26/11 Plus One

Enough has already been said about ‘terrorism’ and about the extremely feeble
‘security landscape’ of our country. We have heard subject-matter experts talk
fervently about terrorism and its impact and how it is a potent threat NOT only to
India but the world at large. We have read, re-read, dissected, analyzed, and
reviewed each one of the media reports published, passionately highlighting
the series of bombings and other terrorist activities on the Indian mainland. We
the people of India have also heard the decision makers of our country beat the age
old rhetoric of a vigorous response and taking sound anti-terror measures, both on
diplomatic and national security front. On the first anniversary of 26/11, let
us attempt to logically review the year gone by. The focus, for this piece of
writing, is on 26/11, homeland security and cross-border terrorism.

It’s an open secret that the Indian sub-continent is witnessing what is unarguably
one of its most traumatic phases. Terrorism is not new to India and this fact is
largely attributable to the regional instabilities that exist. Pakistan – our traditional
adversary more than a neighbor, and Afganistan have regularly exported trained
terrorists into our country. North-East remains a disturbed region with its share of
separatist elements. And now, Naxals are practically knocking on the doors of most
of our mega cities (as of now, Naxals are active across approximately 220 districts
out of a total of 626 in India).

While terrorism has prevailed for the better part of our country’s independent
existence, like the Parliament attack of Dec 2001, the Mumbai terror attacks
marked a turning point in terrorism in India. The highly coordinated attacks on
Mumbai would be better classified as a ‘military raid’ than a ‘terrorist strike’ owing
to the similarity it bore to the commando tactics specific to the
aforementioned special operation viz., detailed planning, recce and
selection of multiple targets, achievement of operational surprise, small team
concept, clock-work precision, effective and coordinated use of weapons and
ammunition etc. The attacks involved five small teams of terrorists who struck at a
total of ten different locations. A first-of-its-kind attack comprising a complex mix of
tactics – including random shootings at public places at peak hours, and bomb
blasts followed by the three-day long hostage situation at two of the city's iconic
hotels and a Jewish residential centre by heavily armed terrorists – was a indicator
of the heightened operational efficiency and the easy access to targets of terror
outfits.

The Mumbai carnage left approximately 174 dead and over 300 injured. The highly
visible live-media coverage of the three day long Mumbai attacks resulted in
a massive impact on the public opinion and the psyche of the masses in
India. Consequent to the Mumbai terror attacks, other than responding to the public
mood, India should have seen a radical shift in the anti-terrorism strategy and
priorities of the government; a scenario very much akin to that experienced by USA
and other western countries following the 9/11 attacks. While there haven’t been
any major incidents in the last one year as far as terrorist strikes are concerned, our
country is still as vulnerable. Indian government’s stance for dealing with such
issues has largely been reactive than proactive. Last year, the Indian government
announced a mixed bag of strategic initiatives to beef up its security
machinery including creation of National Investigation Agency (NIA), national
identity management system, new counter-insurgency and anti-terrorism schools,
expansion of NSG, and creation of a coastal command. Mixed bag – firstly, because
the focus is not clearly on prevention and pre-emption and secondly, the success of
these initiatives will depend directly on our ability to implement them at a national
scale. Even with expansion of NSG and capacity building of state level police
forces (with specialized CT units), they would still be post-event reactionary
forces. There is a great deal of improvement in intelligence gathering and collation
but little is known about the improvement in intelligence assessment and sharing
capabilities (apparently, these were the major lacunae that resulted in the
unfortunate event).

Though it can be easily agreed upon that our preparedness levels have gone up
since 26/11/2008 and that there is coordination at the senior most level of decision
making apparatus in the country for the first time, it is too early to congratulate
ourselves for the last 12 months as we need to understand the developments
in Pakistan. No major terrorist strike in India (outside the state of J&K)
is simply resultant of the fact that the terrorists/jihadis are fighting for their own
survival. Some credit also goes to the government for staying on course of
sustaining the diplomatic pressure on Pakistan (something which was not seen
earlier).

We may be better prepared in terms of our response to a terrorist strike or incident

management, but India still needs to go a long way before it can even begin to think
that it is in a position to replicate USA’s success record of terror free eight
years following 9/11 – thanks to the 9/11 commission report and subsequent
creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). We are still some distance
away from developing capabilities to prevent and pre-empt terrorist attacks. Once
the situation stabilizes in our neighborhood, we will probably get back to being
prime target for the terrorists as their infrastructure is yet to be dismantled, which
can be activated and primed at an opportune moment. India cannot afford to be
complacent at this point in time and must continue to implement effective strategic
initiatives for internal security.