoked the case ofVitug vs. Montemayor, L-5297 decided by this Court on
Oct. 20, 1953 which is anaction for partition and liquidation of the said 30
parcels of land wherein theproperties were found to be conjugal in nature.
ISSUE: Doesthe presumption of conjugality of properties acquired by the
spouses duringcoverture provided for in Article 160 of the Civil Code apply to
propertycovered by a Torrens certificate of title in the name of the widow?
HELD: The petitionis impressed with merit.
When the subject propertieswere mortgaged to the PNB they were registered
in the name of DonataMontemayor, widow. Relying on the torrens certificate
of title covering saidproperties the mortgage loan applications of Donata
were granted by the PNB andthe mortgages were duly constituted and
registered in the office of theRegister of Deeds. In processing the loan
applications of Donata Montemayor,the PNB had the right to rely on what
appears in the certificates of title andno more. On its face the properties are
owned by Donata Montemayor, a widow.The PNB had no reason to doubt nor
question the status of said registered ownerand her ownership thereof.
The well-known rule in thisjurisdiction is that a person dealing with a
registered land has a right torely upon the face of the torrens certificate of
title and to dispense with theneed of inquiring further, except when the party
concerned has actual knowledgeof facts and circumstances that would impel
a reasonably cautious man make suchinquiry.
The presumption applies toproperty acquired during the lifetime of the
husband and wife. In this case, itappears on the face of the title that the
properties were acquired by DonataMontemayor when she was already a
widow. When the property is registered in thename of a spouse only and
there is no showing as to when the property wasacquired by said spouse, this
is an indication that the property belongsexclusively to said spouse. The PNB
had a reason to rely on what appears on thecertificates of title of the
properties mortgaged.
Indeed, if the PNB knew ofthe conjugal nature of said properties it would not
have approved the mortgageapplications covering said properties of Donata
Montemayor without requiringthe consent of all the other heirs or co-owners
thereof. Moreover, when saidproperties were sold at public auction, the PNB
was a purchaser for value ingood faith. So its right thereto is beyond
question.
As correctly held by thelower court. Pragmacio and Maximo Vitug as
occupants and lessees of theproperty in question cannot now dispute the
ownership of their mother over thesame who was their lessor.
Hilario vs. City of Manila,19 SCRA 931
FACTS: Dr.Jose Hilario was the registered owner of a large tract of land
around 49hectares in area (Barrio Guinayang, San Mateo, Rizal). Upon his
death thisproperty was inherited by his son, Jose Hilario, Jr., to whom a new
certificateof title was issued. During the lifetime of plaintiffs father, the
Hilarioestate was bounded on the western side by the San Mateo River. To
prevent itsentry into the land, a bamboo and lumber post dike or ditch was
constructed onthe northwestern side. This was further fortified by a stonewall
built on thenorthern side. For years, these safeguards served their purpose.

17

However, in1937, a great and extraordinary flood occurred which inundated

the entire placeincluding the neighboring barrios and municipalities. The
River destroyed thedike on the northwest, left its original bed and meandered
into the Hilarioestate, segregating from the rest thereof a lenticular piece of
land. Thedisputed area is on the eastern side of this lenticular strip which now
standsbetween the old riverbed site and the new course. In 1945, the US
Army opened asand and gravel plant within the premises, and started
scraping, excavating andextracting soil, gravel and sand from the nearby
areas along the River. Theoperations eventually extended northward into the
strip of land. Consequently,a claim for damages was filed with the US War
Department by Luis Hidalgo, thethen administrator of Dr. Hilarios estate. The
US Army paid. In 1947, theplant was turned over to herein defendantsappellants and appellee who tookover its operations.
On 22 October 22, 1949,plaintiff filed his complaint for injunction and
damages against the defendantsCity Engineer of Manila, District Engineer of
Rizal, the Director of PublicWorks, and Engr. Busuego, the Engineer-in-charge
of the plant. Subsequently,the Bureau of Mines and Atty. Maximo Calalang
were respectively allowed to jointhe litigation as intervenors; as per issue of
fees and penalties for materials(sand and gravel) extracted. On 14 March
1954, defendants filed a petition forinjunction against plaintiff and intervenor
Calalang in the same case, allegingthat the latter have fenced off the
disputed area in contravention of anagreement had between the latter and
the Director of Public Works wherein thedefendants were allowed to continue
their operations but subject to the finaloutcome of the pending suit. On 13
May 1954, plaintiff amended his complaintand impleaded as additional
defendants the City of Manila, the ProvincialTreasurer of Rizal, and Engr.
Eulogio Sese, the new Engineer-in-charge of theplant. Plaintiff also converted
his claim to one purely for damages directedagainst the City of Manila and
the Director of Public Works, solidarily, in theamount of P1,000,000.00, as the
cost of materials taken since 1949, as well asthose to be extracted therefrom
until defendants stop their operations. On 21December 1956, the lower court
rendered its decision, ordering the City ofManila and Director of Public Works
to pay Hilario in solidum the sum ofP376,989.60 as cost of gravel and sand
extracted from the plaintiffs land,plus costs; and ordering the Provincial
Treasurer of Rizal to reimburseintervenor Calalang of P36.80 representing
gravel fees illegally collected.None of the parties litigants seemed satisfied
with this decision and they allsought a reconsideration of the same. On
August 30, 1957, the lower courtresolved the motions to reconsider with an
order, holding that the 2/5 portionof the area in controversy to Hilario, and
dismissing the case against theBureau of Public Works insofar as money
claims are concerned without prejudiceto Hilario taking action against proper
party in such claim. Hilario andCalalang filed a second motion for
reconsideration, which the lower court denied.Hence, the appeal.
ISSUES: (a)Whether or not the northern two-fifths of the disputed area
belongs toplaintiff Hilario. (b) When a river, leaving its old bed, changes its
originalcourse and opens a new one through private property, would the new
riverbankslining said course be of public ownership also?
HELD: (a) TheSupreme Court set aside the decision and orders appealed
from, and enteredanother judgment to the effect that the City of Manila and
the Director ofPublic Works, and his agent and employees, are absolved of
liability fromextracting materials from subject property (of public domain);
and the portionwithin the strip of land question declared not part of public
domain andconfirmed as part of Hilarios private property. No Costs.
(b) From 1945 to 1949, thewest bank of the River extended westward up to
the secondary bank line; from1950 to 1952, this bank had moved, with the
River, to the east, its lateralborders running along a line just 20 meters west
of the camachile tree; andfrom 1953 to 1955, the extremities of the west
bank further receded eastwardbeyond the camachile tree, until they lay just
about 20 meters east of saidtree. Evidence shows that the River floods with
annual regularity during therainy season. These floods can hardly be called

18

accidental. The Colegio deSan Jose case is not exactly in point. What was
mainly considered there wasArticle 74 of the Law of Waters relating to lakes,
ponds and pools. In thepresent case, none of these is involved.
Defendants cannot be accusedof unjustly profiting at plaintiffs expense. They
were not responsible for theshifting of the river. It was due to natural causes
for which no one can beblamed. Further, defendants were extracting from
public property then, underproper authorization. The government, through
the defendants, may have beenenriched by chance, but not unjustly.
Director of Lands vs. Courtof Appeals, 179 SCRA 522
FACTS: Theland in question is situated in Obando, Bulacan. It adjoins the
Kailogan Riverand private respondent Valeriano have converted it into a
fishpond. In theirapplication in 1976, private respondents claimed that they
are the co-owners infee simple of the land partly through inheritance and
partly by purchase andthat; it is not within any forest or military reservation.
The Republic of thePhil., represented by the Dir of the Bureau of Forest
Development, opposed theapplication on the principal ground that the land
applied for is WITHINTHEUNCLASSIFIED REGION of Obando, Bulacan and that
such area are denominated asFORESTLANDS-do not form part of the
disposable and alienable portion of thepublic domain. The Trial Court ordered
registration of the subject land infavor of the Valerianos. This was affirmed by
the CA which said in part thatsince the subject property is entirely devoted
to fishpond purposes, it cannotbe categorized as part of forest lands.
ISSUE: Whetheror not the courts can reclassify the subject public land.
HELD: Courtscannot reclassify... its beyond their competence and
jurisdiction. Theclassification of public lands is an exclusive prerogative of the
Executive Departmentof the Government (Bureau of Forest Development)
and not of the Courts. In the absenceof such classification, the land remains
as unclassified land until it isreleased therefrom and rendered open to
disposition. Since the subject propertyis still unclassified, whatever
possession Applicants (Valeriano) may have had,and, however long, cannot
ripen into private ownership. The conversion of thesubject property into a
fishpond by Applicants does not automatically renderthe property as
alienable and disposable. The recommendation of the DistrictForester for
release of subject property from unclassified region is not theultimate word
on the matter.
Ong vs. Republic, GR No.175746, 12 March 2008, 548 SCRA 160
FACTS: OnJuly 1, 1999, petitioner Charles L. Ong (petitioner) in his behalf and
as dulyauthorized representative of his brothers, namely, Roberto, Alberto
and Cesar,filed an Application for Registration of Title[4] over Lot 15911
(subject lot)situated in Barangay Anolid, Mangaldan, Pangasinan with an area
of five hundredseventy four (574) square meters, more or less. They alleged
that they are theco-owners of the subject lot; that the subject lot is their
exclusive propertyhaving acquired the same by purchase from spouses Tony
Bautista and AliciaVillamil on August 24, 1998; that the subject lot is
presently unoccupied; andthat they and their predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous andpeaceful possession of the subject lot in the
concept of owners for more thanthirty (30) years.
After due notice andpublication, only respondent Republic of the Philippines
(respondent),represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, opposed the
application forregistration of title. Respondent asserted that neither
applicants nor theirpredecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notoriouspossession and occupation of the subject lot since
June 12, 1945 or earlier asrequired by Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act
No. 141, as amended byPresidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1073; that applicants
failed to adduce anymuniment of title to prove their claims; that the tax
declaration appended tothe application does not appear genuine and merely
shows pretended possessionof recent vintage; that the application was filed

19

beyond the period allowedunder P.D. No. 892; and that the subject lot is part
of the public domain whichcannot be the subject of private appropriation.
On January 16, 2002, thetrial court rendered a Decision in favor of petitioner
and his brothers.
Aggrieved, respondentappealed to the Court of Appeals which rendered the
assailed Decision.
In reversing the decision ofthe trial court, the Court of Appeals found that the
subject lot is part of thealienable and disposable lands of the public domain.
Thus, it was incumbentupon petitioner to prove that they possessed the
subject lot in the nature andfor the duration required by law. However,
petitioner failed to prove that heor his predecessors-in-interest have been in
adverse possession of the subjectlot in the concept of owner since June 12,
1945 or earlier as mandated bySection 14(1) of P.D. 1529. It noted that the
earliest tax declaration whichpetitioner presented is dated 1971.
Consequently, petitioner could not fairlyclaim possession of the land prior to
1971. Neither was petitioner able toprove that he or his predecessors-ininterest actually occupied the subject lotprior to the filing of the application.
Thus, the trial court erred in grantingthe application for registration of title
over the subject lot.
ISSUE: (a)Whether or not petitioner, together with his brothers have
registrable ownershipover the real property and (b) whether or not the
findings and conclusions ofthe Court of Appeals that the subject real property
is a public land iscorrect.
HELD: Thepetition lacks merit. The law provides that applicants for
registration oftitle must prove that: (1) the subject land forms part of the
disposable andalienable lands of the public domain, and (2) that they have
been in open,continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation
of the same undera bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or
earlier. Theserequisites involve questions of fact which are not proper in a
petition forreview on certiorari.
There is no dispute that thesubject lot is classified as alienable and
disposable land of the publicdomain. The Report of the Bureau of Lands
stated that the subject lot is withinthe alienable and disposable zone. This
finding is, likewise, embodied in theReport of the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources CommunityEnvironment and Natural Resources Office
(DENR-CENRO) and the blue print Copyof the plan covering the subject lot.
However, petitioner failed to prove thathe or his predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive andnotorious possession and
occupation of the subject lot since June 12, 1945 orearlier.
Further, as correctlypointed by the Court of Appeals, possession alone is not
sufficient to acquiretitle to alienable lands of the public domain because the
law requirespossession and occupation.
Director of Lands vs. C.A,129 SCRA 689
FACTS: Petitionersseek a review of the Decision and Resolution of the Court
of Appeals affirmingthe judgment of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan,
decreeing registrationof a parcel of land in private respondents' favor. The
land in question, issituated in Obando, Bulacan, and has an area of
approximately 9.3 hectares. Itadjoins the Kailogan River and private
respondents have converted it into afishpond.
In their application forregistration, private respondents claimed that they are
the co-owners in feesimple of the land applied for partly through inheritance
in 1918 and partly bypurchase on May 2, 1958; that it is not within any forest
zone or militaryreservation; and that the same is assessed for taxation
purposes in theirnames.
The Republic of thePhilippines, represented by the Director of the Bureau of
Forest Developmentopposed the application on the principal ground that the
land applied for iswithin the unclassified region of Obando, Bulacan, and that
areas within theunclassified region are denominated as forest lands and do
not form part of thedisposable and alienable portion of the public domain.

20

The Trial Court orderedregistration of the subject land in favor of the

Applicants. This was affirmedon appeal by respondent Appellate Court, which
found that "throughindubitable evidence and their predecessors-in-interest
have been in open,public, continuous, peaceful and adverse possession of the
subject parcel ofland under a bona fide claim of ownership for more than 30
years prior to thefiling of the application" and are, therefore, entitled to
registration.It further opined that "since the subject property is entirely
devoted tofishpond purposes, it cannot be categorized as part of forest
lands."
ISSUES: (1)Whether or not Courts can reclassify the subject public land; and
(2) Whetheror not applicants are entitled to judicial confirmation of title.
HELD: TheGovernment's case is meritorious. The parties, through their
respectivecounsel, stipulated that the land is within an unclassified region of
Obando,Bulacan. No evidence has been submitted that the land has been
released orsubsequently classified.
The classification of publiclands is an exclusive prerogative of the Executive
Department of the Governmentand not of the Courts. In the absence of such
classification, the land remainsas unclassified land until it is released
therefrom and rendered open todisposition. This is in consonance with the
Regalian doctrine that all lands ofthe public domain belong to the State, and
that the State is the source of anyasserted right to ownership in land and
charged with the conservation of suchpatrimony.
While it may be that theMunicipality of Obando has been cadastrally
surveyed in 1961, it does notfollow that any lands comprised therein are
automatically released asalienable. A survey made in a cadastral proceeding
merely identifies each lotpreparatory to a judicial proceeding for adjudication
of title to any of thelands upon claim of interested parties. Besides, if land is
within thejurisdiction of the Bureau of Forest Development, it would be
beyond thejurisdiction of the Cadastral Court to register it under the Torrens
System.
Since the subject propertyis still unclassified, whatever possession Applicants
may have had, and,however long, cannot ripen into private ownership.
The conversion of subjectproperty into a fishpond by Applicants, or the
alleged titling of propertiesaround it, does not automatically render the
property as alienable anddisposable. Applicants' remedy lies in the release of
the property from itspresent classification.
Seminaryof San Carlos vs. Municipality of Cebu, G.R No. L-4641, 13
March 1911, 19 Phil.32
FACTS: The petition in this case,made by the Seminary of San Carlos, asks
for the registration of two pieces ofland, included in one plan, petitioner's
Exhibit J, located in the city ofCebu, alleging as its source of little a royal
cession from the King of Spain.
The opponent of theregistration, the city of Cebu, denies the title of the
petitioner and allegesin itself ownership of the land in question, stating that
its title is basedupon possession thereof of the kind and for the period
required by law to effecta little by prescription.
The land in controversy issituated in the city of Cebu. It is claimed by the
seminary that it includes aportion of one of the public squares of that city.
Aside from that of theownership of the land, there are two questions raised
on the trial andpresented for review on this appeal. The first one relates to
the quantity ofthe land claimed by the seminary, and the second to its
precise location. Theland in dispute in this case admittedly lies to the south of
the churchbelonging to the seminary. This church, according to the plans and
theevidence, is located upon a plot of ground adjoining the public square on
itsnorth side. So that the land in question, if it does not extend into the
plaza,necessarily lies between it and the church. This clearly appears from
the plan,Exhibit J, presented by the petitioner and is a fact undisputed in the
record.

21

ISSUE: Whobetween the Seminary of San Carlos and the Municipality of Cebu
has legal titleto the land in dispute.
HELD: Thepetitioner has the legal title to the land in dispute, but that the city
ofCebu has the right to the possession, occupation and use of said.
The previous judgment ismodified and the land described in Exhibit J is
hereby ordered registered inthe name of the petitioner, but such registration
is subject to and mustaffirmatively show the rights of the City of Cebu to the
possession, occupationand use of said land as hereinabove set forth. As
modified, said judgment isaffirmed.
RealtySales vs. IAC, 161 SCRA 56
FACTS: Two(2) adjacent parcels of land located in Almanza, Las Pias, Metro
Manila arecovered by three (3) distinct sets of Torrens titles, one of which is
TCT No.20408 issued in the name of Realty Sales Enterprise, Inc., pursuant to
DecreeNo. N-63394 in LRC Cases Nos. 657, 758 and 976, GLRO Record Nos.
N-29882,N-33721 and N-43516, respectively. In 1977, Morris Carpo filed a
complaint for"declaration of nullity of Decree No. N-63394 and TCT No.
20408." Thecomplaint alleged that TCT No. 20408 as well as OCT No. 1609
from which it wasderived, is a nullity as the CFI of Rizal, Branch VI, was not
sitting as a landregistration court, but as a court of ordinary jurisdiction.
During thependency of this case, Petitioners filed a manifestation alleging
that the caseat bar is closely connected with G.R. No. L-46953,
Jose N. Mayuga et. al. v. The Court ofAppeals, Macondray Farms, Inc., Realty
Sales Enterprise, inc., et. al. andmoved for consolidation of the two cases
involving as they do the sameproperty. By Resolution of August 29, 1984, this
Court denied the motion forconsolidation.
ISSUE: Whetheror not the case at hand and G.R. No. L-46953 should be
consolidated?
HELD: NO,they should not be consolidated. The Supreme Court emphasized
that the actionfiled by Carpo against Realty is in the nature of an action to
remove cloudsfrom title to real property
. By asserting its own titleto the property in question and asking that Carpo's
title be declared null andvoid instead, and by filing the third-party complaint
against QCDFC, Realty wassimilarly asking the court to remove clouds from
its own title. Actions of suchnature are governed by Articles 476 to 481,
Quieting of Title of the Civil Codeand Rule 64, Declaratory Relief and Similar
Remedies of the Rules of Court.
Suits to quiet title are nottechnically suits in rem, nor are they, strictly
speaking, in personam, butbeing against the person in respect of the res,
these proceedings arecharacterized as quasi in rem. (McDaniel v. McElvy, 108
So. 820 [1926].) Thejudgment in such proceedings is conclusive only between
the parties. (Sandejasv. Robles, 81 Phil. 421 [1948]). The ruling in this case is
therefore withoutany prejudice to this Court's final determination of G.R. No.
L-46953 - a caseinvolving the validity of the compromise agreement between
the parties in thiscase.

18(Maribeth)
Bornalesvs Intermediate Appellate Court, 166SCRA 519
FACTS:
In1927, SixtoDumolong married to Isabel Marquez-Dumolong was awarded a
parcel oflanddenominated as Lot 1318 and covered by Original Certificate of
Title No.6161. Since1920 however, said spouses have been living separately
and that theyhad nochildren. Sixto then cohabited with one Placida Dumolong
and they hadchildren,one of which is Renito Dumolong.
InMarch 1978 aDeed of Extrajudicial Adjudication and Sale of Real Property
wasexecuted byRenito and Isabel as settlement of the conjugal estate of
Sixtoinvolving Lot1318 and its eventual sale. A supposed thumbmarkof Isabel

22

appearedin the document. Thedeed was registered and pursuant thereto

TransferCertificate of Title No.T-15856 was issued in the name of the vendees.
Thesubject lot was further sold to Spouses Bornales, the cultivators ofthe
subjectlot, and eventually they were able to secure a TCT in their names.
OnMarch 11,1980, Isabel filed an action for reconveyance and damages
againstSpousesBornales, Placida, Renito and all the other parties named in
theExtrajudicialAdjudication and Sale of Real Property alleging forgery
thereof.The lower court rendered judgement in favorof Isabel and against all
thedefendants. Spouses Bornales were declared purchasers in bad faith. On
appeal,the appellate court affirmed theappealed decision with modifications
as itfound that the subject land was theexclusive property of Sixto who had
otherillegitimate children surviving withRenito. It further denied
thehereinpetitioners motion for reconsideration, hence, the petition.
ISSUE: Whetheror not SpousesBornales may invoke the indefeasibilityof a
certificate of title?
HELD: No.Having bought the land registered under the Torrenssystem from
the vendor whoprocured title thereto by means of fraud, they cannotinvoke
the indefeasibilityof a certificate of title against Isabel to theextent of her
interest over thelot. TheTorrens system of land registration should not be
used as a meansto perpetratefraud against the rightful owner of real
property. Registration, to be effective, must be made ingood faith. It is
asettled rule thatthe defense of indefeasibility of a certificate of title doesnot
extend to atransferee who takes it with notice of the flaws in histransferors
title.
19(Ailyn)
NATURE OF RECLAIMED LANDS
G.R. No. 133250 July 9,2002
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, PETITIONER, VS. PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY AND
AMARI COASTAL BAY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, RESPONDENTS
FACTS
On November 20, 1973, the government, through the Commissioner of Public
Highways, signed a contract with the Construction and Development
Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP) to reclaim certain foreshore and
offshore areas of Manila Bay. On February 4, 1977, then President Ferdinand
E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1084 creating PEA - tasked to
reclaim land, including foreshore and submerged areas, and to develop,
improve, acquire, x x x lease and sell any and all kinds of lands. On the
same date, then President Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1085
transferring to PEA the lands reclaimed in the foreshore and offshore of the
Manila Bay under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project
(MCCRRP).
On January 19, 1988, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Special Patent
No. 3517, granting and transferring to PEA the parcels of land so reclaimed
under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP)
.Subsequently, on April 9, 1988, the Register of Deeds of the Municipality of
Paraaque issued Transfer Certificates of Title in the name of PEA, covering
the three reclaimed islands known as the Freedom Islands located at the
southern portion of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road, Paraaque City. On April
25, 1995, PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) with AMARI, a
private corporation, to develop the Freedom Islands. PEA and AMARI entered
into the JVA through negotiation without public bidding. On June 8, 1995, then
President Fidel V. Ramos, through then Executive Secretary Ruben Torres,
approved the JVA.
On November 29, 1996, then Senate President Ernesto Maceda delivered a
privilege speech in the Senate and denounced the JVA as the grandmother
of all scams. As a result, the Senate Committee on Government Corporations
and Public Enterprises, and the Committee on Accountability of Public Officers
and Investigations, conducted a joint investigation. Among the conclusions of

23

their report are: (1) the reclaimed lands PEA seeks to transfer to AMARI under
the JVA are lands of the public domain which the government has not
classified as alienable lands and therefore PEA cannot alienate these lands;
(2) the certificates of title covering the Freedom Islands are thus void, and (3)
the JVA itself is illegal.
On December 5, 1997, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Presidential
Administrative Order No. 365 creating a Legal Task Force to conduct a study
on the legality of the JVA. The Legal Task Force upheld the legality of the JVA,
contrary to the conclusions reached by the Senate Committees.
On April 27, 1998, petitioner Frank I. Chavez (Petitioner for brevity) as a
taxpayer, filed the instant Petition for Mandamus with Prayer for the Issuance
of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order.
Petitioner contends the government stands to lose billions of pesos in the sale
by PEA of the reclaimed lands to AMARI. Petitioner prays that PEA publicly
disclose the terms of any renegotiation of the JVA, invoking Section 28, Article
II, and Section 7, Article III, of the 1987 Constitution on the right of the people
to information on matters of public concern. Petitioner assails the sale to
AMARI of lands of the public domain as a blatant violation of Section 3, Article
XII of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting the sale of alienable lands of the
public domain to private corporations. In a Resolution dated March 23, 1999,
the Court gave due course to the petition and required the parties to file their
respective memoranda.
On March 30, 1999, PEA and AMARI signed the Amended Joint Venture
Agreement (Amended JVA). On May 28, 1999, the Office of the President
under the administration of then President Joseph E. Estrada approved the
Amended JVA.
Due to the approval of the Amended JVA by the Office of the President,
petitioner now prays that on constitutional and statutory grounds the
renegotiated contract be declared null and void.
ISSUE
WHETHER THE Lands reclaimed from foreshore and submerged areas also
form part of the public domain and are also inalienable
WHETHER THE STIPULATIONS IN THE AMENDED JOINT VENTURE AGREEMENT
FOR THE TRANSFER TO AMARI OF CERTAIN LANDS, RECLAIMED AND STILL TO
BE RECLAIMED, VIOLATE THE 1987 CONSTITUTION
RULING
The 1987 Constitution, like the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions before it, has
adopted the Regalian doctrine. The 1987 Constitution declares that all natural
resources are owned by the State, and except for alienable agricultural
lands of the public domain, natural resources cannot be alienated.
Under Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, the foreshore and
submerged areas of Manila Bay are part of the lands of the public domain,
waters x x x and other natural resources and consequently owned by the
State. As such, foreshore and submerged areas shall not be alienated,
unless they are classified as agricultural lands of the public domain. The
mere reclamation of these areas does not convert these inalienable natural
resources of the State into alienable or disposable lands of the public domain.
There must be a law or presidential proclamation officially classifying these
reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable and open to disposition or
concession. Moreover, these reclaimed lands cannot be classified as alienable
or disposable if the law has reserved them for some public or quasi-public
use.
Lands reclaimed by the government are sui generis, not available for sale to
private parties unlike other alienable public lands. Reclaimed lands retain
their inherent potential as areas for public use or public service.
Clearly, the Amended JVA violates glaringly Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution. Under Article 1409 of the Civil Code, contracts whose
object or purpose is contrary to law, or whose object is outside the
commerce of men, are inexistent and void from the beginning. The Court

24

must perform its duty to defend and uphold the Constitution, and therefore
declares the Amended JVA null and void ab initio.

TAX DECLARATION
G.R. No. 177797, December 04, 2008
SPS. PEDRO TAN AND NENA ACERO TAN, PETITIONERS, VS. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT
FACTS
The spouses Pedro Tan and Nena Acero Tan were natural-born Filipino citizens,
who became Australian citizens on 9 February 1984. They seek to have the
subject property registered in their names. The subject property was declared
alienable and disposable on 31 December 1925, as established by a
Certification dated 14 August 2000 issued by the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR), Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office (CENRO), Cagayan de Oro City. Prior to the spouses Tan, the
subject property was in the possession of Lucio and Juanito Neri and their
respective spouses. Lucio and Juanito Neri had declared the subject property
for taxation purposes in their names.The spouses Tan acquired the subject
property from Lucio and Juanito Neri and their spouses by virtue of a duly
notarized Deed of Sale of Unregistered Real Estate Property dated 26 June
1970. The spouses Tan took immediate possession of the subject property on
which they planted rubber, gemelina, and other fruit-bearing trees. They
declared the subject property for taxation purposes in their names and paid
realty taxes thereon.
However, a certain Patermateo Casio (Casio) claimed a portion of the
subject property, prompting the spouses Tan to file a Complaint for Quieting
of Title against him before the RTC of Cagayan de Oro City. On 29 August
1989, the RTC rendered a Decision favoring the spouses Tan and declaring
their title to the subject property thus "quieted." Casio appealed the said
RTC Decision to the Court of Appeals . In a Resolution the appellate court
dismissed for lack of interest to prosecute. Casio elevated his case to this
Court via a Petition for Review on Certiorari. In a Resolution dated 13 March
1991 the Court denied Casio's Petition for being insufficient in form and
substance. The said Resolution became final and executory on 3 June 1991.
Refusing to give up, Casio filed an Application for Free Patent on the subject
property before the Bureau of Lands. On 8 December 1999, Casio's
application was ordered cancelled by Officer Ruth G. Sabijon of DENR-CENRO,
Cagayan de Oro City, upon the request of herein petitioner Pedro Tan, the
declared owner of the subject property pursuant to the 29 August 1989
Decision of the RTC. In 2000, the spouses Tan filed their Application for
Registration of Title to the subject property before the RTC of Cagayan de Oro
City. The application of the spouses Tan invoked the provisions of Act No. 496
and/or Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 141,as amended. In compliance
with the request of the Land Registration Authority (LRA) dated 29 August

25

2000, the spouses Tan filed on 5 October 2000 an Amended Application for
Registration of Title to the subject property.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance on behalf of
the Republic, but failed to submit a written opposition to the application of
the spouses Tan.
When no opposition to the application of the spouses Tan was filed by the
time of the initial hearing the RTC issued on 23 April 2001 an order of general
default, except as against the Republic. Thereafter, the spouses Tan were
allowed to present their evidence ex-parte.
After the establishment of the jurisdictional facts, the RTC heard the
testimony of John B. Acero , nephew and lone witness of the spouses Tan.
After Acero's testimony, the spouses Tan already made a formal offer of
evidence, which was admitted by the court a quo. On 9 May 2001, the RTC
rendered a Decision granting the application of the spouses Tan. The Republic
appealed the RTC Decision to the Court of Appeals.
On 28 February 2006, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision granting the
appeal of the Republic, and reversing and setting aside the 9 May 2001
Decision of the RTC on the ground that the spouses Tan failed to comply with
Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as the Public
Land Act, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073, which requires
possession of the subject property to start on or prior to 12 June 1945. Hence,
the appellate court ordered the spouses Tan to return the subject property to
the Republic.
The spouses Tan filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the foregoing Decision
of the Court of Appeals. To refute the finding of the appellate court that they
and their predecessors-in-interest did not possess the subject property by 12
June 1945 or earlier, the spouses Tan attached to their Motion a copy of Tax
Declaration No. 4627 covering the subject property issued in 1948 in the
name of their predecessor-in-interest, Lucio Neri. They called attention to the
statement in Tax Declaration No. 4627 that it cancelled Tax Declaration No.
2948. Unfortunately, no copy of Tax Declaration No. 2948 was available even
in the Office of the Archive of the Province of Misamis Oriental. The spouses
Tan asserted that judicial notice may be taken of the fact that land
assessment is revised by the government every four years; and since Tax
Declaration No. 4627 was issued in the year 1948, it can be presupposed that
Tax Declaration No. 2948 was issued in the year 1944.
The Court of Appeals denied the Motion for Reconsideration of the spouses
Tan in a Resolution dated 12 April 2007.
The earliest evidence of possession and occupation of the subject property
can be traced back to a tax declaration issued in the name of their
predecessors-in-interest only in 1952. However, the spouses Tan are now
asking the kind indulgence of this Court to take into account Tax Declaration
No. 4627 issued in 1948, which they had attached to their Motion for
Reconsideration before the Court of Appeals but which the appellate court
refused to consider. Just as they had argued before the Court of Appeals, the
spouses Tan point out that Tax Declaration No. 4627 was not newly issued but
cancelled Tax Declaration No. 2948; and should the Court take judicial notice
of the fact that tax assessments are revised every four years, then Tax
Declaration No. 2948 covering the subject property was issued as early as
1944.
ISSUE

26

WHETHER TAX DECLARATIONS AND RECEIPTS ARE CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE OF

OWNERSHIP
RULING
Tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership. At
most, they constitute mere prima facie proofs of ownership of the property
for which taxes have been paid. In the absence of actual, public and
adverse possession, the declaration of the land for tax purposes
does not prove ownership.They may be good supporting or collaborating
evidence together with other acts of possession and ownership; but by
themselves, tax declarations are inadequate to establish possession of the
property in the nature and for the period required by statute for acquiring
imperfect or incomplete title to the land.
The spouses Tan purchased the subject property and came into possession of
the same only in 1970. To justify their application for registration of title, they
had to tack their possession of the subject property to that of their
predecessors-in-interest. While the spouses Tan undoubtedly possessed and
occupied the subject property openly, continuously, exclusively and
notoriously, by immediately introducing improvements on the said property,
in addition to declaring the same and paying realty tax thereon; in contrast,
there was a dearth of evidence that their predecessors-in-interest possessed
and occupied the subject property in the same manner. The possession and
occupation of the subject property by the predecessors-in-interest of the
spouses Tan were evidenced only by the tax declarations in the names of the
former, the earliest of which, Tax Declaration No. 4627, having been issued
only in 1948. No other evidence was presented by the spouses Tan to show
specific acts of ownership exercised by their predecessors-in-interest over the
subject property which may date back to 12 June 1945 or earlier.
For failure of the Spouses Tan to satisfy the requirements prescribed by
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended, this Court has no other
option but to deny their application for judicial confirmation and registration
of their title to the subject property.

DECREE OF REGISTRATION
G.R. No.123346, December 14, 2007
MANOTOK REALTY, INC. AND MANOTOK ESTATE CORPORATION, PETITIONERS,
VS. CLT REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, RESPONDENT
FACTS
On 10 August 1992, CLT Realty Development Corporation (CLT) sought
to recover from Manotok Realty, Inc. and Manotok Estate Corporation
(Manotoks) the possession of Lot 26 of the Maysilo Estate in an action filed
before the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City. CLTs claim was anchored on
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) issued in its name by the Caloocan City
Register of Deeds, which title in turn was derived from Estelita Hipolito

27

(Hipolito) by virtue of a Deed of Sale with Real Estate Mortgage dated 10

December 1988. Hipolitos title emanated from Jose Dimsons (Dimson) TCT ,
a title issued pursuant to an order of the Court of First Instance (CFI) of
Caloocan City. Dimsons title appears to have been sourced from OCT No.
994.
For their part, the Manotoks challenged the validity of the title relied on by
CLT, claiming that Dimsons title, the proximate source of CLTs title, was
irregularly issued and, hence, the same and subsequent titles flowing
therefrom are likewise void. The Manotoks asserted their ownership over Lot
26 and claimed that they derived it from several awardees and/or vendees of
the National Housing Authority. The Manotok title likewise traced as its
primary source OCT No. 994 which, on 9 September 1918, was transferred to
Alejandro Ruiz and Mariano Leuterio who had previously acquired the
property on 21 August 1918 by virtue of an Escritura de Venta executed by
Don Tomas Arguelles and Don Enrique Llopis. On 3 March 1920, Ruiz and
Leuterio sold the property to Francisco Gonzalez who held title thereto until
22 August 1938 when the property was transferred to Jose Leon Gonzalez,
Consuelo Susana Gonzalez, Juana Francisca Gonzalez, Maria Clara Gonzalez,
Francisco Felipe Gonzalez and Concepcion Maria Gonzalez under TCT No.
35486. The lot was then, per annotation dated 21 November 1946,
subdivided into seven (7) parcels each in the name of each of the
Gonzalezes.
The trial court, ruling for CLT, adopted the factual findings and conclusions
arrived at by the majority commissioners appointed to resolve the conflict of
titles. It was established that the entire Maysilo Estate was registered under
Act No. 496 by virtue of which OCT No. 994 was issued by the Register of
Deeds of Rizal;that Lot 26 was transferred to CLT by Hipolito whose title was
derived from the Dimson title and that on the basis of the technical
descriptions of the property appearing in the Manotok titles, the latters
property indeed encroached on the property described in CLTs title.
The Manotoks appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the decision
of the trial court. Their motion for reconsideration having been denied, they
filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court, ascribing error to the
appellate court in upholding the trial courts decision which decided the case
on the basis of the majority commissioners report and overlooked relevant
facts in the minority commissioners report.
ISSUE
whether the titles issued in the name of CLT IS valid
RULING
With respect to G.R. No. 123346, the Court upheld the validity of the trial
courts adoption of the commissioners majority report as part of the decision.
The Court pointed out that the titles of respondents in all three cases were
derived from OCT No. 994 of the Registry of Deeds of Caloocan City
registered on 19 April 1917. The Manotoks filed their respective motions for
reconsideration. On 5 June 2006, the cases were elevated to the Court en
banc. In the Manotok petition, CLT had originally filed a complaint for
annulment of the titles in the name of the Manotoks, alleging that it was the
registered owner of Lot 26 of the Maysilo Estate. It is evident from all three
titles CCLTs, Hipolitos and Dimsonsthat the properties they purport to
cover were originally registered on the 19th day April 1917 in the
Registration Book of the Office of the Register of Deeds of Rizal. As earlier

28

established, there is no such OCT No. 994 originally registered on 19 April

1917. None of these three titles can be accorded recognition simply because
the original title commonly referred to therein never existed. To conclude
otherwise would constitute deliberate disregard of the truth. These titles
could be affirmed only if it can be proven that OCT No. 994 registered on 19
April 1917 had actually existed. CLT and the Dimsons were given the
opportunity to submit such proof before this Court, but they did not. In fact,
CLT has specifically manifested that the OCT No. 994 they concede as true is
also the one which the Office of Solicitor General submitted as true, and that
is OCT No. 994 issued on 3 May 1917.Given this essential clarification, there
is no sense in affirming the 2005 Decision which sustained the complaints for
annulment of title and/or recovery of possession filed by CLT and the Dimson
when their causes of action are both founded on an inexistent mother title.
From these premises, the Court is able to make the following binding
conclusions. First, there is only one OCT No. 994. As it appears on the record,
that mother title was received for transcription by the Register of Deeds on 3
May 1917, and that should be the date which should be reckoned as the date
of registration of the title. It may also be acknowledged, as appears on the
title, that OCT No. 994 resulted from the issuance of the decree of
registration on 17 April 1917, although such date cannot be considered as the
date of the title or the date when the title took effect. Second,any title that
traces its source to OCT No. 994 dated 17 April 1917 is void, for such mother
title is inexistent. This error alone is, in fact, sufficient to invalidate the
Dimson and CLT claims over the subject property if singular reliance is placed
by them on the dates appearing on their respective titles.
The land becomes a registered land only upon the transcription of the decree
in the original registration book by the register of deeds, the date and time of
such transcription being set forth in the process and certified to at the foot of
each entry or certificate of title. The issuance of the original and owners
duplicate certificates are basic for the valid existence of the title. Issuance of
additional copies are permissive and their non-existence does not affect the
status of title. A certificate of title is deemed as regularly issued with the
issuance of the original copy and owners duplicate

>7L
20(Jen)
21(Bambi) - Hindi ko mahanap ang Galloy vs. CA, 173 SCRA 26
22(Nelson)
HACIENDABIGAA, INC.,
Petitioner,
versus
EPIFANIOV. CHAVEZ (deceased), substituted by SANTIAGO V.
CHAVEZ,
Respondent. -- G.R.No. 174160

Facts:
Hacienda Calatagan covered by TCT 722 with an area of 9,652.583
hectares wasowned by Ayala y Cia and the Zobels, they expanded the lot to
cover 2000hectares consisting, among others of beach, foreshores and bay
areas, andnavigable waters(excess areas), making it appear that these

29

excess areas arepart of the hacienda. They sold the excess area to different
third parties; oneof them was the Hacienda Bigaan(herein petitioner).
Notwithstanding the priorruling of the court dated 1965 that renders
Hacienda Calatagan as public landincluding the expanded area outside the
land, they still sold it to anothercontending that the subject land is not
included in the priordecision(antecedent cases of Dizon, Ayala y Cia, and
Delos Angeles).
HaciendaBigaa also contended that the rulings in the antecedent cases on
the nullity ofits subdivision titles should not apply to the present case
because the titlesTCT Nos. 44695 and 56120 have not been specifically
declared void by courtorder and must be given probative value. It likewise
positsthat Chavez failed to introduce evidence before the MTC that the
landsubject matter of the suit is the same land covered by the decision of
theSupreme Court in the antecedent cases.
On June5, 1996, petitioner Hacienda Bigaa, a buyer or transferee of the
subject land,filed with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Calatagan, Batangas
acomplaint[for ejectment (forcible entry) and damages withapplication for
writ of preliminary injunction against respondent Epifanio V.Chavez (Chavez),
docketed as Civil Case No. 129. The complaintalleged that Chavez, by force,
strategy and/or stealth, entered on April 29, 1996the premises of Hacienda
Bigaa's properties (subject land) by cutting through asection of the barbed
wire fence surrounding the properties and destroying thelock of one of its
gates, subsequently building a house on the property, andoccupying the lots
without the prior consent and against the will of HaciendaBigaa.
Defendant(now respondent) Chavez alleged in his answer before the MTC of
Calatagan thathis mother, Zoila de Chavez (who died intestate on September
14, 1979) was afishpond permittee/lessee under Fishpond Permit Nos.F-45720 and F-24735 issued by the Bureau of Fisheries onApril 21, 1959 and June 3,
1966, respectively; that the areas covered by thepermits are the same
parcels of land which he presently occupies as Zoila'ssuccessor-in-interest
and which Hacienda Bigaa also claims.
Issue:
1. Whether or not Chavez has a better claim over the subject land.
2. Whether or not Hacienda Bigaas title carry no probative value.
Held:
1. NO. As framed above, the case before us inevitably brings to memory
the antecedent decided cases touching on the ownership of the vast
tract of land in Calatagan, Batangas, covered by Transfer Certificate
of Title (TCT) No. 722 in the name/s of Ayala y Cia, Alfonso Zobel,
Jacobo Zobel and Enrique Zobel and/or Hacienda Calatagan the
predecessors-in-interest of petitioner Hacienda Bigaa. We ruled in the
antecedent cases of Dizon, Ayala y Cia, and De los Angeles, that: (1) all
expanded subdivision titles issued in the name of Ayala y Cia, the
Zobels and/or Hacienda Calatagan covering areas beyond the true
extent of TCT No. 722 are null and void because they cover areas
belonging to the public domain; (2) Ayala y Cia and the Zobels of
Hacienda Calatagan are mere usurpers of these public domain areas;
and that (3) these areas must revert to the Republic.Significantly,
we declared in De los Angeles that the Republic, as the rightful
owner of the expanded areas portions of the public domain has
the right to place its lessees and permittees (among them
Zoila de Chavez) in possession of the fishpond lots whose
ownership and possession were in issue in the case.
1. Yes. The Court rejected this contention in light of our holding in the
Ayala y Cia and De los Angeles cases that apart from those expressly
litigated and annulled, all other subdivision titles over the excess areas
of Hacienda Calatagan must be nullified for covering unregisterable
lands of the public domain that must revert to the Republic. To
reiterate, lots and their titles derived from the Ayalas and the

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Zobels TCT No. 722 not shown to be within the original

coverage of this title are conclusively public domain areas and
their titles will be struck down as nullities. What could have
saved Hacienda Bigaa, as successor-in-interest of the Ayalas and the
Zobels, is competent evidence that the subdivision titles in its
possession do not fall within the excess areas of TCT No. 722 that are
null and void because they are lands of the public domain. Hacienda
Bigaa however failed to discharge this burden.
Significance:
The registration of lands of the public domain under Torrens System,
by itselfcannot convert public land into private land.
23(JM)
Directorof Forestry vs. Munoz, 23 SCRA 1183 (L-24796, June 28,
1968)
FACTS:
PINAGCAMALIGANINDO-AGRO DEVELOPMENTCORPORATION, INC (Piadeco) is
a company engaged inlogging. It was given a Certificate ofPrivate Woodland
Registration sothat itcan operate in a 72000 hectare.It also has a Titulo de
Propriedad which itacquired in1894 under the Spanish regime.
In1964, the NAWASA director orderedthe cancellation of Piadecos
certificatebecause it encroached beyond what wasallowed in the certificate. It
actuallycut trees inthe Angat and Marikina watershed area which was
prohibited. Thelower courtruled in favor of Piadeco. Piadeco also had a
settlement withNawasa. Piadecosought to renew its certificate but it was
deniedby the Asst.Director of Forestry. The latter ruled that the Spanish title
isno longerrecognized and should have never been used to applyfor a
Certificate.
ISSUE:
Whetheror not Piadeco can claimownership over the property.
HELD:
No.The Spanish title it acquired cannotbe used to register for
anotherCertificate. There should be no question nowthat Forestry
Administrative Order12-2 has the forceand effect of law. It was promulgated
pursuant to law.Section 1817, RevisedAdministrative Code, empowers the
Bureau of Forestry, withthe approval of the department head, to issue
regulations deemed expedient ornecessary to secure the protection and
conservation of thepublic forests insuch manner as to insure a
continuedsupply of valuable timber andother forestproducts for the future,
and regulating the use and occupancy of theforests andforest reserves, to the
same end. It is an administrative regulationgermane to the objects and
purposes of the law.
24(Maris)
25(Reg)
26(Greg)

31

27(Ed)
28(LJ)
29(Zax)
30(Clathem)
Intestate Estate of Don Mariano San Pedro V. Court of Appeals, GR No.
103727, 1 December 1996265 SCRA 733Facts: The heirs of the late Mariano
San Pedro y Esteban laid claim and have been laying claim to the ownership
of, against third persons and the Government itself, a total land area of
approximately 173,000 hectares or 214,047 quiniones on the basis of a
Spanish title, entitled Titulo de Propriedad Numero 4136 dated April 25, 1894.
The claim, according to the San Pedro heirs, appears to cover lands in the
provinces of Nueva Ecija, Bulacan, Rizal, Laguna and Quezon; and such Metro
Manila cities as Quezon City, Caloocan City, Pasay City, City of Pasig and City
of Manila, thus affecting in general lands extending from Malolos, Bulacan to
the City Hall of Quezon City and the land area between Dingalan Bay in the
north and Tayabas Bay in the south.Issue: whether or not petitioners Titulo de
Propriedad No. 4136 is null and void and of no legal force and effect.Held:
Yes. Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 is null and void because Presidential
Decree No. 892 is already abolished. Hence, the use of Spanish Titles as
evidence in Land Registration is no longer recognized. Furthermore, The
Titulo cannot be relied upon by the petitioners-heirs or their privies as
evidence of ownership because under the Torrens system of registration,
Titulos cannot be superior to the Torrens titles. Hence, there can be no net
estate to speak of after the Titulos exclusion from the intestate proceedings
of the estate of the late Mariano San Pedro.
31(Lea)
32(Rubie)