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SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
BenitezBadua vs. Court of Appeals
*
G.R.No.105625.January24,1994.
469
VOL.229,JANUARY24,1994
469
PETITIONforreviewoncertiorariofadecisionoftheCourt
ofAppeals.
ThefactsarestatedintheopinionoftheCourt.
Reynaldo M. Alcantaraforpetitioner.
Augustus Cesar E. Azuraforprivaterespondents.
PUNO,J.:
This is a petition for review of the Decision of the 12th
Division of the Court of Appeals
in CAG.R. No. CV No.
1
30862datedMay29,1992.
________________
1
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SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
BenitezBadua vs. Court of Appeals
ThefactsshowthatthespousesVicenteBenitezandIsabel
ChipongianownedvariouspropertiesespeciallyinLaguna.
Isabel died on April 25, 1982. Vicente followed her in the
graveonNovember13,1989.Hediedintestate.
The fight for administration of Vicentes estate ensued.
On September 24, 1990, private respondents Victoria
BenitezLirio and Feodor Benitez Aguilar (Vicentes sister
andnephew,respectively)institutedSp.Proc.No.797(90)
beforetheRTCofSanPabloCity,4thJudicialRegion,Br.
30.Theyprayedfortheissuanceoflettersofadministration
of Vicentes estate in favor of private respondent Aguilar.
Theyalleged,inter alia,viz:
xxx
4.Thedecedentissurvivedbynootherheirsorrelativesbethey
ascendants or descendants, whether legitimate, illegitimate or
legally adopted; despite claims or representation to the contrary,
petitioners can well and truly establish, given the chance to do so,
that said decedent and his spouse Isabel Chipongian who pre
deceased him, and whose estate had earlier been settled extra
judicial,werewithoutissueand/orwithoutdescendantswhatsoever,
andthatoneMarissaBenitezBaduawhowasraisedandcaredfor
bythemsincechildhoodis,infact,notrelatedtothembyblood,nor
legallyadopted,andisthereforenotalegalheir;xxx
OnNovember2,1990,petitioneropposedthepetition.She
alleged that she is the sole heir of the deceased Vicente
Benitezandcapableofadministeringhisestate.Theparties
further exchanged reply and rejoinder to buttress their
legalpostures.
The trial court then received evidence on the issue of
petitionersheirshiptotheestateofthedeceased.Petitioner
tried to prove that she is the only legitimate child of the
spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian. She
submitted documentary evidence, among others: (1) her
CertificateofLiveBirth(Exh.3);(2)BaptismalCertificate
(Exh.4);(3)IncomeTaxReturnsandInformationSheetfor
MembershipwiththeGSISofthelateVicentenamingher
as his daughter (Exhs. 10 to 21); and (4) School Records
(Exhs.5&6).Shealsotestifiedthatthesaidspousesreared
andcontinuouslytreatedherastheirlegitimatedaughter.
On the other hand, private respondents tried to prove,
mostly thru testimonial evidence, that the said spouses
failed to beget a child during their marriage; that the late
Isabel,then
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VOL.229,JANUARY24,1994
471
appellatecourtstates:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from herein is REVERSED
andanotheroneentereddeclaringthatappelleeMarissaBenitezis
notthebiologicaldaughterorchildbynatureofthespouseVicente
O.BenitezandIsabelChipongianand,therefore,notalegalheirof
the deceased Vicente O. Benitez. Her opposition to the petition for
the appointment of an administrator of the intestate estate of the
deceasedVicenteO.Benitezis,consequently,DENIED;saidpetition
and the proceedings already conducted therein reinstated; and the
lower court is directed to proceed with the hearing of Special
ProceedingNo.SP797(90)inaccordancewithlawandtheRules.
Costsagainstappellee.
SOORDERED.
Injuxtaposition,theappellatecourtheldthatthetrialcourt
erredinapplyingArticles166and170oftheFamilyCode.
Inthispetitionforreview,petitionercontends:
1. TheHonorableCourtofAppealscommittederrorof
law and misapprehension of facts when it failed to
apply the provisions, more particularly, Arts. 164,
166,170,and171oftheFamilyCodeinthis
________________
2
She died during the pendency of the present action, and was
substitutedbyherdaughters,MayraB.LirioandNievaL.Islaandson,
JoseB.Lirio,Jr.
472
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SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
BenitezBadua vs. Court of Appeals
case and in adopting or upholding private
respondents theory that the instant case does not
involve an action to impugn the legitimacy of a
child;
2. Assuming arguendo that private respondents can
question or impugn directly or indirectly, the
legitimacy of Marissas birth, still the respondent
appellateCourtcommittedgraveabuseofdiscretion
when it gave more weight to the testimonial
evidence of witnesses of private respondents whose
credibility and demeanor have not convinced the
trial court of the truth and sincerity thereof, than
the documentary and testimonial evidence of the
nowpetitionerMarissaBenitezBadua;
3. The Honorable Court of Appeals has decided the
case in a way not in accord with law or with
applicable decisions of the Supreme Court, more
particularly,onprescriptionorlaches.
Wefindnomerittothepetition.
PetitionersinsistenceontheapplicabilityofArticles164,
166, 170 and 171 of the Family Code to the case at bench
cannotbesustained.Thesearticlesprovide:
VOL.229,JANUARY24,1994
473
Acarefulreadingoftheabovearticleswillshowthatthey
do not contemplate a situation, like in the instant case,
where a child is alleged not to be the child of nature or
biological child of a certain couple. Rather, these articles
governasituationwhereahusband(orhisheirs)deniesas
hisownachildofhiswife.Thus,underArticle166,itisthe
husband who can impugn the legitimacy of said child by
proving: (1) it was physically impossible for him to have
sexualintercourse,withhiswifewithinthefirst120daysof
the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the
child; (2) that for biological or other scientific reasons, the
child could not have been his child; (3) that in case of
children conceived through artificial insemination, the
written authorization or ratification by either parent was
obtained through mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation or
undueinfluence.Articles170and171reinforcethisreading
as they speak of the prescriptive period within which the
husband or any of his heirsshouldfile
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SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
BenitezBadua vs. Court of Appeals
theactionimpugningthelegitimacyofsaidchild.Doubtless
then,theappellatecourtdidnoterrwhenitrefusedtoapply
thesearticlestothecaseatbench.Forthecaseatbenchis
notonewheretheheirsofthelateVicentearecontending
thatpetitionerisnothischildbyIsabel.Rather,theirclear
submission is that petitioner was not born to Vicente and
Isabel. Our ruling in CabatbatLim vs. Intermediate
AppellateCourt,166SCRA451,457citedintheimpugned
decisionisapropos,viz:
PetitionersrecoursetoArticle263oftheNewCivilCode[nowArt.
170oftheFamilyCode]isnotwelltaken.Thislegalprovisionrefers
to an action to impugn legitimacy. It is inapplicable to this case
becausethisisnotanactiontoimpugnthelegitimacyofachild,but
an action of the private respondents to claim their inheritance as
legal heirs of their childless deceased aunt. They do not claim that
petitioner Violeta Cabatbat Lim is an illegitimate child of the
deceased, but that she is not the decedents child at all. Being
neither legally adopted child, nor an acknowledged natural child,
nor a child by legal fiction of Esperanza Cabatbat, Violeta is not a
legalheirofthedeceased.
strong and convincing that she is not, but that said couple being
childless and desirous as they were of having a child, the late
VicenteO.BeniteztookMarissafromsomewherewhilestillababy,
and without he and his wifes legally adopting her treated, cared
for,reared,considered,andlovedherastheirowntruechild,giving
herthestatusasnotso,suchthatsheherselfhadbelievedthatshe
wasreallytheironlydaughterandentitledtoinheritfromthemas
such.
The strong and convincing evidence referred to by us are the
following:
First, the evidence is very cogent and clear that Isabel
Chipongianneverbecamepregnantand,therefore,neverdelivered
achild.Isabelsownonlybrotherandsibling,Dr.LinoChipongian,
admittedthathissisterhadalreadybeenmarriedfortenyearsand
wasalreadyabout36
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VOL.229,JANUARY24,1994
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delivered a baby, and that when she saw the baby Marissa in her
cribonedaywhenshewenttoIsabelshousetosetthelattershair,
shewassurprisedandaskedthelatterwherethebabycamefrom,
and she told me that the child was brought by Atty. Benitez and
toldmenottotellaboutit(p.10,tsnNov.29,1990).
Thefactsofawomansbecomingpregnantandgrowingbigwith
child, as well as her delivering a baby, are matters that cannot be
hidden from the public eye, and so is the fact that a woman never
becamepregnantandcouldnothave,therefore,deliveredababyat
all.
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SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
BenitezBadua vs. Court of Appeals
Hence,ifsheissuddenlyseenmotheringandcaringforababyasif
it were her own, especially at the rather late age of 36 (the age of
Isabel Chipongian when appellee Marissa Benitez was allegedly
born),wecanbesurethatsheisnotthetruemotherofthatbaby.
Second,appelleesbirthcertificateExh.3withthelateVicente
O. Benitez appearing as the informant, is highly questionable and
suspicious.ForifVicenteswifeIsabel,whowasalready36yearsold
at the time of the childs supposed birth, was truly the mother of
thatchild,asreportedbyVicenteinherbirthcertificate,shouldthe
child not have been born in a hospital under the experienced,
skillful, and caring hands of Isabels obstetriciangynecologist Dr.
ConstantinoManahan,sincedeliveryofachildatthatlateageby
Isabel would have been difficult and quite risky to her health and
even life? How come, then, that as appearing in appellees birth
certificate, Marissa was supposedly born at the Benitez home in
Avenida Rizal, Nagcarlan, Laguna, with no physician or even a
midwifeattending?
Atthisjuncture,itmightbemeettomentionthatithasbecomea
practice in recent times for people who want to avoid the expense
andtroubleofajudicialadoptiontosimplyregisterthechildastheir
supposed child in the civil registry. Perhaps Atty. Vicente O.
Benitez, though a lawyer himself, thought that he could avoid the
trouble if not the expense of adopting the child Marissa through
court proceedings by merely putting himself and his wife as the
parents of the child in her birth certificate. Or perhaps he had
intendedtolegallyadoptthechildwhenshegrewalittleolderbut
didnotcomearounddoingsoeitherbecausehewastoobusyorfor
someotherreason.Butdefinitely,themereregistrationofachildin
hisorherbirthcertificateasthechildofthesupposedparentsisnot
a valid adoption, does not confer upon the child the status of an
adoptedchildandthelegalrightsofsuchchild,andevenamounts
to simulation of the childs birth or falsification of his or her birth
certificate,whichisapublicdocument.
Third, if appellee Marissa Benitez is truly the real, biological
daughter of the late Vicente O. Benitez and his wife Isabel
Chipongian, why did he and Isabels only brother and sibling Dr.
NiloChipongian,afterIsabelsdeathonApril25,1982,stateinthe
extrajudicial settlement Exh. E that they executed of her estate,
that we are the sole heirs of the deceased ISABEL CHIPONGIAN
because she died without descendants or ascendants? Dr.
Chipongian, placed on the witness stand by appellants, testified
that it was his brotherinlaw Atty. Vicente O. Benitez who
preparedsaiddocumentandthathesignedthesameonlybecause
the latter told him to do so (p. 24, tsn Nov. 22, 1990). But why
wouldAtty.Benitezmakesuchstatementinsaiddocument,unless
appellee Marissa Benitez is really not his and his wifes daughter
anddescendantand,therefore,nothisdeceasedswifelegalheir?As
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VOL.229,JANUARY24,1994
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(Exhs.F1,F1AandF1B)
We say odd and strange, for if Marissa Benitez is really the
daughterofthespousesVicenteO.BenitezandIsabelChipongian,
it would not have been necessary for Isabel to write and plead for
theforegoingrequeststoherhusband,sinceMarissawouldbetheir
legalheirbyoperationoflaw.Obviously,IsabelChipongianhadto
implore and supplicate her husband to give appellee although
withoutanylegalpapersherpropertieswhenshedies,andlikewise
forherhusbandtogiveMarissathepropertiesthathewouldinherit
fromher(Isabel),sinceshewellknewthatMarissaisnottrulytheir
daughter and could not be their legal heir unless her (Isabels)
husbandmakesherso.
Finally, the deceased Vicente O. Benitez elder sister Victoria
Benitez Lirio even testified that her brother Vicente gave the date
December 8 as Marissas birthday in her birth certificate because
thatdateisthebirthdayoftheir(VictoriaandVicentes)mother.It
is indeed too much of a coincidence for the child Marissa and the
motherofVicenteandVictoriatohavethesamebirthdayunlessit
is true, as Victoria testified, that Marissa was only registered by
Vicenteashisandhiswifeschildandthattheygaveherthebirth
dateofVicentesmother.
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SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
BenitezBadua vs. Court of Appeals