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OF

MANUAL

SCHOLASTIC

MODERN

PHILOSOPHY
By
MERCIER

CARDINAL
And
PROFESSORS

LOU

PHILOSOPHY,

T.

INSTITUTE

HIGHER

THE

OF

OF

VAIN

Authorized

and EighthEdition,by
Translation,

PARKER,

M.A.,

L.

With
P.

Preface
Ph.D.

COFFEY,

Professor of

S. A.

and

ETHICS,

by
(Louvain)

Ireland
at Majnooth College,
Philosophy

VOL.
NATURAL

O.S.B., M.A.

PARKER,

II

THEOLOGY
HISTORY

WITH

LOGIC,

(THEODICY),
OF

FACSIMILE

PHILOSOPHY

LETTER

LONDON

KEGAN

PAUL,

TRENCH,
ST. Louis

TRUBNER
:

B.

1917

HERDER

"

CO,

LTD.

obstat

Nihil

J.

Imprimi
E.

Almond,

Cuthbertus

potest

Butler,

Cuthbertus

die

obstat
C.

deputaius.

Can

Vic.

Surmont

Gen.

Westmonasterii,

second

7-

Edm

This

19*

S.T.D.

Imprimatur

OJ

Junii,

O.S.B.

Schut,
Censor

Italian

Angl.

Congr.

Prases

Abbas

Nihil

O.S.B.

this,

work

(two

Jour

editions)

translation

Italian.

die

has

Proj.

24

editions

French
and
been
de

Septembris,

Wutj

have

already

been

published,

well

as

as

translations.

Spanish
made

1917.

from
has

the

fourth

amplified
iv

the

French

History,

edition,
and

with
has

read

the

aid
the

of the

proofs.

CONTENTS

THE

OF

VOL.
Prefatory
Preface

letter

to the

GENERAL

from

Cardinal

Mercier

Edition

English

INTRODUCTION
Cardinal

by

P.

by
TO

MANUAL

I.
to

the

Coffey,

Translators

Ph.D.

PHILOSOPHY

Mercier

(A Theory

COSMOLOGY

by

D.

Nys, S.T.B.,

Ph.D.

(A Theory of Organic Being)

PSYCHOLOGY
Mercier

Cardinal

by
CRITERIOLOGY

by

of Inorganic Being)

(A
Cardinal

Theory

Mercier

of

'

Thought-Being

'

Certitude)

or

METAPHYSICS

GENERAL

ONTOLOGY

OR

by

(A Theory

Cardinal

THEOLOGY

by

Cardinal

OR

THEODICY

(A Theory of

Ph.D.

Arendt,

SPECIAL

of Right Thinking)

(A Theory

of Right Living)

(based

upon

Cardinal

Mercier's

Notes)

ETHICS

by J. Halleux,
OF

by

(A Theory

ETHICS

A.

HISTORY

Being]

Mercier

ETHICS

by

First

Mercier

Cardinal

GENERAL

General)

II.

LOGIC

by

in

Mercier

VOL.
NATURAL

of Being

de

M.

Ph.D.

(Other Theories)

PHILOSOPHY

Wulf,

Synopsis

in the

Glossary

of Scholastic

form

Ph.D.,
of the

LL.D.,

J.U.D.

Principal

Terms,

by

G.

Theses

Simons,

Ph.D.

Index.
ILLUSTRATIONS.
of

Portrait

His

Eminence

Cardinal

Mercier, from

photograph

Five

Physiological

Facsimile

of

by

Pardon
I.

Frontispiece,Vol.

Brussels

Letter

Vol.

Plates
from

Cardinal

Mercier
V

I.

To

face

pp.

331-330.

Frontispiece,Vol.

II.

Volume

of

AnalyticalContents

II
PAGE

NATURAL
INTRODUCTION

of

Meaning

branches

the

among
treatise

THEOLOGY

(3)

natural

of

place
of

"

...

The
CHAP.

I.

the

PART

The

Its

theology
(i)"
(2) Division

philosophy

Existence
OF

IDEA

God

of
THE

DIVINE

BEING

idea
Infinite
God
idea
of an
of a
(4) The
Supreme
Being,
of the
moral
superior to the world, the guardian
order, is an
idea
of absolutely simple perfection ; and
is therefore
sufficient
natural
to provide
a
theology with
object (5) Triple
proper
"

"

of

process
A

neither

process

CHAP.
ART.

I.

fallacious

and

useless

nor

THE

II.

CRITICAL

OPPOSED
General

elimination

attribution,

sketch

THE

(7)

EXISTENCE
OF

PROOF

GOD

THE

GOD'S

OF

(6)"

....

OF

EXAMINATION

TO

transcendence

DOCTRINES
EXISTENCE

and
of
(8) Positivism
agnosticism
(9) Criticism
Criticism
of Comte's
Law
of the
agnostic position (10)
Three
the
it produces
Stages and
agnostic mentality
(n)
Criticism
of traditionalism
Criticism
of ontologism
(12)
(13)
Criticism
of
the
New
of
Examination
Philosophy
(14)
the religion of Sentiment
(15)
"

"

the

"

"

"

'

'

"

ART.
I.

"

II.

THE

THE

ONTOLOGICAL

ST.

OF

ARGUMENT

Criticism
II.

PROOFS

(18)

AUGUSTINE'S

ST.

OF
.

ARGUMENT

ESSENCES

THE

ANSELM

FROM

Statement

EXISTENCE

of

the

GOD

Statement
.

(17)
.

KNOWLEDGE

OUR

criticism

and

OF

"

.29

POSSIBLE

OF

(19)

argument

III.

PROOFS

OF

Thomas's

EXISTENCE

THE

OF

proofs
(21)

GOD

General

statement

of

32

St.

drawn
from
(20)
Argument
metaphysical
this
Objections
against
argument
(22)
drawn
from
efficient
Argument
causality
(23)
Argument
drawn
from
the
of
contingency
Conclusion
beings
(24)
to these
three
common
A
proofs (25)
corollary (26)
Argu
ment
drawn
from
the
of
in
manifested
grades
perfection
drawn
from
the
beings (27) Argument
order
of the
universe
A
note
Scientific
(28)" Corollaries
(29)
(30)
proofs for the
existence
of
God
Proof
from
the
consent
(31)
of
common
mankind
Proof
from
the
(32)
higher aspirations of mankind
Proof
from
drawn
moral
(33)
obligations (34)
movement

15

"

"

"

"

"

"

"

"

"

"

"

"

"

...

vi

35

ANALYTICAL

CONTENTS

vii

PAGE

The
CHAP.

II

Nature

of

God

METAPHYSICAL

THE

I.

PART

ESSENCE

GOD

OF

of the question
metaphysical essence
(35) Solution
Proof
of St. Thomas's
subsistens
ipsum esse
(36)
of
the
Criticism
opinion (37)
opinions opposed to St. Thomas's
thesis (38)
of

Meaning
'

Deus

"

'

est

"

"

60

...

CHAP.

INTIMATELY

IDEAS

II.

OF

THAT
I.

OF

WITH

GOD

GOD
OF
:
Meanings of simplicity(40)
absolutely simple (41) Corollaries (42)

SIMPLICITY
is

II.

CONNECTED

ESSENCE

THE

INFINITE
is

Proof

"

that

God

.65

"

PERFECTION

GOD

OF

Meaning of

perfection(43)

I. God

"

meaning (44) and proof (45) II.


Himself
all the
perfections belonging to His
is infinite in perfection:
Corollary (47) God
and proofs (49) Objections (50)
perfect :

God

"

unites

in

works

(46)
meaning (48)

"

"

69

"

III. IMMENSITY
IV.

ABSOLUTE

V.

ETERNITY

VI.

GOD

OF

Meaning (51) and proof (52)

IMMUTABILITY
GOD

OF

UNICITY

GOD

OF

GOD

OF

Meaning

(54) and

Meaning

Proof

God

that

is

PART

The
Nature

and

action

(57)
"

CHAP.

I.

Intellectual

79

....

proof (53)

proof (55)
a

84
86

....

unique being (56)

88

III

Activity

of God

and

Life

of

God

in God

THOUGHT

(58)

91

....

GOD

IN

life of God
(59) God's knowledge is the actual com
all things actual
knows
prehension of His nature
(60) God
and
possible (61) The divine ideas (62) The objects of the
divine knowledge (63) God
possesses a knowledge of possible
God
the
things (64)
knowledge of vision
(65)
possesses
in which
Manner
the object of His
God
knows
knowledge of
that
of His
simple intelligence (66), and
knowledge of
vision
(67) The difficult question of divine foreknowledge
and
the freedom
of the creature
(68)
"

"

"

"

"

'

'

"

"

'

'

'

'

"

CHAP.

II.

WILL

IN

93

GOD

Meaning (69)

Proof
that in God
formal
there is a will (70) The
object of the will of God is the goodness of the divine essence
be a
(71) Whatever
participatesin the divine goodness can
the
loves
secondary object of the will of God
(72) God
goodness of His essence
necessarilyand the goodness of created
and immutability of God
things freely (73) Freedom
(74)
of God
and
Goodness,
justice,liberality,
(75) The
mercy
omnipotence of God (76)
"

"

"

"

"

"

"

....

108

CONTENTS

ANALYTICAL

viii

PAGE

CHAP.
works

The
I.

CREATION

created

by

neither

refutation

III.

THE

(77)

of

God
;

part

nor

OF

"3

"

(78) Historical theories concerning


has been
world
(79) The world
The
world
is
refutation
of dualism
(80)
"

the

to

"

"

emanation

an

(81)"

of
alone

God

divine

the

(82)

created

"

Substance

create

can

Meaning (83) Everything


by God (84)

GOD

of creation

of monism

has

;
.113

of

need

conserved

DIVINE

GOVERNMENT

Universal

Providence

providence

providence and
sovereignty of
government of
CONCLUSION

'

Extra

God

CONSERVATION

being

ad

Meaning

relation

the

II.

'

of God

WORK

THE

III.

God

and

the

God

of

universal

are

free-will

the

and

(85)"
"

government
God

government

and

particularprovidence (86)

and

(87)
(88)
"

of creatures

"

of evil in the

presence

world

The
The
The

(89)

121

J32

......""""""

LOGIC

INTRODUCTION

:
"

Final

Definition

logic (i) Material


psychology and

of

Difference

(2, 3)

causes

logic (4)"
metaphysics and logic
art
an
(7) Divisions of

between
(5) Difference
and
practical science

cause

"

(6)" Logic
logic (8)

formal

and

"

between

"

.135

CHAP.

EFFICIENT

THE

I.

CAUSE

of intellectual
Principles and nature
fundamentally identical, although
and
reasoning made
possible by
concepts (n)

LOGICAL

OF
acts

Intellectual

(9)
"

manifold
the

ORDER

(10)

abstract

acts

Judgment

"

character

of
"

CHAP.

MATERIAL

THE

II.

ART.
I. THE

CAUSE

OF

LOGICAL

ORDER

CONCEPTS

I.

The
CONCEPT
THE
:
concept in
QUALITIES OF
with
to
it (14)
in
regard
logic (13)" Questions arising
logic
The
categories or logicalpredicaments (15) The predicables
(Z6) Comprehension and extension of concepts (17) Subor
dination
of ideas in respect of extension
(18) Comparison of
of identity and
ideas in respect of comprehension : Relations
opposition (19)

OBJECT

I4I

AND

"

"

"

"

"

...

"

II. DIVISION

CONCEPTS
OF
:
Principles of division (20) ; I.
according to content
(21) ; II. According to their
of representing their
object (22) ; III. According
of their formation
manner
(23)
II.

ART.
I.

THE

OBJECT

(24)
II. DIVISION

OF

QUALITIES

AND

The

"

ten

TERMS

parts
(26)

...

of

OF

THE

*44

Divided
manner

to

the
.152

TERMS
TERM

speech (25)

The

object of

the term
154

.156

ANALYTICAL

CONTENTS

ix

PAGE

CHAP.

III.

ART.
I. THE

I.

OF

"

"

i.

OF

AND

AND
JUDGMENT
judgment and

of the

JUDGMENT

OF

CAUSE

JUDGMENT

THE

Place

(28)

FORMAL

THE

MEANING

II. KINDS

THE

THE

ORDER

PROPOSITION

PROPOSITION

THE

Definition

proposition in thought (29)

PROPOSITION

AND

LOGICAL

157

"

of Simple Propositions : I. Division


Classification
according to
matter
Two
kinds
of
in
matter
(31)
judgment
(32)
necessary
Other
nomenclature
according to form
(33) II. Division
of
the
(34) Import
predicate of proposition (35) III.
Division
according
according to quantity (36) IV. Division
to quality (37)
159
of complex
Classificationof Compound
Propositions: Division
propositions (38)
164
"

"

"

"

"

"

"

2.

III.

RELATIONS

PROPOSITIONS
(39) Equivalence (40)
(41) Opposition and subordination
(42) Rules
concerning the truth and falsityof opposed propositions (43)
and
of subordinate
inferences
propositions (44) Immediate
(45)
BETWEEN

"

"

Conversion

"

"

"

ART.
I. NATURE

II.

165

REASONING

REASONING
OF
SYLLOGISM
of reasoning
AND
OF
THE
: Nature
and
(47) The
syllogism and its terminology (48) Nature
of the necessity of
logicalbasis of the syllogism (49) Nature
syllogisticprinciples (50) Logical first principles (51)
moods
of
the
of
the
Figures and
syllogism (52) Rules
syllogism (53) The rules of the syllogism and truth (54)
"

"

"

"

"

"

"

II. VARIOUS

"

i.

KINDS

SYLLOGISM

OF

Basis

of classification

(55)

170

.178

Classification
of Syllogisms accordingto their Form
(56) : Varieties
of the
and
rules of the
categorical syllogism (57) Nature
hypothetical syllogism (58) Conjunctive and
disjunctive
syllogisms(59) The exclusive syllogism (60) The dilemma
(61)

Classificationof Syllogisms according to


syllogism and its truth- value (62)

182

"

"

"

"

2.

DIFFERENT

KINDS

into

"

OF

certain

DEMONSTRATION

their

Matter

I. Fundamental

79

The

division

strictlyscientific demonstration
(63) Con
(64) Proof of fact and causal demon
stration (65) II. A prioriand a posterioridemonstrations
(66)
III. Circular
or
regressive demonstration
(67) IV. Other
accidental
forms
of demonstration
.183
(68)
PROBABLE
ARGUMENTS
from
(69) : I. Arguments
analogy
(i)
or
enthymeme,
(2) analogical induction
analogy, (3)example
186
(70) II. Hypothesis (92) III. Argument from authority (71)
ERRONEOUS
ARGUMENT
FALLACIES
AND
(74),
(73) : Of induction
and of deduction
187
(75)
ditions

of

and

the

"

latter

"

"

"

"

"

"

"

ART.

Knowledge
I. FACTORS

IN

III.

system

THE

...

SCIENTIFIC

SYSTEMATIZATION

(76) Systematization
"

SYSTEMATIZATION

OF

of

knowledge (77)

our

KNOWLEDGE

I. Definition

(78) Kinds of definition (79) Definition formed


by analysis,
or
by analysis and synthesis combined
(80) Rules for defini
tion (81) II. Division, the necessary
concomitant
of definition
(82) Rules for division (83)
.192
"

"

"

"

"

...

191

CONTENTS

ANALYTICAL

PAGE

II. METHOD

Synthetic method
sciences
of
the
(86) Stages of
experimental
(85) ii Method
induction
Methods
of
inductive
the
(88)
(87)
process
induction
of
induction
of
(90)
grounds
Logical
Object
(89)
Induction
and the syllogism (91) Statistics and induction
(92)
of philosophy
method
III. Analytico-synthetic
(93) Method
J96
(94)
I.

(84)

scientific methods

Diversity of

"

"

"

"

"

"

"

"

"

"

"

CHAP.

Logic

THE

IV.

attainment

the

and

science

(96)

of

(95) Definition

knowledge

of scientific

ORDER

LOGICAL

OF

CAUSE

FINAL

"

204

..........

ETHICS
The
:
object of
specialethics (2)

INTRODUCTION
ethics

and

CHAP.

209

I.

PRELIMINARY

NOTIONS

LAST

END

Good

and

Nature

and

Evil

END

OF

natural

tendencies

MAN
; the

end
Kinds

(5)
"

good (4)
end
(6)
"

of

"

211

NATURE

HUMAN

OF

NATURAL

Diversity of natural
Kinds
of good (7)
II. THE

Ethics

of

THE

I.

general

General

Theory

"

.......

PART

of

(i) Meaning

ethics

subjectively and

has

I. Man

reallya last natural end (8) II. Man has only one natural end
(9) III. Regarded indeterminately and in the abstract, it is
his happiness (10) IV. Regarded in the concrete, the objective
end is not in any thing created, but it is in God
(11) V. Man
enters
into possessionof his happiness by an act of his intellect
is realized
(12) VI. Subjective beatitude
by an act of the
intellect
and
Corollaries
speculative
(13)
(14) Summary
conclusion
in
Beatitude
the
A
(15)
present
difficulty(16)
life (17); Conditions
for the realization
of happiness (18) A
difficulty(19) Accidental
qualities of happiness (20) The
end of man
is a supernatural end (21) No contradiction
in the
conception of a natural happiness (22)
.214
"

"

"

"

"

"

"

"

"

"

"

"

"

"

CHAP.
I.

MEANING

PROOFS

AND

liberty (24)
INFLUENCE

OF

"

nature

and

influence

OF

of free-will

PASSIONS

THE

question (26)

of material

of external

the

causes

causes

Meaning

of
224

WILL

Statement

influence
on

on

WILL

THE

(25)

FREE-

ON

of

Extent

FREE-WILL

FREEDOM

OF

Proofs

"

II.

II.

of

free-will

free-will

(27)
(28)
"

of

the

sensitive

man's
Nature

of the
225

....

CHAP.
I. MORAL

GOOD

good

moral

or

evil

THE

MORAL

real, intrinsic

ORDER
distinction

Distinction

between

moral

between

goodness
explained ultimately by
influence (31)
divine extrinsic,positive

of

badness
human

EVIL

AND

and

III.

human

(30)
"

actions

not

and
any
.

229

CONTENTS

ANALYTICAL

xi
PAGE

FOUNDATION

II.

DISTINCTION

THE

OF

GOOD

MORAL

BETWEEN

AND

conformity or non-conformity of actions


of
end
(32) Corollary (33) Sources
supreme
social well-being the
individual
nor
morality (34) Neither
worth
of moral
measure
(35) Criticism of individualistic (36)
of
of
social
utilitarianism
and
Spencer's
(37) Criticism
and
evolutionist theory (38) Sociological
pragmatist theories
(39)
EVIL

natural

The

with

our

"

"

"

"

"

"

"

III. THE

LAW

MORAL
eternal

subject to a natural
of
(41) Nature
(43),namely, in human

natural

and

law

IV.

MORAL

V.

THE

"

moral

"

(42),and basis of it
reason
ultimately in the practical

(40) The
obligation
(44) and

law

is

Man

law

nature

of Providence

(45)

240

CRITERION

SUBJECTIVE

MORALITY

OF

Moral

distinct

from

of

natural

the

VI.

THE

of

able

VII.

doctrine

(54)
"

first commandment
be

must

done

after

of the

of

the

evil

and

Kantian

demanded

"

trial

of

happiness

of

of merit

law

of

Basis

the

duty (55)

his

conclusion
244

....

ORDER

MORAL

THE

(57),and

The

unreason

of moral

principles and

OF

moral

"

upon

is not

categoricalimperative (56)

the

(53)

positive pain

doctrine

(51)
reward

Eternal

(52)

time

of

loss of

Kantian

the

sanction

Some

infliction

CHARACTERISTICS

NATURAL
teristics

life insufficient

eternal

to

Outline
the

Notion

LAW

of

in addition

concerning

the

moral

Charac

act

(58)
"

(59)
(60)
any
? (61)
Good
and
(62) The good
Duty
the supreme
end
(63) Degrees of goodness or of wicked
in human
acts
(64) Pessimistic
Morality (65) Indepen
Morality (66) Secular or Lay Morality (67)

morally
ness

MORAL

present
punishment

of

dent

accumulated

241

Criticism

and

'

sense

"

and

practicalreason,
law, is that good

the

eternal

Christian

"

No

"

adequate explanation (49)

no

the

THE

OF

"Those

sinner

race's

the

and

(48)

(50)

SANCTION

or

intellect

utilityoffer

principleof

avoided

the
of

experiences
First

'

postulate

to

evil

and

good

of our
practical reason
'
instinct ' or
moral
moral
a

distinguishedby judgments
need

"

of merit

'

indifferent

"

'

there

Are

'

acts

'

"

"

"

"

"

"

CHAP.

Meaning

of

conscience

conscience

IV.

Directive

(68)
"

(69)

and

249

of

obligatory powers

.239

II

Special Ethics :
Theory of Right and

CONSCIENCE

PART

INTRODUCTION

Duty

Definition
of natural
law
:
(70) Its distinctive
of natural
law to positive law (72)
(71) Relation
Corollary (73) Originof rights(74) Kinds of right (75)
"

character

"

"

"

CHAP.
I. RESPECT

236

(46, 47)

VIRTUES

231

OF

Lawful

HUMAN

"

I.

RIGHTS

LIFE

self-defence

OF

THE

Foundation

(77)

....

263

INDIVIDUAL
of

the

right

to live

(76)
"

.270

ANALYTICAL

xii

CONTENTS
PAGE

right to work
(78) Liberty to choose
of
a
opinion (80) Liberty of con
profession (79) Liberty
science (81)

II. RESPECT

LIBERTY

OF

The

"

"

"

272

.........

: Definition
(82) Limits of ownership (83)
right of ownership (84) Ownership founded on
social conventions
and on
legislation(85) Ownership founded
labour
The
from
on
man's
(86)
right of ownership derived
nature
Outline
and
criticism
of
the
doctrine
of
(87)
(88)
(89)
therefrom
and
conclusion
communism,
(90) Outline
(91)
criticism
and
of collectivism
(92) of the doctrine
Reply to
objections brought against the capitalistic
regime (93) Titles
to
property : I. Occupancy
(94) ; II. Prescription (95) ;
III. The rightto make
The rightof inheritance
a will ; IV.
(97)
279

III. RESPECT

PROPERTY

OF

Basis

"

"

of the

"

"

"

"

"

"

"

CHAP.
I.

II.

PURPOSE

RIGHTS

OF

the

OF

THE

INSTITUTION

THE

OF

MARRIAGE

OF

of the

good

MEMBERS
:

Second

(99)

THE

First end
end

FAMILY

of

marriage

of

spouses
marriage : the
of children
their education
and
(100) Education
procreation
is physical, intellectual, moral
and
religious(101) Corollary
"

"

"

(102)
II.

PERPETUITY

III. THE

FAMILY
the

AND

State

GENERAL

II.

PANTHEISTIC

III. THE
IV.

THE

STATE

THE

THE

VI.

THE

Principle(103)
"

Relations

THE

between

OF

SOCIAL

OF

THEORY

OF

OF

STATE

THE

THE

CHRISTIAN

CONTRACT

ORGANISM
OF

THE

STATE

THE

"

The

Philosophy
"

the

systems

philosophy

of
of

Brahmanas
the

China

in

society (115)
Authority (117)

of

"

"

335

of the

India
of
and

the

PHILOSOPHY

and

utilityof
(3)

the

treatise

341

later Sanskrit

(8)

of

Nature

of

Philosophy (4) Hymns

328
333

OF

Division

PART

of

Con

of civil

HISTORY

Philosophy (2)

The

the

328

(113)

Introductory (i)" Meaning


of

(108)

"

INTRODUCTION:

RIGHT

Interpretations of

"

OF

325

....

CONCEPTION

OUTLINES

and

....

DIVINE

and foundation
(114) Nature
Origin of Authority (116) The
role
Limits
of sovereignty (118)

losophy

family

32

STATE

(107)

POSITIVE

OF

SOCIAL

THE

dividual

Indian

the

(104)

325

INSTITUTION

AN

History

Divorce

(106)

THEORY

THEORY

RIGHTS

tract-Theory (109-112)
V.

323

III.

NOTIONS

STATE

BOND

(105)

CHAP.
I.

MARRIAGE

THE

OF

316

the
of
or
.

and

China

Rigveda (5) The


the
Upanishads

Phi

"

Hindu
.

period
.

(6)"

(7)
"

The
-343

xiii

CONTENTS

ANALYTICAL

PAGE

PART

Philosophy

Greek
Periods

of

Greek

II

philosophy (9)
I.

CHAP.

PHILOSOPHY

PRE-SOCRATIC

Characteristics
schools
group

CHAP.

and
subdivision
(10) First
(n)
Pythagoras (12) School
of pre-Socratic schools
(14) The
"

"

"

GREEK

PHILOSOPHY

pre-Socratic

of
group
of Elea

(13)
Sophists (15)

"

II.

345

....

FROM

"

Second
.

346

TO

SOCRATES

ARISTOTLE
I. SOCRATES

Characteristics

"

II. PLATO

Life

of

Greek

"

Ethics

"

ARISTOTLE

Life

"

Ideas

Aesthetics

and

(19) Physics
.350
(22)
"

character

(26)

ality (27) Physics (28) Psychology (29)

Ethics

"

"

III.

"

FROM

RISE
General

THE

OF

Stoic

(39)
"

End

"

of

division

Greek

features

(36) Systems
"

fifth

and

century

Plotinus

philosophy (40)

PART

remarks

"

III

(41) Patristic philosophy during


of the
Augustine (43) Writers
Pseudo-Dionysius (44)
"

lastic

"

369

IV

Philosophy

the philosophy of the Middle


on
Ages
philosophy (45) Division of the philosophy of
Ages (46)

General

363

"

(42)

Mediaeval

leading up to neo(38) Porphyry

...

St.

"

Nemesius

LEADING

Philosophy

division

centuries

IT

Neo-Platonism

Patristic

first three

SYSTEMS

AND
TO

PART

General

"

and

(37)

THE

TO

"

UP
character

352

School

NEO-PLATONISM

Platonism

third
of the
(31) Schools
(32), Epicurean School,
and
Sceptic Schools (33) Eclecticism (34)
neo-Pyrrhonic School (35)
-359

Peripatetic School
Scepticism of the

General

SCHOOL

division

and

"

IV.

Actu

(30)

ARISTOTLE

OF

NEO-PLATONIC

centuries

second

CHAP.

DEATH

THE

characteristics

and

"

his

of

Pure

"

"

division

and

philosophy (24) Logic (25) Metaphysics

CHAP.

349

General

(23)

of the

Theory

or

(20) Psychology (21)


"

III.

period

......

Dialectic

(18)

this

philosophy during
(17)

of Socrates

(16) Philosophy

and

Scho

the Middle

375

CONTENTS

ANALYTICAL

xiv

PAGE

CHAP.

FIRST

I.

PERIOD

MEDIAEVAL

PHILOSOPHY

PHILOSOPHY

WESTERN

I.

ART.

OF

characteristics
of Scholasticism
Main
VIEW
:
during this
period (47)" Organization of philosophical schools
(48)
Philosophical literature (49) Division of this period (50)

I. GENERAL

"

"

II.

WESTERN

PHILOSOPHY

TURIES

"

TENTH,

NINTH,

IN

ELEVENTH

AND

CEN

"

Philosophy : The
question of Universals
(51)
(52)
Non-Scholastic
Philosophy : John Scotus Eriugena (53)
Philosophy and TheologicalControversies (54)
"

St.

Anselm

" 2.
" 3.

382

.384
.385

III. WESTERN

"

379

Scholastic

i.

PHILOSOPHY

IN

CENTURY

TWELFTH

Scholastic

"

Philosophy : Realism
formulae
(55) Anti- Realist
of
Moderate
Realism
(57) The dawn
(58)
of Salisbury (59) Alan
of Lille
of St.(60) Hugh
Victor
."....
(61)
385
Non-Scholastic
Philosophies (62)
.389
The
Theological Movement
of the Twelfth Century : Schools
of
Scholastic
Theology (63) Mystic schools (64)
389

i.

"

Abelard

(56)
John
"

"

"

"

"

" 2.
" 3.

"

....

ART.

II.

Philosophy

BYZANTINE

AND

the

among

Philosophy among

CHAP.

II.

Armenians,
the

MEDIAEVAL

Arabs

(68)

survey

I.
II.

GENERAL

PERIPATETICISM
Albert

IV.

CONFLICT

Great

Paris
V.

JOHN

VI.

LOGICIANS
tive

Latin

III.

Averrojsm

393

(72)"

Alexander

.394

of Hales

(73)
.400

GREAT

THE

AND

THE

of

ST.

AND

THOMAS

Aquinas (76)
OLDER

Thomism

"

.403

SCHOLASTICISM

(77)
"

Eclectics

"

of

4o6

(79)

grammarians

ART.

(69)

(74)

GRAMMARIANS

AND

THIRTEENTH

synthesis (71).

Its precursors

supporters

SCOTUS

391

PHILOSOPHIES

Scholastic

THOMISM
and

"

THE

of this renaissance

University (78)

DUNS

IN

(75)" St. Thomas

BETWEEN

Adversaries

Syrians (66)

GENERAL

ALBERT

OF

the

The

and

Jews (67)

SCHOLASTIC

(70)"

SCHOLASTICISM
St. Bonaventure

"

III.

II.

VIEW

OLDER

Causes

"

ART.

I.

PHILOSOPHY

Persians
and

PHILOSOPHY
CENTURY
ART.

General

ORIENTAL

(80)

Petrus

Hispanus

and

the

NON-SCHOLASTIC

(81)" Sigerof Brabant

specula

.408

......

PHILOSOPHERS

(82)

ANALYTICAL

IV.

ART.
Neo-Platonic

MINOR

(84)

CHAP.

III.

MEDIAEVAL

I.

SCHOLASTIC
The

(86)

fifteenth
NON-SCHOLASTIC

School

III.

PHILOSOPHIES

CURRENTS

MINOR

(95)
Nicholas

"

IV.

General
I.

sketch

division

OF

The
and
-413

(94) Develop
"

Eckhart

(97)

THE

"

Master

(91)

.416

and

German

.418

RENAISSANCE

PERIOD

(98)

419

PHILOSOPHIES

NEW

of Cusa

PHILOSOPHIES

Averroism

PHILOSOPHY

OF

Mysticism (96)
CHAP.

Ockham-

fourteenth

the

Latin

"

The

Thomism

"

413

philosophy (87)
"

of

(88)

(90)

"

of Ockhamism

ment

THE

THE

of Ockham

II.

of Scholastic

(92) Mysticism
(94)

centuries

OF

Decline

Scotist

(89)" The
Aegidian School

HALF

School; William

ites

Roger

CENTURY

DURING

FIRST

PHILOSOPHY

Terminist

410

PHILOSOPHY
AND

FIFTEENTH
outline

direction

"

FOURTEENTH

General

CURRENTS

(83) Experimental
Lully (85)

Raymond

"

xv

PHILOSOPHICAL

direction

Bacon

CONTENTS

OF

RENAISSANCE

THE

Revival

of

General

features

and

the

systems of antiquity (100)


The
naturalistic
movement
and
social
law
(101) Natural
(102) Protestant
philosophy and
mysticism (103) Theism
the philosophy of religion(104) Scepticism (105)
or
(99)
"

"

"

"

"

"

II.

SCHOLASTIC

PHILOSOPHY

schools

General

(107)

Spanish

ings between
century (109)

Scholastics

"

CHAP.

I.

Outline

(in)

I.

DESCARTES

II.

CARTESIANISM

MODERN

(no)

"

CENTURIES

IN

431

KANT

General

sketch

"

"

The

(126)

PHILOSOPHY

sketch

(128)

(130)

Ethics

"

(127)
IN

THE

Leibniz

(115) Mysticism
"

(118)

"

(124)

Reaction

"

(125)
"

435

EIGHTEENTH

AND

School

School

Thomas

(119)

earlier

The

Associationist
Hume

Scottish

Deism

"

432

CENTURY
Occasionalism

SEVENTEENTH

THE

John Locke
(121) The
Berkeley (123) David

"

BEFORE

SEVENTEENTH

THE

PHILOSOPHY

FRENCH

(112, 113)

BACON

"

IV.

432
FRANCIS

"

Law

Seventeenth

PHILOSOPHY

OF

tionalism

the

Philosophy

division

and

AND

ENGLISH

in

426

disciplesof Descartes
(114)
Spinoza (117)
(116) Baruch
III.

"

scientists

and

Modern
character

420

Scholastic
(106) Ancient
(108) Misunderstand

Scholasticism

PART

General

"

Hobbes

(120)
(122) George
against sensa
"

"

Ethics

and

Natural
439

.......

EIGHTEENTH

CENTURY

General

Speculative sensism (129) Religiousphilosophy


law
(132)
(131) Natural
"

"

....

446

CONTENTS

ANALYTICAL

xvi

PAGE

V.

PHILOSOPHY

GERMAN

KANT)

philosophy

The

"

Wolff

and

(138)

The
of

(133)

"

(135)
history
Philosophy

"

in

Wolff

(141)
Faculty

Reason
The
Critique of Pure
(140)
philosophy
Reason
(142)" Critique of the
Critique of Practical
Sentiment
or
(143)
Judgment

"

"

PHILOSOPHY

GERMAN

PHILOSOPHY
HALF

FIRST

THE

DURING

454

...

POST-KANTIAN

III.

CHAP.

OF

NINETEENTH

THE

immediate
The
disciples and
(144)
Idealism
Fichte
Critical
of
Kant
(146)
(145)
opponents
idealism
and
(149)"
logical
Schelling
(148)" Hegel
(147)
Realism
Critical
The
Schopenhauer
(151)
(150)
Hegelians
School
The
Herbart
Psychological
(154)
(153)
(152)
CENTURY

General

449

KANT

I.

"

OF

PHILOSOPHY

THE

of

philosophy

Reaction
(137)
popular form

of

(LEIBNIZ
(134)
sentiment
(136)
against Leibniz
(139)
TO

of

school

The

"

The

"

II.

CHAP.

Critical

sketch

school

aesthetic

The

THE

IN

General

CENTURY

EIGHTEENTH

sketch

"

"

"

"

"

"

"

"

II.

FRENCH
THE

tic

FROM

CENTURY

sensualism

New
ENGLISH

ITALIAN

of

PHILOSOPHY

IN

The
(161)
positivism
SPANISH

AND

Philosophy

of

in

(163)

PHILOSOPHY

school

(157)
(159)
"

CENTURY

(164)

Philosophy

(162)

"

476

....

in

Italy

(165)

"

480

(166)

Spain

471

General

Associationism

School;

OF

461

Materialis

"

Positivism

"

Evolutionism

"

(155)
Eclectic

the

(158)

NINETEENTH

THE

Scottish

"

English
IV.

"

MIDDLE

THE

TO

sketch

General

and

phases

sketch

REVOLUTION

THE

Spiritualism
ontologism
positivism (160)

(156)

Traditionalism

"

III.

PHILOSOPHY
NINETEENTH

APPENDIX

Philosophy

Contemporary
Favourite

(167)
problems
philosophy

Scholastic

SYNOPSIS

IN

DOCTRINES
GLOSSARY

INDEX

THE

FORM
MAINTAINED

OF

PHILOSOPHIC

"

Tendencies

and

systems

(168)

"

THESES

OF
IN

TERMS

Neo-

481

(169)

THE

STATING

THE

MANUAL
....

PRINCIPAL

488
5"5

528

THEOLOGY

NATURAL

OR

THEODICY

INTRODUCTION*

Meaning

1.

Natural

of

of God.

Natural

"

It establishes

of

existence

the

things, and then investigatesthe


its methods
its principles and
derives

natural

Christian
human

of

alone, and

reason

discovering but
mind

has

which

2.

Place

studies

with

Study.

have

us,

deals

Books

for

revelation

divine

by

belief

Christian

elaborated

has

these

have

already

with

Scholastics
by Aristotle
Metaphysics, 1). Philosophy, they
this is speculativephilosophy;
is

Gen.

(i) what

and

the

"

consultation

or

philosophic

how

seen

of

Branches

the

among

classified

and

study

Theology

We

"

been

(Introduction,9,
tell

it

to

quite incapable

is

resources

given

are

Natural

of

Philosophic

own

the

which

data

from

starts

the

and
co-ordina
of reflection, deduction
by means
all up into a systematized
them
gradually worked
know
of theology.
we
by the name

data

tion, and
whole

which

endowed

revealed

its

light of
distinguishedfrom
from

is

Cause.

of this

nature

account

latter

if left to

reason

the

This

theology.

this

on

Cause

first efficient

of all
It

theology or,
philosophical study

called, theodicy1is the

it is sometimes

as

Theology.

"

etsa
nature
(Beauchesne, Paris, 1915).
2nd
ed., 1896).
London,
Theology (Longmans,
2nd
The
God
AVELING,
of Philosophy (C. T. S., London,
ed., 1914).
Christian
DRISCOLL,
York, 2nd ed., 1902).
Philosophy : God (Benziger, New
The
Existence
MOVES,
of God
1906).
(brochure : Sands, London,
D eu
et L'Agnosticisme contemporain (Lecoffre, Paris,
1909).
MICHELET,

Dieu,

Garrigou-Lagrange,
BOEDDER,

Natural

CALDECOTT

and

large edition

Institut

Literature

the

from

Theism

of

1904).
of

Th6odicee

de

Superieur

as

of the

volume

Philosophic

as

in

Cours

preparation

by

announced

was

before

the

the
of

destruction

vain.

Lou
1

Etymologically
subject of God, GeoG
theodicee

1710)

Kant

took

theology
Theodicy
theology
is also

ROSMINI,
M.S.P."

; and

the

signify

the

in

by

word

it is of

in the

purely

it

narrower

Theodicy,

3 vols.

VOL.

in

II.

God

same

to

present-day

Aristotle
the

used

'

from

derived

known

as

sense

but

philosophical study

is confined
this

is

an

advocate's

'

plea

on

the

de
in his Essai
by Leibniz
mal
(Amster
et I'origine du
he
that
speaks.
by revelation
used
then
since
theodicy has been
from
of
distinguished
as
God,

find
it first used
SI'/CT/.We
de Dieu, la liberte de I'homme

here

word

which

the

la bonte

sur

dam,
to

Selections

MACKINTOSH,

(Clark, Edinburgh,
A

existence

son

was

the
sense

study

of

is also

God

as

often

known

to

called

us

by

rational,

revelation.

natural,

or

[The word

catalogued as TJ #60X071/07 0tXoo-o0ta.


Providence:
of 'God's
Justice/ His
meaning
1912). TRS.].
(Longmans, London,
"

THEOLOGY

NATURAL

philosophy. Speculative
(2)what oughtto be this is practical
of
the
nature
movement, of quantity,
philosophyinvestigates
the treatises that correspond,
have
Hence
of substance.
we
namely,physics,mathematics and metaphysics.
If we ask what is the placeof natural theologyin speculative
philosophy,we find that it belongs both to physicsand to
proof
metaphysics, (i)To physics,because the fundamental
"

of the existence

consideration

in the

see,

of the First

is to be

Being

of movement

found,
the

or

as

we

shall

transition from

observe it in the thingsthat


to actuality,
as
we
potentiality
the particular
within our experience
was
come
; and movement
of the physicsof the ancients.
(2)To meta
subject-matter
is
because
the First Cause, the real existence of which
physics,
in no way needs
made
known
to us by the fact of movement,
the intervention of a beinganterior to itself for the explanation
of its existence and its activity
; for it has in itselfall the per

fections that constitute it.

It

to actuality
; or,
potentiality
terms

of the

admit

can

to

use

Scholastics,it is in

of

no

transition from

the concise and

no

expressive

moved, but it is the

sense

Unmoved.

Being does not admit of being other than it


of passing from
is, of the possibility
potency to actuality,
it is whollyand entirely
actual,actus purus ; and consequently
of materiality;in other
admits
neither of potentiality
nor
the
words, it is immaterial
(Gen. Metaphysics,123). Now
formal
objectof metaphysics,we saw
(3),is substance con
Since

the First

sidered

without

istics which

any

reference

to

change

or

to those

character

being as
investigates
It
immaterial
immobile.
negatively or
positivelyand
follows,then, that if we take the division of philosophyac
cordingto the ancients,natural theologyis not reallya distinct
branch of study : the existence of God is the ultimate
con
the
clusion,
highestflightof the study of physics,and the
of generalmetaphysics
study of His nature is an application
to a particular
being,the Being that is absolutelyperfect.
We conclude,then, that there is no special
science
philosophic
are

proper

to

matter

"

it

"

of God.

Moreover,
of its
we

to

distinct science would

requirea

formal

object

specialprinciples.Yet all the concepts that


form regardingGod
can
not
are
applicableexclusively
All our
Him, at least in regardto their positive
content.
own

and

INTRODUCTION

positive, proper
that

concepts
the

within

comes

whatever

immaterial

beings,

applications of

be
the

about

have

the

negative ones

around

its

call

Hence,

as

far

so

the

of

also

positiveis shared
has

theology

adequately
we

possess

finite and

by

formal

no

imper

contingent

and

notions

the

them

the

and

are

origin

make
all

finite

the

may

God

concepts

them

from

we

to

and

proportionately

object

to

own.

the

principles

which

from

fundamental

the

are

different

between

the

from

analysis of

the

and

where

can

be

is

there

the

no

For,

relations

that

which

formal

object

formal

study
the

it to

are

principles

of

establishes

in

science

of the

out

drawn

previously

object special to
to

sets

mind

the

it has

concepts

principles peculiar

no

this

God.

applicable exclusively to

science

and

of

from

analogical.

best

at

only

drawn

knowledge

world

content

it is

as

natural

beings,

Again,
not

particular, can

extension

of

knowledge

in

material

can

material

human

which

God

being

be

characteristic

concerning

previously

all the

by eliminating

are

represents.
about

have

the

the

in

God,

to

that

beings

in

and

us,

form

we

God

we

down

limit

we

ally apprehended
fections

notions

apply solely to spiritualbeings

we

applicable

concepts

world

material

experience (Psychology, 90).

our

concerning

immaterial

an

ideas

The

and

world

material

of

scope

the

from

drawn

are

positive

Therefore

question

science, there

the

it

constitute

special

science.
Natural

physics
the

the

in

Cause,

study
3.

far

so

as

and

it is

to

of

of

physics
it is

metaphysical,

principles
existence

the

and

to

application

an

general metaphysics
is made

which

meta

known

the

to
to

of

us

by

of movement.
of

Division

existence
the

concepts

First

both

theology, then, belongs

of

God

activityof

correspond

the

Theology.

Natural
;

the

it

inquires

First

three

Cause.

chief

into
To

the

Theodicy

"

nature

these

parts of natural

three

of

proves

the

and

into

problems

there

God

theology.

PART

The

Before

attempting

first

define

which

is

first
the
"

with

part
one

the

what

the

be

of

Natural

existence

the

prove
to

are

we

to

dealing

to

by

of

proof.

Theology

of God.

the

idea

our

we

of

of

existence

understand

object

with

God

of

Existence

divide
the

divine

God

we

Sovereign

the

Accordingly
into

Being
this

chapters,

two

Being

must

the

other,

CHAPTER

IDEA

The

4.

God,

God

whether

in
in

next,

the

it ;

We

as

lastly,
of

races

find

instinctively
'

we

consciousness

and

in

Master
all

God

first

individual

;
to

serve

entertained

by

God
all

disposes

'

'

expressions

such

use

God

Thank

not,

or

'

'

God

only

that

belief

professing

reflection

any

that

implies
will

the

which

names

not.

or

is

regarded

things,

whose

groups

of

as

Supreme

the

wisdom

penetrates

things.

and

There

the

Elohim,
the

the

groups

either

Allah,

of

in

meaning

all4

of

upon
3.

hearkens

civilized

past

and

from

(e.g.
the

the

the

again,

De

present,

Being

agree
there

indicate

(El,

permanence,

self-same

when

the

dyut,

root

shining
who

in

one,

in

called

0"nro/"u, I invoke).

Quatrefages,

religious

peoples,

the
a

the

Sanskrit

the

heaven,
or

God

in both

universe

the

else

or

remains

petition (0"0'sfrom

savage
in

who

radiant

studied
and

group)

(Zev?

of

for

Semitic

the

that

shown

stand

that
Master

Supreme

group)
to

words

Being

Anthropologists
have

the

Semitic

change

Indo-Germanic

the

the

beam,

to

of

of

power

languages,

Philologists have

roots

immutability

midst

well-defined

two

are

Indo-Germanic.

the

these

the

This

whose

2.

who

the

whether

men,

knows

the

religious notions

the

without

to

religion

of

distinction,

it exists, in

as

with

mankind.

that

Would
'

revealed

know

may

spontaneous

and

different
1.

with

study

our

begin

without

men

original significationof

the

portray

God

of

it should

all

to

common

acquainted

are

notion

place,

is

amongst

if

but

methodical

be

is to

is found

perfection,

environment

infinite

an

"

every

Christian

that

they

This

in

theology

of

notion

Himself

of

notion

The

God.

Infinite

an

in

live

who

natural

the

of

possessing

those
of

Idea

BEING

DIVINE

THE

OF

conceptions

Lang,
of

Chantepie)
the

that

everywhere,

is to

be

found

the

various
both
idea

in
of

EXISTENCE

THE

OF

GOD

above
the order of mankind,
powerful divinities,
who
reward good and punish evil.
It is the philosopher's
task to ascertain whether this univer
from
a
sallyaccepted notion comes
purely anthropomorphic
mind
whether
there really
exists
or
tendency of the human
several beings which
one
or
correspond to it. Whatever

one

more

or

will be ex
the existence of God, which
may be said about
must
first establish the following
amined
in Chapter II, we

proposition.
5. The

Idea

the Guardian

of
of

the

Supreme
Moral

Perfection

Natural

Theology with

these

terms

and

Order,

; and

Simple

prove

is
a

Being, Superior
is

therefore

Idea

an

of

an

Sufficient

We

Proper Object.
"

the

to

Absolutely
to

have

World,

the

to

provide

explain

proposition.

idea of God is sufficiently


: An
our
argument
briefly
it comprisesan
characteristic of its objectwhen
absolutely
although the spontaneous idea of
simple perfection.Now
God we
does not contain the explicit
have described above
notion of the Infinite,nevertheless it comprisesseveral per
those of absolute
fections that are absolutely
simple,especially
of immutabilityin the midst of change, and of a
sovereignty,
being who is guardian of the moral order. An idea such as
this is sufficient to provide natural theology with
a
proper
formal object.
is this

Put

Perfections

are

of different kinds,

as

has

been

shown

in

distinguishbetween
Metaphysics (174, 175). We
mixed, simple and
absolutely**
simple perfections,(i) The
first kind formally contain an
imperfection,
e.g. the power
is the characteristic perfection
of man.
of reasoningwhich
is one
which
does not, by
(2)A simple perfection(simplex)
its very definition,
imply any imperfection,
yet at the same
of intelligence
time does not exclude it ; e.g. the perfection
of life. (3)By an absolutely
or
(simpliciter
simple perfection
whose
one
simplex)is meant
concept formally excludes all
of God
The perfections
belong to
imperfectionwhatsoever.
this third category. They are
characteristic of the divine
Being, since in them we can find neither trace of admixture
General

nor

of limitation.

Nevertheless, the

recognize in God
the result of

which
absolutelysimple perfections

either

from

spontaneous knowledge

philosophic
argumentationdo

not

contain

or

in

we
as

an

THEOLOGY

NATURAL

io

of this

is

of perfection.It
infinity
that

we

draw

from

these

perfection.The

eminent

Actuality is

of pure

nature

deduction

idea

concepts the

of

character

the
explicit
way
only by a further

contained

found

in them

first

infinite
in

an

implicit
way.
According

and

to Descartes

the

who
ontologists

follow him

is
and proper concepts of what
positive
of the Infinite. For, with them, the
immaterial, especially
notion of the Infinite is primordial
; arguing as they do that
finite bespeaks limitation, and that limitation is a
the idea
negative idea that entails a previousacquaintancewith the
positiveof which it is the denial : hence the idea of God is
In his
and proper one.
well as a positive
as
a primary idea
that it is by a
Descartes argues
Meditations metaphysiques,
way of limitation appliedto this primordialconcept we have
mind

the human

has

'

'

of the Infinite that

we

all finite

know

beings ; the

human

mind

primarilyconscious of the subsistent Infinite Being.


The truth
Descartes' theory of innate ideas is erroneous.
that the formal
in Psychology (90-97),
is, as we have seen
is abstract
which underlie
natures
objectof our intelligence
what
But none
of the notes that
we
perceiveby the senses.
be
can
formallybelong to the world perceivedby our senses
is

predicatedin the
Descartes

himself

same

sense

allows

of the divine

Being, which

and
is supersensible

even

infinite. Not

and proper notions of the mind


can
then, of the positive
be appliedas such to God, nor, in consequence,
can
they give
one,

natural

theology the formal object which it demands.


have but a negativeand analogicalknowledge of what

can

by

nature

We
is

spiritual.

is capable only of
of man
intelligence
It is clearly
forms.
receivingfinite intelligible
impossiblefor
form to represent the Infinite in a positive
any finite intelligible
Our finite intelligence,
and proper way.
then, cannot conceive
idea of the Infinite. The Beatific Vision,the promise
a proper
faith givesus of lifeeternal,cannot
be by means
of concepts. It
is not given to imperfect
beings such as we are to reach God by
the way
We
suggested by Descartes.
must, therefore, fall
back on the longeryet more
secure
way taught by the Scholastic

Again,

the

finite

system.
Kant
existence

was

aware

of

an

of

line of argument for establishing


the
Infinite God
which
proceeds first to assert
a

EXISTENCE

THE
the existence

it His

of

leap from
appealto the

that

involved
combated

very
which

argument

an

"

sequentlyhe argued

to the infinity
of God
necessity
ontological
argument which he

the

the

an

GOD

necessary Being and then to conclude from


not
allow its validityon the
but he would

Infinity
;

ground

OF

all

that

also refuse to

we

stration of the existence of God

accept. Con

demon
rigorousphilosophical
by the Theoretic Reason must

necessarily
imply the direct affirmation of the Infinite. Recog
he arrived
nizing,and quiterightly,that this is impossible,
conclusion

the

at

that

it

postulatesthat

the Practical Reason

makes,

can

lead

us

alone, from

fact of God's

positthe

to

the

existence.
Later

shall show

we

that the criticisms of Kant, based

as

of recourse
to the ontological
they are on the necessity
argument
for passingfrom the first to the second stagein the proofof an
Infinite God,
We

without

are

assert, then,

Descartes

proof

that

6.

must, take

we

Triple Process
We

of

Kant
as

of God

and
positive

foundation

against

of the existence

that is not

any

proper

(25).

that

against

can,

we

startingpoint for

our

notion

of the infinite

our

Being

one.

Attribution, Elimination

and

Transcend

in predicting
of God the simpleper
justified
fections that are presentedto us in the consideration of the
world and of man
efficient
; for the divine Being is the supreme
of them, and surelyin the cause
must
be found the per
cause
ence.

"

are

fections of the effect.


But

further

in the world
them

to

of God

must

we
a

in

submit

all perfections
as

of elaboration

process

if we

we

know

wish to

them

predicate

they will belong to Him alone.


This process involves three stages, (i)First we
affirm of
the primary Cause all simpleperfections.This is the process
of attribution,
We
then immediately exclude from these
(ii)
perfectionsall idea of imperfection.This is the process of
elimination, (iii)
These
perfections,
purifiedfrom all alloy,
in a
attribute to God, affirming
that they belongto Him
we
different
way from that in which they belongto the contingent
beings from which we have apprehended them.
They are in
Him

in

way

that

supereminent way.

This

is the

process

of tran

scendence.
Thus
and

purifiedand

by the processes of
become
simpleperfections

exalted

transcendence, these

elimination

absolutely

NATURAL

12

simple(5),or,

more

and the

aspects one
7. This

THEOLOGY

strictly,
they manifest to us under
absolute perfection.
same

Process

Fallacious

neither

is

be made

may

they

are

meaning

or

as

transcendence.

and

Useless.

nor

The

objection

the different notions of the divine

that

given

they

to

this method

by

us

and

concepts represent one

the

are

formalityor

same

essence

either without

for either these

erroneous

are

"

of this threefold process

is raised by the employment


difficulty

of attribution,elimination

different

different

else formali

In the first
quite different from one another.
; in the
hypothesisthere is no ground for any multiplicity
inasmuch
their
second hypothesis,
as
they lead us into error
ties that

are

which
is
cannot
represent the divine essence
multiplicity
above compositionof any kind.
This difficulty,
long ago put by Duns Scotus againstthe
teachingof St. Thomas, can be solved onlyby attendingto the
virtual incomplete
distinction that exists between
the different
that we
attribute to the divine Being. Let us
perfections
recall what has been said on the subjectof distinctions (General
48).
Metaphysics,
and these are either
Distinctions correspond
to compositions,
real or existing
onlyin the mind, (i)A compositionisreal when
quite independentlyof any consideration by the mind it
this thing and
of things; it exists between
impliesa plurality
that thing,inter rem
be a
et rem.
In order that there may
real

it is not at all necessary that the things,though


distinction,
distinct, be reallyseparable.By their very nature
they

be

incapableof existing
apart from one
they may be in realitydistinct,e.g. essence
thought and the facultyof thinking. (2) We
may

distinction

concepts
one
reason
same

when

of the

of pure
or

reason,

or

more

as

well

as

be either

the

reason

mind,

material

than
explicit

of pure
rational animal,

logical

logicaldistinction may
virtual one.
(a) It is one

are,

have

existence,
different

thing.

same

and

yet

several

in

rationis ratiocinantis when

formal

be
may
tinction

there

and

another

the

between

object,although
the

Thus

one

there

concepts of

(b)A logicaldistinction

tinctio rationis ratiocinatae when

concepts have

the two

other.

of

is virtual

pure
the

of them
is

and

man
or

dis

dis-

concepts have the same


material objectbut not the same
formal object
; they regardone
and the same
entity,but they view it under different aspects
the

distinct formalities

or

OF

EXISTENCE

THE

"

for

as,

GOD

example,

13

the

distinction be

of the soul. Further,


and the simplicity
spirituality
this logical
virtual distinction may be completeor incomplete
the formal objectof each of these distinct
when
(a)complete,
distinguish
concepts is realizable separately,
e.g. the rnind can
the

tween

"

in the

of the human

case

soul its intellectual,


its animal

and

distinct
when
each formally
vegetativelife; (p)incomplete
object implicitly
comprisesthe others.
the divine
With
these terms
defined, we recognizeamong
divine
incompletevirtual distinction. The
perfectionsan
be represented
to us by
which is simplein itself,
essence,
may
concepts which have a formallydistinct content ; nevertheless,
the formal objectwhich each of these concepts representscon
tains in an implicit
the objects
manner
represented
by the other
concepts. Moreover, the divine perfectionsare attributed
to an
infinite being ; each of them because it is infinite must
comprisethe others. The virtual distinction that we recognize
between
the divine perfections
must, then, be imperfector
incomplete2.
For the very reason
that this distinction is incomplete,
our
knowledge of the divine Being is not, in the first place,falla
cious ; for the concept of each perfection,
since it implies
contains all the other perfections.Our
infinity,
implicitly
knowledge would be untrue only if it representedas distinct
those perfections
which constitute a real unity.
In the second place, this notion of the perfectBeing is
anythingbut useless ; for each concept which goes to form it
brings before us, in an explicit
some
different
aspect
manner,
its

of the

If

divine

essence.

inquirewhat

we

is the real foundation

virtual distinction that


find that

we

viewed

in

it

we

make

between

certainlycannot

be

absolute manner,
for God
composition; but it is to be found
viewed

in

an

relativemanner

the

for this

incomplete
of God,
perfections

in the

divine

in Himself
in

the

essence

is above

divine

all

essence

that
the world,
relatively,
God
is the primary efficient cause
well as the
as
to our
intelli
supereminent archetypalcause, and relatively
and
is the essence
of material beings,
gence whose proper object
whose
of knowing, being abstract and
manner
fragmentary,
a

is,to

"

of which

The

same

attributes

of

incomplete virtual distinction


being. Gen. Metaphysics.76,

is seen

amongst

the transcendental

On

which

creation

in

maintained

and

surround

that

created
mind

as

the

once

nature.

us

true

God,

the

primary

and

rise

we

them.

foundation

and

wisdom,

and

intelligence

then,

of

useful,

to

from

idea

inasmuch

and

archetypal

that

composite

that

we

piece

in
of

rise
the

the

God

order

we

cosmos

infirmity
of

the

the

glance

this

nature

From

the

single

of

the

see.

we

at

account

know

only

can

we

in

taking

God.

of

fection
mind

from

it

prevents

is

THEOLOGY

NATURAL

I4

to

of

the

as

He

the

His

the

cause

is

of

knowledge,
together

human
to

established

idea

of

of

power

per

relations

finality

contingency
of

simple

of

the

God's

beings

God

regarded
created

which

concerning

who

by

the

things,
is

at

His

CHAPTER

EXISTENCE

THE

ART

DOCTRINES

General

terial
human

mind

the

truth

(3)
God

reach

reasoning,
divine

chiefly by
deals

God

for

His

existence

fundamental

impulse

or

does

himself

must

at

least

of God's

and
most

must

other

with
akin

the

a
a

of

means

proof

rest

those

examine

to

Rev.

these

who

various

affirm

we

Action),
Elan

God

Being.

every

Him3.

subjective
the

of

not

vital

the

and

each

of

do

(la Pens^e-

source

but

experience

on

but

abundant

of Himself,

vital

reasoning,
calls

method

no

we

Thought- Action

the

is

there

the

latter,

the

Bergson

of

whatever

to

existence
of

process

any

speak briefly of

has

man

(5) Lastly,
the

make

we

affirmation

sentiment.

proofs

for

the

teachings

and

existence
show

of
both

has
some
affinity with
Philosophy
positivism
evolutionistic
monism
reducible
to
an
ultimately
;
of
Heraclitus.
See
idealism
and
the
phenomenalism
Hegelian
Le
(Reprint
probleme de Dieu
d'apres la Philosophic nouvelle.
1908.)
Neo-Scolastique, Louvain,

respects

Kantianism

BALTHASAR,
from

by

of God,

that

expounded

as

According

God's

upon

intuition

Philosophy

question

God,

of discursive

ontologism

to

Roy.

dealing directly with

we

In

the

is also

existence

Before

God,

Le

reality which

which

afford

not

within

New

demonstrating

intuitivelyby

that

is in the

of

asserts

method

immediate

an

reduce

and

that

based

ontologism

use

may

speciallywith

available
prove

there

Bergson

to

view

the

of faith

of

object

the

existence

the

act

an

hand,

have

(4) We

content

only by
other

we

holds

proving

neccesary

that

essence.

positive
who

it is not

but

of

incapable
the

be

imma

the

that

asserts

(2) Traditionalism

On

THE

PROOF

particular, cannot

received

be

can

revelation.
to

in

God

is

THE

(i) Positivism

"

knowledge.

since
this

and

OF

EXISTENCE

GOD'S

Sketch.

world,

GOD

TO

OPPOSED
OF

8.

OF

EXAMINATION

CRITICAL

I.

II

the

New

it is

15

i6

NATURAL

and
possibility
divine Being.

the

the

THEOLOGY

of provingthe
necessity
On

existence of the

this

question of the
school is divided
existence of God we find that the positivist
The
deals with the possibility
of our
into two groups.
one
knowledge of what is immaterial and, by way of consequence
only,of our knowledge of God in particular
; the other deals
directlywith the questionof the existence of the Supreme
Being.
who deny that we have any notion about
Those positivists
the immaterial
on

Agnosticism.

and

9. Positivism

which

"

is of scientificvalue base their

different considerations.

Some

set

out

argument

with

simple

affirmation which

self-evident and
they maintain is perfectly
must
mind
be taken as a postulate,
namely, that the human
is capable of thinkingonly in positiveideas. With
regard
to the soul,God; and in general
all thingsthat are not clothed
with material conditions,they professa necessary ignorance,
sometimes
waiving the questionwhether they exist or not,
sometimes
denial. Other
disposingof them by a categorical
dominated
philosophers,
by Kantianism, put forward as their
for eliminating
all idea of the immaterial
from human
reason
thought the fact that there is a law of our understanding
enforcingthis. It is part,indeed, of the Kantian system that
scientificwhich are synthetic
are
only those of our cognitions
a priori
judgments, and these are conditioned by pure intui
tions of time and space,
As what
is immaterial
is, by its

nature, withdrawn
human

mind

from

have

cannot

conditions, it follows that

such
a

scientific

knowledge

the
such

of

beings.
Those

whose purpose is a direct criticism of the


philosophers
knowledge that we affirm we can have of God, rest their con
tention chiefly
considerations of fact. Accordingto Comte
on
the historyof ideas as shown
to us both in the development
of ages and in the life of each
mind
ceptions of the human

by a law
ledge,he

his famous

'

individual reveals that the

con

governed in their progress

are

law of the three

stages '. Our know


says, passes through three successive stages. The
first is the theological
stage, in which the mind is inclined to
absolute

"

cognitions: phenomena

resultants of the direct action of

and, in consequence,

as

regarded by it as the
supernaturalfree agencies,

subjectto

are

no

fixed law.

This

is the

THE

OF

EXISTENCE

GOD

17

everything is ascribed to deities. Subsequent


to this is the metaphysicalstage, when
is no longer
recourse
had to supernatural
of phenomena,
realitiesfor the explanation
but instead to invisible powers
or
forces,which are nothing
than abstractions accredited with reality.Lastlycomes
more
the
a
stage, the positivestage, at which the mind recognizes
of attainingabsolute notions, of knowing the
impossibility
of phenomena, and
inmost causes
confines itself exclusively
to gaininga knowledge of the invariable relations of succession
and similarity
which unite them.
It is not
the place here to appraisethe worth
of Kant's
criticism and of his unproved claim that our knowledge has no
scientific value except as formulated
in synthetic a priori
period when

judgments.4We
agnosticismand
10. Criticism

confine

must

the

our

positivismof

of the

attention

an

order.

Agnostic Position.

attain

refutation of

The

agnosticasserts
all examination
concerning

"

self-evident,that
what

is of the

may ask, is it thus evident without any


of human
extent
knowledge that the mind

But,

into the

Comte.

prioritruth, anterior to
the object of our
knowledge, and as
rise above
cognitivefaculties cannot
as

to

we

our

sensible

inquiry
cannot

immaterial

beings,should such happen to exist ?


The objectof intellectual knowledge is simplything,
something;
the intellectual apprehends what-a-thing-is,
quiddity,being
(Psychology,88). A very elementary introspection
proves
material being,is the
this, that being, and not necessarily
it is not
:
object of intelligence
being, thing,as material
which it grasps, but simply as being ; its objectis not neces
But
are
we
sarilycharacterized by material conditions.
far from
learn from an elementary
assertingthat what we
our
inquiry about our cognitivefacultywarrants
declaring
that we
able to know
immaterial
are
; it
being positively
only shows that it is incorrect to infer,as do the positivists,
that material thingsare the only objectof intellectual know
ledge5. Their postulatetherefore is both a prioriand gratui
tous.

to

If indeed after mature

reflection we

find that the material

world

that immaterial
requiresfor its adequateinterpretation
to what
thingsalso exist,we shall not be wrong in listening
our

reason
"

informs

us

about

those immaterial

things.

See Criteriology,
39, 40 ; and cp. Crit. gen. (Cours Superieur),98
Cp. Crittriologit
gtntvale (Cours Sup6rieur), 116.

f
.

THEOLOGY

NATURAL

i8

of the Spenceriantype may


rejoinby assert
positivist
ing that, granted it is a prioriand arbitraryto rule out all
immaterial beingsfrom the domain of knowledge,stillany such
knowledge we may acquireof such beings,and therefore of
The

littlewe
the

Unknowable
do

We

scientific value ; only


and weight can
of extension, number
of

be

any

of certain and
positivescience
subject-matter
of God is only enough to let us know that
know

the

'

cannot

in terms

is known

what
be

Being,

divine

the

He

is

'.

wish

not

the

which

is concealed

admit

that

to

under

important aspect of

an

material

world

truth

the

objection.We

above

the

finds in the

mind

our

deny

the

readily
object

capabilities
; sensible things
And
in a proper
and
what
know
are
we
positiveway.
where
if the
un
philosopher in defining his terms
doubtedly there is scope for what is arbitrary calls scientific
which
only those representations
possess these character
be the objectof
the immaterial
cannot
istics,then assuredly
which

is

its

proportionateto

"

"

science.

But, having said this,we


above

notions

the

forgetthat, over and


concerning the material world,

must

have

we

never

and negative
capable of possessinganalogical
We
are
not, indeed, able to predicate
conceptionsof God.
of Him
also to material beings;
what is common
positively
have
taken originally
nevertheless these concepts which we
of a
from the material world of things we
refine by means
process of negationwhich eliminates from them
every element
in a posi
of imperfection.Without
what
signifying
strictly
in reality
is peculiar
tive manner
to God, these concepts are
to Him
alone, and thus they afford us a true know
applicable
ledgeof the divine Being.
minds

our

11.

are

Criticism

of Comte's

Law

Agnostic Mentality itproduces.

"

'

of the

Comte

Three

Stages

endeavoured

'

and

the

to establish

law of the three stages on various considerations : (i)The


generalhistoryof the sciences shows that this law reallyexists.
his

All

'

knowledge has

gone
of human

three stages
is corroborated
man

hood

marks

prey

an

reveals in its

every

is

by

through or is stillgoing through these


thought. (2) The historical argument
argument from analogy. The life of

to

course

three

credulityand
metaphysicalillusions.
that

of

successive stages. Child


belief. Youth
theological
Mature

age

turns

man

THE
to the

EXISTENCE

GOD

OF

19

(3) Finallythere is an intrinsic argu


to show
ment
the necessityof this law.
The human
mind
feels a need of connecting,by some
theory or other,the facts
which come
under its experience.Along with this mental
need

physicalorder.

there also discloses itself,


in the

to
development,the inability

discover

facts observed.

If,therefore,a

the

of his intellectual

man

earlystages of rational
a theory suggested by

wanted

to find scope

for

he had to invent
activity,
from the information at hand some
that would
interpretation
to unifythe phenomena he observed : theologyserved
serve
him
this purpose.
to the
This prepared the way
meta
physical
theoryof nature, whence humanity has been enabled
to arrive at this stage of positive
science,which is the final

employment

stage.

To-day there are not many of the followers of Comte who


hold by this celebrated law.
Indeed, it is not very difficult
to show
by various historical facts that it is false. In the
unfamiliar with the
days of old the Greeks were by no means
study of natural phenomena. Though Aristotle was a giant
in metaphysicalspeculations,
also the compilerof all
he was
the observations both in physicsand politics
of his times.
And
in mediaeval
times the West, engrossedin theological
has given us, besides such metaphysiciansas
speculations,
St. Thomas
of the calibre of
and Duns
Scotus, a physicist
Roger Bacon.
Again, it is no less false to maintain that each individual
passes through the three stagesof theology,
metaphysicsand
the positivesciences. The
of
dreams
child by no
means
explainingthe phenomena that attract his attention by the
and it is Comte's
agency of divine beings. In this sense
he is not at all naturally
inclined to religion.Youth, in general,
shows very littlebent for metaphysical
On the
abstractions.
philosophical
contrarywe meet with powerfulminds for whom
"

"

studies

are

if
chiefly,

the final
not

stage of

and
an

then

intermediary
stage

wrote
on

devoted

some

universal

quakes, on
M.S.P.-VOL.

the
H.

the

which

study of

of mathematical

historyof the

considerations

career

devoted

has been

physicalsciences.
Helmholz, who was first a physiologist
himself
to
philosophy after passing

to
entirely,

Such, for example, was

the

So

study.

too

of the heavens,

concerningfire,various studies

on

nature

tkeory of winds,

and

an

essay

on

Kant

sketch
earth

headaches,
,c

THEOLOGY

NATURAL

20

before he reached

the

his two

elaborated

final

stage of his thought in which

Critiques.
logicalproof of

Again, Comte's

the

from

stages derives all its value


'

the three

of
necessity

the

'

he

law of

his

empiricalproof.
it would
be a petitio
Isolated from history,
principii.For he
the assertion that the first hypotheseswhich the human
makes
mind
constructed were
theological.But on what
necessarily
does

of nature
structs

read

theory into

some

hypothesisconcerningthe

some

to the

this

facts, that he

con

of the connexions

nature

and

experi

verification of this

theory,this

premature

theological,and
'

'

accustomed

his

directs his observations

bindingfacts togetherand
ments

It is true that the observer

he base his assertion ?

grounds does

primitiveman

'

indeed,

as
'

anomalous
to

adopt

hypothesis; it is true that


provisionaryhypothesis,may be
Spencer remarks, certain un

some

phenomena
theory of

well have
led
may
this kind : but there

is

had to
our
was
nothing to warrant
saying that recourse
such
an
explanationas a general rule.
takes it for granted, without
Moreover, Comte
offering
adequate proof, that the positivestage of knowledge is the
final and
'

law

yet this is an essential part of his


historical
stages '. What
apart from

perfectone, and

of

the

considerations

three

"

is the

proof he adduces ? That, on the one


co-exist with theological
hand, positive
cannot
or
explanations
metaphysicalones, since they are mutuallyexclusive ; and that,
the other
on
hand, positivescience cannot
precede or be
since the human
inferior,
mind is subjectto a law of indefinite
and
is this an
retrogressionis impossible.But
progress
of knowledge,
adequate proof ? Why may not the perfection
the final stage,be a synthesis
of all,theological,
metaphysical
and positive
?
And
for
what
there
the assertion
grounds are
that progress
is indefinite and that it is impossiblefor the
human

race

without

"

to

fall back

proof,and

assertion

mere

pretendedlaw of the three


stages is merely a corollaryof a non-proven
postulate; or
it is an attempt at proof based on the historical grounds that
and metaphysicalexplana
everywhere and always theological
tions have
claimed
one,

and

It is

as

in this

this is

Either

case

his

given way to positiveones


a logical
proof is found

apart

from

to

in which
be

historical observation

interesting,
moreover,

to

note

that

case

reallyan
has

no

what

was

empirical

value at all.

for the foundation

EXISTENCE

THE

OF

GOD

21

to a necessary
positivismComte had to have recourse
of the mind
to bind
and universal law, namely the necessity
from this
facts together
by a theory,in order to prove precisely
that there are
such things as necessary laws but only
no
A
less constant.
associations that are
more
or
positivist
of
what
he
what
cannot
about
is,
can
ought
speak
pronounce

of his

to be.

Though

as

of fact the

matter

'

law

of the

three

stages

'

even
majorityof philosophers,
by
it
has
of
consider
the positivists
left
a heritage
themselves,
yet
who
able influence.
are
engrossedin the study
Many thinkers

has

been

of the

abandoned

natural

the

by

sciences and

confine themselves

the

to

of

use

experimentalmethods, consider every metaphysicalor religious


of the positive
inquiry as vain and illusory.The method
to consist in a completedisregard
for any
sciences they make
their method, they assure
has
such speculation.And
us,
proved its value. To it we are indebted for those marvellous
which have enlarged
conquests in the realms of the unknown
man's horizon both in knowledge and in action.
And to Comte,
it is said,belongsthe gloryof all these modern
achievements
;
to him
for
must
the founder of positivism
be grateful
as
we
of observation which has exercised such
revealingthe method
a
powerfulinfluence on the various branches of the sciences.
But is it reallytrue that the credit is due to the positive
method
extolled by Comte
for the progress in the sciences
which

is the

objectof

?
blessings

This

the

Comte

Pasteur

French

showed

and

what

play.

Comte

left him

phenomenon

their

times.

to

consider

antecedent

is the real

is pure

amongst them

the manifold

not

is the

sophistry,

to

to the

face with

antecedents

in which

allowing an
cause

to

of the

source

InauguralAddress

conditions

complex
method, by

great part

method
positive

put the observer face

in the

This

in

the

This confusion

in his celebrated

Academy.

nature

which

of abundant

source

due

created between

experimentalmethod,

discoveries of modern
as

and the

eulogy of positivismis

the confusion which


and

admiration

our

of the

of

they find

inquiry into
phenomenon

less legiti
enables us merely to pass, more
or
explained,
mately,from what has been to what can be. The experimental
method, which alone is of value in the physicalsciences, starts
to be

out,
menter

on

the

contrary, from

endeavours

to

directive idea

verifyby

his

study

which
of the

experi
phenomena.
the

THEOLOGY

NATURAL

22

He

varies

appears

he sets

of
intensity

subject to

are

the

method
positivistic

which

under

conditions

modifies

the result that his conclusions

with
passive,

the

The

others.

in certain

leaves the observer

phenomenon

certain antecedents, and

aside

action

the

which

under

the conditions
artificially

the

phenomenon

studyingpresentsitself; the experimentalmethod leads


him actively
to search for the laws that natural agents obey.
of a positive
that the dream
remember
Finally we must
science supplantingphilosophyin every
respect has already
he is

passed

writers

other

on

'

the

Poincare*, Duhem,

H.

of fashion.

out

of
critique

the sciences

'

have

and

Roy

Le

done

much

proud claims made by scientists. Metaphysical,


have
ethical and
again taken their
speculations
theological
sciences,which
proper placebeside and above the experimental
fail to satisfy
mind.
of the human
the ultimate questionings
to humble

the

12. Criticism

Traditionalism.

of

of traditionalism

There

"

are

two

schools

(i)The radical school who regardthe human


as
reason
incapableof demonstrating the existence of God,
which they make the objectof an act of faith based on a primi
tive revelation handed
to us by society. Since the coming
on
of Christ this revealed deposit
has been entrusted to the Church.
(2)The

likewise maintain

semi-traditionalists who

first instance

unaided

is

reason

that

in the

incapableof attainingto

knowledge of the existence of God, but differ from the former


school by professing
that after a revelation of the fact it is now
to demonstrate
possible
by rational proof.
To establish their fideism the traditionalists point chiefly
to the errors
in the historyof philosophy. De Bonald,
shown
the

able

to a
them, had recourse
We
cannot
think, he says, without
psychological
argument.
words ; and to create language man
had to think and, conse
most

quently,must

thinker

amongst

alreadyhave

vicious

circle.)Since reason
language and of making an
own,
man

it is necessary
to have
recourse

of which

We

we

see

rationalism
of the

many

receive
that
the

weakness
errors

by

for the
to

had
was

act

(An evident
in itselfincapableof creating
of thought which is reallyits

the

faith.

way

of

reaction

traditionalists took
human

displayedby

of words.

explanationof these activities in


primitiverevelation,the teachings

by

of the

use

the

mind.

from
most

The

revolutionary
exaggeratedview
a

truth

is that

historyof philosophyare

the
no

THE

EXISTENCE

OF

GOD

cogent proof of the total incapacityof


radical conclusion

of
speculations

the laborious

that

than

nothing more
established

could

the truth.

towards

But

there

that

assert

we

such

to take

Such

reason.

all thinkers

delirium.

long

one

our

if it could
justified

only be

would

23

in all ages

were

if this

were

Only
has

be shown

been

no

progress
of the
view
pessimistic

great systems of philosophyis absolutelyto falsify


history.
Revelation
the

serve

it is

but

show, the
As

we

morallynecessary for humanity to pre


ethical truths it has inherited ;
body of speculative
In any
not physically
shall
case, as we
necessary.
existence of God cannot
be simply the object of an

of divine faith.

act

of

is indeed

de Donald's

to

language,which

maintained

he

be due

must

(whichit is not given us

here

existence,he solved

discuss)of

to

how

origin

the

appeal to

an

revelation,

to

that the very thorny


remark, in the first place,

may

into

from

argument

problem

language came

by induction but purelya priori.


if we
And even
grant, in spiteof all that is to be said to the
contrary, this first premiss of his argument, namely, that
languagetogetherwith all the notions that it embodies could
result

only

from

divine

of the human

members

not

teaching made

race

the

to

still to remark

have

we

known

first

(a)that

be
a revelation : the former
teachingis not necessarily
may
the appealmade
of his disciple,
by a master to the intelligence
whilst
the latter is an
appeal to the faith of a believer.
(b) That, if we suppose the human mind to be absolutely
incap
able,a revelation is not sufficient to explainhow we are able to
a

arrive at

If

God.

certain
receive

we

blind credence
the

claims

but

that

and it is

only by

ourselves

about

the

on

knowledge

assertion

revealed

only after

this

of

the

the

This

"

have

authorityof God8.

We

say
of that

finite ;

the

rational

adviscly on
authority.
former, which

supernatural gift.

reason

authorityof

The

we

by
can

traditionalism

about
faith ;

satisfy
is based

totallyincapable. The
objectof his faith by relyingon

knowledge

the

that

of

act

an

is

reason

the

our

of

nature

be received

to

Yet
credibility.

that

and

satisfied ourselves

have

we

admits
believer,in reality,
that he has

existence

truth, this is not by

has
proposition

the exercise

its

of the

act, then, presupposes


very
of God's existence and of the

God

and

not

on

the evidence

of credibility,
are
latter,the motives
is the motive
of faith, is unlimited, and

which

we

necessarily
faith

is

THEOLOGY

NATURAL

24

69). Therefore
(Criteriology,
the proposition
succeed in establishing
traditionalism can never
that the existence of God is acceptedby faith; it drives man
back to an agnosticposition.
that
the other hand, by recognizing
Semi-traditionalists,
on
carried on, in spiteof
the reason
has a limited capacity,
are
themselves, to the same
opinionas we uphold ; for by logically
followingout their conclusions they are forced to acknowledge
that a proofof the existence of God is possible.
Their

of

fact

historical

proofunder

the

intellectual

existence of God
which
that

is that

contention

this

enables
it has

revelation

accept as

truth

attainingby

its

proof become

their

less.

already known,

truth

own

is necessary
is in itself
the

unknown

arrive at

can

rational truth

the

knowledge

revelation.

that

which

reason

reason

But
guidanceof the lightof revelation.
operationof the mind which discovers the
is intrinsically
the operation
as
just the same

it to

of

human

the

acquiredby

revelation of

the

our

Undoubtedly, after the


intellectual faculties are capable

power, the extrinsic difficultiesof


But since the discursive act of the
for the attainment
same

the act

as

it follows

that

of

truth hitherto

by which
to

we

prove

grant that

reason

this last operationis also to admit


to make
power
of producing the first operation. The
its intrinsic capability
has

the

intermediate

which
position

up

is untenable

to

that

of

fall back

to

the semi-traditionalists have

taken

either
logical,

return

they must,

radical

if

they are

traditionalism

and

agnosticscepticism,or

else

ultimate

the concession
consequences
of the Scholastics
rationalistic position

proofof

therefore

they

they
and

must

have

ultimately
carry

made

to its
to

the

acknowledge that

God's existence is

possible.
of proving
After this conclusion regardingthe possibility
God's existence, we
school,
must, against the ontologistic
of demonstrating
show the necessity
it.
a

13.

Ontologism. According to the teaching of


of a syllogism
but
and Gioberti,God is not the term

Criticism

Rosmini

of

"

objectof an intuition. This immediate knowledge of the


divine Being is primordialin man
; only subsequentlyare
of a comprehensiveview
contingentbeings known, by means
and
through which the mind directlysees the divine essence
in it the eternal archetypesof all created beings.
This theory is based by its proponents chieflyon
two
the

EXISTENCE

THE

arguments
sented

which

gain

can

as

this

the

afterwards

be true, it must

to

in the

But

order

all created

and

order of

knowledge,we
contingentbeings.

Ontologism

1.

25

sets

from

out

an

His

know

from

knowledge only

objectknown.
primary Being

also in the

of fact does

matter

(2) For knowledge


the

GOD

that God should


(i)It is quiteimpossible
any finite form ; consequentlythe human

under

gence,

OF

in

vision.

conformitywith

of real

beings, God

first know

and

God

theory of

erroneous

is

posterior.So

thingsare
must

existence,

immediate

an

be

be repre
intelli

ideas.

have shown
else
as
we
objectof the intelligence,
forms
where
as
89), consists in the intelligible
(Psychology,
To
see
apprehended in the world presentedto our senses.
The

proper

God

is the

limitations

the

of the
which

have
we
processes
have first drawn
we

attests
if

Moreover
should
in the

of

immaterial

know

can

ence

life of grace.
supernatural
our
knowledge in this present life
beings only by applying,by means
alreadyspoken of (6),the notions
from the material world.
Experi

goalpromised by faith to

Under
we

constitutes the Beatific Vision, which

is in Himself

He

as

that

we

have

no

the

infinite

intuition of the

Being.

could

the very essence


of God, we
gaze upon
by the enjoyment of this supreme happinessbe absorbed
of God
contemplationof the inexhaustible perfections
we

and lost in the love of the infinite Goodness.


our

minds

and

we

would

not

should be

anything else.

more

Since

be

subjectto

At

the least

same

time

about

God,

the

error

certain of His existence than


such

consequences

are

belied

of that of

by facts,

the

follow stands condemned.


theoryfrom which they necessarily
In the second place,the ontologists
2.
at fault in their
are
logic: (a) They maintain that God can in no way be repre
sented in our
knowledge by a finite form.
Undoubtedly this
is true if it is a questionof a knowledge that is positive,
proper
and adequate; but this is no argument againstour
attainment
of knowledgeof God that is analogical
of
and negative,by means
finite forms,
(b)Again, truth by its very definition is the con
formityof the mental cognitionwith the thingknown, and from
this they argue that the order in which our
knowledge arises in
the mind must necessarily
order in which things
follow the precise
reallyexist. But this inference they draw from the definition
of truth

is unwarrantable.

tion does

requirethe

The

truth

of

conformityof this

an

individual

cogni

cognition with

the

THEOLOGY

NATURAL

26

thing cognized;
particular
to be true, there is

of its

order

but

need for

no

logicalsuccession.

system of

for the
to

us

our

cognitions

representeverythingin

Such

is needed

condition

the
for

of our
scientific system, not for its truth : a
perfection
thingis true when what we say of it is in conformitywith what
affirm of God, although it is by
What
it is ontologically.
we
from the world
and drawn
mediate
ideas which
are
originally
and Last
is that He is the First Cause
of sensible experience,
End
of this world
(5).
the

14.

Roy8,
'

of the

Meaning

'

is infinite

becoming.
',becoming. In so far

God

movement

According

"

The
as

7.

'

Philosophy

New

essence

He

has

to Le

realityis
alreadybecome
of

divine ; in so far as He will


continue to developHimself, He is the transcendent
ceaselessly
within

divine.
of

He

us,

Now

is the

immanent

I have

within

becoming, of
and

more

more

I feel within

tendency to become

immediate

myself an

This supremacy
of the moral law which
myself constitutes the affirmation of the existence

atheists
himself

properly soan
aspiration

is better ; or rather, we
should say, every
one
of atheism whensoever
he is doing what
season

what

experiencesa
is evil and

perfect,

more

moral.

There
.of God.
are,
accordingly,no
feels within
called, since every man
towards

and

more

intuition

advancing towards the ideal. The only true


is an incessant becoming,conscious of itselfin varying
reality
as
degrees and this is known
Thought-Action(la PenseeAction). Our reasoningas it were
congealsthis continuous
not

"

flow of

To use
the meta
realityand so changes its nature.
phoricallanguage of this philosophy,realityis a continuous
curve,

reasoningis

movement

the

tangent which

mind

any moment
its utilitarian
at

stops its

or
owing to
practical
this is matter ; it
and breaks it up
tendency scatters reality,
then unifies by reasoningthese scattered elements
that were
created by Thought- Action.
echo
Here we have as it were
an
of the underlying
fundamental
of the one
and eternal
continuity
becoming which is the only reality,
namely, Thought- Action.
and reason
Besides matter
it is necessary to posita directive
element
which
draws u- on to perfection this is the principle

'

'

"

"

Here

we

confine

ourselves

to

some

fundamental

criticisms.

For

further

details,see

BALTHASAE,
op. cit.
8
E. LE ROY, A New
Philosophy: Henri
" Norgate, London,
1913).

Bcrgson, tr.

V.

Benson

(Williams

THE
of

growth,

cannot

be

EXISTENCE

GOD

OF

27

moral

of our
spirit
reality.This reality,
spirit,
it
reduced
other
of
is
to any
form
at the
reality
;
of existence. It is necessary to positits supremacy,
or

very source
and it is this which

constitutes the affirmation

of God.

The

'

New

'

Philosophyis,then, opposed to philosophia


perennis
the philosophyof becoming is opposed to that of being.

as

It is

for it is all consciousness


idealist,

it is

for
evolutionist,

the fundamental

is a more
and more
reality
perfectbecoming,
which is necessitated by its own
nature ; being is a dynamic
effort to develop.
an
welling-up,
which claims to correct common
1. This system of philosophy
and to go beyond it by asserting
as
sense
a
postulatethat
thoughtcannot reach out beyond itselfor know an objectother
than
terminate
in pantheism,
thought itself,must logically
what
be affirmed to the contrary. For
notwithstanding
may
God is made
to live within us, to realize Himself
in us ; by
the higherpart of our
beingwe are in fact God, since we know
Him and since thought can know
nothingbut itself.
self2. We
are
conscious, it is said, of a tendency towards
of being drawn
to perform the good. This, how
realization,
be a vital experience
ever, cannot
of God, unless indeed we are
ourselves God.
For if there exists a tendency in my
nature
towards working what is justand noble and good, it is legiti
mate
to argue that this finite impulse towards
the ideal is
contingentlike my nature, and therefore requiresfor its
and
explanationa Necessary Being already self-perfected
not
needing to acquirefurther reality
; but this is a proof
of God
from causalityand not by any
vital experienceof

Him.
3. It is not

that

the

of thought
principles
change the nature of reality.Granted they do not apprehend
all reality,
that they abstract from many
elements
in reality,
nevertheless
they do apply to realityand they trulyexpress
the laws of reality.It is thus that the becoming, or the
of reality,
be adequatelyexplainedwithout
cannot
acquisition
to an
unmoved
recourse
being which in some
way
possesses
this perfection
of reality.We
shall return
to this pointwhen
we

We

deal with

true

the

argument

abstract

motu

for the

existence

of God.

reality
becoming is the fundamental
without at the same
time denying the objectiveapplication
of the principle
of sufficient reason.
The New
Philosophydoes
cannot

say

that

THEOLOGY

NATURAL

28
from

shrink

not

this

extreme

consequence

and

its

utters

so

condemnation.

own

We

ourselves

confine

here

must

to

fundamental

these

Philosophycannot establish the affirma


tion of God by a vital experiencewithout
reducingGod to the
Him
of what
is
level of finite things,and thereby despoiling
The

criticisms.

New

divine.
15.

of the

Examination

is

immanence
The

sophy.

The

"

word

prominent in present-dayphilo
extraordinarily
cannot
New
get
Philosophy tells us that man
of consciousness

his states

beyond

Religion of Sentiment.

has

; he

an

intuition of the

thought and
operationwhich is at once
between
action.
Other
thought and
philosophersdistinguish
of God
and they positthe existence
sentiment
by virtue of a
purelysubjectivesentiment which cannot be reduced to thought.
The development of these ideas is to be ascribed partlyto the
action
influence of Protestantism, partlyto the disintegrating
of the
Critiqueof Pure Reason ',and partlyalso to the vague
impression that everythingis subjectto a law of rhythmic
evolution, that nothing is absolute, and that truth is but the

real

virtue

by

of

an

'

fruit of the will 9.


It is sufficient for

problems

which

to

reflectingreason

to

us

the
must

remark

study

that

in the

solution

gives rise

of consciousness

always have

the

last

of the

word.

the

Feeling

is blind ; it is the provinceof


of its very nature
that it is right. Man
be obliged to admit
to show
can

sentiment

or

reason

God

to Him

proves His existence.

if he

only

is meritorious

viction.

The

classical

free-thinker, that
throw

only

in his lot

on

The

if it is founded

pieceof

advice

that

on

reason

Pascal

pays

and
gave
he

con

to

the

should
of his reason
use
any
the side of religion,
as
preferableto taking

without

oppositeside,is obviouslyof no avail.


criterion by which
to judge the
truth

the
a

worship man

doctrine ; sentiment, unless


powerlessto decide.

it makes

an

Reason
or

the

appeal

alone

affords

falsityof
to reason,

is

and
this conception the ideas of Renan
fallingunder
Catholic
advocates
certain degree, the ideas of some
a
of a new
of Pascal
apologetic which they associate with the name
; they dis
the part played by the reason
in religiousquestions and
particularly
parage
in the question of God's
existence, and place undue
emphasis upon the part
the
the
will
and
feelings.
played by
9

We

may

Sabatier, and

rank

even,

as

in

THE

ART.

II.

16.

THE

OF

PROOFS

THE

of this Article.

Division

and
a posteriori,
priori,
is one
that proceedsfrom
a

for

sequent. Such,

OF

EXISTENCE

GOD

EXISTENCE

Proofs

"

(a)An

effect,from

to

cause

instance, is

OF

of three

are

simultaneo.

29

GOD

kinds

"

prioriproof
to

reason

con

the
syllogismestablishing
goodness of the end of the universe by startingout from the
idea of a first Cause infinitely
wise and good, (b)An a posteriori
proof goes to work in just the oppositeway, from an effect
to a cause
or
principle.Such, for example, is the proof,in
of the soul from the immaterial
psychology,of the spirituality
of the acts of the mind and the will, (c)An a simultaneo
nature
is the proofof one
demonstration
thingby another which is not
it in reality
but
is conceived
distinct from
which
by the
mind
as
preceding it : e.g. the immortalityof the soul
This threefold division
demonstrated
as
by its spirituality.
of proofs,it is clear, is founded
the relation that exists
on
between
and the way
in which
thingsas they are in reality

they
It

unfold

themselves

is not

in

difficult to

concepts.

our

see

that

is

there

form

only one

of

and valid for the existence of God, namely,


proofthat is possible
an
a posteriori
proof. For, in the first place,we cannot con
ceive of any a priori
proof; it would be absurd to suppose a
although
beinganterior to the First Being. In the second place,
an

known
this
state

that

simultaneo
in

demonstration

has

been

put forward,

that

ontological
argument of St. Anselm,
shall
We
conclusion.
argument leads to no justifiable
and examine
it,and then pass on to review the proofs
are
capableof demonstratingthe existence of God.
I. THE

17.

the

history as

ARGUMENT

ONTOLOGICAL

Statement

of

the

Argument.

"

OF

The

ST. ANSELM

celebrated

argument

brieflyfor
mulated
thus : Every man
possesses the concept of that being
which is the greatestpossible.But existence in the ontological

to

which

order is

St. Anselm

has

given

perfection.Therefore

law of contradiction,grant that


which
possible,

conclude
This

then

is

we

the

name

has

be

may

must, unless

being which

has
absolutely
perfect,

that God

argument

his

this

we

violate the

is the

greatest

perfection.We

does exist.
been

taken

up

by various well-known

THEOLOGY

NATURAL

30

philosophersDescartes10,Bossuet, Leibniz. This last, who


in the argument,
could not
weakness
help feelingsome
tried to strengthenit. He gave it a new
foundation, in the
if He
of the divine essence.
is,
God, he alleged,
possibility
if
it
is
is possible, so
His essence,
can
only exist of Himself.
it comprises
it is realizable but inasmuch
not inasmuch
as
as
in
in itself existence.
Consequently,if the divine essence
involved is possible,
God must
which existence is necessarily
does exist.
exist. But It is possible.Therefore God
18. Criticism
of the OntologicalArgument.
i. In general.
The idea we
have
of an
absolutely perfectbeing we form
form it by apprehendingthe
that is to say, we
synthetically,
various perfections
in creatures, subtractingall limitations
and imperfections
from such ideas, and then combining them
togetherinto a single
concept,which is that of the divine being.
Now
to argue
deductivelyfrom this idea, to analyse this
syntheticnotion of God, is to do nothingelse than to unwrap
"

"

"

again the
from

elements

that

analysisof

the

'

idea

our
'

the note

of

of God

could

only have

notion

'

'

of

proved
*"

it

infinite

used
in

this idea

of

if in

two

further

'

to

infinite

we

introduced

been

forming it
Outside

arguments

these

for God's

could

not

'

draw

synthetic

our

three

'

existence

either

had

we

Hence

it.
never

can

into

it

seen

or

hypotheses

existence.

the idea

me

form

'

For the idea of the

of God.

postulatedit.

or

Descartes

(1) I have
But

existence

originallywent

of God, i.e. of the Being that


have
had its origin in me,
since

is
I

perfect.
infinitely
am

limited

in my

give a causal explanation of this


the existence
of God.
This
idea, to admit
(Third Meditation.)"
argument
would
be valid if the idea that we
have
of God
represented the Infinite to us
But
this is not so, as we
have
in a positive and
already seen.
proper way.
finite
finite
idea
of
the
Infinite
is
causes.
explained
by
My
truths
these two
(2) I exist and I have the idea of the perfectBeing. From
of fact it is easy to draw
existence.
For if I had given my
a proof of God's
being to myself, I should have given myself all the perfectionsof which I can
being.

conceive.
lie with

Therefore

Therefore
God.

And

am

the

forced, in order

reason

further

of my

it is not

to

existence
difficult to

cannot
see

that

lie with
there

me

is

no

but

must

power

in

for a
being even
preserve
The
contingent nature, then, of our
being requires the
existence
of a necessary
Being. (Principlesof Metaphysics, 20 and 21.)
the proof
The
second
part of this argument comprises, in a confused
way,
which
here
drawn
from
shall
later
Still
we
we
becoming
explain
(21).
may
that the fact of our
idea of God
existence
and our
object against Descartes
which
is not at all the basis on
we
expect to found the argument from
may
of
contingency. Whilst it is true that we have not in ourselves the reason
to know
this not by observing with Descartes that
own
our
being, we come
the notion
if a being which
of the infinite had
given itself its own
possesses
itself
to
it
without
it
would
have
limits
such
a line of thought
:
being
given
any
is
that
it
for
to
would
at
least
a
itself,and this
cause
possible
being
presuppose
involves
the absurd
supposition that a being can be anterior to itself.

by which we
single moment.
us

are

able

to subsist

or

ourselves

in

"

THE

EXISTENCE

it could not have been

had

professontologism;
existence.

God's

GOD

31

advocate

an

from

in the

In the
of

act

very

he

has

as

this would

be

questionis of proving
it is equallyimpossible,
place,
syntheticconceptionof God,
the

moreover

second

forming

of St. Anselm's

admittingthat

intuition of this existence,inasmuch

an

to

Now

there.

shrink
certainly

would

argument

OF

the

is in
His existence ; for this,as we
say, is just what
question. And the third hypothesis,which is the only one

to

prove

left,namely, that in forming our idea we postulatedthe exist


of God, would make the argument a glaring
ence
petitio
principii.
It is
2. In
particular. (a)The argument of St. Anselm.
"

refutingthe argument of so able a thinker


merely to observe that he jumps quiteunjustifi

sufficient for

not
as

"

St. Anselm

ably from
himself

considered

that

contained
necessarily
Consequentlyhe did

in the

existence

left him

St. Anselm

order
ontological

is

in the very concept of the infinite Being.


not consider that he was
leapingthe abyss

separatesthe ideal order from

that

Indeed

the ideal order to the real order.

unmoved.

For

him

the

the

real,and this objection

premissfrom

which

he

was

was
starting
alreadyrelated to the real order.
is based on
It
this major :
The reasoningof St. Anselm
is necessary to conceive the perfectBeing as existing
'. This
'

we

do not

to contradict.

venture

Consequently the
is illogical.
From

the

based, all that

be inferred with

can

He

antecedent

the

followingconsequent :
infinite Being includes real

then

goes on
exists '. This

perfectBeing

'

on

which

his

that

existence

inference

reasoningis

concept of

the

under

infer

the real order is

regard to

Given

to

pain

tradiction,if this Being exists, this existence

the

of self-con

belongs

to

It

'

'

in the proposition
predicate existence
must
be united to the subject perfectBeing by a necessary
did not
St. Anselm
nexus.
perceivethat the necessityof
real existence which
our
concept of infinityincludes is only
a hypothetical
necessity.If I conceive the most perfectpos
existent.
sible being, I can
only conceive it as necessarily
But this is no proofthat it really
exists.
(b)The argument as emended
by Leibniz. As the divine
is possible,
and this essence
includes existence,it follows
essence
and
necessarily,

the

'

'

"

that the divine

St. Anselm's
flaw

as

essence

argument

before.

exists

so

runs

is clothed.

Leibniz

confuses

the
It has
the

new

the

form

in which

same

essential

various

kinds

of

THEOLOGY

NATURAL

32

(Gen.Metaphy
alreadydistinguished
is different
that intrinsic possibility
sics,19). We have seen
The former we may call a non-impossi
from extrinsic possibility.
the
of contradiction between
in other words, the absence
bility,
The latter impliesthe exist
that constitute an essence.
notes
for the production
of a being which is the sufficient reason
ence
of
that is intrinsically
of an
essence
possible
; or, in the case
the Being that does not admit of being produced,the presence of
for us to positthe existence of this being which we can
a reason
not know
properly.Hence, when Leibniz asserts that the divine
is possible,
he cannot
conceived
by the intelligence,
essence,
be either to
to its extrinsic possibility,
be referring
as this would
at issue,or to lapseinto the fallacy
presuppose the very question
He must
be speaking
of St. Anselm
that we have justrefuted.
it is true to say that if we saw
Now
onlyof intrinsic possibility.
in the idea of God's
that there was
no
positively
repugnance
existence, we should ipsofacto be seeing His existence. For
and proper view of
should have to possess a positive
this we
His essence
which impliesexistence : and this would be to fall
that we
possibilities

into

the

Our
when
we

priorino

for

reason

more

admit.

not

affirming

argue from the negative and analogicalconcept that


possess of God is this,that we do not see that He is impos
we

So

that He

Indeed

long, however,

exists,we
it is from

possibility
; and
of those
direct

existence that
we

see

made

of

as

II.

ST. AUGUSTINE'S

the

we

for

reason

asserting

is intrinsically
possible.

draw

our

notion

of intrinsic

the

the

Thus

despitethe

of God,
possibility

conceals the
logic,

analysis

fundamental

same

argument of St. Anselm.

Statement

and

ARGUMENT

necessary

FROM

POSSIBLE

ESSENCES

Criticism

of the

of metaphysicaltruth
the

no

positive
way the intrinsic possibility
have
and nature
whose
we
properties

in

of his

flaw

notes

have

we

affirm that He

cannot

apparent correctness

19.

as

beings alone of
knowledge (Gen.Metaphysics,20).

Leibniz

that

nor

does

possiblethan for affirmingthat He is impossible.


of mind
is absolutely
negative ; all that we can say

state

sible.

have

we

himself

is

God

that

fact

Leibniz

that

ontologism

pointof

In

have

the

OUR

KNOWLEDGE

Argument.

"

Neither

OF

the

laws of criteriology
objective
of possiblesnor their unlimited
possibility
nor

THE

immediate

supply an

number

OF

EXISTENCE

GOD

reason
sufficient

necessary and
The
truth, St.

ofa

independentof
truth, but

It is

existences.

then, be
for the

Being.
infinite
Augustine somewhere
all contingentbeings.

of the truth.

33

It is

for

says, is
No

in itself,

one

speaks of

one

anterior

norm

the existence

to

my
all created

immutable, eternal, necessary.

It cannot,

explainedby a contingentexistence ; there must be,


explanationof its notes, a Being that is necessary,

eternal,infinite.
This

line of argument

same

followed

was

St. Bona venture

by

adopted by Bossuet, Balm"s, and d'Hulst. And most


Scholastics allow its validity.Fr. Lepidi especially
modern
and in the extramental
in the objectivity
sees
realityof ideal
truth the stumbling-block
of Kantian
philosophy.
and

opinionthat

The

tions ',that

Bossuet

in

put forward

metaphysicaltruth, or

ifthe truth
it

should

-f

'

is the truth of

be

of

the world

God Himself, seems


something divine, even
from the error
of ontologism. For would
'

of his

one

EleVa-

is
possibles,

far removed

not

it not

God, when

'

follow that

apprehend

we

in Himself

? Such a consequence
seeingGod
has not escaped modern
exponents of the argument, who are
is not God
that this world of possibles
in asserting
explicit
Himself but only an
of God.
Alongsidethe world of
effect
existences there is,they say, the world of metaphysicaltruth,
of the abstract essences
of possible
being,equallyreal with it
althoughnot existential ; and the notes of necessity,
eternity,
of this world would directly
lead us, by virtue of the
universality
of causality,
to affirm the existence of God, since in
principle
we

other

no

way

and

are

to

The

the
logic,

number
2.

and

11

account

then to ask ourselves if we

recourse
1.

we

Such

to

may

without

explainthem

not

conditional and
essences

that

of

not

absolute.

belongto the
actual beings;

realm
or

as

of

assertions
logical

the

old Scholastics

and
criticism of the argument, see
London), pp. 89-95, and S. REINSTADLER,
Philosophic Scholasticae (Herder, London), II, pp. 232-235.
a

is the

God11.

Possible

For

notes.

immutabilityof truth, the necessityof the laws of


of possibles
and their unlimited
necessary possibility

are

not

for these

to examine
It behoves
version of the argument.
us
of possible
the characteristics and nature
essences,

modern
what

can

fuller statement

Ontology (Longmans,

P.

COFFEY,
Elementa

THEOLOGY

NATURAL

34

would

have

expressedit, Necessitatem habent hypotheticam


in praedicandoet non
in essendo '.
absolutam
Now
this necessityof relations can be adequatelyexplained
by the facultyof abstraction and universalization which our
finite and
(Psychology,89-92).
contingent mind
possesses
'

It does not;
for the

then^ constitute the immediate

existence of

sufficient

reason

and, in

Being absolutely
necessary

con

happens is this : the mind leaves


sequence, infinite. What
notes
side all the individuating
of a thing and
on
one
so
constitutes

which

norms

posited are

once

conditions
dependentof contingent
ence.

Whether

that
possible
there would
would
The

I exist

I should
be

or

and

not, 2+2

exist.

even

regarded

of

our

still make

If,however, there

as

in

very exist
4, it is still

were

no

mind,

truth and

would not make


2+2
4 ; there
be no possibles
that I exist.
not be possible
; it would
objectionmay be raised that preciselybecause 2+2
no

and
make
I am
necessarily
necessarily
possible,
4, because
finite intelligences
there is demanded
are
a neces
contingent,
should always make
so that 2+2
sary and infinite intelligence
4 and that it should always be possiblethat I exist. We
replythat if we know that God exists,we know also that the
truth is always presentbefore Him
do
; but that as long as we
not know
the fact of His existence (thisis the very point in
question)we have quitean adequateexplanationof the truth
that 2+2
always make 4 because in our very statement of it
of the proposition
we
always to be pre
suppose the two terms
makes
sented to some
Since my
mind
other.
or
intelligence
abstraction

from

siderations,it

the conditions

space in its con


it is in possessionof these

of time

and

granted that
terms, that always and everywhere2+2=4.
In our
opinion,to give to the ideal world a realityoutside
the mind that conceives it is to multiplybeingswithout neces
of the ideal order is sufficiently
sity; and the objectivity
safeguardedagainstthose who hold a purely subjectiveview
that are drawn from the
by the presence in the mind of essences
Kant's view is that we
sensible world.
activelyconstitute
that guide us in its search are
the truth, since the principles
abstract our
a priori
; it is sufficient to replyto him that we
that we
are
passivein the elaboration
concepts from reality,
of them

and

sees,

of the

relations that

39 f.).
(Criteriology,

unite

them

to

one

another

EXISTENCE

THE
These
is not,

20.

leads

III. PROOFS

THE

General

consider
of the

that
perfections

tion

whereby

which

GOD

OF

Proofs.

of

essence

it,whether

constitute

When

"

we

its existence,

being is the si m
they are essential

Existence is that

accidental.

or

individual

The

possibles

the existence ot

perceivein it its essence,

being, we

of

world

EXISTENCE

that there

assert

to affirm

of St. Thomas's

Statement

its action.

and

OF

us

35

to

us

of existences, a

special
way
Being.

some

necessary

force

to us,

seems

alongsidethe world
in

which

it

reasons,

GOD

OF

final determine
or
actuality
is made to be actual,
perfection
into
essence
being. By its

this constitutive

determines

individual

action,the beingbecomes

efficientcause,

an

and

thus manifests

its essential

its end by putting


and tends towards
perfections
into operation
the means
that lead to it.
deals with each
St. Thomas
Theologica
Aquinas in his Summa
of these aspects, static and
dynamic, of being to arrive at
for the

arguments
essential

existence

of
perfection

basis of the

argument from

and

becoming

demands

metaphysical proofsof the


others

(iv)The

shows

and

demand

supreme

designeras

cause

proofdrawn

in the

from
reality

movement13,

argument known

drawn

which

from

Metaphysical

St. Thomas

is to

sets

out

passingfrom

Movement.

as

For

metaphysical
to
potentiality

M.S.P.

Gen.
VOL.

around

v-s

capablecf

explanation of the metaphysical ideas utilized in this argu

further

see

that

I.

"

is

say, the
actuality.There are beings,he says, in the world
formal perfection
which, at first without some
yet
11

cosmos

physico-theological
argument.

21. Argument

ment,

other

(v)The

world,

an

adds

argument from the

manifest
:

the

as

St. Thomas

with the

is the

purpose

this

being:

known

are

of God

find in the

that the orderliness and

exists

their contin

shows

necessary

is connected

one

metaphysical movement
that we
degreesofperfection

The

of

existence

from

the

beings

these

'

two

of

there

argument from efficient

is the

existence

the

that

conclusion

argument from contingency.


three basic arguments which

To
'

the

of their action,which

The
causality,(iii)
gency
is the

to

the

conditional

(ii)The

movement,

that

providesthe

finite being is received

of beings leads
activity
first cause

fact

(i)The

God.

of

Meizphysics. 112-121.
II.

THEOLOGY

NATURAL

36

: what
it,do acquirethis perfection
happens is that
possessing
determinate
is made
by its actuality. This
potentiality

actualityis

activityof efficient causality; it


formal cause
gives to a being by

the

not

which
perfection

the

this

And

trinsic self-communication.

is the
in

an

which
perfection

com

be essential or accidental : thus food is


pletesa being may
digestedand transformed into the very substance of the man that
his intelligence.
takes it ; a thought received by a pupilperfects
II. Now
a
being in a state of potency is not able itself to
be

or
principle

the

receivingthis

before

it acquires. For
perfection

of the

source

determination

formal

being is without

the

of its perfection
that it is itself the principle
suppose
to the
is to assert that it alreadypossesses it. This amounts
To

it.

sayingthat the being which isin potentiality


and does not yet possess it,already
to receive some
perfection
to
potentiality
possesses it. Consequentlythe passingfrom
other
actualitycan be explainedonly by the action of some
being alreadyin actuality.

self-contradiction

III. Now
cannot
at

of

series of

mount

ad

up

without
infinitum,
itself has in

which

first term

beings each subjectto

external action

an

coming
acquiredthe

ever

no

way
For not

to

stop

essential

of these moved
it.
that characterize
one
perfections
of
would
have in itself the reason
beings,taken individually,
would
which
it receives, and the same
be true
the perfections

with

regard to

in this whole
which

ment

the whole

series

series which

could

we

not

in it communicates

they go

find the

form, for

to

of
principle

itself from

the

being to

one

even

move

another.

could
have
not
Consequently these formal determinations
produced themselves, and we are forced, for the explanation
of the passingfrom potentiality
observe
to actualitywhich
we
in the

beings around

is the

of
principle

being

His

there is

no

us,

to have

it and

who

to

recourse

does

not

receive

Being
any
this

who

other

Being
perfections.And as in
there is no poten
metaphysicalmovement
possible,

Theologica.
The

from

essential

own

since His formal determinations


; and
tiality
in passivepotentiality,
Re is purely actual or
Such is the first proofdevelopedby St. Thomas
'

First

We

give

first and

motion.

things are

the
most

It is certain

in motion.

are

not

Pure

received

Actuality.

in his Summa

text.

manifest
and

way is the argument


that
evident to our
senses

Whatever

is in motion

is moved

from
some

by

THE

another, for nothing can


for
potentiality
whereas
"

motion

37

except it have

it is
as

being moved

it is actual.

nothing else than

mean

we

which

inasmuch

moves

"

GOD

be in motion

towards

that

thing

OF

EXISTENCE

the

By

reduction

of

into a state
of
something from a state of potentiality
actuality.Nothing, however, can be reduced from a state
unless by something
of potentiality
into a state of actuality,
Thus that which is actually
alreadyin a state of actuality.

wood, which is potentially


fire,makes
hot, to be
and changes it. It is not
hot, and thereby moves
actually
hot,

as

that the same


thing should be at once in a state of
possible
from the same
point of view,
actualityand potentiality
but only from different pointsof view.
What
is actually
hot cannot
be only potentially
hot ; still,
simultaneously
it is simultaneouslypotentially
It is therefore
cold.
impossiblethat from the same
point of view and in the
and mover,
same
or
way anything should be both moved
that

it should

motion
which

be

must

itself. Therefore, whatever

move

put in motion

it is put in motion

also must
another

needs

be

be itself

put in motion

again. This

by

another.

is in

If that

by

put in motion, then this


by another, and that by

because
infinity,
then there would be no first mover,
and, consequently,
no
other mover
that
seeing
only move
subsequentmovers
inasmuch
as they are
; as
put in motion by the first mover
the staff only moves
because it is put in motion by the
cannot

go

on

to

"

hand.

Therefore

put in motion
to be God

To

by

13.

:
(I) There
recapitulate

(II)The
11

'

it is necessary to arrive at a First Mover,


other ; and this everyone understands
no

'

Pyima

Certum

est

of

reason

autem,
enim, et

quod

the

are

formal

are

determinations

moved

which

'

they

sumitur
via est, quae
ex
parte motus.
in hoc mundo
: omne
autem,
constat, aliqua mover!
nisi secundum
alio movetur.
Nihil enim
quod
movetur,
et

manifestior

sensu

ab
movetur,
in potentia ad illud, ad quod movetur
autem
: movet
Movere
enim
nihil aliud est, quam
educere
quod est actu.
in actum.
De potentia autem
non
potest aliquid reduci
est

aliquod

'

beings that

aliquid,secundum
aliquidde potentia
in actum,

nisi per

ignis,facit lignum, quod est


calidum
in potentia, esse
actu
calidum, et per hoc movet, et alterat ipsum.
Non
autem
idem,
est possibile,ut idem
sit simul in actu et potentia secundum
sed solum
in actu, non
secundum
diversa ; quod enim
est calidum
potest simul
esse
calidum
in potentia,sed est simul frigidum in potentia. Impossibileest
vel
et motum,
idem, et eodemmodo
ergo, quod secundum
aliquid sit movens
moveri.
ab
alio
quod moveat
oportet
seipsum : omne
ergo, quod moveatur,
Si ergo id,a quo movetur,
illud
moveatur,
oportet et ipsum ab alio moveri, et
ens

in actu

sicut

calidum

in actu, ut

38

THEOLOGY

NATURAL

acquireis

in themselves

found

not

(Ill) To

explain how

necessary

to

these

it is therefore

acquired it

perfectionsare

admit, outside the series of agents that

would

go to form
which
comes

they

the

movement

then

admit

before
of

the existence

all movement,

d'etre of
must

Cause, withdrawn

of
principle

is itself the

which

raison

experience. We

our

motor

action.

moved, the total

give the

not

is

moved,

are

external

agent that is not itself subject to any


Because, if there existed only beings that are

an

series that

extrinsic.

its

from
deter

own

minations.
It is

importantto
It leads

argument.

that
perfections

of this
scope and validity
to place at the head of each series of
the exact

grasp
us

find before

we

in the world

us

formal

cause

plenarydegree these perfections.But it


does not prove that these pure actualities placed at the top
of each series of perfections
in such a way as to con
converge
in assert
stitute only one being. We are not at all yet justified
ing that there is one first Being or that there are man)* first
Beings. A further analysisof the notion to which this argu
leads us is necessary for our enlightenment on this point.
ment
In the same
cannot
we
immediately state the manner
way
in which the perfective
itself to the sub
communicates
reality
itself in
ject it perfects.Does the first Being communicate
to the potentiality
that it perfects
? Or is not this
trinsically
that

in

possesses

mode

"f communication

of pure

Actualityrequirethat
it

that

being
being

itself

be answered
We

completes in
of

one

the

is

alio

hie autem

baculus

non

devenire

ad

movet,

aliquod

intelliguntDeum
The

non

et
movens,
movent
non

secunda

above

Dominican

the

nature

determine

the

moved

eminent

an

series ?

and

manner

These

not

as

only

questions can

this

fundamental

the power

est

procedere

is also

in infinitum,

formal

quia

sic

may
from

we

their

from

other
a

meta

drawn

one

non

perfection,
esset

aliquod

nee
quia moventia
aliquod aliud movens,
per consequens
nisi per hoc, quod sunt mota
sicut
a
primo movente,
nisi per hoc, quod est motus
est
a
manu
; ergo necesse
hoc
et
moveatur
omnes
nullo
primum movens,
quod a
;

'.

Summa
Theologica,I, q. 2, a. 3.
of the following translations
most
are
translation
of St. Thomas
(Washbourne, London,
and

it

From

one.

follow, the

to act

from

drawn

argument

causalityof beings, the

contingency. For
ab

it should

arguments that

two

conditional

primum

the

also that

note

physicalmovement
the

not

by analysis.

must

deduce

does

impossible,and

taken

from

1914).

the

EXISTENCE

THE
and
the

again existence
argument

that the formal


has

the

same

which
cause

value

is

GOD

OF

39

perfective
actuality.In

is based

on

the

communicates
when

consequence
intrinsic determinations

to the

applied to

being in potentiality

action

and

existence

also.
22. Objections to the Preceding

Argument.

"

(a)The principle

be put in this form : A being


difficulty
may
that passes from potentiality
to actuality
does not find in itself
but in some
of the perfection
other being the reason
that it
or
acquires,
Quidquid movetur ab alio movetur ; but this prin
which
is the stapleof the argument given above, admits
ciple,
of exceptions. For there are
some
beings which pass from
however
being subject to any
potency to actualitywithout
external agency, e.g. livingbeings,
the characteristic of which
lies in the spontaneityof their immanent
The
action.
cell
nourishes
itself,and is certainlythe principleof its own

of movement.

nutrition.

objectionrests on the false assumption that life is


certain French
spontaneous in its activity
spiritualist
; and
are
philosophers
quitewrong in maintainingthat the charac
teristic of a livingbeing consists in this. The truth is that it
of action, not
immanence
spontaneity. In it the
possesses
is identical with the subjective
in other
efficient cause
cause,
the
is the same
words, the subjectthat receives the activity
as
that produces it ; but in the whole scale of living
principle
beingswe do not find any spontaneous action which is not sub
ordinated to an external influence.
The vegetableacts only
in consequence
of certain actions coming from outside itself.
Animal
excitation
life presupposes
caused
by the external
world and received by the sensitive cognitional
faculty. The
of man
mind
has knowledge only when
determined
concur
will is
his
the
active
and
and
intellect
the senses
rentlyby
;
solicited by the good which his mind
puts before it. After
excitation of this kind the livingbeing reacts, it acquires
an
a
perfectionnot possessedbefore, and this reaction which
is distinct from the action undergone this increase of actuality
find its adequate explanation only in the pre-motionof
can
the Being that is pure Actuality. This pointwill be explained
The

'

"

"

in detail in the last

more
we

are

part of this treatise. The objection


does not, then, in any way overthrow
the
considering
'

principleQuidquid movetur

ab

alio movetur

'. The

passage

THEOLOGY

NATURAL

40
'

'

from

power
tion exterior

'

to

act

'

in

livingbeingpresupposes

excita

an

facultythat acts and beyond this excita


tion itselfthe pre-motionfrom the first Cause.
that the founda
(b)The New Philosophyraises the objection
tion of being is nothing static but movement,
becoming ;
change is the fundamental, necessary reality.Reality is
continuous becoming and being is perpetual
spring'. The
to grant that if all move
advocates of this theory are willing
to

the

'

'

'

ment

necessarilybe derived

must

from

of explanation
would
principle

the ultimate

But
only in a supreme Unmoved.
-movement
as
thingsare themselves self
there is

furtherneed

no

something static,then
the

as

found

be
certainly
is

case

otherwise,

nothingbut movement,

and

theyreceived it.

to ask how

reply to this objectionis that a solution of this kind


of the
leads logically
to the denial of the objectivevalidity
of the
principleof sufficient reason
analysis,
or, in ultimate
of contradiction.
For, to become is to acquiresome
principle
thing. A thingcannot become what it alreadyis. And since
nothing can give itself what it does not already possess, it
must
receive it from some
being that does possess
necessarily
from some
it,and ultimately
beingwhich has not itself received
be
it from
this want
of having would
another
otherwise
traced from one
to another
and there would never
indefinitely
The

"

be

end.

an

Unless, then,

we

are

to introduce

contradiction

into the very heart of metaphysicsand to maintain


that reality
is self-contradictory,
of movement
must
we
positat the source

Unmoved

an

Being.

23. Argument

drawn

Efficient

from

which forms
metaphysicalreality
subordinated
causalitywhich we
surround

that

phrase. We
other

'

us,

Causality." I.

the basis of this

observe

can

in istis sensibilibus

', to

use

The

proofis

in

the

the

things

St. Thomas's

on
beings acting ; they depend essentially
for
activityand for the very being which
agents, both

is the

see

gives

out

heated

only
a

the

earth

the

sun.

II. Now

the

plantgrows
from

which

none

of its own
principle
involve

activity.For example, a pieceof coal


heat with
which
it has previouslybeen

of their

source

and

flowers and

it draws

of these
causal

the contradiction

causes

bears

nourishment

can

contain

fruit
and

by
the

within

means

of

rain and

itself the

activity.For, to suppose this would


of asserting
the one
hand that it
on

THE

depends for
the

activityon

it is not

that

other

its

of its

reason

OF

GOD

extrinsic

an

41

and
principle,

the

on

subjectto any external action since it has


in itself. Moreover, to say that
efficiency

own

efficient cause

an

EXISTENCE

of
principle

is the

its

being is to assert
dependent also for

own

before it exists ; it is therefore


its very being upon some
extrinsic to itself. A conditional
cause
efficient cause,
then, presupposes the action of a distinct being.
it acts

that

III. It is useless

to

series of

dependent

far from

solving the

series can

do

no

the other

On

make

to

either
and

merely
difficulty
than

is

therefore forced
'

The

conclusion

of

extrinsic

an

efficientcausation.

There

is

in which
indeed, possible)
is

which
go

intermediate
the

there be
no

be

cause,

no

it

same

Cause

find there is an

order of

(neitheris it,

known
is found

thing

be

to

the

priorto itself,
to
it is not possible

it would

be

followingin
whether

only.

one

and

cause,

cause,

take

To

the effect. Therefore, if


there will be

efficientcauses,

any

inde

efficient

case

away

among
nor

formalityof

several,or

is to take

first cause

ultimate

as

cause.

we

so

is

of the ultimate

cause

cause

cause

no

so

give the

of the intermediate

cause

is the

the intermediate

away

there

the

of itself; for

order, the first is the


the

causes

impossible.In efficientcauses
because in all efficientcauses
infinity,

to

on

that

is from
way
In the world of sense

efficient cause

of

is to

which

"

second

causation.

infinite

An

subordinate
dependent on some
dependent upon itself. We are

is thus

to the

all action

cause

it is

or

"

pendent of

it.

complicatethe problem indefinitely.

other

any
ourselves ;

in the series and

cause

imagined

cause

renews

singlecongeries,gives rise to a dilemma


distinct from
cause
dependent on some

whole

as

new

hand, mentallyto unite the chain

independentof

solution

since each

causes,

more

of them
the

down
causalityad infinitum

trace

If in efficient

intermediate.

it is possible
there will be no first
to go on to infinity,
efficientcause, neither will there be an ultimate effect,nor
causes

any

intermediate

false.

14

'

Secunda

via
esse

est

est

ordinem

ex

it is necessary
to which everyone
ratione

sliquid sit

possibile,quod
seipso,quod est impoesibile:
tibus

procedatur

cam:

in infinitum,

to

givesthe

efficientium,

non

est

name

Invenimus

nee

efficiens sui

autem

quia

put forward

efficientis.

causae

causarum

is

; all of which

causes

Therefore

Efficient Cause,

sensibilibus

efficient

tamen

ipsius,quia
possibile,quod in

in omnibus

causis

plainly
First

'14.

of God

in istis

enim

invenitur,
sic esset
causis

efficientibns

nee

prius

efficienordinatis

THEOLOGY

NATURAL

42

of the world
having
possibility
with
Thomas
St.
Some
existed ab aeterno.
great philosophers,
establish by reason
cannot
that we
at their head, maintain
have had a beginning. If the world
alone that the world must
had a beginning in time, there must
evidentlyexist an eternal
Here

self-subsisting
Being
nothingness nothing
could

historyof

the

could

establish

if

life

it

But

of

complete
if science

even

of this world

as

we

geologicaldata, etc., could


that

at

law

the

of

the forces of the world

could

alone

reason

find
trace

certain stage of the

if
impossible,

fact that

as

for out

come.

show

was

far-off ages,

originin

an

have

past and

the

evolutions

cosmic

could

commencement

caused

have

to

that the actual state

demonstrate

it had

the

speak of

must

we

had

have

be

never

entropy
that

sure

other state of
endlesslyprecededby some
of data.
which
science is entirelyignorant through absence
of the question
it is imprudent,seeingthe difficulty
In any case
with
of uncertainty of the best philosophers
the
and
state
the questionof the existence
regard to these matters, to identify
this state

world

the

the

b2yond

not, it is necessary

or

series of caused

causes,

even

if such

uncaused

Cause.

problem is

of

the existence

by

existed

always

has

an

us

there is to be found the

in another

is to say,
it did not seem

But

adequatereason

he calls such

passage

se, that

solved

not

similar

causes,

causes

to him

is in the

there

whole

causes

causae

in

singlecause
for example a

only
reality

primum
sive

est

causa

tantum

unum

medii,

et

medium

est

autem

causa,

remota

causa

primum

falsum.
omnes

Cp.

Sum.

in causis

Ergo
Deum

est

necesse

nominant

Theol
,

I, q. 46,

ponere
'.
a.

aliquam

Sum.
2, ad

number

of the workman

ultimi, sive media

non

erit

sint

prirna csusa
efficientem

causam

2,

plura,
si

non

Sed, si
efficiens,

mediae, quod patet

emcientes

Theol., I, q.
7.

which

effectus ; ergo,
removetur
erit ultimum, nee
medium.

emcientibus, non
in causis emcientibus,
procedatur in infinitum
erit nee
effectus ultimus, nee
ct sic non
causae

fuerit

causes

againper accidens,as
keep breakingin the hands

that

series of

say, in a series of exactly


limit. In this case
be any

ever

sum

is to

is replaced
againand

of hammers

in

impossiblethat

need

there

;
of the dependentcausality

subordinatae per
dependent in the very act of causing15.

dependent per accidens,that

11

infinite,

be

of times.
proposingit an endless number
says that reason
passage just quoted St. Thomas
in which
in the series of causes
to regress to infinity

the

forbids

quam

posit,

to

the fact of

In

esse

Whether

of the World.

that of the commencement

with

of God

not

was

a.

3.

primam

THE

and

transire

est

be

consequently cannot
'

second

in the

GOD

OF

the action

In the firstcase

usingthem.
such

EXISTENCE

43

depends on
'

infinitum

infinite, nam
action

the

the series

depends only

as

non
a

on

singlecause.

proof to say,
argument, then, against St. Thomas's
in the
often said, that there is nothing unreasonable

It is
is

as

no

so

havingexisted ab aeterno ; such a retort would be nothing


but an
elenchi. The necessityof a first Cause laid
ignoratio
in no way supposes that God is put on
down
by St. Thomas
if they are
multi
the same
level with secondarycauses,
even
pliedad infinitum.Outside and above the series which they
form
be a primary Cause
there must
which is not univocal
world

with

but

them

analogical.
: (I) There
recapitulate

To

(II)Their

raison

d'etre cannot

is necessary
if it be infinite,
an

even

adequateexplanationof
24.

drawn

Argument

to

efficient

causes.

(Ill)

in themselves.

found

be

Consequentlyit
causes,

dependent

are

posit,outside

uncaused

Cause

series of

the

givesthe

which

their action.
the

from

Contingency

of

Beings."

beingswhich beginto be, which pass from non-being


yonder and myself are both instances of
being; the man

I. There
to

are

beingswho at one time did not


II. A being which beginsto
of its

reason

exist.
be does

possess in itselfthe

not

existence,for in this hypothesisit has

own

not

begun to be but always has been. Consequentlythe transition


from non-beingto being is only explainedby the action of a
distinct,anterior being.
III. It is useless to continue
the series of contingentbeings
ad infinitumwithout
ever
admitting a first Being which is
itself the

of its

reason

that constitute the series gives the

is found

in it, there

existence.
existences
the

reason

If

existence.

own

cannot,

none

of the

of the existence that

reason

Being, be any
explanationof contingent

without

first

Consequentlythe causal
requiresa Being that is independentand
of its

St. Thomas

own

beings

is itself

existence.

gives the argument

from

contingency under a
the reasoning into two

different form.
He breaks up
slightly
He
of which follows from
the other.
one
syllogisms,
proves
in the first placethe existence of necessary
beings. Amongst
these
above

'

some

the

are

law

'

in the sense
necessary
of transformation
that

that

their nature

is

affects all corporeal

NATURAL

44

substances

yet these

THEOLOGY
indebted

are

to

some

other

being for

of itself
soul, which
(e.g.the human
is naturallyincorruptible)
also be that there is a
; it may
finds its explanationin itself.
necessity
necessary being whose

their necessary

being

of

nature

this sort, which

has

its

of

source

being

within

itself,is then inevitablyarrived at by a second syllogism.


The argument, however, can well be shortened
by the omission
of

middle

namely, the beings whose necessityis


from
contingentbeings to
dependent, and we pass directly
the being that is necessary
by itself. This is what we have
of our
done in the statement
proof.
and necessity,
The third way is taken from possibility
We
find in nature thingsthat could either
and runs
thus.
exist or not exist,since they are found to be generated,and
then to corrupt ; and, consequently,
they can exist,and
for these alwaysto exist,for
then not exist. It is impossible
time
that which can
one
day cease to exist must at some
to
have not existed. Therefore, if everythingcould cease
exist,then at one time there could have been nothingin
one

term,

'

existence. If this

were

true, even

now

there would

be noth

ing in existence, because that which does not exist only


beginsto exist by something alreadyexisting/Therefore,if
in existence,it would have been im
time nothing was
at one
possiblefor anythingto have begun to exist ; and thus even
be in existence
is absurd.
which
now
nothing would
but there
Therefore, not all beings are merely possible,
must
exist something the existence of which is necessary.
caused
by
Every necessary thing either has its necessity
It is impossible
in
to go on
to infinity.
another, or not.
things which have their necessitycaused by
necessary
another, as has been already proved in regard to efficient
but postulatethe existence of
Therefore we cannot
causes.
and not re
some
being having of itself its own
necessity,
ceivingit from another, but rather causing in others their
speak of as God '|16.
necessity. This all men
"

'

et necessario
ex
possibili,
(quae tails est). Ines.se, cum
quaedam, quse sunt possibiliaesse, et non
et
inveniantur
et
esse,
generari
corrumpi,
possibilia
quaedam
per consequens
et non
esse.
omnia, quae sunt talia, semper
Impossible est autem
esse, quia
Si igituromnia
est.
sunt possi
non
esse, quandoque
quod popsibileest non
etiam
Sed si hoc est verum,
nunc
bilia non
esse, aliquando nihil fuit in rebus.
Si
nihil esset, quia quod non
est, non
incipitesse, nisi per aliquid,quod est.
modo
fuit
ibile
sic
et
nihil
fuit,
quod
eese,
impose
aliquid
irciperet
enr,,
igitur
Non
entia sunt
nihil esset : quod patet esse
falsum.
possibilia,
ergo omnia
16

venimus

Tertia

enim

via

est

sumpta

in rebus

GOD

OF

EXISTENCE

THE

45

:
(I) There are beings which begin to be.
recapitulate
for by some
(II)These contingent beingsare only accounted
(Ill)No explanationof their
being external to themselves.
dependent existence is found by endlesslytracing a series of

To

do

beings that
Therefore

we

itself the

reason

their raison

contain

not

posita Being

must

d'etre in themselves.

which

shall contain

existence, in

of their

word,

within

necessary

Being17.
Common

25. Conclusion

into

sible to merge
from
do

which

uncaused

Is it evident
of its own
a

that

pure
The

being ?

three

Is it pos

arguments

contingency,presentingas they
differing
only in the pointsfrom
other, inasmuch

as

an

Actualitydraws

from

itself the

reason

will appear if we try to conceive


of all potentialitysuch is Pure Actuality

is devoid

beingthat

"

exist of itself. Is the first also involved

must

cause

Proofs.

these

involve each

conclusions

last two

Three

they start

The

and

reasoningand

same

these

singleconclusion

action

movement,

the

to

answer

"

:
explanatory,sufficient reason
such a being is inconceivable, since the purely Actual Being,
it contingent,would be at one time only capableof being,
were
actuality.
potentialto existence,and thus not simplyand solely

"and

yet is

There

is,then,

own

conclusion

common

developed,namely, that

have

we

its

not

contains within itselfthe

reason

the three

to

there

exists

arguments

Being

existence and

of its own

which

action,

all actual, so that it is potential


are
perfections
to receiving
further reality.
no
in deciding
These proofs,however, do not yet warrant
us
whether the Being which is purelyActual is infinite or finite,
of uniquenessor involves many
whether it has the perfection
further points will be determined
actualities. These
pure

and

sed

whose

necessarium
autem
in rebus.
Omne
necessarium
est autem
Non
habet.
necessitatis aliunde, vel non
causam
habent
in
in
infinitum
necessariis,
procedatur
quae

oportet aliquid

vel habet

causam

esse

suae

possibile,quod

necessitatis, sicut

suae

nee

in

dictisin ipso art.): ergo necesse


habens causam
necessitatis
non

quod
17

is

say

subject

raison

other

that

d'etre in

mately
cannot

to

call it

Deum'.

other

some

reducible

words,

efficientibus,ut

est ponere

Sum.
Theol., I, q. 2, a. 3.
but is not self -existent
and, in consequence,
exists,
being
to saying that it has its
change and destruction, is tantamount

dicunt

omnes

To

probatum est (in jam


aliquid,quod sit per se necessarium,
aliis :
necessitatis
aliunde, sed quod est causa

causis

to

the

synthetic a

esse

being. The principleof sufficient reason


Kantian
The
principle of contradiction.
and
since
esse
non
a
between
a se
esse
priori,

ab alio,it is evident

that

there

is

no

middle

term.

is ulti
school
se

or, in

THEOLOGY

NATURAL

46

by

of what
analysis
acquiredabout

careful

that

have

we

the

that

againstKant

in these first notions

is contained

We

may

transition from

the

God.

also here

remark

Being necessarily

order to the Infinite Being does not


ontological
This latter
argument.
appeal to the ontological
the concept of the greatest possible
being to the

existent

in the

involve

an

jumps from
factof its real existence. But in the argument which we are
that the necessary
first demonstrate
putting forward, we
further analysis
reveals must,
Being exists,and then whatever
by the very fact of this previousdemonstration, refer to the
real order ; for our
concepts are not in their buildingup or
in their further analysisthe resultants of subjectiveforms,
not a priori
are
syntheses.
now

able

to

proofsof the existence of God


important moral consequence

which

we

26.

We

Corollary.

"

religion. If

are

we

are

indebted

have

namely,

;
to

draw

first

the

from

the

three

established,an
foundation

Being for

of

essential

our

our
activityand our existence, there is a moral
perfections,
of worshippingthat Being. The act of worship
on
us
obligation
whereby we confess that God alone is He who is and that our
are
essentiallydependent upon Him
being and perfections

of

is that

mental

act

of this

manifestation

external

the

the

embraces

soul that it is subordinate

of the human

internal avowal
and

adoration, which

And

adoration.

to Him

avowal, is the funda

religion.

of natural

the Grades
mani
of Perfection
from
Argument drawn
of this proof is as
fested in Beings. St. Thomas's
exposition

27.

"

follows

:
"

'

in

The

is taken

fourth way

from the

beingsthere

things.Among

are

gradationto

some

more

and

'

be found
less

some

'

'

'

less
and
more
good, true, noble, and the like. But
are
predicatedof different things,according as they re
semble in their different ways something which is in the
degree of most ',as a thingis said to be hotter according
as it more
nearlyresembles that which is hottest ; so that
'

is truest,

something best,some
something which is utter
thing noblest, and, consequently,
most
trulythey
being; for the truer things are, the more
there is

something which

exist. What
in that

is most

genus ;
of heat, is the

as

cause

of all
genus is the cause
is the most
completeform

completein any
fire,which

whereby

all

things are

made

hot.

EXISTENCE

THE

Therefore

there

beings the

cause

perfection
; and
At first sightSt.
notice in

beings which

OF

GOD

47

also be

something which is to all


of their being,goodness,and every other
must

this

Thomas's
the

are

'

call God

we

18.

to be this : We
proof seems
objectof our knowledge a gradu

scale of

ated

:
virtue, nobleness, goodness, etc.,
perfections
appear before us in varyingdegrees. But we judge the degree
of perfection
that we
find,according as it approximatesto or

falls away

from

type. Therefore, since

supreme

parativepresupposes

this
superlative,

com

every

ideal of

perfection

exist.

must

To

proofthe objectionmight very well be raised that


this absolute perfection
the standard
for judg
which
we
use
as
realized in the things we
know,
ing the degree of perfection
is merely a concept of our
mind.
Is there not latent in St.
Thomas's
proof the old fallacyof the ontological
argument,
the existence of this ideal in the mind to its ex
a jump from
such

istence in the real order ?


As

proof,we think, has in the mind of


Aquinas quiteanother meaning 19 :
I. We discover that in beingsthere are graduatedperfections.
II. The
limitation of virtue, goodness, nobleness, etc.,
shows that these perfections
do not belong to the beings of
a

matter

of fact the

"

themselves,in virtue of their essences.


that which makes
it is
a being what
"

in

For
cannot

an

be

Essence

"

i.e.

partlyverified

is
being ; the perfection
possessedin virtue of its essence
not a
or
wholly present or else not at all : a being is a man
and
cannot
be partly a man.
man,
Conversely,anything
a

that is
cannot

its reason
11

less
that admits of more
or
way
belongto it in virtue of its essence, but must have for

present in

being in

than

somethingelse other

the

For

essence.

it would

'

Invenitur
ex
Quarto,via sumitur
gradibus, qui in rebus inveniuntur.
et sic de
et
et
minus
nobile,
et
bonum,
verum,
aliquid magis,
aliis hujusmodi.
de diversis, secundum
Sed magis, et minus
dicuntur
quod
sicut
est :
ad
magis
appropinquant diversimode
aliquid, quod maxime
calidum
Est igituraliquid,
calido.
est, quod magis appropinquat maxime
maxime
et per consequens
quod est verissimum, et optimum, et nobilissimum,
dicitur
2.
Nam
sunt
ut
ens.
maxime
maxime
sunt
Metaph.
entia,
vera,
quae
omnium,
est causa
dicitur maxime
Quod autem
tale in aliquo genere,
quae
omnium
sunt
illius generis ; sicut ignis,qui est maxime
calidus, est causa
entibus
calidorum, ut in eodemlibro
dicitur.
Ergo est aliquid,quod omnibus
Deum
'.
est causa
dicimus
hoc
et
esse, et bonitatis, et cujuslibetperfectionis,
enim

Sum.
11

in rebus

Theol., I, q.
Our

2,

a.

3.

interpretation is founded
especiallySum. cont. Gent., II, c. 15,

other

on

and

De

passages

Potentia, q. 3,

from
a.

5.

St.

Thomas,

THEOLOGY

NATURAL

48
indeed

be

is likewise the formal

wisdom

it is true to say that this


by virtue of its essence,
it and

causal

III. But

have

have

found

in the

the extrinsic

seen

in the fact that

by existence,and
material

communicated

intervention

the

of

the

the

three

action.

above, it is

arguments

essence

is the

in
why the perfections

reason

actualityof

in which

cause

some

inde

limited,viz. their dependence on an extrinsic


yet to inquirewhat is the intrinsic reason.

being are
We

been

explanationto posita being which


the Being we call God.
perfections,

of its own

We

it has

that

for their

necessary
reason

itself.

established

have

we

of wisdom.

no

of

is

wisdom

for supposing an
justification
caused by an extrinsic
perfections

is

finitely
long series
As

but

than

there

which

by

of the absence

reason

consequentlypresupposes

agent other

that

in a limited degree
perfection
does not belong to the being
perfection

find

Wherever, therefore,we

to

to hold that

contradiction

is that

is limited

This

it is received.

is

cause.

It is

is actualized

which

existence

case

by

the

where

of Scholastic metaphysics:
apply the generalprinciple
ad modum
Receptum est in recipiente
recipients.A being's
it is its role to
existence is limited to the essential perfections
of a being is the intrinsic reason
The receptivity
make actual.
must

we

it is not

why

being
its

correspondsto
for this
who
is

itself but

is self-existent and receives not


limitation

no

We

be careful

drawn

St. Thomas

by

fections of
head

to

things.

of each

much

its

it is finitein its existence.

reason

must

just that

or
potentiality,

subjectto

the

has

being which

receptivity.It

God,

on

the

His existence from

in His essential

is

contrary,
another,

perfections.

notice the limits of this argument


from the degrees observable in the per
to

In the first place,he

series of

does

say that at
there is a being
not

graduated beings
eminent
which
degree their essential type.
possesses in an
This is the realisticconception of Plato, not the thought of the
The
latter asserts
that the perfections
we
Angelic Doctor.
in
world
find in varying degrees
the
mind
carry our
up to
absolute

the principles
of these limited perfec
as
perfections,
tions in the world.
Secondly,he makes no further statement
united
these total perfections
in a single
to whether
as
are
Being or whether there exist several beings each possessing

EXISTENCE

THE

perfectionsin

certain

28.

the

drawn

Argument

That

GOD

degree,or

there is order

whether

even

adapted to

make

one

Order

the

from

there

Universe."

abundantly manifest ;
activities composing the world
and
are
and enduring whole.
This
harmonious

and
free
intelligent
conceived its design,then to have chosen

demands

the

of

is

universe

in the

elements

many

order

49

absolutely
perfectbeings.

several

are

supreme

OF

have

first to

cause,

an

to carry it into

execu

it is not.
or
necessary cause
If it is necessary, the existence of God is proved. If it is con
and
to a necessary
cause
tingent,it leads us in its last analysis

tion.

thus

this

Now

again

the

to

come

we

is either

cause

Being.

divine

"

is the

Such

Summa

develops in his

that St. Thomas

argument

fifth

Theologica.

of the
is taken from
fifth way
the governance
such
world ; for we see that thingswhich lack intelligence,
natural bodies, act for some
as
purpose, which fact is evi
1

The

actingalways,or nearlyalwaysin the

dent from their


so

way,
not

Hence

the best result.

to obtain

as

it is

same

plainthat

do they achieve
but designedly,
fortuitously,

their pur

fulfil some
cannot
intelligence
pur
in
endowed
with
unless
it
is
directed
some
being
by
pose,
is shot to its mark
and knowledge ; as the arrow
telligence
being exists by
intelligent
by the archer. Therefore some
whom
all natural
things are ordained towards a definite

purpose
We

lacks

Whatever

pose.

and

this

beingwe

first establish the

must

'

call God

20.

and

major

the

minor

of this

argument.
I. We
order

of the

Order
to

have

the notion of order


alreadyexamined
universe (Gen. Metaphysics,169 ff.).

unity. By

the

kinds of order, that


of subordination

elements

or

constitute

In the second

the

leading in some
way
of unification we
distinguishtwo
principle

manifold

supposes

and

elements

of co-ordination
order.
teleological
the

parts of

the elements

are

one

means

all

or

sesthetical order, that


In the first the different
and

the

same

arrangedin

view

whole.
of

one

viasumitur
enim.quod alicua,
: Videmus
rerum
ex
gubematione
natnralia, operantur propter finem,
cognitione carent, scilicet corpora
modo
operantur,
aut
quod apparet ex hoc, quod semper,
frequentius eodem
red
ut consequaritur id, quod
a
casu,
Unde
est optimum.
patet, quod non
ex
intentione perveniunt ad finem.
habent
Ea autem,
cognitior.em,
quae non
non
tendunt
in finem, nisi directa ab aliquo cognoscente et intelligent, sicut
naturales
res
sagitta a sagittante; ergo est aliquisintelli^ens,a quo omnes
ordinantur ad finem, e* hcc dicimus
Sum.
Deun~
Theol., I, q. 2, a. 3.
80

'Quinta

quae

'

NATURAL

50
and

the

end.

same

In

order ; for every

same
are

arranged

so

tend

realize the

to

which

is

which

is

these
reality

form

harmonious

one

end.

same

but

are

order

The
of the

static,exists in view

aspectsof the

two

for action.

being is made

to

as

THEOLOGY

order

The

elements

whole, and they


of co-ordination,
of subordination,

dynamic. Now
turning to order in the universe we
notice the followingvarious ways
it is exhibited :
in which
(a) Every livingorganism displayswonderful order in the nice
adjustment of its various parts. All its organs are perfectly
arranged and work togetherfor the welfare of the whole living
"

being.

Each

elements
nected

is made

too

organ

displayingforces

and

subordinated

organism.

This

class of

of

number

immense

an

different yet so intercon


to subserve the good of the entire

that

as

of

up
are

orderliness that

phenomena presentsan

order
that has refer
one
particular
ence
only to the individual beingof which it is a characteristic.
(b) Furthermore, thingsdo not fulfil the end of their being
in a
of isolation. They are
bound
state
up with certain
other thingsand in such a way
that their mutual
adaptations
we

term

may

present

absolute

an

"

orderliness which,

an

as

distinguishedfrom

the

above,

order. An example is to be
particular
found in the wonderful
proportionexistingbetween the anato
of the eye and the physiological
mical structure
working of
and its physical
the visual organ on the one
hand
agent, light,
be called relative

may

the other,

on

(c)There

are

discernible

classes

stillwider

even

combinations, the different kingdoms of beingswhich exhibit


further mutual
static and dynamic. The interdepend
relations,
of

of

ence

all the

parts

universal order.

The

of

world

the
is

constitutes

universe
a

instinct with

poem

and displaying
a marvellous
life,
harmony, known
the

as

basis

The

Cosmos.
of

the

is

fresh

constant.

ment,

the

The

universe

individual

the

revelation

Lastly, this order, absolute and


universal, is not a passingphase
and

action and

to the Greeks

existence of order in the universe

physicalsciences,and

scientific progress

relative

and

order,

of

(d)

particularand

something continuous

is animated

characters

this

relative,
but

result

invariable
of

is the

the

with
scenes

incessant
shift

move

rapidly;

yet in the perpetualflux types remain constant, ends do not


alter,the good alike of individuals and of the whole steadily
continues
To

to be

attained.

guard againstany misconceptionof

the

meaning

of these

assertions,it
do

which
In the
is

as

most

by

noted

be

must

is

in the universe

thing

that

GOD
that

say

there

every

elements

no

are

of disorder and

sources

as

51

do not

we

orderly,that

perhaps appear

not

OF

EXISTENCE

THE

evil.

major as we lay it down it is merely asserted that order


a
generalrule the characteristic phenomenon and the
universal phenomenon exhibited by the universe and

the

parts of which it is made

II. The

up.
order in the universe is contingent.Reason

forbids

It therefore demands
assignsuch an effect to chance.
for it
its designer. Indeed to account
as
an
cause
intelligent
by an adequatecause, we must admit the existence of a mind
this subordination
to have designedand a will to have chosen
us

to

of the
us

multifarious

elements

those

suppose

order
particular

component elements

to be the

exhibitingwhat

called

have

we

directed in their

and

sport of chance

(a) Let

end.

to one

In such
principle.
by no sort of controlling
a
supposition
inorganicand organicsubstances would act at
random, combiningand disintegrating
anyhow ; there would no
longerbe any motive making them combine accordingto strictly
fixed proportions
in a way that would render vital activity
possible.We must conclude, then, that chance can offer no
explanationof this kind of order we observe. Nay more, it
would be positively
detrimental to any such effect. Left to

mutual

convergence

themselves

these elements

to all order but

if each cell in
of the

cells would

not

causes

organism received

an

would

work

merely indifferent

on

go

keep

no

for its

For

instance,

influence from

end

immediate

own

the rest
:

the

the glandular
indefinitely,
without control, the epithelial
secreting

tissues would

tissues would

be

disorder.
productiveof positive

body, it

muscular

would

contract

growing, and

on

all these

activities

being

devoid

of any sort of direction would never


achieve the wellbeingof the organism as a whole. Chance, then, far from sup
for what we
observe in this parti
plyingthe sufficient reason
cular

order, would

In order to find
since
which

our

furnish

only a

sufficient reason

observation

of themselves

are

meets

for its

reason

with

impossibility.

for this wonderful


a

indifferent to

multitude

of

enteringinto

order,

elements
any

com

bination and yet are drawn to such a felicitous and purposeful


union, we must look for it not in the elements themselves but
in some
Furthermore, the ar
cause.
overruling,
controlling

rangement of
M.S.P

-VOL.

ii.

so

many

elements

with

view

to

an

end, and
E

their nice
and

THEOLOGY

NATURAL

52

proportions,imply

act

an

of will that

that

the

conceived

carried it into execution

has

this

be

must
designingcause
and will,//
(b)And
gence

mind

agent endowed

an

offers

chance

no

in the universe.

of the relative order manifest

To

is,

; that

intelli

with

better

plan

explanation
take

but

one

example : the breathingof animals and the action of chlorophyl


in plantskeeps our
atmosphere constantlyadapted to the life
of both
kingdoms. The chemical bodies composing the air
in themselves
indifferent to forming either a useful or a
are
be accountable
noxious admixture, and therefore they cannot
for this effect. Neither are plantsand animals if left to them
selves the sole causes, for there is nothingto stop plantsfrom
indefinitely
absorbingthe carbonic acid with their green parts
and animals from breathingit out in unlimited
quantities,
order
of which
and thus militating
the
against
very relative
their jointaction is an example. The only sufficient reason
of the phenomena of this kind is to be found once
again in
of the beings themselves
outside
which
a
cause
controlling
exhibit

this order,

immense

drama
that

scenes

universe taken

(c)The

where

succeed

the

one

whole

is like

an

of the innumerable

generalsuccess
is secured

another

as

by

the harmonious

settingand developmentof all its parts. This likewise requires


for its adequatecause
an
as
intelligence
designer, (d) Finally,
the evolution

and

of the world

numberless
well-nigh

counts

yet in these similar though

not

identical

phases,

situations

there

the

of parts which is conducive


that interplay
reappears
welfare of the whole.
Here
the inadequacy of chance

the

most

apparent

the

sake

of

ever

; for the

cosmic

to

is

order is

persistent
despite
in it,despitethe
the multiplicity
of parts that are concerned
varietyof phases in which it manifests itself. Suppose, for
argument, that

action did
particular
what
preventedthis

order

the next

The

must

have

be

moment

sought

in

for a

to account

at

indifferent to any
combine
harmoniously;

elements

some

moment

some

from
reason

supreme

broken up at
being hopelessly
of the persistence
of this order
controllingforce,and since we

phenomenon

which

undoubtedlyevidences

have a lifethat is endowed


and will,this being must
intelligence
and
with
will. Hence
to the general
come
we
intelligence
which
conclusion that the only cause
explainsthe order we
observe

in nature

throughoutthe

is to be found

in

which
principle

universe the combination

of elements

determines
and

beings

THE

towards

the

good

EXISTENCE
of

OF

GOD

53
and

of kingdoms
species,

of the

whole

even

if you

universe.
III. Now

such

it to be

allow

presuppose
Itself the
29.

only contingentin
existence

the

of Its

reason

Corollaries.

efficient cause
world

intelligent,
voluntarycause,

an

i.

"

own

We

of

anterior

being and
have

of the wonderful

around

an

its nature, must

necessarily

Being

of Its

own

that

has

perfection.

established the existence of


order

which

an

is in

observe

we

in

this cause
whether
questionnow
is reallydistinct from
out
the designwhich is being worked
and the end to which it is progressing.If this exemplary cause
and this final cause
which
have
to postulate
been bound
we
the

are

We

us.

in their nature, then


efficient cause
from which

necessary

necessary

proceeds. If they
necessary
shall have

cause

are

they

are

the

contingent,they

identical with

order of the universe


must

depend

on

it is in this latter that


and, consequently,

to placethe designand
ultimately

universe, for

creatures

intervention

of the

can

neither exist

necessary

cause.

the

We

nor

the purpose
act

thus

we

of the

without
come

the

to

the
ac

the efficient,
knowledge a necessary Being that is at once
exemplary and final cause of the world He has brought into
being.
next
2. The
argument
questionin this physico-theological
is whether
the controlling,
of the universe
ordinatingcause
is one
In reference to this questionwe may
or many.
remark,
in the first place,that there is no
need to postulateseveral
designersin order to explainthe tendency towards the good
that we
observe : one alone is sufficient. In the second place,
from
the unity of the order which
reveals the
the cosmos
over
legitimateinference is that it is a singleGod who presides
the governance
of the world.
it is possible
to con
Certainly
ceive two beingswith identically
end in view in their
the same
of
means
rulingof the world and using exactly the same
But
it would
to assert the
be gratuitous
bringingit about.
actual existence of two such beings: if the end and action of
the two governingcauses
are
identical,one of them is useless.
Hence we have here at least a presumptionin favour of there
beingonly one God.
30. Note.
The proof we
have just developedis not merely
an
inclined to think so,
argument from analogy. If some
are
the reason
is to be found in the faultyexposition
given of
"

NATURAL

54

THEOLOGY

this

They argue that we judge the


proofby certain authors.
intellectual capacity of our
fellow-men
by the adaptation
of the means
they choose to their ends, that order or adaptation
is an
indication of intelligence
; that the universe manifests
order ; therefore,etc.
Argument of this kind need
supreme
cause
no
misgiving. The example given embodies
simply
of
the
of
order
the
which
a
on
singleapplication
principle
physico-theological
argument is based ; the real argument is
that

arranges

which

and

from

St. Thomas

beingsas

arguments which
31.
we

ment

on

is not

then

that

the

towards

such

the earth

of the
these

as

Existence
:

that

of

had

of

and

over

life has

had

shows

that

above

cosmic

the

condensation

and

in time,

been

reached.

nature
scientific

of matter
first place,

still less for intellectual life;

commencement
have

proofs

commence

entropy

equilibriumwould
considerations

The

God."

of

simpleintrinsic evolution
accountingfor vegetablelifein the
; that

equilibriumof

an

have

that

the

for sensitive life and


law

in

are

infrequentlybrought forward.

not

Proofs

capableof

and

must

are

that

proofsfor the existence of


draws from the different
aspectsof being
other
some
whole, we must notice briefly

are

Scientific

refer to

elements

can

of sufficient reason.
principle
After having thus examined

God

between

only be explained by a cause


them
(Gen. Metaphysics,
by its intelligence
argument is based not on analogy but on the

ff.). Our

171

obtains

indifferent

themselves
which

which

order

the

the actual

or

forces tend

proves that they


else that state of

These

and

valuable

are

universe

indications
is

there

kindred

something

explains this acquisitionof forces and directs this


evolution.
They are different aspects of a process of reality
which is not self-explanatory
; but by themselves
they have
unless supportedby the philosophical,
no
metaphysical
cogency
that this principle
of explana
argument which demonstrates
be pure Actuality,
must
tion taken to its last analysis
necessary
first
subsistent
and
Cause,
Perfection,
highest Intel
Being,
ligence.

which

32. Proof

drawn

In the fact that all


God
and
we

some

see

from

the Common

races

of

men

of Mankind.

acknowledge the

spontaneousdeclaration

this, they argue, cannot


think, calls for two remarks.

Consent

"

existence of

part of humanity,
be fallacious. This argument,
on

the

EXISTENCE

THE

GOD

OF

55

of ages many
erroneous
therefore
and
entertained,
a unanimous

In the first place,


duringthe

course

have been
conceptions
verdict is not always infallible. Nevertheless,for psychological
reasons
special
weight does attach to this universal testimony
It is a question,
Pascal
as
regarding the existence of God.
well observes, that is of the utmost
importance. It
very
has

that there is

Master

itself from

ate

spiteof

that

seem

the

assertion that God

proofsof
In

here

no

mere

time

exists.

mental

or

God's

and

races

then, in

through

is

This

for

energy

for

has

who

man

examining

is

which

argument

an

intrinsic

the

existence.
ideas of God vary very
place,since human
different peoples,this argument
does not in

the second

among
realitydemonstrate
more

brief,we

than

more

that

is above

there

higherbeings rulingthe destinies


have to guard against two excesses

is sometimes

made

to

prove
value.

too

much,

33. Proof

from

the

Higher

one

men

of mankind.

In

the argument
sometimes
it is

and

Its real value


despisedas having no
a presumptionthat valid proofsdo exist.
'

If

anthropomorphism
are
proofswarranting

but perfectly
sound
extrinsic,

much

or

have

we

the

law.

all

punishes

sought to liber

ever

moral

morallycertain indication that there

indirect and

who

of every temperament, learned and unlearned,


all acknowledgingthe existence of God,
illiterate,

but

not

of the

find among

bias,we

life if he knows

men

cultured and
it would

passionhas

this Guardian

this natural

all times

out

Human

man's

his service and

claims

who

he does amiss.

what

the direction of

great bearing on

is that it

Aspirations of

supplies

Mankind.

"

'

in te
writes
requiescat
St. Augustine, and we
find the echo in the Melanges philosophiquesof the unfortunate Jouffroy, All earthlysatisfaction
graduallyexhausts itself and ends in disappointmentand dis
gust '. Man, it is argued,has been made for the true and the
when
virtue will be clasped
good ; he yearns for that yet-to-be
in the embrace
of happinessand its present divorce for ever
ended.
Such happinesscan
only consist in the contemplation

Irrequietumest

donee

nostrum

cor

'

of the true, and

therefore exist.
Granted

that

since the true


Is this

human

flaw, undoubtedly God


activities. But

can

we

valid

must

proof?
vitiated

nature' is not
must

alone He

in God

is found

exist

as

postulatethat

the
our

by

end
nature

radical

some

of its
is

so

higher
made

56

NATURAL

THEOLOGY

Is it not

it that we know
because it is God who made
precisely
it is a perfectproduction ?
How, in consequence,
we
can
affirm the existence of God
by basing it on the needs of our
?

nature

It is true

alone

man

But

this is

with

it more

can

we

of all creatures

would

only an argument

from

than

Again, why
world

We

have

need

we

exist,

not

be

irremediablyunhappy.
carries
analogy that scarcely

of God

the

as

is necessary

led back

thus

are

did

probability.

except because He

nature

that, if God

say

as

an

satisfaction of

our

explanationof

the

examine

to

the

traditional

proofs of God's existence, and to weigh in the light of


objectiveevidence of the principleof sufficient reason
motives leadingus to positHis existence.
34. Proof

is

he

then

law

so

eternal

the

as

and

and

Man

"

to

avoid

feels that

evil.

God

the

Legislator.
all-powerful
that
this
all,
proofdoes not demon
God.
It merely declares that the man
God
has already admitted
obligation
imposes His will. The certitude of

first of

existence of

admits

who

practise
good

to

remark,

must

strate the

Obligation.

the

there can
be no law.
exist,for without a legislator
universal,so imperiousas the moral law presupposes

supreme,

We

Moral

from

morally bound

must

drawn

the

moral

Legislatorwho

God's existence is the

same

as

that of the moral

law.

With

the

spectacleof nature and humanity before his eyes man


spon
taneouslyacknowledges that there is a higher Being who
obligeshim to do his duty. If the existence of God is not
is a pure illusion,
and
of moral obligation
admitted, his feeling
there is no
further questionof duty. This proof,if it were
but a simultaneo (16),
like the
valid,would not be a posteriori,
argument
In

of St. Anselm.

place,the fact of moral obligationcould,


in our
opinion,be sufficiently
explained without having
to a divine Legislator.Human
nature
because it is
recourse
natural tendencyafter the true and
human, strives by its own
the good. To fail in its human
dignity,to disregardthe re
quirementsof justicetowards our fellow-men, is self-degrada
the

tion, and

second

be used

may
end

;
"

or

so,

in two

senses.

own

Either

law.

For

it is the

the word
ordinance

'

law
of

'

for gaininga special


this or that means
prescribes
its own
it is the natural tendency of a being towards
laws. Now
to say
e.g., we speak of chemical or physical

superiorwho
end

fallingshort of its

EXISTENCE

THE
that the law of

Legislator,is to

supreme
'

'

law

that

used

be

cannot

when

intimate

second

in itself. And

what

in this it would

57

law

in

and

this

word

surely is

not,

or

no

were

the

case

wish U

we

feel

offendingagainst the

are

merely considered

nature

that

seem

if there

our

sense,
we

is wrong
we
requirementsof our human
do

we

that

suppose

in the

GOD

be

not

question. Whether

the whole

beg

to

would

nature

our

OF

there

is

sufficient

obligationwhich is yet consistent with the


play of liberty,since the good that is presented to us in the
conditions of our
present lifealways carries with it at the same
of doing wrong.
time the possibility
if considered
Certainly,
for

reason

real

of

this
ontologically,

law

until

that God

are

we

of this.

For

does

God

exists

be ignorant
perforce
His will openly as do

must

we

manifest

not

of God, but

work

but He ingrainsit in the


legislators,
nature
(Ethics,40). Hence it appears

human

of

aware

is the

nature

our

very
that

tendencies

special
a divine
argument can be drawn from moral obligation
requiring
Legislatorfor its immediate
explanation. The proof which
is adduced
is not an independentone, but is reducible to the
fourth developedby St. Thomas
(27): namely, that our con
our

science

informs

virtuous, and
of

Being
Being

sary
see here

that

us

therefore

must

more

have

or

less

share

Goodness.

feel himself

cannot
a

we

are

is subsistent

who

also

we

to be

good, more
of the

Moreover
under

no

as

or

perfections
the

neces

we
obligation,

aspect of contingencyor
particular

less

can

of movement.

Furthermore, the argument may take the form of a considera


tion of man
he
as
a whole, not
simply of the moral obligation
him
but also of a tendency
recognizesas incumbent
upon
towards
a reward, or
as
sanction,of virtue.
happinessprecisely
The performanceof duty we feel must
lead to completehappi
consist in the contemplation
of God in another
which must
ness

life (Ethics,
10-13),or if not, if there
would

nature

be

an

were

no

sanction,our

moral

imperfectproduction,and

we

might just

well set at

ourselves to
naught the call of duty and abandon
the pleasuresof the senses
and of the present life as surrender
these enjoyments to follow the strait path of duty. Pre

as

sented

God
man,
21

the ethical argument for the existence of


of
to the proof from the natural aspirations

in this form

is reducible
and
These

theyarc

to

subjecttherefore
different

be treated

points
ex

to the

cannot

in
professo

be
the

same

criticisms ai.

fully discussed

largerwork

on

here

in

this

manual

Natural Theology*

PART

The

Natural
of

the

preliminary

We

Being

demonstrated

are

of

the

God

Being.

(Chapter
notions

(Chapter

of

We

I)

shall
then

immediately
II).

studies

of

the

of

His

first

God

nature

treats

and

then

the

third,

activity.
of

knowledge

our

existence
divine

see,

the

knowledge

our

divine

His

treating

divisions

three

second

spoken

God

of

of

the

or

and

divine

consists

God

already

part,

the

have

second
the

of

attributes

the

into

question

existence

His

proves

Nature

falls

theology

II

connected

now

we

as

of

all,

far
with

as

in

we

that

supreme
to

pass
the

or

essence

first

what,

the

what

are

of

nature

His

essence

concerned,
the

essence

the
of

CHAPTER

THE

35.

METAPHYSICAL

which

whether
or

ESSENCE

the

number

of

its

of

subjects

it is

latter

concerns

in

second

united, and, in this

sense,

this
it

stantial

essential

and

life

of

need

and

on

seen

the

to

From

the

so

many

or

analysis

substance,

misleading
further

and

that
sub

logical
made

about

Thus

and

et

specific differ
For

properties
them

of

all

to

good
being
avoid

implicitly,
difficulty

without

may

that

say

given explicitly,but

reasoning

the

animalitas

the

contain

of

up

can

essence.

all the

con

defining

we

rationale,

genus

it must

may

and

matter

whole

set

parts.

be

we

essence.

may

essence

type.

physical parts

metaphysical

of

fixed

necessary,

single

(animal

that

one

indissolubly

are

clearness

and

these

cannot,

and

of

as

proximate
as

that

primary

physical

only

combination

material

sake

reason

indeed

as

namely,

the

metaphysical

being defective
them.

discover

and

an

or

relation

is the

really distinct

is its

regarded

definition

that

is

essence

the

are

man

not,

its

comprising

which

perfections

the

it into

by analysing

of

is

applied.

as

appears

logical parts,

or

rationalitas)

sical

an

view,

type

also, for

metaphysical
sensitive

be

can

relative

essence

in

say,

it constitutes

this

consider

sistency,

The

and

may

we

whole

of

its constitution,

form

But

it

or

expressing

by

into

enter

is to

essence

notes

define

that

point

of

number

When

former,

the

beings

contingent

from

regarded

itself,absolutely,

here, every

us

certain

of

matter

no

comprehension.

this

From

so

be

which

to

world

of

essences

knowledge,

our

the

From

extension,

regarded

its

in

notes

view.

of

point

side

ence

in

merely possible, may

absolute

of

GOD

The

"

object

exist

really

OF

Essence.

Metaphysical

form

they

are

the

of

Meaning

things

problem
essence

different

of

before

God,

from

us

what
every

is to

ascertain

is that
other

which

what
makes

being, just

as

is the
God

metaphy
what

sensitive

He

is,

life and

make

reason

scale of
At

to be

man

OF

NATURE

THE

to hold

and

man

61

GOD

distinct

placein

the

beings.

first

sight

may

be

to

appear

futile,

absolutely simple perfectionof

the

in

that

seeing

question

the

God

complexity,and therefore no matter for analysis.


However, since the supereminent perfectionof the Infinite
Being is in our thought equivalentto a metaphysicalwhole
for us to make
it is quitepossible
of a very vast comprehension,
of the essences
of
like that we make
a logical
analysisof God
define them
finite things when
we
by their metaphysicalparts
which
constituents the reality
and so reduce to fundamental
endeavour
they each severallycontain. Consequently our
here is to ascertain what from our point of view is that divine
the explicit
concept of which takes precedenceover
perfection
is

there

no

'

'

all others
from

analysisof this
belonging tc
perfections

the

all the

mere

of the

36. Solution

Four

sistens'.
"

and

Descartes
the

'

Deus

deserve

The

2.

of the

attention

follow

Leibniz

the

make

preferencefor
of

School

divine

Duns

Esse

Sub-

have

been

intensive
God

of

that

fundamental attribute
possibleperfections.
3. Billuart24 and

in

thought

of

consist

in

to

highestpower,
extensive

an

sense.

philosophyand seem
absolute goodness.
Scotus23 places the characteristic

in the

essence

their

raised to

attributes

the

of God

essence

understood
say, to infinity
Some, however, hark back to the Platonic
to have

deduce

may

Ipsum

est

is to

that

that

so

Being.

our

philosopherswho

of all His

sum

that

we
perfection

the divine

Question:

answers

modern

The

first

Being,

supreme

question32.

this

given to
1.

characteristic of the

the

as

Thomists

some

i.e. in

infinityof God,
is the

which

of

recent

thought.
commonly, with St. Thomas,

of

root

all

it

make

date

consist in intellectual
4. But

more

of God

essence

is considered

lie in the

to

the
very

metaphysical
being

of

God,

is in
exaggerate the importance of this discussion, which
it
seen:s
chief
Its
merit,
realityonly a simple question of scientific method.
if philosophers
to us, is that it emphasizes the simplicityof God, inasmuch
as
11

We

should

constrained

are

perfection from
viction

a.

that

"

In

24

Cursus

i.

at

not

by

the

this
bottom

or

very
that
these

Sent., dist. 3.
Theol., I, Diss.

limits

of the

human

mind

particularaspect, they
divine
perfectionsare
2,

a.

2,

"

2.

"

Cp. GONET,

at

to
once

but

one

study
and

the

divine

their

evince

the

Clypeus,Tr.

con

same.

I. Disp. 2,

NATURAL

62

THEOLOGY

'

'

irreceptum or, to adopt a Latinism commonly made use


St. Thomas
of, in His aseity,esse a se'K.
says :"
Absolute being,that is to say, beingconsidered as including
the whole
of being, surpasses both the perfection
perfection
of life and
other
definite perfection.And
therefore
every
absolute being contains eminently in itself all other perfec
is here speaking of the
tions '. It is clear that St. Thomas
absolute Being,esse irreceptum,esse a se, for he immediately
adds :
But being which is received in particular
things that
of being but have a limited
do not possess the whole perfection
being,as the being enjoyedby a creature, is less perfectthan
that which has a determined
added to it. This is why
perfection
the pseudo-Dionysius
beings are more
perfect
says that living
esse

'

'

'

beings which

than

more
intelligence

this

proof should
to

proper

place in
and

larger treatise

presumingas

it does

truths

on

theless it will be convenient

existence is

in the

and

of the

have

we

To

yet

the

drift of it,

existence

It

that actual

it is shown

metaphysicalessence

actual absolute

Never

to establish.

to notice the

here

part of

that

second

of

is the

God,

whole

metaphysicalessence.
Actual

I.

not

"

parts,in the first of which

falls into two


absolute

enjoy its full force


of reasonings
a
sequence
by itself as here,
appear

Opinion.

its

find

'

those

than
perfect

of St. Thomas's

37. Proof

with
beings endowed
which are merely living 28.

life and

exist without

absolute

God.

We

existence

being is

itself the

that

have

seen
of
Actuality,Necessary Being.
essence

"

Since

of its

reason

belongs to
the

the

First

metaphysical
Being is Pure

it is evident

that

such

existence,it is unwarrantable

postulateoutside of this being a priorand further reason


for its actual perfections
Must it not be that
and existence.
is essentially
who
one
Being must be Actual Being ? Does
in here ?
not the principle
of identity
come
to

""

Zigliarahas

were

intended

with

but

tried to reconcile

to

doubtful
have

complete
success

it.

each
; he

the two
other

appears

(Summa

last

opinions and

to show

that

they

his attempt
to have met
seems
; but
rather
to have
the discussion
evaded

Phil., Vol. II, p. 325.)


simpliciteracceptum, secundum
quod includit in se omnem
perfectionem
essendi, praeeminet vitae et omnibus
perfectionibussubsequentibus.
Sic igituripsum esse
bona
praehabet in se omnia
subsequentia. Sed si consideretur
habent
ipsum esse, prout participaturin hac re vel in ilia,quae non
totam
sed
sicut
habent
est
esse
essendi,
esse
perfectionem
imperfectum,
sic
manifestum
est
esse
cum
cujuslibetcreaturae
perfectionc
;
quod ipsum
Unde
superaddita est eminentius.
Dionysius dicit, quod viventia sunt meliora existentibus, et intelligentia
viventibus
'. I-II, q. 2, a. S.^ad.2.
than
*

to

'

Esse

ended

THE
absolute

Actual

2.

God.

OF

NATURE

is

existence

GOD

63

the

whole

metaphysical

be

existent,to be subessentially
is ground for a sufficient and explicit
sistent absolutely,
distinc
tion between
God
and contingent
things; secondly,from such
shall presently
absolute essential existence,as we
be
see, can
deduced
by analysisand reasoningall the divine perfections,
and intelligence37.
even
includinginfinity

of

essence

to
Firstly,

"

Criticism

38.

Thesis.

The

"

is

what

the

of

other

requiredfor

Opinions Opposed

St.

to

opinionswe have mentioned


a true
metaphysicalessence

Thomas's

fail to

give

of the divine

Being.
of the

Each

1.

first

the
perfections

opinion constitutes

anterior to this union


Those

who

of which

essence

of

accordingto this
God, is evidently

itself.

of God
consist
metaphysicalessence
absolute goodnesscan
to the sumtotal
only be referring
they lay themselves open
perfections
; consequently

in His
of His
to the

make

the

criticism

same

the notion of

and

the

union

the Cartesian

as

goodness is

view above.

Moreover,

superaddedto the notion of

one

being

is not

priorto it.
of God is not a principle
which reveals to us
2. The
infinity
the necessity
of the existence of the self-subsistent Being, but
it is a conclusion to be inferred from this necessity
as
itself,
wili be seen
presently.
that the metaphysicalessence
Billuart maintains
3. When
of God
and

be found

must

in the most

under
labouring

Thomas, between
God

and

(see 36,
2T

abstract

the

passage

which

makes

spoken

of

fore, that

form

Therefore
'

Esse

His

it is

est

actualitas

spoken

in subsistence, he is

of

subsistence

concrete

is His

to

'

is that

Existence

says

goodness or humanity
existing. It is necessary,

; for

of

as

is

only

there

essence,

in Him

Existence

omnis

he

it,in the
is distinct from
which
there is
God
in
since
Therefore,
potentiality.

stand
to

Essence

actual

nature

as
actuality
it follows that
potentiality,

no

for this when

reason

relation

same

us

contingentexistence of creatures
Further,
quoted from the Summa).

or

actual, when
existence should
as

to

and

gives the

every

realityknown

ideas, alreadyexposed by St.

essential and

the

the

St. Thomas

of

confusion

be found

it cannot

consequentlythat

noble

formae

does

essence

not

existence.

differ from

'.
vel

naturae

non

enim

bonitas

vel

esse.
Oportet
significaturin actu, nisi prout significamus
est aliud ab ipso sicut
igiturquod ipsum esse comparetur ad essentiam
quae
sequitur quod
actus ad potentiam.
Cum
igiturin Deo nihil sit potentiate,

humanitas

earn

non

est

aliud

in

esse

'.

Sum.

Theol., I. q. 3,

eo

essentia

quam
a.

4.

suum

esse.

Sua

igitur essentia

est

suum

how

the

It

could

is

do

this

(2)

opinion

Conclusion
before

brings

Who

am

Israel

He

Ait

sum

18

sic

formam
et

enim

Unumquodque

sed

denominatur

ipso,

cum

Unde

in

est

se

deficit

intelligit,
minus

dicuntur
"

Totum

modo

Deo

enim

in

seipso

infinitum

minatur
essendi

determinat,

pelagus

Significat
esse

enim
non

et

omnibus

et

esse

in

Et

dicit

de

ipsum

habet

indeterminatum."

se

habet

; sed

Tertio
"

praesenti

hoc

vel

et

hoc
futurum

qui

nomen,

ad

indeterminate

infinitum.

praeteritum

enim

vero

ex

maxime
'.

ejus

lib.

quoddam

qui

ideo

est.

pelagus

nomine
nullum

est,

9)

I, cap.

est,

alio

Deo

nomina

proprie

magis

determodum
nominat

consignificatione.

proprie
Sum.

de

quod

fid.,

Et

omnes.

autem

aliqua

tanto

velut

esse

con-

secundum

nominibus,

Quolibet
rei

id

quanto

(Orth.

dicuntur

Deo

si

rationem.

viae,

circa
ideo

univer-

vel

Intellectus

absoluta,

et

Damascenus

quae

substantiae

substantiae

determinet
est.

se

communia
et

comprehendens

sed

novit

cognoscere

in

magis
Unde

modus

aliquis

Deus

ejus
;

statu

4),

Deum.

secundum

in

ejus

art.

3,

nominat

propter

ipsum.

enim

ipsa

(q.

communia

ipsum

supra

modum

quo

nobis.

principalius

substantiae

essentiam

quemcumque

determinata,
de

Quod

sed

Secundo
minus

pro-

sit

Dei
est

"

sunt

vos

Non

esse

28.

'

maxime

est

proprie

determinant

et

Dei

maxime

aliquid

informant

ipsam

potest

non

cum

forma.
vel

addunt

ratione

qui

sum

ad

me

ostensum

supra
hoc

sua

tamen

quodammodo

noster

ut

nomina

alia

Unde

esse.

nomina

alia

Omnia'enim

vertantur

ipsum

Ego

of

people

signincationem.

sui

He

replied

the

you.

triplici

est,

He

misit

est

propter

conveniat,

inter

qui

qui

quidem

alii

quod

est

salitatem.

cuius

nulli

Israel,

to

and

which

that

to

say

me

(4).
God

Moses,

by

sent

nomen,

Primo

aliquam,

hoc

manifestum

ipsum

Hoc

"

"

essentia,

sunt

'

14.

Dei.

nomen

filiis

is

shalt

thou

(o "5i/) hath

dices

Ill,

signincat

quod

is

Who

Exod.,

prium

(Jahweh)

am

former

the

to

connotes

essence

advo

the

maintaining

asked

when

back

God

intelligence

words,

properly

metaphysical

known

other

driven

which

name

concept
of

this

that

ourselves

are

we

His

us

made

Himself
I

The

in

ultimately

which

that

to

or

fact

the

subsistent

are

the

to

all-powerfulness

of

virtue

essentially

or

of

cates

in

lead

such

as

and

eternity

only

so

intelligence

of

immensity,

infinite

one

notion

the

can

of

'

THEOLOGY

NATURAL

64

Theol.,

de

Deo

I, q.

dicitur,
13,

a.

CHAPTER

of

attributes

God,

of

question

the

which

derive

we

known

formal

as

they

of

fact

be

41.

types
and

virtual

is

of

or

Simple.

Absolutely

and

this

motion
from

and

be

unless

since

in

we

find

and

Sum.

Mover

difference,

are

no

previously
It
;

has

is

and

Theol., I, q. 3,

extended

in three

shown

induction.

Prime

19

can

of
;

from

composition

and

these

compound,

are

according
of

any

distinguishable by
object

the

in

may

Him

there

in

natural

a.

(v)

'

God

(a) Because

else,

been

already proved

that

3, ad

i.

65

unmoved.

we

do

accident.
a

body

no

by something

the

strictly

nor,

is not

moved

Himself

of

(iii)nature

and

substance

parts.

ways

beings

existence,

(vi)

none

are

form,

and

induction.

from

Argument

i.

"

parts, (ii)matter

there

idea

the

which

(i) extended

God

simple

composite things

merely

that

genus

of

speak

can

con

we

object independently

composition

speaking,

being unique.

simplicity

the

under

His

mind.

personality, (iv) essence


(i) In

of

immutability,

distinct

are

are

aspects

the

by

.that

parts

mind,

the

His

We

29. By

'

in the

absolutely simple,

find

not

things

different

the

viewed

is

or

by

God

God

of

'

like the

were

really distinct

are

consideration
reason

they

knowledge

our

union

the

mean

as

though

as

the

GOD

idea

composition

of

on

follows

as

of

OF

The

"

absolute

St. Thomas

are

character

or

Simplicity.

negation

the

things only

we

of

Meaning

of

They

SIMPLICITY

THE

called

immensity,

unicity

His

I.

by

God.

of

THAT

GOD

sometimes

thought

the

infinity, His

eternity, and

ceive

OF

are

complete
essence

His

simplicity,

40.

which

notions,

These

39.

WITH

ESSENCE

THE

OF

His

CONNECTED

INTIMATELY

IDEAS

II

as

body

is in

is evident

God

Therefore

is the
it

is

66

NATURAL

clear God

THEOLOGY

body, (b)Because the First Being must of


necessityactuallyexist, and in no way remain in a state of
potentiality.Although in any singlething that passes from
the potentiality
of potentiality
to a state of actuality,
a state
is prior in time
to the actuality; nevertheless, absolutely
is priorto potentiality
is in
speaking,actuality
; for whatever
actual
can
by some
potentiality
only be reduced into actuality
being. It has already been proved that God is the First Being.
there should be any
It is therefore impossiblethat in God
But
because
body is in potentiality,
potentiality.
every
is continuous, formally considered, is divisible to
whatever
that God should be a body.
infinity
; it is therefore impossible
(c)Because God is the most noble of beings, It is impos
sible to admit that any body is the most noble of beings 30.
and form.
(ii)There is in God no composition of matter
is composed of
To quote St. Thomas
again : (a) Whatever
and form is a body ; for extended
dimensions
the
matter
are
is not a body ; therefore
But
God
first quality of matter.
and form,
He is not composed of matter
(b) Matter is neces
But
God is pure Actuality
sarilyin a state of potentiality.
Hence
it is impos
(Actus Purus), without any potentiality.
81.
sible that God should be composed of matter and form
There is in God
no
(iii)
compositionof nature and person
that is to say, there is no need to add any
alityor hypostasis,
of God to make
Him
individual Being
an
thingto the essence
conceive
of an
never
(cp. Gen. Metaphysics,87-91). We
is not

'

'

'

""

'

Deum

non

esse

tripliciterostendi
patet inducendo

corpus,
ut

movet
non
motum,
corpus
autem
supra (q.2, art. 3)
manifestum
est quod Deus

quod

Deus
est

est

primum

potest. i" Quia nullum


est
per singula. Ostensum
movens

immobile.

Unde

2"

est, id quod est


Quia necesse
in potentia. Licet enim
in uno
et
primum ens, esse in actu, et nullo modo
eodem
quod exit de potentia in actum, prior sit tempore potentia quam
actus,
simplicitertamen
prior est actus quam
potentia ; quia quod est in potentia
in actum, nisi per ens
reducitur
Ostensum
noj"
actu.
est autem
(quaest.
supra
primum ens.
Impossibileestigiturquod in Deo
praec., art. 3) quod Densest
in potentia. Omne
sit aliquid
autem
est in potentia ; quia continuum, in
corpus
hujusmodi, divisibile est in infinitum.
quantum
Impossibile est igiturDeum
esse
in entibus, ut ex
3" Quia Deus est id quod est nobilissimum
corpus.
dictis patet. Impossibile est autem
in
nobilissimum
esse
aliquod corpus
non

corpus.

"

"

entibus
11

'

'.

ST. THOMAS,

Sum.

Theol., I, q. 3,

a.

i.

(a) Omne

et forma
est corpus ; quantitas enim
compositum ex materia
dimensiva
est quae
materiae.
Sed
Deus
est corpus,
ut
non
primo inhaeret
ostensum
est (art.
praec.).Ergo Deus non est composite ex materia et forma.
est id quod est in potentia. Deus
est purus
(b) Materia
autem
actus, non
habens aliquidde potentialitate. Unde
impossible est quod Deus sit compo"

situs

ex

materia

et forma

'.

Loc. cit.,
a.

2.

NATURE

THE

existingbeing except

But

actual, existential being. He

is His

God

67

individual.

an

as

GOD

OF

compositionof nature
(iv)There is in Him

and
no

See above, 36, 37, Sum.

Theol.,I, q. 3,

a.

that from

which

be

then

and existence.

4.

genus

difference.

and

of

notion

the

'

thence

of

essence

cannot

hypostasis.
compositionof essence

(v) God excludes all compositionof


from which we draw
(a) The formality
and
difference,

the

specific

the difference constitut

is derived,is always related to that from which


ing the species
is related to potentiality.
the genus
is derived, as actuality
be said to be added to potentiality,
Since in God actuality
cannot
it is impossible
that He should be in any genus as a species.

(b) Since
He

in any
being", because, since it is
if God

is His essence,

the existence of God

be in the genus
of its nature, genus refers to the
predicated

genus,

The

be

genus,

generic essence.

being;
God

for

'

of

essence

that

thing.
being

for every genus has differences distinct from


exist distinct from
No
difference can
be

non-beingcannot

is not in

were

(Metaph.,Bk. Ill, 10)

Philosopherhas shown

cannot

its

would

"

genus

difference.

It follows that

3a.

of substance and
is in God no composition
(vi)Lastly,tjiere
A subjectis compared to its accidental qualities
accidents.
made
is in some
to actuality
as potentiality
sense
; for a subject
actual by its accidental qualities.
But there can be no potenti
33.
in God
ality
and
be potentiality
In every compound there must
2.
actuality
; for the different parts that constitute a being can
'

'

'

only go
are
are

to form

substantial unit

on

the condition that

others in actuality. Beings in

in

and
potentiality
only united to one

if they are,

another

as

it were,

some

actuality
mutually

constituens
speciem, se
in
Unde
cum
potentiam.
genus,
Deo non
est quod sit in genere tanquam
adjungatur potentia actui,impossibile
species.(b) Quia cum esse Dei sit ejusessentia,ut ostensum est (art.praec.);
Nam
si Deus
esset
in aliquo genere,
oporteret quod genus ejus esset ens.
autem
Ostendit
est.
in
essentiam
eo
significat
cum
rei,
quod quid
praedicetur
Philosophus(Metaph.lib. Ill, text. 10) quod ens non
potest esse genus alihabet
enim
gene
cujus. Omne
differentias,quae sunt extra essentiam
genus
ris. Nulla autem
esset extra ens
differentia potest inveniri quae
; quia non
ens non
potestesse differentia. Unde relinquiturquod Deus non sit in genere '.
88

'

habet

(a) Semper

ad

illud unde

enim

id

quo

sumitur

differentia

sicut actus

sumitur

ad

"

Loc. cit.,
a. 5.
"

'

Subjectum enim comparatur


accidens
subjectum enim secundum
potentia, omnino
M.S.P."

VOL.

removetur
II.

Deo

'.

ad
est

accidens

sicut

aliquo modo

actum

potentia ad

in actu

esse

autem

Loc. cit.,
a. 6.
P

;
in

THEOLOGY

NATURAL

68

; in which

they form
Yet they may
accidental union.
substantial but
an
not
a
be in potentiality
relativelyto the whole which they form ;
for they are
actually united after having been in potenti
form

together and

bound

possibleunion.
is in
there
potentiality

ality
and

'

Him

in

since

But

to

accident

group

case

God

there

composition of

no

is

no

substance

34.

So, again, every composite thing is posteriorto its


But God
is the
component parts and is dependent on them.
'

3.

Being 35.
Every compound presupposes
'

first

beingthat has made it ;


compound is the union proceedingfrom several parts.
But these parts which are in themselves multiplecome
together
of
under
another
action
form
the
to
a unityonly
unifying
being.
be need of another
If God were
a compound there would
being
made
to have
him.
He could not have compounded himself ;
'

4.
for a

no

being

be

the

is

compounds

would

then
'

Cause

of

contradiction

which

have

another

an

case

being priorto itself. But


being is its efficient cause.

efficient cause

and

would

not

would

there

be

being
God

the

first

36.

42. Corollaries.
of the

since in this
itself,

unto

cause

"

i.

It is impossible
to

givea

strict definition

'

divine

be defined,
Being (Logic,78-81). God cannot
for every
definition is by genus
and
difference'37.
specific
God and creature
not distinguished
differ
are
by any specific
which we
ences
can
predicateof them as though they belonged
to the same
; whence,
genus ; they differ by their whole reality
'

strictly
speaking,we
34

'

In
enim
non

say

there

is

difference between

pmni composite oportet esse

et potentiam.
actum
Non
enim
plura
aliquid ibi sit actus et aliquid potentia.
non
uniuntur, nisi quasi colligatavel sicut congregata :
in quibus etiam
simpliciter,
ipsae partes congregatae

possunt simpliciterfieri

Quae

cannot

quae
sicut
sunt
fuerint in

actu
sunt

sunt
unum

unum,

nisi

Sunt
enim
unitae
potentia respectu unionis.
in actu, postquam
nulla est potentia ; non
potentia unibiles. In Deo autem
est igitur
in eo aliqua compositio '.
36
Item
omne
compositum posterius est suis componentibus et dependens
eis.
Deus
ex
est primum
autem
'. I, q. 3, a. 7.
ens
36
Omnis
compositio indiget aliquo componente
; si enim
compositio est,
ex
secundum
pluribus est. Quae autem
sunt
se
non
conveplura,in unum
niunt, nisi ab aliquo componente
Si igiturcompositus esset Deus,
uniantur.
haberet
enim
componentem
; non
ipse seipsum componere
posset, quia nihil
est causa
sui ipsius; esset enim
prius seipso,quod est impossibile. Compoest causa
nens
autem
emciens
erficiencompositi. Ergo Deus haberet causam
tem
esset causa
; et sic non
prima '. Cont. Gent,, I, 18.
'

'

if

Cont. Gent., I, 25.

THE

GOD

OF

NATURE

69

marks
complete diversity
; diversity
difference a relative opposition38
opposition,
but

them

absolute

an

'

Care

2.

the

be

must

pregnant saying

that

the

true

'

of

'

est, quae

esse
'

prets thus

non
plariter,

; which St. Thomas


super esse est, Deitas
omnium
effective et
Deitas dicitur esse

exem-

40.
spirit

pure

INFINITE

II. THE

PERFECTION

Perfection.

of

Meaning

inter

39.

'

per essentiam

autem

is

3. God

43.

meaning be given to
Esse omnium
Catholic theology :

taken

Our

"

GOD

OF

imagination naturally

monad
represents a simplebeing as an unknowable
very akin
to an abstraction,but reflection tells us that God is called simple
is all that

He

because

quiaquidquidhabet
We

then

have

St. Thomas

(II) God

'

has.

est

'

ideo

Deus

simplex dicitur

41.

ascertain

God

what

He
perfection
that God

answers

is

has, that
in His

possesses

is to

say,

simplicity.

and therefore good


(I)perfect,

all

perfectionto
is infinite
in perfection.
possesses

God
(III)

hoc

to

plenitudeof

what

He

found

in creatures

when it is
thingis perfect
for its action
completelymade, when it has everythingpossible
and natural requirements(Gen. Metaphysics,173). When
we
do not signifydirectly
the
we
say that a thing is perfection
of its rank, but its intrinsic mode
of being,the manner
nobility
that it has, whatever
in which it possesses the properties
be
the degreethat it occupies
in the scale of beings. The question
therefore whether
God is perfectis in other words this : Does
God
His
nature
actuallypossess all the perfectionwhich
that He enjoys
implies? or on the contrary is the perfection
?
capable of being increased, is it yet further perfectible
44.

'

I. God

is Perfect.

Perfectum

dicitur cui
'

38

'

Deus
eidem

et

esse

Sum.

40

Cp.

41

quod

creatum

est sit

non

generi)additis, sed

quam
sed diversa esse
/ Sent.,dist. 3,
39

id

diversum

q. i,

a.

2, ad

enim

modum

est
perfectus,
'

suae

quae-

43.

aliquibus differentiis utrique (tanunde


nee
differre,
proprie dicuntur

ipsis :
est

sit

Optimo modo

differunt
se

secundum

Deus

utrum

quaerere

Deus

utrum

nihil deest

'

perfectionis;
rere

We

"

say that

be

absolutum,

sed

diiferens

relativum

'.

3.
8, ad

i.
Theol., I, q. 3, a.
Gent., I, 18, 3, and 20, 5.
De
ST. AUGUSTINE,
Civitate Dei, II,

Cont.

7me Conf.
42
ST. THOMAS,

Sum.

Theol., I, q. 4,

a.

10

3 ; and

MONSABR",
CAJETAN,

Cow/, de
Comment,

N.-D.,
in h.L

THEOLOGY

NATURAL

7o
45. Proof.

is pure actuality; the perfectionwhich He


But
all potentiality.
from
perfectibility
pre

God

"

is removed

has

'

Existenti in potentiadeest
:
supposes a certain potentiality
in actu
ut sic
id quod in actu esse
potest : existenti autem

perfectionof
enjoys the plenitudeof

nihil deest' ^

Therefore

but
perfectible

He

the

God

is

His

natural

longer

no

per

fection.
II. God

46.

belonging

to

that

Works.

His

are
perfections
because
perfect,

found

united

possesses

"

Himself

in

be

It must

He

Hence

in God.
He

'

lacks not

is

any

all the Perfections

said that

spoken of

excellence

as

all created

universally

which

be
may
the consideration

from
in any genus.
This may be seen
whatever
exists in any effect must
perfection
effective

either in the

be found

in a
or
formality,
eminent
more
degree. It is plain that the effect pre-exists
virtuallyin the causative agent. Although to pre-existin
of a material
is to pre-exist
the potentiality
in a more
cause
and an agent
imperfectway, since matter as such is imperfect,
such is perfect
in the causative
as
; still to pre-exist
virtually
in a more
agent is not to pre-exist
imperfect,but in a more
Since God is the first effective Cause of things,
perfectway.
of all things must
the perfections
in God in a more
pre-exist
eminent
line of argument
Dionysiusimpliesthe same
way.
by sayingof God : It is not that He is this but not that, but
in the

that He
'

is

cause

all,as the

Nothing

cause

of all

except inasmuch

acts

'

same

44.
it is in

: action
actuality
measure
actualityin the agent.
It is impossibletherefore for any effect that is brought into
than is the actuality
being by action to be of a nobler actuality
of the agent. It is possible
however
for the actuality
of the

therefore

43
44

CAJETAN,
'

Dicendum

in

of the

loc. cit.

quod

in

Deo

sunt

Unde
et
perfectionesomnium
rerum.
deest ei aliqua nobilitas,quae inveniaquidem ex eo considerari potest quia quidquid

universaliter perfectus,quia

dicitur
tur

follows the

as

Et

aliquo genere.

hoc

non

est in effectu, oportet inveniri


in causa
perfectionis
eamdem
modo.
rationem, vel eminentiori
Manifestum
virtute in causa
autem
agente. Praeexistere
praeexistit

effectiva
est enim

in virtute

vel

secundum

quod

effectus

agentis
praeexistereimperfection modo, sed perfection ; licet praeexisterein
materialis sit praeexistereimperfectiorimodo
potentia causae
; eo quod materia,
inquantum hujusmodi, est imperfecta ; agens vero, inquantum hujusmodi,
est
sit prima causa
Deus
perfectum. Cum
ergo
effectiva rerum,
oportet
omnium
rerum
perfectiones praeexistere in Deo
secundum
eminentiorem
Et hanc
rationem
modum.
tangit Dionysius (De div. nont., cap. 5, lect. i),
dicens de Deo, quod
non
quidem hoc est, hoc autem
est ; sed omnia
non
est
'. ST. THOMAS, Sum. Theoi., I, q. 4, a. 2.
ut omnium
causa
non

est

"

"

causae

THE

effect to be less

perfectthan

of
actuality

the

the

actingcause,

as

to which

be found

in God

(though the

proofused

ning (4 f.)on

the

dicated of God
possesses in
in creation.

actuallyis in any
eminentlythan

that

much

more

is not

converse

is God, of Whom

which

to one
cause
ultimately
Everythingtherefore

true); God then

in connexion
way

leads

us

the

with what

supereminentway

other

in the

thing itself

said

creatures

conclusion

all

things.
thing must

are

is most

we

of
perfections

to the

reducible

everything is

category of efficient causation

This

71

the part of the object


be weakened
action may
on
which it is spent. Now
in
it is terminated, or upon

inasmuch

the

GOD

OF

NATURE

'

perfect*5.
at the begin

that the Divine


to
perfections

all the

be pre

can

Being

be found

teachingthat St. Thomas


developsin
Theologica(de bono
Question5 and Question6 of the Summa
in communi, de bonitate Dei)is only a more
express statement
of the divine
the perfection
of the precedingtheories about
than give as a
Being. Hence there is no need to do more
corollarythe leadingideas of these Questions.
Goodness
and being are
1.
reallythe same, and differ
is clear from
the followingargument.
only logically
; which
The formalityof goodness consists in this,that it is in some
is what
way desirable. Hence the Philosopher
says : Goodness
all desire. It is clear that a thingis desirable in so far as it is
'.
perfect
perfection
; for all desire their own
Since goodness is that which all men
desire,and since
2.
this has the formal aspect of an end, it is clear that goodness
impliesthe formal aspect of an end '.
Corollary. The

47.

"

'

'

'

3.

Good

is attributed

fections flow from

good

as

all

He

is in God

Him
as

to
as

from

'

Nihil

as

the uni vocal, cause

in the first,but not

things,it must be in Him


is called the Supreme Good

45

alldesirable per
Therefore
their first Cause.

God, inasmuch

of

excellently
; and therefore

more

Bonum

Summum

or

'.

actu ; actio igiturconsequitur


igitureffectum, qui per action em
sit actus
educitur, esse in nobiliori actu quam
agentis. Possibile est tamen
effectum
sit actus
causae
imperfectiorem esse, quam
agentis,eo quod actio
In genere
autem
causae
potest debilitari ex parte ejus in quod terminatur.
efficients fit reductio
ad unam
dicitur, ut ex dictis patet,
causam,
quae Deus
a quo
sunt
omnes
Oportet igiturquidquid
res, ut in sequentibus ostendetur.
modum

actu

in

actus

agit nisi
in

in quacumque
ilia ; non
autem

est
re

Cont. Gent., I, 28.

secundum

quod
Impossible

agente.

re
e

est

alia, inveniri
converse.

(Trs.RICKABY,

Of

in

est

in

Deo

multo

igitur Deus

God

and

His

eminentius,

quam

sit

perfectissimus '. Id.,


Creatures, p. 22.)

Est

THEOLOGY

NATURAL

72
'

by His

God alone is good

4.

its

good according to
creature
to no
by
ordered

essence

own

of all

He

things.

5.
much

is the

God

as

He

end ; but

His

as

Himself

is the

it is manifest

Hence

God

alone

that

Essence

own

therefore

'.

Essence

good from the Divine Goodness, inas


first exemplary,efficient and final principle

Everythingis

'

is not

...

by His
every kind of perfection
alone is good by His own
Himself

has

for He

Existence

is His

anything else

to

last end

Essence

alone

in whom

perfection.

its

Everythingis called
But
perfection
belongs
it belongs to God
only,

Essence.

own

called

goodness'46.

of all

III. God

48.

in

Infinite

is

Perfection.

ideas

The

"

finite

derived from
material extension,
are
originally
infinite
and then appliedby analogy to the goodness and perfection
of spiritual
we
beings. When
say, then, that God is infinite,
of the divine Being
that the goodness or perfection
we
mean

and

is not

has
finite,

limits.

no

when
as
we
distinctly,
compare
is
size or perfection.There

being so good and


more
perfectthan
of

i"

'

better way

Bonum

et

tantum.

there

gettinga

of

is a

by saying: God
be

cannot

it is not

if it is

beings of different

more

no

conceive

do not

better

or

in the

againstreason
it to

be

inferior

to suppose
self-contradictory
to anything else 47.

an

infinite

for
perfect,

be

is inferior

being that
*'

Whilst

He.

finite being,even

rationem

or

then

perfectthat

so

another, it would

to

two

distinct idea of the infinite than

clear and

case

limit itself we

Now

idem
secundum
sunt
sic
Quod
patet. Ratio
ens

differunt

; sed

rem

enim

boni

sit

secundum

consistit, quod

in hoc

bonum
aliquid appetibile.Unde
est quod omnia
Philosophus dicit quod
Manifestum
est autem
appetunt".
est appetibilesecun
quod unumquodque
dum
omnia
quod est perfectum ; nam
appetunt suam
perfectionem '. q. 5,

a.

"

i.

2"

'

Cum

bonum

finis,manifestum

3"

'

Bonum

effluunt ab eo
sicut in prima
modo.

4"

Et
'

propter hoc

etiam

omnium

suam

ad
rerum.

perfectionem
essentiam

suam

omnia

quod

est

per

Sic ergo
bonum

quod
'.

bonum

cum

sit in
q. 6,

a.

eo

autem

sit in Deo,

excellentissimo

2.

Unumquodque

Perfectio

enim

nulli create

dicitur

competit

essentiam, sed soli Deo, cujus solius essentia est suum


esse.
aliud ordinatur
sicut ad finem, sed ipse est ultimus
finis
Unde
manifestum
est quod
solus Deus
ha bet omnimodam

nihil

secundum
'.

suam

essentiam.

Et

ideo

ipse

solus

est

bonus

per

Ibid., a. 3.

'

5"

oportet,

essentiam.

perfectum.

rationem

Ibid., a. 4.
finisimportat
omnes
perfectiones desideratae

univoca,

summum

habeat

autem

'.

inquantum

suam

hoc

appetunt,
rationem

non

dicitur

est bonus

secundum

secundum

quod

omnium

causa

Solus Deus

bonum

Ipse

sit

est quod bonum


Deo
attribuitur,
sicut a prima causa.

dicitur
bonum
bonitate
Unumquodque
divina, sicut primo principle
exemplari, effective et finali totius bonitatis '. Ibid.,a. 4.
47
Infmitum
sed non
quantitatem sequitur
potest infinitas Deoattribui
nisi secundum
spiritualemmagnitudinem : quae quidem spiritualis
magnitude
'

NATURE

THE

OF

GOD

73

This

of which we
have been speaking,we
attribute
infinity,
in the first placeto the divine Being,then to the divine per
God is the absolute pleni
: the divine Being is infinite,
fection
tude of being ; God
He is eminently
is infinite in perfection,
all pure perfection,omnis
perfectio
simplex'.
First we
call to mind
the leadingthesis
49. Proof.
must
'

"

all

which

on

God

first discussion

our

furnish

does not

with

based

was

that

idea of

our

positivecharacteristic,but
48.
God and creatures
to distinguish
by way of negationwe come
to try to establish a proof
It would then be againstall reason
contain
the conclusion of which
would
a
positiveconcept of
the manner
of God's existence ; any
and show directly
infinity
be ruled
argument that makes such a claim must
necessarily
it will not
of court.
Nevertheless
be sufficient merely
out
is the

He

could

God

that

to prove

first

us

limited Himself, and, since

have

not

Being,could

any

been

have

not

limited

by

another

being priorto Himself ; the point is to establish that intrin


God knows
limit.
no
sically
First Argument. The
i.
leading idea of the fundamental
"

'

Since the

divine

is His

but

is summed

of St. Thomas

argument

Being

is not

perfect49.
develops this proof under

Summa

is clear that

two

in

lines

anything

God

Himself

'

is infinite and

He

in these

being received

Being,it

subsist ent

own

up

Gentiles

contra

'

God

than

more

is not

one

other

than

form
His

in the
self-ex

infinitely
being,and by this
perfect
is wanting.
being to whom no kind of perfection
Indeed a being is endowed
with perfection
in the measure
which it has existence,e.g. a man
would have no perfection

istence ; He
I mean
the

is therefore the

'

in

ad

quantum

priae

naturae

duo

attenditur, sell, quantum

bonitatem

sive

minus

album

etiam

magnitude virtutis
magnitudinum una

quo

in

eo

quantum ad proaliquid magis vel


compleatur ; pensatur
et

potentiam
Diciturenim

completionem.

modum

secundum

ad

sua

albedo

Harum
magnitudine virtutis vel facto rum.
autem
aliam
hoc ipso quod aliquid
ex
consequitur ; nam
in actu est, activum
est ; secundum
completur,
igiturmodum
quo in actu suo
est modus
virtutis ; et sic relinquiturres spirituales
magnitudinis suae
magnas
dici secundum
mole
modum
in his quae non
suae
completionis : nam
magna
Ostendendum
est igitursecun
est majus quod est melius.
sunt, illud omne
dum
Deum
infinitum
hujus magnitudinis modum
quia nullus est peresse,
fectionis suae
terminus, sive finis,sed est summe
perfectus '. Cont. Gent.,
ex

I, 43

; cp.

48
49

SUAREZ,

De

Deo, lib. II, c. i,

2 ; ST. THOMAS,
Cum
divinum
esse

Cp.
'

subsistens,manifestum
Theol., I, q. 7, a. i.

n.

5.

Cont.
non

est

Gent., I, 14.
sit esse
receptum

quod ipse

Deus

in

aliquo, sed ipse sit suum


et perfectus.'

sit infinitus

esse

Sum.

THEOLOGY

NATURAL

74

in virtue of his wisdom


; and

wisdom

if he

of his other

so

wise

by his
the degreeof
its perfections,

himselfmade

not

were

perfections.Whence

thing has determines the degree of


and the limits of the being of a thing determine the limits
perfection.Therefore if there is a being which has the
being that

of
perfection

of being,no
perfection

Being which is its own being must


of being ; justas if whiteness be sup
perfection

the total

have

posed

would

of whiteness

white

and degrees
properties
to any particular
be wanting to it ; whereas
degreesof whiteness may be wanting, and
of the

self-existent, none

be

to

thing

some

the

this because

can

the

Now

to it.

wanting

be

total

whatsoever

kind

any

of its

receives

subjectwhich

is

the whiteness

imper

fect,since it receives this whiteness conformablywith the limita


tions of its
full

the

to

own

not

wholly

according
entirely

and

God, who be
being possesses being in all its fullness,

of
perfection

is His

He

cause

and

nature

own

Therefore

whiteness.

perfection.
wanting in any possible
belong to a
Moreover, justas every dignityand perfection
thing in proportionas it has being, so any defect is found in
that it lacks being. So in regard to God,
it in the measure
from
justas He has being wholly,so is He wholly removed
non-being ; for in proportionas a thing is being,it is removed
from
non-being. Therefore defect of any kind has no place
be

cannot
'

wholly perfect. On the other


hand, things whose being is limited are imperfectnot because
in itself,absolutely,
of being considered
of the imperfection
but by this that they do not possess being in all its fullness ;
they have received being in a
they are imperfectbecause
and inferior grade 50.
particular
in God

is

consequentlyHe

'

'

60

Deus

fectum.
nobilitas.
nulla

qui
Et

Omnis

"

enim

et sic de

aliud

enim

nobilitas

esset homini
Sic ergo secundum

alio.

specialem

Nam

modum

nobilior

vel

suum

quam

universaliter

nobilitas

in nobilitate.
hoc

est

non

dico

essendi, ei nulla virtus


Sed rei, quae
est suum

modum

quo

secundum

non

ut
non

per-

habet

nobilitatis

deesse

is esset

albedinis.

Deus

dicitur
cui

potest, quae
secundum
albedinis
modum

ad

competit

deesse
suum

aliquem

secundum
tota

virtus

rei conveniat.

essendi

virtute

modus

suus

esse

alicui
totam

nihil ei de

est

esse,

contrahitur

albedinis

potest,ex
recipit,et

potestadeesse
defectu
fortasse

igiturqui
esse,
posse
totam
virtutem
probatum est, habet esse secundum
ipsius esse ;
Sicut
aliqua nobilitate, quae alicui rei conveniat.
potest ergo carere
et perfectioinest rei, secundum
omnis
nobilitas
quod est, ita omnis

supra

autem

res

secundum

esse, competit esse


aliqua albedo separata,
alicui albo aliquidde virtute
posset. Nam
secundum
recipientisalbedinem, qui earn
; sicut

tem

ens

alien jus generis


perfectum,
suum
esse
cujuscumquerei estsibi secundum
;
ex
sua
sapientia,nisi per earn sapiens esset,
deest

non

esse
quod suum
nobilitatis,majorem vel minorem,
minus
nobilis.
Igitur si aliquid est

res,

universaliter

est

esse,

cui

totum

est

totum

suum

THE

I. We

is the absolute

God

first that

say

75

form.
put in the followingsyllogistic

be

reasoning may

This

GOD

OF

NATURE

plenitudeof being,

infinite Being.

an

existence

God, whose

virtue of His essence,

'

is,

He

what

proved, is

have

we

of

divinum

esse

Himself, in

est

suum

esse

'. But a being which is,by virtue of its


subsistens,
irreceptum
but be the
what it is,suum
subsistens, cannot
esse
essence,

plenitudeof being. Therefore God is the absolute


of being ; God is infinite.
plenitude
but
Proofs of the minor : A self-subsistent being cannot
be the absolute plenitudeof being, (a) If you go through
actual or possible,
the whole series of beings,
you find that all
the one
and only cause
which
are
inevitablylimited. Now
absolute

for this universal

accounts

inevitable

and

limitation

is that

being,realized or realizable,is a subjectwhich is not


formallyexistent in virtue of its intrinsic constitution,but
of existence,an essential type being presupposed
is susceptible
each

to mark

beforehand

out

being to

be

defectus
habet
per

so

sole

rei, secundum
totaliter,ita ab

habet

aliquidesse

quod
deficit

the

non

esse.

perfectus.

Ista

esse

Deo

vero

imperfectapropter imperfectionem ipsius esse

Deus

est.

non

quae

sicut
modum

per
omnis
defectus

tantum

absoluti,

which

autem

quia

ergo

the

existence

precisedegree in

aliqualiternon
absistit

sphere of

which

essence

of the

totaliter

eo

absistit ; est igituruniversaliter


sunt

that

reason

inest

esse

quern

produced ;
is the

presupposes

shall be the definite

what

non

sunt,
enim

non

ipsa

habent

esse
secundum
totum
suum
posse, sed quia participantesse
per quemet imperfectissimum '. Cont.
particularem modum,
Gent., I, 28, and
alteri inhaerens
terminationem
actus
ibid.,43 : Omnis
cp. with
recipitex
in quo est ; quia quod est in altero est in eo
eo
modum
recipientis. Actus
per
igiturin nullo existens, nullo terminatur
esset per se existens,
: ut puta si albedo
perfectioalbedinis in ea non terminaretur, quominus haberet quidquid de per-

dam

'

fectione albedinis haberi


est actus
nullo
modo
in alio
autem
potest. Deus
existens ; quia non
in materia, ut probatum est (c.26 et 27),nee
est forma
esse
inhaeret alicui formae
suum
vel naturae, quum
ipse sit suum
esse, ut supra

(c.21) ostensum

'

'. Also :
Deus
est
Relinquitur ergo ipsum esse infmitum
actus infinitus ; quod patet ex
hoc
finitur nisi dupliciter.
quod actus non
Uno
modo
artificis recipitquantitatem
ex
parte agentis ; sicut ex voluntate
et terminum
Alio modo
ex
pulchritudo domus.
parte recipientis; sicut color
in lignisterminatur
et quantitatem
dispositionem lignorum.
recipitsecundum
divinus actus non
finitur ex
Ipse autem
est ab alio
aliquo agente, quia non
sed est a seipso; neque
finitur ex
nihil potentiae
alio recipiente,quia cum
passivae ei admisceatur, ipse est actus purus
non
receptus in aliquo ; est
enim
Deus
in nullo receptum.
Unde
ipsum esse suum
patet quod Deus est
infinitus; quod sic videri potest. Esse enim
hominis
terminatum
est ad
hominis speciem, quia est acceptum
in natura
specieihumanae
; et simile est
de esse
sit in aliquo acceptum
Esse autem
cujuslibetcreaturae.
non
Dei, cum
sed sit esse
limitatur
ad
modum
non
perfectionisessendi, sed
aliquem
purum,
totum
se

esse

in

est.

se

habet

et

potest extendere, ita divinum

sic sicut

esse

esseinfinitum

in universali
est'. Id., De

ad

infinita

potentia,q.

i, art. 2.

acceptum

THEOLOGY

NATURAL

76

in the fullness of being. Therefore, the


thing participates
self-subsistent being which is not a subjectrealized or realizable

in which

and

the

subjectto

is not

is

there

presupposedbefore existence,
which universally
have mentioned

essence

no

cause

we

inevitablylimits creatures ; it is outside every conceiv


able limit 51,it does not participate
by way of degree at all in
being but it is itself the absolute fullness of being, (b)The

and

proof may

same

subsistent

assume

being, were

reasonable

different form

all

not

represent Him

to

it would

but
perfection,

If God, the

unreasonable

be

it

only would
of being
susceptible

being, not

as

to

selfbe

and

of

represent Him

every form and every


actual only if we
nature
can
; goodness or humanity are
say
that they are
It is necessary, then, that existence
existent.

otherwise.

is

there

in

to

of

is the

is

52.
actualityto potentiality

as

distinction between

no

God, His

really distinct
'

His

The

existence.

His

Therefore

self-subsistent

Being is then

it, in
in God

Now

existence ; in the
is the first thing conceivable

existence, which
'

thing that it is possibleto conceive.


it follows that in Him
no
potentiality,
from

from

and

essence

which

essence,

being, is identical with

actualityof

which

essence,

relation

same

case

Existence

stand

should
the

'

is the

Since in God

is His

essence

is

there

does not

essence

last

differ

existence

'

53.

all

the fullness of being.


being,
II. Next we say that the infinite Being is infinite
in perfection.
and dignityaccording
Proofs: (a) A being has perfection
in which
to the measure
it is ; and imperfectionaccording
'

the

to

in which

measure

it is not

'

54. But

God

is the

fullness

of

being. Therefore He is being comprisingall the modes of


being,being in every respect, and consequentlyHis being
51

As

to

conceive

we

exclude

from

an

words

and

idea
to

tionis Deum
q. i,
52

a.
'

2, ad

Esse

humanitas

the

Infinite

by way of negation of
being limitations of which

subsistent

consider

to

attempt

derive

the

limits

of

some

other

kind

than

the
we

those

finite,we
have

no

of which

may

not

concept
we

can

from

would
be to play with
things that exist or are intelligible
Dicimur
in fine nostrae
attempting the impossible.
cogni'. ST. THOMAS,
In Boeth. de Trin.,
ignotum cognoscere
tamquam
be

'

i.

est

actualitas

significaturin

omnis

formae
nisi

vel

naturae,

non

enim

bonitas

vel

actu,
esse.
prout significaturearn
Oportet
ad
ab ipso
est aliud
essentiam
igitur quod ipsum esse
comparetur
quae
sicut actus
ad potentiam '. ST. THOMAS,
Sum.
Theol., I, q. 3, a. 4.
68
Cum
est aliud in
igiturin Deo nihil sit potentiate,sequitur quod non
essentia quam
Sua igituressentia est suum
eo
suum
esse.
'. Ibid.
esse
64
Sicut omnis
nobilitas
et
perfectio inest rei, secundum
quod est, ita
omnis
defectus
inest ei, secundum
est '. Id., Cont.
quod aliqualiternon
'

'

Gent., I, 28.

embraces, without

OF

NATURE

THE

limits,every

any

GOD

pure

77

perfection.(6) The

the existence
contingentperfection
presupposes
of a pure actuality
correspondingto it which possesses this
Now
to affirm the existence of a per
perfection
essentially.
is to affirm
fection such that it is in a state of pure actuality
that this perfection
is identical with the subsistent Being.
is
in a state of pure actuality,
Therefore all-perfection,
when
God
is the
who
identical with the subsistent being. Hence
is the
He
Now
subsistent being is eo ipso all-perfection.
of being. Therefore He is the plenitude
of all perfect
plenitude
ion ; He is infinite in perfection.
an
a
priori
2. Second
Argument. Our first argument was
is drawn
of God ; the following
one
(Sio'ri)
proofof the infinity
from a psychological
fact, namely the necessary and supreme
55.
tendencies of the soul towards the Infinite
towards
The soul by its higherfaculties spontaneously
aspires
what
is more
and more
perfect; no finite thing can satiate

existence of

"

'

the desires of the mind

infinite. Now

the

'

; the soul of man,

there

are

two

then, tends towards

alternatives

either this

of
to it or it is a matter
corresponding
illusion. If it is illusory,
then we
face to face with an
are
fact : we
of man,
the spectacle
a small and
see
inexplicable
whom
feeble creature
all the powers of body, mind and heart,
combined
with the refinement
of art, not only fail to satisfy
but ever
to a deepersense
awaken
of emptinessand disappoint

tendencyhas

real end

'

'

ment

; and

we

should therefore have

to conclude

that, whilst

'

66

Intellectus noster ad infinitum


in intelligendo
extenditur, cujus signum
quod qualibet quantitate finita data intellectus noster majorem excogitare
intellectus
nisi esset
ad infinitum
esset haec ordinatio
possit; frustra autem
infinita ; oportet igituresse
aliqua res intelligibilis
aliquam rem intelligibilem
Deus
dicimus
infinitam, quam
Deum.
et hanc
rerum,
oportet esse maximam
igiturest infinitus '.
Omni
finito potest aliquidmajus cogitari; ex quo
declaratur
quod intel
lectus noster
habet
Intelinfinitatem
sui
quandam
intelligibilis.
respectu
Omni
est
autem
ligibileautem
res.
actus, cum
potentiae respondet suus
dicatur.
Cum
sit actus
et perfectio
potentia ad actum
igiturintelligibile
Infiniti autem
infinitam.
intellectus,oportet ponere aliquam rem
intelligibilem
nihil agat ultra seipsum '. Id.,
principium non
potest esse aliquid finitum cum
est

'

Cont.

Gent., I, 43.
intellectus
finitum, desiderium
quietare potest, quod exinde ostenditur, quod intellectus quolibetfinito dato, aliquidultra molitur apprehendere ;
unde
qualibet linea finita data, aliquam majorem molitur apprehendere, et
'

Nihil

similiter

in numeris,
et haec
est
'. Ibid., Ill, 50.

ratio

infinitae

additionis

in numeris

et lineis

mathematicis
6t

Essai
that

VAN
sur
one

WEDDINGEN,
la

Elements

Raisonnes
de
S. Anselme, pp. 307 and
struck by the oft recurrence

philosophicde

cannot

but

be

Religion, p.
This

374.
author

320.
of the noblest

Cp.

also

remarks
minds

to

THEOLOGY

NATURAL

78
and

harmony

monstrosity in

more,

will under

good

of the

form

human

satisfythem.
infinite Being who

Conse

the form

intellect under

the

nay

of the

will

the existence of what


proves
quently there must reallyexist an
our

world,

anomaly,

an

tendencies

natural

soul

object of

of this

nature.

fact, then, of these

The

beings

master-pieceof creation, is

alone, the

man

lower

the

finalitygovern

of the true, and

and

is the

since

of

our

dependence of

with infinity,
the only being that can
any kind is incompatible
be identified with the infinite is God ; therefore God
whom

livingand caringfor us is infinite.


of Krause, lays the
50. Objections. Tiberghien,a disciple
charge of assertinga contradiction againstthose who maintain
conceive

we

as

"

that

is infinite and

God

the world.

distinct from

he argues, must
be all that is ; for,if we
thingoutside of or beside God, He would

in that
But

the advocates

is not

distinct from
Infinite is not

of his

final

(b)in

the

any

since
infinite,

parts.

of the dualistic

infinite57.

argument

of His

and

be

not

(a) in

the

meanings in
that

sense

be, in the ineffable super-eminenceof His


reason

conceive

be divided into two

realitywould

two
replyby distinguishing

miss

could

infinite,

positionmaintain that God


is,for they postulate
a created world
as a reality
Him
; therefore they are guiltyof sayingthat the

all that

We

of

the whole

case

The

being and

own

of all that

cause

the

the

the

nature,

the

formal

efficient exemplary

supreme

that the Infinite must

pre

Infinite must

is outside of Him,

there

major

grant

we

be

that is to say
formally,
must
constitute, all that exists, we
intrinsically
deny. In
the same
his minor ; and accordingly
way we contradistinguish
sense

refuse assent

to the conclusion.

St. Thomas
'

foresaw

The

beingwhich

other

beings and
But

stance.

from

other

St. Anselm's

57

See

and

65.

He

works

50 and

The

such

with
as

author

objection:

same

that it is distinct from

clearlynot

stone

or

'.

wood.

And

is that the objectiveelement


such

vivid

all

entity,is a finite sub


and is reallydistinct

infinite substance

reason

them

of the

is

an

subjective notion

the

nature

not

is not

to

propounded the

possess their
is of such a nature

beings ;

appears

the

sophie,pp.

does

argument.

the infinite

envelop

is of

God

sequentlyGod

and

clearness

that

its

to

Con

this he

in the

light

idea of

seems

to

well, p. 307.

passim, especiallyIntroduction
Esquisse de Phil. Mor.,

54 (Brussels,1888), and

" la Philopp.

48, 54,

THE

NATURE

OF

'

replied: Because God exists


predicateinfinityof Him, He
all other

from
'

Him

beings and

its nature

by

is such

nature

every

surpasses

but

do

we

is determinate

of

reason

not

be

distinct

confounded

with

to the

assent

we

other

some

being is finite which


not

be
necessarily

must

must

we

that that
proposition
is determined and distinct from other beings,
which is exclusive of the
realizes a perfection

beingis finite which


of
perfections

79

Himself, because

must

they

68. In other words,

because

of

GOD

and

not

allow

distinct from

that

that

all others

exclusive

perfectionbut because its


that it embraces
all modes
of being,and thus
other being because it compriseseverything
some

eminentlyin its absolute substance.


A rejoinder
might be made : Finite beings are not pure
of reality.Since
endowment
non-entity,
they have their own
this is so, there is no reason
why they should not be added to
the infinite being. But if this addition were
made, we should
have a total which is greater than infinitywhich is absurd.
Therefore the infinite impliesa contradiction.
To this we replyby denying the supposition
which underlies
the major. Addition
is possibleonly of terms
which
are
"

units of the

same

Being, and

creatures

genus

; and

between

God, the transcendent

that

enjoy only an existence analogous


to that of God
there is nothing common
in the same
genus :
therefore the supposed addition is intrinsically
impossible.
such an addition intrinsically
Furthermore, even were
possible,
which we
do not allow, the resultant would
be more
beings,
that is to say more
natures
as
opposed to nothing,not more
excellence ; in fact it would
being,i.e.more
imply
necessarily
of any
less excellence,inasmuch
kind
as
a
being susceptible
of compositionwould
be inferior to that whose
absolute sim
plicity
permits of none.
III. THE
51.

Meaning

of

IMMENSITY

Immensity.

"

For

OF

GOD

being to
its activity
upon
a

be somewhere,

that is to say, for it to exercise


other beings,
is certainly
a
therefore,since both spiritual
perfection
; and
*8

tiam.

Ergo
R.

'

Quod

ita

Sed

Deus

Deus

non

Dicendum

receptum

in

substansecundum
est aliud, est finitum
quod non
enim
est aliud.
est hoc et non
Non
est lapis nee
lignum.
est infinitus secundum
substantiam.
quod ex hoc ipso quod esse Dei est per se subsistens non
est hoc

aliquo, prout

et alia removentur

ab

eo

'.

dicitur

Sum.

infinitum,

distinguiturab

Theol., I, q. 7,

a.

i, ad

3.

omnibus

aliis

THEOLOGY

NATURAL

8o

God
perfection,

only somewhere, to have a


sphere of action in space like
definite
be circumscribed by ambient space like
to be

However

possess it.

must

too

this

have

substances

created

material

and

limited presence and a


to
and stillmore
spirits

which
imperfection

apply to
the Being without division or limit. In order to gain as com
which corre
pletean idea as possibleof the divine perfection
sponds to the presence of a created being in space, we must
in turn
examine
(i)on what grounds, (2)to what extent, (3)

material bodies,impliesan

in what

manner,

of His

must

we

This

works.

in which
analysingthe manner
in freeingthis conception
then
is present and
find included
element
of imperfectionthat we

creature

from

midst

the

reason,

will consist in

examination
a

is

God

that

say

fundamental

(4) for what


present in

cannot

every

in it.
In

i.

wider

a
expression,
being is said
active influence,
and in this sense

of the

sense

of its
present by reason
presentto the objectsunder
within
to the things falling
and in the
strictly
present only where
attribute to

He

thingsby

these

God.

and

which

His

Power, inasmuch

He

more

of the

different

God

created, which

knows

even

expressiona being is
The presence that we
substantially.

has

He

works

on

attribute to

must

we

creature

it is

the control of its power, and


the scope of its perception
;
sense

proper
it is

be

to

grounds, we

and

can

is

He

naturallypresent to the
preserves in being,which
'

governs.

Therefore, God

all

is in all

subjectto
His Power
; He is in all thingsby His Presence, as all things
bare and open to His eyes ; He is in all thingsby His
are
Essence,inasmuch as He is the cause of existence to all things 59.
as

things are

'

'

God

is in all things ; not,

accident ; but as
an
it works.
God
.

indeed, as part of their essence,


agent is present to anythingupon

an

causes

existence

they first begin to exist,but


existence.

present

'

Sic

sunt

et

I, q. 8,

long

as

Deus

is most

est

in

intimate

omnibus

thing exists,God
of existence.
to

which

thing and

must

Now
what

be

exist
is at

omnia
ejus
per potentiam, inquantum
praesentiam in omnibus, inquantum omnia nuda
adest
aperta oculis ejus ; est in omnibus
per essentiam, inquantum
ut causa
est (art.i) '. ST. THOMAS,
essendi, sicut dictum
Sum.
Theol.,
ergo

potestatisubduntur
omnibus

as

as

thingsnot only when


they are preservedin

long as

it,according to its mode

is what
(esse)

ence

69

to

Therefore

as

in

nor

a.

3.

; est per

NATURE

THE

the very
mination

bottom

of all

things,inasmuch

is in

of whatever

as

thing. Hence

thingsintimately60.
Further, omnipresenceor ubiquityis

2.

81

GOD

it is the final deter

it must

be that God

'

is in all

'

OF

an

to
is in every
place; which means
First,He is so in all things as givingthem

God

attribute of God.
exist

everywhere.

being,and power,
and operation; for He is in every placeas givingit existence
inasmuch
and locative power.
Also, thingsplacedare iriplace,
as
they fillplace; and God fillsevery place; not, indeed, like
inasmuch
as it does not
a body ; for a body is said to fillplace,
of another
suffer the co-presence
body ; whereas by God
being in a place,others are not thereby excluded from it ;
indeed, by the very fact that He givesexistence to everything
in every place,He fillsevery place 61.
of
quotationjust cited also indicates the manner
3. The
God's
continues :
Al
everywhere. St. Thomas
presence
though corporealthingsare said to be in anything as in that
which
contains them, nevertheless
spiritual
things contain
those thingsin which they are ; as the soul contains the body.
Hence also God is in thingsas containingthem ; nevertheless
by a certain similitude to corporealthings,it is said that all
6a.
thingsare in God, inasmuch as they are contained by Him
Incorporealthingsare not in placeby contact of dimensive
quantity,as bodies are ; but by contact of power 63. Hence
'

'

'

'

'

60

'

Deus

est in omnibus

'

quidem sicut pars essentiae, vel sicut


in rebus,
causat
esse
quod agit. Deus
solum
non
quando primo esse incipiunt,sed quamdiu in esse conservantur.
Quamdiu igiturres habet esse, tamdiu
oportet quod Deus adsit ei secundum
modum
habet.
Esse
cuiillud quod est magis intimum
esse
autem
est
quo
inest ; cum
sit formale
omnium
libet,et quod profundius omnibus
respectu
in re sunt.
Unde
'.
rebus
et intime
quae
oportet quod Deus sit in omnibus
accidens, sed sicut agens

I, q. 8, a.
61

'

Deus

rebus,

adest

non

ei in

i.

est in omni

loco, quod est esse ubique. Primo


quidem sicut est
rebus, ut dans eis esse, et virtutem, et operationem, sic etiam
est in omni
loco, ut dans ei esse, et virtutem
locativam.
Item, locata sunt in
loco in quantum
locum
sicut
omnem
replent locum
; et Deus
replet; non
dicitur replerelocum, inquantum
non
compatitur secum
corpus, corpus enim
aliud corpus,
sed per hoc quod Deus
excluditur
est in aliquo loco, non
quin
alia sint ibi ; imo
locatis
loca, quod dat esse omnibus
per hoc replet omnia
loca '. I, q. 8, a. 2.
quae replentomnia
82
Licet
in aliquo sicut in continente, tamen
corporalia dicantur esse

in omnibus

'

continent
spiritualia

in quibus sunt ; sicut anima


continet
Unde
ea
corpus.
est in rebus, sicut continens
Tamen
similitudinem
res.
per quamdam
omnia
in Deo, inquantum
continentur
ab ipso '
esse
corporalium dicuntur
I, q. 3, a. i, ad 2.

et

Deus

63

sicut

'

Incorporalia non

corpora,

sunt

sed per contactum

in loco

per contactum
virtutis '. I, q. 3,

quantitatisdimensivae,
a.

2, ad

i.

THEOLOGY

NATURAL

82

according as their power can extend itself to one or to many,


it is in one
or
to a small thing,or to a great one
; in this way
M.
'As
the
soul is
and in a small or largeplace
in many
places,
'

in every
in each one

whole
and

'

in all

whole

part of the body, so is God

things

65.

omnipresence of God is a simple corollaryof His


priorto His
immensity which is a higher absolute perfection
It belongs to anything to be everywhere
creative activity
:
be every
it must
absolutely(perse)when, on any supposition,
alone.
For whatever
This properlybelongs to God
where.
if an infinite number
of placesare supposed,even
were
number
supposed besides what already exist, it would be necessary
4. The

'

that God

should be in all of them

; for

exist

nothing can

except

by Him'66.
Although
tion of God's

and

proper
we

an

positive
representa

conceive

can

eminent

there must

that

perfec

some

manner,

local presence gives to finite


absolute exigence that involves

what

intrinsic and

beings, some
or

Being, in

correspondsto

tion that

immensity,yet

be in the infinite

His

form

cannot

we

substantial presence in all the worlds that He has created


His omnipotence,His omniscience
will create, where
ever

action
providential
supreme
of God.
52. Proof of the Immensity
His

and

have

be

to

exercised.

The

proofof the immen


sity of God is evident from what we have just said. The
infinite Being comprises every
absolutelypure perfection
;
the
; therefore
immensity is an absolutelypure perfection
"

infinite Being is immense.

Proofofthe minor premiss: To be endowed with an absolutely


to possess a perfection
which excludes
means
pure perfection
that can
detract from it. Now
the presence
all imperfections
it is something positive,
of a thing somewhere, inasmuch
as
is a perfection
without
; immensity is justthis same
perfection
that are
the other impairing elements
mixed
with it when
64

ad

'

quod

Secundum

ejus se potest extendere

virtus

vel ad

secundum

hoc

substantia

magnum,
vel magno
'.
vel pluribus locis,et in loco parvo
'
""
Sicut anima
est tota in qualibet parte

parvum

omnibus
""

'

et
Per

singulisentibus
convenit

ad

unum

vel ad

incorporea

Ibid.,ad.

multa,

est in

uno

2.

corporis,ita Dens

totus

est in

'.

Ibid., ad. 3.
ubique alicui, quando

esse
tale est qnod, qualibet
Deo
positione facta, sequitur illud esse ubique. Et hoc proprie convenit
;
etiamsi
loca
infinita
quia quotcumque
ponantur,
ponerentur
praeter ista
Deum
nisi per
esse
sunt, oporteret in omnibus
; quia nihil potest esse
quae
ipsum '. I, q. 8, a. 4.
se

THE

realized in creatures.

of

case

for the double


imperfection

involves

being which

of

the

In

the

depends on

it is circumscribed

or

in

GOD

OF

NATURE

creature,

other

presence
it is a mode

that

reason

creature

some

83

itself,and that, as
restricted,it is
way

The

immensity, however,
of God is identical with His substantial being; that beinghas
unlimited in every
extended
no
parts but is indivisible reality
line,and excludingby its very essence
every limit,no matter
limitation.

subject to
essentially

what

and

be the number

may

size of the worlds to which

His

action extends.
Therefore
What

simpleperfection.
immensityis an absolutely
is there,

connexion

between
His

present.

terminate

is there

But

action

the

in

and

is immense

; for since God

action should

ask, between

His presence in place?


concomitance
relation of constant

on

the two

may

Himself

thingsoutside
Undoubtedly there is a

of God

we

something

between

the

be that

it cannot
which

to

He

of God

action

is not

and

His

placea necessary connexion, in such a way that we


infer the latter from the former ?
can
logically
in the affirmative,
arguingfrom the im
Many writers answer
St. Bona venture,
of action at a distance
: Cajetan,
possibility
the Dominican
School in general,Suarez, Kleutgen,are sup
porters of this view, and they claim in generalthe support of
St. Thomas's authority. On the other hand, Scotus, Vasquez
and assert that the
and some
others hold to a negative
answer,
which their opponents rely does not apply to
on
principle
the question.
28, c. 3) argues that the action by which God
Vasquez (Disp.,
preserves the world in beingis no other than the continuation
presence in

'

'

of the act of creation ; but the creative act requiresthat there


be no pre-existing
subtrate since it producesthe created thing

from

nothingness
;

of God

therefore it is absurd

to suppose

the action

presence in the objectof His


of action
action. And he goes on to say that the impossibility
at a distance proves at most
only a presence of continuous
of God
whereas
what
needs proof in the case
juxtaposition,
is an

demands
necessarily

inmost

which

presence

fundamental

sense.

From

it is not

to infer from
logical
stantially
present in place.

These

criticisms

M.S.P.-VOL.

n.

seem

to

His

penetrates the
these

creature

premisseshe

the action of God

us

well founded

in

concludes
that He

and

most
that

is sub

the inference
G

THEOLOGY

NATURAL

84
they oppose

consequentlyis

action itself and

therefore, in order

and

between

nexion
action

back

on

to

substantial

the

to an

appears

the

condition
prerequisite

is

there

be

by proofsthat

con

necessary
of God
and

His

either to go
the one
and

necessary
is anterior to both

to establish each

object

posteriorto

presence

would

thingswithout, it
which
some
principle

other, or else

the

not

that

show

to

of God

presence

deals with

creative action

His

that

; the
illogical

seems

mutually

are

independent.
Moreover

think

we

teaching of St.

in agreement

are

we

Thomas

the

on

with

the

of creation.

act

whole

True, the

be brought againstus :
have alreadyquoted may
we
passage
God is in all things,
as an
agent is present to what it acts upon.
'

every agent should be united to what


is immediatelysubjected
touch
to its action and that it should

it is necessary

For

it

his

by

67. But

'

moved
of

way

as

any
the

in

to this

in

the

spot

universe

created

divine

object

by

reasons

act

in

reason

which

consequently,
this wise : Just

their presence
manifests itself in the
to

us

in asserting
that
us
justifies
analogically

eminent

an

they

objects reveals

Being comprisesin

sponds in

where

action of God

the

St. Thomas

an

con

corporealagents presupposes

to
legitimate

of exterior

action

reply that

action of

The

immediate

agent moving and

an

we

it is
hypothesis,

place,so

Himself

to the

way

the

something which corre


denoted by the local
perfection

of finite agents68

presence

IV.
53.

between

analogy.

their presence
on

it follows that

operation. Whence

is necessary

tact

that

THE

Meaning

without

ABSOLUTE

and

comment

Proof.
the

"

IMMUTABILITY
We

concise

cannot

and

do

clear

OF

GOD

better

than

statement

give
of

St.

Thomas.
God is immutable

i.

is

God
above

6 7

'

enim

that there is

what

it is shown
precedes,

contingere.
Cp.
\

some

(a)First,because it was
first Being,whom
call God
we

that
shown
; and

est in omnibus

Deus
omne

mutatio

From

immutable,
altogether

I, q. 8, a.
88

'

agens
Unde

rebus, sicut agens adest ei in quod agit. Oportet


conjungi ei in quod immediate
virtute illud
agit, et sua
et
simul '.
probatur quod motum
movens
oportet esse

i.

Cont.

Gent., II, 16, 7, and

'

17.

Quod

creatio

non

est motus

nequc

THE

NATURE

OF

GOD

85

be purely Actual
(Actus Pur us),
Being must
that potentiality
without
; for the reason
any potentiality
is absolutely
posteriorto actuality.Everything which is in
Hence
it is
way a potentiality.
any way changed,is in some
for God to be in any way change
evident that it is impossible
is moved,
able,
(b)Secondly, because everything which
remains as it was
as
term, and passes away
as
regardssome
what
other
term
is
from
moved
whiteness to
; as
regardssome
in substance ; thus in everything
blackness, remains the same
kind of compositionto be found
which is moved, there is some
above that in God there is no composition;
It has been shown
for that He is absolutely
simple. Hence it is manifest that God
be moved,
cannot
(c)Thirdly,because everythingwhich is
moved
somethingby its motion, and attains to what
acquires
is Infinite,compre
it had not attained previously.As God
hending in Himself the plenitudeof perfectionof all Being,
extend Himself to any
He cannot acquireanything new,
nor
He
not
extended
was
previously.Hence
thing whereto
69.
motion in no way belongsto Him
immutable : Thus in every creature
2. God alone is absolutely
to change either as regardssubstantial
there is a potentiality
existence,as in the case of thingscorruptible
; or as regards
locality
only,as in the case of the celestial bodies [which in the
considered
incorruptible]
physicsof the ancients were
; or
of their
as
regardsthe order of their end, and the application
with the angels; and
powers to divers objects,as is the case
taken together
further the whole order of creatures
is capableof
beingchanged,since the Creator has power to maintain them in
this first

that

'

'

existence

or

to annihilate them.

But

as

God

alone

is in

none

of

Deum
omnino
immutabilem
esse
:
praemissis (q.2, a. 3) ostenditur
all
ostensum
est
esse
(loc.cit.)
quod primum ens, quod
Quidem, quia supra
dicimus
actum
Deum
ens
oportet esse
; et quod hujusmodi primum
purum
absque permixtione alicujus potentiae ; eo quod potentia simpliciter est
modo
Omne
autem
est aliquo
mutatur,
quod quocumque
posterior actu.
modo
in potentia. Ex
aliquo modo
patet quod impossibileest Deum
quo
mutari." 2" Quia omne
quod movetur, quantum ad aliquid manet, et quan
de
albedine
in nigredinem,
movetur
tum
ad aliquid transit ; sicut quod
Et sic in omni
manet
substantiam.
secundum
eo
quod movetur, attenditur
est autem
aliqua compositio. Ostensum
supra (q.3, a. 7) quod in Deo nulla
manifestum
est compositio, sed est omnino
est quod Deus
simplex. Unde
motu
moveri
suo
non
quod movetur,
aliquid acquipotest. 3" Quia omne
sit
rit,et pertingitad illud ad quod prius non
pertingebat. Deus autem, cum
in
totius
se
omnem
infinitus,
plenitudinem perfectionis
comprehendens
esse,
in aliquid ad quod prius non
se
non
potest aliquidacquirere ; nee extendere
sibi competit motus
'. I, q. 9, a. I.
pertingebat. Unde nullo modo
68

'

Ex

i"

"

THEOLOGY

NATURAL

86

mutable, it belongsto Him

these

ways
immutable

V.

to

The

"

clearer there stands out

concept of it becomes

our

at once
eternity
imperfection.In

without

duration

These

(b)limit, (c)vicissitude.

ment,

by

'

the Scholastics

of
possession

(a)commence

has been

become

universally
perfect

Eternityis the full and

life ; Interminabilis

interminable

an

of

features have

since Boethius

fixed in the definition which


received

altogether

idea of

its distinctive characteristics the absence

as

be

to

GOD

OF

Eternity.

as

everyone

proportionas

ETERNITY

THE

of Divine

54. Meaning

appears

alone

70.

'

vitae tota

perfectapossessio'.
Let us go through the ascendingscale of contingentbeings
in such a way as to eliminate one
by one from our concept of
that are found
in them.
the duration of God all imperfections
stand corporeal
substances,which (a)come
1. At the bottom
the result of a natural
moment
as
into being at a particular
acci
combination, (b) constantlymanifest
or
disintegration
later their
or
dental changes (phenomena),until (c) sooner
combines
or
decomposes under the action of
very substance
simul et

extrinsic action, to

some

form

one

or

more

substances

new

(temporaryduration, tempus).
2. Higher in the scale come
spiritual
beingswhich, though
unchangeablein their substantial nature and therefore natur
(a)are no less subject to variations in the
allyimperishable,
development of their faculties,and (b)are dependent at each
the omnipotence of God
for their preservation
in
moment
on
received

(c)at
life (permanentduration,aevum)

the

have

being they

this

dependence involves

of their

the commencement
It does

not

here

us

concern

succession of real
positive
parts
parts (St.Bona venture)or simplya succession of possible
(St.Thomas, Suarez) in the duration of a spiritual
being.
is
matter
such
the
condition
of every
as
a
offad
3. Although
substance, yet it is not repugnant to the mind to
spiritual
whether

'

70

dum

Sic

esse

tantum
et

virtutis

communiter

potestate est
rum

creatura

est

potentia

ad

mutationem

sicut corpora
corruptibilia: vel secundum
vel
secundum
ordinem
(sicut corpora
coelestia)
;
substantiate

applicationem

creaturae

omni

igiturin

esse

sit mutabilis,

et

non

diversa, sicut in angelis;

ad

sunt

mutabiles

esse

earum.

proprium ejus est

secundum

Unde,
omnino

vel
esse

ad

et universaliter

potentiam creantis, in
cum

Deus

immutabilem

nullo
esse

istorum
'.

secun-

locale

finem,
omnes
cu

jus

modo-

Ibid.,a.

2.

OF

NATURE

THE

GOD

87

spiritcreated from all eternityand raised at the


of its end ; such a being would
first instant to the possession
neither date of origin
know
nor
change in action from the point
end ; but does it follow
of view of the enjoyment of its supreme
conceive

that it would

be eternal

be ; for

allowingthat
variation in its acts and no real development
there were
no
would
in the duration of its existence,such a favoured
spirit
stillalwaysbe liable to annihilation and, consequently,
radically
speakingit
Strictly

subjectto

the law

would

not

even

of successive duration.

this negativeidea that we have of eternity


perfect
and unvaryingexistence
must
raise the factof this perpetual
we
to the heightof an
however
of a spirit,
great such a dignity,
and exclude; as beingintrinsically
essential right,
incompatible
with the nature
of an eternal being,not only the fact but even
of a commencement,
of an end, or of any kind
the possibility
In order

of
'

series of successive

to

events

in the

of its existence.

course

'

my

God,' writes St. Augustine, Thy years neither

come

departingthrust out
by coming years,
Thy years are one
away.
day ; and Thy day is not daily,but To-day,seeingThy To-day
for neither doth it replace
to-morrow,
gives not place unto
yesterday. Thy To-day, is Eternity 71.
of God
It follows from what
have said that the eternity
we
is absolute,that is to say, independentof all relation to time,
justas His immensity is independentof all relation to space ;
nor

go ;

they stand

together,nor
for they pass not

are

'

and

therefore the

and

the future of His

from

His

co-existence of God
creatures

is

with

the

past,the present

following
only a corollary

eternity72.

71

Confessions,XI,

72

'

Conveniens

13.
definitio

dicens
ponit Boetius
perfecta possessio'.
Sicut in cognitionem simplicium oportet
venire
nos
per composita, ita in
venire
cognitionem aetemitatis
oportet nos
per tempus ; quod nihil aliud
est quam
secundum
numerus
motus
prius et posterius. Cum enim in quolibet
sit successio, et una
motu
hoc quod numeramus
prius
; ex
pars post alteram
et posterius in motu,
apprehendimus tempus, quod nihil aliud est quam
numerus
In eo
autem
prioriset posteriorisin motu.
quod caret motu, et
eodem
modo
se
habet, non
est accipere prius et posterius. Sicut
semper
igiturratio temporis consistit in numeratione
prioriset posteriorisin motu,
ita in apprehensione unifo mutatis
extra
con
motum,
ejus quod est omnino
sistit ratio aetemitatis.
Item
dicuntur
ea
tempo re mensurari, quae princiin tempo re, ut dicitur (Phys., lib. IV, text. 70). Et
pium et finem habent
hoc ideo, quia in omni
eo
quod movetur, est accipere aliquod principium et
est omnino
Quod vero
aliquem finem.
immutabile, sicut nee successionem.

quod
'

aeternitas

est

aetemitatis

interminabilis

vitae

est

ea

tota

quam
simul

et

THEOLOGY

NATURAL

88

'

is Eternal.

God

55.

"

idea of

The

eternityfollows

immu

from
the idea of time follows movement,
as appears
as
tability,
is supremely immutable, it
God
the preceding. Hence
as
supremely belongs to Him to be eternal. Nor is He eternal
eternity,whereas no other being is
only : but He is His own
its

duration,

own

His

own

VI. THE
56. Proof.
that there

"

are

show

not

and

cannot

i" Ex

finem

aut

hoc

quod

GOD

OF

polytheismis

be several

and

error

an

the

gods answering to

Being.
habere
id

notificatur
potest. Sic ergo ex duobus
est in aeternitate, est interminabile, id est
2" Per hoc
terminus
ad utrumque
referatur.

quod

principio et fine carens


; ut
ipsa aeternitas successione

?uod

that

may

principium

nee

aeternitas

UNICITY

We

concept of the supreme


ita

essence,

'

alone

God

own

Eternity really and


properly
follows
for
God
alone,
eternity
immutability.
74.
is absolutely
immutable

in

speaking is
And

is His

He

as

is

God

'

Eternal.

is

alone

God

existence.

own

'

His

is He

so

Being, and hence


eternity 73.

uniform

own

is its

other

no

as

simul

caret, tota

existens

'.

Sum.

Theol.,

i.
q. 10,
'
In tempore
a.

est duo
considerare, scilicet ipsum tempus, quod est succesDicitur
aeternitatis
sivum, et nunc
tempo ris quod est imperfectum.
ergo
temtota simul, ad removendum
nunc
tempus ; et perfectaad excludendum
poris '. Ibid., ad 5.
'

aeternitas
sit mensura
esse
permanentis, secundum
quod aliquid
hoc recedit ab aeternitate.
permanentia essendi, secundum
Quaedam
sic recedunt
autem
est subjectum
a
permanentia essendi, quod esse eorum
transmutationis, vel in transmutatione
consistit,esse hujusmodi mensurantur
tempore, sicut omnis motus, et etiam esse omnium
corruptibilium. Quaedam
recedunt
minus
in trans
vero
a
nee
permanentia essendi ; quia esse eorum
mutatione
habent
est
consistit, nee
subjectum transmutationis
; tamen
transmutationem
adjunctam vel in actu vel in potentia : sicut patet de
naturam
angelisqui habent esse intransmutabile
pertinet,
quantum ad eorum

Cum

recedit

transmutabilitate

cum

ligentiarum
surantur

quod

secundum

et affectionum

aevo,
mensurat

et

electionem,
loco

est medium

quod

rum

inter

et

Et

aeternitatem

intel-

transmutabilitate

cum

modo.

suo

ideo

et

hujusmodi
Esse

tempus.

men

autem

est
mutabilitati
aeternitas, nee
mutabile, nee
adjunctum.
habet
in se prius
autem
non
tempus habet prius et posterius ; aevum
et posterius,sed ei conjungi possunt ; aeternitas autem
habet
non
prius neque
posterius,neque ea compatitur'. I, q. 10, a. 5.
78
Ratio
aeternitatis consequitur immutabilitatem,
sicut ratio temporis

Sic ergo

'

consequitur motum,
maxime

aeternus, sed
est

non

suum

74

'

litatem

Deus

esse.

Aeternitas

dictis

'.

'.

Solus

suum

I, q.
solo

autem

Ibid., a. 3,

nulla

tamen
est

proprie in

et

vere

patet (art.praec.). Unde


competit esse aeternum.
cum

;
autem

aeternitas

sua

consequitur.

superiusostensum

ex

sibi maxime
aeternitas

est sua

essentia, ita

sua

ut

immutabilis,

10,

alia

a.

Deo

Deus

res

sit

uniforme.

esse

cum

Nee
sua

Deus

sit

solum

est

duratio, quia

Unde

sicut

est

2.

est

quia

est omnino

aeternitas

immutabi

immutabilis,

ut

est

NATURE

THE

OF

GOD

89

alreadyseen that the unity of plan and purpose


it affords an in
that is manifested by the universe as we know
of Him who presides
75.
its governance
dication of the unicity
over
which
This affords a presumption in favour of His unicity,
confirm by two arguments.
we
may
We

have

From

1.

fact that God

the

is His

self-subsistence.

"

It is

impossiblethat the actual beingof an individual,e.g. my own


communicated
to
personalbeing,should be shared by'others,
is absolutelyand
the divine nature
several. But
entirely
actual
it is
identical with His
Therefore
personal
being.
impossiblethat the divine nature should be shared by several
gods.
of gods would only be possible
if
In other words, a plurality
the divine

were

essence

type,distinct

from

His

existence,that

could be identified with several

could be realized,and

or
species

individuals

fallingwithin it. But the divine


type capableof being shared by several
Being is not a specific
individuals.
Therefore there can
only be one God T6.
Infinite simplicity
is identical with infinite unity; in virtue
of His infinite simplicity
God not only is one
God, but that
the whole of
And
as
uniquenessis His essentially.
oneness,
of God is His actual being,there is nothing in it
the essence
that can
to several, nothing that
is not
be communicated
numericallyone and unique.
that there should be two infinite
2. It is impossible
beings,
with

several

different from one


another
or
suppose them
lutelyalike. For if we suppose them to be different,one
whether

has

we

that
perfection

the other

lacks, and

is,to say the least,not infinite. If we


perfectlyalike, we are faced with two
75

Cp. Sum.

'

enim

Deum

quod

Theol., I, q.
esse

illud unde

sed
pptest,
Si ergo

id, unde

Socrates

per

enim

plures Socrates, ita non


venit Deo.
Nam
ipse Deus
Theol.,I, q. 3,
'

Natura

a.

unde

3 ; q. n,

a.

them

alternatives

to

be

either

Socrates

hoc

aliquid,nullo

modo

est

est
multis

communicari
homo, multis
nisi
uni tantum.
communicari,
potest
hie
sicut
est
non
homo,
quod
possunt
per
autem
Hoc
conpossent esse plures homines.
est'.
est sua
Sum.
natura, ut supra ostensum

est hie homo,


id esset homo,

esse

suppose

a.

aliquidsingulareest

Illud

communicabile.

then

therefore the latter

3 ; Cont. Gent., I, 42, 3 and 6.


Manifestum
stratur
ex
ejus simplicitate.

n,

demon

unum

abso

est

non

3.

in
Deus, aut est per seipsam individuata
significatahoc nomine
hoc Deo, aut per aliquidaliud.
Si per aliud, oportet quod ibi sit compositio ;
si per seipsam, ergo impossible est quod alteri conveniat.
Illud enim
quod
est individuationis
principium, non
potest esse pluribus commune.
Impossi*
bile est igitur
esse
plures deos '. Cont. Gent., I, 42,

former

for
of

d'etre

77

'Deum

sic
ergo

Si
uni
ille
esse

ergo

quod
in

quo

plures

and

that

has

4,

a.

2)

quod

esset
deos

Si

privatio,
'.

Sum.

autem

non

ejus

comprehendit
oporteret

eos

simpliciter

esset

Theol.,

I,

q.

se

differre.

n,

a.

then

totam

alterieorum

that

77.

Ostensum

perfectionem

Aliquid

perfectus.
3.

raison
eminent

an

perfectionis.

perfectio

esset,

the

beings

in

the

longer

no

be

in

infinite

infinitate

hoc

is

conclude

We
two

In

not.

God

comprise,

being.

ex

is

definitely

must

be

it

or

latter,

the

must

Deus

dii,

plures
alteri.

non

He

cannot

probatur

essent

In

so

exists

there

unum

(q.

supra

essendi.
veniret

that

be

to

God

on

infinite.

order

esse

enim

dependent

not

hypothesis

any

est

is

in

all

is

everything

degree,
in

it

case,

infinite,

Et

infinite

second

the

est

THEOLOGY

NATURAL

90

ergo

con-

deesset.

Impossibile

PART

The

57.

intrinsic

as

the

case

medium

of

actions,

being

substance

is
His

and

it is

ence

since

is accidental

is substance.

in

In

God,

throughout

accident

an

it needs

exist

to

it ; and

on

For

their

with

its nature.

of

the

through

acts

latter, together

what

in order

depends
from

proportion

of view

point

another
that

be

can

also

and

determinations

of God

is

58.

in

Life

God.

"

transitive

and

latter

knowledge

are

Beings
subject
should

to

inhere

its

to

im
in

depend

accident

an

is the

; for this

perfected

to

There

but

and

reason

The

and

the

to

The

transcendent

substantial

highest

natural

to

acci

the

nature

activity.
of

are

kinds,

two

of

manifestations

'

is

ad

He

beings
there

now

extra

is

no

', that

from

them.

is before

in

are

reason

is, on

actuality without

reaction

is what

belong

to

proper

the

volition.

other

He

which

of creatures

actions
;

on

independence

any

turn

why

God

things

out

potentiality

Moreover

anything

their

exists

is the

He

and

has

act.

is

no

vegetable

essential

substance,

since

subject

Being

creatures.

transitively

act

side Himself,

power

of

of reaction

law

the

not

act

the

perfections

immanent

which

to

is not

the

self-active

both

has
all-perfect,

dental

both

He

substance

is

who

substance

First

of

trace

essence

same

perfection.

God,

He

nature

determinations

no

is this

is the

being

imperfect.

perfecting of

this

The

powers.

being

Nevertheless,

it is

finite

of

essence

nature

of

there
of

the

activities.

accidental

whole

The

"

principleof

pliesimperfection,
a

it is ;

what

operative

are

however,
the

of

of God.

God

of

Activity

Action

reason

considered
In

and

Nature

III

need
and

actuality

to

point

out

sensitive,
of

are

God.

that

the

lower

incompatible
Intellectual

91

degrees
with

of

the

life, however"

life,
pure

NATURAL

92

it

is

buted

be

attributed

order,

and

endowed

with

enjoy

of

the

the

being

perfect

of

sion
than

only
of

the
in

divine

the

actual

own

directs

therefore

belong

it

is

This

its

therefore

good

infinitely

belongs

to

infinite

the

good

cannot

can

find

that

something

the

to

must

definition

is

it

life

infinite

of

possession
and

in

love,
is

essence

Him

posses
be

other

its

this

such

good
way

that

activity

intelligibility

the

its

intellection,

own

its

its

lovableness,

love.

Therefore

there
the

inspires

Author

essence.

infinite

thought

understood,

good.

divine

the

But

infinite

an

their

endowed

perfect

So

intellectual

this

imperfection

any

are

most

is

contin

that

by

the

design
order

(b) Among

some

of

it

reasons

this

of

(c) Beatitude

must

And

Cause

wherefore

enjoying.

and

Being.

without

will

attri

manifests

(28).

are

possession

of

capable

positive,

purely

there

be

may

positive

world

first

will

perfections,
conscious

three

the

and

and

thought

and

is

that

world

this

same

full

is

know

imperfection;

an

account,

The

(a)

intelligence
in

power

for

Him

to

this

on

moreover,

we

with

beings

gent

(5) and,

And,

contain

formally

not

perfection

God.

to

must

does
"

simple

and

will

and

knowledge

THEOLOGY

in

are

works

that

God

thought

exterior

are

to

and

love
and

God,

this

this

love

thought

them.

According

to

this

into

three

chapters

The

work

of

God

very
:

brief

Thought

(III).

argument
in

God

divide

we

(I)

Will

in

Part
God

III

(II)

CHAPTER

words

in other
in itself

in

or

Considered
sist

Life

Intellectual

59.

in

knowledge
its object.
subjectively,in
of

of

of

of

reasoning, for

process

is

there

substance

known

truths

from

to

of

succession
of

act

exhausts

Considered

ledge is,primarily,of the very


of all other things that exist or
God's

60.

Nature.

divine

the

of

actual

being understood
divine

the

actual

the

Now

object

of this

rests

is

its

which

object.
know

and, secondarily,

Comprehension
on

no

and

of

His

simplicity of the
intellective
potentiality
the

intellection

being

divine

the

God,

intellection

one

Being

exist.

Actual

to

are

substance,

of

may

there

determined

being

essence.

actual

fore

God

act

an

say

in its term,

nature

the

proposition
In

Being.

capable
is His

This

i.

"

is

Knowledge

is to

of
intelligibility

glance the whole


looked
at
objectively,

at

nor

series

perfection there
multiplicity of acts
knowledge is a single

nor

that

comprehension,

adequate

entire

divine

The

action.

goes

in whom

in God

ideas, for in

of abstract

divisions

no

fruit

ratiocination

and

unknown,

perfectly His own


knowledge
fragmentary

neither

nor

truth

is

is it the

nor

con

there

God

faculty of

the

not

potentialitythere is no intellectual growth


abstractive
employs a
an
operation which

no

again is it
of compositions and
who
is actually and
is

faculties

and

composition
a

in

God,

considered

does

itself, it

faculty, since

be

science, may

or

life of

intellectual

-The

God.

of

His

exercise

the

GOD

IN

THOUGHT

or

the

actual

His

intellection

understanding
same

thing.

and

There

intellection, is also

intellection.

infinityof the divine perfection. This


intelligible
essence,
infinityof perfectionimplies (a)an infinitely
of knowing, and
(c) a union of the power
(b)an infinite power
of knowing
its infinitelyperfect object in such
with
a
way
and
the one
that there
is an
adequate correspondence between
the other.
Consequently the exercise of the power of knowing
2.

It

rests

on

the

93

THEOLOGY

NATURAL

94
is proper to
of this
perception
that

Being, in
divine Being.

of the

'

physics,Bk. XII,

'

Possible.

and

Actual

all Things

knows

God

61.

Being consists in the adequate


word, in a comprehensive view

infinite

an

God

that

lays down
this opinionhe

Aristotle

"

In

Meta
know

can

followed

by his
and Averroes, the pleabeing
Avicenna
Arabian
commentators,
urged that the knowledge of a secondary objectis incompatible
with
the absolute
perfectionof the divine Being : an act
the knower,
which perfects
of knowledge, they argued,is one
other objects
besides His essence,
and therefore,
did God know
His perfection
would be due to something else than His essen
tial perfection.A second argument is that, in order to know
would
such
objects,the divine intelligence
require to be
sort of intelligible
determined
impres
by them, to receive some
in
and
this
sion from
them
would
imply potentiality Him,
;
He is pure Actuality.
Aristotle concludes that
whereas
Finally,
nothing but

there

apparent after

on

established

The

Creator

and

has revealed

to

considered

were

Further, it would

be

to know.

our

own

will

thesis.

physico-theological
argument
us

and purpose.
actingwith intelligence
beingsHe has called into existence were
of the

than

which
misunderstanding,

have

we

posteriori
proof:

for the existence of God

was

it is better not to know

is founded
objection

more

1.

In

thingsthat

some

are

This
be

Himself.

Author

an

Therefore

at

of nature

least the

present to the thought


suitable for existence.

as

arbitraryto

that

suppose
to His

only

the

mind, since the


beingsactuallycreated were
present
beings which have been created, having been so by an act of
must
have been chosen from all possible
free-will,
beings. God
alia a se ', i.e. everythingthat has been
therefore knows
created or could have been created by Him.
2. A
prioriproof: God's knowledge of His nature would
not be
comprehensive if it did not know this nature under
'

'

all the
the

to

'

aspectsunder which it is knowable.


divine

in an
fectly78,
78

would

of

in terms.

be

of ways

writer, Pieralisi,maintains
divine

the

necessarilybe

diction

it should

indefinite number

Franciscan

of imitations

that

nature

essence

infinite ; and

This

because

yet

objection is

Now

imitable, albeit imper

by

an

that

it is not
of such

production of an
playing with

mere

possibleto speak
divine exemplar

infinite is
words.

fact that the

be

'

indefinite number

copy

St. Thomas
St. Augustine nor
overlooked
the
adequately imitated, yet they did not hesitate
of creatures
being the imagines et similitudines Dei
neither

not

it is essential

to
'

or

contra

Certainly
Infinite

can

regard the possibility


the
vestigiaDei ',
'

THE
of creatures

this

ACTIVITY

OF

is
instability

the divine nature.

GOD

95

intrinsic characteristic of

an

follows,then, in the first placethat the

It

'

'

would
not be
knowledge of the divine essence
comprehensive
if it perceivedthis essence
absolute object
as
an
exclusively
time
at the same
without
seeing it under the indefinitely
of intelligible
great number
aspects that it presents as the
of all the possible
imitations of the divine
exemplary cause
is
know
Being. In the second place,that what He must
the formal
and proper
being that creatures would possess if
they existed ; for this formal and proper being is that by
which the creature
images the divine Being,it is the expression
of the mode according
imitates the essence
to which the creature
of its Creator.
And
in the third place,that He possesses a
alike
distinct knowledge of creatures
; all the perfections,
in their
essential and accidental,which their being represents,
generic,specificand individual essence
; all without
any
exceptionare before the thought of God in their proper for
malities because all without
definite
exceptionare so many
imitations of the Being whose
God
imitability
compre
'

hends '.
Before
correct

He

passingon

to

say

God

knows

remark
the

that

almightycause of all His creatures.


the supereminentexemplary causes

of creation

before He

them.

creates

sees

Hence

we

posterioriargument,

He

Him

sees

of all the ideal

types

as

the second

alone

gives the

causal

of the

of beings distinct from God.


intelligibility
objectionof Aristotle and his Arabian commentators
the ground before this explanation.
Whilst thingsoutside

reason

The
fallsto
God

but

For

that actually
the power
given our first proof as an

Himself
have

strictly
thingsbecause

it is not
of

essences

is the

self as

that

must

we

are

less not

the

objectof

the divine

knowledge, they

are

neverthe

of
determining
principle
superaddedto the essence
determina
God, after the manner
of the accidental intelligible
tion which completesthe potential
intel
facultyof the human
lect when as yet it is intrinsically
101 f.).
incomplete(Psychology,
The divine essence
by itself correspondsto the intelligible
impressionor speciesthat the later Scholastics have called
speciesimpressa ; in other words, it is in itself its own
determiningprincipleof intellection, medium
quo intellectionis ; whilst it is also itself the intelligible
counterpart,
the
which
the
speciesexpressa ', or that in
cognoscibility
'

'

'

'

'

THEOLOGY

NATURAL

96
of

thingis manifested,

real

'

in quo

medium

objectiverelucet

'.
quidquidest intelligibile
and

objectof

derived

St. Thomas

when

Moreover,

the

a
distinguishes
primary object
divine knowledge, he does not

suppose that in God there is any process of discursive reasoning;


dis-currere
for this
impliesa succession of cognitiveacts
"

"

which

singleact which
in alio

62. The

(a) the

has

Ideas.

Divine

connotes

which

sees

whatever

sees

"

the

'

idea

reasons

thought

knowledge

and, in this
connexion

necessary

An

"

essential

present to

are

divine

aliud ; the
the divine essence

olio ad

proceed ex

'

in

essence

'

things,

of

God, and

"

with it.

Scholastic

of

is

language

rationes rerum,'

(b)their

formal

So that, whilst
thingsto be created.
is considered as a subjective
the
form,
speciesintelligibilis
the idea is the objective
terminus of the divine intuition. The
is single
former in God
manifold, inasmuch
; the latter are
and having an indefinitely
as
thingsbeingmanifold to infinity
of mutual
relations of causality,
etc.,
finality,
great number
modes
the
distinct
which
infinite
to
so
are
according
many
of the divine Being is imitable.
perfection
It must
not
be thought,however, that these ideas are
so
is identical with that of
realities in God ; their reality
many
divine
considered
the
the supreme
essence
as
archetype of
character

models

as

of

'

'

things;

God

of its role
of God

of
'

in His

as

the
archetype,

what

is distinct from

own

divine
Him

extra

'.

In

this

sense

the

essence

under

actual

the mind

guiseof a

multitude

the

which

ideas of the

Everything
left vague, comprisesobjectsthat
various groups.
which
One distinction,

can

can

be

be

produced

divine

intellect

The

expression
purposely
into
distinguished

Knowledge.
'; which we
possible

and

in virtue

presentsto

in number.
many
63. The
Objects of the Divine

'

But

essence.

objectsresembling those
intelligible

ad

are

them

sees

"

have

have

alreadynoticed,is that between


the- primary object of the divine knowledge,namely, the very
nature
of God
considered absolutely,
and the derived object
or the derived objects,
namely, what God knows in His essence
considered
These

thingsas
at

some

as

imitable

we

'

ad extra'.

objects of this secondary knowledge


well as thingsexistent which have come
definite

moment

of

time.

'

are

possible
into

being

Possibles ', whether

ACTIVITY

THE

GOD

OF

97

reference to actual existence

considered without

or

form
exclusive)

sive
excludingit (sivepraecisive

definitely

as

object

the

objectum
simple intelligence,
scientiae simplicis
Things which have existed,
intelligentiae.
exist or will exist, form the objectof intuitive knowledge,
objectum scientiae visionis.
In the controversies that have taken placeabout the know
intermediate
ledgeof God there is the further questionof an
knowledge', scientia media, which deals with objectstermed
d
conditional futurables ', that is to say, thingswhich wou
call

Schoolmen

the

what

of

'

'

have

existed

action

of

some

or

should

of

knowledge

exist if,under

would

or

take

definite

cause

place.

Those
that

maintain

'

had

taken

who

advocate

taking

place,were

this third kind

futurables

conditional

knowledge of

conditions,the

certain

'

do

not

',seeing
intelligence
futurables
and
not
that they are
mere
possibles; or
under God's intuitive knowledge of vision ',seeingthat they
do not belong to the class of definite and true future things;
theymust then be ranked, they say, as the objectof a knowledge
these other two, in a sense
distinct from
midway between
them : they are the objects
of a scientia media.'
The
is sometimes
called
knowledge of simpleintelligence
also necessary knowledge,since its objectis not conditioned by

fall either under

the

'

pure

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

any

'

free act

either

the

on

part of

God

'

or

on

the

part

of the

'

as
free
knowledge of vision is also known
knowledge, since its objectis dependent on the free fiatof
the creative act ; the intermediate knowledge againappears
distinct from these other two, since its objectconsists in those
but
thingsof the future that are dependent on human liberty
order of
considered as belongingto the purely hypothetical
free conditional future
things,called by the Scholastics
things'.
also distinguish
In God
we
a
knowledge,
speculative
may
the objectof which is the divine nature and the possibles
which
not and
will be realized,from a practical
know
are
never
ledge,which directs either the will or the activity ad extra

creature

the

'

'

'

'

'

of God.
64. God

possesses

Knowledge

of

Possible

Things.

"

Of

be distingushed
two kinds (seeGen. Meta
may
is verified when
physics,18 f.). Intrinsic possibility
an
object
there
possibility

presentselements

which

from

the

of
compatibility

their nature

THEOLOGY

NATURAL

98

extrinsic

the existence
means
possibility
of a cause
possible.
capableof producingwhat is intrinsically
whatever
is
the
of
is
In
God
who
case
almighty
intrinsically
is also extrinsically
possible.
possible
The
ad
divine ideas are types that are formallyimitable
allow

of existence

'

',outside the divine

extra

perfectly.Therefore
'.

extra

But

is to know

He

is

there

these ideas

'

imitable

are

contradiction

no

knows

'

formallyimitable

as

that these ideas

to know

that

them

knows

God

Now

essence.

in the

ad

ad
'

extra

existence

of

thingsthat imitate the model ideas conceived by the divine


things as intrinsically
intelligence
; in brief, it is to know
possible^
His Nature
Further, God knows
adequatelyand sees it allpowerful,capable of realizingthings after the archetypal
Now
to know
conceives.
ideas which His intelligence
Himself
is to know
is intrinsically
what
as
possible
capableof realizing
God sees possible
the extrinsic possibility
of things. Therefore
thingsboth in their negativeand in their positive
possibility.
65.

God

'the

possesses

of

Knowledge

omniscient

with

regard to

and

with

infallible knowledge every

knows

going to

be

embraces

past or
present
events

performed.

The

everythingwhich
future.
or

With

past does

take

He

sees

the

knowledge

them

all in

happen

knowledge of
for

would

us

God, however,

not

place,but

will

all that

date

advance,

His

of vision would

which

vision that

He

of the

is
has

present,

knowledge
that

of

our

these

knowledge is unchangeable
from

that

so

His

future

free act

be

is

God

"

in the

the actual time

from

because

Vision'.

be

this

point of view

named
appropriately
after our manner
of thinkingand speaking as that of prevision.
It embraces
all things that take
place,whether
necessary
the
free-will
of
Yet
chief
the
or
on
man.
dependent
point
of interest is mainly in reconciling
the infallible certitude of
with man's freedom of action,and therefore
this foreknowledge
the thesis we
to establish will deal mainly with free
have now
more

future acts.

perfectRuler of this universe,and in


high place is occupiedby beingsthat are endowed
God

is the

this universe
with

intel

ligenceand free-will. To establish this order and to maintain


it,two things are obviously indispensable,
namely the know

ledgeof

the end

the attainment

of the universe
of this end

and

and

of the
in order

means

to

suitable

for

guarantee this

the

order is,the
be

must

to

means
more

both the end


certainty,
of the
it ; and the greater the perfection
and in certitude
perfectboth in penetration
of the

knowledge

the

constitute

that

elements

Further, the universe

comprisesa physicalorder

order, with the former

in subordination
both

Designer of

fore the supreme

infallibleknowledge of all moral


be

it has

or

modify

acts.

realization ; in

and

end
a

to

vary

word, take away

the

means

66. How

and

does

God

know
'

Intelligence ?

Simple

or

"

The

for its

and the
foreknowledge
compromised God, there

God's

vision of the order


in

of the acts of free creatures


the

no

only after

necessary

of the order of nature would be


stability
clear
infallible,
fore,eternally
possesses a full,
of the universe

be

can

later,for the
work, for Him

be necessary sooner
of the order in the whole of His

His

moral

possess completeand
This knowledge must

must

about, it would

come

it.

and there
latter,

to the

the very first,since in God there


what
If God
knew
happens
progress.

maintenance
to

and

completefrom

change

of

with

but adequatelyand
conjecture,
and

99

and by way
know, not partially

of it must

order,the author

GOD

OF

ACTIVITY

THE

Object

reply to

His

of

particular.

Knowledge of

"

this first

questionhas

givenabove : by His intellect God knows in His essence


of everythingpossible,
and in the un
the internal possibility
limited power of His will their external possibility.
of
An infinitenumber
of possible
worlds and the infinitenumber
ways in which circumstances may be arrangedin them are, then,
Now
these combinations
eternally
present before God.
among
there are some
which are conditioned by the free fiatof God's
others which
creative act ; there are
are
dependent on a
be carried into
possible
fiatthat as a matter of fact will never
execution.
In order to explainGod's knowledge of this latter
have
class of combinations, some
introduced" uselessly,
been

we

think

'

the

"

scientia media

', different both

and
or intelligence
simpleunderstanding
or

of

that

from

that of intuition

from

vision.
67. How

Vision

'

does
"

i.

God

God

knows

future effectsof causes


that He

know

that

has created He

forces,as well

as

the

II.

Object of

in

the

are

knows

play of

quence their effects.


does He know
2. How
M.S.P.-VOL.

the

His

decrees

necessary

of

His

by knowing

their nature
infallibly
their combination, and

the future effects of

of

Knowledge

causes

will
the

the

causes

and their
in

conse

that
H

are

THEOLOGY

NATURAL

loo

'

futures

'

futurables
to

seems

others

'

exclude

conditione

freedom

The
(futurabilia).
of
the possibility

by

of

those
'

scientia media

sub

(futura essent

called

are

'

of His

invention

the

futures

conditional
or

'

reallyfuture, free contingent

are

(futura contingentia)
;

for
responsible
'

effects

of these

Some

free?

'

free

possibili),
these

acts

infallible knowledge of

an

the

understand

let us
difficulty
Revolution
of 1789. We
consider the example of the French
know the causes
which, in the lightof after events, explainthe
revolution
the philosophy of the eighteenth century, the
:

in their

them

of the

abuses

These

etc.

To

causes.

of Louis
XVI,
regime, the weakness
supply us to-day with the sufficient reason

ancient

causes

of that
why the men
But
making event.
knowledge of these

time

acted

so

no

with

one

the

even

that

and

would have been able to predictwith


setting,
the effect which they have produced.To say
foresight

in their
infallible

whole

done

could have

one

antecedents

the

that

the

that

who

men

clearlymanifested

to

brought

been

have

consequent

about

free but

that any

to the

assertion

in themselves
; and

it would

Revolution

the

bringingit about, and

able to avoid

not

be tantamount

that necessitated their

reason

not

would

so

the event

of
would

Similarlywith

necessary.

epoch-

thorough

most

in themselves

both

causes,

bringabout

to

as

the

follow

'89 were
appear
all the

free actions of my individual life : does the adequateknowledge


of my
faculties,my temperament, my character,
nature, my
the circumstances
will, necessarily
affectingmy
imply an
infallible knowledge of my
I
I

at this moment

am

complex state
otherwise

than

would

be

free

the

example, the

to

not

power

But

and

the circumstances

"

no

necessary

though

anyone
knowledge both my

could

never

on

them.

How

than

an

granted that, on
which

have

connexion

and

be certain of

eventuallymake.

led

with

should know
nature

would

such conditions

nothingmore

meaning.

shall

have

write

to

any

he

for

act

write ?

If the

affirmative,it would follow that, given my


previousto my decision,I am powerlessto decide

write still remain

that

as,

is in the

answer

have

"

performingin writingthese lines,which

persuade myself I

dom

free act

as

decision to
my
these ?
My free

illusion,
a word
the contrary, my
to my

me

this

without
nature

present action

action, it follows then

with the most


the conditions

readingin

them

possible
perfect
of its operation,
the

decision I

ACTIVITY

THE

OF

GOD

101

Molina,
perhaps insoluble difficulty,
other
have
introduced
the
scientia
Lessius and
theologians
follows : The Apostle Peter
of God.
media
as
They reason
and denied his Master.
He
yieldedto the voice of a woman
need not have done so ; he denied Him
freely. Since he has
that he would
true from all eternity
denied Him, it was
deny
which
reflects all truth,
Him.
The divine essence,
necessarily
is a mirror in which
the divine intelligence
apprehends the
of
truth, Peter denies his Master at a certain precisemoment
history'. The divine knowledge has thus for its necessary
solve this real and

To

'

'

'

objectall the eternal

truths

that

connected

are

with free actions

is for God the


in the future ; in other words, the divine essence
means
(medium in quo) by which He knows free future events.

divine

the

Moreover

ditional future events


it

as

reason,

represents the

essence

with the

same

of

con

clearness,and for the

same

representsthat of absolute

truth

in the future.

events

This

explanation,they say, enables us to reconcile God's


infallibleknowledge of vision with the perfectfree-will on the
part of the objectof His knowledge 79.
Unfortunately their explanation is quite indefensible.
(a)In the first place,the existence of an eternal truth in the
of free futures if they are
considered without reference
case
to the divine intelligence
is a mere
fancy. Truth depends
; it is a transcendental
upon reality
property of being. Where
beingdoes not exist there is no truth. Leave out of considera
tion the divine intelligence,
Peter previousto the
and where was
"

decree

According to
of creation

objectof

"

the

to the eternal
'

view

our

; before

scientia
vision

we

the

media

"

If the will decides

knowledge

knew

such

follow that

the

and
it has

all truth
divine

essence

the divine
a

truth
as

which

free act
act is
decree

not

knowledge

would

has

an

such

conditions

come

essence

be

and

also

the

not

proposition in
But

after

the

be

infinite.

future
true

unless

which
the

this
divine

represented it, it would


complete representation of

eternal truth

same
thing happens with regard to
from
all eternity,since it is
intelligible

such and
So from

before

conditionallyfuture, and the


it is counted
as
being present

free act, the


is eternal.

divine

the

would

temporal existence,

'The
are

; after the

posit,in time,

to

though
ledge.

the

the

of God.

decision is expressed has

all truth

regard
decree

conditional
from

about, this determinate

The

future

for the divine


events

actj

know

"

they

eternity that, should


choice

would

be made.

true that Peter the Apostle when


eternity it was
questionedby the
Jews should
Master.
deny his divine
Similarly,one of the two following
from
true
is tempted by the ser
propositionswas
eternity : If the first man
the
pent, he will yield ; or again, when
will
tempted by
serpent, the first man
not yield. If propositionsare
true from
all eternity God
know
them
must
as
they are in themselves (inseipsis)
'. DUPONT,
Thtodicte, These LVII, pp. 101102.

THEOLOGY

NATURAL

102

first century
he

in existence,he could

not

was

in God

eternal truth

an

intellectus humanus

is

The

'

truth.

no

moment

for

Etiam

dicerentur

res

Sed

divinum.

intellectum

which

there is
God, eternally

esset, adhuc

non

since

act

an

truth.

outside

but

consequentlythere

nothing : and
in ordine ad

of

And

exists and thinks, there is room

that God

that it is admitted

exist.

put forth

not

foundation
ontological

the

be

should

did not

; he

Nowhere

A.D.

si

si

verae,

uterque intellectus,

veriauferri,nullo modo
intelligeretur
impossibile,
80. (b)In the second place,even
tatis ratio remaneret
sup
t
ruth
it
were
eternally
existing, would
posingthat an objective

quod

est

'

be

not

for God's

term

unless

thought

influence

we

that

suppose

it

His

But
such
intelligence.
is untenable, since God cannot
be subjectto the
a supposition
It is then in God Himself,ab intm, that
action of any cause.

exercises

look for the

must

we

This

active

an

although

they

unum,

divine

the

to its definite act

nevertheless

tating motion,

determined
antecedently

not

are

man

say, and
appliesthe free-will of man

ad

knowledge.

find in the decrees of the divine will.

the free acts of

Although

of the divine

reason

Thomists

reason

on

divine motion

it pass, although in a manner


of willingto
from
the power

is

There

infallibleconnexion

an

free act of

the human
the freedom

between

Far

from

of the free act, the divine motion

voluntary causes

because

being

is proper

God

does

not

the

"

seipsum

trium

movet

tatis, quod sit prima

aliquidsit
est

prima

bus

causis

movendo
riae ; sed

does not

in all
to

of this

movens

movendo
causas

of

libre

the

'

nature

causas

et

per liberum
necessitate

de

est

sicut

voluntarias.

quin actus earum


aufert
quin actiones

arbitre

(chap. 8), has

fundamental

reason

ad

nee

ejus.

causa

Et
sint

earum

facit: operatur cnitn in unoquoque


Theol., I, q. 83, a. i, ad 3.

this theory and

being

thingin them

in eis

Bossuet, in his Traiti du

exposition

non

liberty,

actions of

homo

hoc

aufert

voluntarias,
Sum.

quia

sui id quod liberum


est
requiriturquod sit prima
non

liberty

'

of this very

sui motus
:
Non
tamen

et naturales
eas,

potius hoc

'.
proprietatem

causa

destroy

ffl.

2.

a.

agendum.

alterius

causa

causa

ad

and

thingsaccording
By moving

each.

operates in each thingaccordingto its own

De veritate,
ST. THOMAS,
q. 7,
'
arbitrium
est causa
Liberum

""

the divine motion

deprivetheir
cause

volition.

compromising the

works

that

necessi

of

act

is the first cause

God

voluntary; but rather is He


for He

the

will,although the former

of the latter.

says St. Thomas,


of
to the mode

is not

is necessary
to the
consistent with its

will to make

freedom,

which

motion

hoc

Deus

arbiliber-

quod
igitur

sicut naturalinaturales
sint

secundum

remarkably

which

ita

volunta-

underlies

ejus
clear
it :

ACTIVITY

THE

OF

GOD

103

theory respects both the divine omnipotence and

This latter

But
the created will ; and herein lies its merit.
which reconciles the two
does it offer any rational explanation

libertyof

the

fail to

We

it does.

how

terms

think

that in this delicate

see

We

questionit is

led rathei

are

to

franklyto

necessary

No explanationyet
reason.
incapacityof human
have not even
to give satisfaction ; and we
put forward seems
Bossuet
solution.
the hope of ever
satisfactory
findinga more
said the very last word on this subject:
to us to have
seems
the

avow

'

conclusion

My

evident

thingsare

two

reason

'

is,'he says,

by

that

is,that

; one

other is,that the actions which

do

we

the natural
we

are

lightof
free,the

included

are
freely

in

which has means


to con
providence,
duct them to its purposes.
Nothing can throw doubt on
these two importanttruths, because both are established by
which it is impossible
to overthrow
reasons
; for whoever
knows
anything of God cannot doubt that His providence
well as His foreknowledgeextends to everything; and
as
reflects on his own
his own
whoever
nature will recognize
freedom with such plainevidence that nothingcan succeed
in obscuringthe conviction he has of it. It is easy to see
that two truths established by such convincing
reasons
can
not be destructive of each other, for truth cannot
destroy
the decrees of divine

difficultit may be to succeed in recon


truth ; and however
is
them, the failure to understand such high matters
ciling
no

in regardto the truths


certainty
so plainly.
we
recognize
Really,if we had to abandon
free-will on account
of God's providenceor God's

which
either
'

for

reason

Freedom

has

diminished

its place in the soul,' he says,

has the power

to choose, but further


God, who is the immediate

choice, and
duce

it in its ultimate

choice must
for there is
which

does

it is,the

God, and

nothing

in the

hold

from

not

thingis,the

from

come

"

more

it must

more

This

act.

being

as

"

of

exercise

freedom,

our

being

act

the

all that

it has.

than

God.

; it follows

So, our

then

soul when

we

this very

exercise

being and

all

perfection,it
and
use

in each

free

is God

renders

the

worthy

"

who

efficacyof
even

to

His

that

act

God

God.

if then

phrase

free acts ',

from

perfection;

the infinite
the

immediately

comes

act

there
of the

the

which

it is

will :

being

it has,

more

any
actual

regard it as actually
under

is the

the

of

maker

being
description
"

if

all

and

is any

placed in

divine

granted that

it be

action, that is of His will, reaches

qualityby

divine
actual

more

that

of choice, is for that very


reason
more
be unintelligible
unless
before. This would

it was

choice, that

actual

the

Now,

the soul

as

of
of its power
needs pro
must

be included
in the
must
however
small the degree of

exercisingits power
action

inasmuch

only

actual

such

it will have

get from

not

the

cause

ultimate

creature,
God

during

'

"

any
free " ;

one

may

the category of

THEOLOGY

NATURAL

104

of free-will,
should
we
providenceon account
where
to begin,so necessary
are
they both, so

evident

the ideas

are

God,

the

on

completeof
'

Let

cannot

we

anywhere, if we
which

we

their

source

reconcile

discover when

except

that both

so

of

questionthose

use

our

reason

known

truths

only have

can

and truth
itself,

reason

cannot

has its source

that
principle

some

on

should not be able to start

together,since all the difficulties

we

in the nature

be attacked

more

as

We

to call in

were

much

certain,to find difficulties

most

are

overcome.

cannot

we

which

in

itself.

reason
'

we

man

attribute

we

equallyincontestable.
in
even
be, then, that it is possible,

conclusion

of which

attribute to

we

considered

be

must

our

matters

which

other

and

sure

; for if reason

questionthat which
hand
experienceis so

that which

truths

these

them

to set above

should appear
to

about

have

we

know

not

I do not

whether

know

we

grounds for believing


comprehend exhaustively
is no
left to be
difficulty

have

that there is any truth which we


and in such a way
that there

solved ; but even


though there be some
thus thoroughlycomprehend, it would
that all truths
if

mistaken

in the

are

same

truths that
be rash
We

case.

soon

can

to presume

be

should

all knowledge as
rejected

we

we

as

no

less

found

we

baffled ; for such is the nature of our mind that it


is necessary for it to pass by degreesfrom what is clear to
minds

our

what

is

ful,and
counters

obscure, and from what is certain


that without

former

the
rejecting

the latter. Whenever

we

is doubt

to what

begin to

soon

as

it

as

must

we

reason,

en

that we can have knowledge of matters


grasp this principle,
whose
issues and
nevertheless escape
the
consequences
range of our
be this : that

The
intelligence.

first rule of

logicshould

our

of any truths which we


for certain,whatever difficulty
know
be in recon
there may
of them
with others ; we must, so to say, hold
some
ciling
on
tightlyto both ends of the chain, though we cannot see
the middle

of

we

must

it,nor

not

loose hold

follow it with

eyes from

our

'

look about for means


Still,
we
may
truths,providedwe are determined
them

; whatever

hold
actually

happens

must

does not attend

our

not

of
not

in the search

"

end

these
reconciling

to abandon

the

good

be let loose,merely because

pursuitof some

to end.

other.

"

any
which

of
we

success

Disputarevis,

THE

ACTIVITY

GOD

OF

105

obest,si certissima praecedatfides ", said S. Augustine.

nee

of
Followingthis thought we proceedto search for means
free-willwith the decrees of Providence.
We
our
reconciling
the different views held by theologiansin
enumerate
may
82.
the hope of findingsomething which will satisfy
us
'

Before
to

passingto
objection.

an

68. A

Difficulty:

dom

of Free

God

foresees with

the

We

"

made

have

the

reply

must

we

of God

Foreknowledge

Acts.

Future

the divine will

study of

the

the

and

Free
that

statement

knowledge free future acts.


of knowledge impliesthat between
this
But the infallibility
knowledge and its object there exists a necessary connexion
which

be

cannot

be

they

as

other

do the

forming as they
must

infallible

an

it is.

than

objectof

foreknown

are

future

Therefore

acts

divine infallible knowledge

and, in consequence,

it would

either the future acts are


Briefly,
entirely
necessary, and then the divine knowledge is explained
only at the expense of human
liberty
trulyfree
; or there are
be infallibly
seen
acts, and then they cannot
by God.
M
of the Summa
Certain writers,led by a passage
Theologica
if
read
which,
we
aright,they misinterpret argue thus :

seem,

necessitated.

are

"

"

With

God

is like to

present. God
summit

is neither

there

of

past

hill upon a
passingaround its foot.

man

future, but

nor

looks

who

plainbelow

where

down
he

eternal

an

from

the

travellers

sees

travellers pass at different times


various pointsof the circumference, but the onlooker who

by

them,

sees

exists

only in

the created

one

things;

another, but the


the divine

co-exists with all the moments

And

when

BOSSUET,

plungesinto

man

his act, for the

82

all simultaneously.
So it is with God.

along, centuries succeed

pass
and

them

sees

The

that

reason

see

Men

movement

thought is eternal

of time.
a

river before my

him

eyes,

plunge in, cease

to

does
be

op. cit.,ch. 4.
quae sunt in tempo

solum
Deo ab aeterno
re sunt
praesentia,non
rationes rerum
apud se praesentes, ut quidam dicunt, sed
qua habet
quia ejus intuitus fertur ab aeterno supra omnia, prout sunt in sua praesentialitate.
Unde
manifestum
est quod contingentia infallibiliter a Deo
cog83

ea

'

Omnia

ratione

noscuntur,

in

sentialitatem,
parata '. Sum.

quantum
et

tamen

subduntur
sunt

Theol., I, q. 14,
videt illos qui post eum
veniunt
;

intuetur,simul

videt

omnes

suam
conspectui secundum
praecausis
comsuis
proximis
contingentia,
Ille qui vadit per viam, non
art. 13, c.
viam
totam
sed ille qui ab aliqua altitudine

divino

futura

transeuntes

'

"

per viam

'.

Ibid., ad

3,

io6

THEOLOGY

NATURAL

free act ?

do
Similarly

the acts

free because

God

which

God

takingplace
cease
Evidentlynot.
In this reply is the key to the solution of the difficulty,
but
it requiresto be properlyhandled.
The principle
involved
influences its object;
is right: Knowledge neither creates nor
to be

it

it such

merely knows
it

knows

such,

as

as

it is

as

them

sees

if it is

; if it is

necessary

sees

event, it

necessary

free,it knows

it

as

free event.
may
suppose the
quiteright,in puttingit in the
When

certain and

possesses

has

definite

is

event

order, the
ontological

place only because

knowledge of

the

free ; therefore

or
necessary
But, in the

event

knowledge to be faithful,it is
logicalorder,to argue : A mind

we

certain

the event

of fact.

matter

it

event, be

an

knowledge

of the

real.

was

it is a questionof reconciling
when
the
Consequently,
foreknowledgeof free events with the freedom of these
the only special
to be solved is to know
by what
difficulty

events,

something which

present

to the mind

This

before God

or,

actual

It

not

does God

what

to

seems

us

to be

in its own

the

determined

be in communication
Our

all

present

immutably and
grant
willingly

succession in the

in terms

being,has

this non-existent

it is not

as

We

cannot, then, say that the

thingshad an entityin
explainhow they could be

much

them.

contradiction

future
to

be

has

are

them

see

for its term

has

God

same,

knowledge of

future act, considered

present. We

of time

course

acts

thought
the real difficulty
stillremains
: how
are
things
yet exist present to the divine thought ? In

But

do

in the

is the

which

Free

by merely stating:

is not, there cannot

there

which

solved

another

one

the
eternally
of God.

be

means

of God.

succeed

yet exist in itselfcan

not

is not
difficulty

which

this

does

certain

with

an

to

say

existence in the
of God

omniscience

entity. Moreover,

present,it would
of

by them,

cannot, it would

mind

if

even

be necessary
which, inas

the term

that

seem,

them.

conclusion is that the

of
determiningprinciple

the divine

think
we
only be within God Himself. What
have
already suggested. We have adopted the

knowledge can
this

is

we

opinionwhich
free acts
their

in

free mode

holds
His

that

Will

to

God
cause

sees

the

them

of being. Certainlyit

of future

occurrence

to

exist

according

is difficult to

to

reconcile

ACTIVITY

THE

freedom

this
but

with

considering.
it

events,
He

say,
have

if

of

14

the

order,

the

of

of

has

the

we

say,
'

homo

Quia

habent
inde

et

in

futura

Sed

inveniuntur

praeterita

mori,

eum

quod

autem,

sitas

sessionis.

aliquem

necessitate

aliquid

sees

His

act

the

onto*

divine

the

to

ab

ei

modo

adsunt
modo

loquimur

nostro

quomodo

ego

hoc,

ex

quod

Impossible
et
esse

eveniunt

ipse

futurum,
'.

video

aliquem
haec

sedeat
et

duo
; et

illud

non

dum

sedere,
simul

sit

non

nee

est
tamen

"

tempo

re

esset,

Manifestum

ingeritur

et

neces-

videam

quod

possibile
propter

Ego

dicendum

vera,

esse

similiter

omnia

tali

sedet.

nulla

excedit,

dicit

hunc
modo

ejus

sedere,

Malachiae
em

suo

pronostica-

et

praesentialiter

famulo

tamen

cum

Petrum

video
est

non

posterius

illud

praescivit

aeterno

locum

posterius

et

is

succession

sed

Moysi

ipse

ab

ris

God
that

quaedam

et

secundum

tempo
futurum

sicut

are

praesentia,

motu,

omnem

et
;

ergo

omni

ita

who

that

consequent*,

prius

quo

answer

sinner

knowledge

words

prius
videmus

est
"

the

exact

in

tempori,
quaedam

of

case

necessitate

His

the

gives

the

; but

act
ex

memoramur,

liber

Cassino

considering

free

et

mutor

Eo

sedentem,

praesciat

He

in

but,

infal

an

from

anterior

is

Monte

posited.

res,

sicut

non

of
is

necessary

being

acts

praeteritum

".
ut

is

mutationi

Deus,

eo

moriturum,
videt

is

says,

praeterita

et

sum

he

cognoscit

et

qui

sum

est

free

Dominus,

Ego

nee

the

quod

est,

abbot
He

sinner

subjacet

futura.

mur

of

successive

object,

object

the

the

to

sin,

acts

through

its

to

actually

that

argue

is

that

with

Granted
to

future

they

them,

sees

order,
of

of

that

freely.

existence

considering.

are

His

free

logical

Thomas

St.

impenitent.

dies

the

reality

He

knows

them,

nature

present

it84.

of

difficulty

the

freely

place

real

know

motion,
at

are

God

He
to

pass

we

how

does

divine

the

of

question

that

take
in

able,

letter

this

to

to

107

which

that

the

according

come

am

knowledge

ex

fact

them

to

logical

"

certain

they

vision

to

aside

foreknowledge,

them,

from

Putting
a

sees

lible

is

distinct

is

GOD

efficacy

sovereign

the

problem

this

OF

quod
hoc

Deus
futura

II

CHAPTER

WILL

Meaning.

69.

which

faculty by

the

its

creature

This

object.

To

will the

towards

union

of desire

rise to

enjoyment, delight.

God

the
is

divine

is

will

of

act

in

of

In

divine

the

perfect

of

will with

will

or

volition.

of
of

is desire

being
satis

the

its

object gives
find

appetition

human
the

act

of will constitute

this

act

of the
is

will there

love

created

will with

the

reality.

desire, because

no

of

elements

transcendental

same

faculty

tendency
possess

towards

object

an

act

faculty of will, the good,

; the

place

no

distinguishbetween

the

the

not

union

the

manifold

these

as

of

The

it does

faction

In

good

constitutes

good which

by

to

union

the

is to love.

good

have

we

will, the

we

faculty tends,

the

which

In the

"

GOD

IN

always

will there
want

no

the

plenary

present,

en

joyment.
Although
yet

apply

we

its

it

to

by

simplicity in

this

recognize

we

of

way

fullness, the

distinction

character

of the

will.

is

perhaps

stand

It
God

superfluous

analogous

experience

object,

it the

secondary

objects

loving because
In

God,

the

divine

Not

that

nothing

is

the

it loves

its formal

essence

loves

wanting

the

these
to

Him

of

; if He
108

in

nothing

in
we

sadness

aversion,

of

objects,

secondary

which

for

formal

to

The

is

will

the

receiving
will

the

its

objects.

itself

of

capable

the

capable

object.
His

secondary
goods

is

passions, which

by uniting

goods

composite

the

there

under

to

Goodness.

or

it is

primary object

the

God

which

better
on

or

classes

two

which

good

are

hate,

"

material

and

that

infinite

the

perfection

add

to

evil

with

is the

primary object

of

from

founded

emotions,

of

is concerned

primary

gives

human

account

on

will

The

the

to

is excluded

all evil

or

human

in order

analogy,

will,

divine

the

objects
order
is

goodness of
created
goods.

will is the
are

to

pleased

acquire them,
to

love

them,

for

this

ACTIVITY

THE

He

is because

wishes to

est sui

bonum

God

In

70.

givethem
diffusivum.
there

is

Will. -We

OF

GOD

the

good

have

forward

ning of Chapter I, brought

109
is self-diffusive
"

already,at

two

the

based

reasons

prove that there is a will in God : (i)the


which has
a Cause
reignsin the universe requires

which

begin
fact

on

order which

designedand

the existence of beingsendowed


with
brought it into effect ; (ii)
which
and free-will proves-^hat there is a Cause
intelligence
both
possesses in a supereminentmanner
A third reason
will, (iii)
be deduced
may
of

attributingsupreme
the
indeed
perfection,

intellect knows

the

object before

an

and free
intelligence
from the necessity
God.
Happiness is a
the
perfections.Now

happiness to
of

sum-total

good,

but

its function

the will rather

is to

present it

itself to seek union

than

as

with

for that identification with it


it ;" it is for the will to make
of which the fruit is enjoyment. Therefore God, who is supreme

ture

call will.

we

form

in the

which
perfection

that

happiness,
possesses

St. Thomas

crea

thus

presents the argument

:"

tendency the substantial form


of the human
(intentio
body involves a tendency of nature
induces a sensitive
naturae) ; knowledge acquiredby the senses
appetite,that of the intelligence
givesrise to an intellective
to be
appetite: therefore the divine knowledge would seem
followed by a love towards
the object of it on the part of God,
Every

carries with

of

case

it

"

'

and

this constitutes

71.

The

of the

Formal

Object

Essence.

Divine

of will.

act

an

"

'

of the

As

in

Will

God

of

Goodness

is the

God, the self-subsisting


Being,

is

nothing accidental,His will is identical with the sub


stance
of His divine Being. But His will is not distinct from
the objectHe loves,otherwise this objectwould
be an accidental
determination
produced in His will by the good. Therefore
the objectHe loves is the substance
of His divine Being.
of the divine will is necessarily
infinite,
Again, the perfection
and this could not be so unless the good that He loves is infinite.

there

If God
His

own

would

"which

is

His nature.

speak

compare

by

infinite self but

else,He

to

drawn

not

were

be subordinate

of His

power

Thus

it is that
as

all

the Summum
'

expressionsle bon

love

towards

to something
drawn
necessarily
it
to that and dependent upon

suppositionthat conflicts

of God

the

were

the

with

have

races

Bonum,
Dieu

'

'

the

shown
as

true
a

preference

Goodness

Goodness

idea of

knows

itself:

',etc.

THEOLOGY

NATURAL

no

72. Whatever

participates

in the

Goodness

Divine

be

can

Secondary Object of the Will of God." God is the Author of the


world, and far from having made it without a purpose He has
Therefore

disposed all things with wisdom.


whatever
good exists in His created
loves His

God

it is

to which

extent

of love to

communicable
imperfectly,

goodness,in
a

God

Himself, in
In the

sented

to

far

it

of

of His

whole

forces Him

nature

loves Himself

to

as

an

love

necessarily.

be with
created will,the act of volition may
of the finite nature
of the good which is pre

under

it is
as

necessarily,and the

God who comprehends Himself


Consequently,
there is nothingin His nature
which is not

account

"

so

but

necessary

"

word, He

case

goodness
in

is
Beings freely. i. The first
proposition
therefore all in Him
is an
: All is good in God, and

that

sees

on

the communication

not

Essence

of His

of Created

object of love ; the

held

objectof love, but

loves the Goodness

easy to prove
objectof love.
is

divine

creatures, is for the

to

contingent beings is

to

the

of His will.

Goodness

He

Whence

creatures.

to

it is communicable

as

necessary

goodness

freeact
73.

far

so

will of God

love.

say, to the full


In itselfit is an object
to

degree,but further,it is an objectof love


goodness is to a certain degree,though ever

His

as

of this

willed

infinite

an

inasmuch

objectof

an

has

works.

that is
infinitely,

essence

He

an

"

object of

it falls short

in

aspect

one

"

love ;

it is not

created will,then, is able to love

or

so

far

under
an

not

as

it

presents its

another

aspect
"

object of love. The


to love an
object,that

is,its love of finitegoods is not a necessary love. In the case


of God, this dualityof aspects in the infinite goodness of the
divine

is not

essence

Himself

must,

we

possible
;

see, be

whence

necessary

the

of God

love

for

love.

Again, the happinessessential to God requiresthat He has


not merely the facultyof enjoyingwhat
is His good, but also
that He has the actual enjoyment of it. Therefore
God has
not the freedom
of lovingor not lovingHimself, but He loves
Himself
2.

with

with

The

necessary love.
second proposition
may
a

be

proved

thus

God

loves

necessary love only His essence, for this is an infinite


good which adequatelycorrespondsto what we may call the
infinite capacityfor enjoyment in the divine will ; and no
a

created

good is capableof adding anythingto

the infiniteGood,

THE

ACTIVITY

for the will of God, which

is

created

any

produced

always substan
accidental perfection

designedthe

on

hand

the other

world

the will which

exercise its activity

did not

purpose and consciousness ; the supreme


of nature must
directed the will of the Author

without
which

and

Yet

good.

in

act of volition

an

receive any

cannot
accomplished,
tially

from

GOD

OF

intelligence
accordingly

good,or God could not have willed


it ; but it could not have presentedit as a good necessary to
since creation is able to add nothingto
His divine happiness,
who
is all-good.
the essential and perfecthappiness of God
which directed the will of
Therefore the supreme
intelligence
to Him
of all thingspresentedthem
the Author
as
a
good
though not as a good lovable by necessitybut with a free
presentedcreation

have

as

love.
In this connexion
that

the

and

divine

observation
Cajetan's

will is neither

is worthy of notice,
nor

necessary

free

(necessity

freedom

but is a tran
being two imperfectperfections),
scendental perfection
which
excludes both
the imperfections
inherent in the necessity
of creatures
and those inherent in their
whatever
freedom, and comprisesin a supereminent manner
goodnessboth the one and the other contain.
74. Freedom
and
Immutability of God.
Although God
wills His works freely,
and for all,without
He wills them once
ever
revokingor modifying the free decree of His will. God
has no reason
from willing
to cease
what He wills,or to will at
the present time otherwise than He has alreadywilled. His
"

15

'

Prima

necessaria

simpliciter,
magis proprium
superior utraque.
ut dicatur
enim simpliciter
Necessitas
vocabulum, quam
quod est causalibera.
repugnat libertati : contingentia vero
imperfectionem in libertate importat,
in I Sent. dist. XXXVIII,
quia ponitmutabilitatem. Et idcirco divus Thomas
causare
vocabula, negat Deum
praeveniens inepta modernorum
contingenter.
Cum
enim
regularesit,quod superiuspraehabet in se unite quae in inferioribus
sunt
est ut causa
prima, superiornecessariis et continsparsa,
consequens
et modum
gentibus,praehabeat in se, non formaliter sed eminenter, naturam
et conecessariarum
et contingentium, et sit causa
causarum
utrarumque,
Et
modos
earum.
operetur utrisquead earum
proprios effectus secundum
omnis
videtur
necessaria
aut contingens, stupepropterea nos, quibus
causa
necessariis
non
sit communis
mus,
causa
praevalentes videre quomodo una
et contingentibus immediate.
Sed si elevemus
mentis
oculos in excellentius
cessat stupor, et omnia
causae,
genus
eminentioremque causandi
modum,
modum
consonant
ilium
in caligine,non
intuentes
remaneamus
; quamvis
intrinsece
modos
illabens, cunctis juxta suos
quo omnibus
cooperatur. Et
hoc est valde
attendendum
in hujusmodi materiis.
Deus,
Appellaturtamen
vel ejus scientia causa
non
necessaria, propter necessitatem
simpliciter,sed
immutabilitatis quae
in eo, etiam
formaliter
salvatur
'.
inquantum causa,
CAJETAN, Com. in Sum. Tkeol., I, q. 14, a. 13, n. 24.

neqne

causa,

contingens,

proprie loquendo,

sed

nee

est

causa

habemus

Nee

"

NATURAL

112

remains

will

it

75.

remains

always

Goodness,

what

immutably,

always,

therefore

THEOLOGY

it

it

is;

free,

is

and

free.

Liberality,

Justice,

Mercy

After

God.

of

"

studied

having

divine

the

siders

different
it

the

when

justice,

goodness,

76.

of

Omnipotence

effects

its

and

work

has

that

pen
Now

the

this

general

also

for

this

man

in

other

judges
This

words,
;

God
in

consideration

omnipotence.

and

reason

short,

that

His

such,
the

is

is

power

able

God
leads

freely
is

as

e.g.

by

which

we

speak

we

conceived

has

in

it

God,

the

bodily

to

will

hand.

but

dependent

not

in

organs

identical.

are

His

that

for

only

perfect,

is

accomplish

hap

at

not

will

to

may

not

are

infinitely

all

call

God.

design

He

in

execution,

place

no

that

reason

his

out

find

can

causes,

will

it into

carry

carrying

special

more

God

good

to

kind

priori

instrumental

upon

In

of

this

for

means

want

good

judged

God's

say,

Hence

man

"

con

we

view

of

mercy

When

God.

Thomas

is to

(q. 21).

liberality,

of

St.

of

nature

observes,
of

point

the

the

that

he

love,

and

19),

q.

good,

its

This
to

judging

I,

to

20).

q.

according

names

regard
of

Dei,

(Deamore

united

as

will

divine

the

(Summa,

volition
will

divine

the

love

of

act

of

object

the

intellect

omnipotent.
us

to

the

works

of

the

divine

\\

CHAPTER
THE
Works

77. The

'

of God

of life within

GOD

OF

WORK
Ad

'.

Extra

Theologiansexplain,

"

faith,that there is in God

teachingof

the
following

III

fullness

Himself, the mystery of the personalTrinity

Unity of nature. In contradistinction to this divine


and the works which
lifead intra,theyspeakof the operations
know belongto Him
the Creator
we
as
by the lightof reason
The works of creation do not justify
of the world.
us in assert
ing that there are more
persons than one in God ; they only
in God a supreme
lead us to recognize
Cause endowed
with
these
Of
will
and
divine
intelligence,
operations
thought
power.

in the

and will
them

are

two

actions,and it is not essential to

immanent

that there should be any

external resultant ; but the ex


demands
terminus ad extra,
a
necessarily

ercise of His power


outside Himself, for it is not immanent
The power
and
(II),

of God

governs it

created the world

but transitive.
it in being
(I),
preserves

(III).
I. CREATION

78.

Meaning of Creation."

exercise their activity


upon

The

agents which

givenmatter

or transform
theymodify it accidentally

it as necessary for their


work upon it. Now we may
from this dependencewith
use

Again,consider that

as

we

see

subject;

at work

whether

it substantially,
they

for they are onlyable


activity,

when

conceive

regardto
a

man

an
a

to

action which is freed

presupposedmatter.

exercises

an

immanent

for example,
when
activity,

he thinks or loves,
he puts his powers
into exercise,and his activity
bringsabout an interior per
fectionwhich these powers therebyacquire.This allows us to
conceive

an

action which

is not

the

perfectible
powers,
no
but alreadyin
way potential
but which

of
puttinginto operation

is the exercise of facultiesthat

113

state of actual

are

perfection.

NATURAL

H4

Creation

the

means

THEOLOGY

which

act

both

excludes

the utilization

matter, and the actualization of the passive


pre-existing
perfectible
powers of the agent. It is usuallydefined as
prosui
In
ductio ex nihilo
et subject! 86.
terms, we may
positive
the production of a substance
define it as
accordingto the
of its being'. The creative act is opposed to the act
totality
of

'

'

"

which

of

materials,or,
phrase of the Scholastics,which
makes

of matter,

in

use

'

eductio

use

draws

upon

potentiamateriae

of the well-known

to make

the

potentiality
sense
explained

',in the

Cosmology,74.
this notion of creation to work

With

(i)that

God

created

something distinct
Theories

concerning

the

chief historical theories

God

to

doing

world
with

away

problem we

the

are:

God
at

are

not

an

to show

consequentlyis
emanation, and

create.

can

The

the

and

have

we

world, (ii)which

Himself

from

that He alone
(iii)
79.

the

upon,

Relation

of God

to the World."

of
concerningthe relationship
(i) Atheistic materialism, which, by
and
suppressingone of the terms of
is no real attempt
present considering,

(2)The doctrine of creation,in which the world


is conceived as having been freelyproduced by God not only
in itsform but also in its very matter.
dualism,
(3)Philosophical
which allows to the world a necessary
existence independent
of God.
It has received its most
completeexpressionin the
at

solution.

of the

doctrine

world
The

theory, which

has

only an

giventhe

now

on

century it found
of

doctrine
The

id
the

more

time

other

us

more

126.

enjoyed a great
We
have
briefly

it (56)87.
reject

hand, is still full of vitality.In

its appearance

in

Italywith Giordano
In the seventeenth
'

'

very felicitous ; a is better, for nothingness is not


In the termino
point of departure, terminus a quo.
subjectum denotes the material cause, subjectamateria ;
means
production which does not presuppose
any subject.
see
Metap hy siquegenerate, cours supe"rieur,
ample treatment

quo, but
Scholastics
ex

creation

For

125 and

it is

systematicexpressionin the geometric


Spinoza,and it thrives again to-day under the

prepositionex

source,

87

one

in the firstdays of the Renaissance.

Bruno

that

the

world it made

the modern

so

as

pantheism.
at

historical interest.

that make

reasons

Pantheism,

logy of

and

dualistic

vogue,

84

or,

known

the refutation of dualism

The

(4) Pantheism

to-day,monism, a theorythat God and the


and the same
substance.
one
are
entirely
doctrine of creation can be proved directly,
and indirectly

commonly

by

Manicheans.

is not
a

ACTIVITY

THE

GOD

OF

115

in his

philosophy. It is the
idealistic philosophyof the last
of German
logicaloutcome
century. At the present time it has spread or is spreading,
rather than a system,in the
under the form of a tone ofthought
in Germany, in certain French
world, in Italy,
English-speaking
and it has succeeded in leavinga decided
circles,
philosophical
impress upon philosophy,history,natural science, art and
limits of this elementary treatise do not
literature. The
philosophical
permit us to dwell at lengthon this erroneous
but we wish to layspecial
view of reality,
emphasison the little
influence of

that

able to say.

are

we

renewed

World

80. The

has

interest

been

created

by God.

of

Refutation

to assert on a priorigrounds that


arbitrary
Some peopletriumphantly
creation is not possible.
appealto the
old saying ex nihilo nihil fit in order to rule out of court
from
any questionof creation. But how do they prove that
? Is it by observation, by
nothingnothing can be made

Dualism.

It is

i.

"

'

'

'

'

If

induction ?

so, the assertion

ductive inference and is tantamount

'

'

ex

nihilo nihil fit is

an

in

As far as my obser
vations carry me I see that nothingappears which is not drawn
from a subjectpriorto itself; natural agents are clearly
not
This

to this

to ; nay more,
are
we
willing
be creators. Yet even
to allow that natural agents cannot

creators.
even

readilyagree

we

so, is there any warrant


to an agent which is not

By

what

are

for God

to

for

sayingthat creation is impossible


subjectto the laws of material nature ?
that it is not possible
in asserting
justified

we

create

There is simplyno

who

is above

all nature

for such
justification

an

that

we

observe ?

assertion.

Indeed

it may

be evident that every effect demands


efficientcause,
an
but it can never
be proved that an effect demands
a material
However

cause.

true in fact it is that modifications

formations of matter

and trans

subjective
cause, on a material
and that an efficientcause
substrate,
producingaccidental or
substantial changes only makes
one
being succeed another;
nevertheless you cannot
for some
establish that it is impossible
efficientcause
to make
after no being,and
some
being come
this power of efficiency
is allthat is claimed for a creative cause.
We conclude,therefore,
creation
that it is arbitrary
to repudiate
on

2.

depend on

priorigrounds.
The

creation

alternative to
M.S.P."

VOL.

II.

of the world must be asserted as a


maintainingthe necessary existence

necessary
of matter
I

u6

THEOLOGY

NATURAL

and

its

of the

propositionwe

the essential

Moreover,
and

infinite.

and

finite.

the

self-subsistent it would

matter

were

already established (56)concerning


Divine Being.

have

unicityof

involves the contradiction

which

with God,
co-eternity

Yet

bodies

Hence

matter

be immutable

manifestlycontingent,changing

are

be

cannot

self-existent.
'

'

must
not
frequentexpression eternal matter
be the occasion of a pitfall.
read
it in this
Matter
we
as
in the abstract ;
in general,
matter
matter
phrase always means
whereas
actual matter
is always in some
body and all material
bodies are
subjectto change and transformation.
It is along the lines of the arguments justindicated that we

Note

that the

refute Gnostic

must

to consider
81.

The

Divine

is neither

Refutation

Part

nor

of

Monism.

historyof philosophyunder

the other

in

World

indeterminate
of

account

law

being

of the

Emanation

an

Monism

"

forms, the

one

appears

idealistic,

of its internal

doctrine

'

(a)is due

originof thingsto

evolution,is

becoming
to

Absolute

called the

'

all

ever

"

consist

which,

on

progressively

things.

thought between
Being. And (b),by making

confusion

being in generaland
God

two

the

makes

itselfand
differentiating
This

then

realistic.

Idealistic monism

an

It remains

dualism.

Manichean

pantheism.

or

Substance.

in the

I.

monism

or

of

the supreme
subjectto the law of becoming,it denies the real nature

of God

as

the pure

Actualitywhose

existence

we

claim to have

demonstrated.
the objectof the first conceptionof the
(a)Being in general,
of comprehension; and it has, conversely,
mind, has a minimum
of potential
a maximum
extension,inasmuch as it is capableof
being attributed to whatever exists or may exist. Being that
is pure Actuality,
of
maximum
the contrary, connotes
on
a
whilst it has no extension, either actual
positiveperfection,
or
be identified with any
potential
; it is itselfand it cannot
thing else. Being in generalis an abstract entitywhich, as
such, cannot have an existence in nature : it exists only in the

mind

that

thinks of it and

puts it in relation

to the

individual

by one it identifies it. Pure Actuality


exists by itself,
independentlyof our thought, or of that of any
finitespirit
whatsoever.
To both, to indefinite being and to the
Divine Being,we do jn faciattribute a characteristic which we
subjectswith which

one

by one
predicatedof

the

and

know

same

former

the

OF

ACTIVITY

THE

117

but
;
namely simplicity
meaning entirelynegative,

name,

it has

GOD

compositionwhich is due to the extreme


poverty of abstract and universal being ; whilst in reference
is something very positive,
to the latter,to God, simplicity
of perfection
such that, in its absolute
it stands for a plenitude
indivisible unity,it surpasses all the accumulated
perfections
of created things.
(b)To confuse abstract and universal being with the divine
Being is to deny the true nature of Him whose existence we
to affirm and
endeavoured
have
prove by arguments drawn
it is

from

an

the

spontaneous dictates of

of the

and
races.

If

is at

our

individual

generalexpressionof feelingamong
must
the result of our
investigations

thingelse than
who

of

absence

once

reasoned

mature

conviction

conscience

the different
to

come

that

God

any
exists

Actuality,necessary and infinite Being,


all hope of beingable to demonstrate
Himself which is the objectof Theodicy

pure

may as well renounce


the existence of God

we

(Oeov$iKTrj\
2.

is

Realistic monism

of creation

we

have

more

directly
opposed to

justdiscussed.

the doctrine

Monism, under

this

form,

thingsto be so many parts or manifestations of the Divine


Reality. Here we have not a theory which sets out from the
in order to arrive by some
of reality
minimum
illogical
process
of it from being in generalto the Absolute ;
at the maximum
it supposes
from the Being which
sets out
which
but one
asserts
all
to keep its infinity,
infinite and, in its endeavour
this aim
identical with it. With
realityto be substantially
it bringsforward various considerations that are rather objec
tions to the doctrine of creation than positivearguments :

sees

"

of the idea of creation ; (ii)


the
understanding efficient causalityif action

(i)the unscientific
of
impossibility

character

has to pass from an agent to an objectthat is substantially


in
the
involved
contradiction
it ; (iii)
distinct from
sup

posing an
reality.

infinite being which

Pantheism, whatever
fallfoul of two

the form

embrace

it assume,

(a)the changes

that

must

take

the whole

of

necessarily
placein the

(b)the consciousness of individual personality.


it is ; it can
what
know
(a)A necessary being is necessarily
change. Yet the fact of change is manifest throughoutthe

universe,and
no

facts

does not

modalities

realities of nature

the

Therefore

universe.
or

THEOLOGY

NATURAL

n8

Being.
beingsof

parts of the necessary

nor

The

independent,infinite.
they
dependent, finite. Therefore
God

is

not

are

phases

not

are

this world

are

substantially

identical with God.

(b)Nothing
myself,or that

world

in the

persuade

can

me

that

not

am

of somebody else. The


self-expression
of myself the word
use
ego in opposition
very fact that I can
that I am
is non-ego, implies
to whatever
myself,that my being
that I am
This personalconsciousness
is incommunicable.
distinct from what is not myself is the great stumbling-block
I

the

am

of monism.

in the way

Furthermore, the
ward

have

tradicts

considerations

little weight :

very

contrary, the notion of


of creation.
we

As

(i)The

"

it
prejudice,

does

have

we

which

monists

idea of creation

contradict

not

bring for
con

On

reason.

the

is identical with that


perfect
causality
developedthis thought already(80),

repeat it here.
Causal
action, indeed, raises
(ii)
will not

an

intricate

problem

of

generalmetaphysics. But we may note that if there is a


in understanding how
acts
substance
one
difficulty
upon
in understandinghow
a
another, there is no less difficulty
substantial agent influences an accident reallydistinct from
itself or how one
act upon
another part of
part can effectively
There
whole.
the same
are
only two ways of escapingfrom
either to deny all efficient causality this is
:
the difficulty
the
to deny all real distinction between
occasionalism
or
"

"

of the

substance

universe

complete phenomenalism.

and

its manifestations, which

Yet

monism

refuses to

is

recognize

either of these alternatives.

(iii)The

existence

of

beings which were


independentof the divine Being would certainlyput a limit
but He is not limited by the fact of
to this Being'sperfection,
the power
to produce creatures that are dependent
possessing
Himself.
must
we
on
remember, is not a collection
Infinity,
and imperfections,
it is a singlereality
of perfections
which
all that is not itself.
contains in a supereminentmanner
82.

God

Alone

itself

can

one

Create."

or

Here

more

we

embark

upon what has


tradition holds

thorny question. Catholic


that creation belongsonly to God.
Further, Catholic philo
in saying that only God in point of
sophers are unanimous

proved

ACTIVITY

THE

OF

GOD

119

fact has created ; they are also of one mind in thinkingthat


the power
of creatingin
is capable of exercising
creature
no
cause.
principal
They add that
action of God,
to become, under the sovereign
a creature
were
in a creative act, it would
instrumental cause
necessarily
an
the
that it
if
for
of
have a limited sphere
reason
action, only
it is
itself. But
could not create
they question whether
to be an instrumental
cause
impossiblefor a secondarycause
an

independentway

of

to

come

and

creative act which

as

makes

limited number

of creatures

forth from
is

St. Thomas

the

holds

Suarez

is often

There

view this

nothingness.
of the opinion that
oppositeview.
brought forward in
does

argument which

not

it is

whilst
impossible,

favour

of St. Thomas's

conclusive

seem

non-entityand beingthere is an infinitedistance


infinite power
can
an
bridge. Against such
"

however,

we

that

the

distance

urge
infinite ; it is measured

may

Between

this

; and

only

argument,

an

between

non-entity

the finite reality

by
being is not
which is opposed to non-entity.
thus :
Kleutgen,in commentating upon St. Thomas, reasons
of
have a mode
God
must
being infinite in all His perfections
perfect. This mode of
causality
proper to Himself, infinitely
causalitycan only be the action which is independent of all
material cause,
namely creation. Therefore the creative act
belongsto God alone 88.
and

11

'

St. Thomas

actio

nisi

presents his argument thus : Creare non potest esse propria


Dei.
effectus
in universaliores
Oportet enim universaliores

solius

reducere.

priorescausas
ipsum esse. Unde

et

causae,

hoc

vel

creatio

quae

Inter

oportet quod

Producere

Deus.

est

sit

tale, pertinet ad rationem

autem

omnes

effectus

universalissimum

est

et universalissimae
in quantum
est
absolute, non
Unde
manifestum
est quod

proprius effectus primae


autem

esse

creationis.

ipsiusDei.
quod aliquidparticipetactionem propriam alicujusalterius,
virtute propria,sed instrumentaliter, in quantum
non
agitin virtute alterius
instrumental
secunda
Causa autem
non
causae
participat actionem
supenisi in quantum
rioris,
per aliquidsibi proprium dispositiveoperaturadeffectum
principalisagentis.
Illud autem
quod est proprius effectus Dei creantis, est illud quod praeabsolute.
Unde
omnibus
aliis ; scilicet esse
non
supponitur
potest aliquid
aliud operari dispositiveet instrumentaliter
creatio
ad hunc
effectum, cum
sit ex aliquo praesupposito quod possitdisponi per actionem
non
instrumentalis agentis. Sic igiturimpossibile
conveniat
est quod alicui creaturae
creare
virtute propria,neque
'. Sum.
instrumentaliter, sive per ministerium
neque
'

est

propria

actio

Con tin gitautem

'

TheoL, I, q. 45,

Kleutgen
be the
that

sums

effect of

a.

5.
the

thought of
secondary causes
only

particularkind

up

; but

inasmuch

as

St. Thomas
in the

they

in this

'

way

respect that they


have beingthey must

:
are

Things

can

of this

or

be the effects

sight this argument

first

At

appears

insufficient.

upholds the opinionof Suarez might rejointhat


of action
that creation is a mode
as
a principle
alone, when this is the very questionat issue.

who
down

God

it is laid

proper to
Granted

only
originand

that

One

causal power that is proper to Himself, and even


which is independent
be a creative cause
God can

has

that God

universal

in its

remains

creative

and

limited

whether

action of God
or

THEOLOGY

NATURAL

120

in its

object;

the

dependenton
causality
in its action impliesa

questionstill
the sovereign
contradiction

not.

Yet

this

objectionof

Suarez

would

A
superficial.
making a singleobject

appear

which has the power of


secondarycause
pass from non-beingto being would have the intrinsic power
call
we
of creatingeverything. For in respect of what
may
of passing
that is to say, of their potentiality
this creatability,
from
non-being to being, all objectsare alike. An agent
capableof producingone of them has in its nature the power
that the
Suarez
all. And
of producing them
even
recognizes
it be regardedas a
power to create everythingcannot, whether
a subordinate
belong to a creature.
cause
or
as
one,
principal
Therefore

it must

be true

that God

alone

can

create

89.

is that a cause
thought of St. Thomas
belongs to a higherorder only on the condition that it has a
of action which properlybelongs to itself. The extent
mode

The

fundamental

which

to

this

cause

is

pointis

the essential

is
applicable

the nature

of

secondaryimportance;
Now

of its action.

the mode

of action proper to God can


only be creation,for all exercise
it ; it alone does
other than creation presupposes
of activity
not

presuppose
being the most

causality.Therefore creation,
perfectpossibleoperation,belongs properly

any

anterior

when
who
a thing is created
produces all things. Now
nothing,it is produced in respect of its being,not only in
Therefore
its production is entirely
so far as it is this or that particularthing.
the fact that
from
Whence
conclude
first
Cause.
the
the effect of
just as we
from
to
the
that
He
has
all
God
nothing, so
produce
things
power
produces
the effect of
be
from
is
what
can
infer
that
we
nothing
only
produced
may
Him who
produces all '. Philos. Scholast., Diss. IX, 1012.
""
Facultas
the argument
thus :
quaevis in
Palmieri
very aptly expresses
formali
sub
extendere
suo
objecto
materialia
omnia
ea
objecta se potest
quae
continentur.
objectum potestatis creativae est ens ut ens,
jAtqui formale
in id
causa
est ens
ergo
; quae
producibile,sive ens ex nihilo emciendum
:
ferri potest,potest versari circa ea
omnia, quae sunt ex nihilo producibilia
'. Institutions
philoomnes
ideoque potest substantias
possibilescreare
Theologia, th. XXXVIII.
sophicae,

of the
or

supreme

produced

Cause

from

'

THE

the first Cause

to

OF

cannot

be shared

and

GOD

121

by

being of

any

Being 90.

the divine

from

different nature

ACTIVITY

II. CONSERVATION
83.

of Conservation.

Meaning

succeeds

non-being;

to

By

"

the

of creation

act

conservation

by

being
being already

Conservation
is the act
existent perseveres in its existence.
in the existence which creation
by which created thingspersist
has conferred

upon

'

It is therefore known

them.

as

continued

creation '.
annihilation

By

it would
a

tive action
have

should
is thus

impossiblethat

real term,

God

as

Annihilation

for it is

soon

as

existence.

beingin

not

about

come

total destruction

the

mean

we

and

to

thing;

to maintain

cease

to be

seen

posi

no

positiveaction should

positiveaction

suppose

terminatingin nothingnessis

annihilation

of

an

evident

of

contra

diction.

Everything created

84.

God.

of this world

Things
beingwhich they have
"

will that

to

being

should

it should

persistin

of conservation
.

beingsis,says
their
sunt

'

Ordo

effectus

is to

will that

create.

is to

To

conserve.

The

act

DIVINE

and

GOVERNMENT

Government.

"

The

conservation

of

St. Thomas,

being

the first effect of the divine govern


ordered towards
the good is the second.

effectus

in bono, et motio
90

dependence
of a being

necessary prolongationof the act of


91.
It is the first effect of God's government

85. Providence

Duo

be

the follow

in
every moment
To will the essence

existence

III. THE

'

therefore,

'

'

is not,

in being at
persistence
at

by

is the

creation.

ment

being conserved

present moment

ing moment.
Everything is
the omnipotence of God.
on
and

of

essentially
contingent. The

are

at the

of their

the sufficient reason

Need

has

effectuum

scilicet conservatio
gubernationis,
ad bonum

earum

est

secundum

'

rerum

92.

ordinem

causarum.

Primus

autem

aliis effectibus praesupponitur et ipsum


ipsum esse, quod omnibus
non
praesupponit aliquem alium effectum ; et ideo oportet quod dare esse in
solius secundum
hujusmodi, sit effectus primae causae
quantum
propriam
virtutem
'. ST. THOMAS,
Qq. disput.De Pot., q. 3, a. 4.
fl
MoNSABRfe, Conferencesde Notre-Dame, 1876, 19 Conf.
92

est

Sum.

Theol., I, q. 103,

a.

4.

NATURAL

122

Providence
which

'

"

in

93.

'

est

designconceived by the divine intelligence


ratio ordinis rerum
all thingsreach their end
divina praeexistens
mente
proprie Providentia
is the

makes

in finem

THEOLOGY

is the realization in time of this scheme

Government

of divine

providence.
The questionis discussed whether
providenceis formally
act of intelli
act of God's
alone or at once
an
an
intelligence
and will. The two
opinionsare not so different from
gence
St. Thomas
another
would appear at first sight. When
one
as
attributes the plan of providenceto the divine intelligence,
in the divine will :
a
presupposes
purpose
end for His work, and providenceis the
supreme

God

he

order

the
'

which
is not

world

substances

real will

made

when

'

',says Monsabre,
relation to

without

bring about

this end.

collection of

another, without

one

conceptionof

incoherent

an

wills

direction

singlewhole in which each


thinghas its own placeand by working towards its own perfec
of the whole.
tion concurs
To see the
towards the perfection
ends, to regulate
placeof each thing,to assignto it its particular
all the particular
ends towards
a
generalend, to dispose,to
decree, to apply the means
by which all the ends are attained,
04.
such is the act of providence: in short,it is to govern
towards

determined

It is

end.

'

"

Universal

86.

have

goodness and

of creatures

God

that

already seen

essential

and

Providence

that

Particular

Providence.

necessary love His


enjoysfreedom in the creation

loves with
He

share
a
receive,though imperfectly,

who

We

"

in the

effects of His infinite goodness.


God

has

no

of

need

is sufficient for Him.

His

own

He

does not

goodness, but in order

munication
the

anything ;

of the

ultimate

order to make
of intrinsic

end

divine

own

create

by

essential

'

finis

creation

we
speak
perfection,

of it

propter quern
as

'

The

it.

creatures

God

goodness

in order to increase

to communicate

goodness to

of creation,

it clear that

His

receives

com

is therefore
'

;
no

the extrinsic

and

in

increase

glory of

God'.
with a view to the supreme
all creatures
end,
arrange
to endow
to the realization of
with the means
them
necessary
this end, is the objectof universal providence.
To

93

Sum.

84

Loc.

Theol., I, q.
cit.

22,

a.

i.

ACTIVITY

THE

OF

alone

creatures
Yet, intelligent

GOD

123

able to understand

are

the in

to have a conscious appreciation


of
providence,
His goodness,to praiseHis perfections
; they are, then, in an
the end of the providential
order, in this sense
especial
way

tentions of God's

it is established for their

that

87. The

and

Providence

advantage

the

they

"

of

Government

'

are

finis cui '.

God

Uni

are

prioriproof: God is infinitely


good, wise, holy,
and powerful, (a)Being infinitely
good, He must necessarily
that can
wish to bring about
in His work all the perfections
belongto it,that is to say, to accomplishin it all the good that
the elements of which it is made
admit of. (b)Being infinitely
versal.

"

wise, He
end

of His work,
which

order

ideal.

infinite wisdom

cannot

created works, to each


well

of the

to parts
species,
thing or a movement

in the

work

bute in

does

either

the

not

that

whole.

contribute
there

way of
evil intention

an

To

can

excess

to

be
or

ignor

or

power95.

posteriori
proof:
how

which

to

as

of the universe, to suppose


of God
any flaw either in the

lack of

to show

well

individuals

appliesto

end

defect,is to attribute to God


or

as

bit of His

every

in their activities,

use

; it

(d) Being

fallsshort of His

which

they

the

will the

must

conceived,

appliesto

means

to

as

suppose a
the ultimate

ance

work

of their activities themselves

to each
as

execute

has

this is reasoningwhich

And

co-operatetowards

must

(c)Being infinitely
holy,He

His

omnipotent,He

element

each

how

sees

each

It is

impossiblefor
and

creature

each

}
finite intelligence

of its movements

contri-

"

positiveway to the harmony of the universe. But


if we consider all thingstogether,we cannot
but acknowledge
that they furnish abundant
evidence of a sovereignDesigner.
This is a proofwe have alreadydeveloped(28),
and so we need
here only summarize
it in the followingconcise words of St.
Thomas
We observe throughout the works of nature that,
:
that takes place which
is better.
Now
always or generally,
this could not come
about unless all beingswere
directed to an
end, which is their good, by an action of providence; this
a

'

the
implies
""

enim
tati

governance

ruler.

Whence

this order

we

St. Thomas

see

'

gives the argument


concisely in this form : Cum
very
Dei
boniconvenit
summae
optimum
optima producere, non
autem
quod res productas ad perfectum non
perfectio
perducat. Ultima
sit

uniuscujusqueest
tinet ut sicut
nare

of

'.

Sum.

in

consecutione
finis.
Unde
ad
ad finem
eas
esse, ita etiam

produxit

Theol., I, q. 103,

a.

i.

divinam

bonitatem

perducat, quod

est

per-

guber-

THEOLOGY

NATURAL

124

clearlyshows a government of the world,


house manifests the design and action
justas a well-arranged
who
has arrangedit 96.
of one
where all seems
to depend
Again,in the world of moral beings,
and on the play of human
the initiative of personalfreedom
on
of God, although it is en
passions,the sovereigndominion
manifest

in nature

'

manifestations
in mystery, is still not without
leads him.
existence 97. Man
acts by himself and God

of its

shrouded

The

88.

Whilst

universal
master

two

truths

of his

actions

own

by

is

man
sovereign,

and

him

We

exercised

the governance

the

and

of God

Sovereignty

Free-will

in His works

God

free,and
how

of Creatures,"

can

needs

this freedom
we

be

makes

reconcile these

?
doubt

for

have

alreadygiven
of being able to arrive at a fully
(67,68) of the possibility
reconcile them.
satisfactory
explanationwhich will positively
and infallibly
what
human
God must
actions
know
perfectly
much

very

"

reasons

we

"

will be.
which

of His

Each

action, just as

every

arranged with

view to

sary that all such


how
the action
can

if it is not
Him

on

wait

for

of

indeed

decisions

our

cause

by
?

whole

His

an

98

to

work

beforehand.

Now,

which

influence

God, who
be

absolutelydependent
is infinitely
wise, cannot

in order

made

to

the

arrange

and

shall do, it is necessary

we

be

for this it is neces

His government ".


Further, it is not sufficientthat God should merelyknow

generalplan of

in

is of its very nature


free-will is, be known
beforehand,

our

foreknows

part of

being that exists,must

every

determined

who

generalend ; and
should be known
activity

indifferent,as

forms

creatures

that He

should

have

sure

what
way

of

enim
in rebus naturalibus
evenire
quod melius est, aut semper
pluribus. Quod non
contingeret,nisi per aliquam providentiam res
naturales
dirigerentur ad finem boni, quod est gubernare. Unde
ipse ordo
manifesto
certus
demonstrat
rerum
sicut si quis
:
gubernationem mundi
intraret
bene
domum
ordinatoris
ordinatione
ex
ordinatam,
ipsa domus
rationem
Theol., loc. cit.
perpenderet '. Sum.
""

'

Videmus

in

aut

"7

MoNSABRfe,

9*

'

ad

utrumque

praecipue
libet,cum
quam
sunt
9"

per

se

haec

futuri

autem

sunt,

vocantur

dependent ex libero
quae
sit quasi in potentia, non

aliam

hujusmodi

op. cit.,19* Conf.


effectus

Quidam

causam

effectus

in

accepti '.

Cp. MoNSABRt,

quorum

causae

indifferentes

contingentia ad utrumlibet,
arbitrio.

Sed

se

ut

habent
sunt

ilia

ad utrum
quia ex causa
progreditur aliquiseffectus. nisi per ali
determinatur
ad aliud ; ideo
magis ad unum
quam
causis quidem ad utrumlibet
nullo modo
cognosci pos-

De verit.,q. 8, a. 12.
op. cit.,20* Conf., p. 83.

leading our

acts

anything else

direct action

125
this be

can

of the

said to

divine

will

be
the

on

will ?

human

of

reconcile the freedom

To

GOD

And

their ends.

to

than

OF

ACTIVITY

THE

with

man

sovereigntyof

the

of the
as well as
providenceis the work of the theologian
connected with the deep problem
for it is intimately
philosopher,
will here confine ourselves to a brief
of predestination.
We
sketch of the principal
attempts that have been made towards
God's

its solution.
of the
by the majority of the theologians
Society of Jesus, chieflydesirous of safeguardingthe part
of creation,attributes
of human
freedomin the generaleconomy

Molina, followed

God

to

The

'.

taneous

school defends

Thomist

'

he calls

which

concurrence,

indifferent ',

'

simul

stricter theory,which

for safeguardingthe absolute sove


they think indispensable
of Providence ; they attribute to God a motion anterior
reignty
to the free determination
of the created will,and this they name
a
pre-motion'.
(a)It is the opinionof the Molinist school that God co-oper
in some
ates with the creature
generaland indefinite way.
This generalco-operation
definite and particular
becomes
by
'

the

action of each

person,

but in such

and
produced is simultaneously
the proper act of the created
will has a priority
of nature

this concurrence,
wills from all
creature's

from

from

is to make
in this

or

to be

the act of God

those

which

acts

providence,

to this

accordance

the creature

brought that

be

act of free

an

of

concurrence

and

God

with

His

will himself

if the initiative

the creature, if the proper part the creature plays


of the indifferent concurrence
of the divine will
use
we
pleasure,

shall have

to say that

action of God subject to its


supreme
is the absolute sovereignty
of providence

makes

decisions.

own

to the

the action

that

the side of God, amounts

that direction at its

the creature

both
totally

eternityto accomplishin

freedom

way

agent. Further, as

freelyperform.
To this the objection
may
comes

the

How

safeguarded?

Molinists meet
eminent
creatures.

power

this
of

objection by urging that God has


leads
persuasionwhereby He infallibly

Sometimes

fellow-men that he
to
beingpossible

acts

man

with

is
a

so

kind

sure

of

of his influence

on

without
infallibility,

say that he has over-ridden

their freedom.

an

His

his
it

If

I26
a

THEOLOGY

NATURAL
has

man

belong

great
God, who
so

to

activities of

all the influences that

will and

our

does
persuasion,
most
intimatelyall
of

power
knows

not

this also

the

different
act

may

upon

it?
to analysethe
reply,however, that if we come
discover in it the compositionof two
we
persuasion,

this

To

we

power of
distinct acts, and

say that the firstis the direct and


It is I who
of the second.
efficacious cause
yieldto the per
its efficaciousness.
If God's
determine
suasion, it is I who
cannot

we

of persuasion,
than His power
sovereigntyis nothing more
I am
able to shake myself free from His action ; and, if I
is entirelymy
act
own
yieldto it, since my determination
and the radical reason
of the good that I may
do and of the
merits that I may
acquire,this good and these merits cannot

be ascribed

to

any

efficaciousness

supreme

part of the

the

on

first Cause.

(b)The

school makes

consist in this,that

God

Cause
He

Thomist

of all

does not

things,and
produce in

us

sovereigntyof

is,in the strictest way,

He
He

absolute

the

be so, in this
not only our
being and
cannot

the

first

opinion,if
our

powers

also the very acts which result from the use of our powers.
Hence
in every created agent that acts God acts ; no being
is able to accomplishits natural action unless by the influence
but

of His
ever

be

divine power

perfectwe
moved
by

no

cause,

not

even

one,
spiritual

suppose it to be, is able to act except it


that is always absolutely
This motion

may
God.

necessary to every created nature, is a motion


will. Unless such a motion is received by our
in truth

say that God

in the last
to

is the author

analysis,
every

action of

of all that
ours

is

imparted to
will

we

belongs to

the

cannot
us,

for,

somethingbelonging

us.

In the well-known
De

how

question,Q.

Potentia, St. Thomas

divine

providence in

sums

up

7, of his opusculum
his views on the action of

3, art.

'

Sic ergo Deus


followingwords :
est causa
actionis cujuslibetinquantum dat virtutem agendi,
et inquantum conservat
earn, et inquantum applicatactioni,
alia virtus agit'. According
et inquantum ejus virtute omnis
to this teaching,the action of providencetherefore comprises
four elements : (a) God
creates, and accordinglyHe is the
author
of every
the powers
active power ; (b)God
conserves
He

has

created ;

the

(c) God

'

moves

to

action

'

these

active

THE

(d)God

powers

is subordinate

cause

It

instrumental

an

Doctor, the action of God


Dominican

the

one.

of the

Angelic

characteristics of what

all the

has

secondary

every

that, according to the mind

clear

seems

as

127

to which

Cause
principal

is the

GOD

OF

ACTIVITY

'

called

have

'

pre-motion or
'.
rather, in a less happy phrase, physicalpredetermination
But the idea of freedom
seems
quite inconsistent with a
motion
who
What
of this kind.
are
we
goingto say to the man
commentators

'

assures

it to
transferring

are

To
'

that he has dominion

us

another

this claim in favour

Certainlya

exclusion

has

man

all necessary

be the

is in the

in the

St.
liberty

that

of its

we

:
replies

be the first cause

of it.

natural

causes

to

the

that

the

not

necessary

movement,

own

world, both

Thomas

his acts, but

over

Though it is

cause

that it should

everythingthat
endowed

of human

dominion

and

acts

own

cause

of the first Cause.

free-will should

his

over

it is not
God

at

moves

and

causes

with free-will ; and justas His motion does not stand


of the acts of natural causes
being natural, so it
way

does not stand in the way of free causes


stillbeingfree. Indeed
His pre-motionmakes
to be so, because
them
God works in
each being accordingto its own
Not
nature.
only does the
divine

will

the

cause

action,but It also
the

to
were

in the

which

in this

be

not

'

free '.

God

God

In

word, the divine motion

one

ea

Cum

Cum

quae

our

evil is not

igiturvoluntas
Deus

vult

divina

sed
fieri,

et

"

voluntatis

necessitas, sed

modum

suum

20e Conf
op. cit.,

Does

sinful acts ?

The

"

sit efficacissima,non

quod

eo

modo

fiantquo
quidem

motae, quae indifferenter


manet
libertas ; sicut etiam

infallibiliter
operatur ; et
contingenter,inquantum
secundum

raised

be

it is a
reality,

Theol., I, q. 19, a. 8. 'Deus


movet
propter efficaciamvirtutis moventis, quae
naturam

necessitate 10".

all qua causa


efficax fuerit ad agendum,
secundum
id quod fit,sed etiam secundum

tantum
.

share in

is

not

answer

this
lies

is the firstCause of the whole

comprise,but
non

manner

perform an
appropriate

secondary agent, in such a way that


there something repugnant to the divine pre-motion
act which
It causes
free will to accomplish,
such an
our

doctrine make

'

to

moves

it to do it in the

causes

but does not


infallibly
efficacious
Once
again the objectionmay

1QO

It

of the

nature

would

act

being

deficere
se

actions
our
reality
privationof reality.

effectus

sequitur causam,
ftendivel essendi.
sequitur quod fiant
vult '. Sum.
ea
fieri

modum
solum
Deus

immutabiliter

voluntatem
non

potest ;

sed

propter

ad diversa, non
inducitur
omnibus
providentia divina

habet

in

tamen
a causis
contingentibus proveniunt effectus
Deus
movet
omnia
proportionabiliter,
unumquodque

'.

De

Malo, q. 6, art. unico, ad

3.

Cp.

128

THEOLOGY

NATURAL

This

privationof beingbelongsto

but

to

alone

us

which

it cannot

Just

of my
soul, the principle
limb

if I

as

the

to

limp,it

but

movement,

defective causes,

are

attributed

be

be defective.

cannot

who

us

to

first Cause

is not

to my

malformed

my
be

failure to walk
attributed ;
properlymust
my
if I sin,it is not to God, the first and indefectible cause
of

so

that

my

actions,but

my

sin must

to

me

free-will that

responsibility
belongs

the

good

there

is in my

101.

'

Molinist and

the

part of my

whole

for
only responsible

is

God

the

on

The

be attributed.

material act of sin


Both

failure

to the

Thomist

theory raise difficulties


they do not giveany answer

the

franklyavow,
that
completelysatisfactory.And, we may add, that the
prolongedcontests these arguments have excited bear witness
is rightin urging us to grasp
to their insufficiency.
Bossuet
firmlythe two ends of the chain, although we do not see all
the links of argument by which they are
united.
We
hold
of God, in the other
in the one hand the truth of the sovereignty
which,

to

must

we

is

the truth of the free-will of

invisible link alluded

If it should

man.

happen

that the

by Bossuet, which unites these two


we
never
badly constructed by human
opinion,
may

truths be

to

theless rest assured that there is


After all,it is not

flaw in the work

no

that
astonishing

of God.

relations of God

the

to

the

of
world, of the essential Being to contingent subjects,
the Infinite and the finite,
should be envelopedin obscurity.
On

otherwise.

stand

must

World.
and

working

then

fact ; there

is a victim

man

How

can

we

necessary

101

very
muth

ably
S.

divine

and

are

to

evils
physical

and
suffering,

Thomas

Defensio doctrinae

moral

et

"

The

attacks

of Frs.

Docinna

Yet

in the

means

how

the existence of evil

phenomena

of nature,

evil defileshis conscience.

these

three

forms, with the

providence?

Conf

op. cit.,20"

S. Thomae

world

is infallible

government

in the

reconcile evil,under

against the

of Evil

in the choice of its

attributes of God's

MoNSABRfe,
"

of the

there be evil in the world

can

the

on

by

in its end

holy both

be

solve all the

of its action

and

its very claim.


of God and
the Presence

condemned

The

"

divine nature

the

Government

89. The

it cannot

must

we

mysteriesof

is

surelyall recognizethat
philosophywhich should claim to

reflection

Thomistic

Scheeman

and

Praemotionis

de Praemotione

view

has

been

defended

Frins, S.J.,by Dummer-

Physicae (Paris, 1886),


Physica (Louvain, 1895).

and

ACTIVITY

THE

The

lies in the

answer

OF

GOD

129

followingconsiderations

"

Physicalevil is the privationof the perfectionthat is


Malum
est aliquid,
to a particular
nature
sed
non
proper
Malum
est privatio
est privatioalicujusboni particularis
;
the accidental
debitae perf
ectionis 102.Now these privations
are
1.

'

"

'

'

'

Particular ends

effects of the clash of the laws of nature.

exigenciesof

are

generalorder
of nature.
Who
will deny that God
can
permit for the
generalorder and the beauty of His work, that a being which
is defective should give way, that an inferior good should be
sacrificed to a highergood ?
To do so would be to contradict
sacrificed
accidentally

to

the

the

'

'

wisdom

103.

is only a relative evil ; it can be and


Suffering,
moreover,
often is a good, if we
take into consideration all the circum
the supreme
end of life,
If comfort were
stances.
griefwould
but man
has an end higherthan earthly
out of place,
be certainly
enjoyment, a moral and religiousend. Consequently,it is
whether
a
grieffurthers or retards
questionof ascertaining
these higher aims.
If it is compatible with these aims, if
it furthers them, grief,
far from being an evil, can
be
even
either a condition or a means
of acquiringthe real good of
Yet
human
nature.
experience bears witness that grief,
it be a privationor endurance, detaches
the heart
whether
2.

from
free

the

play to

character
is not
'

trammels

life of the senses,


has a deep influence
aspirations,

the moral

and

bind

that

the

draws

it to

soul to

in life'sluxuries that God

Bonum

virum

God.

man
'

habet

him

tests and thus


by severe
prepares him
periturin dura, sibi ilium praeparat 104.

the

on

Seneca

As

looks for the

in deliciis non

Deus

leaves

says : It
of good will
"

but

He

proves
Ex'

for Himself

"

'

3. Moral

evil cannot

says, whatever
referred to God
is a
of

is
as

10*

positivein
what

to

is

; but

in

De

Malo,

q. i,
'
Cum

a.

act
so

far

i, and

a.

St. Thomas

of sin must
as

it proceedsfrom
right,

free-will ; thus it is that moral


ST. THOMAS,
MONSABRE,

As

God.

the material

its first Cause

from

falling
away
our

be attributed

evil,which

such

an

be
act

the defect
is

defect

2.

provisor totius entis,


ipsius providentiam pertinet ut permittat quosdam defectus esse in aliuniversi
perfectum. Si
quibus particularibusrebus, ne impediatur bonum
'. Sum.
enim
universe
omnia
deessent
mala
bona
impedirentur, multa
lo*

22"

Conf

"

ad

Theol., I, q. 22, a.
104
SENECA, De

2, ad

2.

Providentia.

Deus

sit universalis

THEOLOGY

NATURAL

I3o

in the

of

act

of all

Cause

tive action

good 105.

on

evil exists not

part, but

God's
'

Moral

attributed

be

never

can

man,

of His

to

God, the first

in virtue of

and
permission,

this per
vult mala

neque
neque vult mala fieri,
mala fieri; et hoc est bonum
sed vult permittere
fieri,

mission is a
non

"

free-will of

The

immoral

for
obliged,

to
free-will,

fections.

man

which

act

be

Deus

it would

that

evil,so
cannot

good

cease

He

is

from

is the

was

the
or

holy,but

'

106.

that is responsible
for moral

cause

involve

posi

contradiction

to

speak

of

an

God
produced without freedom.
sake of hinderingman's abuse of his
to suspend the exercise of His per
He is free,omnipotent,wise, as well

Now
all these attributes of God
exceedinglybounteous.
are
intimatelyconnected with one another, and they must
manifestation.
attain their end, namely their legitimate
God's
will it before everything
holiness,which wills the good, must
to
else,before that good which would consist in our inability
as

sin.
If God

were

obligedto prevent

longerhave the freedom


it is His

which

all moral

evil,He

would

no

to choose from all possible


worlds the one

good pleasureto create, for the

reason

that there

possible,
namely the world in which He sees
only beings that are perfect. To expect that man's freedom
be abused, would
should
be to demand
never
necessarily
useless miracles of the divine omnipotence. For it is the law
that every being acts accordingto its nature, and it is in the
of a defectible being that it should have the power
nature
to
fail. And yet the objection
demands
we
that
are
considering
overruled
this
God should have
law of nature from all eternity.
of evil
sound, the possibility
Further, if the objectionwere
would make
good impossible: every good would have to be
withheld
lest,by the fault of him who receives it,evil would
And therefore God could not givemen
follow.
life
necessarily
which is a good,free-will which is
which is a good,intelligence
is a good, because some
creatures
a good, His assistance which
might abuse these divine gifts.
and the
Finally,evil indeed may exist,yet the infallibility
would
holiness of God's government
only be compromised
be

would

only one

mala
est entitatis et actionis in actione
delectus
sed
ibi
est
non
causatur
quod
;
deficiente '. Sum.
secunda
Theol., I, q. 49, a. 2, ad 2.
106
Id.,I,-q.19, a. 9, ad 3.
IDS

sicut

"

in

reducitur

Quidquid
causam

Deo, sed

in Deum
ex

causa

ACTIVITY

THE

permittedevil

if He

OF

GOD

of His

in the works

131

creation to such

an

triumph over good. But this is not


God
is sufficiently
the case.
powerful,says St. Augustine,
of the final
the cause
to make
the evil which He permitsserve
Ad providentiam
Dei pertinuit
ut ex libero
good of creation.
arbitrio venientia mala voluntatis permitteret.Tanta quippe
de malis possit
est omnipotentiaejus voluntatis, ut etiam
sive sanando, sive ad utilitatem
facere bona, sive ignoscendo,
piorum co-optando atque vertendo, sive etiam justissime
puniendo 107.
that

extent

evil should

'

'

However, whilst each

certainlysome

has

of the

weight,

answers

of

none

solution.
give a complete
positive
and

the

world

the

"

The

we

have

them,

we

considered

think,

relations between

reconciliation of the divine

can

God

immutability

knowledge of thingswhich
of time ; of His all-powerful
to pass in the course
sove
come
and, consequently,
reigntywith the dominion of our free-will,
of the infallibility
of His foreknowledgewith the contingent
holiness and His perfect
nature
of our free acts ; of His perfect
with the fact of creation,with the

goodness with the existence


for the

consequences

of moral

guiltywho

loss
all these are
irreparable
limited understandingof man.
"

evil and

bring down

its disastrous

upon

themselves

mysteriesto
necessarily
Nor

should

we

the

expect it

to

ideas of God's
onlyanalogical
activity.The most we can do is to make ourselves thoroughly
and rationally
of our
convinced
present state of impotence
where it is a questionof knowing God's nature and of under
of His action.
and manner
ideas the reason
standingin positive
The deepestknowledge of God convinces us, says St. Thomas,
that,when leftto the lightof natural reason, we are necessarily
Further
ignorantof His nature and His dealingswith men.
in order to give ourselves a satisfactory
explanationof
more,
His government of the world, we
requireto know the plan of
know
whereas in fact we
only a
providencein its entirety,
be otherwise,seeingthat

small

we

have

fraction of His work, and

from

this

we

cannot

do

more

Is it,then, to
guesses at His designin creation.
be wondered
laborious efforts to put together
at that in our

than

make

fragmentsof the whole there should sometimes


in seeing how
difficulty
part fits in with part ? When

the detached
be

107

De

M.8.P."

Continentia, c. 6, n.
VOL.

II.

15.

in

bear

we

the

of

natural

objective

be

led

that

bears

which

much

confront

facts

God's
realms

shall

of

can

by

of

then

solution

real

known

the

to

character,

the

many

be

never

we

found

philosophical.

exclusively

is

which

investigation

from

us

is

part

belonging

adequate

an

it

as

but

more

supernatural

that

understand

to

problems
by

fact

and

such

forms

alone,

reason

creation,

universe

entire

the

that

mind
of

light

work
of

THEOLOGY

NATURAL

I32

Conclusion

is

God
Him

we

For

this

of

Seneca
flee

to

end

and

108

mum

quidquid

'

to

said

bonum,

of

quid
et

agimus'.

'

thy

thine

Epistola

sit,
totius
LXXI.

life

aut

vitae

the

whole
to

from

activity.
aspirations
moral

Sovereign

the

our

wishest

on
'

all

our

thou

as

eyes

whole

fugiendum

propositum

devote

oft

So

and

Him

to

must

we

fix

find,

purpose

Quoties

Him

to

faculties

our

End

Supreme

our

direct

must

we

has

or

being,

our

reason

and

Beginning

receive

soul

our

As

First

our

life.

know

what

Good,

the

108.

quid

petendum

respice.

Illi

scire
enim

voles,
consentire

ad

sum-

debet

INTRODUCTION
Definition

1.

which

needs

of

Logic.

exist

to

Logic

"

in

reflexstudy of

is the

reasoning processes for them


is laid down
definition
(i) what

this

(material
elaboration
end

the

of

in

materials

consists

of

Logic.

various

But

reasoning.

In

"

orderliness, this

(formal cause)
aims

broad

mind

of the

acts

"

materials

the

sense

apprehension, judg

10).

apprehension the mind


represents to itself
affirming or denying anything about
things without
this act
of conception, or
concepts resulting from

hension,

are

affirming
consists
a

denying

ing

inference

or

in such
is the

ing

one

or

names

thing

of

(2)
is

another

The

or

them.

appre
of

act

judgment

it

the objects of two


concepts
establishing between
of identity or non-identity, of agreement
or
disagree

Its outward

ment.

a
common

way

combination

is the
that

and

is the

expression

new

judgment

(3) Reason

proposition.
of two

or

of the

syllogism

The

is formed.

complete expression

judgments

more

simplest

reason

process.

3.

expressed by

terms.

one

in

relation

the

or

only

are

(i) By
The

(3)

attainment

the

"

; and

strictly,they

speak

to

apprehension (3 and

of

more

of

introduced

be

this

this elaboration

In

subject-matter

must

what

(2)

which

the

and

acts

order

object) ;

Cause

logic are

ment

is the

truth.

to

us

more

(finalcause).

Material

2.

the

towards

of truth

of

or

cause

which

into

materials

logic, the

lead

to

elaborate

and

inferences

judgments,

our

order

the

Formal

point
Books

Cause

of view

of

Logic.

from

which

The

"

formal

logic regards

object
acts

of

logic

of the

or

mind

for study
consultation
or
Institut
Mercier, Logique (5th ed., 1909,
supe"rieur de Philosophic
Lou
vain).
P. Coffey, The
Science
of Logic, 2 vols. (Longmans,
London,
1912).
London,
JOYCE, Principles of Logic (Longmans,
1908).
2nd
Introduction
to Logic (Clarendon
ed., 1916).
JOSEPH, An
Press, Oxford,
2nd
A Manual
WELTON,
ed., 1904).
of Logic, 2 vols. (Tutorial Press, London,
An
Text-book
MELLONE,
of Logic (Blackwood,
Edinburgh.
Introductory
1902).
"

Card.

135

LOGIC

136

for being arranged in order


or
suitability
adaptability
gathered into bodies of truth, such as are the various

is their
and

specialsciences

and

the

science of Philo

fundamental

more

sophy itself. Indeed the building up of our knowledge is a


progressivework : the mind has first to apprehend the mani
fold aspects of reality
one
by one before it can put its frag
in one
mentary explanationstogether and co-ordinate them
The first elaboration of our
syntheticwhole.
simpleideas is
the

work

of

materials

judgment ; judgments

supply the

in their turn

for inference ; finally,


since a single
reasoningprocess
furnish a full knowledge of a thing,inferences become

does not

the materials

of

for the construction

This

scientificsystem.

by the mind, this introduction of order


into its own
acts, this marshallingof its ideas with a view to
attainingtruth, is what is meant
by logicalorder, the order
facit
with which logicdeals :
ordo quern ratio considerando
in proprio actu '.

buildingup

of ideas

'

4. Difference

deal

may

different

pointof

between

with

the

Psychology
same

of
properties

view.

it

In such

and

Logic.

the acts

to be

is said

there

case

(or indeterminate)object,whilst
formal (ordeterminate)
object.
has

studies

object provided that each


and so* approaches it from a

material

Psychologyalso

Several sciences

"

of the human

common

one

has

each

different

mind

its

as

proper
part of

its material

ciselyas

object,but it does not claim to study them pre


does logic(formalobject). To psychologythey are

vital acts whose

and

nature

have
geneticprinciples

to be inves

tigated. Logic, on the other hand, considers them only in so


far as they have a cognitional
import,are abstract and universal
and
furnish the materials for those
representations
of objects,
relations which the mind
formulates
in judgments and infer
builds up into a scientific system. As in all the
other sciences that deal with the world of reality,
in psychology
and

ences

order
it is

is the

condition

the
object,
object of logicis
an

sine

very
the

qua

-non

of the

science

; in

logic

thing logicstudies : since the proper


form itselfwhich knowledge-building

requires.
5. Final

of

Cause

Logic." The

systematization of the results of


secure

truth

Before

in

our

ulterior end
our

for

which

reasoningmakes,

the
is to

knowledge.

explaininghow

logicdirects

its acts

towards

truth,

INTRODUCTION

judgment and

not

truth

that

remember

must

we

belong
that

to

the

Now

Jabberwocky
the claim

to

as

sun,

error

are

qualitiesof

is

mentions
long as a man
some
imaginativeobject)

or

Truth
right or wrong.
or
propositionthat the
real (Criteriology,
6).

of

the

As

is

say that he
the statement

can

one

and

of the concept.

the
only a singleobject(e.g.
no

137

logicto

lead

the

and

exists,

sun

'

mind

error

truth

to

',

as
one
thought that the meaning is that logic,
sciences. Obviously
science,can take the placeof all the special
the mind
it cannot
each of the specialsciences enlightens
:
in regardto the special
and so the man
objectit contemplates,
all is far better equipped for making a true
versed in them
who
merely knows logic. There is,
judgment than the man
of
however, another way of gettingat all truth than by means
the successive and collective study of the separate sciences,
which is very different,namely, that way
in which
a
more
Indeed, it is a law of
generalscience aids a less generalone.
our
thought that the simplehelpsus to understand the com
in the matter
of knowledge
plex (Gen. Introduction,2) ; now
simplicityand universality
always go together: therefore
the most
general sciences are those which have the simplest
throw
light on any more
object,and so can
complex or
particularobjectsto which they can have application.In
this sense
it is a
it is that logicleads to truth, inasmuch
as
the content of all the other
generalscience because it regulates
sciences,because they have all to be drawn up accordingto
its laws.
It has an objectof the extremest
and of
simplicity
the widest extension
being of the mind ',ens rationis,as we
will proceed to explain.

it must

be

not

"

"

'

"

6. Difference

another

science which

since it touches
science
treat

between

"

Metaphysics

and

"

has all beingfor its object,


and

all knowledge,also merits the

name

namely metaphysics. Metaphysics and

of all

they treat
their proper

being,they

of it from
formal

There

Logic.

have

different

common

material

is

therefore,

of

general

logicalike
object;

points of view, they have

but
each

object. The former considers real being,


regardedformally as it is in itself
(ENS REALE) and possessing
real attributes. Logic studies the same
being.formallyconsidered
it is in the mind
and pos
as
entity,
(ENS RATIONIS),as a logical
mental attributes bestowed on it by the mind
and in virtue
sessing
to the process ofthought.
of its beingsubjected

LOGIC

I38

can
capable of existing,
it is thought about, as a concept in

existingor

Anything, whether
thought

When

about.

of its

result

such,

as

tions such

they

as

universal.

are

as

Between

objectsit is possibleto establish rela


conditions
of things
concrete
particularizing

universal

and

abstract

and

object,it is abstract

mental

object of intellectual thought

being an

the

clothed with attributes which

becomes
mind, it necessarily
the

be

the

as

outside

are

do

mind

the

not

of

allow

mental

one

attribute of another
the predicate
or
object
object becomes
its
relation
the
to
fulfils
of
of thought which, on account
first,
of ideas give
and
extension
the role of subject
; the content
rise to relations of identityor non-identity
; judgments are
and
for all
the material
formed, reasoning processes ensue,
mental
these various
operationsis throughout one and the
same
namely, being : not real being,as it is in itself and
ens
independent of thought, but being-as-it-is-in-the-mind,
"

rationis, i.e. under


attach to it
We

see,

science

of

as

aspect and

the

with

attributes

the

that

objectof thought.

an

then, that

metaphysics is

whereas

reality
; logicis

universal

the

science

universal

the
of

know

our

ledgeof reality1.
7. Is

Logic

Science

practicalscience

only at

knowledge

one,

on

the

with

view

of the

action

to

or a
logica speculative

of its

nature

hand, furnishes

other

Is

"

speculativescience

"

Art

an

or

or

to

some

is

which

one

object;

aims

practical

knowledge of its object


'

ulterior purpose

finis

actio '.
speculativae,veritas ; finis operativaeseu practicae,
The logiciandoes not contemplatethe acts of his mind merely
for the pleasure of knowing the relations they bear to one
another, but with a view to using this scientific knowledge
for the

direction

further

this sense,

science.

and
But

without

not

if

of the

reason,

view

broader

operationsof his
logicis said to be
is taken

and

the

mind.

In

practical

direction

of the mind
is considered as indeed
operations
but a step towards the knowledge of all truth, it may
then be
said to be a speculative
science. This is the standpointof St.

logicgivesto

The

relations

the

studied

the attention
of the mind
intentiones
', objects of
from
learns

the
of

in logic are
not
the ontologicalrelations on
first of all falls,first or direct mental
views '
first abstraction, but logicalrelations
which
a

juxtaposition of two abstract objects or ideas and which


intentiones
', objects of
only upon
reflecting, secundae

abstraction.

which

primae
arise

the

'

mind

second

INTRODUCTION
when

Thomas

dialectica

est

'

he says
.

Logic is also

art,if therebyis meant

an

it is not

But

external

an

'

2.

collectionofpractical

accordingto the more


action in questionto

art

requiresthe

restricted definition which


some

rationalis scientia

et alia scientia demonstrativa

rules to direct action 3.

result in

alia
speculativis

In

139

production.

to-day to
divide logicinto two
parts,formal logicand real logic. But
of such a division is to be questioned:
the advisability
(a)It
in
its originchieflyto some
owes
arbitrarypresuppositions
Kantian
42). (b)Many of the ques
philosophy(Criteriology,
of a
tions discussed in real logicfurnish for us the matter
separate treatise followingimmediately after psychology,
the scientific analysis
namely epistemology or criteriology,
of

8. Divisions

Logic.

i.

"

It is not

uncommon

"

of certitude.

logicis generallydivided into three parts, dealing


reasoning.
respectivelywith apprehension,judgment and
it is
as
Against such a division,excellent as it is inasmuch
of logic,
based on the threefold nature
of the object-matter
we
division.
to adopt another
have nothingto say but that we prefer
in accord with
which is more
3. The other division we prefer,
the general division of all philosophical
inquiry4, is that
suggestedby the consideration of logicalorder through its
four causes,
material,formal and final(see Gen. Meta
efficient,
physics,Part IV).
Formal

2.

Sum.

'

homo
ad

rationis

autem

hurnanos

actus

viunt.

2, ad

Theol., I-II, q. 51, art.


animalia, ait, quodam

Alia

Nihil

faciliter

enim

per determinata

judicio in

aliud

et

ars

3.
naturali

instinctu

ad

actus

suos

suis

operibus dirigitur. Et
ordinate
perficiendos diversae
videtur, quam

esse

certa

inde

ordinatio

aguntur,
est, quod

artes

deser-

rationis, qua

debitum
ad
finem actus humani
perveniunt. Ratio
dirigerepotest inferiorum
partium actus, sed etiam actus sui
directiva
enim
est.
Hoc
est proprium intellectivae partis ut
in seipsam
reflectatur : nam
intellectus
similiter
et
ratio
de
suo
actu
intelligit
seipsum,
ratiocinari
hoc
ratiomanus
potest. Sicut igitur ex
quod ratio de actu
autem

media

solum

non

cinatur adinventa

aedificatoria
vel fabrilis,
homo
ars
faciliter et
per quas
actus
ratione
exercere
ars
potest ; eadem
quaedam
necessaria
scilicet homo
est, quae sit directiva ipsius actus rationis,per quam
in
ipso actu rationis ordinate et faciliter
et sine errore
procedat. Et haec est ars
Logica,id est rationalis scientia. Quae non solum rationalis est ex hoc, quod
ordinate

est

est

hujusmodi

secundum

rationem,

hoc, quod
ideo
artes
"

est circa
videtur
ars
esse

procedunt

Cp.

Thomas
Farm.

the
:

De

'.

quod
ipsum actum
artium

ST.

introduction

THOMAS,
of

omnibus

est

rationis

quia

in actu

I Post.
small

artibus
sicut

rationis

Analyt., lect.

treatise

totius Logicae Aristotelis

commune

circa

Summa.

on

sed

etiam

propriam materiam.
nos
dirigit,a quo

ex

Et
omnes

i.

logic among
Op. XLIV,

the

works

Proemium.

of

St.
Ed.

LOGIC

140

The

strictly
it

of

matter

of

chapter

material
III

Chapter

in

the

will

order.

of
In

tion
'

[Logica]

per
et

logic

the

four

and

in

scilicet
errore

in

of

directiva
homo

procedit

of
of

text

will

order
Thomas

cause)

(efficient

cause)

cause)

'.

wish

to

into
observed

of

considered

of

logic

quoted

ipso

actus
actu

the

rationis
rationis

utility
order

in

5.

is
in

at

logical

the

of

logic

studies

and

arrive

cause

establishment

ipsius
in

In

inferences,

formal

cause

St.

word,

II).

be

to

of

we

be

this

the

(formal

(final

if
the

final

introduced

rules

drawing

word,

(IV)

the

causes

the

the

terms,

in

(Chap.
be

to

first

"

systems,

philosophy

of

est

quam
sine

scientific

has

the

judgments,

chapter

(1)

which

and

order

make

The

I).

concepts

logical

investigated

operations,

Mention
of

last

and

mental

be

truth

science

our

of

up

knowledge

to

of

forming

this

we

introduced

be

belongs
shall

(Chap.
with

deal

must

itself

order

the

building

the

of

cause

materials

these

order

here

yet

chapter
will

order

logical

psychology,

proper

which

of

cause

preliminary

into

the

of

treatise

the

material

with

efficient

the
domain

the

to

the

the

of

study

made

in

our

footnote

on

(material
ordinate

defini
p.

139.

cause)
et

faciliter

CHAPTER

and

Principles

9.

principle or
made

stance

of

of soul

up

principle is

and

The

"

is the

acts

; their

body

intellectual

the

proximate

remote

human

sub

immediate

or

faculty (Psychology, 153).

it is shown

psychology

In

intellectual

our

ORDER

Acts.

Intellectual

of

Nature

source

LOGICAL

OF

CAUSE

EFFICIENT

THE

of the

all acts

that

mind

their

owe

object of sensation
sense-experience. The
beginning to some
material
thing,
sense-perception is always a determinate
or
of

made
of

this

conception

it is

considered

which

it is

universal

applicable

or

is round
on

space

in

shape

my

table

is

of

notion

circumstances
at

of

matter

judgment,

All

"

be

may

shape

form

can

determining

by

which
no

particular

what
when

or

when

whatsoever,

made,
sound,

or

much

so

one

all bells

way,

accidental
The

or

where

features

forms
"

(a)

or

act

that
"

it will be

apprehension
the

which
mind

the

of

or

have

to

"

secured

of

some

different

determine.

conception

an

what

certain

have

of interest

kind

same

understanding

considers
141

apprehension,

mind-

the

although they

modalities

When

or

Fundamen

are

fundamentally

are

est

of

acts

intuition

quid

first

"

Manifold,

though

the

reasoning

thing is, quod

of

Acts,

intellectual

an

ferent

they

possess

may

Identical.

i.

all these

from

and

brass

time

But

quite determinate.

general

material

what

Intellectual

tally

in

particular moment

abstracts

of

exist.

may

10.

act,

in

least

qualitiesthey
they

that

subjects.

occupies

particularizing attributes

or

represent,

this

at

is made

pleasing tone,

the

consequently

of individual

which

touch,

of

and

bell

and

see

with

outside

existing actually
number

any

All this is

at it.

looking

names

when

to

universal,

particularizingconditions

the

really endowed

object

the

and

is abstract

proper

from

apart

bell, which

This

thought

(abstrahere, separatim considerare),and

mind

am

of

or

possessing these qualities;

and

matter

for

assumes

dif

it different

object independently

LOGIC

142

surroundingobjectsit

of the

(b)This

of the

bute
or

attention

to

its attributes taken

object,but

teristics which
mental

directed

be

objectindependentlyof

of the

essence

may

acts

is said

are

as

acts

others united with it,

any

whole,

considered

individualize
called

give attention to it.


either to one
singleattri
to

they constitute the

as

apart from

it in the

world

of abstraction,

of

those

charac

: such
reality

(c)Abstraction

is

(d) Abstraction is also a work


generalization,
of analysis
is
or
a mental
process by which an objectknown
decomposed into its several notes or attributes, (e)The act
by which these notes, previouslyconsidered apart, are re
united or gatheredtogetherby the mind is called a synthesis.
conceived successively
are
(/)When two objects
by the mind and
to exist between
a relation is perceived
them, this apprehension,
rather
this double apprehension,is called a comparison.
or
is an intui
(g)The direct perceptionof some
existingreality
of
tion. The words percept,perception,
used in the case
are
in contrast with concept, conception,
which
existingrealities,
refer to ideal objectsof things considered
apart from their
the mind
has for its objectacts of the
existence,
(h) When
its spiritual
soul, especially
acts, apprehensionis then termed
consciousness,
(i)Finally,the act by which the mind con
ceives that one
another is known
as
as
objectis not the same
distinction (Gen. Metaphysics,48). By
object id quod
understand
whatsoever
be
can
ob-jiciturcognoscenti we
for an act of thought.
matter
act of judgment consists in predicating
2. The
one
object
that two
of another, in recognizing
objectspreviouslyappre
hended
in mutual
are
agreement or disagreement. It is an
of
act of apprehensionhaving as its formal objectthe identity
the terms
of two previousapprehensions
apprehensio
; it is an
to
complexa or complexorum as opposed
simpleapprehension,
apprehensioincomplexaor incomplexorum.
is a series of judg
or
inference,
3. Reasoning,ratiocination,
the reason
It is a process by which
two
ments.
compares
terms
between which it does not yet perceive
extreme
a relation
of identity
to exist,with a third common
term
in order to dis
cover
by this comparison whether or not they are identical.
Apprehension in its manifold forms, judgment, and reason
kind of act, namely
ing,are fundamentallyone and the same
into what a thingis. They are all
an
apprehensionof or insight
the

basis for

'

'

"

"

alike

of

acts

its

possesses

their
consequence

the

object

in

in

of

mind

in

can

nature

they

species.
latter
and

term,

quod

ad

"

See

mental

of

the

that

it

is

is,

incon

another

for

or

example,

and

tree

not

any

of

be
are

is

that

affirmed

attributed

to

of

makes

intentio

Metaphysics,
ARISTOTLE,

we

is

the

see

result

is, it is found
individuals,

them

of

(universale
this

or

class-natures,1
possible,

later,
of

apart

abstracting.

species

reasoning

shall

the

mental

of
predicated
one
idea's
of things
our

or

entire

an

representative

as

virtue

in

apprehension

other

of

abstraction

same

Abstraction

of

in

of

that

predicated

be

universality

'.

it

this

power

multitude

be

may

requires,

General

in

beings
of

quality

affirmed
lies

answer

is universal,

concept

be

can

regarding

the

abstractive

Hence

virtue

The
of

power

may

thing

one

notes,

realized

sequitur

praedicantur

this

made.

is

the

this

things
In

the

is

tree

in

individual,

Socrates,

how

then,

judgments

another.

as

; this

else

has

found

abstraction

and

to

the

by

existing

affirmed

be

another.

judgment

of

our

intellect,

Possible

it is

could

being

arises,

praedicando).

genus

called

individuality

individualizing

be

may

it

being

Every

"

another,

not

real

one

the

that

and

no

when

In

or

and

question

from

be

143

6.

another

fact

Concepts.

attributed
and

tree

The
of

such

way

himself

other

ORDER

made

are

incommunicable

own

that

ceivable

is

of

is itself

order

any

LOGICAL

faculty,

same

Reasoning

Character

Abstract

actual

the

and

Judgment

11.

in

and

one

OF

understanding.

or

reason

CAUSE

EFFICIENT

THE

of

genera

inasmuch

universal

abstraction

whole

middle
:

abstrahi

universalitatis.

26.
Anal,

'

Non

singularia

pr., I, 27.

de

aliis

sed

alia

de

ipsis

II

CHAPTER

12.

into

which

consist
these

in

articles

with

(Art. I)

alike

the

THE

The

13.

OBJECT

the

is but

step forward

as

chief

only

in

far

so

as

subdivisions,

QUALITIES

for

the

towards
to

the

sion
as

with

logic is

to

the

of

act

(5) ;

they

they

occasion

of

of

and

logic

with

enunciated
which

expressed

or

the

by

ject (id quod

in

far

so

of truth,
not

"

concerned,

the

materials

For

truth

and

with

then,

for

true

direct

notio

them

appertain

error
or

apprehen

concepts

judgments

are

business

the

can

simple conception

to

is

and

(4)

they

as

predicate

or

mind

the

as

appears

concepts

judgment,

subject

only

inference

and

judgment

deals

the

of

of

role

acts

erroneous

and

precisely
are

the

ones.

ideas

or

term,

CONCEPT

judgment

judgment,

new

elements

are

judgment,

furnish

Concepts
of

mental

logic

of

respec

simple apprehension

act

mind,

attainment

the

Both

and

concept

subjicibilisvel praedicabilisin enuntiatione.


of

materials

dealing

THE

OF

Since

"

the

fulfillingthe

of

capable

of

act

two

logic,
which

that

(Art. II).

terms

which

CONCEPTS

Logic.

materials

supplies
the

of

cause

elementary

in

I.

AND

in

Concept

of

of each.

ART.

I.

The

materials

out

introduced,

qualitiesof

and

content

be

to

that

and

of

allow

kinds

the

has

the

By

"

material

the

in order.

arrange

ORDER

understand

we

order

concepts

tively with
and

to

Chapter.

aliquid fit): by

quo

studying

are

this

anything

(id ex

that

then,

of

LOGICAL

OF

of

Division

cause

it is made

we

and

Object

material

or

CAUSE

MATERIAL

THE

are

predicated
predication is
'

the

verb

est

subjectum

to

then
of

in

another

made.

be

logic

', the

and

The

copula.

attribution!
144

nexus

vel

the
the

thought-object
thought-object
between

Together

is

them
the

sub

praedicationi) and

MATERIAL

THE

known

are

the extremes

prehension.

logiconly
consider

The

"

in

145

limits of the assertion.

or

Logical Questions

14.

ORDER

(idquod praedicaturvel attribuitur)


(termini)of a proposition,
being indeed

the terms

as

LOGICAL

OF

attribute

or
predicate

the

CAUSE

concept,
far

so

it then

in these two

the

Act

of

Simple

Ap

just said, finds a placein


or
predicate. Let us
subject

have

we

it acts

as

from

arising

as

roles

:"

of a proposition
is always ultimately,
subject
though
ultimate analysisonly, an
individual.
Propositionsmay

The

1.

in

indeed have

subject,and in fact often have, an abstract


this abstract type is always itself the
cases

their

as

type, yet in such

other previoussubject. This is so for two


predicateof some
the first objectof thought
reasons
: (a)because
psychologically
is drawn
from sense-experience,
and the senses
can
only grasp

callyonly an
term

what

"

the

on

being
with

one

and

Aristotle calls

one

hand

but

to

himself

to

ontologiof the

first substance

irpuTrj overia,

it is attributable

hand

incommunicable

no

other

individual ; and (b)because


individual is a subjectin the strict sense

is concrete

at what

since

"

other, individuality

no

another, Socrates

being

identical

(Gen. Metaphysics,26), and

the

on

it is the

subjectof abstract, universal concepts


of it on various titles7.
which can
be predicated
of illustration the proposition
Consider by way
Snow
:
melts in the sun'.
'Snow', a generalor universal idea, is
abstract subject. But what
does
an
? This
snow
mean
to be white and falling
to the ground
somethingwhich I perceive
in lightflakes and I feel cold to my
This white, cold
touch.
this white, cold, flaky
:
thing that falls in flakes is snow
is a
thingis a first subject; and of this firstsubject snow
'

'

'

'

'

predicate. The generalor abstract


the

subject of

idea

further

of
predicate,
in-the-sun '. This analysis
of the terms
trates how there is always a first term
a

individual subject (roSt


n) and

'

'

snow

'

next

becomes

attribute

the

of

'

'

melts-

illus
proposition
which is originally
an
a

the mind

attributes

to

which

two

special questions: (a)


does it state of the subject?

all the
2.

What

'

predicationsit makes.
The
predicate furnishes
does it mean

Omnium

possint universe

eorum,

or

convey

quae

; what

stint, alia sunt

praedicari, velut

Cleon

ejusmodi,

Callias, et
solis sensibussubjicitur,
de ipsisautem
alia praedicantur
et homo
est et aniirans
*. ARISTOTLE, Anal. pr.t I, 27.
et

ut

de

millo

alio

vere

singulariset quod
; uterqueenim illorum

res

LOGIC

146
in

And

have

we

answer

the

of

study

the

logicalpredicamentsas

the classification of

times

does it

called,

it be

must

way

(b)How

or
predicables

15. The

attributed
of

ways

Categories

belong

This

it ?

to

to

the
or
categories,

is some
predicates

the
is

subject,in what
question of the

predicating.
Logical Predicaments.

or

"

There

is of

in detail all the pre


distinguishing
dicates of the immense
mind
varietyof judgments the human
is capable of making. What
Aristotle attempted to do was
to a number
of heads or types of predication
to reduce them
in order to see how many
(typus praedicationis)
reallydifferent
of predicates,
aspects of a subjectmight be indicated by means
each type constituting
kind.
a
category of ideas of the same

course

discovered

He
of

of

question here

no

great headings, supreme

ten

under
predication,

one

or

be

can

types

or

genera,

of which

other

arranged

general notion we can conceivablyuse in inter


possible
pretingor judgingthe individual thingsor subjectswhich come
in the course
of our
mental
experience.
up for investigation
follows
:
They are as
every

"

Substance

1.

This

something our

'

is

'.

snow

'

our

is an

senses

abstract

say,

or

second

substance.

perceiveas white, cold and flaky


of the
abstract notion representative

senses
'

Snow

subjectwhich

is to

that

"

tell us has attached

to it the accidental
'

determinations

'

expressedby the adjectives white ', cold ',


the mind
designatesany concrete
flaky'. When
subject
roSe
the
senses
a
perceivedby
by
concept signifying
is
its substance
it
to
of the
it
or essence,
a predicate
applying
'

"

"

firstcategory,f)ovo-ia,

By

of

way

"

"

"rri.

contrast

to

individual

subject,TT/WOT^ ovo-ta,
predicationsare ultimately

prima substantia, of which all


made
(14),the category of substance
substantia

secunda

; for

whilst it

can

is called Sevrtpa ov"r"a,


serve

as

the

subjectof

or
attributes,it yet itself presupposes
predicates
logical

crete

con

subjectto which it refers.


other nine heads

"

we

The

of

predication
represent accidental
of these modes
determinations 8. Now
of being apper
some
to the individual subject
tainingto substance are INTRINSIC
attributed : two of them, quantity
to which they are
two
(e.g.
cubits in size)and quality(e.g.
inherent
white, learned),
are
2.

For
convey

the

by

difference
our

between

substantial

logicalpredicates,see

essence

General

and

accidental

Metaphysics, 83

f
.

essence

THE

CAUSE

MATERIAL

OF

LOGICAL

ORDER

147

subjectconsidered in itself,
absolutely
; a third,relation
is affirmable of the subjectin virtue of some
con
(e.g.double),
nexion with some
thing or things other than itself. Some
the other hand, representsomething EXTRINSIC
on
predicates,
to the subject
in the street)
and time (e.g.
: place(e.g.
yester
the measure
of quantityand duration.
day) are respectively
Action and
passion (i.e.being acted upon) are amrmable
of the former and the
of a subjectbecause it is the principle
he cuts a stone, a stone is cut).
objector end of the latter (e.g.
The exact
has pro
meaning of the two remainingcategories

in the

'

voked

'

considerable

totle,but

discussion among
think the philologist
Max

we

state

f\"LV

passiveintransitive

the

as

well)9.

I am
(e.g.
The

and
afraid)

am

of Aris

Muller has hit upon the


^cio-flou as
intransitive action
interpreting

rightmeaning by
(e.g.I walk, I

commentators

Predicables."

Human

thought has the two features


of being abstractive and of unitingits ideas (GeneralIntroduc
of nature
of a
tion,2). It representssome
reality
by means
of abstract notes that are
number
universal,i.e.
potentially
found to be universal upon reflection. Now
the question
are
arises how the mind unites these abstract notes or predicates
in the single
objectwhich is the subject. What is the relation
which
exists between
what
? On
subject and predicate
for what
ground,with what justification,
precisereason, can
such and such an attribute be predicated
of such and such a
different
than one answer
: there are
subject? There is more
relations or predicates,there are
modes
different ways
or
in which things
are
predicable
of other things.
1.
Certain
Necessary,essential predicables.
qualitiesor
notes constitute the essence
that
or class-nature of a thing,
are
which make
the thing to be what
it is (quod quid est, rb ri
16.

"

ty emu),and without

which

it could not

exist

nor

be conceived

the notes of animality


and rationality
in the case of man).
(e.g.
do
2. Necessary,non-essential predicables.
notes
Other
not constitute the essence
derived from it,
but are necessarily
and serve
to reveal and develop the subject's
essential per
fection ; they are called its properties
(proprium,iStov).
3. Contingentor accidental predicables.Lastly,there are
other attributes that have only a contingent
connexion
with
"

"

"

St. THOMAS,

M.S.P.-VOL.

In
II.

Met., lect.

9.

LOGIC

148
the essence,

which

are

ut
contingentaccidents (contingit

called

sint,a-vfjL^/SfjKos)
or
simply accidents 10.
admit
The first class,essential predicables,
For

the

objectof
essence
specific

the

of

subdivision.

the individual

the intellect is not

but

essence

of abstract,
represents by a number
universal concepts. Species(tfSos),
then, designatesthe sumtotal of the abstract,universal notes that togethermake
up an
essence

the

as

constitutive
form

that it

mind

human

of the

speciesas

are

whilst
(ycvos),

genus

it u.

knows

the

others, and

Thus

those

all other

"

and
species
To

its two

the

three

constitutive

find

we

are

essence

of

subjectwhich

necessary accompaniment
exist apart from it. Indeed

it,and

in

say

we

specific
type when it belongs
question,is universally
present
is constant

it is realized,and

though

to the species in
exclusively

instance

in allfivepredicables.

have

we

added

be

of

can
never
consequence
to
thingis proper,or peculiar,

whenever

differentia.

must
predicables

those determinations
are
Properties
of its

and

parts,genus

of essential

kinds

property and accident,and

throughout in

every

'

proprium dicitur quod convenit soli alicui speciei,


the facultyof learningto read and
et semper '. Thus
is proper to man
is proper to immaterial
; incorruptibility

omni
write

is proper
to
strict acceptation,
property and essence
substances

sion;

limitation

when

tible with

the

essence

with

latter case, when


true

to
sively

the

three

it is
quality,

however

of the

of

one

verified by

may

species

therefore

speciesof the
the
(differentia,
difference
specific
Sta""o/"a).
genus, are
of essential predicablesthere are three distinct kinds

same

not

of these notes

also to other

common

differentiate it from

to it,which
peculiar

Such

not

to which

qualityhas

property ; when,
specific
type, but is
opportunity here

In

have

same

property, it is not

true

it attaches.

one

in
or

for

The

term

less strict

sense

this, its
exten

is not
conver

property
in this

of the characteristics

two

instance, it belongs exclu

to be found

for

the

mentioned

conditions

be used

reason

creatures.

neither

universally

(necessary
confusing ontologicalaccident
is
which
with
logicalaccident
contingent)
which
to properties,and
and
is therefore
immediately opposed to essence
it is predicated ; what
is predicated as acci
relative to the subject of which
dental of one
subject may be predicated of another as essential.
11
the
be on
his guard against confusing logicalspecies,
must
The
student
natural
have
used
in
which
with
the
term
of
we
defined,
same
just
meaning
which
are
it designates a group
of individuals
science. In the latter case
interse fertile.
10

or

There

is

which

is

opposed

to

substance

all

constantlyin

nor

to be

doctor

CAUSE

MATERIAL

THE

or

always,yet

there

found

and

called

be

speciesonly, can

be called

in this

property:

him

to

that
does

sense

have

to

is

property what

thus

proper to
of a species

sense,

belongingto beings of

not

it is proper

that

Porphyry say of man


legs. So, too, may

149

type

individual

in every

that

is,in this

mathematician

ORDER

of
beings representative

Similarlya qualityfound

man.

LOGICAL

OF

two
to

common

of a species
and to them only,but which
representatives
belongs to them merely for a time ; for instance,accordingto

all the

Porphyry, it is proper
The

to

white hair in old age.


quality,or accident (O-V/Z/^/^KOS,
to have

man

accidental

common

opposed to proprium),may
a
qualitythat is not a pro
As a positive
definition Porphyry
perty in the strict sense.
to the absence or presence
says that an accident is that quality
of a subjectis indifferent, accidens est
of which the essence
id quod adest et abest praeter subjecti
corruptionem '. He
be constant
or
goes on to say that this accidental qualitymay
and at another
at one
time be sleeping
animal may
not : an
opposed to r"oi/,accidens commune
best be defined negatively,
as

'

not

that

noted

not

property. As
a
property and
induction

sufficient to enable

is not

observation

shall

we

Mere

property.

to decide

is

what

between

is the

objectof scientific
employment of experimental

the

demands

us

be

must

later,the discrimination

see

is accidental

what

and

qualityis

constant

every

it

Hence

always black.

remains

raven

methods.
17.

the

notice

comprehension and
The comprehensionof

extension.
idea

an

or, as

"

its connotation, implication,


intent
to be contained

in it. If

its connotation

or

teristicswe

have

we

the notes
drawn

by

See

or

scope

of

take

as

intension13

or

an

variouslytermed,
"

or

it embodies
abstraction

Vol. I, p. 5, footnote.

or

notes

is its

are

the various

from

'

man

of

',

charac

individual
an

con

discovered

instance the idea

applicationof
the number
application,

extension, denotation,

sphere

it is

characteristics

of the

tent, the sum-total

11

"

there exist certain relations of sub


predicables
for the rightunderstandingof which it is necessary
two
logicalqualitiesof abstract concepts, namely

their

The

Between

Concepts.

different

ordination
to

of

Extension

and

Comprehension

man.

idea, is its

subjects to

LOGIC

150
it is

which

or

be

can

in

applied or,

other

words,

which

to

it

extends.

concept is thus

abstract, universal

The

considered

as

'

'

whole.
The concept
whole and as a logical
man
metaphysical
viewed as to its comprehension i.e. as comprisingthe notes
and reason,
is a metaphysical
of corporeity,
life,sensibility
whole
made
metaphysicalparts (Gen. Meta
up of so many
of all
46). Viewed in its extension, i.e.as predicable
physics,
it forms
a
past, present, future and merely possible,
men,
taken distributively
whole of which men
the logical
are
logical
totus
and
omnis
correspond
parts. The two Latin words
exactlyto this distinction.
An idea is of greater or less comprehensionin proportionto
"

'

'

it includes.

of notes

the number

'

It has

'

greater or less

exten

proportionas it may be appliedto a largeror smaller


of the concept vary
number
of subjects.These two qualities
the greaterthe comprehension
the less the extension,
:
inversely
sion in

vice

and
If

we

versa.

two

compare

18.

ideas

some

than

Ideas

others, among

in

scale.
the bottom
logical
of no subjectand
which is predicable
of all predication.Immediatelyabove
At

asserted of the individual.

there

of the subaltern
be

may

proximate

by

Relations
or

of

so

those

of

man

and

Non-identical

is the ultimate
this

subject

the

comes

species

the

general of all, the

most

as

the

subordination.
of their

Respect

Opposition.
"

their contents

or

Two
are

ideas

the

rational animal

Comprehension.
same

are

are
or

identical
different

identical ; not

animal).

ideas

liquidand sugar)or

in

and

man

and

is individual substance,

subjoinedtable, known
essential
predicablesof

the

of Ideas

accordingas
different

(e.g.the ideas of

category

same

immediate, subaltern

or

their mutual

and

Identity

application

The

highestor supreme genus.


Porphyry's tree, shows
Comparison

the

Next

intermediate, surmounted

19.

certain

are

the genus which is predicated


speciesand the individuals. Of genera

many,

category of substance

of wider

to
referring

concepts

there is a

both

there

of their Extension."

Respect

universal,i.e.are

more

are

that

ideas.

of

Subordination

respect of their extension

shall discover

the

relations between

ideas in

more

comprehension we

and

As

or

compatible (e.g.those of
and solid).
those of liquid
incompatible
(e.g.
are

either

MATERIAL

THE
Genus

OF

LOGICAL

ORDER

151

Substantia

generalissimum

Differentia

Genus

CAUSE

Corporea

Incorporea

(Angel)

subalternum
.

Differentia
.

Genus

subalternum

Insensibile

Sensibile
.

proximum

Differentia

(Mineral)

Vivens

Differentia

Genus

Inanimatum

Animatum
.

Rationale

(Vegetable)

Animal

Irrationale

of ideas or
Incompatibility
oppositionis of four kinds :
contradictory,
privative,
contrary and relative.
1.
Contradictory
oppositionexists between two ideas when
of them
is
inasmuch
one
as
they have nothingin common,
less than
nor
being and the other nothing,one is neither more
the negation of the other (e.g.white and not -white, just and
not -just).
is the absence
of a perfectionin a subject
2. Privation

LOGIC

152

'

its nature

it, negatio alicujusformae


of possessing
blindness
is the priva
in subjecto apto nato habere illam
(e.g.
of life).But it is not merely synonym
tion of sight,
as is death
does not possess sight,
with negation or absence
ous
; a mineral

capableby

'

deprivedof

be said to be

it cannot

but

it.

3. Contrary oppositionexists between


series of thingsbelonging to the same

if

degrees of lightare

the

white,

same

and

courage

cowardice, are

4. Relation

relative

or

which

series,the

two

Contrarietyexists

exist at the

both

instance,

time

same

in

sickness, justiceand injustice,

all

examples.
oppositionexists

when

ideas

two

for their

dependent

each other
upon
and son, of double

of father

For
a

of

extremes

genus.

contraries.

are

things which cannot


subject: health and

between

two

mentally representedas

black and

extremes,

the

meaning ; e.g.
half, of knowledge

and

are

the

ideas

and

that

is known.

II. DIVISION
of Division.

Principles

20.

(I)according

aspect, seized upon

manner
according
and
(III)according to

bases

these

such

are

the

concept,

be divided
may
i.e. the particular

mind, of the knowable

the

by

the

to

Concepts or ideas

"

objectof

the

to

CONCEPTS

OF

of
the

thing ; (II)
object known
;
of their formation. But
divisions are
not
mutually

representingthe
manner

that

the

exclusive.
I. Ideas

21.

divided

are

according

tion of the
the
even

the

on

which

those

gendered

is

common

or

with

or

genericidea

other

the content

they

of

;
an

divi

in the forma

individual,the concept en
e.g. the idea of Caesar, of Napoleon
it

other

speciesof
and
idea

thingsunder

all share

an

an

an

object as
of the

represen
it possesses

species
specific

same

genus, it is either a
it is universal.
Further,

same

in both

in common,

of

individuals

the

may
the

determinate

less

a
conveys
such
notes
only

either with

in

goes so far as to grasp all


object is possessedof, including

idea

tation,embodying

conceive

that

constitute

the

If, however,

is

If abstraction

singularone

Tran

i.

This

degreesof abstraction involved

concept.

determinations

Content."

singularideas.

and
scendental,generic,
specific
sion based

to

cases

less full ; the mind may


aspect of those characteristics that
be

even

that

are

possessedby

all

beings

of the universe,in
'

one

goes
notions

scendental

verum,
aliquid,

ing one

that

not

'

confuse

to

characteristics of

all the

latter

does not
'

Of

these

collective

they

may

swims) ; or they may

tinct,containingalong with other

'

idea.
former

at

least all

confused,

be

represent the objectin

distinguishit from

to

to

must

care

of the intellect. The

scope

enable

which

form

the

object,or

as

us

unum,

as

universal

so
indistinct,

animal

an

as

'

with

an

less full in their content

are

indefinite and

fish

'

collective

coming within the natural

that

considered

are

inadequate ideas.

and

Adequate

those

res,

'

'

embody

'

omnem
categoriam ',
genus,
all the categories. These
tran

several individuals

when

153

transcendental

is called
them
whole, the idea representing
such is the idea of
people', army '. But

idea ;
be taken
2.

omne

beyond
are
only six in number : ens,
37 ff.).
bonum
(Gen.Metaphysics,

its extension

Note

enim

ORDER

be

word, its concept may

transcendit

"

LOGICAL

OF

CAUSE

MATERIAL

THE

notes

all others

way

(e.g.

be clear and dis


to other

common

things

and differentiating
thingrepresented
which breathes only
it from all others (e.g. fish as the animal
through its gills).
An
idea is complex if it is
3. Complex and simple ideas.

the

to
peculiar

note

some

'

'

made

of several

up

'

dicate ; thus
'

'

'

both

are

man

elements

each

of which

divided

are

an

according

the

There
term

of

and

abstract,

concrete idea ;
thing reallyas a strictly
improperly used to signifya note or qualityas

is
is

pre
and

Manner

their

to

representing their Object, chieflyinto concrete


and negative,
positive
proper and analogous.
1.

'

'

is such

just man
simpleideas.

22. II. Ideas

stand as
may
idea.
But
just

no

such

'

'

in a subject
white
: for instance,the idea
existing
represents
concrete
a
subject. Whereas
qualityas belongingto some
in reality
the so-called abstract idea (although all ideas are
something existing
abstract)represents a note as if it were
apart from a subject; it is the result of the mind singlingout
and disregarding
that it is the note
note
or
some
abstracting
whilst
of a subject: e.g.
whiteness ', animality'. Hence
'

the

concrete

idea

'

is the

abstract idea results from


upon
2.

result
a

of

double

one

abstractive

act, the

abstraction,is consequent

reflection.
A

positiveidea

is

of attributes that it

one

which

represents a thing by

reallypossesses

'

e.g.

life',

'

means

light'.

LOGIC

154
idea is one which
negative
emphasisingthe absence
'

darkness
to it : e.g.
3. A positiveidea

gives us knowledge of
of a qualitywhich does

'

', death '.

it connotes
is proper when
qualitywhich is distinctive of the

that is,some

thingby
not belong

property,

it is

being as

if it denotes an
idea is analogical
in reality.An
positively
objectthat is beyond the grasp of the mind and requiringfor
its representation
a
comparison with something else known

form an analogous idea of


proper knowledge : thus we
lifein God from our
knowledge of created life,and of the pre

with

of

sence

from
spirits

idea

our

of the

of bodies

presence

in

space.
III. Ideas

23.

Formation
immediate

according
and

immediate

into

intuitive when

or

itselfunited

divided

are

intellect

to the

in
representation

it.

mediate

an

second

from

unlike

or

intuitive

cursive

it is proper or
objectwhich* serves~to make the

the

is of like

known

are

objectdepends for its being


beingknown, the apprehension

upon another objectalso


idea is said to be mediate.
And

analogical
accordingas

Ideas

at least itself produces its own

or

known
or

ideas.

of their

object of apprehensionis

the

When

the Manner

to

knowledge,
knowledge.

in this

case

nature

to

mediate

it.

distinct

As

is sometimes

called dis
i

ART.

OBJECT

I. THE
24. The

TERMS

II.

AND

QUALITIES

OF

-Terms

Object of the Term."

TERM

THE

or

names

are

vocal

of objectsas they are conceived by the mind ;


signsexpressive
they are not the expressionof subjective
concepts as such nor
of thingsas they are in nature, in themselves
; but they stand
the mind
conceives them, they denote
for thingsprecisely
as
referuntur ad res significandas
mediante
objectsknown : voces
sun
',for instance,does
conceptioneintellectus 13. The word
'

'

not

idea of

stand for our


does not

word

refer

'

sun

but for the

to
directly

the

of nature, since for ages the word

round

18

our

planet

St. THOMAS,

"

Sum,

which

sun

as

connoted

is evidentlynot

Theol., I. q. 13,

a.

i.

itself; and

sun

yet the

it exists in the order


a

body

true

that revolved

of the

sun

itself

CAUSE

MATERIAL

THE

OF

LOGICAL

ORDER

155

thoughtto be by men before the discovery


of Galileo and Copernicus.
It belongs to psychologyto study the nature and functions
of language.
H
Ten
25. The
Parts
of Speech.
Just as thought -objects
ten parts
admit of a tenfold division into the ten categories,
so
of speech are
distinguished
by grammarians corresponding
to the ten
categoriesof concepts. The correspondencebe
the categories
and the parts of speech is however
not
tween
quiteadequate.
The first subjectof every logical
is that which
predication
the senses
perceivein its concrete realityand which at the
first mental contact, so to speak,is graspedonly as something
this something hoc
indeterminate, as
aliquid'. Subse
quentlyand graduallythis indeterminate objectis invested in
but

onlyof the

sun

as

"

'

"

the mind

by

with formal

abstraction

determinations
which

and

the

which

the mind

of

terms

conceives

language

express.

The

principalof these are expressedby the substantive, the


which
adjectiveand the verb-predicate,
together constitute
the essential materials of language.
its
firstdetermination
of a thingis by its essence
or
1. Our
by the noun or substantive.
very substance,and this we designate
The noun
(orpronoun)is used to denote every objectwhich is a
substance or every qualityconsidered as if it were
a substance
:
The latter case
horse, height,whiteness.
e.g. man,
gramma
rians speak of as an
abstract noun
all nouns
: in reality
are
'

abstract,and

so

common,

and

secondarysense
The

determinations

it is

which

or
we
qualitative
quantitative,

'

proper

word

is used

in

further determined,

noun.

inhere in

subject,whether
by the adjective.
of or on a subject.The
a

express
verb-predicate
expresses action
to be ',it must
be noted, either expresses actual existence

3. The

verb

the

except when

a substance
designates

i.e.individualized,when
2.

'

(e.g.I

copula
exist)or is nothingelse than a logical
and is implied in every
connecting subjectand predicate,
I hear
I am
verb-predicate
(e.g.
hearing).
It is worthy of remark, moreover,
that the results of philo
research bearout
what we have said of logical
logical
concepts,
for justas predicates
of judgments are abstract, so the primitive
am

forms

ideas.

or

roots

of

language

are

observed

to

express

abstract

156

LOGIC

II. DIVISION
26.

Division

noticed

of

called

are

either

and

if the

either

are

terms,

latter,they
and

or

few

have

we

remarks

Common

terms

and

universal

generic or specific.

are

specificterms

analogical,according
division

singular.
simply general
or

common

transcendental

Generic

ing

to

divisions

for.

are

ones

the

Although

"

concepts apply in general also

Terms

1.

Terms.

of

TERMS

OF

univocal, and

are

to

distinction

transcendental

based

follow

the

on

of terms.

Terms

of the same
name
by means
they
the
essential
definition
same
designate things which verify
:
the name
animal
is applied with identically
the same
mean
and cow,
inasmuch
both
as
ing to man
comply with the defini
tion of sentient
are
living being. Terms
equivocal when
by
of the same
means
name
they designatedifferent things giving
in its
dog
respectivelydifferent concepts : e.g. the name
2.

univocal

are

'

when

'

'

application

to

animal

an

and

to

'

constellation.

Terms

are

in the mind
are
analogical when
they stand for things which
represented by concepts that are only partly the same
; thus,
when
bodies
and
of spiritsthat they occupy
we
say of material
space,

the

in

but

same

3.

like

Terms,

They

6. Terms

direct,

'

genus

concepts,

concrete

vey

in

the

i.e.

are

used

not

are

simple

are

of the

abstract

or
'

latter

vice

and

direct

complex,

or

whiteness

the

'

former

'

white

'.
'

negative:

e.g.

may

be

death

',

used

'

immor

render

to

versa.
'

reflex:

or

', species
'

'

e.g.

substance

',

'

', are

man

reflex.

are
are

those

which

con
by themselves
and
thus
are
capable by themselves
subject or predicate (e.g. man
');

Categorematic terms
a
complete meaning
role of
the
fulfilling

syncategorematic terms
in conjunction with some

of

positiveterm

7.

of

'

space

worded.

that

are

'

and

sense.

positive or

are

tality'. Note
negative idea

'

occupy

analogous

an

single-or many4. They are


is an
example,
5.

'

words

'

are

those
other

term

which

require
'

(e.g.

every

to

',

be

'

none

used

').

CHAPTER

THE

FORMAL

27.

CAUSE

Introductory.
its

into

The

"

acts, the

own

The

work.

attach

and

together
thus

and

of

construct

we

which

this

the

to

logic seeks

which

in

will

judgment

studied

is

proposition (I),the

ART.

THE

28.

OF

Definition.

pression of
^.bout

the

else

something

omnis

every

oratio

something

but

JUDGMENT

is
'

not

it states

entreaty 14.

assertion

ARISTOTLE,

and

the
pro

judgments

Every

PROPOSITION

THE

is

announcing
est

may
IV
157

something
'

something,
signifies

""ao-is ^wi/r) o-^ai/n/oj, but

imperative

an

announcement
take

and

ex

enunciativa

oratio

utterance

verbal

the

something.

no

cc.

PROPOSITION

which

propositio

makes

Penhermenias,

and

judgments

AND

utterance

nothing

it

14

an

announce

signification,yet
'An

(Art. I)

judgment

THE

significativa',

does

utterance

the

subdivisions,

three

existing between

AND

calls it.
est

of

division

the
of

proposition,

judgment,

formation

(III).

THE

The

"

uTTo^avo-t? Aristotle
'

relations

JUDGMENT

MEANING

of

nature

upon

divisions

main

main

into

falls

judgments

logical system

three

first

divisions

propositions

I.

I. THE

the

various

positions (II), various


between

The

the

progres

reasoning bearing

progressive

establish.

to

to

formally

complex

into

divided

threefold

dealing respectively with

and

science.

view

we

elaborate

more

be

when

up

of

train

by putting judgments

build

we

with

mind

the

by

already said,

Next,

the

call

we

chapter

corresponding
order

them

ORDER

order

judgment,

subject.

of

have

we

is

step

Lastly, by

reason.

knowledge
Now

is,as

comparing

object

one

to

LOGICAL

of its ideas

arrangement

first

predicate

OF

introduction

acquisition of knowledge,
sive

III

V.

an

term

is not
;

signifies
without

likewise

affirmativeform

an
or

LOGIC

158
; all

form
negative
of these
two
the

terms

'to

be

at
proposition,

notion,

is true

29. The

we

define

may

the

of

that

utterance

an

whilst

Indeed

paniesthese
of
subsisting,
and

the

perhaps
shape of

"

the

in

Proposition

chief act towards

to

acts

which

which

of its leaves

"

of

forth, there

so

am

accom

"

I have

of external

of

object

some

apprehension of

which

acts

branches, the roughness

and

refer them

can

successive

qualitiesof this tree

and

its trunk

subjectfrom

by

attributes

several

simultaneous

seizes

mind

the sensible

attributes apart

of these

and

Judgment

our

of its bark, the colour

something

gatheredmy
and

my

abstract

consideration

shape, roughness, and

mind
in my
them
attributing
this indeterminate
subject which I am
tryingto describe,
sayingthat they belong to it,to judgingthat a tree is what

colour

to

propositionas

thought converges, but in pointof fact there


thought which does not terminate in an act of judg
of

the
perceiving,

to

onlyis the judgment the

Not

"

knowledge

notes

of

"

simple apprehension the


of

up

predicate,S and P connected


by
feature of the
'. Looking then at only one
analysis of
property disclosed by the mere

Place

the progress
is no act of
ment.

assertion is made

An

false.

or

Thought.

'.

combinations

are

subjectand

"

verb

the

enunciations

elemental

assertions

complex

more

"

is

reallytantamount

to

they togetherconnote.
this testimony
The study of language supports and amplifies
For the invention

is nothingbut to
of a name
subject
apply a concept, under the form of language,to some
which
I denote in an indeterminate
way by the demonstrative
that '. As an instance in point,the etymo
this or
pronoun
wolf ',lupus,Sanskrit Vrka, shows it to mean
logy of the word
there
wolf
that which tears in pieces ; to call the animal
fore is nothing but to apply an abstract concept to something
otherwise
indeterminate, to apply to this subjectthe attribute
of the act of lacerating.

of consciousness.

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

II. KINDS

OF

JUDGMENTS

AND

'

PROPOSITIONS
Some

propositions
are
simple,consistingonly of subject,attribute and copula;
others are complex or composed of several simplepropositions
that are
allow
connected.
in some
Simple propositions
way
30.

General

Division

of

Propositions.

"

FORMAL

THE

of

i.

159

the

related

as

is,and

it

than

former,

is the

the

is

two

apparent

'

or

it may

mutually
previously
judgment. Now
the

Schoolmen,

be in materia

on

con-

', when

matter

the

the

be other

absolutelycannot

the mind

to

"

terms

of

in necessary
terms

Matter.

considered

nomenclature

necessaria

between

connexion

the

use

in materia

tingenti.It

to their

the

to
proposition,

be

according

assertion of this relation in the

the formal

may

divided

are

is meant
proposition
subject and predicatebut

of

matter

(I),

of Simple Propositions
Classification

I. Propositions

31.

ORDER

quality(IV).

and
(II),quantity(III),

"

to

LOGICAL

fourfold classification,
namely,accordingto their matter

form

By

OF

CAUSE

analysis

mere

independentlyof all experience: e.g. 2 + 2


4.
is in contingentmatter
the connexion
A proposition
when
certain
the two
terms
is such that it depends upon
between
conditions in the order of contingentbeingsand consequently
be stated previouslyto the experienceof it : e.g.
cannot
The contingent
freezes at 32 deg.Fahrenheit.
water
judgment
takes
of which
cognizancemust not be thought to be
logic
is a
without the characteristic of necessity
15,but its necessity
in necessary
conditional one, whilst that of the judgment
Both judgmentsare necessary,
matter
is an absolute necessity.
but only the one kind is necessary in the sense
of in necessary
of the terms,

'

'

'

'

'

'.

matter

'

'

is knowable
by itself,
propositionin necessary matter
propositio
per se nota ; whereas the contingentproposition
depends for its being known upon something else beyond the
terms
of the proposition,propositio
mere
per aliud nota '.

The

'

'

'

Kinds

32. Two

class of

one

the

between

considered

Judgment

of

judgments

'

Matter.

Necessary

in necessary

is necessary

terms

in

matter

'

the

in its essential elements, is the

connexion

the

either because

subject,

term

same

In

i.

"

as

the

for instance
as
judgment of identity,
that
i +
is an equilateral
i
a square
quadrangle', 2
inasmuch
the*
because the subjectincludes the predicate
as
or
of the subject,
latter is some
element in the essence
e.g. 'a
'. In both cases
is intelligent
', a man
square is a rectangle

predicate which
"

is

'

'

'

"

'

18

within

The
the

particularjudgment
scope

of science

'in

contingent

scientia

non

est de

matter'

does

not

singularibus.

fall directly

LOGIC

160

the

of the

comparison

mere

sufficient to

make

two

judgment

their connexion

necessityof

the

of the

terms

is

evident

is necessary
because
involves the subject,
and in consequence
the predicate
necessarily
In

2.

second

the

connexion

class the

bringingit into its definition. This


called of
so
happens when the predicateis a property strictly
but something necessarily
the subject,i.e. is not its essence
resultingfrom it. Thus the definition of the predicate be it
simple or disjunctive when
juxtaposed with the essential
without

be denned

cannot

"

of the

notion

Let

terms.

two

'

number

'

number

up the necessary
illustrate this :
(a)

connexion

subjectshows

is

is

by

each
groups
the elements

us

'

Five

"

propositionwith
definition

one

containing the

is

of the

prime

a
'

simple predicate. Prime


which
be splitup into
cannot
a

of units 16.

number

same

of this definition is not

to be found

Now

in

the number

5,

is it the essential definition of 5 that it is a prime number


nor
analysethe notion,split5 up into groups so as to have 24-2
and

it

immediatelybecomes

5, inasmuch

'

either odd

The

or

'

attribute

not

even

is either odd

duo

dicendi

lf

prime

or

same

is

be

may

although

even,

of number,

necessary
unity excepted inas

number,

number, is divisible or
kinds

two

PER

SE

number

is

'

of

17,*a0

'

necessary
followed

herein

who

Schoolmen,

ACCIDEXS,

PER

the

to be either odd

; for every

for these
the

dicendi

But

property

by two,

not

even.

given by
modi

reckoned

or

name

that

into the definition

enter

it is not

as

The

'

of number

resultant
much

is it even

nor
'

said of attribute
it does

'

odd

of number

notion

is a

even

1,

'

it is

as

can
prime number
its necessarily
agreeingwith the number
is
property of it. (b) Every number
with a disjunctive
proposition
predicate.
is not
comprehended in the essential

be defined without

not

evident

; but

Aristotle, was

in contrast

ovro,

propositions
the

to

modi

Kara

generally defined

one

as

divisible

only by

itself and

unity.
'

17

Per se dupliciterdicitur.
Uno
cujus praedicatum cadit in definitione
animal

enim

in definitione

cadit

enim

modo

hcr.ai-iis. Et

quia

propositio per

dicitur

subjectisicut ista
id

Homo

quod

est

est

se,

animal

in defmitione

alicujus aliquo modo

causa
praedicata
ejus,in his quae sunt per se, dicuntur
dicitur propositio per se, cujus e contrario
subjecti. Alio modo
est
subjectum ponitur in definitione
praedicati; sicut si dicatur : Nasus
esse

causa

simus,

vel

et

nihil aliud

tum

par
est

numerus

causa

est
est

par
quam

praedicati'.

simum
numerus

enim

nihil aliud

ST. THOMAS,

De

est

quam

nasus

curvus,

habens, et in istis subjec


anima, lib. II, lect. 14.

medietatem

LOGICAL

OF

CAUSE

FORMAL

THE

ORDER

161

necessityof the connexion is


sometimes
accord
sometimes
mediately,
apparent immediately,
difficult.
or
ing as the analysisof the terms is straightforward
and in no way
matter
But this is an entirely
affects
subjective
be

It must

that

the

of the connexion.

the nature
33.

added

the

for

Nomenclature

Different

Same

Pro

Division.-

also called absolute or meta


in necessary matter
are
positions
distinct from conditional or physical
as
physicalpropositions,
seeingthat their objectis metaphysicallynecessary and
ones,
independentof the conditions belongingto contingentbeings.
by way of
They are also called rational or pure propositions
by itself,pure reason, is capable of
emphasisingthat reason
perceivingtheir truth ; contingent propositionsare then
experimental or empiricalinasmuch as the knowledge of them
depends upon an acquaintance with fact.
Lastly,since the days of Kant the two classes of propositions
called a priori and
a
are
or
posteriori,
again,
respectively
analyticand synthetic. It is very important to notice that
and
in Kantian
these terms
post-Kantian philosophybear a
from that used in Scholastic philosophy
different signification
18.
of this deep-rooted
difference between
The extent
the
neces
and
contingentjudgments of Scholasticism and the
sary
is a matter
analyticand syntheticjudgments of Kantianism
which
(40).
engaged our attention in Criteriology
**

'

'

34.

II.

Propositions

are

divided

to their

according

Form."

of

the union

subjectand predicateprecisely
it is realized in the assertion of the judgment.
be affirmative
or
I. A
negative19,
proposition
may
according
the mind declares that the predicatebelongs,or does not
here

Form
as

as

18

The

means

(op. cit,,p.

JOYCE

Scholastic

53) thus succinctlycontrasts

52,

definitions

The

"

Analytic proposition is one in


the
which
either
predicate is conof the subject,
tained in the intension
of the
or the subject in the intension
predicate.
in
A Synthetic proposition is one
of subject and
which
the connexion
is

the

"

Analytic proposition is one


which
the predicate is contained
the definition of the subject.

in
in

A
in

Synthetic proposition is one


the predicate is not
conin the notion of the subject.

which

tained

"

of the terms.

intension
"

in

involved

not

definitions

An

An

predicate

modern

:"

TRS.

negative proposition
'

affirmative

one

'

e.g.

This

similarly an
;
generous
is not
Man
affirmative
: e.g.
'

may

sometimes

assume

the

infallible '.

'

The

world

is not

of

appearance
'

'

is

lacking in generosity
apparently negative proposition
man

means

be
may
infinite '.

an

is not

really

LOGIC

162

must
be united (comand accordingly
subject,
with itao.
not united (divisio)
or
positio)
is the modalityof judgments or
2. Closelyallied to form
which qualifies
the union of predicate
and
the particular
manner
subject. On this score judgments may be divided into apodeicassertoric, and
problematic omnis protic, empirical or

the

belong,to

'

"

continetur,ut
eo
positio

inesse,aut

aut

necessario inesse,aut

ai.
enuntiet
ut insit,
contingere
(which must not be confused with
proposition
apodeictic
in necessary matter) asserts that the predicate
the proposition
either necessarily
belongs to, or else is necessarily
repugnant
have a first cause
',
to, the subject: e.g. The world must
for the world to exist by itself'.
It is impossible
declares that the predicate
The assertoric proposition
belongs
X
matter
of
fact
Mr.
died
: e.g.
to the subject
as a
yesterday'.
which
is founded
The
on
simple
problematicproposition,
'

posse
The

'

'

'

is a
possibility23,
of

non-occurrence

with

tentative declaration

determining

'

cause

e.g.

appointed commander-in-chief
35. Import
tion.

intension

The

"

the

form

upon
tion

they are

tive

one.

and

by nature
possiblethat

of the

extension

Predicate

Mr.

is

of

Proposi

of the

: in an
proposition
inverse proportion
to what

of the

in

connected

'.

Logical Value

or

It is

or

occurrence

that is not

event

some

of the

predicatedepend
affirmative proposi
they are in a nega

affirmative
propositionthe predicateis taken
accordingto the whole of its comprehension, althoughthis be
and according
less than the comprehension of the subject,
All the' notes of the predicate,
to part only of its extension.
but
taken togetheror separately,
are
appliedto the subject,
in
the subjectneed not, and in fact does not, stand precisely
virtue of the enunciation for more
than a part of the objects
i.

In

an

Every proposition announcing something (P) about a subject (S) effects


union
(compositio)of S and P. The question is here concerning
to the subject or not.
whether the predicatebelongs objectively
ST. THOMAS,
88

mental

Periher., lect. III.

In
ai

12

ARISTOTLE,
Analyt. pr., I, 2.
Aristotle does not mean
By possible
understands

St. Thomas
determinatum

est

solum

the
ad

same
esse

here
'

Dicitur

but contingent.
not-contradictory,
necessarium
quod in sua natura

autem
; impossibile

quod

est

determinatum

autem
est omnino
determina
quod ad neutrum
; possibile
ad
sive
habeat
tum, sive se habeat magis ad unum
se
alterum,
aequalitcr
quam
ad utrumque, quod dicitur contingens ad utrumlibet
'. In Periher.,lect. 14, n. 8.

solum

ad

non

esse

in

included

assert that

the

'

the

has all the

dog

connoted
there

are

CAUSE

FORMAL

THE

the

predicate:thus

'

vertebrate

'

; but

163
when

dog.

be made,

exceptionto

one

namely in
definition (P) and

of essential definitions : here the

case

ORDER

I do not affirm that

other vertebrates besides the

no

is,however,

There

LOGICAL

to declare that the


dog is a vertebrate ',I mean
and distributively,
taken collectively
qualities,

the idea

by

of

extension

OFJ

the
the

thingdefined (S)have the same extension and the same com


prehension.
the oppositeis the case, the
2. In a negative
proposition
is taken in the whole of its extension, yet only ac
predicate
indefinite portionof its comprehension: thus,
cordingto some
that

'

the mollusc

is not

belong to
though it may

the

class,it does

not

does not
even

vertebrate

note

some

verifythe
to which
allsubjects

brate

brate ; I exclude
but I do not
be applied,
which

class,inasmuch

or

whole

as,

other of the verte


definition of verte

the idea

this account

on

that the mollusc

means

vertebrate

whole

possess

'

'

vertebrate

exclude

'

may

all the notes

this idea contains.

36. III.
"

Propositionsare divided according to their Quantity.


be universal, singularor
Propositionsmay
particular,

indefinite.
is one which declares that an attri
proposition
denoted by an idea or that it
bute belongsto all the subjects
are mortal '/No
man
belongsto none of them : e.g. All men
universal

'

escapes death*.
is one which
proposition
singular
belongsto one individual. Should
A

declares that

an

attribute

subjectstand for a
definite group of individuals,
it is said to be a collectivesubject,
is concerned it is not differentfrom a singular
but as far as logic
in which the subjectis not universal
one.
Every proposition
is a particular
whether the subjectbe
matter
no
proposition,
individuals of the same
class or simply one individual :
many
*

the

'

wise ', The British nation is prosperous '.


are
e.g. Some men
An indefinite
is one
in which the identity
or
proposition
of subjectand predicate
is expressed,
non-identity
yet so
to leave it ambiguous whether
the subjectis taken in
whole

or

part of its extension

choly',where

the

subjectmay

'

be

e.g.

An

'

one

old
all

'

or

the

is melan

man
'

as

'

some

old

men.

Attention

need

M.S.P."

n.

VOL.

hardlybe

called to the

importance
superior
M

LOGIC

164
of the universal

the particular,
for inasmuch
over
proposition
is contained in the universal a knowledge of
the particular
as
the latter impliesa virtual knowledge of the former, while the
is not

converse

true.

Propositions are divided according to their Quality.

37. IV.

"

false according as the connexion


is in conformityor not
subjectand predicate

Propositionsare

true

declared between

or

with fact ".

of Compound Propositions($
Classification

" 2.
38. Division

Complex

of

Propositions. The

compound,

"

or

is reallyan assertion containing


complex,proposition
of Port
several simple propositions. Of these the logicians
six kinds in which it is immediatelyevident
Royal enumerate
that there is more
than one
and four where
this
proposition

better

is less evident.

requiredfor
The

i.

Let

us

establish the

define and

conditions

their truth.

first six

copulativedisjunctive

propositionsare

conditional,
causal, relative and adversative.
there are
in which
(a) A copulativepropositionis one
several subjectsor several predicates
joinedby the affirmative
'

'

is
negativeconjunctions and or nor '. This proposition
true onlywhen
each of its partsis true. In the case where the
is also called a r emotive
conjunctionis negativethe proposition
proposition.
is one
in which there are two
(b)A disjunctive
proposition
alone of which can
be true : e.g.
one
incompatiblepredicates,
Every free action is morallygood or bad '. For such a pro
to be true the two members
must
be so opposed to each
position
of no middle proposition.
other as to admit
is one
which contains two parts
(c)A conditional proposition
linked togetherby the conjunction if ; the firstpart containing
or

'

'

the condition istermed


'

e.g.

If the

soul

is

is true
proposition
if the antecedent
soul

were

(d)A
18

By

the

'

the second the consequent;


antecedent,

it is
spiritual,

immortal

of

the consequence involved is true, even


and consequent are false : e.g. If the animal
'

qualityof

called

form, i.e. whether

rather

of words

than

kind

when

it would be immortal
'.
spiritual,
causal proposition
is one made
up of

the

This

'.

of

proposition many
it is affirmative

importance.

authors
or

two

understand

negative.

The

parts joined
what

we

have

questionis one

FORMAL

THE

OF

CAUSE

LOGICAL

165

ORDER
'

conjunctionsignifyinga cause : e.g. Logic is studied


truth is sought'. To this class belongs the reduplica
because
tive proposition
: e.g.
Evil, as evil (or qua evil),is not
it is not sufficient that
For all these propositions
attractive'.
that one should
the two partsbe true but also,and in particular,
by

'

of the other.

be the real cause

expresses a relation,
of this dependsthe truth of the proposition
:

is
relative proposition

(e)A
and

on
'

e.g.

the accuracy
As a man
lives,so
adversative

(f)An
contains

or

one

does he die '.


which
propositionis^one
judgments separatedby some

discretive

or

different

more

which

one

'

'

'

conjunction,but ', as ', nevertheless ',etc. : e.g.


Happinessdepends not upon riches but upon virtue '. For its
truth such a proposition
depends both on the truth of the parts
and on the opposition
them.
set between
called sometimes
four other kinds of propositions,
2. The
which are in appearance
simple but in
propositions,
exponible
comparativeand
realitycompound, are exclusive,exceptive,
desitive propositions.
or
inceptive
which asserts that an
is one
(a)An exclusive proposition
attribute belongs to one
subjectonly : e.g. God alone is to
adversative
'

'

be loved for His

own

sake '.
which affirms

is one
(b)An exceptive
proposition

subjectbut

'

with

restriction

All virtues admit

e.g.

of

an

excludingpart

excess

an

attribute of

of its extension

'.

except the love of God

(c)A comparative
propositionis one which not only asserts
that a thing possesses certain attributes but that it possesses
them in a greater or less degreethan some
other thing: e.g.
'

Wisdom

is better than

riches/

and desitive are


(d)Inceptive
that

those

certain

attributes

thinghas commenced
Slaveryceased
e.g.
'

assert
respectively
ceased to enjoy certain

which
or

in the British Dominions

in

1834 '"
Each

of these four

judgmentsand

propositions
reallycontains

therefore is not

III. RELATIONS
39. Relations

bear
to

between

different relations to

distinguish,
namely
opposition.

and

true

BETWEEN

unless both

two

separate

parts are

true.

PROPOSITIONS

Propositions. Propositions may


"

it is necessary
of ^l^alencet
conversion,subordination
one

another

which

LOGIC

166
40.
said

of

Equivalence

expressionwhilst
example, All men

in

not

Conversion

41.

propositionsare

logicalvalue.

'

', No

immortal

are

men

Propositions. Conversion

of

in their

another

one

and

meaning

mortal

are

Those

"

differ from

which
equivalent

be

to

Propositions.

For

'

24.

consists in

"

so

that the new


transposingthe two terms of a proposition
pro
if
thus obtained is true
the original
is.
one
position
is convertible since both
(a)A universal negativeproposition
No
universal : e.g.
mineral
its terms
are
performs vital
actions is as true as
Any beingperformingvital actions is not
'

'

'

mineral

'.

is likewise convertible
proposition
(b)A particular
affirmative
that both terms
for the same
of equal extension :
are
reason
with reason
sensitive beingsare endowed
', Some
e.g. Some
these
with reason
"are sensitive '. In both
beings endowed
is evident ; the two terms
the conversion
cases
are
clearly
transposable.The questionarises whether these are the only
'

two

'

The

cases.

consider that

if we

(c)In

the

not

real

is

individual
stance

would

answer

first

"

place,the

term, which

singularpropositions

concrete,

determined,

or

basis of attribution.

a
'

Peter is wise
say that
Peter ',the term
Peter
'

subject.
(d)And in the

of

ultimatelyrepresents a

as

serve

'

conversion

since

conversion

',cannot

to be in the affirmative

seem

or
'

One

is in

'

first sub

Thus, when

of the class of wise

spiteof

the

is

men

conversion

still

the

second

tion allows of conversion

in the

universal

but only on
change places,
made
subject be limited in

may
when

are

men

sensitive

'

the

is
predicate

are
predicate

conversion

Thus

'

All

'

', but the


called,per accidens, conversion
there is,however,
propositions
which

its extension.

become
sensitive beings are
Some
may
conversion is imperfector, as it is otherwise

men

and

proposi
affirmative
that subjectand predicate
sense
the condition that the predicate

place,a

is not

of

an

by
one

Among

exception,namely

essential definition and

equal extension.

true

limitation.

In other

conversion, because

that in

subject
imperfect

thus
'

cases

these

'

instead of the two

The
used by many
term
Latin
writers and
adopted by Mill and Mansel
equipollence. The process of changing a proposition into its equivalent
is commonly
known
as
obversion, the new
proposition being spoken of as the
and
obverse of the originalproposition,the obverUnd
(cp.converse
14

is

TRS.

FORMAL

THE

OF

CAUSE

beingsimplysubstituted

terms

definition of conversion, one

LOGICAL

ORDER

167

for each other, accordingto the

term

(P) is altered by having its

restricted.

extension

42. Relations

of

Opposition

and

Subordination.

These

"

rela

give rise to four different classes


propositions
contrary, subcontrary
propositions,
namely contradictory,

tions between
of

The

subaltern.

and

first two

alone

present the characteristic

relative

opposition.
propositionsare said to be contradictories if they
other as to exclude a middle proposition.
are
so opposed to each
They differ both in form and in quantity. Compare, e.g.,
of true

(a)Two

'

All

white

are

men

'

with

'

Some

men

are

not white

'

25.

said to be contraries which have the


are
propositions
thus so
universal quantity but differ in form, and are
same
being true. Com
opposed as to allow of a middle proposition
All men
are
just and No men are just ; between these
pare
two extreme
a third or middle
propositions
proposition
may be
not just'.
are
true, that Some men
(c)Propositionswhich differ in form only and are each
Some
in quantity,are subcontraries : e.g.
are
men
particular
just', Some men are not just'.
form but of different quantities
of the same
(d)Propositions
subalterns : e.g. All men
are
are
are
just ;
just', Some men
is just', Some
not just'.
or again, No
are
man
men
to make
of the conventional
It is the custom
of logicians
use
letters A E I O to symbolizepropositions
under their double
aspect of quantityand form :"
A stands for a universal affirmative proposition.
E stands for a universal negativeproposition.
I stands for a particular
affirmative proposition.
0 stands for a particular
negativeproposition.

(b)Two

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

different modes

The
of

diagram will serve to show the


following
M
and contrary opposition
:
contradictory
"

11

ARISTOTLE,

""

'

Universalis

Pcriherm.,

contrariae, sicut Omnis


universalis
negatio non

designat
ponit
tiva

et

extremam

hoc

c.

VI.

(propositio)affirmativa,
homo
solum

est

removet

distantiam,

pertinetad

Justus,Nullus

ration

in
em

et

universalem

negativa sunt
Justus; quia scilicet

universalis

homo

est

affirmationem,

inter contraria.
sicut medium
negativa sehabent
affirmationem
negatio non
plus facit, nisi quod removeat
In Periher.,lect. n.
et

sed

etiam

quantum negat totum, quod affirmatio


affirma
et ideo particularis
contrarietatis,
.

In contvadictoriis
.

'.

ST.

THOMAS,

i68

LOGIC

CONTRADICTORIES

A
All

are

men

Q
Some

just.

O,

men

are

just.

not

.A

I
Some

No

are

men

just.

concerning the Truth


Propositions. i. Contradictories
43. Rules

"

both

false,since

of the other.
versa

that

Hence

if it is true

:
'

is

one

Some

traries cannot
would

be true

true

the

negation

other is false,and

both be true, but both may


the

at

be

just',it cannot

are

men

be true, for if they

both

both

All

false.
one

',stillmore

just', or which
propositionNo
tion
But
the
out

All

men

the

'

"

of
falsity

It may
its being true that

3. Subcontraries
Both may
be true
not

just

Every

be untrue
'

that

All
'

No

men

are
are

imply

not

'

compare

just

'

Some

that
Some men
suppose it untrue
No men
are
just must be true
'

44.

Rules

Some

men

Propositions.

"

The

tivelysubordinate
the

are

concerning

universals

just

are

men

not

the

men

some

one

"

men

without

group of men
both cannot

be false,

be false

if

we

just',the contradictory

are

; stillmore,

and

to their universals

false.

Some

just',

are

then, must

is the

it be

subcontrary.

Falsity of Subordinate

I and
particular
propositions

impliesthat

be
'

just',which

Truth

be

; there may

with

not.

be found in

; justice
may

'

that

proposi

the truth of

both be true, but both cannot

may
:

'

'

true

just'. The

are

But
being the virtue of another group.
for were
they so the two contradictories would

'

is

is not

man

is the contrary of the

does
proposition

though all men

'

All
'

just
just,even

not

are
'

'

not

are

men

that

just'.

are

just,even

are

just

are

men

contrary.

men

Some

men

'

'

'

'

is it false to say that


to the same,
No men

comes

be true

If it is true

time.

same

If it is false to say that

man

vice

the contradictories

were

just',the contradictory Some

are

nor

be false. Con

'

men

Opposed

just'.

not

Contraries cannot

2.

'

both
less than

or

of

Falsity

cannot

is true, the

one

that

are

men

and

nothing more

if

are

men

CONTRADICTORIES

just.

and

E.

are

The

of the subalterns ; but

respec
truth

of

the truth

THE

CAUSE

FORMAL

OF

LOGICAL

ORDER

169

of the subalterns does not entail that of the universals.

Again,

ifthe particulars
the universals ; but falsity
so
are
are false,
of the particulars
of the universals does not imply the same
27.
too

45. Immediate

Inferences.

inference

real

"

conclusion

the

different terms, and that

three

or
propositions
premissesof

that in a
presently
results from
a
comparison of
this comparison is made
in two

an

seen

When,

argument.

the case, it is permissible


to draw

is sometimes

as

It will be

directlyfrom

however,
conclusion

singleassertion,the reasoningis

eduction.

immediate

Such

inferences

inferenceor
able through the conversion, opposition,
and

called

are

an

obtain

subordination

propositions.TKefrules we Have justgiven are sufficient


be made.
guide to show how these inferences may legitimately
of

ART.
46.

II.

REASONING

Introductory. In the presentchapterwe


the orderlyarrangement of our knowledge or,
the

are

"

formation

as

we

considering
have

said,

logicalorder. In the first article we saw


how concepts are arrangedin the judgment, and terms
in the
proposition.We then classified judgments before making a
comparison of them.
Judgments,however, are only elements
in a stilllargersystem of thought : from judgments that we
of a
alreadyknow we proceed to a new judgment by means
discursive process called reasoningor inference.
This process,
whether expressed in words or in writing,
is known
the syl
as
logism. In this Article we have therefore to consider first
and next (II)
(I)the nature of reasoningand of the syllogism,
the different forms they may
assume.
17

and
The
the

In the

case

negation lies
typicalcases

of

not

of

followingsquare
S is necessarily P
(S must be P)

S is

possibly P
be P)

(S may

affirmation
propositionsthe contradiction between
of the proposition but with the verb.
the attribute
modal
propositionsare best seen from
opposition between

of modal

with

"

^^XTTTD
ATM^TTMDTTTC
CONTRADICTORIES

rnvTT?
AnirTfVRTFq
CONTRADICTORII

S is not

(g need

necessarilyP
not
be p)

PossiblY p
(S cannot ^ p)

s is not

LOGIC

170

I. NATURE
47.

Nature

of

REASONING

OF

Reasoning.

AND

The

"

SYLLOGISM

THE

of all progress in know


truths are known
some

end

ledgeis the attainment of truth. Now


of truths
others mediatelythrough the medium
immediately,
that have been immediatelyapprehended. Those of the one
kind, which give rise to the second, are termed principles
;
of the

those

other, consequences

principles.The

or

from

passage

conclusions

to
principles

flowing from
conclusion

is

reasoning.
it therefore asserts a predi
proposition,
it is quiteapparent that the predicate
cate of a subject. When
is evident (Criteriobelongs to the subject,the proposition
logy,52). Evidence may be immediate, i.e. when the objective
is immediately
and the subject
connexion
between the predicate
apprehended,and in this case the certitude engenderedis also
called immediate.
Or, as is the case in most of our judgments,
it may
be mediate ; it may
only after the mind has
appear
As

conclusion

made

of

use

one

is a

or

comparisonbetween
furnishes mediate
of

reasoning. It

the

terms, i.e. common

middle

more

subjectand predicate:

certitude

is known

what

or

is this kind of evidence

as

which

terms

of

such evidence
the certitude

is characteristic

of conclusions.
of comparisons
why we have to proceedby means
is the disproportion
between the complexityof knowable
existing
to know
thingsand the relative feebleness of our mind striving
The

reason

28.

them

of reasoning or
ratiocination is a perfection,
power
call it a mixed perfection
because
yet such that metaphysicians
it impliesimperfection
that is to say, because
; perfection,
The

is better than

to be able to arrive at the truth


to remain

to have

it is a circuitous

consists in the
of

18

tum

'

Discursus

rationis

discursus

intellectu

erat

be established

two
as

as

Reasoning, then,
concepts the S and P

Terminology.
of

and

"

conclusion

"

"

with

common

ad intellecincipitab intellectu et terminatur


semper
intellectis
enim
ex
procedendo
quibusdam
; et tune
perficitur,
quando ad hoc pervenimus ut intelligamus id

rationis

ratiocinamur

quod prius

its

comparison

judgment to

to reason

inasmuch
ignorantof it,and imperfection
it.
and difficultway of attaining

Syllogism and

48. The

not

ignotum.

procedit'.

Quod

ST. THOMAS,

ergo
Sum.

ratiocinamur, ex aliquo praecedenti


Theol., II.,q. 8, a. i, ad 2.

FORMAL

THE

'

'

third

or

mean

OF

CAUSE

LOGICAL

concept, in order thus

ORDER

discover

to

171

whether

Its perfect
the one includes or excludes the other.
objectively
is the syllogism.By Aristotle
and simplest
type of expression
certain things
is defined as
the syllogism
a discourse in which
follows simply from
being positedsomething else necessarily
their being posited 2n.
that
the
When
the predicate belongs
asserts
reason
objectivelyto the subject,the conclusion is affirmative ;
it sees
that one
when
only of the terms agrees with the
'

'

middle

that

and

term

second

the

does

not, the conclusion is

negative.
The

two

of the conclusion

terms

are

simply extremes, in contrast to the


(mediusterminus)with which they are
predicateis called the major extreme,

called extreme
'

'

or

or

mean

terms,

middle

term

both
the

compared. The
subjectthe minor

extreme.

from which the conclusion is drawn


propositions
and
called the premisses (praemittunturconclusioni),
are
together they form the antecedent. The premissesare those
judgments which, to use the phrase of Aristotle,once being
positedor supposed as true, involve the conclusion. The
conclusion is called the consequent. Often
the proposition
asserted first is spoken of as the major premiss and the one
The

two

asserted second

the minor

words

is to call the

which

the

but

more

accurate

use

of the

in
that proposition
major (or propositio)

major term is compared with the middle term and


the minor (orassumpta)that one in which the minor term is so
compared.
The premissesand conclusion, antecedent
and consequent,
constitute the matter of the syllogism.The form lies in the
the antecedent
and
nexus
existingbetween
consequent ;
it is summed
the consequence
up in the therefore expressing
of the syllogism.
(consequential,
consecutio)
In studying the nature
of reasoningwe
inquirehow it is
that
when
certain thingsare posited,
something else neces
follows simplyfrom their beingposited
'.
sarily
'

'

'

49.

Nature

ingargument
have

"

two

Anal.

and

of the

Syllogism." The

follow

which
specimen of a syllogism: Triangles
equal have two anglesequal ; but this triangle

is

sides

Logical Basis

pr.. I, i.

'

LOGIC

172

ABC

has

two

sides

equal;

therefore this

anglesequal '.
Reasoning is the bringingof

triangleABC

has

two

under
the
definite
subject
that something
extension of an abstract type in order to infer
which
is predicable
of the abstract type as such is likewise predicable
of
this definite
subject.
is a necessary proposition,
The major of the syllogism
assert
ing that the predicateof the conclusion (the qualityof having
some

angles equal) is necessarilyconnected with


middle term
(triangle
having two sides equal). As

two

an
an

abstract
abstract

concept the middle term is not actuallyuniversal but capable


of becoming universal,of being universalized ; that is to say,
further act of reflection it may

be

as predicable
recognized
of a species
of one or of several or of all the subjects
or a genus.
that the middle term
extends
In the minor the mind preceives
has two sides
to the subjectof the minor
(thatthis triangle
therefore the mind
equal). When
puts major and minor
it perceives
that
together and regards them simultaneously,
the predicateof the conclusion
(having two angles equal)
which belongs necessarily
to the middle
term
with
(triangle
two sides equal)belongslikewise to the subjectof the conclusion

by

which

of the middle

fallswithin the extension

it

perceivethe necessary connexion


predicateof the conclusion, which

it set out

term

between

the

is the advance

; thus

does

subjectand
of

thought

to achieve.

mental act of universalization.


a
syllogismis essentially
The principle
which it is founded may be enunciated thus :
on
Whatever
is necessarily
predicable
of an abstract subject the
middle term"
also of every subject
is predicable
under the
falling
The

"

extension

of

the middle

From

term.

this it is clear that

the

in the

syllogismbetween the extremes


and the middle term
the comprehension
on
depends at once
of the
and on the extension of the terms.
In the major, one
extremes, the predicate of the conclusion, is connected
with the middle term in respect of comprehension
: quaecumque
connexion

sunt
same

its

established

eadem

uni tertio sunt

middle

term

extension,and

on

eadem

inter

is considered

from

this

se.

related

score

In

the minor, the

the

point of

to the

second

view

of

extreme,

de subjecto
Quidquidaffirmatur
abstractim considerate,
ejus
affirmandumest de omnibus et singulis
uno
verbo, universaliter. Quidquid negatur de
inferioribus,
the

subjectof

the conclusion

"

LOGICAL

OF

CAUSE

FORMAL

THE

ORDER

173

subjectoabstraction consider ato, negandum est de omnibus et


inferioribus
singulis
ejus,uno verbo, univer saltier30.
Although the syllogismwe have taken as an example leads
be easily
to an affirmative conclusion,the analysis
applied
may
to one
in a negativeconclusion 31.
resulting
50. The

Necessity of SyllogisticPrinciples."

of the

Nature

major premissand servingas the


foundation
of a syllogismis sometimes
metaphysicaland
absolute in character (e.g.the example justanalysed),
some
times it is physicalor natural and consequentlydependenton
ascertained (e.g.
conditions which must be empirically
the law
that water has its maximum
densityat 4" Centigrade).
In the first case
the predicateattributed to the subject
The

generallaw stated

of the

conclusion
of the

essence

that

Here

subjectof

In the second

else

or

necessityof

the attribute is

case
a

law

part of the
property of

or

necessary

applying this predicate

is absolute.

the conclusion

in virtue of

term

term

the

whole

either the

connotes

middle

essence.

to the

in the

which

predicatedof
to be

had

has

the middle

ascertained

by
subject is

experience; accordinglyits predicationof the


These laws empirically
ascertained
hypothetically
necessary.
in
discover
of reasoning known
we
as
by the method
duction, as will be pointed out in a subsequent part of this
treatise.
51.

Logical First Principles. The

we
syllogism,
proving force from a
"

have

its cogency
or
proposition.The questionarises,Whence

does this

tion

may

seen,

derives

itself derive

its

logicalvalue ?
reasoning. Yet, as

previousprocess of
infinite series of
an
(52-54),
be

never

be

sure

have

we

inferences

You

just

necessary

say

proposi
from

Criteriology
could
is impossible,
or we
we

certain conclusion.

saw

in

There

must

then

for our
which serve
as
propositions
starting-points
reasoning processes, propositionswhich themselves do not
stand in need
called logical
of demonstration.
These
are
and they assert simple relations between
first con
principles,
some

cepts.

80

This

COFFEY,
S1
see

For

view
The
an

of the

Science

analysisof

largeedition

nature

of the

syllogism is explained more

of Logic, I, p. 301 f ."

; also

the

made
objections

58.
Criteriology,

fully by Dr.

TRS.

by J. S.

Mill

against the syllogism,

LOGIC

174

There
1.

The

2.

The

52.

kinds of

:
principles
logical
of each particular
formative principles
science
of all thought.
regulativeprinciples

are

two

"

Moods

Figures and

the

of

Aristotle's

In

Syllogism.

"

terminology the figures (c-x^ara)of the syllogismare the


different forms which the syllogism
assume
according to
may
the relations the middle

is the

Fig.i. The middle term


predicateof the minor.
Fig. 2. The

middle

bears to the two

term

is the

term

subjectof
predicateof

extremes

:"

major and

the

both

premisses.
premisses.

Fig.3. The middle term is the subject of both


The syllogisms
which are
possiblein these different figures
if we
regard the quantity universal or particular and the
foim
affirmative or negative of the proposition,
are
styled
the moods
of the syllogism.The
of such possible
number
be
combinations, independent of their logicalvalues, may
"

"

"

"

reckoned

as

256 moods.

But

there

this number

among

are

only twenty-fourin which a conclusion is derived, and of these


five though valid are useless ; in all therefore there remain, as
valid and useful,nineteen moods
viz. :
of the syllogism,
All, EAE, EIO
(indirect)AAI, EAE, All, AEO, IEO
2nd figure
AGO, EAE, EIO
: AEE,
3rd figure: AAI, All, EAO, EIO, IA1, OAO

figure: AAA,

ist

specialrules for each


figure,
logicians
usuallygiveeightrules applyingto the syllogism
in generaland expressing
the nature of reasoning.
RULE
esto triplex:
i. Terminus
medius, majorque, minorque.
In the syllogism
there must
be three terms, neither more
nor
with a
less. For reasoningis the comparison of two terms
53. Rules

of the

Syllogism.
"

Besides

"

common

third term

first two

terms

are

in order to discover
related
logically

whether

to each

other.

or

how

the

This rule

by defect,that is,if onlytwo terms are used ;


than three be employed, (a) An
or
by excess, should more
instance of a syllogism
of only two terms is that in which one
of the premissesis tautological
:
Every effect has a
e.g.

may

be violated

'

cause.

The

universe is

an

effect.

Therefore

the universe

has

Consequentlythis first rule is violated by all the


fallacies known
Petitio Principii
as
or
Begging the Question.
contains more
than two terms when one of them
(b)A syllogism
a

cause

'.

THE

FORMAL

CAUSE

is

ambiguous, inasmuch as
meanings is equivalentto
have

the

brain

for

brain

for its organ

organ
RULE

LOGICAL

which

term

two

ORDER

be used

can
'

terms

175

Acts

e.g.

of

An
act
which
organ.
Therefore
is material.
acts
of
the middle

'

term,

having

in two

thought

their

material '. Here

are

OF

has

the

thought

the brain

for

\ is equivocal.
Latius

2.

conclusio

hoc

vult ;

non

(terminosextremes) quam
praemissae
better: Aeque ac praemissaeextendat

or

conclusio voces; the extremes


in the conclusion
must be the same
in the premisses. The conclusion expresses the result of
as
the

comparison made

this.

in the

premisses. It

cannot

Were

beyond
compared

go

it to do so, it would pass from the terms


in the premissesto some
other and would thus violate Rule
the observance
RULE

of which

3. Aut

semel

is

aut

for
indispensable

iterum

medius

for this rule is easily


understood

reason

rightreasoning.

generalityesto.
after

i,

The

"

of
analysis

an

the

of

reasoning(49). The middle term must be taken


at least once.
If not, ifit is used twice as particular,
universally

process

should

we

in each

be certain that the

never

partsof the extension taken

and in consequence
certain
different,
never
the syllogismhad
not four terms
(Rule i). E.g. All

that

case

not

were

'

metals

This

heavy.

are

substance

is

'

metal

substance
where

"

either of the

premisses. This

Ab

omnes.

uno

disce

RULE

4.

middle

heavy.

Therefore

this

'

heavy is not a universal in


is often tersely
fallacy
expressed:

medium

Nequaquam

is

'

capiatconclusio fas est.

The

"

It belongs
appear in the conclusion.
to the conclusion to apply to the two extremes
the result of the
term

must

not

comparison effected
middle

in the

Hence

term.

were

premissesbetween
the middle

term

and

them

the

brought into

the

conclusion the purpose of the reasoningwould not be attained.


RULE
affirmancesnequeunt generare negantem.
5. Ambae
"

From

affirmative

two

be drawn.
not

but

observed
it cannot
RULE

both

If two

agree
;

premissesa negativeconclusion

ideas agree

with

if there

be denied

one

is

an

with

the

same

can

never

third,they

can

another, all other rules being duly

identityaffirmed

in the

premisses,

in the conclusion.

6.

Utraquesi praemissaneget,nil inde sequetur. Where


of drawing a
premisses are negative,there is no means

conclusion.
excluded

"

The

from

being that, if two


middle term, they cannot

reason

extremes

be

are

connected

both

by

LOGIC

i;6

of this exclusion with each

reason

that

the

term

same

related
definitely
the

are

through

middle

term

related

or

of this

the medium
two

extremes

givesus no
that they are

conclusion at all about


RULE

middle

middle

new

be

term

to affirm

warrant

Hence

term.

from

excluded

are

certain

either that

they are

related to each other, to make

not

any

them.

Pejorcm sequiiursemper

7.
conclusion

middle

agreement or disagreementto be
to each
other, and so a conclusion

not

or

fact that

mere

other

some

happen

of their

account

on

reached

which

terms

by comparison with

may

found

two

Yet it may
excluded from one

other.

conclusio

partem.
"

'

The

'

weaker
necessarilytakes after the
premiss.
The meaning of this may
be expanded into :"
the conclusion must
(1)If one of the premissesis negative,
be negative.If A and B are two ideas of which A agrees with
C and B does not, we can never
assert positively
and certainly
that A

agrees with B.

the conclusion must


of the premissesis particular,
be particular.
be negative
For, since both premissescannot
(Rule 6),there are only two possiblecases, viz. where both
premissesare affirmative and where one is affirmative and one
negative, (a)If both premissesare affirmative,then their two
must
(35,i) as well as one subject(bysupposition)
predicates
and only one
Now
be particular,
term is left to be universal.

(2) //

by Rule

one

Therefore

we

that the middle

know

neither

premisses. And
conclusion

of the

term

must

be

universal.

once

be

universal

in the

they cannot, therefore,be

universal

in the

extremes

(Rule 2), i.e. the

can

conclusion

be

particular.
the premisses
(b)If one premissis affirmative and one negative,
will contain two
universal terms, viz. the predicateof the
which by
negative premissand the subjectof the proposition
is universal.
Further, the conclusion is negative,
supposition
that its predicate
is universal.
which when
this term
Now
so
in the conclusion is universal,is not the middle term
predicate
(Rule 4) ; and therefore the
term, and
must

be

which

the extreme

in
particular

ticular also in the

the

must

becomes

subjectin

premissesand,

conclusion

i.e. the

'

particular.Examples are : All men


is not a material being. Therefore
conclusion would

be

justthe

be the middle

other universal must

same

if one

are

the conclusion

in consequence,
conclusion has
material

is not

onlyof

the

par
to

be

beings. A
man

'. The

propositions

FORMAL

THE

both universal and

were

CAUSE

is

negative:

Therefore

man.

OF

is not

LOGICAL
'

No

ORDER

men

are

177

pure

'

spirit;

pure

spirits.

'

or

'. In a word, when


spirit.Therefore B is not a man
the conclusion is particular.
one
premissis particular,
RULE
8. Nil sequitur
geminis ex particularibus
unquam.
be drawn.
From
conclusion
two
can
particular
premissesno
Since both premissescannot
be negative(Rule 6),only two
: either both
combinations, as above, are possible
premisses
affirmative,or one is affirmative and the other negative.
are
(a) In the first case, all the terms are particularthe two
of affirmative proposi
because they are predicates
predicates
tions ; the two
subjectsby supposition.Hence there is no

is

pure

"

"

distributed

middle

violation of Rule
be drawn.

can

Some

term, it is

universal

once

there is

conclusion
consequentlyno legitimate

3, and

Take

not

as

instance

an

'

Some

men

rich.

are

'

ignorant Therefore some rich men are ignorant


Were such a syllogism
valid,one might prove in a similar way
rich men
that some
are
(b)In the second case the pre
poor,
misses contain only one universal term, namely, the predicate
of the negativepremiss. But as the conclusion is negative,
is universal,and if it is so in the conclusion,that
its predicate
also be so in the premisses. Hence the middle term
term must
which is not the predicate
of the conclusion (Rule4) is par
ticular both times in the premisses,
and Rule 3 is againviolated
to the prejudiceof any
conclusion.
are
E.g. Some men
men

are

"

"

'

learned.
men

are

Some

laid down
not

Rules

'

virtuous.

which

"

of the

do

Syllogism and

than

more

connexion

learned

some

correctness

Truth."

The

rules

just

of the inference and

The
logicalself-consistency.
antecedent and consequent is quite

ensure

between

thingfrom

Therefore

is obviouslynonsense.

only safeguard the

logicalconnexion
another

not

are

not virtuous

54. The

do

men

the truth of the

consequent

; for the neces

things posited and the thing


necessarily
followingfrom their being positedthrows no light
of the premissesin which those first
upon the truth or falsity
of the conclusion is to
thingsare posited. The truth or falsity
be determined
by the two following
generalrules :
i. If the
premissesare true, the conclusion will be true :
Ex vero
The conclusion is nothing
non
sequiturnisi verum.
than
of the
statement
relations perceivedin the
more
a

sary

between

the

"

premisses;

what

has

been

acknowledged

to

be

true

in the

LOGIC

178
be

premisses must

when

equally true

stated

in

the

con

clusion.
lead to a false
premissescannot
of a doctrine
conclusion,it follows that it is a legitimate
disproof
of its consequences.
or
Thus,
theoryto argue from the falsity
condemned
be
its
for example, atheism may
conse
justly
by
From

the fact that

quences.
2. If

true

premisses are false the conclusion is


false : Ex falso sequitur
but not necessarily,
quidlibet.
generally,
All men
minerals.
Aristotle gives the example :
All
are
both

or

one

'

minerals
'

All minerals

no

horse is

an

animal.

of

may

mineral '.

Therefore

all

'All horses

no

may

is an

horse

is

man

are

men

animal.
animals.

are

horse '.

arrive at

Hence

is a mixture
of
statement
original
because
the element of truth prevails,
or
in the long run
each other.
counteract

false antecedent

is not

enough

that

certain number

drew

many

for the

may
proof of

For

theoryto

argument drawn

an

doctrine

No

man

by

the

is
use

truth and
two

falsehoods

consequent, it

true
or

error

theory to

show

to be

from

experimentally,
figmentof his imagina

of
consequences
to show that all its con
the

true.

are

II. VARIOUS
55. Basis

Therefore

verified them

be conclusive it is necessary

sequences

'.

true : e.g. New


of its consequences
are
conclusions from his theory of emissions con

cerningthe nature of lightand


yet the theoryitselfwas found
tion.

have

animals

conclusion,either

correct

the

Since

ton

No

animals.

are

false premissone

because
and

Therefore

animals.

are

of

KINDS

Classification.

"

OF

We

SYLLOGISM.

may

several
distinguish

syllogisms
accordingas we consider the form
and the matter
of syllogisms.The form of a syllogism
is its
mode
of arriving
at a consequence,
structure, its particular
apart
of the actual
from any consideration of the truth or falsity
premisses; its matter, or the material aspect of the syllogism,
is the propositions
it is made
up of, which are either true or
shall consider in
false. In the two following
subsections we
turn both these two pointsof view, oiform and of truth.
the
from
induction
differ essentially
does not
Scientific
syllogism. Analogy and example, which
logiciansusually
different kinds of

FORMAL

THE

CAUSE

OF

ORDER

LOGICAL

179

with induction, may also therefore be brought under


of the syllogism.Hence all forms of real reasoning
the method

connect

are,

as

shall

we

"

i.

as

form

phase or

some

see

of

generalconclusion
the syllogism.
a

from

of Syllogisms
accordingto
Classification

this section,

their Form

Regarded from the pointof view of structure or form, the


or
conditional,con
hypothetical
syllogismmay be categorical,
The last two kinds are reducible to
or
junctive,
disjunctive.
the hypothetical
and two complex syllogismsthe
syllogism,
and the dilemma
exclusive syllogism
elabora
are
respectively
forms.
tions of the categorical
and hypothetical
57. Varieties of the Categorical Syllogism. The syllogism
have hitherto spokenabout iscalled the categorical
we
syllogism,
because it contains premisseswhich
make
straightforward,
of
certain
modifica
It
statements.
allows,however,
categorical
tions in structure which give the various forms of reasoning
called by logicians
sorites and
the epicheirema,
polysyllogism,
56.

"

"

"

enthymeme.

epicheirema(cVl\tipu, I take in hand) accordingto


modern
terminology3a is a syllogismhaving one or both of its
premissesimmediatelyfollowed by a proof. A polysyllogism
is a series of syllogisms
that the conclusion of one
so connected
serves
as
a premissfor the next.
In pointof fact a polysyllogism
is usuallyabridgedinto the
of the
form called sorites (o-wpo?,
the predicate
a heap),where
firstproposition
of the series becomes the subjectof the second,
and so forth,until finally
the predicate
of the last conclusion
soul
is linked up with the first subject. Thus :
The human
forms abstract thoughts; beingscapableof forming abstract
thoughtsare spiritual
; spiritual
beingsare by their nature
incorruptible
incorruptible
; beingswhich are by their nature
be
cannot
be annihilated ; spiritual
beings which cannot
The

'

annihilated

immortal

are

therefore

the

human

soul

is

immortal '.
An

enthymeme is commonly put down

of the

inasmuch
syllogism

misses, which
'"

With

M.S.P."

is understood

Aristotle

tinguishedfrom
VOL.

as

II.

epicktirema means

^eal

it appears

instead
an

of

as

to lack

form
disguised
one

of its pre

being expressed. In

attempted demonstration'

one.

as

dis

LOGIC

i8o

sufficient to warrant

is not
this circumstance
reality
a
specialplace as a distinct

form

its having

of the

syllogism.With
Aristotle,however, it did mean
something reallydifferent,
which has onlya probableconclusion (70,i).
namely a syllogism
Rules

and

Nature

58.

the

of

Hypothetical Syllogism.

"

is one in which the major is a conditional


syllogism
hypothetical
E.g. If the soul is simple,it is incorruptible
proposition.
; but
'.
the soul is simple; therefore it is incorruptible
The major simplyaffirms a necessary connexion
between the
of the soul) and
what
is conditioned
condition
(simplicity
Granted
this necessary
connexion, the
(incorruptibility).
rest of the argument proceeds as
of
an
ordinarysyllogism,
which the minor is the antecedent of the conditional proposi
'

the conclusion

its consequent.
important feature of the hypotheticalsyllogismis in

tion and
The

premissis equivalentto an absolute affirma


If the soul is simpleit is incorruptible
tive proposition
: thus,
',
is equivalent to
All simplesouls are incorruptible
'. And as
is not convertible (41),
the two
a universal affirmative
proposition
followingrules for the hypothetical
syllogism
may be deduced :
the

This

major.

'

'

condition

the

(i) Affirm

conditioned

the

Londoner, you
fore you

propositionor
are

British.

consequent and you

or

-'

you are a Londoner, you


British.
Therefore
are
you

neither

case

is the

If you
are
Londoner.
There

"

conditioned

not

or

you

antecedent

But

may

proposition
you

are

'.

But

affirm

the

Londoner

affirm

'

British.

are

true

converse

are

must

you

the condition

deny

If

not

in

But

must

and

consequent

you
(2) Deny the

British '.

are

antecedent

or

without having to affirm the condition,


proposition
and deny the condition without having to deny the consequent.
matter
Note that (a)it may happen, owing to the particular
of the conditional proposition,
that the truth of the consequent
conditioned

involves that

the

between
'

if

'

antecedent

between

than
^'presumption

been
59.

of the

indicates that

connexion

tried

equal '. (b)The conjunction if

are

in the mind

express

'

E.g. If
'

its radii

ence

of the antecedent.

there

them, and
a

nqx^us

of necessary
Not

in this

strict inference.

it expresses rather
had
E.g. If this man

case

'

opinion'.
Disjunctive Syllogisms. A conjunctive

he
by ill-fortune,

Conjunctive and

figureis a circle,
does not always

depend
infrequently
consequent.
is only a partial,
or
a contingent

speaker a
and

'

would

be of another
"

FORMAL

THE

in which

is one
syllogism
i.e.

that if one

so

in London.

York

'.

Such

Therefore

argument

an

181

major is a conjunctive
proposition,
between
two
incompatibility
cases,

simultaneouslyin

were

ORDER

'

the other is thereby denied.

is affirmed

be

could not

LOGICAL

OF

the

positsan

which

one

CAUSE

London

and

New

E.g. You
York.

you could not have


is reducible to the

been

You
in New

hypothetical

laws.
syllogismand is subjectto the same
A
disjunctive
syllogismhas a disjunctivepropositionfor
its major, i.e. a propositionthat positsinstead of a simple
alternatives which
are
entirelyexhaustive.
incompatibility,
this form of syllogismrequiresthe observance
of the
Hence
followingrules : (i) The disjunctionposited in the major
the minor affirms one
of the
must
be exhaustive.
(2)When
of the disjunction,
the other member
members
members
or
For example :
must
be denied in the conclusion,and vice versa.
This act of swearing
All free acts are morallygood or bad.
is not morallybad ; therefore it is morallygood '. Or, It is
bad ; therefore it is not good'. Or, It is good ; therefore it
"

'

'

'

is not bad
The

60.

'.

'

It is not

good

; therefore it is bad

Syllogism is

Exclusive

in which

one

'.

both

premisses

'

exclusive

propositions.E.g. Only spiritual


beings are
alone
is free '.
Therefore man
alone is spiritual.
This syllogismmay
be splitup into two
one
propositions,
negativeand one affirmative : Spiritual
beingsare free. Man
is spiritual.
is free. All free beings are
Therefore
man
not spiritual.
There
are
spiritual.All beingsother than men

are

free.

Man

'

"

fore

they

61. The

tion

as

minor.

are

not

free '.
is

Dilemma

major

with

two

combination
or

of

disjunctiveproposi

conditional

more

First the

as
propositions
are
disjunction

of the
members
particular
excluded
by successive partialconclusions ; whereupon the
as
a
generalconclusion follows that the disjunctive
proposition
whole is inadmissible.
It is a livelyand
of
effective form
argument : the adversaryis left to choose one of two alterna
tive propositions
he chooses he is proved to be
and whichever
The validity
of the argument requiresthe observance
wrong.
of the rules applyingto disjunctive
and to hypothetical
syllo
to
such
members
of
be
allow
the major must
as
gisms : (i)The
of no other possibility,
they must be exhaustive or complete'.
which make
(2)The two hypothetical
syllogisms
up the minor
'

must

each

lead to

conclusion

and

to

one

and

the

same

con-

LOGIC

i82

that in

suppose

God, we

forced to accept one

are

sions that
Him

He

to have

wisdom

was

fool

been

fool

reconcile

His

renunciation

Jesus Christ

both

Since

istherefore

tallyreducible

ambitious

most

be
easily

can

can

shown
to the

the

conclu
impossible
But

impostor.

an

if

reconcile the

we

doctrine with

life and

madman

or

or

other of the

or

fool,how

displayedin His

istics of

It

'

example of the dilemma is this : If we


spiteof His own attestations Jesus Christ is not

A celebrated

elusion.

If He

suppose

penetrating

the character

impostor,how
His humility and

was

claims

we

an

with

alike inadmissible,

hypothesesare

Messiah,the Son of the LivingGod'33.

fundamen
are
syllogisms
or
typicalsyllogism.
categorical
that the

above

" 2. Classification
of Syllogisms
accordingto their Matter
The

62.

of view

its Truth-

and

Syllogism

value.

"

From

the

point

divided accordingto the rela


are
syllogisms
tion their propositions
bear to truth.
As judgments and pro
positionsare certain, probable or erroneous,
syllogismsare
likewise demonstrative, probableor erroneous.
1. A
judgment is certain when the mind firmlyadheres to
what
it knows
to be the truth : the syllogism
leadingto this
of matter,

certitude is
2.

site

demonstration.

longas the mind remains undecided between two oppo


adhering to either of them,
judgments without definitely
As

it is in suspense
though without

other, it has

opinionis
tion

the

to

doubt.

or

When

it is inclined towards

absolutely
adoptingit to the

one

exclusion

side,
of the

opinion: the syllogismwhich results in an


varies in propor
probableone, and its probability
of the motives
which solicit this partial
cogency
an

of the mind.

adherence
3. The
with the
called
The
ments

oppositeof truth, the disagreementof a judgment


thing known, is error, and arguments producingit are
sophisms or fallacies.
various
of demonstration
kinds
and
probableargu
well as the more
call for closer
as
common
fallacies

attention.

88

The

dilemma

must

parts,'which
pronouncing upon each

successive
the

conclusion

which

was

'

reasoning by
consists
in enumerating all the species of a genus,
of them
in turn and then assertingof the whole
genus
not

valid

be

confused

for each

with

method

of the parts.

of

KINDS

DIFFERENT

tific Demonstration.

at

premissesthat

from

which

by

In

certain conclusion.

into Certain

Demonstration

"

are

183

ORDER

DEMONSTRATION

OF

Division

I. Fundamental

63.

LOGICAL

OF

CAUSE

FORMAL

THE

is

and

StrictlyScien

process of reasoning
arrive logically
certain we

stricter

it is

sense

syllogism

'

know, i.e. to know

the cause
we
givesus
that this cause
is really
and that
the cause
of a thing,to know
it 84.
be otherwise than we
know
therefore the thing cannot

that

to know

which

'

syllogismwhich leads to a certain


conclusion.
scientific
givesa strictly
64. Conditions

for

and

conclusion

Demonstration.

Scientific

"

which

that

In

dealing

Aristotle enumerates

of scientificdemonstration

with the nature

the demonstrative

be between

first distinction,
then, must

Our

be true, ultimate,
conditions, that the premissesmust
immediate, better known than, and priorto, the conclusion, and
the

as

the

cause

True

1.

lowed

by

be the

of its truth.

reason

or

arrive at

to

will set out from true

a valid demonstration
premisses,

natural

not

demonstrable, in the

themselves

strations of

admit
are,

3.
not

to form

science have

first link of which

true

premisses

for its true conclusion.

source

Ultimate,that is,partakingof the

2.

from

conclusion

true

never

Since it is the aim

of the truth in the conclusion.

cause

of demonstration

as

be fol

although false premissesmay sometimes


their falsity,
true conclusion (54),
as
such, can

consists of

of demonstration.
in
consequently,

as

that

sense

it

were

premissesthat

These

ultimate,

relation to those which

Immediate, of such

nature

of firstprinciples,

nature

that

all the demon

singlechain, the

do not

themselves

first,premisses

or

follow"

they

are

Self-evident,

requiringany proof.

4. The cause
order or
logical

or

the

35

reason

of

of

order

the

conclusion,not

knowledge,but

only in

also in the

the

onto-

order.
logical
since the
5. Prior to the conclusion,
of the conclusion.
the cause
or
reason

premissesmust contain
need be
The priority

of nature.
only a priority
6. Better

known

reasoningis to
84

ARISTOTLE,

31

For

lead
Anal,

this distinction

than
us

from

post., I,
see

the

conclusion, because

the better known

2.

Gen.

Metaphysics,165.

the

aim

of

to the less known

LOGIC

184

theoryof Aristotle's has reference


to the ontological
order.
In the subjective
order the fact of
is priorto the idea of its essence
form by abstrac
we
experience
to the universal.
tion from it ; we
the particular
pass from
But in the world of reality
the nature of a thingis priorto its
sensible manifestations, law controls what
happens and is
necessary for its explanation.
65. Proof of Fact and Causal Demonstration.
Corresponding
the syllogism
to the fundamental
distinction between
leading
to a certain conclusion
scientific demonstration
and strictly
is the Aristotelian division into proofof fact and causal demon
or

unknown.

that this

Note

"

stration.
The

former, demonstration
'

'

on,

'

demonstratio

quia or quod
'),is a proof that

'

that ',not
because
(where quia signifies
something is, without any explanationhow
is Cajetan understands
The
to have both
existential signification.
'

Causal
the other

so.

copulativeand

demonstration, Sid", demonstratio propter quid, on


hand, shows the immediate

the intrinsic

and

it is

why

or

'

on
(dpxn oiicaa)

reason

cause

of the

thingproved,

of which

account

it is so ;

it is therefore

scientificdemonstration.
strictly
A proofwhich givesan extrinsic or a general
reason
the connexion
between
subjectand predicateis
demonstration
Sid", propter quid,but belongsto
proofsof fact.
66. II. A

which

Priori

and

Posteriori

Proofs.

"

to

not

explain
a

real

the class of

distinction,

This

modern

logicians
preferto use in place of the one we
have justbeen considering,
is not such a strict one, yet has a
An a prioriargument is one
foundation
in nature.
in which
the middle term is priorin reality
of the con
to the predicate
or
clusion,one which proceedsfrom the cause
reason
(a causa
vel ratione quae in se est prior,a priori)
to effect or result (ad
effectum vel rationatum). In an
a
posteriori
argument the
Examples
progress is just the reverse, beingfrom effect to cause
An
immaterial
are
: of the a priori
subjectis incorruptible.
The human
'.
soul is immaterial.
Therefore it is incorruptible
.

'

"

Of the
demands
The

argument
posteriori
a

cause

other than

universe is such that at

Therefore there is
universe '.

cause

'
"

Whatever

commences

itselfto account
some

for its existence.

time it commenced

accountable

to exist

to exist.

for the existence of the

To this division

OF

CAUSE

FORMAL

THE

demonstration

prioriproof or

with

they

term

quasi a

an
They mean
one
thing from

about

is not

which

another

185

ORDER

simultaneo.

derives its conclusion

argument which
its connexion

what

add

authors

some

LOGICAL

distinct from

it in

be conceived of in thought
but is such that it cannot
reality,
An example is the
the thoughtof the other.
without involving
of in endeavouringto prove
made
use
argument St. Anselm
the existence of God from the concept of the most
perfect
being.
67.

III. Circular

Demonstration.

Regressive

or

Reason

"

to
again from cause
This
effect,in order to explain the latter by the former.
circular or regressive
as
proof,for the mind
process is known
it were
as
completesa circle by coming back to the effect from
it started its reasonings.This argument, unlike the
whence
existence
valid ; the undoubted
vicious circle(75,
26),is perfectly
is as
but its nature
of the phenomenon
is the starting-point
confusedly
; in the second
part of the process
yet only known
of the thing but only after it
the mind starts from the nature
distinct notion of it ; the latter is then used
has acquireda more
at first.
to explainthe effects observed

from

ascends

68. IV.

effect to

Accidental

Other

indirect demonstration

and

to extrinsic circumstances

is direct

monstration

descend

to

cause

of Demonstration.

Forms

This

than

to

is

the

i.

"

distinction due
of

nature

Direct
rather

things. De
it

(likeall those yet enumerated) when

straightforward
way that the conclusion
is virtually
contained in the premisses. It is indirect when
is
assent
considerations are appealedto and positive
subjective
givento the truth of the conclusion on account of the necessity
of rejectingits contradictory.Free-will is thus indirectly
This
of determinism.
proved from the absurd consequences
is called reductio per impossibile
latter kind of demonstration
shows

or

in

clear and

reductio ad absurdum.
2.

Absolute demonstration

is that

which

adequate of itself

is

is true for everybody ; relative or


carry conviction and
ad hominem
that which may be materially
false but is sufficient
to

to convince

opponent36.
particular

3. In contrast
demon siratio
88

E.g.

Our

Aristotle mentions

to scientificdemonstration
a

Lord's

is

signo or per signum, which


reply

to

those

who

censured

for

Him

his
Sabbath
by asking which of them would not rescue
bath.
For other examples see JOSEPH., op. cit.,p. 550.
"

ox

or

TRS.

extrinsic

an

healing on
ass

on

the

the
Sab

186

LOGIC

from

proof drawn
proved. An
below

circumstances

external

of this kind

example

to

the

of extrinsic

thing to
proof

be

occurs

(71).

These
all be

accidental

can
secondary forms of demonstration
classified accordingto the fundamental
distinction of

demonstrations

"m

or

and

demonstrations

PROBABLE
69. Probable

ARGUMENTS
for

have

Arguments

Ston.

one

or

both

premisses

and a conclusion which in conse


only probablepropositions
quence is only as certain as the premisses. For a classification
first heading all that falls under the
a
we
may
group under
generalterm arguments from analogy the Aristotelian enthyinduction,example,and inferences drawn from
analogical
meme,
the calculus ofprobabilities
; under a second heading,hypothesis;
"

under
70.

third,argument from authority.


I. Arguments from Analogy.
i. The
a

"

argument drawn from probabili


say, from signsor symptoms which are

to Aristotle's definition is

ties or

'

signs

; that is to

enthymeme according

'

an

regarded as properties
inevitably
belongingto the subject
to which
they are attributed,but probably do belong. This
in daily life. E.g.
kind of argument is extremely common
in this par
Most
act through self-interest. Therefore
men
ticular case
Peter is actingthrough self-interest'.
not

'

2.
we

Analogicalinduction or analogy:
shall see later (85-91),
singlesout

from

the many

among

various accidents

Scientific induction, as
some
a

natural
substance

property
manifests,

that the property in question


certainty
is the basis of a generallaw.
Analogicalinduction or analogy
is a similar method
of argument, excepting
that the conclusion
is not certain but only probable. Thus
are
we
making use
of it when
we
argue from the knowledge that two objectsor
to the
in common
phenomena have actuallycertain qualities
in common
other qualities
likelihood of their also possessing
it infers with

and

from

not

yet known.
abuse

to

by

by

This argument, it should be noted, is liable


resemblances
between
things being exaggerated,

differences

taken
3.

from

for valid

being overlooked,

grounds of

or

mis

by metaphors being

inference.

induction
Example : Both scientific and analogical
an
empiricalfact to its natural sufficient reason,

work
or

its

THE

law, and

thence

OF

CAUSE

FORMAL

LOGICAL

ORDER

187

the

that the law


logicalgeneralization
appliesuniversally.Example, on the other hand, is a form
of argument which proceedsfrom a particular
to a par
case
ticular case
and
advances
never
beyond a conjecture: e.g.
'

Avarice

has

it in that

to

this effect in the

case

of A, therefore it will have

of B '.

and
Inferencesdrawn from the calculation of probabilities,
Hypothesis (II)are deferred for consideration later (92).
4.

71.

III.

Argument

from

numberless

In

Authority.
"

in

cases

dailylife we allow ourselves to be guided by the opinionsand


knowledge of other people; in a word, we assent to arguments
from authority.
A statement
made
we
by another whom
regard as having
fact or a
some
a
degree of authority,whether it concern
values a probability
doctrine, is in the scale of logical
; for it
is not without
and

that

reason

of
sincerity

fidence in such

the
a

we

incline to

testimony of

statement,

if

we

put

faith in the accuracy

fellow-men.

our

follow

the

Yet

laws

of

con

right

be

we
regardedas absolute. Even one whom
esteem for his prudence and observation of facts may
be caught
napping at times, perhaps on this very occasion, or one of
well-known
sinceritymay
possibly on occasion be found
untruthful and deceiving. Whilst, then, the argument from
authorityhas its value accordingto the circumstances of each
particularoccasion,human
testimonyof its very nature cannot
which is absolute.
begeta certainty
In matters
does not hesitate
bearingon doctrine St. Thomas
to declare that the argument based on human
authorityis the

cannot

reason,

of

weakest
fundatur
These
minds

all

super

words

'

Locus
ab
auctoritate, quae
arguments :
ratione humana, est infirmissimus '.

contain

who

valuable

that

imagine
cation of personalreasoningin
authority.
ERRONEOUS
72. False

matter, of
when

and

an

argument

premissesthat
certain ; to the

Scholasticism

ARGUMENTS

Reasoning.

for those

answer

favour

stands
of

AND

superficial

for the

blind

abdi

followingof

FALLACIES

be due to the grounds,or


may
It is due to the grounds
to its form.

Error

"

or

supposed as true
or unconsciously,
form when, consciously
are

false

or

doubtful

are

LOGIC

i88

is drawn

conclusion

from

premisseswhich

the

does not

logic
case
allyfollow from
reasoning
should be called erroneous
argument, and in the latter a. fallacy.
is deceiving
is a paralogismif the reasoner
Further, a fallacy
of the term,
himself,and a sophism,in the presentacceptation
to deceive another.
when
he is consciously
reasoningfalsely
in General."
73. Fallacies
Following John Stuart Mill we
fallacies into two main groups.
classify
may
fallacies : These
Fallacies of simph inspection
1.
or
a priori
and generalizations
which
fallacies are
are
popular maxims
taken
for granted,usuallywithout
discussion and therefore
at least ambiguous if not
and which are
without
suspicion,
that ideas correspond
An example is the principle
erroneous.
the logical
to the ontological
to things,
order
a preconception
of the chief supports of pantheism. Again,
which becomes
one
the fallacyby which
rationalism endeavours
to substantiate
its denial of revelation,namely, the a priori
of one
repudiation
of attainingknowledge along with
methods
the
or
more
a

In the former

them.

the false

"

assertion that whatever

simultaneous

Fallacies

itself:
and

in

known

an

arbi

is

trarilyselected way
statement
unqualified
liberty.
2.

is not

Or, again,the
entirelyunknowable.
that man
has the rightto unrestrained

of inferenceor fallacies in

the

reasoningprocess

These

themselves
into fallacies of induction
arrange
fallacies of deduction, the latter comprising verbal and

formal fallacies.
74.

of Induction.

I. Fallacies

placed all

fallacies

Under

"

this

to be

heading are

occurring in inductive

reasoning whether
of the argument
preliminaries

they are concerned with the


of observation)
with the actual reasoningprocess
or
(fallacies
of generalization,
itself (fallacies
viz. of interpretation
and of
illicitinduction)
.

i.

must

Fallacies
be

of facts ;

conclusion

the

of observation
fruit of

For

induction

trustworthyand

to

be scientificit

sustained

observation

a
very often it happens that the desire to reach
leads to assertions which trespassbeyond the limits

justified
by

observation.

observation,
by seeingwhat

Induction
is wished

may

be vitiated

for,not what

is as

by
a

matter

Haeckel
discovered his primary moners
:
so
reality
Huxley his famous Bathybius. Or by non-observation,by

of

failure to

see

what

it would

be inconvenient

to see

mat-

and
the

thus false

THE

OF

CAUSE

FORMAL

LOGICAL

ORDER

189

theories see only what pointsto the identity


of the
biological
cellin all kingdoms of life.
These
consist in a wrong
:
2. Fallacies
of interpretation
of the facts observed.
The observation is per
interpretation
fect, but through the influence of some
preconceivedtheory
is
undue
attached
to
facts. An instance
the
an
significance
in point is the inference,from the fact that forms of energy
energy, that all material
includingenergiesdeveloped in a nervous
energies,
subject
be reckoned

can

of mechanical

in terms

the

accompaniment of sensation,emotion, or spontaneous


or of the thoughtprocesses and volition,
are nothing
movement,
but mechanical
energies.
when
3. Fallacies of illicitinduction : Example is abused
under observation to another
case
we
pass on from a particular
without first having taken care
inductive
to discover by an
be traced back to the same
natural
argument that they can
as

cause,

'

Ab

uno

'. In

omnes

similar way

false use

may

analogy37.

of

be made

disce

75. II. Fallacies

arise from

the

of Deduction.

meaning

of

it

"

Verbal

i.

fallacies.These

being altered from what


being used in different senses.

word

words
was
or from
originally
The most
importantare :"
is the
This fallacy
or
(a)Equivocation
ambiguityof terms.
in a syllogism
of a word which has a double meaning or the
use
employment of some
badly defined phrase in two different
',
acceptations.Flagrantoffenders are such words as liberty
', evolution ', rationalism ', liberalism ', socialism '.
equality
The ambiguity introduces a fourth term into the syllogism.
(b) The fallacyof composition.This consists in taking
'

'

'

'

together in the conclusion


the

premisses;

whole

what

'

'

what

not

was

taken

together in

of the
affirming
parts taken distributively.

in other words, this consists in

is true

only of the
Gospel records that

the
Thus, when
walk, the deaf hear ',the statement

blind see, the lame


is true only if the clauses
'

The

understood

not if collectively.
disjunctively,
(c)The fallacy
ofdivision is justthe oppositeof the preceding
what
and consists in predicating
of thingsdistributively
fallacy,
is true of them onlywhen taken together. Thus I might argue,

are

87

Some

headings.

inductive

fallacies

can

be

under
ranged indifferently

several of the

LOGIC

igo
'

is

Five

But

singlenumber.

two

and three

five.

are

There

38.
singlenumber
2. Fallacies of ratiocination : (a)Begging the question(petitio
principii).This is a fallacywherein something yet unproved
in the course
is implicitly
of the argument as though it
assumed
were
alreadyproved. It may take different forms : the very point
be assumed
at issue may
be taken for granted; the whole may
whereas
the whole
a
part has to be proved ; or a part when
requiresproof; or each of the parts of the whole to be proved ;
it may be some
connected
with
or
pointof doctrine necessarily
the pointat issue.
(b)Vicious circleis reallythe same
fallacy,
except that it not
of unproven
what is to be proved but makes
use
only assumes
Thus did Descartes
for the proof of each other.
propositions
the Divine Veracityby an
appeal to self-evidence and
prove
then justify
self-evidence by the Divine Veracity.
(c)Fallacyofaccident consists in confusing(a)what is accidental
what is relatively
with what is essential,
true with what is
or
(/3)
true, for instance,absolutely
absolutely
condemning a practice
because of the abuses to which it givesrise.
concomitance
or
(d) Fallacy of false cause,
(a)Here mere
fore two

'

and three

are

"

succession

for true

is mistaken

causal relation

propter hoc, oiposthoc,ergo propterhoc


for identity
: cum
hoc, ergo ipsum hoc.

fallacyof confusingcondition

and

hoc, ergo

cum

again,concomitance
Akin to this is the
(ft)
and
or
a partial
cause

or

cause,

the total cause.

of many
questionsis the combination
if only one
would suffice,whereas
answer
in reality
more
are
required. Thus if it is asked : Has the
honourable
gentleman ceased beatinghis wife ? the question
he been
to a
Has
impliesan answer
previousquestion:

(e)Fallacy of many
questionstogetheras

'

'

'

beating his wife ?


(/)Evasion of
much,

too

the

question (ignoratioelenchi).This

real

of three

be

fallacymay

'

kinds

little,
or
something

the

argument

may
irrelevant
and
quite

prove too
beside the

point39.
88

Caius
88

E.g.
loves
To

is for those

Heaven

his friends.

this

list of

common

dictum

speaking

it is

itself may

be either true

the

first of which

alone

who

and

forgivetheir

Caius

enemies.

will go to Heaven
'. TRS.
fallacies may
be added
the paradox.

contrary
or

their friends

love

Therefore

false.

to

There

"

Strictly
in
and
d"5"tav),
opinion (irapb.
accordingly two kinds of paradox,

received
are

strictlydeserves

the

name.

Thus

the

statement

FORMAL

THE

ART.
76.

is

Knowledge

System.

ORDER

191

SYSTEMATIZATION

SCIENTIFIC

III.

LOGICAL

OF

CAUSE

"

The

construction

of

know

our

gradual process : concepts are united


to form
judgments ; judgments are marshalled into syllogisms;
furnish new
conclusions,fresh piecesof knowledge,
syllogisms
fragments of a largerwhole ; all the several inferences,sub
ordinated and co-ordinated among
themselves, togetherform a
which
science. A science is,then, a whole body of propositions
stand together (o-wrny/xa,
a
system) onjDne basis. Its unity
of its having one formal object.
belongsto it by reason
ledge is

As

the

soon

of

work

as

have

we

the definition of the

of the

or

essence

of a thing,we begin to make


some
simple,general
properties
known
as
(= beginnings)or axioms,
propositions,
principles
and from these the mind proceedsto deduce various conclusions.

primaryconclusions lead on to others, which


quently either directlyor indirectlydependent

These

conse

are

the
upon
completescientificedifice

and so on, until we have a


principles,
firstfurnished by the
constructed upon the principles
entirely
of our knowledge
analysisof the subject.This systematization
is the supreme
end or aim of logic.
77.

Systematization of

factors which
'

modi

tres

go to form
'

sciendi

us

There

"

of
systematization

us

with

conclusions

to

on

Knowledge.

from

As

them.

division.

and

principles
; and

three

are

knowledge,

our

definition,demonstration

"

furnishes
Definition
carries

our

demonstration
definition has

thingis and to show us in what it differs from


thingsof another speciesof the same
genus, a differentiation or
of definition.
aid or concomitant
division is an indispensable
of these three
We
of one
have alreadyspoken sufficiently
to tell us

what

factors, viz. demonstration.

only

functions

the

We

have

of definition and

ditions

requiredfor
shall inquirehow

their lawful

therefore

to

division and

employment (I).

consider
the

After

con

this

processes have an
applicationin the several specialsciences and in philosophy,
i.e.we shall consider method in generaland the different methods
we

these

factors

or

mental

peculiarto different groups of sciences (II).


'

All

minds

better

to

reality.
"

stands

equal

are

'

(a

suffer evil than


In

for

loose

mere

sense,

statement
to do it ' is
which

perversity of

of Helvetius) is

real

paradox

;
not

'

Far

in
so
only prima faciea paradox, and
is of no importance here, paradox sometimes
expression or a cynicism born of ill-humour*

LOGIC

I92
I. FACTORS

IN

78. I. Definition.
what

SYSTEMATIZATION

THE

definition of

"

Definition has

it is.

thingis

twofold

KNOWLEDGE

OF

function

of

statement

inasmuch

as, in

ideas for us, it states the elements


of which they are made
know
can
things more
up so that we
function,it provides
accurately
by them ; and, as its principal
the first place,
it clears

foundation

thing is
and

but

further

knowledge

everythingis demonstrable, so not every


of further analysis
Analysisis susceptible

definable.

on,

so

which

on
starting-point

or

be built up.
Now
justas not

can

our

later

or

sooner

get down

we

which

notions

to

analysisinto simpler ideas : such, for


instance, are the ideas of unity', number', the basic ideas
These
ideas provide the materials for the
of arithmetic.
definitions or first principles
whereon
the construction of the
refuse

submit

to

to

'

'

Kinds

79.

meaning
ing
in

Real

its

either

word

ideas and

our

to

of

of Definition.

its conventional

to

2.

40.

science rests for its foundation

whole

or

explainsthe
definition
its etymology or accord

Its purpose

use.

declares
definition

essence

Verbal

accordingto

avoid the

so

i.

"

us

clear

of ambiguity.
possibility
what
a thing is,either according

of its accidents

some

is to make

or

of its natural

some

properties.
gives a full statement
(a) Essential definition
is inasmuch
The

essence

it makes

as

of

ideas

are

hope

to know

all others, is however

universal

and

must

or

thing

essence.

it is this

thing

individual,whilst

89-91);
(Psychology,

this essence,

definitions with

its inner nature

particular
thing,that whereby

distinct from

and

known

of what

we

can

be content

therefore
in

our

our

never

essential

essence
declaringthe genericor specific

of

thing.
(b)Accidental
essence
specific,

As the generic,and still less the


definition:
of a thingis not evident to us at once, we take
note first of its qualities,
regardlessof whether they are natural
be called,
or
accidental, and this general descriptionmay
definition '.
though somewhat
inaccurately,a
descriptive
'

'

40

beginnings or principlesof the sciences are improvable definitions.


what
makes
known
something is ; thus mathematics
postulates
means,
starting-pointa knowledge of what unity is,of what odd number
The

Definition
as

and

its
so

on

'."ARISTOTLE,

Analyt. post.,II, 3.

which

notes

LOGICAL

representsthe thingby

it

When

OF

CAUSE

FORMAL

THE

taken

as

ORDER

193

of all the accidental

means

belongonly to it,it is called

group

definition.

accidental

the mind
these qualities
From
:
(c)Natural definition
which
by a process of induction, discover one or more
and the definition is
i.e.properties;
qualities,
necessary
a

an

can,
are

then

natural definition.
definitions

The

zoology,etc., are
definitions,or

best

the

natural

is formed

80. Definition

which

Synthesis. A science is rational


its principles
are furnished by pure
observation.

In

of fact

The

Analysis

experimentalaccording
reasoningor by induction

or

rational science definition is obtained

deductive
synthetic,

seldom

we

is strictly
scientific

process, whilst in
science the process is first of all analyticand
Let us explain.

by

Essential

by Analysis or by Combined

"

from

definitions.

in matter

ideal to which

an

reallyit is the only one


philosophical.

and

as

chemistry,mineralogy,botany,
most
accidental
part descriptive,

Yet

attain.

and

for the

at

definition is rather

in

used

rational sciences:

experimental
synthetic.

an

then

sensible data

From

presented to
us
by generalobservation we abstract very simple ideas (de
which we immediatelyproceed to put together
composition),
i.

and build into more


and more
(synthesis)
complex ideas. The
elementaryideas are wider in their extension than the notion
in which they are all united by the act of synthesis,
their sum
is more
restricted in itsapplication
than iseach of them individu
restricts its objectand pro
ally; thus synthesis
progressively
vides it with a definition
a
(opos6/3107x05,
boundary). Take,
for example, the definition
Three is the first odd number
'.
Each
of the simple ideas belongs to other numbers
besides
three ',but the union of them narrows
down their application
'

'

to the

of
is

'

number

three

'

and

thus defines it.

the extension

As

concept is restricted in proportionas its comprehension


notes is
fuller,
synthesisor the binding together of many
a

therefore

direct process of definition,


justas, we may remark
it is an indirect method
of elimination or division.
incidentally,
The

attribute

'

odd

'

excludes the number


taken
out

in its double

all other numbers

being the oppositeof the attribute


'

two

'. The

meaning

word
'

of

except ng

'

'

first
'

first
two

'

and

'

which

"

'

prime

and^'three

'.

'

',

even

may
'
"

be
rules

Hence

LOGIC

194

combined

when
other

than
is

concept

three ', they

'

firstodd

apply

exclude

all numbers

it alone ; the

to

compound

adequate definition of it.

an

sciences or sciences of observation like


experimental
but only after analysis.
as a final process
employ synthesis
The

2.

wise

Before
of

'

'

the attributes

define life we

can

we

'

being called
of which

virtue

We

all.

ourselves

they

are

left with

all immanent

abled

the

"

tinue

and

the

differences
'

vital

'

is in

them
there

(nutrition,

and
intellectual)

or

characteristic

common

of

distinctive features

definition of the

this definition will start another

began,

predicatedof

term

we

that

what

we

that

"

Im

the definition of life.

elimination

form

to

us

be

can

kinds

operations(Psychology,10, 11).

is therefore
activity

Division

find out

sentient

their

the various

whatever

thought

volition,whether

find

manent

try to

which
operations

the

cognitionand

in

to

attribute

same

eliminate

be among

may

living',and
the

to observe

have

has

"

element.

common

division from

where

en

Now,

the

analysis

For instance, to con


the process is renewed.
characteristic of life,viz.
example, the common
so

different in
action, is discovered to be specifically
and volitional lifewhether sentient
nutritive life,
in cognitional

immanent

or

intellectual.
to the

genus

Science

are

directions.

forms

from

the

species.

This alternation of
in other

legitimately
passes again

be continued

and synthesis
analysis
may
Besides forms

of transitive

of immanent

activity
;

from

there
activity

these

the

mind

ab

activity
; this is the
character
is a differentiating
genericelement, and immanence
of the two characteristics
istic : the placing
together(synthesis)
stracts

the
(analysis)

makes

the

that

are

definition,the

related

tracks down

"

combination

of the

In this way
genus and differentia.
through all these speciesa genus which
so

eventually elements

type that is
are

reached

analysis,and which therefore are


formative principles
of all sciences.
The fundamental
part played by
edifice is clear.

notions

two

analysis

as

wide, and
increasingly
until

feature

common

and

more

which

becomes

more

defy

simple,
further

first definitions and

the

definition in the scientific

In the sciences of observation

no

less than

in

decompositionof
a thing through a graspingof its simplest
attributes, together
with their union or synthesis
with which it is to be identified.
the rational sciences definition consists in

THE

The

attribute

OF

CAUSE

FORMAL

which

determination

or

LOGICAL

ORDER

is the least

195

comprehen

the most extensive forms the


in consequence
of the definition ; that which completesthe

sive and
element

'

element, which

limits

'

is proper

concept, and

the

generic
generic
the

to

it,is the specific


difference.
thingand specifies
The buildingup of knowledge,scientific systematization,
the mind
end in view, namely, to make
has always the same
in the
effects by their causes, and consequences
understand
lightof their principles.
for Definition.

81. Rules

arrangedunder

heads

two

"

be
rules for definition may
to the twofold func
corresponding
The

above

tion of definition mentioned

Since the essential function of definition is to furnish the

1.

proceedfrom

of the sciences,
firstprinciples
(a)a definition must

objectwhich

an

'

is
'

that defined

'

and

sickness ',may
the definition of each other, for the

such

as

health

priorto

not
one

correlative terms,
therefore be used in

is

the various members


the other ; neither can
be used in the definition of one another ; nor

of

as

defined

by

itself or

genus made

by

be the

of must

use

Since definition has

2.

in
precise

our

is

what

as

ambiguousand obscure
in its expression.

words

and

division

division

to

make

us

thing
of the thingto
repeat the name
composed of metaphoricalor of
; it must be concise and adequate

82^11. Division, the Necessary


Definition

thingbe
itself, (b)The
can

to
posterior
proximategenus.
secondarypurpose

ideas,a definition must

defined ; hence it must


never
be defined; it must
not be

unknown

much

as

are

be clearer than the

of Definition."

Concomitant

two

mutually complementary

logical
processes. While definition informs us what a thing is,
and by naming itsgenus and specific
difference identifiesit with
the simpleelements making up its essence, division makes clear
how far,or to what special
forms, the genericelement of the
definition extends.
'

tion

or

'

reason

of

The
a

genus

of the definition is the founda

division.

genericnotion
at each step
species,

In the rational sciences reason

I.

starts with

and

proceedsgraduallyto recount its


making a new division or subdivision of the genus into its
notion
num
different subordinate species.Thus the generic
The idea
even/
ber
and
is divided into the species odd
'

'

'

odd

'

'

number

M .8.P." VOL.

II.

'

'

is further subdivisible into

'

factorizable

'

and
O

LOGIC

196
'

'

'

'

('prime in both senses)


prime '. And the firstodd number
three '.
appliesonly to the number
sciences the process is justthe opposite,
it
2. In the positive
here division leads up to definition. For
is first analytical
:
animal
instance, first of all the different activities of vegetable,
'

and

to

common

observed, and the characteristic


these several divisions discerned,namely,immanent
substances

human

activity.The
analysed,and

are

different kinds

two

their

of

are
activity

foundation

common

or

in their turn

supreme

is

genus

activity.Thus step by step reason


passes
from
of a division
the speciesto genera, from
the members
of their divisibility.
to the reason
When, however, the common
has been reached, the mind reverts
again to the sub
principle
jectsanalysedin order to obtain a completesyntheticview of
the formal division of the genus into its species.
Definition and division are, then, intimately
bound
up with
In rational sciences division is subsequent to
each other.
there is first a superficial
definition ; in experimentalones
division leadingup to the formation of the essential definition,
and then this definition becomes
ground for a stricter,formal
division than the provisional
informal
with which
the
one
analysisbegan.
discovered

83. Rules
serve

ing

be

to

Division.

for

"

Division, like definition,has

to

double purpose
is to helpin establish
: its chief purpose
scientific orderliness in our
knowledge, and its secondary
a

to make
purpose
of view, to aid

clear

thinkingeasier.

From

the first

point

scientific arrangement,

be
(i) division must
and, as far as possible,
logically
progressive
complete,
positive.
And to be a real help to clear thinking,
it needs to be (2)com
clear and methodical 41.
plete,

II. METHOD
84.

Diversity of
'

means

road

Scientific
towards

or

way
leading to scientific knowledge.
the

science to

which

sometimes
synthetic,
41

We

to make

may
too

too little

add, from
few

the Port
the

is

accordinglysometimes

rather

we

Royal logicians,
that,

say that the

may
'

it is

it is to make
too many
; the
other is to distract the mind
'.
as

(/xefoSos)

method is the way


; scientific
of
It varies with the nature

and

analytic.Or

divisions

light,whilst

it leads

Method

Methods."
'

one

as

great

mistake

fault is to throw

THE

ORDER

197
of both

42.
synthetic
analytico-

This

of the

section will treat

in (I)the
respectively

"

as

plesin

arithmetic
necessary

tion, deduce

new

different methods

employed
experimental

abstract sciences, (II)the

sciences,and (III)
philosophy.
The
85. I. Synthetic Method.
such

LOGICAL

of scientificknowledge is really
a combination

method
it is

OF

CAUSE

FORMAL

and

geometry,

matter, and
truths

rational

and

start

or

deductive sciences,

with

certain

princi

from
so

these, taken in conjunc


define, as they advance, the

of ideas is
The march
objectsunder consideration.
from simple to compound, from the more
general to the less
general; in a word, the method is synthetic.The mental act
the elements
also
which combines
expressedin the definition
time effects the division of the objectdefined and
at the same
is the chief factor in all deductive proof. As an example, let
of the angles
us
suppose as alreadyestablished that (a)the sum
side of a straight
line by other straight
lines is
made
on
one
equal to two rightangles; (b) the internal alternate angles
lines by a line cuttingthem are
made with two parallel
straight
straightline may be drawn to any given
equal ; (c)a parallel
straightline : the combination of these three propositions
furnishes the discoveryof a new
relation,the equalityof the
with two rightangles.
three anglesof a triangle
of the Experimental Sciences.
86. II. Method
The experi
sciences start with the observation of con
mental or positive

various

"

crete

The

facts in order to formulate


progress here is from

to the
particular

the

the laws which

complex

the method

them.
govern
from the
to the simple,

is

analytic.
variations displayedin the pheno
ftIn spiteof the numerous
of the natural world, it needs but a superficial
observa
mena
tion to show that these variations are governed by certain con
It is the objectof the empirical
sciences
stant generallaws.
to determine
these laws of phenomena and the nature of the
with
the observation
of
things observed.
They commence
facts at once
complex and variable,and end when they have
discovered the simple elements of their compositionand the
stable laws governing their variability.
This
method
of
The

general:

used in the building up of a science.


are
analytico-syntheticmethods
with
didactics
the methods
of imparting science
to
do
here
or
nothing
to others.
See large edition, Logique, I, p. 378 f.,and
P. COFFEY,
Science of
Logic, II, p. 14 f.
42

We

have

LOGIC

ig8

the complex, in other words, analysis,


when
simplifying
is called induction.
sidered in its completeness,
Hence
sciences

are

known

purelyrational

are

Stages

87.

inductive,in contrast

as

of the

or

deductive

from effects to their

ment

Induction

"

is

; it consists first in

cause

these
which

sciences.

Process.

Inductive

with those

con

of the cause, and through them


the properties
the law of its action is understood.
finally

an

argu

determining

its nature, until


It includes

four

separatesteps :

"

1.

Observation

of the

senses.

and under
gen

of certain facts which


For

example, the

varied circumstances

(H) combines

with another

fall within

chemist

that

fixed

the scope

observes

repeatedly
fixed quantityof hydro
quantityof chlorine (Cl)

compound, HC1.
scientist supposes that the observed
2. Hypothesis. The
of purely
phenomenon cannot be due to a constant repetition
fortuitous coincidences,and that therefore a sufficient
reason
of the reactingbodies.
lie in the nature
must
Accordingly
scientific
he makes
a
hypothesisas a provisional
explanation
to form

definite

of the facts observed


3. The

43.

of the hypothesis,
which
verification

is the

most

important part of the inductive argument, is sometimes made


decisive
by the more
by further observation, sometimes
process of experiment, (a)By observation : he considers what
his hypothesistrue and looks
would be the implications
were
to see if these results are actually
:
present, (b)By experiment
than witness what happens ; he may
the scientist does more
bring an active influence to bear upon phenomena ; he may
the various agents concurringto pro
vary by artificialmeans
them in accordance with
duce a complex phenomenon, directing
the

idea
preconceived

which

As soon
4. Deduction.
possessedby H and Cl. of

he set out to check.


the mind

the property
recognizes
of
combiningin the fixed proportions
its observations,
i and 35-5, it goes further and, after verifying
each time that H
draws the generalconclusion : Henceforth
in the proportionsi and 35-5 and subjected
and Cl are mixed
to the action of the
sun's rays hydrochloricacid will be
formed, accompanied by the disengagementof 22 calories the
molecule-gramme
as

43

For

COFFEY,

fuller treatment

op. cit.

of

hypothesissee

the

largerLogique, p. 345

f ., and

LOGICAL

ORDER

199

steps raise specialpointsfor consideration,

various

These

OF

CAUSE

FORMAL

THE

(i)In reference to the observation of facts and their verification


by experimentwe must describe the methods of induction. (2)
from the facts obtained by observa
made
The generalization
the real grounds
tion and experimentleads us to ask : What
are
of induction ?
(3)The deduction which is the final stage of
induction leads us to inquireinto the relations between deduc
tion and

induction.
of Induction.

88. Methods

the methods

usuallyenumerate
concomitant

Following J.

"

of

S. Mill

agreement,of

variations,of residues,and

logicians
of
difference,

jointmethod.

The

the

ones.
principal
1. Method
of Agreement: When the phenomenon the nature
in different cases
and each different
of which is in question
occurs
that circumstance
has only one
circumstance
in common,
case
of the phenomenon.
is probablythe sufficient reason
the phenomenon under
When
2. Method
:
of Difference
in one
of two cases
and not in the other,
occurs
investigation

first three

and

are

in both

all the.circumstances

cases

are

identical

save

one

which
present in the first and absent in the second, that
circumstance
is the total or partialsufficient reasonjjof
j the
is

phenomenon.
made up
3. Method ofResidues : This is a compound method
from a
When
modified.
of the two
precedingones
slightly
phenomenon that part is subtracted which is known by previous
inductions

to be

the

effect of certain antecedents, the residue

phenomenon is caused by the remainingantecedents.


the variations
of Concomitant Variations : When
4. Method
of a phenomenon correspondto the variations of a determinate
antecedent, it is to be presumed that the phenomenon and ante
effect and
cedent are connected, immediatelyor mediately,
as
of the

Mill observes that tin'smethod

cause.

where

the

happens

foregoingmethods

when

the

cause

are

of the

of

has its chief

no

in

use

cases

avail,as indeed mostly

phenomenon

be

cannot

com

isolated.
pletely

JointMethod
precedingmethods.
5.

89.

This is

Object of Induction.

fix the law of


cause

of the

derived

from

some

"

chemical

simultaneous

The

use

of

lead

experimentswhich

combination

of the

some

deal with

the

and
body, for they reveal its properties
the formal cause.
They also determine

us

to

formal

these

what

are

is

LOGIC

200

the material

of the chemical

cause

proportional quantitiesof the

fix the

They

may
tendencies

the

which

according to

as

the

they

elements.

component
of the

finalcause

also regard the

inasmuch

compound

combinations

combinations

or

take

place.
Nevertheless

be

the

particularobject of
of the train of observations
the purpose
is really
investigation
and the same, namely,to ascertain some
one
propertyof a being
and ultimatelythe law of
nature
and through this its specific
its activity.Inductive research, then, aims at the discovery
of causes
(proofof fact,on) or at what lies deeperthan this,the
discoveryof the laws of nature and the definition of natural
Sion).
types (demonstration
of Induction.
The problem connected
90. Logical Grounds
with induction
be stated thus : From
particularfacts
may
whatever

cause

"

formulates

induction

observed instances
what

on

ground

tion is found

is

by

cases),we
particular
a

are

nothing else

be

bodies which

that where

forces that

not in

than

and

the

differ from
reality

tive methods

we

observed
The

find

consider

variable

are

the

ever

solu

always
same
(a

experiment in all
in arguingthat there must
justified

the

be

union, and that this sufficient reason


natural

is to be found

Induction

certain

and

tendencyon

verified not

only but always and everywhere


91.

we

combination

observation

for this

reason
sufficient

can

and

harmonious

fact established

from

argue

instances yet to be
possible
such a procedure legitimate
?

of elements
form

we

to all

in the consideration

able number

unitingto

general law

as

Syllogism.
"

the

ascertain

in the

the

cases
particular

generallaw 44.

Scientific induction

syllogism.By
is the

what

part of

the

does

of the induc

means

of

cause

48

observed

an

methods, being reducible to


of the hypo
those of agreement and difference,
are
applications

phenomenon,
thetical
have

and

by the inductive
the presumed cause

syllogism.Again, when

established
is in truth

menon

inductive

these

the fact that


its real

that this is not

we

show

by

its nature

to

cause

indifferent

an

manifest

(which is a

certain

cause

methods
of

we

pheno
demonstration
6Vt),
but

property,to

determined

one

act

according

argument has already been developed in Critenology,63.


is no
of complete
question here of perfectinduction, or induction
is not a scientific method.
enumeration, which
Cp. Logique, 331 f and COFFEY,
Science of Logic, Vol. II, p. 48 f.
44

This

46

There

.,

THE
to

in

law.

FORMAL

Such

OF

CAUSE

LOGICAL

demonstration

ORDER

201

likewise be

may

expressed

syllogisms.
92. Statistics and

Induction.

"

aim

The

of scientificinduction

fixed law of
certaintythe existence of some
Now
nature.
frequentlyit may happen that we have before
of facts which though obviouslygoverned
us
a great multitude
at
by certain laws are yet so complex that the mind cannot
is to infer with

once

discern their various

note

down

all the

In other words,

tory

or

list of

we
a

the

facts and
draw

As

causes.

step forward

of facts wherein

great number

may

they display.

coincidences

statistics.Statistics form

up

we

an

inven

tabulate

we

accordingto their relative frequencyor coin


indication of a natural
some
hope of discovering

in classes

them

cidence in the
connexion.

sufficient

reason

for the

constant

recurrence

of these

phenomena undoubtedlyliesin the nature of the objects,


less know, which
but we may
much
not be able to conjecture,
natural properties
the key to the law as yet undiscovered 46.
are
this
When
the thoughtfulobserver is able to detect among
medley of facts which antecedents are constant (method of
and which
agreement),which exclusive (method of difference),
the variants of intensity,
he is then on the brink of knowledge :
he is able to form a scientific
and to verifythis
hypothesis,
by the work of induction.
93. III. Analytico-SyntheticMethod.
We usuallydistinguish
two
scientific methods, the syntheticof the rational sciences
and the analytic
of the experimentalsciences. The distinction
feature of
that synthesis
is the dominant
is valid in the sense
the first group and analysis
of the second ; but neither method
is employed exclusively
The first self-evident
in either group.
which the rational sciences are based necessarily
on
principles
preliminaryobservations ; on the other hand,
presuppose some
the results obtained in the positive
sciences by analysisand
induction prepare
the way
for later deductive
or
synthetic
All science indeed aims at the knowledge of things
processes.
Causal demonstration
through their causes.
(propterquid)
"

"

We

constancy

find
that

cases

in which

indicates

it is

law.

impossible

You

use

may
of a dozen

to
a

discover
die that

from
is

facts

the

perfect
"

any
its faces

casts 3 and 5 will each turn


up
three times, 2 and 4 twice, i and 6 only once.
The
probabilityof the recur
and yields
of contingentphenomena
be made
the subject of calculation
rence
can
its
value,
and
the
results.
For
calculus
of
logical
interesting
probabilities
Bernouilli's theorem
Poisson's
and
laws of numbers,
see
Logique, p. 352 f.

with

the usual

markings

to

"

and

LOGIC

202

strictlyscientific. The particularsciences which


contemplatenature under one or other of its several aspects
mechanics, chemistry,optics,etc. aim at reducing their
of mathematics
conclusions to terms
and metaphysics. In
then, there is one and one onlyscientificmethod, namely,
reality,
the analytico-synthetic,
inductive and deductive
the combined
is

alone

"

"

method.
94. Method

of

The

Philosophy.

analytico-synthetic
method
is that of all philosophical
speculation.Philosophy
is the science of beingin general,
of all being,
and therefore its
scope includes both the ideal order and the empiricalorder.
in order subsequently
Both of them it traverses first analytically
to combine
the results synthetically
and thus offer a rational
explanation. In this sense is to be read Aristotle's definition
alreadyquoted (Gen.Introduction,4) : philosophyis the science
of thingsthrough their ultimate causes,
or
again,the science
founded
In

on

each

"

the universal
of

its

order.

branches

physics philosophy avails


"

same

"

physics, mathematics,

itself of the

meta

inductive-deductive

method.

physicsof the ancients has been replacedto-dayby


cosmology and psychology. Cosmology working from the
results of the physical,
chemical
and mineralogical
sciences
at the general conclusions
arrives inductivly
that corporeal
substance is composed of matter and form and that it produces
certain distinctive activities. By these principles
philosophy
both
of corporealactivity
the nature
explainsdeductively
and
the varietyand stability
of the laws which regulateit.
in psychologythe observation of phenomena warrants
Similarly
lifeis a material
the induction that the first subjectof human
compound informed by an immaterial soul ; and this conclu
for the synthetic
sion,which forms the principle
phase,enables
to understand
the proper objectof the human
intellect,
us
the complex character of man's lifewith the mutual dependence
of the activities of body and soul.
is bound
2. The
philosophyof mathematics
up in practice,
and
:
no
reasonably so, with the science of mathematics
1.

The

mathematician
from

which

tions are
the

separates his theorems

ever

they

needed

to

of
principles

are

deduced.

Certain

from

the axioms

elementary observa
become

suggest the axioms, and these in

turn

the

deduced

synthesesfrom

which

are

the

FORMAL

THE

sciences

of

number

abstract

more

The

3.

lead

and

physics

of

actuality,

efficient
intrinsic

finality

number,

etc.,

to

surface

of

ing

moral

the

to

or

mind's

these

contemplates
thus

makes
'

stitutes
formal

its

them

ideal

elements

knowledge
all

things

infinite
First

wisdom
of

aim

of

and

laws

man

wisdom
Cause

is

the

in

the

of

an

line

end,
order

right

metaphysics

or

it

branches,
and

relations,

their

which

synthesis

general

the

or

moral

the

to

and

addition,

the

philosophical

is

in

philosophy

the

con

narrow,

light

the
of

act

the

of

First

and

of

the

perfect

most

who

Cause,

continues

to

vision
the

work

universe

the

explain

to

comprehensive

culmination

influence

the

philosophy

("ro"j"ta)or

philosophy

almighty
;

an

word.

the

attain

can

His

by

of

'

potentiality
by

to

being,

and

produced

as

ethics

objects

principles

rational

such

these

indefinable

acceptation

The

truth

First
of

results

analysis

distinction,

unity,

notional

to

objects.

the

up

the

quantity
to

logic

under

to

continuous

good

the

gathers

mathematics

sciences

of

changes

to

subject

criteriology

further

compounded
form,

passive

the

to

up

philosophical
of

incapable

and

203

lead

eventually

the

substance

to

matter

in

cause

plain

of

objects

to

ORDER

geometry.

pure

departments

mind

definition

of

speculations

LOGICAL

that

quantity

and

several

the

OF

CAUSE

of
of

synthetic
has

govern

the

with

world

philosophy.

created

by
in

His
its

CHAPTER

THE

95.

FINAL

CAUSE

and

Logic

The

ordering

ings

that

form

is

what

of

the

Definition

as

whole,

and

Such

The

truth,

ultimate
extrinsic

"

alone
of

understanding

scientific

with

and

scientific

knowledge,
the

apart

are,

and

stances,

the

from

formally,

of

principles

whence

deduced.

These
founded

in

law
'

later

generating
on

its formal

of

the

of
is
to

this, that
all

one

from
of its

reason

science

be

is

their

form
The
the

unity

of

principles of
object.
204

This

to

most

what

deals

Science

dictum.
is

Science

science, considered

are

the

furnish

first definitions

propositions

of

circum

favourite
whole.

own

know

to

'

action.

one

at

collect

to

variable

and

Aristotle's

thought
matter

science, it is

savant

(b)

their

the

universal

must

true,

of reflective

contingent

propositions.

consists

form

mediately

up

such,

as

of

their

the
universal
only with
(d) Systematically arranged

body

fruit

province

aim

is the

what

uni

or

is, manifestly

is the

cannot,

The

way.

make

(c) Necessary,

is not

and

as

objects formally lacking

therefore

particular facts

to

body

of its action.

laws

certitude

concerned

is

as

so

intrinsic

the

give

that

science

certain, necessary

(a) Objectively evident,

unified

of

knowledge

define

may

which

things

Yet

logic.

contrast

immediately

and

subject

evidence

selves

truth.

propositions

prepare

intellect.

by

evident,

drawn

of the

these

say

Certain
faith

of

end

"

reason

guarantee

no

though

We

"

are

are

of the

nature

is

arranged systematically

as

which

properties and
be

which

well

versal,

We

intrinsic

scientia, science, the

of Science.

propositions

the

of

name

the

and

judgments

our

man's

"

Knowledge.

object is.

an

96.

of

knowledge

deserves

of

ORDER

Scientific

ideas

our

logician therefore

certain

of

is the

science

of
orderly arrangement
is the
which
final object

of the

of

systematization

this

end

LOGICAL

OF

Attainment

the

or

to

go

IV

synthetically

science

are

object is, if

them
not

the

at

essence,

the

fore
the

nature

Such

CAUSE

FINAL

THE

least

intimate

is

"Vrt)
the

of

ideal

LOGICAL

property
of

reason

(rt" n'

unity

natural

OF

the

of

the

unity

of

of

object.
a

perfect

ORDER

science.

real
science

205

subject.
is

the

There
essence,

ETHICS

INTRODUCTION*
I. The
of

Object

of

Ethics"Ethical

philosophyis

practical philosophy (Gen. Introduction,7

deals

with

These
is

the

order

acts

of the

the

order

that

We

may

be

to

will

man,

and

free-will.
2.

those

subject

are

are

words,

of the

under

which

cerned

into

moral

moral

of

and

Special

ethics
in

acts.

ethics.

order

is

considers
towards

be

to

investigatesthe
order

particular

but

the
his

duties

of

about.

conditions
the

conditions

is called

God,

to

hand, takes
the

moral

; it examines

when

right

special

as

con

relating

other

According

towards

man

fellow-men, it

of

former

it is not

variety of situations in which

brought

control

The

naturally does, find himself placed


special requirements which
flow from
them

the

end

an

philosophy is

and

may,

peculiar

to

the

Moral

special

Special ethics, on

the

view

acts.

right

to

in

acts

those

and

Ethics."

and

will

object

of human

mean

with

moral

of the

it

"

acts

reason

general and

various

consideration

agent

direction

it will conform

the

produced

called

act

we

20)

its formal

it treats

acts

also

general

with

different

are

object

that

and

free acts

in these

human

are

the

Ethics

into

treats

By

which

to

These

General

livided

its material

say, in other

i.e.

in the

is to be established

"elation to their ends.


to

realized

department

towards

ethics

himself

religious,personal,

or

social

or

cinics.

Books

for

study

consultation"

or

ien^e
of,E"!?s'vols2

"GilI" Dublin'

1909-1917).

3rdV

",
nd

of Modern

Socialism

Ethics

Examined

Justificati-

(Benziger,

of

New

,900).

Rights) (MacYork,

3rd

cd..

(tr. Gettelman,
^eace

and

War

Herder, St. Louis, 1904)


(The Principles of International

Morality)

Non-Scholastic"
Tutorial
"^(Cliye;
1

209

Press, London,

5th ed., 1915).


yth ed., 1007).
Outlines
(Macmillan, London, 5th ed., 1902).

L,

London,

PART
Ethics

General

General

of

3. Division

requiresthat

of Good

Theory
Ethics.

"

As

the

and

moral

should

Evil

philosopher

of will and

exist among
acts
this
should
be appropriateto their ends, it

studies the order which


order

acts

acts :
of the end of human
will be necessary to give an account
of the first chapter. In the second
which will be the purpose
conditions under which these
shall analysethe psychological
we

human

nating them

the

to

question,What

is that

should

conform

which

will treat

the moral
be in

agent

as

far

we

as

of

order.
in

When

II

of the will

the acts

for the third

matter
we

subordi

will arise the

Next

man.

understand

we
itself,
objectively,

chapter,
what

is

shall then

chapter to it in its subjective


and put into practice
it is known
by the
final

chapter will

deal with

order, the human

aspect

this final

specially
designateit,conscience.

M.S.P.-VOL.

questionof

order to which

will form

considered

aspect of the moral


as

This

positionto give a

aspect, i.e.in
moral

moral

of moral

order

end

natural

is

there

placewhen

actions take

211

the
of

subjective

morality

or

CHAPTER

NATURAL

THE

Nature

tion

existence

line,

one

disposal
is that

and

the

make

towards

one

of which

its nature.

word,

the

substance

and

internal

the

intrinsic

Nature,

in
est
we

the

with

the

object

being

is attracted

other

term

activity

towards

between

this
e

materialiter

Further,

realizes
To

est

its

end

suo

reality one

final

and

the

of

it

the

in

denotes

primary

defines

as

its

aim

or

agent

We

seeking

it.

Bonum

whether

one

or

the

of the

direction

relation

the

is

activity of

use

the

either

end

which

being

natural

good.

special

this

is that

good

the

consider

of indifference

which
or

end

of any

matter

being

conformity

of
Finis

et

bonum,
seu

(Gen. Metaphysics, 66-75).

convertuntur

since

or,

conceptu formaliter distincta, objectivetamen

good

perfectivum, it

itself to

strive

It is

we

The

tendency

towards

as

end

made,

or

nature

determinate

being.

is its end

according

The

Aristotle

activity of

the

natural

appetunt.

that

bonum

the

end.

within

This

their

movement.

of this

good

at

tendency

meaning,
it has

as

forces

be done

its natural

activity.

towards

tendency,

or

omnia

quamvis

far

so

principle of

first

conformity

say

in

of

principle

called

quod

being

along

inclination

inherent

primary

then, impresses upon

direction,
is also

of

its

In

or

to

comes

cujus gratia aliquid fit. The


its one
is called
end
being towards

of their

direction

aim

supreme

sub

observa

our

various

many

the

first moment

continuous

anything

of

under

the

id

one

None

"

come

from

steady

they

sake

Good.

The

have

converge

for the

End

aimlessly

that

so

MAN

NOTIONS

sense

they

OF

manifestations

various

in any

act

Natural

and

whose

stances

END

PRELIMINARY

I.

4.

is the

is clear

of

source

that

full, by following the

after

its

natural

and

the

same

thing.
212

and

self-perfection,

being perfects itself,or

the

good

all

to

impulse

perfect

of its nature.

itself

are

in

THEORY

A
5.

Diversity of Natural

being

it

namely, according as

from

the

external

; and

natural

movement

whereas

body

by

tendency is
a

merely

of movement

is

its movement,

to

an

The

way.

different

wholly
subjectof the

the

subjectof

it in any

to

the first kind

the

that

cause

itself contribute

contribute

pulse does not


sopherscalled

ways,

of self-direction
power
In both cases the movement

of this is that

does
is

inclination^of
any

enjoys the

reason

that

213

be exercised in two

may

communicated

movement

EVIL

The

"

this fundamental

proceedsfrom

which

end

directed.
it or is passively

towards

AND

Tendencies.

its natural

towards

GOOD

OF

extrinsic im
older

philo

natural, the second

violent.
natural movement

itself is

quitedifferent accordingas
it is or is not precededby a knowledge of the end towards which
it is tending; the latter is simply natural, the former natural
also,but in addition voluntaryor spontaneous.
But

alone directs his actions in the full

Man

since he alone

freelyorder

can

which is assignedto him, he

his will.

sense

He

of the word,
knows

the end

freelydirect himself towards it


by suitable means, or, freelybut culpably,turn himself from it.
The end is called proximateor immediate
6. Kinds of Ends.
to a higher end
it is subordinated
when
; it is the last or
can

"

The last end


supreme end when it is related to no ulterior end.
i.e.in the intention of the agent
may be the last subjectively,
the last in

aiming at it,or
natural

ends

without
7.
I.

and

in
reality,
The

means.

order of
ontological
when
meant
we
speak

the

latter is

of the last end.


qualification

Kinds

of

Good.

The

be
will may
in itself; such

of good.
three kinds
distinguish
disposedtowards an objectconsidered as
"

We

objectis an absolute good. It may also


but as leading
tend towards an object not as good in itself,
towards
ulterior good ; such an objectconstitutes a relative
an
The absolute good is an end
a useful good.
good, bonum utile,
for the will,the relative good is only a means.

good

2.

By

good is

virtue of
a

source

an

law, the attainment of the


psychological
of pleasureto the conscious subject. In

time seek
good objectthe will may at the same
the pleasurewhich it will experiencein the attainment
of that
object. The good objectitselfis called the objective
good ; the
pleasurewhich its possessionbringsto the subjectis bonum
delectabile the agreeablegood.

after
striving

"

ETHICS

2i4

which

good objecttowards

3. The

the will under

is inclined,is called bonum

of

the

guidance

honestum.

rightreason
When
speakingof the natural tendency and of the end of a
the beingin the fullness of its nature.
being,we are considering
Thus
while man
tendencies, so that
certainly
possesses many
ends
as
we
particular
might even
say that he has as many
has

he

has

he
being and activity,
end only.

II. THE
In

LAST

this section
and

end

considered

faculties,yet when

only

shall

we

; next

one

HUMAN

OF

show

tendency, one

NATURE

that

shall

we

fullness of his

fundamental

one

END

in the

has

man

determine

natural

one

what

that

end

is.

End.

Natural
an

Thesis

First

8.

by

an

end.

to

an

end

which

are
definition,

we

either this end is

of

one

and

Really

it is

an

first

the
hypothesis

Last

satisfied with
necessarily
to a higherend.
Human

performed with a view to


these acts performed with a view
acts

will call A.

One

of two

results follows

thesis stands

proved.

In the

second, the

questionis simply put further back, for we have to


regardto B what we have alreadyasked respectingA
last end

end in which the will is at rest, or


supreme
the will refers to a higherend B.
In the

which

end

will is

further relation

suppose

us

Subjectively

human

no

their very
Let

has

Man

I. The

"

bears

end which

acts,

of the will

or

is it subordinated

to

ask
:

with

is it the

further end

C ?

be that the end B is related to another


end C, and
It may
that there should be no
limit to
C to D, but it is impossible
of ends

this subordination

subordinated
end

to

one

except under

to

another,

higher end.
so

the influence of

that

In

does

one

series of ends
not

act

as

an

another, the suppressionof

last end, desirable in itselfand capableof evoking the others,


involves the abolition of every intermediate
tendency and
of
consequentlythe impossibility

there must

exist

any

end which
supreme
the will through the

power of moving
If there
dinated ends.
'

were

no

moral

action.

in itself the

possesses

medium

last end,

Hence

of the

subor

nothing would

be

desired, nor would any action have its term, nor would the
first
no
intention of the agent be at rest ; while if there were

thing among

those that

are

ordained

to the

end, no

one

would

THEORY

GOOD

OF

EVIL

AND

anything,and counsel would


*.
continue
but would
indefinitely
natural
II. There exists in reality
a supreme
begin to work

at

215
have

term,

no

'

'

acts

end

for human

'.

varietyof faculties,
different
of which
each
finds its expressionin specifically
actions ; yet it also laysdown, with no less emphasis,that man
In a
is a singlesubstantial being,one
nature, one
person.
of action,
word, there are in man
secondaryprinciples
many
but all proceedfrom one
primary principle.Now, every prin
towards an end.
Hence,
cipleof action tends by its activity
the primary principle
of action tends towards a primary end,
of action can
tend only
and the secondaryor derived principles
This
this primary end.
towards
end
to
subordinate
an
primary end is the natural end of man, his natural good, the
of all his progress towards perfection.
cause
(ratio)
This may be more
to
from the fact that, were
we
seen
clearly
human
natur$ capable of being without an end, we
suppose
should
have
have
would
to admit
disorder againstwhich
a
the
to be set the perfectorder
of the universe, especially
of
is the crowning work
who
pre-eminentdignityof man,
Psychologyteaches

that

man

possesses

nature.

It

is,moreover,

that
suppose
nature, should have

to
impossible

Being,the Creator of our


tendency which could never
9. Second

Thesis

wise
infinitely

put in

us

natural

find its fulfilment.


has

Man

an

only

One

Natural

End.

'
"

It is

time
impossiblefor one man's will to be directed at the same
is because,
to diverse things,as last ends.
The
first reason
since everythingdesires its own
desires for
a man
perfection,
his ultimate end, that which
he desires as his perfectand
crowninggood. It is therefore necessary for the last end so to
fillman's
to
appetite,that nothing is left beside it for man
desire. Which
is not possible,
if something else be required
for his perfection.Consequently it is not possiblefor the

appetite so to tend
perfectgood *.

to

two

things,as

though each

were

its

'

'

esset ultimus finis,nihil appeteretur,nee


aliquaactio terminaretur,
in his
esset primum
non
quiesceret intentip
agentis. Si autem
consunt ad finem, nullus
quae
inciperetaliquid operari, nee terminaretur
silium, sed in infinitum procederet '. ST. THOMAS,
Theol., I-II,q. i, a. 4.
Sum.
2
ad diversa
sehabeat
simul
Impossibile est quod voluntas unius hominis
sicut ad ultimos
fines.
Prima
ratio est, quia cum
appetat
unumquodque
suam
finem
perfectionem, illud appetitaliquisut ultimum
quod appetit ut
nee

Si non

etiam

'

ETHICS

216
last

The
that

end, St. Thomas

Hence

desire.

If

ends.

second

good

10. Third

is

nothing left

it follows that

anything beyond
or

end

second

Thesis

The

Indeterminately and

in the

This is

rather

conclusion

fulfilall

so

as

desires

our

object of further

an

have

cannot

we

good satisfies our

one

will seek

the

it there

outside

tellsus, must

two

or

desires to the full,how


?

And

purpose

of

would

Human

Nature,

regarded

Abstract, is the Happiness of


than

could

serve

End

what

last

more

thesis

man."

requiring
proof.

It is

givesfull satisfaction to his natural


tendency ; it is the completegood which excludes evil under
VIall its forms and fulfilsall the aspirations
of human
nature ; and
nhis is the definition of happiness
Beatitudo,cum
sitperfectum
malum
desiderium implet'.
excludit el omne
bonum, omne
But in what
does this complete and all-sufficing
good in
What
consist ?
is the objectcapableof providingman
reality
with perfecthappiness?
clear that

the end

of

man

"

'

"

Fourth

11.

is in

End

Thesis
Created

Regarded
Good

in the

Concrete, the Objective

; it is in God.

Negativeargu
The
ment."
com
objectcapable of making us happy must
must
be secure
pletelysatiate all our desires ; its possession
and assured ; and this object must
be attainable by all. But
in no created good are all these conditions verified. Therefore
created good can be the adequateobjectof our happiness.
no
Proof of the minor : There are three kinds of goods : those
of the body, those of the soul, and external goods. But all
these goods have a threefold deficiency
which
renders them
powerlessto constitute man's beatitude : they are so in
satisfied anyone ; they are of
complete that they have never
so

no

short duration

without

and

so

unstable that

no

"

one

i.

can

possess them
limited
so
are

anxietyand fear of losingthem ; they


that they can
of people.
be possessedonly by a small number
No
created good, then, can
verifythe conditions of man's
beatitude.
Furthermore, a union of all these different
objective
goods would be equallypowerlessto make man
perfectly
happy,
of each class is not due to the quantitybut
for the insufficiency
to the intrinsic qualityof these goods.
sui ipsius. Oportet igiturquod ultimus
perfectum et completivum
impleat totum hominis appetitum, quod nihil extra ipsum appetendum
ad ipsiusperfectionem
relinquatur; quod esse non potest, si aliquidextraneum
in
sic
tendat
duo
non
potest esse
requiratur. Unde
appetitus, ac si
quod
perfectum ipsius'. Id., Sum. Theol., I-II, q. I, a. 5.
utrumque sit bonum
bonum

finis ita

THEORY

GOOD

OF

AND

EVIL

217

Positive argument. The objectin which our


nature
finds
other than God Himself, the Uncreated
its absolute rest is none
2.

"

Good.

For

be

object can

an

the

adequate

of man's

cause

happinessonly on

condition that it realizes the whole

of which

man

naturallycapable;

condition

verified.

is

Proof of the

minor

subservient
manifestly

organicand

Man's

and

to his intellect and

only in

perfection
God

is this

sensitive powers
are
will. The will in its

only after the exercise of the intellect,


under the attraction of the objectwhich this latter presents to
it. We must
then conclude that the perfection
of our nature
is
of the intellect. Now
connected with the perfection
primarily
the
the most
perfectionof the intellect demands
perfect
of
its
formal
the
i.e.
knowledge possible
object,
synthetic
the
all
material
essences
knowledgeof
of
things,through their
and
laws, togetherwith the
supreme cause, of their properties
realitiesthat are con
knowledge of the supersensible
analogical
nected with them.
the completedevelopment
Or more
briefly,
is the knowledge of the First Cause, the
of the mind's activity
of the order of the universe. Here, then, at lengthwe
principle
have an objectcapableof making man
happy.
is he to come
into possession
How
of this object? By what
to him
will the objectivebeatitude communicate
his
means
subjective
happiness?
turn

into action

comes

12. Fifth

Happiness

Thesis

by

Man

Act

an

into

enters

of his

the

Intellect.

"

of his

Possession

Human

with

nature

in
of many
faculties finds its highestperfection
the exercise of these faculties ; for action is the complement of

its endowment

the

of
capacities

The

subject.

sense-faculties

subordinate

must
perfection

intellect and

highest endowment,

man's

are

his will.

With

which

be connected
happinessof man
divided on
are
Philosophers
attributes happiness to both
former

and

may

Duns

Scotus

for the intellect,


the

between

be,

intellectual

the

be attained.

faculties

Thomas

to

It is evidently
by the exercise of the latter that man's

faculties.

Two

are

these
we

are

three
of

is

only

of these must

his

viz.

the supreme

this

question. St.

intellect and

Bonaventure

will, whilst

St.

for a singlefaculty the


argue
latter for the will. The difference
"

one

of

opinion that

standpoint. However
it is in the

exercise

this
of the

ETHICS

2i8

intellect that

the

of human

end

supreme

is

nature

formally

realized.

Proof. The
jectiveend of
be
tially
The

in

human

its beatitude

tendencyof
tendency in
be in

will

with

second

act

an

its end

formallyinto

posses

of the

For

will.

we

activityof the will : 'he


and the gratification
of this

when,

moment

having passedfrom

of repose.
has the passage
How
to the second been brought about ? Clearly

change must have


with regardto its

been

the first state

its

essen

the will at one


moment
to
suppose
towards its end, and
of tendency,of movement

state

produced in

of the
disposition

the

end ; and what could such a change be


will except its being brought into contact

of the

case

must

Now

in the

enters

in the

states

its first state, it is in


from

be

cannot

its end.

consider it againat

some

nature

the will towards

state

this end

sub

the

of the intellect.

distinguishtwo

may

constitute

Therefore

nature.

by which

act

sion of

human
act

an

of the will cannot

exercise

"

of

made
representation
by the act
im
Hence the act by which human
of the intellect ?
nature
of its supreme
end, the act by
mediatelyenters into possession
which the taking possessionof the supreme
end is actually

good by

means

brought about, is an
If it is true
in

of intellect.

act

that the act which


is

its end

possessionof

an

the human

soul

act, it remains

to be

formallyputs

intellectual

is

whether
this
inquired,as a last analysis,
of the practical
intellect.
or
speculative
Thesis

13. Sixth
Act

of the

Subjective

Speculative Intellect.

"

Beatitude

There

are

an

act

is realized

of the

by

an

three considerations

in support of this assertion : (i)God is not the object of the


practicalintellect. (2)Contemplationof the truth is sought
for its

own

sake

considered

are

them
that

and
man

the other hand, acts of the

on

with

view to the end for which

realizes them.
comes

14. Corollaries.

nearer
"

i.

to

Two

reason
practical

the will pursues

intellect
(3)It is by the speculative
beings superiorto himself.
points are established : (a)God is

the supreme
nature,
objectiveend of human
(b)The means
nature
attains its supreme
objectiveend is the
by which human

contemplation of God.
subjectiveend of human
end
only a subordinate
expresses it.

contemplation is, then, the


it is
nature
; yet, to speak strictly,
'finissub fine', as St. Thomas
This

"

THEORY

What

2.

end

our

of God

final love

The

"

this love

affords

beatitude.

The

will does

the

enjoyment of

perfectionof

supreme
15.

of which

perfectact
this act

is the

the

is then

He

With

nature.

end

end of

The

"

is

the

the
reality

of

act

an

beingis the

In the

capable.

most

of

case

This

of God.

man

know

beatitude.

his natural

of man,

knowledge, as indeed of any


object,a subjector principle
is the

the action

source.

of our
most
perfectact
perfection
of the objectiveend of our
perfection

the

regard to

is the

nature

it is because

good,

the
the first,

regardto

is God

of

essence

rise to it is in

action,involves three things : an


of action,and the delectation of which
With

the

happinessis the natural


it is only a consequence

contemplativeknowledge

of
perfection

which

rational nature.

our

its nature

ledge constitutes the


But

given

Conclusion.

and

Summary

219

satisfaction

constitute

not

supreme
end, but

has

which
activity

the

and

of obtainingour
consequence
of this.
For if this enjoyment is

intellectual

EVIL

AND

of
part played by the will in the possession

is the
?

GOOD

OF

second, the subjectiveend of

the

exercise of

its

thought appliedto

our

our

highest
Finally,

object; that is to say, it is the contemplationof God.


with regard to the third,the complacency which results in
will from

the

union

of

with

nature

our

the
also

its supreme
end
action presupposes

the
However, as an
object towards which it tends, it is necessary to say that the
absolute last end is God, 'finisultimus
; and the subjective

forms part of

end.

our

'

beatitude

and

the

sub fine'.
end, 'finis
16. A Difficulty. This

study

"

If every
difficulty.

subordinate

the supreme
without God

must

love.

But

end, it
Himself

knowledge and

be

does
the

are

to will

us
our

of

motive

anything

knowledge

inform

not

raises

man

its influence from

borrows

first objectof

subordinate

of

end

impossiblefor

being the

love of God

bringsare

of the

end

consciousness

our

it

which
felicity

the

that

us

all

and

acts

our

of

volition.
It is true
end

to himself

Hence

our

concrete

does not

man

the

explicitconcept

from

the

first

last

end, the

and

under

one

determined.

alone that the last end


even

always representhis

under

have

we

cepts of
other

that

governs

this undetermined

the first

It is under

form

acts

the

two

con

undetermined, the

abstract and

our

Being.

of the Divine

between
distinguished

all

supreme

of will.

end

of

man

concept

Further,
is not

ETHICS

220

always

have
we
actually and consciously.What
established is that every good for the will is either the perfect
else a particular
or
good itself,
good which can be the objectof
it is related to the perfect
will only inasmuch
as
our
good. It
is in this sense
that the desire of the SovereignGood
inspires,
each
at any rate implicitly
and virtually,
of our acts of volition,
17. Beatitude
in the Present
Life.
During his earthlylife
does not experience
that completedevelopmentof his being
man
the soul with the
which allaysall desire and want
and endows
imperturbablerepose of happiness. Beatitude in the full sense
is possible
Nevertheless,in a restricted
only in a life to come.
with the conditions of our
sense, happinessis not incompatible
earthlylife. ( Some are said to be happy in this life,either on
of the hope of obtaining
account
happinessin the life to come
;
of happiness,
account
of a certain participation
or
on
by reason
of a kind of enjoyment of the SovereignGood '.
Men esteem
that there is some
kind of happinessto be had in this life,
on
of a certain likeness to true happiness. And
thus
account
3.
in their estimate
they do not fail altogether
willed

"

'

'

'

18. Conditions

have

we

explainedand

cerningthe
what
1.

of man's

essence

first condition

of

Happiness.

proved the fundamental

the conditions

are

The

the Realization

for

is the rectitude of the will

the will bears to its supreme


cludes the love of the means
which conduce
of the

and

of the end

only if the

ordered

relatingto

means

love of the

be realized.
sinlessness.

or

end

naturallyin

to it.

But

it will be

the love

rationally

is subordinated

means

con

to consider

happinessis to

love that

that

thesis

beatitude, it remains
which

on

Now

"

to

the

end ; and this subordination


of the love of the
to that of the end is simply the rectitude of the will.

of the

love
means

Thus

the rectitude of the will is

state

of beatitude.

condition

of the conditions

one

of the

of

perfecthappinessis securityagainst
its loss. Perfect happiness requiresthat the natural ten
dencies of the will shall be satisfied. But these aspirations
are
co-extensive with our intellectual knowledge,and this does not
2.

"

dae

'

Another

Beati

aliquiin hac vita vel propter spem beatitudinis


vita, vel propter aliquam participationem beatitudinis

dicuntur

in futura

boni

summi

aliqualem
aliquam beatitudinem,
et

sic

non

ex

toto

Theol., I-II, q. 5,

a.

fruitionem.

propter
in

3, ad

sua
i

"

Homines

aliquam

aestimatione
and

ad

3.

reputant

similitudinem
deficiunt

in

verae

'.

ST.

hac

adipiscensecundum
vita

esse

beatitudinis

THOMAS,

Sum.

THEORY

confine existence and


abstracts

from

existence

and

happinesscannot
or

in other

cannot

respectsmay

its happinessmust

Thus

EVIL

221

limited duration

the

natural

be satisfied if the

but

desire of

happiness

lost.

Besides, the soul


which

AND

happinesswithin

all time-limits.

be limited

may

GOOD

OF

endure

enjoy a singlemoment's
happiness
be perfect,
unless it is certain that

for

ever.

3. Is the union of the soul and the body also a necessary


condition of the state of perfecthappiness?
(a)It is certain

the

If the

body

is not

essential to

the

happinessof the soul.


(b)On the other hand, since the union of soul and body is natural,
cannot
admit that the reunion of the body with the soul
we
be an
obstacle to
after the dissolution of the compound can
that the reunion of the
happiness, (c)Indeed, it seems
perfect
of human
to the exigencies
nature.
soul and the body answers
that

organism did

human

not

contribute

its share

to

the

of the noblest faculties of the soul,we should be right


perfection
of the human
in concludingthat the union
compound is
172).
againstnature (Psychology,
in the Thomistic
Here, however, we are met by a difficulty
explanation.
19. A
Gentes

Difficulty. St. Thomas


"

'

The

human

soul

writes in the Sumnta

becomes

more

portionas it frees itselffrom the trammels


the highestknowledge consists in knowing

Contra

perfectin
of the body.
whatever

pro
For

is most

by the ardour
with which the will restrains the animal passions. It would
then, that the soul,far from beingdissolved by its separa
seem,
tion from the body, finds its perfection
in this very separation
'.
inevitable that in
The first answer
is that it is by no means
the human
body should impede the expansionof the
every case
of the soul ; these hindrances are an accidental
higheractivity
the
of the imperfections
of the body which
consequence

immaterial, and

soul
spiritual

moral

has for the

rectitude

is measured

present at its service.

the absolute and


between
carefully
distinguish
be
the relative perfectionof a separated soul. It cannot
denied that a purelyspiritual
mode
of knowledge is,absolutely
speaking, superior to the psychologicalprocess which is
But a process
of bodily organs.
dependenton the concurrence
of cognitionwhich is too elevated may
be a relative imperfection
for a soul that is not raised to so noble a state of perfection.

We

must

next

ETHICS

222

20. Accidental

of

Qualities

Happiness

demand

certain

of the dead, which

we

almighty yet

perfect

are

acci

the

generalresurrection
will be brought about by an

suppose

intervention

natural

state of

which
qualities

happinessseems
dental and complementary, (a)After
to

The

"

of

Divine

Providence

(Psychology,172), the sensitive faculties,no longer hampered


will exercise their
by the countless infirmities of the present life,
activities in

far

so

this is compatiblewith

as

the free

play of the
empire of the will

will be

higherfaculties. They

subjectto the
in such a way that the most
perfectharmony will rule in all the
of life; the human
manifestations
body will receive from
beatified

the

soul

increase

of

perfection,
glory and joy.
will find a place of
(b)Thus constituted in beatitude man
his interior state.
existence befitting
And
(c)most probably
to him
will also find there the joyspeculiar
as
a social being.
21. The
made

of Man

End

accordingto

him,

he would

is

Supernatural

of pure

state

he directed his

had
to

an

the moment

of his creation God

might

all his

to

had been

the end

then

proposed

been able to be the possessor of


is not.
have been we know
From

But

and

If man

have

so

beatitude.

first man,

what

"

(Psychology,
173),and

nature

towards
aspirations

even

End.

in matter

descendants,

of fact
a

assignedto the
destiny,
supernatural

destinyabove the exigenciesof all created


At the same
nature
and beyond its power of attainment.
time
He
the supernaturalmeans
them
which were
requisite
gave
that

is to

say,

for the realization of this end.


the

22. Does

of

Natural

Happiness

Involve

destinyis in point of fact a supernatural


know
since we
one
possible,
; such a destinyis intrinsically
that it is actuallya reality.May we, then, stillspeak of a happi
To be happy is to be in possession
that is purelynatural ?
ness
of a good which givesfull satisfaction to the desires of the will,
is capable,
and if it is admitted that human
nature
by super
that a
it would seem
natural aid, of knowing God
intuitively,
discursive knowledge of God cannot
suffice for man's happiness.
has been
made
One attempt at solvingthis difficulty
by
the
in
condition
the
of
nature
which
declaringthat
pure
for
it would have been utterly
objection
impossible
supposes
intuitive
of a supernatural
to conceive the possibility
man
even
Contradiction

Conception
"

Our

"

"

vision
summary

of

the

Infinite.

assertion has

We

doubt, however,

sufficient foundation.

whether

this

THEORY

A
It

seems

Reason

here

necessary

is in

in

his

make

to

EVIL

223

distinctions

some

(i)

certaintythat the
natural
exigencies

surpasses the
Man
creature.
would

Essence

of every
capabilities

found

AND

position to establish with

vision of the Divine


and

GOOD

OF

not

then

have

inclination (appetitus
innatus
seu
any
naturalis)
callingfor the vision of the Divine Being as its final
nature

perfection.(2)Without

could not
lightof revelation man
have convinced
himself of the positive
of the vision
possibility
of God
of the essential capacityof a rational creature
to
nor
bear such an intense felicity.
On the contrary, he would
surely
have concluded
that the vision of God was
beyond the reach of
created nature.
the condition
God

with

the

It is reasonable
of pure

we

the will of man,

in

nature, is incapableof

categoricalabsolute

(3)Nevertheless

that

to say

are

will

the vision of
willing
elicitus efficax).
(appetitus

inclined to think

that

unaided

natural

of obtain
might easilyhave conjectured the possibility
ing from the divine Omnipotence an intuitive knowledge of the
have
this would
followed a conditional desire
Deity. From
elicitus inefficax),
a
velleity',a hope, rather than a
(appetitus
But under the guidance
will,of the sight of God.
categorical
of the wisdom
proceedingfrom his reason, his will might have
kept this desire within the limits ordained by the plan of
it to
the
subordinated
Providence, and might have
higher
absolute desire of maintainingthe order of the universe which
reason

'

is the

expressionof the will of God.


conception of a natural happinessis
After

these

whether
merit

The

the

the

considerations

attainment

of the

in

the

natural

happiness reduces
happiness of a being consists

supreme

end.

in the

absolute

Now
sense

doubtless
of

the

no

the

way

question

of

name

it follows

Hence

end

itself to

contradiction^

of

does
a

that the

ascertaining
or

matter

does

not

of words.

possessionof its
supernaturalend alone is,

word,

in

the

end
supreme
of things in which
the

of

an

find
intelligent
nature, in the real order
we
ourselves placed. Yet the natural end, which
in a possible
order
of things might have
the complete and
constituted
exclusive end of man,
is also,in a legitimate
yet relative sense,
end
that is to say, one not subordinated
to a higher
a supreme
end.
Thus there is nothing to prevent the attainment
of the
natural
less
end being called happiness,though in a sense
complete than that of the supernaturalend.
"

II

CHAPTER

FREE-WILL

23.

and

Object
has

nature

been

consists

order
natural

be

that

is

there

devoted

the

to

has, however,

doctrines
moral

liberty in
been

in

of

aspects

order

moral

this

to

essen

presupposi
then,

must,
of

question

section

second

of

are

moral

chapter

liberty
it

various

the

deal

to

of

influence

the

the
act

the

man's

Psychology (112-120),

in

and

that

human

the

in

of

end

see

on

preliminary

that

liberty

rests

As

treated

philosophy, especially

certain

order

of free-will.

established,

there

of

subject.

the

recall

to

the

existence

The

"

shall

we

of

physical

the

study

us

Later

very

already

for

will suffice

the

from

Chapter.

subordination

the

But

tiallydistinct
tion

discussed.
in

end.

of this

Division

with

passions

the

on

in

special importance

free-will.

MEANING

I.

24.

of

Meaning

ing determination,
from

exterior

an

production,
judgment
since
can

it

they
always

have

to

are

this

always

will

the
in

formally

by

judgments

of

assent

will.

for

but

of

facts

for

free-will,

of

their

object,

particular, contradictory

will

and

to

is

the

faculty

the

it alone

mind.
to

Consequently

put

an

end

the

judg

abstract
acts

its

refuse

to

or

Our

free

The

law.

indetermination

an

in the

comes

necessary

to

determined,

influenced

determination

antecedents

root

all necessitat

internal

some

WILL

THE

excludes

particular, individual

be

the

its

has

it resides

undetermined

belongs

from

upon

OF

free act

whether

or

depends

it is true,

ments,

The

"

matter

no
cause

Liberty

assent.

Liberty.

FREEDOM

OF

that, given all the

is such

act

PROOFS

AND

to

the

and
it

in

determination.
Moral

objects

liberty
considered

in

their

of

relation
224

choice
to

different

between
the

end

of

rational

nature.

moral

AND

EVIL

225

in man
the faculty
of choice between
Indeed, it implies
good and evil, but this power is a weakness and an

of
imperfection

free,and

are

free-will.

our

of Free-will.

25. Proofs
we

GOOD

OF

THEORY

study of

the

consciousness

Our

"

the free act

informs

givesus

that

us

the

inner

good exercises an irresistible


determining action upon us, since it correspondsadequately
will. But with particular
with the capacityof our
goods this
be willed ; for they are means
These
is not the case.
may
of the whole good (summum
towards the attainment
bonum)
real goods. They need not be willed,
and on this account
are
the final determina
since they are not the good. Hence when
tion is made, it does not proceedmerely from the objectbut
must
depend on the will ; this facultytherefore controls its
volition (Psychology,
own
115).

II. THE

26.

universal

The

of this fact.

reason

INFLUENCE

Statement

always involves
of desire

the

of
a

OF

Question.

judgment

the part
the intellect and
spiritual,
act

their

action

PASSIONS

THE

on

the

on

The

"

exercise

of

liberty

part of the intellect and

of the will.

will

the

FREE-WILL

ON

Now

depend

an

althoughthey are
for the

exercise of

the sensitive faculties. These


latter are
upon
and normal
therefore subordinate to the integrity

organicand
functioningof

libertydepends in its
exercise on the same
material conditions.
This dependence is
when
the case
the free act is not simplyan act of the
especially
will (actuselicitus)
but an
act of an
organicfacultyresulting
from a command
of the will (actusimperatus).
27. Extent

the

of the

Hence

organism.

Influence

Material

Causes

fortunate

individuals

of Man's

Free-will.

on

who

is beyond
irresponsible,

That

"

owing

to

Nature

Sensitive

there

are

and

certain

derangement

mental

of
un
are

disputed.
That there are others who, whilst able to form correct judg
ments
on
speculativematters, are incapable of resisting
solicitations to evil, does not contradict any
point of our
doctrine but seems
rather to be established by experience.It
not
be even
impossiblethat there exists,as Lombroso
may
'

professed,

criminal

sistibly
given over

doubt

and

type ', that

to crime

who

can

has

never

monsters

irre

recognizedby

certain

is to

be

been

say,

ETHICS

226

and pathological
characteristics. Such
anatomical, physiological

characteristics

criminals.

most

Further,

we

less

more

or

may

also

numerous

admit,

this assertion rests must

which

experimentson
caution, that

be found

to

are

person
lose
the
use
suggestion

among
though the

be handled

with

under
the influence of hypnotic
may
of his liberty.All these facts are not

with the theory of free-will,


the exceptiondoes
as
incompatible
not disprovethe rule.
Beyond these exceptionsjust mentioned, the passions or

lower

emotional

do
generally

states

than

and

external

weaken

material

agents do

not

moral

liberty.
here with
We
not
concerned
the passionswhich
are
are
consequent upon the free act, since so long as they are con
sequent upon it they cannot affect its nature : they are rather
indication of the intensityof the will's action and are
an
But of the antecedent passionsthe case
of its reaction.
subjects
more

is otherwise.

act

is in the

direction

same

to it. When
will,sometimes in opposition
they
in the direction of the will,it would
seem
they ought to

that

as

their action

Sometimes

of the

increase the

rather
liberty

Self-control,the

case.

it ; but

weaken

than

characteristic feature

such
of

is not

the

freedom, is

lost in

the
proportionas sensible emotion increases. When
is there
to the higher,
appetitepullsin opposition
liberty

lower

by lessened,but
it is made
that

which

entirelyto
have

we

if not
exert

may

the soul's

ing

the

it is not

real power
absolute is none

lay down

to

of control

Either

through change
activity,
Or

generalrule that

over

our

testifies
clearly

passions;

one

limited.

We

the less real because

it in different ways.
other

as

consciousness

Our

cease.

will to

passions.

true

of

indirectly,
by diverting
thought, throughapply

through exciting other


the
will directlyacting on

objects,even

directly,
by

to strengthenthem
passions,

the
or

to

repress
third way,

them,

at least to

perhaps the most


effectual : by conjuring
some
appropriate
up in the imagination
under
the sensitive appetite
its influence
object and retaining
would have us
until the new
passionneutralises what reason
Or

certain extent.

yet by

combat.
The

organic or

habits
heredity,

immense

material

of life,climate

influence

on

and
temperament
temperature, have all an

conditions

and

the functions

of

of

our

sensitive nature

and

the will ; but apart from certain anomalous


on
hence, indirectly,

THEORY

and

rare

very

OF

GOOD

AND

their influence is not

cases

EVIL

227

incompatiblewith

4.
and responsibility
liberty

sensitive

appetite,the

First of all,no

1.

and

material

not

the action of

even

exercise violence in the strict sense


will.

human

Violence

volition,the actus

may

be done

elicititsof

our

to

limbs,

our

by

is
free-will,

influence
necessitating

over

Himself,

the determinations

the

upon

commanded

movement

agent, except God

external

No

the

as

action
constraining
proofagainstevery directly

nature
2.

such

"

the free will ?

over

preventingby physicalforce
will,but

the Will.

on

bodilyorgans

agent whatsoever,

Almighty,can

action of

state

Causes

extrinsic causes,

of the

able to exercise

are
agencies,

God

influence which

is the

What

of External

of the Influence

28. Nature

can

our

by

its

5.

have

of the will.

and in
appetiteinfluences the will directly
it when it seeks the
either by strengthening
directly.Directly,
same
object as the will,or by weakening it when it seeks a
contrary object. In the latter case the loss of energy on the
part of the will correspondswith the intensityof the lower
appetite. Indirectlyand in a no less degree because the
of the passions affecting
the
is indirect by means
manner
cognitivefaculties : they create a disturbance of the organism
and in consequence
de
upset the mind which is objectively
pendent on the sensitive faculties. They also exercise a
of
powerful influence over sensuous
knowledge,for by reason
the attractions and repulsions
which they foster within us they

sensitive

3. The

"

"

help to
of

fix the

imaginationupon

others, a proceedingwhich

influence

objectsto
fail to

cannot

judgment and

the exclusion

exercise
on

the

bad

upright

steadfastness of the will.

and

ness

the rectitude of the

on

certain

necessario, quia
Ex
voluntas
inclinatur, non
aliquo modo
corpora
ad iram
resistere potest, sicut choleric! ex natural! complexione inclinantur
;
isti
inclination!
'.
resistere
voluntatem
tamen
cholericus
aliquis
potest
per
ST. THOMAS,
De
Ventate, q. 22, a. 9, ad 2.
'
Incontinens
dicitur vinci a passionibus,non
quasi ipsae passionescogant
sed in quantum
vel imrautent
necessario
earum
impulsui volunvoluntatem,
"

'

tarie cedit
'

Ibid., ad 3.
potest immutare

'.

tamen
de necessitate,non
voluntatem
potest earn
dicitur
in aliquid,non
immutetur
enim
voluntas
cogere.
Quantumcumque
inclinari
in
illud ;
est
cogi in illud. Cujus ratio est, quia ipsam velle aliquid
inclinationi
illius rei quae
coactio autem
cogitur.
vel violentia est contraria
facit ut praecedentiinclinationi
Cum
immutat,
voluntatem
igitur Deus
maneat.
et secunda
succedat
alia inclinatio, et ita quod prima auferatur
inclinationi jam
Unde
est contrarium
illud ad quod inducit voluntatem,
non
"

Deus

existenti, sed
coactio

'.

M.B.P.-VOL.

inclinationi

quae

prius

inerat

unde

non

est

violentia

Ibid.
II.

nee

ETHICS

228

understand

to

us

agents
and

sensitive
We

out

and

which

of

has

that
has

man

share

be

especially

action

exercised

between
a

states,
and

in

clear

control

complete

intermediate

passions

Their

it.

must

is

always

through

the

leads

material
indirect
medium

view
of

free

fully

the

of
his

in

act

the

of

carrying

"

the

of

morality

will

and

the

his

conduct

entirely

act

"

and

responsibility

lacking

their

it

and

agents

will

our

upon

appetite.
then,

see,

appetite

external

affect

to

since

sensitive

the

how

able

are

remote

the

of

influence

The

4.

in

which

the

spiritual

the

determination

freedom,
the

faculty
of

there

and

senses

of

our

are

the

will,

activity.

possible
the
each

reason,

strive

many
the
for

CHAPTER

MORAL

THE

moral

the

and

Object

29.

other, of the

order

distinction

of

foundation

arise from
of the

law

moral

Natural

of the

T. MORAL
There

Good

is

ness.

Certain

"

and

Evil.

things

right, other
itself upon

imposes

certain

are

virtue
with

things

vice, the

consciousness.

trjith,
every

can

which

virtues, which

(v) Our

the

moral

knowledge
law

(vii)

between

Moral

from

conscious

consciousness
and

it is

good

as

this

distinction

Similarly there

evil, justiceand

and

of which

before

of

code

impossible

injustice,
to

passions
be

found

of

in

human

this

the

contest

"

in

spite of

that

Hence,

229

of

evil

is

necessity,

the

contrary

sufficient

reason

objective manifestatipjL_pf

truths

reason

data

and
of

notes

which

origin and

human

circumstances.

such

interests

compelling

merely

capacity

and

good

between

and

the

confirms

with

us

"

only
of

Induction

"

persistence

better, of

or

contingent
natural

(ii)The

law,

wrong,

distinction

The

"/

presented

solicitations
it

good

truth

argument.

universality and
for

about

in

sincerity.

Inductive

always

moral

irresistible evidence.

with

judgments

and
any

2.

us

We

consider

evil ;

drawn

our

and

bad

as

shall

Distinction

before

come

evil.

EVIL

Argument

i.

"

the

law.

AND

Intrinsic

Real,

Moral

and

GOOD

and

moral

of

moral

morality

and

law

sanction

of

of

of human

treats

we

(iv)The

moral

of the

(vi) The

and

(iii)The
;

philosophy

good

good

goods

certain

characteristics

30.

The

"

to

between

observance

the

act

part

distinction

this

to choose

obliges us

free

of the

this second

study

(i) The

Chapter.

this

of

Division

relations

to

now

ORDER

comprises two parts : the one


is the psychological condition

act

liberty, which
have

III

to

are

anterior

independent

of

short

of

denying

know

the

truth, and

to

all
the

of

ETHICS

230

admit
must
we
logically
professing
scepticism,
that4hei
moral good^angLeyiLisjQ.unded
f
distinction between
on Jhe_yery
thus

doubt

No

]facts
\

the

of

allows

but

siderable ;

of
application
divergencesand

moral

variations
of

ideas

the root

all

the

more

and

good

unjust,of lawful and unlawful, are


\among

to particular
principles

at all times

same

leads to the end

definition that which

call wrong
Now
nature.

there

others unsuitable to human


evil there
of

the nature
The

Divine.

"

writers

Many

for

Goodness

in

explained

Positive

or

Influence, whether

think

that

on

education.

the civil law the foundation


and

Puffendorf

before him

free will the

of

power

Badness

of

Analysis by

Human

even

or

purely positiveinfluences

this

created by
prejudices
that

and

traditional

as
or

an

Montaigne thought it enough

decree of God.^

made

moral

is founded

its Ultimate

distinction,such
social conventions
or
laws,
possessions,
account

can

oppositionto the end


some
objectssuitable,

6. Therefore between

the

between

is not

Extrinsic

any

rightis by

rational nature

distinction which

drawn

be

things.

Distinction

Actions

Human

be

be

must

nature

must

of man's
is in

whatever

we
conversely,

31.

and

peoples.
"

good and

con-

evil,oL.jusl_,aiid

argument may
argument. Another
3. Deductive
itself. The good or
from the study of human
nature

of human

less

or

Hobbes
of

and

pre
absolutelyfree

appealto

to

It would

Descartes, attributed

creatingthe

both

Rousseau

morality.

distinction made

the

seem

to God's

by

us

good and evil.


In the first place,this distinction is not explainedby any
human
influence,
(a)The nature of good and evil,as presented
and reproduced in the invincible con
consciousness
to our
victions of the human
that the dis
race, has alreadyshown

between

moral

the

tinction between

of certain actions
Tightnessand wrongness
all positive intervention
is independent
or
system of
that is local,particularand changingl
government. JA cause
cannot
explainan effect that is universal,generaland constant.!
of

(b)It

is useless to have

commands

of

of
exigencies
"

ST. THOMAS,

an

absolute

monarch,

Gent., Ill,

Hobbes
or

with

;~such commands

social contract

Cont.

with

recourse

c.

129.

to the

or

despotic
to

the

contracts

do

Rousseau

not

OF

THEORY

themselves

ex

possess,

GOOD

EVIL

AND

an
hypothesi,

231

intrinsic goodnessLgind

coniinunicate^iLlQ^tJieaets-~w4uch_it is
consequently cannot
their purposejo regulate.
/ In the second
place,this distinction does not rest on a free
decree

of the

opinionthat
depend on the

The

Will.

Divine

good and evil

tinction between

leads to inadmissible

(a)God

consequences

of contracts

blasphemy, perjury,violation

the dis

makes

free will of pod

and

make

then

might
the

like obli

morally good would be


obligatory,and even heroism would be a duty forced upon us.
(c)If all moral law owed its originto a free act of the sovereign
for us to
be necessary
will of God, a positiverevelation would
gatory upon

discern

the

clusions

difference
these

as

is

(b) Whatever

us.

good and evil. Such


principlefrom which

between

condemn

the

con

they

follow.
logically

II. THE

FOUNDATION

OF

GOOD
32.

The

the

Natural

our

Supreme

Distinction

If the

"

Good

good

tendency of a being, the moral


tendencyof the rational nature
perfectshimself.

Now

the

and

Evil

of

Non-conformity

or

end

MORAL

BETWEEN

EVIL

AND

between

Conformity
End.

DISTINCTION

THE

answers

good

is what

of

our

natural
to

answers

and is that

man

on

with

Acts

our

to the

is what

of

is founded

by which

rational nature

the
he

is the

knowledge and love of God togetherwith the joy that results


from this knowledge and love.
Hence
a
morally good act is *
one
which, whether
or indirectly,
helps us to know and 1!
directly
of our 1
love God, and in so doing contributes to the perfecting
is the *J
rational nature
a thing is morallygood which
; similarly,
objectof a morally good act.
to the
Moral evil,on the other hand, is what is in opposition
to
end of our rational nature
; it is the act which is prejudicial
the perfecting
of our rational nature, or it is the object of this
withdraws
act ; in its ultimate
us
analysisit is whatever
from the perfectknowledge and love of the Supreme Being
and

from

What,

the
as

happiness which
matter

nature

connexion

or, what

comes

acts should

of fact,is the criterion

of the intrinsic morality of


it in the

these

an

action ?

of this action
to the

same,

with

Do
the

bring us.

by

which

we

not

we

judge

always find

of
perfection

in its connexion

with

our
our

ETHICS

232

end ?

supreme

We

look upon them


We
esteem

we
us.

condemn

dignityas

and

licentiousness,

vices,because they degradeand disgrace


temperance and chastityas true virtues,
as

they ennoble

because

drunkenness

us

and

to

answer

the

demands

of

our

men.

or
is, at least implicitly
act which contributes to the gloryof God, justas
an
virtually,
the majesty of God.
Hence,
every bad act is an offence against

33.

Corollary.

"

St. Thomas
it cannot

worthy

Every good

act

that every morally bad act, inasmuch


as
be referred to God, the last end of creation,is blame
teaches

in His

34. The

sight7.

Sources

of

Morality.
"

There

are

thingswhich
action,namely,

three

goodnessor badness of a human


and the end.
the circumstances
the formal object,
of the goodness
is the firstdeterminant
I. The formal object
not
action.
of a human
or badness
By formal objectwe mean
of a thing,but the reality
considered absolutely,
the reality,
looked at in reference to the moral act, as bearinga relation of
of the
of conformity with the end
conformity or want
of money
rational nature of the agent. Thus a sum
unjustly
acquiredis the objectof an act of theft, whereas the same
bestowed
freelyon the poor becomes the objectof an
money
8.
act of almsgiving
P/2. The objectivecircumstances of time, place and person
determine

the

likewise contribute their share to the


Thus

act.
wrong

than

to steal five

from
shillings

to steal the same

amount

character
poor man
from a rich
a

of the moral
is

greater

one.

the extrinsic purpose contributes to the perfection


Finally,
Thus to givean alms from a religious
of an act.
or imperfection
motive is an act which presentstwo distinct kinds of goodness,
3.

Sum.

Theol., I-II, q. 21, a. 4.


Bonum
actionis, sicut et
Sum.
Theol, I-II, q. 18, a. 2.
attenditur ex plenitudine essendi vel defectu ipsius. Pricaeterarum
rerum,
autum, quod ad plenitudinem essendi pertinerevidetur, est id quod dat
mum
naturalis habet speciem ex sua forma, ita actio
res
rei speciem. Sicut autem
Et idepsicut prima
sicut
termino.
et motus
ex
habet
speciem ex objecto,
attenditur
ex
forma, quae dat speciem ei, ita et
sua
bonitas rei naturalis
et a
unde
prima bonitas actus moralis attenditur ex objectoconvenient!:
Et sicut in rebus
vocatur
bonum
ex
genere, puta uti re sua.
T

ST. THOMAS,

ST.

'

THOMAS,

quibusdam

consequitur formam
est, si res generata non
primum malum
loco
sed
hominis, ita primum
homo,
si
aliquid
non
generetur
puta
specificam,
est quod est ex objecto, sicut accipere aliena,
in'actionibus moralibus
malum
modo
ex
et dicitur malum
loquendiquo
genere, genere
pro specie accepto, eo

naturalibus

dicimus

humanum

genus

totam

humanam

speciem *.

the

GOOD

OF

THEORY

AND

intrinsic to the act, that of

one

EVIL

233

succouringthe needy,the

members.
lovingChrist in His suffering
in
in its
good, it must be so
itself,
totally

that of
other extrinsic,
For

act

an

of these conditions
'

Bonum
The

ex

make

is sufficient to

malum

integracausa,

absence

The

in its circumstances.

and

motives

to be

ex

the

act

bad

one

one

defectu '.

quocumque

well be raised here whether

questionmay

of any

there is such

non-moral act : is every human


act
or
indifferent
either good or bad ? This is a subjectof contro
necessarily
schools. Accordingto St. Thomas
the theological
versy among
indifferent is impossible.Though
act that is really
a human
there are human
acts which, if we consider their object
only,are
neither good nor bad, yet taken in their concrete reality
together
with their end and the circumstances
determiningthem they
either moral or immoral 9 (61).
are
necessarily

thing as

an

Individual

35. Neither
of Moral

Worth.

nor

Hobbes

"

Social

and

in

Well-being

generalall

school consider
positivist
pleasureof the presentlife,to be

modern

the

is,the

is the

Measure

the adherents

of

well-being,that

man's

the sole motive-force

of

goodness of an
conformitywith
standard of right

since the
consequence,
in its relation of
action consists for everyone
all

our

In

actions.

pleasureand pain are the


Well-beingthus becomes the ultimate

his supreme
and wrong.

end,

criterion of

morality.
such as
Littre*,Herbert
Spencer,
positivists,
in this, that they have
and
Huxley, differ from Hobbes
of the community for
attempted to substitute the well-being
the egoistic
pleasureof the individual.
The

later

36. Criticism

of Individualistic

notice firstof all that itwould

Utilitarianism."

involve

I.

We

may
maintain
contradiction to

pleasureis the first objectof all voEtion. As a matter of


fact,pleasureresults from volition,which?7therefore naturally
precedesthe pleasurethat it begets.
re