PERSONS CASE DIGESTS ART 1-17 of Civil Code

136 SCRA 27 (1985) Taada v. Tuvera

Lorenzo Taada and co-petitioners sought a writ of
mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish,
and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various
presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders,
proclamations, executive orders, letters of implementation,
and administrative orders, invoking the peoples right to be
informed on matters of public concern, a right recognized in
Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Philippine Constitution*.
*The right of the people to information on matters of public
concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to
documents and papers pertaining to official acts,
transactions, or decisions, shall be afforded the citizen
subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
Important People:
Lorenzo M. Taada petitioner; Hon. Juan C. Tuvera
respondent, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the
President
FACTS: (In order of chronological events)
1. Petitioners sought a writ of mandamus to compel
respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the
publication in the Official Gazette of various
presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general
orders, proclamations, executive orders, letters of
implementation,
and
administrative
orders,
in
accordance with Commonwealth Act 638, which
provides:
Section 1. There shall be published in the Official Gazette all
(1) important legislative acts and resolutions of a public
nature of the Congress of the Philippines; (2) all executive
and administrative orders and proclamations, except such as

have no general applicability; (3) decisions or abstracts of

decisions of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals as
may be deemed by said courts of sufficient importance to be
so published; (4) such documents or classes of documents as
may be required so to be published by law; and (5) such
documents or classes of documents as the President of the
Philippines shall determine from time to time to have general
applicability and legal effect, or which he may authorize so to
be published.

2. Through the Solicitor General, respondents argued for

the dismissal of the case on the ground that
petitioners have no legal personality or standing to
bring the instant petition. They claim that petitioners
are not considered aggrieved parties as provided in
Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court**.
**SEC. 3. Petition for Mandamus When any tribunal,
corporation, board or person unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a
duty resulting from an office to which such other is entitled,
and there s no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby
may file a verified petition in the proper court alleging the
facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered
commanding the defendant, immediately or at some other
specified time, to do the act required to be done to protect
the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages
sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of
the defendant.
3. Respondents further contend that publication in the
Official Gazette is not a requirement for the effectivity
of laws where the laws themselves provide for their
own effectivity dates. Citing Article 2 of the Civil
Code***, they claim that since the presidential
issuances in question contain special provisions as to
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the date they are to take effect, publication is not

indispensible for their effectivity.
***Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after 15 days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless
it is otherwise provided.
ISSUE(s):
1. Whether or not the petitioners have legal standing in
seeking for a writ of mandamus
2. Whether or not the publication in the Official Gazette is
necessary for the enforcement of the law
HOLDING:

Before any person may be bound by the law, he must

first be officially and specifically informed of its
contents.
The Court therefore declares that presidential
issuances of general application which have not yet
been published shall have no force and effect.
Note: From the report submitted to the Court by the Clerk of
Court, of the presidential decrees sought by petitioners to be
published, only PD Nos. 1019 to 1030, 1278, and 1937 to
1939 have not been published.
VERDICT:

1. YES, the petitioners have legal standing. The Court

states that when the question is one of public right,
the people are regarded as the real party in interest.
There is no need to show that the petitioners have any
special interest in the result, given that they are
citizens and are therefore interested in the execution
of the laws.

The Court thereby orders respondents to publish in the

Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances which
are of general application, and unless so published, they shall
have no binding force and effect.

2. YES, publication in the Official Gazette is necessary for

the enforcement of the law. Although the respondents
are right in claiming that Article 2 of the Civil Code
recognizes special provisions as to the date of
effectivity of the laws, the said article does not
preclude the requirement of publication in the Official
Gazette. /// The objective of Section 1 of
Commonwealth Act 638 is to give the general public
adequiate notice of the various laws which are to
regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. It would
be unjust to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for
the transgression of a law which he had no notice
whatsoever. This is especially significant in the context
of the present case as the President enjoys the power
given to the legislature. /// Therefore, all presidential
issuance of a public nature is mandated by law.

1. Petitioners owned a firewall of a burned-out building which

collapsed and destroyed the tailoring shop the family of
private respondents occupied. Because of the collapse, the
private respondents were injured and Marissa Bernal died.
Petitioners warned the respondents to vacate their shop in
view of its nearness to the weakened wall.

De Roy v. CA
Facts:

2. However, the respondents failed to do so. With the case in

fact, the Regional Trial Court rendered judgment finding the
petitioners guilty of gross negligence and liable of awarding
damages to private respondents. On appeal, the decision of
the trial court was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals in
a decision promulgated on August 17, 1987, a copy of which
was received by petitioners on August 25, 1987.

3. On September 9, 1987, the last day of the fifteen-day

period to file an appeal, petitioners filed a motion for
extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration.
Nonetheless, the appellate court denied the motion for
reconsideration in the Resolution of September 30, 1987.
Petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration on
September 24, 1987 but this was again denied in the
Resolution because the same was not filed within the grace
period as inscribed in the present jurisprudence.
Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed grave
abuse of discretion in denying the denied the motion and let
the petitioner be bound by the negligence of their counsel
Held: No. The Court finds that the Court of Appeals did not
commit a grave abuse of discretion when it denied
petitioners' motion for extension of time to file a motion for
reconsideration. In the instant case, petitioners' motion for
extension of time was more than a year after the expiration
of the grace period. Hence, it is no longer within the
coverage of the grace period. Considering the length of time
from the expiration of the grace period to the promulgation
of the decision of the Court of Appeals on August 25, 1987,
petitioners cannot seek refuge in the ignorance of their
counsel regarding said rule for their failure to file a motion for
reconsideration within the reglamentary period. It is the
bounden duty of counsel as lawyer in active law practice to
keep abreast of decisions of the Supreme Court particularly
where issues have been clarified, consistently reiterated, and
published in the advance reports of Supreme Court decisions
(G. R. s) and in such publications as the Supreme Court
Reports Annotated (SCRA) and law journals.
People v. Que Po Lay
Facts:
1. Appellant who was in possession of foreign exchange
consisting of U.S. dollars, U.S. checks and U.S. money orders

failed to sell the same to the Central Bank through its agents
within one day following the receipt of such foreign exchange
as required by Central Bank Circular No. 20.
2. Appellant appeals on the claim that the said circular had
no force or effect because the same was not published in the
official Gazette prior to the act or omission imputed to said
appellant.
3. The Solicitor General counters that Commonwealth Act.
No. 638 and 2930 do not require the publication in the
Official Gazette of said circular issued for the implementation
of a law in order to have force and effect.
Issue: Whether or not circulars and regulations should be
published in order to have force and effect.
Held:
Yes, circulars and regulations especially like Circular
No. 20 of the Central Bank which prescribes a penalty for its
violation should be published before becoming effective.
Before the public is bound by its contents, especially its penal
provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be
published and the people officially and specifically informed
of said contents and its penalties.
People vs. Que Po Lay
FACTS

Que Po Lay (Que) was charged of violating Central Bank

Circular No. 20 for failing to sell foreign exchange in his
possession consisting of U.S. dollars, U.S. checks, and U.S.
money orders amounting to $7,000 to the Central Bank
within one day from the receipt of such foreign exchange.
The trial court found him guilty.
Hence, this appeal where Que contends that Circular No.
20 had no force and effect because it was not published in
the Official Gazette, prior to the act or omission imputed
to him.
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ISSUES/HELD

NPC v. Pinatubo

Should the circular have been published to produce legal

effects? YES. JUDGMENT REVERSED.

G.R. No. 176006, March 26, 2010

RATIONALE

It is true that Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank is not a

statute or law but being issued for the implementation of
the law authorizing its issuance, it has the force and effect
of law according to settled jurisprudence.
Thus, it has to comply with the requirements of
publication of a statute before it may take effect as
mandated by Section 11 of the Revised Administrative
Code and Art. 2 of the Civil Code.
Moreover, as a rule, circulars and regulations which
prescribe a penalty for their violation should be published
before becoming effective; this is on the general principle
and theory that before the public is bound by its contents,
especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation, or
circular must first be published and the people officially
and specifically informed of said contents and its
penalties.
It is clear that Circular No. 20 did not have any legal effect
and bound no one until its publication in the Official
Gazette or after November 1951.
Thus, Que could not be held liable for its violation for it
was not binding at the time he was found to have failed to
sell the foreign exchange in his possession within one day
following his taking possession thereof.
Although this issue was only raised for the first time on
appeal, it may still be considered because the court may
be said to have had no jurisdiction when it rendered a
judgment finding Que guilty of violating Circular No. 20
which, in the eyes of the law, was not in existence for not
having been published.

FACT:
The National Power Corporation (NPC) questions the
decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Mandaluyong City, declaring items 3 and 3.1 of NPC Circular
No. 99-75 unconstitutional, which [allow] only partnerships or
corporations that directly use aluminum as the raw material
in producing finished products either purely or partly out of
aluminum, to participate in the bidding for the disposal of
ACSR wires as unconstitutional for violating substantial due
process and the equal protection clause of the Constitution
as well as for restraining competitive free trade and
commerce.
ISSUE(S):
WON items 3 and 3.1 of NPC Circular No. 99-75 (a) violated the equal protection clause of the Constitution;
and
(b) restrained free trade and competition.
RULING:
No. The equal protection clause does not preclude
classification of individuals who may be accorded different
treatment under the law as long as the classification is
reasonable and not arbitrary.
The equal protection clause means that no person
class of persons shall be deprived of the same protection
laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes
the same place and in like circumstances. The guaranty
the equal protection of the laws is not violated by
legislation based on a reasonable classification.

or
of
in
of
a
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Items 3 and 3.1 clearly did not infringe on the equal

protection clause as these were based on a reasonable
classification intended to protect, not the right of any
business or trade but the integrity of government property,
as well as promote the objectives of RA 7832. Traders like
Pinatubo could not claim similar treatment as direct
manufacturers/processors especially in the light of their
failure to negate the rationale behind the distinction.
Neri v. Senate Committee
G.R. No. 180643

25 March 2008

Facts:
On April 21, 2007, the DOTC entered into a contract
with ZTE for the supply of equipment and services for the
NBN Project in the amount of nearly Php 6B and was to be
financed by the Republic of China.
Several Resolutions regarding the investigation and
implications on national security and government-xtogovernment contracts regarding the NBN Project were
introduced in Senate.
Respondent Committees initiated the investigation by
sending invitations to certain personalities and cabinet
officials involved in the NBN Project. Petitioner was
summoned to appear and he testified to the Committees for
eleven (11) hours, but refused to answer three important
questions, invoking his right to executive privilege. For failing
to appear in the other days that he was summoned, Neri was
held in contempt.
Issues:
1. Whether or not Neri can invoke executive privilege;
2. Whether or not the invocation of executive privilege
violate Sec. 28, Art. II and Sec. 7, Art. III; and
3. Whether or not the Committees gravely abused their
discretion by holding Neri in contempt.

Held:
(1) The communications elicited by the three questions
are covered by executive privilege.
Despite the
revocation of E.O. 464, there is a recognized claim of
executive privilege. The privilege is said to be a
necessary guarantee of presidential advisors to
provide the President and those who assist him with
freedom to explore alternatives in the process of
shaping policies and making decisions and to do so in
a way many would be unwilling to express except
privately.
Furthermore, the claim was properly
invoked by the letter provided by Executive Secretary
Ermita stating the precise and certain reason that the
said information may impair the countrys diplomatic
as well as economic relations with China.
(2) The petitioner was able to appear in at least one of the
days where he was summoned and expressly
manifested his willingness to answer more questions
from the Senators, with the exception only of those
covered by his claim of executive privilege. The right
to public information and full public disclosure of
transactions, like any other right, is subject to
limitation. These include those that are classified by
the body of jurisprudence as highly confidential. The
information subject to this case belongs to such kind.
(3) The Committees violated Sec. 21, Art. VI of the
Constitution for having failed to publish its Rules of
Procedure. Inquiries are required to be in accordance
with the duly published rules of procedure. Without
these, the aid of legislation are procedurally infirm.
Neri vs. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public
Officers and Investigations
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Petition for Certiorari assailing the Show Cause Letter (Nov.

22, 2007) and Contempt Order (Jan. 30, 2008) issued by
respondent Senate Committee against petitioner Neri (former
Director General of NEDA)
April 21, 2007 DOTC entered into a contract with ZTE for
the supply of equipment and services for the NBN Project
amounting to P16 Billion. The project was to be financed by
the Peoples Republic of China
Petitioner was summoned by respondents to appear and
testify in the investigation on the NBN Project on a number of
dates, however, he attended only on the Sept. 26 hearing.
Sept. 18, 2007 businessman Jose de Venecia III testified
that several high executive officials and power brokers were
using their influence to push the approval of the Project
initially approved as a Build-Operate-Transfer project, but on
March 29, 2007, NEDA acquiesced to convert it into a
government-to-government project to be financed through a
loan from the Chinese government.
Sept. 26, 2007 petitioner testified before respondent
Committees for 11 hours. He disclosed that COMELEC
Chairman Benjamin Abalos offered him P200 Million in
exchange for his approval of the project, and he informed
President Arroyo about the bribery attempt. When probed
further on what they discussed, petitioner refused to answer
3 questions, invoking executive privilege:
-

WON President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project

WON she directed him to prioritize it
WON she directed him to approve

Respondents issued a Subpoena Ad Testificandum, requiring

petitioner to appear and testify on Nov. 20, 2007. However, a
Letter (Nov. 15, 2007) by Executive Secretary Ermita
requested respondents to dispense with petitioners
testimony on the ground of executive privilege that covers

above questions, maintaining that the confidentiality of

conversations of the President is necessary in the exercise of
her executive and policy decision making process and for the
protection of the public interest disclosure of information
might impair our diplomatic and economic relations with
China.
Nov. 22, 2007 respondents issued the Show Cause Letter
requiring him to explain why he should not be cited in
contempt.
On Nov. 29, petitioner replied that it was not his intention to
ignore the hearing and he thought the only remaining
questions were those he claimed to be covered by executive
privilege. He further requested to be furnished in advance as
to what else he needs to clarify. In a letter by his counsel, it
was stated that it was upon the order of the President that he
did not appear, and that the conversation with the president
dealt with delicate and sensitive national security and
diplomatic matters relating to the impact of the bribery
scandal.
Jan. 30, 2008 respondents found petitioners explanations
unsatisfactory, and without responding to his reply, issued
the Order citing him in contempt and ordering his arrest and
detention at the Office of the Senate Sergeant-At-Arms until
he gives his testimony.
The parties were directed to manifest to the Court if they
were amenable to the Courts proposal of allowing petitioner
to immediately resume his testimony before the respondents
to answer other questions without prejudice to the decisions
on the merits of this petition Senate disagreed.
OSG Motion for Leave to Intervene:
- Communications between petitioner
covered by the executive privilege.

and

President

are

- Petitioner was not summoned by respondent in accordance

with the power to inquiries in aid of legislation as laid down
in Sec. 21, Art. 6, Constitution and Senate v. Ermita
March 6, 2008 President Arroyo issued Memorandum
Ciruclar No. 151, revoking EO 464 and Memorandum Circular
N. 108, advising officials and employees to abide by the
Consitution, existing laws and jurisprudence (Senate v.
Ermita) when they are invited to legislative inquiries in aid of
legislation.
*Sec. 21, Art. 6 of Constitution Legislative powers of
Congress relates to the power to conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation aim is to elicit information that may be used for
legislation can compel the appearance of executive officials
*Sec. 22,
Congress
to obtain
function
officials

Art. 6 of Constitution Oversight powers of

relates to the power to conduct a question hour
information in pursuit of Congress oversight
cannot compel the appearance of executive

*Principle of Separation of Powers

- executive branch cannot frustrate power of Congress to
legislate by refusing to comply with its demands of
information
- power of judicial review is available right of Congress to
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is susceptible to abuse
subject to certiorari (Sec. 1, Art. 8, Constitution)
Issues and Ratio:
1. WON the communications elicited by the 3
questions are covered by Executive Privilege. (YES.
2 reasons)
*Power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation
broad legislative cannot legislate wisely/effectively in the

absence of information respecting the conditions which the

legislation is intended to affect/change compulsory
process to enforce it limitations validity: done in
accordance with the Senate or House duly published rules of
procedure and the rights of persons appearing/affected be
respected. Such power extends to executive officials and
exemption can only be through a valid claim of executive
privilege.
a. There is a recognized claim of executive privilege despite
revocation of EO 464.
Concept of executive
underpinnings.

privilege

has

constitutional

US v. Nixon public interest: preserve confidentiality of

conversations that take place in the Presidents performance
of his official duties (presidential communications privilege)
Presidents generalized interest in confidentiality provide
him and those who assist him with freedom to explore
alternatives in the process of shaping policies and making
decisions.
In Re: Sealed Case 2 kinds of executive privilege: (1)
Presidential communications privilege communications,
documents or other materials that reflect presidential
decision-making and deliberations which President believes
should remain confidential decision making of the President
(separation of powers) (2) Deliberative process privilege
advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations
comprising part of a process by which governmental
decisions and policies are formulated decision-making of
the Executive Officials (common law privilege). The officials
covered by the former are those functions that form the core
of presidential authority that are quintessential and nondelegable Presidential power (commander in chief power,
appointment/removal
power,
power
to
grant
pardons/reprieves, etc)
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Courts ruled that Executive has a right to withhold

documents that might reveal military/state secrets, identity
of government informers, information related to pending
information and foreign relations. Chavez v. PCGG secrets
regarding military, diplomatic and other security matters.
Chavez v. PEA Presidential conversations, correspondences
in closed-door Cabinet meetings
SC: Executive Secretary Ermita premised his claim of
executive privilege on the ground that the communications
elicited by the 3 questions fall under the conversation and
correspondence between the President and public officials
necessary in her executive and policy decision-making
process disclosure might impair diplomatic & economic
relations with Peoples Republic of China (Presidential
Communications Privilege and Executive Privilege on matters
relating to Diplomacy or Foreign Relations)
- communications relate to a quintessential and nondelegable power (enter into an executive agreement w/
other countries w/o concurrence w/ Legislature)
- communications are received by a close advisor of the
President (operational proximity test petitioner is a
member of the cabinet)
- no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify
the limitation of the privilege. No categorical explanation
from respondents to show a compelling need for the
answers to the questions, and veer more towards exercise
of legislative oversight function (Sec. 22, Art. 6)
Respondents: a claim of executive privilege does not guard
against a possible disclosure of a crime/wrongdoing (US v
Nixon specific need for evidence in pending criminal trial
outweighs Presidents interest in confidentiality)

Respondent: the grant of executive privilege violates

constitutional provisions on the right of the people to
information on matters of public concern (Sec. 7, Art. 3,
Constitution)
SC: Petitioner made himself available to them during the
Sept. 26 hearing, questioned for 11 hours, and expressly
manifested willingness to answer more questions except the
3 covered by executive privilege. Peoples right to
information is limited by law (RA 6713, Sec. 7; RPC, Art. 229;
RA 3019, Sec. 3(k); and Rules of Court, Rule 130, Sec. 24 (e)).
The information in this case is classified as confidential
wherein there is public interest in its confidentiality. Not
every legislative inquiry is an exercise of peoples right to
information.
b. The claim of executive privilege is properly invoked.
The letter (Nov. 17, 2007) of Executive Secretary Ermita
satisfies the requirement for a formal claim of executive
privilege (a precise and certain reason for preserving
confidentiality). It serves as the formal claim of privilege:
this Office is constrained to invoke the settled doctrine of
executive privilege (Secretary v. Ermita), and the Office of
the President has advised Sec. Neri accordingly The
information if disclosed might impair diplomatic and
economic relations with Peoples Republic of China. The
grounds were specific enough so as not to leave respondent
in the dark on how the requested information could be
classified as privileged. Congress must not require the
executive to state the reasons for the claim with such
particularity as to compel disclosure of information which the
privilege sought to protect respect to a co-equal
department.

SC: information in this case is elicited not in a criminal

proceeding but a legislative inquiry. The validity of exectuve
privilege depends not only on the ground invoked but also on
the procedural setting/context which the claim is made.
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2. WON respondent Committees committed grave abuse of

discretion in issuing the Contempt Order.
YES. 5 reasons:
- There was a legitimate claim of executive privilege therefore
the Order suffers from constitutional infirmity
- Committees did not comply with the requirement (Senate v.
Ermita) that the invitations should contain the possible
needed statute which prompted the inquiry, the usual
indication of the subject of inquiry and the questions
relative to and in furtherance thereof. Compliance is
imperative, both under Sec. 21 and 22 of Art. 6 of
Constitution, to ensure rights of persons appearing and
affected by the inquiry are respected.
- It is revealed in the transcript that the proceeding on Jan. 30,
2008 had only a minority of the members of the Senate
Blue Ribbon Committee present during the deliberation (7
only). Sec. 18 of the Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries
in Aid of Legislation provides that a vote of majority of its
members may punish any witness for contempt. Members
who did not actually participate in the deliberation were
made to sign the contempt Order, and its validity is
doubted. Sen. Pimentel insisted that the quorum of the
committee was only 2 and that the will of the lead
committee prevails over all the other.
- The Court finds merit in the argument of the OSG that
respondent violated Sec. 21, Art. 6 of the Constitution
requiring that the inquiry be in accordance with the duly
published rules of procedure, which the respondents failed
to meet therefore its hearings were procedurally infirm.
- Respondents issuance of the contempt Order were arbitrary
and precipitate because it did not pass upon the claim of
executive privilege and inform the petitioner of their ruling,
curtly dismissed his explanation as unsatisfactory and
simultaneously issued the Order. Petitioner was not an
unwilling witness and manifested his willingness to testify.
Respondents denied him due process of law.

Court was also accused of attempting to abandon its

constitutional duty when it required parties to consider a
proposal that would lead to a possible compromise it was
only to test a tool that other jurisdictions find to be effective
in settling similar cases to avoid a piecemeal consideration of
the questions for review. Much of this spirit of compromise is
reflected in the generality of language foundi n the
Constitution (US v. American Tel. & Tel Co.).
Judgment: Petition Granted. Contempt Order Nullified.
Pimentel v. Senate Committee of the Whole
G.R. No. 187714: March 8, 2011.
FACTS:
On 8 October 2008, Senator Madrigal introduced P.S.
Resolution 706, which directed the Senate Ethics Committee
to investigate the alleged double insertion of P200 million by
Senator Manny Villar into the C5 Extension Project. After the
election of Senator Juan Ponce Enrile as Senate President, the
Ethics Committee was reorganized, but the Minority failed to
name its representatives to the Committee, prompting a
delay in the investigation. Thereafter, the Senate adopted
the Rules of the Ethics Committee.
In another privilege speech, Senator Villar stated he will
answer the accusations before the Senate, and not with the
Ethics Committee. Senator Lacson, then chairperson of the
Ethics Committee, then moved that the responsibility of the
Ethics Committee be transferred to the Senate as a
Committee of the Whole, which was approved by the
majority. In the hearings of such Committee, petitioners
objected to the application of the Rules of the Ethics
Committee to the Senate Committee of the Whole. They also
questioned the quorum, and proposed amendments to the
Rules. Senator Pimentel raised the issue on the need to
publish the rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole.
9

ISSUE:
Whether or not publication of the Rules of the Senate
Committee of the Whole is required for their effectivity.
HELD:
YES. Since rules of the House or the Senate that affect only
their members are internal to the House or Senate, such
rules need not be published, unless such rules expressly
provide for their publication before the rules can take effect.
Hence, in this particular case, the Rules of the Senate
Committee of the Whole itself provide that the Rules must be
published before the Rules can take effect. Thus, even if
publication is not required under the Constitution, publication
of the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole is
required because the Rules expressly mandate their
publication.
GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO,
petitioner, VS. RODERICK A. RECIO, respondent
October 2, 2001
Facts:
The respondent, a Filipino was married to Editha Samson, an
Australian citizen, in Rizal in 1987. They lived together as
husband and wife in Australia. In 1989, the Australian family
court issued a decree of divorce supposedly dissolving the
marriage. In 1992, respondent acquired Australian
citizenship. In 1994, he married Grace Garcia, a Filipina,
herein petitioner, in Cabanatuan City. In their application for
marriage license, respondent was declared as single and
Filipino. Since October 1995, they lived separately; and in
1996 while in Autralia, their conjugal assets were divided. In
1998, petitioner filed Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage on the ground of bigamy, claiming that she learned
of the respondents former marriage only in November. On
the other hand, respondent claims that he told petitioner of

his prior marriage in 1993, before they were married.

Respondent also contended that his first marriage was
dissolved by a divorce decree obtained in Australia in 1989
and hence, he was legally capacitated to marry petitioner in
1994. The trial court declared that the first marriage was
dissolved on the ground of the divorce issued in Australia as
valid and recognized in the Philippines. Hence, this petition
was forwarded before the Supreme Court.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the divorce between respondent and
Editha Samson was proven.
2. Whether or not respondent has legal capacity to marry
Grace Garcia.
Held:
The Philippine law does not provide for absolute
divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it. In mixed
marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Article 26 of
the Family Code allows the former to contract a subsequent
marriage in case the divorce is validly obtained abroad by
the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.
In this case, Recios Australian divorce decree, which
was validly admitted as evidence, adequately established his
legal capacity to marry under Australian law. However in this
case, Recio did not procure an absolute divorce. Even if he
did, the court may under some foreign statutes, still restrict
remarriage. Under the Australian divorce decree issued a
party to a marriage who marries again before this decree
becomes absolute commits the offense of bigamy which
shows that marriage might have been restricted. Respondent
also has insufficient evidence showing the foreign law
governing his status. Clearly, he fails to establish his legal
capacity to remarry according to the alleged foreign law.

10

Art. 4 - VALEROSO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

164815 February 22, 2008

GR

(focusing on PROSPECTIVITY)
FACTS:
1. On, July 10, 1996, petitioner was roused from his
slumber when 4 heavily armed men in civilian clothes
bolted the room. They trained their guns at him and
pulled him out of the room. Eventually, while the
petitioners hands were tied, they searched and
ransacked he room. Moments later, an operative
exclaimed that he got a gun from the room. He was
told that theres a shoot to kill order against him but
he was not shown of any warrant for his arrest.
2. Because of such, petitioner alleged that the search
done in the boarding house was illegal. (They forcibly
opened his locker and took his firearm)
3. On May 6, 1998 trial court found Valeroso guilty and
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of prision
correccional in its maximum plus fine (15,000).
4. Petitioner moved to reconsider but his motion but was
denied.
5. He appealed to the CA.
6. On May 4, 2004, the appellate court affirmed the RTC
disposition but modified penalty imposed (removed
the fine).
ISSUE:
Whether or not retroactive application of the law is valid
taken into account that the commission of the offense was on
July 10, 1996 wherein the governing law was PD 1866 which
provides the penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum
period to reclusion perpetua.
HELD:

YES. RA 8294 amended PD 1866 on July 6, 1997, during the

pendency of the case with the trial court. So, the
imprisonment is lowered to prision correctional in its
maximum period from reclusion temporal in its maximum
period to reclusion perpetua. The law looks forward, never
backward (prospectivity). Lex prospicit, non respicit. A new
law has a prospective, not retroactive effect. However, penal
laws that favor a guilty person, who is not a habitual criminal,
shall be given retroactive effect.
VALEROSO vs PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
164815 February 22, 2008

GR

(focusing on PROSPECTIVITY)
Petitioner: PSINSP JERRY C VALEROSO
Respondent: The People of the Philippines
FACTS:
1. On July 10, 1996, SPO2 Antonio Disuanco of the Criminal
Investigation Section Division, Central Police District
Command received a dispatch order which directed him and
three (3) other personnel to serve a warrant of arrest against
petitioner in a case for kidnapping with ransom.
2. After briefing, team conducted necessary surveillance on
petitioner, checking his hideouts in Cavite, Caloocan and
Bulacan. Then, the team proceeded to the Integrated
National Police Central Station in Culiat, Quezon City, where
they saw petitioner as he was about to board a tricycle.
3. SPO2 Disuanco and his team approached petitioner. They
put him under arrest, informed him of his constitutional
rights, and bodily searched him. Found tucked in his waist
was a Charter Arms, bearing Serial Number 52315 with five
(5) live ammunition.
Petitioner was brought to the police station for questioning. A
verification of the subject firearm at the Firearms and
11

Explosives Division at Camp Crame revealed that it was not

issued to the petitioner but to another person. Petitioner was
then charged with illegal possession of firearm and
ammunition under PD No. 1866 as amended.
On May 6, 1998 trial court found petitioner guilty as charged
and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of prision
correccional in its maximum plus fine. Petitioner moved to
reconsider but his motion was denied. He appealed to the CA.
On May 4, 2004, the appellate court affirmed the RTC
disposition.
SC affirmed CAs decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not retroactive application of the law is
valid taken into account that the commission of the offense
was on July 10, 1996 wherein the governing law was PD 1866
which provides the penalty of reclusion temporal in its
maximum period to reclusion perpetua.
HELD:
(1) YES. RA 8294 amended PD 1866 on July 6, 1997, during
the pendency of the case with the trial court. The law looks
forward, never backward (prospectivity).Lex prospicit, non
respicit. A new law has a prospective, not retroactive, effect.
However, penal laws that favor a guilty person, who is not a
habitual criminal, shall be given retroactive effect.(Exception
and exception to the exception on effectivity of laws).
PNB v. Office of the President
Facts:
1. Private respondents were buyers on installment of
subdivision lots
2. Subdivision
developers
(Marikina
Village,
Inc.)
mortgaged the lots in favor of PNB
3. Unaware of such mortgage, respondents complied with
their obligations as lot buyers and constructed their
houses on the lots

4. Subdivision developers defaulted and PNB foreclosed

on the mortgage. As highest bidder, PNB became
owner of lots
5. Office of Appeals rendered judgment ruling that PNB
may collect only from respondents the remaining
amortizations and cannot compel them to pay all over
again for the lots they had already bought from the
subdivision developers
6. Regulatory board affirmed decision and Office of the
Pres. Concurred. Hence, the recourse to the SC.
ISSUE:
WON the Office of the President erred in applying P.D. 957
(compelling
respondents
to
pay
only
remaining
amortizations) because said law was enacted only on July 12,
1976 while the subject mortgage was executed on Dec. 18,
1975.
HELD:
While PD 957 did not expressly provide for retroactivity in its
entirety, such application can be inferred from the
unmistakable intent of the law to protect innocent lot buyers
from scheming subdivision developers. PNB could not have
been unaware that the property had been built on by small
lot buyers. Respondents were powerless to discover the
attempt of the land developer to hypothecate the property
being sold to them. It was precisely for such purpose that PD
957 was enacted. It was in order to provide a protective
mantle over helpless citizens who may fall prey to such
schemes. Court cannot allow the injustice that will be
wrought by a strictly prospective application of the law.
Petition was denied. There was no reversible error/grave
abuse of discretion in the assailed decision.
ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corp. v. CTA
G.R. No. L-52306. October 12, 1981
12

Facts:
1. ABS-CBN was engaged in the business of telecasting
local and foreign films acquired from foreign
corporations not engaged in trade or business in the
Philippines.
2. For which, ABS-CBN paid rentals after withholding
income tax of 30% of one-half of the film rentals. In
implementing Section 4(b) of the Tax Code, the
Commissioner issued General Circular V-334.
3. Pursuant thereto, ABS-CBN dutifully withheld and
turned over to the BIR 30% of of the film rentals it
paid to foreign corporations not engaged in trade or
business in the Philippines.
4. The last year, the company withheld taxes pursuant to
the Circular was in 1968.
5. On 27 June 1908, RA 5431 amended Section 24 (b) of
the Tax Code increasing the tax rate from 30% to 35%
and revising the tax basis from such amount
referring to rents, etc. to gross income.
6. In 1971, the Commissioner issued a letter of
assessment and demanded for deficiency withholding
income tax for years 1965 to 1968.
7. The company requested for reconsideration in which
the Commissioner did not act upon.
Issue: Whether Revenue Memorandum Circular 4-71,
revoking General Circular V-334 may be applied retroactively.
Held:
Revenue Memo. Circular 4-71 cannot be applied retroactively.
Herein, the prejudice the company of the retroactive
application of Memorandum Circular 4-71 is beyond question.
It was issued only in 1971, or three years after 1968, the last
year that petitioner had withheld taxes under General
Circular No. V-334. The assessment and demand on
petitioner to pay deficiency withholding income tax was also
made three years after 1968 for a period of time

commencing in 1965. The company was no longer in a

position to withhold taxes due from foreign corporations
because it had already remitted all film rentals and had no
longer control over them when the new circular was issued.
Insofar as the enumerated exceptions are concerned, the
company does not fall under any of them.
Art. 6 Waiver of rights
EMETRIO CUI vs. ARELLANO UNIVERSITY
Facts:
1. Cui was a law scholar at the Arellano University; he
paid the tuition fees but it was returned to him at the
end of every semester.
2. Before Arellano awarded the scholarship grant, Cui
was made to sign a contract covenant and agreement
saying that he waives his right to transfer to another
school in consideration of the scholarship grant and if
he transfers, he shall pay the tuition fees awarded to
him while being a scholar.
3. He transferred to another school to finish his last term
in law school.
4. When he was about to take the Bar, his TOR at
Arellano was not issued unless he pays the amount of
the tuition fees that were returned to him when he was
still their scholar. He paid under protest.
Issue:
Whether or not the provision of the contract between
plaintiff and the defendant, whereby the former waived his
right to transfer to another school without refunding to the
latter the equivalent of his scholarship grants in cash, is valid
or not.
Held:
The waiver signed by Cui was void as it was contrary
to public policy; it was null and void.
13

Scholarship grants, as pointed out by the Director of

the Bureau of Private Schools in Memorandum No. 38, are
awarded in recognition of merit and not to attract and keep
brilliant students in school for their propaganda value. To look
at such grants as a business scheme designed to increase
the business potential of an educational institution is not only
inconsistent with sound public policy but also good morals.
Consequently, the waiver signed by the student, waiving his
right to transfer to another school unless he refunds to the
university the equivalent of his scholarship grants, is null and
void.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby
reverse and another one shall be entered sentencing the
defendant to pay to the plaintiff the sum of P1,033.87, with
interest thereon at the legal rate from September 1, 1954,
date of the institution of this case, as well as the costs, and
dismissing defendants counterclaim. It is so ordered.
Sec. 6 Waiver of rights
PNB v. Nepomuceno Productions G.R. No. 139479 27
December
Facts:
1. PNB granted respondents 4M pesos of credit line to
finance a movie project, which was later on finally
increased to 7.5M. The loan was secured by mortgages
on respondents real and personal properties.
Nepomuceno Productions defaulted in their obligation.
2. Petitioner sought foreclosure of the mortgaged
properties. The auction sale was re-scheduled several
times without need of republication of the notice of
sale.
3. Subsequently, the respondents filed an action before
the RTC of Pasig for annulment of the foreclosure sale
claiming that such was void because, among others,

there was lack of publication of the notice of

foreclosure sale.
4. The trial court ordered the annulment and set aside
the foreclosure proceedings. Upon appeal, the CA
affirmed the lower court.
5. Hence, the petition for review filed before the SC.
Issue:
WON CA erred in declaring PNBs foreclosure sale of
respondents properties null and void for lack of republication
despite the parties agreement to waive the republication and
reposting of sheriffs sale.
Held:
Petitioner and respondents have absolutely no right to
waive the posting and publication requirements of Act No.
3135.
While it is established that rights may be waived,
Article 6 of the Civil Code explicitly provides that such waiver
is subject to the condition that it is not contrary to law, public
order, public policy, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial
to a third person with a right recognized by law.
Notices are given to secure bidders and prevent a
sacrifice of the property. Clearly, the statutory requirements
of posting and publication are mandated, not for the
mortgagors benefit, but for the public or third persons. In
fact, personal notice to the mortgagor in extrajudicial
foreclosure proceedings is not even necessary, unless
stipulated. As such, it is imbued with public policy
considerations and any waiver thereon would be inconsistent
with the intent and letter of Act No. 3135.
Sec. 6; People vs. Serzo Jr.
Facts:

14

1. Appellant Mario Serzo was convicted of murder by

the lower court for the stabbing/killing of Alfredo
Casabal after the latter rescued minors being held
by the former.
2. Pre-trial was waived and the case proceeded to trial
on the merits.
3. The accused alleged that he was denied the right to
counsel. During the arraignment he appeared
without counsel,so the court appointed a counsel
de officio. Thereafter, he moved that the
arraignment be reset so he can engage the
services of his own counsel however, during the
arraignment, he still appeared without one. The
arraignment proceeded with him being assisted by
the counsel de officio.
4. During the trial, the same counsel appeared and
cross-examined for the accused.
Issue:
Whether or not appellants right to counsel de
parte can be waived.
Held: Yes. Though the right of an accused to counsel is
guaranteed by the Constitution, the right of the accused to
counsel de parte is not absolute. Thus, the court may restrict
the accuseds option to retain a counsel de parte. Also, the
right to counsel de parte is, like other personal rights,
waivable so long as the waiver is not contrary to law, public
order, public policy, morals or good customs or prejudicial to
a third person with a right recognized by law and the waiver
is unequivocally, knowingly, and intelligently made. Since
moral damages were not discussed at all in Plaintiffs
testimony, without evidence award of moral damages is not
justified. Wherefore, the assailed decision is hereby
AFFIRMED but the award of moral damages deleted instead
appellant is ordered to pay P50,000 as civil indemnity and
actual damages of P2,000 as burial expenses. SO ORDERED.

Facts:
1. A lot, which was part of the Tambobong Estate, used to
belong to the Roman Catholic Church. Such lot was
originally leased to Amada Aquino who in turn sublet it
to Matias Gongon for a term of 15 years. Gongon
constructed his residential house on the lot and since
then has been living there together with his family.
2. Meanwhile, the Government purchased from the
Roman Catholic Church the whole estate under Sec. 1
of Commonwealth Act. No. 539 (through purchase or
expropriation)
3. Gongon filed an application to defunct the purchase,
claiming preferential right as bona fide occupant.
4. Aquino opposed it, who filed her own application,
alleging the same right.
5. After investigation, Bureau of Lands approved
Gongons application, he being the actual occupant.
On appeal though, they gave due course to Amada
Aquinos application.
6. Matias moved for reconsideration until it moved to
the Office of the President, which affirmed decision of
Land Tenure Administration in favor of Aquino.
7. Gongon filed case in the CFI of Manila to annul such
decision and cancel registration of Aquino and have his
name registered instad
8. CFI dismissed the complaint because Gongon
accordingly had waived whatever right he might have
had over the lot in question was factual in nature and
could not be reviewed by the courts.
9. Gongons motion for reconsideration have been denied
by the CA and therefore filing the case before the SC
ISSUE:
WON the alleged waiver of whatever right he might have had
over said lot is valid.

Art. 6 Waiver of rights; Gongon v. Court of Appeals

15

HELD: No. Such waiver of right is against public policy and

shall be considered null and void. Commonwealth Act No.
539 lays down a public policy.
Art. 7 Repeal of Laws; Mecano v. Commission on
Audit
1. Petitioner, who was a director at NBI, was hospitalized
for cholecystitis, which he incurred medical and
hospitalization expenses. He is claiming for the total
amount from the COA.
2. He requested reimbursement from Director Lim for his
expenses on ground that he is entitled to the benefits
under Sec. 699 of RAC
3. Director Lim forwarded petitioners claim
4. Undersecretary of Justice Bello returned petitioners
claim to Director Lim, having considered that the Sec.
699 of RAC was repealed by Admin Code of 1987.
5. Petitioner re-submitted claim to Director Lim stating
that Admin Code of 1987 did not repeal Sec. 699 of
RAC
6. Again, petitioner was denied of his claim for the same
reason alleged by Undersecretary of Justice Bello and
that same section was not restated nor re-enacted in
the Admin Code of 1987
7. Petitioner elevated the case to the SC
ISSUE: WON Admin Code of 1987 repealed or abrogated Sec.
699 of RAC.
HELD: No. There is no implied repeal. Before there can be a
repeal, there must be a clear showing on the part of the
lawmaker that the intent in enacting the new law was to
abrogate the old one. The intention to repeal must be clear
and manifest. Otherwise, at least, as a general rule, the later
act is to be construed as a continuation of and not a
substitute for, the first act and will continue so far as the two
acts are the same from controversy. Implied repeals are not
favored.

Art. 8; People v. Licera

1. The Court of First Instance of Occidental Mindoro
convicted Rafael Licera for the crime of illegal
possession of firearm and was sentenced to
imprisonment of five (5) years.
2. In his appeal before the Court of Appeals, Licera
reasoned that Gov. Feliciano Leviste of Batangas had
appointed him as his secret agent and justified that as
such, he was a "peace officer." He invoked the decision
of the court in People v. Macarandang (Dec. 23, 1959)
and, thus, in pursuant thereof, that he was exempt
from the requirements relating to the issuance of
license to possess firearms.
3. He further alleged that the court erred in relying in the
latter case of People v. Mapa (Aug. 30, 1967) which
held that Sec. 879 of the Revised Administrative Code
provides no exemption for persons appointed as secret
agents by provincial governors from the requirements
relating to firearms.
ISSUE: Whether or not the judicial decision in People v.
Macarandang have the force and effect of law.
RULING: YES. Article 8 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
decrees that "Judicial decisions applying interpreting the law
or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of
the Philippines."
It must be noted however that where a new doctrine
abrogates an old rule, the new doctrine should operate
prospectively only and should not adversely affect those
favored by the old rule. This holds more especially true in the
application or interpretation in the field of penal law.
In the case in fact, the appointment given to Licera
bears the date Dec. 11, 1961 and includes the grant of
possessing the firearm with the terms which are in
accordance to the decision made in the case of People v.
16

Macarandang. Furthermore, People v. Mapa only revoked

People v. Macarandang only in 1967. Therefore, the court's
decision in People v. Macarandang must have the force and
effect of law regarding this matter.
Art. 8 Judicial decisions form part of the law of the
land
People v. Jabinal
Facts:
1. The instant case was an appeal form the judgment of
the Municipal Court of Batangas finding the accused
guilty of the crime of illegal possession of firearm and
ammunition. The validity of the conviction was based
upon a retroactive application of the Supreme Courts
ruling in People vs. Mapa.
2. The accused admitted that on September 5, 1964, he
was in possession of the revolver and the ammunition
described in the complaint was without the requisite
license a permit.
3. He however, contended that he was a SECRET AGENT
appointed by the governor, and was likewise
subsequently appended as Confidential Agent, which
granted him the authority to possess fire arm in the
performance of his official duties as peace officer.
Relying on the Supreme Courts decision in People vs.
Macarandang and People vs. Lucero, the accused
sought for his aquittal.
4. Noting and agreeing to the evidence presented by the
accused, the trial court nonetheless decided otherwise,
citing that People vs. Macarandang and People vs.
Lucero were reversed and subsequently abandoned in
people vs. Mapa.
Issue: WON the appellant should be acquitted on the bases
of Supreme Court rulings in Macarandana and Lucero, or
should his conviction stand in view of the completer reversal
of Macarandang and Lucero doctrine in Mapa

Ruling: The judgment appealed was reversed, and the

appellant was acquitted.
Reason:
The doctrine laid down in Lucero and Macarandang was part
of the jurisprudence, hence, of the law, at the time appellant
was found in possession of fire arm in question and he was
arraigned by the trial court. It is true that the doctrine was
overruled in Mapa case in 1967, but when a doctrine of the
Supreme Court is overruled and a new one is adopted, the
new doctrine should be applied prospectively, and should not
apply to partres who had relied on the old doctrine and acted
on the faith thereof.
Art. 9 Duty of Judges; Chuayan v. Bernas
Facts:
1. A match was held in the cockpit of municipality
between two cocks belonging to the plaintiff and
defendant. Each of them put up a wager of 160.
2. The referee announced the defendants cock as the
winner.
3. Plaintiff brought a suit against the defendant and
asked the justice of peace court to declare his cock the
winner
4. The justice of peace court declared the cockfight a
draw. The plaintiff appealed, filed his complaint and
prayed to the same court to render judgment ordering
the defendant to abide by and comply with the rules
and regulations governing cockfights
5. CFI dismissed the appeal. Thus, the proceeding went
the SC.
ISSUE: WON the CFI committed grave abuse of discretion
when it refused to render judgment on the ground that he is
not familiar with the rules governing cockfights etc. and
knows no law whatever that governs the rights of the parties.
17

HELD: YES. Ignorance of the court or lack of knowledge

regarding the law applicable or the rules applicable to the
subject are not reasons that can serve to excuse the court for
terminating the proceedings by dismissing them without
deciding the issues. Such an excuse is the less acceptable.
The second paragraph of Art. 6 provides that the customs of
the place shall be observed and in the absence thereof, the
general principles of law.

regardless of his own religious or moral beliefs. In this case,

Art. 9 Duty of Judges; People v. Veneracion

Art. 9; Case 23; Duty of Judges

the judge must impose the death penalty. This is consistent

in the rule laid down in the Civil Code (Article 9 thereof)
which provides that no judge or court shall decline to render
judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity, or insufficiency
of the laws.

Caltex Inc. Palomar 18 SCRA 247

1. In August 1994, four accused were found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of rape with homicide committed
against a seven year old girl. The Presiding judge was
Lorenzo Veneracion.
2. Under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code which
treats of the crime of Rape with Homicide, the penalty
imposable shall be death.
3. However, Judge Veneracion refused to impose the
death penalty but instead he sentenced the four
accused to reclusion perpetua.
4. The city prosecutor filed a motion for reconsideration
praying that the penalty of death be imposed upon the
four accused but the judge refused to act.
ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Veneracion has the discretion
to impose a lesser penalty than that imposed by law.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court ruled that the law mandates
that after an adjudication of guilt, the judge should impose

FACTS:
1. In the year 1960, Caltex Philippines conceived and laid
the ground work for a promotional scheme calculated
to drum up patronage for its oil products. The contest
was entitled Caltex Hooded Pump Contest, which
calls for participants to estimate the actual number of
liters as hooded gas pump at each Caltex station will
dispense during a specific period.
2. Foreseeing the extensive use of the mails not only as
amongst the media for publicizing the contest but also
for
the
transmission
of
communications,
representations were made by Caltex with the postal
authorities for the contest to be cleared in advance for
mailing.
3. This was formalized in a letter sent by Caltex to the
Post master General, in which Caltex, thru its counsel,
enclosed a copy of the contest rules and endeavored
to justify its position that the contest does not violate
the The Anti-Lottery Provisions of the Postal Law.
4. Unfortunately, the Palomar, the acting Postmaster
General denied Caltexs request stating that the
contest scheme falls within the purview of the Antilottery Provision and ultimately, declined Clatexs
request for clearance.

the proper penalty provided for by the law on the accused

18

5. Caltex sought reconsideration, stressing that there

being no consideration involved in part of the
contestant, the contest was not commendable as a
lottery.
6. However, the Postmaster General maintained his view
that the contest involves consideration, or even it does
not involve any consideration it still falls as Gift
Enterprise, which was equally banned by the Postal
Law.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the Caltex contest is a lottery/gift enterprise.
HELD:
No. The contest is not a lottery. The contention of Caltex is
well taken, i.e., the first element is lacking (no consideration).
The contest is also not a gift enterprise. The Supreme Court
went on to discuss that under prevailing jurisprudence and
legal doctrines as well as definitions provided by legal
luminaries, there is no explicit definition as to what a gift
enterprise is. However, under the Postal Law, the term gift
enterprise was used in association with the term lottery.
As such, the principle of noscitur a sociis, a principle in
statutory construction, is applicable. Under this principle, it is
only logical that the term under a construction should be
accorded no other meaning than that which is consistent with
the nature of the word associated therewith. Hence, applying
noscitur a sociis, if lottery is prohibited only if it involves a
consideration, so also must the term gift enterprise be so
construed. Therefore, since the contest does not include a
consideration, it is neither a lottery nor a gift enterprise.
Caltex should be allowed to avail of the Philippine postal
service.
Art. 10 Doubtful statutes; PEOPLE v. PURISIMA
Facts:

Petitioners: City Fiscal of Manila, Provincial Fiscal of Samar,

and the Solicitor General
Public Respondents: CFI of Manila-branches VII & XVIII, CFI
of Samar

Par. 3, PD#9 provides:

It is unlawful to carry outside of residence any bladed,

pointed or blunt weapon such as fan knife, spear,
dagger, bolo, balisong, barong, kris, or club, except
where such articles are being used as necessary tools or
implements to earn a livelihood and while being used in
connection therewith; and any person found guilty thereof
shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from 5 to
10 years as a Military Court/Tribunal/Commission may
direct

Petitioners-fiscals
filed
before
the
respective
respondent courts several & separate informations for
illegal possession of deadly weapon in violation of Par. 3 of
PD#9. (For illustration, one of the similarly written infos.
alleged: Thataccused did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and knowingly carry outside of his residence a
bladed and pointed weaponthe same not being used as
a necessary tool or implement to earn his livelihood nor
being used in connection therewith.)

Respondent courts, upon motions to quash filed by the

defense counsels, issued their respective orders quashing
the informations on common ground that the said
informations did not allege facts constituting an offense
penalized under PD#9 for failure to state an essential
element of the crime: that the carrying outside of the
accuseds residence of a bladed, pointed or blunt weapon
is in furtherance or on the occasion of, connected with or
related to subversion, insurrection, or rebellion, organized
lawlessness or public disorder. They said that PD#9
should be read in the context of Proc.#1081 which seeks
to attain the maintenance of law and order throughout the
Philippines and the prevention and suppression of all forms
of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or
rebellion. They added that the non-inclusion of the
aforementioned element of the offense leads to confusion
as the same act punished as an offense under par. 3 of
19

PD#9 is also the subject of another penal statute and a

Manila city ordinance:
Sec. 26, Act#1780: It should be unlawful for any person to
carry concealed about his person any bowie knife, dirk,
dagger, kris, or other deadly weapon: x x x. Any person
violating the provisions of this section shall, upon conviction
in a court of competent jurisdiction, be punished by a fine not
exceeding P500, or by imprisonment for a period not
exceeding 6 months, or both
Ordinance#3820penalizes with a fine not more than P200
or imprisonment for not more than one month, or both
anyone who shall carry concealed in his person in any
manner that would disguise its deadly character any kind of
firearm, bowie knife, or other deadly weaponin any public
place.

Thus, the 26 petitions for review assailing the

respective orders of the respondent courts. The petitions,
having similar issues, were consolidated by the Supreme
Court.

The argument of the petitioners:

1. A perusal of par.3 of PD#9 shows that the prohibited acts
need not be related to subversive activities; that the act
proscribed is essentially a malum prohibitum penalized for
reasons of public policy
2. The City Fiscal of Manila adds that in statutory offenses
the intention of the accused who commits the act is
immaterial; it is enough if the prohibited act is voluntarily
perpetuated
ISSUE: W/N the informations filed are sufficient form and
substance to constitute the offense penalized under PD#9
HELD: NO.

It is a constitutional right of any person who stands

charged in a criminal prosecution to be informed of the
nature and cause of accusation against him.

Sec. 5 Rule 110 of the Rules of Court expressly

requires that for a complaint or information to be
sufficient, it must state the designation of the offense by
the statute, and the acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense. This is essential to avoid surprise
on the accused and to afford him the opportunity to

prepare his defense accordingly. This is especially in the

case at bar where the acts being punished are covered by
2 penal statutes and a city ordinance. The right becomes
more compelling for an accused to be confronted with the
facts constituting the essential elements of the offense
charged against him, otherwise such act may be made to
fall, at the discretion of a police officer or a prosecuting
fiscal, under any of the 3 punitive laws and thus expose
the accused to oppression and harassment.

The elements of the offense under par. 3, PD#9 are: 1)

the carrying outside ones residence of any bladed, blunt
or pointed weapon not used as a necessary tool or
implement for a livelihood; and 2) that the act of carrying
the weapon was either in furtherance of, or to abet, or in
connection with subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless
violence, criminality, chaos or public disorder. It is the
second element which removes the act of carrying a
deadly weapon, if concealed, outside of the scope of
Act#1780 and Ord#3820. Thus, a simple act of carrying
any of the weapons described under PD#9 is not a crime
in itself. What makes the act criminal under the decree is
the motivation behind it. Without such motivation, the act
falls under the Act or the Ordinance. Consequently, the
informations filed by petitioner are fatally defective and
quashal is proper.

The filing of the petitions were unnecessary because

the petitioners could have availed itself of other remedies
based on Rule 117, Sec.7. (Effect of sustaining the motion
to quash); Rule 110, Sec.13 (Amendment of Info or
complaint):
1. If the evidence so warranted, the People could have filed
an amended info to include the second element of the
offense as defined in the disputed orders of respondents.
The SC has previously ruled that if the facts alleged in the
info do not constitute an offense, the case should not be
dismissed but the prosecution should be given an
opportunity to amend the info.
2. If the facts so justified, the petitioners could have filed a
complaint either under Sec. 26 of Act#1780 or Manila city
ordinance#3820, especially since the dismissal of the cases
20

were made prior to arraignment of the accused and on a

motion to quash. Under Sec. 8, Rule 117, an order sustaining
the motion to quash is not a bar to another prosecution for
the same offense unless the motion was based on
extinguishment of criminal liability or double jeopardy.
PETITIONS DENIED.

public, finding itself unprejudiced by such practice has

acquiesced for years.
Art. 11-12 Customs; Yao Kee v. Sy-Gonzales
Facts:

1. On Spetember 11, 1908, Martinez was riding a

carromata in Ermita along the left side of the street
when a delivery wagon belonging to the defendant to
which a pair of horses was attached came along the
street in the opposite direction at great speed.
2. The horses ran into the carromata and wounded
Martinez servely.
3. The defendant presented evidence that the cochero
was a good servant and a reliable and safe cochero.
4. And that he was delivering stuff so he tied the driving
lines of the horses to the front end of the delivery
wagon and went inside the wagon to unload the stuff
to be delivered.
5. But while unloading, another vehicle drove by whose
driver cracked a whip and made some noises which
frightened the horses and which made it ran away.
6. The cochero was thrown from the inside of the wagon
and was unable to stop the horses.
7. The horses collided with the carromata.

1. Sy Kiat is a Chinese national who died on January 17,

1977 in Caloocan City where he was then residing,
leaving behind real and personal properties here in the
Philippines worth about P300,000.
2. Aida Sy-Gonzales et al filed a petition for the grant of
letters of administration and alleged that (a) they are
the children of the deceased with Asuncion Gillego; (b)
to their knowledge Sy Mat died intestate; (c) they do
not recognize Sy Kiat's marriage to Yao Kee nor the
filiation of her children to him.
3. The petition was opposed by Yao Kee et al who alleged
that she is the lawful wife of Sy Kiat whom he married
on January 19, 1931 in China and the other oppositors
are the legitimate children of the deceased with Yao
Kee.
4. Probate court ruled that Sy Kiat was legally married to
Yao Kee and the other oppositors were legitimate
children of Sy Mat.
5. On appeal, CA simply modified probate courts
judgment and stated that Aida Sy-Gonzales et al are
natural children of Sy Mat.
6. They filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied.
Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: W/N the employer is liable for the negligence of his

cochero

ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage of Yao Kee and Sy Kiat is

valid in accordance with Philippine laws.

HELD: No. Defendant not liable. Cochero was not negligent.

What happened was an accident. It has been a custom or a
matter of common knowledge and universal practice of
merchants to leave horses in the manner which the cochero
left it during the accident. This is the custom in all cities. The

HELD: For a marriage to be recognized as valid, the

existence of foreign law as a question of fact and the alleged
marriage must be proven by clear and convincing evidence.
In the case at bar petitioners did not present any competent
evidence relative to the law and custom of China on
marriage. The testimonies of Yao and Gan Ching cannot be
21

Art. 11-12 Customs; Martinez v. Van Buskirk

Facts:

considered as proof of China's law or custom on marriage not

only because they are self-serving evidence, but more
importantly, there is no showing that they are competent to
testify on the subject matter. For failure to prove the foreign
law or custom, and consequently, the validity of the marriage
in accordance with said law or custom, the marriage between
Yao Kee and Sy Kiat cannot be recognized in this jurisdiction.
Art. 11-12 Customs
Case 29
I.

In the Matter of Petition for Authority to

Continue the Use of the Firm name Sycip,
Salazar, Feliciano, Hernandez & Castillo

FACTS:
The case involves two petitions. The first was filed by the
surviving partners of Atty. Alexander Sycip who died on May
5, 1975 and the other by the surviving partners of Atty.
Herminio Ozaeta who died on February 14, 1976 praying that
they be allowed to continue using in the name of their firms
the names of their deceased partners who had passed away.
The petitioner anchored their petitions on the following:
1) that under the law, a partnership is not prohibited from
continuing its business under a firm name which
includes the name of a deceased partner;
2) that in regulating other professions, such as
accountancy and engineering, the legislature has
authorized the adoption of firm names without any
restriction as to the use, in such firm name, of the
name of a deceased partner;
3) that the Canons of Professional Ethics are not
transgressed by the continued use of the name of a
deceased partner in the firm name of a law
partnership because Canon 33 of the Canons of
Professional Ethics adopted by the American Bar
Association declares that the continued use of the

name of a deceased or former partner when

permissible by local custom, is not unethical but care
should be taken that no imposition or deception is
practiced through this use;
4) that no local custom prohibits the continued use of a
deceased partner's name in a professional firm's name
5) US Courts allow the continued use of deceased
partners name in the firm name of law partnerships
has been consistently and is an accepted practice in
the legal profession of most countries in the world
Issue: WON the petitioners should be allowed to use in their
firm names the names of their deceased partners
Held: The court ruled in the negative. The court cited the
following reasons. First is that Article. 1815 of the Civil Code
provides that Every partnership shall operate under a firm
name, which may or may not include the name of one or
more of the partners. Those who, not being members of the
partnership, include their names in the firm name, shall be
subject to the liability, of a partner thus it is clearly tacit in
the above provision that names in a firm name of a
partnership must either be those of living partners and in
the case of non-partners, should be living persons who can
be subjected to liability.
And lastly while the court admits that it is true that Canon
33 does not consider as unethical the continued use of the
name of a deceased or former partner in the firm name of a
law partnership when such a practice is permissible by local
custom but the Canon warns that care should be taken that
no imposition or deception is practiced through this use. It
must be conceded that in the Philippines, no local custom
permits or allows the continued use of a deceased or former
partner's name in the firm names of law partnerships.
Art. 13 Computation of Period; CIR v. Primetown
Facts:
22

1. Gilbert Yap, Vice Chair of Primetown applied on March

11, 1999 for a refund or credit of income tax which
Primetown paid in 1997.
2. He claimed that they are entitled for a refund because
they suffered losses that year due to the increase of
cost of labor and materials, etc.
3. However, despite the losses, they still paid their
quarterly income tax and remitted creditable
withholding tax from real estate sales to BIR. Hence,
they were claiming for a refund.
4. On May 13, 1999, revenue officer Elizabeth Santos
required Primetown to submit additional documents to
which Primetown complied with.
5. However, its claim was not acted upon which
prompted it to file a petition for review in CTA on April
14, 2000.
6. CTA dismissed the petition as it was filed beyond the 2year prescriptive period for filing a judicial claim for
tax refund according to Sec 229 of NIRC.
7. According to CTA, the two-year period is equivalent to
730 days pursuant to Art 13 of NCC.
8. Since Primetown filed its final adjustment return on
April 14, 1998 and that year 2000 was a leap year, the
petition was filed 731 days after Primetown filed its
final adjusted return. Hence, beyond the reglementary
period.
9. Primetown appealed to CA. CA reversed the decision of
CTA. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: W/N petition was filed within the two-year period
HELD: Pursuant to EO 292 or the Administrative Code of
1987, a year shall be understood to be 12 calendar months.
The SC defined a calendar month as a month designated in
the calendar without regard to the number of days it may
contain. The court held that Administrative Code of 1987
impliedly repealed Art 13 of NCC as the provisions are
irreconcilable. Primetown is entitled for the refund since it is
filed within the 2-year reglementary period.

Art. 15-17 - Miciano v. Brimo

Facts:
1. Juan Miciano, judicial administrator of the estate in
question, filed a scheme of partition.
2. Andre Brimo, one of the brothers of the deceased
(Joseph Brimo) opposed Micianos participation in the
inheritance.
3. Joseph Brimo is a Turkish citizen.
ISSUE: Whether Turkish law or Philippine law will be the basis
on the distribution of Joseph Brimos estates.
HELD: Though the last part of the second clause of the will
expressly said that it be made and disposed of in
accordance with the laws in force in the Philippine Island,
this condition, described as impossible conditions, shall be
considered as not imposed and shall not prejudice the heir or
legatee in any manner whatsoever, even should the testator
otherwise provide. Impossible conditions are further defined
as those contrary to law or good morals. Thus, national law
of the testator shall govern in his testamentary dispositions.
The court approved the scheme of partition submitted
by the judicial administrator, in such manner as to include
Andre Brimo, as one of the legatees.
Art. 15 17; Van Dorn v. Romillo
Facts:
1. Petitioner is a Filipino citizen while respondent is an
American. They were married in Hong Kong. After their
marriage, they established their residence in the
Philippines.
2. On Dec. 18, 1975, the parties were divorced in
Nevada, US. Petitioner also re-married in Nevada, this
time to Theodore Van Dorn.
3. Respondent filed suit against petitioner, stating that
Van Dorns business is conjugal property of the parties
23

and asking that Van Dorn be ordered, among others, to

declare Romillo with right to manage conjugal
property.
4. Van Dorn moved to dismiss the case on the ground
that cause of action is barred by the divorce
proceedings wherein respondent acknowledged that
Van Dorn had no community property.
5. RTC Pasay denied Motion to Dismiss on the ground that
property involved is located in the Philippines so that
the Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case.
6. Denial is now the subject of the Certiorari proceeding.
ISSUE: WON the divorce is valid and binding in this
jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local law and public
policy
HELD: YES. It is true that owing to the nationality principle
embodied in Art. 15 of the CC, only Philippine nationals are
covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same
being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and
morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad which
may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid
according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in
Nevada released private respondents from the marriage the
standards of American law, under which divorce decree
dissolves the marriage.
Art. 15-17; Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera
FACTS:
1. Imelda M. Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, was married with
private respondent, Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German
national before the Registrar of Births, Marriages and
Deaths at Friedensweiler, Federal Republic of Germany.
They have a child who was born on April 20, 1980 and
named Isabella Pilapil Geiling.
2. Conjugal
disharmony
eventuated
and
private
respondent initiated a divorce proceeding against

petitioner in Germany before the Schoneberg Local

Court in January 1983.
3. The petitioner then filed an action for legal separation,
support and separation of property before the RTC
Manila on January 23, 1983.
4. The decree of divorce was promulgated on January 15,
1986 on the ground of failure of marriage of the
spouses. The custody of the child was granted to the
petitioner.
5. On June 27, 1986, private respondent filed 2
complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila
alleging that while still married to Imelda, latter had
an affair with William Chia as early as 1982 and
another man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983.
ISSUE: WON Geiling has the legal capacity at the time
of the filing of the complaint for adultery, taking into
consideration that it was done after obtaining a divorce
decree
HELD: The law specifically provided that in prosecution for
adultery and concubinage, the person who can legally file the
complaint should be the offended spouse and nobody else.
Though in this case, it appeared that private respondent is
the offended spouse, the latter obtained a valid divorce in his
country, the Federal Republic of Germany, and said divorce
and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines in
so far as he is concerned.
Thus, under the same
consideration and rationale, private respondent is no longer
the husband of petitioner and has no legal standing to
commence the adultery case under the imposture that he
was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.
Art. 15-17 Civil laws; Govt. v. Frank
1. In the city of Chicago, defendant entered into a
contract for a period of 2 years with the plaintiff, by
which defendant was to receive a salary per year as a
24

2.

3.
4.
5.
6.

stenographer. They also agreed that Frank was to be

paid in advance the expenses incurred in traveling
from Chicago to Manila
According to the contract, in case of violation of its
terms on the defendants part, he should be liable for
the expenses incurred in traveling from Chicago to
Manila and one-half salary paid during that period
Frank arrived in the Philippines and was paid halfsalary
Frank left the service and refused to make further
compliance with the terms of the contract
Insular Gov. commenced an action in the CFI claiming
that it is entitled to recover the expenses incurred by
Frank
Frank, now plaintiff before the SC, claims, among
others, that under the laws of the Philippines at the
time the contract was made, male persons in said
country did not reach their majority until they had
attained the age of 23 years. Therefore, he was not
liable under said contract, contending that the laws of
the Philippines governed.

ISSUE: WON Frank is not liable under said contract because

accordingly, the laws of the Philippines apply

Art. 15 17; Barnuevo v. Fuster

BARNUEVO V. FUSTER (1913)
Short summary: Spanish subjects get married in Spain, but
wanted to divorce in RP. Wife further claims the refund of the
30k Spanish dollars which is allegedly her paraphernal
property. Court held that even if divorce is not allowed in RP,
the court could still exercise jurisdiction over the parties who
are domiciled in RP and it is not divested jurisdiction by the
subject matter.
Facts:
Gabriel FUSTER and Constanza Yanez were
>married in Spain 1875
>1899: made an agreement in public document that they
resolved to separate and live apart
>1909: Constanza commenced DIVORCE proceedings vs.
Gabriel for Adultery, praying for:
Decree of divorce
Conjugal society liquidated

HELD: No. No rule is better settled in law than that matters

bearing upon the execution, interpretation, and validity of a
contract are determined by the law of the place where the
contract is made. Matters connected with performance are
regulated by the law prevailing at the place of performance.
Remedies, such as the brining of suit, admissibility of
evidence, and the statute of limitations, depend upon the law
of the place where the action is brought.

Share adjudicated to her

In this case, the plaintiff being qualified to enter into contract

at the place and time the contract was made, he cannot
plead infancy as a defense at the place where the contract is
enforced.

Payment of support

Payment of support
(probably the property of the spouses belonging to the
conjugal property are all located in RP)
TC: for CONSTANZA
suspension of life in common between plaintiff and defendant

Division of communal property

25

>>>BOTH Parties appealed: Alleged dowry: WON it should be

returned to CONSTANZA
WON RP courts are competent to decree the divorce? YES
Authority of jurisdictional power of courts to decree a divorce
is NOT COMPRISED W/n the personal status of the husband
and wife
-whole theory of the statutes and the rights which belong to
everyone does not go beyond the sphere of private law
-authority and jurisdiction of courts are matters of public or
political law
-jurisdiction of courts and other questions relating to
PROCEDURE are considered to be of a public nature,
submitted to the TERRITORIAL PRINCIPLE
All persons have to demand justice in a court which would
have coercive means to enforce any decision they may
render
Justice should be administered WITHOUT TAKING INTO ANY
ACCOUNT THE STATE TO WHICH THE LITIGANTS BELONG
-all civilized nations are interested in doing justice, not alone
to their people, but to those foreigners who contract w/n the
country or outside of it juridical ties which in some manner
affect their sovereignty
HERE
CFI had jurisdiction over the person of the litigants: residents
of Manila, had domicile in Manila
THEREFORE: CFI had power and jurisdiction to try actions for
divorce. Not divested of jurisdiction by reason of the subject
matter of the litigation
Testate Estate of Bohanan v. Bohanan

Doctrine:
As in accordance with Article 10 of the old Civil
Code, the validity of testamentary dispositions are to be
governed by the national law of the testator provided that
the law be evidenced in the court.
FACTS: Magdalena C. Bohanan were married on January 30,
1909, and that divorce was granted to him on May 20, 1922.
Decedent in this case gave out of the total estate
(after deducting administration expenses) of P211,639.33 in
cash, his grandson P90,819.67 and one-half of all shares of
stock of several mining companies and to his brother and
sister the same amount. To his children he gave a legacy of
only P6,000 each, or a total of P12,000.
The wife Magadalena C. Bohanan and her two children
question the validity of the testamentary provisions disposing
of the estate in the manner above indicated, claiming that
they have been deprived of the legitimate that the laws of
the form concede to them.

Lower Court Ruling: Dismissed the objections filed by

Magdalena C. Bohanan, Mary Bohanan and Edward Bohanan
to the project of partition submitted by the executor and
approving the said project.
The testator permanent residence or domicile in the
United States depended upon his personal intent or desire,
and he selected Nevada as his homicide and therefore at the
time of his death, he was a citizen of that state.
Wherefore, the court finds that the testator C. O.
Bohanan was at the time of his death a citizen of the United
States and of the State of Nevada and declares that his will
and testament, Exhibit A, is fully in accordance with the laws
of the state of Nevada and admits the same to probate.
26

ISSUES:
1. Whether the testamentary dispositions, especially
those for the children which are short of the legitime
given them by the Civil Code of the Philippines, are
valid NO.
RATIO: The court below had found that the testator and
Magdalena C. Bohanan were married on January 30, 1909,
and that divorce was granted to him on May 20, 1922; that
sometime in 1925, Magdalena C. Bohanan married Carl
Aaron and this marriage was subsisting at the time of the
death of the testator. Since no right to share in the
inheritance in favor of a divorced wife exists in the State of
Nevada and since the court below had already found that
there was no conjugal property between the testator and
Magdalena C. Bohanan, the latter can now have no longer
claim to pay portion of the estate left by the testator.
Edward and Mary Lydia, who had received legacies in
the amount of P6,000 each only, and, therefore, have not
been given their shares in the estate which, in accordance
with the laws of the forum, should be two-thirds of the estate
left by the testator.
The old Civil Code, which is applicable to this case
because the testator died in 1944, expressly provides that
successional rights to personal property are to be earned by
the national law of the person whose succession is in
question.
In the proceedings for the probate of the will, it was
found out and it was decided that the testator was a citizen
of the State of Nevada because he had selected this as his
domicile and his permanent residence. (See Decision dated
April 24, 1950, supra). So the question at issue is whether
the testementary dispositions, especially hose for the
children which are short of the legitime given them by the

Civil Code of the Philippines, are valid. It is not disputed that

the laws of Nevada allow a testator to dispose of all his
properties by will (Sec. 9905, Complied Nevada Laws of
1925, supra). The law of Nevada, being a foreign law can
only be proved in our courts in the form and manner provided
for by our Rules, which are as follows:
Art. 15-17; Bellis v. Bellis
1. Amos G. Bellis was a citizen of the State of Texas and
of the United States. He had five legitimate children
with his first wife (whom he divorced), three legitimate
children with his second wife (who survived him) and,
finally, three illegitimate children.
2. 6 years prior Amos Bellis death, he executed two (2)
wills (one which shall be governed by properties
located in Philippines and the other for those covered
under Texas), apportioning the remainder of his estate
and properties to his seven surviving children.
3. The appellants filed their oppositions to the project of
partition claiming that they have been deprived of
their legitimes to which they were entitled according to
the Philippine law.
4. Appellants argued that the deceased wanted his
Philippine estate to be governed by the Philippine law,
thus the creation of two separate wills.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Philippine law be applied in the case in
the determination of the illegitimate childrens successional
rights
RULING:
Court ruled that provision in a foreigners will to the effect
that his properties shall be distributed in accordance with
Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal and
void, for his national law cannot be ignored in view of those
27

matters that Article 10 now Article 16 of the Civil Code

states said national law should govern.
Where the testator was a citizen of Texas and domiciled in
Texas, the intrinsic validity of his will should be governed by
his national law. Since Texas law does not require legitimes,
then his will, which deprived his illegitimate children of the
legitimes, is valid.
The Supreme Court held that the illegitimate children are not
entitled to the legitimes under the texas law, which is the
national law of the deceased.
Art. 15-17; Aznar v. Garcia
Facts:
1. Edward S. Christensen, though born in New York,
migrated to California where he resided and
consequently was considered a California Citizen for a
period of nine years to 1913.
2. He came to the Philippines where he became a
domiciliary until the time of his death. However, during
the entire period of his residence in this country, he
had always considered himself as a citizen of
California.
3. In his will, executed in the Philippines, he instituted an
acknowledged
natural
daughter,
Maria
Lucy
Christensen as his only heir but left a legacy of some
money in favor of Helen Christensen Garcia who, in a
decision rendered by the Supreme Court had been
declared as an acknowledged natural daughter of his.
4. Counsel of Helen claims that under Art. 16 (2) of the
civil code, California law should be applied, the matter
is returned back to the law of domicile, that Philippine
law is ultimately applicable, that the share of Helen

must be increased in view of successional rights of

illegitimate children under Philippine laws.
5. On the other hand, counsel for daughter Maria , in as
much that it is clear under Art, 16 (2) of the Mew Civil
Code, the national of the deceased must apply, our
courts must apply internal law of California on the
matter.
6. Under California law, there are no compulsory heirs
and consequently a testator should dispose any
property possessed by him in absolute dominion and
that finally, illegitimate children not being entitled to
anything under California law, the will of the deceased
giving the bulk of the property to Maria Lucy must
remain undisturbed.
ISSUE: Whether the Philippine law or the California law
should apply
HELD: Since the conflicts rule of California refers back the
matter to the Philippines (place of domicile), our courts have
no alternative but to accept the referring back to us. If our
courts will to do otherwise and throw back the matter to
California, the problem would be tossed back and forth
between states concerned, resulting in an international
football.
Art. 15-17; Roehr v. Rodriguez
1. Petitioner Wolfgang O. Roehr, a German citizen,
married private respondent Carmen Rodriguez, a
Filipina, on December 11, 1980 in Germany. Their
marriage was subsequently ratified on February 14,
1981 in Tayasan, Negros Oriental. Out of their union
were born Carolynne and Alexandra Kristine.
2. Carmen filed a petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage before the Makati Regional Trial Court (RTC).
Wolfgang filed a motion to dismiss, but it was denied.
28

3. Meanwhile, Wolfgang obtained a decree of divorce

from the Court of First Instance of HamburgBlankenese. Said decree also provides that the
parental custody of the children should be vested to
Wolfgang.
4. Wolfgang filed another motion to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction as a divorce decree had already been
promulgated, and said motion was granted by Public
Respondent RTC Judge Salonga.
5. Carmen filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, with
a prayer that the case proceed for the purpose of
determining the issues of custody of children and the
distribution of the properties between her and
Wolfgang. Judge Salonga partially setting aside her
previous order for the purpose of tackling the issues of
support and custody of their children.
ISSUE: W/N Judge Salonga's act was valid when she assumed
and retained jurisdiction as regards child custody and
support.
HELD: YES. As a general rule, divorce decrees obtained by
foreigners in other countries are recognizable in our
jurisdiction. But the legal effects thereof, e.g. on custody,
care and support of the children, must still be determined by
our courts.
Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata to
a foreign judgment, such as the award of custody to
Wolfgang by the German court, it must be shown that the
parties opposed to the judgment had been given ample
opportunity to do so on grounds allowed under Rule 39,
Section 50 of the Rules of Court (now Rule 39, Section 48,
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure).
In the present case, it cannot be said that private
respondent was given the opportunity to challenge the
judgment of the German court so that there is basis for
declaring that judgment as res judicata with regard to the

rights of Wolfgang to have parental custody of their two

children. The proceedings in the German court were
summary. As to what was the extent of Carmens
participation in the proceedings in the German court, the
records remain unclear.
Absent any finding that private respondent is unfit to
obtain custody of the children, the trial court was correct in
setting the issue for hearing to determine the issue of
parental custody, care, support and education mindful of the
best interests of the children.
Art. 15-17; Eugenio v. Velez
Facts:
1. Petition of habeas corpus was filed before RTC of
Misamis Oriental by the siblings of Vitaliana. They
alleged that Vitaliana was forcibly taken from her
residence despite her desire to escape from Tomas
Eugenio, whom she was living with.
2. Eugenio reasoned that a corpse cannot be subject of
habeas corpus proceedings and that he had already
obtained the papers for her burial. As her common law
husband, he claimed legal custody of her body.
3. Defendants contend, however, that Eugenio is in no
anyway related to Vitaliana and therefore, wrong with
the Vargases duty to bury her body being the next of
kin in the Philippines, they are legal custodians of the
dead body of their sister under the CC (305 and 308).
4. Petitioner claims that he is the spouse contemplated
under Art. 294, the term spouse used therein not
being preceded by any qualification. Hence, it may be
concluded that he is the rightful custodian of
Vitalianas body.
5. Vitalianas brothers and sister contend otherwise.
ISSUE: WON
marriages

Philippine

Law

recognizes

common

law

29

HELD: No. A man and woman legally married who cohabit for
many years as husband and wife, etc. may be considered
legally married in common law jurisdiction but not in the
Philippines. In addition, Eugenio has a subsisting marriage
with another woman, a legal impediment which disqualified
him from even legally marrying Vitaliana. Art. 332 of RPC
cannot be used in view of the application in the case at bar.
The provisions of the CC must be contemplated unless
expressly providing to the contrary that spouse means that
a lawfully wedded spouse. Eugenio was not a lawfullywedded spouse to her. In fact, he was not legally capacitated
to marry her in her lifetime.
Custody of the dead body of Vitaliana was correctly awarded
to her surviving brothers and sisters.
Art. 15-17; Republic v. Iyoy
1. The case is a petition for review by the RP represented
by the Office of the Solicitor General on certiorari
praying for the reversal of the decision of the CA dated
July 30, 2001 affirming the judgment of the RTC
declaring the marriage of Crasus L. Iyoy (respondent)
and Ada Rosal-Iyoy null and void based on Article 36.
2. On December 16, 1961 Crasus Iyoy and Ada Rosal-Iyoy
married each other, they had 5 children. In 1984, Fely
went to the US, in the same year she sent letters to
Crasus asking him to sign divorce papers.
3. In 1985, Crasus learned that Fely married an American
and had a child.
4. Fely went back to the Philippines on several occasions,
during one she attended the marriage of one of her
children in which she used her husbands last name as
hers in the invitation.
5. March 25, 1997, Crasus filed a complaint for
declaration of nullity of marriage alleging that Felys

acts brought danger and dishonor to the family and

were manifestations of her psychological incapacity.
6. Crasus submitted his testimony, the certification of the
recording of their marriage contract, and the invitation
where Fely used her newhusbands last name as
evidence.
7. Fely denied the claims and asserted that Crasus was a
drunkard, womanizer, had no job, and that since 1988
she was already an American citizen and not covered
by our laws. The RTC found the evidences sufficient
and granted the decree; it was affirmed in the CA.
ISSUE: WON the divorce decree obtained by Fely can be
recognized under Philippine laws
Held: No. Art. 26, par. 2 refers to a special situation wherein
one of the married couple is a foreigner who divorces his or
her Filipino spouse. By its plain and literal interpretation, the
said provision cannot be applied to the case of respondent
Crasus and his wife Fely because at the time Fely obtained
her divorce, she was still a Filipino citizen. Although exact
date was not established, Fely herfself admitted in her
Answer filed before the RTC that she obtained a divorce from
respondent Crasus after she left for US in 1984, afterwhich
she married her American husband in 1985. In the same
Answer she alleged that she had been an American citizen
since 1988. At the time she filed for divorce, Fely was still a
Filipino citizen and pursuant to the NATIONALITY PRINCIPLE
embodied in Art. 15 of the Civil Code, she was still bound by
Philippine laws on family rights and duties, status, condition,
and legal capacity even when she was already living abroad.
Philippine laws, then and even until now, do not allow and
recognize divorce between Filipino spouses. Thus, Fely could
not have validly obtained a divorce from Crasus.

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