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Procedural Issues
a. Whether or not the case presents a justiciable controversy.
Yes
In Francisco, Jr. v. House of Representatives. The argument that impeachment
proceedings are beyond the reach of judicial review was debunked in this wise:
The major difference between the judicial power of the Philippine Supreme Court
and that of the U.S. Supreme Court is that while the power of judicial review is
only impliedlygranted to the U.S. Supreme Court and is discretionary in nature,
that granted to the Philippine Supreme Court and lower courts, as expressly
provided for in the Constitution, is not just a power but also a duty, and it
was given an expanded definition to include the power to correct any grave
abuse of discretion on the part of any government branch or instrumentality.
b. Whether or not judicial review of impeachments undermines their
finality and may also lead to conflicts between Congress and the
judiciary.
The Constitution did not intend to leave the matter of impeachment to the sole
discretion of Congress. Instead, it provided for certain well-defined limits, or in
the language of Baker v. Carr, "judicially discoverable standards" for determining
the validity of the exercise of such discretion, through the power of judicial
review.
There exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of
judicial review over impeachment proceedings would upset the system of checks
and balances.Verily, the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and "one
section is not to be allowed to defeat another." Both are integral components of
the calibrated system of independence and interdependence that insures that no
branch of government act beyond the powers assigned to it by the Constitution.
II.
Substantive issue
A. Whether or not public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing its two assailed
Resolutions.
(Petitioner basically anchors her claim on alleged violation of the due process clause (Art.
III, Sec. 1) and of the one-year bar provision (Art. XI, Sec 3, par. 5) of the Constitution.)
1. Due process of law
i. On the allegations of being bias and vindictiveness of the Respondents chairperson (Niel
Tupas, Jr.).
Representative Niel Tupas, Jr. (Rep. Tupas), is the subject of an investigation she is
conducting, while his father, former Iloilo Governor Niel Tupas, Sr., had been charged by
her with violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act before the
Sandiganbayan. To petitioner, the actions taken by her office against Rep. Tupas and his
father influenced the proceedings taken by public respondent in such a way that bias
and vindictiveness played a big part in arriving at the finding of sufficiency of form and
substance of the complaints against her.
The Court finds petitioners allegations of bias and vindictiveness bereft of merit, there
being hardly any indication thereof. Mere suspicion of partiality does not suffice.[26]
The act of the head of a collegial body cannot be considered as that of the entire body
itself.
In the present case, Rep. Tupas, public respondent informs, did not, in fact, vote and
merely presided over the proceedings when it decided on the sufficiency of form and
substance of the complaints.[29]
ii. Whether or not the indecent and precipitate haste of public respondent in finding the two
complaints sufficient in form and substance is a clear indication of bias.
An abbreviated pace in the conduct of proceedings is not per se an indication of bias,
however. So Santos-Concio v. Department of Justice[31] holds:
Speed in the conduct of proceedings by a judicial or quasi-judicial officer
cannot per se be instantly attributed to an injudicious performance of
functions. For ones prompt dispatch may be anothers undue haste. The
orderly administration of justice remains as the paramount and constant
consideration, with particular regard of the circumstances peculiar to each case.
The presumption of regularity includes the public officers official actuations in all
phases of work. Consistent with such presumption, it was incumbent
upon petitioners to present contradictory evidence other than a mere
tallying of days or numerical calculation. This, petitioners failed to
discharge. The swift completion of the Investigating Panels initial task
cannot be relegated as shoddy or shady without discounting the
presumably regular performance of not just one but five state
prosecutors.
iii. Whether or not public respondent failed to ascertain the sufficiency of form and
substance of the complaints on the basis of the standards set by the Constitution and its
own Impeachment Rules.
provisions
are
self-
Section 3(8) does not, in any circumstance, operate to suspend the entire impeachment
mechanism which the Constitutional Commission took pains in designing even its details.
the Constitution and betrayal of public trust. She concludes that public respondent
gravely abused its discretion when it disregarded its own rules.
Petitioners claim deserves scant consideration.
The Constitution allows the indictment for multiple impeachment offenses, with each
charge representing an article of impeachment, assembled in one set known as the
Articles of Impeachment.[94] It, therefore, follows that an impeachment complaint need
not allege only one impeachable offense.
b. Whether or not the rule on consolidation applies.
Since public respondent, whether motu proprio or upon motion, did not yet order a
consolidation, the Court will not venture to make a determination on this matter, as it
would be premature, conjectural or anticipatory.[97]
Even if the Court assumes petitioners change of stance that the two impeachment
complaints were deemed consolidated,[98] her claim that consolidation is a legal anomaly
fails. Petitioners theory obviously springs from her proceeding = complaint equation
which the Court already brushed aside.