Manila Prince Hotel v.

GSIS Digested
Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS GR 122156, 3 February 1997
WHETHER OR NOT THE COSNTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS ARE SELF-EXECUTING
FACTS:
The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine Government under
Proclamation 50 dated 8 December 1986, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares
of the Manila Hotel (MHC). In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two bidders participated: Manila Prince Hotel
Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong
Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share,
or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner. Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning bidder/strategic partner and
the execution of the necessary contracts, the Manila Prince Hotel matched the bid price of P44.00 per share tendered by Renong
Berhad in a letter to GSIS dated 28 September 1995. Manila Prince Hotel sent a managers check to the GSIS in a subsequent
letter, but which GSIS refused to accept. On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that GSIS has disregarded the tender of the
matching bid and that the sale of 51% of the MHC may be hastened by GSIS and consummated with Renong Berhad, Manila Prince
Hotel came to the Court on prohibition and mandamus.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the provisions of the Constitution, particularly Article XII Section 10, are self-executing.
RULING:
A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Article II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not
self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling
legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is selfexecuting. Thus a constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the liability
imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an examination and construction of its terms, and
there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for action. In self-executing constitutional
provisions, the legislature may still enact legislation to facilitate the exercise of powers directly granted by the constitution,
further the operation of such a provision, prescribe a practice to be used for its enforcement, provide a convenient remedy for
the protection of the rights secured or the determination thereof, or place reasonable safeguards around the exercise of the
right. The mere fact that legislation may supplement and add to or prescribe a penalty for the violation of a self-executing
constitutional provision does not render such a provision ineffective in the absence of such legislation. The omission from a
constitution of any express provision for a remedy for enforcing a right or liability is not necessarily an indication that it was not
intended to be self-executing. The rule is that a self-executing provision of the constitution does not necessarily exhaust
legislative power on the subject, but any legislation must be in harmony with the constitution, further the exercise of
constitutional right and make it more available. Subsequent legislation however does not necessarily mean that the subject
constitutional provision is not, by itself, fully enforceable. As against constitutions of the past, modern constitutions have been
generally drafted upon a different principle and have often become in effect extensive codes of laws intended to operate
directly upon the people in a manner similar to that of statutory enactments, and the function of constitutional conventions has
evolved into one more like that of a legislative body. Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to
enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the
constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the power to
ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law. In fine, Section 10, second paragraph, Art. XII of the 1987
Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing
laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation.

Alfredo M. de Leon vs Benjamin Esguera GR. No. 78059, August 31 1987

Alfredo M. de Leon vs Benjamin Esguera
GR. No. 78059, August 31 1987
Facts:
In the barangay elections held in May 17, 1982 petitioner Alfredo M. de Leon was elected Barangay Captain and other petitioners Angel S.
Salamat, Mario C. Sta Ana, Jose C. Tolentino, Rogelito J. de la Rosa, and Jose Ressurreccion, as a Barangay Councilmen of Barangay Dolores,
Tagaytay Rizal under Batas Pambasa Blg, 22, otherknown as the Baramgay Election Act of 1982. On February 9, 1987, petitioner Alfredo M. de
Leaon received a memorandum antedated Decemeber 1, 1986 but signed by respondent OIC Governor Benjamin Esquerra on February 8 1987
designating respondent Florentino G. Magno as Brgy. Captain of the said place. It was contended that the designation made was by authority of the
Minister of Local Government. Also in the memorandum the OIC Governor designated Remigio M. Tigas, Ricardo Z. Lacanieta, Teodoro V. Medina,
Roberto S. Paz,a nd Teresita Tolentino as Memebers of Barangay Council.
The petitioners pray that the subject Memoranda of February 8, 1987 be declared null and void and that to prohibit the respondents from taking
over the positions. Petitioners maintain that pursuant to the Sec.3 of the BP Blg. 222, their term of office shall be 6 years which shall commence on
June 7 1982 and shall continue until their successors shall have elected and shall have qualified, or upto June 7 1988. It is also in their position
that with the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, the OIC Governor nolonger has the authority to replace them and to designate their successors.
On the otherhand the respondents rely on Section2, Article III of the Provisional Constitution promulgated on March 25 1986, which provided [All
elective and appointed officials under 1973 Constitution shall continue in office until otherwise provided by proclamation or executive order or
upon the designation or appointment and qualification of their successors, if such appointment is made within a period of a year from February 25
1986.
Issue
1. Whether or not the designation of respondents to replace petitioners was validly made during the one year period which ended on Feb. 25 1987.
2. Whether the 1987 Constitution took effect on Feb. 2 1987 the date of plebecite for its for its ratification was held or whether it took effect on
Feb. 11, 1987, the date its ratification was proclaimed.
Ruling:

The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebesite February 2, 1987. By that date, therefore, the provisional Constitution must be deemed
superseded. Having become inoperative, respondent OIC Governor could no longer rely on Sec. 2, Art 111, therefore to designate respondents to
the elective position occupied by petitioners. Until Office of the barangay officials has been determined by law, therefore the term of office of six
years provided in the Barangay Election Act of 1982 should still govern.
The Supreme Court also find nothing inconsistent between the term of six years for elective Barangay Officials and the 1987 Constitution.
The memoranda issued by the OIC Governor, therefore be declared null and void and the Writ of Prohibition is granted which bar the
respondents from taking over petitioners position in Barangay Council.

White light corp vs. city of manila

Police Power Not Validly Exercised Infringement of Private Rights
On 3 Dec 1992, then Mayor Lim signed into law Ord 7774 entitled An Ordinance prohibiting short time admission in hotels, motels,
lodging houses, pension houses and similar establishments in the City of Manila. White Light Corp is an operator of mini hotels and
motels who sought to have the Ordinance be nullified as the said Ordinance infringes on the private rights of their patrons. The RTC
ruled in favor of WLC. It ruled that the Ordinance strikes at the personal liberty of the individual guaranteed by the Constitution. The
City maintains that the ordinance is valid as it is a valid exercise of police power. Under the LGC, the City is empowered to regulate
the establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging
houses and other similar establishments, including tourist guides and transports. The CA ruled in favor of the City.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ord 7774 is valid.
HELD: The SC ruled that the said ordinance is null and void as it indeed infringes upon individual liberty. It also violates the due
process clause which serves as a guaranty for protection against arbitrary regulation or seizure. The said ordinance invades private
rights. Note that not all who goes into motels and hotels for wash up rate are really there for obscene purposes only. Some are
tourists who needed rest or to wash up or to freshen up. Hence, the infidelity sought to be avoided by the said ordinance is more or
less subjected only to a limited group of people. The SC reiterates that individual rights may be adversely affected only to the extent
that may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare.

SJS V Atienza G.R. No. 156052 March 7, 2007

J. Corona
Facts:
On November 20, 2001, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 8027 and Atienza passed it the following day.
Ordinance No. 8027 reclassified the area described therein from industrial to commercial and directed the owners and operators of
businesses disallowed under Section 1 to cease and desist from operating their businesses within six months from the date of effectivity of
the ordinance. These were the Pandacan oil depots of Shell and Caltex.
But the city of Manila and the DOE entered into an MOU which only scaled down the property covered by the depots and did not stop their
operations. In the same resolution, the Sanggunian declared that the MOU was effective only for a period of six months starting July 25,
2002. It was extended to 2003.
Petitioners filed for mandamus in SC urging the city to implement Ordinance 8027. Respondents defense is that Ordinance No. 8027 has
been superseded by the MOU and the resolutions and that the MOU was more of a guideline to 8027.
Issues:
1. Whether respondent has the mandatory legal duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and order the removal of the Pandacan Terminals, and
2. Whether the June 26, 2002 MOU and the resolutions ratifying it can amend or repeal Ordinance No. 8027
Held: Yes to both, Petition granted
Ratio:
1. Rule 65, Section 316 of the Rules of Court- mandamus may be filed when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully
neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station. The petitioner should
have a well-defined, clear and certain legal right to the performance of the act and it must be the clear and imperative duty of respondent to
do the act required to be done.
Mandamus will not issue to enforce a right, or to compel compliance with a duty, which is questionable or over which a substantial doubt
exists. Unless the right to the relief sought is unclouded, mandamus will not issue. When a mandamus proceeding concerns a public
right and its object is to compel a public duty, the people who are interested in the execution of the laws are regarded as the real
parties in interest and they need not show any specific interest. Petitioners are citizens of manila and thus have a direct interest in
the ordinances.
On the other hand, the Local Government Code imposes upon respondent the duty, as city mayor, to "enforce all laws and ordinances
relative to the governance of the city. "One of these is Ordinance No. 8027. As the chief executive of the city, he has the duty to enforce

Ordinance No. 8027 as long as it has not been repealed by the Sanggunian or annulled by the courts. He has no other choice. It is his
ministerial duty to do so.
These officers cannot refuse to perform their duty on the ground of an alleged invalidity of the statute imposing the duty. The reason for this
is obvious. It might seriously hinder the transaction of public business if these officers were to be permitted in all cases to question the
constitutionality of statutes and ordinances imposing duties upon them and which have not judicially been declared unconstitutional. Officers
of the government from the highest to the lowest are creatures of the law and are bound to obey it.
2. Need not resolve this issue. Assuming that the terms of the MOU were inconsistent with Ordinance No. 8027, the resolutions which ratified
it and made it binding on the City of Manila expressly gave it full force and effect only until April 30, 2003.

ACEBEDO OPTICAL VS. CA

Municipal Corporation Proprietary Functions Police Power
Acebedo Optical applied for a business permit to operate in Iligan City. After hearing the sides of local optometrists, Mayor Cabili of
Iligan granted the permit but he attached various special conditions which basically made Acebedos dependent upon prescriptions
to be issued by local optometrists. Acebedo is not allowed to practice optometry within the city. Acebedo however acquiesced to the
said conditions and operated under the permit. Later, Acebedo was charged for violating the said conditions and was subsequently
suspended from operating within Iligan. Acebedo then assailed the validity of the attached conditions. The local optometrists argued
that Acebedo is estopped in assailing the said conditions because it acquiesced to the same and that the imposition of the special
conditions is a valid exercise of police power; that such conditions were entered upon by the city in its proprietary function hence the
permit is actually a contract.
ISSUE: Whether or not the special conditions attached by the mayor is a valid exercise of police power.
HELD: NO. Acebedo was applying for a business permit to operate its business and not to practice optometry (the latter being within
the jurisdiction PRC Board of Optometry). The conditions attached by the mayor is ultra vires hence cannot be given any legal
application therefore estoppel does not apply. It is neither a valid exercise of police power. Though the mayor can definitely impose
conditions in the granting of permits, he must base such conditions on law or ordinances otherwise the conditions are ultra vires.
Lastly, the granting of the license is not a contract, it is a special privilege estoppels does not apply.

G.R. No. 135962. March 27, 2000

METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner, vs. BEL-AIR
VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC., respondent.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner MMDA is a government agency tasked with the delivery of
basic services in Metro Manila. Respondent Bel-Air Village
Association, Inc. (BAVA) is a non-stock, non-profit corporation whose
members are homeowners in Bel-Air Village, a private subdivision in
Makati City. Respondent BAVA is the registered owner of Neptune
Street, a road inside Bel-Air Village.
On December 30, 1995, respondent received from petitioner, through
its Chairman, a notice dated December 22, 1995 requesting respondent
to open Neptune Street to public vehicular traffic starting January
2, 1996.
ISSUES:
Petitioner MMDA raises the following questions:
1. HAS THE METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (MMDA) THE
MANDATE TO OPEN NEPTUNE STREET TO PUBLIC TRAFFIC PURSUANT TO ITS
REGULATORY AND POLICE POWERS?
2. IS THE PASSAGE OF AN ORDINANCE A CONDITION PRECEDENT BEFORE
THE MMDA MAY ORDER THE OPENING OF SUBDIVISION ROADS TO PUBLIC TRAFFIC?
3. IS RESPONDENT BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC. ESTOPPED FROM
DENYING OR ASSAILING THE AUTHORITY OF THE MMDA TO OPEN THE SUBJECT
STREET?
4. WAS RESPONDENT DEPRIVED OF DUE PROCESS DESPITE THE SEVERAL
MEETINGS HELD BETWEEN MMDA AND THE AFFECTED BEL-AIR RESIDENTS AND
BAVA OFFICERS?
5. HAS RESPONDENT COME TO COURT WITH UNCLEAN HANDS?
HELD:
Petitioner MMDA claims that it has the authority to open Neptune
Street to public traffic because it is an agent of the state endowed
with police power in the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila.
Clearly, the MMDA is not a political unit of government. The power
delegated to the MMDA is that given to the Metro Manila Council to
promulgate administrative rules and regulations in the implementation
of the MMDA's functions. The explanatory note to the bill stated that
the proposed MMDA is a "development authority" which is a "national
agency, not a political government unit." It is thus beyond doubt
that the MMDA is not a local government unit or a public corporation
endowed with legislative power. Unlike the MMC, the MMDA has no power
to enact ordinances for the welfare of the community. It is the local
government units, acting through their respective legislative
councils, that possess legislative power and police power. In the
case at bar, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City did not pass
any ordinance or resolution ordering the opening of Neptune Street,
hence, its proposed opening by petitioner MMDA is illegal and the
respondent Court of Appeals did not err in so ruling. Its good
intentions cannot justify the opening for public use of a private
street in a private subdivision without any legal warrant.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is denied.

LUCENA GRAND CENTRAL TERMINAL v. JAC LINER Case Digest

LUCENA GRAND CENTRAL TERMINAL, INC. v. JAC LINER, INC.
452 SCRA 174 (2005), EN BANC (Carpio Morales, J.)
The true role of Constitutional law is to effect an equilibrium between authority and liberty so that rights are exercised within the
framework of the law and the laws are enacted with due deference to rights.
FACTS: Two ordinances were enacted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Lucena with the objective of alleviating the traffic congestion said
to have been caused by the existence of various bus and jeepney terminals within the city. City Ordinance 1631 grants franchise to the
Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc. to construct, finance, establish, operate and maintain common bus- jeepney terminal facility in the City
of Lucena. City Ordinance 1778, on the other hand, strips out all the temporary terminals in the City of Lucena the right to operate which as a
result favors only the Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc.
The Regional Trial Court of Lucena declared City Ordinance 1631 as a valid excercise of police power while declaring City Ordinance 1778
as null and void for being invalid. Petitioner Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc. filed its Motion for Reconsideration which was denied.
Lucena then elevated it via petition for review under Rule 45 before the Court. The Court referred the petition to the Court of Appeals (CA)
with which it has concurrent jurisdiction. The CA dismissed the petition and affirmed the challenged orders of the trial court. Its motion for
reconsideration having been denied by the CA, Lucena now comes to the Court via petition for review to assail the Decision and Resolution
of the CA.
ISSUE: Whether or not the means employed by the Lucena Sannguniang Panlungsod to attain its professed objective were reasonably
necessary and not duly oppressive upon individuals
HELD: With the aim of localizing the source of traffic congestion in the city to a single location, the subject ordinances prohibit the operation
of all bus and jeepney terminals within Lucena, including those already existing, and allow the operation of only one common terminal
located outside the city proper, the franchise for which was granted to Lucena. The common carriers plying routes to and from Lucena City
are thus compelled to close down their existing terminals and use the facilities of Lucena.
The true role of Constitutional Law is to effect an equilibrium between authority and liberty so that rights are exercised within the framework
of the law and the laws are enacted with due deference to rights.
A due deference to the rights of the individual thus requires a more careful formulation of solutions to societal problems.
From the memorandum filed before the Court by Lucena, it is gathered that the Sangguniang Panlungsod had identified the cause of traffic
congestion to be the indiscriminate loading and unloading of passengers by buses on the streets of the city proper, hence, the conclusion
that the terminals contributed to the proliferation of buses obstructing traffic on the city streets.
Bus terminals per se do not, however, impede or help impede the flow of traffic. How the outright proscription against the existence of all
terminals, apart from that franchised to Lucena, can be considered as reasonably necessary to solve the traffic problem, the Court has not
been enlightened. If terminals lack adequate space such that bus drivers are compelled to load and unload passengers on the streets
instead of inside the terminals, then reasonable specifications for the size of terminals could be instituted, with permits to operate the same
denied those which are unable to meet the specifications.
In the subject ordinances, however, the scope of the proscription against the maintenance of terminals is so broad that even entities which
might be able to provide facilities better than the franchised terminal are barred from operating at all.
The Court is not unaware of the resolutions of various barangays in Lucena City supporting the establishment of a common terminal, and
similar expressions of support from the private sector, copies of which were submitted to this Court by Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc.
The weight of popular opinion, however, must be balanced with that of an individuals rights.

CITY OF MANILA, HON. ALFREDO S. LIM as the Mayor of the City of Manila, HON. JOSELITO L. ATIENZA, in his capacity as ViceMayor of the City of Manila and Presiding Officer of the City Council of Manila, et.al vs. HON. PERFECTO A.S. LAGUIO, JR., as
Presiding Judge, RTC, Manila and MALATE TOURIST DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
G.R. No. 118127, April 12, 2005
FACTS: Private respondent Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTDC) is a corporation engaged in the business of operating hotels,
motels, hostels and lodging houses. It built and opened Victoria Court in Malate which was licensed as a motel although duly accredited with
the DOT as a hotel. On 28 June 1993, MTDC filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief with Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or
Temporary Restraining Order7 with the lower court impleading as defendants, herein petitioners City of Manila, Hon. Alfredo S. Lim (Lim),
Hon. Joselito L. Atienza, and the members of the City Council of Manila (City Council). MTDC prayed that the Ordinance, insofar as it includes
motels and inns as among its prohibited establishments, be declared invalid and unconstitutional.
Enacted by the City Council and approved by petitioner City Mayor, the said Ordinance is entitled
AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT OR OPERATION OF BUSINESSES PROVIDING CERTAIN FORMS OF AMUSEMENT,

ENTERTAINMENT
, SERVICES AND FACILITIES IN THE ERMITA-MALATE AREA, PRESCRIBING
PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION THEREOF, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
Judge Laguio rendered the assailed Decision (in favour of respondent).
On 11 January 1995, petitioners filed the present Petition, alleging that the following errors were committed by the lower court in its ruling:
(1) It erred in concluding that the subject ordinance is ultra vires, or otherwise, unfair, unreasonable and oppressive exercise of police power;
(2) It erred in holding that the questioned Ordinance contravenes P.D. 499 which allows operators of all kinds of commercial establishments,
except those specified therein; and
(3) It erred in declaring the Ordinance void and unconstitutional.
ISSUE: WON the ordinance is unconstitutional.
HELD: The Court is of the opinion, and so holds, that the lower court did not err in declaring the Ordinance, as it did, ultra vires and therefore
null and void.
The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions has held that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be
within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and must be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must
also conform to the following substantive requirements:
(1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;
(2) must not be unfair or oppressive;
(3) must not be partial or discriminatory;
(4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
(5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and
(6) must not be unreasonable.
The Ordinance was passed by the City Council in the exercise of its police power, an enactment of the City Council acting as agent of
Congress. This delegated police power is found in Section 16 of the LGC, known as the general welfare clause.
The inquiry in this Petition is concerned with the validity of the exercise of such delegated power.
A. The Ordinance contravenes
the Constitution
The enactment of the Ordinance was an invalid exercise of delegated power as it is unconstitutional and repugnant to general laws.
The police power granted to LGUs must always be exercised with utmost observance of the rights of the people to due process and equal
protection of the law. Due process requires the intrinsic validity of the law in interfering with the rights of the person to his life, liberty and
property.
Requisites for the valid exercise
of Police Power are not met
To successfully invoke the exercise of police power as the rationale for the enactment of the Ordinance, and to free it from the imputation of
constitutional infirmity, not only must it appear that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class,
require an interference with private rights, but the means adopted must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and
not unduly oppressive upon individuals.60 It must be evident that no other alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of
private rights can work. A reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the police measure and the means employed for its
accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private property will not be
permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.
Lacking a concurrence of these two requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into private rights a
violation of the due process clause.
The object of the Ordinance was, accordingly, the promotion and protection of the social and moral values of the community. Granting for the
sake of argument that the objectives of the Ordinance are within the scope of the City Councils police powers, the means employed for the
accomplishment thereof were unreasonable and unduly oppressive.
The worthy aim of fostering public morals and the eradication of the communitys social ills can be achieved through means less restrictive of
private rights; it can be attained by reasonable restrictions rather than by an absolute prohibition. The closing down and transfer of
businesses or their conversion into businesses allowed under the Ordinance have no reasonable relation to the accomplishment of its
purposes. Otherwise stated, the prohibition of the enumerated establishments will not per se protect and promote the social and moral

welfare of the community; it will not in itself eradicate the alluded social ills of prostitution, adultery, fornication nor will it arrest the spread of
sexual disease in Manila.
The enumerated establishments are lawful pursuits which are not per se offensive to the moral welfare of the community. While a motel may
be used as a venue for immoral sexual activity, it cannot for that reason alone be punished. It cannot be classified as a house of ill-repute or
as a nuisance per se on a mere likelihood or a naked assumption.
If the City of Manila so desires to put an end to prostitution, fornication and other social ills, it can instead impose reasonable regulations such
as daily inspections of the establishments for any violation of the conditions of their licenses or permits; it may exercise its authority to
suspend or revoke their licenses for these violations; and it may even impose increased license fees. In other words, there are other means to
reasonably accomplish the desired end.
It is readily apparent that the means employed by the Ordinance for the achievement of its purposes, the governmental interference itself,
infringes on the constitutional guarantees of a persons fundamental right to liberty and property.
Modality employed is
unlawful taking
It is an ordinance which permanently restricts the use of property that it can not be used for any reasonable purpose goes beyond regulation
and must be recognized as a taking of the property without just compensation.78 It is intrusive and violative of the private property rights of
individuals.
There are two different types of taking that can be identified. A possessory taking occurs when the government confiscates or physically
occupies property. A regulatory taking occurs when the governments regulation leaves no reasonable economically viable use of the
property.
What is crucial in judicial consideration of regulatory takings is that government regulation is a taking if it leaves no reasonable economically
viable use of property in a manner that interferes with reasonable expectations for use. When the owner of real property has been called upon
to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in the name of the common good, that is, to leave his property economically idle, he has suffered a
taking.
The Ordinance gives the owners and operators of the prohibited establishments three (3) months from its approval within which to wind up
business operations or to transfer to any place outside of the Ermita-Malate area or convert said businesses to other kinds of business
allowable within the area. The directive to wind up business operations amounts to a closure of the establishment, a permanent deprivation
of property, and is practically confiscatory. Unless the owner converts his establishment to accommodate an allowed business, the structure
which housed the previous business will be left empty and gathering dust. It is apparent that the Ordinance leaves no reasonable
economically viable use of property in a manner that interferes with reasonable expectations for use.
The second and third options to transfer to any place outside of the Ermita-Malate area or to convert into allowed businesses are
confiscatory as well. The penalty of permanent closure in cases of subsequent violations found in Section 4 of the Ordinance is also equivalent
to a taking of private property.
Petitioners cannot take refuge in classifying the measure as a zoning ordinance. A zoning ordinance, although a valid exercise of police power,
which limits a wholesome property to a use which can not reasonably be made of it constitutes the taking of such property without just
compensation. Private property which is not noxious nor intended for noxious purposes may not, by zoning, be destroyed without
compensation. Such principle finds no support in the principles of justice as we know them. The police powers of local government units which
have always received broad and liberal interpretation cannot be stretched to cover this particular taking.
Further, The Ordinance confers upon the mayor arbitrary and unrestricted power to close down establishments. Ordinances such as this, which
make possible abuses in its execution, depending upon no conditions or qualifications whatsoever other than the unregulated arbitrary will of
the city authorities as the touchstone by which its validity is to be tested, are unreasonable and invalid. The Ordinance should have
established a rule by which its impartial enforcement could be secured. Similarly, the Ordinance does not specify the standards to ascertain
which establishments tend to disturb the community, annoy the inhabitants, and adversely affect the social and moral welfare of the
community.
The cited case supports the nullification of the Ordinance for lack of comprehensible standards to guide the law enforcers in carrying out its
provisions.
Petitioners cannot therefore order the closure of the enumerated establishments without infringing the due process clause. These lawful
establishments may be regulated, but not prevented from carrying on their business.
B. The Ordinance violates Equal
Protection Clause
In the Courts view, there are no substantial distinctions between motels, inns, pension houses, hotels, lodging houses or other similar
establishments. By definition, all are commercial establishments providing lodging and usually meals and other services for the public. No
reason exists for prohibiting motels and inns but not pension houses, hotels, lodging houses or other similar establishments. The classification
in the instant case is invalid as similar subjects are not similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed. It is arbitrary as
it does not rest on substantial distinctions bearing a just and fair relation to the purpose of the Ordinance.
The Court likewise cannot see the logic for prohibiting the business and operation of motels in the Ermita-Malate area but not outside of this
area. A noxious establishment does not become any less noxious if located outside the area.

The standard where women are used as tools for entertainment is also discriminatory as prostitution one of the hinted ills the Ordinance
aims to banish is not a profession exclusive to women. Both men and women have an equal propensity to engage in prostitution. Thus, the
discrimination is invalid.
C. The Ordinance is repugnant
to general laws; it is ultra vires
The Ordinance is in contravention of the Code (Sec 458) as the latter merely empowers local government units to regulate, and not prohibit,
the establishments enumerated in Section 1 thereof.
With respect to cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses, and other similar establishments, the
only power of the City Council to legislate relative thereto is to regulate them to promote the general welfare. The Code still withholds from
cities the power to suppress and prohibit altogether the establishment, operation and maintenance of such establishments.
It is well to point out that petitioners also cannot seek cover under the general welfare clause authorizing the abatement of nuisances without
judicial proceedings. That tenet applies to a nuisance per se, or one which affects the immediate safety of persons and property and may be
summarily abated under the undefined law of necessity. It can not be said that motels are injurious to the rights of property, health or
comfort of the community. It is a legitimate business. If it be a nuisance per accidens it may be so proven in a hearing conducted for that
purpose. A motel is not per se a nuisance warranting its summary abatement without judicial intervention.
Not only does the Ordinance contravene the Code, it likewise runs counter to the provisions of P.D. 499. As correctly argued by MTDC, the
statute had already converted the residential Ermita-Malate area into a commercial area. The decree allowed the establishment and operation
of all kinds of commercial establishments except warehouse or open storage depot, dump or yard, motor repair shop, gasoline service station,
light industry with any machinery or funeral establishment. The rule is that for an ordinance to be valid and to have force and effect, it must
not only be within the powers of the council to enact but the same must not be in conflict with or repugnant to the general law.
Conclusion
All considered, the Ordinance invades fundamental personal and property rights and impairs personal privileges. It is constitutionally infirm.
The Ordinance contravenes statutes; it is discriminatory and unreasonable in its operation; it is not sufficiently detailed and explicit that
abuses may attend the enforcement of its sanctions. And not to be forgotten, the City Council under the Code had no power to enact the
Ordinance and is therefore ultra vires, null and void.
Petition Denied.

TATEL VS. MUNICIPALITY OF VIRAC [207 SCRA 157; G.R. No. 40243; 11 Mar 1992]
Friday, January 30, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts:

Petitioner Celestino Tatel owns a warehouse in barrio Sta. Elena, Municipality of

Virac. Complaints were received by the municipality concerning the disturbance caused by the operation of
the abaca bailing machine inside petitioner's warehouse. A committee was then appointed by the municipal
council, and it noted from its investigation on the matter that an accidental fire within the warehouse of the
petitioner created a danger to the lives and properties of the people in the neighborhood. Resolution No. 29
was then passed by the Municipal council declaring said warehouse as a public nuisance within a purview of
Article 694 of the New Civil Code. According to respondent municipal officials, petitioner's warehouse was
constructed in violation of Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952, prohibiting the construction of warehouses near
a block of houses either in the poblacion or barrios without maintaining the necessary distance of 200
meters from said block of houses to avoid loss of lives and properties by accidental fire. On the other hand,
petitioner
contends
that
Ordinance
No.
13
is
unconstitutional.

Issues:
(1) Whether or not petitioner's warehouse is a nuisance within the meaning Article 694 of the Civil Code
(2) Whether or not Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952 of the Municipality of Virac is unconstitutional and void.

Held: The storage of

abaca and copra in petitioner's warehouse is a nuisance under the provisions of

Article 694 of the Civil Code. At the same time, Ordinance No. 13 was passed by the Municipal Council of
Virac in the exercise of its police power. It is valid because it meets the criteria for a valid municipal
ordinance: 1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute, 2) must not be unfair or oppressive, 3)
must not be partial or discriminatory, 4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade, 5) must be general and
consistent with public policy, and 6) must not be unreasonable. The purpose of the said ordinance is to
avoid the loss of property and life in case of fire which is one of the primordial obligation of government. The
lower court did not err in its decision.

REPUBLIC VS. GINGOYON, digested

Posted by Pius Morados on November 7, 2011

GR # 166429, December 19, 2005 (Constitutional Law Eminent Domain, Expropriation, Just Compensation)
FACTS: NAIA 3, a project between the Government and the Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc (PIATCO) was nullified.
Planning to put NAIA 3 facilities into immediate operation, the Government, through expropriation filed a petition to be entitled of a writ of possession contending
that a mere deposit of the assessed value of the property with an authorized government depository is enough for the entitlement to said writ (Rule 67 of the Rules
of Court).
However, respondents avers that before an entitlement of the writ of possession is issued, direct payment of just compensation must be made to the builders of the
facilities, citing RA No. 8974 and a related jurisprudence (2004 Resolution).
ISSUE: WON expropriation can be conducted by mere deposit of the assessed value of the property.
HELD: No, in expropriation proceedings, entitlement of writ of possession is issued only after direct payment of just compensation is given to property owner on the
basis of fairness. The same principle applied in the 2004 Jurisprudence Resolution and the latest expropriation law (RA No. 8974)