Introduction

A. The Regalian Doctrine

a. Under the Regalian Doctrine, all lands of whatever
classification and other natural resources not otherwise
appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed
to belong to the State which is the source of any asserted right
to ownership of land.
PACIFICO M. VALIAO VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. 170757
Facts:
Pacifico, Lodovico, Ricardo, Bienvenido, all surnamed Valiao, and
Nemesio Grandea filed with the RTC of Kabankalan, Negros
Occidental an application for registration of a parcel of land with an
area of 504,535 square meters, more or less, situated in Barrio
Galicia, Municipality of Ilog, Negros Occidental. A year after, Macario
Zafra and Manuel Yusay filed a Motion to Dismiss the said application
which was supported by the Office of the Solicitor General.
RTC:
The court denied the Motion to Dismiss by the oppositors and grants
the application of the petitioner in the titling of the said lot.
CA:
The CA reverse the decision of the RTC and ruled that the
classification of lands of the public domain is an exclusive prerogative
of the executive department of the government and in the absence of
such classification; the lands remain as unclassified until it is released
therefrom and rendered open to disposition.
Issue:
Whether or not lot no. 2372 of the ilog cadastre is alienable and
disposable land of the public domain and the alleged
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possession of the applicants through their predecessors-ininterest is sufficient to sustain their claim for prescription
Ruling:
The court held that all lands of the public domain belong to the State,
which is the source of any asserted right to any ownership of
land. All lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership
are presumed to belong to the State and the burden of proof in
overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the
public domain is on the person applying for registration (or claiming
ownership), who must prove that the land subject of the application
is alienable
or disposable.
To
overcome
this
presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be established that
the land subject
of
the application
(or
claim)
is alienable
or disposable.
In the case at bar, the petitioner failed to prove that (1) the subject
property was classified as part of the disposable and alienable land of
the public domain; and (2) they and their predecessors-in-interest
had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation thereof under a bona fide claim of ownership since
June 12, 1945 or earlier, their application for confirmation and
registration of the subject property under PD 1529 should be denied.

Secretary of the DENR v Yap

G.R. 172775
**********There are two consolidated petitions. The first is G.R. No.
167707, a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court
of Appeals (CA) affirming that of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in
Kalibo, Aklan, which granted the petition for declaratory relief filed by
respondents-claimants Mayor Jose Yap, et al. and ordered the survey
of Boracay for titling purposes. The second is G.R. No. 173775, a
petition for prohibition, mandamus, and nullification of Proclamation
No. 1064 issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo classifying
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Boracay into reserved forest and agricultural land.

Facts:
GR no. 167707
On April of 1976, the DENR approved the National reservation survey
of Boracay which identified several lots as being occupied by named
persons.
On November of 1978, Pres. Marcos issued PP 1801 declaring
Boracay Island as tourist zones and marine reserves under the
administration of the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA), then later on
approves PTA Circ. 3-82 to implement the said proclamation.
Yap, together with other respondents filed a petition for declaratory
relief with the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan claiming that the said
proclamation prevented them from filing an application for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title or survey of land for titling purposes.
Moreover, they contend that they or through their predecessor-ininterest has been in an open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession of the subject land since time immemorial and they were
paying their realty tax.
Further, the said proclamation did not place Boracay beyond the
commerce of men, classified as a tourist zone, therefore, susceptible
of private ownership. Invoking Sec 48(b) of CA 141 otherwise known
as the Public Land Act, they have the right to have the lots registered
under their names.
The republic, through OSG, opposed the petition of the respondents
claiming that Boracay Island was an unclassified land of public
domain. Invoking Sec 3(a) or PD 705 or the revised forestry code, as
amended, it is not susceptible of private ownership.
The OSG maintained that the right of the respondent to judicial
confirmation of title was governed by PD 705 and CA 141. Since the
Island has not been classified as alienable and disposable, whatever
possession they have cannot ripen into ownership.
RTC: It upheld respondents right to have their occupied lands titled
in their name. It ruled that neither Proclamation No. 1801
nor PTA Circular No. 3-82 mentioned that lands in Boracay were
inalienable. The Circular itself recognized private ownership of
lands. The trial court cited Sections 87 and 53 of the Public Land Act
as basis for acknowledging private ownership of lands in Boracay and
that only those forested areas in public lands were declared as part of
the forest reserve.
OSG moved for reconsideration but it was denied. Thus, they
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appealed it to the CA.

CA: Affirmed the decision of the lower court.
OSG moved for reconsideration, but, it was also denied. They
appeled to the SC.
GR no. 173775
However, during the pendency of the case (GR no. 167707) Pres.
Arroyo issued PP 1064 which classifies Boracay into 400 ha of forest
land and 628.96 ha or agricultural land. On august of 2006, Sacay,
Gelito and other land owners filed a petition for nullification of
PP1064. They contend that the said proclamation infringes their prior
vested right over portions of Boracay, also, they have been
occupying the lot since time immemorial.
Nonetheless, the OSG argued that they dont have vested rights over
the property because Boracay is an unclassified public forest land
ursuant to PD 705. Therefore, they are neither alienable nor
disposable lands.
*****On November of 2006, the court ordered the consolidation of
both cases as they involve the same issues on land classification of
Boracay Island.*****
Issue:
Whether or not private claimants (respondents-claimants in G.R. No.
167707 and petitioners-claimants in G.R. No. 173775) have a right to
secure titles over their occupied portions in Boracay.
Ruling:
The Court of Appeals decision was reversed.
Except for lands already covered by existing titles, Boracay was
an unclassified land of the public domain prior to Proclamation
No. 1064. Such unclassified lands are considered public forest
under PD No. 705.
PD No. 705 issued by President Marcos categorized all unclassified
lands of the public domain as public forest. Appying this law, all
unclassified lands, including that of the Boracay Island is considered
as Public forest. Nonetheless, PD No. 705 respects titles already
existing prior to its effectivity.
The 1935 Constitution classified lands of the public domain into
agricultural, forest or timber, such classification modified by the 1973
Constitution. The 1987 Constitution reverted to the 1935 Constitution
classification
with
one
addition:
national
parks. Of
these, only agricultural lands may be alienated. Prior to Proclamation
No. 1064 of May 22, 2006, Boracay Island had never been expressly
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and administratively classified under any of these grand divisions.

Boracay was an unclassified land of the public domain.
A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required.
In keeping with the presumption of State ownership, the Court has
time and again emphasized that there must be a positive act of the
government, such as a presidential proclamation or an executive
order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of
Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute. The applicant
may also secure a certification from the government that the land
claimed to have been possessed for the required number of years is
alienable and disposable. The burden of proof in overcoming such
presumption is on the person applying for registration (or claiming
ownership), who must prove that the land subject of the application is
alienable or disposable.
In the present case, there was neither a proclamation, EO,
Administrative action, report statute nor a certificate presented in
court. Proc. No. 1801 cannot be deemed the positive act needed to
classify Boracay Island as alienable and disposable land. If President
Marcos intended to classify the island as alienable and disposable or
forest, or both, he would have identified the specific limits of each, as
President Arroyo did in Proclamation No. 1064. This was not done in
Proclamation No. 1801.
Noting that millions were invested for the development of Boracay
Island making internationally known ad some called it their home.
However, the SC expressed that they are bound to apply the law
strictly and judiciously. Thus, saying Ito and batas, ito ang dapat
umiral.

FERNANDA ARBIAS vs THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

GR No. 173808
Facts:
On 12 March 1993, Lourdes T. Jardeleza (Jardeleza) executed a
Deed of Absolute Sale selling to petitioner, married to Jimmy Arbias
(Jimmy), a parcel of unregistered land situated at Poblacion,
Estancia, Iloilo, and identified as Cadastral Lot No. 287 of the
Estancia
Cadastre
(subject
property),
for
the
sum
of P33,000.00. According to the Deed, the subject property was
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residential and consisted of 600 square meters, more or less.

Three years thereafter, on 17 June 1996, petitioner filed with the RTC
a verified Application for Registration of Title over the subject
property. On 3 September 1996, the RTC transmitted the application
with all the attached documents and evidences to the Land
Registration Authority (LRA) that petitioner had already complied with
all the requirements precedent to the publication.
Subsequently, the RTC ordered that its initial hearing on 17 February
1999. On 6 January 1999, the respondent Republic of the Philippines,
through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed its Notice of
Appearance and deputized the City Prosecutor of Iloilo City to appear
on its behalf before the RTC.
At the hearing on 23 July 1999 before the RTC, petitioner took the
witness stand where she identified documentary exhibits and testified
as to her purchase of the subject property, as well as her acts of
ownership and possession over the same. The owners of the lots
adjoining the subject property who attended the hearing were Hector
Tiples, who opposed the supposed area of the subject property; and
Pablo Garin, who declared that he had no objection thereto.
When its turn to present evidence came, respondent, represented by
the City Prosecutor, manifested that it had no evidence to contradict
petitioners application for registration. It merely reiterated its
objection that the area of the subject property, as stated in the Deed
of Sale in favor of petitioner and the Tax Declarations covering the
property, was only 600 square meters, while the area stated in the
Cadastral Survey was 717 square meters.
Issue:
Whether or not the public respondent court of appeals erred in
not holding that the lot in question ceases (sic) to be public land
in view of petitioners and that of her predecessors-in-interest
possession en concepto de dueno for more than thirty (30)
years.
Held:
Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to
the State, and the State is the source of any asserted right to
ownership of land and charged with the conservation of such
patrimony. This same doctrine also states that all lands not otherwise
appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to
belong to the State. Hence, the burden of proof in overcoming the
presumption of State ownership of lands of the public domain is on
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the person applying for registration. The applicant must show that the
land subject of the application is alienable or disposable.
Section 14, paragraph 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 states the
requirements necessary for a judicial confirmation of imperfect title to
be issued. In accordance with said provision, persons who by
themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain
under a bona fide claim of ownership since 12 June 1945 or earlier,
may file in the proper trial court an application for registration of title
to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives.
In the present case, petitioners cite a surveyor-geodetic engineers
notation indicating that the survey was inside alienable and
disposable land. Such notation does not constitute a positive
government act validly changing the classification of the land in
question. Verily, a mere surveyor has no authority to reclassify lands
of the public domain. By relying solely on the said surveyors
assertion, petitioners have not sufficiently proven that the land in
question has been declared alienable.
In the absence of incontrovertible evidence to prove that the subject
property is already classified as alienable and disposable, we must
consider the same as still inalienable public domain.
The fact that no third person appeared before the RTC to oppose the
petitioners application for registration is also irrelevant. The burden
of proof imposed by law on petitioner does not shift. Indeed, a
person who seeks the registration of title to a piece of land on the
basis of possession by himself and his predecessors-in-interest must
prove his claim by clear and convincing evidence, i.e., he must prove
his title and should not rely on the absence or weakness of the
evidence of the oppositors. Furthermore, the court has the bounden
duty, even in the absence of any opposition, to require the petitioner
to show, by a preponderance of evidence and by positive and
absolute proof, so far as possible, that he is the owner in fee simple
of the lands which he is attempting to register
The Survey Plan and Technical Description of the subject property
submitted by petitioner merely plot the location, area and boundaries
thereof. Although they help in establishing the identity of the property
sought to be registered, they are completely ineffectual in proving that
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petitioner and her predecessors-in-interest actually possessed the

subject property in the concept of an owner for the necessary period.

NICASIO I. ALCANTARA vs. DENR

G.R. No. 161881
Facts:
Nicasio Alcantara is a lessee under Forest Land Grazing Lease
Agreement No. 542 (FLGLA No. 542) which he claimed to be
subsisting since 1983 issued by DENR with an area of nine hundred
twenty-three (923) hectares of public forest land located at Sitio
Lanton, Barrio Apopong, General Santos City. In which the land is
claimed as ancestral land of indigenous Blaan and
Maguindanaoans since time immemorial and that only after World
War II that Christian settlers started occupying the area.
On April 10, 1990, private respondents, representing the B'laan and
Maguindanao tribes, filed a complaint against petitioner before the
Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP) seeking
the cancellation of FLGLA No. 542 and the reversion of the land to
the indigenous communities. Alcantara questions the authority of the
COSLAP and alleged that it was the secretary of the DENR who
should have jurisdiction to administer and dispose of public lands.
Despite opposition, Alcantara was able to renew FLGLA No. 542 in
1993 for another 25 years, or until December 31, 2018.
On October 29, 1997, Congress passed Republic Act No. 8371, or
the Indigenous People's Rights Act (IPRA), which was intended to
recognize and promote all the rights of the country's Indigenous
Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples (ICCs/IPs) within the
framework of the Constitution. Later, COSLAP rendered its decision
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in favor of the complainant indigenous people and recommended to

DENR to cancel Alcantaras renewed FLGLA No. 542 and declare the
area as ancestral lands of the Blaans. Alcantara filed before the
Court of Appeals (CA) questioning the decision of the COSLAP, but
the CA affirmed in toto the decision of the COSLAP, ruling that the
issues and arguments it raised had all been addressed squarely in
the Supreme Court's decision in G.R. No. 145838 which upheld the
COSLAP's decision and which had long become final and executory.
Issue(s):
Whether petitioner, based on his alleged residual rights, may continue
his enjoyment of the land up to the expiration of FLGA No. 542 on
December 31, 2018;
Whether respondents DENR officials committed grave abuse of
discretion in implementing the COSLAP's decision.
Ruling:
The question whether FLGLA No. 542 is valid has been settled
conclusively in G.R. No. 145838 in which the Court made final finding
that FLGLA No. 542 was issued illegally, and that it was made in
violation of prevailing laws. It was likewise declared that FLGLA No.
542 granted to petitioner violated Section 1 of Presidential Decree
No. 410 which states that all unappropriated agricultural lands
forming part of the public domain are declared part of the ancestral
lands of the indigenous cultural groups occupying the same, and
these lands are further declared alienable and disposable, to be
distributed exclusively among the members of the indigenous cultural
group concerned. Petitioners alleged "residual right" has no legal
basis and contradicts his admission that FLGLA No. 542 has been
declared invalid by the Court in its decision in G.R. No. 145838.
Petitioner has had no residue of any right and no entitlement to the
land, from the very beginning.
The Court finds that no grave abuse of discretion was committed by
respondent DENR officials in their implementation of the COSLAP
decision, FLGLA No. 542 is a mere license or privilege granted by the
State to petitioner for the use or exploitation of natural resources and
public lands over which the State has sovereign ownership under the
Regalian Doctrine. Like timber or mining licenses, a forest land
grazing lease agreement is a mere permit which, by executive action,
can be revoked, rescinded, cancelled, amended or modified,
whenever public welfare or public interest so requires. Thus, a
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privilege or license is not in the nature of a contract that enjoys

protection under the due process and non-impairment clauses of the
Constitution. In cases in which the license or privilege is in conflict
with the people's welfare, the license or privilege must yield to the
supremacy of the latter, as well as to the police power of the State.
Such a privilege or license is not even a property or property
right, nor does it create a vested right; as such, no irrevocable
rights are created in its issuance.

BUENAVENTURA VS. REPUBLIC

GR NO. 186865 March 2, 2007
Facts:
The subject property in dispute was acquired by Amado
Buenaventura and Irene Flores (spouses Buenaventura) even before
World War II. In 1978, the spouses Buenaventura transferred, by way
of Deed of Sale, the subject property to their children, among whom
are herein petitioners, Angelita and Preciosa. Petitioners then filed an
Application for Registration of Title on 5 June 2000 before the RTC of
Paraaque City of the subject property, where they alleged that "they
and their predecessors-in-interest acquired title to the said parcel of
land thru inheritance, transfer, and possession as owners of the same
since time immemorial and/or within the period provided for by law."
They also presented and identified various documents supporting
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their claim. On 29 October 2001, the court a quo issued an Order

granting the application for registration of title of the subject property.
Feeling aggrieved, the Republic appealed to the Court of Appeals,
alleging that petitioners own evidence tends to show that the subject
property is not alienable and disposable because it was a salt bed
and a fishpond and under Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution,
except for agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be
alienated. Likewise, under the Regalian Doctrine, all lands not
otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are
presumed to belong to the State. On 23 August 2004, the Court of
Appeals rendered a Decision in favor of the Republic, thus,
overturning the Order of the court a quo.
Issue:
Whether or not the subject property in dispute is a public land.
Held:
NO. It is true that under the Regalian Doctrine all lands of the public
domain belong to the State and all lands not otherwise appearing to
be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the
State. However, such presumption is not conclusive. It can be
rebutted by the applicants presentation of incontrovertible evidence
showing that the land subject of the application for registration is
alienable and disposable.

The certification issued by the Department of Environment and

Natural Resources verified that the subject parcel of land is alienable
and disposable land of the public domain. The said certification is
sufficient to establish the true nature or character of the subject
property.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS CANDY MAKER, INC.
GR.NO. 163766, June 22, 2006
Facts:
On April, 29, 1999, Antonia, Eladia, and Felisa, all surnamed Cruz,
executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Candy Maker, Inc. for a
11

parcel of land located below the reglementary lake elevation of

12.50m, about 900 meters away the Laguna de Bay. Candy Maker,
Inc. as applicant, filed an application with the MTC of Taytay, Rizal for
registration of its alleged title over the lot.
The CENRO of Antipolo City declared the land to fall within the
alienable and disposable zone. On the other hand, the Land
Registration Authority recommended the exclusion of lot no. 3138-B
on the ground that it is a legal easement and intended for public use,
hence, inalienable and indisposable. On July 2001, the Republic of
the
Philippines, the LLDA filed its opposition which alleged that the lot
subject of the application for registration may not be alienated and
disposed since it is considered part of the Laguna Lake Bed, a public
land within, its jurisdiction.
Issue:
Whether or not the property subject of the amended application is
alienable and disposable property of the State, and if so, whether
respondent adduced the requisite quantum of evidence to prove its
ownership over the property.
Ruling:
The property subject of this application was alienable and disposable
public agricultural land. However, respondent failed to prove that it
possesses registrable title over the property. The statute of limitations
with regard to public agricultural lands does not operate against the
statute unless the occupant proves possession and occupation of the
same after a claim of ownership for the required number of years to
constitute a grant from the State. A mere casual cultivation of portions
of the land by the claimant does not constitute sufficient basis for a
claim of ownership, such possession is not exclusive and notorious
as to give rise to presumptive grant from the state. In light of the
foregoing, the petition of the Republic of the Philippines is granted.

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i. Effect of the Regalian Doctrine: All lands of the public domain

belong to the State which is the source of any asserted right to
an asserted ownership of land. Property of the public domain is
beyond the commerce of man and not susceptible of the private
appropriation and acquisitive prescription.
REPUBLIC VS HEIRS OF LACHICA-SIN
GR. NO. 157485
Facts:
On August 26, 1991, respondent heirs instituted in the RTC of Kalibo,
Aklan a complaint against Lucio Arquisola (Superintendent of ANCF)
for recovery of possession, quieting of title, and declaration of
ownership with damages. Respondent heirs claim that a 41,231square meter-portion of the property they inherited had been usurped
by ANCF, creating a cloud of doubt with respect to their ownership
over the parcel of land they wish to remove from the ANCF
reservation.
The ANCF Superintendent countered that the parcel of land being
claimed by respondents was the subject of Proclamation No. 2074 of
then President Ferdinand E. Marcos allocating 24.0551 hectares of
land within the area, which included said portion of private
respondents alleged property, as civil reservation for educational
purposes of ANCF. The ANCF Superintendent averred that the
subject parcel of land is timberland and therefore not susceptible of
private ownership.
The RTC remanded the case to the MCTC of New Washington and
Batan, Aklan, in view of the enactment of Republic Act No. 7659
which expanded the jurisdiction of first-level courts.
On June 19, 2000, the MCTC rendered its Decision in favor of
respondents. The MCTC ruled that the claim of respondent heirs over
the disputed land by virtue of their and their predecessors open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession amounts to an
imperfect title, which should be respected and protected.
Petitioner, through the Solicitor General, appealed to the RTC of
Kalibo, Aklan and the RTC rendered its Decision affirming the MCTC
Judgment. Petitioner Republic elevated the case to the Court of
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Appeals through a Petition for Review and the Court of Appeals

rendered its Decision dismissing the petition for lack of merit.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA gravely erred on a question of law in upholding
respondents claim to supposed private rights over subject land
despite the DENR certification that it is classified as timberland.
Ruling:
The private right referred to is an alleged imperfect title, which
respondents supposedly acquired by possession of the subject
property, through their predecessors-in-interest, for 30 years before it
was declared as a timberland on December 22, 1960. It must be
noted that respondents have not filed an application for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title under the Public Land Act or the
Property Registration Decree.
The Court held that there are two requisites for judicial confirmation
of imperfect or incomplete title under CA No. 141, namely: (1) open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
the subject land by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest
under a bona fide claim of ownership since time immemorial or from
June 12, 1945; and (2) the classification of the land as alienable and
disposable land of the public domain. With respect to the second
requisite, the courts a quo held that the disputed property was
alienable and disposable before 1960, citing petitioners failure to
show competent evidence that the subject land was declared a
timberland before its formal classification as such on said year. In
Heirs of Malabanan vs Republic, the members of this Court were in
disagreement as to whether lands declared alienable or disposable
after June 12, 1945 may be subject to judicial confirmation of
imperfect title. There was, however, no disagreement that there must
be a declaration to that effect.
In the case at bar, it is therefore the respondents which have the
burden to identify a positive act of the government, such as an official
proclamation, declassifying inalienable public land into disposable
land for agricultural or other purposes. Since respondents failed to do
so, the alleged possession by them and by their predecessors-ininterest is inconsequential and could never ripen into ownership.
Accordingly, respondents cannot be considered to have private rights
within the purview of Proclamation No. 2074 as to prevent the
application of said proclamation to the subject property. The SC grant
14

the prayer of petitioner Republic to dismiss the civil case for lack of
merit.

B. The Regalian Doctrine does not negate Native Title: Ancestral

lands and domains; time-immemorial possession.
a. Ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not deemed part of
the lands of the public domain but are private lands belonging to
indigenous cultural communities or indigenous people who
have actually occupied, possessed and utilized their territories
under claims of ownership, based on NATIVE TITLE, since TIME
IMMEMORIAL. The rights of the ICC/IPs may be acquired in 2
modes:
(a) by NATIVE TITLE over both ancestral lands and domains, or
(b) by TORRENS TITLE under the Public Land Act and Property
Registration Decree with respect to ancestral lands only.
b. Basis of Native Title
c.
CARINO VS. INSULAR GOVERNMENT
41 Phil 935
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Facts:
Don Mateo Carino, an Igorot, sought to register with the land
registration court a parcel of land in the Province of Benguet. He
claimed that the said land had been possessed and occupied by his
ancestors since time immemorial. His grandfather had lived upon it,
and had maintained fences around the property for holding of cattle.
Furthermore, his father had cultivated some parts of the land. And
that he inherited it in accordance with Igorot custom. No document of
title, however, had been issued from the Spanish Crown.
In 1901, Carino obtained possessory title to the land under the
Spanish Mortgage Law. The American colonial government, however,
ignored his possessory title and built a public road on the land
prompting him to seek a Torrens title to his property in the land
registration court.
In 1904, the land registration court granted Carinos application for
absolute ownership to the land. Both the Government of the
Philippine Islands and the U.S. Government appealed to the CFI of
Benguet which reversed the land registration court and dismissed
Carinos application. The Philippine Supreme Court affirmed the CFIs
decision by applying the Valenton ruling. Carino took the case to the
U.S. Supreme Court. On one hand, the Philippine government
invoked the Regalian Doctrine and contended that Carino failed to
comply with the provisions of the Royal Decree of June 25, 1880,
which required registration of land claims within a limited period of
time. Carino, on the other hand, asserted that he was the absolute
owner of the land jure gentium, and that the land never formed part of
the public domain.
Issue:
Whether or not the land in question belonged to the Spanish Crown
under the Regalian Doctrine.
Ruling:
No. Law and justice require that the applicant should be granted title
to his land.
The United States Supreme Court, through Justice Holmes declared:

16

It might perhaps, be proper and sufficient to say that

when, as far as testimony or memory goes, the land has
been held by individuals under a claim of private
ownership, it will be presumed to have been held in the
same way from before the Spanish conquest, and never
to have been public land.
There is an existence of native title to land, or ownership of land by
Filipinos by virtue of possession under a claim of ownership since
time immemorial and independent of any grant from the Spanish
Crown, as an exception to the theory of jura regalia.
d. Private land titles existed irrespective of any royal grant
1. CRUZ V. SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL
RESOURCES
G.R. No. 135385
Facts:
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa in their capacity as
citizens and taxpayers assailed the constitutionality of R.A. No. 8371
which is also known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997
(IPRA) on the ground that it amounts to the unlawful deprivation of
the States ownership over lands of the public domain and all other
natural resources therein, by recognizing the right of ownership of
Indigenous Cultural Communities or Indigenous Peoples (ICCs/IPs)
to their ancestral domains and ancestral lands based on their native
title. After the deep-seated deliberation, the members of the court
voted as follows: Seven Justices have voted to dismiss the petition
while the other 7 Justices ruled in favor of the petition. They failed to
come up with the necessary majority instead the votes were equally
divided. Both parties initiated a redeliberation but nothing happened
since the voting remained the same. As a result, in virtue of Section
7, Rule 56 of the Rules of Court, the petitioned was dismissed.
Issue:
Whether or not the Regalian Doctrine negates native title
Ruling:
The Regalian Doctrine does not negate native title to lands held in
private ownership since time immemorial. The Congress in its
wisdom did not intend to have clashing of laws. In this case, it also
resolved the question on whether the existence of native title to land
17

is considered as an exception to the theory of Regalian. It has been

clearly elucidated by the Supreme Court that the Doctrine of native
title is not an exception to the Regalian Doctrine. The Regalian
Doctrine and the Doctrine of the Native Title can exist side by side.
The possession per se since time immemorial has ripened to
ownership. By having this IPRA, it serves as a way that removed the
barriers when it comes to the idea of reconciling the Regalian
Doctrine and Doctrine of Native Title such as for this instance wherein
it is impossible to own land in Baguio or in the whole Cordillera
Administrative Region under PD 1529 since lands which are beyond
18 % slope cannot be titled but this problem was cured. On the other
hand, the NCIP does not give title but it merely facilitates the
recognition of ancestral lands. It is a recognition of something that is
already present. Moreover, registration may spawn if ownership of
land is not acquired or proven by the seven modes of acquiring
ownership.

2. History of public land disposition

SECRETARY OF DENR VS. YAP
G.R. NO. 167707
Facts:
The DENR identified several lots in Boracay as being claimed by
named persons. President Ferdinand Marcos issued Proclamation
No. 1801 declaring Boracay Island, among other islands, caves and
peninsulas as tourist zones and marine reserves under administration
18

of the Philippine Tourism Authority. Respondents-claimants alleged

that it raised doubts on their right to secure titles over their occupied
lands. Respondents-claimants posited that Proclamation No. 1801
and its implementing Circular did not place Boracay beyond the
commerce of man. Since the Island was classified as a tourist zone,
it was susceptible of private ownership. The Office of the Solicitor
General countered that Boracay Island was unclassified land of the
public domain which formed part of the public forest
.
Issue: Whether or not the Proclamation No. 1801 has posed any legal
impediment to the titling of lands in Boracay Islands.
Ruling: The RTC and CA ruled that the Proclamation No. 1801 was
not a legal impediment in the titling of lands in Boracay Islands. The
CA held that respondents-claimants could not be prejudiced by a
declaration that the lands they occupied since time immemorial were
part of a forest reserve.
Proclamation No. 1801 cannot be deemed the positive act needed to
classify Boracay Island as alienable and disposable land. If President
Marcos intended to classify the island as alienable and disposable or
forest, or both, he would have identified the specific limits of each, as
President Arroyo did in Proclamation No. 1064. This was not done in
Proclamation No. 1801.
The Whereas clauses of Proclamation No. 1801 also explain the
rationale behind the declaration of Boracay Island, together with other
islands, caves and peninsulas in the Philippines, as a tourist zone
and marine reserve to be administered by the PTA to ensure the
concentrated efforts of the public and private sectors in the
development of the areas tourism potential with due regard for
ecological balance in the marine environment. Simply put, the
proclamation is aimed at administering the islands for tourism and
ecological purposes. It does not address the areas alienability. Thus
the islands remain as public domain which is governed by the
Regalian doctrine.

19

i. But: University Land Awarded to Indigenous People voided

CENTRAL
MINDANAO
UNIVERSITY
VS.
EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY
GR NO. 184869
Facts:
This case involves the constitutionality of a presidential proclamation
appropriating state university property to be allocated to indigenous
peoples and cultural communities.
Petitioner Central Mindanao University (CMU)
is
a
chartered
educational institution owned and run by the State. In 1958 President
Garcia issued Presidential Proclamation 476, reserving 3,401
hectares of lands of the public domain in Musuan, Bukidnon, as
school site for CMU. Eventually, CMU obtained title in its name over
3,080 hectares of those lands.
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo after forty-five years (January 7,
2003) issued Presidential Proclamation 310. Said proclamation takes
670 hectares from CMUs registered lands for distribution to
indigenous peoples and cultural communities in Barangay Musuan,
Maramag, Bukidnon.
CMU subsequently filed a petition to declare the presidential
proclamation as unconstitutional.
RTC ruled that Presidential Proclamation 310 was constitutional,
being a valid State act. More so, the RTC posited that the ultimate
owner of the lands is the State and that CMU merely held the same in
its behalf.
20

Issue:
Whether or not Presidential Proclamation No. 310 is constitutional.
Ruling:
No. Presidential Proclamation No. 310 is unconstitutional for being
contrary to law and public policy.
CMU is a school established to promote agriculture and industry; as
such the need for a vast tract of agricultural land for future programs
of expansion is justified. When President Garcia issued Proclamation
No. 476 exempting from sale or settlement and reserving for
the Mindanao Agricultural College (forerunner of the CMU) a land
reservation of 3,080 hectares is for the promotion of the schools
agriculture and industry.
Through the years the CMU lands were used to support the
expanding activities of the school in the fields of agricultural
technology and scientific research. It is in Bukidnon that it was built,
so that there are enough resources and wide open spaces. These are
needed fro an agricultural educational institution to grow, and for the
furtherance of development and training of future farmers of
Mindanao.
The taking of the CMU land which had been segregated for
educational purposes for distribution to yet uncertain beneficiaries is
a gross misinterpretation of law.
Indeed ,the education of the youth and agrarian reform are among
the highest priorities in the government socio-economic programs. In
this case, neither have to be compromised. Certainly, there must still
be vast tracts of agricultural land in Mindanao outside the CMU land
reservation which can be allocated to qualified beneficiaries.
The decision in this case is of optimum significance. This ruling
concerns state colleges and universities whose resources and
research facilities may be gradually eroded by misconstruing the
exemptions from the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARP).
State colleges and universities like the CMU are the countrys conduit
towards scientific and technological advancement in the field of
agriculture, which is apparently an important field in our society.
Still, the proclamation of President Arroyo is immaterial, for the lands
in dispute ceased to be alienable public lands from the time President
Garcia dedicated them for CMUs use in scientific and technological
research in the field of agriculture.Thus, the petition of the CMU
asking for the unconstitutionality of Proclamation No. 310 is granted.
21

C. The Problem of Registration and the Present Challenge

HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN vs. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES
GR No. 179987April 29, 2009
Facts:
On February 20 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for land
registration before the RTC of Cavite, covering a parcel of
land situated in Silang Cavite, consisting of 71,324 sq. meters.
Malabanan claimed that he had purchased the property from Eduardo
Velazco, and that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in
open, notorious, and continuous adverse and peaceful possession of
the land for more than 30 years. Velazco testified that the property
was originally belonged to a twenty-two hectare property owned by
his great-grandfather, Lino Velazco. Lino had four sons Benedicto,
Gregorio, Eduardo and Estebanthe fourth being Aristedess
grandfather. Upon Linos death, his four sons inherited the property
and divided it among themselves. But by 1966, Estebans wife,
Magdalena, had become the administrator of all the properties
inherited by the Velazco sons from their father, Lino. After the death
of Esteban and Magdalena, their son Virgilio succeeded them
22

in administering the properties, including Lot 9864-A, which originally

belonged to his uncle, Eduardo Velazco. It was this property that was
sold by Eduardo Velazco to Malabanan. Among the evidence
presented by Malabanan during trial was a Certification dated 11
June 2001, issued by the Community Environment & Natural
Resources Office, Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (CENRO-DENR), which stated that the subject property
was verified to be within the Alienable or Disposable land per Land
Classification Map No.3013 established under project no. 20-A and
approved as such under FAO 4-1656 on March 15, 1982. On
December 3, 2002, the RTC approved the application for registration.
The Republic interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, arguing
that Malabanan had failed to prove that the property belonged to the
alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and that the RTC
had erred in finding that he had been in possession of the property in
the manner and for the length of time required by law for confirmation
of imperfect title. On February 23, 2007, the Court of Appeals
reversed the RTC ruling and dismissed the application of Malabanan.
Issues:
1. In order that an alienable and disposable land of the public domain
may be registered under Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No.
1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, should
the land be classified as alienable and disposable as of June 12,
1945 or is it sufficient that such classification occur at any time prior
to the filing of the applicant for registration provided that it is
established that the applicant has been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession of the land under a bona
fide claim of ownership since June12, 1945 or earlier?
2. For purposes of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree,
may a parcel of land classified as alienable and disposable be
deemed private land and therefore susceptible to acquisition by
prescription in accordance with the Civil Code?
3. May a parcel of land established as agricultural in character either
because of its use or because its slope is below that of forest lands
be registrable under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration
23

Decree in relation to the provisions of the Civil Code on acquisitive

prescription?
4. Are petitioners entitled to the registration of the subject land in their
names under Section14 (1) or Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree or both?
Ruling:
The Petition is denied.
In connection with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree,
Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act recognizes and confirms that
those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since
June 12, 1945 have acquired ownership of, and registrable title to,
such lands based on the length and quality of their possession. (a)
Since Section 48(b) merely requires possession since 12 June
1945 and does not require that the lands should have been alienable
and disposable during the entire period of possession, the possessor
is entitled to secure judicial confirmation of his title thereto as soon
as it is declared alienable and disposable, subject to the timeframe
imposed by Section 47 of the Public Land Act. (b) The right to register
granted under Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act is further
confirmed by Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree.
In complying with Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration Decree,
consider that under the Civil Code, prescription is recognized as
a mode of acquiring ownership of patrimonial property. However,
public domain lands become only patrimonial property not only with a
declaration that these are alienable or disposable. There must also
be an express government manifestation that the property is already
patrimonial or no longer retained for public service or the
development of national wealth, under Article 422 of the Civil Code.
And only when the property has become patrimonial can the
prescriptive period for the acquisition of property of the public
dominion begin to run. Patrimonial property is private property of the
government. The person acquires ownership of patrimonial property
24

by prescription under the Civil Code is entitled to secure registration

thereof under Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration Decree.

THE TORRENS SYSTEM OF LAND REGISTRATION

A. Essence of Registration, in general
a. CHING VS. MALAYA
153 SCRA 412
Facts:
The petitioners Jose Ching and Caridad Ching had alleged in their
complaint for ejectment that the private respondents Cesar and
Araceli Alvarado had forced their way into the disputed premises
without any right whatsoever and had refused to vacate the same
despite repeated demands. These demands were based on the
petitioners case that they were the owners of the said property,
having acquired it by virtue of a valid sale. The property in question
consists of a residential house and lot covered by TCT No. T-85126
and registered in the name of petitioner Jose Ching in the Registry of
Deeds of Laguna. The private respondents, in their answer, had
challenged the claimed sale, arguing that the property belonged to
them by right of inheritance.
The municipal court, affirming its jurisdiction, proceeded to trial and
thereafter rendered judgment ordering the private respondents to
vacate the disputed property. The respondents argued, as the basic
question was one of ownership and not of mere possession, the
25

municipal court had no jurisdiction and should dismiss the complaint.

On appeal, this decision was set aside by the respondent judge, who
held that the municipal court had no competence to resolve the case
as it involved a question of ownership.
Issue:
Whether or not Ching is the rightful owner of the residential land.
Ruling:
Municipal courts do not have jurisdiction over ownership cases.
But the Supreme Court held that this particular case is not an
ownership case. The mere circumstance that proof of title, or
evidence of ownership, had been introduced during the trial before
the Municipal Court would not deprive said court of jurisdiction to rule
on the question of who had the prior physical possession. The parties
just showed evidence of ownership so as to prove possession and
this will not divest the Municipal Court of its jurisdiction.
On the other hand, the land is registered under Chings name in
the Registry of Deeds in Laguna. The land was actually sold to him
by Alvarados father in 1978. No protest was ever filed against the
Deed of Sale since 1978. Alvarado only filed an annulment case
(which is a separate case) when the ejectment case was filed. With a
strong evidence to back Chings claim, the Municipal Courts decision
was reinstated by the Supreme Court.

26

b. Purpose of Registration
CONSUELO LEGARDA vs. N.M.SALEEBY
G.R.No. L-8936 October 2,1915
Facts:
The plaintiffs, Consuelo and Mauro, and the defendant, Saleeby, are
owners of adjoining lots in the district of Ermita in the city of Manila.
Between the said lots was a stone wall which is located on the lot of
the plaintiffs. On the 2nd day of March, 1906, the plaintiffs presented
a petition in the Court of Land Registration for the registration of their
lot. After a consideration of said petition the court, on the 25th day of
October, 1906, decreed that the title of the plaintiffs should be
registered and issued to them the original certificate provided for
under the Torrens system. Said registration and certificate included
the wall. Subsequently, the defendant presented a petition in the
Court of Land Registration for the registration of the lot now occupied
by him. On the 25th day of March, 1912, the court decreed the
registration of said title and issued the original certificate provided for
under the Torrens system. The description of the lot given in the
petition of the defendant also included said wall. On December
13,1912, the plaintiffs discovered that the wall which had been
included in the certificate granted to them had also been included in
the certificate granted to the defendant .They immediately presented
a petition in the Court of Land Registration for an adjustment and
correction of the error committed by including said wall in the
registered title of each of said parties.
However, the lower without notice to the defendant, denied said
petition upon the theory that, during the pendency of the petition for
the registration of the defendant's land, they failed to make any
objection to the registration of said lot, including the wall, in the name
of the defendant. The decision of the lower court is based upon the
theory that the action for the registration of the lot of the defendant
was a judicial proceeding and that the judgment or decree was
binding upon all parties who did not appear and oppose it.

Issue:
27

Who is the owner of land registered in the name of two different

persons?
What is the purpose of registration?
Ruling:
The real purpose of that system is to quiet title to land; to put a stop
forever to any question of the legality of the title, except claims which
were noted at the time of registration, in the certificate, or which may
arise subsequent thereto. That being the purpose of the law, it would
seem that once a title is registered the owner may rest secure,
without the necessity of waiting in the portals of the court, or sitting in
the "mirador de su casa," to avoid the possibility of losing his land.
If the holder of a certificate cannot rest secure in this registered title
then the purpose of the law is defeated. If those dealing with
registered land cannot rely upon the certificate, then nothing has
been gained by the registration and the expense incurred thereby has
been in vain. If the holder may lose a strip of his registered land by
the method adopted in the present case, he may lose it all.
In case of double registration under the Land Registration Act, that
the owner of the earliest certificate is the owner of the land. That is
the rule between original parties.

c. REGISTRATION IS NOT A MODE OF ACQUIRING OWNERSHIP

VAGILIDAD V. VAGILIDAD
G.R. No. 161136. November 16, 2006
Facts:
28

A parcel of land (Lot No. 1253) situated in Atabay, San Jose, Antique
was owned by Zoilo Labiao as per Original Certificate of Title No. RO2301 issued on March 3, 1931. Sometime in 1931, Zoilo died.
Subsequently, on May 12, 1986, Loreto Labiao, son of Zoilo, sold to
Gabino Vagilidad Jr. a portion of Lot No. 1253, measuring 1,604
square meters as evidenced by the Deed of Absolute Sale executed
by Loreto.
Zoilos children Loreto, Efren Labiao and Priscilla Espanueva, in view
of their fathers death, executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate
dated January 20, 1987, adjudicating the entire Lot No. 1253,
covering 4,280 square meters, to Loreto. On January 29, 1987,
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-16693 was issued in favor of
LORETO, EFREN and PRISCILLA, but on even date, TCT No. T16693 was cancelled and TCT No. T-16694, covering the said
property, was issued in the name of LORETO alone.
On July 31, 1987, Gabino Jr., as petitioner, filed a Petition for the
Surrender of TCT No. T-16694, covering Lot No. 1253 against
LORETO, docketed as Cadastral Case No. 87-731-A. The parties
however seemed to have already reached an amicable settlement
without the knowledge of their counsels, the trial court issued an
Order dated March 21, 1994 sending the case to the archives.
Gabino Jr. paid real estate taxes on the land he bought from Loreto
as per Tax Declaration No. 1038 where the property was specified as
Lot No. 1253-B. Gabino Jr. thereafter sold the same lot to Wilfredo
Vagilidad as per Deed of Absolute Sale dated December 7, 1989. On
the same date, Deed of Absolute Sale of a Portion of Land involving
the opt-described property was also executed by Loreto in favor of
Wilfredo.
On February 14, 1990, the sale of Lot No. 1253-B to Wilfredo was
registered. Consequently, TCT No. T-18023, cancelling TCT No.
16694, was issued in favor of Wilfredo pursuant to the Deed of
Absolute Sale dated December 7, 1989. Spouses Wilfredo and Lolita
obtained a loan from the Philippine National Bank in the amount of
P150,000.00 and mortgaged Lot No. 1253-B as collateral of the said
loan and the transaction was inscribed at the back of TCT No. 18023
as Entry No. 186876. Subsequently, the real estate mortgage was
cancelled under Entry No. 191053 as per inscription dated November
17, 1992 in TCT No. 18023.
Subsequently, Wilfredo obtained another loan from Development
Bank of the Philippines in the amount of P200,000.00 and mortgaged
29

Lot No. 1253-B as collateral of the loan and the transaction was
inscribed at the back of TCT No. 18023 as Entry No. 196268. The
said loan was paid and, consequently, the mortgage was cancelled
as Entry No. 202500.
Spouses Gabino and Ma. Dorothy Vagilidad, as plaintiffs, filed a
Complaint for Annulment of Document, Reconveyance and Damages.
But Wilfredo claimed that they are the owner the land because they
already bought it to from the former owner who sold the same to
Gabino. Then Gabino claimed that Wilfredo resort to fraud to obtain
ownership of the said property. They raised that defendant Wilfredo
requested Gabino Jr. to transfer the ownership of Lot No. 1253-B in
defendant Wilfredos name for loaning purposes with the agreement
that the land will be returned when the plaintiffs need the same. They
added that, pursuant to the mentioned agreement, plaintiff Gabino Jr.,
without the knowledge and consent of his spouse, Dorothy, executed
the Deed of Sale dated December 7, 1989 in favor of defendant
Wilfredo receiving nothing as payment therefor.
The trial court ruled in favor of petitioners. Gabino, Jr. and Dorothy
filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. The appellate court
reversed and set aside the decision of the trial court.
Issue:
Are the petitioners correct in their contention that since the
subdivision plan of Lot No. 1253 was only approved on January 19,
1987, the appellate court can not presume that the aliquot part of
Loreto was the parcel designated as Lot 1253-B?
Ruling:
No. The mere fact that Loreto sold a definite portion of the co-owned
lot by metes and bounds before partition does not, per se, render the
sale a nullity. We held in Lopez v. Vda. De Cuaycong that the fact that
an agreement purported to sell a concrete portion of a co-owned
property does not render the sale void, for it is well-established that
the binding force of a contract must be recognized as far as it is
legally possible to do so.
In the case at bar, the contract of sale between Loreto and Gabino,
Jr. on May 12, 1986 could be legally recognized. At the time of sale,
Loreto had an aliquot share of one-third of the 4,280-square meter
30

property or some 1,426 square meters but sold some 1,604 square
meters to Gabino, Jr. We have ruled that if a co-owner sells more
than his aliquot share in the property, the sale will affect only his
share but not those of the other co-owners who did not consent to the
sale. Be that as it may, the co-heirs of Loreto waived all their rights
and interests over Lot No. 1253 in favor of Loreto in an Extrajudicial
Settlement of Estate dated January 20, 1987. They declared that they
have previously received their respective shares from the other estate
of their parents Zoilo and Purificacion. The rights of Gabino, JR. as
owner over Lot No. 1253-B are thus preserved. These rights were not
effectively transferred by Loreto to Wilfredo in the Deed of Absolute
Sale of Portion of Land. Nor were these rights alienated from Gabino,
Jr. upon the issuance of the title to the subject property in the name of
Wilfredo. Registration of property is not a means of acquiring
ownership. Its alleged incontrovertibility cannot be successfully
invoked by Wilfredo because certificates of title cannot be used to
protect a usurper from the true owner or be used as a shield for the
commission of fraud.

i. Distinguish title from a Certificate of Title

DINAH C. CASTILLO vs ANTONIO M. ESCUTIN
G.R. No. 171056
March 13, 2009
Facts:
Petitioner is a judgment creditor of Raquel K. Moratilla. Racquel, her
31

mother, Urbana Kalaw and sister, Perla Moratilla, co-owned Lot

13713, 15,000 square-meter, covered by Tax Declaration No. 00449.
When the petitioner verified the property, she found out that the
application of Summit Point Golf & Country Club, Inc. for conversion
of several agricultural landholdings, including Lot 13713, to
residential, commercial, and recreational uses was approved and the
property was not covered by a certificate of title, whether judicial or
patent, or subject to the issuance of a Certificate of Land Ownership
Award or patent under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program.
Petitioner then proceeded to levy on execution Lot 13713. Before the
scheduled public auction sale, petitioner learned that Lot 13713 was
inside the Summit Point Golf and Country Club Subdivision owned by
Summit Point Realty and Development Corporation. She immediately
went to the Makati City office of Summit Realty to meet with its Vice
President, Orense. However, she claimed that Orense did not show
her any document to prove ownership of Lot 13713 by Summit
Realty.
Petitioner bought Raquels 1/3 pro-indiviso share in Lot and was then
issued Tax Declaration No. 00942-A, indicating that she owned 5,000
square meters of Lot 13713, while Urbana and Perla owned the other
10,000 square meters.
When petitioner attempted to pay real estate taxes, she was shocked
to that, without giving her notice, her Tax Declaration No. 00942-A
was cancelled. Lot 13713 was said to be encompassed in and
overlapping with the 105,648 square meter parcel of land known as
Lot 1-B, both in the name of Francisco Catigbac. The reverse side of
TCT No. 129642 bore three entries, reflecting the supposed sale of
Lot 1-B to Summit Realty.
In the supposed Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Summit Realty by
Leonardo Yagin, as Catigbacs attorney-in-fact, it did not express the
desire of Summit Realty to purchase Lot 1-B or indicate its consent
and conformity to the terms of the Deed. There were also missing
information in the said Deed.
Petitioner asserted that Summit Realty was well-aware of Catigbacs
death, having acknowledged the same in LRC Case No. 00-0376, the
32

Petition for Issuance of New Owners Duplicate of TCT No. 181 In

Lieu of Lost One, filed by Summit Realty before the Regional Trial
Court of Lipa City. During the ex parte presentation of evidence in the
latter part of 2000, Orense testified on behalf of Summit Realty that
Catigbacs property used to form part of a bigger parcel of land, Lot 1
of Plan Psu-12014, measuring 132,975 square meters, covered by
TCT No. 181 in the name of Catigbac; after Catigbacs death, Lot 1
was informally subdivided into several parts among his heirs and/or
successors-in-interest, some of whom again transferred their shares
to other persons; Summit Realty separately bought subdivided parts
of Lot 181 from their respective owners, with a consolidated area of
105,648 square meters, and identified as Lot 1-B after survey;
despite the subdivision and transfer of ownership of Lot 1, TCT No.
181 covering the same was never cancelled; and the owners
duplicate of TCT No. 181 was lost and the fact of such loss was
annotated at the back of the original copy of TCT No. 181 with the
Registry of Deeds. Subsequently, in an Order dated 3 January 2001,
the RTC granted the Petition in LRC Case No. 00-0376 and directed
the issuance of a new owners duplicate of TCT No. 181 in the name
of Catigbac, under the same terms and condition as in its original
form.
Petitioner cast doubt on the acts undertaken by Summit Realty in
connection with Catigbacs property, purportedly without legal
personality and capacity. The Special Power of Attorney dated 6
February 1976 granted Yagin the right to sue on behalf of Catigbac,
yet it was Summit Realty which instituted LRC Case No. 00-0376,
and Yagin had no participation at all in said case. Likewise, it was not
Yagin, but Orense, who, through a letter dated 27 June 2001,
requested the cancellation of TCT No. 181 covering Lot 1 and the
issuance of a new certificate of title for Lot 1-B. Hence, it was
Orenses request which resulted in the issuance of TCT No. 129642
in the name of Catigbac, later cancelled and replaced by TCT No. T134609 in the name of Summit Realty.
Petitioner questioned why, despite the cancellation of TCT No.
129642 in the name of Catigbac and the issuance in its place of TCT
No. T-134609 in the name of Summit Realty, it was the former
cancelled title which was used as basis for canceling petitioners Tax
Declaration No. 00942-A. Tax Declaration No. 00949-A was thus still
33

issued in the name of Catigbac, instead of Summit Realty.

Summit Realty bought Lot 1-B measuring 105,648 square meters,
specifically covered by TCT No. 129642, both in the name of
Catigbac. As a result of such purchase, ownership of Lot 1-B was
transferred from Catigbac to Summit Realty. Summit Realty had
every reason to believe in good faith that said property was indeed
owned by Catigbac on the basis of the latters certificate of title over
the same. Catigbacs right as registered owner of Lot 1-B under TCT
No. 181/No. 129642, was superior to petitioners, which was based
on a mere tax declaration.
Issue:
Whether petitioner was indeed unlawfully deprived of her 5,000
square meter property.
Ruling:
As between Catigbacs title, covered by a certificate of title, and
petitioners title, evidenced only by a tax declaration, the former is
evidently far superior and is, in the absence of any other certificate of
title to the same property, conclusive and indefeasible as to
Catigbacs ownership of Lot 1-B. Catigbacs certificate of title is
binding upon the whole world, including respondent public officers
and even petitioner herself. The Court ruled that tax declarations and
corresponding tax receipts cannot be used to prove title to or
ownership of a real property inasmuch as they are not conclusive
evidence of the same. Petitioner acquired her title to the 5,000 square
meter property from Raquel who, it is important to note, likewise only
had a tax declaration to evidence her title. In addition, the Court of
Appeals aptly observed that, "curiously, as to how and when
petitioners alleged predecessor-in-interest, Raquel K. Moratilla and
her supposed co-owners acquired portions of Lot 1 described as Lot
13713 stated in TD No. 00449, petitioner had so far remained utterly
silent."
A title is different from a certificate of title. Title is generally defined as
the lawful cause or ground of possessing that which is ours. It is that
which is the foundation of ownership of property, real or personal.
Title, therefore, may be defined briefly as that which constitutes a just
34

cause of exclusive possession, or which is the foundation of

ownership of property. Certificate of title, on the other hand, is a mere
evidence of ownership; it is not the title to the land itself. Under the
Torrens system, a certificate of title may be an Original Certificate of
Title, which constitutes a true copy of the decree of registration; or a
Transfer Certificate of Title, issued subsequent to the original
registration.

d. Advantages of the Torrens System of Registration

e. Effects of Registration, In General
i. PNB vs CA
153 SCRA 435
Facts:
Montemayor mortgaged to PNB three lots covered by Torrens
Certificate of Title to guarantee the loan granted by PNB to Jaramilla,
35

Bacani and Vitug. Since Jaramilla, Bacani and Vitug failed to pay
their loans, the lots were foreclosed and sold at public auction.
Certificate of sale was then issued to PNB for being the highest
bidder.
It was then found that the subject properties used as guarantees for
mortgage were conjugal properties of spouses Montemayor and
Vitug. The heirs of Vitug with his first wife question the validity of the
mortgage and pray for the declaration of the public auction as void.
Issue:
Is the Torrens Certificate of Title conclusive?
Ruling:
Yes. The well-known rule in this jurisdiction is that a person dealing
with a registered land has a right to rely upon the face of the Torrens
certificate of title and to dispense with the need of inquiring further,
except when the party concerned has actual knowledge of facts and
circumstances that would impel a reasonably cautious man make
such inquiry. A Torrens title concludes all controversy over ownership
of the land covered by a final degree of registration.The PNB had a
reason to rely on what appears on the certificates of title of the
properties mortgaged. For all legal purposes, the PNB is a mortgagee
in goodfaith for at the time the mortgages covering said properties
were constituted the PNB was not aware to any flaw of the title of the
mortgagor.
ii. Limitations:
Merely confirms pre-existing right; not a means of
acquiring ownership
SPOUSES ANTONIO BORNALES and FLORENDA DIAZ
BORNALES vs. THE HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE
COURT
G.R. No. 75336 October 18, 1988

Facts:

36

Sixto Dumolong, married to Isabel Marquez, was originally awarded a

parcel of land in Capiz in 1927. Sixto and Isabel whose marriage was
not blessed with any child lived separately since 1920. Subsequently,
Sixto cohabited extramaritally with Placida Dumolong with whom he
had a son by the name of Renito Dumolong and other children.

In November 1977 Placida filed a petition for reconstitution of title

over the lot. Reconstitution was granted in a decision. In March 1978,
a "Deed of Extrajudicial Adjudication and Sale of Real Property and
the sale of said lot for P6,000.00 to spouses Carlito Patanao and
Minda Dumolong and to spouses Bernardo Decrepito and Loreta
Dumolong, was executed by Renito Dumolong and by Isabel
Marquez Dumolong whose supposed thumbmark appeared in the
document.

About three months later, the spouses sold the lot for P40,000.00 to
petitioner-spouses Antonio Bornales and Florenda Diaz Bornales
through a Deed of Absolute Sale.

Alleging forgery of the "Deed of Extrajudicial Adjudication and Sale of

Real Property", private respondent Isabel Marquez filed an action for
reconveyance and damages against Placida Dumolong, Renito
Dumolong, spouses Carlito Patanao and Minda Dumolong, spouses
Bernardo Decrepito and Loreto Dumolong, and spouses Antonio
Bornales and Florenda Diaz.

The lower court rendered judgment in favor of plaintiff and against all
the defendants including the petitioners herein who were expressly
declared purchasers in bad faith. The subject land was held to be the
conjugal property of Sixto Dumolong and plaintiff Isabel Marquez and
that the Deed of Extrajudicial Adjudication and Sale of Real Property
was a forgery through the machinations of the defaulted defendants.
The appellate court affirmed the appealed decision.The petitioners
37

claim that they were not aware of any defect in the title of their
vendors.

Issue:

May Bornales invoke the indefeasibility of a Torrens title?

Ruling:

No. The chain of events starting from the reconstitution of the original
certificates of title to the execution of the deed of absolute sale in
favor of the petitioners reveals a clear scheme to dispossess the
private respondent of her share in the property subject of this
controversy.

Having been the cultivators of the land, petitioners were aware that
the private respondent was the legal wife of Sixto Dumolong and was
a rightful heir to the properties of the latter. They should have not
bought the land from Placida, considering their knowledge of the fact
that Placida could not have own any portion of the land.

Having bought the land registered under the Torrens system from
their vendors who procured title thereto by means of fraud, petitioners
cannot invoke the indefeasibility of a certificate of title against the
private respondent to the extent of her interest therein. The Torrens
system of land registration should not be used as a means to
perpetrate fraud against the rightful owner of real property.
Registration, to be effective, must be made in good faith.

38

Thus, it is a settled rule that the defense of indefeasibility of a

certificate of title does not extend to a transferee who takes it with
notice of the flaws in his transferor's title. If at all, the petitioners only
acquire the right which their vendors then had.

Protection is not Absolute

VIAJAR vs. COURT OF APPEALS
168 SCRA 405
Facts:
The spouses Ricardo Y. Ladrido and Leonor P. Ladrido were the
owners of Lot No. 7511 of the Cadastral Survey of Pototan
comprosing of an area 154,267 square meters and was registered in
the names of the spouses under Transfer Certificate of Title. Rosendo
H. Te,sold this lot to Angelica F. Viajar and Celso F. Viajar for P5,000
with the confirmation of Ana Te.. A Torrens title was later issued in the
names of Angelica F. Viajar and Celso F. Viajar.Later Viajar found out
that the propert was in possession of Ladrido and demanded for its
return but latter refused.
Angelica F. Viajar and Celso F. Viajar instituted a civil action for
recovery of possession and damages against Ricardo Y. Ladrido.
During the pendency of the case, plaintiff Celso F. Viajar sold his
rights over Lot No. 7340 to his mother and co-plaintiff, Angelica F.
Viajar. Defendant Ladrido died and substituted by his wife and
children.
The facts admitted by the parties during the pre-trial show that the
piece of real property which used to be Lot No. 7340 of the Cadastral
Survey of Pototan was located in barangay Guibuanogan Pototan,
Iloilo; that it consisted of 20,089 square meters; that at the time of the
cadastral survey in 1926, Lot No. 7511 and Lot No. 7340 were
separated by the Suague River; that the area of 11,819 square
meters of what was Lot No. 7340 has been in the possession of the
defendants; that the area of 14,036 square meters, which was
formerly the river bed of the Suague River per cadastral survey of
1926, has also been in the possession of the defendants; and that the
39

plaintiffs have never been in actual physical possession of Lot No.

7340.The lower court rendered its judgment in favour of the
defendants.
The court of appeals affirmed the decision if court a quo
Contention of the Petitioners:
Article 457 of the New Civil Code must be construed to limit the
accretion mentioned therein as accretion of unregistered land to the
riparian owner, and should not extend to registered land. Thus, the lot
in question having remained the registered land of the petitioners,
then the private respondents cannot acquire title there in derogation
to that of the petitioners, by accretion, for that will defeat the
indefeasibility of a Torrens Title.
Issue:
Whether the land registered protected from ownership by accretion in
accordance with article 457
Ruling:
No. The rule that registration under the Torrens System does not
protect the riparian owner against the diminution of the area of his
registered land through gradual changes in the course of an adjoining
stream is well settled. InPayatas Estate Improvement Co. vs.
Tuason, 53 Phil. 55.Registration does not protect the riparian owner
against the diminution of the area of his land through gradual
changes in the course of the adjoining stream. Accretions which the
banks of rivers may gradually receive from the effect of the current
become the property of the owners of the banks (Art. 366 of the Old
Civil Code; Art. 457 of the New).

40

 Does not make holder true owner of all property described

therein
CORONEL v IAC
155 SCRA 270
Facts:
Petitioner Rodolfo Coronel filed a complaint for recovery of
possession of a parcel of land registered under his name against the
private respondents Elias Merlan, Brigido Merlan, Jose Merlan,
Teodorico Nostrates, Severo Jeciel Santiago Fernan and Fortunato
Ocampo before the then Court of First Instance of Cavite. Coronel
alleged that at the time he purchased the parcel of land, the
defendants were already occupying a portion thereof as "tenants at
will". Despite demands to vacate the premises, the defendants
refused to.
The defendants denied Coronel allegations. They contended that the
lots occupied by them form part of a 1/3 undivided share of brothers
Brigido Merlan and Jose Merlan which they inherited from their
deceased father Gabriel Merlan, one of the three heirs of Bernabela
Lontoc. The Merlan brothers never sold their undivided 1/3 share of
the lot to anybody. It was actually their other co-heirs who sold their
undivided portions, hence plaintiffs ownership is fraudulent, void, and
without effect. The Merlans have always been in open and peaceful
possession of their undivided share of the lot throughout the years.
The lower courts ruled in favor of the defendants, declaring them as
the absolute owners of the remaining 1 1/3 of the 2/8 portion
pertaining to the late Bernabela Lontoc
Issue:
Whether the holder (Cornel) of the certificate of title is the true owner
of all the property
41

Ruling:
No, the holder (Cornel) of the certificate of title is not necessarily the
owner of all property.
The simple possession of a certificate of title, under the Torrens
System, does not necessarily make the possessor a true owner
of all the property described therein. If a person obtains a title, under
the Torrens system, which includes by mistake or oversight land
which cannot be registered under the Torrens systems, he does not,
by virtue of said certificate alone, become the owner of the lands
illegally included.
Lontocs property was survived by three sets of heirs. 1) Bernardino
Merlan; 2) Jose Merlan and Brigido Merlan; and 3) Daniel Anuat and
Paz Anuat.
Bernardino Merlan sold their 2/3 undivided portion of the lot to
spouses Ignacio Manalo and Marcela Nobelo. However, Ignacio sold
his interest to Mariano Manalo, which Coronel also bought later on.
The deed of sale was registered in the name of petitioner Rodolfo
Coronel.
The private respondents never sold their 1/3 share, what their coowners sold to Ignacio Manalo was their 2/3 share of the same lot;
and that Ignacio Manalo sold only the 2/3 share to third-party
defendant Mariano Manalo, the predecessor-in-interest of petitioner
Rodolfo Coronel.
Moreover, private respondents Brigido Merlan and Jose Merlan were
in open, peaceful and adverse possession of their 1/3 share over the
lot even after 1950 when the first sale of the lot took place. The 1/3
undivided portion of the private respondents was mistakenly included
in the transfer certificate of title of Mariano Manalo. The petitioner is
bound to recognize the lien in favor of the private respondents which
was mistakenly excluded and therefore not inscribed in the torrens
title of the land of his predecessors-in-interest.
42

 Not conclusive evidence of ownership over illegally

included areas
GOLLOY vs. CA 173 SCRA 26
GR No. 47491, May 4, 1989
Facts:
Petitioner possessed and a registered owner of a 41, 545-sq.m parcel
of land for more than 20 years. On the other hand, the Southwest
portion of the petitioners land is bounded by the respondents
land.The respondents subdivided their land among themselves and
placed 2 monuments inside the Southwest portion of the petitioners
land. Hence, petitioner filed an action to quit title. In the per-trail, the
parties agreed that they will appoint a public surveyor to relocate the
disputed area to determine the true and correct boundaries of their
parcels. Subsequently, the surveyor submitted a report wherein there
are overlapping on the boundaries of the 2 lands and that the
overlapping are due to the defect in the survey on petitioner's land
since it did not duly conform with the previously approved survey.
Wherefore, he submitted a report that respondents' land, prevails
over petitioner's land, since the former was surveyed and titled
ahead.
Issue:
Whether the petitioner is entitled to the land in dispute.
Ruling:
Yes, the petitioner is entitled to the land in dispute. It is hardly
persuasive that private respondents' predecessor, Dominga Balanga,
believing that she has a rightful claim to the overlapped portions,
however, no such objection was made. These facts could only be
construed to mean that private respondents' predecessor, Dominga
Balanga, never believed that she has a right and legal claim to the
overlapped portion. Besides, considering that petitioner and his
predecessor or predecessors have been in continuous possession in
the concept of an owner, for almost 50 years when the property was
registered, up to when the respondents placed 2 monuments inside
his land, the latter if they have any right at all to the overlapped
portion, are guilty of laches.

43

 The registration of lands of the public domain under the

torrens system, by itself cannot cover public lands into
private lands
HACIENDA BIGAA, INC. vs. EPIFANIO V. CHAVEZ
G.R. No. 174160 April 20, 2010
Facts:
The lots under consideration in this litigation were originally covered
by TCT No. 722, owned by Ayala y Cia and/or Alfonso, Jacobo and
Enrique Zobel, with an area of 9,652.583 hectares, known as
Hacienda Calatagan. Ayala and/or the Zobels expanded TCT No.
722 to cover an additional 2,000 hectares of land consisting of beach,
foreshore and bay areas, and navigable waters (excess areas),
making it appear that these excess areas are part of Hacienda
Calatagan's TCT No. 722. The hacienda, including such excess
areas, was later subdivided and was sold to third parties.Among the
buyers or transferees of the expanded and subdivided areas was
Hacienda Bigaa, which caused the issuance of titles under its name
covering the purchased subdivided areas. On the other hand, the
Republic, through the Bureau of Fisheries, leased out portions of the
same lands to qualified applicants in whose favor fishpond permits
44

were issued. This event gave rise to ownership and/or possessory

disputes between the owners of Hacienda Calatagan and their privies
and/or successors-in-interest, and the Republic or fishpond
permittees. Suits were filed in various courts in Batangas for the
recovery of the areas in excess of the area originally covered by TCT
No. 722.In those previous cases,the Supreme Court declared that the
excess areas of TCT No. 722 are unregisterable lands of the public
domain such that any title covering these excess areas are
necessarily void;that the Ayalas and the Zobels were found to be
mere usurpers of public domain areas;and all subdivision titles issued
to them or their privies and covering these areas were invalidated; the
wrongfully registered public domain areas reverted to the Republic.
In this petition,Hacienda Bigaa,Inc. alleged that on April
29,1996,Chavez, by force entered the premises of Hacienda Bigaa's
properties covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. 44695
and 56120, built a house on the property, and occupied the lots
without the prior consent and against the will of Hacienda Bigaa.The
case of forcible entry filed by the petitioner was dismissed by the
MTC,and affirmed by the RTC and Court of Appeals. Hence, this
petition.
Issue:
Between the petitioner and the respondent,who has the better right of
possession of the disputed lots?
Ruling:
The antecedent cases which were both ruled in favor of the Republic
and its lessees or permittees laid to rest the issues of ownership and
of possession oover the subject lands. The registration of lands of
the public domain under the Torrens system cannot convert public
lands into private lands.The Republic, as the rightful owner of the
expanded areas portions of the public domain has the right to
place its lessees and permittees (among them Zoila de Chavez) in
possession of the fishpond lots. The certificate of title which Hacienda
Bigaa have, does not in fact support their claim of ownership over the
lands in dispute. Since the transfer of lands by the Ayalas and Zobels
to Hacienda Bigaa,Inc. is void, the latter has no better right over the
subject land than the defendant. For that reason,there can be no valid
cause for the ejectment of Epifanio Chavez by Hacienda Bigaa, Inc..
Thus, the case for forcible entry should be dismissed.
45

B. Systems of Registration Prior to PD 1529

a. Spanish Title
DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY vs MUNOZ
G.R. No. L-24796 June 28, 1968
Facts:
Pinagcamaligan Indo-Agro Development Corporation (PIADECO)
was claiming to be the owner of some 72,000 hectares of land
located in municipalities of Angat, Norzagaray, and San Jose Del
Monte, province of Bulacan, and in Antipolo and Montalban, province
of Rizal. PIADECO relied on the Titulo Propriedad No. 4136 as
incontrovertible evidence of its ownership. Piadeco applied
for registration as private woodland some 10,000 hectares of
this land. In 1964, the NAWASA director ordered the cancellation of
Piadecos certificate because it encroached beyond what was
allowed in the certificate. It actually cut trees in the Angat and
Marikina watershed area which was prohibited. The lower court ruled
in favor of Piadeco. Piadeco also had a settlement with Nawasa.
Piadeco sought to renew its certificate but it was denied by the Asst.
Director of Forestry. The latter ruled that the Spanish title is no longer
recognized and should have never been used to apply for a
Certificate. Justice Sanchez noted the dubious validity of the title in
his opinion, stating Private ownership of land must be proved not
only through the genuineness of title but also with clear identity of the
land claimed xxx no definite area seems to have been mentioned in
the title.
Issue:

Whether or not Piadeco can claim ownership over the property.

46

Ruling:

No. The Spanish title it acquired cannot be used to register for

another Certificate. There should be no question now that Forestry
Administrative Order 12-2 has the force and effect of law. It was
promulgated pursuant to law. Section 1817, Revised Administrative
Code, empowers the Bureau of Forestry, with the approval of the
department head, to issue regulations deemed expedient or
necessary to secure the protection and conservation of the public
forests in such manner as to insure a continued supply of valuable
timber and other forest products for the future, and regulating the use
and occupancy of the forests and forest reserves, to the same end.
Forestry Administrative Order 12-2 was recommended by the Director
of Forestry, and approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources. It is no less a valid law. It is an administrative regulation
germane to the objects and purposes of the law. A rule shaped out by
jurisprudence is that when Congress authorized the promulgation of
administrative rules and regulations to implement a given legislation,
[a]ll that is required is that the regulation should be germane to the
objects and purposes of the law; that the regulation be not in
contradiction with it, but conform to the standards that the law
prescribes.

47

C. Nature of Judicial Proceedings

a. Sec. 2, PD 1529
i. In Rem Proceedings
Ching vs. Malaya
Facts:
The petitioners had alleged in their complaint for ejectment, filed
before MTC, that the private respondents had forced their way into
the disputed premises without any right whatsoever and had refused
to vacate the same despite repeated demands. These demands were
based on the petitioners' case that they were the owners of the said
property, having acquired it by virtue of a valid sale. The private
respondents, in their answer, had challenged the claimed sale,
arguing that the property belonged to them by right of inheritance.
The MTC ruled in favor of Ching. Alvarado appealed before the RTC
and Judge Asuncion held that the MTC has no jurisdiction over the
case because the issue between the two parties was not a mere
possession case. The two parties actually adduced evidence of
ownership: i.e. Deed of Sale presented by Ching & inheritance claims
by Alvarado. Judge Asuncion ruled that MTCs have no jurisdiction
over ownership cases.
Issue:
Whether or not the MTC has jurisdiction over the case?
Ruling:
The MTC has jurisdiction. The pertinent provisions of that law read as
follows:
Sec. 88. Original jurisdiction in civil cases. -In all civil actions,
including those mentioned in Rules fifty-nine and sixty-two (now Rule
57 and 60) of the Rules of Court, arising in his municipality or city,
and not exclusively cognizable by the Court of First Instance, the
justice of the peace (now municipal judge) and the judge of a
municipal court (now city court) shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction. In forcible entry and detainer proceedings, the justice of
the peace or judge of the municipal court shall have original
jurisdiction, but the said justice or judge may receive evidence upon
48

the question of title therein, whatever may be the value of the

property, solely for the purpose of determining the character and
extent of possession and damages for detention.
The mere assertion of ownership by the defendant in an ejectment
case will not oust the municipal court of its summary jurisdiction. This
has to be so, for "were the principle otherwise, the ends of justice
would be frustrated by making the efficacy of this kind of actions
depend upon the defendant in all cases.
The mere circumstance that proof of title, or evidence of ownership,
had been introduced during the trial before the Municipal Court would
not deprive said court of jurisdiction to rule on the question of who
had the prior physical possession.
Even where defendant in a detainer or forcible entry alleges title to
the property in his answer, it is declared in a great number of cases
that the Justice of the Peace or the Court of First Instance on appeal
will not be divested of its jurisdiction by such allegations alone.
There is one exception, however, and that is where it appears during
the trial that, by the nature of the evidence presented, the issue of
possession cannot be decided without deciding the issue of
ownership. In such a case, the jurisdiction of the municipal court is
lost and the action should be dismissed.
In the case at bar, the petitioners themselves adduced evidence of
ownership over the property in question did not, as claimed, have the
effect of divesting the municipal court of its jurisdiction. As permitted
in the above-cited Section 88 of R.A. No. 296, the plaintiff in an
ejectment case may introduce such evidence for the purpose of
proving the character of his possession and the amount of damages
he is claiming for unjust deprivation of such possession. The
petitioners were only trying to prove their right to possession and
damages by establishing their right of ownership.

But petitions for cancellation of entries are classified as

49

proceedings quasi-in-rem
Zenaida ACOSTA vs. Trinidad
SALAZAR
G.R. No. 161034, June 30, 2009

SALAZAR

AND

ANICETA

Facts:
On November 19, 1985, respondents Trinidad and Aniceta Salazar
filed a petition for the cancellation of the entries annotated at the back
of OCT No. 40287 registered in the names of spouses Juan Soriano
and Vicenta Macaraeg, who died without issue. The Salazars claim
that two of the entries annotated in the title are void since no
consolidation of rights appear in the Registry of Deeds (RD) of Tarlac
to support the entries; and that TCT No. 9297, which supposedly
cancelled OCT No. 40287, is non-existent according to a certification
issued by the RD. On October 21, 1986, RTC Branch 63 of Tarlac
resolved to grant the petition and ordered the cancellation of Entry
No. 20102. No respondent was impleaded in the said petition.
Subsequently, the Salazars filed an urgent motion praying for the
issuance of an order to direct the RD of Tarlac to recall all titles
issued under Entry Nos. 19756 and 20102 and to cancel all the tax
declarations issued based thereon. The motion was granted.
Later,
the Salazars filed a second urgent motion praying that the owners of
the affected property be ordered to appear before the court to show
cause why their titles should not be cancelled.
On October 20, 1987, the Salazars filed a new motion praying that
the RD of Tarlac be ordered to comply with the courts order issued
on November 7, 1986. The RD, however, explained that to comply
with the said court order would remove the basis for many other
transfer certificates of title and would result in the deprivation of the
right to due process of the registered owners thereof. On this basis,
the RTC denied the motion and advised the Salazars to elevate the
matter en consulta to the Land Registration Commission. After the
Salazars moved for reconsideration, the RTC directed the RD of
Tarlac to comply with the orders. Threatened with contempt, the RD
elevated the matter en consulta to the National Land Titles and
Deeds Registration Administration, which, in turn, issued a resolution
50

directing the RD to comply with the RTCs orders.

Then herein petitioners together with other subsequent purchasers
for value of the disputed property twenty-seven (27) titleholders in
all filed their formal written comment dated April 17, 1989. In their
comment, the oppositors contended, among others, that they had
acquired their titles in good faith and for value, and that the lower
court, acting as a land registration court, had no jurisdiction over
issues of ownership.
Defendants filed three separate answers. Defendants Raymundo
Macaraeg, Martha Estacio (both deceased), Adelaida Macaraeg,
Lucio Macaraeg, represented by Eufracia Macaraeg Baluyot as
attorney-in-fact, Gregorio Baluyut and Eligia Obcena (hereinafter,
Macaraegs) maintained that the November 7, 1986 order of the RTC
is null and void because the court did not acquire jurisdiction over the
case. They also argued that TCT No. 219121 issued in the name of
the Salazars is void and that the case for quieting of title is not a
direct, but a collateral, attack against a property covered by a Torrens
certificate.
The Court of appeals ruled in favor of the Salazars. Hence, this
petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the action taken by the Salazars regarding the
cancellation of the subsequent titles and tax declarations is valid.
Ruling
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the petitioners. the failure of the
Salazars to implead indispensable party defendants in the petition for
cancellation of entries in OCT No. 40287 should have been a ground
for the RTC to dismiss, or at least suspend, the proceedings of the
case. Yet, although the action proceeded, any judgment or order
issued by the court thereon is still null and void for want of authority
on the part of the court to act with respect to the parties never
impleaded in the action. Thus, the orders issued by the lower court
never acquired finality. More crucial is the fact that both parties in this
case are dealing with property registered under the Torrens system.
To allow any individual, such as the Salazars in this case, to impugn
the validity of a Torrens certificate of title by the simple expediency of
filing an ex parte petition for cancellation of entries would inevitably
51

erode the very reason why the Torrens system was adopted in this
country, which is to quiet title to land and to put a stop forever to any
question on the legality of the title, except claims that were noted, at
the time of registration, in the certificate, or which may arise
subsequent thereto. Rarely will the court allow another person to
attack the validity and indefeasibility of a Torrens certificate, unless
there is compelling reason to do so and only upon a direct action filed
in court proceeded in accordance with law. Furthermore, the court
also noted that for 30 years the Salazars never contested the
ownership of the said property in any court, nor the transfer of the
portions of the property to the petitioners. Hence, the Supreme court
granted the petition and the appellate courts decision was set aside,
and the case was reinstated to the RTC.

ii. Distinguished from In Personam Proceedings

D. Court of Competent Jurisdiction
a. Regional Trial Courts have plenary jurisdiction over land
registration proceedings and over all petitions filed after original
registration of titles
i. The Regional Trial Court, acting as a Land Registration Court
now has authority to act not only on applications for original
registration but also on all petitions filed after the original
registration of title. Coupled with authority is the power to hear
and determine all questions arising upon such applications or
petitions
ANTONIO TALUSAN vs. HERMINIGILDO TAYAG
G.R. No. 133698. April 4, 2001
Facts:
Petitioners bought a condominium unit covered by Title No. 651, from
Elias Imperial on December 7, 1981. The sale was purportedly
evidenced by a Deed of Sale which, however, had not been
52

registered with the Register of Deeds. Petitioners have been in actual

possession of the Unit in question, since they bought the same from
its former owners
Due to non-payment of delinquent real estate taxes, Juan D.
Hernandez, City Treasurer of Baguio City, sold the property at a
public auction to bidder Tayag (respondent) who caused the
ownership of said property consolidated under his name as per
decision of the trial court . Thus, petitioners filed a Complaint seeking
the annulment of the auction sale. They cited irregularities in the
proceedings and noncompliance with statutory requirements. The
Complaint was dismissed for the reason that a previous judgment by
Branch 6 of the same court under LRC Adm. Case No. 207-R in 1987
in1987 had consolidated ownership of the condominium unit in favor
of Respondent Tayag and also upheld the legality of the questioned
auction sale. Hence, to rule again on the same issue would amount
to passing upon a judgment made by a coequal court, contrary to the
principle of conclusiveness of judgment.
Issue:
Does the RTC, acting as a land registration court, have jurisdiction to
resolve the said issue?
Ruling
Yes, Land Registration courts can now hear and decide even
controversial and contentious cases, as well as thos invoking
substantial issues. The court now has the authority to act not only
on applications for original regisgtration but alson on all petitions filed
after the original registration of title. Presidential Decree (PD) 1529,
however, intended to avoid a multiplicity of suits and to promote the
expeditious termination of cases. This Decree had eliminated the
distinction between general jurisdiction vested in the regional trial
court and the latters limited jurisdiction when acting merely as a land
registration court.

53

ii. To avoid multiplicity of suits and to promote the expeditious

resolution of cases
SM PRIME HOLDINGS, INC. v ANGELA V. MADAYAG
G.R. No. 164687 February 12, 2009
Facts:
On July 12, 2001, respondent Angela V. Madayag filed with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Urdaneta, Pangasinan an application
for registration of a parcel of land with an area of 1,492 square
meters located in Barangay Anonas, Urdaneta City, Pangasinan.
Attached to the application was a tracing cloth of Survey Plan Psu01-008438, approved by the Land Management Services (LMS) of
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR),
Region 1, San Fernando City. On August 20, 2001, petitioner SM
Prime Holdings, Inc., through counsel, wrote the Chief, Regional
Survey Division, DENR, Region I, demanding the cancellation of the
respondents survey plan because the lot encroached on the
properties it recently purchased from several lot owners and that,
despite being the new owner of the adjoining lots, it was not notified
of the survey conducted on June 8, 2001. Petitioner then manifested
its opposition to the respondents application for registration. The
Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor
General, and the heirs of Romulo Visperas also filed their respective
oppositions. On February 6, 2002, petitioner filed its formal
opposition. Petitioner alleged that it had recently bought seven
parcels of land in Barangay Anonas, Urdaneta, delineated as Lots B,
C, D, E, G, H and I in Consolidation-Subdivision Plan No. (LRC) Pcs21329, approved by the Land Registration Commission on August 26,
1976, and previously covered by Survey Plan No. Psu-236090
approved by the Bureau of Lands on December 29, 1970. These
parcels of land are covered by separate certificates of title, some of
which are already in the name of the petitioner while the others are
still in the name of the previous owners.
On February 20, 2002, the RTC declared a general default, except as
to the petitioner, the Republic, and the heirs of Romulo Visperas.
54

Thereafter, respondent commenced the presentation of evidence.

The CA ratiocinated that the survey plan which was duly approved by
the DENR should be accorded the presumption of regularity, and that
the RTC has the power to hear and determine all questions arising
from an application for registration.
Issue:
Whether the Court of Appelas committed manifest errorr in holding
that the Lower Court has acted with grave abuse of discretion in
suspending the proceedings and archiving the case.
Ruling:
It is well to note at this point that, in its bid to avoid multiplicity of suits
and to promote the expeditious resolution of cases, Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 1529 eliminated the distinction between the
general jurisdiction vested in the RTC and the latters limited
jurisdiction when acting merely as a land registration court. Land
registration courts, as such, can now hear and decide even
controversial and contentious cases, as well as those involving
substantial issues. When the law confers jurisdiction upon a court, the
latter is deemed to have all the necessary powers to exercise such
jurisdiction to make it effective. It may, therefore, hear and determine
all questions that arise from a petition for registration. In view of the
nature of a Torrens title, a land registration court has the duty to
determine whether the issuance of a new certificate of title will alter a
valid and existing certificate of title. An application for registration of
an already titled land constitutes a collateral attack on the existing
title, which is not allowed by law. But the RTC need not wait for the
decision of the DENR in the petition to cancel the survey plan in order
to determine whether the subject property is already titled or forms
part of already titled property. The court may now verify this allegation
based on the respondents survey plan vis--vis the certificates of title
of the petitioner and its predecessors-in-interest. After all, a survey
plan precisely serves to establish the true identity of the land to
ensure that it does not overlap a parcel of land or a portion thereof
already covered by a previous land registration, and to forestall the
possibility that it will be overlapped by a subsequent registration of
any adjoining land.Should the court find it difficult to do so, the court
may require the filing of additional papers to aid in its determination of
the propriety of the application, based on Section 21 of P.D. No. 1529
55

b. But First Level Courts may be delegated to hear and decide

cadastral and land registration proceedings
c. Scope of Jurisdiction
i. The RTC has jurisdiction over all civil actions which involve
the title to or possession of real property or any interest therein
ii. Hence, the CA or the LRA has no jurisdiction to cancel a
certificate of title
Manotok v. Barque
G.R. No. 162335 &162605 December 18, 2008
Facts:
On 11 June 1988, a fire gutted portions of the Quezon City Hall,
immolating, among others, records stored in the Office of the Register
of Deeds of Quezon City. That fire has attained notoriety due to the
numerous certificates of title on file with that office, which were
destroyed as a consequence. Respondents Heirs of Homer Barque
(the Barques) filed a petition with the Land Registration Authority
(LRA) for administrative reconstitution of the original of Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 210177 (the Barque title) issued in the
name of Homer Barque. They alleged that the Barque title was
among the records destroyed by the 1988 fire. In support of their
petition, the Barques submitted copies of the alleged owners
duplicate of the Barque title, real estate tax receipts, tax declarations
and a Plan FLS 3168-D covering the property. Severino M. Manotok
IV, et al. (the Manotoks) filed their opposition thereto. The Manotoks
claimed that the lot covered by the Barque title formed part of the
land covered by their reconstituted title TCT No. RT-22481 [372302]
(the Manotok title) in the name of Severino Manotok, et. al. They
further alleged that the Barque title was spurious.
On 30 June 1997, Atty. Benjamin M. Bustos, as reconstituting officer
of the LRA, denied the petition for reconstitution of the Barque
title.The Barques motion for reconsideration was denied by Atty.
Bustos in an Order dated 10 February 1998; hence, the Barques
appealed to the LRA.
The LRA reversed Atty. Bustos on appeal. It ruled that the
reconstituting officer should not have required the submission of
documents other than the owners duplicate certificate of title as basis
56

for denying the petition and should have confined himself to the
owners duplicate certificate of title. The LRA further found anomalies
in the Manotoks title.
Both the Manotoks and the Barques appealed the LRA decision to
the Court of Appeals (CA). The Barques petition for review was
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 66700, while the Manotoks petition
for review was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 66642.
On 13 September 2002, the Second Division of the Court of Appeals
rendered a Decision denying the Barques petition and affirming the
LRA Resolution.
Issue:
Whether the Court of Appeals was empowered to direct the
annulment of the Manotok title through the petitions raised before it
by the Barques and the Manotoks.
Ruling:
It could not pursuant to Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529,
also known as the Property Registration Decree.
Clearly, the cancellation of the Manotok title cannot arise incidentally
from the administrative proceeding for reconstitution of the Barque
title even if the evidence from that proceeding revealed the Manotok
title as fake. Nor could it have emerged incidentally in the appellate
review of the LRAs administrative proceeding.There is no doubt that
the Court of Appeals does not have original jurisdiction to
annul Torrens titles or to otherwise adjudicate questions over
ownership of property. Its exclusive original jurisdiction is determined
by law, particularly by Batas Pambansa (B.P. 129). Section 9 of that
law restricts the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals
to special civil actions and to actions for annulment of judgments of
the regional trial court. Still, the Court of Appeals did acquire
jurisdiction over the Barques and the Manotoks petitions, albeit in
the exercise of its exclusive appellate jurisdiction over the ruling of
the LRA, also pursuant to Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended.
57

Thus, for the appellate court to be able to direct the cancellation of

a Torrens title in the course of reviewing a decision of the LRA, the
LRA itself must have statutory authority to cancel a Torrens title in the
first place.
Section 6 of P.D. No. 1529 enumerates the general functions of the
Land Registration Commissioner. Nowhere in the aforecited provision
is it stated that the LRA has the power to cancel titles. Indeed, the
Barques are unable to point to any basis in law that confirms the
power of the LRA to effect such cancellation, even under Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 26 as amended by Rep. Act No. 6732, which authorizes
the administrative reconstitution of titles in limited cases. In fact, as
we shall see shortly such laws take great care to ensure that a
petition for administrative reconstitution of title will not disturb
existing Torrens titles.
It is thus clear that neither the Court of Appeals nor the LRA had
jurisdiction to cancel the Manotok title.

d. Duty of Clerks of Courts in Land Registration Cases

E. Discontinuance of Pre-Existing Systems of Registration
a. Sec. 3, PD 1529
b. Spanish Titles Inadmissible as Evidence
PEDRO R. SANTIAGO vs. SUBIC BAY
AUTHORITY
G. R. No. 156888
November 20, 2006

METROPOLITAN

Facts:
Plaintiffs claim that co-petitioner Victoria Rodriguez is the sole heir
and administrator of the estate of Hermogenes Rodriguez.
Hermogenes Rodriguez was the owner of parcels of land registered
in his name under a certificate of title denominated as Titulo de
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Propriedad de Terrenos of 1891 Royal Decree. Said parcels of land

were leased by Rodriguez to Santiago and Mateo for a period of 50
years. By virtue of the contract Santiago is occupying the land. The
petitioners further alleged that defendant having no authority to
possess the land, defendant is still claiming possessory rights over
said property. And in fact defendant is using the two parcels of land
for commercial and other purposes. To comply with her contractual
commitments, Rodriguez now desires to recover possession of the
property from the defendant.
Lately, Santiago is informed by the agents of SBMA that he should
vacate the property because said defendant would need the same for
its own use. SBMA further alleged in its counter statement of facts
that, Liwanag Santiago (wife of Pedro Santiago) only availed of the
housing units as a privilege for her being an employee of SBMA.
However, since the contract between Liwanag and SBMA concluded
and has not been renewed, Liwanag Santiago ceased to be an
employee of respondent SBMA; and that as a consequence thereof,
as mandated by the SBMA Housing Policy, she and her family were
asked to vacate and return possession of the subject housing unit.
Issue:
Whether or not Spanish Titles are still admissible as evidence of
ownership of lands?
Ruling:
It has long been settled that by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 892
which took effect on 16 February 1976, the system of registration
under the Spanish Mortgage Law was abolished and all holders of
Spanish titles or grants should cause their lands covered thereby to
be registered under the Land Registration Act (Act No. 496) within six
months from the date of effectivity of the said Decree or until 16
August 1976. If not, non-compliance therewith will result in a
reclassification of the real property.
The fact that petitioners were in actual possession of the Subject
Property when they filed the Complaint with the trial court on 29 April
1996 does not exclude them from the application of P.D. No. 892, and
their Spanish title remain inadmissible as evidence of their ownership
59

of the Subject Property, whether in a land registration proceeding or

in an action to remove a cloud on or to quiet title.
In the case at bar, we have no alternative but to uphold the ruling that
Spanish titles can no longer be countenanced as indubitable
evidence of land ownership. And, without legal or equitable title to the
subject property, Victoria M. Rodriguez, Armando G. Mateo and
petitioner Pedro R. Santiago lacked the personality to claim
entitlement to possession of the same. Title to real property refers to
that upon which ownership is based. It is the evidence of the right of
the owner or the extent of his interest, by which means he can
maintain control and, as a rule, assert right to exclusive possession
and enjoyment of the property.

c. Presidential Decree No. 892

INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE DON MARIANO SAN PEDRO Y
ESTEBAN vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 103727 December 1, 1996
Facts:
The heirs of the late Mariano San Pedro y Esteban laid claim and
have been laying claim to the ownership of, against third persons and
the Government itself. The petitioners contend on the basis of a
Spanish title, entitled "Titulo de Propriedad Numero 4136" dated April
25, 1894. The claim, according to the San Pedro heirs, appears to
cover lands, thus affecting in general lands extending from Malolos,
Bulacan to the City Hall of Quezon City and the land area between
Dingalan Bayin the north and Tayabas Bay in the south. Considering
the vastness of the land claim, many suits have been filed all for the
purpose of owning the lands.
60

Issue:
WON the heirs of Don Mariano have the legal claim over the
properties involved.
Ruling:
No, the Supreme Court ruled otherwise. While the petitioners contend
that the lands are subject of The Spanish Mortgage Law or the Titulo
Propriedad Numero 4136, It is settled that by virtue of Pd no 892
which took effect on February 16. 1976 the syte of registration under
the Spanish Mortgage Law was abolished and all holders of Spanish
titles or grants should cause their lands coverd thereby to be
registered under the Land Registration Act within 6 months from date
of effectivity of the said decree. In this case the heirs have no legal
claim over the said lands because PD 892 invaldates any claim of
title and must be first registered under the Torrens system of titling.
ADMINISTRATION OF THE TORRENS SYSTEM
A. Sections 4-13, PD 1529
B. Land Registration Authority
a. Functions of the Authority
b. Functions of the Administrator
C. The Register of Deeds
a. General Functions
i. Preparation of an index system of all registered owners
b. Ministerial character of duty to register instrument
BARANDA V. GUSTILO
GR No. 81163 September 26, 1988
Facts:
This case involves two cases (G.R. No. 64432 and G.R. No. 6204)
over the same parcel of land known as Lot No. 4517 of Sta. Barbara,
Iloilo covered by OCT No. 6406. This is the subject of the dispute
between petitioner Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia, and
respondents Gregorio Perez, Maria Gotera and Susan Silao. OCT
No. 6406 was cancelled and TCT No. 106098 was issued in the
names of the petitioner. However, the respondents refused to honor it
on the ground that they also have a TCT numbered T-25772 over the
same lot. The court resolved that TCT No. T-25772 was acquired
61

fraudulently, and declared it null and void. It held the validity of Title
No. T-106098 to which, the court also ordered the writ of possession
to the petitioners be carried out. However, a notice of lis pendens "on
account of or by reason of a separate case (Civil Case No. 15871)
still pending in the Court of Appeals" was carried out and annotated in
the new certificates of titles issued to the petitioners. This prompted
the petitioners to file for a new petition directing the Acting Register of
Deeds to cancel the notice of lis pendens annotated in the new
certificates of titles issued.
Issues:
1. Whether the pendency of the appeal in Civil Case No. 15871 with
the Court of Appeals prevents the court from cancelling the notice of
lis pendens in the certificates of titles of the petitioners which were
earlier declared valid and subsisting by this Court in G.R. No. 62042
and G.R. No. 64432.
2. Whether the Register of Deeds has the duty to annotate or annul
the notice of lis pendens in a Torrens Certificate of Title.
Ruling:
1. No. Under these circumstances, it is crystal clear that private
respondents herein, in filing Civil Case No. 15871 were trying to delay
the full implementation of the final decisions in G.R. No. 62042 as
well as G.R. No. 64432. Lis pendens has been conceived to protect
the real rights of the party causing the registration thereof. The
private respondents are not entitled to this protection. SC have once
held that while ordinarily a notice of pendency which has been filed in
a proper case, cannot be cancelled while the action is pending and
undetermined, the proper court has the discretionary power to cancel
it under peculiar circumstances, as for instance, where the evidence
so far presented by the plaintiff does not bear out the main
allegations of his complaint, and where the continuances of the trial,
for which the plaintiff is responsible, are unnecessarily delaying the
determination of the case to the prejudice of the defendant.
2. No. Section 10, Presidential Decree No. 1529 states that "It shall
be the duty of the Register of Deeds to immediately register an
62

instrument presented for registration dealing with real or personal

property which complies with all the requisites for registration. ... . If
the instrument is not registrable, he shall forthwith deny registration
thereof and inform the presentor of such denial in writing, stating the
ground or reasons therefore, and advising him of his right to appeal
by consulta in accordance with Section 117 of this Decree.
The function of a Register of Deeds with reference to the registration
of deeds encumbrances, instruments and the like is ministerial in
nature. The respondent Acting Register of Deeds did not have any
legal standing to file a motion for reconsideration of the respondent
Judge's Order directing him to cancel the notice of lis pendens
annotated in the certificates of titles of the petitioners over the subject
parcel of land.
i. No need for notice and hearing
LEDESMA v. VILLASENOR
13 SCRA 494
Facts:
Felix Villaseor, in his capacity as special administrator of the estate
of his deceased father, Eusebio Villaseor, filed a petition in the Court
of First Instance of Negros Occidental (Civil Case No. 5662) to enjoin
the Register of Deeds of the same province from registering a deed
of sale by which the deceased conveyed to Jose Ma. Ledesma two
lots registered in his name, to wit, Lots Nos. 2532-C and 2533-B of
the Cadastral Survey of Bago, Negros Occidental. The reason given
for seeking injunctive relief was that the deed of sale was fictitious
and that the signature of the vendor was forged. The court issued a
writ of preliminary injunction to maintain the status quo. The vendee,
Ledesma, who had not been impleaded as a party-defendant,
intervened in the case. On October 3, 1960 the court lifted the writ of
preliminary injunction and dismissed the petition.
Two days later, on October 5, Ledesma filed his own petition in the
cadastral record of said lots, asking that the Register of Deeds be
ordered to register the aforementioned deed of sale. The ground
alleged in the petition was that Civil Case No. 5662 had been
dismissed and the preliminary injunction issued therein had been
dissolved. On the same day the court, without notice either to the
Register of Deeds or to appellant, and solely on the basis of the
allegations in the petition, issued the corresponding order for
registration. In compliance therewith the Register of Deeds cancelled
63

the two certificates of title in the name of the deceased Eusebio

Villaseor and issued new ones in Ledesma's name. On October 8,
1960, again upon Ledema's petition, the court ordered the
cancellation of the certificates thus issued and the issuance of still
new ones, also in his name.
Villaseor moved for reconsideration of the two orders and then
perfected this appeal upon their denial.
Appellant claims that the lower court erred in issuing the orders
appealed from because: (1) appellee failed to give notice to appellant
or to furnish him copy of the petition; (2) appellee should have filed
the same in Civil Case No. 5662 and not in the cadastral proceeding;
(3) the court had no power to order the Register of Deeds to register
the deed of sale in question when the same was being contested as
fictitious nor to order the issuance of titles in the name of the
supposed buyer; and (4) if, as appellee points out, the Register of
Deeds had improperly refused to register the deed of sale, the proper
remedy should have been a suit for mandamus.
Issue:
Whether or not the court erred in issuing the orders of lifting the
injunction and the dismissal of the petition without notice to the
Register of Deeds or to appellant.
Ruling:
We are of the opinion that the lower court did commit the error
attributed to it. To be sure, when the writ of preliminary injunction in
Civil Case No. 5662 was dissolved in the same order which
dismissed appellant's petition the obstacle to the registration of the
deed of sale was removed. The effect of the dissolution was
immediate and would not be stayed even if an appeal had been
perfected from the order of dismissal (Watson v. Enriquez, 1 Phil.
480; Sitia Taco v. Ventura, 1 Phil. 497). But that is only as far as the
Register of Deeds was concerned, his duty under the circumstances
if the document was on its face registrable being administrative
and ministerial. The lifting of the injunction, however, or even the
dismissal of the petition, was no authority for the court in the
cadastral proceeding to issue the orders complained of without notice
to the Register of Deeds or to appellant, considering that the
dismissal of Civil Case No. 3662 was not yet final. The court knew of
the pendency of that case and of the fact that the relief sought therein
by appellant was precisely to prevent registration. Irrespective of the
propriety or impropriety of the remedy pursued, that is, whether or not
64

mandamus should have been resorted to, the least that the court a
quo should have done was to afford appellant proper notice and
hearing, so that he could reiterate his objections to the registration
and present evidence to substantiate them and/or call the court's
attention to the fact that the question had not yet been definitely
settled in the civil action since the order dismissing it was not yet
final.
It is one thing for the Register of Deeds, in the exercise of his
ministerial duties under the law, to register an instrument which in his
opinion is registrable, and quite another thing for the court itself to
order the registration. The former does not contemplate notice to and
hearings of interested parties such as are required in a judicial
proceeding nor carry with it the solemnity and legal consequences of
a court judgment. The court a quo, in anticipating the action of the
Register of Deeds, unnecessarily took the matter out of his hands
and at the same time preempted the question of registration still
pending in the civil action filed by appellant.

iii. Determination of the validity of an instrument belongs to

the courts
ALMIROL V. REGISTER OF DEEDS OF AGUSAN
22 SCRA 1152
Facts:
On June 28, 1961 Teodoro Almirol purchased from Arcenio Abalo a
parcel of land situated in the municipality of Esperanza, province of
65

Agusan, and covered by original certificate of title P-1237 in the name

of "Arcenio Abalo, married to Nicolasa M. Abalo." Sometime in May,
1962 Almirol went to the office of the Register of Deeds of Agusan in
Butuan City to register the deed of sale and to secure in his name a
transfer certificate of title. The Register of Deeds refused to register
the land contending that it is a conjugal property and needs the
consent of the other spouse. So the petitioner filed to the CFI of
Agusan a petition for mandamus to compel the register of deeds. In
its answer, the respondent contends that the petitioner did not extract
all remedies before going to court since he can appeal the decision to
the Commissioner of Lad Registration.
The lower court held that mandamus cannot lie because that exist
that adequate remedy.
Issue:
Whether or not a case can be directly filed to the court without
appealing first to the Commissioner of Land Registration?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that the dismissal by the lower court is
correct and provides that "where any party in interest does not agree
with the Register of Deeds . . . the question shall be submitted to the
Commissioner of Land Registration," who thereafter shall "enter an
order prescribing the step to be taken or memorandum to be made,"
which shall be "conclusive and binding upon all Registers of Deeds."
This administrative remedy must be resorted to by the petitioner
before he can have recourse to the courts.
c. When Register of Deeds may deny registration of
voluntary instruments
AURELIO BALBIN v REGISTER OF DEEDS OF ILOCOS SUR
G.R. No. L-20611 May 8, 1969
Facts:
Aurelio and Francis Balbin presented to the Register of Deeds
Ilocos Sur a duplicate copy of the registered owners certificate
of title and a deed if donation intervivos, requesting that the
latter be annotated on the title. Cornelio Balbin(registered
owner) appeared to have donated the 2/3 of the subject land. On
the other hand, the RoD denied the petition for annotation
legally defective or otherwise not sufficient in law.
66

It shows that there was an annotation in the memorandum of

encumbrance on the Original Certificate of Title of 3 separate sales
executed by the registered owner, Cornelio, in favor of Florention,
Juana Gabayan and Roberto Bravo. The said persons received their
co-owners duplicate CTs. The petitioners failed to present the 3 coowners copies of CTs, which is why the RoD denied said annotation.
Thus, the petitioners referred the matter to the LRC, who on the other
hand upheld the decision of the RoD.

Issue:

W/N the LRC is correct in denying request for annotation?

Ruling

Yes. Pursuant to sec. 55 of Act 496, there should only be one

duplicate of the title in question( the registered owner himself).
However, if there are duplicates than that of originally issues, it must
contain identical entries of transaction affecting the land covered by
the said title. Thus, if different copies were permitted to carry different
annotations, the whole system of Torrens system would cease to be
reliable.

In the case at bar, there were several copies of the same title in
existence, there integrity might be affected if it was annotated in once
copy and not on the others..
Since the property subject of donation is also presumed conjugal, that
is, property of donor Cornelio and his deceased wife Nemesia Mina,
there should first be a liquidation of the partnership before the
surviving spouse may make such a conveyance. Assuming the
67

conjugal nature of the property, the donation bears on its face an

infirmity which justified the denial of registration, namely, the fact that
2/3 portion of the property which Cornelio donated was more than
his share, not to say more than what remained of such share after he
had sold portions of the same land to 3 other parties.

i. Register of Deeds may refuse to register a private

instrument
ii. Duty of the Register of Deeds when in doubt
GALLARDO vs INTERMEDIATE APPELATE COURT
155 SCRA 248
68

Facts:
Petitioners were nephew and niece of the late Pedro Villanueva and
first cousin of the private respondent Marta Villanueva de Agana, the
latter being the daughter of Pedro Villanueva. The subject matter of
this controversy involves a parcel of land situated in Cavinti, Laguna
consisting of 81,300x square meters, more or less, initially covered by
an Original Certificate of Title No. 2262, issued on April 2, 1924
owned and registered in the name of the late Pedro Villanueva. On
August 10, 1937, petitioner claimed that the aforesaid land was sold
to them in a private document, an unnotarized deed of sale written in
Tagalog that was allegedly signed by the late Pedro Villanueva
conveying and transferring the property in question in favour of the
petitioners. Subsequently, the OCT was cancelled and a new
certificate of title was issued in the name of the petitioners covered by
TCT NO. RT-6293 (No. 23350) on January 4, 1944. On November
17, 1976, defendant Marta Villanueva together with Pedro Villanueva,
Jr., and Restituto R. Villanueva executed and filed an Affidavit of
Adverse Claim with the Office of the Registered of Deeds of Laguna.
When petitioners learned of this Affidavit of Adverse Claim, attempt
was made to settle said controversy amicably, but they failed. So,
petitioners instituted court suit against the private respondent and
her husband, Dr. Marcelo S. Agana, Sr. by filling a complaint for
Quieting of the Title and Damages with the Court of First Instance of
Laguna on February 3, 1977.
The Court of First Instance of Laguna rendered its decision declaring
the deedd of sale of August 10, 1937, as well as the reconstituted
transfer certificate of title of petitioners, void ab initio. Thus,
petitioners file a notice of appeal to the IAC. However, the IAC, on
May 22, 1984, affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court.

Issue:
Whether or not there was a valid reconstitution of Transfer Certificate
ofTitle No. RT-6293 (No. 23350) issued in the names of petitioners.
69

Ruling:
No. Section 127 of Act 496 which requires, among other things, that
the conveyance be executed before the judge of a court of record or
clerk of a court of record or a notary public or a justice of the peace,
who shall certify such acknowledgement substantially in from next
hereinafter stated was violated.
The action of the Register of Deeds of Laguna in allowing the
registration of the private deed of sale was unauthorized and did not
lend a bit of validity to the defective private document of sale. With
reference to the special law, Section 127 of the land Registration Act,
Act 496 Deed of Conveyance, affecting lands, whether registered
under this act or unregistered shall be sufficient in law when made
substantially in accordance with the following forms, and shall be as
effective to convey, encumber or bind the lands as though made in
accordance with more prolix forms heretofore in use.
It is therefore evident that Exhibit E in the case at bar is definitely
not registerable under the Land Registration Act. Also, the contention
that ownership over registered property may be acquired by
prescription or adverse possession is absolutely without merit. No title
to registered land in derogation of that of the registered owner shall
be acquired by prescription or adverse possession. Prescription is
unavailing not only against the registered owner but also against his
hereditary successors.

LAND, IN GENERAL
A. Land Classification. Sec. 3, 1987 Phil Constitution
a.
70

(1) CRUZ V. DENR SECRETARY

GR No. 135385 December 6, 2000
Facts:
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa, assailing the
constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371 (R.A.
8371), otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of
1997 (IPRA), and its Implementing Rules and Regulations
(Implementing Rules), brought suit on September 29, 1998 for
prohibition and mandamus as citizens and taxpayers. Respondents
Chairperson and Commissioners of the National Commission on
Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), the government agency created under
the IPRA to implement its provisions, defended the constitutionality of
the IPRA and pray that the petition be dismissed for lack of merit. The
respondents filed through the Solicitor General a consolidated
comment on October 19, 1998. The Solicitor General however is of
the view that the IPRA is partly unconstitutional on the ground that it
grants ownership over natural resources to indigenous peoples and
prays that the petition be granted in part. A group of intervenors, Sen.
Juan Flavier, one of the authors of the IPRA, Mr. Ponciano
Bennagen, a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, and
the leaders and members of 112 groups of indigenous peoples
(Flavier, et. al) join the NCIP on November 10, 1998 in defending the
constitutionality of IPRA. Likewise, the Commission on Human Rights
(CHR) prays the petition be dismissed asserting that IPRA is an
expression of the principle of parens patriae and that the State has
the responsibility to protect and guarantee the rights of those who are
at a serious disadvantage like indigenous peoples. Also, the Ikalahan
Indigenous People and the Haribon Foundation agree with the NCIP
and Flavier, et al. that IPRA is consistent with the Constitution. The
parties and intervenors, after oral argument heard on April 13, 1999
filed their respective memoranda which reiterate their arguments.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the following provisions of the
IPRA and its Implementing Rules on the ground that they amount to
an unlawful deprivation of the States ownership over lands of the
public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources
therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2,
Article XII of the Constitution.
71

Issues:
1. Whether some provisions of the IPRA and its Implementing Rules
are unconstitutional that it violates the regalian doctrine embodied in
Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution;
2. Whether the provisions of the IPRA defining the powers and
jurisdiction of the NCIP and making customary law applicable to the
settlement of disputes involving ancestral domains and ancestral
lands violates the due process clause of the Constitution;
3. Whether Rule VII, Part II, Section 1 of the NCIP Administrative
Order No. 1, series of 1998 characterizing the administrative
relationship of the NCIP to the Office of the President infringes upon
the Presidents power of control over executive departments under
Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution.
Ruling:
The votes were equal (7 to 7) as to dismiss or grant the petition and
pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the
petition is DISMISSED.

Concurring Opinion(s):

PUNO, J.: The struggle of the Filipinos throughout colonial history

had been plagued by ethnic and religious differences. These
differences were carried over and magnified by the Philippine
government through the imposition of a national legal order that is
mostly foreign in origin or derivation. Largely unpopulist, the present
legal system has resulted in the alienation of a large sector of society,
specifically, the indigenous peoples. The histories and cultures of the
indigenes are relevant to the evolution of Philippine culture and are
vital to the understanding of contemporary problems. It is through the
72

IPRA that an attempt was made by our legislators to understand

Filipino society not in terms of myths and biases but through common
experiences in the course of history. The Philippines became a
democracy a centennial ago and the decolonization process still
continues. If the evolution of the Filipino people into a democratic
society is to truly proceed democratically, i.e., if the Filipinos as a
whole are to participate fully in the task of continuing democratization,
it is this Court's duty to acknowledge the presence of indigenous and
customary laws in the country and affirm their co-existence with the
land laws in our national legal system.

KAPUNAN, J. contradicts the arguments of the petitioners that the

law affords no protection to those who are not indigenous peoples.
The enactment of IPRA, Congress did not purport to annul any and
all Torrens titles within areas claimed as ancestral lands or ancestral
domains. The statute imposes strict procedural requirements for the
proper delineation of ancestral lands and ancestral domains as
safeguards against the fraudulent deprivation of any landowner of his
land, whether or not he is member of an indigenous cultural
community. In all proceedings for delineation of ancestral lands and
ancestral domains, the Director of Lands shall appear to represent
the interest of the Republic of the Philippines. With regard to ancestral
domains, the following procedure is mandatory: first, petition by an
indigenous cultural community, or motu proprio by the NCIP; second,
investigation and census by the Ancestral domains Office ("ADO") of
the NCIP; third, preliminary report by the ADO; fourth, posting and
publication; and lastly, evaluation by the NCIP upon submission of the
final report of the ADO. With regard to ancestral lands, unless such
lands are within an ancestral domain, the statute imposes the
following procedural requirements: first, application; second, posting
and publication; third, investigation and inspection by the ADO; fourth,
delineation; lastly, evaluation by the NCIP upon submission of a
report by the ADO. Neither do the questioned sections of IPRA on the
composition and powers and jurisdiction of the NCIP and the
application of customary law, violate the due process clause of the
Constitution. Petitioners concerns are unfounded. The fact that the
NCIP is composed of members of the indigenous peoples does not
mean that it (the NCIP) is incapable, or will appear to be so
73

incapable, of delivering justice to the non-indigenous peoples. A

persons possession of the trait of impartiality desirable of a judge has
nothing to do with his or her ethnic roots. In this wise, the indigenous
peoples are as capable of rendering justice as the non-indigenous
peoples for, certainly, the latter have no monopoly of the concept of
justice. In any case, there are sufficient checks in the law against any
abuse by the NCIP of its quasi-judicial powers. Section 67 states that
the decision of the NCIP shall be appealable to the Court of Appeals
by petition for review. The regular remedies under our rules of
procedure are likewise available to any party aggrieved by the
decision of the NCIP.Anent the use of customary laws in determining
the ownership and extent of ancestral domains, suffice it to say that
such is allowed under paragraph 2, Section 5 of Article XII of the
Constitution. Said provision states, "The Congress may provide for
the applicability of customary laws governing property rights and
relations in determining the ownership and extent of the ancestral
domains."

Separate Opinion(s):
MENDOZA, J. says that petitioners do not complain of any injury as a
result of the application of the statute to them. They assert a right to
seek an adjudication of constitutional questions as citizens and
taxpayers, upon the plea that the questions raised are of
"transcendental importance."
PANGANIBAN, J. concedes that indigenous cultural communities
and indigenous peoples (ICCs/IPs) may be accorded preferential
rights to the beneficial use of public domains, as well as priority in the
exploration, development and utilization of natural resources. Such
privileges, however, must be subject to the fundamental law.
Panganiban disagrees to legitimize perpetual inequality of access to
the nation's wealth or to stamp the Court's imprimatur on a law that
offends and degrades the repository of the very authority of this Court
- the Constitution of the Philippines. Social justice principle of giving
more in law to those who have less in life, Congress in its wisdom
may grant preferences and prerogatives to our marginalized brothers
and sisters, subject to the irreducible caveat that the Constitution
74

must be respected.

(2) SECRETARY OF THE DENR V. YAP

GR No. 167707 October 8, 2008
Facts:
On November 10, 1978, then President Marcos issued Proc. No.
1801 declaring Boracay Island as a tourist zone and marine reserve.
President Marcos later approved the issuance of PTA Circular 3-82 to
implement Proclamation No. 1801. Claiming that Proclamation No.
1801 and PTA Circular No 3-82 precluded them from filing an
application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title or survey of land
for titling purposes, respondents-claimants Mayor Yap, Jr., and
others filed a petition for declaratory relief with the RTC of Kalibo,
Aklan. They declared that they themselves, or through their
predecessors-in-interest, had been in open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious possession and occupation in Boracay since June 12,
1945, or earlier since time immemorial. Respondents-claimants
posited that Proclamation No. 1801 and its implementing Circular did
not place Boracay beyond the commerce of man. Since the Island
was classified as a tourist zone, it was susceptible of private
ownership.
The Republic, through the OSG, opposed the petition for declaratory
relief. The OSG countered that Boracay Island was an unclassified
land of the public domain. It formed part of the mass of lands
classified as public forest, which was not available for disposition
pursuant to Section 3(a) of the Revised Forestry Code, as amended.
On July 14, 1999, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of
respondents-claimants. The Republic then appealed to the CA. In
2004, the appellate court affirmed in toto the RTC decision. On May
22, 2006, during the pendency of the petition in the trial court,
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 1064
classifying Boracay Island partly reserved forest land (protection
purposes) and partly agricultural land (alienable and disposable).

75

On August 10, 2006, petitioners-claimants Sacay, and other

landowners in Boracay filed with this Court an original petition for
prohibition, mandamus, and nullification of Proclamation No. 1064.
They alleged that the Proclamation infringed on their prior vested
rights over portions of Boracay. On November 21, 2006, this Court
ordered the consolidation of the two petitions.
Issue:
Whether the private claimants have a right to secure titles over their
occupied portions in Boracay.
Ruling:
No. The petitions were denied. The decision of the Court of Appeals
was reversed.
Except for lands already covered by existing titles, Boracay was an
unclassified land of the public domain prior to Proclamation No. 1064.
Such unclassified lands are considered public forest under PD No.
705.
PD No. 705 issued by President Marcos categorized all unclassified
lands of the public domain as public forest. Section 3(a) of PD No.
705 defines a public forest as a mass of lands of the public domain
which has not been the subject of the present system of classification
for the determination of which lands are needed for forest purpose
and which are not. Applying PD No. 705, all unclassified lands,
including those in Boracay Island, are ipso facto considered public
forests. PD No. 705, however, respects titles already existing prior to
its effectivity. A positive act declaring land as alienable and
disposable is required.

76

b. Friar lands. One who acquires land under the Friar Lands Act,
as well as his successor in interest may not claim successional
rights to purchase by reason of occupation from time
immemorial as this contravenes the historical fact that the
Government of the Philippine Islands bought the friar lands not
from individual persons but from certain companies, a society
and a religious order. Under the Friar Lands Act, only actual
settlers and occupants at the time said land are acquired by the
Government were given preference to lease, purchase or acquire
their holdings in disregard of the settlement and occupation of
persons before the government acquired the lands.
CANETE V. GENUINO ICE CO. INC.,
GR No. 154080 January 22, 2008
Facts:
Petitioners filed a complaint and an amended complaint for
cancellation of title to property covered by several TCTs for being
spurious, fictitious and issued under mysterious circumstances
considering that the holders thereof and their predecessors-in-interest
were never in actual, adverse, and physical possession of the
property rendering them ineligible to acquire title under the Friar
Lands Act. They also seek to annul OCT No. 614 from which the
foregoing TCTs originated of were derived. The amended complaint
alleged that the plaintiffs and their predecessors-in-interest are
among those in actual, adverse, peaceful, and continuous possession
in the concept of owner of unregistered parcels of land in Sitio
Mabilog, Quezon City. And that the real property in question is a
portion of the friar land known as the Piedad Estate, which is
intended for distribution among the bona fide occupants thereof
pursuant to the Friar Lands Act.
Respondent, sought the dismissal of the case on the ground that it
fails to state a cause of action because petitioners are not real
parties-in-interest, that no relief may be granted as a matter of law,
and that petitioners failed to exhaust all administrative remedies. The
77

motion to dismiss was denied. The respondents filed a petition for

certiorari to the CA which granted the petition and dismissed the
amended complain of the petitioners.
Issue:
Whether the CA acted with grave abuse of discretion in granting
the certiorari and dismissing the complaint
Ruling:
No. The complaint and amended complaint failed to state the
ultimate fact which are essential facts constituting the plaintiffs
cause of action. The plaintiffs gave only an incomplete narration of
facts unsupported by documentary or other exhibits, and the
allegations are mere conclusions of law also, the allegations of fraud
are not specific and were not substantiated.
The initial claim that OCT 164 of which all the other subject titles are
derivatives is null and void has been proven wrong as held in
previous cases (Pinlac). It has been found that OCT 614 did legally
exist and was previously issued in the name of the Philippine
Government in 1910. An Ad Hoc Committee of the then Ministry of
Natural Resources specifically tasked to investigate the historical
background of the Piedad Estate, found that as early as prior to the
Second World War, all lots in the Piedad Estate had already been
disposed of. The Piedad Estate has been placed under the Torrens
system which means that all lots therein are titled. Also, as held in the
Balicudiong case one who acquired title under the Friar Land Act, as
well as his successors-in-interest, may not claim successional rights
to purchase by reason of occupation from time immemorial unless it
is shown that their predecessors-in-interest were actual settlers and
occupants at the time said land were acquired by the government.
Also, the plaintiffs did not pray to be declared owners of the subject
property-despite their alleged adverse possession-but only to be
adjudged as the bona fide occupants thereof, conceding to the
States ownership of the property. Being so, they are not real parties
in interest for the purpose of maintaining a suit for cancellation of the
subject titles. Their interest is mere expectancy based on the
probability that the government would give them preference as
78

buyers or lessees of the subject lands. On real-parties in interest may

file for the cancellation of title of property and not one whose interest
is based on mere expectancy.
REGISTRABLE PROPERTIES
A. Non-registrable Properties
a. Properties of public dominion
REPUBLIC V. CA
131 SCRA 532
Facts:
Respondents Benjamin Tancinco, Azucena Tancinco Reyes, Marina
(should be "Maria") Tancinco Imperial and Mario C. Tancinco are
registered owners of a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate
of Title No. T-89709 situated at Barrio Ubihan, Meycauayan, Bulacan
bordering on the Meycauayan and Bocaue rivers.
They filed an application for the registration of three lots adjacent to
their fishpond property but the Bureau of Lands filed a written
opposition to the application for registration.
The private respondents filed a partial withdrawal of the application
for registration with respect to Lot 3 in line with the recommendation
of the Commissioner appointed by the Court, hence it was ordered
withdrawn from the application. and trial proceeded only with respect
to Lots 1 and 2 covered by Plan Psu-131892.
On June 26, 1976, the lower court rendered a decision granting the
application on the finding that the lands in question are accretions to
the private respondents' fishponds covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 89709 however, the petitioner Republic appealed to the
respondent Court of Appeals.
On August, 19, 1982, the respondent Court rendered a decision
affirming in toto the decision of the lower court.

79

There are facts and circumstances in the record which render

untenable the findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that
the lands in question are accretions to the private respondents'
fishponds.
Issue:
Whether the registration of the lots valid.
Ruling:
No, the registration of the lots is not valid.
The lower court cannot validly order the registration of Lots 1 & 2 in
the names of the private respondents. These lots were portions of the
bed of the Meycauayan river and are therefore classified as property
of the public domain under Article 420 paragraph 1 and Article 502,
paragraph 1 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. They are not open to
registration under the Land Registration Act. The adjudication of the
lands in question as private property in the names of the private
respondents is null and void. The only valid conclusion therefore is
that the said areas could not have been there in 1939. They existed
only after the private respondents transferred their dikes towards the
bed of the Meycauayan river in 1951. What private respondents claim
as accretion is really an encroachment of a portion of the
Meycauayan river by reclamation.

80

i. Properties of public dominion are reserved for public

purposes. (Article 420, Civil Code)
ii. Properties of public dominion are held by the State by
regalia right, are res publicae and incapable of private
appropriation.
REPUBLIC V. ALAGAD
169 SCRA 466
Facts:
In 1951, the defendants filed an application for registration of their
title over a parcel of land in Laguna. The Republic, however, opposed
the application on the ground that the applicants and their
predecessors have not been in possession of the land openly,
continuously, publicly and adversely under a bona fide claim of
ownership since July 26, 1894 and the land has not ceased to be part
of the public domain. It appears that barrio folks also opposed the
application. In a case, promulgated in 1956, defendants were
declared owners of lots 1, and lot 2 was declared public land. In a
civil case they filed in 1966, they prayed for the eviction of the barrio
folk occupying portions of Lot 1. Judgment was rendered in 1968,
ordering the defendants therein to return possession of the premises
to herein defendants, as plaintiffs therein.
Issue:
Whether the property in question a foreshore or a part and parcel of
the public domain
Ruling:
Properties of public dominion, held by the State by regalian right, are
res publicae and incapable of private appropriation. Laguna de Bay is
a lake. And under Article 74 of the Law of Waters, the natural bed or
basin of lakes is the ground covered by their waters when at their
81

highest ordinary depth, and in which case, it forms part of the national
dominion. Otherwise, where the rise in water level is due to the
extraordinary action of nature, rainfall for instance, the portions
inundated thereby are not considered part of the bed or basin of the
body of water in question. It cannot therefore be said to be foreshore
land but land outside of the public dominion, and land capable of
registration as private property. A foreshore land, on other hand, is a
strip of land that lies between the high and low water marks and that
is alternatively wet and dry according to the flow of the tide.
This case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.

82

iii. A public market & public plaza are properties of public

dominion.
MUNICIPALITY OF ANTIPOLO V. ZAPANTA
133 SCRA 820
Facts:
The Municipality of Antipolo, for more than 50 years now, has
considered the disputed property, described below, to be public land
subject to Antipolos use and permission to use within the
prerogatives and purposes of a municipal corporation. There is
indication to the effect that it had been the site of the public market as
far back as 1908, or at the latest, since 1920 up to today. Gradually,
additional public structures were built thereon, like the Puericulture
and Family Planning Center, the Integrated National Police Building,
the Office of the Municipal Treasurer, and the public abattoir. Those
public structures occupy almost the entire area of the land.
On August 8, 1977, a single application for the registration of two
distinct parcels of land was filed by two distinct applicants before the
then CFI Rizal, Branch XV, Makati (the Registration Court). One of
the two applicants was Conrado Eniceo. He had applied for
registration under the Torrens system of a parcel of land containing
258 sq. m. The other applicant was Heirs of Joaquin Avendao, and
the land they were applying for registration was a parcel containing
9,826 sq. m. (the disputed property) surveyed in the name of the
Municipality of Antipolo. Both parcels were situated in the Municipality
of Antipolo. The applications were approved by the Registration Court
on 26 February 1980. Antipolo took steps to interpose an appeal but
because it failed to amend the Record on Appeal, its appeal was
disallowed.
On May 22, 1981, Antipolo filed a complaint (Civil Case 41353) at the
CFI Rizal, Branch XIII, Pasig against named Heirs of Joaquin
Avendao, and their assignees praying for nullification of the
judgment rendered by the Registration Court. The defendants, in their
83

Answer, pleaded a special defense of res judicata. After a preliminary

hearing on the mentioned special defense, the case was dismissed.
Antipolo perfected an appeal to the then Court of Appeals. A notice to
file Brief was issued by the Appellate Court, which Antipolo claimed it
had not received. Upon motion of the Avendao heirs to dismiss on
the ground the Antipolo had not filed its Brief within the reglementary
period, the appeal was dismissed on August 23, 1983 despite the fact
that before the dismissal, Antipolo had submitted its Appellants Brief.
Antipolo filed a motion for reconsideration.
Issue:
Whether the subject parcel of land was a property of public domain.
Ruling:
The claim of the Avendao heirs that they merely tolerated
occupancy by Antipolo which had borrowed the disputed property
from them, since they had been in possession, since as far back as
1916, erroneously presupposes ownership thereof since that time.
They forget that all lands are presumed to be public lands until the
contrary is established. The fact that the disputed property may have
been declared for taxation purposes in their names or of their
predecessors-in-interest as early as 1918 does not necessarily prove
ownership. They are merely indicia of a claim of ownership. Antipolo
had also declared the disputed property as its own in Tax
Declarations Nos. 909, 993 and 454.
Since the Land Registration Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the
application for registration of public property of Antipolo, its Decision
adjudicating the disputed property as of private ownership is null and
void. It never attained finality, and can be attacked at any time. It was
not a bar to the action brought by Antipolo for its annulment by reason
of res judicata.
It follows that the titles issued in favor of the Avendao heirs must
also be held to be null and void.

84

MARTINEZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. L-31271 April 29, 1974
Facts:
The spouses Romeo Martinez and Leonor Suarez, now petitionersappellees, are the registered owners of two (2) parcels of land
located in Lubao, Pampanga, covered by transfer certificate of title
No. 15856 of the Register of Deeds of the said province. Both parcels
of land are fishponds. The property involved in the instant case is the
second parcel mentioned in the above-named transfer certificate of
title.
The disputed property was originally owned by one Paulino
Montemayor, who secured a "titulo real" over it way back in 1883.
After the death of Paulino Montemayor the said property passed to
his successors-in-interest, Maria Montemayor and Donata
Montemayor, who in turn, sold it, as well as the first parcel, to a
certain Potenciano Garcia.
On April 17, 1925. Potenciano Garcia applied for the registration of
both parcels of land in his name, and the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga, sitting as land registration court, granted the registration
over and against the opposition of the Attorney-General and the
Director of Forestry. Pursuant to the Court's decision, original
certificate of title No. 14318, covering said parcels 1 and 2 was
issued to the spouses Potenciano Garcia and Lorenza Sioson.
These parcels of land were subsequently bought by Emilio Cruz de
Dios in whose name transfer certificate of title No. 1421 was first
issued on November 9, 1925.
Thereafter, the ownership of these properties changed hands until
eventually they were acquired by the herein appellee spouses who
hold them by virtue of transfer certificate of title No. 15856.
To avoid any untoward incident, the disputants agreed to refer the
matter to the Committee on Rivers and Streams, by then composed
85

of the Honorable Pedro Tuason, at that time Secretary of Justice, as

chairman, and the Honorable Salvador Araneta and Vicente Orosa,
Secretary of Agriculture and National Resources and Secretary of
Public Works and Communications, respectively, as members.
While Civil Case No. 751 was still pending the Honorable Florencio
Moreno, then Secretary of Public Works and Communications,
ordered another investigation of the said parcel of land, directing the
appellees herein to remove the dikes they had constructed, on the
strength of the authority vested in him by Republic Act No. 2056,
approved on June 13, 1958, entitled "An Act To Prohibit, Remove
and/or Demolish the Construction of Dams. Dikes, Or Any Other
Walls In Public Navigable Waters, Or Waterways and In Communal
Fishing Grounds, To Regulate Works in Such Waters or Waterways
And In Communal Fishing Grounds, And To Provide Penalties For Its
Violation, And For Other Purposes.
Contention of Private Defendant:
In holding that the investigation ordered by the respondent Secretary
in this case is illegal on the ground that the said respondent Secretary
has arrogated unto himself the power, which he does not possess, of
reversing, making nugatory, and setting aside the two lawful
decisions of the Court Exhibits K and I, and even annulling thereby,
the one rendered by the highest Tribunal of the land;. In not
sustaining respondent's claim that petitioners have no cause of action
because the property in dispute is a public river and in holding that
the said claim has no basis in fact and in law;
CA
The ruling of the Court of Appeals that Lot No. 2 covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 15856 of the petitioners-appellants is a public
stream and that said title should be cancelled and the river covered
reverted to public domain, is assailed by the petitioners-appellants as
being a collateral attack on the indefeasibility of the torrens title
originally issued in 1925 in favor of the petitioners-appellants'
predecessor-in-interest, Potenciano Garcia, which is violative of the
rule of res judicata. It is argued that as the decree of registration
issued by the Land Registration Court was not re-opened through a
86

petition for review filed within one (1) year from the entry of the
decree of title, the certificate of title issued pursuant thereto in favor of
the appellants for the land covered thereby is no longer open to
attack under Section 38 of the Land Registration Act (Act 496) and
the jurisprudence on the matter established by this Tribunal. Section
38 of the Land Registration Act cited by appellants expressly makes a
decree of registration, which ordinarily makes the title absolute and
indefeasible, subject to the exemption stated in Section 39 of the said
Act among which are: "liens, claims or rights arising or existing under
the laws or Constitution of the United States or of the Philippine
Islands which the statute of the Philippine Islands cannot require to
appear of record in the registry."
When it comes to registered properties, the jurisdiction of the
Secretary of Public Works & Communications under Republic
Act 2056 to order the removal or obstruction to navigation along
a public and navigable creek or river included therein, has been
definitely settled and is no longer open to question (Lovina v.
Moreno, G.R. No L-17821, November 29, 1963, 9 SCRA 557;
Taleon v. Secretary of Public Works & Communications G.R. No.
L-24281, May 16, 1961, 20 SCRA 69, 74).
Ruling:
The evidence submitted before the trial court which was passed upon
by the respondent Court of Appeals shows that Lot No. 2 (Plan Psu
992) of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15856, is a river of the public
domain. The technical description of both Lots Nos. 1 and 2
appearing in Original Certificate of Title No. 14318 of the Register of
Deeds of Pampanga, from which the present Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 15856 was derived, confirms the fact that Lot No. 2
embraced in said title is bounded practically on all sides by rivers. As
held by the Court of First Instance of Pampanga in Civil Case No.
1247 for injunction filed by the petitioners' predecessors-in-interest
against the Municipal Mayor of Lubao and decided in 1916 (Exh. "L"),
Lot No. 2 is a branch of the main river that has been covered with
water since time immemorial and, therefore, part of the public
domain. This finding having been affirmed by the Supreme Court,
there is no longer any doubt that Lot No. 2 of Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 15856 of petitioners is a river which is not capable of private
87

appropriation or acquisition by prescription.

NAVERA V. QUICHO
5 SCRA 45
Facts:
On January 24, 1961 the municipality of Ligao filed for the correction
of Transfer Certificate of Title issued in the name of Godofredo
Navera, covering Lot No. 2793-A, on the ground that a portion of 123
sq. m. was erroneously included in said title during the cadastral
survey of Ligao.
Consequently, Navera filed a motion to dismiss based on the ground
that the relief which petitioner seeks to obtain cannot be granted
under Section 112 of Act 496 because the same would involve the
opening of the original decree of registration.
The municipality of Ligao alleged that the land amounting to 123 sq.
m. is erroneously included in Lot No. 2793-A, for said portion of land
is part of a street in the municipality. Thus, the municipality prays for
the correction in the certificate of title, with a view to excluding
therefrom, the portion of 123 sq. m. erroneously included therein.
The trial court affirmed the petition of the municipality. The ruling of
the trial court is founded on the principle that, if a person obtains a
title under the Torrens System which includes by mistake or oversight
a land which cannot be registered, he does not by virtue of such
certificate alone become the owner of the land illegally included
therein. Hence, this petition by Navera.
Issue:
Whether the 123 sq. m. of land is erroneously included in Lot No.
2793-A, which title is granted to Navera.
Ruling:

88

Even if the portion to be segregated was really erroneously included

in the title issued to petitioner because it is part of the Natera street
which belongs to the municipality of Ligao that portion may be
excluded under Section 112 of Act 496 because under the law any
public highway, even if not noted on a title, is deemed excluded
therefrom as a legal lien or encumbrance, is in our opinion correct.
This is upon the principle that a person who obtains a title which
includes by mistake a land which cannot legally be registered does
not by virtue of such inclusion become the owner of the land
erroneously included therein. But this theory only holds true if there is
no dispute that the portion to be excluded is really part of a public
highway. This principle only applies if there is unanimity as to the
issue of fact involved.
In the present case unanimity among the parties is lacking. Thus,
petition is affirmed, the order of the respondent court is set aside.

89

iv. Ropponggi property in Tokyo, Japan is a property of

public dominion.
LAUREL V. GARCIA
187 SCRA 797
Facts:
The subject Roppongi property is one of the four properties in Japan
acquired by the Philippine government under the Reparations
Agreement entered into with Japan on 9 May 1956, the other lots
being the Nampeidai Property (site of Philippine Embassy Chancery),
the Kobe Commercial Property (Commercial lot used as warehouse
and parking lot of consulate staff), and the Kobe Residential Property
(a vacant residential lot). The properties and the capital goods and
services procured from the Japanese government for national
development projects are part of the indemnification to the Filipino
people for their losses in life and property and their suffering during
World War II.
The Roppongi property was acquired from the Japanese government
through Reparations Contract. The Roponggi property consists of the
land and building "for the Chancery of the Philippine Embassy." As
intended, it became the site of the Philippine Embassy until the latter
was transferred to Nampeidai on 22 July 1976 when the Roppongi
building needed major repairs. Due to the failure of our government to
provide necessary funds, the Roppongi property has remained
undeveloped since that time.
During the incumbency of President Aquino, a proposal was made by
former Philippine Ambassador to Japan, Carlos J. Valdez, to lease
the subject property to Kajima Corporation, a Japanese firm, in
exchange of the construction of 2 buildings in Roppongi, 1 building in
Nampeidai, and the renovation of the Philippine Chancery in
Nampeidai. The President issued EO 296 entitling non-Filipino
citizens or entities to avail of reparations' capital goods and services
in the event of sale, lease or disposition. Amidst opposition by various
sectors, the Executive branch of the government has been pushing,
90

with great vigor, its decision to sell the reparations properties starting
with the Roppongi lot.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the Roppongi property and others of its kind can be
alienated by the Philippine government.
2. Whether there was a conflict of law between the Japanese law on
property (as the real property is situated there) and Philippine law.
Ruling:
1. No. The nature of the Roppongi lot as property for public service is
expressly spelled out. It is dictated by the terms of the Reparations
Agreement and the corresponding contract of procurement which
bind both the Philippine government and the Japanese government.
There can be no doubt that it is of public dominion and is outside the
commerce of man. And the property continues to be part of the public
domain, not available for private appropriation or ownership until
there is a formal declaration on the part of the government to
withdraw it from being such.
It is not for the President to convey valuable real property of the
government on his or her own sole will. Any such conveyances must
be authorized and approved by a law enacted by the Congress. It
requires executive and legislative concurrence.
2. No. A conflict of law rule cannot apply when no conflict of law
situation exists. A conflict of law situation arises only when: (1) there
is a dispute over the title or ownership of an immovable, such that the
capacity to take and transfer immovables, the formalities of
conveyance, the essential validity and effect of the transfer, or the
interpretation and effect of a conveyance, are to be determined; and
(2) a foreign law on land ownership and its conveyance is asserted to
conflict with a domestic law on the same matters. Hence, the need to
determine which law should apply. In the present case, none of the
above elements exists.

v. Land already registered as patrimonial property of the

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State.
REPUBLIC V. CA
83 SCRA 453
Facts:
Respondents Benjamin Tancinco, Azucena Tancinco Reyes, Marina
(should be "Maria") Tancinco Imperial and Mario C. Tancinco are
registered owners of a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate
of Title No. T-89709 situated at Barrio Ubihan, Meycauayan, Bulacan
bordering on the Meycauayan and Bocaue rivers.
They filed an application for the registration of three lots adjacent to
their fishpond property but the Bureau of Lands filed a written
opposition to the application for registration.
The private respondents filed a partial withdrawal of the application
for registration with respect to Lot 3 in line with the recommendation
of the Commissioner appointed by the Court, hence it was ordered
withdrawn from the application and trial proceeded only with respect
to Lots 1 and 2 covered by Plan Psu-131892.
On June 26, 1976, the lower court rendered a decision granting the
application on the finding that the lands in question are accretions to
the private respondents' fishponds covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 89709 however, the petitioner Republic appealed to the
respondent Court of Appeals.
On August, 19, 1982, the respondent Court rendered a decision
affirming in toto the decision of the lower court.
There are facts and circumstances in the record which render
untenable the findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that
the lands in question are accretions to the private respondents'
fishponds.

Issue:
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Whether the registration of the lots valid.

Ruling:
No, the registration of the lots is not valid.
The lower court cannot validly order the registration of Lots 1 & 2 in
the names of the private respondents. These lots were portions of the
bed of the Meycauayan river and are therefore classified as property
of the public domain under Article 420 paragraph 1 and Article 502,
paragraph 1 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. They are not open to
registration under the Land Registration Act. The adjudication of the
lands in question as private property in the names of the private
respondents is null and void. The only valid conclusion therefore is
that the said areas could not have been there in 1939. They existed
only after the private respondents transferred their dikes towards the
bed of the Meycauayan river in 1951. What private respondents claim
as accretion is really an encroachment of a portion of the
Meycauayan river by reclamation.

vi. Streets or public highways.

NAVERA V. QUICHO
5 SCRA 454
Facts:
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On January 24, 1961, the municipality of Ligao filed with the Court of
First Instance of Albay a petition under Section 112 of Act No. 496, as
amended, for the correction of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-9304
issued in the name of Godofredo Navera, covering Lot No. 2793-A,
on the ground that a portion of 123 sq. m. was erroneously included
in said title during the cadastral survey of Ligao.
Navera filed a motion to dismiss based on the ground that the relief
which petitioner seeks to obtain cannot be granted under Section 112
of Act 496 because the same would involve the opening of the
original decree of registration. He contends that, under said section,
the court can only authorize an alteration which may not impair the
rights recorded in the decree, or one which will not prejudice such
rights, or one which is consented to by all parties concerned, or can
authorize the correction of any error or mistake which would not
involve the reopening of the original decree of registration. Here the
petition will have such effect, for it will involve the correction of the
technical description of the land covered by the certificate of title in
question, segregating therefrom the portion alleged to have been
erroneously included, which eventually will cause the amendment of
the original decree of registration. This cannot be done at this stage
after the lapse of 23 years from the issuance of the certificate of title.
It is alleged by the municipality of Ligao that in the course of the
construction or repair of Natera street of said municipality it was
ascertained by a duly licensed surveyor that Lot No. 2793-A of the
cadastral survey of Ligao has encroached upon said street by
depriving the street of an area amounting to 123 sq. m. which was
erroneously included in Lot No. 2793-A now covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-9304 issued in the name of Godofredo
Navera. Hence, the municipality prays for the correction of such error
in the technical description of the lot, as well as in the certificate of
title, with a view to excluding therefrom, the portion of 123 sq. m.
erroneously included therein.
The court a quo issued an order denying the motion to dismiss and
requiring Navera to answer the petition within the reglementary
period. The courts based its decision on the rationale that It is a rule
of law that lands brought under the operation of the Torrens System
94

are deemed relieved from all claims and encumbrances not

appearing on the title. Among the burdens on the land registered
which continue to exist, pursuant to said Section 39, is "any public
highway, way, private way established by law, or any Government
irrigation canal or lateral thereof, where the certificate of title does not
state that the boundaries of such highway, way, or irrigation canal or
lateral thereof, have been determined." The principle involved here is
that, if a person obtains a title under the Torrens System which
includes by mistake or oversight a land which cannot be registered,
he does not by virtue of such certificate alone become the owner of
the land illegally included therein.
Petitioner Navera does not agree with this ruling Navera contends
that the purpose of the instant petition is not merely to correct a
clerical error but to reopen the original decree of registration which
was issued in 1937, and this is so because the petition seeks to direct
the register of deeds to make the necessary correction in the
technical description in order that the portion erroneously included
may be returned to the municipality of Ligao. In effect, therefore, the
petition does not seek merely the correction of a mistake or error but
the return or reconveyance of a portion of a registered property to
respondent.
Issue:
Whether the inclusion of public highways in the title is correct.
Ruling:
The theory entertained by the court a quo that if the portion to be
segregated was really erroneously included in the title issued to
petitioner because it is part of the Natera street which belongs to the
municipality of Ligao that portion may be excluded under Section 112
of Act 496 because under the law1 any public highway, even if not
noted on a title, is deemed excluded therefrom as a legal lien or
encumbrance, is in our opinion correct. This is upon the principle that
a person who obtains a title which includes by mistake a land which
cannot legally be registered does not by virtue of such inclusion
become the owner of the land erroneously included therein.2 But this
theory only holds true if there is no dispute that the portion to be
95

excluded is really part of a public highway. This principle only applies

if there is unanimity as to the issue of fact involved.

vii. Lots forming part of the public dominion.

CASIANO AMPOLOQUIO V. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. Nos. L-46800-01. April 29, 1994
Facts:
96

Respondent Salvador Zartiga claimed ownership over nine (9) lots

which a total area of more or less 289.9920 hectares. He claimed that
he had been the absolute owner and possessor of said parcels of
land, having bought the same from Datu Julian Bagobo under a deed
executed in 1927, but that petitioners had occupied certain portions of
the nine (9) lots, about forty-nine (49) hectares of the 285 hectares,
without his knowledge and consent. Petitioners, on the other hand,
denied private respondent's ownership and alleged that the land in
question is public land; that neither private respondent nor his
predecessor-in-interest had occupied the property. The Director of
Lands intervened, asserting the property subject matter of Civil Case
No. 670 to be "public agricultural land, owned by the Government of
the Republic of the Philippines. The Municipality of Bansalan, on its
part, filed an opposition to the petition on the ground that the nine (9)
parcels of land included in the petition for registration were reserved
for townsite of, and actually occupied by, the Municipality of
Bansalan. Evidence was introduced to the effect that about 10,000
people inhabited the poblacion of Bansalan and that approximately
500 buildings, private and government-owned, as well as schools,
markets, religious, commercial and residential structures, and other
constructions, including municipal roads and other infrastructures,
already stood in place within the disputed area.
The trial court and Court of appeals ruled in favour of Zartiga and
awarded him the Lots No. 2326, 2325, 2342, 2343, 2344 and 2416.
Issue:
Are the disputed lands form part of the public domain?
Ruling:
Evidently, the litigated area was forestal land. The fact that Datu
Julian Bagobo and the other occupants had to make kaingin in order
to clear the lots is certainly indicative of the forestal nature of the
same. Datu Julian Bagobo and his predecessors who claimed
possession over the area did not and could not have acquired
ownership over the said land considering that the same was then
inalienable and non- disposable. It remained so for many years. In
fact, it was only on February 4, 1956 when the contested portions of
the public domain were declared and classified as alienable and
97

disposable per Forestry Administrative Order No. 4-480 issued by the

then Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. The picture
becomes clear enough. Respondent Zartiga knew that he could not
directly acquire the lots since they were part of the public domain. So,
he had to get access to the land indirectly. He also realized that the
indirect way was Datu Julian Bagobo who claimed possession over
the area. He had to clothe the datu with a color of ownership so that
the latter could subsequently transfer the land to him. Respondent
accomplished this in a haphazard manner by railroading the
issuance of a tax declaration to the uneducated datu and
manipulating the alleged sale within the same day. This explains why
there could not be sufficient and concrete evidence of the alleged
deed of sale, why the contested lots could never be accurately
identified (boundaries were not uniformly identified) and why private
respondent never raised a hand when the townsite of Bansalan was
being developed.

b. Waters are properties of public dominion.

i. Portions of territorial waters.
REPUBLIC V. AYALA y SIA
14 SCRA 259
Facts:
In an amended complaint filed against Ayala Y Cia et al., the plaintiff
sought the annulment of titles allegedly obtained by the defendant
over portions of the territorial waters of the public domain. The
defendant company caused the survey and preparation of a
composite plan of Hacienda Calatagan, increasing its area from
9,652.583 hectares (as evidenced by TCT No. 722) to 12,000
hectares, by taking or including therein lands of public dominion.
Thus, plaintiff also prayed for recovery of possession of such areas in
98

excess of those covered by TCT No. 722, and for which fishpond
permits were already issued in favor of bona fide applicants. Miguel
Tolentino and 22 others alleged holders of fishpond permits issued by
the Bureau of Fisheries over the areas supposedly outside the
boundaries of Hacienda Calatagan, were allowed to intervene in the
case and make demand for recovery of possession of said areas, and
claim for damages for the deprivation of possession thereof allegedly
by the illegal acts of defendants.
The defendants contended that the excess was insignificant in nature
and attributable to the inaccuracy of the magnetic survey that was
used in the preparation of the plan upon which OCT No. 20 was
based.
After trial, the court rendered judgment annulling TCT No. T-9550
issued to defendants Dizons covering Lots 360, 362, 363 and 182, as
well as other subdivision titles issued to Ayala y Cia. and/or Hacienda
de Calatagan over the areas outside its private property covered by
TCT No. 722. This ruling was based upon the finding that the
disputed areas form part of the navigable water, or are portions of the
sea, beach and foreshores of the bay.
Issue:
Whether the areas in dispute are territorial waters of the public
domain.
Ruling:
The decision of the lower court appealed from is hereby affirmed.
The areas in dispute (those covered by permits issued by the Bureau
of Fisheries) were found to be portions of the foreshore, beach, or of
the navigable water itself. And, it is an elementary principle of law that
said areas not being capable of registration, their inclusion in a
certificate of title does not convert the same into properties of private
ownership or confer title on the registrant.
99

In the present case, as the lots covered by TCT No. T-9550 issued in
the names of defendants Dizons (and which were purchased by the
latter from defendants Ayala y Cia., and/or Alfonso Zobel) were found
to be portions of the foreshore or of the territorial waters, the lower
court committed no error in rendering judgment against said
defendants and ordering the reversion of said properties to the public
dominion.

ii. Navigable rivers; Definition of river; components.

HILARIO V. CITY OF MANILA
19 SCRA 931
Facts:
The subject of the petition is a lot situated on the Western side of San
Mateo River. To prevent the river from entering the lot, a dike was
built on the northern side of the river. In 1937, flood occurred and the
river destroyed the dike, left its original bed and meandered into the
Hilario estate, segregating from the rest thereof a lenticular place of
land. In 1945, the US Army conducted excavations in the lenticular
strip which stands between the old river bed and the new course. The
US Army has paid for such activities. In 1947, the sand and gravel
100

plant was turned over to the respondents. The respondents continued

the activities carried out by the US army. The petitioner then filed the
case praying that the excavation, bulldozing and extraction activities
be restrained.
Issue:
Is a newly formed riverbank in a private estate considered property of
public dominion?
Ruling:
Yes. A "river" consists of water, a bed and banks, these several parts
constituting the river, the whole river. Since a river is but one
compound concept, it should have only one nature. And since rivers
are of public ownership, it is implicit that all the three component
elements be of the same nature also.

iii. Non-registrability of navigable rivers

REPUBLIC V. SIOSON
9 SCRA 533
Facts:
The spouses Segundo Sioson and Pascuala Bautista filed an
application for registration four (4) parcels of land situated in barrio
San Roque, Paombong, Bulacan, of which the claimed to be the
owners in fee simple.
The Director of Lands filed an opposition to one of the parcels of land
the registration which was applied for stating (a) that neither the
applicants nor their predecessors in interest had sufficient title to the
101

said parcel of land, the same not having been a acquired either by
composicion title from the Spanish Government or by possessory
information title under the Royal Decree of February 13, 1894;(b) that
neither the applicants nor their predecessors in interest have
possesses the land openly, continuously, publicly, adversely and
under bona fide claim of ownership since July 26, 1894; (e) that the
said parcel of land sought to be registered is a part of the public
domain and as such belong to the Republic of the Philippines.
The CFI Bulacan ordered the registration of Lots Nos. 1, 2 and 3 in
favor of the spouses. However, no adjudication was made with
respect to Lot 4.
The applicants appealed from the judgment in so far it did not decree
the registration of Lot No. 4 in their names.
The Solicitor General in behalf of the Director of Lands, instead of
filing a brief to answer that of the appellants, filed in the Court of
Appeals a pleading recommending that the registration of Lot No. 4
be decreed in the name of the appellants. The Court of Appeals
rendered judgment modifying that of the lower court and decreeing
the registration of Lot No. 4 in the name of the appellants.
The Solicitor General in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, filed
in the same Court a petition for review of the decree of registration
and cancellation of title to a parcel of land in the name of the spouses
Segundo Sioson and Pascuala Bautista. The parcel of land referred
to in the petition is Lot No. 4. The petition alleges actual and extrinsic
fraud practiced by the herein respondents, then applicants, by
intentional and deliberate concealment of facts and connivance by
and between the respondents and the land inspector.
The respondents filed an opposition to the petition. Respondents
alleged, among other things, that they had not practiced any actual
fraud; that the said Lot No. 4 was and still is in truth and in fact an
accretion to a titled parcel of land; that the present petition for review
under the principle of res judicata is undeniably improper,
unwarranted and illegal; and that the Solicitor General is deemed to
be in estoppel to make allegations in the present petition contrary to
or inconsistent with those stated in the a pleading entitled
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"Comments" recommending that the registration of the fourth parcel

of land which was an accretion to the titled lands of the then
applicants-appellants be decreed in their names.
Without hearing and presentation of evidence the lower court entered
an order denying the petition. The Republic of the Philippines has
appealed.
Issue:
Whether the trial court erred in dismissing the petition without hearing
the evidence in support of the allegation and claim that actual and
extrinsic fraud had been committed by the respondents.
Ruling:
There being an allegation of actual and extrinsic fraud the Court
should have afforded the petitioner an opportunity to prove it.
Moreover, if it is true that the lot is or forms part of the bed of a
navigable stream, creek or river the decree and title to it in the name
of the respondents would not give them any right or title to it.
Navigable rivers cannot be appropriated and registered under the
Land Registration Act.
REPUBLIC V. CA
132 SCRA 514
Facts:
The lot subject matter of this land registration case is situated near
the shore of Laguna de Bay, about twenty (20) meters there from in
Barrio Pinagbayanan, Pila, Laguna. It was purchased by Benedicto
del Rio from Angel Pili on April 19, 1909. When Benedicto del Rio
died in 1957, his heirs extrajudicially partitioned his estate and the
subject parcel passed on to his son, Santos del Rio, as the latter's
share in the inheritance. Santos del Rio, herein applicant-private
respondent, filed his application for registration of said parcel on May
9, 1966. The application was opposed by the Director of Lands and
by private oppositors. Sometime before 1966, private oppositors
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obtained permission from Santos del Rio to construct duck houses on

the land in question. Although there was no definite commitment as to
rentals, some of them had made voluntary payments to private
respondent. In violation of the original agreement, private oppositors
constructed residential houses on the land which prompted private
respondent to file an ejectment suit against the former in 1966.
4Meanwhile, during the latter part of 1965 and in 1966, private
oppositors had simultaneously filed their respective sales applications
with the Bureau of Lands, and in 1966, they opposed Santos del Rios
application for registration. The Court of First Instance of Laguna
dismissed the application for registration. Applicant appealed and
obtained a favorable judgment from the Court of Appeals. The
Director of Lands and the private oppositors filed their respective
Petitions for Review of said decision.
Issue:
Whether the applicant private respondent has registrable title to the
land.
Ruling:
Property, which includes parcels of land found in Philippine territory,
is either of public dominion or of private ownership. Public lands, or
those of public dominion, have been described as those which, under
existing legislation are not the subject of private ownership, and are
reserved for public purposes.
The inundation of a portion of the land is not due to "flux and reflux of
tides." It cannot be considered a foreshore land, hence it is not a
public land and therefore capable of registration as private property
provided that the applicant proves that he has a registerable title. The
purpose of land registration under the Torrens System is not the
acquisition of lands but only the registration of title which applicant
already possesses over the land.
While it is true that by themselves tax receipts and declarations of
ownership for taxation purposes are not incontrovertible evidence of
ownership, they become strong evidence of ownership acquired by
prescription when accompanied by proof of actual possession of the
104

property. Applicant by himself and through his father before him,

has been in open, continuous, public, peaceful, exclusive and
adverse possession of the disputed land for more than thirty (30)
years and has presented tax declarations and tax receipts. Applicant
has more than satisfied the legal requirements. Thus, he is clearly
entitled to the registration in his favor of said land.

iv. Not subject to acquisitive prescription.

MATEO V. MORENO
28 SCRA 796
Facts:
In 1959 a number of residents of Guiguinto, Bulacan, sent a lettercomplaint to the Highway District Engineer of that province asking
that the Sapang Cabay, a public navigable stream, which had been
blocked by means of dikes and dams and converted into fishponds,
be ordered reopened and restored to its original condition.
The letter was referred to the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, who caused an investigation to be conducted
105

pursuant to RA No. 2056. Subsequently, the Secretary rendered his

decision on August 10, 1959, finding that the Sapang Cabay was a
public navigable stream.
Moreover, the Secretary ordered Mateo, who had acquired the
property inside which the creek is situated, to remove the dikes and
dams constructed therein within 30 days from notice; otherwise they
would be removed at his expense.
Issue:
Whether or the body of water is private property or constitutes a
navigable stream or river of the public domain and subject to
acquisitive prescription.
Ruling:
The absence of any mention of a navigable stream within a property
covered by a certificate of title does not preclude a subsequent
investigation and determination of its existence nor make it private
property of the title holder.
It is true that Jacobo who was then the owner from whom Mateo
subsequently bought the property, was able to get her free patent
application approved in 1953 and to secure the corresponding
certificate of title, but said title did not change the public character of
the Sapang Cabay.
Moreover, the findings of fact made by the Secretary of Public Works
and Communications should be respected in the absence of illegality,
error of law, fraud or imposition, as long as such findings are
supported by substantial evidence; and that the ownership of a
navigable stream or of the bed thereof is not subject to acquisitive
prescription.

106

v. Man-made alluvial deposits are not registrable.

REPUBLIC V. CA
132 SCRA 514
Facts:
Benjamin Tancinco, Azucena Tancinco Reyes, Maria Tancinco
Imperial and Mario C. Tancinco are registered owners of a parcel of
land covered by TCT T-89709 situated at Barrio Ubihan,
Meycauayan, Bulacan bordering on the Meycauayan and Bocaue
rivers. On 24 June 1973, the Tancincos filed an application for the
registration of 3 lots adjacent to their fishpond property (Psu-131892:
Lot 1, 33837 sq.m.; Lot 2, 5,453 sq.m.; Lot 3, 1985 sq. m.).On 6
March 1975, the Tancincos filed a partial withdrawal of the application
107

for registration with respect to Lot 3 of Plan Psu-131892. On 7 March

1975, Lot 3 was ordered withdrawn from the application and trial
proceeded only with respect to Lots 1 and 2 covered by Plan Psu131892. The lower court rendered a decision granting the application
on the finding that the lands in question are accretions to the
Tancincos' fishponds covered by TCT 89709. The Republic appealed
to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court rendered a decision
affirming in toto the decision of the lower cost.Hence, the petition for
certiorari to set aside the decision of the CA. The petitioner submits
that there is no accretion to speak of under Article 457 of the New
Civil Code because what actually happened is that the private
respondents simply transferred their dikes further down the river bed
of the Meycauayan River.Thus, if there is any accretion to speak of, it
is man-made and artificial and not the result of the gradual and
imperceptible sedimentation by the waters of the river. The private
respondents contended that the accretion was without human
intervention because the transfer of the dike occurred after the
accretion was complete.
Issue:
Whether the lands in question are accretions to the private
respondents fishponds, entitling them to the ownership thereof.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court granted the petition. The following are the three
requisites that need to occur before an accretion is said to have taken
place: (1) that the deposit be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it be
made through the effects of the current of the water; and (3) that the
land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of
rivers.The requirement that the deposit should be due to the effect of
the current of the river is indispensable. This excludes from Art. 457
of the New Civil Code all deposits caused by human intervention.
Alluvion must be the exclusive work of nature. Evidence shows the
addition to the said property was artificial and man-made. The alleged
alluvial deposits came into being not because of the sole effect of the
current of the rivers but as a result of the transfer of the dike towards
the river and encroaching upon it.Moreover,the lots in question were
108

not included in the survey of their adjacent property conducted on

May 10, 1940 and in the Cadastral Survey of the entire Municipality of
Meycauayan conducted between the years 1958 to 1960. The
alleged accretion was declared for taxation purposes only in 1972 or
33 years after it had permanently formed allegedly on 1939. Said
areas existed only after the private respondents transferred their
dikes towards the bed of the Meycauayan river in 1951. The accretion
claimed is really an encroachment of a portion of the Meycauayan
river by reclamation.The lots sought to be registered were portions of
the bed of the Meycauayan river and are therefore classified as
property of the public domain .They are not open to registration under
the Land Registration Act. The adjudication of the lands in question
as private property in the names of the private respondents is null
and void.

iv. Creek, defined.

MANECLANG V. IAC
161 SCRA 469
Facts:
Petitioners. filed for quieting of title over a certain fishpond located
within the four parcels of land belonging to them situated in Barrio
Salomague, Bugallon, Pangasinan. The trial court dismissed the
complaint upon a finding that the body of water traversing the titled
properties of petitioners is a creek constituting a tributary of the Agno
River; therefore public in nature and not subject to private
appropriation. Petitioners appealed said decision to the Intermediate
Appellate Court. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
109

Issue:
Whether the compromise agreement adjudicating the ownership of
the property in favor of the petitioner is null and void.
Ruling:
Creek is a recess/arm extending from a river and participating in the
flow of the sea. It is a property belonging to the public domain. It is
not susceptible to appropriation & acquisitive prescription because
such is as public water, it cannot be registered under the Torrens
System in the name of any individual. Its nature as property of the
public domain cannot be modified by the construction of irrigation
dikes by the National Irrigation Authority, or by its conversion into a
fishpond.
Hence, a compromise agreement adjudicating the ownership of such
property in favor of an individual is null and void.
The compromise agreement has no legal effect since it is contrary to
law and public policy.

vii. Lakes are of public dominion.

REPUBLIC V. REYES
155 SCRA 313
Facts:
Urbano C. Lara and Godofredo R. Eusebio filed with the Bureau of
Lands their Free Patent Applications for the parcels of land
designated as Free Patent Applications Nos. 7-207 and 7-208 for Lot
No.1and Lot No.2 situated in Napindan, Taguig, Rizal. The said free
patent applications were approved on June 14, 1956. Free Patent
Titles were then issued to respondents Godofredo R. Eusebio and
Urbano C. Lara. These patents were transcribed and registered on
110

June 21, 1956 the Register of Deeds of Rizal in the Registration Book
for the Province of Rizal.
The Anti-Graft and Corruption Board of the Bureau of Lands
conducted and investigation and it was discovered that the parcels of
land patented and titled in the names of respondents Godofredo R.
Eusebio and Urbano C. Lara were actually under water and form part
of the Laguna de Bay. Eusebio and Lara expressly agreed to have
their patents and certificates of title cancelled. Complaints were also
filed against them before the CFI of Pasig, Rizal. The lower court then
rendered separate decisions declaring null and void Certificates of
Title Nos. 140 and 139 and ordering the Register of Deeds of Rizal to
cancel said patents and titles and for failure of defendants to move for
reconsideration or appeal, said decisions became final and executory.
Issue:
Whether lakes can be registered under the Torrens System.
Ruling:
That it is well settled that any title issued on non-disposable lots even
in the hands of an alleged innocent purchaser for value, shall be
cancelled. In the case at bar, the free patents and certificates of title
issued to Eusebio and Lara cover areas which form parts of Laguna
de Bay. These are neither agricultural nor disposable. Subject patents
and titles were erroneously issued due to misrepresentations and
false reports and must therefore be cancelled. Any false statement in
an application for public land shall ipso facto produce the cancellation
of the title granted. This rule applies even after the issuance of the
certificate of title. A certificate of title cannot be used as a shield to
perpetuate fraud, and the doctrine of indefeasibility of torrens title
does not apply to free patent secured through fraud. Likewise, the
Court ruled in Cuevas vs. Pineda, 143 SCRA 674 [1986], that mere
possession of land does not itself divest the land of its public
character.
Void free patents and certificates of title do not divest the state of its
ownership of the land nor operate to change the public character of
the land to private.
111

c. Forests or timberlands, public forests or forest reserves.

DIRECTOR OF LANDS vs. AQUINO
G.R. No. 31688 December 17, 1990
FACTS: A 70-hectare lime rich land in Bucay, Abra is claimed by the
private respondents Abra Industiral Corporation (AIC) as their own
since they and their predecessors-in-interest have been occupying
the said land for forty-nine years. They have also complied with all
the requirements for registering the said land. On the other hand, the
petitioners opposed the application of AIC since the highly
mineralized parcels of land are within the Central Cordillera Forest
Reserve and are not yet reclassified as alienable and disposable
lands pursuant to the Public Land Law. The lower court approved the
registration of the said parcels of land, but the Director of Lands thru
112

the Provincial Prosecutor filed a motion for reconsideration

contending that although the land may be reclassified by the Bureau
of Mines as a mineral land, it has not yet been excluded from the
Cordillera Forest Reserve pursuant to Sec. 1826 of R.A. No. 3092.
Therefore, the lands applied for are still part of the forest zone which
was inalienable under the 1935 Constitution. Private respondents
opposed the motion for reconsideration prayed for, but the lower court
denied it saying that the Bureau of Mines and Bureau of Forestry
should also be parties to the case, but further contended that motion
of intervention by said bureaus are not proper in land registration
cases. Then the petitioners filed an appeal to the Court of appeals but
were denied since it was filed out of time. Meanwhile, registration of
AICs applied lands were issued. After a year from the issuance, the
Solicitor General thru the lower court filed for a petition for review of
the said decrees. They alleged there was fraud in the application of
AIC, since they only showed 24 hectares but actually included 46
hectares of the said forest reserve. But the lower court ruled that the
judicial error was not synonymous with actual fraud. Without waiting
for the decision, the petitioners filed to the Supreme Court a petition
for review for certiorari under R.A. No. 5440.
Issue:
Whether or not the lower court erred in granting the application of
registration of the said lands, notwithstanding the fact that they are
within the forest zone.
Ruling:
The Supreme court ruled in favor of the petitioners, citing a long line
of cases, with mention of Director of Forestry v. Muoz where it was
held that forest lands and forests reserves are not alienable, however
long a person was in possession thereof, as it is premised in the
Regalian doctrine which is enshrined in our constitution. It is the
President who has the authority to classify the lands of the public
domain upon recommendation of the proper department head. In the
case, AIC was not able to prove that the lands they claimed were
alienable and disposable or that the lands were no longer part of the
forest reserve.Hence, the decision of the lower court was reversed
and set aside.
DIRECTOR OF FORESTY V. MUNOZ
23 SCRA 184
113

Facts:
Pinagcamaligan Indo-Agro Development Corporation, Inc. (Piadeco)
is a company engaged in logging. It was given a Certificate of Private
Woodland Registration so that it can operate in a 72,000 hectare of
land. It also has a Titulo de Propriedad which it acquired in 1894
under the Spanish regime.
In 1964, the NAWASA director ordered the cancellation of Piadecos
certificate because it encroached beyond what was allowed in the
certificate. It actually cut trees in the Angat and Marikina watershed
area which was prohibited. The lower court ruled in favor of Piadeco.
Piadeco also had a settlement with Nawasa. Piadeco sought to
renew its certificate but it was denied by the Asst. Director of Forestry.
The latter ruled that the Spanish title is no longer recognized and
should have never been used to apply for a Certificate.
Issue:
Whether Piadeco can claim ownership over the property.
Ruling:
No. The Spanish title it acquired cannot be used to register for
another Certificate. There should be no question now that Forestry
Administrative Order 12-2 has the force and effect of law. It was
promulgated pursuant to law. Section 1817, Revised Administrative
Code, empowers the Bureau of Forestry, with the approval of the
department head, to issue regulations deemed expedient or
necessary to secure the protection and conservation of the public
forests in such manner as to insure a continued supply of valuable
timber and other forest products for the future, and regulating the use
and occupancy of the forests and forest reserves, to the same end.
Forestry Administrative Order 12-2 was recommended by the Director
of Forestry, and approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources. It is no less a valid law. It is an administrative regulation
germane to the objects and purposes of the law. A rule shaped out by
jurisprudence is that when Congress authorized the promulgation of
administrative rules and regulations to implement a given legislation,
[a]ll that is required is that the regulation should be germane to the
114

objects and purposes of the law; that the regulation be not in

contradiction with it, but conform to the standards that the law
prescribes.
REPUBLIC V. CA
154 SCRA 476
Facts:
In 1968, Martina Carantes for and in behalf of the heirs of Salming
Piraso filed in the CFI of Baguio an application for the registration of
the land, which the latter claimed to be in their possession and
occupation openly, continuously, exclusively, notoriously since 1915.
The Director of lands, through the Solicitor General and the Director
of Forestry, opposed the application on the ground that the said
portion land is within the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve as shown
in the reports and testimonies of the district foresters. The CFI
granted the application, which was also affirmed by the CA. The
governments failure to show that the disputed land is more valuable
for forest purposes is one of the reasons for the CAs ruling. It also
noted the failure to prove that trees are thriving in the land.
Issue:
Whether the land in dispute is alienable and disposable.
Ruling:
No. The Court ruled that the petitioner clearly proved thru the reports
and testimonies of the district foresters that the land applied for
registration is a part of a forestland. As to the claim of the applicants
that they have been in possession of the land since 1915, the court
cited its decision in Director of Forestry v. Munoz (23 SCRA
1184),where it stated that possession of forest lands, no matter how
long, cannot ripen into private ownership.
In its decision, the Court also addressed the CAs ruling by citing its
decision in Heirs of Amunatequi v. Director of Forestry (126 SCRA 69,
75), where it ruled, A forested area classified as forest land of the
115

public domain does not lose such classification simply because

loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover.
Forestlands do not have to be on mountains or in out of the way
places. The classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status
and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks
like.
The Court again reiterated that there must first be a formal
Government declaration that the forestland has been re-classified into
alienable and disposable agricultural land, before private persons in
accordance with the various modes of acquiring public agricultural
lands can acquire it.
REPUBLIC V. ANIMAS
56 SCRA 499
Facts:
The land covered by the free patent and title in question was
originally applied for by Precila Soria, who on February 23, 1966,
transferred her rights to the land and its improvements to defendant
Isagani Du Timbol who filed his application therefor on February 3,
1969, as a transferee from Precila Soria.
On December 12, 1969, free Patent No. V-466102 was issued by the
President of the Philippines for the land in question, and on July 20,
1970, after transmittal of the patent to the Register of Deeds of
General Santos City, Original Certificate of Title (O.C.T.) No. P-2508
was issued in the name of defendant Isagani Du Timbol.
On August 5, 1971, the Republic of the Philippines, at the instance of
the Bureau of Forestry, filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance
of Cotabato, Branch I, General Santos City (Civil Case No. 1253), to
declare free patent No. V-466102 and Original Certificate of Title No.
P-2508 in the name of defendant Isagani Du Timbol null and void ab
initio and to order the reversion of the land in question to the mass of
public domain. The action is based on the ground that the land
covered thereby is a forest or timber land which is not disposable
116

under the Public Land Act; that in a reclassification of the public lands
in the vicinity where the land in question is situated made by the
Bureau of Forestry on March 7, 1958, the said land was plotted on
Bureau of Forestry map L.C. 700 to be inside the area which was
reverted to the category of public forest, whereas the application for
free patent by Isagani Du Timbol was filed on June 3, 1969, or more
than eleven years thereafter; that the said patent and title were
obtained fraudulently as private respondent Isagani Du Timbol never
occupied and cultivated the land applied for.

Issue:
Whether the area is a part of the forest zone

Ruling:
Yes, it is.
After careful deliberation, this Court grants the petition on the ground
that the area covered by the patent and title is not disposable public
land, it being a part of the forest zone and, hence the patent and title
thereto are null and void.
A certificate of title that is void may be ordered cancelled. A title will
be considered void if it is procured through fraud, as when a person
applies for registration of the land under his name although the
property belongs to another. In the case of disposable public
lands, failure on the part of the grantee to comply with the conditions
imposed by law is a ground for holding such title void. The lapse of
the one year period within which a decree of title may be reopened
for fraud would not prevent the cancellation thereof, for to hold that a
title may become indefeasible by registration, even if such title had
been secured through fraud or in violation of the law, would be the
height of absurdity. Registration should not be a shield of fraud in
securing title. Considering that it is the state is seeking the
cancellation of the title of respondent Isagani Du Timbol, said title has
not become indefeasible for prescription cannot be invoked against
117

the state. A title founded on fraud may be cancelled, notwithstanding

the lapse of one year from the issuance thereof, through a petition
filed in court by the Solicitor General. Public land fraudulently
included in patents or certificates of title may be recovered or
reverted to the state in accordance with Section 101 of the Public
Land Act (Director of Lands vs. Jugado et al., G.R. No. L-14707, May
23, 1961). Prescription does not lie against the state in such cases for
the Statute of Limitations does not run against the state (Article 1108,
paragraph 4 of the New Civil Code). The right of reversion or
reconveyance to the state is not barred prescription. Even granting
that the title of private respondent Isagani Du Timbol can no longer be
reopened under the Land Registration Act, the land covered thereby
may be reconveyed to the state in an action for reconveyance under
Section 101 of Commonwealth Act 141 (Public Land Act), for the
remedy of reconveyance is adequately covered by the prayer of the
complaint for the grant of such other relief as may be just and
equitable in the premises.

118

i. Forest land, defined.

HEIRS OF AMMUNATEGUI V. DIRECTOR OF LANDS
126 SCRA 69
Facts:
There are two petitions in this case. The Court of Appeals declared
the disputed property as forest land. These two petitions have their
genesis in an application for confirmation of imperfect title and its
registration filed with the Court of First Instance of Capiz. The parcel
of land sought to be registered is known as Lot No. 885 of the
Cadastral Survey of Pilar, Capiz, and has an area of 645,703 square
meters.
Roque Borre, petitioner in G.R. No, L-30035, and Melquiades Borre,
filed the application for registration. In due time, the heirs of Jose
Amunategui, petitioners in G.R. No. L-27873 filed an opposition to the
application of Roque and Melquiades Borre. At the same time, they
prayed that the title to a portion of Lot No. 885 of Pilar Cadastre
containing 527,747 square meters be confirmed and registered in the
names of said Heirs of Jose Amunategui. During the progress of the
trial, applicant-petitioner Roque Borre sold whatever rights and
interests he may have on Lot No. 885 to Angel Alpasan. The latter
also filed an opposition, claiming that he is entitled to have said lot
registered in his name. After trial, the Court of First Instance of Capiz
adjudicated 117,956 square meters to Emeterio Bereber and the rest
of the land containing 527,747 square meters was adjudicated in the
proportion of 5/6 share to Angel Alpasan and 1/6 share to Melquiades
Borre. Only the Heirs of Jose Amunategui and the Director of Forestry
119

filed their respective appeals with the Court of Appeals.

In
its
decision,
the
Court
of
Appeals
held
". . . the conclusion so far must have to be that as to the private
litigants that have been shown to have a better right over Lot 885 are,
as to the northeastern portion of a little less than 117,956 square
meters, it was Emeterio Bereber and as to the rest of 527,747 square
meters, it was the heirs of Jose Amunategui; but the last question that
must have to be considered is whether after all, the title that these
two (2) private litigants have shown did not amount to a registerable
one in view of the opposition and evidence of the Director of Forestry
". . . turning back the clock thirty (30) years from 1955 when the
application was filed which would place it at 1925, the fact must have
to be accepted that during that period, the land was a classified forest
land so much so that timber licenses had to be issued to certain
licensee before 1926 and after that; that even Jose Amunategui
himself took the trouble to ask for a license to cut timber within the
area; and this can only mean that the Bureau of Forestry had stood
and maintained its ground that it was a forest land as indeed the
testimonial evidence referred to above persuasively indicates, and
the only time when the property was converted into a fishpond was
sometime after 1950; or a bare five (5) years before the filing of the
application; but only after there had been a previous warning by the
District Forester that that could not be done because it was classified
as a public forest; so that having these in mind and remembering that
even under Republic Act 1942 which came into effect in 1957, two (2)
years after this case had already been filed in the lower Court, in
order for applicant to be able to demonstrate a registerable title he
must have shown "open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain
under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership for at least thirty
(30)
years,
preceding
the
filing
of
the
application;
the foregoing details cannot but justify the conclusion that not one of
the applicants or oppositors had shown that during the required
period of thirty (30) years prescribed by Republic Act 1942 in order for
him to have shown a registerable title for the entire period of thirty
(30) years before filing of the application, he had been in
"open,

continuous,

exclusive

and

notorious

possession

and
120

occupation

of

agricultural

lands

of

the

public

domain,

it is evident that the Bureau of Forestry had insisted on its claim all
throughout that period of thirty (30) years and even before and
applicants and their predecessors had made implicit recognition of
that; the result must be to deny all these applications; this Court
stating that it had felt impelled notwithstanding, just the same to
resolve the conflicting positions of the private litigants among
themselves as to who of them had demonstrated a better right to
possess because this Court foresees that this litigation will go all the
way to the Supreme Court and it is always better that the findings be
as complete as possible to enable the Highest Court to pass final
judgment;
"IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision must have to be as it is hereby
reversed; the application as well as all the oppositions with the
exception of that of the Director of Forestry which is hereby sustained
are dismissed; no more pronouncement as to costs."cralaw virtua1aw
library. A petition for review on certiorari was filed by the Heirs of Jose
Amunategui contending that the disputed lot had been in the
possession of private persons for over thirty years and therefore in
accordance with Republic Act No. 1942, said lot could still be the
subject of registration and confirmation of title in the name of a private
person in accordance with Act No. 496 known as the Land
Registration Act. On the other hand, another petition for review
on certiorari was filed by Roque Borre and Encarnacion Delfin,
contending that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing their complaint against the Heirs of Jose Amunategui. The
Borre complaint was for the annulment of the deed of absolute sale of
Lot No. 885 executed by them in favor of the Heirs of Amunategui.
The complaint was dismissed on the basis of the Court of Appeals
decision that the disputed lot is part of the public domain. The
petitioners also question the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals in
passing upon the relative rights of the parties over the disputed lot
when its final decision after all is to declare said lot a part of the
public
domain
classified
as
forest
land.
The Heirs of Jose Amunategui maintain that Lot No. 885 cannot be
classified as forest land because it is not thickly forested but is a
"mangrove swamp." Although conceding that a "mangrove swamp" is
included in the classification of forest land in accordance with Section
121

1820 of the Revised Administrative Code, the petitioners argue that

no big trees classified in Section 1821 of said Code as first, second
and third groups are found on the land in question. Furthermore, they
contend that Lot 885, even if it is a mangrove swamp, is still subject
to land registration proceedings because the property had been in
actual possession of private persons for many years, and therefore,
said land was already "private land" better adapted and more
valuable for agricultural than for forest purposes and not required by
the public interests to be kept under forest classification.
Issue:
Whether the decision of the Court of Appeals should be sustained
Ruling:
Yes, it should be sustained.
A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not
lose such classification simply because loggers or settlers may have
stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land
may actually be covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin
cultivators or other farmers. "Forest lands" do not have to be on
mountains or in out of the way places. Swampy areas covered by
mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other trees growing in brackish or
sea water may also be classified as forest land. The classification is
descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be
descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Unless and until the
land classified as "forest" is released in an official proclamation to that
effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of
the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not
apply.
The fact that no trees enumerated in Section 1821 of the Revised
Administrative Code are found in Lot No. 885 does not divest such
land of its being classified as forest land, much less as land of the
public domain. The appellate court found that in 1912, the land must
have been a virgin forest as stated by Emeterio Berebers witness
Deogracias Gavacao, and that as late as 1926, it must have been a
thickly forested area as testified by Jaime Bertolde. The opposition of
122

the Director of Forestry was strengthened by the appellate courts

finding that timber licenses had to be issued to certain licensees and
even Jose Amunategui himself took the trouble to ask for a license to
cut timber within the area. It was only sometime in 1950 that the
property was converted into fishpond but only after a previous
warning from the District Forester that the same could not be done
because
it
was
classified
as
"public
forest."
In confirmation of imperfect title cases, the applicant shoulders the
burden of proving that he meets the requirements of Section 48,
Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by Republic Act No. 1942.
ii. Inclusion of a forest land in tile nullifies the title.
REPUBLIC V. SPS. MAXIMO
135 SCRA 156
Facts:
The Court of First Instance at Gumaca, Quezon on March 21, 1961
rendered a decision, ordering the registration of said land, Lot 1,
allegedly located at Barrio Cambuga (Anonang), Mulanay, in the
names of the spouses Prudencio Maxino and Tarciana Morales, less
200 hectares which should be registered in the names of the Heirs of
Lorenzo Consolacion. The basis of the claim of the Maxinos is a
Spanish title, a gratuitous composition title or adjustment title issued
on July 30, 1888 to Prudencio Tesalona pursuant to the Royal Decree
of December 26, 1884 for 29 hectares of pasture land. The decision
became final and executory. A decree and an original certificate of
title were issued. More than eight years later, the Republic filed with
court an amended petition to annul the decision, decree and title on
the ground that they are void because the land in question was still a
part of the unclassified public forest. Moreover, the possessory
information title relied upon by the Maxino spouses covered only 29
hectares of land and not 885 hectares. The petition was verified by
the Acting Director of Forestry. After hearing the judge denied the
petition and ruled in favor of the spouses.
Issue:
Whether the land in question can be registered under the Torrens
System
123

Ruling:
No, the said land cannot be registered. It is axiomatic that public
forestal land is not registerable. The spouses have not shown that a
title for 29 hectares could be a valid title for 970 hectares. The
boundaries and areas stated in Tesalona's tax declarations reveal
that a different land was covered thereby. The title states that the 29hectare land was located in Barrio Yamay. Tesalonas tax declarations
stated that the land was located in Barrio Cambuga, now Anonang.
The court said that possession of public forestal lands, however long,
cannot ripen into private ownership.

124

iii. Forest lands cannot be owned by private persons.

LAND BANK V. REPUBLIC
543 SCRA 453
Facts:
A parcel of land in Davao City with an area of 41,276 square meters
was issued to Angelito C. Bugayong with OCT no. P-2823 (the
mother title came from the Sales Patent No.4576) in 1969. The land
was subdivided into four lots with a new TCT in the name of
Bugayong and sold all his lots to different persons. He sold one
particular lot to the spouses Du. They then then subdivided the lot
into two, in which they sold one lot to the spouses Dayola and
registered the other lot in the name of Lourdes Farms Inc. (which is
the subject of the case). Lourdes Farms, Inc. mortgaged the land to
Landbank on April 14, 1980.
The Bureau of Lands conducted an investigation upon a formal
petition and found out that the Land of Bugayong with Sales Patent
no.4576 was classified within the forest zone on August 6, 1923 and
was released as alienable and disposable only on March 25, 1981
through an Administrative order. The Bureau resolved that the sales
patent was illegally issued and the OCT was improperly issued by the
Director of Lands at that time. Now, the Republic of the Philippines
represented by the Director of Lands, through the office of the Sol.
Gen. filed a complaint before the RTC of Davao to cancel the titles
that were issued to Bugayong and the other owners and mortgagors
of the land and the reversion of the land into the mass of public
domain. LBP claimed that it is a mortgagee in good faith and for
value. It prayed that should the TCT issued to Lourdes Farms, Inc.
be annulled by the court, Lourdes Farms, Inc. should be ordered to
125

pay its outstanding obligations to LBP or to provide a new collateral

security.
Issue:
1. Whether a forest land is capable of private appropriation.
2. Whether or not LBP have the Mortgage Right and Interest over the
land for being a purchaser in good faith.
Ruling:
1. No. Forest lands are outside the commerce of man and
unsusceptible of private appropriation in any form.
2. No. It is well settled that a certificate of title is void when it covers
property of public domain classified as forest, timber or mineral lands.
Any title issued covering non-disposable lots even in the hands of an
alleged innocent purchaser for value shall be cancelled. The rule
must stand no matter how harsh it may seem. Dura lex sed lex.Ang
batas ay maaaring mahigpit subalit ito ang mananaig.

126

iv. Forest lands are not registrable. Requirements for

exemption.
DIAZ V. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 181502; February 2, 2010
Facts:
Petitioners late mother, Flora Garcia, filed an application for
registration of a vast tract of land located in Laur, Nueva Ecija and
Palayan City in the then Court of First Instance on August 12, 1976.
She alleged that she possessed the land as owner and worked,
developed and harvested the agricultural products and benefits of the
same continuously, publicly and adversely for more or less 26 years.
The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the
Solicitor General, opposed the application because the land in
question was within the Fort Magsaysay Military Reservation,
established by virtue of Proclamation No. 237 in 1955. Thus, it was
inalienable as it formed part of the public domain.
The CFI ruled in Garcias favor in a decision dated July 1, 1981.
The Republic eventually appealed the decision of the CFI to the Court
of Appeals. In its decision dated February 26, 1992, penned by
Justice Vicente V. Mendoza,the appellate court reversed and set
aside the decision of the CFI.
The CA observed that Garcia also traced her ownership of the land in
question to Possessory Information Title No. 216. As Garcias right to
the property was largely dependent on the existence and validity of
the possessory information title the probative value,and inasmuch as

127

the land was situated inside a military reservation, the CA concluded

that she did not validly acquire title thereto.
During the pendency of the case in the CA, Garcia passed away and
was substituted by her heirs, one of whom was petitioner Florencia G.
Diaz.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the Mendoza decision.
While the motion was pending in the CA. Subsequently, however, the
CA encouraged the parties to reach an amicable settlement on the
matter and even gave the parties sufficient time to draft and finalize
the same.
The parties ultimately entered into a compromise agreement with the
Republic withdrawing its claim on the more or less 4,689 hectares
supposedly outside the FMMR. For her part, petitioner withdrew her
application for the portion of the property inside the military
reservation. They filed a motion for approval of the amicable
settlement in the CA.
On June 30, 1999, the appellate court approved the compromise
agreement. On January 12, 2000, it directed the Land Registration
Administration to issue the corresponding decree of registration in
petitioners favor.
However, the OSG filed a motion for reconsideration of the CA
resolution ordering the issuance of the decree of registration. The
OSG informed the appellate court that the tract of land subject of the
amicable settlement was still within the military reservation.
Issue:
Whether or the land within the military reservation is registrable.
Ruling:
SC ruled that in registration cases filed under the provisions of the
Public Land Act for the judicial confirmation of an incomplete and
imperfect title, an order dismissing an application for registration and
declaring the land as part of the public domain constitutes res

128

judicata, not only against the adverse claimant, but also against all
persons.
However, it is true that forest lands may be registered when they
have been reclassified as alienable by the President in a clear and
categorical manner coupled with possession by the claimant as well
as that of her predecessors-in-interest. Unfortunately for petitioner,
she was not able to produce such evidence. Accordingly, her
occupation thereof, and that of her predecessors-in-interest, could not
have ripened into ownership of the subject land. This is because prior
to the conversion of forest land as alienable land, any occupation or
possession thereof cannot be counted in reckoning compliance with
the thirty-year possession requirement under Commonwealth Act 141
(CA 141) or the Public Land Act. The rules on the confirmation of
imperfect titles do not apply unless and until the land classified as
forest land is released through an official proclamation to that effect.
Then and only then will it form part of the disposable agricultural
lands of the public domain.

129

d. Mangrove swamps are comprised within the public

forests.
DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY V. VILLAREAL
G.R. No. L-32266 February 27, 1989
Facts:
Ruperto Villareal applied for its registration on 25 January 1949, a
land consisting of 178,113 sq. m. of mangrove swamps located in the
municipality of Sapian, Capiz, alleging that he and his predecessorsin-interest had been in possession of the land for more than 40 years.
He was opposed by several persons, including the Director of
Forestry on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines. After trial, the
application was approved by the CFI Capiz. The decision was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The Director of Forestry then came
to the Supreme Court in a petition for review on certiorari.
Issue:
Whether or not the land in dispute was forestal in nature and
not subject to private appropriation.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals
and dismissed the application for registration of title of Villareal and
held that It is elementary in the law governing natural resources that
forest land cannot be owned by private persons. It is not registerable.
The adverse possession which can be the basis of a grant of title in
confirmation of imperfect title cases cannot commence until after the
forest land has been declared alienable and disposable. Possession
130

of forest land, no matter bow long cannot convert it into private

property. It is reiterated for emphasis that, conformably to the
legislative definition embodied in Section 1820 of the Revised
Administrative Code of 1917, which remains unamended up to now,
mangrove swamps or manglares form part of the public forests of the
Philippines.
i. Mangrove lands are neither timber nor mineral
lands.
TONGSON V. DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, ET AL
G.R. No. L-34463 September 27, 1977

Facts:

As early as 1905 the parcel of land (LOT 855) was under the
exclusive possession of Francisco Borja who cut trees therefrom and
converted them into firewood. Moreover, he established a salt factory,
selling salts and the firewood. After his death, his son Arturo took
possession of the land, continued to cut trees up until 1910. May of
1917, Antero Borja sold the land to Deogracias Gayacao evidenced
by a private instrument.
Deogracias on the other hand sold 5 parcels of land to Santiago
Bermejo one of the parcels known as parcel No. 4 is cadastral Lot
No. 855. The sale is evidenced by the public instrument. During his
lifetime, Santiago M. Bermejo possessed said parcel of land, cut
trees for the firewood purposes and also had a salt factory. Upon his
death in 1951, his children took possession of this parcel of land and
when Macario Bermejo was appointed judicial administrator by the
Court of First Instance of Capiz, LOT 855 appeared in the Revised
Inventory of the estate of the late Santiago M. Bermejo. When
Macario Bermejo took possession of the land in 1953 he converted it
into a fishpond and started to construct fishpond dikes. However, due
131

to lack of funds, the construction of the fishpond was not completed.

On May 30, 1956, Macario Bermejo, in his capacity as administrator
of the estate of the late Santiago M. Bermejo, leased the land to
Leopoldo L. Somes with the approval of the Court of First Instance of
Capiz.

The possession of the heirs of Santiago M. Bermejo together with

that of their predecessors-in-interest was likewise peaceful,
continuous, open, adverse and in concept of owners for a period of
not less than fifty years.

Issue:

Whether or not a parcel of land, in the possession of the

predecessors- in-interest and the oppositor Bermejo as far back as
1905, asserted to have originally been mangrove swamps, thereafter
converted into a fishpond, may still be considered as part of the
timber domain which is not disposable.

Ruling:

The decision of the lower court is affirmed. "In the case of Mapa v.
Insular Government ..., this court said that the phrase 'agricultural
lands' as used in Act No. 926 means those public lands acquired from
Spain which are not timber or mineral lands. Whatever may have
132

been the meaning of the term 'forestry' under the Spanish law, the Act
of Congress of July Ist 1902, classifies the public lands in the
Philippine Islands as timber, mineral or agricultural lands, and all
public lands that are not timber or mineral lands are necessarily
agricultural public lands, whether they are used as nipa swamps,
manglare, fisheries or ordinary farm lands. The definition of forestry
as including manglares found in the Administrative Code of 1917
cannot affect rights which vested prior to its enactment," 9 What is
even more persuasive as to the correctness of the decision reached
by the lower court is that in the Garchitorena decision, this Court,
through Justice Ostrand who was famed for his authoritative opinions
on public land controversies, promulgated in 1933, more than fifteen
years after the effectivity of the Revised Administrative Code, was
equally explicit:

The opposition rests mainly upon the proposition that in the

land covered by the application there are mangrove lands as
shown in this opponent's Exhibit 1, but we think this opposition
of the Director of Forestry is untenable, inasmuch as it has
been definitely decided that mangrove lands are not forests
lands in the sense in which this phrase is used in the Act of
Congress ... It could be said, therefore, that even on the
assumptions that the parcel of land in question could be
characterized as mangrove swamps, the conclusion reached by
the lower court is not without support in the applicable
authorities.

In fact, it cannot be said with certainty that there was a finding in the
appealed decision that to the disputed lot was originally mangrove
swamps. As stated therein: "Mangrove swamps where only trees of
mangrove species grow, where the trees are small and sparse fit only
for firewood purposes and the trees growing are not of commercial
value as lumber, do not convert the land into public land. Such lands
are not forest in character. They do not form part of the public
domain." Based on such a finding which must be accorded due
weight and is control the sole question raised on appeal is one of law,
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the decision arrived at by the lower court is not open to any valid
objection.

e. Foreshore lands.
REPUBLIC vs. AMANDA LAT VDA. DE CASTILLO
G.R. No. L-69002 June 30, 1988
Facts:
In 1951,Modesto Castillo applied for the registration of two parcels of
land, Lots 1 and 2, located in Batangas. In a decision dated August
134

31, 1951, the said Modesto Castillo was declared the true and
absolute owner of the land with the improvements thereon, for which
OCT No. 0-665 was issued to him by the Register of Deeds. By virtue
of an instrument dated March 18, 1960, the said Lots 1 and 2 covered
by OCT No. 0-665, together with Lot No. 12374 covered by TCT No.
3254-A and Lot No. 12377 covered by TCT No. 3251-A, were
consolidated and sub-divided into Lots 1 to 9 under Pcs-1046. After
the death of Modesto Castillo, in 1960, Amanda Lat Vda. de Castillo,
et al., executed a deed of partition and assumption of mortgage in
favor of Florencio L. Castillo, et al., as a result of which OCT No. D665 was cancelled, and in lieu thereof, new transfer certificates of title
were issued to Florencio Castillo, et al. The Republic of the
Philippines then filed a Civil Case with the lower court for the
annulment of the certificates of title issued to defendants, and for the
reversion of the lands covered thereby to the State.
Issue:
Whether or not the decision of the Land Registration Court involving
shore lands constitutes res adjudicata.
Ruling:
Shores are properties of the public domain intended for public use
and, therefore, not registrable. Accretions on the bank of a lake, like
Laguna de Bay, belong to the owners of the estate to which they have
been added while accretion on a sea bank still belongs to the public
domain, and is not available for private ownership until formally
declared by the government to be no longer needed for public use.
The defense of long possession is likewise not available in this case
because, as already ruled by this Court, mere possession of land
does not by itself automatically divest the land of its public character.
i. Foreshore, land defined.
REPUBLIC V. ALAGAD
G.R. No. L-66807 January 26, 1989

Facts:
135

On or about October 11, 1951, defendants filed an application for

registration of their title over a parcel of land situated at Linga, Pila,
Laguna, with an area of 8.1263 hectares, reflected in survey plan
Psu-116971, which was amended after the land was divided into two
parcels, namely, Lot 1 with an area of 5.2476 hectares and Lot 2 with
an area of 2.8421 hectares, reflected in survey plan Psu-226971,
amd. 2. The Republic opposed the application on the stereo-typed
ground that applicants and their predecessors have not been in
possession of the land openly, continuously, publicly and adversely
under a bona fide claim of ownership since July 26, 1894 and the
land has not ceased to be a part of the public domain. Republic
claims that the decree and title rendered and issued in LRC Case is
concerned, are void ab initio. The trial court ruled that the parcel of
land is a portion of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the
Philippines, and hence, available for disposition and registration.

Issue:

Whether or not the properties in question are foreshore lands or part

and parcel of the public domain.

Ruling:

The Supreme court reversed the decision of the lower court. The
parcel of land is a foreshore land so it is not registerable. It defines a
foreshore land as that part of (the land) which is between high and
low water and left dry by the flux and reflux of the tides. If the
submergence, however, of the land is due to precipitation, it does not
become foreshore, despite its proximity to the waters. The Court
cannot make a ruling because the case is not a trier of facts, and it is
in possession of no evidence to assist it in arriving at a conclusive
136

disposition, hence the Supreme Court remanded the case to the trial
court for further proceedings.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES V. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-43105 AUGUST 31, 1984
Facts:
The subject land in this case is situated 20 meters away from the
shores of Laguna de Bay. Said land was owned by Benedicto del Rio.
After the death of Benedicto, the land was acquired by his son Santos
Del Rio. The private oppositors in this case sought and obtained
permission from Santos Del Rio to construct duck houses on said
land. The private oppositors, however, violated their agreement and
instead constructed residential houses thereon. Santos then filed an
ejectment suit against the private oppositors and later on sought to
register the land. Meanwhile, private oppositors simultaneously filed
their respective sales applications with the Bureau of Lands, and they
opposed Santos del Rios application for registration. The CFI of
Laguna dismissed the application for registration. Applicant appealed
and obtained a favourable judgment from the Court of Appeals. The
Director of Lands and the private oppositors filed their respective
petitions for review on said decision to the Supreme Court. The
Director of Lands contends that since a portion of the land is covered
with water four to five months a year, the same is part of the lake bed
of Laguna de Bay and therefore it cannot be the subject of
registration.
Issue:
Whether or not the parcel of land in question is public land.
Ruling:
The inundation of a portion of the land is not due to "flux and reflux of
tides." It cannot be considered a foreshore land, hence it is not a
public land and therefore capable of registration as private property
provided that the applicant proves that he has a registerable title. The
purpose of land registration under the Torrens System is not the
acquisition of lands but only the registration of title which applicant
137

already possesses over the land.

ii. Land covered by the sea at high tide not due to
abnormal
conditions, are part of the shore and therefore
public land.
CAGAMPANG V. MORANO
G.R. No. L-25738. March 14, 1968
Facts:
The case began with a forcible entry and detainer suit instituted by
Silverio Cagampang to recover from the defendant, Flaviano Morano,
a parcel of land abutting on the sea in the municipality of Bacuag,
Surigao del Norte. Plaintiff, who claimed to have been in possession
of the land for over 80 years, charged that in 1960 defendant, through
strategy and stealth, occupied a portion of the land and refused to
vacate it, to the prejudice of plaintiff; wherefore, the latter sought to
have possession restored to him, to collect a rental of P3.00 a month,
plus P5,000.00 damages and costs. The defendant's answer pleaded
occupancy by virtue of a foreshore "grant from proper authorities".
At the ocular inspection in 1965, the Court found that the lot in
question is not reached, much less, covered by the highest ordinary
tide. It can only be reached or covered by the highest tide during the
months of May, June and July or during the months when the highest
tide of the year will occur.
Issue:
Whether or not lands covered by the sea at high tide not due to
abnormal conditions are part of the shore and therefore public land.
Ruling:
At the ocular inspection, the Court found that the land was covered by
the sea water at high tide in the months of May, June and, July. This
finding makes it clear that the land was part of the shore, and was,
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therefore, public land belonging to the State, conformably to Article 1,

paragraph 3 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866:
Art. 1. The following are part of the national domain open to public
use: (3) The Shores. By shore is understood that space covered and
uncovered by the movement of the tide. Its interior or terrestrial limit
is the line reached by the highest equinoctial tides. Where the tides
are not appreciable, the shore begins on the land side at the line
reached by the sea during ordinary storms and tempests. By Article
420 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, shores are declared property
of the public domain.
As the lot was covered by the highest tides from May to July, and
there is no showing that these tides are due to abnormal conditions,
the land is obviously part of the shore and public property. Hence,
legal possession thereof appertains to the national government or its
grantees.

139

iii. Seashore, foreshore land and portions of the territorial

waters and beaches cannot be registered.
DIZON V. RODRIGUEZ
G.R. Nos. L-20300-01 April 30, 1965
Facts:
These are separate appeals instituted by Antonino Dizon, et al. (G.R.
Nos. L-20300-01) and the Republic of the Philippines, et al. (G.R.
Nos. L-20355-56), from a single decision of the Court of Appeals.
Hacienda Calatagan is owned by Alfonso and Jacobo Zobel. In 1938,
the Hacienda constructed a pier, called "Santiago Landing," to be
used by the Hacienda sugar mill but when it ceased its operation the
owners converted the pier into a fishpond dike and built additional
dikes which were converted into a fishpond. In 1949, the Zobels
ordered the subdivision of the Hacienda which was approved by the
Director of Lands, and the Register of Deeds issued a title in the
name of Jacobo Zobel and the latter sold to Antonio Dizon Lot 49 with
37 hectares. On May 24, 1952, Miguel Tolentino and his daughter
filed with the Bureau of Fisheries an application for ordinary fishpond
permit or lease for Lot 49 and Lot 1.
The Dizons, Sy-Jucos, and Gocos filed a protest with the Bureau of
Fisheries, claiming the properties to be private land but were
dismissed by the Director of Fisheries. On October 1, 1954, the
protestants filed an action in the CFI of Manila to restrain the Director
of Fisheries from issuing the fishpond permits but the court dismissed
this petition for non-exhaustion of administrative remedy. On appeal
to this Court, the decision of the lower court was sustained.
Protestants then filed an appeal with the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources. Hence the Dizons filed Civil Case in the CFI of
Batangas, to quiet their titles over Lots 49 and 1.
The Republic of the Philippines intervenes in view of the finding that
the lots were part of the foreshore area before their conversion. The
CFI of Batangas promulgated a joint decision making the finding that
140

the subdivision plan was prepared in disregard of the technical

description. In its decision the appellate court adopted the findings of
the lower court but the CA awarded to applicants Tolentinos damages
in the amount of P200.00 per hectare. Appellants were thus declared
entitled to retention of the properties.
Issue:

Whether or not the Lots in question are part of the seashore or

foreshore area.

Ruling:
It is noteworthy in connection with the appeal of plaintiffs, that they do
not contest the existence of the pier that was used by the hacienda
owners in the loading of their manufactured sugar to vessels. The fact
that said pier jutted out 600 meters to the sea indicates that the area
over which such cemented structure spanned was part of the sea or
at least foreshore land. And, plaintiffs were not able to disprove the
testimonial evidence that the fishponds in question were constructed
by enclosing the areas with dikes, using the pier as one of the ends of
the fishponds. It is clear that the areas thus enclosed and converted
into fishponds were really part of the foreshore. This, and the fact that
the subdivision plan was found to have been prepared not in
accordance with the technical descriptions in but in disregard of it,
support the conclusion reached by both the lower court and the Court
of Appeals that Lots 49 and 1 are actually part of the territorial waters
and belong to the State. And, it is an elementary principle that the
incontestable and indefeasible character of a Torrens certificate of
title does not operate when the land thus covered is not capable of
registration.
On the matter of possession of plaintiffs-appellants, the ruling of the
Court of Appeals must be upheld. There is no showing that plaintiffs
are not purchasers in good faith and for value. As such title-holders,
they have reason to rely on the indefeasible character of their
141

certificates.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES V. CASTILLO

G.R. No. L-69002 June 30, 1988
Facts:
In 1951,Modesto Castillo applied for the registration of two parcels of
land, Lots 1 and 2, located in Batangas. In a decision dated August
31, 1951, the said Modesto Castillo was declared the true and
absolute owner of the land with the improvements thereon, for which
OCT No. 0-665 was issued to him by the Register of Deeds. By virtue
of an instrument dated March 18, 1960, the said Lots 1 and 2 covered
by OCT No. 0-665, together with Lot No. 12374 covered by TCT No.
3254-A and Lot No. 12377 covered by TCT No. 3251-A, were
consolidated and sub-divided into Lots 1 to 9 under Pcs-1046. After
the death of Modesto Castillo, in 1960, Amanda Lat Vda. de Castillo,
et al., executed a deed of partition and assumption of mortgage in
favor of Florencio L. Castillo, et al., as a result of which OCT No. D665 was cancelled, and in lieu thereof, new transfer certificates of title
were issued to Florencio Castillo, et al. The Republic of the
Philippines then filed a Civil Case with the lower court for the
annulment of the certificates of title issued to defendants, and for the
reversion of the lands covered thereby to the State.
Issue:
Whether or not the decision of the Land Registration Court involving
shore lands constitutes res adjudicata.
Ruling:
One of the requisites of res judicata is that the court rendering the
final judgment must have jurisdiction over the subject matter; that
shores are properties of the public domain intended for public use
(Article 420, Civil Code) and, therefore, not registrable. Thus, it has
142

long been settled that portions of the foreshore or of the territorial

waters and beaches cannot be registered. Their inclusion in a
certificate of title does not convert the same into properties of private
ownership or confer title upon the registrant

Accretions on the bank of a lake, like Laguna de Bay, belong to the

owners of the estate to which they have been added while accretion
on a sea bank still belongs to the public domain, and is not available
for private ownership until formally declared by the government to be
no longer needed for public use. But such distinction will not help
private respondents because there is no accretion shown to exist in
the case at bar. On the contrary, it was established that the occupants
of the lots who were engaged in duck raising filled up the area with
shells and sand to make it habitable.
The defense of long possession is likewise not available in this case
because, as already ruled by this Court, mere possession of land
does not by itself automatically divest the land of its public character.
CANTOJA V. LIM
G.R. No. 168386 March 29, 2010
Facts:
Respondent Roberto Cantoja Sr. filed an application for a Foreshore
Lease Contract over the foreshore area located in Makar, General
Santos City in 1989. The Lease contract was executed on November
23, 1990 and would expire on October 21, 2015. Five years after,
petitioner Harry Lim filed a protest questioning the grant of FLA to
Cantoja since according to him, Cantoja has committed fraud and
misrepresentation in declaring in his application that the subject
foreshore area adjoined his (Cantojas) property.To prove this
allegation, Lim presented a TCT over a lot which adjoins the
foreshore area subject of the lease. Upon ocular inspection, during
which petitioner failed to appear despite notice, a Special Investigator
found that Cantoja was in actual possession of the foreshore area
143

which was utilized as dock-board of the Cantojas Fishing

Business. It was ascertained that no portion has been occupied or
possessed by any other person or persons, nor was there any
adverse claimant thereof. Like the DENR Secretary, the Office of the
President also relied on the findings of Special Investigator that the
petitioners titled land is an inalienable foreshore area which could not
be subject of a valid patent or title.
Aggrieved, respondent Harry Lim appealed to the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals held that Cantoja committed misrepresentation
amounting to fraud in his application for lease when he declared in
his application that his lot adjoins that of the foreshore area sought to
be leased.
Issue:
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in cancelling the Foreshore
Lease Contract granted to Cantoja covering the foreshore area?
Ruling:
No. It is undisputed that respondent is the registered owner of the
land adjacent to the foreshore area leased to Cantoja, Thus, prior to
Cantojas foreshore lease application in1989 and the grant of the
foreshore lease contract on November 23, 1990; respondent already
owned the land adjacent to the foreshore land. The sketch plan
submitted by the Geodetic Engineer clearly shows that respondents
property is in between the foreshore land and Cantojas property.
Being the owner of the land adjoining the foreshore area, respondent
is the riparian or littoral owner who has preferential right to lease the
foreshore area as provided under paragraph 32 of the Lands
Administrative Order No. 7-1, dated 30 April 1936.
Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 provides that, while
lands added to the shore by accretions and alluvial deposits caused
by the action of the sea form part of the public domain, such lands,
when they are no longer washed by the waters of the sea and are
not necessary for purposes of public utility, or for the established of
special industries, or for the coast guard service, shall be declared
by the Government to be the property of the owners of the estates
144

adjacent thereto and as increment thereof.

In other words, article 4 recognizes the preferential right of the littoral
owner (riparian according to paragraph 32) to the foreshore land
formed by accretions or alluvial deposits due to the action of the
sea. The reason for that preferential right is the same as the
justification for giving accretions to the riparian owner, which is that
accretion compensates the riparian owner for the diminutions which
his land suffers by reason of the destructive force of the waters. So,
in the case of littoral lands, he who loses by the encroachments of the
sea should gain by its recession.
In this case, Cantoja committed fraud when he misrepresented
himself as the riparian or littoral owner in his application for the
foreshore lease. Under stipulation no. 15 of the Foreshore Lease
Agreement, any fraud or misrepresentation committed by the
applicant is a ground for cancellation or rescission of the Foreshore
Lease Agreement.

145

f. Previously titles lands.

LAHORA V. DAYANGHIRANG, JR.
G.R. No. L-28565 January 30, 1971

Facts:

Spouses Lahora and Toribia Moralizon filed a petition for the

registration of the nine parcels of land located in Davao. One-half of
the said land was acquired by Toribia through inheritance and the
other half was by purchase and open, continuous, exclusive and
adverse possession in the concept of an owner. Said petition was
opposed by Emilio Dayanghirang Jr., who alleged that the subject
lands belong to him and his wife. The Director of Lands also opposed
the petition of Lahora spouses because applicants or their
predecessors-in-interest never had sufficient title over the parcels of
land sought to be registered, nor have they been in open, continuous,
and notorious possession thereof for at least 30 years.The said lot
has been previously registered and titled, said parcel of land can no
longer be the subject of adjudication in another proceeding.The lower
court contends that patent issued to oppositor's wife was procured by
fraud, because appellants, the alleged actual occupants of the land,
were not notified of the application for patent therefor and of its
adjudication. Thus, according to appellants, since they were the
actual occupants of the property, the government could not have
awarded it to oppositor's wife, and the patent issued to the latter, as
146

well as the original certificate of title subsequently obtained by her,

were null and void.

Issue:

Whether or not the subject land can be re-registered under Torrens

title even if it was already recorded in the issuance of public land
patent.

Ruling:

In the present case, Lot No. 2228 was registered and titled in the
name of oppositors' wife as of 21 June 1956, nine (9) years earlier.
Clearly, appellants' petition for registration of the same parcel of land
on 26 November 1965, on the ground that the first certificate of title
(OCT No. P-6053) covering the said property is a nullity, can no
longer prosper. Having become registered land under Act 496, for all
legal purposes, by the issuance of the public land patent and the
recording thereof, further registration of the same would lead to the
obviously undesirable result of two certificates of title being issued for
the same piece of land, even if both certificates should be in the
name of the same person. And if they were to be issued to different
persons, the indefeasibility of the first title, which is the most valued
characteristic of Torrens titles, would be torn away.

In a cadastral case the court has no jurisdiction to decree again the

registration of land already decreed in an earlier case; and that a
second decree for the same land would be null and void. Of course, if
the patent had been issued during the pendency of the registration
proceedings, the situation would be different. If there indeed exists a
proper case for cancellation of the patent for intrinsic fraud, the action
147

for review of the decree should have been filed before the one year
period had elapsed. Thereafter, the proper party to bring the action
would only be the person prejudiced by the alleged fraudulent act
the owner and grantor, and not another applicant or claimant.
Furthermore, the relief provided by the law in such instance may be
secured by the aggrieved party, not in another registration, for land
already registered in the name of a person cannot be the subject of
another registration, but in an appropriate action such as one for
reconveyance or reversion, or for damages in case the property has
passed into the hands of an innocent purchaser for value.

g. Mineral Lands.
Sec. 3, Art. XII, 1987 Philippine Constitution
Sec. 2, CA 141
LEPANTO CONSOLIDATED MINING COMPANY V. DUMYUNG
G.R. Nos. L-31666, L-31667 and L-31668 April 30, 1979

Facts:

The Republic of the Philippines thru the Director of Lands filed three
Civil Cases for the annulment of Free Patents and of Original
148

Certificates of Title, on the ground of misrepresentation and false data

and information furnished by the defendants.
The lands embraced in the patents and titles comprise a total area of
58.4169 hectares, and situated in the Municipal District of Mankayan,
Mountain Province.

The defendants alleged that they are entitled to the benefits of

Republic Act No. 3872. It was stipulated therein that a member of the
national cultural minorities who has continuously occupied and
cultivated, either by himself or through his predecessors-in- interest, a
tract or tracts of land, whether disposable or not since July 4, 1955,
shall be entitled to the right to said land.

The Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company, petitioner herein, filed

motions for intervention in the three civil cases, which were granted.
Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company alleged that the portion of the
titled land is within its ordinary timber license No. 140-62 and that
another portion of said lands is embraced in its mineral claims.

The defendants in the three civil cases filed an amended joint answer
with counterclaim to the complaint in intervention. The proceedings
on the three civil cases were suspended pending the outcome of the
criminal cases.
After the presentation of evidence by the prosecution in the three
criminal cases, the defense filed a motion to dismiss the same on the
ground that the accused had complied with all the legal requirements
in the acquisition of their patents which were duly issued by the
Director of Lands and that they are not guilty of the alleged
falsification of public documents.

149

The trial court ruled in favor of the defense and dismissed the three
criminal cases for insufficiency of evidence to sustain the conviction
of the accused.
Subsequently, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the three civil
cases on the ground that the extinction of the penal action carries
with it the extinction of the civil action when the extinction proceeds
from a declaration that the fact from which the civil might arise did not
exist.

The plaintiff, Republic of the Philippines represented by the Director

of Lands, and the intervenor, Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company,
filed separate motions for reconsideration of the order dismissing the
three Civil Cases.

The court of appeals sustained the ruling of the trial court. As such
intervenor filed this petition.

Issues:

(1) Whether or not the lands in question are timber or mineral lands.

(2) Whether or not the private respondents are entitled to the benefits
of Republic Act No. 3872.

Ruling:

(1) Yes, the lands in question are considered mineral lands.

150

(2) No, because the lands are not alienable and disposable. There is
no evidence that the private respondents are members of the
National Cultural Minorities; that they have continuously occupied and
cultivated either by themselves or through their predecessors-ininterest the lands in question since July 4, 1955; and that they are not
the owner of any land secured or disposable under the Public Land
Act at the time they filed the free patent applications. These
qualifications must be established by evidence. Precisely, the
intervenor, petitioner herein, claims that it was in possession of the
lands in question when the private respondents applied for free
patents thereon.

It is well settled that a certificate of title is void when it covers property

of public domain classified as forest or timber and mineral lands. Any
title issued on non-disposable lots even in the hands of alleged
innocent purchaser for value, shall be cancelled.

The acquittal of the private respondents in the criminal cases for

falsification is not a bar to the civil cases to cancel their titles. Thus,
the order of the trial court is set aside.

ATOK BIG-WEDGE MINING COMPANY, VS. INTERMEDIATE

APPELLATE COURT and TUKTUKAN SAINGAN
193 scra 71
Facts:
The evidence for the applicant who was 70 years old at the time he
testified shows that he acquired the land from his father-in-law,
Dongail, when he married his daughter; that he was then 18 years
old; that at the time of his acquisition, it was planted with camote,
casava, langka, gabi, coffee and avocados; that he lived on the land
since his marriage up to the present; that he has been paying the
151

taxes during the Japanese occupation and even before it; that he was
never disturbed in his possession. Supporting his oral testimony,
applicant submitted tax declarations both dated March 20, 1948, the
former for a rural land and the latter for urban land and improvement
therein. The receipt showing payment of the taxes on such tax
declarations is dated Feb. 8, 1949. The said tax declarations show
that they cancel tax declaration No. 439 dated Feb. 10, 1947 which
was presented by the Oppositor Atok Big Wedge Mining Company
as its Exhibit 14, and the land tax under Exh. 14 was paid by
applicant in 1947. Applicant has also submitted Exh. `C, which
indicates that all pre-war records of tax declarations and real property
receipts of the municipality of Itogon where the property is located
were burned and destroyed during the last world war. The Atok Big
Wedge Mining Company came in also as oppositor claiming that the
land in question is within its mineral claims - Sally, Evelyn and Ethel
Atok Big Wedge Mining Company submitted Exhibits 6, 7 and 8, all
showing that the annual assessment work of these mineral claims
were maintained from 1932 to 1967 for Sally and Evelyn and from
1946 to 1967 for Ethel. It was likewise shown that these mineral
claims were recorded in the mining recorders office; Sally and Evelyn
on Jan. 2, 1931 and Ethel on March 18, 1921. Petitioners
presentation of evidence proving registration of the mining claims of
petitioner in the Mining Recorder of Benguet dating back to 1931, at
the latest, notably about sixteen (16) years before private respondent
declared the land in question for taxation purposes and thirty four (34)
years before private respondent filed the land registration
proceedings in 1965, apparently impressed the court a quo. And so it
ruled in favor of petitioner as oppositor in the land registration
proceedings, the court a quo ratiocinating in this wise:
The mining claims were recorded ahead of the time when the
applicant declared the land for taxation purposes based on his
documentary exhibits. So the evidence of the applicant cannot
prevail over the documentary exhibits of the oppositor Atok Big
Wedge Mining Company. The foregoing facts show that the mining
company had established its rights long before applicant asserted
ownership over the land. The perfection of mining claims over the
mineral lands involved, segregated them from the public domain and
the beneficial ownership thereof became vested in the locator.
The CA reversed the trial courts decision and ruled in favor of the
152

applicant, ruling that the applicant possessed the land in the concept
of an owner.
Issue:
Whether or not the ownership of subject land had long been vested
on petitioner after it had allegedly located and recorded its mining
claim in accordance with the pertinent provisions of the Philippine Bill
of 1902.
Ruling:
The records bear out that private respondent has been in possession
of subject parcel of land in concept of owner for more than thirty (30)
years. The court a quo made the following factual findings based on
the testimony of private respondent: The land applied for is almost
90% improved with numerous irrigated rice terraces newly planted to
palay at the time of the ocular inspection and others planted to
vegetables such as potatoes, banana plants, flowering plants and
fruit trees such as mangoes, jackfruits, coffee plants, avocados and
citrus - all fruit bearing.
We agree with respondent Court of Appeals that a reading of tsn.
would rather persuade that applicant had shown quite well that
subject property had been in continuous and adverse possession,
first, of his predecessor-in-interest, Dongail and, after the death of the
latter, himself, years before, that is, long before the outbreak of the
last war.
We also learn from our reading of our past and present mining laws in
their proper historical perspectives, that the process of recording
mining claims could not have been intended to be the operative act of
classifying lands into mineral lands. The recording of a mining claim
only operates to reserve to the registrant exclusive rights to
undertake mining activities upon the land subject of the claim. The
power to classify lands into mineral lands could not have been
intended under the Philippine Bill of 1902 to be vested in just anyone
who records a mining claim. In fact, this strengthens our holding that
the rights of a mining claimant are confined to possessing the land for
purposes of extracting therefrom minerals in exclusion of any or all
other persons whose claims are subsequent to the original mining
153

locator. Thus, if no minerals are extracted therefrom, notwithstanding

the recording of the claim, the land is not mineral land and
registration thereof is not precluded by such recorded claim. Equally
borne out by the records is the fact that petitioner has indeed applied
for a mining lease under P.D. No. 1214. For that reason, it has, in
effect, waived its right to secure a patent and it shall have been
governed, if private respondents claim of adverse and open
possession of the subject land for more than 30 years were not
established, by P.D. No. 463 in its activities respecting its mining
lease.

h. Watershed.
TAN V. DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY
154

G.R. No. L- 24548 October 27, 1983

Facts:
Sometime in April 1961, the Bureau of Forestry issued Notice No.
2087, advertising for public bidding a certain tract of public forest land
situated in Olongapo, Zambales. This public forest land, consisting of
6,420 hectares, is located within the former U.S. Naval Reservation
comprising 7,252 hectares of timberland, which was turned over by
the United States Government to the Philippine Government.
On May 5, 1961, petitioner-appellant Wenceslao Vinzons Tan
submitted his application in due form after paying the necessary fees
and posting tile required bond therefor. Nine other applicants
submitted their offers before the deadline.
Thereafter, questions arose as to the wisdom of having the area
declared as a forest reserve or allow the same to be awarded to the
most qualified bidder. On June 7, 1961, then President Carlos P.
Garcia issued a directive to the Director of the Bureau of Forestry that
the area formerly covered by the Naval Reservation be made a forest
reserve for watershed purposes for Olongapo, Zambales.
On August 3, 1961, Secretary Cesar M. Fortich of Agriculture and
Natural Resources sustained the findings and recommendations of
the Director of Forestry who concluded that it would be beneficial to
the public interest if the area is made available for exploitation under
certain conditions. To award the area, as planned, to a reputable and
responsible licensee who shall conduct logging operations therein
under the selective logging method and who shall be obliged to
employ a sufficient number of forest guards to patrol and protect the
forest consecration and watershed protection.
The Bureau of Forestry had already conducted a public bidding to
determine the most qualified bidder to whom the area advertised
should be awarded. Needless to stress, the decision of the Director of
Forestry to dispose of the area thusly was arrived at after much
thought and deliberation and after having been convinced that to do
so would not adversely affect the watershed in that sector.
Finally, of the ten persons who submitted proposed the area was
155

awarded to herein petitioner-appellant Wenceslao Vinzons Tan, on

April 15, 1963 by the Bureau of Forestry. Against this award, bidders
Ravago Commercial Company and Jorge Lao Happick filed motions
for reconsideration which were denied by the Director of Forestry on
December 6, 1963.
On May 30, 1963, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
Benjamin M. Gozon, who succeeded Secretary Cesar M. Fortich in
office, issued General Memorandum Order No. 46, series of 1963,
pertinent portions of which states that the Director of Forestry is
authorized to grant new ordinary timber licenses where the area
covered thereby is not more than 3,000 hectares each; and be the
extension of ordinary timber licenses for areas not exceeding 5,000
hectares each which takes effect immediately.
Thereafter, Jose Y. Feliciano was appointed as Acting secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, replacing Secretary Benjamin M.
Gozon. Upon assumption of office he immediately promulgate on
December 19, 1963 General Memorandum Order No. 60, revoking
the authority delegated to the Director of Forestry, under General
Memorandum order No. 46, to grant ordinary timber licenses, which
order took effect on the same day, December 19, 1963.
Ordinary Timber License No. 20-'64 (NEW) dated April 22, 1963, in
the name of Wenceslao Vinzons Tan, was signed by then Acting
Director of Forestry Estanislao R. Bernal without the approval of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. On January 6, 1964,
the license was released by the Office of the Director of Forestry. It
was not signed by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
as required by Order No. 60 aforequoted.
On February 12, 1964, Ravago Commercial Company wrote a letter
to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources shall be
considered by tile Natural Resources praying that, pending resolution
of the appeal filed by Ravago Commercial Company and Jorge Lao
Happick from the order of the Director of Forestry denying their
motion for reconsideration, OTI No. 20-'64 in the name of Wenceslao
V. Tan be cancelled or revoked on the ground that the grant thereof
was irregular, anomalous and contrary to existing forestry laws, rules
and regulations.
156

On March 9, 1964, acting on the said representation made by

Ravago Commercial Company, the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources promulgated an order declaring Ordinary Timber
License No. 20-'64 issued in the name of Wenceslao Vinzons Tan, as
having been issued by the Director of Forestry without authority, and
is therefore void ab initio.
Tan as the petitioner-appellant claims that the respondents-appellees
unlawfully, illegally whimsically, capriciously and arbitrarily acted
without or in excess of their jurisdiction, and/or with grave abuse of
discretion by revoking a valid and existing timber license without just
cause, by denying petitioner-appellant of the equal protection of the
laws, by depriving him of his constitutional right to property without
due process of law, and in effect, by impairing the obligation of
contracts.
Issue:
Whether the cancellation of the timber license of Tan void ab initio?
Ruling:
We fully concur with the findings of the trial court that petitionerappellant's timber license was signed and released without authority
by then Acting Director Estanislao R. Bernal of Forestry, and is
therefore void ab initio.
In the first place, in general memorandum order No. 46 dated May
30, 1963, the Director of Forestry was authorized to grant a new
ordinary timber license only where the area covered thereby was not
more than 3,000 hectares; the tract of public forest awarded to the
petitioner contained 6,420 hectares. The petitioner contends that only
1,756 hectares of the said area contain commercial and operable
forest; the authority given to the Director of Forestry to grant a new
ordinary timber license of not more than 3,000 hectares does not
state that the whole area should be commercial and operable forest.
It should be taken into consideration that the 1,756 hectares
containing commercial and operable forest must have been
distributed in the whole area of 6,420 hectares. Besides the license
states, attached sketch and technical description,' gives an area of
157

6,420 hectares and does not state what is the area covered of
commercial and operable.
In the second place, at the time it was released to the petitioner, the
Acting Director of Forestry had no more authority to grant any license.
The license was signed by the Acting Director of Forestry on
December 19, 1963, and released to the petitioner on January 6,
1964 .The authority delegated to the Director of Forestry to grant a
new ordinary timber license was contained in general memorandum
order No. 46 dated May 30, 1963. This was revoked by general
memorandum order No. 60, which was promulgated on December
19, 1963. In view thereof, the Director of Forestry had no longer any
authority to release the license on January 6, 1964, and said license
is therefore void ab initio .
The release of the license on January 6, 1964, gives rise to the
impression that it was ante-dated to December 19, 1963 on which
date the authority of the Director of Forestry was revoked. But, what
is of greatest importance is the date of the release or issuance, and
not the date of the signing of the license. While petitioner-appellant's
timber license might have been signed on December 19, 1963 it was
released only on January 6, 1964. Before its release, no right is
acquired by the licensee. As pointed out by the trial court, the Director
of Forestry had no longer any authority to release the license on
January 6, 1964. Therefore, petitioner-appellant had not acquired any
legal right under such void license.

i. Grazing Lands.
DIRECTOR OF LANDS V. RIVAS
G.R. No. L-61539 February 14, 1986
158

Facts:
On March 14, 1873 the Alcalde Mayor and judge of the Court of First
Instance in Tuguegarao, Cagayan purportedly granted to Domingo
Bunagan a possessory information title for a tract of land,called
Nottab, Gaceta de Manila dated November 3, 1885 mentions
Bunagan as having obtained a "composicion gratuita" for a parcel of
land in Enrile, Cagayan or a gratuitous adjustment title as
distinguished from an onerous adjustment title.

The conflicting evidence of the oppositor Cagayan Valley Agricultural

Corporation (Cavaco) and petitioner Pacifico Vijandre shows that two
persons, the brothers Luis Guzman Rivas and Lope Guzman Rivas,
sons of Pablo Guzman, played decisive roles in its disposition. The
evidence is conflicting because, according to Cavaco's evidence, the
whole land was sold to Luis Guzman Rivas and later to Cavaco,
whereas, according to Vijandre's evidence, only a portion was sold to
Luis and the remainder was sold to Lope Guzman Rivas who in turn
sold portions to Vijandre and Fernando A. Pascua.

Solicitor General's view is that the whole Nottab land, whatever its
area, is forestal and grazing land, and consequently, was inalienable
land and, therefore, all supposed sales regarding that land were void.

Lope Guzman Rivas and Vijandre filed in May, 1968 an application

for the registration of two parcels of land located at Sitio Nottab, the
same Nottab land previously applied for by Cavaco. It is covered by
Plan Psu-178846, embracing thirteen lots with an area of 1,033
hectares, and Plan Psu-179101 covering fifteen lots with an area of
890 hectares, or a total of 1,92.7 hectares.
Before the application was filed, Lope Guzman Rivas sold to his copetitioner Vijandre l/2 of the entire land at P50 a hectare. Vijandre
159

undertook to finance the registration of the land. Should the

registration of the land not materialize for causes not imputable to
Vijandre, then Lope would return to mall cash advances

The trial court declared the disputed land public land and dismissed
the applications of Lope Guzman Rivas and Vijandre and the claims
of Pascua and Cavaco.
The Appellate Court reversed the trial court's decision. It granted the
application of Lope and Vijandre, except with respect to Lot No. 13,
which was already covered by OCT No. 0-393. The Directors of
Lands and Forest Development appealed to this Court. Lope
Guzman Rivas and Vijandre did not file any appellees' brief.

The Solicitor General contends that the Appellate Court erred (1) in
not declaring that the disputed land is part of a forest reservation; (2)
in not finding that Lope Guzman Rivas and Vijandre and their
predecessors have not been in the open, continuous, uninterrupted,
exclusive and notorious possession of the disputed land and that their
possession was not in the concept of owner: (3) in not finding that
Domingo Bunagan's Spanish titles were not authentic and (4) in not
finding that the 1960 decision in favor of Cavaco is not res judicata.

On the other hand, lawyer Pascua argues (1) that the disputed land
was already private in the hands of Domingo Bunagans (2) that
portions of said land, 1,222 hectares and 9 hectares, were titled in the
names of Cavaco and Melardo Agapay (Benjamin V. Pascua)
respectively; (3) that the pasture lease agreements did not convert
private land into public land and (4) that Bunagan's Spanish titles
were authentic and valid.
Issue:
160

Whether or not the disputed land is non-registrable property.

Ruling:
The decision of the Appellate Court is reversed and set aside. The
application for registration of Lope Guzman Rivas and Pacifico V.
Vijandre and the counter-application of lawyer Fernando A. Pascua
are dismissed

The disputed land is inalienable public grazing land, being a part of

the forest reserve. It is part of Timberland Project No. 15-A of Enrile,
Cagayan. It is included in the Bureau of Forestry Map L. C. 2263,
comprising the Timberland of the Cagayan Land Classification,
containing an area of 8,249 hectares, situated in Enrile, Solana and
Amulong, Cagayan. It is non-registerable (Exh. 2-Rep.). It cannot be
appropriated by private persons. It is not disposable public
agricultural land.

Said land is a part of the to forest reserve under Presidential

Proclamation No. 159 dated February 13, 1967. It is intended
for "wood production watershed soil protection and other forest
uses" (Exh. 1-B and 7, Rep.; 63 OG 3364). The reservation was
made prior to the instant 1968 application for registration.
The application for the possessory information title was
approved "bajo la condicion de sin perjuicio determination derecho
que el Estado o otro tercero pudiera tener en referida finca rustica"

Grazing lands and timber lands are riot alienable under section 1,
Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution and sections 8, 10 and 11 of
Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution. Section 10 distinguishes strictly
agricultural lands (disposable) from grazing lands (inalienable).

161

Lands within the forest zone or timber reservation cannot be the

object of private ownership

j. Military Reservations.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES V. MARCOS
G.R. No. L-32941 July 31, 1973
Facts:
On November 12, 1966, the Carantes heirs, filed under Civil
Reservation Case No. 1 of the Court of First Instance of Baguio City a
petition for the re-opening of said proceeding to have them declared
owners, and for the registration in their favor of four lots with a total
area of 74,017 square meters. The subject lots are inside the Camp
John Hay Leave and Recreation Center. Then on December 14,
1966, respondent Judge issued an order requiring the publication and
posting of notices thereof. The Director of Lands duly opposed, as a
report of an investigator of his office was that the area sought to be
registered is inside Camp John Hay in Baguio City. This
notwithstanding, on November 9, 1968, the respondent Judge
rendered his decision in favour of the Carantes. The efforts exerted
by the Director of Lands and the City of Baguio to appeal said
decision did not prosper because respondent Judge because he
believes that "the proper party to appeal should be Camp John Hay.
It was not until August 22, 1969 that the Solicitor-General entered his
162

appearance in the case and filed a motion to annul the decision

based on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the court over the
subject matter of the proceedings as the land in question is part of a
duly established military reservation. Such motion was denied by
respondent Judge on December 8, 1969. It must be noted that the
location of the lot inside Camp John Hay is not a subject of dispute.
Apparently, the respondent Judge in refusing to set aside his decision
was impressed by the claim that the private respondents had been in
possession "since the Spanish regime," and thus came within the
protection of the words annotated on all survey plans of Camp John
Hay, to wit: "subject to prior and existing private rights."
Issue:
Is the land in dispute is part of the alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain?
Ruling:
Yes. Its historical background was next passed upon: "An earlier act,
enacted as far back as 1903, specifically governs the subject matter
of reservations. As provided therein: "All lands or buildings, or any
interests therein, within the Philippine Islands lying within the
boundaries of the areas now or hereafter set apart and declared to be
military reservations shall be forthwith brought under the operations
of the Land Registration Act, and such of said lands, buildings, and
interests therein as shall not be determined to be public lands shall
become registered land in accordance with the provisions of said
Land Registration Act, under the circumstances hereinafter stated."
The validity of this statute was sustained as against the allegation
that there was a violation of the due process clause, in a 1910
decision, Jose v. Commander of the Philippine Squadron." Finally, an
earlier case of decisive significance was referred to: "What is even
more conclusive as to the absence of any right on the part of the
private respondents to seek a re-opening under Republic Act No. 931
is our ruling in Government v. Court of First Instance of Pampanga, a
1926 decision. We there explicitly held: "The defendant's contention
that the respondent court, in a cadastral case, has jurisdiction to
order the registration portions of a legally established military
reservation cannot be sustained. The establishment of military
163

reservations is governed by Act No. 627 of the Philippine Commission

and Section 1 of that Act provides that "All lands or buildings, or any
interest therein, within the Philippine Islands lying within the
boundaries of the areas now or hereafter set apart and declared to be
military reservations shall be forthwith brought under the operations
of the Land Registration Act. ... ." ' "
This Court could conclude therefore that as contended by petitioner
Republic, respondent Judge in that case was devoid "of jurisdiction to
pass upon the claim of private respondents invoking the benefits of
Republic Act No. 931."

DIRECTOR OF LANDS vs. COURT OF APPEALS

179 SCRA 522

Facts:

Lot No. 1736 is a 233.6883-hectare agricultural land in Barrio Kapok,

Orion, Bataan, alleged to have been occupied since 1913 by the late
Vicente Rodriguez, who, during his lifetime filed Lease Application
No. 1206 but was rejected upon knowledge that the land was
classified as within the U.S. Military Reservation under Executive
Order of the President of the United States of America, embodied in
Proc. No. 10 of the Governor-General of the Philippines.
Upon Vicentes death, his sons, Victorino (the father of Arturo) and
Pablo possessed the property that was subsequently turned over to
Arturo. Thereafter, Arturo sold two-thirds (2/3) undivided portion of the
land to Guillermo Reyes and Francisco S. Alcantara.
The land in question was deemed reverted to the public domain as it
164

was excluded from the US-Philippine Military Bases Agreement.

Thirty-nine (39) persons filed their Opposition to the petition for
registration filed by Arturo and Guillermo contending that they have
been in actual, peaceful, adverse and continuous possession of
portions of Lot No. 1736 for more than thirty (30) years and have
introduced improvements thereon; that the applicants have never
been in possession of the property; and that Arturo could not have
inherited the land from his grandfather, because the children of
Vicente are still living.
The Director of Lands likewise filed his opposition alleging that the
applicants do not possess sufficient title to the land.
The lower court ruled in favor of the applicants ordering its
registration in their names.
The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision of the lower
court.
In a resolution, the Court of Appeals reversed its decision and ruled
that the prior decision of the cadastral court declaring the lot in
question as public land way back in 1930 does not bar the present
application for registration of title or confirmation of imperfect title
under Act 496 of the same parcel of land.

Issue:
Whether the applicants had registrable title over Lot 1736.
Ruling:

None. While the cadastral proceedings in 1927 cannot be considered

a bar to the registration proceedings instituted by private
respondents, the chronology of events clearly negates compliance by
165

private respondents with the 30-year possession requirement. The

intervening period commencing from the promulgation of Proc. No. 10
in 1925 declaring the land in question as part of the U.S. Military
Reservation until 1953 when the land was deemed reverted back to
the public domain disturbed private respondents, possession over the
land in question because during this interregnum, no amount of time
in whatever nature of possession could have ripen such possession
into private ownership, the land having been segregate as part of a
military reservation.
This circumstance considered, private respondents' claim of open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession over the land in
question should be counted only from 1953. Considering that the
application for registration was filed in 1965, the 30-year requirement
had not been met at the time the action for registration was filed that
would add up to only fourteen (14) years.
When Cadastral Case No. 15 was instituted in 1927 and terminated
in 1930, the land in question was still classified as within the U. S.
Military Reservation and was deemed reverted to the public domain
only in 1953. The decision in the aforesaid cadastral case does not
constitute res judicata upon a subsequent action for land registration
considering the futility of filing any claim then over the land in
question since the same would nevertheless have been denied
because during the pendency of the cadastral case, said land was
not alienable nor disposable and this was shown by the denial of the
lease application filed then by private respondents' predecessor-ininterest.

k. Nature of Reclaimed Lands.

CHAVEZ V. NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY
G.R. No. 164527 15 August 2007
166

Facts:
President Cory Aquino, on 1988, issued Memorandum Order No.
(MO) 161 directing the implementation of the Comprehensive and
Integrated Metropolitan Manila Waste Management Plan. Among the
agencies tasked for the implementation of such plan is respondent.
NHA was ordered to conduct feasibility studies and develop low-cost
housing projects at the dumpsite and absorb scavengers in NHA
resettlement/low-cost housing projects. Respondent then formulated
the Smokey Mountain Development Plan and Reclamation of the
Area Across R-10 and submitted it to the President for approval.
The Build-Operate-and-Transfer Law (BOT) being enacted, the role
of the private sector was recognized in national development. NHA
then entered into a joint venture agreement with R-II Builders Inc.
(RBI). Part of the profit of the developer RBI as provided for in the
JVA is to own 40 hectares of the reclaimed area.
Petitioner Chavez filed a petition against respondents raising
constitutional issues. He alleges that RBI cannot acquire the
reclaimed foreshore and submerged areas as these are inalienable
public lands beyond the commerce of man
Issue:
Whether RBI can validly acquire reclaimed foreshore and submerged
areas?
Ruling:
Yes. It may be argued that the grant of authority to sell public lands,
pursuant to PEA, does not convert alienable lands of public domain
into private or patrimonial lands. In a ruling involving PEA alienable
lands of public domain must be transferred to qualified private parties,
or to government entities not tasked to dispose of public lands, before
these lands can become private or patrimonial lands.
NHA is a government agency not tasked to dispose of public lands
under its charter. The NHA is an end-user agency authorized by law
167

to administer and dispose of reclaimed lands. The moment titles over

reclaimed lands based on the special patents are transferred to the
NHA by the Register of Deeds, they are automatically converted to
patrimonial properties of the State which can be sold to Filipino
citizens and private corporations, 60% of which are owned by
Filipinos.

i. CHAVEZ V. PEA
G.R. No. 133250

July 9, 2002

Facts:
168

On February 4, 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued

Presidential Decree No. 1084 creating Public Estates Authority
(PEA). PD No. 1084 tasked PEA "to reclaim land, including foreshore
and submerged areas," and "to develop, improve, acquire, x x x lease
and sell any and all kinds of lands." On the same date, then President
Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1085 transferring to PEA the
"lands reclaimed in the foreshore and offshore of the Manila
Bay" under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project
(MCCRRP).
On January 19, 1988, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued
Special Patent No. 3517, granting and transferring to PEA "the
parcels of land so reclaimed under the MCCRRP containing a total
area of 1,915,894 square meters." Subsequently, on April 9, 1988, the
Register of Deeds of the Municipality of Paraaque issued Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. 7309, 7311, and 7312, in the name of PEA,
covering the three reclaimed islands known as the "Freedom Islands"
located at the southern portion of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road,
Paraaque City.
On April 25, 1995, PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement
(JVA) with AMARI, a private corporation, to develop the Freedom
Islands. The JVA also required the reclamation of an additional 250
hectares of submerged areas surrounding these islands to complete
the configuration in the Master Development Plan of the Southern
Reclamation Project-MCCRRP. PEA and AMARI entered into the JVA
through negotiation without public bidding. On April 28, 1995, the
Board of Directors of PEA, in its Resolution No. 1245, confirmed the
JVA. On June 8, 1995, then President Fidel V. Ramos, through then
Executive Secretary Ruben Torres, approved the JVA.
The Senate Committee on Government Corporations and
Public Enterprises, and the Committee on Accountability of Public
Officers and Investigations, conducted a joint investigation. The
Senate Committees reported the results of their investigation in
Senate Committee Report No. 560 dated September 16,
1997. Among the conclusions of their report are: (1) the reclaimed
lands PEA seeks to transfer to AMARI under the JVA are lands of the
public domain which the government has not classified as alienable
lands and therefore PEA cannot alienate these lands; (2) the
certificates of title covering the Freedom Islands are thus void, and
(3) the JVA itself is illegal.
On December 5, 1997, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued
169

Presidential Administrative Order No. 365 creating a Legal Task

Force to conduct a study on the legality of the JVA in view of Senate
Committee Report No. 560. The Legal Task Force upheld the legality
of the JVA, contrary to the conclusions reached by the Senate
Committees.
The Philippine Daily Inquirer and Today published reports that there
were on-going renegotiations between PEA and AMARI under an
order issued by then President Fidel V. Ramos.
On April 27, 1998, petitioner Frank I. Chavez as a taxpayer, filed the
instant Petition for Mandamus with Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ
of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order. Petitioner
assails the sale to AMARI of lands of the public domain as a blatant
violation of Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting
the sale of alienable lands of the public domain to private
corporations.
Meanwhile, petitioner filed a Reiterative Motion for Issuance of a TRO
dated May 26, 1999, which the Court denied in a Resolution dated
June 22, 1999.
On March 30, 1999, PEA and AMARI signed the Amended Joint
Venture Agreement. On May 28, 1999, the Office of the President
under the administration of then President Joseph E. Estrada
approved the Amended JVA.
Due to the approval of the Amended JVA by the Office of the
President, petitioner now prays that on "constitutional and statutory
grounds the renegotiated contract be declared null and void."
Issue:
Whether the stipulations in the amended joint venture agreement for
the transfer to AMARI of certain lands, reclaimed and still to be
reclaimed, violate the 1987 constitution.

Ruling:
The Amended JVA covers not only the Freedom Islands, but also an
additional 592.15 hectares which are still submerged and forming part
of Manila Bay. There is no legislative or Presidential act classifying
170

these submerged areas as alienable or disposable lands of the public

domain open to disposition. These submerged areas are not covered
by any patent or certificate of title. There can be no dispute that these
submerged areas form part of the public domain, and in their present
state are inalienable and outside the commerce of man. Until
reclaimed from the sea, these submerged areas are, under the
Constitution, "waters x x x owned by the State," forming part of the
public domain and consequently inalienable. Only when actually
reclaimed from the sea can these submerged areas be classified as
public agricultural lands, which under the Constitution are the only
natural resources that the State may alienate. Once reclaimed and
transformed into public agricultural lands, the government may then
officially classify these lands as alienable or disposable lands open to
disposition. Thereafter, the government may declare these lands no
longer needed for public service. Only then can these reclaimed
lands be considered alienable or disposable lands of the public
domain and within the commerce of man.
The DENR decides whether areas under water, like foreshore or
submerged areas of Manila Bay, should be reclaimed or not.
Thus, the mere transfer by the National Government of lands of the
public domain to PEA does not make the lands alienable or
disposable lands of the public domain, much less patrimonial lands of
PEA.
Absent two official acts a classification that these lands are
alienable or disposable and open to disposition and a declaration that
these lands are not needed for public service, lands reclaimed by
PEA remain inalienable lands of the public domain.
Foreshore and submerged areas form part of the public domain and
are inalienable. Lands reclaimed from foreshore and submerged
areas also form part of the public domain and are also inalienable,
unless converted pursuant to law into alienable or disposable lands of
the public domain.
Thus, the 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain
inalienable natural resources of the public domain until classified as
alienable or disposable lands open to disposition and declared no
longer needed for public service. The government can make such
classification and declaration only after PEA has reclaimed these
submerged areas. Only then can these lands qualify as agricultural
171

lands of the public domain, which are the only natural resources the
government can alienate. In their present state, the 592.15 hectares
of submerged areas are inalienable and outside the commerce of
man.
Since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership
of 290.156 hectares of still submerged areas of Manila Bay, such
transfer is void for being contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution which prohibits the alienation of natural resources other
than agricultural lands of the public domain. PEA may reclaim these
submerged areas. Thereafter, the government can classify the
reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable, and further declare them
no longer needed for public service. Still, the transfer of such
reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain to AMARI will be void
in view of Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which
prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable
land of the public domain. Clearly, the Amended JVA violates glaringly
Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. Under Article
1409 of the Civil Code, contracts whose "object or purpose is
contrary to law," or whose "object is outside the commerce of men,"
are "inexistent and void from the beginning." The Court must perform
its duty to defend and uphold the Constitution, and therefore declares
the Amended JVA null and void ab initio.

l. Other Kinds of Reservations.

i. Medical center site
REPUBLIC V. CA
G.R. No. L-40912 September 30, 1976
172

Facts:
On January 22, 1921, Eugenio de Jesus, the father of respondent
Alejandro de Jesus, applied with the Bureau of Lands for Sales
Patent (Sales Application No. 5436) of a 33-hectare situated in barrio
Libaron, Municipality of Davao (now Davao City). The property
applied for was a portion of what was then known as Lot 522 of the
Davao Cadastre. On January 23, 1934, the Bureau of Lands, through
its Davao District Land Officer, accepted sealed bids for the purchase
of the subject land. One Irineo Jose bidded for P20.00 per hectare,
while a certain Dr. Josc Ebro submitted a bid of P100.50 per hectare
The Director of Lands, however, annulled the auction sale for the
reason that the sales applicant, Eugenio de Jesus, failed to
participate in the bidding for non-service of notice on him of the
scheduled bidding. In lieu of that sale, another bidding was held on
October 4, 1934. Sales applicant Eugenio de Jesus was the lone
bidder. He equalled the bid previously submitted by Dr. Jose Ebro
and made a deposit of P221.00 representing 10% of the price of the
land at P100.50 per hectare. Because the area conveyed had not
been actually surveyed at the time Eugenio de Jesus filed his Sales
Application, the Bureau of Lands conducted a survey under Plan Bsd1514. On July 29, 1936, the plan was approved and the land awarded
to Eugenio de Jesus was designated as Lot Nos. 1176-A, 1176-B-1-A
and 1176-B-1-B with an aggregate area of 20.6400 hectares, Bsd10153, City of Davao. On August 28, 1936, the Director of Lands
ordered an amendment of the Sales Application of Eugenio de Jesus
stating that "a portion of the land covered by Sales Application No.
5436 (E-3231) of Eugenio de Jesus is needed by the Philippine Army
for military camp site purposes, the said application is amended so as
to exclude therefrom portion "A" as shown in the sketch on the back
thereof, and as thus amended, it will continue to be given due
course." The area excluded was Identified as Lot 1176-B-2, the very
land in question, consisting of 12.8081 hectares.
On September 7, 1936, President Manuel L. Quezon issued
Proclaimation No. 85 withdrawing Lot No. 1176-B-2 from sale and
settlement and reserving the same for military purposes, under the
administration of the Chief of Staff, Philippine Army. On November
29, 1939, Eugenio de Jesus paid P660.45 covering the 8th and 10th
installment for 20.6400 hectares, the remaining area after his Sales
173

Application was amended. This payment did not include the military
camp site (Lot No. 1176-B-2) as the same had already been excluded
from the Sales Application at the time the payment was
made. Thereafter, or on May 15, 1948, then Director of Lands Jose
P. Dans ordered the issuance of patent to Eugenio de Jesus,
pursuant to his Sales Application for "a tract of land having an area of
20.6400 hectares, situated in the barrio of Poblacion, City of Davao.
On the same date, then Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources Mariano Garchitorena granted a Sales Patent to Eugenio
de Jesus for "a tract of agricultural public land situated in the City of
Davao, Island of Mindanao, Philippines, containing an area of 20
hectares, 64 ares, and 00 centares. On August 11, 1956, President
Ramon Magsaysay revoked Proclamation No. 85 and declared the
disputed Lot 1176-B-2 open to disposition under the provisions of the
Public land Act for resettlement of the squatters in the Piapi Beach,
Davao City. In the following October 9, President Magsaysay
revoked this Proclamation No. 328 and reserved the same Lot No.
1176-B-2 for medical center site purposes under the administration of
the Director of Hospital. Whereupon, on December 6, 1969, petitioner
Mindanao Medical Center applied for the Torrens registration of the
12.8081-hectare Lot 1176-B-2 with the Court of First Instance of
Davao. The Medical Center claimed "fee simple" title to the land on
the strength of proclamation No. 350 reserving the area for medical
center site purposes. Respondent Alejandro de Jesus, the son and
successor-in-interest of sale applicant Eugenio de Jesus, opposed
the registration oil the ground that his father, Eugenio de Jesus, had
aquired a vested right on the subject lot by virtue of the Order of
Award issued to him by the Director of Lands. A certain Arsenio
Suazo likewise filed his opposition to the registration on the claim that
the 2-hectare portion on the northeastern part of Lot 1176-B-2
belongs to him. After due hearing, the Court of First Instance of
Davao rendered judgment on September 2, 1966, directing "the
registration of the title to Lot No. 1176-B-2 of Subdivision Plan Bsd5134, shown on Plan Ap-6512, situated in the Barrio of Central, City
of Davao, and containing an area of 128,081 square meters in the
name of the Mindanao Medical Center, Bureau of Medical Services,
Department of Health. The two oppositors, Alejandro de Jesus and
Arsenio Suazo, excepted from this judgment of the trial court and
appealed the case to the respondent Court of Appeals. On July 5,
1974, petitioner Mindanao Medical Center moved for reconsideration,
174

maintaining ownership over the entire area of 12.8081 hectares, but

the Appellate Court in a Special Division of Five denied the motion on
June 17, 1975. Forthwith, petitioner Mindanao Medical Center
elevated the matter to Us thru the present appeal.
Issue:
Whether the appeal of the petitioner meritorious
Ruling:
We find petitioner's appeal to be meritorious.
Petitioner Mindanao Medical Center has registerable title over the
whole contested area of 12.8081 hectares, designated Lot No. 1176B-2, and not only on a portion thereof occupied by the Medical
Center, its nervous disease pavilion and their reasonable
appurtenances. Proclamation No. 350, dated October 9, 1956, of
President Magsaysay legally effected a land grant to the Mindanao
Medical Center, Bureau of Medical Services, Department of Health, of
the whole lot, validity sufficient for initial registration under the Land
Registration Act. Such land grant is constitutive of a "fee simple" tile
or absolute title in favor of petitioner Mindanao Medical Center. Thus,
Section 122 of the Act, which governs the registration of grants or
patents involving public lands, provides that "Whenever public lands
in the Philippine Islands belonging to the Government of the
Philippines are alienated, granted, or conveyed to persons or to
public or private corporations, the same shall be brought forthwith
under the operation of this Act [Land Registration Act, Act 496] and
shall become registered lands." It would be completely absurd to rule
that, on the basis of Proclamation No. 350, the Medical Center has
registerable title on the portion occupied by it, its nervous disease
pavilion and the reasonable appurtenances, and not on the full extent
of the reservation, when the proclamation explicitly reserved the
entire Lot 1176-B-2 of 12.8081 hectares to the Center. Certainly,
proclamation no. 350 is free of any legal infirmity. It proceeds from the
recognized competence of the president to reserve by executive
proclamation alienable lands of the public domain for a specific public
use or service. section 64 (e) of the Revised Administrative Code
empowers the president "(t)o reserve from sale oe other disposition
175

and for specific public uses for service, any land belonging to the
private domain of the Government of the Philippines, the use of which
is not otherwise directed by law. the land reserved "shall be used for
the specific purposes directed by such executive order until otherwise
provided by law." Similarly, Section 83 of the Public Land Act (CA
141) authorizes the President to "designate by proclamation any tract
or tracts of land of the public domain as reservations for the use ofthe
commonwealth of the Philippines or of any of its branches, or of the
inhabitants thereof, ... or for quasi-public uses or purposes when the
public interest requires it, including reservations for ... other
improvements for the public benefit. It is true that Proclamation No.
350 states that the same is subject to "privilege rights, if any there
be," but Eugenio de Jesus or his son Alejandro de Jesus failed to
prove any private rights over the property reserved. Wee-settled is
the rule that unless the applicant has shown by clear and convincing
evidence that a certain portion of the public domain was acquired by
him or his ancestors either by composition title from the Spanish
Government or by possessory information title, or any other means
for the acquisition of public lands, such as grants or patents, the
property must be held to be part of the public domain. Nor could
respondent Alejandro de Jesus legetimately claim to have obtained
title by prescription over the disputed 12.8081 hectares, inasmuch as
by applying for the sale thereof (assuming hypothetically that the
12.8081-hectare lot was included in the original sales application for
33 hectares), his father, Eugenio de Jesus, necessarily admits that
the portions applied for are part of the public domain, against which
no acquisitive prescription may lie 27 except as provided in Section
48(b) of C.A. 141, as amended.

ii. Baguio Townsite Reservation.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES V. MARCOS
G.R. No. L-26100 February 28, 1969
176

Facts:

Prior to Civil Reservation Case No. 1, a military reservation known as

the U.S. Fleet Naval Rehabilitation Center consisting of Lots 140 and
141 of the Baguio Cadastre was set aside pursuant to Executive
Order No. 1254 of October 10, 1910, issued by the then President
William Howard Taft of the United States. After independence, the
United States relinquished to the Republic of the Philippines all
claims to title over the military bases including the aforesaid lots, their
relinquishment being formalized by an agreement of December 6,
1956.

On May 21, 1965 the Pirasos, respondents herein, sought the

reopening of Civil Reservation Case No. 1, praying for the issuance in
their favor of title to a parcel of land designated as LRC-SWO-6132
(Lots 140 and 141, Baguio Cadastre). On September 11, 1965,
respondent Daisy Pacnos filed an opposition, alleging she has the
right to register it.
On October 7, 1967, Judge Marcos decided the case in favor of
respondent Daisy Pacnos.

The Solicitor General filed a motion to annul the decision dated

October 7, 1967, based on lack of jurisdiction.

The Pirasos claimed: "The land in question is not a military

reservation under the Republic of the Philippines although it was
formerly reserved and placed under the control of the Navy
Department for the use as Naval Hospital and for other purposes of
the Navy during the American regime (U.S. Government) pursuant to
Executive Order No. 5139, and was subsequently released or turned
177

over to the Republic of the Philippines in accordance with the

provisions of the U.S.-Philippine Military Bases Agreement on Dec. 6,
1956 but the same has not been reserved for military purposes by the
Republic of the Philippines."

Issue:
Whether the Baguio Courts can reopen judicial proceedings involving
Civil Case No. 1?

Ruling:
No, the Baguio Courts cannot reopen.

Republic Act No. 931 speaks in a manner far from ambiguous. It is

quite explicit and categorical. Only persons "claiming title to parcels
of land that have been the object of cadastral proceedings" are
granted the right to petition for a reopening thereof if the other
conditions named therein are successfully met. It cannot admit of
doubt, therefore, that if the parcels of land were not the object of
cadastral proceedings, then this statute finds no application.
Considering that as far back as October 10, 1910, the then President
of the United States, William H. Taft, issued an executive order
reserving for naval purposes the lots now disputed, they could not
have been the object of the cadastral proceeding involving the Baguio
townsite reservation, decided only on November 13, 1922.

The respondent Judge is devoid of jurisdiction to pass upon the claim

of private respondents invoking the benefits of Republic Act No. 931.
This lack of jurisdiction on the part of respondent Judge is made more
patent by another specific restriction of the right of a person to seek
reopening under this statute. For the power of the Court to order such
reopening is limited "to such of said parcels of land as have not been
178

alienated, reserved, leased, granted, or otherwise provisionally or

permanently disposed of by the Government ... ." Included in the
petition is an executive order of the then President Herbert Hoover of
June 19, 1929, declaring to be a naval reservation of the Government
of the United States "that tract of land known as lot no. 141,
residence Section D, Baguio naval reservation, heretofore reserved
for naval purposes ... ." If there were still any lingering doubt, that
ought to be removed by this reaffirmation of a presidential
determination, then binding and conclusive as we were under
American sovereignty, that the lot in question should be a naval
reservation.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES V. MARCOS

G.R. No. L-32941 July 31, 1973
Facts:
On November 12, 1966, the Carantes heirs, filed under Civil
Reservation Case No. 1 of the Court of First Instance of Baguio City a
petition for the re-opening of said proceeding to have them declared
owners, and for the registration in their favor of four lots with a total
area of 74,017 square meters. The subject lots are inside the Camp
John Hay Leave and Recreation Center. Then on December 14,
1966, respondent Judge issued an order requiring the publication and
posting of notices thereof. The Director of Lands duly opposed, as a
report of an investigator of his office was that the area sought to be
registered is inside Camp John Hay in Baguio City. This
notwithstanding, on November 9, 1968, the respondent Judge
rendered his decision in favour of the Carantes. The efforts exerted
by the Director of Lands and the City of Baguio to appeal said
decision did not prosper because respondent Judge because he
believes that "the proper party to appeal should be Camp John Hay.
It was not until August 22, 1969 that the Solicitor-General entered his
appearance in the case and filed a motion to annul the decision
based on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the court over the
subject matter of the proceedings as the land in question is part of a
179

duly established military reservation. Such motion was denied by

respondent Judge on December 8, 1969. It must be noted that the
location of the lot inside Camp John Hay is not a subject of dispute.
Apparently, the respondent Judge in refusing to set aside his decision
was impressed by the claim that the private respondents had been in
possession "since the Spanish regime," and thus came within the
protection of the words annotated on all survey plans of Camp John
Hay, to wit: "subject to prior and existing private rights."
Issue:
Is the land in dispute is part of the alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain?
Ruling:
Yes. Its historical background was next passed upon: "An earlier act,
enacted as far back as 1903, specifically governs the subject matter
of reservations. As provided therein: "All lands or buildings, or any
interests therein, within the Philippine Islands lying within the
boundaries of the areas now or hereafter set apart and declared to be
military reservations shall be forthwith brought under the operations
of the Land Registration Act, and such of said lands, buildings, and
interests therein as shall not be determined to be public lands shall
become registered land in accordance with the provisions of said
Land Registration Act, under the circumstances hereinafter stated."
The validity of this statute was sustained as against the allegation
that there was a violation of the due process clause, in a 1910
decision, Jose v. Commander of the Philippine Squadron." Finally, an
earlier case of decisive significance was referred to: "What is even
more conclusive as to the absence of any right on the part of the
private respondents to seek a re-opening under Republic Act No. 931
is our ruling in Government v. Court of First Instance of Pampanga, a
1926 decision. We there explicitly held: "The defendant's contention
that the respondent court, in a cadastral case, has jurisdiction to
order the registration portions of a legally established military
reservation cannot be sustained. The establishment of military
reservations is governed by Act No. 627 of the Philippine Commission
and Section 1 of that Act provides that "All lands or buildings, or any
180

interest therein, within the Philippine Islands lying within the

boundaries of the areas now or hereafter set apart and declared to be
military reservations shall be forthwith brought under the operations
of the Land Registration Act. ... ." ' "
This Court could conclude therefore that as contended by petitioner
Republic, respondent Judge in that case was devoid "of jurisdiction to
pass upon the claim of private respondents invoking the benefits of
Republic Act No. 931."

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES V. FAGONIL

G.R. No. L-57112 November 29, 1984

Facts:

In 1912, a petition was filed regarding the Baguio Townsite

Reservation (Case No.211).The purpose of the case was to
determine what portions of the Baguio Townsite Reservation were
private and registerable under Act No. 496. Once so determined, no
further registration proceeding would be allowed. In 1915, the court
required all persons claiming lots inside the reservation to file within
six months from the date of the notice petitions for the registration of
their titles under Act No. 496. In 1922, Judge C. M. Villareal held that
all lands within the Reservation are public lands with the exception of
(1) lands reserved for specified public uses and (2) lands claimed and
181

adjudicated as private property. He ruled that claims for private lands

by all persons not presented for registration within the period fixed
were barred forever. The 1922 decision established the rule that lots
of the Baguio Townsite Reservation, being public domain, are not
registerable under Act No. 496. As held by Judge Belmonte in a 1973
case, the Baguio Court of First Instance "has no Jurisdiction to
entertain any land registration proceedings" under Act No. 496 and
the Public Land Law, covering any lot within the Baguio Townsite
Reservation. After more than half a century from the 1922 decision
declaring the townsite public domain, or during the years 1972 to
1976, petitioners filed with the Court of First Instance of Baguio
applications for the registration of lots inside the Baguio Townsite
Reservation. They alleged that in case the lots are not registerable
under Act No. 496, then section 48 (b) and (c) of the Public Land Law
should be applied because they and their predecessors have been in
possession of the lots for more than thirty years.

The Director of Lands opposed the applications, on the grounds of

lack of jurisdiction, prescription and res judicata. The trial judge held
that section 48 cannot be invoked by the applicants because it
applies only to disposable agricultural lands situated outside the
reservation. He concedes that lands within the Baguio Townsite
Reservation may not be acquired by long possession for over thirty
years subsequent to Case No. 211. However, the judge refused to
dismiss the applications because presentation of satisfactory
evidence in a regular hearing as to the presence or absence of
complete service of notice is needed, in order to determine whether
res judicata applies.

Issue:

Whether applications for the registration of lands could prosper in the

absence of complete service of notice of the reservation received by
the respondents.
182

Ruling:

Sections 3 and 4 of Act No. 627, the law governing military

reservations, contemplate notification to two classes of persons,
namely, (1) those who are living upon or in visible possession of any
part of the military reservation and (2) persons who are not living
upon or in visible possession but are absentees. As to those who are
living upon or in visible possession of the lands, service is not
complete, and the six-month period does not begin to run until
the notice is served upon them personally. Their right relative to the
period within which they must respond are determined by the date of
the personal service. In the case at bar, the fact is that the notice in
Case No. 211 was issued on July 22, 1915. The clerk of court
certified that 134 persons living upon or in visible possession of any
part of the reservation were personally served with notice of the
reservation. Section 3 of Act No. 627 provides that the certificate of
the clerk of court is "conclusive proof of service". Contrary to the
opinion of Judge Fangonil, applications for the registration of lands
could not be made because such would reopen Case No. 211. It
would give way to baseless litigations intended to be foreclosed by
that 1912 case. The eight applicants do not base their applications
under Act No. 496 on any purchase or grant from the State or on
possession since time immemorial. That is why Act No. 496 cannot
apply to them. Moreover, they are not "Igorot claimants". The trial
court erred in requiring the presentation of evidence as to the notice
required under Act No. 627. Such evidence cannot be produced at
this time because the court record of Case No. 211 was completely
destroyed during the last war. The applicants have the burden of
proving that their predecessors were living upon or in visible
possession of the lands in 1915 and were not served any notice. The
Solicitor General is correct that after Case No. 211, it has always
been necessary to issue Presidential proclamations for the
disposition of portions of the Baguio Townsite Reservation. The
period of more than fifty years completely bars the applicants from
securing relief due to the alleged lack of personal notice to their
predecessors.
183

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES V. SANGALANG

G.R. No. L-58822 April 8, 1988
Facts:
The subject property was inherited by the private respondents Kiangs
from their father, known as old man Kiang (one name) who in turn
inherited the same from his parents Quebec and Cawane, who were
in continuous possession of the land since the Spanish times. Kiang
had it surveyed by the Bureau of Lands and filed an application for
registration. The Court of First Instance of Benquet, Mountain
Province, rendered a decision declaring as public lands all lands
within the limits of the Baguio Townsite Reservation, with the
exception of lands reserved for specific public purposes and those
claimed and adjudicated private property. Among those declared
public lands were the lands applied for by old man Kiang which was
dismissed by the court in said decision. After 31 years, the
respondent Kiangs filed with the Court of First Instance of Baguio
and Banquet an application for registration under Act No. 496, as
amended, of the parcels of land in question. The respondent court
presided over by Judge Pio R. Marcos rendered a decision
adjudicating the aforesaid parcels of land in favor of the respondents.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Solicitor
General, filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance of Baguio
and Banquet, docketed as Civil Case No. 3168, for the annulment of
the decision of Judge Pio R. Marcos.
Issue:
Whether or not the court which awarded title do not have jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the action.
Ruling:

184

The decision of land registration court in Civil Reservation Case No. 1

declared all lands comprised within the Baguio Townsite Reservation
as public lands, with the exception of lands "reserved for specific
public purposes and those claimed and adjudicated private property."
Outside of those lands specifically excepted from the effects of the
decision, all lands within the limits of the Baguio Townsite
Reservation were declared 'public lands' no longer registrable under
the Land Registration Act. It is clear, therefore, that the Court of First
Instance of Baguio and Banquet, presided over by Judge Pio R.
Marcos, had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of Land
Registration Case and to render a decision awarding title to the land
in question to the applicants Mariano Kiang et al. The decision of
Judge Marcos was null and void ab initio for want of jurisdiction over
the subject matter.

HEIRS OF DICMAN V. CARIO

G.R. No. 146459 June 8, 2006
Facts:
The subject land had been part of the land claim of Mateo Cario.
Within this site, a sawmill and other buildings had been constructed
by H.C. Heald in connection with his lumber business. On March 14,
1916, H.C. Heald sold the buildings to Sioco Cario, son of Mateo
Cario and grandfather of private respondent Jose Cario. Sioco
Cario then took possession of the buildings and the land on which
the buildings were situated. The petition originated from an action for
recovery of possession of the eastern half of a parcel of land situated
in Residence Section "J", Camp Seven, Baguio City. On October 22,
1928, Ting-el Dicman executed a public instrument entitled "Deed of
Conveyance of Part Rights and Interests in Agricultural Land" with
Sioco Cario. On January 10, 1938, Sioco Cario sold the subject
land to his son, Guzman Cario.
On May 23, 1955, Guzman Cario filed a Free Patent Application
over the land in question. The application was given due course, but
Guzman later withdrew it when he decided to file his opposition to the
petition later filed by the heirs of Ting-el Dicman. The petition sought
to establish ownership over Lot 76-A and Lot 76-B. Guzman Cario
opposed the petition insofar as he insisted ownership over Lot 76-B,
185

the land in controversy. The Estate of Sioco Cario likewise filed an

opposition.
On March 6, 1963, the trial court rendered a partial judgment and
confirmed that the title over Lot 76-A belonged to the heirs of Ting-el
Dicman, there having been no adverse claim. But as to Lot 76-B, the
trial court found it necessary to hold further hearing in order to decide
on the adverse claims of the parties.
Meanwhile, on January 8, 1960, while the foregoing petition was
pending in the trial court, President Carlos P. Garcia issued
Proclamation No. 628 excluding from the operation of the Baguio
Townsite Reservation certain parcels of public land known as Igorot
Claims situated in the City of Baguio and declaring the same open to
disposition under the provisions of Chapter VII of the Public Land
Act.
Issue:
Whether or not Proclamation No. 628 reserved the subject land from
Igorot claims?
Ruling:
Segregating and reserving certain Igorot claims and prohibiting
encumbrance or alienation therein for 15 years from the grant of the
patent is not applicable where vested interest are affected. The
executive issuance can only go as far as to classify public land, but it
cannot be construed as to prejudice vested rights. Proclamation No.
628 issued by then President Carlos P. Garcia on January 8, 1960
had the effect of segregating and reserving certain Igorot claims
identified therein, including one purportedly belonging to the Heirs of
Dicman, and prohibiting any encumbrance or alienation of these
claims for a period of 15 years from acquisition of patent. But by the
time the Proclamation had been issued, all rights over the property in
question had already been vested in private respondent. The
executive issuance can only go so far as to classify public land, but it
cannot be construed as to prejudice vested rights.
Proceedings for registration of land
A.Judicial Registration
a.Judicial Confirmation of Imperfect Title
i. Under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529,applicatns for registration
of title must sufficiently establish first, that the subject land
forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public
domain,second, that the applicant and his predecessors-ininterest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
186

possession and occupation of the same; and third, that it is

under bona fide claim of ownership since June 12,1945, or
earlier.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. REMMAN ENTERPRISES
G.R. NO. 199310
Facts:
Respondent Remman Ent. Inc. applied for a judicial confirmation of
title with the RTC of Taguig. Said application is comprised of two
parcels of land also located in Taguig. On Dec. 31, 2001, RTC found
that the application for registration was sufficient in form and
substance and scheduled an initial hearing which was published in
the Official Gazette, a newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines, and the notice was posted in conspicuous places in the
City Hall of Taguig.
May 30,2002, only Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA)
appeared as oppositor to the said application. LLDA avers that the
subject lands are not alienable and disposable. Likewise, the
Republic of the Philippines also opposed said registration since they
claim that the respondents failed to prove that they and their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious possession of the lands since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Each party presented their respective witnesses. Respondents also
presented documents supporting their claim over the subject parcel of
lands, it also included certifications by the DENR that the said lands
are alienable and disposable. On the other hand, LLDA pointed out
that under RA 4850 it states that lands surrounding the Laguna de
Bay, located at and below the reglamentary elevation of 12.50 meters
are public lands which form part of the bed of the said lake. The
engineer for LLDA testified that upon aerial survey of the subject
parcel of lands, it was found out that the elevations of the lots were
less thatn 12.50 m, which the engineer for the respondents rebutted.
The RTC ruled in favor of the respondents on May 2007. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the RTC Decision which
187

granted the application for registration filed by the respondent.

Ruling:
Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to
the State, which is the source of any asserted right to any ownership
of land. In the case at bar, the Supreme Court held that the
respondents failed to present incontrovertible evidence to establish
that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable
Furthermore, sect. 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 refers to the judicial
confirmation of imperfect to public land acquired under Sect. 48(b) of
C.A. No. 141, or the Public Land Act, as amended by P.D. No. 1073.
Under Sect. 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529, applicants for registration of title
must sufficiently establish: first, that the subject land forms part of the
disposable and alienable lands of the public domain; second, that the
applicant and his predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
the same; and third, that it is under a bona fide claim of ownership
since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
The respondents failed to satify the above mentioned requisites. They
have presented certification from a proper government agency but
failed to obtain an approval from the DENR Secretary that the land of
public domain is released as alienable and disposable. The original
approved document signed by the DENR Secretary must also be
presented, and should be attested by the legal custodian of the
official records. In addition, the second requisite was not also
satisfied, as the respondents only started paying taxes for the said
properties in 2002 which is contrary to their claim that their
predecessors-in-interest were already in possession of said lots in
1943.
Having failed to prove that the subject properties form part of the
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain and that it and its
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious possession and occupation of the same since June 12,
1945, or earlier, the respondent's application for registration was
denied.

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ii.Public Land Act: Two requisites for judicial confirmation of

title. The two requisites for judicial confirmation of imperfect or
incomplete title under CA No. 141, name;y: (1) open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the
subject land by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest
under bona fide claim of ownership since time immemorial or
from June 12, 1945; and (2) the classification of the land as
alienable and disposable land of the public domain.
NATIONAL COLLEGES OF FISHERIES (ANCF) VS HEIRS OF
MAXIMA LACHICA SIN
G.R. NO. 157485
Facts:
Respondent heirs instituted a complaint against the National
College of fisheries (ANCF) in Kalibo, aklan), for recovery of
possession, quieting of title, and declaration of ownership with
damages. Respondent heirs claim that a 41,231-square meter-portion
of the property they inherited had been usurped by ANCF, creating a
cloud of doubt with respect to their ownership over the parcel of land
they wish to remove from the ANCF reservation. the respondent
heirs presented evidence that they inherited a bigger parcel of
land from their mother, Maxima Sin, who died in the year 1945 in
New Washington, Capiz (now Aklan). Maxima Sin acquired said
bigger parcel of land by virtue of a Deed of Sale, and then
developed the same by planting coconut trees, banana plants,
mango trees and nipa palms and usufructing the produce of said land
until her death in 1945.
189

Respondent heirs of Maxima Sin asserted that they were previously

in possession of the disputed land in the concept of an owner. To
prove possession, respondents presented several tax declarations,
the earliest of which was in the year 1945.
The ANCF Superintendent countered that the parcel of land being
claimed by respondents was the subject of Proclamation No. 2074 of
then President Ferdinand E. Marcos allocating 24.0551 hectares of
land within the area, for educational purposes of ANCF and that the
subject parcel of land is timberland and therefore not susceptible of
private ownership.
On June 19, 2000, the MCTC rendered its Decision in favor of
respondents. The MCTC thus ruled that the claim of respondent heirs
over the disputed land by virtue of their and their predecessors open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession amounts to an
imperfect title, which should be respected and protected. The RTC
affirmed the MCTCs decision.
Issue:
Whether or not the heirs of Maxima Lachica Sin acquired private
rights by virtue of their possession to the disputed property so as to
entitle them for the judicial confirmation of imperfect title.
Ruling:
The private right referred to is an alleged imperfect title, which
respondents supposedly acquired by possession of the subject
property, through their predecessors-in-interest, for 30 years before it
was declared as a timberland on December 22, 1960.
This Court has thus held that there are two requisites for judicial
confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title under CA No. 141,
namely: (1) open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation of the subject land by himself or through his
predecessors-in-interest under a bona fide claim of ownership since
time immemorial or from June 12, 1945 ; and (2) the classification of
the land as alienable and disposable land of the public domain.
Accordingly, in the case at bar, the failure of petitioner Republic to
show competent evidence that the subject land was declared a
timberland before its formal classification as such in 1960 does
not lead to the presumption that said land was alienable and
disposable prior to said date.
On the contrary, the presumption is that unclassified lands are
inalienable public lands.
In the case at bar, it is therefore the respondents which have the
190

burden to identify a positive act of the government, such as an official

proclamation, declassifying inalienable public land into disposable
land for agricultural or other purposes. Since respondents failed to
do so, the alleged possession by them and by their predecessors-ininterest is inconsequential and could never ripen into ownership.
Accordingly, respondents cannot be considered to have private
rights within the purview of Proclamation No. 2074 as to prevent the
application of said proclamation to the subject property. We are thus
constrained to reverse the rulings of the courts a quo and grant the
prayer of petitioner Republic to dismiss Civil Case No. 1181 ( 4390)
for lack of merit.

iii.Land registration, confirmation and registration of imperfect

and incomplete title, open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession. The possession contemplated by section 48(b) of
CA no. 141 is actual, not fictional or constructive. In Carlos vs
Republic of the Philippines, the court explained the character of
the required possession as follows: the law speaks of
possession and occupation. Since these words are separated by
the conjunction and, the clear intention of the law is not make
one synonymous with the other. Possession is broader than
occupation because it includes constructive possession. When,
therefore, the law adds the word occupation, it seeks to delimit
the all-encompassing effect of constructive possession. Taken
together with the word open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious, the word occupation serves to highlight the fact that
for an applicant to qualify, his possession must not be a mere
fiction. Actual possession of land consists in the manifestation
of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a party would
naturally exercise over his own property. Proof of actual
191

possession of the property at the time of the filing of the

application is required because the phrase adverse, continuous,
open, public, and in concept of owner, the RCAM used to
describe its alleged possession is a conclusion of law not an
allegation of facts. Possession is open when it is patent, visible,
apparent and notorious xxx continuous when uninterrupted,
unbroken and not intermittent or occasional; exclusive when
exclusive dominion over the land and an appropriation of it to
own use and benefit and notorious when it is so conspicuous
that it is generally known and talked of by the public or people in
the neighborhood.

ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF MANILA VS CRESENCIA

STA. TERESA RAMOS
G.R. No. 179181
Facts:
At the core of the controversy in the present petition are two parcels
of land Lot 1 with an area of 34 square meters and Lot 2 with an
area of 760 square meters- covered by amended Plan PSU-223919
property), both located in what used to be Barrio Bagumbayan,
Taguig, Rizal. On September 15, 1966, the RCAM filed before the R
TC, (then Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch 11, acting as a land
registration court, an application for registration of title (application) of
property, pursuant to Commonwealth Act C.A.) No. 141 (the Public
Land Act). On October 4, 1974, the RCAM amended its application by
reducing Lot 2 to 760 square meters (from 1,832 square meters).
In its amended application, the RCAM claimed that it owned the
property; that it acquired the property during the Spanish time; and
that since then, it has been in open, public, continuous and peaceful
possession of it in the concept of an owner. It added that to the best
of its knowledge and belief, no mortgage or encumbrance of any kind
affects the property, and that no person has any claim, legal or
equitable, on the property.
On August 18, 1992, respondent Cresencia Sta. Teresa Ramos,
through her husband Ponciano Francisco, filed her opposition to the
RCAM's application. She alleged that the property formed part of the
entire property that her family owns and has continuously possessed
192

and occupied from the time of her grandparents, during the Spanish
time, up to the present. Cresencia submitted documents, among
others, to support her requested confirmation of imperfect title.
Issue:
Who -between the RCAM and Cresencia -is entitled to the benefits of
C.A. No. 141 and Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529 for
confirmation and registration of imperfect title.
Ruling:
Neither RCAM nor Cresencia is entitled to the benefitsof C.A. No. 141
and Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529 for confirmation and
registration of imperfect title,.
a. The RC M failed to prove possession of the property in the manner
and for the period required by law
The possession contemplated by Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141 is
actual, not fictional or constructive. In Carlos v Republic of the
Philippines, the Court explained the character of the required
possession, as follows:
The law speaks of possession and occupation. Since these words are
separated by the conjunction and, the clear intention of the law is not
to make one synonymous with the other. Possession is broader than
occupation because it includes constructive possession. When,
therefore, the law adds the word occupation, it seeks to delimit the
all-encompassing effect of constructive possession. Taken together
with the words open, continuous, exclusive and notorious, the word
occupation serves to highlight the fact that for an applicant to qualify,
his possession must not be a mere fiction. Actual possession of a
land consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a
nature as a party would naturally exercise over his own property.
Accordingly, to prove its compliance with Section 48(b)' s possession
requirement, the RCAM had to show that it performed specific overt
acts in the character an owner would naturally exercise over his own
property. Proof of actual possession of the property at the time of the
filing of the application is required because the phrase adverse,
continuous, open, public, and in concept of owner," the RCAM used
to describe its alleged possession, is a conclusion of law,not an
allegation of fact. Possession is open when it is patent, visible,
apparent [and] notorious x x x continuous when uninterrupted,
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unbroken and not intermittent or occasional; exclusive when [the

possession is characterized by acts manifesting] exclusive dominion
over the land and an appropriation of it to [the applicant's] own use
and benefit; and notorious when it is so conspicuous that it is
generally known and talked of by the public or the people in the
neighborhood."
Very noticeably, the RCAM failed to show or point to any specific act
characterizing its claimed possession in the manner described above.
The various documents that it submitted, as well as the bare
assertions it made and those of its witnesses, that it had been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the property,
hardly constitute the "well-nigh incontrovertible evidence required in
cases of this nature. We elaborate below on these points.
Under the same legal parameters we used to affirm the RTC's denial
of the RCAM' s application, we also find insufficient the evidence that
Cresencia presented to prove her claimed possession of the property
in the manner and for the period required by C.A. No. 141. Like the
RCAM, Cresencia was bound to adduce evidence that irrefutably
proves her compliance with the requirements for confirmation of title.
To our mind, she also failed to discharge this burden of proof; thus,
the CA erred when it affirmed the contrary findings of the RTC and
confirmed Cresencias title over the property.
At any rate, even if we were to consider these pieces of evidence to
be sufficient, which we do not, confirmation and registration of title
over the property in Cresencia' s name was still improper in the
absence of competent and persuasive evidence on record proving
that the property is alienable and disposable.

194

b. Ordinary Land Registration Proceeding

i. Who may apply?
A private corporation may nor hold alienable lands of the
public domain except by lease not to exceed 1,000
hectares. The rule does not apply where at the time of the
corporation acquired the land, the same was already
private land as when it was possessed by its predecessor
in the manner and for such length of time as to entitle the
letter to registration.
REPUBLIC VS IAC AND ACME
G.R. NO. 73002
Facts:
Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., a corp. represented by Mr.
Rodolfo Nazario, acquired from Mariano and Acer Infiel, members of
the Dumagat tribe 5 parcels of land.Possession of the Infiels over the
landdates back before the Philippines was discovered
by Magellan.Land sought to be registered is a private land pursuant
to RA 3872 granting absolute ownership to members of the nonChristian Tribes on land occupied by them or their ancestral lands,
whether with the alienable or disposable public land or within
the public domain.Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., has introduced
more than P45M worth of improvements.Ownership and possession
of the land sought to be registered was duly recognized by the
government when the Municipal Officials of Maconacon, Isabela.
Donated part of the land as the townsite of Maconacon Isabela
IAC affirmed CFI in favor of Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc
Issues:
1. Whether or not the land is already a private land.
2. Whether or not the constitutional prohibition against
their acquisition by private corporations or associations applies.
Ruling:
1. YES. Already acquired, by operation of law not only a right to a
grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that
a certificate of title should be issued in order that said grant may
be sanctioned by the courts, an application therefore is sufficient.
195

It had already ceased to be of the public domain and had

become private property, at least by presumption. The application
for confirmation is mere formality, the lack of which does not
affect the legal sufficiency of the title as would be evidenced by
the patent and the Torrens title to be issued upon the strength of
said patent. The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to
confer title, but simply to establish it, as already conferred by the
decree, if not by earlier law
2. NO. If it is accepted-as it must be-that the land was already
private
land to which the Infields had a legally sufficient and
transferable title On October 29, 1962 when Acme acquired it from
said owners, it must also be conceded that Acme had a perfect
right to make
such acquisition. The only limitation then extant was
that corporations could not acquire, hold or lease public agricultural
lands in excess of 1,024 hectares.

Private corporation as applicant

DIRECTOR OF LANDS VS MERALCO
G.R. No. L-57461
Facts:
Manila Electric Company filed an amended application for registration
of a parcel of land located in Taguig, Metro Manila on December 4,
1979. On August 17, 1976, applicant acquired the land applied for
registration by purchase from Ricardo Natividad who in turn acquired
the same from his father Gregorio Natividad as evidenced by a Deed
of Original Absolute Sale executed on December 28, 1970.
Applicant's predecessors-in-interest have possessed the property
under the concept of an owner for more than 30 years. The property
was declared for taxation purposes under the name of the applicant
196

and the taxes due thereon have been paid.

On May 29, 1981 respondent Judge rendered a decision ordering the
registration of the property in the name of the private respondent. The
Director of Lands interposed this petition raising the issue of whether
or not a corporation may apply for registration of title to land. After
comments were filed by the respondents, the Court gave the petition
due course. The legal issue raised by the petitioner Director of Lands
has been squarely dealt with in two recent cases (The Director of
Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court and Acme Plywood & Veneer
Co., Inc., etc., No. L-73002 (December 29, 1986), 146 SCRA 509.
Issue:
Whether or not the doctrine that open, exclusive and undisputed
possession of alienable public land for the period prescribed by law
creates the legal fiction whereby the land, upon completion of the
requisite period ipso jure and without the need of judicial or other
sanction, ceases to be public land and becomes private property.

Ruling:
In the case at bar, if the land was already private at the time Meralco
bought it from Natividad, then the prohibition in the 1973 Constitution
against corporations holding alienable lands of the public domain
except by lease (1973 Const., Art. XIV, See. 11) does not apply.
Petitioner, however, contends that a corporation is not among those
that may apply for confirmation of title under Section 48 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141, the Public Land Act.
As ruled in the Acme case, the fact that the confirmation proceedings
were instituted by a corporation is simply another accidental
circumstance, "productive of a defect hardly more than procedural
and in no wise affecting the substance and merits of the right of
ownership sought to be confirmed in said proceedings." Considering
that it is not disputed that the Natividads could have had their title
confirmed; only a rigid subservience to the letter of the law would
deny private respondent the right to register its property which was
validly acquired.
197

SUSI VS RAZON
G.R.NO. 24066
Facts:
This action was commenced in the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga by a complaint filed by Valentin Susi against Angela
Razon and the Director of Lands, praying for judgment: (a) Declaring
plaintiff the sole and absolute owner of the parcel of land described in
the second paragraph of the complaint; (b) annulling the sale made
by the Director of Lands in favor of Angela Razon, on the ground that
the land is a private property; (c) ordering the cancellation of the
certificate of title issued to said Angela Razon; and (d) sentencing the
latter to pay plaintiff the sum of P500 as damages, with the costs.For
his answer to the complaint, the Director of Lands denied each
allegation contained therein and, as special defense, alleged that the
land in question was a property of the Government of the United
States under the administration and control of the Philippine Islands
before its sale to Angela Razon, which was made in accordance with
law.After trial, the CFI of Pampanga rendered judgment declaring
Susi entitled to the possession of the land, annulling the sale made
by the Director of Lands in favor of Angela Razon, and ordering the
cancellation of the certificate of title issued to her, with the costs
against Angela Razon. From this judgment the Director of Lands took
this appeal, assigning thereto that :the holding that plaintiff is entitled
to recover the possession of said parcel of land; the annulment of the
sale made by the Director of Lands to Angela Razon; and the
ordering that the certificate of title issued by the register of deeds of
the Province of Pampanga to Angela Razon by virtue of said sale be
cancelled; and The evidence shows that on December 18, 1880,
Nemesio Pinlac sold the land in question, then a fish pond, tho
Apolonio Garcia and Basilio Mendoza for the sum of P12, reserving
the right to repurchase the same. September 5, 1899, sold it to
Valentin Susi for the sum of P12, reserving the right to repurchase it
(Exhibit A). Before the execution of the deed of sale, Valentin Susi
had already paid its price and sown "bacawan" on said land, availing
himself of the firewood gathered thereon, with the proceeds of the
sale of which he had paid the price of the property. The possession
and occupation of the land in question, first, by Apolonio Garcia and
Basilio Mendoza, and then by Valentin Susi has been open,
continuous, adverse and public, without any interruption, except
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during the revolution, or disturbance, except when Angela Razon, on

September 13, 1913, commenced an action in the CFI of Pampanga
to recover the possession of said land, after considering the evidence
introduced at the trial, the court rendered judgment in favor of
Valentin Susi and against Angela Razon, dismissing the complaint.
Having failed in her attempt to obtain possession of the land in
question through the court, Angela Razon applied to the Director of
Lands for the purchase thereof on August 15, 1914. Having learned
of said application, Valentin Susi filed and opposition thereto on
December 6, 1915, asserting his possession of the land for twentyfive years. After making the proper administrative investigation, the
Director of Lands overruled the opposition of Valentin Susi and sold
the land to Angela Razon. On August 31, 1921, the register of deeds
issued the proper certificate of title to Angela Razon. Armed with said
document, Angela Razon required Valentin Susi to vacate the land in
question, and as he refused to do so, she brought and action for
forcible entry and detainer in the justice of the peace court of
Guagua, Pampanga, which was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, the
case being one of title to real property. Valentin Susi then brought this
action.
Issue:
Whether or not the land in question being of the public domain, the
plaintiff-appellee cannot maintain an action to recover possession.
Ruling:
It clearly appears from the evidence that Valentin Susi has been in
possession of the land in question openly, continuously, adversely,
and publicly, personally and through his predecessors, since the year
1880, that is, for about forty-five years. While the judgment of the
Court of First Instance of Pampanga against Angela Razon in the
forcible entry case does not affect the Director of Lands, yet it is
controlling as to Angela Razon and rebuts her claim that she had
been in possession thereof. When on August 15, 1914, Angela Razon
applied for the purchase of said land, Valentin Susi had already been
in possession thereof personally and through his predecessors for
thirty-four years. And if it is taken into account that Nemesio Pinlac
had already made said land a fish pond when he sold it on December
18, 1880, it can hardly be estimated when he began to possess and
199

occupy it, the period of time being so long that it is beyond the reach
of memory. Valentin Susi had acquired the land in question by a grant
of the State, it had already ceased to be the public domain and had
become private property, at least by presumption, of Valentin Susi,
beyond the control of the Director of Lands. Consequently, in selling
the land in question to Angela Razon, the Director of Lands disposed
of a land over which he had no longer any title or control, and the sale
thus made was void and of no effect, and Angela Razon did not
thereby acquire any right.

REPUBLIC VS IGLESIA NI CRISTO

G.R. NO. 180067
Facts:
On November 19, 1998, Iglesia Ni Cristo (INC), represented by Erao
G. Manalo, as corporate sole, filed its Application for Registration of
Title before the MCTC in Paoay-Currimao. Subject Lot No. 3946 of
the Currimao Cadastre was surveyed and consisted of 4,201 square
meters.
Appended to the application were the sepia or tracing cloth and
technical description of subject lot, the Geodetic Engineers
Certificate, Tax Declaration, and the September 7, 1970 Deed of Sale
executed by Bernardo Bandaguio in favor of INC.
The Republic, through the OSG appeared and filed an Opposition to
INCs application.
In February 23, 1952, Sabuco sold a small portion of the bigger lot to
INC which built a chapel on the lot. Saturnino Sacayanan, who was
born in 1941 and became a member of INC in 1948, testified to the
sale by Sabuco and the erection of the small chapel by INC
in1952. Subsequently, Sabuco sold the bigger lot to Bernardo
200

Badanguio less the small portion where the INC chapel was built.
Badanguio in 1954 then declared the entire bigger lot he purchased
from Sabuco for tax purposes and was issued TD 006114.In 1959,
Badanguio also sold a small portion of the bigger lot to INC for which
a Deed of Absolute Sale was executed on January 8, 1959.
The cadastral court held that based on documentary and testimonial
evidence, the essential requisites for judicial confirmation of an
imperfect title over the subject lot have been complied with. The
MCTC found and appreciated the continuous possession by INC of
the subject lot for over 40 years after its acquisition of the lot. It noted
that Badanguio and Sabuco, the predecessors-in-interest of INC,
were never disturbed in their possession of the portions they sold to
INC constituting the subject lot.
CA affirmed the lower court decision.
Issue:
May a judicial confirmation of imperfect title prosper when the subject
property has been declared as alienable only after June 12, 1945.
Ruling:
It is well-settled that no public land can be acquired by private
persons without any grant, express or implied, from the government,
and it is indispensable that the persons claiming title to a public land
should show that their title was acquired from the State or any other
mode of acquisition recognized by law. In the instant case, it is
undisputed that the subject lot has already been declared alienable
and disposable by the government on May 16, 1993 or a little over
five years before the application for registration was filed by INC.
The period of possession required under Sec. 14(1) of PD 1527 is not
reckoned from the time of the declaration of the property as alienable
and disposable.
The possession of INC has been established not only from 1952 and
1959 when it purchased the respective halves of the subject lot, but is
201

also tacked on to the possession of its predecessors-in-interest,

Badanguio and Sabuco, the latter possessing the subject lot way
before June 12, 1945, as he inherited the bigger lot, of which the
subject lot is a portion, from his parents. These possessions and
occupationfrom Sabuco, including those of his parents, to INC; and
from Sabuco to Badanguio to INChad been in the concept of
owners: open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation under a bona fide claim of acquisition of property. These
had not been disturbed as attested to by respondents witnesses.

ii. When land sold under pacto de retro

iii. Land grants affected through presidential proclamation
REPUBLIC VS CA
73 SCRA 146
Facts:
On June 22, 1957, RA 1899 was approved granting authority to all
municipalities and chartered cities to undertake and carry out at their
own expense the reclamation by dredging, filling, or other means, of
any foreshore lands bordering them, and to establish, provide,
construct, maintain and repair proper and adequate docking and
harbor facilities as such municipalities and chartered cities may
determine in consultation with the Secretary of Finance and the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications.
Pursuant to the said law, Ordinance No. 121 was passed by the city
of Pasay for the reclamation of foreshore lands within their jurisdiction
and entered into an agreement with Republic Real Estate Corporation
for the said project.
Republic questioned the agreement. It contended, among others, that
the agreement between RREC and the City of Pasay was void for the
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object of the contract is outside the commerce of man, it being a

foreshore land.
Pasay City and RREC countered that the object in question is within
the commerce of man because RA 1899 gives a broader meaning on
the term foreshore land than that in the definition provided by the
dictionary.
RTC rendered judgment in favor of Pasay City and RREC, and the
decision was affirmed by the CA with modifications.
Issue:
Whether or not the term foreshore land includes the submerged
area and whether or not foreshore land and the reclaimed area is
within the commerce of man.

Ruling:
The Court ruled that it is erroneous and unsustainable to uphold the
opinion of the respondent court that the term foreshore land
includes the submerged areas. To repeat, the term "foreshore lands"
refers to:
The strip of land that lies between the high and low water marks and
that is alternately wet and dry according to the flow of the tide. A strip
of land margining a body of water (as a lake or stream); the part of a
seashore between the low-water line usually at the seaward margin
of a low-tide terrace and the upper limit of wave wash at high tide
usually marked by a beach scarp or berm. The duty of the court is to
interpret the enabling Act, RA 1899. In so doing, we cannot broaden
its meaning; much less widen the coverage thereof. If the intention of
Congress were to include submerged areas, it should have provided
expressly. That Congress did not so provide could only signify the
exclusion of submerged areas from the term foreshore lands. It bears
stressing that the subject matter of Pasay City Ordinance No. 121, as
amended by Ordinance No. 158, and the Agreement under attack,
have been found to be outside the intendment and scope of RA 1899,
and therefore ultra vires and null and void.
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iv. A public land sales applicant cannot be a proper party to file

original registration of the same land covered by his sales
application.
PALAWAN AGRICULTURAL AND INDUCTRIAL COMPANY VS
DIRECTOR OF LANDS
G.R. No. L-25914
Facts:
On April of 1920, the Palawan Agricultural and Industrial Company,
Inc. (Palawan Company) Filed a sales application over a parcel of
public land located in Aborlan, Palawan which was given due course
by the Bureau of Lands. On December of 1930, the Palawan
Company requested the director of Land to reduce the area applied
for because the portion it originally applied for were squatted and
claimed by others. Subsequently, it issued a letter advising Palawan
Company to recommend to the Sec. Of Agriculture and Commerce an
appraisal of P18.00/ha.
After 4 years, the Director of Lands issued a notice of auction setting
the date of bidding for Feb. 27, 1935 at Puerto Princesa, however, it
did not take place as the applicant requested for postponement.
Subsequently, the applicant prayed that its Sales Application be not
cancelled, in view of the Director of lands that it be cancelled for lack
of interest of the said company.
Momentarily, it was again set to be sold at a public bidding but was
again postponed because the company asked for reappraisal of the
value given by the Director of lands. Since the time, the applicant
took possession of the land and improved portion thereof, planting
coconuts and other crops. Thus, he asked this court that the land be
declared in favour of him as he was in an open, continous, exclusive
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and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands under

a bonafide claim of acquisition of ownership.
Issue:
Whether or not a sales applicant can file a registration of the same
land covered by his sales application.
Ruling:
No.The appellants possession of the land in question was merely
that of a sales applicant thereof, to whom it had not been awarded
because of its refusal to pay the price fixed therefore by the Bureau of
Lands. As such sales applicant, appellant manifestly acknowledged
that he does not own the land and that the same is a public land
under the administration of the Bureau of Lands, to which the
application was submitted. The trial court was, therefore, justified in
concluding that applicant possession was not that of an owner, as
required by law.
Again, as the trial court had aptly observed:In the mind of the Court,
the possession and occupation by the applicant company of the land
sought to be registered, is not the possession and occupation
contemplated by the present law on this matter (Subsection [b],
Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 as amended by Republic
Act No. 1942). If this were the case, there will be many instances
where the government will be defrauded. If confirmation or
registration of title can be done, as it is being done now by the
applicant company, a possessor and occupant of a public agricultural
land under the administration of the Bureau of Lands who has applied
for the purchase of the same will just sit on his right, making the
application pending for more than 30 years while he possesses and
occupies the land, declare the same for taxation purposes, pay the
corresponding taxes religiously and consistently, and then after a
lapse of 30 years, will abandon his sales application and convert it to
an application for judicial confirmation or registration of title. Such
situation is not the one contemplated by our legislators when they
passed Republic Act No. 1942, for had it been their intention, our
legislators would have been a party to an act of defrauding our
government ... .

205

Exception: Successor who acquired by prescription a land

previously subject to free patent application of his predecessorin-interest may file registration.
DIRECTOR OF LAND MANAGEMENT VS CA
205 SCRA 486
Facts:
Teodoro Abistado filed a petition for original registration of his title
over 648 square meters of land under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
1529. The land registration court in its decision dated June 13, 1989
dismissed the petition for want of jurisdiction, in compliance with the
mandatory provision requiring publication of the notice of initial
hearing in a newspaper of general circulation. The case was elevated
to respondent Court of Appeals which, set aside the decision of the
trial court and ordered the registration of the title in the name of
Teodoro Abistado. The Court of Appeals ruled that it was merely
procedural and that the failure to cause such publication did not
deprive the trial court of its authority to grant the application. The
Director of Lands represented by the Solicitor General thus elevated
this recourse to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the Director of Lands is correct that newspaper
publication of the notice of initial hearing in an original land
registration case is mandatory.
Ruling:
YES. Petition was granted.The pertinent part of Section 23 of
Presidential Decree No. 1529 requires publication of the notice of
initial hearing. It should be noted further that land registration is a
proceeding in rem. Being in rem, such proceeding requires
constructive seizure of the land as against all persons, including the
state, who have rights to or interests in the property. An in
rem proceeding is validated essentially through publication. This
being so, the process must strictly be complied with.
The Supreme Court has no authority to dispense with such
mandatory requirement. The law is unambiguous and its rationale
clear. Time and again, this Court has declared that where the law
speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no room for
interpretation, vacillation or equivocation; there is room only for
application. There is no alternative. Thus, the application for land
registration filed by private respondents must be dismissed without
prejudice to reapplication in the future, after all the legal requisites
206

shall have been duly complied with.

v. A mortgagee or his successor in interest cannot be proper

applicants as failure to redeem by the mortgagor does not
automatically vest ownership over the land.
REYES VS SIERRA
G.R. No. L-28658
Facts:
Vicente Reyes filed on January 3, 1961 an application for registration
of his title to a parcel of land situated in Antipolo, Rizal covered by
Plan Psu-189753 of the Bureau of Lands which he acquired by
inheritance from his father. An opposition was filed by the Director of
Lands, Francisco Sierra and Emilio Sierra together with Alejandra,
Felimon, Aurelio, Apolonio, Constancio, Cirilo, all surnamed Sierra
and Antonia Santos. The trial court declares Vicente Reyes the true
and rightful owner of the land and orders the registration of his title,
provided that the title to be issued shall be subject to a public
easement of right of-way over a 2.00 meter-wide strip of the land
along Lucay Street for the latter's widening and improvement.
Oppositors appealed contending that the land applied for was
originally owned by Basilia Beltran's parents, and upon their death in
1894, Basilia inherited the property. On April 19, 1926, Basilia
Beltran, a widow, borrowed from applicant's father, Vicente Reyes, Sr.
the amount of P100.00 and secured the loan with the piece of land in
question. Applicant, in seeking the registration of the land, relied on
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his belief that the property belongs to his father who bought the same
from Basilia Beltran. Oppositors contended that the words "isinangla,"
"na ipananagutan sa inutang na halagang isang daang piso," "Kahit
isangla o ipagbili," etc., manifest that the document should be treated
as a mortgage, antichresis, or pactum commission and not as an
absolute sale or pacto de retro sale.
Issue:
Whether the land was mortgaged or a subject to conditional sale
Ruling:
The Suprem Court held that the applicant's predecessor-in-interest is
a mere mortgagee, and ownership of the thing mortgaged is retained
by Basilia Beltran, the mortgagor. The mortgagee, however, may
recover the loan, although the mortgage document evidencing the
loan was non-registrable being a purely private instrument. Failure of
mortgagor to redeem the property does not automatically vest
ownership of the property to the mortgagee, which would grant the
latter the right to appropriate the thing mortgaged or dispose of it. The
act of applicant in registering the property in his own name upon
mortgagor's failure to redeem the property would amount to a pactum
commissorium which is against good morals and public policy.
Meanwhile, oppositors-appellants are directed to pay the applicantappellee within ninety (90) days from the finality of decision, the debt
in the amount of P100.00 plus interest at the rate of six per cent (6%)
per annum from April 19, 1926 until paid.

vi. An antichretic creditor cannot acquire by prescription the

208

land surrendered to him by the debtor.

RAMIREZ VS C.A.
144 SCRA 292
Facts:
On September 15,1959, petitioners-spouses Hilario Ramirez and
Valentina Bonifacio filed an application for registration of a parcel of
Riceland in Pamplona, Las Pinas Rizal. The petitioners presented
parol evidence that they acquired the land in question by purchase
from Gregorio Pascual during the early part of the American regime
but the corresponding contract of sale was lost and no copy or record
of the same was available. Thereafter, the court ordered the issuance
of OCT No. 2273 in the petitioners names. On March 30, 1960, the
private respondents filed a petition to review the decree of registration
on the ground of fraud. They alleged, among others, that in 1938
respondents obtained a loan of P400.00 from the petitioners which
they secured with a mortgage on the land in question by way of
antichresis and that for this reason, Tax Declaration No. 8777 was
cancelled and substituted by Tax Declaration Nos. 9522 and 2385
issued in the names of the petitioners. In their answer, the spouses
Ramirez denied the material allegations of the petition, they based
their claim to the land on two deeds of sale allegedly executed on
April 15, 1937 and April 23, 1937 which they allegedly found
accidentally in March 1960. After trial, the court found that the deeds
of sale were spurious, and that the respondents took possession of
the land as owners after the death of Agapita Bonifacio and in 1938,
mortgaged it to the spouses Ramirez to secure the payment of a loan
in the amount of P400.00. It was agreed that the respondents could
not redeem the property within a period of five years and that the
petitioners would take possession of the land, enjoy its fruits, and pay
the land taxes thereon. Finding the claims of the herein respondents
sustained by the evidence, it ordered the cancellation of Original
Certificate of Title No. 2273 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal in the
names of herein petitioners and the issuance in lieu thereof of
another original certificate of title in the names of herein respondents.
Issue:
Whether or not an antichretic creditor can acquire by prescription the
land surrendered to him by the debtor.
Ruling:
NO. The Court ruled that the issue was submitted to the appellate
209

court and was correctly resolved therein. The Court of Appeals

stated:...The petition alleged that 'the applicants Hilario Ramirez and
Valentina Bonifacio willfully and fraudulently suppressed the facts that
the petitioners are the legal and rightful owners of the rice field in
question and that they possess the said rice field merely as
antichretic creditors as security for the loan of P400.00; that the
applicants are guilty of fraudulent misrepresentation and concealment
when they declared in their application, in the case at bar, that no
other person had any claim or interest in the said land.' These we
believe are sufficient allegations of extrinsic fraud.
In the applicant's application for registration, which followed the form
required by the Land Registration Act, the applicants alleged that 'to
the best of our knowledge and belief, there is no mortgage or
incumbrance of any kind whatsoever affecting said land, nor any
other person having any estate or interest therein, legal or equitable,
in possession, remainder, reversion or expectancy.' This allegation is
false and made in bad faith, for, as We have found, the applicants are
not the owners of the land sought to be registered and they are in
possession thereof only as antichretic creditors.

vii. Applicants who were previously denied claims of ownership

in reivindicatory actions cannot file for registration of same land
involved.
KIDPALOS VS BAGUIO MINING
14 SCRA 913
Facts:
The fact is uncontroverted that on August 31, 1954, Maglia Cayapa,
Nabos Valenciano, Waldo Kidpalos, Fernandez Kidpalos, and Ipang
Lebos Vda. de Lampacan sued the Baguio Gold Mining Company
and the Director of Mines in the Court of First Instance of Baguio City
(Civil Cases Nos. 457, 458, 460, 463 and 549), seeking judgment
declaring said plaintiffs to be the owners of certain parcels of land
situated in sitio Binanga Barrio of Tuding, Municipality of Itogon,
Benguet, Mountain Province; to annul the declarations of location of
certain mineral claims of the Baguio Gold Mining Company,
overlapping the parcels claimed by plaintiffs; and to recover damages
from the Company. The complaint also sought to enjoin the Director
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of Mines from proceeding with the lode patent applications of The

Mining Company, and to have the mine buildings erected on the land
in question demolished at the latter's expense. The defendant Baguio
Gold Mining Company, claiming title by virtue of valid locations of the
claims since 1925 to 1930, asked for dismissal of the action and
damages.
After due trial, the Court of First Instance found that the plaintiffs
Cayapa, et al., had failed to substantiate their claims of ownership
and dismissed the suits. Upon appeal to the Court of Appeals (CAG.R. No. 19628-R to 19632-R), the latter rendered judgment, on July
31, 1958, finding that the land lay within the Cordillera Forest
Reservation proclaimed by Governor General Stimson, and that it
formed part of the Public domain.
While the cases were still pending appeal before the Court of
Appeals, plaintiffs had filed in Court the present registration cases.
Baguio Gold opposed the registration, and moved to dismiss the
applications.
The 1960 Supreme Court resolution in L-16649-53 having become
final, the oppositor Baguio Gold Mining Company reiterated its
motions to dismiss the registration cases in the Court of First
Instance. The latter dismissed the applications, and the applicants
then directly appealed to this Supreme Court. It thus appears that
appellants do not dispute that the subject matter in the present
registration proceedings is the same land involved in the previous
litigation, or that the parties are the same. Neither is it disputable that
the causes of action in both cases are identical, since in both the
appellants asserted that they are the sole and exclusive owners of
the land in dispute, allegedly invaded by appellee Baguio Gold Mining
Company. While the former cases were reivindicatory in character
and the ones presently before us are land registration proceedings,
such difference in forms of action are irrelevant for the purposes of
res judicata.
Issue:
Whether or not once previously threshed out and finally adjudicated
should no longer be relitigated between the same parties on the
same subject matter and cause of action.
Ruling:
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The appealed order of dismissal of these proceedings on the ground

of res judicata is affirmed.
The substance of res judicata, without which multiplicity of actions will
be unavoidable. Hence the doctrine is that Under this rule, if the
record of the former trial shows that the judgment could not have
been rendered without deciding the particular matter, it will be
considered as having settled that matter as to all future actions
between the parties, and if a judgment necessarily presupposes
certain premises, they are as conclusive as the judgment itself. Or, as
stated in Redden vs. Metzger, 26 Am. St. Rep. 97, 99-100:
... . The rule of res adjudicata applies as well to facts settled and
adjudicated as to causes of action: Whitaker v. Hawley, 30 Kan. 326.
The judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction is compulsive on
the parties as to all points directly involved in it and necessarily
determined. When a fact has been once determined in the course of
a judicial proceeding, and a final judgment has been rendered in
accordance therewith, it cannot be again litigated between the same
parties without virtually impeaching the correctness of the former
decision, which, from motives of public policy, the law does not permit
to be done The estoppel is not confined to the judgment, but extend
to all facts involved in it as necessary steps, or the groundwork upon
which it must have been founded. It is allowable to reason back from
a judgment to the basis on which it stands, upon the obvious principle
that where a conclusion is indisputable, and could have been drawn
only from certain premises, the premises are equally indisputable with
the conclusion.

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viii. Only the Government through the Solicitor General, has the
personality to file a case challenging the capacity of a person to
acquire or to own land based on non-citizenship.
BALAIS-MABANAG VS REGISTER OF DEEDS OF QUEZON CITY
G.R. NO. 153142
Facts:
On January 19, 1985, Romulo A. Coronel and other Coronels
executed a document entitled receipt of down payment, stipulating
that they received from respondent Ramona through her mother,
respondent Concepcion D. Alcaraz, the sum of P50,000.00 as down
payment on the total purchase price of P1,240,000.00 for their
inherited house and lot, covered by TCT No. 119627 of the Registry
of Deeds of Quezon City.
On February 18, 1985, the Coronels sold the property covered by
TCT No. 327043 to the petitioner for the higher price
ofP1,580,000.00. So the Coronels rescinded their contract with
Ramona by depositing her down payment of P50,000.00 in the
bank in trust for Ramona Patricia Alcaraz. On February 22,
1985, Concepcion filed a complaint for specific performance and
damages in her own name in the RTC in Quezon City against the
Coronels. On March 1, 1989, the RTC rendered its decision ordering
defendant to execute in favor of plaintiffs a deed of absolute sale and
the plaintiffs claim for damages and attorneys fees, as well as the
counterclaims of defendants and intervenors are dismissed. Upon
denial of the motion for reconsideration, the Coronels and the
petitioner appealed to the CA but was denied hence they appealed
the CA judgment to SC but affirmed the CA decision.
Acting on the respondents motion for execution, the RTC issued
a writ of execution but the petitioner and the Coronels filed
their motion to stay execution and supplemental motion for
213

reconsideration, which the RTC denied. Upon failure to comply with

the writ of execution, the RTC approved the respondentsmotion for
appointment of suitable person to execute deed, etc., and ordered the
RTC of Quezon City to execute the deed of absolute sale in favor of
Ramona in lieu of the defendants. So the petitioner and Coronels filed
in the CA a petition for certiorari assailing the RTCs orders but the
CA dismissed the petition but they presented their MR in the
CA. Ultimately, the CA denied the MR. The petitioner thus appealed
to the Court, which denied her petition for review for being filed out of
time and denied the MR. Thereafter, the respondents moved in the
RTC for the resolution of their pending motion. After the RTC granted
the respondents pending motion on July 29, 1999, the petitioner filed
a MR against such order, but the RTC denied her motion
on September 23, 1999.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in sustaining the registration by the
Registrar of Deeds of the deed of absolute sale despite the lack of
indication of the citizenship of the buyer of the subject property.
Ruling:
The petition lacks merit. In the complaint dated February 22, 1985,
respondent Concepcion, as plaintiff, categorically averred that she
was a Filipino citizen. The petitioner did not deny or disprove the
averment of Filipino citizenship during the trial and on appeal. The
petitioner did not also advert to the issue of citizenship after the
complaint was amended in order to implead Ramona as a co-plaintiff,
despite the petitioners opportunity to do so.
Yet, now, when the final decision of the RTC is already being
implemented, the petitioner would thwart the execution by assailing
the directive of the RTC for the Branch Clerk of Court to execute
the deed of absolute sale and by blocking the registration of the deed
of absolute sale in the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City, on the
ground that Ramona was disqualified from owning land in the
Philippines.
214

The petitioners move was outrightly unwarranted. The issue of

citizenship of the registered owner of land cannot anymore be raised
to forestall the execution of a final and executory judgment where the
objecting party had the opportunity to raise the issue prior to the
finality of the judgment. The time for assailing the capacity of the
winning party to acquire the land was during the trial, not during the
execution of a final decision.

215

c. Grounds for application: Manner of acquisition of land

i. Prove mode of acquisition: (1) Prescription: in the acquisition
of public domain lands, prescription sets in upon concurrence
of (i) a declaration that the land is alienable and disposable, and
(ii) an express government manifestation that the property is
patrimonial property or no longer used for public service or
development.
MALABANAN VS REPUBLIC
G.R. NO. 179987
Facts:
On 20 February 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for land
registration covering a parcel of land in Silang Cavite. Malabanan
claimed that he had purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco,
and that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open,
notorious, and continuous adverse and peaceful possession of the
land for more than thirty years. The application was raffled to the RTC
Cavite-Tagaytay City. The OSG duly designated the Jose Velazco, Jr.
to appear on behalf of the State. Apart from presenting documentary
evidence, Malabanan himself and his witness, Aristedes Velazco,
who testified that the property was originally belonged to a twenty-two
hectare property owned by his great-grandfather, Lino Velazco.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioners can register the subject land under Section
14(1) or Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree or both
Ruling:
No. There is no substantive evidence to establish that Malabanan or
petitioners as his predecessors-in-interest have been in possession
of the property since 12 June 1945 or earlier. The earliest that
216

petitioners can date back their possession, according to their own

evidencethe Tax Declarations they presented in particularis to
the year 1948. Thus, they cannot avail themselves of registration
under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. Neither can
petitioners properly invoke Section 14(2) as basis for registration.
While the subject property was declared as alienable or disposable in
1982, there is no competent evidence that is no longer intended for
public use service or for the development of the national evidence,
conformably with Article 422 of the Civil Code. The classification of
the subject property as alienable and disposable land of the public
domain does not change its status as property of the public dominion
under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code. Thus, it is insusceptible to
acquisition by prescription.

(2) Accretion does not automatically become registered land just

217

because the lot which receives such accretion is covered by a

Torrens Title. There must be a separate action for the
registration thereof.
CITY MAYOR OF PARANAQUE VS EBIO
G.R. NO. 178411
Facts:
Respondents claim to be absolute owners of A 406 square meters
parcel of land located in Paraaque City covered by Tax Declarations
in the name of respondent Mario D. Ebio. Said land was an accretion
of Cut-cut creek. Respondents assert that the original occupant and
possessor land was their great grandfather, Jose Vitalez, which was
given to his son, Pedro Valdez, in 1930. From then on, Pedro
continuously and exclusively occupied and possessed the said lot. In
1966, after executing an affidavit declaring possession and
occupancy, Pedro was able to obtain a tax declaration over the said
property in his name.
Meanwhile, in 1961, respondent Mario Ebio married Pedros
daughter, Zenaida. In April 1964 and in October 1971, Mario Ebio
secured building permits from the Paraaque municipal office for the
construction of their house within the land. On April 21, 1987, Pedro
transferred his rights over the land in favor of Ebio. On March 30,
1999, the Office of the Sangguniang Barangay of Vitalez passed
Resolution No. 08, series of 1990 seeking assistance from the City
Government of Paraaque for the construction of an access road
along Cut-cut Creek located in the said barangay. The proposed road
will run from Urma Drive to the main road of Vitalez Compound
traversing the lot occupied by the respondents. Respondents
immediately opposed and the project was suspended.
In January 2003, however, respondents were surprised when several
officials from the barangay and the city planning office proceeded to
cut eight (8) coconut trees planted on the said lot.On March 28, 2005,
218

the City Administrator sent a letter to the respondents ordering them

to vacate the area within the next thirty (30) days, or be physically
evicted from the said property. Respondents sent a reply, asserting
their claim over the subject property and expressing intent for a
further dialogue. The request remained unheeded.
Threatened of being evicted, respondents went to the RTC of
Paraaque City on April 21, 2005 and applied for a writ of preliminary
injunction against petitioners.
Issue:
Whether or not the State may build on the land in question
Ruling:
It is an uncontested fact that the subject land was formed from the
alluvial deposits that have gradually settled along the banks of Cutcut creek. This being the case, the law that governs ownership over
the accreted portion is Article 84 of the Spanish Law of Waters of
1866, which remains in effect, in relation to Article 457 of the Civil
Code. ART. 84. Accretions deposited gradually upon lands contiguous
to creeks, streams, rivers, and lakes, by accessions or sediments
from the waters thereof, belong to the owners of such lands. Art. 457.
To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the
accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current
of the waters.
It is therefore explicit from the foregoing provisions that alluvial
deposits along the banks of a creek do not form part of the public
domain as the alluvial property automatically belongs to the owner of
the estate to which it may have been added. The only restriction
provided for by law is that the owner of the adjoining property must
register the same under the Torrens system; otherwise, the alluvial
property may be subject to acquisition through prescription by third
persons. In contrast, properties of public dominion cannot be
acquired by prescription. No matter how long the possession of the
219

properties has been, there can be no prescription against the State

regarding property of public domain. Even a city or municipality
cannot acquire them by prescription as against the State.
Hence, while it is true that a creek is a property of public dominion,
the land which is formed by the gradual and imperceptible
accumulation of sediments along its banks does not form part of the
public domain by clear provision of law.
GRANDE VS COURT OF APPEALS
5 SCRA 524
Facts:
Petitioners are the owners of a parcel of land, with an area of 3.5032
hectares, located at Isabela by inheritance from their deceased
mother Patricia Angui (who inherited it from her parents Isidro Angui
and Ana Lopez).When it was surveyed for purposes of registration
sometime in 1930, its northeastern boundary was the Cagayan
River). After many years a gradual accretion on the northeastern side
took place, by action of the current of the Cagayan River. In 1958,
the bank thereof had receded to a distance of about 105 meters from
its original site, and an alluvial deposit of 19,964 square meters
(1.9964 hectares), more or less, had been added to the registered
area. Petitioners instituted the present action in the Court of First
Instance of Isabela against respondents, to quiet title to said portion
(19,964 square meters) formed by accretion, alleging in their
complaint that they and their predecessors-in-interest, were formerly
in peaceful and continuous possession thereof, until September,
1948, when respondents entered upon the land under claim of
ownership. In their answer, respondents claim ownership in
themselves, asserting that they have been in continuous, open, and
undisturbed possession of said portion, since prior to the year 1933 to
the present.After trial, the Court of First Instance of Isabela, rendered
a decision adjudging the ownership of the portion in question to
petitioners, and ordering respondents to vacate the premises and
deliver possession thereof to petitioners. The Court of Appeals
reversed the decision of lower court.
Issue:
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Whether or not the respondents have acquired the alluvial property

through prescription.

Ruling:
Yes. The Court of Appeals, after analyzing the evidence, found that
respondents-appellees were in possession of the alluvial lot since
1933 or 1934, openly, continuously and adversely, under a claim of
ownership up to the filing of the action in 1958. This finding of the
existence of these facts, arrived at by the Court of Appeals after an
examination of the evidence presented by the parties, is conclusive
as to them and cannot be reviewed by us.
The law on prescription applicable to the case is that provided in Act
190 and not the provisions of the Civil Code, since the possession
started in 1933 or 1934 when the pertinent articles of the old Civil
Code were not in force and before the effectivity of the new Civil
Code in 1950. Hence, the conclusion of the Court of Appeals that the
respondents acquired alluvial lot in question by acquisitive
prescription is in accordance with law.

ii. Character of land as Alienable and Disposable is determined

at the time of the application.
REPUBLIC vs. DILOY
GR NO. 174633, 26 August 2008, 563 SCRA 413 (2008)
Facts:
As early as 1948, Crispin Leaban had already declared the subject
property for taxation purposes under his name. He was then
succeeded by his son, Eusebio Leaban, who also filed for taxation
purposes in his name from the period covering the years 1951221

1969. Thereafter, in 1974, the subject property was transferred to

Eusebio Leabans daughter, Pacencia Leaban, who, in turn, declared
the same for taxation purposes under her name. On 15 June 1979,
the subject property was then conveyed by Pacencia Leaban to her
daughter, herein respondent Gregoria L. Diloy, by virtue of a Deed of
Absolute Sale.
In 1997, respondent Gregoria L. Diloy filed an Application for
Registration of Title over the subject property.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), however, on behalf of the
Republic, filed an Opposition to the Application for Registration of
Title.
During the hearing of the Application for Registration of Title,
respondent presented her father, Rustico Diloy, and Armando Ramos
as witnesses to strengthen her claim that her predecessors-in-interest
had been in actual, continuous, open, notorious and adverse
possession of the subject property.
The MCTC rendered a Decision dated 5 May 1999 in favor of the
respondent, granting her application for registration over the subject
property.
The Republic filed a Motion for Reconsideration arguing that the
respondent failed to prove her possession as required under
Presidential Decree No. 1529. The said Motion for Reconsideration
was denied. Subsequently, the Republic appealed the Decision of the
MCTC to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals denied the
appeal of the Republic. Aggrieved, the Republic filed a motion for the
reconsideration of the aforesaid Decision which was likewise denied.
Hence, this Petition.
Issue:
Whether the respondent has acquired a registrable title.
Held:
No. It is beyond question that the subject property was already an
alienable and disposable land at the time the Application for
Registration of Title over the same was filed by the
respondent. However, the subject property became alienable and
disposable only on 15 March 1982. Prior to its declaration as
alienable land in 1982, any occupation or possession thereof could
222

not be considered in the counting of the 30-year possession

requirement.
The period of possession by the respondent of the subject
property cannot be considered to have started in 1979, when the
same was conveyed to her by her mother. Neither can her
possession of the subject property be tacked to that of her
predecessors-in-interest, even if they had occupied and were in
possession of the same since 1948, because during those periods,
the subject property had not yet been classified as alienable and
disposable land capable of private appropriation.
Any period of possession prior to the date when the subject lot
was classified as alienable and disposable is inconsequential and
should be excluded from the computation of the period of possession.
Such possession can never ripen into ownership and, unless the land
has been classified as alienable and disposable, the rules on the
confirmation of imperfect title shall not apply thereto.
From 1982 up to 1997, the year the respondent filed an
Application for Registration of Title over the subject property, the
respondent was in possession of the same for only 15 years, which
was short of another 15 years from the 30-year-period possession
requirement.
Petition is granted.

iii. Possession resulting in presumption of right to grant application

REPUBLIC vs. DE PORKAN
June 18, 1987, 151 SCRA 88
Facts:
Minda de Porkan and Lolita Macatindog acquired Lots Nos. 1099 and
1546 from their predecessors-interests, who in turn acquired said lots
though a grant by the government by virtue of their proven, open,
exclusive and undisputed possession for more than 30years. An
issue over said lots arose when a certain Viola Azurin obtained from
223

the then Philippine Fisheries Commission an Ordinary Fishpond

Permit covering portions of Lots Nos. 1099 and 1546. Azurin filed with
the Bureau of Lands a complaint for correction, amendment or
cancellation of the Homestead Patent of De Porkan over Lot no. 1546
and the Free Patent of Macatindog over Lot No. 1099 alleging among
others that the patentees secured their patents and titles through
fraud, misrepresentation and illegal machinations. The Solicitor
General sided with Azurin; when the case was brought to the Court of
First Instance, the SG stated that the disputed portions of land were
actually claimed by Azurin and that such lands could not be disposed
by the Director of Lands under the Public Land Act. Hence, the
patents and titles issued to de Porkan and Macatindog were void
insofar as the portion occupied and covered by the fishpond permit of
Azurin. After hearing however, the CFI dismissed the complaints and
upheld the validity of the titles/patents of de Porkan & Macatindog
over the lands in dispute. The SG in the present petition avers among
others that the lots in dispute could not be the subject of disposition
under the Homestead and Free Patent provisions of the Public Act
since they are marshy and swampy, certified as such as more
suitable for fishpond development, disposable only thru lease under
the Public Land Act.
Issue:
Whether possession and cultivation of a land for more than 30 years
will entitle the possessor thereof of a government grant and a
certificate of title.
Held:
Yes. As early as 1953, the respondents had already acquired by
operation of law not only a right to a grant over Lot No. 1099, but a
grant of the Government over the same alienable land by virtue of
their proven, open, exclusive and undisputed possession for more
than 30 years, since the Spanish colonial period.
The possession of a public land identified as Lot No. 1099 dates back
to the time of the Spanish colonial period. Such possessions of the
said public land has attained the character and duration prescribed by
law as the equivalent of an express grant from the Government. The
mandate of the law itself provides that possessors shall be
224

conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential

to a government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title. By
legal fiction, the land ceases to be public and thus becomes a private
land.

iv. Possession alone is not sufficient to acquire title to alienable

lands of the public domain because the law requires possession
and occupation.
CHARLES L. ONG vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 175746

March 12, 2008

Facts:
On July 1, 1999, petitioner Charles L. Ong (petitioner) in his behalf
and as duly authorized representative of his brothers, namely,
Roberto, Alberto and Cesar, filed an Application for Registration of
225

Title over Lot 15911 (subject lot) situated in Barangay Anolid,

Mangaldan, Pangasinan with an area of five hundred seventy four
(574) square meters, more or less. They alleged that they are the coowners of the subject lot; that the subject lot is their exclusive
property having acquired the same by purchase from spouses Tony
Bautista and Alicia Villamil on August 24, 1998; that the subject lot is
presently unoccupied; and that they and their predecessors-ininterest have been in open, continuous and peaceful possession of
the subject lot in the concept of owners for more than thirty (30)
years.
After due notice and publication, only respondent Republic of the
Philippines (respondent), represented by the Office of the Solicitor
General, opposed the application for registration of title. Respondent
asserted that neither applicants nor their predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of the subject lot since June 12, 1945 or earlier as
required by Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as
amended by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1073; that applicants
failed to adduce any muniment of title to prove their claims; that the
tax declaration appended to the application does not appear genuine
and merely shows pretended possession of recent vintage; that the
application was filed beyond the period allowed under P.D. No. 892;
and that the subject lot is part of the public domain which cannot be
the subject of private appropriation.
On January 16, 2002, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of
petitioner and his brothers and orders the registration of the said
parcel of land stating that evidences presented by the applicant
indubitably established sufficient basis to grant the applicant for
registration. The same parcel of land has been declared in the name
of the applicant and her predecessors-in-interest and its taxes has
been religiously paid. The said circumstances further show that the
possession and ownership of the applicant and her predecessors-ininterest over the same parcel of land has been continuous and
peaceful under bona fide claim of ownership before the filing of the
instant application for registration on July 1, 1999.
Aggrieved, respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court
of Appeals reversed the decision of the Regional Trial Court. In
reversing the decision of the trial court, the Court of Appeals found
that the subject lot is part of the alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain. Thus, it was incumbent upon petitioner to prove that
226

they possessed the subject lot in the nature and for the duration
required by law. However, petitioner failed to prove that he or his
predecessors-in-interest have been in adverse possession of the
subject lot in the concept of owner since June 12, 1945 or earlier as
mandated by Section 14(1) of P.D. 1529. It noted that the earliest tax
declaration which petitioner presented is dated 1971. Consequently,
petitioner could not fairly claim possession of the land prior to 1971.
Neither was petitioner able to prove that he or his predecessors-ininterest actually occupied the subject lot prior to the filing of the
application.
Issue:
Whether possession is sufficient to acquire title to alienable lands of
the public domain.
Held:
Pursuant to Section 14(1) of P.D. 1529, applicants for registration of
title must prove: (1) that the subject land forms part of the disposable
and alienable lands of the public domain, and (2) that they have been
in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the same under a bona fide claim of ownership since
June 12, 1945, or earlier. Possession alone is not sufficient to acquire
title to alienable lands of the public domain because the law requires
possession and occupation. As held in Republic v. Alconaba: The law
speaks of possession and occupation. Since these words are
separated by the conjunction and, the clear intention of the law is not
to make one synonymous with the other. Possession is broader than
occupation because it includes constructive possession. When,
therefore, the law adds the word occupation, it seeks to delimit all
encompassing effect of constructive possession. Taken together with
the words open, continuous, exclusive and notorious, the word
occupation serves to highlight the fact that for an applicant to qualify,
his possession must not be a mere fiction. Actual possession of a
land consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a
nature as a party would naturally exercise over his own property.

227

d. Form and Contents of Application

i. Waiver of lack of verification
JOHN M. MILLER and EMILIO ESPINOSA, JR. vs.THE DIRECTOR
OF LANDS, ET AL. ANSELMO IRENEA, ARTURO DE LA CRUZ,
DOMINADOR MANGCAO, LUCAS FRANCISCO, CIPRIANO
SEQUILLO, PEDRO TAGALOG, PONCIANO GARCIA, RODOLFO
DE DIOS, ET AL
G.R. No. L-16761
Facts:
228

A parcel of land in Tigbao, Milagros, Masbate was applied for

registration in the Court of First Instance of Masbate on June 18,
1956 by John M. Miller and Emilio Espinosa, Jr.
After notice and publication, initial hearing was held on June 20,
1957. The Director of Lands and Bureau of Public Highways filed
written oppositions. Thirty-five individuals appeared and expressed
verbal oppositions. All persons, except the abovementioned
oppositors, were declared in default on July 8, 1957.
On July 24, 1958 applicants started presenting evidence and the
private oppositors were given five days to file written opposition. Of
the oppositors, 28 filed written but unverified opposition. On August
20, 1958 applicants finished adducing evidence and rested their
case.
On August 27, 1958 the private oppositors presented their first
witness. After his cross-examination, counsel for applicants called the
Court's attention to the lack of verification in the opposition filed by
the private oppositors and moved to dismiss the same.
The private oppositors offered to verify their opposition. After parties
had filed memoranda, the court issued an order on January 13, 1959
dismissing the unverified opposition, without pronouncement as to
costs Motion for reconsideration was denied by order dated
November 18, 1959. The private oppositors have appealed from both
orders.

Issue:
Whether he unverified opposition is sufficient
Held:
Without objecting to the unverified opposition, they proceeded with
the trial, presented evidence and rested their case. Only after the first
witness of the private oppositors had testified and applicants' counsel
had cross-examined him, was the defect of lack of verification
brought up. By that time, applicants had waived the defect.
229

The act of proceeding to trial on the merits without objection is

generally a waiver of all uncertainties, ambiguities, irregularities,
formal defects, of fault or defects of any kind in the pleading of the
adverse party.

230

ii. When the applicant is a non-resident; additional

requirements
iii. When 2 or more parcels of land applied for; additional
requirements
iv. When land borders on road; additional requirements
v. Requirement of additional facts
e. Where to file
Delegated jurisdiction of First Level Courts
f. What to file
g. Ocular inspection may be mad
h. Amendments. Need publication and notice is changes are
substantial.
i. As to parties. An amendment due to change of name of
applicant does not require publication.
DIRECTOR OF LANDS V. IAC
G.R. No. 73246. March 2, 1993
Facts:
Land involved is an island known as Tambac Island in Lingayen Gulf.
231

Situated in the Municipality of Bani, Pangasinan, the area consists of

187,288 sq. m., more or less. The initial application for registration
was filed for Pacific Farms, Inc. under the provisions of the Land
Registration Act, Act 496, as amended. The Republic of the
Philippines, thru the Director of Lands opposed the application
alleging that the applicant, Pacific Farms, Inc. does not possess a fee
simple title to the land nor did its predecessors possess the land for
at least 30 years immediately preceding the filing of application. The
opposition likewise specifically alleged that the applicant is a private
corporation disqualified under the 1973 Constitution from acquiring
alienable lands of the public domain citing Section 11, Article 14. The
Director of Forest Development also entered its opposition alleging
that the land is within the unclassified public land and, hence,
inalienable. Other private parties also filed their oppositions, but were
subsequently withdrawn. In an amended application, Pacific Farms,
Inc. filed a manifestation-motion to change the applicant from Pacific
Farms, Inc. to J. Antonio Araneta. Despite the supposed amendment,
there was no republication. On 4 October 1979, the trial court
rendered a decision adjudicating the subject property to J. Antonio
Araneta. On appeal to the then Intermediate Appellate Court, the
decision of the lower court was affirmed on 12 December1985.
Hence, the petition for review.
Issue:
Whether the lower court erred in granting registration in favor of
private respondent.
Held:
We are inclined to agree with petitioners that the amendment of the
application from the name of Pacific Farms Inc., as applicant, to the
name of J. Antonio Araneta Inc., was a mere attempt to evade
disqualification.
Our Constitution, whether the 1973 or 1987, prohibits private
corporations or associations from holding alienable lands of the public
domain except by lease. Apparently realizing such prohibition,
respondent amended its application to conform with the mandates of
the law.
However, We cannot go along with petitioners' position that the
232

absence of republication of an amended application for registration is

a jurisdictional flaw. We should distinguish. Amendments to the
application may be due to change in parties or substantial change in
the boundaries or increase in the area of the land applied for.
In the former case, neither the Land Registration Act, as amended,
nor Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property
Registration Decree, requires republication and registration may be
allowed by the court at any stage of the proceeding upon just and
reasonable terms. On the other hand, republication is required if the
amendment is due to substantial change in the boundaries or
increase in the area of the land applied for.

ii. As to the land applied for

iii. Amendment due to the inclusion of additional land requires
publication. Reasons.
BENIN vs TUASON
57 SCRA 531
Facts:
The plaintiffs alleged that they were the owners and possessors of
three parcels of agricultural lands located in Laloma, Caloocan, Rizal,
inherited
from
their
ancestor
Sixto
Benin,
who
inturn inherited the same from his father, Eugenio Benin; that they an
d their predecessors in interest had possessed these three parcels of
land
openly,adversely,and peacefully, cultivated the same and exclusively
enjoyed the fruits harvestedtherefrom; that Eugenio Benin, plaintiff's
grandfather, had said parcels of land surveyed on March 4 and 6,
1894, that during the cadastral survey by the Bureau of Lands in
1933, Sixto Benin and herein plaintiffs claim the ownership over said
parcels of land; that they declared said lands for taxation purposes in
233

1940under Tax Declaration No. 2429; that after the outbreak of the
last
World
War,
or sometime in 1942 and subsequently thereafter, evacuees from Ma
nila and other places, after having secured the permission of the
plaintiffs, constructed their houses thereon and paid monthly rentals
to plaintiffs. Only defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. was actually
served with summons. The other defendants were ordered
summonedbypublication in accordance with Sections 16 and 17 of th
e Rules of Court. Only defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. appeared.
The other defendants were all declared in default.
Issue:
Whether the plaintiff has a valid claim over the disputed property.

Held:
If the amendment consists in the inclusion in the application for
registration of an area or parcel of land not previously included in the
original application, as published, a new publication of the amended
application must be made.
The purpose of the new publication is to give notice to all persons
concerned regarding the amended application. Without a new
publication the registration court cannot acquire jurisdiction over the
area or parcel of land that is added to the area covered by the original
application, and the decision of the registration court would be a
nullity insofar as the decision concerns the newly included land.
The reason is because without a new publication, the law is infringed
with respect to the publicity that is required in registration
proceedings, and third parties who have not had the opportunity to
present their claim might be prejudiced in their rights because of
failure of notice.
But if the amendment consists in the exclusion of a portion of the
area covered by the original application and the original plan as
previously published, a new publication is not necessary. In the latter
case, the jurisdiction of the court over the remaining area is not
affected by the failure of a new publication.
234

B. Publication, Service and Posting of Notices

a. Notice of Initial Hearing
b. When and How Initially Set
c. How given
i. Publication. Must be published once in the Official Gazette
and once in a newspaper of general circulation as a requirement
of due process.
Purpose and Effects of Publication
VICTOR BENIN, et al. vs. J. M. TUASON & CO., INC.
G.R. No. L-26127 June 28, 1974
Facts:
The plaintiffs alleged that they were the owners and possessors of
the parcels of agricultural lands; that they inherited said parcels of
land from their ancestor Sixto Benin, who in turn inherited the same
from his father, Eugenio Benin; that they and their predecessors in
interest had possessed these parcels of land openly, adversely, and
peacefully, cultivated the same and exclusively enjoyed the fruits
235

harvested therefrom; that Eugenio Benin, plaintiff's grandfather, had

said parcels of land surveyed on March 4 and 6, 1894, that during the
cadastral survey by the Bureau of Lands of the lands in 1933 Sixto
Benin and herein plaintiffs claim the ownership over said parcels of
land; that they declared said lands for taxation purposes in 1940
under Tax Declaration No. 2429; that after the outbreak of the last
World War, or sometime in 1942 and subsequently thereafter,
evacuees from Manila and other places, after having secured the
permission of the plaintiffs, constructed their houses thereon and paid
monthly rentals to plaintiffs.
Sometime in the year 1951 while they were enjoying the peaceful
possession of their lands, the J.M. Tuason and Co. Inc., through their
agents and representatives, with the aid of armed men, by force and
intimidation, using bulldozers and other demolishing equipment,
illegally entered and started defacing, demolishing and destroying the
dwellings and constructions of plaintiffs' lessees, as well as the
improvements, disregarding the objections of plaintiffs, and as a
result plaintiffs were deprived of the rentals received from their
lessees.
The plaintiffs made inquiries regarding the probable claim of
defendants, and in 1953 they discovered for the first time that their
lands had either been fraudulently or erroneously included, by direct
or constructive fraud, in what appears as Parcel No. 1 (known as
Santa Mesa Estate) in Original Certificate of Title No. 735 of the Land
Records of the province of Rizal in the names of the original
applicants for registration, the defendants.
The plaintiffs alleged that before the decision was handed down in
the application for registration by the defendants, the area,
boundaries and technical descriptions of parcel No. 1 were altered
and amended; that the amendments and alterations, which were
made after the publication of the original application, were never
published; that on March 7, 1914 a decision was rendered in LRC No.
7681 based on the amended plan; that pursuant to the decision of
March 7, 1914 a decree of registration was issued on July 6, 1914,
known as Decree No. 17431, decreeing the registration in the names
of the applicants of the two parcels of land (Santa Mesa Estate and
Diliman Estate); and that the decision dated March 7, 1914 in LRC
No. 7681 is null and void because the Land Registration Court had no
jurisdiction to render the decision for lack of publication.
In its answer, J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc., among others, specifically
236

denied plaintiffs' claim of ownership of the lands involved in each

case.
After trial, the lower court, among others, concluded that the decision
and the decree in LRC No. 7681 are null and void ab initio, having
been rendered without jurisdiction and the plaintiffs are the owners
and entitled to the possession of the parcels of land described in their
respective complaints.
J.M. Tuason & Co. Inc. appealed from the decision. It contends that
the trial court erred in holding that the Land Registration Court lacked
or was without jurisdiction to issue decree No. 17431 for the alleged
reason that the amendment to the original plan was not published.
Issue:
Whether the trial court erred when it held that the Land Registration
Court was without jurisdiction to render the decision in LRC No. 7681.
Held:
The lower court erred when it held that the Land Registration Court
was without jurisdiction to render the decision in LRC No. 7681.
If the amendment consists in the inclusion in the application for
registration of an area or parcel of land not previously included in the
original application, as published, a new publication of the amended
application must be made.
The purpose of the new publication is to give notice to all persons
concerned regarding the amended application. Without a new
publication the registration court cannot acquire jurisdiction over the
area or parcel of land that is added to the area covered by the original
application, and the decision of the registration court would be a
nullity insofar as the decision concerns the newly included land.
The reason is because without a new publication, the law is infringed
with respect to the publicity that is required in registration
proceedings, and third parties who have not had the opportunity to
present their claim might be prejudiced in their rights because of
failure of notice.
But if the amendment consists in the exclusion of a portion of the
area covered by the original application and the original plan as
previously published, a new publication is not necessary. In the latter
case, the jurisdiction of the court over the remaining area is not
237

affected by the failure of a new publication.

When the lower court said that the area of Parcel 1 in the decree of
registration is bigger than the area of Parcel 1 in the application as
published, it did not mention the fact that the difference in area is only
27.10 square meters. We believe that this difference of 27.10 square
meters is too minimal to be of decisive consequence in the
determination of the validity of Original Certificate of Title No. 735.
The very slight increase of 27.10 square meters would not justify the
conclusion of the lower court that "the amended plan ... included
additional lands which were not originally included in Parcel 1 as
published in the Official Gazette." It being undisputed that Parcel 1
has an area of more than 8,798,600 square meters (or 879.86
hectares), We believe that this difference of 27.10 square meters,
between the computation of the area when the original plan was
made and the computation of the area when the amended plan was
prepared, cannot be considered substantial as would affect the
identity of Parcel 1.
REPUBLIC v FLORENCIA MARASIGAN

G.R. No. 85515 June 6, 1991

Facts:

The private respondent, claims to be one of the heirs of Epifania

Alcano, registered owner of a parcel of land located in Canubing,
Calapan, Oriental Mindoro, covered by a Transfer Certificate of Title
in the Registry of Deeds of Calapan, Oriental Mindoro, filed a petition
for the reconstitution of "the original and duplicate copy (sic)" of the
said Transfer Certificate of Title on the basis of the owner's duplicate
copy. She alleged therein that she is in possession "of the title
subject matter of" the petition but she, however, did not allege the
reason why she asked for the reconstitution. From the evidence
adduced by the petitioner, it appears that she is one of the vendees of
238

a certain parcel of land situated in Malamig, Calapan, Oriental

Mindoro covered by Transfer Certificate of Title and registered in the
name of Epifania Alcano. The original copy of said title which was
usually kept in the Office of the Register of Deeds of this province
was destroyed by reason of the fire which razed to the ground the
entire Capitol Building then housing said office on August 12, 1977.
The Regional Trial Court however granted the reconstitution filed by
the private respondent.
Petitioner appealed from said Order to the Court of Appeals because
the trial court erred in acquiring jurisdiction over the instant petition for
reconstitution of the original and the owner's duplicate copies of tct
no. t-66062 without the requisite service of notice of hearing to the
adjoining owners and actual occupants of the land as required by
section 13 of republic act no. 26. The CA affirmed the Trial Courts
decision.

Issue:

Whether the Trial Court acquired jurisdiction over the petition

Held:

No, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the petition. Section
23 of P.D. No. 1529 was never meant to dispense with the
requirement of notice by mailing and by posting. What it simply
239

means is that in so far as publication is concerned, there is sufficient

compliance if the notice is published in the Official Gazette, although
the law mandates that it be published "once in the Official Gazette
and once in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines."
However, publication in the latter alone would not suffice. This is to
accord primacy to the official publication.
The Court of Appeals negates one of the principal purposes of
the Decree, which is clearly expressed in its exordium, namely, to
strengthen the Torrens System through safeguards to prevent
anomalous titling of real property.
A defective publication deprives the court of jurisdiction.
PO vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. L-27443 July 19, 1971 / 40 SCRA 37

Facts:

Judgment was rendered on March 11, 1964, granting the petition of

Juanita Po for naturalization as citizen of the Philippines. On April 15,
1966, she filed a motion to be allowed to take the requisite oath of
allegiance, after the notice and hearing prescribed by law. On
November 14, 1966, the court issued, the appealed order allowing
her to take said oath and directing the issuance, in her favor, of the
corresponding certificate of naturalization.
However, the motion for reconsideration was denied on the ground
that the lower court had no jurisdiction to entertain appellee's petition
for naturalization because the petition was not published in
accordance with law.
In the case at bar, the appellee's "petition" for naturalization that was
240

not published, but a "notice" summarizing the allegations of said

pleading. The publication of such notice is insufficient to vest, in the
trial court, jurisdiction to hear and decide this case. Besides, said
notice was published in the "Nueva Era," and the records do not
show that this newspaper is of general circulation in Surigao del
Norte, the province in which the appellee resides.

Issue:

Whether the defect in the publication of the petition deprives the court
of jurisdiction.

Held:

Sec. 9 of Com. Act No. 473 requires that the "petition" for
naturalization be published "in the Official Gazette and in a
newspaper of general circulation in the province where the petitioner
resides.
Since the appellees petition for naturalization has not been
published, which is in violation of Sec. 9 of said Act, the trial court had
no jurisdiction to entertain and hear said petition, much less to grant
the same.

241

Instances of defective publication

a) Different description
APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION OF TITLE, ELDRED
FEWKES vs. NACITA VASQUEZ, DOMINGO VASQUEZ ,et al.
G.R. No. L-29075 June 10, 1971
242

Facts:
On 2 March 1967, Eldred Fewkews, an American citizen, filed in CFI
of Albay,an application for registration of two lots,referred to as Lot
No. 21-A of Psu-61470 (a portion of Lot No. 1383, Libon PLs-763 D),
with an area of 223, 241 square meters more or less, and Lot with an
area of 11,283 square meters, situated Bulusan, Libon, Albay.
Attached to the application were the tracing cloth and blue print of
plans Psu-61470 and the corresponding technical descriptions of Lots
21-A and 21-B of Psu-61470, the certified copies of the tax
declarations on said land, and the two deeds of absolute sale dated
20 June 1966 and 27 January 1967, executed by the Velascos in
favor of applicant. After the initial hearing of case, the court issued an
order dismissing the application for lack of jurisdiction, based on the
finding that the properties sought to be registered only formed part of
a bigger tract of land which was described in the plan attached to the
application, and that the notice of initial hearing did not delineate
accurately the portions of the land involved in the registration
proceeding. Hence,this appeal.The appellant contended that since
the description of the bigger parcel of which the properties sought to
be registered formed part was already published, then there was no
need for further publication of the aforesaid small portions in order to
vest jurisdiction on the land registration court.
Issue:
Whether the exact description of the land sought to be registered
must be published in order to confer jurisdiction to the court over the
res.
Held:
The notice of the hearing must be addressed to all persons appearing
to have an interest in the lot being registered and the adjoining
owners, and indicating the location, boundaries and technical
description of the land being registered, and shall be published in the
Official Gazette for two consecutive times. Publication of the notice of
hearing is considered one of the essential bases of the jurisdiction of
the court in land registration cases. It is only when there is
243

constructive seizure of the land, effected by the publication and

notice, that jurisdiction over the res is vested on the court. Moreover,
such notice and publication of the hearing enables all persons
concerned having any rights or interests in the property, to come
forward and show to the court why the application for registration
thereof is not to be granted. In the case at bar, what was sought to be
registered was not the big parcel of land (Lot No. 1383, Pls-764-D or
Lot No. 21), but the certain portions thereof (Lots Nos. 21-A and 21B). Therefore, it is the technical description of these 2 smaller lots
that must be published in order that the persons who may be affected
by their registration may be notified thereof. The lower court could not
merely direct the amendment of the application, instead of issuing an
order of dismissal. This is because it is not permissible to make
amendments or alterations in the description of the land after its
publication in the newspapers and after the registration of the
property has been decreed, without the publication of new
notifications and advertisements making known to everyone the said
alterations and amendments.

b) Actual publication was after the hearing

REPUBLIC vs COURT OF APPEALS
236 SCRA 442
Facts:
244

Respondent spouses bought Lots 347 and 348, Cad. s38-D, as their
residence with a total area of 91.77 sq. m. situated in San Pablo City,
from one Cristeta Dazo BeleN. At the time of the purchase,
respondent spouses where then natural-born Filipino citizens. The
spouses filed an application for registration of title of the two (2)
parcels of land before the Regional Trial Court of San Pablo City. This
time, however, they were no longer Filipino citizens and have opted to
embrace Canadian citizenship through naturalization. The court a
quo rendered a decision confirming private respondents' title to the
lots in question. At the outset, petitioner submits that private
respondents have not acquired proprietary rights over the subject
properties before they acquired Canadian citizenship through
naturalization to justify the registration thereof in their favor. It
maintains that even privately owned unregistered lands are presumed
to be public lands under the principle that lands of whatever
classification belongs to the State under the Regalian doctrine. Thus,
before the issuance of the certificate of title, the occupant is not in the
juridical sense the true owner of the land since it still pertains to the
State. Petitioner further argued that it is only when the court
adjudicates the land to the applicant for confirmation of title would the
land become privately owned land, for in the same proceeding, the
court may declare it public land, depending on the evidence.

Issue:

Whether the application for registration of title is void on the ground of

foreign nationality.

Held:

NO. Even if private respondents were already Canadian citizens at

245

the time they applied for registration of the properties in question,

said properties as discussed above were already private lands;
consequently, there could be no legal impediment for the registration
thereof by respondents in view of what the Constitution ordains. The
parcels of land sought to be registered no longer form part of the
public domain. They are already private in character since private
respondents' predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous
and exclusive possession and occupation thereof under claim of
ownership prior to June 12, 1945 or since 1937. The law provides
that a natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his
Philippine citizenship may be a transferee of a private land up to a
maximum area of 1,000 sq.m., if urban, or one (1) hectare in case of
rural land, to be used by him as his residence (BP 185).
It is undisputed that private respondents, as vendees of a private
land, were natural-born citizens of the Philippines. For the purpose of
transfer and/or acquisition of a parcel of residential land, it is not
significant whether private respondents are no longer Filipino citizens
at the time they purchased or registered the parcels of land in
question. What is important is that private respondents were formerly
natural-born citizens of the Philippines, and as transferees of a
private land, they could apply for registration in accordance with the
mandate of Section 8, Article XII of the Constitution. Considering that
private respondents were able to prove the requisite period and
character of possession of their predecessors-in-interest over the
subject lots, their application for registration of title must perforce be
approved.

246

THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF MALABON, METRO MANILA vs.

THE HONORABLE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, MALABON,
METRO MANILA, BRANCH 170
Facts:
On March 17, 1988, a Deed of Absolute Sale of a property covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title No. R-3899 in the name of Salome
Castillo in favor of Jose M. Castillo, was presented to the Register of
Deeds (Atty. Francisco Romero) at the Glovic Bldg. in Caloocan City
for registration. It could not be given due course because the original
of said TCT No. R-3899 in the Registry of Deeds was missing. As the
missing title covered a parcel of land in Malabon, Atty. Gaudencio
Cena, the Register of Deeds for Malabon, filed on April 12, 1988 in
the Regional Trial Court of Malabon, a verified petition for
reconstitution of the original of TCT No. R-3899 under Rep. Act No.
26. The petition was given due course on April 22, 1988. The court
directed that a copy of its order giving due course to the petition and
setting it for hearing on August 17, 1988 be published in two (2)
consecutive issues of the Official Gazette as provided in Section 9 of
Republic Act No. 26. At the hearing on August 17, 1988, for the
purpose of establishing the jurisdictional requirement of publication of
the notice of the hearing of the petition, the petitioner submitted the
following exhibits:
a) a certification dated August 10, 1988, of the Director of the
National Printing Office certifying that the order dated April 22, 1988
247

was included in Volume 84, Nos. 21 and 22, May 23 and May
30,1988 issues of the Official Gazette (Exh. B);
b) the sheriffs certificate of posting (Exh. D); and
c) the registry return receipts for the copies of the notices which
were sent to the Director of Lands, the Office of the Solicitor General,
the National Land Title's and Deeds Registration Administration
(NLTDRA) Salome Castillo, and Jose Castillo
At the continuation of the hearing on November 3, 1988, the
petitioner caused to be marked as Exhibit G the certificate of
publication issued by the Director of the National Printing Office
stating that the order of the court dated April 22, 1988 was published
in Volume 84, Nos. 21 and 22, May 23 and May 30, 1988 issues of
the Official Gazette and that the May 30, 1988 issue was released for
circulation on October 3, 1988.
The Judge of the Regional Trial Court in Malabon dismissed the
petition for lack of jurisdiction because the notice of the petition was
not published in the Official Gazette "at least thirty (30) days prior to
the date of hearing" (Sec. 9, R.A. No. 26) which had been set on
August 17, 1988. The May 23 and May 30 issues of the Official
Gazette were actually released for circulation on October 3, 1988, or
forty-seven (47) days after the scheduled hearing of the petition.
Issue:
Whether the actual publication of the notice of the petition in the
Official Gazette was sufficient to vest jurisdiction in the court to hear
and determine the petition.
Held:
The purpose of the publication of the notice of the petition for
reconstitution in the Official Gazette is to apprise the whole world that
such a petition has been filed and that whoever is minded to oppose
it for good cause may do so within thirty (30) days before the date set
by the court for hearing the petition. It is the publication of such notice
that brings in the whole world as a party in the case and vests the
court with jurisdiction to hear and decide it. Where there is a defect in
248

the publication of the petition, such defect deprives the court of

jurisdiction. And when the court a quo lacks jurisdiction to take
cognizance of a case, it lacks authority over the whole case and all its
aspects.

ii. Mailing. Persons and officials to whom notice is given by

mailing
iii. Posting
d. How notice proven
C. Opposition
a. Who may file opposition
i. Oppositor need not be named in the notice of initial hearing

ELIGIO T. LEYVA vs . COURT OF APPEALS, FRANCISCO LAIZ

and MANUELA JANDOC

G.R. No. 71939 January 25, 1988

Facts:
249

Petitioner Leyva had an alleged Compromise Agreement with private

respondent Jandoc. Said agreement was entails that spouses Leyva
will withdraw their opposition to the land registration case filed by
Jandoc, if the latter will transfer a ownership over a parcel of land
belonging to Jandoc. The agreement was purpotedly executed in
1963 but was only notarized in 1972.
On the other hand, private respondent Laiz executed an
agreement of sale with Jandoc in 1959 involving the same parcel of
land. Laiz was able to acquire transfer of ownership and possession
of the said land by virtue of a case he filed for specific perfomance
against Jandoc.
The RTC ruling was then affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals.
Issue:
Whether the petitioner or private respondent has a preferred right of
ownership over the land in question.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court upheld the ruling of the Court of Appeals which
are the following:
1. The Compromise Agreement was null and void for being
undated and belatedly notarized.
2. In the registration proceedings, Laiz was mentioned as an
adverse possessor but not Leyva.
3. The agreement of sale between Laiz and Jandoc is valid, and
also supported by an earnest money given by Laiz.
4. Due execution of the agreement was witnessed by three
credible witnesses.
5. It has been established that the subject was lot was occupied
by Laiz since 1954, and was given TCT over the said lot by
virtue of specific performance.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court concluded that the Agreement of
Sale prevails over the alleged Compromise Agreement. The reliance
of Leyva on his expert witnesses was not able to overcome the
testimonies given by the three witnesses. As held in our
jurisprudence, "the positive testimony of the three attesting witnesses
ought to prevail over the expert opinions which cannot be
mathematically precise but which on the contrary, are subject to
250

inherent infirmities." In any event, it is well established that the

appellate court will not disturb the factual findings of the lower court
for the latter is in a better position to gauge credibility of witnesses.
It is evident that what petitioner seeks from Supreme Court a review
of the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the
findings of the trial court. Indeed, it has long been established to the
point of being elementary, that the factual findings of the Court of
Appeals are final and may not be reviewed by this Court except in
certain instances which have no application here. Petition was
denied.

ii. Oppositor need not show title; but must appear to have an
interest
251

DE CASTRO VS MARCOS
26 SCRA 644
Facts:
The case commenced from the petition of respondent Rufino Akia
before the Court of First Instance of Baguio City, acting as a cadastral
court, for the reopening of cadastral proceedings, pursuant to
Republic Act 931, where the registration in his name of 15,922
square meters of land situated in the City of Baguio was sought for.
Petitioner Virginia L. de Castro moved to intervene. Her interest is in
the 1,000 square meters allegedly included in the 15,922 square
meters of land specified in respondent Akia's petition. It appears that
petitioner Virginia de Castro filed with the Bureau of Lands Township
Sales Application [TSAV-3559 (E-V-405)] covering a 1,000 square
meter-parcel of land identified as Lot 1, Quezon Hill Subdivision,
Residential Section "K", Baguio City. The lot was awarded in her
favor. She also paid the full purchase price of the land.
Petitioner's motion for intervention was granted. A trial was made
and the case was submitted for decision. However Akia lodged a
motion to dismiss petitioner's opposition to his (Akia's) petition to
reopen the cadastral proceedings. Ground therefor, amongst others,
was that petitioner lacked personality to sue. The motion was granted
by respondent judge on the grounds that mere applicants of public
land have no capacity to sue independently of the Bureau of Lands.
But de Castro moved to reconsider. She stressed the fact that she
was not a mere applicant of public land but an equitable owner
thereof. Because, she was an awardee who had paid to the
government, in full, the sales value of the land she applied for but
respondent judge refused reconsideration, on the ground of a
"Manifestation" of counsel for the Director of Lands of stating that on
October 15, 1965, the Director of Lands had cancelled the award in
favor of petitioner. Other Motions filed by de Castro were all denied.

Issue:
252

Whether De Castro have the personality or legal standing to oppose

the application for registration of Akia.
Ruling:
Petitioner De Castro has legal standing before the cadastral court.
Under Republic Act 931, the petition for reopening is narrowed down
by the specific conditions therein set forth. It bears repetition to say
that said petition is possible "only with respect to such of said parcels
of land as have not been alienated, reserved, leased, granted or
otherwise provisionally or
permanently disposed of
by
the
Government." The statute made it abundantly clear that judicial
proceedings shall be reopened only, if the cadastral court "shall find
that all conditions herein established have been complied with." Thus
it is, that the alienation, reservation, lease, grant or any provisional or
permanent disposition by the government of the land claimed should
suffice to bar reopening.
Petitioner Virginia de Castro here, it must be recalled, is an awardee
in the public bidding held upon her own township sales application. Of
course, the award up to now has not been fully implemented because
she has not yet complied with one condition imposed on her. But, if
the award is not a permanent disposition, it is at least a provisional
one, enough to prevent reopening by respondent Akia as to the land.
an award under a sales application has "the effect of withdrawing the
lands of the public domain that were 'disposable' by the Director of
Lands."

253

iii. A mere foreshore lessee of a public land cannot be an

oppositor
ELIGIO T. LEYVA and EUFEMIA L. LEYVA vs. MANUELA JANDOC
and HON. JOSE S. BORROMEO, Judge of Court of First Instance
of Cotabato
G.R. No. L-16965 February 28, 1962
Facts:
On September 10, 1958, Manuela Jandoc applied, in the Court of
First Instance of Cotabato, for the registration of three (3) parcels of
land situated in Dadiangas, General Santos, Cotabato, and more
particularly known as Lots Nos. 1, 2 and 3 of Plan Psu-12647. Eligio
T. Leyva objected thereto on December 10, 1958, with respect to a
portion of said land of about one (1) hectare which he claimed to
have adversely possessed in good faith and under legal title since
1937. On or about December 17, 1958 his wife Eufemia L. Leyva filed
another opposition alleging that she and her husband had occupied a
portion of the land in question, which they had acquired from the
defunct "NARRA", and that both had similarly occupied as owners
since 1937, another portion of said land of about 88 meters by 6.66
meters, "with their improvements ... made in good faith." Later, other
oppositions were filed, also, including one by the Bureau of Lands,
which claimed the land applied for as part of the public domain.
After declaring in default all those who had not objected to the
petition for registration, the court proceeded with the hearing of the
case on the merits, which covered a period of several days. A
reconsideration of the court's ruling was subsequently denied. Hence,
this appeal by certiorari.
Issue:
Whether a mere foreshore lessee can be an oppositor.
Held:
We find no merit in this pretense.
The Court of Appeals did not err, much less, commit an abuse of
254

discretion, in holding that petitioners' interest.

... being merely that of foreshore lessees, can therefore be amply
protected by the provincial fiscal who represents the Government,
with the collaboration of their counsel. This being so, their
presence in court is not indispensable. Upon the other hand, their
active independent intervention may not even result in confusion of
the evidence for the Government.
From the point of view of the end result of the registration
proceedings, the interest of the petitioners is likewise amply
protected. If the land applied for is finally adjudged to be private
property, the right of the petitioners as foreshore lessees either
automatically terminates or would depend entirely at the pleasure
of the private party to whom the land is adjudged. If, on the other
hand, the land is ultimately declared part of the public domain,
their right as foreshore lessees would have suffered no
impairment.
The Court of Appeals rejected such pretense for the following
reasons: .
While the right claimed by the petitioners herein seemed at first
blush to be directly opposed to the adjudication of ownership to the
applicant, it developed in the proceedings that their right, that of
being foreshore lessees of public land, is completely subordinate
to the interests of the Government, and must necessarily be
predicated upon the property in question being part of the public
domain. In such case, it is incumbent upon the duly authorized
representatives of the Government to represent its interests as
well as private claims intrinsically dependent upon it. It is wellsettled that the interests of the Government cannot be represented
by private persons.
We are fully in agreement with the foregoing view. It may not be
amiss to add, also, that this being an action in rem, there is no reason
why claims which do not partake of the nature of real rights or rights
in rem should be settled therein.
The decision appealed from is affirmed.

255

iv. Homesteader, purchaser of friar land and all persons who

claim to be in possession prior to issuance of their titles or
awards to public lands
De Castro v. Marcos and Akia
26 SCRA 644
Facts:
Rufino Akia before the Court of First Instance of Baguio City, acting
as a cadastral court, for the reopening of cadastral proceedings,
pursuant to Republic Act 931. Respondent Akia there sought the
registration in his name of 15,922 square meters of land situated in
the City of Baguio. On July 30, 1965, petitioner Virginia L. de Castro
moved to intervene. Her interest is in the 1,000 square meters
allegedly included in the 15,922 square meters of land specified in
respondent Akia's petition below. It appears that petitioner Virginia de
Castro filed with the Bureau of Lands Township Sales Application
[TSAV-3559 (E-V-405)] covering a 1,000 square meter-parcel of land
identified as Lot 1, Quezon Hill Subdivision, Residential Section "K",
Baguio City. It was surveyed for which she paid a fee of P150.00 on
October 21, 1955. Public auction, duly published, was conducted at
which petitioner de Castro was the highest bidder. On December 17,
1955, the lot was awarded in her favor at a cost of P4.30 per square
meter, or a total of P4,300.00. Petitioner fully paid the purchase price
which, with interests, amounted to P4,306.38. Petitioner, it is claimed,
had been paying taxes on the lot.On August 16, 1965, petitioner's
motion for intervention, despite Akia's opposition, was granted by the
court below.
Issues
1. Whether the question of jurisdiction is meritorious
2. Whether petitioner Virginia L. de Castro has legal standing in the
proceedings.
3. Whether the plight of petitioner has effect on the case?
Ruling:
The thrust of petitioner's argument is that the reopening of the
cadastral case below is jurisdictionally tainted by lack of publication.
Respondent Akia's petition for reopening was instituted
under Republic Act 931, effective June 20, 1953. The foregoing
256

provision establishes the procedure for reopening cadastral

proceedings. Such procedure does not include publication. Neither is
publication mentioned in any of the other provisions of Republic Act
931. Section 1 above-quoted merely states that "the competent Court
of First Instance, upon receiving such petition, shall notify the
Government, through the Solicitor General." About two years back,
we held in a case, that under Republic Act 931, it is unnecessary to
furnish the Director of Forestry a copy of the reopening petition
"inasmuch as said Act [931] only required service thereof to the
Solicitor General."The Court held that the authority of the cadastral
court over the reopening proceedings below is not impaired by failure
of publication. In an early case, this Court declared that mere citizens
could have no interest in public land. Under Republic Act 931, the
petition for reopening is narrowed down by the specific conditions
therein set forth. It bears repetition to say that said petition is possible
"onlywith respect to such of said parcels of land as have not been
alienated, reserved, leased, granted or otherwise provisionally or
permanently disposed of by the Government." The statute made it
abundantly clear that judicial proceedings shall be reopened only, if
the cadastral court "shall find that all conditions herein established
have been complied with." Thus it is, that the alienation, reservation,
lease, grant or any provisional or permanent disposition by the
government of the land claimed should suffice to bar reopening.The
Court ruled that petitioner has legal standing before the cadastral
court.
3. Respondent judge should have taken all these facts into
consideration. While petitioner's plea for reconsideration before the
Bureau of Lands was pending, appeal by petitioner from respondent
judge's order would have been futile. For, there was then nothing
definite on which to base her appeal. So, there was really nothing to
do but to wait. Upon the other hand, respondent judge should have
taken stock of the fact that petitioner was at an obvious disadvantage.
The writ of certiorari is hereby granted; the orders of December 4,
1965, February 1, 1966, and March 2, 1966 dismissing the opposition
filed by petitioner Virginia L. de Castro in the matter of the petition for
reopening of judicial proceedings by respondent Rufito Akia (Civil
Res. Case No. 1, G.L.R.O. Record No. 211, Court of First Instance of
Baguio, Branch I), are hereby annulled; and the respondent judge or
whoever may take his place is hereby directed to reinstate petitioner's
257

opposition aforesaid and to decide the case on the merits.

v. The failure of the government to file an opposition, despite

receipt of notice, does not deprive it of its right to appeal a
decision adjudicating the land as private property
HEIRS OF MARINA C. REGALADO AND HEIRS OF ARNULFO C.
REGALADO, REPRESENTED BY AMADEO C. REGALADO vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 168155

February 15, 2007

Facts:
Marina Regalado filed on July 14, 1987 an application for registration
of a parcel of land situated in Sitio Balubad, Barrio Nangka, Marikina,
Metro Manila. The application was published on November 14, 1988
in the Official Gazette and in a newspaper of general circulation.
Marina subsequently filed on January 18, 1991 a motion to withdraw
the application without prejudice to the refiling of the same, citing as
grounds the discrepancies on the question of the survey and
accession number corresponding to the survey plan of the property
and for another reason that the inevitable absence of applicant from
the country to arrange and assist in the intestate estate of her late
widowed sister whose children [were] all minors in London.
The motion to withdraw the application was granted.
On March 17, 1992, Marina filed a petition to reinstate the earlier
application which was withdrawn. The court denied the petition on a
technical ground. Subsequently, Marina filed another application for
land registration before the Pasig RTC.
258

Marina later filed on May 28, 1992 an "Amended Application for

Registration alleging, inter alia, that she had "by herself or through
her predecessor-in-interest have been in open, continuous and
notorious possession and occupation of said land which is alienable
and disposable of the public domain under a bona fide claim of
ownership since 1945 or earlier"; and that she acquired the land "by
virtue of a Deed of Assignment dated January 3, 1977 executed by
the registered claimant Tomas Antero as Assignor in her favor.
The National Housing Authority (NHA) filed an opposition on March
15, 1994, it claiming to be the owner of the property which it referred
to as the "Balubad Nangka Project" and which had been declared as
an Area for Priority Development under Proclamation No. 1967 dated
May 14, 1980. While the case is pending, Marina died as a result, her
eldest son Arnulfo Regalado pursue the land registration case in their
behalf. Arnulfo Regalado executed a Waiver of the "area covered by
the National Housing Authority without prejudice to the other land
subject of the petition. In the same Waiver, he ceded, transferred, and
waived 30,239 square meters of the property to the NHA.
Issue:
Whether Marina had been in open, continuous, and adverse
possession in the concept of an owner under a bona fide claim of
ownership to validly register said land?
Held:
Marina's heirs as applicants in this land registration case "bear the
burden of overcoming the presumption that the land sought to be
registered forms part of the public domain." This they failed to
discharge.
In addition, other than Marina's uncorroborated testimony given in a
previous attempt to have the property registered, there is not proof to
sustain the trial court's finding that Marina, her uncle, aunt, and other
relatives have been residing in the property for more than 30 years
and that she herself had been residing there for 15 years when a
Tomas Antero executed the deed of assignment in her favor.
In fine, the trial court's finding that Marina had been in open,
continuous, and adverse possession in the concept of owner under a
bona fide claim of ownership fails.
259

vi. Resolution/Disposition of buildings and improvements on

the land subject of registration, if there is no opposition
Fernandez vs Aboratigue
36 SCRA 476
Facts:
Ana P. Fernandez is the owner of a parcel of land where the father of
defendant Feliza Aboratigue, was during his lifetime employed as
guard at one of the gates to the property, and as such was allowed to
plant fruit trees in a small portion in the immediate vicinity; and that
after his death the said defendant, together with her husband
Restituto Bacnan, were allowed to stay therein, but that later on they
claimed to be the owners of the said portion. In their answer to the
complaint the defendants alleged, as basis of their claim of
ownership, continuous possession and cultivation of the disputed
area, by themselves and through their predecessors-in-interest since
the year 1901. On January 28, 1959 the Court denied the motion and
on the basis of the facts stipulated rendered judgment or the plaintiff,
declaring her to be the owner of the disputed property and ordering
the defendants to vacate the same, with right to reimbursement of the
value of the improvements thereon, they being builders in good faith.
Issue:
Whether a mere claim can defeat a registered title.
260

Held:
No,It is obvious that a mere claim cannot defeat a registered title.
Furthermore, the "claim" here is only noted on the survey plan, and
such notation cannot prevail over the actual decree of registration as
reproduced in the certificate. All claims of third persons to the
property must be asserted in the registration proceedings. If any
claim to a portion thereof is upheld, that portion is segregated from
the property applied for, and is not included in the decree of
registration and certificate of title subsequently issued to the
applicant. If it is included, the claim is deemed adversely resolved
with finality, subject only to a petition for review of the decree within
one year from its issuance on the ground of fraud, under Section 38
of the Land Registration Act.
The rule is that the owner of buildings and improvements should
claim them during the proceedings for registration and the fact of
ownership, if upheld by the court, must be noted on the face of the
certificate. There is no such notation here in favor of the appellants.
However, inasmuch as the improvements in the disputed area have
been acknowledgment by plaintiff in her complaint as belonging to the
appellants' predecessor-in-interest, and the lower court's decision
allowing them to recover the value of the improvements is not now in
question, this right of the appellants must be upheld. The trial court
has left the determination of such value to mutual agreement
between the parties. This disposition should be modified in the sense
that if they fail to agree, the matter should be submitted to the said
court for hearing and adjudication.

261

b. Contents
i. Names and addresses of adjoining owners
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ANTONIO BACAS et al..
G.R. No. 182913 November 20, 2013
Facts:
262

The Bacases filed their Application for Registration on November 12,

1964 covering a parcel of land together with all the improvements
found thereon, located in Patag, Cagayan de Oro City with Lot No.
4354 of the Cadastral Survey of Cagayan, L.R.C. Record No. 1612.
They alleged ownership in fee simple of the property and indicated in
their application the names and addresses of the adjoining owners,
as well as a statement that the Philippine Army (Fourth Military Area)
recently occupied a portion of the land by their mere tolerance.
The director of the Bureau of Lands, registered its written opposition
and on On April 10, 1968, based on the evidence presented by the
Bacases, the Land Registration Court (LRC) rendered a decision
holding that the applicants had conclusively established their
ownership over the subject land and that their possession, including
that of their predecessor-in-interest, had been open, adverse,
peaceful, uninterrupted, and in concept of owners for more than forty
(40) years. No appeal was interposed by the Republic from the
decision of the LRC. Thus, the decision became final and executory,
resulting in the issuance of a decree and the corresponding certificate
of title over the subject property
The LRCs decision in both applications for registration the Republic
filed a complaint for annulment of titles against the Bacases and the
Chabons before the RTC. More specifically, on September 7, 1970 or
one (1) year and ten (10) months from the issuance of OCT No. 0358, a civil case for annulment, cancellation of original certificate of
title, reconveyance of lot or damages was filed by the Republic
against the Bacases.
The Republic averred that the subject land had long been reserved in
1938 for military purposes at the time it was applied for and, so, it
was no longer disposable and subject to registration. The RTC
dismissed the complaints of the Republic they ruled that the
respondents did not commit fraud in filing their applications for
registration.The CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC. Thus, the appeal
on the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the applications for registration of the subject parcels
of land should be allowed.
263

Held:
The Republic can question even final and executory judgment when
there was fraud.
It can also question a final and executory judgment when the LRC
had no jurisdiction over the land in question. With respect to the
Bacases, although the lower courts might have been correct in ruling
that there was substantial compliance with the requirements of law
when they alleged that Camp Evangelista was an occupant, the
Republic is not precluded and estopped from questioning the validity
of the title.
The success of the annulment of title does not solely depend on the
existence of actual and extrinsic fraud, but also on the fact that a
judgment decreeing registration is null and void.
A mere casual cultivation of portions of the land by the claimant, and
the raising thereon of cattle, do not constitute possession under claim
of ownership. In that sense, possession is not exclusive and
notorious as to give rise to a presumptive grant from the State.

c. Partial Opposition
i. Sufficiency of unverified opposition
MILLER vs. DIRECTOR OF LANDS
Facts:
A parcel of land in Tigbao, Milagros, Masbate was applied for
registration in the Court of First Instance of Masbate on June 18,
1956 by John M. Miller and Emilio Espinosa, Jr. After notice and
264

publication, initial hearing was held on June 20, 1957. The Director of
Lands and Bureau of Public Highways filed written oppositions.
Thirty-five individuals appeared and expressed verbal oppositions. All
persons, except the abovementioned oppositors, were declared in
default on July 8, 1957. On July 24, 1958 applicants started
presenting evidence and the private oppositors were given five days
to file written opposition. Of the oppositors, 28 filed written but
unverified opposition. On August 20, 1958 applicants finished
adducing evidence and rested their case. On August 27, 1958 the
private oppositors presented their first witness. After his crossexamination, counsel for applicants called the Court's attention to the
lack of verification in the opposition filed by the private oppositors and
moved to dismiss the same. The private oppositors offered to verify
their opposition. After parties had filed memoranda, the court issued
an order on January 13, 1959 dismissing the unverified opposition,
without pronouncement as to costs Motion for reconsideration was
denied by order dated November 18, 1959.
Issue:
The sufficiency of unverified opposition.
Ruling:
Without objecting to the unverified opposition, they proceeded with
the trial, presented evidence and rested their case. Only after the first
witness of the private oppositors had testified and applicants' counsel
had cross-examined him, was the defect of lack of verification
brought up. By that time, applicants had waived the defect. The act of
proceeding to trial on the merits without objection is generally a
waiver of all uncertainties, ambiguities, irregularities, formal defects,
of fault or defects of any kind in the pleading of the adverse party.

265

d. Affirmative Relief in Opposition

D. Order of Default
a. General Default
b. Special Default
c. Distinctions between General and Special Default
d. Effects of Default
i. entered against the whole world hence all persons are
bound by the order of default
CACHERO VS. MARZAN
196 SCRA 601 1991
Facts:
The Spouses Cachero filed a case in the CFI of La Union against the
respondents for recovery of possession and ownership of 2 parcels of
266

land in Barrio Basca, Aringay, LaUnion. The lower court rendered

judgment declaring the petitioners owners of the subject land. The
judgment became final and executory. About 7 years later the
Spouses Cachero filed for the registration under the Torrens Act of
the subject land (109,480 sq. m.) identified as Lot No. 6860 of the
Cadastral Survey and another parcel of land (50,412 square meters)
identified as Lot No. 6859 of the same Cadastral Survey, both lots
being situated in Sitio Iriw, Basca Aringay, La Union. Subsequently,
Atty. Yaranon filed oppositions in said case in behalf of the
respondents Tomas Cachero died before judgment and was
substituted
by
hischildren.The judgment was rendered in favor of the spouses findin
g that the spouses and their predecessors-in-interest had been
in continuous and notorious possession of subject lots for more than
60 years in concept of owners except for a one-hectare portion of Lot
No. 6860 which the Cacheros had sold to Bernardino Marzan; that
Tomas Cachero had inherited said lots from his late father, Simeon
Cachero; and that the applicant spouses had been religiously paying
the realty taxes on the parcels of land as owners thereof. The
respondents thru their counsel, Atty. Yaranon, filed a motion for
reconsiderationon the ground that the Court had no jurisdiction over
the case and that the subject lands, which have been the subject
of cadastral proceedings, showed that neither the Cacheros nor their
predecessors-in-interest had ever entered a claim for either lot. The
Cacheros opposed the motion and argued that by the time the motion
for reconsideration was filed, the judgment sought to be reconsidered
had already become final. The motion was denied. About 7 months
after the filing of the motion for reconsideration, persons not parties to
the registration proceedings filed a "
petition for review of judgment and/or decree
." They alleged that they were the owners of the land designated as
Lot No. 6859 which they purchased sometime in 1929 and that they
have been in continuous possession thereof since then. They also
alleged that the petitioners fraudulently omitted to give them notice of
their application for registration and that in the earlier cadastral
survey, Lots Numbered6859 and 6860 had been declared public land
for lack of any original claimant and at the cadastral hearing only the
Director of Lands, the Director of Forestry, and they had file cadastral
answer. The petition prayed for the re-opening, review and setting
aside of the judgment and for the accord to them of an opportunity to
267

prove their asserted contentions. The petition for review was denied.
The Registration Court ruled that the according to the report of the
chief surveyor of the Land Registration Commission, there was no
decree of registration issued as regards the subject lots. It also ruled
that the movants had failed to show fraud on the Cacheros' part.
Paulina Nodo and Felix Genova subsequently died and were
substituted by their heirs. These Genova heirs filed an amended
petition which was also denied by the Registration Court. Then, they
appealed the case to the Court of Appeals which forwarded it to the
Supreme Court, holding that the former had no appellate
jurisdiction over the matter. The CA also declared that the Genovas
are third persons who came into the case.
Issue:
WON the cadastral proceedings should be deemed as a bar to the
Registration Proceedings.
Held:
NO, the cadastral case mentioned commenced before the outbreak
of the Pacific war. It had been abandoned and had not been
continued or resumed after the war, thus, it had ceased to exist.
Hence, said compulsory cadastral proceedings under the Cadastral
Act cannot be invoked and set up as a bar to the registration
proceedings under the Torrens Act initiated more than twenty years
later by the Cacheros. A cadastral proceeding which had long
discontinued and abandoned, and which had resulted in no judgment
or final order affecting the lands involved in a subsequent registration
act under Act496, cannot be invoked and set up as a bar to the latter
proceedings. There being no final adjudication in the cadastral
proceeding, there is no reason to apply the doctrine of res judicata.
Moreover, the Genovas were and are bound by the order of default
issued in Land Reg. Case No. N-824, a proceeding undoubtedly in
rem in character. That default order was entered "against the whole
world," with the exception only of the parties who had appeared and
filed pleadings in the registration case.

268

ii. All allegations are deemed confessed

BASILISA S. ESCONDE vs.HON. SAMILO N. BARLONGAY and
RAMON V. DELFIN
G.R. No. L-67583 July 31, 1987
Facts:
Ramon Delfin (private respondent) filed an application for a parcel of
land located in Valenzuela, Bulacan. It was granted and now covered
with an OCT issued by the Registry of Deeda, Bulacan.
Delfin as an applicant, filed for a petition for Writ of Possession
against spouses Francisco and Basilisa Esconde, as they have been
occupying the said land. Subsequently, on March of 1978 the
opposition filed by the petitioner was denied by Judge Bautista.
269

Moreover, Judge constantino, who took over the same branch

presided over judge Bautista issued an order for Writ of Possession
against the spouses. Immediately, petitioner filed a motion to quash
which was denied.
Petitioner then filed complaint for conveyance against Delfin which
was rebutted by the latter via motion to dismiss on the ground that (1)
the cause of action, if any, is barred by re judicata (2) the complaint
fails to state sufficient cause or causes of action for reconveyance
and (3) the plaintiff is barred by prescription or laches from filing the
case.
Thereafter, petitioner filed a rejoinder to motion to dismiss and motion
for leave of court. The sheriff then, upon the courts order, delivered
possession to Delfin however he was barred in entering the premises.
Delfin filed a motion for an Alias writ of possession which was
granted.
The sheriff turned over the possession to the representative of Delfin,
however, when the latter went to the premises he was again barred
by the petitioner. Then, Delfine asked for demolition and he moved for
a second alias writ of possession which was again, granted.
Subsequently, the writ of reconveyance filed by the petitioner was
dismissed. After which motions and motions have been filed. The
second resolve the issue, a temporary restraining order directing the
sheriff and Delfin to refrain from enforcing and/or carrying out the
third alias writ of possession. Petitioner then filed motion to amend
the resolution and TRO, either nullifying third alias writ of possession
served or to issue a mandatory injunction which was denied by the
said court.

Issue:
1. Whether petitioner's cause of action is barred by res judicata; and
2. Whether petitioner's motion to admit amended complaint and for
issuance of restraining order and/or preliminary injunction is proper.
270

Ruling:
The petition is devoid of merit.
Land registration proceedings in this case commenced on April 14,
1969 and decision thereon was rendered on December 8, 1969.
Hence, the law in force at the time was Act 496, P.D. 1529 (otherwise
known as Property Registration Decree) having taken effect only on
Jan. 23, 1979.
Petitioner's claim that she came to know of the land registration case
only upon receipt of a Petition for Writ of Possession is completely
rebutted by private respondent's evidence. In the notice of Initial
Hearing (Rollo, p. 148-a) she is one of those cited to appear; in the
Survey Notification Letter (Rollo, p. 148-c) her husband was notified
of the scheduled survey of the land as indicated by his signature
opposite his name and in the Surveyor's Certificate (Rollo, p. 148-b)
her husband was reported one of the adjoining owners present.
There is no question that notice to her husband is notice to her under
the law, her husband being the administrator of the conjugal
partnership (Art. 165, Civil Code). Otherwise stated, there was no
concealment on the part of private respondent. In fact, the records
show that private respondent stated in his application for registration
of title that a portion of the land was being occupied by petitioner
sometime in September 1967, by breaking the stone wall fence
without his knowledge and consent. However, petitioner and her
husband, despite the chance given them to be heard in the land
registration proceedings, opted not to appear.
Thus, as aptly stated by respondent Judge, "A land registration
proceedings which is in rem, is valid and conclusive against the
whole world. The failure of the plaintiff and her husband, despite the
notice of the publication and posting by the sheriff of the notice of
hearing, to oppose the defendant's application for registration will bar
her from filing this action."

271

e. Remedy of a defaulted interested person

f. It is improper to declare a person in default simply because he
failed to appear at the pre-trial after filing an opposition. Remedy
is the special civil action of certiorari not an appeal.
Director of Lands vs. Santiago
G.R. No. L-41278, April 15, 1988
272

Facts:
This is a petition for certiorari, to nullify and set aside the orders and
decision of the respondent Judge, and mandamus to order the
respondent Judge to give due course to the petitioners Motion for
New Trial. The petitioner also prays for the dismissal of the
respondent corporations application for registration. On Sept. 8,
1973, an application for land registration was filed by respondent
Garcia in the CFI of Bataan. A copy of the application was forwarded
to the SolGen thru the director of Lands. On Feb. 19, 1974, the
Director of lands filed an opposition to this application, and at the
same time the SolGen entered his appearance and authorized the
Provincial Fiscal to appear on his behalf at the hearing of the same.
Subsequently, respondent IMPERIAL DEVELOPMENT CORP., with
the conformity of the respondent Garcia, filed a Motion to Substitute
Party Applicant from Maria Garcia to Imperial Corp without amending
the boundaries of the area stated in the original application. Said
motion was granted by the respondent Judge Santiago. A notice of
initial hearing was sent by respondent Judge to all parties concerned,
with the warning that a party who failed to appear would be declared
in default. The same notice was likewise published in the Official
Gazette and posted by the sheriff as required by law. On Jan. 23,
1975, the date of the initial hearing, neither petitioner nor his counsel
was present; an order of general default was issued by the
respondent Judge on the same date. After the reception of the
evidence for the applicant before the clerk of court, the respondent
Judge rendered the questioned decision and adjudicated the lands in
favor of the respondent corporation. Thereafter, petitioner filed a
Motion for New Trial on the grounds that the failure of his counsel to
appear at the initial hearing was excusable,a nd that the decision was
contrary to facts and to law. The motion was however denied.
Issue:
WON respondent Judge Santiago erred in decreeing the following
orders and decisions:
1. Admitting the Amended Application for Registration and
adjudicating the parcels of land in favor of respondent corporation,
273

2. Declaring the Director of Lands in default,

3. Denying the petitioners Motion for New Trial.;

Held:
The petition is GRANTED; the Order of general default against the
petitioner, and the Order denying the Motion for New Trial, the
Decision dated February 17, 1975, as well as the decree of
registration issued pursuant thereto, if any, are all declared VOID and
SET ASIDE. The respondent corporations subject application for land
registration is hereby DISMISSED. This decision is IMMEDIATELY
EXECUTORY. The lower court gravely abused its discretion when it
granted the respondent corporations application for registration,
without sufficient proof that the applicant possessed an imperfect and
incomplete title that is registrable under Sec. 48, par. b, of
Commonwealth Act 141, as amended by Republic Act 6236,
otherwise known as the Public Land Act. The Supreme Court is not
convinced with the conclusion of the respondent Judge and with the
arguments of the respondent corporation that the latter, through its
predecessors-in- interest, has been in open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the
public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership,
for at least thirty years.
First, it appears that Maria Garcia and Vicente Obdin, from whom the
respondent corporation purchased the subject lots, have pending
sales applications as evidenced in the plans submitted to the land
registration court by Maria Garcia herself. As such sales applicants,
they manifestly acknowledge that they do not own the land and that
the same is a public land under the administration of the Bureau of
Lands, to which the applications were submitted. Therefore, their
possession was not that of an owner, as required by law. (The private
respondents were conspicuously silent on this point, as if they were
trying to conceal this vital fact)
274

More than anything else, however, registration in this instance cannot

be granted on the basis of Section 48, paragraph b, of the Public
Land Act as said provision applies exclusively to agricultural lands of
the public domain. It appears from Forestry Administrative Order No.
4-1157, dated April 28, 1971, that the subject landswere forest
lands and only later declared as alienable or disposable by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. Thus, even on the
assumption that the applicant herein, through its predecessors-ininterest, had been in possession for at least thirty years, such
possession never ripened into private ownership. The respondent
Garcia and Vicente Obdin must have applied for sales patents
precisely because they wanted to acquire ownership over the subject
lands. An examination of the dates will show that the filing of the
sales applications, apparently on October 24, 1971, was done after
the lands had been declared as alienable and disposable.
The opposition or answer filed by the Director of Lands, which is
based on substantial grounds, having been formally filed prior to the
issuance of the Notice of Initial Hearing, it was improper for the
respondent Judge taking cognizance of such registration case to
declare the oppositor in default simply because he failed to appear on
the day set for the initial hearing. The declaration of default against
the petitioner was patently invalid because when the same was
made, he had already entered an appearance and filed his opposition
or answer.
The pertinent provision of law which states: If no person appears and
answers within the time allowed, the court may at once upon motion
of the applicant, no reason to the contrary appearing, order a general
default to be recorded , cannot be interpreted to mean that the
court can just disregard the answer before it, which has long been
filed, for such an interpretation would be nothing less than illogical,
unwarranted, and unjust
Especially in this case where the greater public interest is involved as
the land sought to be registered is alleged to be public land, the
respondent Judge should have received the applicants evidence and
set another date for the reception of the oppositors evidence. The
oppositor in the Court below and petitioner herein should have been
accorded ample opportunity to establish the governments claim.
275

The respondent Judge, in denying the petitioners Motion for New

Trial, ignored the established rule that courts should be liberal in
setting aside a default judgment. The Court, in the exercise of wise
discretion, could have restored their standing in court and given them
an even chance to face their opponents.
The Supreme Court no longer deem it imperative to order a new trial
of this case which would only prolong the litigation unnecessarily, for
as it said in a recent case, the remand of a case to the lower court for
Lither reception of evidence is not necessary where the court is in a
position to resolve the dispute based on the records before on the
records before it.
In view of the basic presumption that lands of whatever classification
belong to the State, courts must scrutinize with care applications to
private ownership of real estate. But this the respondent Judge sadly
failed to heed; the tax declarations and plans submitted by the private
respondents were not carefully analyzed, and the allegations in the
petitioners opposition to the application were so casually ignored.

OMICO MINING AND INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION and

FREDERICK G. WEBBER vs. JUDGE AMADOR T. VALLEJOS, in
his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Cavite,
ALFREDO CATOLICO, and LEONARDO ALCID, in his capacity as
City Sheriff of Manila

[G.R. No. L-38974, March 25, 1975]

276

Facts:

On June 1, 1973, Alfredo Catolico, filed against Omico Mining and

Industrial Corporation and Frederick G. Webber, the latter in his
personal capacity and as President and Chairman of the Board of
Directors of said corporation, alleging first, for the return of ten (10)
certificates of stock of the corporation borrowed from him by the
defendants, and the second, for the payment of his services as legal
counsel for the corporation. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint on two grounds: namely (1) improper venue, in that the
case was filed in Cavite where plaintiff is not a resident, the truth
being that he is a resident of Quezon City where he has his
permanent family home; and, as to the second cause of action, the
contract of personal and professional services between plaintiff and
defendants was entered into in the City of Manila, and, therefore, the
case should have been filed in Manila in accordance with Section I of
Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court; and (2) lack of cause of action,
in that with regard to the stock certificates the same are in the name
of Vicente Resonda; and, with respect to the contract of personal and
professional services wherein it was agreed that the plaintiff shall
head the legal department of defendant Omico Mining & Industrial
Corporation.
On June 16, 1973, the date set for the hearing of the motion to
dismiss, neither the parties nor their respective counsels appeared in
court. While the motion to dismiss was pending resolution by the
court because defendants had not yet presented to the court the
required proof of service, plaintiff, on January 11, 1974, filed a petition
to declare the defendants in default that defendants had been served
with summons and copies of the complaint on June 8, 1973; that as
of January 11, 1974, or after a lapse of seven (7) months from the
service of summons, defendants had not filed their answer to the
complaint. The court granted the petition and, consequently, it
received ex parte the evidence of the plaintiff and rendered judgment
in favor of Catolico. Defendants filed a motion for reconsideration but
Catolico file a motion to postpone hearing of motion for
reconsideration.

277

On May 31, 1974, while defendants' motion for reconsideration was

still pending before the court because the defendants had not filed yet
their reply to the opposition as they had not received a copy, Catolico
filed a motion for immediate execution of judgment, alleging that said
judgment had already become final and executory because the
defendants failed to have the order of default lifted; that the motion for
reconsideration was filed out of time; that there was a "manifest
attempt on the part of the defendants to delay the proceedings to
afford them an opportunity to have all their assets and shares
dissipated by continuous sale of the same to the prejudice". Thence,
the court denied the defendants motion for reconsideration.
Defendants filed their notice of appeal. On July 22, Pio R. Marcos, as
President and Chairman of the Board of Directors of defendant
Omico Mining and Industrial Corporation, wrote a letter to respondent
Sheriff asking that the defendants be given a little chance to exhaust
the legal remedies available to hold in abeyance the execution and
garnishment for the reasons that defendants were not given a chance
to have their day in court in the motion for immediate execution of
judgment and that they have already appealed from the lower court's
decision and order of immediate execution.

Issue:

Whether respondent Judge acted without or in excess of jurisdiction

or with grave abuse of discretion in declaring the defendants in
default, in receiving plaintiff's evidence ex parte and in rendering
judgment.

Held:
278

The Supreme Court ruled that the respondent Judge acted with grave
abuse of discretion when he declared the petitioners in default. The
motion to dismiss was pending before the court when such
declaration was made, and it is generally irregular to enter an order of
default while a motion to dismiss remains pending and undisposed of.
The irregularity of the order of default is evident from the fact that
when the petitioners were declared in default, their time for filing an
answer had not yet commenced to run anew because on said date,
their counsel had not yet received any notice of the action taken by
the court on their motion to dismiss. There may be cases where the
attendance of certain circumstances "may be considered substantive
enough to truncate the adverse literal application of the pertinent
rules violated." Inasmuch as petitioners were declared in default while
their motion to dismiss was still pending resolution, they were,
therefore, incorrectly declared in default, and the holding of the trial of
the case on the merits, in their absence, without due notice to them of
the date of hearing, was a denial of due process. Consequently, the
order of default, the judgment and the order of execution are patent
nullities.

279

g. Motion to dismiss grounded on res judicata is allowed in land

registration cases. Rules of Court apply in a suppletory
character whenever applicable or convenient.
VALISNO vs. PLAN
143 SCRA 502
Facts:
Petitioners purchased 2 parcels of land from the family of Blancos
and subsequently declared ownership over the land for taxation
purposes and took possession thereof by assigning a caretaker over
the property who built his house thereon. Respondent Cayaba claims
to be the owner of the property by virtue of a deed of sale executed in
his and Bienvenido Noriegas favor from the heirs of Verano and
280

ousted the caretaker from the property and constructed an apartment

thereon. Petitioners filed an action for recovery of possession of the
land. The court decided in favor of the petitioner but on appeal, the
CA reversed the decision and dismissed the complaint of the
petitioner on grounds that the description of the property in the
complaint is different from the subdivision plan provided by the
respondents with their respective area and boundaries appearing to
be completely different. The court did not find any compliance to the
requirement of the law that the property in dispute must be clearly
identified. Contrasting the evidence of the respondent and petitioner,
the court choose the respondents evidence as they were able to
provide a vicinity plan that shows the land position in relation to the
adjoining properties with known boundaries and landmarks. Petitioner
merely presented a sketch prepared by Dr. Blanco constituting as
mere guess works. Subsequently, the respondents filed a petition for
registration of the property before the CFI which was opposed by the
petitioner. The CFI dismissed the opposition on ground of
res judicata thus this appeal before the SC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Motion to Dismiss filed by the petitioner
should be granted.
RULING:
The SC held that the Land Registration Act does not provide for
pleading similar to a motion to dismiss but the Rules of Court allows
its application in land registration proceeding as only suppletory when
it is practicable and convenient. Therefore, the court may sustain a
motion to dismiss in land registration proceeding as the case at bar.
Noted by the court in the ordinary civil case, the counterclaim can be
taken as a complaint where the defendantbecomes the plaintiff. The
original plaintiff thus becomes defendant in the counterclaim and he
may choose to answer the counterclaim or be declared in default or
file a motion to dismiss the same. The respondent clearly opted for
the last choice. The SC held that res judicata operates in the case at
bar with its requisites present in the case: [a] the former judgment
must be final, [b] it must have been' rendered by a court having
jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the parties, [c] it must be a
judgment on the merits and [d] there must be between the first and
second actions identity of parties, of subject matter and of cause of
action. The inclusion of private respondent Cayaba's co-owner,
Bienvenido Noriega, Sr., in the application for registration does not
281

result in a difference in parties between the two cases. The

employment of two different actions does not allow one to escape
against the principle of res judicata where one and the same cause of
action cannot be litigated twice. Although the first action was litigated
before a competent court of general jurisdiction and the other over a
registration court is of no significance since that both courts should be
of equal jurisdiction is not a requisite for res judicata to apply. For
convenience, the SC should decide whether to dismiss the
application for registration or the opposition thereto. Because the
conflicting claims of both parties have been settled and decided by
the court previously, it upheld the finality of its decision and dismissed
the petition.
E. Hearing
a. Speedy Hearing
b. Rules of procedure applicable
i. Order of trial
c. Burden of proof falls on applicant
Secretary of the DENR vs. Yap
G.R. No. 167707 October 8, 2008
Facts:
On November 10, 1978, then President Marcos issued Proc.
No. 1801 declaring Boracay Island as a tourist zone and marine
reserve. President Marcos later approved the issuance of PTA
Circular 3-82 to implement Proclamation No. 1801. Claiming that
Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No 3-82 precluded them
from filing an application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title or
survey of land for titling purposes, respondents-claimants Mayor Yap,
Jr., and others filed a petition for declaratory relief with the RTC of
Kalibo, Aklan. They declared that they themselves, or through their
predecessors-in-interest, had been in open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious possession and occupation in Boracay since June 12,
1945, or earlier since time immemorial. Respondents-claimants
posited that Proclamation No. 1801 and its implementing Circular did
not place Boracay beyond the commerce of man. Since the Island
was classified as a tourist zone, it was susceptible of private
ownership.
282

The Republic, through the OSG, opposed the petition for declaratory
relief. The OSG countered that Boracay Island was an unclassified
land of the public domain. It formed part of the mass of lands
classified as public forest, which was not available for disposition
pursuant to Section 3(a) of the Revised Forestry Code, as amended.
On July 14, 1999, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of
respondents-claimants. The Republic then appealed to the CA. In
2004, the appellate court affirmed in toto the RTC decision. On May
22, 2006, during the pendency of the petition in the trial court,
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation No.
1064 classifying Boracay Island partly reserved forest land (protection
purposes) and partly agricultural land (alienable and disposable).
On August 10, 2006, petitioners-claimants Sacay, and other
landowners in Boracay filed with this Court an original petition for
prohibition, mandamus, and nullification of Proclamation No.
1064. They alleged that the Proclamation infringed on their prior
vested rights over portions of Boracay. On November 21, 2006, this
Court ordered the consolidation of the two petitions.
Issue:
Whether or not the private claimants have a right to secure titles over
their occupied portions in Boracay.
Held:
NO. The petitions were DENIED. The decision of the Court of
Appeals was reversed.
Except for lands already covered by existing titles, Boracay was an
unclassified land of the public domain prior to Proclamation No. 1064.
Such unclassified lands are considered public forest under PD No.
705.
PD No. 705 issued by President Marcos categorized all unclassified
lands of the public domain as public forest. Section 3(a) of PD No.
705 defines a public forest as a mass of lands of the public domain
which has not been the subject of the present system of classification
for the determination of which lands are needed for forest purpose
283

and which are not. Applying PD No. 705, all unclassified lands,
including those in Boracay Island, are ipso facto considered public
forests. PD No. 705, however, respects titles already existing prior to
its effectivity. A positive act declaring land as alienable and
disposable is required.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LEE

G.R. No. L-64818 May 13, 1991
Facts:
On June 29, 1976, respondent Maria P. Lee filed before the then CFI
of Pangasinan, an application for registration in her favor of a parcel
of land consisting of 6,843 square meters, more or less, located at
Mangaldan, Pangasinan. The Director of Lands, in representation of
the Republic of the Philippines, filed an opposition, alleging that
neither the applicant nor her predecessors-in-interest have acquired
the land under any of the Spanish titles or any other recognized mode
for the acquisition of title; that neither she nor her predecessors-ininterest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession of the land in concept of owner at least thirty years
immediately preceding the filing of the application; and that the land is
a portion of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the
Philippines.
Issue:
Whether the land applied for has been in the possession of her
respondents predecessors-in-interest for more than 20 years and
constitute the "well-nigh incontrovertible" and "conclusive" evidence
required in the proceedings
Held:
284

No. It is incumbent upon private respondent to prove that the alleged

twenty year or more possession of the spouses Urbano Diaz and
Bernarda Vinluan which supposedly formed part of the thirty years
period prior to the filing of the application, was open, continuous,
exclusive, notorious and in concept of owners. This burden, private
respondent failed to discharge to the satisfaction of the Court. The
bare assertion that the spouses Urbano Diaz and Bernarda Vinluan
had been in possession of the property for more than twenty years
found in private respondent's declaration is hardly the "well-nigh
incontrovertible" evidence required in cases of this nature.
LARAGAN VS CA

G.R. No. L-47644 August 21, 1987

Facts:
On 14 October 1968, the herein petitioners filed an application with
the CFI of Isabela for the registration of their title over a parcel of land
with an area of 221,667 sq. m., more or less, situated in the Barrio of
Sto. Tomas, Ilagan, Isabela. The applicants alleged that they acquired
said parcel of land by way of an absolute deed of sale from the
spouses Anastacio and Lucrecia Sibbaluca and that they have been
in possession thereof for more than 34 years. The Land Registration
Commission issued a notice of initial hearing. On 7 July 1969, the
Solicitor General filed a written opposition, on behalf of the Director of
Lands, alleging that the applicants and their predecessor-in-interest
do not have sufficient title to the parcel of land sought to be
registered. He prayed that the land be declared public land. On 2
August 1969, Teodoro Leano, Tomas Leano, Vicente Leano,
Francisco Leano, and Consolacion Leano filed their opposition to the
application claiming that they are the owners, pro indiviso, of the
southern part of the land applied for, with an area of 16 hectares of
their deceased parents and which has been in their possession for
more than 30 years.
285

The trial court rendered judgment confirming the title of the applicants
over the parcel of land applied for and ordering its registration in the
names of the applicants. The oppositors appealed to the CA. On 9
November 1977, the appellate court affirmed the judgment of the trial
court, but excluded the southern portion of the land applied for, the
appellate court declaring such excluded portion to be public land, and
part of the public domain, in view of the failure of the applicants and
oppositors to prove registrable title over the same. The petitioners
filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision but their motion was
denied.

Issue:

Whether the appellate court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction

in declaring the parcel of land in question as public land.
.
Held:

The argument is untenable. While it may be true that the Director of

Lands did not appeal from the decision of the trial court, his failure to
so appeal did not make the decision of the trial court final and
executory, in view of the appeal interposed by the other oppositors,
Teodoro Leano, Tomas Leano, Francisco Leano, and Consolacion
Leano, who also seek the confirmation of their imperfect title over the
land in question. Neither did such failure of the Director of Lands to
appeal foreclose the appellate court from declaring the land in
question to be public land, since the oppositors and the herein
petitioners are both seeking the registration of their title pursuant to
the provisions of Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Law where the
presumption always is that the land pertains to the state, and the
occupants and possessors claim an interest in the same, by virtue of
their imperfect title or continuous, open, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation under a bona fide claim of ownership for
286

the required number of years.

Besides, it is an established rule that an applicant for registration is
not necessarily entitled to have the land registered in his name simply
because no one appears to oppose his title and to oppose the
registration of the land. He must show, even in the absence of
opposition, to the satisfaction of the court, that he is the absolute
owner, in fee simple. Courts are not justified in registering property
under the Torrens system, simply because there is no opposition
offered. Courts may, even in the absence of any opposition, deny
registration of the land under the Torrens system, if the facts
presented do not show that the petitioner is the owner, in fee simple,
of the land which he seeks to register.
The petition is denied for lack of merit.

d. Quantum of Evidence required Competent, clear and

persuasive
REPUBLIC vs SAYO
Facts:
The respondent spouses filed an original application for registration of
a tract of land having an area of 33,950 hectares. Oppositions were
filed by the Government, through the Director of Lands and the
Director of Forestry, and some others. The case dragged on for about
twenty (20) years. The remaining area of 5,500 hectares was, under
the compromise agreement, adjudicated to and acknowledged as
owned by the Heirs of Casiano Sandoval, but out of this area, 1,500
hectares were assigned by the Casiano Heirs to their counsel, Jose
C. Reyes, in payment of his attorney's fees. In a decision rendered on
287

1981, the respondent Judge approved the compromise agreement

and confirmed the title and ownership of the parties in accordance
with its terms.
The Solicitor General contends that no evidence whatever was
adduced by the parties in support of their petitions for registration;
neither the Director of Lands nor the Director of Forest Development
had legal authority to enter into the compromise agreement; as
counsel of the Republic, he should have been but was not given
notice of the compromise agreement or otherwise accorded an
opportunity to take part therein; that he was not even served with
notice of the decision approving the compromise; it was the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Quirino Province that drew his
attention to the "patently erroneous decision" and requested him to
take immediate remedial measures to bring about its annulment.
The respondents contended that the Solicitor General's arguments
are premised on the proposition that the disputed land is public land,
but it is not.
Issue:
Whether there was no evidence adduced by the parties in support of
their petitions for registration

Held:
Yes. There was no competent evidence adduced by the parties in
support of their petitions for registration.
The assent of the Directors of Lands and Forest Development to the
compromise agreement did not and could not supply the absence of
evidence of title required of the private respondents
It thus appears that the decision of the Registration Court a quo is
based solely on the compromise agreement of the parties. But that
compromise agreement included private persons who had not
adduced any competent evidence of their ownership over the land
subject of the registration proceeding. Portions of the land in
288

controversy were assigned to persons or entities who had presented

nothing whatever to prove their ownership of any part of the land.
What was done was to consider the compromise agreement as proof
of title of the parties taking part therein, a totally unacceptable
proposition. The result has been the adjudication of lands of no little
extension to persons who had not submitted any substantiation at all
of their pretensions to ownership, founded on nothing but the
agreement among themselves that they had rights and interests over
the land.
In the proceeding at bar, it appears that the principal document relied
upon and presented by the applicants for registration, to prove the
private character of the large tract of land subject of their application,
was a photocopy of a certification of the National Library. But, as this
Court has already had occasion to rule, that Spanish
document cannot be considered a title to property, it not being one of
the grants made during the Spanish regime, and obviously not
constituting primary evidence of ownership. It is an inefficacious
document on which to base any finding of the private character of the
land in question.
It thus appears that the compromise agreement and the judgment
approving it must be, as they are hereby, declared null and void, and
set aside. Considerations of fairness however indicate the remand of
the case to the Registration Court so that the private parties may be
afforded an opportunity to establish by competent evidence their
respective claims to the property.
The decision of the respondent Judge complained of is annulled and
set aside.
DIRECTOR OF LANDS vs COURT OF APPEALS
Facts:
Teodoro Abistado filed a petition for original registration of his title
over 648 square meters of land under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
1529. The land registration court in its decision dated June 13, 1989
dismissed the petition for want of jurisdiction, in compliance with the
289

mandatory provision requiring publication of the notice of initial

hearing in a newspaper of general circulation. The case was elevated
to respondent Court of Appeals which, set aside the decision of the
trial court and ordered the registration of the title in the name of
Teodoro Abistado. The Court of Appeals ruled that it was merely
procedural and that the failure to cause such publication did not
deprive the trial court of its authority to grant the application.
Issue:
Whether the Director of Lands is correct that newspaper publication
of the notice of initial hearing in an original land registration case is
mandatory.
Held:
YES. Petition was granted. The pertinent part of Section 23 of
Presidential Decree No. 1529 requires publication of the notice of
initial hearing. It should be noted further that land registration is a
proceeding in rem. Being in rem, such proceeding requires
constructive seizure of the land as against all persons, including the
state, who have rights to or interests in the property. An in
rem proceeding is validated essentially through publication. This
being so, the process must strictly be complied with. The Supreme
Court has no authority to dispense with such mandatory
requirement. The law is unambiguous and its rationale clear. Time
and again, this Court has declared that where the law speaks in clear
and categorical language, there is no room for interpretation,
vacillation or equivocation; there is room only for application. There is
no alternative.

Judgment
a. Partial Judgment
b. Judgment confirms title
290

i.

Duty of land reg. officials to renderreport may extend even after

finality of judgment but not yet beyond one year from entry of
decree

ATTY. JOSE S. GOMEZ et,al. VS HON. COURT OF APPEALS,

G.R. No. 77770
Facts:
Petitioners applied for registration of several lots situated in
Bayambang, Pangasinan on August 30, 1968.The lots were among
those involved in the case of Government of the Philippine Islands vs.
Abran, wherein the Supreme Court declared Consolacion M. Gomez
owner of certain lots in Sitio Poponto Bayambang, Pangasinan.
Petitioners are the heirs of Teodoro Y. Gomez (father of Consolacion).
After notice and publication, and there being no opposition to the
application, the trial court issued an order of general default. On 5
August 1981, the court rendered its decision adjudicating the subject
lots in petitioners' favor.
On October 6, 1981, the trial court issued an order expressly stating
that the decision of August 5, 1981 had become final and directed
the Chief of the General Land Registration Office to issue the
corresponding decrees of registration over the lots adjudicated in the
decision of August 5, 1981.
On July 11, 1984, respondent Silverio G. Perez, Chief of the Division
of Original Registration, Land Registration Commission submitted a
report to the court a quo stating that portions of the land sought for
registration were covered by homestead patents issued in 1928 and
1929 and registered under the Land Registration Act. He
recommended that the decision of August 5, 1981 and the order of
October 6, 1981 be set aside. Petitioners opposed the report, pointing
out that no opposition was raised by the Bureau of Lands during the
registration proceedings and that the decision of August 5, 1981
should be implemented because it had long become final and
executory.
291

After hearing, the lower court rendered a second decision setting

aside the decision dated August 5, 1981 and the order dated October
6, 1981 for the issuance of decrees. Petitioners moved for
reconsideration but the motion was denied. AHence, this recourse.
Issue:
Whether the decision dated August 5, 1981 had become final and
executory, that it may no longer be reopened, reviewed, or set aside.
Ruling:
Petitioners anchor their claim on section 30 of P.D. No. 1529
(Property Registration Decree) which provides that, after judgment
has become final and executory, the court shall forthwith issue an
order to the Commissioner of Land Registration for the issuance of
the decree of registration and certificate of title. Petitioners contend
that section 30 should be read in relation to section 32 of P.D. 1529 in
that, once the judgment becomes final and executory under section
30, the decree of registration must issue as a matter of course. This
being the law, petitioners assert, when respondent Judge set aside in
his decision, dated 25 March 1985, the decision of 5 August 1981 and
the order of 6 October 1981, he clearly acted without jurisdiction.
Petitioners' contention is not correct. Unlike ordinary civil actions, the
adjudication of land in a cadastral or land registration proceeding
does not become final, in the sense of incontrovertibility until after the
expiration of one (1) year after the entry of the final decree of
registration.
Petition denied.

c. In whose name registration may be made; land may be dealt

with.
292

MENDOZA VS. CA
84 scra 76
Facts:
In 1964, it was proven that a parcel of land located in Sta. Maria,
Bulacan, is owned by Mendoza. Mendoza applied for a title. During
pendency of the application before the land registration court,
Mendoza sold the land to Daniel Cruz. The contract of sale was
admitted in court in lieu of the pending application for land title. The
registration court rendered a decision in July 1965, ordering the
registration of the two parcels of land in the name of Cruz subject to
the usufructuary rights of Mendoza.
The decision became final and executory. In 1968, however, upon
failure of Cruz to pay Mendoza, Mendoza petitioned that the title
issued in the name of Cruz be cancelled. The land registration court
ruled in favor of Mendoza on the ground that the court erred in its
earlier decision in issuing the land title to Cruz who was not a party
to the application of title initiated by Mendoza. Cruz appealed. The
Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Cruz.
Issue:

Whether the title can be dealt with in the name of a third party.

Ruling:

Yes. The Court of Appeals ruling must be sustained. First of all, it was
proven that Mendoza caused the registration in the name of Cruz
pursuant to their contract of sale. Second, Mendoza overlooks
Section 29 of the Land Registration Act which expressly authorizes
the registration of the land subject matter of a registration proceeding
in the name of the buyer (Cruz) or of the person to whom the land
293

has been conveyed by an instrument executed during the interval of

time between the filing of the application for registration and the
issuance of the decree of title.
SEC. 29. After the filing of the application and before the issuance of
the decree of title by the Chief of the General Land Registration
Office, the land therein described may be dealt with and instruments
relating thereto shall be recorded in the office of the register of deeds
at any time before issuance of the decree of title, in the same manner
as if no application had been made. The interested party may,
however, present such instruments to the Court of First Instance
instead of presenting them to the office of the register of deeds,
together with a motion that the same be considered in relation with
the application, and the court after notice to the parties, shall order
such land registered subject to the encumbrance created by a said
instruments, or order the decree of registration issued in the name of
the buyer or of the person to whom the property has been conveyed
by said instruments. . . .
A stranger or a third party may be dealt with in the land registration
proceedings. The only requirements of the law are: (1) that the
instrument be presented to the court by the interested party together
with a motion that the same be considered in relation with the
application; and (2) that prior notice be given to the parties to the
case. And the peculiar facts and circumstances obtaining in this case
show that these requirements have been complied with in this case.

294

d. Only claimed property or portion can be adjudged

JULIA CARAGAY-LAYNO VS CA
26 DECEMBER 1984, 133 SCRA 718

Facts:

Mariano De Vera died in 1951. His widow administered his property

until her death in 1966. De Veras nephew (Salvador Estrada) took
over as administrator of De Veras estate. Prior to the widows death,
she made an inventory showing that De Veras property (located in
Calasiao, Pangasinan) measures 5417 sq. m (more or less). Estrada
however noticed that the Torrens title under De Vera indicated that his
property measures 8752 sq. m. He learned that the discrepancy is
the 3732 sq. m. being occupied by Juliana. Estrada sued to evict
Juliana.

Juliana averred that she and her father have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and in the concept of
an owner of the land since 1921; that theyve been paying taxes; that
the title held by Estrada was registered in 1947 but it only took them
to initiate an action in 1967 therefore laches has set in.

Issue:

Whether the disputed portion should be adjudged in favor of De

Veras estate.

295

Ruling:

No. The inclusion of Julianas land in De Veras title was erroneously

done. It was shown that Juliana, an unlettered woman, agreed to
have Mariano de Vera borrow her title for the purposes of Mariano
obtaining a loan during de Veras lifetime; that when de Vera
registered his portion of land adjoined to that of Juliana, the latters
land was erroneously included.
The error is highlighted by the fact that de Veras widow, in her
inventory before she died, attested that de Veras portion of land is
only 5417 sq. m. more or less. The discrepancy approximates the
portion of land actually being occupied by Juliana. By that, the only
portion that can be adjudged in favor of de Veras estate is that which
was being claimed by the widow (in her inventory). A recalculation
must however be made to specify the exact measure of land
belonging to each: 3732 sq m should be retained by Juliana (portion
which she actually occupies) and 5020 sq. m. should go to de Veras
estate.

296

297

e. Where portions of land subject of a land registration case are

covered by titles based on homestead, free or sales patent, the
court cannot simply invalidate them; subject of separate
litigation.

DIRECTOR OF LANDS VS THE COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. L-17696
Facts:
On November 19, 1926 a sales application was filed with the Bureau
of Lands by Benito Tolentino for a tract of public agricultural land with
an area of 5 hectares, situated in Barrio Callang Municipality of
Gamu, Province of Isabela. In accordance with the application, which
was given number 8706, the land was advertised for sale to the
highest bidder and on February 15, 1928 was duly awarded to the
applicant pursuant to the provisions of Chapter V of the Public Land
Act On January 19, 1950, Tolentino having complied with the legal
requirements as to actual occupancy, cultivation and improvement of
the area applied for as well as the payment of the purchase price, the
Director of Lands signed the corresponding order for the issuance of
a patent in his favor. Upon investigation, however, the applicant
discovered that a portion of the land covered by his application with
an area of 2.3506 hectares, specifically that portion identified as Lot
No. 8091 Pls-62, had been applied for as a homestead by the herein
defendant Braulio Cosme on March 22, 1949 and that Homestead
Patent No. V-19 had been issued to him by the Bureau of Lands on
the following August 19, pursuant to which he obtained Original
Certificate of Title No. P-880 from the Office of the Register of Deeds
for the Province of Isabela on November 10, 1949. The homestead
settlement application had been filed with the now defunct National
Land Settlement administration pursuant to Executive Proclamation
No. 610 promulgated in 1940, under which certain areas of public
agricultural land in Isabela were reserved for settlement purposes,
and it was upon recommendation of that office that the patent was
issued by the Director of Lands.
Upon protest by Benito Tolentino filed with the Bureau of Lands, an
298

investigation was conducted by the District Land Officer for Isabela,

and when it was verified that the land covered by the homestead
patent was embraced within the area awarded to Tolentino in 1928,
the Director of Lands filed the present action on November 27, 1953,
for the cancellation of the homestead patent and the original
certificate of title issued to the defendant Braulio Cosme.
Their principal contention is that after the certificate of title was issued
on November 10, 1949 by virtue of Homestead Patent No V-19 the
land in question came under the operation of the Land Registration
Act as provided in Section 122 thereof, and that upon the expiration
of one year from the date of its issuance, the said title became
incontrovertible.
Issue:
Whether the court can invalidate the lands covered by titles based on
homestead,free or sales patent.
Ruling:
No. Where a portion of a land subject of a land registration case are
covered by titles based on homestead, free or sales patent, the court
cannot simply invalidate them.
A certificate of title based on a patent, even after the expiration of
one year from the issuance thereof, is still subject to certain
conditions and restriction.As a matter of fact, in appropriate cases
and after prior administrative investigations by the Director of
Lands, proper actions may be instituted by said official which may
lead to the cancellation of the patent and the title, and the consequent
reversion of the land to the Government.On the other hand certificate
of title issued pursuant to Act 2259, after the lapse of one (1) year,
becomes incontrovertible.The inescapable conclusion, therefore, is
that, while with the due registration and issuance of a certificate of
title over a land acquired pursuant to the Public Land Law, said
property becomes registered in contemplation of Act 496,in view of its
nature and manner of acquisition, such certificate of title, when in
conflict with one obtained on the same date through judicial
proceedings, must give way to the latter.7
A certificate of title issued pursuant to a homestead patent partakes
of the patent to a certificate issued in a judicial proceeding, as long as
the land disposed of is really a part of the disposable land of the
public domain (El Hogar Filipino vs. Olviga, 60 Phil. 22; Ramoso vs.
Obligado, 70 Phil. 86 and others), and becomes indefeasible and
299

incontrovertible upon the expiration of one year from the date of the
issuance thereof, ... a certificate of title, be it original or a duplicate,
may only be ordered cancelled under special circumstances, and one
of them is when the title is void. And a title will be considered void if it
is procured through fraud, as when a person applies for the
registration of a land in his name although he knows that the property
belongs to another.

f. Finality of Judgment
i. Now 15 days counted from receipt of the notice of judgment.
ii. As to the government, period of appeal shall be reckoned from
the receipt of the decision by the solicitor general who
represents the government in all registration proceeding.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. HON. SOFRONIO G. SAYO
G.R. No. L-60413
Facts:
Spouses Casiano Sandoval and Luz Marquez filed an original
application for registration of 33,950 hectares tract of land but was
opposed by the government including the Heirs of Liberato Bayaua .
The land was formerly part of Santiago, Isabela, but had been
transferred to Nueva Vizcaya in virtue of Republic Act No. 236.
Then, an order of general default was entered against the whole
world except the oppositors.
300

After about 20 years, a compromise agreement was entered into by

the parties. Under the compromise agreement, the Heirs of Casiano
Sandoval renounced their claims and ceded
1) in favor of the Bureau of Lands, an area of 4,109 hectares;
2) in favor of the Bureau of Forest Development, 12,341
hectares;
3) in favor of the Heirs of Liberato Bayaua, 4,000 hectares; and
4) in favor of Philippine Cacao & Farm Products, Inc., 8,000
hectares.
The remaining area of 5,500 hectares was adjudicated to and
acknowledged as owned by the Heirs of Sandoval, but out of
this area, 1,500 hectares were assigned to their counsel, Jose
C. Reyes, in payment of his attorney's fees.
The respondent Judge approved the compromise agreement
and confirmed the title and ownership of the parties in
accordance with its terms.
The applicants for registration presented a mere photocopy of a
certification of the National Library stating that the property in
question was registered under the Spanish system of land
registration as private property. But, that Spanish
document cannot be considered a title to property, it not being
one of the grants made during the Spanish regime, and
obviously not constituting primary evidence of ownership.
Issues:
Whether the Registration Court correctly rendered decision based
from the
compromise agreement of the parties.
Whether informacion posesoria is a prima facie evidence of
possession.
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Ruling:
The compromise agreement and the judgment approving it is
declared null and void.
The decision of the Registration Court a quo is based solely on the
compromise agreement of the parties but such included private
persons who had not adduced any competent evidence of their
ownership over the land subject of the registration proceeding.
Portions of the land in controversy were assigned to persons or
entities who had presented nothing whatever to prove their ownership
of any part of the land. What was done was to consider the
compromise agreement as proof of title of the parties taking part
therein, a totally unacceptable proposition. The result has been the
adjudication of lands of no little extension to persons who had not
submitted any substantiation at all of their pretensions to ownership,
founded on nothing but the agreement among themselves that they
had rights and interests over the land.
Under the Spanish Mortgage Law, informacion posesoria was
considered a mode of acquiring title to public lands, subject to two
conditions: first, the inscription thereof in the Registry of Property, and
second, actual, public, adverse, and uninterrupted possession of the
land for 20 years; but where, as here, proof of fulfillment of these
conditions is absent.

iii.Execution pending appeal is not allowed

THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS et.al. VS HON. SALVADOR C. REYES
G.R. No. L-27594

Facts:

On February 24, 1964, the applicant Alipio Alinsunurin, claiming

302

ownership in fee simple by inheritance from the late Maria Padilla,

sought the registration of title under Act 496, as amended, of a vast
tract of land, situated at the municipality of Laur, province of Nueva
Ecija, admittedly inside the boundary of the military reservation of
Fort Magsaysay.
The Director of Lands, Director of Forestry, and the Armed Forces of
the Philippines opposed the application, claiming that the applicant
was without sufficient title and was not in open, exclusive, continuous
and notorious possession and occupation of the land in question for
at least thirty (30) years immediately preceding the filing of the
application; that approximately 13,957 hectares of said land consist of
the military reservation of Fort Magsaysay established under
Proclamation No. 237, dated December 10, 1955 of the President.
The applicant Alipio Alinsunurin filed a motion for substitution of
parties, requesting that the Paraaque Investment and Development
Corporation be considered as the applicant in his place, it having
acquired all his rights, interests, ownership and dominion over the
property subject matter of the application. The motion was granted by
the lower court.
It is beyond dispute that the land subject of the application is included
within the area reserved for military purposes under Proclamation No.
237, dated December 19, 1955, of the President. The land is largely
uncultivated, mountainous and thickly forested with a heavy growth of
timber of commercial quantities.
It is claimed by the applicant that Melecio Padilla acquired the land by
virtue of a possessory information title issued during the Spanish
regime on March 5, 1895, and upon his death in 1900, he transmitted
the ownership and possession thereof to his daughter and sole heir,
Maria Padilla. The latter in turn continued to cultivate the land thru
tenants and utilized portions for pasture, until her death sometime in
1944.
On November 19, 1966, the lower court rendered decision holding
that the parcel of land applied for is adjudicated to and ordered to be
registered in favor of:
(a) Paraaque Investment and Development Corporation, a
Philippine corporation wholly owned by Filipino citizens, with address
at Manila, Philippines, two-thirds (2/3) portion, subject to the rights of
Ariosto Santos and
303

(b) Roman C. Tamayo, Filipino citizen, married, resident of Cullit,

Lallo, Cagayan, one-third (1/3) portion of the said property.

The oppositors Director of Lands, Director of Forestry and the Armed

Forces of the Philippines filed a Notice of Appeal from the said
decision to the Supreme Court.
By an order, the lower court required the Provincial Fiscal to file an
Amended Record on Appeal, so as to include therein certain orders
and pleadings, within ten days from receipt of the order. On March
16, 1967, the Amended Record on Appeal was duly filed and copies
served upon the appellees.
Pending the approval of the Record on Appeal, the applicant
Paraaque Investment and Development Corporation filed a motion
for the issuance of a decree of registration pending appeal. Likewise,
Roman C. Tamayo, thru counsel, filed a motion for the issuance of a
decree of registration. Both motions were opposed by the
Government.
On March 11, 1967, the lower court, ruling that its decision of
November 19, 1966 had become final as to the share of Roman C.
Tamayo, directed the issuance of a decree of registration of the entire
land, one-third (1/3) pro-indiviso in favor of Roman C. Tamayo, and
two-thirds (2/3) pro indiviso in favor of Paraaque Investment and
Development Corporation, subject to the final outcome of the appeal.
On March 14, 1967, the Commissioner of Land Registration issued
Decree No. 113485 pursuant to the said order, and, on March 15,
1967, the Register of Deeds issued Original Certificate of Title No. 03151 of the Register of Deeds of the Province of Nueva Ecija.
On April 12, 1967, the lower court approved the Amended Record on
Appeal which, together with the evidence and transcripts, was
forwarded to this Court in due course of appeal.
As the lower court denied reconsideration of the order directing the
issuance of a decree of registration, the petitioners instituted before
the Supreme Court a special civil action for certiorari and mandamus
304

with preliminary injunction, seeking to nullify the order dated March

11, 1967, the decree of registration issued pursuant thereto and
Original Certificate of Title of the Register of Deeds for the province of
Nueva Ecija.

Issue:

Whether the lower court acted without jurisdiction or exceeded its

jurisdiction in ordering the issuance of a decree of registration despite
the appeal timely taken from the entire decision a quo.

Ruling:

The appeal taken by the Government was from the entire decision,
which is not severable. Thus, the appeal affects the whole decision.
In any event, We rule that execution pending appeal is not applicable
in a land registration proceeding. It is fraught with dangerous
consequences. Innocent purchasers may be misled into purchasing
real properties upon reliance on a judgment which may be reversed
on appeal.
A Torrens title issued on the basis of a judgment that is not final is a
nullity, as it is violative of the explicit provisions of the Land
Registration Act which requires that a decree shall be issued only
after the decision adjudicating the title becomes final and executory,
and it is on the basis of said decree that the Register of Deeds
concerned issues the corresponding certificate of title.
Consequently, the lower court acted without jurisdiction or exceeded
its jurisdiction in ordering the issuance of a decree of registration
despite the appeal timely taken from the entire decision a quo.

305

iv. Court retains control of the case for 1 year, notwithstanding

lapse of 15 days from the receipt of judgment.

ATTY. JOSE S. GOMEZ et,al. VS HON. COURT OF APPEALS,

G.R. No. 77770
Facts:
Petitioners applied for registration of several lots situated in
Bayambang, Pangasinan on August 30, 1968.The lots were among
those involved in the case of Government of the Philippine Islands vs.
Abran, wherein the Supreme Court declared Consolacion M. Gomez
owner of certain lots in Sitio Poponto Bayambang, Pangasinan.
Petitioners are the heirs of Teodoro Y. Gomez (father of Consolacion).
After notice and publication, and there being no opposition to the
application, the trial court issued an order of general default. On 5
August 1981, the court rendered its decision adjudicating the subject
lots in petitioners' favor.
306

On October 6, 1981, the trial court issued an order expressly stating

that the decision of August 5, 1981 had become final and directed
the Chief of the General Land Registration Office to issue the
corresponding decrees of registration over the lots adjudicated in the
decision of August 5, 1981.
On July 11, 1984, respondent Silverio G. Perez, Chief of the Division
of Original Registration, Land Registration Commission submitted a
report to the court a quo stating that portions of the land sought for
registration were covered by homestead patents issued in 1928 and
1929 and registered under the Land Registration Act. He
recommended that the decision of August 5, 1981 and the order of
October 6, 1981 be set aside. Petitioners opposed the report, pointing
out that no opposition was raised by the Bureau of Lands during the
registration proceedings and that the decision of August 5, 1981
should be implemented because it had long become final and
executory.
After hearing, the lower court rendered a second decision setting
aside the decision dated August 5, 1981 and the order dated October
6, 1981 for the issuance of decrees. Petitioners moved for
reconsideration but the motion was denied. AHence, this recourse.
Issue:
Whether the decision dated August 5, 1981 had become final and
executory, that it may no longer be reopened, reviewed, or set aside.
Ruling:
Petitioners anchor their claim on section 30 of P.D. No. 1529
(Property Registration Decree) which provides that, after judgment
has become final and executory, the court shall forthwith issue an
order to the Commissioner of Land Registration for the issuance of
the decree of registration and certificate of title. Petitioners contend
that section 30 should be read in relation to section 32 of P.D. 1529 in
that, once the judgment becomes final and executory under section
30, the decree of registration must issue as a matter of course. This
being the law, petitioners assert, when respondent Judge set aside in
his decision, dated 25 March 1985, the decision of 5 August 1981 and
the order of 6 October 1981, he clearly acted without jurisdiction.
307

Petitioners' contention is not correct. Unlike ordinary civil actions, the

adjudication of land in a cadastral or land registration proceeding
does not become final, in the sense of incontrovertibility until after the
expiration of one (1) year after the entry of the final decree of
registration.
Petition denied.

v. Hence, the case may still be reopended and the decision set
aside when granted
CAYANAN V. DE LOS SANTOS
21 SCRA 1348
Facts:
The title of appellee De Los Santos to Lot 56 of Porac Cadastre was
confirmed by Judge Santos of the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga.
In the same year, there was a petition for review for the said lot. It
was alleged that said lot was registered in the name of appellee De
los Santos through actual fraud, through deceit and through
intentional omission of facts. It was stated further that a simulated
Deed of Absolute Sale was executed in favor of the other respondent
appellee, Felix Camaya.
It prayed further for the opening of the decree of registration, the
cancellation of the Original Certificate of Title, as well as the Transfer
Certificate of Title and the adjudication of said lot in favor of
petitioners, now appellant Cayanan, however it was denied.
308

Issue:
Whether the case may still be reopened and the decision set aside
when granted
Ruling:
Yes, it may.
As long as the final decree is not issued by the Chief of the General
Land Registration Office in accordance with the law, and the period of
one year filed for the review thereof has not elapsed, the title is not
finally adjudicated and the decision therein rendered continues to be
under the control and sound discretion of the court rendering it.
B.Decree of Registration
a. Issued pursuant to an order of the court upon finality of the
judgment preparation and issuance of decree.
b. When and by whom issued
HEIRS OF CRISTOBAL MARCOS vs. DE BANUVAR
G.R. No. L-22110.
FACTS:
On March 24, 1938 the CFI rendered a decision confirming the titles
of La Urbana, Inc. over lot 5 and lot 1, Psu-56145, with certain
reservations, and ordered the registration of these lots in favor of the
latter.On May 17, 1960 de Erquiaga, one of the successors-ininterest of La Urbana, Inc. filed a petition for reconstitution of the
decision of March 24, 1938. During the pendency of the reconstitution
proceedings, the respondent De Banuvar acquired lot 1 from de
Erquiaga, who was thus substituted as a party for the latter.
However, the petitioners opposed the application for the
reconstitution, on a claim that they have been in actual, adverse,
open and uninterrupted possession and occupation of the said parcel
in the concept of owners since time immemorial, long before the
World War II, and have introduced improvements thereon. They
309

prayed that the application for the reconstitution of records be denied

and that "the parcels of land in question be ordered registered in the
respective names of the herein oppositors or declare the same as
public land and be subdivided to oppositors who are landless." On
June 13, 1963 the respondent court ordered the issuance of a decree
in favor of De Banuvar with respect to lot 1 only, after finding that the
decision in the land registration case had already become final and
executory. Moreover, the court issued another order granting a writ of
possession in favor of De Banuvar and "against all persons who have
entered and occupied portions of lot 1, Psu-56145 before the
issuance of the decree."

ISSUE:
Whether the issuance of the order is proper.
RULING:
In the opposition to the petition for reconstitution, the petitioners'
alleged possession and occupation of portions of lot 1 arose prior to
or during the registration proceedings. For this reason, the order of
granting a writ of possession in favor of De Banuvar against the
petitioners, is proper and justified. The petitioners herein admittedly
took possession and occupation of portions of lot 1 prior to July 1,
1963 when the decree in question was issued. The fundamental rule
is that a writ of possession can be issued not only against the original
oppositors in a land registration case and their representatives and
successors-in-interest, but also against any person unlawfully and
adversely occupying said lot at any time before and up to the
issuance of the final decree.
Furthermore, there is no provision in the Land Registration Act
similar to Sec. 6, Rule 39, regarding the execution of a judgment in
civil action, except the proceedings to place the winner in possession
by virtue of a writ of possession. The decision in a land registration
case unless the adverse or losing party is in possession, becomes
final without any further action, upon the expiration of the period for
perfecting an appeal.
310

There is nothing in the law that limits the period within which the court
may order or issue a decree. The reason is ... that the judgment is
merely declaratory in character and does not need to be asserted or
enforced against the adverse party. Furthermore, the issuance of a
decree is a ministerial duty both of the judge and of the Land
Registration Commission; failure of the court or of the clerk to issue
the decree for the reason that no motion therefor has been filed
cannot prejudice the owner, or the person in whom the land is
ordered to be registered.

i. Court may still issue order even beyond 15 days from entry of
judgment
EUFEMIA VILLANUEVA VDA. DE BARROGA,et al. VS. ANGEL
ALBANO,et al.
G.R. No. L-43445 January 20, 1988
Facts:
On July 31, 1941, CFI Ilocos Norte rendered a decision in Cadastral
Proceeding No. 44 adjudicating a parcel of land known as Lot No.
9821 in favor of Delfina Aquino.One of the oppositors was Ruperta
Pascual, who was declared in default. However, the decree of
registration was only issued on October 14, 1955; and it was only on
November 17, 1979, that an original certificate of title was issued in
Delfina Aquino's name.On August 11, 1970, Eufemia Barroga and
Saturnina Padaca,the children and heirs of Ruperta Pascual, brought
suit in the same Court of First Instance praying that Delfina Aquino's
title be voided and cancelled, and that title be adjudicated in their
favor. Barroga's and Padaca's complaint was denied by the court.
Thereafter, the Court of First Instance ordered execution of the
judgment on December 6, 1973. On August 8, 1975, the Cadastral
Court promulgated an order granting the motion of Angel Albano, et
al. for a writ of possession as regards Lot No. 9821. A writ of
possession dated August 28, 1975 was issued. The plaintiffs
311

appealed. The motion was thereafter denied by the court by Order

dated September 22, 1975. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether the Court could still issue orders despite lapse of long period
of time from entry of judgment.
Held:
The judgment of the cadastral court was a judgment in rem, binding
generally upon the whole world, inclusive of persons not parties
thereto, and particularly upon those who had actually taken part in the
proceeding as well as their successors in interest by title subsequent
to the commencement of the action or special proceeding, litigating
for the same thing and under the same title and in the same
capacity. The writ of possession could properly issue despite the not
inconsiderable period of time that had elapsed from the date of the
registration decree, since the right to the same does not prescribe.
The appellees are entitled to said writ of possession, despite the
lapse of many years, their right thereto being imprescriptible at least
as against the persons who were parties to the cadastral case or their
successors-in-interest.

312

c. Finality and incontrovertibility of decree; significance of the

decree
MAMERTA DE LA MERCED VS.COURT OF APPEALS
5 SCRA 240
Facts:
Ezequiel Santos (and his wife) is claiming ownership of Lot No. 395
of the Rizal Cadastre by virtue of an adjudication of the cadastral
court in favor of his father. Defendants, in their answer, resisted
plaintiffs' claim and asserted their ownership over said property as
evidenced by an OCT issued to their predecessor Juan de la Merced
and their continuous possession of the land for more than 30 years.
Mamerta de la Merced, a legitimate daughter of Juan de la Merced,
was allowed to intervene and make common cause with the
defendants. The court rendered a decision for the plaintiffs after
making a finding the lot was part of the OCT in the name of the
spouses Inocencio de los Santos and Victorina Macapagal, parents
of plaintiff Ezequiel Santos. The cadastral court declared the lot a
public land, as a consequence of which Juan de la Merced, after filing
a homestead application therefor, was able to obtain Original
Certificate of Title. Holding that the cadastral court had no jurisdiction
to issue the order declaring the lot public land, and, therefore, the
same as well as the certificate of title issued thereafter was null and
void, the court ordered the cancellation of OCT in the name of Juan
de la Merced; directed defendants to vacate Lot. While the court held
that the land having ceased to be part of the public domain, the
Director of Lands no longer had authority to grant the homestead
patent over the same to Juan de la Merced, Plaintiffs interposed an
appeal to the Court of Appeals.. Hence, the filing of the instant
313

petition for review.

Issue:
Whether the property thereby affected still be lost by adverse
possession.
Ruling:
A decree of registration and a certificate of title, under Act 496, are
two different things. And it is the decree of registration, to be issued
by the Land Registration Commissioner, which shall be the basis of
the certificate of title to be issued subsequently by the corresponding
register of deeds, that quiets title to and binds the land. The title of
ownership on the land is vested upon the owner upon the expiration
of the period to appeal from the decision or adjudication by the
cadastral court, without such an appeal having been perfected. The
certificate of title would then be necessary for purposes of effecting
registration of subsequent disposition of the land where court
proceedings would no longer be necessary.
As we have here a decree issued by the cadastral court, ordering the
issuance to Inocencio de los Santos of the certificate of title over Lot
No. 395 after the decision adjudicating ownership to him of the said
property had already become final, and there being no imputation of
irregularity in the said cadastral proceedings, title of ownership on the
said adjudicatee was vested as of the date of the issuance of such
judicial decree. The land, for all intents and purposes, had become,
from that time, registered property which could not be acquired by
adverse possession.

314

i. When considered final

ii. When not considered final

DIRECTOR OF LANDS VS. BUSUEGO

12 SCRA 678

Facts:
Teodora Busuego applied for a decree of registration of the Lot No.
2497, Gapan Cadastre. A decree of registration was issued in favor of
the applicant. Within one year from the issuance of the decree, the
spouses Amando Joson and Victoria Balmeo filed in the same
proceeding, a petition for the setting aside of said decree and the
cancellation of the certificate issued thereunder, on the ground that
the decision ordering the decree was obtained by Busuego by
misrepresenting herself to be the sole owner of the lot when in truth,
petitioners, through their predecessor-in-interest, were owners of
one-half thereof, having acquired the same by purchase from
Teodora's mother, Fausta Busuego. In a separate petition, Antonio
and Rogelio Busuego, children of a deceased brother of Teodora,
also prayed for the same relief on the allegation that their father was
an undivided co-owner (with Teodora) of one-half of Lot 2497, having
acquired the same by descent from their father, Severino Busuego.
The court dismissed the said petitions for the reason that its
jurisdiction as a cadastral court being special and limited, it has no
authority to pass upon the issues raised in the pleadings. Hence, the
315

present appeal by the petitioners.

ISSUE:
Whether the decreed issued in favor of the respondent Busuego is
final.
RULING:
It has been held that the adjudication of land in a registration or
cadastral case does not become final and incontrovertible until the
expiration of one year from entry of the final decree, and that as long
as the final decree is not issued and the period of one year within
which it may be reviewed has not elapsed, the decision remains
under the control and sound discretion of the court rendering the
decree, which court after hearing, may even set aside said decision
or decree and adjudicate the land to another.
... As long as the final decree is not issued by the Chief of the
General Land Registration Office in accordance with the law, and the
period of one year fixed for the review thereof has not elapsed, the
title is not finally adjudicated and the decision therein rendered
continues to be under control and sound discretion of the court
rendering it. Such is the ruling laid down in the case of De los Reyes
vs. De Villa (48 Phil. 227), which was later reiterated in that of Roman
Catholic Bishop of Cebu vs. Philippine Railway Co. and Reynes(49
Phil. 546). ... ( Afalla et al v. Rosauro, 60 Phil. 622).
In the present case, as the petitions were filed within one year from
the date of the issuance of the decree, pursuant to Section 38 of Act
496, the same are properly cognizable by the court that rendered the
decision and granted the said decree.

316

 Review of Decree, when allowed

ELAND PHILIPPINES, INC. VS. AZUCENA GARCIA, ELINO

FAJARDO, AND HEIR OF TIBURCIO MALABANAN NAMED
TERESA MALABANAN
G.R. NO. 173289, FEBRUARY 17, 2010

Facts:
On March 1998, respomdents filed with the RTC of Tagaytay a
complaint for Quieting of Title with Preliminary Injunction against the
petitioner, Eland Phil. Inc. Respondents contended that they are the
owners, in fee simple, of a parcel of land which was already
registered by the petitioner, in fact was already awarded an OCT for
it.
Petitioner moved to dismiss the case alleging that the pleading
asserting the claim stated no cause of action and that the
respondents are not entitled to the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction. After a series of several motions and delays
(postponements), the RTC granted the Motion for Summary
317

Judgment filed by the respondents on August 1999. The lower court

nullified the title held by the petiotioners, and was ordered to be
cancelled including the tax declaration covering the subject land.
The petitioners filed an appeal to the Court of Appeals on February
2006, but was dismissed by the said court.
Issue:
Whether a summary judgment is the proper remedy in quieting of
title.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that a summary judgment, as provided
under Rule 35 of the 1997 Rules of Procedure, is permitted only if
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and a moving party
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment is
proper if, while the pleadings on their face appear to raise issues, the
affidavits, depositions, and admissions presented by the moving party
show that such issues are not genuine.Furthermore, the Supreme
Court stated that summary judgment covers any action with the
exemption of actions for annulment of marriage or declaration of its
nullity or legal separation.
In their motion for summary judgment, the respondents failed to
clearly demonstrate the absence of any genuine issue of fact. They
merely reiterated their averments in the complaint for quieting of title
and opposed some issues raised by the petitioner in its Answer Ad
Cautelam.
This Court, going by the records, observed keenly that plaintiffs
cause of action for quieting of title on the disputed parcel of land is
based on the alleged fraud in the substitution of their landholdings
Notwithstanding, the issue of possession is a question of fact by the
interaction of the basic pleadings, the observation of this Court is that
the plaintiffs were able to prove by the well-nigh incontrovertible
evidence, the aspects of possession in accordance with Section 48
(b) of Commonwealth Act 141, as amended,
318

Clearly, the facts pleaded by the respondents in their motion for

summary judgment have been duly disputed and contested by
petitioner, raising genuine issues that must be resolved only after a
full-blown trial. When the facts as pleaded by the parties are disputed
or contested, proceedings for summary judgment cannot take the
place of trial. In the present case, the petitioner was able to point out
the genuine issues. A "genuine issue" is an issue of fact that requires
the presentation of evidence as distinguished from a sham, fictitious,
contrived or false claim.
Regarding the nature of the action filed before the trial court, quieting
of title is a common law remedy for the removal of any cloud upon or
doubt or uncertainty with respect to title to real property.
Under Article 476 of the New Civil Code, the remedy may be availed
of only when, by reason of any instrument, record, claim,
encumbrance or proceeding, which appears valid but is, in fact,
invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, a cloud is thereby cast
on the complainants title to real property or any interest therein.
It can thus be seen that for an action for quieting of title to prosper,
the plaintiff must first have a legal, or, at least, an equitable title on
the real property subject of the action and that the alleged cloud on
his title must be shown to be in fact invalid
As long as a final decree has not been entered by the Land
Registration Authority and period of one year has not elapsed from
the date of entry of such decree, the title is not finally adjudicated and
the decision in the registration case continues to be under the control
and sound discretion of the registration court. After the lapse of said
period, the decree becomes incontrovertible and no longer subject to
reopening or review.
The one-year period stated in Sec. 32 within which a petition to reopen and review the decree of registration refers to the decree of
registration described in Section 31, which decree is prepared and
issued by the Land Registration Administrator.
A petition for review under Section 32 is a remedy separate and
319

distinct from a motion for new trial and the right to the remedy is not
affected by the denial of such a motion irrespective of the grounds
upon which it may have been presented. Thus, where petitioners
acquired their interest in the land before any final decree had been
entered, the litigation was therefore in effect still pending and, in
these circumstances, they can hardly be considered innocent
purchasers in good faith.

Where the petition for review of a decree of registration is filed within

the one-year period from entry of the decree, it is error for the court to
deny the petition without hearing the evidence in support of the
allegation of actual and extrinsic fraud upon which the petition is
predicated. The petitioner should be afforded an opportunity to prove
such allegation.
The Supreme court granted the petitioners review and reversed and
set aside the ruling of the lower court.

iii. Effect of finality of Decree

BOLANOS VS JM TUASON & CO.

37 SCRA 223, 1971
Facts:
J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. appealed the order dated September 9,
1965 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch X in LRC Rec.
No. 7581, Quirino Bolaos, et als., petitioners, versus J. M. Tuason &
Co., Inc., et al., respondents, which granted the petition of Quirino
320

Bolanos and ordered herein respondents-appellants (J.M. Tuason &

co. ) their agents and all persons acting for the in their behalf as well
as all other from disturbing the physical possession of Bolanos of the
parcel of land comprising of 13.26 hectares and included in the area
covered by TCT Nos. 37677 & 37686. The petition of Bolanos not to
be disturbed in their physical possession was upon the ground that in
the three other civil cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623 of the same
Court of First Instance of Rizal, the said court has rendered a
decision, still pending appeal, declaring Original Certificate of Title
No. 735 from which the two above-mentioned titles have been
derived null and void, principally for want of jurisdiction of the court
that issued said original title on account of defects in the publication
of the notices of the proceedings for their registration.
In a previous case filed by appellant Tuason against appellees for the
recovery of the possession of said land (Tuason vs. Bolaos, 93 Phil.
106), wherein appellees Bolanos had alleged among their defenses
that appellant Tuason's titles were obtained "thru fraud or error and
without knowledge (of) or notice, either personal or thru publication
to" said appellees, this Court upheld the validity of the questioned
titles and affirmed the decision of the trial court "declaring defendant
(now appellee Bolaos) to be without any right to the land in question
and ordering him to restore possession thereof to plaintiff (now
appellant) Tuason."
Issue:
Whether or not the land registration court has jurisdiction to hear and
to resolve issues of possession, in any of its aspects, after the
original registration proceedings have come to an end and a writ of
possession has already been issued?
Ruling:
No. The appealed order of September 9, 1965 is declared to have
been issued beyond the jurisdiction of the court a quo and it is hereby
declared null and void and set aside.
Once a land registration proceeding is terminated and a
corresponding decree has been issued, the only matter of possession
of the land involved that remains within the jurisdiction of the Land
Registration Court is in regard to the issuance of the writ of
321

possession, if one should be needed. No provision of the Land

Registration Act (Act 496). Section 112 of Act 496 which is the only
provision in the said law empowering the land registration court to
issue post or after-registration orders refers exclusively to
amendments and alterations of the title issued and has nothing to do
with possession of the land at all.

322

d. Enforcement of the Decree; Period for enforcement

HEIRS OF CRISTOBAL MARCOS vs. DE BANUVAR

G.R. No. L-22110. September 28, 1968
FACTS:
On March 24, 1938 the CFI rendered a decision confirming the titles
of La Urbana, Inc. over lot 5 and lot 1, Psu-56145, with certain
reservations, and ordered the registration of these lots in favor of the
latter. On May 17, 1960 de Erquiaga, one of the successors-ininterest of La Urbana, Inc. filed a petition for reconstitution of the
decision of March 24, 1938. During the pendency of the reconstitution
proceedings, the respondent De Banuvar acquired lot 1 from de
Erquiaga, who was thus substituted as a party for the latter. However,
the petitioners opposed the application for the reconstitution, on a
claim that they have been in actual, adverse, open and uninterrupted
possession and occupation of the said parcel in the concept of
owners since time immemorial, long before the World War II, and
have introduced improvements thereon. They prayed that the
application for the reconstitution of records be denied and that "the
parcels of land in question be ordered registered in the respective
names of the herein oppositors or declare the same as public land
and be subdivided to oppositors who are landless." On June 13, 1963
the respondent court ordered the issuance of a decree in favor of De
Banuvar with respect to lot 1 only, after finding that the decision in the
land registration case had already become final and executory.
Moreover, the court issued another order granting a writ of
possession in favor of De Banuvar and "against all persons who have
entered and occupied portions of lot 1, Psu-56145 before the
issuance of the decree."
ISSUE:
Whether or not the issuance of the order is proper.
323

RULING:
In the opposition to the petition for reconstitution, the petitioners'
alleged possession and occupation of portions of lot 1 arose prior to
or during the registration proceedings. For this reason, the order of
granting a writ of possession in favor of De Banuvar against the
petitioners, is proper and justified. The petitioners herein admittedly
took possession and occupation of portions of lot 1 prior to July 1,
1963 when the decree in question was issued. The fundamental rule
is that a writ of possession can be issued not only against the original
oppositors in a land registration case and their representatives and
successors-in-interest, but also against any person unlawfully and
adversely occupying said lot at any time before and up to the
issuance of the final decree. Furthermore, there is no provision in the
Land Registration Act similar to Sec. 6, Rule 39, regarding the
execution of a judgment in civil action, except the proceedings to
place the winner in possession by virtue of a writ of possession. The
decision in a land registration case unless the adverse or losing party
is in possession, becomes final without any further action, upon the
expiration of the period for perfecting an appeal. There is nothing in
the law that limits the period within which the court may order or issue
a decree. The reason is ... that the judgment is merely declaratory in
character and does not need to be asserted or enforced against the
adverse party. Furthermore, the issuance of a decree is a ministerial
duty both of the judge and of the Land Registration Commission;
failure of the court or of the clerk to issue the decree for the reason
that no motion therefor has been filed cannot prejudice the owner, or
the person in whom the land is ordered to be registered.

REALTY SALES ENTERPRISE, INC. and MACONRDAY FARMS,

INC. VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ET AL.
161 SCRA 56
Facts:
Two (2) parcels of land are in dispute for allegedly being covered by
certificates of title and registration decrees under three (3) different
entities, namely Morris Carpo, Quezon City Devt. and Financing
Corp. (QCDF) and Realty Sales Enterprise, Inc. (Realty). Thus,
324

Carpo instituted a complaint before the CFI under Respondent Judge

Vera against Realty and Macondray Farms, Inc. (Macondray) for the
declaration of nullity of its corresponding certificate of title, on the
ground that the same was issued by a court not sitting as a land
registration court but one of ordinary jurisdiction, and that the judge
had no authority since the records which was made basis of the title
was lost during the war and is pending reconstitution;
In reply, Realty denied the allegations and countered that the Reyes
Court which issued its title was performing a purely ministerial duty,
and that it was Carpos title that was null for having been issued
despite being covered by another title. Realty further impleaded
through a third-party complaint QCDF for nullity of its own title
covering the same subject properties;
In reply, QCDF filed a fourth-party complaint against Alvendia, et al.
being the source of its own title, praying therefor for the
reimbursement of its purchase price paid for the said properties.
However, the same was dismissed for QCDFs lack of interest in
prosecuting the case;
On January 20, 1981, the trial court rendered judgment annulling
Realtys and QCDFs titles to the property in favor of Carpo. The
same was appealed before the High Court by Realty, but the latter
resolved to refer the case the Court of Appeals for determination of
the merits; and
The CA in turn set aside the trial courts decision and issued a new
one in favor of Realty. However, the case was subjected to the
reorganization of the Judiciary, from which resulted a re-raffling of the
case and later on, a reversal of the prior decision through Carpos
MR. Further, the change from CA to IAC yielded a change in Justices
assigned to the case.
Issues:
1.Whether the Special Third Civil Cases Division was conferred with
jurisdiction to try and render a decision of final resolution for the
Court;
2. Whether a Petition for Certiorari was the proper remedy in the
case;
3.Whether Carpos title is valid as against Realtys and QCDFs ,
since Realtys title was issued when the records relative thereto was
undergoing reconstitution;
4. Whether Carpo was an innocent purchaser for value; and
5. Whether QCDF was properly impleaded to the case.
325

Ruling:
1. Yes. A reading of the law will readily show that what BP 129
prohibits is appointment from one class of divisions to another class.
For instance, a Justice appointed to the Criminal Cases Divisions
cannot be assigned to the Civil Cases Divisions. Justice Bidin was
reassigned from the Fourth
Civil Cases Division, while Justice Camilon was reassigned from the
Second Civil Cases Division. The two therefore come from the same
class of divisions to which they were appointed. Thus, the
reassignment of Justices Bidin and Camilon to form the Special Third
Civil Cases Division in view of the voluntary inhibition of two (2)
"regular" members, is still within legal bounds
2. Yes. There are two modes by which cases decided by the then
Courts of First Instance in their original jurisdiction may be reviewed:
(1) an ordinary appeal either to the Supreme Court or to the Court of
Appeals, or (2) an appeal on certiorari to the Supreme Court. To the
latter category belong cases in which only errors or questions of law
are involved. Each of these modes have different procedural
requirements. x x x Realty originally filed a Petition for certiorari with
this Court docketed as G.R. No. L-56471 questioning the decision of
the Vera Court, and asking that it be allowed to appeal directly to this
Court as it was raising only questions of law. However, this Court
referred the case to the Court of Appeals "in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction for proper determination on the merits of the appeal. " It
may thus be observed that even this Court treated the petition first
filed as an appeal, and not as a special civil action for certiorari. After
as, a petition for review by certiorari is also a form of appeal. (People
v. Resuello L-30165, August 22, 1969, 69 SCRA 35). x x x Thus it
was error for the IAC to hold that the Decision of the Vera Court
"cannot be passed upon anymore in the Court of Appeals decision
because appeal and not certiorari was the proper remedy." Precisely,
petitioners brought the case to this Court on appeal, albeit by way of
certiorari;
3. No. Applying the doctrine in the Nacua decision to LRC Case No.
657, the parties thereto did not have to commence a new action but
only had to go back to the preceding stage where records are
available. The land registration case itself remained pending and the
Court of First Instance of Rizal continued to have jurisdiction over it.
The records were destroyed at that stage of the case when an that
remained to be done was the ministerial duty of the Land Registration
326

Office to issue a decree of registration (which would be the basis for

the issuance of an Original Certificate of Title) to implement a
judgment which had become final (See Government v. Abural, 39
Phil. 996 [1919] at 1002; Sta. Ana v. Menla, 111 Phil. 947 [1961], 1
SCRA 1294; Heirs of Cristobal Marcos v. De Banuvar, 134 Phil. 257
[1968], 26 SCRA 316). There are however authentic copies of the
decisions of the CFI and the Court of Appeals adjudicating Lots 1, 2
and 3 of Plan Psu-47035 to Estanislao Mayuga. Moreover, there is an
official report of the decision of this Court affirming both the CFI and
the CA decisions. A final order of adjudication forms the basis for the
issuance of a decree of registration.;
4. No. x x x Even Carpo himself cites no factual proof of his being an
innocent purchaser for value. He merely relies on the presumption of
good faith under Article 527 of the Civil Code. x x x Carpo bought the
disputed property from the Baltazars, the original registered owners,
by virtue of a deed executed before Iluminada Figueroa, Notary
Public of Manila dated October 9, 1970. However, it was only later,
on October 13, 1970, that the decree of registration in favor of the
Baltazars was transcribed in the Registration Book for the Province of
Rizal and that an Original Certificate of Title was issued. It was on the
same day, October 13, 1970, that the deed evidencing the sale
between the Baltazars and Carpo was inscribed in the Registry of
Property, and the Original Certificate of Title was cancelled as
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 303961 in the name of Carpo was
issued. x x x Thus, at the time of sale there was as yet no Torrens title
which Carpo could have relied upon so that he may qualify as an
innocent purchaser for value. Not being a purchaser for value and in
good faith, he is in no better position than his predecessors-ininterest;
5. Yes. Moreover, even as this Court agrees with QCDFC that the
third-party complaint filed against it by Realty was procedurally
defective in that the relief being sought by the latter from the former is
not in respect of Carpo's claim, policy considerations and the factual
circumstances of the case compel this Court now to rule as well on
QCDFC's claim to the disputed property.** To rule on QCDFC's claim
now is to avoid multiplicity of suits and to put to rest these conflicting
claims over the property. After an, QCDFC was afforded fun
opportunity, and exercised its right, to prove its claim over the land. It
presented documentary as well as testimonial evidence. It was even
permitted to file a fourth-party complaint which, however, was
327

dismissed since it failed to prosecute its case.

e. The mother title was received for transcription by the Register

of Deeds on May 3,1917. That is the reckoning date of
registration of the title. It may be also be acknowledged as
appears on the title that OCT No. 994 resulted from the issuance
od the decree of registration on April 17, 1917 although such
date cannot be considered as the date of the title when the title
took effect. OCT No. 994 is void and inexistent.
MANOTOK VS. BARQUE
G.R. NOS. 162335 & 162605
Facts:
Piedad Estate originally owned by Philippine Sugar Estates
Development Company, Ltd., La Sociedad Agricola de Ultramar, the
British-Manila Estate Company, Ltd., and the Recoleto Order of the
Philippine Islands. (It is a Friar Land.)
The subject parcel Lot No. 823 is part of the Piedad Estate and is
located in QC.
On 23 December 1903, Piedad Estate was acquired by the
Philippine Government pursuant to the Friar Lands Act. The
certificate of title in the name of the government was OCT No. 614.
The Estate was placed under the administration of the Director of
Lands.
Controversy arising from conflicting claims over Lot 823 began after
a fire gutted portions of the Quezon City Hall on June 11, 1988 which
destroyed records stored in the Office of the Register of Deeds.
In 1990, Manotoks filed a petition with the LRA for administrative
reconstitution of TCT No. 372302 covering Lot No. 823 with an area
of 342,945 square meters GRANTED TCT No. RT-22481
(372302) was issued in 1991.
In 1996, 8 years after the fire the Barques filed a petition with the
LRA for administrative reconstitution of TCT No. 210177 in the name
of Homer Barque also covering Lot 823. In support of their petition,
328

the Barques submitted copies of the alleged owners duplicate of the

TCT, real estate tax receipts, tax declarations and a Plan Fls 3168-D
covering the property.
MANOTOK opposed alleging that TCT No. 210177 was spurious.
Although both titles of the Manotoks and the Barques refer to land
belonging to Lot No. 823, TCT No. 210177 actually involves 2 parcels
with an aggregate area of 342,945 square meters, while TCT No. RT22481 (372302) pertains only to a 1 parcel of land, with a similar area
of 342,945 square meters.
In 1997 Barques petition was DENIED. Lot. No. 823 already
registered in the name of the Manotoks.
--> Barques MR was
denied They appealed to the LRA LRA Reversed.
LRA found that the reconstitution of the Manotok title was fraudulent.
Hence, it ordered the Barque title to be reconstituted. BUT
cancellation must 1st be sought in a court of competent jurisdiction of
the 1991 Manotok TCT.
The LRA denied the Manotoks MR and the Barques prayer for
immediate reconstitution. Both the Manotoks and the Barques
appealed the LRA decision to the CA.
In the CA, Felicitas Manahan filed a motion to intervene and sought
the dismissal of the cases claiming ownership of the subject property.
In 2002 and 2003 2 separate divisions of the CA both directed the
RD of QC to cancel the Reconstituted Manotok Title and to
reconstitute the Barques valid, genuine and existing TCT No.
210177.
Hence, the Manotoks filed the present separate petitions which were
ordered consolidated on August 2, 2004.December 12, 2005, SC
First Division affirmed both decisions of the CA. Manotoks filed
MR Denied in April 2006 Resolution.
Thereafter, the Manotoks filed a Motion for Leave to File a Second
MR with their MR attached. Denied in June 2006 Resolution.
Eventually entry of judgment was made in the Book of Entries of
Judgment on May 2, 2006. In the meantime, the Barques filed
multiple motions with the First Division for execution of the judgment,
while the Manotoks filed an Urgent Motion to Refer Motion for
Possession to the SC En Banc (with prayer to set motion for oral
arguments). Case was referred to the En Banc in July 2006.
On September 7, 2006, Felicitas Manahan and Rosendo Manahan
filed a motion to intervene, to which was attached their petition in
intervention. They alleged that their predecessor-in-interest, Valentin
329

Manahan, was issued Sale Certificate No. 511 covering Lot No. 823
and attached the findings of the NBI that the documents of the
Manotoks were not as old as they were purported to be.
Consequently, the Director of the Legal Division of the LMB
recommended to the Director of the LMB the reconstituted Manotok
Title should be reverted to the state
Oral arguments were held on July 24, 2007.
In 2008 - En Banc set aside the December 2005 1 st division decision
and entry of judgment recalled and the CAs Amended Decisions in
CA-G.R. SP Nos. 66642 and 66700 were reversed and set aside.
The En Banc remanded the case to the CA.
The CA was directed to receive evidence of and focus on the issue of
WON the Manotoks can trace their claim of title to a valid alienation
by the Government of Lot No. 823 of the Piedad Estate, which was a
Friar Land. PURPOSE: to decide WON the title of the Maotoks
should be annulled.
CAs findings None of the parties were able to prove a valid
alienation of Lot 823 from the government in accordance with the
provisions of Act No. 1120 otherwise known as the Friar Lands Act.
Notably lacking in the deed of conveyance of the Manotoks is the
approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce as required
by Section 18 of the said law. Upon close scrutiny, the factual
allegations and voluminous documentary exhibits relating to the
purchase of Lot 823 by the predecessors-in-interest of the claimants
revealed badges of fraud and irregularity.
BASIS FOR THEIR CLAIMS FOR OWNERSHIP:
Manotoks - Their grandfather bought Lot 823 from the Government in
1919. They have since occupied the land, built their houses and
buildings on it. The subject land is now known as Manotok
Compound.
Barques - Teresita claims her father (Homer) bought land from
Emiliano Setosta who had a TCT in his name.
Manahans - The lot originally belonged to his parents but was
subsequently bought by his wife. They had a caretaker on the
property but she was ousted by armed men in 1950s so they just
declared the property for taxation to protect their rights.
ISSUE:
Who has the better right over Lot No. 823?
330

Ruling:
Manotok Appeal denied
Manahan Petition for intervention denied
Petition for reconstitution of the Barque title denied
All the TCTs in the name of Manotoks, Manahans and Barque, are
NULL and VOID. The Register of Deeds of Caloocan City and/or
Quezon City are hereby ordered to CANCEL the said titles.
Lot No. 823 is property of the National Government of the Philippines
w/o prejudice to Reversion proceedings
Act No. 1120 SECTION 18. No lease or sale made by Chief of the
Bureau of Public Lands under the provisions of this Act shall be valid
until approved by the Secretary of the Interior.
It is clear from the foregoing provision and from jurisprudence that the
sale of friar lands shall be valid only if approved by the Secretary of
the Interior (later the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce).
In their Memorandum, the Manotoks pointed out that their photocopy
of the original Deed of Conveyance No. 29204, sourced from the
National Archives, shows on the second page a poorly imprinted
typewritten name over the words Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, which name is illegible, and above it an even
more poorly imprinted impression of what may be a stamp of the
Secretarys approval.
The Manotoks are invoking the presumption of regularity in the
performance of the RDs task in issuing the TCT in the Manotoks
name. The Manotoks contend that we can assume that the Manotok
deed of conveyance was in fact approved by the Department
Secretary because the register of deeds did issue TCT No. 22813 in
the name of the buyer Severino Manotok. FURTHER, the Manotoks
assert that even if we were to ignore the presumption of validity in the
performance of official duty, Department Memorandum Order No. 1605 issued on October 27, 2005 by then DENR Secretary Michael T.
Defensor, supplies the omission of approval by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources in deeds of conveyances over friar
lands.
DENR Memorandum Order No. 16, invoked by both the Manotoks
and the Manahans, states that some Deeds of Conveyance on record
331

in the field offices of the LMB do not bear the Secretarys signature
despite full payment for the Friar Land. They are deemed signed or
otherwise ratified by this Memo provided that the applicant really paid
the purchase price and complied with all the requirements under the
Friar Lands Act.
Manotoks also point out that the Friar Lands Act itself states that the
Government ceases reservation of its title once the buyer had fully
paid the price. (They were claiming that they fully paid!) Their basis is
SECTION 15 of the Friar Lands Act.
Court found that the old rule would support the Manotoks contention
however, the new rule Pugeda v. Trias, the conveyance executed in
favor of a buyer or purchaser, or the so-called certificate of sale, is a
conveyance of the ownership of the property, subject only to the
resolutory condition that the sale may be cancelled if the price agreed
upon is not paid for in full.
Clearly, it is the execution of the contract to sell and delivery of the
certificate of sale that vests title and ownership to the purchaser of
friar land. Such certificate of sale must, of course, be signed by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, as evident from
Sections 11, 12 and the 2nd paragraph of Section 15, in relation to
Section 18.
Re: Manotoks, could not have acquired ownership of the subject lot
as they had no valid certificate of sale issued to them by the
Government because their Certificate lacks the signature of the
Director of Lands and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources
The decades-long occupation by the Manotoks of Lot 823, their
payment of real property taxes and construction of buildings, are of
no moment. It must be noted that the Manotoks miserably failed to
prove the existence of the title allegedly issued in the name of
Severino Mantotok after the latter had paid in full the purchase price.
The Manotoks did not offer any explanation as to why the only copy
of TCT No. 22813 was torn in half and no record of documents
leading to its issuance can be found in the registry of deeds. As to
the certification issued by the Register of Deeds of Caloocan, it
simply described the copy presented as DILAPIDATED without
stating if the original copy of TCT No. 22813 actually existed in their
records, nor any information on the year of issuance and name of
registered owner.
332

Re: Manahans, No copy of the alleged Sale Certificate No. 511 can
be found in the records of either the DENR-NCR, LMB or National
Archives. Although the OSG submitted a certified copy of
Assignment of Sale Certificate No. 511 allegedly executed by Valentin
Manahan in favor of Hilaria de Guzman, there is no competent
evidence to show that the claimant Valentin Manahan or his
successors-in-interest actually occupied Lot 823, declared the land
for tax purposes, or paid the taxes due thereon.
MANOTOK REALTY, INC. AND MANOTOK ESTATE
CORPORATION VS.CLT REALTY DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION
G.R. NO. 123346
Facts:
The Petition involved properties covered by Original Certificate of
Title (OCT) No. 994 which in turnencompasses 1,342 hectares of the
Maysilo Estate. The vast tract of land stretches over three (3) cities
withinMetropolitan Manila, comprising an area larger than the
sovereign states of Monaco and the Vatican.CLT Realty Development
Corporation (CLT) sought to recover from Manotok Realty, Inc. and
Manotok EstateCorporatio
n (Manotoks) the possession of Lot 26 of the Maysilo Estate. CLTs
claim was anchored on TransferCertificate of Title derived from
Estelita Hipolito. Hipolitos title emanated from Jose Dimson whose
title
appears to have been sourced from OCT No. 994.
For their part, the Manotoks challenged the validity of the title relied
on by CLT, claiming that Dimsons title,the proximate source of CLTs
title, was irregularly issued and, hence, the same and subsequent
titles flowing
therefrom are likewise void. The Manotoks asserted their ownership
over Lot 26 and claimed that they derivedit from several awardees
and/or vendees of the National Housing Authority. The Manotok title
likewise tracedas its primary source OCT No. 994.The trial court ruled
for CLT. Manotoks appeal to the CA was denied.
Issue:
333

Whether the title issued in the name of CLT valid.

Ruling:
It is evident from all three titlesCLTs, Hipolitos and Dimsons
that the properties they purport to coverwere " originally registered on
19
April 1917 in the Registration Book of the Office of the Register of
Deeds of Rizal." These titles could be affirmed only if it can be proven
that OCT No. 994 registered on 19 April 1917 hadactually existed.
CLT were given the opportunity to submit such proof but it did not.The
established legal principle in actions for annulment or reconveyance
of title is that a party seeking itshould establish not merely by a
preponderance of evidence but by clear and convincing evidence that
theland sought to be reconveyed is his. In an action to recover, the
property must be identified, and the plaintiffmust rely on the strength
of his title and not on the weakness of the defendant's
claim.Considering that CLT clearly failed to meet the burden of proof
reposed in them as plaintiffs in the action forannulment of title and
recovery of possession, there is a case to be made for ordering the
dismissal of theiroriginal complaints before the trial court.As it
appears on the record, OCT No. 994, the mother title was received
for transcription by the Register ofDeeds on 3 May 1917 based
from the issuance of the decree of registration on 17 April
1917.Obviously, April 19, 1917 is not the date of inscription or the
date of transcription of the decree into theOriginal Certificate of Title.
Thus, such date cannot be considered as the date of the title or the
date when thetitle took effect. It appears that the transcription of the
decree was done on the date it was received by theRegister of Deeds
of Rizal on May 3, 1917here is a marked distinction between the
entry of the decree and the entry of the certificate of title; the entryof
the decree is made by the chief clerk of the land registration and the
entry of the certificate of title is madeby the register of deeds. The
certificate of title is issued in pursuance of the decree of registration.
It wasstressed that what stands as the certificate of the title is the
transcript of the decree of registration made bythe registrar of deeds
in the registry.Moreover, it is only after the transcription of the decree
by the register of deeds that the certificate of title isto take
effect.Hence, any title that traces its source to OCT No. 994 dated 17
334

April 1917 is void, for such mother title isinexistent. The fact that CLT
titles made specific reference to an OCT No. 994 dated 17 April 1917
casts doubton the validity of such titles since they refer to an
inexistent OCT. This error alone is, in fact, sufficient toinvalidate the
CLT claims over the subject property if singular reliance is placed by
them on the datesappearing on their respective titles.The Court
hereby constitutes a Special Division of the Court of Appeals to hear
the case on remand.In ascertaining which of the conflicting claims of
title should prevail, the Special Division is directed to makefurther
determinations based on the evidence already on record and such
other evidence as may be presentedat the proceedings before it.
The Piedad Estate is patrimonial property of the
government, hence State property without prejudice to
reversion proceedings.
MANOTOK VS HEIRS OF HOMER L. BARQUE,
G.R. NOS. 162335 & 162605
AUGUST 24, 2010
Facts:
Lot No. 823 is a part of the Piedad Estate, Quezon City, a Friar Land
acquired by the Philippine Government from the Philippine Sugar
Estates Development Company, Ltd., La Sociedad Agricola de
Ultramar, the British-Manila Estate Company, Ltd., and the Recoleto
Order of the Philippine Islands on December 23, 1903, as indicated
in Act No. 1120 (Friar Lands Act) enacted on April 26, 1904. The
Piedad Estate has been titled in the name of the Government under
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 614 and was placed under the
administration of the Director of Lands.
After the promulgation of the December 12, 2005 decision, the
Manotoks filed several motions for reconsideration with the
1st Division but these were all DENIED by the Court. The decision of
the 1st Division was later entered in the Book of Entries of Judgment.
But when the Barques moved for the execution of the decision, the
Manotoks sought the referral of the motion to the Court en banc,
which the Court en banc accepted on July 26, 2006.
335

The Manahans sought to intervene in the case, alleging that their

predecessor-in-interest, Vicente Manahan, was issued Sales
Certificate No. 511 covering the lot No 823.
On December 18, 2008, the Court promulgated an en banc
resolution that SET ASIDE the decision and resolutions of the
1st Division and RECALLED the entry of judgment. Voting 8-6 with 1
abstention, the Court REVERSED the decisions and resolutions of
the CA and the LRA, and REMANDED the cases to the CA for further
proceedings to determine the validity of the Manotoks title.
In due time, the CA received evidence with primary focus on whether
the Manotoks can trace their claim of title to a valid alienation by the
Government of Lot No. 823 of the Piedad Estate, which was a Friar
Land. The Barques and Manahans were likewise allowed to present
evidence on their respective claims that may have an impact on the
correct determination of the status of the Manotok title.
Issue:
Whether the absence of approval of the Secretary of the
Interior/Agriculture and Natural Resources in Sale Certificate No.
1054 and Deed of Conveyance No. 29204 warrants the annulment of
the Manotok title.
Ruling:
Yes, the absence of approval of the Secretary of the
Interior/Agriculture and Natural Resources in Sale Certificate No.
1054 and Deed of Conveyance No. 29204 in favor of the Manotoks
predecessor-in-interest warrants the annulment of the Manotok title.
Sale Certificate No. 1054 dated March 10, 1919 (Exh. 10) was not
signed by the Director of Lands nor approved by the Secretary of the
Interior. Exhibits 33 and 34-OSG-LMB contained only the signature
of the Director of Lands. The Manotoks belatedly secured from the
National Archives a certified copy of Deed of Conveyance No. 29204
dated December 7, 1932 (Exh. 51-A) which likewise lacks the
approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources as it
was signed only by the Director of Lands.
Section 18 of Act No. 1120 provides:

336

SECTION 18. No lease or sale made by Chief of the Bureau of

Public Lands under the provisions of this Act shall be valid until
approved by the Secretary of the Interior. (Emphasis supplied.)
C. Post-Judgment incidents
a. Writ of Possession
i. The writ may be issued not only against the person defeated in
the registration case but also against any one adversely
occupying the land during the proceedings up to the issuance of
the decree.
Vencilao vs. Vano
182 SCRA 491
Facts:
Three consolidated cases are resolved, given that there are same
parties and parcels of land in question.
1) In the first case, the heirs of the late Juan Reyes filed an
application for registration of the subject parcel of land, which
resulted in an OCT. After the heirs tried to take possession of the
property, a reconveyance of property was filed against them by
Vencila et al., asserting that:
a. They have acquired the land by purchase or inheritance and in
OCEN
possession
for
30
years
b. The parcels of land that they own were by mistake part of Juan
Reyes estate
2) The second case involved the death of the administratix of the
estate of the owners/heirs of the land. After her death, a TCT was
issued in the name of Pedro Luspo, and another was issued in the
name of several persons. A writ of possession was issued by the trial
court against petitioners.
3) The third case involved one of the registered owners of the land
who filed a petition for complaint against the occupants who refused
to vacate the land and sign the Sheriffs return.
337

The heirs of Juan Reyes moved to dismiss the case of reconveyance

stating that the other parties had no cause of action and that they
were barred by prior judgement already.
The lower court denied the motion to dismiss, then set aside the
same order, and then reversed itself partially (some cases were
dismissed, some were not -- since there were several petitioners).
The parties whose cases were dismissed appealed to the SC.
These petitioners contend that they were not claimants-oppositors
nor defeated oppositors in the said land registration case, as their
names dont appear in the amended application for registration. They
argue that they have occupied the parcels of land for more than 30
years which began long before the application for registration and
that even after registration, they continued to possess the land.

Issue/s:
-Whether or not res judicata is applicable in an action for
reconveyance
-Whether or not the writ of possession may be issued against them
considering that the petitioners were not the defeated parties in the
registration case
Held:
1. No. Res judicata applies to all cases and proceedings, including
land registration and cadastral proceedings. A final judgment is
conclusive even in subsequent cases involving the same parties and
their successors-in-interest as long as the ff. requisites are present:
a.
The
former
judgment
must
be
final
b. Rendered by a court having jurisdiction on the subject matter and
of
the
parties
c.
The
judgment
was
based
on
the
merits
d. There is identity of parties, subj matter, and cause of action
between the first and second actions (Land registration and action for
reconveyance)

338

2. Yes. A writ of possession may be issued not only against a person

who has been defeated in a registration case but also against anyone
unlawfully and adversely occupying the land or any portion thereof
during the land registration proceedings up to the issuance of the final
decree.
Note: In a registration case, the judgment confirming the title of the
applicant and ordering its registration in his name necessarily carries
with it the right of ownership (right to possess-may be obtained
through writ of possession).
On the issue of contempt, the court ruled that the occupants were not
guilty. Contempt only applies when after the sheriff dispossess or
eject the occupants, they enter/attempt to enter the property. It was
the sheriffs and not the petitioners fault that there was delivery of
possession was unsuccessful.

339

ii. When unavailable. The writ does not lie against a person who
entered the land after the issuance of the decree and who was
not a party in the case. He can only be proceeded against in a
separate action for ejectment for reivindicatory action.
Bernas vs Nuevo 127 SCRA 399
G.R. No. L-58438 & G.R. No. L-60423
FACTS:
Heirs of Pascual Bellosillo and Francisca Besa, represented by
Silvestre Bellosillo, petitioners in G.R. No. 60423, filed a complaint
against defendants Edilberto Bernas, Baldonera Bulquirin and Teofilo
Berano for recovery of possession of a 33 1/3 hectare parcel of land
of the Panay Cadastre and for the issuance of writ of preliminary
injunction to restore the plaintiffs to the possession of the land in
dispute. The motion for the issuance of a preliminary injunction
having been denied, the plaintiffs subsequently filed another motion
for the issuance of a writ of possession on the ground that the same
is paramount for the prevention of the estate represented by Lot
3382, otherwise it will be dissipated and the plaintiffs as heirs might
have nothing to inherit, while the defendants have not shown any
definite title or right over the estate as they had first claimed that they
were lessees then later, tenants, which are two incompatible and
divergent sources of right.
On August 28, 1981, Judge Pelayo Nuevo granted the writ of
possession applied for by plaintiffs after pre-trial and hearing of the
motion for the issuance of said writ. A motion for reconsideration was
filed by defendants but the same was not acted upon due to the
retirement of Judge Nuevo. Hence, the defendants filed the petition
for certiorari. Meanwhile, the sala vacated by Judge Nuevo was filled
through the appointment of Judge Oscar Leviste. While the petition
assailing the order granting the writ of possession was pending
before this Court, Judge Leviste, on December 8, 1981, acted on the
motion for reconsideration filed by the defendants (Bernas) on
September 12, 1981 and issued an order declaring null and void the
writ of possession issued by former Judge Nuevo. In a subsequent
order dated April 20, 1982, the same Judge also ordered the
340

defendants to be place in possession of the property in question, Lot

3382. Hence, a petition for certiorari was filed, this time by the
plaintiffs in Civil Case No.
ISSUE:
Whether Judge Nuevo and Judge Leviste erred in granting the writ of
possession filed by the parties.
Ruling:
The Court held that when parties against whom a writ of possession
is sought have been in possession of the land for at least ten years,
and they entered into possession apparently after the issuance of the
final decree, and none of them had been a party in the registration
proceedings, the writ of possession will not issue. A person who took
possession of the land after final adjudication of the same in
registration proceedings cannot be summarily ousted through a writ
of possession secured by a mere motion and that regardless of any
tittle or lack of title of persons to hold possession of the land in
question, they cannot be ousted without giving them their day in court
in proper independent proceedings. In the case at bar, the
defendants-petitioners had been in possession of the lot since 1960
under an alleged lease contract and were not a party to the original
registration case of the same way back in 1930. This notwithstanding,
the writ was issued after pre-trial and hearing of the motion for the
issuance of the writ only and not after final adjudication of the rights
of the parties over the lot in controversy. Therefore, it was a patent
error on the part of respondent Judge Nuevo to issue the questioned
writ. The rule is "when other persons have subsequently entered the
property, claiming the right of possession, the owner of the registered
property or his successors in interest cannot dispossess such
persons by merely asking for a writ of possession. The remedy is to
resort to the courts of justice and institute a separate action for
unlawful entry or detainer or for reinvidicatory action, as the case may
be." The act of Judge Leviste issuing the orders constituted
disrespect and disregard of the authority and jurisdiction of this Court.
He should have waited for this Court's decision before acting on said
motion for reconsideration and issuing the said orders.

341

iii. When issued as a matter of course

LUCERO V. LOOT
G.R. No. L-16995
Facts:
Julio Lucero filed and was granted a writ of possession of property
(based on a final decree in a land registration proceeding). Although
the other party filed a motion to quash the writ, this was granted by
CFI Iloilos Judge Fernan.
The Loots opposed the decision on the ground that there were
defects in the reconstitution of the records and that the motion was
not under oath. The court dismissed these as trivial arguments. Two
motions for reconsideration were also denied. The writ of possession
prayed for was issued in favor of Lucero.
The Loots went straight to the Supreme Court for an appeal for
certiorari.
Issue:
Whether or not the order granting the writ of possession was in
accordance with law.
Ruling:
Yes, the order granting the writ of possession was based on a
decision promulgated on a land registration case in 1938, which
became a final decree on October 29, 1941.
After the final decree, the issuance of the writ of possession was only
a ministerial duty of the court if no writ has been issued to the
registered owner yet. The final decree, in effect, immediately
empowered the court to enforce the order/judgment/decree. This
automatic process is to avoid further delay and inconvenience to a
successful land registration litigant if he were compelled to
commence another action to secure possession.
Furthermore, there is no period of prescription as to the issuance of a
writ of possession.The writ may be issued not only against the person
who has been defeated in a registration case, but also against
anyone adversely occupying the land or any portion of the land. Even
fraud shall not be a bar to the issuance of the writ of possession,
which necessarily implied the delivery of possession of the land. As to
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the questions of fact raised by the Loots, the SC can do nothing.

These must be raised at the CA of appeals; otherwise, the parties
contesting the facts are deemed to have waived the opportunity to
question the correctness of the findings.

iv. Against whom issued.

EUFEMIA VILLANUEVA VDA. DE BARROGA AND SATURNINA
VILLANUEVA VDA. DE PACADA, VS.
ANGEL ALBANO, ARSENIO ALBANO, ENCARNACION ALBANO,
ROSALIA ALBANO, ASSISTED BY HER HUSBAND, JUANITO
ALBANO, ROSITA ALBANO, ASSISTED BY HER HUSBAND,
ALFREDO RAMIREZ, MIGUEL ALBANO, CHARITO ALBANO,
AND PEDRO ALBANO, PETITIONERS-APPELLEES. RICARDO Y.
NAVARRO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS JUDGE OF SALA I, COURT OF
FIRST INSTANCE OF ILOCOS NORTE, RESPONDENT.
G.R. NO. L-43445 JANUARY 20, 1988
Facts:
On July of 1941, a decision was rendered adjudicating a parcel of
land in favour of Delfina Aquino. However, the decree of registration
was not issued except until after 14yrs and only after 24 yrs had
343

passed that an OCT was issued in favour of the latter.

On august of 1970(after the decree has been issued but before title),
the children and heirs of Ruperta Pascual (oppositors to the cadastral
proceeding) brought a suit againsts the children of Delfina Aquino, the
appellees.
The appellants argued that they had been in possession of the said
land since 1941 an rayed that a new title be made out in their names.
Parenthetically, it shows that the Aquinos title encroached upon a
4sq.m. portion of adjoining land which belongs to Cesar Castro.
Subsequently, Castro filed a complaint of intervention to recover the
said land.
A judgemtn has been rendered awarding the 4sw.m. portion of
overlapped land to Castro and dismissing the complaint filed by the
Barrogas and Padacas. Thereafter, at the instance of defendant
Angel Albano, et. Al (heirs of Delfina Aquino), the court ordered
executon of judgemtn. However, the Barroga and Padacas moved to
quash said writ, stating that there was nothing to execute since the
verdict was simply one of dismissing the complaint. The matter
apparently ended. No further development anent this case appears in
the record. However, the record shows that on August of 1975 the
Cadastral Court promulgated an order granting the motion of Angel
albano et. Al. for a writ of possesson to the said land and was issued.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court may still issue order even beyond 15 days
from entry of judgment
Ruling:
On November 24, 1925 judgment was promulgated by this Court
in Manlapas, et al. v. Llorente, etc., et al., ruling that:
(1) a party in whose favor a decree of registration is issued by a
cadastral court in accordance with the Torrens Act (Act No. 496), or
his successor-in-interest, has "a perfect right not only to the title of
the land, but also to its possession;"
(2) he has the right, too, under Section 17 of the same Act, to a writ of
possession as against any "party to the registration proceeding and
who is directly and personally affected and reached by the decree"
(or who had been served with process therein but had not appeared
nor answered); and
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(3) his right to obtain a writ of possession is not subject to the

provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure regarding execution of
judgments, since the decree "is to exist forever." These doctrines
have since been reiterated and reaffirmed.
"The fundamental rule," the Court said some forty-three years
later, "is that a writ of possession can be issued not only against the
original oppositors in a land registration case and their
representatives and successors-in-interest, but also against any
person unlawfully and adversely occupying said lot at any time before
and up to the issuance of the final decree." It also pointed out that
neither laches nor the statute of limitations applies to a decision in a
land registration case, citing Sta. Ana v. Menla, et al. to the following
effect:
We fail to understand the arguments of the appellant. ... except
insofar as it supports his theory that after a decision in a land
registration case has become final, it may not be enforced after the
lapse of a period of 10 years, except by another proceeding to
enforce the judgment. ... (Sec. 6, Rule 39). This provision of the
Rules refers to civil actions and is not applicable to special
proceedings, such as a land registration case. This is so because a
party in a civil action must immediately enforce a judgment that is
secured as against the adverse party, and his failure to act to enforce
the same within a reasonable time as provided in the Rules makes
the decision unenforceable against the losing party. In special
proceedings the purpose is to establish a status, condition or fact; in
land registration proceedings, the ownership by a person of a parcel
of land is sought to be established. After the ownership has been
proved and confirmed by judicial declaration, no further proceedings
to enforce said ownership is necessary, except when the adverse or
losing party had been in possession of the land and the winning party
desires to oust him therefrom.
Furthermore, there is no provision in the Land Registration Act similar
to Sec. 6, Rule 39, regarding the execution of a judgment in a civil
action, except the proceedings to place the winner in possession by
virtue of a writ of possession. The decision in a land registration case,
unless the adverse or losing party is in possession, becomes final
without any further action, upon the expiration of the period for
345

perfecting an appeal. ...

... There is nothing in the law that limits the period within which the
court may order or issue a decree. The reason is ... that the judgment
is merely declaratory in character and does not need to be asserted
or enforced against the adverse party. Furthermore, the issuance of a
decree is a ministerial duty both of the judge and of the Land
Registration Commission; failure of the court or of the clerk to issue
the decree for the reason that no motion therefor has been filed
cannot prejudice the owner, or the person in whom the land is
ordered to be registered.
v. Until when available
JULIO LUCERO VS. JAIME L. LOOT, ET AL.
G.R. NO. L-16995, OCTOBER 28, 1968
Facts:
The trial court granted a writ of possession in favor of Lucero stating
that the writ of possession, once the final decree has been issued the
issuance of a writ of possession is only a matter of course if nothing
in the past has been issued in favor of the registered owner. There is
no period of prescription as to the issuance of a writ of possession,
and inasmuch as the final decree has already been entered, it follows
that a writ of possession should be issued in favor of the registered
owner. This was opposed to by oppositors Loot contending that
there are defects in the reconstitution of the records and that the
motion is not under oath is trivial in its nature and consequently
untenable. The court didnt see any merit in the same.
Consequently, a writ of possession was issued.
Issue:
Whether or not the order granting the writ of possession was in
accordance with law.
Ruling:
A writ of possession may be issued not only against the person
who
has
been defeated in
a registration case but also against anyone adversely
occupying
346

the land or any portion thereof during the land registration proceeding
s. The issuance
of the decree of registration is part of the
registration proceedings. Consequently, any
person unlawfully and adversely occupying said lot at any time up to
the issuance of the final decree, may be subject to a judicial
ejectment by means of a writ of possession and it is the
duty of the registration court to issue said writ when asked by the
successful
claimant.
If the writ of possession issued in a land registration implies the
delivery of the possession of the land to the successful litigant,
a writ of demolition must, likewise issue, especially considering that
the latter writ is but a complement of the latter, which, without said
writ of execution would be ineffective.

347

vi. A person who took possession of a parcel of land after final

adjudication of the same in registration proceedings cannot be
summarily ousted through a writ of possession secured by mere
motion.
b. Writ of Demolirion
JULIO LUCERO VS. JAIME L. LOOT, ET AL.
G.R. NO. L-16995 OCTOBER 28, 1968
Facts:
The trial court granted a writ of possession in favor of Lucero. This
was opposed to by oppositors Loot, but the court didnt see
any merit in the same. A motion for reconsideration was filed three
times, however it was all denied. Then an appeal was filed to the
Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not there is prescription with regard to the issuance of a
writ of possession.
Ruling::
Regarding the writ of possession, once the final decree has been
issued the issuance of a writ of possession is only a matter of course
if nothing in the past has been issued in favor of the registered owner.
There is no period of prescription as to the issuance of a writ of
possession, and inasmuch as the final decree has already been
entered, it follows that a writ of possession should be issued in favor
of the registered owner.
In Demorar v. Ibaez it was decided that: ".. a writ of possession may
be issued not only against the person who has been defeated in a
registration case but also against anyone adversely occupying the
land or any portion thereof during the land registration proceedings ...
The issuance of the decree of registration is part of the registration
348

proceedings. In fact, it is supposed to end the said proceedings.

Consequently, any person unlawfully and adversely occupying said
lot at any time up to the issuance of the final decree, may be subject
to judicial ejectment by means of a writ of possession and it is the
duty of the registration court to issue said writ when asked for by the
successful claimant." As a matter of fact, in a 1948 decision, it was
held by us that "the fact that the petitioners have instituted, more than
one year after the decree of registration had been issued, an ordinary
action with the Court of First Instance attacking the validity of the
decree on the ground of fraud, is not a bar to the issuance of the writ
of possession applied for by the registered owners."
Moreover, in Marcelo vs Mencias it was held that If the writ of
possession issued in a land registration implies the delivery of the
possession of the land to the successful litigant therein, a writ
of demolition must, likewise issue, especially considering that the
latter writ is but a complement of the latter, which, without said writ of
execution would be ineffective.

i. Aspects of Writ of Posession and Demolition

349

ii. A writ of demolition is but a compliment of the writ of

possession and may be issued by a special order of the court.
EMILLANO GAWARAN, MAGDALENA GAWARAN ET AL, VS.
HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, HON.
ALEJANDRO C. SILAPAN,
[G.R. NO. L-72721 JUNE 16, 1988]
Facts:
Petitioners oppose the application for registration and confirmation of
title over Lot 2, PSU-173975 situated in Digman, Bacoor, Cavite, on
which petitioners had their residential house and a "camarin." The
trial court awarded the lot to the petitioners. The respondents
appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed the decision of the
trial court and confirmed the ownership of said Lot No. 2 in the names
of private respondents. On motion of private respondents, the
respondent Regional Trial Court, on March 19, 1985, issued the
questioned writ of possession with the complimentary directive for the
oppositors to dismantle and remove their building and/or structure
from Lot No. 2 under pain of demolition and to vacate the premises in
favor of private respondents within thirty (30) days. The petitioners
appealed but the petition was dismissed, and an order for the
issuance of a decree in favor of private respondents was issued.
Issue:
Whether or not the court is correct in issuing the writ of possession
with a special order of demolition.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that the respondent appellate court
committed no reversible error in holding that the writ of possession
issued by the trial court and it is a necessary consequence of the
adjudication of ownership and the corresponding issuance of the
Original Certificate of Title. In a registration case, the judgment
confirming the title of the applicant and ordering its registration in his
name necessarily carries with it the delivery of possession which is
350

an inherent element of the right of ownership. Hence, a writ of

possession may be issued not only against the person who has been
defeated in a registration case, but also against any one unlawfully
and adversely occupying the land or any portion thereof during the
registration proceedings up to the issuance of the final decree. It is
the duty of the registration court to issue said writ when asked for by
the successful party.

c. In lieu of demolition, award of damages proper

351

AYALA CORPORATION vs. RAY BURTON DEVELOPMENT

CORPORATION
294 SCRA 48
FACTS:
Petitioner Ayala Corporation (AYALA) is the owner of the Ayala estate
located in Makati City. The said estate was originally a raw land
which was subdivided for sale into different lots devoted for
residential, commercial and industrial purposes.
On March 20, 1984, Karamfil Import-Export Company Ltd.
(KARAMFIL) bought from AYALA a piece of land identified as Lot 26,
Block 2 consisting of 1,188 square meters, located at what is now
known as H.V. de la Costa Street, Salcedo Village, Makati City. The
said land is now the subject of this case. The transaction was
documented in a Deed of Sale of even date, which provides, among
others, that the vendee would comply with certain special conditions
and restrictions on the use or occupancy of the land.
On February 18, 1988, KARAMFIL sold the lot to Palmcrest
Development and Realty Corporation (PALMCREST) under a Deed
of Absolute Sale of even date. AYALA gave its written conformity to
the sale but reflecting in its approval the same special
conditions/restrictions as in the previous sale.
PALMCREST in turn sold the lot to Ray Burton Development
Corporation (RBDC), now respondent, on April 11, 1988, with the
agreement that AYALA retains possession of the Owners Duplicate
copy of the title until a building is erected on said parcel of land in
accordance with the requirements and/or restrictions of AYALA. As in
the KARAMFIL-PALMCREST transaction, AYALA gave its conformity
to the sale, subject to RBDCs compliance with the special
conditions/restrictions which were annotated in the deed of sale.
Sometime in June of 1989, RBDC submitted to AYALA for approval a
set of architectural plans for the construction of a 5-storey office
building on the subject lot. The building was to be known as
Trafalgar Tower but later renamed Trafalgar Plaza. Since the
building was well within the 42-meter height restriction, AYALA
352

approved the architectural plans.

Early in June of 1990, RBDC made another set of building plans for
Trafalgar Plaza and submitted the same for approval, this time to
the Building Official of the Makati City Engineers Office, not to
AYALA. In these plans, the building was to be 26-storey high, or a
height of 98.60 meters, with a total gross floor area of 28,600 square
meters. After having obtained the necessary building permits from
the City Engineers Office, RBDC began to construct Trafalgar
Plaza in accordance with these new plans.
ISSUE:
Whether or not award of damages is proper, in lieu of demolition.
RULING:
YES.
In sum, there is more than ample evidence on record pinpointing
RBDCs violation of the applicable FAR restrictions in the
Consolidated and Revised Deed Restrictions (CRDRs) when it
constructed the 27-storey Trafalgar Plaza. The prayer of petitioner is
that judgment be rendered, among others, ordering Ray Burton to
comply with its contractual obligations in the construction of Trafalgar
Plaza by removing or demolishing the portions of areas thereof
constructed beyond or in excess of the approved height, as shown by
the building plans submitted to, and approved by, Ayala, including any
other portion of the building constructed not in accordance with the
said building plans. However, the record reveals that construction of
Trafalgar Plaza began in 1990, and a certificate of completion thereof
was issued by the Makati City Engineers Office per ocular inspection
on November 7, 1996. Apparently Trafalgar Plaza has been fully built,
and we assume, is now fully tenanted. The alternative prayers of
petitioner under the CRDRs, i.e., the demolition of excessively built
space or to permanently restrict the use thereof, are no longer
feasible. Thus, we perforce instead rule that RBDC may only be held
alternatively liable for substitute performance of its obligations the
payment of damages. Ray Burton Development Corporation acted in
bad faith in constructing Trafalgar Plaza in excess of the applicable
restrictions upon a double submission of plans and exercising deceit
353

upon both AYALA and the Makati Engineer's Office, and thus by way
of example and correction, should be held liable to pay AYALA
exemplary damages in the sum of P2,500,000.00.
CADASTRAL PROCEEDINGS
A. Basic concepts
a. Nature of Proceedings

VDA.DE BARROGA VS ALBANO

G.R. No. L-43445 January 20, 1988
Facts:
In Cadastral Proceeding of the then Court of First Instance of Ilocos
Norte, a decision was rendered on July 31, 1941 adjudicating a
parcel of land known as Lot No. 9821 in favor of Delfina Aquino. One
of the oppositors was Ruperta Pascual, who was declared in
default. However, for reasons not disclosed by the record, but as to
which no sinister or prejudicial character is imputed by the appellants,
the decree of registration did not issue except until after the lapse of
fourteen (14) years or so, or on October 14, 1955; and it was only
after twenty-four (24) years had passed, or on November 17, 1979,
that an original certificate of title (No. C-2185) was issued in Delfina
Aquino's name. On August 11, 1970, after the decree of registration
had been handed down but before title issued in Delfina Aquino's
favor, the children and heirs of Ruperta Pascual appellants
Eufemia Barroga and Saturnina Padaca-brought suit in the same
Court of First Instance against the children and heirs of Delfina
Aquino appellees Angel Albano, et al. Said appellants alleged that
they, and their mother, Ruperta Pascual, had been in possession of
Lot 9821 since 1941 and were the real owners thereof; and they
prayed that Delfina Aquino's title be voided and cancelled, that the
defendants be commanded to reconvey the land to them, and that a
new title be made out in their names. After trial on the merits,
judgment was rendered dismissing the Barroga's and Padaca's
complaint.
Issue:
354

What is the nature of the cadastral proceedings.

Ruling:
The familiar doctrine of res adjudicata operated to blot out any hope
of success of Barroga's and Padaca's suit for recovery of title Lot No.
9821. Their action was clearly barred by the prior judgment in the
cadastral proceeding affirming Delfina Aquino's ownership over the
property, and in which proceeding the former's predecessor-ininterest, Ruperta Pascual, had taken part as oppositor but had been
declared in default. The judgment of the cadastral court was one
"against a specific thing" and therefore "conclusive upon the title to
the thing." It was a judgment in rem, binding generally upon the whole
world, inclusive of persons not parties thereto,and particularly upon
those who had actually taken part in the proceeding (like the
appellants' predecessor, Ruperta Pascual, who had intervened
therein as an oppositor) as well as "their successors in interest by title
subsequent to the commencement of the action or special
proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the same title and
in the same capacity

b. Jurisdiction not limited to adjudicating ownership to

claimants; if there are no claimants, land is declared
355

public
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, AND THE DIRECTOR OF
LANDS VS. HON. ABRAHAM P. VERA, JUDGE, CFI, BATAAN,
BRANCH I, AND THELMA TANALEGA
G.R. No. L-35779
Facts:
G.R. No. L-35778:
On May 4, 1972, respondent Luisito Martinez filed with the lower
court an application for registration of title under Act 496 of one (1)
parcel of land, situated in the Municipality of Mariveles, Bataan,
containing an area of 323,093 square meters, more or less. On July
7, 1972 the lower court issued an order of general default except as
to the Republic of the Philippines and the Province of Bataan. On July
24, 1972, the Republic of the Philippines filed with the lower court an
opposition to the application stating that the parcel of land applied for
is a portion of the public domain belonging to the Republic, not
subject to private appropriation. Records show that in the hearing of
this case in the lower court, applicant Luisito Martinez, 62 years old,
testified that he is the owner of the land applied for, having inherited
the same from his parents, consisting of 32 hectares, more or less;
that he started possessing the land in 1938; that about 8 hectares of
the land is planted to palay, and there are about 42 mango trees; that
kamoteng kahoy is also planted thereon; that he declared the land for
taxation purposes only in 1969 because all the records were lost
during the war, and that possession was continuous, open,
undisturbed and in the concept of owner.
G.R. No. L-35779:
On March 21, 1972, respondent Thelma Tanalega filed an application
for registration under Act No. 496 in the Court of First Instance of
Bataan, docketed as Land Registration Case No. N-206, L.R.C. Rec.
No. N-41884, of two (2) parcels of land located in the barrio of
Camaya, municipality of Mariveles, province of Bataan, containing an
area of 443,297 square meters, more or less, and 378,506 square
meters, more or less, respectively, and more particularly described
and Identified as portions of Lot 626, Mariveles Cadastre, covered by
Plans (LRC) SWO-13430 and (LRC) SWO-13431, respectively. At
the hearing of this case in the lower court, applicant Thelma
356

Tanalega, 27 years old, testified that she had possessed the land
"openly, adversely, notoriously and in the concept of owner since
February 2, 1970 when the said land was sold to her by Elisa Llamas
who allegedly possessed this land" in the same manner since 1935;
that the applicant had paid for the taxes of the land for the years
1970-1972.
In both cases, the Court of First Instance of Bataan in two separate
decisions, dated October 9, 1972 and October 16, 1972, confirmed
the titles to subject parcels of land and adjudicated them in favor of
applicants Luisito Martinez and Thelma Tanalega, now respondents
herein.
Issue:
Whether or not the lower court is without jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the application for voluntary registration under Act 496 and
that the lands in question can no longer be subject to registration by
voluntary proceedings, for they have already been subjected to
compulsory registration proceedings under the Cadastral Act.
Ruling:
The petitions are meritorious and reversal of the questioned
decisions is in order. In a cadastral proceedings any person claiming
any interest in any part of the lands object of the petition is required
by Section 9 of Act No. 2259 to file an answer on or before the return
day or within such further time as may be allowed by the court, giving
the details required by law, such as: (1) Age of the claimant; (2)
Cadastral number of lot or lots claimed, or the block and lot numbers,
as the case may be; (3) Name of the barrio and municipality,
township or settlement in which the lots are situated; (4) Names of
the owners of adjoining lots; (5) If claimant is in possession of the lots
claims and can show no express grant of the land by the Government
to him or to his predecessors-in-interest, the answer need state the
length of time property was held in possession and the manner it was
acquired, giving the length of time, as far as known, during which his
predecessors, if any, held possession; (6) If claimant is not in
possession or occupation of the land, the answer shall set forth the
interest claimed by him and the time and manner of its acquisition; (7)
If the lots have been assessed for taxation, their last assessed value;
and (8) Encumbrance, if any, affecting the lots and the names of
adverse claimants as far as known. In the absence of successful
claimants, the property is declared public land.
In the instant cases, private respondents apparently either did not file
357

their answers in the aforesaid cadastral proceedings or failed to

substantiate their claims over the portions they were then occupying,
otherwise, titles over the portions subject of their respective claims
would have been issued to them. The Cadastral Court must have
declared the lands in question public lands, and its decision had
already become final and conclusive.
Respondents are now barred by prior judgment to assert their rights
over the subject land, under the doctrine of res judicata. A cadastral
proceeding is one in rem and binds the whole world. Under this
doctrine, parties are precluded from re-litigating the same issues
already determined by final judgment. A mere casual cultivation of
portions of the land by the claimant does not constitute possession
under claim of ownership. In that sense, possession is not exclusive
and notorious so as to give rise to a presumptive grant from the
State. The possession of public land however long the period thereof
may have extended, never confers title thereto upon the possessor
because the statute of limitations with regard to public land does not
operate against the State, unless the occupant can prove possession
and occupation of the same under claim of ownership for the required
number of years to constitute a grant from the State. Applicants,
therefore, have failed to submit convincing proof actual, peaceful and
adverse possession in the concept of owners of the entire area in
question during the period required by law.
WHEREFORE, the decisions dated October 9,1972 and October 16,
1972 of the Court of First Instance of Bataan, Branch I should be, as
they are hereby reversed. Without pronouncement as to costs.
VIRGINIA FRANCO VDA. DE ARCEO, CARMELITA ARCEO,
ZENAIDA ARCEO, ROMEO ARCEO, RODOLFO ARCEO and
MANUEL ARCEO VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 81401
Facts:
Spouses Abdon Arceo and Escolastica Geronimo were the owners of
four parcels of unregistered land (six were involved but only four were
disputed) located in Pulilan, Bulacan, identified as lots nos. 2582,
2595, 3054, and 8131. Escolastica died on September 16, 1942 while
Abdon passed away in 1953. They had one son, Esteban, who died
on September 2, 1941. Esteban had five children, Jose, Pedro,
Lorenzo, Antonio, and Sotera. Jose married Virginia Franco, with
whom he fathered six children, Carmelita, Zenaida, Rodolfo, Manuel,
358

Cesar, and Romeo. Pedro, Lorenzo, Antonio, and Sotera are the
private respondents herein while Jose's widow, Virginia (Jose died on
March 8, 1970), and their children are the petitioners. On October (or
September) 27, 1941, the Arceos executed a deed of donation inter
vivos, in which the spouses bestowed the properties in favor of Jose.
Since 1942, Jose had been paying taxes thereon. In 1949, he took
personal possession thereof, worked thereon, and claimed them as
owner thereof. On August 2, 1950, the spouses executed another
deed of donation inter vivos, disposing of the properties further in
favor of Jose. On January 12, 1972, Virginia, together with her
children, filed with the cadastral court an application for registration in
their names of lots Nos. 2582, 2595, 3054, and 8131. Pedro and
Lorenzo specifically contested the application on lots Nos. 3054 and
8131 on claims that each of them was entitled to one-third thereof.
The cadastral court rejected all three documents and distributed the
properties according to the law on intestate succession. Virginia and
her children shortly went to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the
decision of the cadastral court and dismissed the appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the cadastral court was bereft of the power to
determine conflicting claims of ownership.
Ruling:
We have held that under Section 2 of the Property Registration
Decree, the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court, sitting as a land
registration court, is no longer as circumscribed as it was under Act
No. 496, the former land registration law. It is not amiss to state
likewise that where the issue, say, of ownership, is ineluctably tied up
with the question of right of registration, the cadastral court commits
no error in assuming jurisdiction over it, as, for instance, in this case,
where both parties rely on their respective exhibits to defeat one
another's claims over the parcels sought to be registered, in which
case, registration would not be possible or would be unduly
prolonged unless the court first decided it.
The evidence for Virginia et al. does not persuade us that they
(through Jose) have acquired the lots by lapse of time. The fact that
in 1941, Jose wrested possession thereof, so we hold, does not
amount to adverse possession because as a co-owner, he had the
right of enjoyment, and his use thereof can not by itself prejudice the
right of his fellow co-owners. The fact that he paid taxes thereon is
not controlling either because payment of real estate taxes does not
359

necessarily confer title upon a claimant. The fact finally that Virginia,
et al. had sought to extrajudicially divide the property is nothing
conclusive because there is no showing that they, Virginia, et al. had
made this known to Pedro, et al. Under these circumstances, we
cannot validly say that the lands had devolved on Virginia., et al., by
way of prescription.
The weight of authority is that a valid donation, once accepted,
becomes
irrevocable, except on account of officiousness, failure by the donee
to comply with charges imposed in the donation, or by reason of
ingratitude.
i. No jurisdiction to adjudicate lands already covered by a
certificate of title. BUT, the jurisdiction of a court in cadastral
cases over lands already registered is limited to the necessary
correction of technical errors in the description of the lands.
AND resolve overlapping claims.
WIDOWS AND ORPHANS ASSOCIATION, INC., VS. COURT OF
APPEALS

G.R. No. 91797

Facts:
Widora filed LRC Case before the respondent (trial) court an
application for registration of title of a parcel of land alleging that the
parcel of land is covered by Titulo de Propriedad Numero 4136
issued in the name of the deceased Mariano San Pedro y Esteban.
Respondent Dolores Molina filed an opposition, claiming ownership
over 12 to 14 hectares of Lot 8. However petitioner Ortigas filed a
motion to dismiss the case alleging that respondent court had no
jurisdiction over the case. The respondent court issued an order
directing the applicant to prove its contention that TCT 77652 and
TCT 77653 are not proper derivatives of the original certificates of
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titles from which they were purportedly issued, and setting the case
for hearing. This motion to dismiss was denied.
Respondent Ortigas instituted an action for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus before respondent court praying for the annulment of
the March 30, 1988 and May 19, 1989 orders and ordered to dismiss
the land registration case. On November 27, 1989, respondent court
rendered the decision sought to be reviewed granting the petition
for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus of petitioner Ortigas &
Company Limited Partnership. WIDORA argues that respondent
court erred in sustaining the validity of TCTs Nos. 77652 and 77653
despite the absence of a supporting decree of registration and
instead utilized secondary evidence, OCT 351 which is supposedly a
copy of Decree 1425. Petitioner maintains that Decree 1425 is itself
existing and available at the Register of Deeds of Manila.

Issue:
Whether or not the respondent trial court erred in sustaining the
validity of the TCT NOs. 77652 and 77653 despite the absence of a
supporting decree of registration.
Held:
Yes. The unilateral action of respondent court in substituting its own
findings regarding the extent of the coverage of the land included in
TCT Nos. 77652 and 77653, ostensibly to correct the error in, and
conform with, the technical description found in OCT 351 based on
the plan and other evidence submitted by respondent Ortigas cannot
be sustained. That function is properly lodged with the office of the
trial court sitting as a land registration court and only after a full-dress
investigation of the matter on the merits. It is before the land
registration court that private respondent must adduce the proof that
the disputed parcels of land is legally registered in its favor.Under Act
496, it is the decree of registration issued by the Land Registration
Commission which is the basis for the subsequent issuance of the
certificate of title by the corresponding Register of Deeds that quiets
the title to and binds the land (De la Merced v. Court of Appeals, 5
SCRA 240 [1962]). Consequently, if no decree of registration had
been issued covering the parcel of land applied for, then the
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certificate of title issued over the said parcel of land does not quiet
the title to nor bind the land and is null and void.
PAMINTUAN VS SAN AGUSTIN
G.R. No. L-17943
Facts:
On April 19, 1917, lot No. 625 was decreed in favor of Florentino
Pamintuan, the petitioner herein, by the CFI of Pampanga, and that
certificate of title No. 540 covering the said lot was thereupon issued
to him in June, 1918. Cadastral case No. 132 was instituted.
Florentino Pamintuan inadvertently failed to claim the lot of trial of the
cadastral case, and the CFI in a decision dated April 29, 1919,
awarded it to the respondents Nicomedes, Maria, Mercedes, Rose
and Eusebia Espinosa, and ordered the cancellation of certificate of
title No. 540. Florentino Pamintuan knew nothing about the
adjudication of the land until the clerk of the CFI
of Pampanga required him to surrender his certificate of title for
cancellation. He then presented a motion to the court asking that the
decision of the court in the cadastral case be set aside and that the
writ of possession issued by virtue of said decision be recalled.
Issue:
Whether or not the court exceeded its jurisdiction in undertaking to
decree in a cadastral case land already decreed in another land
registration case.

Held:
The court exceeded its jurisdiction. Cadastral proceedings are
authorized and regulated by Act No. 2259. What is understood by
"settlement and adjudication" is very clearly indicated in section 11 of
the Act: SEC. 11. The trial of the case may occur at any convinient
place within the province in which the lands are situated or at such
other place as the court, for reasons stated in writing and filed with
the record of the case, may designate, and shall be conducted in the
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same manner as ordinary trials and proceedings in the Court of Land

Registration, and shall be governed by the same rules. Orders of
default and confession shall also be entered in the same manner as
in ordinary cases in the same court and shall have the same effect.
All conflicting interest shall be adjudicated by the court and decrees
awarded in favor of the person entitle to the lands or the various parts
thereof, and such decrees, when final, shall be the basis for original
certificates of title in favor of said persons, which shall have the same
effect as certificates of title granted on application for registration of
land under the Land Registration Act, and except as herein otherwise
provided all of the provisions of said Land Registration Act, as now
amended, and as it hereafter may be amended, shall be applicable to
proceedings under this Act, and to the titles and certificate of title
granted or issued hereunder. In cadastral case, the jurisdiction of the
court over lands already registered is limited to the necessary
correction of technical errors in the description of the lands, provided,
such corrections, do not impair the substantial rights of the registered
owner, and that such jurisdiction cannot operate to deprive a
registered owner of his title.

GABRIEL vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. L-26348
Facts:
In 1916, the subject land located in Bataan was surveyed for
Potenciano Gabriel. Survey Plan Psu- 9742, with an area of
2,729,712 square meters was subsequently amended because it was
found that certain portions of the land covered by Plan I-1054 in the
name of Quimson and later transferred to Naval were included. The
undivided portions were excluded by order of the Court and so Plan
Psu- 9742 was amended with an area of 2,436,280 or a reduction of
293,432 square meters. The OCT No. 1264 issued in the name of
Potenciano Gabriel on November 1, 1918 contained the reduced
area. A cadastral survey was also made and the land of Gabriel,
covered by Plan Psu-9742 Amd. became Lot No. 557 with a reduced
area of 2,096,433 square meters, or a further reduction by 339,847
square meters. No new certificate of title was issued. Accordingly the
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partition of the estate of Gabriel by his heirs was based on plan Psu9742 Amd. instead of Lot No. 557 with a smaller area of 2,096,433
square meters.
Issue:
Whether or not courts have the authority to order the necessary
correction of an erroneous technical description and make it conform
to the correct area.
Held:
In cadastral cases, the jurisdiction of the court over lands already
registered is limited to the necessary correction of technical errors in
the description of the lands, provided such corrections do not impair
the substantial rights of the registered owner, and that such
jurisdiction cannot operate to deprive a registered owner of his title. In
this case, the lower court merely corrected the error in the technical
description appearing in Plan Psu-9742 Amd. so as to make it
conform to the areas and technical description of Lot No. 557 of the
Hermoso Cadastre and Lot No. 363 of Orani Cadastre which lots
embody the correct technical description thereof.
i. Limitations: On right of claimant; and on the power of the
court to order reopening of proceedings.

CITY OF BAGUlO vs. MARCOS

G.R. No. L-26100
Facts:
In 1961, respondent Belong Lutes petitioned the cadastral court to
reopen Civil Reservation Case No. 1, GLRO Record No. 211, in the
CFI of Baguio, as to the parcel of land he claims. The subject land
was among those declared public lands by final decision rendered in
the November 13, 1922 case. His prayer was that the land be
registered in his name. On December 18, 1961, private petitioners
Francisco Joaquin, Sr., Francisco Joaquin, Jr., and Teresita Buchholz
registered opposition to the reopening. They claimed themselves as
farm lessees upon agreements executed by the Bureau of Forestry in
364

their favour. On May 5, 1962, the City of Baguio likewise opposed the
reopening.
Issue:
Whether or not the cadastral court has power to reopen the cadastral
proceedings upon the application of respondent Lutes
Held:
The title of RA 931 authorizes the filing in the proper court, under
certain conditions, of certain claims of title to parcels of land that have
been declared public land, by virtue of judicial decisions rendered
within the forty years next preceding the approval of this Act. The
body of the statute, however, in its Section 1, speaks of parcels of
land that have been, or are about to be declared land of the public
domain, by virtue of judicial proceedings instituted within the forty
years next preceding the approval of this Act. There thus appears to
be a seeming inconsistency between title and body. RA 931 claims of
title that may be filed thereunder embrace those parcels of land that
have been declared public land, by virtue of judicial decisions
rendered within the forty years next preceding the approval of this
Act.
B. Order for speedy settlement and adjudication
C. Petition for Registration
D. Answer
a. Who may file answer; Form and contents of answer; When to
file answer.
b. When motion to dismiss is proper; applicability of Rules of
Court.
i. Motion to dismiss proper if cadastral proceedings involve
land covered by a certificate of title issued pursuant to a
public land patent; applicability of Rules of Court.

365

JOSE O. DURAN vs. BERNABE OLIVIA

G.R. No. L-16589
Facts:
An application for the registration in their names of sixteen lots was
filed by Jose O. Duran and Teresa Diaz Vda. de Duran .On April 20,
1954, the case was heard initially and on May 5, 1954, the oppositors
filed their opposition to the application. Four years after, the
oppositors filed a motion to dismiss the application on the ground that
the court has no jurisdiction to decree registration of the lots
respectively claimed by them. The applicants filed their objection to
said motion, alleging that the reasons for the motion to dismiss do not
appear in the application but are mere assertions of the parties and
that the trial court has jurisdiction to consider the application even
though the lots subject matter thereof are already covered by
certificates of title. After a reply to the opposition was filed by the
oppositors, the lower court resolved the motion to dismiss and
rendered successively the two orders of dismissal appealed from.
Issue:
Whether or not the dismissal of the application with respect to
particular lots upon mere assertion that these lots are covered by
certificates of title based merely upon the granted public land patents
is correct.
Ruling:
Yes, the motion to dismiss is proper in cadastral proceedings which
involve land covered by a certificate of title issued pursuant to a
public land patent. The appellants claim that a certificate of title
based upon a mere homestead, sales or free patent covering private
land is null and void as well as the claim that the lower court
possesses jurisdiction to try and decide the instant land registration
proceedings even with respect to the lots already covered by
certificates of title are without merit. The primary and fundamental
purpose of the Torrens System of registration is to finally settle the
titles to land; to put to stop any question of legality of title thereto.
That being the purpose of the law, there would be no end to litigation
if every property covered by torrens title may still be relitigated in a
subsequent land registration proceedings. Pursuant to the above
purpose, we have held in a long line of decisions that a homestead
patent once registered under the Land Registration Act cannot be the
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subject matter of a cadastral proceeding and that any title issued

thereon is null and void. A homestead patent, once registered under
the Land Registration Act, becomes as indefeasible as a Torrens title,
and cannot thereafter be the subject of an investigation for
determination or judgment in a cadastral case. Any new title which
the cadastral court may order to be issued is null and void and should
be cancelled. All that the cadastral court may do is to make correction
of technical errors in the description of the property contained in its
title, or to proceed to the partition thereof if it is owned by two or more
co-owners. As the title of the respondents, who hold certificates of
title under the Land Registration Act becomes indefeasible, it follows
that the Court of First Instance has no power or jurisdiction to
entertain proceedings for the registration of the same parcels of land
covered by the certificates of title of the respondents.

ii.

Motion to dismiss proper on the ground of res judicata;

applicable to cadastral and ordinary land registration
proceedings.

Republic of the Philippines vs CA

99 SCRA 651

FACTS:
Petitioner relates Supreme Courts decision in Valdehueza v.
Republic and the final judgment of the Court of Appeals in Yu v.
Republic. In Valdehueza v. Republic, Supreme Court affirmed the
judgment of expropriation of Lot No. 939 in Lahug, Cebu City, and
ruled that therein petitioners, Francisca Valdehueza, et al., were not
entitled to recover possession of the lot but only to demand its fair
market value. In Yu v. Republic, the Court of Appeals annulled the
subsequent sale of the lot by Francisca Valdehueza, respondents,
367

Ramon Yu, and held that the latter were not purchasers in good
faith. The parties did not appeal the decision and so, judgment
became final and executory. Respondents filed a complaint for
reversion of the expropriated property. Republic of thePhilippines,
denied respondents right to reacquire title and ownership over the lot
on the ground of res judicata.
ISSUES:
Is the action barred by res judicata? Are respondents entitled to
reversion of the expropriated property?

RULING:
The elements of res judicata are: (1) the judgment sought to bar the
new action must be final; (2) the decision must have been rendered
by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the
parties; (3) the disposition of the case must be a judgment on the
merits; and (4) there must be as between the first and second
action, identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action. In
the present case, the first three elements are present. The
doctrine of res judicata provides that a final judgment on the merits
rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction, is conclusive as to
the rights of the parties and their privies and constitutes an absolute
bar to subsequent actions involving the same claim, demand, or
cause of action. Considering that the sale on which respondents
based their right to reversion has long been nullified, they have not
an iota of right over the property and thus, have no legal personality
to bring forth the action for reversion of expropriated property. Lack
of legal personality to sue means that the respondents are not the
real parties-in-interest. This is a ground for the dismissal of the
case, related to the ground that the complaint evidently states no
cause of action. Consequently, the second issue is now mooted
and made academic by our determination of res judicata in this
case.

368

E. Hearing
F. Judgment
a. How and when appeal taken.
HEIRS OF CORNELIO LABRADA represented by NATIVIDAD L.
DIOCTON vs.THE HONORABLE SINFORIANO A. MONSANTO, in
his capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch
XXVII, Catbalogan, Samar, and the HEIRS OF ISABEL YBOA,
represented by Tito V. Tizon
FACTS:
The lot is contested by petitioners-heirs of Cornelio Labrada, on and
by respondents-heirs of Isabel Yboa. Said predecessors-in-interest
had filed their respective answers in the cadastral proceedings in
June, 1932. Labrada had already been in continuous possession of
said lot for more than forty-three (43) years when he filed his answer
in 1932; and that he continued his possession until 1943 when he
died. His son succeeded in possessing the land. Immediately after his
demise, Meliton Labrada was succeeded in the possession of said
land until he himself died in 1976; and possession of the property in
issue was passed to Meliton's direct heirs, who until the present are
still in possession. None of the heirs of Isabel Iboa is in possession of
any portion of the questioned lot. Petitioners had moved in 1973 for
the case to be heard by the now defunct Court of First Instance of
Samar. The conflicting parties presented both their oral and
documentary evidence in support of their respective claims over the
lot. Respondent regional trial court rendered its decision in favor of
respondents-claimants. An appeal was filed by the petitioners. After a
month respondents-claimants filed their motion for the issuance of a
decree contending that petitioners had failed to perfect their appeal
because they failed to file a record on appeal. Respondent court
369

granted respondents' motion. The decree for the registration was

accordingly ordered by respondent court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners failed to perfect their appeal because
they failed to file a record on appeal.
RULING:
Petitioners' appeal must be given due course and the issuance of a
decree of registration and the corresponding certificate of title were
prematurely and baselessly ordered by respondent court and must be
set aside. The Court provided for specific exceptions with respect to
"appeals in special proceedings in accordance with Rule 109 of the
Rules of Court," wherein multiple appeals at different stages of the
case are allowed such as when the order or judgment on appeal
refers to: (a) the allowance or disallowance of a will, (b) determination
of the lawful heirs of a deceased person or their distributive shares in
the estate; (c) the allowance or disallowance, in whole or in part, of
any claim against the estate or any claim presented on behalf of the
estate in offset to a claim against it; (d) the settlement of the accounts
of an executor, administrator, trustee or guardian; (e) a final
determination in the lower court of the rights of the party appealing in
proceedings relating to settlement of the estate of a deceased person
or the administration of a trustee or guardian; and (f) the final order or
judgment rendered in the case. In these cases, therefore, since the
original record has to remain with the probate court in connection with
the other various pending matters, a party appealing from a specific
order is required to file the corresponding record on appeal. Petition
is granted. Dispensing with briefs or memoranda, judgment is
rendered (a) setting aside the questioned orders which denied due
course to petitioners' appeal and ordered the issuance of a decree of
registration; (b) annulling any certificate of title which may have been
issued to respondents pursuant thereto; and (c) ordering respondent
court to give due course to petitioners' appeal from its decision of July
11, 1983 and to transmit to the Intermediate Appellate Court the
records of the case pertaining to the disputed Lot No. 1910 of the
370

Catbalogan Cadastral survey, together with the oral and documentary

evidence.

b. Effect of decision or judgment.

FIDEL SILVESTRE vs. COURT OF APPEALS and RUFINO DIMSON
Facts:
Both private petitioner Fidel Silvestre and petitioner Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources seek the reversal of the decision
of respondent Court of Appeals which set aside the decision of the
Court of First Instance of Bataan dismissing the complaint filed by
respondent Rufino Dimson declaring null and void Homestead Patent
No. 72493 and Original Certificate of Title No. 292, granted by
petitioner Secretary in favor of petitioner Fidel Silvestre and instead
rendered judgment in favor od Dimson.

In 1956, Petitioner Silvestre filed for a homestead application for a

parcel of land he has been occupying since 1927 in Hermosa,
Bataan. In December 1956, he was issued a Torrens title. He began
paying realty taxes thereon in 1957.

In 1959, Respondent Dimson filed for an adverse claim over the

same parcel of land. Claiming that the land could not be the subject
of homestead patent as it was already a private property even before
World War II. Dimson, who also owns the lots adjoining
the disputed property, argued that the land was actually adjudicated
to spouses Batungbakal through a cadastral proceeding; that in 1927,
Batungbakal, through a Compromiso de Venta conveyed ownership
to Dimson; that Dimson has paid realty taxes; and that title was never
issued in his name because of the outbreak of war.

371

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Compromiso de Venta entered into by
Batungbakal and Dimson conveyed ownership to Dimson.

Held:
The alleged execution in 1927 of the Escritura of Compromiso
de Venta in favor of Dimson by the Batungbakal spouses was not
tantamount to possession. First of all, there was only an allegation
that a Compromiso was established. But even if there actually was a
Compromiso, Dimson should have made actual possession. If
Dimson had been in possession, then he could have first asserted his
alleged ownership and possession and waited for Silvestre to
controvert his possession and seek recovery of the land, instead of
belatedly suing to annul Silvestres Torrens title and to recover actual
damages.

This is further bolstered by the fact that Dimson started paying

taxes on the land only in 1958 apparently in preparation for his suit
contrary to his allegation in his complaint that he had allegedly paid
all the real estate taxes thereon before World War II, considering that
no evidence was presented by him to prove his allegation.
Dimson also failed to show that the Batungbakal spouses his
predecessors-in-interest were the actual owner of the disputed land.
He said that Batungbakal acquired the property through a cadastral
proceeding but he never showed any proof of such decree granting
Batungbakal title over the disputed land.

In this regard, assuming that there was a transaction between

Dimson and Batungbakal, the property could not have been
conveyed in favor of Dimson due to the fact that Batungbakal was not
the owner of the land in dispute.
372

Petition granted.

c. When judgment declares land applied for is public land.

THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ANDRES
REYES, MARIANO V. AGCAOILI and DELFIN FL. BATACAN.
Facts:
The land in dispute is Lot No. 1736, a large tract of agricultural land in
Barrio Kapok, Orion, Bataan, alleged to have been occupied since
1913 by the grandfather of applicant, Vicente Rodriguez, who, filed
Lease Application with the Bureau of Lands, but which was rejected
upon investigation that the land was classified as within the U.S.
Military Reservation. Upon the death of Vicente Rodriguez in 1924,
possession of the property was taken over by his three sons, the two
waived their share in favor of petitioner Arturo Rodriguez. Thereafter,
Arturo sold two-thirds portion of the land to Guillermo Reyes and
373

Francisco S. Alcantara.In 1953, the land in question was deemed

reverted to the public domain as it was excluded from the USPhilippine Military Bases Agreement. In 1965, Arturo Rodriguez
together with Reyes and Alcantara filed a petition for registration of
their title to Lot No. 1736 on the ground of open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession for more than 30 years. Thirtynine persons headed by Rosauro Canaria filed their Opposition to the
petition for registration contending, that they have been in actual,
peaceful, adverse and continuous possession of portions of Lot No.
1736 for more than thirty years and have introduced improvements
thereon.The Director of Lands likewise filed his opposition alleging
that neither the applicants nor their predecessors-in-interest possess
sufficient title to the land applied for, as they have not been in OCEN
possession and occupation of the land sought to be registered for at
least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application.
The trial court ruled in favor of the applicants. Canaria filed a motion
for reconsideration but it was denied. Director of Lands filed for a
motion to dismiss or for reconsideration alleging that the present
petition for registration was intended to reopen Cadastral Case No.
15, L.R.C. Record No. 1021, wherein a cadastral court already
declared Lot 1736 as public land; and that a decision in a cadastral
case constitutes res judicata. The lower court ruled in favor of the
applicants confirming their title. The CA affirmed the ruling of the trial
court but subsequently reversed its decision upon motion by
respondents contending that the cadastral case constitutes res
judicata.
Issue:
Whether or not the prior decision of the cadastral court in a proper
cadastral proceeding declaring that the lot in question as public land
constitute res judicata, as such, a bar to the present application by
subsequent possessors for registration of title or confirmation of
imperfect title over the same parcel of land.
Held:
Res Judicata does not apply. When Cadastral Case No. 15 was
instituted in 1927 and terminated in 1930, the land in question was
still classified as within the U.S. Military Reservation and was deemed
reverted to the public domain only in 1953. On this basis, the Court
finds that the decision in the aforesaid cadastral case does not
constitute res judicata upon a subsequent action for land registration
374

considering the futility of filing any claim then over the land in
question since the same would nevertheless have been denied
because during the pendency of the cadastral case, said land was
not alienable nor disposable as was shown by the denial of the lease
application filed then by private respondents predecessor-in-interest.
A decision in cadastral proceedings declaring a lot public land is not
the final decree contemplated in Sections 38 and 40 of the Land
Registration Act. Thus, a judicial declaration that a parcel of land is
public, does not preclude the same applicant from subsequently
seeking a judicial confirmation of his title to the same land, provided
he thereafter complies with the provisions of Section 48 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, and as long as said public
land remains alienable and disposable. But while the cadastral
proceedings in 1927 cannot be considered a bar to the registration
proceedings instituted by private respondents in 1965, the chronology
of events in the case at bar clearly negates compliance by private
respondents-applicants with the thirty-year possession requirement.
As such there is not claim for an imperfect title. Petition granted.
d. Effect of failure to appeal.
DE LA MERCED V. COURT OF APPEALS
Facts:
Ezequiel Santos (and his wife) claims ownership of Lot No. 395 of the
Rizal Cadastre by virtue of an adjudication of the cadastral court
dated December 26, 1923, in favor of his father, sought recovery of
ownership and possession thereof from the named defendant, and of
the landlord's share in the harvests for the agricultural years 19501956. Defendants asserted their ownership over said property as
evidenced by Original Certificate of Title No. 3462 issued to their
predecessor Juan de la Merced on October 10, 1931 and their
continuous possession of the land for more than 30 years.
1.) By virtue of the final decision dated December 26, 1923,
Santos'
title to Lot No. 395 was definitely confirmed as against the whole
world, including the Government;
375

2.) The same cadastral court issued a decree dated December

19, 1925 declaring its decision of December 26, 1923 final
and directing the Chief of the General Land Registration
Office to issue the certificate of title to Inocencio de los
Santos. Although no such certificate was actually issued;
3.) On December 28, 1926, the cadastral court, without
reopening the case, declared the same Lot 395 public land
as a result of which Juan de la Merced, after due application,
was able to obtain therefor a homestead patent and OCT
No. 3462 on October 10, 1931;
4.) Juan de la Merced, until his death in 1931, was the overseer
of Inocencio de los Santos for a big portion of land which
included Lot 395 in question and was, therefore, a trustee for
said lot at the time he applied for it as a homestead;
5.) That the complaint for recovery of ownership and possession
was filed in 1952.
Respondents predicate their claim of ownership over the said lot on
Original Certificate of Title No. 3462 issued on October 10, 1931 in
favor of Juan de la Merced, their predecessor-in-interest, pursuant to
a homestead patent issued on September 15, 1931, contending that
the decision of December 26, 1923, adjudicating the lot to the
plaintiffs, was still subject to review since there was no decree issued
pursuant thereto.
Issue:
What is the effect of failure to appeal the decision of a cadastral court
proceeding within thirty days from the date of receipt of a copy of the
decision?
Held:
376

There is no doubt that had the land involved herein been public, by
specific provision of Act 496, the act of registration shall be the
operative act to convey and affect the same, and such registration
shall be made in the office of the register of deeds for the province
where the land lies. In other words, in cases of public lands, the
property is not considered registered until the final act or the entry in
the registration book of the registry of deeds had been accomplished.
(But in the other way, the land had become private land.) With
respect to the question of when title to the land in a cadastral
proceeding is vested, this Court, in the case of Government of the
Philippine Islands v. Abural, said: -After trial in a cadastral case, three
actions are taken. The first adjudicates ownership in favor of one of
the claimants. This constitutes the decision the judgment the
decree of the court, and speaks in a judicial manner. The second
action is the declaration by the court that the decree is final and its
order for the issuance of the certificates of title by the Chief of the
Land Registration Office. Such order is made if within thirty days from
the date of receipt of a copy of the decision no appeal is taken from
the decision. The third and last action devolves upon the General
Land Registration Office. This office has been instituted "for the due
effectuation and accomplishment of the laws relative to the
registration of land." The judgment in a cadastral survey, including
the rendition of the decree, is a judicial act. As the law says, the
judicial decree when final is the base of the certificate of title. The
issuance of the decree by the Land Registration Office is a ministerial
act. The date of the title prepared by the Chief Surveyor is
unimportant, for the adjudication has taken place and all that is left to
be performed is the mere formulation of technical description. As a
general rule, registration of title under the cadastral system is final,
conclusive, and indisputable, after the passage of the thirty-day
period allowed for an appeal from the date of receipt by the party of a
copy of the judgment of the court adjudicating ownership without any
step having been taken to perfect an appeal. The prevailing party
377

may then have execution of the judgment as of right and is entitled to

the certificate of title issued by the Chief of the Land Registration
Office. The exception is the special provision providing for fraud.
Under the foregoing pronouncement, the title of ownership on the
land is vested upon the owner upon the expiration of the period
to appeal from the decision or adjudication by the cadastral
court, without such an appeal having been perfected. The certificate
of title would then be necessary for purposes of effecting registration
of subsequent disposition of the land where court proceedings would
no longer be necessary. As we have here a decree issued by the
cadastral court, ordering the issuance to Inocencio de los Santos of
the certificate of title over Lot No. 395 after the decision adjudicating
ownership to him of the said property had already become final, and
there being no imputation of irregularity in the said cadastral
proceedings, title of ownership on the said adjudicatee was vested as
of the date of the issuance of such judicial decree.
e. Courts power to set aside judgment and readjudicate land.
CAYANAN VS. DE LOS SANTOS
21 SCRA 1348
FACTS:
On May 30, 1958, the title of appellee De los Santos to Lot No. 56 of
the Porac Cadastre was confirmed by the Hon. Arsenio Santos, then
Judge of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga. On December 16,
1958, a petition for review was filed in the same proceeding alleging
that the said lot was registered in the name of appellee De los Santos
"through actual fraud, through deceit and through intentional omission
of facts" as a result of which the aforesaid decision was rendered and
a decree of registration obtained on August 8, 1958. Moreover, it was
stated further that a simulated Deed of Absolute Sale was executed in
favor of the other respondent, Felix L. Camaya, on October 26, 1958,
covering the said lot. The prayer was for the opening of the decree of
registration, the cancellation of the Original Certificate of Title, as well
as the Transfer Certificate of Title and the adjudication of said lot in
378

favor of petitioners, now appellant Cayanan and others.

This petition was denied in the order of February 9, 1959, which is on
appeal. It was the view of the lower court: "Such being the case, as
admitted by the petitioners, even if the petition has been filed within
one (1) year after entry of final decree, the same cannot be favorably
acted upon for the reason that the questioned lot has already been
transferred to Felix L. Camaya in accordance with section 38 of the
Land Registration Act. While it is true that the petition states that such
transfer is fictitious and, therefore, not for value and that Felix L.
Camaya is not an innocent purchaser, this question can be properly
threshed out in an ordinary civil action and not in a simple petition,
like the one at bar.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the cadastral court who tried and issue a decree of
registration has the power to set aside said judgment and
readajudicate the land in favor of another?
HELD:
The case should not be filed in another CFI considering that the
cadastral court is also a court of first instance. It has been held that
the adjudication of land in a registration or cadastral case does not
become final and incontrovertible until the expiration of one year from
entry of the final decree, and that as long as the final decree is not
issued and the period of one year within which it may be reviewed
has not elapsed, the decision remains under the control and sound
discretion of the court rendering the decree, which court after hearing,
may even set aside said decision or decree and adjudicate the land
to another."
"In the present case, as the petitions were filed within one year from
the date of the issuance of the decree, pursuant to Section 38 of Act
496, the same are properly cognizable by the court that rendered the
decision and granted the said decree."
As a matter of fact, several decisions held that:
Santos v. Ichon,(1959): "It is true that under previous rulings of this
court, appellee could have moved for the reopening of the case in the
cadastral court so that he could be given an opportunity to prove his
right to the land in question and get a decree in his favor, since the
adjudication of land in a registration or cadastral case does not
379

become final and incontrovertible until the expiration of one year after
the entry of the final decree, and until then the court rendering the
decree may, after hearing, set aside the decision or decree and
adjudicate the land to another person."
Afalla v. Rosauro,: "As long as the final decree is not issued by the
Chief of the General Land Registration Office in accordance with the
law, and the period of one year fixed for the review thereof has not
elapsed, the title is not finally adjudicated and the decision therein
rendered continues to be under the control and sound discretion of
the court rendering it."
Valmonte v. Nable,: "It should be borne in mind that the adjudication
of land in a registration or cadastral case does not become final and
incontrovertible until the expiration of one year after the entry of the
final decree. Within this period of one year the decree may be
reopened on the ground of fraud and the decree may be set aside
and the land adjudicated to another party. As long as the final decree
is not issued and the period of one year within which it may be
reviewed has not elapsed, the decision remains under the control and
sound discretion of the court rendering it."
Capio v. Capio,: "that the adjudication of land in a registration or
cadastral case does not become final and incontrovertible until the
expiration of one year after the entry of the final decree; that as long
as the final decree is not issued and the period of one year within
which it may be reviewed has not elapsed, the decision remains
under the control and sound discretion of the court rendering the
decree, which court after hearing, may set aside the decision or
decree and adjudicate the land to another party."
FABIAN B. S. ABELLERA VS. NARCISO DE GUZMAN, ET AL.
Facts:
Fabian Abellera filed a complaint with the Court of First
claiming title to the hacienda found in municipality of
Province of La Union, by virtue of a donation which he
accept in a public instrument as required in article 633 of
Code but was dismissed.

Instance
Aringay,
failed to
the Civil
380

After the dismissal of the complaint, the plaintiff brought another

action against the same defendants for ejectment. This second action
was dismissed, on the ground that the title to the tract of land from
which he sought to eject the defendants might well be litigated in the
cadastral case then pending in the same court which included the
tract of land, divided into lots and claimed by both the plaintiff and the
defendants, the court of first instance being of the opinion that, should
title to the tract of land be confirmed and decreed in the name of the
plaintiff, the latter could bring an action against the defendants for
damages. From this order of dismissal, the plaintiff did not appeal.
The plaintiff again brought another action with the same court for
ejectment against the same defendants in the two previous cases ,
or their successors-in-interest, including new or additional defendants
who are the claimants of lots in the cadastral case, which lie within
the area of the tract of land claimed by the plaintiff, and prayed for
judgment declaring him the owner of the tract of land from which he
had sought defendants' ejectment in the two previous cases; for the
possession of the lots unlawfully occupied or detained by the
defendants; for the recovery of damages from each and every one of
the defendants, amounting all in all to P40,000 and costs; and for
general relief.
Instead of answering the complaint the defendants moved for its
dismissal, on the ground (1) that it states no cause of action; and (2)
that there is another action pending between the same parties for the
same cause. On 18 June 1946, acting upon the motion to dismiss
filed by the defendants, the trial court sustained the second ground of
the motion and dismissed the complaint without costs.
Issue:
Whether or not the cadastral court has the authority to award
damages
Ruling:
No. The cadastral court possesses no authority to award damages,
for its power is confined to the determination as to whether the
381

claimants are really entitled to the lost, as alleged in their answers;

and, after finding that they are, to the confirmation of their title to, and
registration of, the lots in their name. In the present action for
ejectment, not only does the plaintiff seek to have a judicial
pronouncement that he is the owner of the tract of land which he
claims is unlawfully occupied by the defendants but also to recover
damages. After hearing, the cadastral court may declare the plaintiff
the owner of the lots and entitled to their possession and may issue a
writ directing the sheriff to put him in possession thereof, but it cannot
award damages to the plaintiff. Where there is a case for ejectment
between parties who, one against the other, claim the same parcel of
land or lot in a cadastral case, it has been customary or the practice
of courts to hold a joint hearing of both the ejectment and the
cadastral cases in which the same parcel of land is litigated and to
render a decision in both cases in its double role, as court of first
instance of general jurisdiction and as cadastral court of limited
jurisdiction.
Medina vs Valdellon
Facts:
The complaint in Civil Case No. 4353-M of the Court of First Instance
of Bulacan alleges that spouses Dolores Medina and Moises Bernal,
who are the plaintiffs in this case, are the owners of a parcel of land
situated at Bo. San Pascual, Hagonoy, Bulacan, with an assessed
value of P800.00.The defendants are family friends of the plaintiffs
and were allowed to remain in the premises and to construct their
residential house, subject to the condition that defendants will return
unto the plaintiffs the premises upon demand. On demand,
defendants-spouses refused and remain obstinate in their refusal to
surrender the property in question. Because of said defendants'
unjustified acts plaintiffs had to institute action and incur damage of
P500 as expenses for court litigation; the reasonable value of the use
of the premises is P100 a month, taking into consideration its
commercial value; and prayed that the defendants be ordered to
vacate the premises and surrender unto plaintiffs the said property
and defendants be ordered to pay plaintiffs the amount of P500 as
incidental expenses and the amount of P100 a month from the filing
382

of this action to the time they surrender its possession to the plaintiffs.
The Court of First Instance dismissed the complaint because another
case pending between the same parties over the same property,
namely Land Registration Case. The plaintiffs moved for Motion for
Reconsideration but was denied.
Issue:
Whether or not the cadastral court has the authority to award
damages.
Ruling:
No. It is true that the Court of First Instance of Bulacan (Branch VI)
acting as a land registration court has a limited and special
jurisdiction confined to the determination of the legality and propriety
of the issue of title over the land subject matter of registration, and it
has no power to entertain issues of rightful possession and claim for
damages emanating from ownership.

G. Decree in Cadastral Registration Proceedings

a. When adjudication in cadastral case becomes final
CAYANAN V. DE LOS SANTOS
G.R. No. L-21150
Facts:
On May 30, 1958, the title of appellee De los Santos to Lot No. 56 of
the Porac Cadastre was confirmed by the Hon. Arsenio Santos, then
383

Judge of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga. On December 16,

1958, a petition for review was filed in the same proceeding alleging
that the said lot was registered in the name of appellee De los Santos
"through actual fraud, through deceit and through intentional omission
of facts" as a result of which the aforesaid decision was rendered and
a decree of registration obtained on August 8, 1958. Moreover, it was
stated further that a simulated Deed of Absolute Sale was executed in
favor of the other respondent, appellee Felix L. Camaya, on October
26, 1958, covering the said lot. The prayer was for the opening of the
decree of registration, the cancellation of the Original Certificate of
Title, as well as the Transfer Certificate of Title and the adjudication of
said lot in favor of petitioners, now appellant Cayanan and others.
This petition was denied in the order of February 9, 1959, which is on
appeal. It was the view of the lower court: "Such being the case, as
admitted by the petitioners, even [if] the petition has been filed within
one (1) year after entry of final decree, the same cannot be favorably
acted upon for the reason that the questioned lot has already been
transferred to Felix L. [Camaya] in accordance with section 38 of the
Land Registration Act. While it is true that the petition states that such
transfer is fictitious and, therefore, not for value and that Felix L.
[Camaya] is not an innocent purchaser, this question can be properly
threshed out in an ordinary civil action and not in a simple petition,
like the one at bar."
Issue:
When will adjudication in cadastral case becomes final?
Ruling:
"It may be stated that we find had no case squarely ruling on this
particular point. The mere mention by the law that the relief afforded
by Section 38 of Act 496 may be sought in 'the competent Court of
First Instance' is no sufficient indication that the petition must be filed
in the Court of First Instance, exercising its general jurisdiction,
considering the fact that it is also the Court of First Instance that acts
on land registration cases. Upon the other hand, it has been held that
the adjudication of land in a registration or cadastral case does not
become final and incontrovertible until the expiration of one year from
entry of the final decree, and that as long as the final decree is not
384

issued and the period of one year within which it may be reviewed
has not elapsed, the decision remains under the control and sound
discretion of the court rendering the decree, which court after hearing,
may even set aside said decision or decree and adjudicate the land
to another."
Then came the concluding portion of the opinion: "In the present
case, as the petitions were filed within one year from the date of the
issuance of the decree, pursuant to Section 38 of Act 496, the same
are properly cognizable by the court that rendered the decision and
granted the said decree."

H. Reopening of Decree no longer allowed. Courts are without

jurisdiction or authority to reopen a cadastral proceeding
since December 31, 1968.
REPUBLIC V. ESTENZO
G.R. No. L-35512
Facts:
The parties in this case contest the ownership of a parcel of land
385

situated in Barrio Valencia, Ormoc City. Herein petitioners maintain

that the land is public land by virtue of a 1940 cadastral court
decision. Private respondents meanwhile take the opposite view
claiming the land as their own based on their purchase thereof from
the original claimant, Apolonia Parrilla, and its subsequent
adjudication in their favor in 1972.
On October 31, 1940, a decision was rendered by the Cadastral
Court declaring Lot No. 8423 of the Ormoc Cadastre as public land.
Thirty-two years later, more specifically on January 12,1972, Felipe
Adolfo and Francisca Padilla, hereinafter referred to as the
SPOUSES, filed a petition docketed as Cadastral Case No. 34,
GLRO Rec. No. 1789 seeking to "re-open the October 31, 1940
decision of the Cadastral Court under Rep. Act No. 931, as amended
by Rep. Act No. 2061 and further amended by Rep. Act No. 6236"
[Petition, Annex "B," Rollo, p. 9]. The SPOUSES, claiming to be the
owners of Lot No. 8423 by virtue of having purchased the same in
1948 as evidenced by a Deed of Quitclaim and Confirmation dated
August 28, 1969, likewise allege that due to the excusable
negligence, accident or mistake of the previous claimant and her
counsel, the land was declared public land; that they and their
predecessor-in-interest have been in open, continuous, peaceful and
adverse possession of the land and have declared the same for
purposes of taxation in their name(s); that Lot No. 8423 has not been
alienated, reserved, leased, granted or otherwise disposed of either
provisionally or permanently by the government or its entity; and that
up to the filing of the petition, they and their predecessor-in-interest
have not applied for any homestead, free patent, lease or sale, over
the parcel of land under Public Land Act No. 141. Despite the
opposition of the Director of Lands respondent Judge granted the
SPOUSES' petition on May 9, 1972. Hence, Lot No. 8423 was
adjudicated in their favor.
The Republic and the Director of Lands now assail that decision by
way of appeal by certiorari.
Issue:
Is the petitioners' stance that the lower court is without jurisdiction to
386

take cognizance of the petition to re-open the cadastral proceedings

is premised on their argument that spouses' petition is barred by the
expiration of the period for re-opening of cadastral proceedings under
Rep. Act No. 931 correct?
Ruling:
Yes. The argument of the petitioners is impressed with merit. Rep. Act
No. 931 section 1 provides:
All persons claiming title to parcels of land that have been the object
of cadastral proceedings, who at the time of the survey were in
actual possession of the same, but for some justifiable reason
had been unable to file their claim in the proper court during the
time limit established by law, in case such parcels of land, on
account of their failure to file such claims, have been, or are
about to be declared land of the public domain, by virtue of
judicial proceedings instituted within the forty year next
preceding the approval of this Act, are hereby granted the right
within five years after the date on which this Act shall take
effect, to petition for a re-opening of the judicial proceedings
under the provisions of act Numbered Twenty-two hundred and
fifty-nine, as amended, only with respect to such parcels of land
as have not been alienated, reserved, leased, granted, or
otherwise provisionally or permanently disposed of by the
Government . . .
This law took effect on June 20, 1953, hence, the period for
reopening cadastral proceedings expired on June 20, 1958. However,
Rep. Act No. 2061 section 2 extended this period until December 31,
1968, after which there had been no further extension. [Republic v.
Estenzo, G.R. No. L-35780, January 27, 1983,120 SCRA 220].
In the case at bar, the SPOUSES filed their petition more than three
years after the lapse of the reglementary period required by the law.
The period having expired, respondent judge was without jurisdiction
when he entertained SPOUSES' petition to re-open the decision of
the cadastral court.

387

Transactions pending original registration

A.
B. Land may be registered in favor of a total stranger.
MENDOZA VS CA, 84 SCRA 67
Facts:
Petitioner filed an application for the registration of two parcels of land
located in Sta. Maria, Bulacan. During the pendency of the
application, petitioner sold the subject land to the private
respondents, subject to usufructuary rights of the petitioner. The land
registration court issued a decision ordering the registration of subject
land in favor of private respondents. The decision of the land
registration court became final and a decree was issued confirming
title in the name of private respondents. An original certificate of title
was then issued to the private respondents.
388

Thereafter, petitioner filed a petition for reconsideration praying for

the setting aside of the decision of the land registration court and the
cancellation of the OCT issued in favor of private respondents on the
ground of failure of the respondents to pay the purchase price.
The land registration court decided in favor of the petitioner on the
ground that it did not have jurisdiction to order the registration of the
lands in the names of the vendees, who were not parties to the
application for registration.
The CA reversed the decision of the Land registration court. Hence,
this petition.
Issue:
Whether the issuance of title in favor of private respondents, who
were neither applicants nor oppositors, was proper?
Ruling:
Yes.
Section 29 of the Land Registration Act which expressly authorizes
the registration of the land subject matter of a registration proceeding
in the name of the buyer or of the person to whom the land has been
conveyed by an instrument executed during the interval of time
between the filing of the application for registration and the issuance
of the decree of title.
The law does not require that the application for registration be
amended by substituting the "buyer" or the person to whom the
property has been conveyed" for the applicant. Neither does it require
that the "buyer" or the "person to whom the property has been
conveyed" be a party to the case. He may thus be a total stranger to
the land registration proceedings.
The only requirements of the law are: (1) that the instrument be
presented to the court by the interested party together with a motion
that the same be considered in relation with the application; and (2)
389

that prior notice be given to the parties to the case. And the peculiar
facts and circumstances obtaining in this case show that these
requirements have been complied with.

Certificate of Title
A. Preparation of Certificate of Title
a. Statement of personal circumstances
b. Entry of Original Certificate of Title
c. The Owners Certificate of Title
d. Registration Book
e. Transfer of Certificate of Title
i. Co-owned land: All co-owners duplicates must be
surrendered
BALBIN VS RD
28 SCRA 12
Facts:
Petitioners presented to the register of deeds a duplicate copy of the
registered owner's certificate of title and an instrument entitled "Deed
390

of Donation inter-vivos," with the request that the same be annotated

on the title. Under the terms of the instrument sought to be annotated,
one Cornelio Balbin, registered owner of the parcel of land described
in the OCT, appears to have donated inter-vivos an undivided twothirds (/) portion thereof in favor of petitioners.
The register of deeds denied the requested annotation for being
"legally defective or otherwise not sufficient in law as it appears that
previously annotated in the memorandum of encumbrances on the
certificate are three separate sales of undivided portions of the land
earlier executed by Cornelio Balbin in favor of three different buyers.
The final part of the annotations stated that three co-owner's
duplicate certificates of title have been issued in favor or 3 buyers.
The commissioner of land registration upheld the decision of the
register of deeds.
Issue:
Whether the decision of the Register of Deeds in refusing the request
for annotation of donation proper?
Ruling:
Yes.
Section 55 obviously assumes that there is only one duplicate copy of
the title in question, namely, that of the registered owner himself,
such that its production whenever a voluntary instrument is presented
constitutes sufficient authority from him for the register of deeds to
make the corresponding memorandum of registration.
It is essential that all the duplicate copies of the title be presented
before annotations are entered. There being several copies of the
same title in existence, in the case at bar, it is easy to see how their
integrity may be adversely affected if an encumbrance, or an outright
conveyance, is annotated on one copy and not on the others. The law
itself refers to every copy authorized to be issued as a duplicate of
the original, which means that both must contain identical entries of
the transactions, particularly voluntary ones, affecting the land
391

covered by the title. If this were not so, if different copies were
permitted to carry differing annotations, the whole system of Torrens
registration would cease to be reliable.

ii. Previous adjudication

REPUBLIC vs. COURT OF APPEALS
83 SCRA 453

Facts:

Both Republic and respondents Alfredo V. de Ocampo and Oscar

Anglo claim ownership over the same lots.
The basis of Republic's claim is that said lots were bequeathed to the
Bureau of Education on September 21, 1926 by the late Esteban
Jalandoni through his will. Republic further alleged that the said
392

parcels of land were already registered under the Torrens System

"before 1919 in a cadastral case in the name of Meerkamp and
Company"; that said company sold the lots to Esteban Jalandoni; that
TCT No. 6014 was issued to the Bureau of Education when the
subject property was bequeathed to it.
Respondent de Ocampo averred that the lots were unregistered
lands belonging to and possessed by him, by virtue of a donation
dated November 10, 1911 from one Luis Mosquera. Respondent
Anglo intervened having allegedly bought the same lots from
respondent de Ocampo.
Procedurally, the records show that the Bureau of Public Schools
initiated a forcible entry and detainer case against de Ocampo. On
appeal, the CFI of Negros Occidental dismissed the complaint.
Then on June 29, 1960, de Ocampo filed an application for
registration of the same two parcels of land. On May 2, 1961,
Republic, represented by the Solicitor General, filed a complaint
against de Ocampo with the CFI of Negros Occidental for the
recovery of possession of the subject lots.
After a joint trial of the cases, the Court of First Instance dismissed
the complaint and adjudged the registration of the subject two lots in
the name of the then applicant de Ocampo.
It is admitted by Republic that it received a copy of the decision on
August 13, 1965 but no appeal was taken therefrom. However,
Republic later filed with the trial court, a Petition for Relief from
Judgment with Preliminary Injunction Pending Proceeding. The trial
court dismissed the Republic's petition for lack of competent proof.
September 28, 1966, Republic filed an "Amended Petition for Relief
from Judgment and/or Review of Decree with Preliminary Injunction.
Republic contended, inter alia, that actual fraud had been perpetrated
by respondent de Ocampo in securing the lower court's decision
ordering the registration of the lots in his name and that the Court of
First Instance no longer had jurisdiction to decree again the
registration of Lots Nos. 817 and 2509, in favor of respondent de
Ocampo, in view of the earlier registration of the same lands in favor
of Meerkamp and Company.
The trial court rendered its decision on the Amended Petition against
393

Republic. From the said decision, Republic appealed to the Court of

Appeals. The Court of Appeals dismissed petitioner's appeal. Hence,
an appeal by certiorari was filed by the petitioner.
Issue:
Whether the trial court has no jurisdiction to entertain the application
for land registration of Alfredo V. de Ocampo on the ground that Lots
Nos. 817 and 2509 were already registered under the Torrens
System before 1919.
Ruling:

The trial court made an express finding that the alleged deed of
donation by Mosquera in favor of de Ocampo, acknowledged before
one Notary Public John Boardman does not appear in his notarial
book and the Provincial Assessor of Negros Occidental likewise
issued a certification, stating that Lots Nos. 817 and 2509 were never
declared in the name of Mosquera. His later certification states that
the said lots were assessed in the name of the Bureau of Education,
and that the technical descriptions in the Bureau of Lands records
show that the same lots were in the name of Meerkamp and
Company.
Authorities are in agreement that a land registration court is without
jurisdiction to decree again the registration of land already registered
in an earlier registration case, and that the second decree entered for
the same land is null and void.
If there is no valid and final judgment by the land registration court to
speak of, then the filing of an admittedly late appeal from the decision
denying the Amended Petition would be immaterial and of no
moment, in so far as these proceedings are concerned in view of the
congenitally fatal infirmity that attaches to the main decision
decreeing for the second time the registration of the same Lots Nos.
817 and 2509 in favor of respondent de Ocampo, despite an earlier
registration in the name of Meerkamp and Company.
The resolution of the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE. The case is
394

remanded to the said Court to give due course to and consider on its
merits Republic's appeal.

iii. Defective title v unblemished title

LORENZANA FOOD CORPORATION vs. COURT OF APPEALS
395

G.R. No. 105027 April 22, 1994

Facts:
The controversy arose when herein appellees learned that the same
parcels were being claimed by herein appellant, B.E. San Diego,
Incorporated.
All parties resolutely seeking to enforce their respective claims over
the subject properties, three civil suits for quieting of title were filed
before the Regional Trial Court of Bacoor, Cavite.
It is Lorenzana Food Corporation's contention that the OCT in B.E.
San Diego's name is null and void because Lorenzana Food
Corporation's title emanated from an OCT issued more than thirtynine years prior to the issuance of B.E. San Diego's original
certificate of title.
In answer, B.E. San Diego countered that it and its predecessors-ininterest have been in the open continuous and adverse possession in
concept of owner of the subject property for more than fifty years prior
to Lorenzana Food Corporation's purchase of the two parcels. It was
further argued that Lorenzana Food Corporation was erroneously
claiming the subject property because of Lorenzana's titled property
is described to be located in Barrio Talaba, while B.E. San Diego's
property is situated in Barrio Niog.
Plaintiffs Jimmy Chua Chi Leong and Albert Chua claim ownership
over the parcels they respectively purchased from the heirs of Juan
Cuenca.

The respondent court decided in favor of the private respondent, B.E.

San Diego, Inc. It rejected petitioners' titles because the appellees
(petitioners) titles state that the properties are located in the barrio of
Talaba when the properties described therein are situated in the
Barrio of Niog.
On the other hand, it found the titles of private respondent
unblemished by any defect. Petitioners assail the Decision in this
petition for review on certiorari as having been issued in grave abuse
of discretion.
396

Issue:
Whether the Court of Appeals committed reversible error of law and
grave abuse of discretion in reversing the decision of the lower court
to uphold the validity of the land titles of private respondent.
Ruling:

We find no compelling reason to reverse this ruling. The defects

appearing on the face of the titles of the petitioners are too glaring to
escape the naked eye.
The title of the appellant's predecessors-in-interest showed that the
land acquired by the appellant and for which title was issued in the
appellant's name was described in said title as being located in Barrio
Niog, while the appellees' title described the property covered by their
title as located in Barrio Talaba. But appellees claim a parcel of land
that is located in Barrio Niog. These two barrios of the town of
Bacoor, Cavite, are located poles apart and were never one and the
same town in the history of the province. The appellees are claiming
property not located in the barrio as described in the technical
description.
With these errors, the titles of the petitioners do not deserve the
sanctity given to torrens title.
In pointing out the discrepancies in petitioners' titles, the respondent
court was simply stressing that these titles cannot be upheld against
the unblemished titles of the private respondent.
The petition for review is DISMISSED there being no showing of
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent court.

397

iv. Overlapping Titles

Cambridge Realty and Resources Corp vs. Eridanus Devt Inc.
GR No. 152445 July 4, 2008
Facts:
Petitioner CAMBRIDGE is the registered owner of a 9,992-square
meter lot, covered by TCT. Respondent ERIDANUS is the registered
owner of a 2,794 square meter parcel of land covered by TCT. The
foregoing properties are adjoining lots located in Barangay Valencia,
Quezon City, and constitute the subject matter of the present
controversy.
On May 30, 1989, ERIDANUS filed Civil Case No. Q-89-2636 to
enjoin CAMBRIDGE from pursuing the planned subdivision and
development of its property, which ERIDANUS claims encroached
upon its own.
Issue:
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENTS WERE ABLE TO PROVE
OVERLAP AND ENCROACHMENT OF PETITIONERS PROPERTY
ON RESPONDENTS PROPERTIES.
Ruling:
The case of overlapping of titles necessitates the assistance of
experts in the field of geodetic engineering. The very reason why
commissioners were appointed by the trial court, upon agreement of
the parties, was precisely to make an evaluation and analysis of the
titles in conflict with each other. Given their background, expertise
and experience, these commissioners are in a better position to
398

determine which of the titles is valid. Thus, the trial court may rely on
their findings and conclusions.
The appellate court, however, found that there is an encroachment,
and the cause thereof may be traced to a change in the technical
description of the petitioners title (which was derived from TCT 578)
when it was subdivided on November 10, 1920
Likewise, we cannot see how a change in the bearings of the
CAMBRIDGE property from S.21deg.5655E in TCT 578 to N.25
deg. 07W in the CAMBRIDGE title can cause an overlap of
respondents properties. This has not been sufficiently shown by
respondents evidence to be the cause of the overlap. Respondents
key witness Nerit does not believe that the CAMBRIDGE title was a
derivative of TCT 578, because there is nothing in the title thereof
which indicates that it was derived from the latter; he was ambivalent,
if not ambiguous, and definitely far from categorical, in this respect.
State surveyor De Laras testimony and Report inconclusive and
incomplete as it is does not help or indicate any. Likewise, a
thorough examination of TCT 578 shows that it has no similar
boundary and bearings with the CAMBRIDGE title. Finally, the
CAMBRIDGE title explicitly declares that it is derived from TCT No.
363717/T-1823, and not TCT 578.
Thus, for failure of the respondents to prove that the CAMBRIDGE
title is a derivative of TCT 578, the conclusion that a change in the
technical description of the former as compared to that of the latter
is the reason for the overlap, simply does not follow. The appellate
court is in clear error.
Finally, we agree with the trial courts observation that the continuous
presence of the old adobe wall diminishes the case for the
respondents. It was only in 1989 that the wall became an ungainly
sight for respondents. Previous owners of what now constitutes the
respondents respective lots did not complain of its presence. The
wall appears to have been built in the 1960s, and yet the Madrigals
(SUSANA title owners) did not complain about it; if they did, Nerit
would have known and testified to the same since he was responsible
for the subdivision of the lot. Only respondents complain about it
now. In one overlapping of boundaries case, the Court held that a
land owner may not now claim that his property has been encroached
upon when his predecessor did not register any objections at the time
399

the monuments were being placed on the claimed encroached area;

nor did the latter make any move to question the placement of said
monuments at the time. In every land dispute, the aim of the courts is
to protect the integrity of and maintain inviolate the Torrens system of
land registration, as well as to uphold the law; a resolution of the
parties dispute is merely a necessary consequence. Taking this to
mind, we cannot grant the respondents prayer without violating the
very principles of the Torrens system. They have failed to lay the
proper foundation for their claim of overlap. This is precisely the
reason why the trial court should have officially appointed a
commissioner or panel of commissioners and not leave the initiative
to secure one to the parties: so that a thorough investigation, study
and analysis of the parties titles could be made in order to provide, in
a comprehensive report, the necessary information that will guide it in
resolving the case completely, and not merely leave the
determination of the case to a consideration of the parties more often
than not self-serving evidence.

400

C. Effect of Issuance of Title

a. Certificate of title cannot be used to protect a usurper from
the true owner; neither can it be used to perpetuate fraud
PAGADUAN v OCUMA
GR No. 176308 May 8, 2009
Facts:
The subject lot used to be part of a big parcel of land that originally
belonged to Nicolas Cleto as evidenced by Certificate of Title (C.T.)
No. 14. The big parcel of land was the subject of two separate lines of
dispositions. The first line of dispositions began with the sale by Cleto
to Antonio Cereso on May 11, 1925. Cereso in turn sold the land to
the siblings with the surname Antipolo on September 23, 1943. The
Antipolos sold the property to Agaton Pagaduan, father of petitioners,
on March 24, 1961. All the dispositions in this line were not registered
and did not result in the issuance of new certificates of title in the
name of the purchasers.
On November 26, 1961, Eugenia Reyes executed a unilateral deed of
sale where she sold the northern portion with an area of 32,325
square meters to respondents for P1,500.00 and the southern portion
consisting of 8,754 square meters to Agaton Pagaduan for P500.00.
Later, on June 5, 1962, Eugenia executed another deed of sale, this
time conveying the entire parcel of land, including the southern
portion, in respondents favor.
On July 26, 1989, petitioners instituted a complaint for reconveyance
of the southern portion with an area of 8,754 square meters, with
damages, against respondents before the RTC of Olongapo City.
The Court of Appeals ruled that while the registration of the southern
portion in the name of respondents had created an implied trust in
favor of Agaton Pagaduan, petitioners, however, failed to show that
401

they had taken possession of the said portion. Hence, the appellate
court concluded that prescription had set in, thereby precluding
petitioners recovery of the disputed portion.
ISSUE:
Whether or not actual fraud is committed
RULING:
Art. 1456. If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person
obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust
for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes. The
property in question did not come from the petitioners. In fact that
property came from Eugenia Reyes. The title of the Ocumas can be
traced back from Eugenia Reyes to Ruperta Asuncion to the original
owner Nicolas Cleto. Thus, if the respondents are holding the
property in trust for anyone, it would be Eugenia Reyes and not the
petitioners. In the instant case, none of the elements of actual or
constructive fraud exists. The respondents did not deceive Agaton
Pagaduan to induce the latter to part with the ownership or deliver the
possession of the property to them. Moreover, no fiduciary relations
existed between the two parties.
ART. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different
vendees, the ownership shall be transferred to the person who may
have first possession thereof in good faith, if it should be movable
property.
Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the
person acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in the Registry of
Property.
Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the
person who in good faith was first in possession; and, in the absence
thereof; to the person who presents the oldest title, provided there is
good faith.
In this case there was a first sale by Eugenia Reyes to Agaton
Pagaduan and a second sale by Eugenia Reyes to the respondents.
For a second buyer like the respondents to successfully invoke the
second paragraph, Article 1544 of the Civil Code, it must possess
good faith from the time of the sale in its favor until the registration of
the same. Respondents sorely failed to meet this requirement of good
402

faith since they had actual knowledge of Eugenias prior sale of the
southern portion property to the petitioners, a fact antithetical to good
faith. This cannot be denied by respondents since in the same deed
of sale that Eugenia sold them the northern portion to the
respondents for P1,500.00, Eugenia also sold the southern portion of
the land to Agaton Pagaduan for P500.00.
b. Registration as an operative act bringing the land
ROXAS vs.DINGLASAN
G.R. No. L-27234
May 30, 1969
Facts:
Felisa Kalaw was the registered owner of a parcel of land situated at
Lipa City. On June 11, 1959, she sold it to Francisca Mojica and
Victoria Dinglasan with different sizes in areas. Long before and at
the time of the sales, Francisca Mojica and Victoria Dinglasan were in
possession of the Lot. The vendor's Certificate of Title No. 9125 was
not delivered to the vendees because it was in the possession of
another person to whom the lot had been mortgaged by Felisa Kalaw.
Pedro Dinglasan, succeeded in having Certificate of Title No. 9125 in
the name of Felisa Kalaw canceled and a new transfer Certificate of
Title No. T-10392 issued in his name by falsifying a public document
of conveyance. He subsequently mortgaged the lot to Leonora T.
Roxas as security for a loan. Roxas, instituted the instant foreclosure
suit against him for his failure to pay his obligation.
Francisca Mojica and Victoria Dinglasan moved to intervene since
they allege that they are the true owners.
The lower court rendered its decision finding that the mortgage was
validly constituted and its foreclosure was in order. The Court of
Appeals certified the appeal of this Court on the ground that it
involves only questions of law.
Issue:
Whether Francisca Mojica and Victoria Dinglasan are the true owners
of the land
Ruling:
403

No, they are not the true owners.

The vendees-intervenors not having acquired the ownership of the
land, their action to vindicate ownership must fail because such
action can prosper only upon proof by plaintiff that he is the owner. As
pointed out, the intervenors did not acquire ownership of the land
because their deeds of sale were not registered.

Egao v CA
174 SCRA 484
Facts:
The respondents claim that they are the owners of the parcel of land
by virtue of the deed of sale they entered into with Roberto Marfori.
The respondents also introduced improvements; they as well paid the
taxes of the property. However, the petitioners illegally occupied
portions of the land. Petitioner answers that they are the true owner
of the land by virtue of the Certificate of Title issued by the Register of
Deeds pursuant to their Free Patent. The lower court ruled in favor of
Egao. The CA reversed the decision on grounds that the main issue
should be whether Egao can validly sell the land to Marfori who
subsequently transferred the ownership to the respondents. The CA
holds both Egao and Marfori to be in pari delicto for violating the 5year restriction provided by Commonwealth 141 against
encumbrance and alienation of public lands acquired thrufree
patent or homestead patent.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners validly transferred their ownership to
Marfori to resolve the rights of the respondents over the land in
dispute
Ruling:
The SC holds that based on the adduced evidence, the Egaos sold
the lot to Marfori within the 5-year restriction period provided by law
on Free Patent. When the land was sold to the respondents, they
know that the OCT is still registered under the name of the
404

petitioners. Thus, they are not considered to be innocent purchaser

as contrary to the ruling of the CA. Where a purchaser neglects to
make the necessary inquiries and closes his eyes to facts which
should put a reasonable man on his guard as to the possibility of the
existence of a defect in his vendor's title, and relying on the belief that
there was no defect in the title of the vendor, purchases the property
without making any further investigation, he cannot claim that he is a
purchaser in good faith for value.

c. Notice to the world

405

PEOPLE vs. REYES

175 SCRA 597
Facts:
The spouses Julio Rizare and Patricia Pampo owned a parcel of land,
registered in their names. Both are now deceased. They were
survived by the following children.
However, the complainants allegedly discovered from the records of
the Register of Deeds that the subject property had already been
transferred in the name of Mizpah Reyes, single, of legal age, Filipino
and resident of the City of Lipa, Philippines". They further allegedly
discovered that the conveyance was effected through a notarized
deed of sale executed and signed by their parents.The deed of sale
was registered with the Register of Deeds. Upon examination of the
document, they found that the signature of their parents were
allegedly falsified and that accused also made an untruthful
statement that she was single although she was married.
Issue:
Whether or not the prescriptive period started when the deed of sale
was registered with the Register of Deeds.
Ruling:
The rule is well-established that registration in a public registry is a
notice to the whole world. The record is constructive notice of its
contents as well as all interests, legal and equitable, included therein.
All persons are charged with knowledge of what it contains.
It has also been ruled that when an extrajudicial partition of the
property of the deceased was executed by some of his heirs, the
registration of the instrument of partition with the Register of Deeds is
constructive notice that said heirs have repudiated the fiduciary
relationship between them and the other heirs vis-a-vis the property
in question. The heirs who were not included in the deed of partition
are deemed to have notice of its existence from the time it was
406

registered with the Register of Deeds.

d. Conclusive evidence of ownership

CHING vs. CA
181 SCRA 9
407

Facts:
A Decree was issued to spouses Maximo Nofuente and Dominga
Lumandan in Land Registration and Original Certificate of Title
correspondingly given by the Register of Deeds for the Province of
Rizal covering a parcel of land.
By virtue of a sale to Ching Leng, TCT No. 91137 was issued.
Consequently, Ching Leng died. His legitimate son Alfredo Ching filed
a petition for administration of the estate of deceased Ching Leng and
was granted.
13 years after Ching Leng's death, a suit against him was filed by
private respondent Asedillo for reconveyance of the said property and
cancellation of T.C.T. No. 91137 in his favor based on possession.
Summons by publication to Ching Leng and/or his estate was
directed by the trial court. The summons and the complaint were
published in the "Economic Monitor", a newspaper of general
circulation.
The title over the property in the name of Ching Leng was cancelled
and a new TCT was issued in favor of Asedillo.
Issue:
Whether or not an action for reconveyance of property and
cancellation of title is in personam, and if so, would a dead man or his
estates be bound by service of summons and decision by publication.
Ruling:
An action to redeem, or to recover title to or possession of, real
property is not an action in rem or an action against the whole world,
like a land registration proceeding or the probate of a will; it is an
action in personam, so much so that a judgment therein is binding
only upon the parties properly impleaded and duly heard or given an
opportunity to be heard. Actions in personam and actions in rem differ
in that the former are directed against specific persons and seek
personal judgments, while the latter are directed against the thing or
property or status of a person and seek judgments with respect
thereto as against the whole world. An action to recover a parcel of
408

land is a real action but it is an action in personam, for it binds a

particular individual only although it concerns the right to a tangible
thing.
Sec. 112 of the Land Registration Act (Act No. 496, as amended)
requires "notice to all parties in interest." Since ChingLeng was
already in the other world when the summons was published he could
not have been notified at all and the trial court never acquired
jurisdiction over his person.
Therefore, the judgment in question is null and void for lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the deceased defendant Ching Leng.

HEIRS OF TEODORO DELA CRUZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 117384. October 21, 1998
Facts:
On November 20, 1986, an action for reconveyance with damages
was filed by petitioners against private respondents involving a parcel
of land situated in Poblacion, San Mateo, Isabela with a total area
of 3,277 square meters. Petitioners assert that the subject land was
bought by their predecessor-in-interest from the private respondents,
Madrid brothers, for P4,000.00 in a deed of sale executed on May 18,
1959, and since then they have been in actual, physical, continuous
and open possession of the property. However, on October 1986,
409

private respondents obtained a Torrens Title over the said land. The
Madrids denied having executed the said deed of sale and assuming
that said document exists, the same is fictitious and falsified. During
the trial, petitioners were unable to present the original deed of sale
since. Instead, they presented a photo copy of the purported original
carbon copy of the deed of sale. The records show that the disputed
property has been in the possession of the petitioners since
1959. They have since been introducing several improvements on
the land.
Issue:
Whether the Certificates of Title issued to private respondents should
be given more weight than the long possession of the subject lands
by the petitioners.
Ruling:
No. The Madrids argue that neither prescription nor laches can
operate against them because their title to the property is registered
under the Torrens system and therefore imprescriptable. Such
principles, while admittedly correct, are subject to certain
exceptions. The fact that the Madrids were able to secure TCT No.
167250, and Marquez, TCT Nos. 167220 and 167256, did not
operate to vest upon them ownership of the property. The Torrens
system does not create or vest title. It is not a mode of acquiring
ownership,especially considering the fact that both the Madrids and
Marquezes obtained their respective TCTs only in October 1986,
twenty-seven long (27) years after petitioners first took possession of
the land. If the Madrids and Marquezes wished to assert their
ownership, they should have filed a judicial action for recovery of
possession and not merely to have the land registered under their
respective names.
CABRERA v CA
267 SCRA 339
Facts:
410

In 1950, a parcel of unregistered land which was owned in mutual by

Daniel, Albertana and Felicidad Teokemian, having inherited the
same from their late father, Domingo Teokemian, was sold to Andres
Orais wherein Felicidad was not able to sign in the Deed of Sale.In
1957, Virgilia Orais, daughter of the vendee issued Free Patent and
Original Certificate of Title over the said property.In 1972, the onethird share of Felicidad Teokemian in her possession was sold to
spouses Elanoand Felicidad Cabrera who instantly took possession
of it. In 1988, Virgilia Orais filed a civil case for quieting of title against
Felicidad Teokemian and Felicidad Cabrera. On April 27, 1989, the
lower court rendered judgment in favor of defendants against the
plaintiff, ruling that the latter can no longer recover the portion of land
occupied by the past due to laches. The Court of Appeals reversed
such findings upon appeal on the justification that the defendants
action for reconveyance based on an implied trust had already been
barred by prescription and that the action of the plaintiffs is not barred
by laches because what was sold to the Cabreras was a definite
portion of the community property.
Issue:
Whether or not the action of the plaintiffs is barred by laches.

Ruling:
Yes. The argument that laches does not apply because what was
sold to the Cabreras was a definite portion of the community property,
and, therefore, void, is untenable.
Undisputed is the fact that since the sale of the two-third portion of
the subject property to the plaintiff, the latter had allowed Felicidad
Teokemian to occupy that one-third portion allotted to her. There has,
therefore, been a partial partition, where the transferees of an
undivided portion of the land allowed a co-owner of the property to
occupy a definite portion thereof and has not disturbed the same, for
a period too long to be ignored, the possessor is in a better condition
or right.
411

AVILA vs. TAPUCAR

G.R. No. L-45947 August 27, 1991
Facts:
In 1918, spouses Pedro Bahan and Dominga Exsaure acquired a
1.8340 hectares parcel of coconut land which was inherited by
private respondents in 1965, as successors-in-interest. In 1960,
petitioner Avila bought under a Deed of Absolute Sale of Unregistered
Land ,a 4,371 square meter parcel of land which is part of the subject
property inherited by the Bahans from their predecessor. On
November 3, 1971, the heirs of Pedro Bahan filed Free Patent
Application for alot which has a total area of 6.9027 hectares in its
entirety. Sometime later, private respondent Julito Bahan and
company gathered coconuts from the land purchased by petitioner
Magdalena Avila. They filed an action for quieting of title and
damages against the Avilas. In their answer, the petitioners Avilas
raised the defense of having purchased the land from a certain Luis
Cabalan and from then on has been in open, continuous, public,
peaceful and uninterrupted possession of the same. The Avilas filed a
motion for a preliminary writ of injunction praying that the Bahans be
enjoined and ordered to refrain and desist from gathering or continue
harvesting the fruits on the land in controversy until the termination
of the case. In the meantime, the Bahans' application for free patent
was approved and the free patent was issued , and on the same date
an Original certificate of title was issued in the name of the Heirs
of Pedro Bahan, represented by Julito Bahan.
Issue:
Whether the free patent and original certificate of title which were
erroneously issued and vested ownership of lands in favor of the
Bahans is proper.
Ruling:
No.The free patent issued to the Bahans is erroneous because it
embraced and comprised portions of lands belonging to the Avilas.
The subsequent registration of the portion of land belonging to
412

the Avilas by the Bahans could not make the latter owners thereof. A
cadastral court has no authority to award a property in favor of
persons who have not put in any claims to it and have never asserted
any right of ownership thereon, and the certificate of title issued under
thecircumstances to such persons would be declared void subject
to the right of innocent purchasers for value. Land registration is a
proceeding
in rem and binds the whole world. However, the simple possession of
a certificate of title under the Torrens Systems does not necessarily
make the holder a true owner of all the property described therein. If
a person obtains a title under the Torrens system,which includes by
mistake or oversight land which can no longer be registered under
the system, he does not, by virtue of the said certificate alone,
become the owner of the lands illegally included. Registration does
not vest title. It is not a mode of acquiring ownership but is merely
evidence of such title over a particular property. It does not give the
holder any better right than what he actually has, especially if the
registration was done in bad faith. The effect is that it is as if no
registration was made at all.

e. A certificate of title is conclusive as to

a. the ownership of the registrant
TAN vs BANTEGUI
GR No. 154027 October 24, 2005
Facts:
Bantegui acquired the property sometime in 1954 and rented it to
spouses Caedos who resided therein until 1994. In 1970, she left for
the United States of America. She returned to the Philippines in
413

January 1988 and executed her special power of attorneymaking

Guadalupe B. Bautista (Bautista for brevity) her representative, after
which, she went back to the United States. For failure of Bantegui to
pay taxes, said property was at public auction held on November 21,
1984, to the spouses Capistranos. Since the property was not
redeemed within the one (1) year redemption period, title to said
property was consolidated to the Capistranos. The property was later
sold on June 20, 1988 by the Capistranos to spouses Pereyra. These
transfers were unknown to Bantegui and the Caedos. Said property
was again sold by the Pereyras to the spouses Tan. Bantegui, thru
her sister Guadalupe Bautista, and joined by the spouses Caedo[,]
filed a Complaint for Annulment of Sale, Quieting of Title, Injunction
and Damages with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. After the
trial court rendered its Decision in favor of respondents, petitioners
appealed to the CA.
Issue:
Whether or not the auction sale was valid.
Ruling:
The tax sale did not conform to the requirements prescribed under
Presidential Decree (PD) No. 464, otherwise known as the Real
Property Tax Code. The auction sale of real property for the collection
of delinquent taxes is in personam, not in rem. Although sufficient in
proceedings in rem like land registration, mere notice by publication
will not satisfy the requirements of proceedings in personam.
[P]ublication of the notice of delinquency [will] not suffice,
considering that the procedure in tax sales is in personam. It is still
incumbent upon the city treasurer to send the notice directly to the
taxpayer -- the registered owner of the property -- in order to protect
the latters interests. Although preceded by proper advertisement
and publication, an auction sale is void absent an actual notice to a
delinquent taxpayer. A certificate of title under the Torrens system
serves as evidence of an indefeasible title to the property in favor of
the person whose name appears on it. While it is true that Transfer
Certificates of Title have already been issued in the names of the
subsequent purchasers, they should nonetheless be invalidated.
Considering the failure to abide by the mandatory requirements of a
414

proceeding in personam, no better title than that of the original owner

can be assumed by the transferees.
Besides, the incontrovertible nature of a certificate of title
applies only when the issue involved is the validity of the original and
not of the transfer. Subsequent titles issued to the prejudice of the
rightful owner will produce no legal effects whatsoever. Quod nullum
est, nullum producit effectum. That which is a nullity produces no
effect.

b. the identity of the land

DEMASIADO vs VELASCO
71 SCRA 105
Facts:
Plaintiff bought the land in question through pacto de retro sale from
his uncle Ambrosio Demasiado which vendor a retro could
repurchase within ten years after the first five years from the date of
the document. That said vendor a retro subsequently executed a
deed of definite sale of same lot in favor of the plaintiff Melquiades
Demasiado and his wife Jovita Pareja It is admitted that both deeds
of sale though contained in a public document have not been
415

registered in the office of the Register of Deeds. From the evidence of

the plaintiff, it has been established that plaintiff's claim to the land in
question is premised on two unregistered documents. This shows
that when said document was executed parties already knew that lot
5169 has been titled and it would have been easy for parties to
inquire from the office of the Register of Deeds as to whether this
land is titled or not. Based on the evidence presented by plaintiff and
defendants, the plaintiff has not even proved his clear right over the
whole lot. Deeds of Sale could not be superior to the existing valid
original certificate of title.
Issue:
Whether or not the plaintiff has clear right over the disputed lot.
Ruling:
Under Section 47 of the Land Registration Act, (Act No. 496) the
certificate of title covering registered land "shall be received as
evidence in all courts of the Philippines, and shall be conclusive as to
all matters contained therein (principally, the Identity of the owner of
the land covered thereby) except so far as provided" in the Act itself.
And there is no pretense that appellant comes under any of the
exceptions mentioned in Section 39 of the Act. What appellant tries to
point out, however, is that the trial court admitted the certificate of title
invoked by appellee without the same being properly Identified.
According to appellant, although the trial court did rule that said
certificate "should be admitted", it did not actually rule that "they are
hereby admitted." We believe such argument is unavailing,
considering that His Honor's ruling that said certificate, "the owner's
copy of Original certificate of Title No. 61801 is admissible", was
precisely made after originally sustaining appellant's counsel's
objection to its admission, which must be deemed to be clearly even
if not categorically, a reconsideration and reversal of its earlier ruling
rejecting the same.

416

c. its location
DAVID ODSIGUE vs. COURT OF APPEALS
233 SCRA 626
Facts:
Armando Angeles, owner of a parcel of land covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. 4050 and situated at Lagundi, Morong, Rizal.
Since 1972, David Odsigue has been in possession of the land by the
tolerance of the owner of the original owner Platon Espiritu Santo. In
1989, Espiritu Santo died and was succeeded by his heirs, among
whom was Armando Angeles. On January 10, 1991, Angeles, as coowner and assignee of the other heirs, sent a letter of demand to
417

David Odsigue to vacate the premises. The letter was delivered to the
Odsigue by the Barangay Captain of Lagundi, Fernando Austria, who,
in a sworn affidavit, stated that he tried to deliver the letter to
petitioner but petitioner had refused to receive it.
On February 8, 1991, private respondent brought this suit for unlawful
detainer in the MTC. The MTC rendered a decision ordering the
petitioner to vacate the premises. On appeal the RTC and, later, the
CA, affirmed the decision of the MTC. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration but his motion was denied by the appellate court,
which found no new matters which would warrant a reversal of its
decision. Hence this petition for review on certiorari.
Issue:
Whether or not the property sought to be recovered has been
properly identified.
Ruling:
A certificate of title is conclusive evidence not only of ownership of the
land referred but also its location. The subject of these proceedings is
the land covered by OCT No. 4050. Accordingly, petitioners will be
required to demolish only whatever is constructed within its
boundaries. Private respondent's title (OCT No. 4050) indicates that
the property is located in Barangay Lagundi. Likewise, the
certification issued by the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer at
Morong, Rizal stated that petitioner was occupying a landholding at
Barangay Lagundi.
f. General incidents
BUDLONG vs. PONDOC
79 SCRA 24
Facts:
On October 27, 1934 the sisters Isabela Pondoc and Crispina
Pondoc donated to Andrea Budlong in a notarial instrument their twothirds share in the said lot in consideration of the donee's personal
418

services to the donors. Andrea accepted the donation in the same

instrument.
Two years after the execution of the donation, or on October 27,
1936, Original Certificate of Title No. 4718 was issued for the said lot.
The title shows that the lot is owned by the following co-owners:
Crispina Pondoc 113; Isabela Pondoc 1/3; Francisco Garrote 1/6, and
Isabela Garrote-Pondoc 1/6.the donee, Andrea Budlong did not
intervene in the cadastral proceeding. She was not substituted for the
donors in that proceeding.
Isabela Pondoc and Crispina Pondoc died without any descendants
in 1935 and 1937. Francisco Garrote left Bohol thirty years before
1966 and had never returned to that province. Isabel Garrote-Pondoc
died and was survived by her five children named Juan, Fabio,
Apolinaria Benedicta and Felicidad all surnamed Pondoc y Garrote
Andrea Budlong has been in possession of the lot. She declared it for
tax purposes in her name. She planted the lot to coconuts, bamboos,
bananas and a mango tree. Early in 1965 Andrea wanted to register
the deed of donation. The register of deeds in a letter dated April 1,
1965 asked Juan Pondoc to surrender the owner's duplicate of OCT
No. 4718.
Andrea Budlong filed in the Court of First instance of Bohol an action
for the partition of the said lot. She was allowed to sue as a pauper.
The trial court dismissed the complaint on the grounds that Andrea
Budlong was guilty of laches and that the registration of the lot
extinguished her rights under the deed of donation.
Issue:
Whether or not the done ceased to be a co-owner because her name
does not appear in the certificate of title
Ruling:
Section 70 of Act No. 496 that registered land, and ownership therein,
shall in all respects be subject to the same burdens and incidents
attached by law to unregistered land", and that nothing in Act No. 496
"shall in any way be construed "to change the laws of descent, or the
rights of partition between coparceners joint tenants and other
cotenants " "or to change or affect in any other way any other rights
or liabilities created by law and applicable to unregistered land,
419

except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act or in the

amendments hereof".
LEGAL INCIDENTS OF REGISTRATION LAND
1 Registered land is subject to the same legal burdens and incidents
as unregistered land and, therefore, fake unregistered land, it is
subject to attachment and execution for the payment of debts. The
rights and liabilities which are created by law and are made
applicable to unregistered land, are applicable to registered land,
except as otherwise provided in Act No. 496.
2. The rights arising from the relation of husband and wife are
applicable to registered lands.
3. Registered land is subject (a) to any alien of any description
established by law on land and the b thereon, or the interest of the
owner in such land or buildings, (b) to the laws of descent, and (c) to
the rights of partition between coparceners joint tenants, will other
cotenants except as otherwise expressly provoked in Act No. 496.
The deed of donation made Andrea Budlong a co-owner of Lot No.
5447. She became the successor-in-interest of the donors, Isabela
Pondoc and Crispina Pondoc. The fact that in OCT No. 4718, which
was issued subsequent to the donation, the donors appear to be the
co-owners and not Andrea Budlong did not extinguish at all the rights
of Andrea as a co-owner.
Section 70 of Act No. 496 is crystal clear. It unmistakably provides
that the conversion of unregistered land into registered land does not
affect the rights of the CO-owners nor the legal rights and liabilities
applicable to unregistered land
G. ATTRIBUTES
i. IMPRESCRIPTIBLE
Section 47, PD 1529 Registered land not subject to
prescription. No title to registered land in derogation of the title
of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or
adverse possession.
Fundamental principle in land registration that the
certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible and
incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the person whose
name appears therein.
CANA VS. EVANGELICAL FREE CHURCH
G.R. 157573
FACTS:
Petitioner Elinel Caa is a former pastor assigned in the respondents
420

affiliate Malabon Christian Evangelical Church (MCEC). The disputed

property consists of a lot and a church, covered by a transfer certificate in
the name of the respondent Evangelical Free Church of the Philippines.
Petitioner was permitted by the respondents to occupy the disputed
property for the worship services of MCEC. On Dec. 1997, the petitioners
revoked the the petitioners license and was verbally ordered to vacate
the premises which the petitioner refused to do, even after a demand
letter later being served.
As a result, respondents filed an ejectment suit against the petitioner,
who in turn filed an answer with counterclaim in the same MTC. The said
court dismissed the parties suit and counterclaim for some technicalities.
An appeal to the RTC was also futile, as the RTC affirmed the decision of
the MTC.
A review was then filed by the respondents with the Court of Appeals,
who also dismissed the same for the case being insufficient in form and
substance. Thereafter, the respondents complied by attaching sufficient
and relevant documents to its suit.
Then the CA reversed the RTCs ruling and ordered said petitioner to
vacate said property. Hence, the petition for review on certiorari filed by
the petitioner.
ISSUE: Whether or not said petitioner has lawful title to the disputed
property.
RULING: The Supreme Court was not persuaded by the petitioners
contention that in all its pleadings, the respondents never disputed
petitioners claim that MCEC was the one who purchased the disputed
property. Records show that the respondents have consistently asserted
their ownership over the said land, with the evidence of the Deed of
Absolute Sale and Transfer Certificate of Title. The evidence presented
by the petitioner, which consisted mainly of affidavits of its members of
the board, was found to be self-serving and unsubstantiated.
The Supreme Court held that the respondent's title over the subject
property is evidence of its ownership thereof. It is a fundamental
principle in land registration that the certificate of title serves as evidence
of an indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the
421

person whose name appears therein. Moreover, the age-old rule is that
the person who has a Torrens Title over a land is entitled to possession
thereof.
In fine, petitioner failed to present competent evidence to prove his right
to remain in possession of the disputed property. Therefore, the
Supreme Court held that an ejectment case against the petitioner was
proper.
NATALIA REALTY CORP. VS. VALDEZ
173 SCRA 534
FACTS:
Petitioner-plaintiff Corporation filed a complaint against respondents,
alleging that defendants unlawfully occupied portions of the parcels of
land belonging to and registered in its name. Petitioner prayed that
defendants be ordered to vacate the same land belonging to the
former and to pay the reasonable compensation and financial reliefs.

Defendants sought the dismissal of all the aforesaid complaints for

ejectment on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Their motion was
denied on a holding that the grounds therefore are not concrete.

On October 1983, plaintiff Corporation moved for a summary

judgment on the consolidated cases under Rule 34 of the Rules of
Court. Claiming that there is no genuine issue averred in the
defendants complaint, and are mere pretended denials and flimsy
defences.

On December 1983, the trial court rendered a summary judgment

upon finding that no valid issue was raised by defendants but only
"conclusions that because they have been in actual possession for
422

over 30 years of their respective farm lots they are entitled to be

respected of such occupancy and as such the complaints should be
dismissed.

A motion for reconsideration was filed with the CA, the CA affirmed
the ruling of the trial court for absence of a valid issue raised by
defendants.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is a factual controversy in these

consolidated cases.

RULING:
None. The rendition of the questioned summary judgment by the trial
court is proper and valid. The very allegations of the defendants
prove that no valid issue has been tendered by them, They relied
mainly on two points, the alleged invalidity of the title of the plaintiff
and their supposed acquisition of the properties by adverse
possession. Defendants' theses are obviously puerile but they are
entitled to the benefit of clarification.

The certificates of title issued in the name of the plaintiff in

accordance with the Land Registration Act (Act No. 496) are
indefeasible after the expiration of one year from the entry of the
decree of registration. A petition for review of the decree must be
presented within one year after its entry. After the lapse of one year,
the decree of registration becomes incontrovertible and is binding
upon and conclusive against all persons. The certificates of title of
Appellee Corporation were issued more than thirty years ago

423

Also, there is nothing either in Presidential Decree No. 2 which may

be said to justify appellants' claim that said decree granted the
ownership of said lands to them and their successors by
title. Apparently, appellants were misled or induced to believe that
they acquired the parcels of land in question when the whole country
was declared by the previous regime as a land reform area.

Even assuming that said titles may still be challenged base on their
claim applying Presidential Deree no. 2 purportedly making them and
their successors owners of said land, the present case does not
provide the vehicle for that remedy since the judicial action required is
a direct, and not a collateral, attack. Petition was granted.

Protection is only in favor of registered owners.

But ownership may be lost through laches.
LUCAS VS. GAMPONIA
100 PHIL 277
FACTS:
By the stipulation of the parties it appears that on March 13, 1916,
free patent No. 3699 was issued over the land subject of the action in
the name of Domingo Mejia. This patent was transcribed in the Office
of the Register of Deeds of Nueva Vizcaya on July 26, 1916 and
certificate of title No. 380 issued in the name of Domingo Mejia. On
March 24, 1916, after the issuance of the patent but before the
registration of the same, patentee Domingo Mejia deeded the land to
Zacarias Ciscar, who immediately took possession thereof and
enjoyed its fruits. Upon his death the property was included in the
distribution of his estate and adjudicated to Roque Sanchez. Roque
Sanchez in turn sold the land on January 21, 1940 to Andres
424

Gamponia, Defendant herein. Sanchez was in possession and

enjoyment of the land from the time he acquired it by inheritance from
Ciscar up to the time he sold it to Defendant Andres Gamponia, the
latter has also possessed and enjoyed the property from the time he
bought it to date.
Upon the above facts the court a quo held that the sale by the
patentee to Zacarias Ciscar is null and void, as the sale was made
only 11 days after the issuance of a patent in violation of the
provisions of section 35 of Act No. 926. The Court further held that
since the land is registered land no title in derogation to that of the
registered owner could have been acquired either by Zacarias Ciscar
or his successors in interest, namely, Roque Sanchez and Defendant
Andres Gamponia.
ISSUE:
Whether plaintiff's right of action has already prescribed by virtue of
the possession of the land by the Defendant and his predecessors in
interest for a period of 37 years
RULING:
Upon a careful consideration of the facts and circumstances, we are
constrained to find, however, that while no legal defense to the action
lies, an equitable one lies in favor of the Defendant and that is, the
equitable defense of laches. No hold that the defense of prescription
or adverse possession in derogation of the title of the registered
owner Domingo Mejia does not lie, but that of the equitable defense
of laches. Otherwise, stated, we hold that while Defendant may not
be considered as having acquired title by virtue of his and his
predecessors long continued possession for 37 years, the original
owners right to recover back the possession of the property and the
title thereto from the Defendant has, by the long period of 37 years
and by patentees inaction and neglect, been converted into a stale
demand.
In Go Chi Gun, et al., vs. Co Cho, et al., (96 Phil., 622) we held that
the equitable defense of laches requires four elements:(1) conduct on
the part of the Defendant, or of one under whom he claims, giving
rise to the situation of which complaint is made and for which the
complaint seeks a remedy; (2) delay in asserting the complainants
rights, the complainant having had knowledge or notice, of the
Defendants conduct and having been afforded an opportunity to
425

institute a suit, (3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the

Defendant that the complainant would assert the right on which he
bases his suit; (4) injury or prejudice to the Defendant in the event
relief is accorded to the complainant, or the suit is not held to be
barred.
All the four elements mentioned above are present in the case at
bar. .
The reason upon which the rule is based is not alone the lapse of
time during which the neglect to enforce the right has existed, but the
changes of condition which may have arisen during the period in
which there has been neglect. In other words, where a court of equity
finds that the position of the parties has to change that equitable relief
cannot be afforded without doing injustice, or that the intervening
rights of third persons may be destroyed or seriously impaired, it will
not exert its equitable powers in order to save one from the
consequences of his own neglect. (Penn Mutual Life Inc. Co., et al.,
vs. City of Austin et al., U. S. 962.)
The judgment appealed from is hereby reversed and one is hereby
entered absolving the Defendant from the action.

RIGHT TO RECOVER POSSESSION IS IMPRESCRIPTIBLE

426

JM TUASON VS CA
93 SCRA 146
FACTS:
It is not disputed that this case originated as an action for recovery of
possession (ejectment) instituted by the plaintiff (petitioner)
corporation against the private respondent Guillermo Renosa.
Respondent's defense to the action for ejectment was that he bought
the disputed portion of land from a certain Capt. Faustino C. Cruz, for
the sum of P3,600.00; that said Faustino C. Cruz acquired the said
portion from 3,000 square meters of land acquired by virtue of a
compromise agreement in Civil Case Nos. Q-135, Q-139, Q-177 and
Q-186 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch;
and that all in all Faustino C. Cruz sold to respondent 360 square
meters of the 3,000 square meters allegedly allocated to the former in
the compromise agreement.
The trial court ruled in favor of the petitioner in the ejectment case on
the grounds that petitioner is the registered owner of the questioned
land; that as owner, petitioner is entitled to possession as an attribute
of ownership. Respondent Court of Appeals in reversing the trial
court's decision based its stand on its firm belief that the compromise
agreement between the petitioner and the "Deudors" created a valid
right in favor of Capt. Cruz to possess the property in question; that
this valid right of possession was transmitted to private respondent
Reosa when Cruz sold a portion of that land in 1956, to Reosa.
ISSUE: Whether private respondent Reosas predecessor-interest in
the disputed property namely, Capt. Cruz, acquired a valid right to
own and possess said land a right that he could have legally
transferred to private respondent Reosa which was also to entitle
the latter to a better right to possession against the admitted
registered owner of the land.
RULING: Taking into consideration the fundamental principle in law
applicable to the circumstances of this case that mere possession of
whatever length cannot defeat the imprescriptible title to the holder of
registered Torrens Title to real property, and that registered real
property under the Torrens system cannot be acquired by acquisitive
prescription. The petitioner who is the registered owner of the
427

disputed land has a right to possess and recover the same, as

against private respondent Reosa who merely claims a right to
possess from his predecessor-in-interest Capt. Cruz who likewise
never acquired any right to possess the disputed property. Both Capt.
Cruz and respondent Reosa cannot be considered exactly as
possessors in good faith because both of them knew at the time they
entered into possession that petitioner was the registered owner of
the disputed land.
Capt. Cruz cannot be considered a possessor in good faith because
as beneficiary of the compromise agreement he should be in a
position to know that there were suspensive conditions attached to
his possible acquisition of the disputed property and that if the
conditions were not fulfilled, his right as beneficiary would never
arise. Aside from the compromise agreement as the only basis of
Capt. Cruz' alleged right to the property in question, he and
respondent Reosa were never able to prove transfer to ownership of
the same from petitioner to Capt. Cruz, thus strengthening the
obvious fact that the suspensive conditions imposed in the
compromise agreement were never fulfilled and hence petitioner
never transferred title to the reserved properties in favor of the
beneficiaries therein. As registered owner of the land and in the
absence of any equal or better right on the part of respondent
Reosa to possess the disputed land, petitioner is entitled to
possession and initiated the correct action when it brought a case to
recover possession of the same.

WHEN LACHES IS UNAVAILING

DABLO VS CA
226 SCRA 618
FACTS:
Petitioners filed a complaint for quieting of title with recovery of
possession and ownership. In their complaint, plaintiffs alleged that
Hilariona Fortaleza Dablo is the surviving spouse of Mariano Dablo
who died in 1936, while Maria and Juanito, both surnamed Dablo are
428

their legitimate children; that plaintiffs inherited from Mariano Dablo a

parcel of unirrigated riceland in Zambales. This parcel of land is
covered by Original Certificate of Title in the name of Hrs. of Mariano
Dablo; it was issued in the name of the heirs of Mariano Dablo on and
was transcribed in the Registry Book of the Resister of Deeds of
Zambales. Mariano Dablo had been in peaceful, continuous, open,
public and adverse possession of the property as owner thereof since
1911 until his death when the plaintiffs succeeded in the possession
of the property, until the defendants illegally entered and occupied it
in 1946. Regional trial court declared that the petitioners are the legal
owners of lot in question.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners are the legal owners of lot in question.
RULING:
SC held that the private respondents are the true and rightful owners
of the western portion of the land in dispute.However, the remedy
granted by respondent Court of Appeals, that is, the cancellation of
Original Certificate of Title No P-3593, does not appear to be proper
and apt.
Neither would prescription aid the cause of private respondents, not
only because the acquisitive prescription of 10 years of possession
provided under Article 1134 of the Civil Code of the Philippines has
not yet transpired (private respondents entered the eastern portion in
1969 while the complaint to quiet title was filed on April 1, 1975), but
also because ownership of registered land under the Torrens System
is imprescriptible (St. Peter Memorial Park, Inc. vs. Cleofas, 92 SCRA
389 [1979]; J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 93 SCRA
146 [1979]).
Nor will laches bolster the claim of ownership of private respondents
over this eastern portion. An action by the registered owner to recover
possession based on a Torrens title is not barred by laches.

429

ii. INDEFEASIBLE AND INCONTROVERTIBLE

MELGAR VS PAGAYON
21 SCRA
FACTS:
A parcel of land was originally owned by Basilia Paccial, who sold it to
one Palomino subject to the right of repurchase within a period of
three years. The period expired without such a right being exercised.
Petitioner acquired the rights and interests. Earlier on January 30,
1925, the Court of First Instance of Iloilo rendered judgment
decreeing the registration in the above lot in favor of vendor Basilia
Paccial noted that it was encumbered to the Palomillo "for the sum of
TEN PESOS (P10.00). The original certificate of title was issued in
430

the name of Basilia Paccial with the foregoing encumbrances and

conditions annotated thereon. Salvador Pagayon, the predecessor-ininterest of the other respondents in this proceeding acquired the
property for the sum of P2,000.00. The Deed of Sale was registered,
and the next day Transfer Certificate of Title was issued in the name
of Salvador Pagayon which cancelled the Original Certificate of Title
in favor of Paccial.
Issue:
Whether or not the vendee is the owner of the land.
Ruling:
The conclusiveness of a decree of registration has been stressed. As
former Chief Justice Arellano so emphatically stated: "[It] shall remain
in full force and effect forever. No other conclusion would do in the
opinion of former Chief Justice Araullo as "Section 38 of Act No. 498 .
. . is very plain and conclusive..The Torrens title then "issued after the
necessary judicial proceedings [possesses] an absolute and
conclusive character. "The effects of the decree of registration cease
to exist when the title is transferred to a successor." The interests of
the Philippines will best be served by a strict adherence to the
provision of the Land Registration Law."
If it were otherwise, much of the stability that it is the purpose of the
Torrens system to maintain would be a thing of the past. The
incontestable and absolute character of the Torrens title.
At the risk of stating what is obvious, We say that land registration
proceedings under Act 496 are in rem and that such proceedings, as
well as the title issued as a result thereof, are binding and conclusive
upon the whole world.
This has to be the rule, for if even after the ownership of a property
has been decreed by a land registration court in favor of a particular
person and title issued may still be annulled, alleged, changed,
altered or modified after the lapse of the one year period fixed by the
legal provision mentioned above, the object of the Torrens system,
namely, to guarantee the indefeasibility of the title to the property,
would be defeated. In the instant case the above doctrine should
apply with more reason, considering the fact that the property has
431

passed from the hands of the original registered owner into those of
clearly innocent third parties."

A title over a property is evidence of ownership. It is a

fundamental principle in land registration that the certificate of
title serves as evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible
title to the property in favor of the person whose name appears
therein. It is an age-old rule that the person who has a Torrens
Title over a land is entitled to possession thereof.
CANA VS. EVANGELICAL FREE CHURCH OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 157573
FACTS:
A dispute over the possession of a land claimed by a church against its
former pastor sparked the commencement of this case in the trial
court. The disputed property,consisting of a church lot and building, is
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 96813, registered in the name
of Evangelical Free Church of the Philippines (respondent), a corporation
existing under and by virtue of Philippine laws. Elinel Caa (petitioner) is
its former pastor assigned to its affiliate, Malabon Evangelical Free
432

Church,
which
petitioner
as Malabon Christian Evangelical Church (MCEC).

refers

to

Respondent permitted petitioner to occupy the disputed property wherein

MCEC maintained worship services. However, on December 1, 1997,
respondent revoked petitioner's license and verbally demanded that
petitioner vacate the disputed property but the latter refused to
obey. Hence, respondent sought the services of a counsel who wrote a
formal demand letter dated December 17, 1997 requiring petitioner to
vacate the disputed premises and surrender peaceful possession thereof
to respondent. Petitioner ignored the demand letter.
Issue: WoN mere possession of the said property defeats a Torrens
Title
Ruing:
No, Respondent's title over the subject property is evidence of its
ownership thereof. It is a fundamental principle in land registration
that the certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible and
incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the person whose
name appears therein. Moreover, the age-old rule is that the person
who has a Torrens Title over a land is entitled to possession thereof.
Having failed to overcome herein respondents right of possession
over the disputed property, petitioner cannot insist that his continued
occupation thereof is lawful. One whose stay is merely tolerated
becomes a deforciant illegally occupying the property the moment he
is required to leave (Caiza vs. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 640).
This is consistent with the principle that a person who occupies the
land of another at the latter's forbearance or permission without any
contract between them is necessarily bound by an implied promise
that he will vacate upon demand, failing which a summary action for
ejectment is the proper remedy against him. (Jimenez vs. Patricia,
Inc., 340 SCRA 525)

433

Instances when defense of indefeasibility is NOT available:

1 The principle of indefeasibility of a Torrens Title does not
apply where fraud attended the issuance of the title. The
Torrens title does not furnish a shield for fraud. As such, a
title issued based on void documents does not run against
the State and its subdivisions.
EAGLE REALTY CORPORATION VS REPUBLIC
G.R. No. 151424
FACTS: Eagle Realty, a company engaged in the real estate
business, bought a parcel of land from a certain Reyes in 1984 via a
Deed of Sale. This Reyes acquired the land from a certain Medina
who earlier acquired the said land via surreptitiously entering a false
record in the records of the Land Registration Commission.
Eventually, the true owners of the said land, the de Leons, discovered
that another title was fraudulently issued to Medina over the same
parcel of land. De Leon was able to have the said title annulled as
well as the TCT issued to Eagle Realty by virtue of the Deed of Sale.

ISSUE: Whether or not the TCT was validly revoked

RULING: Yes, the principle of indefeasibilty of a Torrens Title does

not apply when the patent and the title based thereon are null and
void. The Director of Lands had no authority to grant a free patent
over privately owned land.

434

2 Principle of indefeasibility does not apply when the patent

and the title based thereon are null and void. The Director
of Lands had no authority to grant a free patent over
privately owned land. Although OCT No. P-30187 was
merely collaterally attacked, it was still correctly nullified
because the free patent on which it was based was null and
void.

DE GUZMAN VS AGBALA

G.R. No. 163566

FACTS:
435

The subject parcels of land were inherited by Carmen, who died

single, without any compulsory heir. Said land was the subject of a
deed of donation in favor of her niece Madelene Javier Cruz.
According to Madelene, she was present when all the signatories
thereon, including the notary public, signed the document. From that
time on, she received the rentals of the properties covered by the
donation. Carmen even informed her tenants that Madelene would
inherit the properties upon her death. The respondent then filed a civil
case against Madelene praying that the deed of donation be nullified,
as well as the subsequent transfers to other parties of the properties
covered by the spurious donation.
An amended complaint was filed on September 15, 1988 to
include the transferees of the properties including petitioner spouses
Raymundo and Perla de Guzman, who were the transferees of the
land.
Respondent claimed that the deed of donation was fake. This
was confirmed by the handwriting expert of the National Bureau of
Investigation, Rogelio Azores.
The RTC, in its decision, declared the deed of donation in favor
of Madelene null and void ab initio. Such decision was affirmed by the
CA.
ISSUE:
Whether or not OCT No. P-30187 was correctly nullified
RULING:
Yes. Although OCT No. P-30187 was merely collaterally attacked; it
was still correctly nullified because the free patent on which it was
based was null and void ab initio. The principle of indefeasibility does
not apply when the patent and the title based thereon are null and
void. An action to declare the nullity of a void title does not prescribe
and is susceptible to direct, as well as to collateral, attack. OCT No.
P-30187 was registered on the basis of a free patent which the RTC
ruled was issued by the Director of Lands without authority. The
petitioners falsely claimed that the land was public land when in fact it
was not as it was private land previously owned by Carmen who
inherited it from her parents. This finding was affirmed by the CA.

436

3 Purchase from one who procured title by Fraud

BORNALES VS. IAC

166 SCRA 512

FACTS:
437

In 1927, Spouses Sixto and Isabel Dumolong were awarded a parcel

of land. Their marriage, however was not blessed by a child. Sixto
then had an extramarital affair and he cohabited with Placida who
even used Sixtos surname. Placida and Sixto begot children.
The petitioner, on the other hand, is Sixtos tenant. In March 1978,
Placida and her children executed a Deed of extrajudicial
Adjudication and Sale of Real Property. They were able to acquire the
supposed thumbmark of Isabel. But apparently, Isabel never affixed
her thumbmark and that the same was not within her knowledge.
In November 1978, Placida registered the Deed and a Torrens title
was issued in their name. Three months thereafter, Placida and her
children sold the land to Bornales. Isabel assailed the sale. Isabel
argued that the acquisition of the Torrens title by Placida et al was
through fraud. Bornales countered he was not aware of the fraudulent
nature of the prior transactions, but since a Torrens was issued he
should be considered as a buyer in good faith, hence entitled to some
right.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Bornales may invoke the indefeasibility of a Torrens
title
RULING:
No. Having bought the land registered under the Torrens
system from their vendors who procured title thereto by means of
fraud, petitioners cannot invoke the indefeasibility of a certificate of
title against the private respondent to the extent of her interest
therein. The Torrens system of land registration should not be used
as a means to perpetrate fraud against the rightful owner of real
property. Registration, to be effective, must be made in good faith.
Thus, it is a settled rule that the defense of indefeasibility of a
certificate of title does not extend to a transferee who takes it with
notice of the flaws in his transferors title. If at all, the petitioners only
acquire the right which their vendors then had.

438

A title procured by fraud or misrepresentation can still be the

source of a completely legal and valid title if the same is in the
hands of an innocent purchaser for value.

HEIRS OF TIRO VS PES

G.R. No. 170528

FACTS:
Guillerma Tiro et al. filed before the RTC a Complaint for Quieting of
Title against PES. Petitioners alleged that they are the children of the
late Julian Tiro. They averred that they and their predecessors-ininterest had been in actual possession of the disputed land since time
immemorial until they were prevented from entering the same by
persons claiming to be the new owners sometime in 1995. But they
discovered that OCT No. RO-1121 had already been cancelled as
early as 1969 and was presently registered in the name of
439

respondent. The petitioners prayed that all the transactions

emanating from the "Extrajudicial Declaration of Heirs and
Confirmation of Sale," executed by Maxima Ochea, be declared void,
including the transfer made in favor of the respondent; that the title
which was issued in the name of respondent be cancelled; and that
the property be restored and registered in the name of the petitioners.
Respondent claimed that its predecessor-in-interest Pacific Rehouse
Corporation acquired the subject land from the Spouses Velayo, the
registered owners of the property who were also in possession of the
same at the time of the sale. Respondent argued that petitioners
action for quieting of title was barred by laches and prescription. The
RTC issued a decision dismissing petitioners complaint. The RTC
ruled that respondent was an innocent purchaser for value who relied
on the correctness of the certificate of title in the name of the
vendor.The petitioners filed with the CA an appeal and MR but were
denied.

ISSUE: Whether or not CA erred in not finding that the act of the RD
of registering a clearly void and unregistrable document confers no
valid title on the presentor and his successors-in-interest.

RULING: Petitioners arguments are unfounded.Certificates of title

merely confirm or record title already existing and vested. The
indefeasibility of the torrens title should not be used as a means to
perpetrate fraud against the rightful owner of real property. Good faith
must concur with registration because, otherwise, registration would
be an exercise in futility.
A person is considered in law as an innocent purchaser for value
when he buys the property of another, without notice that some other
person has a right or an interest in such property, and pays a full
price for the same at the time of such purchase, or before he has
notice of the claims or interest of some other person in the property. A
person dealing with registered land may safely rely on the
correctness of the certificate of title of the vendor/transferor, and the
law will in no way oblige him to go behind the certificate to determine
440

the condition of the property. The courts cannot disregard the rights of
innocent third persons, for that would impair or erode public
confidence in the torrens system of land registration. Thus, a title
procured by fraud or misrepresentation can still be the source of a
completely legal and valid title if the same is in the hands of an
innocent purchaser for value.

4 Land covered by previous valid title.

5 Patent and Certificate issued over private land.

AGNE VS DIRECTOR OF LANDS

181 SCRA 46

FACTS:

On April 13, 1971, private respondent spouses filed a case in the CFI
of Pangasinan for recovery of possession and damages against
petitioners. Their complaint states that they are the registered owners
under the aforesaid Transfer Certificate of Title No. 32209 of the
parcel of land situated in Barrio Bantog, Asingan, Pangasinan which
is now in the possession of petitioners. But petitioners alleged that
they became the owners by accession or accretion of the respective
aliquot parts of said river bed bordering their properties. While the
above-mentioned case was still pending, petitioners filed a complaint
against the respondents Director of Lands and spouses Agpoon with
the CFI of Pangasinan for annulment of title, reconveyance of and/or
action to clear title to a parcel of land. Petitioners alleged that the land
441

in question belongs to them and that it was only on April 13, 1971,
when respondent spouses filed a complaint against them, that they
found out that the said land was granted by the Government to
Herminigildo Agpoon under Free Patent No. 23263, pursuant to which
OCT. 2370 was issued in the latter's name. And the said patent and
subsequent titles issued pursuant thereto are null and void since the
said land, an abandoned river bed, is of private ownership and,
therefore, cannot be the subject of a public land grant. The trial court
rendered a decision ordering the defendants to surrender to the
plaintiffs the physical possession of the land in question.

On June 24, 1974, the aforesaid CFI of Pangasinan, acting on the

motion to dismiss filed by respondents Director of Lands and spouses
Agpoon, issued an order dismissing Civil Case No. U-2649 for
annulment of title by merely citing the statement in the case
of Antonio, et al. vs. Barroga, et al. that an action to annul a free
patent many years after it had become final and indefeasible states
no cause of action.

ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court is justified in dismissing the

complaint although the facts and circumstances set forth in the
complaint show that the land in question was private land under
Article 370 of the old Civil Code.

RULING:
The aforesaid case of Antonio relied upon by the lower court in its
dismissal order is not controlling. It is true that by filing the application
for a free patent Barroga impliedly admitted either the invalidity or
insufficiency of Titulo Real No. 12479 issued in the name of his
predecessor in interest on July 22, 1894, but neither the allegation
made in his answer that his aforesaid predecessor in interest was the
absolute owner of the property covered by said Titulo Real nor his
implied admission of the latter's invalidity or insufficiency are grounds
for the annulment of the free patent and original certificate of title in
442

question. Evidently, it was Barroga's privilege to rely or not to rely

upon his claim of private ownership in favor of his predecessor in
interest and of whatever the latter's Titulo Real was worth. He
decided not to rely upon them and to consider that the property
covered by the Titulo Real was still part of the public domain. Acting
accordingly he applied for a free patent and was successful. It must
be borne in mind that the Titulo Real was not an indefeasible title and
that its holder still had to prove that he had possessed the land
covered by it without interruption during a period of ten years by
virtue of a good title and in good faith (Royal Decree of June
25,1880). We may well presume that Barroga felt that he had no
sufficient evidence to prove this, for which reason he decided to
acquire the land as part of the public domain.
The facts alleged in the complaint constitute a sufficient cause of
action against private respondents. Petitioners in their complaint
alleged that the disputed area was formerly an abandoned river bed
formed due to natural causes; that they are the real and lawful
owners of the said land as decreed by Article 370 of the old Civil
Code, the law then in force; that since the said area was a private
land, the same could not have been the subject matter of an
application for free patent; and that all these facts were known to the
private respondents and their predecessor in interest.The
indefeasibility and imprescriptibility of a Torrens title issued pursuant
to a patent may be invoked only when the land involved originally
formed part of the public domain. If it was a private land, the patent
and certificate of title issued upon the patent are a nullity.

443

6 A certificate of title issue on the basis of a free patent

procured through fraud or in violation of the law may be
cancelled since such title is not cloaked with
indefeasibility.

MARTINEZ VS CA

G.R. No. 170409

FACTS:
Respondents are the heirs of the late Melanio Medina, Sr. who during
his lifetime inherited the properties from his mother, Rosa Martinez
Emitao, who in turn inherited them from her own mother, Celedonia
444

Martinez (Celedonia). The complaint alleged that sometime in 1992,

petitioner, Gregoria Merquines, represented herself as Gregoria
Martinez and as thus one of the descendants of Celedoniaand under
that name applied for free patents over the properties with the
CENRO. Unbeknownst to private respondents, the corresponding
OCTs were thus issued in the name of Gregoria Martinez. When
private respondents later filed an application for land registration over
the same properties, petitioner opposed the same. This impelled
private respondents to file the instant complaint.
The only issue raised at the trial was whether the free patents and
land titles should be annulled due to fraud and misrepresentation in
their procurement. The trial court rendered a decision ordering the
cancellation of petitioners titles. Before the Court of Appeals, She
argued the titles secured were already indefeasible in view of the
lapse of one year from the issuance of the titles.
Concerning the alleged indefeasibility of the titles issued to petitioner,
the Court of Appeals ruled that the argument is untenable since
petitioner employed fraud in the proceedings which led to the
issuance of the free patents and the titles.
ISSUE:
Whether or not titles of the petitioner are already indefeasible and
incontrovertible following the lapse of one year from their issuance
RULING:
No, the titles of the petitioner are not considered indefeasible and
incontrovertible notwithstanding the lapse of one year from their
issuance since the certificate of title in this case has been issued on
the basis of free patent procured through fraud manifested in the
facts that Gregoria Merquines has misrepresented herself as
Gregoria Martinez who happened to be one of the descendants of
Celedonia.
Under the recent jurisprudence, a certificate of title issued on the
basis of free patent procured through fraud or in violation of the law
may be cancelled since such title is not cloaked with indefeasibility.
Furthermore, the principle of title is unavailing where fraud attended
445

the issuance of the free patents and titles. The petition is denied.

7 Illegally included area.

CARAGAY-LAYNO VS CA
132 SCRA 718
FACTS:
Petitioner, Juliana Caragay, and the decedent, Mariano De Vera,
were first cousins, "both orphans, who lived together under one roof
in the care of a common aunt. In year 1951, Mariano De Vera died.
His widow administered his property until her death in 1966. De
Veras nephew (Salvador Estrada) took over as administrator of De
Veras estate. Prior to the widows death, she made an inventory
446

showing that De Veras property (located in Calasiao, Pangasinan)

measures 5417 sq. m (more or less). Estrada however noticed that
the Torrens title under De Vera indicated that his property measures
8752 sq. m. He learned that the discrepancy is the 3732 sq. m. being
occupied by Juliana. Estrada sued to evict Juliana.

Juliana averred that she and her father have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and in the concept of
an owner of the land since 1921; that theyve been paying taxes; that
the title held by Estrada was registered in 1947 but it only took them
to initiate an action in 1967 therefore laches has set in.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the disputed portion should be adjudged in favor of

De Veras estate

RULING:

No. The inclusion of Julianas land in De Veras title was erroneously

done. It was shown that Juliana, an unlettered woman, agreed to
have Mariano de Vera borrow her title for the purposes of Mariano
obtaining a loan during de Veras lifetime; that when de Vera
registered his portion of land adjoined to that of Juliana, the latters
land was erroneously included.

The error is highlighted by the fact that de Veras widow, in her

inventory before she died, attested that de Veras portion of land is
only 5417 sq. m. more or less. The discrepancy approximates the
447

portion of land actually being occupied by Juliana. By that, the only

portion that can be adjudged in favor of de Veras estate is that which
was being claimed by the widow (in her inventory). A recalculation
must however be made to specify the exact measure of land
belonging to each: 3732 sq m should be retained by Juliana (portion
which she actually occupies) and 5020 sq. m. should go to de Veras
estate.

In the case at bar, the principle of indefeasibility applies only in the

claimed portion or property wherein it can be adjudged not on the
illegally included area.

8 The rule on incontrovertibility and indefeasibility is equally

applicable to title acquired through homestead or free
patents.
IGLESIA VS CFI OF NE
208 PHIL 441
FACTS:
This petition seeks to reverse the decision of the respondent court in
the case of Development Bank of the Philippines v. Iglesia ni Cristo,
Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija, and the National Treasurer of the
448

Philippines. The respondent court upheld the primacy of the

respondent banks title and ordered the cancellation of the petitioners
title. Petitioner raised the sole issue of: which of the two titles is
superior, an earlier title secured administratively or a latter title
secured thru judicial proceedings?.
The property in question is covered by T.C.T. No. NT-14302 in the
name of the plaintiff, and T.C.T. No. NT-53573 in the name of
defendant Iglesia ni Kristo; that said property was acquired by the
plaintiff in a foreclosure sale from Emilio Libunao in whose name the
same was previously registered by virtue of a homestead patent; that
defendant acquired the said property from Victoria Maravilla who was
the registered owner of a parcel of land including the land in question
under O.C.T. by virtue of a decree/decision, of the CFI of Nueva Ecija
. The lower court declared the title of Iglesia ni Kristo as null and void.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the respondent Court
denied it. Failing to obtain a reversal of the decision, the petitioner
filed this petition for review on certiorari.
Issue: Whether or not the court erred in holding that title acquired
earlier by homestead is superior to that secured in a subsequent land
registration proceedings.
Ruling: The petitioner contends that the land covered by the
conflicting titles had been possessed by Victoria Maravilla and her
predecessor Mariano Padilla even several years before the
Revolution of 1896 and that is why it was adjudicated as private land
and ordered registered in her name in Land Registration Case No.
3244, LRC. With this as factual background, the petitioner attacks the
validity of the homestead patent and title issued to the respondent
banks
predecessor,
Emilio
Libunao.
In case of Lahora vs Dayang-hirang: "The rule in this jurisdiction,
regarding public patents and the character of the certificate of title
that may be issued by virtue thereof, is that where land is granted by
the government to a private individual, the corresponding patent
therefor, is recorded and the certificate of title is issued to the
grantee; thereafter, the land is automatically brought within the
operation of the Land Registration Act, the title issued to the grantee
becoming entitled to all the safeguards provided in Section 38 of said
449

Act. In other words, upon the expiration of one year from its issuance,
the certificate of title becomes irrevocable and indefeasible like a
certificate issued in a registration proceeding."
Applying the case of Pajomayo, Et. Al. v. Manipon, Et Al., (39 SCRA
676) Supreme Court held that once a homestead patent granted in
accordance with the Public Land Act is registered pursuant to Section
122 of Act 496, the certificate of title issued in virtue of said patent
has the force and effect of a Torrens Title under the Land Registration
Act. Supreme Court should add that the Director of Patents, being a
public officer, has in his favor the presumption of regularity in issuing
the questioned homestead patent.

iii. NOT SUBJECT TO COLLATERAL ATTACK

Section 48, PD 1529 Certificate not subject to collateral attack.
A certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It
cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct
proceeding in accordance with law.
The Doctrine of non-collateral attack of a decree or title, 7 SCRA
504.
A certificate of title cannot be subject to collateral attack and can
be altered, modified or cancelled only in a direct proceeding in
accordance with law.
HEIRS OF SPS, LIM VS. RTC JUDGE
G.R. No. 173891
FACTS:
Amparo E. Caosa (respondent Caosa) filed a petition before the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City seeking the reconstitution of the
original Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 169395 of the Register
of Deeds of the same city. The trial court had ex parte presentation of
evidence before the branch clerk of court. Convinced that the
jurisdictional requirements were complied with and finding merit in the
petition, the trial court ordered the reconstitution of the original and
owners duplicate copy of TCT No. 169395.
450

Petitioners filed a verified petition for the annulment of the trial courts
decision.
According
to
petitioners,
their
parents, spouses Luciano P. Lim and Salud Nakpil Bautista, are
the registered owners of a parcel of land. They acquired it from
Domingo L. Santos. The lot contained an area of 795 square meters
more or less and was covered by TCT No. 27997. Furthermore, they
alleged that their parents had been in actual physical possession of
the property. A fired razed Quezon City Hall, the records destroyed
was the original copy of TCT No. 27997 and thus, one of the
petitioners applied for and was issued a reconstituted title, TCT No.
RT-97223, in September 1994.
Petitioners claimed that when respondent Caosa filed a petition
for the reconstitution of TCT No. 169395. They insisted that the
petition for reconstitution did not comply with the requirements found
in Sections 12 and 13 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 26 as it failed to
state specifically the boundaries of the property subject of the petition
as well as the names of the occupants or persons in possession of
the property. Petitioners considered these circumstances as extrinsic
fraud. Caosa alleged that there was no fraud and that the
jurisdictional requirements of notice and publication had been
complied with.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. Petitioners sought
reconsideration of the resolution, but their motion for reconsideration
was denied by the Court of Appeals.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioners have personality and right to be
notified of the reconstitution proceedings nor do they have any right
to file the petition for annulment of judgment.
Ruling:
Petitioners are not real parties-in-interest because the reconstitution
of the original and duplicate copy of TCT No. 169395 will have no
effect on their property, the latter being different from, and not even a
part of the property covered by the reconstituted title. One having no
right or interest of his own to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of
the court as a party plaintiff in an action, thus petitioners petition for
451

annulment of judgment was rightfully dismissed.

Petitioners impute error to the Court of Appeals when it dismissed
their petition after it concluded, on the basis of its simple comparison
of petitioners and respondents TCTs, that the properties covered by
the two titles are entirely different. Petitioners argue that the Court of
Appeals should have conducted a trial and received evidence; and
having failed to do so, its conclusion was allegedly not only flawed
but was also arrived at with grave abuse of discretion and without due
process. Supreme Court does not agree.
The Court of Appeals did not dismiss the petition for annulment
of judgment outright. In fact, it required respondent Caosa to
file
her
answer,
and
even
allowed
the
filing of an amended answerproof that it was predisposed to
consider the arguments of both parties before it even decided to
finally dismiss the petition. Mere filing of a petition for annulment
of judgment does not guarantee the holding of trial or reception
of evidence. A petition for annulment of judgment may in fact be
dismissed outright if it has no prima facie merit. With more
reason that the Court of Appeals may dismiss a petition even
without a hearing if it finds that based on the averments in the
petition and the responsive pleading, the annulment of the
assailed judgment is not warranted.
TAPUROC VS LOQUELLANO
G.R. No. 152007
FACTS:
On September 19, 1996, petitioners filed a complaint against
respondents, the complaint alleges that petitioners Procopio Tapuroc
and all the successors-in-interest of deceased co-owner Antonia Ebe
are the co-owners, co-heirs of the original owners of a parcel of land
with an area of 5,795 square meters situated in Booy, Tagbilaran,
Bohol; that in 1992, when petitioners decided to partition the subject
property, they discovered from the Office of the City Assessor that the
title covering the land was already in the name of a certain Evans
Mende by virtue of a Deed of Sale executed in favor of the latter by
their predecessors-in-interest in 1967; that said Deed of Sale is a
forged document because the alleged vendors therein, did not sign
452

the conveying deed; and that one of the alleged vendors, Antonia
Ebe, had already passed away in 1960, ong before the purported
Deed of Sale was said to have been executed in 1967. Hence,
Petitioners, pray for the nullification of the same Deed of Sale, the
cancellation of the title issued pursuant thereto and the restoration of
the previous title in their names, plus damages.
Respondents assert that they had been in open, continuous, and
peaceful possession of the land in question from the time of said sale,
and had been religiously paying the realty taxes due thereon.
On June 7, 1999, the trial court finding that the evidence adduced by
the petitioners insufficient to establish their claim that the questioned
Deed of Sale was a forgery. A motion for reconsideration was filed
with the CA, which affirmed the decision of the trial court, ruling that
petitioners are barred from filing their petition due to laches.
ISSUE: Whether or not the recourse of the petitioners is valid.
RULING: No. The recourse must fail. As it is, the petitioners call for a
review of the facts of the case. Their action calls for the determination
of the truth or falsehood of an alleged fact, a matter not for this Court
to resolve.
It appears that the assailed Deed of Sale is a public document,
having been duly notarized by a certain Atty. Rodolfo Yap. Being a
notarial instrument, the deed in question is a public document and as
such enjoys the presumption of regularity in its execution.
More so, as a rule, forgery cannot be presumed. It must be
proved by clear, positive and convincing evidence. Mere allegation of
forgery is not evidence and the burden of proof lies on the party
alleging it. Here, the petitioners failed to discharge their burden.
A Torrens title cannot be collaterally attacked. The question on
the validity of a Torrens title, whether fraudulently issued or not, can
be raised only in an action expressly instituted for that purpose. The
title represented by the certificate cannot be changed, altered,
modified, enlarged, diminished, or cancelled in a collateral
proceeding. The action for the declaration of nullity of deed of sale
commenced by the petitioners in the RTC of Tagbilaran City is not the
direct proceeding required by law to attack a Torrens certificate of
title. Petition was denied.
453

NATALIA REALTY VS VALDEZ

173 SCRA 534
FACTS: Petitioner, Natalia Realty, filed separate ejectment cases
against respondents with the RTC of Rizal for allegedly unlawfully
occupying parcels of lands which were covered by the petitioners
transfer certificates. The respondents file a consolidated answer
moving to dismiss said case based on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction.
Then the trial court rendered a summary judgment upon finding that
there is no valid issue raised by the respondents, but only
conclusions that they have been in actual possession of the subject
lands for more than 30 years. They were then ordered to vacate the
lots and to pay monthly rents. So the respondents filed an appeal with
the Intermediate Appellate Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondents have a valid claim over the
disputed land?
RULING: The Supreme Court approved the ruling of the lower court
that the certificate of title issued to the petitioners in accordance with
the Land Registration Act is indefeasible after the expiration of one
year from the entry of the decree of registration. After the lapse of one
year, the decree of registration becomes incontrovertible and is
binding upon and conclusive against all persons whether or not they
were notified of or participated in the registration proceedings. The
said titles were issued to the petitioners more than 30 years ago.
Furthermore, the SC averred that, under the law, Section 48 of the
Property Registration Decree 20 expressly provides that a certificate
of title cannot be subject to collateral attack and can be altered,
modified or cancelled only in a direct proceeding in accordance with
law.
Appellants' claim of acquisitive prescription is likewise baseless.
Under Article 1126 of the Civil Code, prescription of ownership of
lands registered under the Land Registration Act shall be governed
by special laws. Correlatively, Act No. 496 provides that no title to
registered land in derogation of that of the registered owner shall be
acquired by adverse possession.
Consequently, proof of possession by the defendants is both
immaterial and inconsequential.
There is nothing either in Presidential Decree No. 2 which may be
said to justify appellants' claim that said decree granted the
454

ownership of said lands to them and their successors by title.

Apparently, appellants were misled or induced to believe that they
acquired the parcels of land in question when the whole country was
declared by the previous regime as a land reform area.
WIDOWS AND ORPHANS ASSOCIATION VS CA
201 SCRA 165
FACTS:
On August 27, 1974, Widows and Orphans Association, Inc. (Widora)
filed an application for registration of title of a parcel of land. It alleged
that the parcel of land has an area of 156 hectares, more or less; and
that the applicant acquired said property from the heirs of Don
Mariano San Pedro on December 12, 1954.
Dolores Molina filed an opposition, claiming ownership over 12 to 14
hectares and praying for a decree of registration over said portions of
Lot 8. Same with Ortigas and Company Limited Partnership (Ortigas)
filed a motion to dismiss the case alleging, among others, that
respondent court had no jurisdiction over the case, the land being
applied for having been already registered under the Torrens System
and in the name of Ortigas under TCT 77652 and TCT 77653.
The trial court denied the motion to dismiss of petitioner Ortigas,
holding, among others, that TCT 77652 and TCT 77653 on their face
show that they were derived from OCT 337, 19, 336, 334, pursuant to
Decree 1425; Ortigas then filed a motion for reconsideration praying
the respondent court to reconsider its order of March 30, 1988 on the
ground that it had no jurisdiction over the application for registration,
the parcels of land subject thereof being already covered by Torrens
Certificates of Title.
Not satisfied, respondent Ortigas instituted an action for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus before respondent court praying for the
annulment of the March 30, 1988 and May 19, 1989 orders of the trial
court. It also prayed that the trial court be ordered to dismiss the land
registration case,the trial court then rendered the decision in favor to
Ortigas.
ISSUE: Do a Torrens Certificate of Title be subjected to a collateral
attack?

455

RULING:
Ortigas alleges that Decree 1425 embraces the lots covered by its
TCT Nos. 77652 and 77653 which are identical to the lots applied for
by petitioner. On the other hand, petitioner maintains that Decree
1425 covers a 17-hectare lot located at Sta. Ana, Manila while the lot
applied for is alienable and disposable as certified by the Bureau of
Lands and by the Bureau of Forestry and has an area of 156
hectares located in Quezon City four (4) kilometers away from Sta.
Ana, Manila. Hence, the necessity of a trial on the merits to ascertain
the disputed facts. Under Act 496, it is the decree of registration
issued by the Land Registration Commission which is the basis for
the subsequent issuance of the certificate of title by the
corresponding Register of Deeds that quiets the title to and binds the
land (De la Merced v. Court of Appeals, 5 SCRA 240 [1962]).
Consequently, if no decree of registration had been issued covering
the parcel of land applied for, then the certificate of title issued over
the said parcel of land does not quiet the title to nor bind the land and
is null and void.
Respondent court committed a procedural lapse in correcting
the alleged error in the questioned TCTs. A certificate of title cannot
be altered, amended or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in
accordance with law. Also, no correction of certificate of title shall be
made except by order of the court in a petition filed for the purpose
and entitled in the original case in which the decree of registration
was entered. While the law fixes no prescriptive period therefor, the
court, however, is not authorized to alter or correct the certificate of
title if it would mean the reopening of the decree of registration
beyond the period allowed by law.
While it may be true, as respondent Ortigas argues, that a land
registration court has no jurisdiction over parcels of land already
covered by a certificate of title, it is nevertheless true that the
aforesaid rule only applies where there exists no serious controversy
as to the certificate's authenticity visa vis the land covered therein. In
the case at bar, the claimed origin of the questioned TCTs evidently
appear to be different from what is stated therein. It does not appear
indubitable that the disputed parcels of land are properly reflected in
the TCTs relied upon by private respondent. Off-hand, and as the
456

parties admit, the TCTs do not show that they are actually derivatives
of OCT 351.
The trial court cannot be faulted for not having granted respondent
Ortigas' motion to dismiss simply because the TCTs relied upon by
the latter do not accurately reflect their supposed origin. Thus, in
Ledesma v. Municipality of Iloilo (49 Phil. 769 [1926]) this Court held
that the "simple possession of a certificate of title, under the Torrens
System, does not make the possessor the true owner of all the
property described therein. If a person obtains a title, under the
Torrens System, which includes by mistake or oversight land which
cannot be registered under the Torrens System, he does not, by
virtue of said certificate alone, become the owner of the lands illegally
included (citing Legarda and Prieto v. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590 [1915])."
As it is in this case, a certificate of title cannot be considered
conclusive evidence of ownership where the certificate itself is faulty
as to its purported origin.

Cancellation of title to be filed in the same court where decree

was entered.
ESLANISLAO VS. HONRADA
114 SCRA 748
FACTS;
This is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to nullify the
decision of respondent Court of Appeals granting ex-parte the
cancellation of title registered in the name of Ching Leng in favor of
Pedro Asedillo.
In May 1960, Decree No. N-78716 was issued to spouses Maximo
457

Nofuente and Dominga Lumandan in Land Registration Case No. N2579 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal and Original Certificate
of Title No. 2433 correspondingly given by the Register of Deeds
covering a parcel of land with an area of 51,852 square meters.
By virtue of a sale to Ching Leng with postal address at No. 44
Libertad Street, Pasay City, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 91137
was issued on September 18, 1961.
On October 19, 1965, Ching Leng died in Boston, Massachusetts,
United States of America. His legitimate son Alfredo Ching filed with
the Court of First Instance of Rizal Branch III, Pasay City a
petition for administration of the estate of deceased Ching Leng.
Alfredo Ching was appointed then asthe administrator of Ching
Leng's estate on December 28, 1965 and letters of administration
issued on January 3, 1966.
Thirteen years after Ching Leng's death, a suit against him was
commenced on December 27, 1978 by Pedro Asedillo with the Court
of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXVII, Pasay City docketed as
Civil Case No. 6888-P for reconveyance of the abovesaid property
and cancellation of T.C.T. No. 91137 in his favor based on
possession. Ching Leng's last known address is No. 44 Libertad
Street, Pasay City which appears on the face of T.C.T. No. 91137 (not
No. 441 Libertad Street, Pasay City, as alleged in private
respondent's complaint).
The trial court ruled in favor of Pedro Asedillo, declaring him to be the
true and absolute owner of the property and ordering alfredo ching to
surrender the title to the Registry of Deeds for its cancellation.
The title over the property in the name of Ching Leng was cancelled
and a new Transfer Certificate of Title was issued in favor of Pedro
Asedillo who subsequently sold the property to Villa Esperanza
Development, Inc. on September 3, 1979. Upon knowing, Alfredo
Ching learned of the abovestated decision. He filed a verified petition
on November 10, 1979 to set it aside as null and void for lack of
jurisdiction which was granted by the court on May 29, 1980.
ISSUE: Where to file an action for the cancellation of a title?
458

RULING:
An action to redeem, or to recover title to or possession of, real
property is not an action in rem or an action against the whole world,
like a land registration proceeding or the probate of a will; it is an
action in personam, so much so that a judgment therein is binding
only upon the parties properly impleaded and duly heard or given an
opportunity to be heard. An action to recover a parcel of land is a real
action but it is an action in personam, for it binds a particular
individual only although it concerns the right to a tangible thing.
Private respondent's action for reconveyance and cancellation of title
being in personam, the judgment in question is null and void for lack
of jurisdiction over the person of the deceased defendant Ching Leng.
Verily, the action was commenced thirteen (13) years after the latter's
death. As ruled by this Court in Dumlao v. Quality Plastic Products,
Inc. (70 SCRA 475) the decision of the lower court insofar as the
deceased is concerned, is void for lack of jurisdiction over his person.
He was not, and he could not have been validly served with
summons. He had no more civil personality. His juridical personality,
that is fitness to be subject of legal relations, was lost through death.
The complaint for cancellation of Ching Leng's Torrens Title must be
filed in the original land registration case, RTC, Pasig, Rizal, sitting as
a land registration court in accordance with Section 112 of the Land
Registration Act (Act No. 496, as amended) not in CFI Pasay City in
connection with, or as a mere incident in Civil Case No. 6888-P
(Estanislao v. Honrado, 114 SCRA 748).
Section 112 of the same law requires "notice to all parties in interest."
Since Ching Leng was already in the other world when the summons
was published he could not have been notified at all and the trial
court never acquired jurisdiction over his person. The ex-parte
proceedings for cancellation of title could not have been held
(Estanislao v. Honrado, supra).
The sole remedy of the landowner whose property has been
wrongfully or erroneously registered in another's nameafter one
year from the date of the decreeis not to set aside the decree, but
respecting the decree as incontrovertible and no longer open to
459

review, to bring an ordinary action in the ordinary court of justice for

damages if the property has passed unto the hands of an innocent
purchaser for value.

A void title is subject to collateral attack.

FERRER VS. BAUTISTA
231 SCRA 748
FACTS:
Under controversy is a strip of land south of Lot 1980 of the Cadastral
survey of Aringay, La Union. Petitioner claims its ownership by virtue
of accretion, she being the owner of Lot 1980 covered by TCT No. T3280, which is immediately north of the land in question. On the other
hand, private respondents equally assert ownership over the property
on account of long occupation and by virtue of Certificate of Title No.
460

P-168, in the name of respondent Magdalena Domondon, pursuant to

Free Patent No. 309504 issued on 24 January 1966 .

On 23 March 1976, petitioner Gloria A. Ferrer filed a complaint with

Branch III of the then Court of First Instance of La Union to "Quiet
Title to Real Property" against herein respondents Mariano Balanag
and Magdalena Domondon. The case was denominated Civil Case
No. A-514.

Prior to Civil Case No. A-514, petitioner had also filed with the Court
of First Instance of La Union, Branch III, a complaint
for reivindicacion (Civil Case No. A-86), dated 25 November 1965,
against private respondents. Herein respondent Judge, who also
handled the case, dismissed, on 10 February 1976, the complaint,
without prejudice, on the ground that the court had no authority to
cancel or annul the decree and the title issued by the Director of
Lands on the basis of a mere collateral attack.

Petitioner filed for motion for reconsideration but the same was
denied.

Petitioner claimed that the respondent judge committed an error in

outright dismissing on the ground of collateral attack on Free Patent
Decree No. 309504 being an abuse of judicial discretion and an
excess of his jurisdiction.

ISSUE: Whether or not a void title can be subject to collateral attack.

RULING: Yes. The Director of Lands has no authority to grant a free

461

patent over land that has passed to private ownership and which has
thereby ceased to be public land. Any title thus issued or conveyed by
him would be null and void. The nullity arises, not from fraud or
deceit, but from the fact that the land is no longer under the
jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands, the latter's authority being limited
only to lands of public dominion and not those that are privately
owned.

Herein private respondents, therefore, acquired no right or title over

the disputed land by virtue of the free patent since at the time it was
issued in 1966, it was already private property and not a part of the
disposable land of the public domain.

Although, ordinarily, a title becomes incontrovertible one year after it

is issued pursuant to a public grant, the rule does not apply when
such issuance is null and void. An action to declare the nullity of that
void title does not prescribe; in fact, it is susceptible to direct, as well
as to collateral attack.

iv. QUIETS TITLE. Section 31, PD 1529

NATIONAL GRAINS AUTHORITY VS IAC
157 SCRA 380
FACTS:
On December 2, 1971, the spouses Paulino Vivas and Engracia
Lizards, as owners of a parcel of land situated in Bo. San Francisco,
Victoria, Laguna, comprising more or less 105,710 square meters,
sold for P30,000.00 said property in favor of spouses Melencio
Magcamit and Nena Cosico, and Amelita Magcamit ,herein private
respondents, as evidenced by "Kasulatan Ng Bilihang Mabiling Muli."
462

This sale with right to repurchase was recorded in the Office of the
Register of Deeds of Laguna on December 6,1971 under Act No.
3344. On January 31,1972 the sale was made absolute by the
spouses Vivas and Lizardo in favor of the private respondents for the
sum of P90,000.00; P50,000.00 of which was paid upon the
execution of the instrument, entitled "Kasulatan Ng Bilihan Tuluyan,"
after being credited with the P30,000.00 consideration of the
"Kasulatan Ng Mabibiling Muli," and the balance of P40,000.00 was
to be paid the moment that the certificate of title is issued. From the
execution of said Kasulatan, private respondent have remained in
peaceful, adverse and open possession of subject property.
On February 26, 1975, an Original Certificate of Title No. T-1728
covering the property in question was issued to and in the name of
the spouses Vivas and Lizardo without the knowledge of the private
respondents and on April 30, 1975, said Spouses executed a Special
Power of Attorney in favor of Irenea Ramirez authorizing the latter to
mortgage the property with the petitioner, National Grains Authority
(NGA).
On May 2, 1974, the counsel for the petitioner wrote the Provincial
Sheriff in Sta. Cruz, Laguna, requesting for the extrajudicial
foreclosure of the mortgage executed by Irenea Ramirez on May 18,
1975, covering, among others, the property involved in this case, for
unpaid indebtedness in the amount of P63,948.80 in favor of the
petitioner.
The Provincial Sheriff then caused the issuance of the notice of sale
of the property in question, scheduling the public auction sale. The
petitioner was the highest and successful bidder so that a Certificate
of Sale was issued in its favor on the same date by the Provincial
Sheriff.
On July 10, 1974, NGA in its capacity as attorney-in-fact of the
mortgagor sold the subject real property in favor of itself. By virtue of
the deed of absolute sale, TCT No. T-75171 of the Register of Deeds
for the Province of Laguna was issued in the name of the petitioner
on July 16, 1974.
A month after, the private respondents learned that a title in the name
of the Vivas spouses had been issued covering the property in
463

question and that the same property had been mortgaged in favor of
the petitioner. Private respondent Nena Magcamit offered to pay the
NGA the amount of P40,000.00 which is the balance of the amount
due the Vivas spouses under the terms of the absolute deed of sale
but the petitioner refused to accept the payment and claimed
ownership of the property in question and has no intention of
disposing of the same. The private respondents are in possession of
subject property were asked by the NGA to vacate it but the former
refused. Petitioner filed a suit for ejectment against private
respondents in the Municipal Court of Victoria, Laguna, but the case
was dismissed.
On June 4, 1975, private respondents filed a complaint before the
then Court of First Instance of Laguna and San Pablo City, Branch III,
San Pablo City, against the NGA and the spouses Vivas and Lizardo,
praying, among others, that they be declared the owners of the
property in question and entitled to continue in possession of the
same, and if the petitioner is declared the owner of the said property,
then, to order it to reconvey or transfer the ownership to them under
such terms and conditions as the court may find just, fair and
equitable under the premises.
In its answer to the complaint, the National Grains Authority
maintained that it is a purchaser in good faith and for value of the
property formerly covered by OCT No. 1728; and that the title is now
indefeasible, hence, cause of action of Nena Magcamit has already
prescribed.
After due hearing, the trial court rendered its decision in favor of
National Grains Authority the lawful owner of the property in question
by virtue of its indefeasible title to the same and ordering plaintiffs to
turn over possession of the land to defendant National Grains
Authority.
The private respondents interposed an appeal from the decision of
the trial court to the Intermediate Appellate Court which rendered its
decision reversing and setting aside the decision of the trial court
ordering the National Grains Authority to execute a deed of
reconveyance sufficient in law for purposes of registration and
cancellation of transfer Certificate of Title No. T-75171.
464

The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the said decision

but the same was denied.
ISSUE: Whether or not the National Grains Authority is the rightful
owner of the disputed land.
RULING:
Yes. In this case, it will be noted that the third party NGA, is a
registered owner under the Torrens System and has obviously a
better right than private respondents and that the deed of absolute
sale with the suspensive condition is not registered and is necessarily
binding only on the spouses Vivas and Lizardo and private
respondents.
It has been invariably restated by this Court, that the real purpose of
the Torrens System is to quiet title to land and to stop forever any
question as to its legality. Once a title is registered, the owner may
rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the portals of the court,
or sitting on the "mirador su casato," avoid the possibility of losing his
land. An indirect or collateral attack on a Torrens Title is not allowed.
The only exception to this rule is where a person obtains a certificate
of title to a land belonging to another and he has full knowledge of the
rights of the true owner. He is then considered as guilty of fraud and
he may be compelled to transfer the land to the defrauded owner so
long as the property has not passed to the hands of an innocent
purchaser for value. Unquestionably, therefore, the NGA is an
innocent purchaser for value, first as an innocent mortgagee under
Section 32 of P.D. 1529 and later as innocent purchaser for value in
the public auction sale.
D, STATUTORY LIENS AFFECTING TITLE
Section 44, PD 1529- Every registered owner receiving a
certificate of title in pursuance of a decree of registration, and
every subsequent purchaser of registered land taking a
certificate of title for value and in good faith, shall hold the same
465

free from all encumbrances except those noted in said

certificate and any of the following encumbrances which may be
subsisting, namely:
First. Liens, claims or rights arising or existing under the laws
and Constitution of the Philippines which are not by law
required to appear of record in the Registry of Deeds in order to
be valid against subsequent purchasers or encumbrancers of
record.
Second. Unpaid real estate taxes levied and assessed within two
years immediately preceding the acquisition of any right over
the land by an innocent purchaser for value, without prejudice to
the right of the government to collect taxes payable before that
period from the delinquent taxpayer alone.
Third. Any public highway or private way established or
recognized by law, or any government irrigation canal or lateral
thereof, if the certificate of title does not state that the
boundaries of such highway or irrigation canal or lateral thereof
have been determined.
Fourth. Any disposition of the property or limitation on the use
thereof by virtue of, pursuant to, Presidential No. 27 or any other
law or regulations on agrarian reform.
a Sec. 44, PD 1529 is an exclusive enumeration.
ROJAS ET AL VS TAGAYTAY CITY
60 OG 6
Petitioners Zosimo Rojas, et al., claiming to be the registered owners
of Lot No. 1, Psu-103916-Amd. originally decreed in their favor in
Case No. 398, G.L.R.O. Record No. 53546, have filed this original
petition for certiorari seeking to nullify the order of the Court of First
Instance of Cavite dated December 2, 1957, denying their petition to
set aside the decision of June 30, 1957 rendered in another and
subsequent Land Registration Case No. 323, G.L.R.O. Record No.
12440 decreeing, for the second time, the registration of the same Lot
No. 1, this time in favor of the City of Tagaytay. At the instance of
466

herein petitioners, a writ of preliminary injunction was issued by this

Court on January 24, 1958, restraining the respondent Judge from
taking further cognizance of the aforementioned registration case No.
323 until further orders from this Court.
The City of Tagaytay sought original registration of this parcel of land,
allegedly acquired by purchase from Zosimo Rojas, either under Act.
No. 496 or pursuant to Chapter VIII of Commonwealth Act. No. 141,
said applicant and its predecessors-in-interest having been in actual
possession of the land since 1894. No copy of the deed of sale was
attached to the application, allegedly because it was either lost or
destroyed during the Japanese occupation.
As nobody appeared at the hearing to oppose the application, an
order of general default was entered by the court against the whole
world, and the applicant was allowed to adduce its evidence.
On June 30, 1957, the court decreed registration of said Lot No. 1
plan Psu-103916-Amd. in the name of the City of Tagaytay, free from
any liens and encumbrances, and the issuance of the corresponding
certificate of title upon the finality of said decision.
On July 15, 1957, Zosimo Rojas, supposed vendor of the lot in
question, together with his present co-petitioners, Manuel, Bernardo,
Deomedes, Felisa and Soledad, all surnamed Rojas, filed in the
same proceeding a petition to set aside the decision of the court in so
far as said Lot No. 1, Psu-103916-Amd was concerned; to lift the
order of general default as far as it affected them because as
adjoining owners cited in the application, no actual notice was served
them as requires in Section 32 of Act 496, as amended; and praying
that they be allowed to file their opposition to the registration of the
aforesaid lot for the reason, among others, that said Lot. No. 1 was
part of a bigger parcel of land already decreed in a previous land
registration case (Case No. 398, G.L.R.O. Rec. No. 53546) and
covered by an original certificate of title (O.C.T. No. 29) issued by the
Register of Deeds of Cavite in their names since December 5, 1940.
The lower court denied this petition by order of December 2, 1957;
hence, the filing of the instant action by the Rojas brothers for the
purpose already stated above
467

Issue:
Is the granting of OCT includes Lot No. 1?
Ruling:
Applicant-respondent also alleges that even granting that Original
Certificate of Title No. 29 includes Lot No. 1, such registration did not
confer ownership upon the petitioners, at least insofar as that portion
occupied by the City Hall of Tagaytay is concerned, it being
contended that such building and the land whereon it was erected are
properties for public use and, hence are outside the scope and
efficacy of the Torrens title acquired by petitioners, pursuant to
Section 39 of Act 496.
The aforementioned Section 39 of the Land Registration Act reads:
SEC. 39. Every person receiving a certificate of title in pursuance of a
decree of registration, and every subsequent purchaser of
registered land who takes a certificate of title for value in good
faith shall hold the same free of all incumbrances except those
noted on said certificate, and any of the following incumbrances
which may be subsisting, namely:
First. Liens, claims, or rights arising or existing under the laws or
Constitution which the statutes of the Philippine Islands can not
require to appear of record in the registry.
Second. Taxes within two years after the same become due and
payable.
Third.Any public highway, way, private way established by law.or any
Government, irrigation canal or lateral thereof, where the
certificate of title does not state that the boundaries of such
highway, way, or irrigation canal or lateral thereof, have been
determined.
The aforequoted provision specifically enumerates the only cases
that may limit the registered owners absolute title over the property:
(1) liens, claims or rights existing or arising under the laws or the
Constitution and which the statutes do not require their annotation or
appearance in the registry; (2) taxes within 2 years after they become
due and payable;(3) encumbrance or lien duly annotated in the
468

certificate of title; and (4)any public highway, way, private way

established by law, or any Government irrigation canal or lateral
thereof existing on the property even if not annotated in the
certificate. It is clear therefrom that even if we concede, for the sake
of argument, that a municipal building or city hall and the land
whereon it is erected may be considered as properties for public use,
under the well-accepted principle of inclusiouniusestexclusioalterius,
respondent cannot validly invoke the provision of law quoted above.
This decision is limited only to the action of the trial court, sitting as
land registration court, decreeing for the second time, the registration
of Lot No. 1 of subdivision plan Psu-103916-Amd. infavor of
respondent City of Tagaytay, a lot already previously decreed by a
competent court in favor of the petitioners, which action, Supreme
Court held, is null and void.
b Certificate of Title is subject to servitudes. Exception.
DIGRAN VS AUDITOR GENERAL
64 OG 19
FACTS:
On June 22, 1909, RupertaCabucos bought from, and fully paid to the
Government, Lot No. 638 of the Banilad Friar Lands Estate situated
in Cebu City for which a formal deed of conveyance was executed in
her favor on November 27, 1915 by the Friar Lands Agency. On
February 28, 1916 Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-3918 (T-320)
was issued to her. The Banilad Friar Lands Estate was among the
friar lands acquired by the Government for resale to actual tenants or
occupants pursuant to Act 1120 of the Philippine Commission.
Sometime in 1914 or 1915, without prior expropriation proceedings,
the government constructed Mango Avenue, a municipal road,
passing through Lot No. 638. A claim for compensation was filed with
the Municipality of Cebu but it was still unpaid when World War II
broke out.RupertaCabucos died in 1940. In 1951 her heirs subdivided
Lot No. 638 into eight lots.
On February 16, 1963 Raymunda S. Digran, a daughter of Candida
Samson, became administratrix of the estate of RupertaCabucos. On
469

February 18, 1963 the Deputy Auditor General, as stated, denied the
claim. This decision was the subject of two motions for
reconsideration, the later one having been denied on June 10, 1963.
On July 9 of the same year Raymunda S. Digran appealed to this
Court from said decision altho on July 1, 1963 she filed an amended
claim for compensation with the Auditor General. On August 7, 1963
the Auditor General desisted from rendering a decision on the
amended claim on July 1, 1963 for the reason that the case was
already sub judice.
ISSUE: Whether or not the heirs of RupertaCabucos are entitled to
compensation for Lot No. 638-B, the road lot.
RULING: The Government denies the obligation to give due
compensation for Lot No. 638-B mainly on the grounds that
RupertaCabucos' title over Lot No. 638 was subject to the
Government's reservations for public use, such as rights of way and
other public servitudes under Sections 19, 20 and 21 of Act 1120 and
Section 39 of Act 496; and, that the right to enforce the claim for
compensation is barred by prescription and laches.
The grounds relied upon by the Government, stated above, lack
merit. Firstly, Sections 19, 20 and 21 of Act 1120 sanction no
authority for the Government to take private lands covered by said
Act for public use without just compensation. Sections 19, 20 and 21
state:
SEC. 19. No purchaser or lessee under this Act shall acquire any
exclusive rights to any canal, ditch, reservoir, or other irrigation
works, or to any water supply upon which such irrigation works
are or may be dependent, but all of such irrigation works and
water supplies shall remain under the exclusive control of the
Government of the Philippine Islands and be administered
under the direction of the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands
for the common benefit of those interests dependent upon
them. And the Government reserves as a part of the contract of
sale in each instance the right to levy an equitable contribution
or tax for the maintenance of such irrigation works, the
assessment of which shall be based upon the amount of
benefits received, and each purchaser under this Act, by
470

accepting the certificate of sale or deed herein provided to be

given, shall be held to assent thereto. And it is further provided
that all lands leased or conveyed under this Act shall remain
subject to the right of way of such irrigation canals, ditches, and
reservoirs as now exist or as the Government may hereafter
see fit to construct.
SEC. 20. All persons receiving title to lands under the provisions of
this Act shall hold such lands subject to the same public
servitudes as existed upon lands owned by private persons
under the sovereignty of Spain, including those with reference
to the littoral of the sea and the banks of navigable rivers and
rivers upon which rafting may be done.
SEC. 21. The Civil Governor, when authorized by resolution of the
Commission, may by proclamation, designate any tract or tracts
of said lands as nonalienable, and reserve the same for public
use, and thereafter such tracts shall not be subject to sale,
lease, or other disposition under this Act.
Section 19 withholds from a purchaser of a friar land exclusive right to
any canal, ditch, reservoir, or other irrigation works, or to any water
supply upon which such irrigation works are or may be dependent
which were already existing at the time of purchase. It also subjects
the land so purchased to the right of way of such canal, ditch,
reservoir or irrigation works. Section 20 holds the friar lands subject
to public servitudes also imposed on other lands owned by private
persons. Section 21 gives the Civil Governor, upon resolution of the
Philippine Commission, the authority to designate any tract or tracts
of friar land as non-alienable and reserve the same for public use.
Needless to say, the road construction through Lot No. 638-B is not
the servitude contemplated in Sections 19 and 20, above quoted.
Moreover, it has not been shown that Lot No. 638-B was declared
nonalienable by the Civil Governor prior to sale to, and purchase by,
Ruperta Cabucos so as to prevent her from acquiring ownership
thereover.

471

E. RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS THAT RUN WITH THE LAND

a. Nature of Restrictive Covenants
ELISEO FAJARDO, JR., and MARISSA FAJARDO vs. FREEDOM
TO BUILD, INC.

G.R. No. 134692

August 1, 2000

FACTS:

Freedom To Build, Inc., an owner-developer and seller of low-cost

housing, sold to petitioners, a house and lot in Barangka, Marikina,
Manila. The Contract to Sell and the Transfer Certificate of Title
covering the lot issued in the name of petitioners contained a
Restrictive Covenant providing prohibitions such as easement of two
meters in front, second storey expansion to be placed above the back
of the house and should not extend forward beyond the apex of the
original building, and the 2nd floor expansion, in front, is 6 meters
back from the front property line and 4 meters back from the front wall
of the house. Petitioners, despite repeated warnings from
respondent, extended the roof of their house to the property line and
expanded the second floor of their house to a point directly above the
original front wall. Respondent filed an action to demolish the
unauthorized structures. The RTC ruled against Spouses Fajardo and
directed them to immediately demolish and remove the extension of
their expanded housing unit that exceeds the limitations imposed by
the Restrictive Covenant. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision
of the trial court. The spouses filed petition for review before the
Supreme Court.

472

ISSUES:

Whether the provisions of the Restrictive Covenant are valid.

Whether respondent has the personality to enforce the provisions of
the covenant.

HELD:

The provisions of the Restrictive Covenant are valid since they are
not synonymous with easements. Restrictive covenants on the use of
land or the location or character of buildings or other structures
thereon may broadly be said to create easements or rights but it can
also be contended that such covenants, being limitations on the
manner in which one may use his own property, do not result in true
easements, but a case of servitudes (burden), sometimes
characterized to be negative easements or reciprocal negative
easements, which is the most common easement created by
covenant or agreement whose effect is to preclude the owner of the
land from doing an act, which, if no easement existed, he would be
entitled to do. The provisions in a restrictive covenant prescribing the
type of the building to be erected are crafted not solely for creating
easements nor as a restriction as to the type of construction, but may
also be aimed as a check on the subsequent uses of the building
conformably with what the developer originally might have intended
the stipulations to be.
Broadly speaking, a suit for equitable enforcement of a restrictive
covenant can only be made by one for whose benefit it is intended. It
is not thus normally enforceable by one who has neither right nor
interest in the land for the benefit of which the restriction has been
imposed. Thus, a developer of a subdivision can enforce restrictions,
even as against remote grantees of lots, only if he retains part of the
land. There would have been merit in the argument of petitioners that respondent, having relinquished ownership of the subdivision to
473

the homeowners, is precluded from claiming any right or interest on

the same property - had not the homeowners' association, confirmed
by its board of directors, allowed respondent to enforce the provisions
of the restrictive covenant.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
F. SPLITTING OR CONSOLIDATION OF TITLE
Section 49, PD 1529 Splitting or consolidation of titles. A
registered owner of several distinct parcels of land embraced in
and covered by a certificate of title desiring in lieu thereof
separate certificates, each containing one or more parcels, may
file a written request for that purpose with the Register of Deeds
concerned, and the latter, upon the surrender of the owners
duplicate, shall cancel it together with its original and issue in
lieu thereof separate certificates as desired. A registered owner
of several distinct parcels of land covered by separate
certificates of title desiring to have in lieu thereof a single
certificate for the whole land, or several certificates for the
different parcels thereof, may also file a written request with the
Register of Deeds concerned, and the latter, upon the surrender
of the owners duplicates, shall cancel them together with their
originals and issue in lieu thereof one or separate certificates as
desired.
G. SUBDIVISION AND CONSOLIDATION PLANS
Section 50, PD 1529 Subdivision and consolidation plans.Any
owner subdividing a tract of registered land into lots which do
not constitute a subdivision project as defined and provided for
under PD No. 957, shall file with the Commissioner of Land
Registration or with the Bureau of Lands a subdivision plan of
such land on which all boundaries, streets, passageways and
waterways, if any, shall be distinctly and accurately delineated.
If a subdivision plan, be it simple or complex, duly approved by
the Commissioner of Land Registration or the Bureau of Lands
together with the approved technical descriptions and the
corresponding owners duplicate certificate of title is presented
for registration, the Register of Deeds shall, without requiring
further court approval of said plan, register the same in
accordance with the provisions of the Land Registration Act, as
474

amended: Provided, however, that the Register of Deeds shall

annotate on the new certificate of title covering the street,
passageway or open space, a memorandum to the effect that
except by way of donation in favor of the national government,
province, city or municipality, no portion of any street,
passageway, waterway or open space so delineated on the plan
shall be enclosed or otherwise disposed of by the registered
owner without the approval of the Court of First Instance of the
province or city in which the land is situated,
A registered owner desiring to consolidate several lots into one
or more, requiring new technical descriptions, shall file with the
Land Registration Commission, a consolidation plan on which
shall be shown the lots to be affected, as they were before, and
as they will appear after the consolidation. Upon the surrender
of the owners duplicate certificates and the receipt of
consolidation plan duty approved by the Commision, the
Register of Deeds concerned shall cancel the corresponding
certificates of title and issue a new one for the consolidated lots.
The Commission may not order or cause any change,
modification, or amendment in the contents of any certificate of
title, or of any decree or plan, including the technical
descriptions therein, covering any real property registered under
the Torrens system, nor order the cancellation of the said
certificate of title and the issuance of a new one which would
result in the enlargement of the area covered by the certificate of
title.
a Simple Subdivisions.
Section 50, PD 1529
b Complex Subdivisions
PD 957

REMEDIES OF PARTIES AGGRIEVED BY REGISTRATION

A. APPEAL
a. Reglementary period: 15 days from receipt.
475

i. As against the government.

REPUBLIC VS SAYO
191 SCRA 71
FACTS:
The spouses, Casiano Sandoval and Luz Marquez, filed an
original application for registration of a tract of land. The land was
formerly part of the Municipality of Santiago, Province of Isabela, but
had been transferred to Nueva Vizcaya in virtue of Republic Act
No.236. The Government including the heirs of Liberato Bayaua
opposed such registration. An order of general default was thereafter
entered against the whole world except the oppositors. The case
dragged on for about twenty (20) years until a compromise
agreement was entered into by and among all the parties. Under the
compromise agreement, the Heirs of Casiano Sandoval (as
applicants) renounced their claims and ceded portions of land in favor
of Bureau of Lands, Bureau of Forest Development, Heirs of Liberato
Bayaua, and Philippine Cacao & Farm Products, Inc. Under the
compromise agreement, 5,500 hectares was adjudicated to and
acknowledged as owned by the Heirs of Casiano Sandoval, but out of
this area, 1,500 hectares were assigned by the Casiano Heirs to their
counsel, Jose C. Reyes, in payment of his attorney's fees. The
parties also mutually waived and renounced all their prior claims to
and over Lot No. 7454 of the Santiago Cadastre. On March 5, 1981,
the respondent Judge approved the compromise agreement and
confirmed the title and ownership of the parties in accordance with its
terms. The Solicitor General, in behalf of the Republic of the
Philippines, has taken the present recourse in a bid to have that
decision of March 5, 1981 annulled as being patently void and
rendered in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.
ISSUE:
Whether or not compromise agreement is a proper remedy in
confirming the title of the private respondents over a tract of land?
HELD:
The assent of the Directors of Lands and Forest Development
to the compromise agreement did not and could not supply the
absence of evidence of title required of the private respondent. It was
476

error to disregard the Solicitor General in the execution of the

compromise agreement and its submission to the Court for approval.
It is, after all, the Solicitor General, who is the principal counsel of the
Government; this is the reason for our holding that "Court orders and
decisions sent to the fiscal, acting as agent of the Solicitor General in
land registration cases, are not binding until they are actually
received by the Solicitor General."
It thus appears that the compromise agreement and the
judgment approving it must be, as they are hereby, declared null and
void, and set aside. Considerations of fairness however indicate the
remand of the case to the Registration Court so that the private
parties may be afforded an opportunity to establish by competent
evidence their respective claims to the property.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent Judge
complained of is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Land Registration
Case No. N-109 subject of the petition is REMANDED to the court of
origin which shall conduct further appropriate proceedings therein,
receiving the evidence of the parties and thereafter rendering
judgment as such evidence and the law may warrant.
REPUBLIC VS CA
135 SCRA 156
FACTS:
In 1961, the CFI of Quezon rendered a decision, ordering the
registration of 885 hectares of public forestland in favor of the
Maxinos. The decision became final and executory so a decree of
registration and an OCT were issued. Eight (8) years after the
decision was rendered, the Republic of the Philippines filed with the
same CFI an amended petition to annul the decision, decree, and title
on the ground that they are void because the land in question was
still a part of the unclassified public forest. The Maxinos opposed the
petition. The CFI judge denied the petition and when appealed, the
same was dismissed on the ground that the order had allegedly long
become final and unappealable so the Government was estopped
thru the registration made by its agents.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Government was estopped in appealing the
registration order?
477

RULING:
No. The Government sufficiently proved that the parcel of land
involved in the present case is a part of a forestland, thus nonregisterable. As to the ruling of CA that the government was
estopped to appeal because the land was erroneously registered by
its own agency, the Court ruled otherwise basing on its decision in
Government of the U. S. vs. Judge of 1st Inst. of Pampanga, (50 Phil.
975, 980), where it held that the Government should not be estopped
by the mistakes or errors of its agents.
ii. Despite the pendency of the appeal, the court retains
jurisdiction until expiration of one year from the issuance of the
decree of registration.
GOMEZ VS COURT OF APPEALS
168 SCRA 503
FACTS:
A court ruling (Philippine Islands vs Abran) settled that 12
parcels of land belonged to one Consolacion Gomez. Consolacion
later died and the 12 parcels of land were inherited by Gomez et al
her heirs. The heirs agreed to divide the property among them. After
notice and publication, and there being no opposition to the
application, the trial court issued an order of general default. On 5
August 1981, the court rendered its decision adjudicating the subject
lots in Gomez et als favor. The decision became final and executory
hence the court directed the Chief of the General Land Registration
Office to issue the corresponding decrees of registration over the lots
adjudicated.
GLRO Chief Silverio Perez opposed the adjudication and
petitioned for its setting aside. He discovered that the 12 parcels of
land were formerly part of a titled land which was already granted by
homestead patent in 1929. Under the law, land already granted by
homestead patent can no longer be the subject of another
registration. The lower court granted Silverios recommendation.
Gomez et al invoked Sec. 30 and 32 of PD 1529 (Land Registration
Act) which provides that after judgment has become final and
executory, the court shall forthwith issue an order to the
Commissioner of Land Registration for the issuance of the decree of
registration and certificate of title. That once the judgment becomes
478

final and executory under Sec 30, the decree of registration must
issue as a matter of course.
ISSUE:
Whether or not to set aside the lower courts initial ruling on
approving the adjudication even after it had become final and
executory.
HELD:
Yes. Unlike ordinary civil actions, the adjudication of land in a
cadastral or land registration proceeding does not become final, in
the sense of incontrovertibility until after the expiration of one (1) year
after the entry of the final decree of registration. The Supreme Court
has held that as long as a final decree has not been entered by the
Land Registration Commission (now NLTDRA) and the period of one
(1) year has not elapsed from date of entry of such decree, the title is
not finally adjudicated and the decision in the registration proceeding
continues to be under the control and sound discretion of the court
rendering it.
HENCE, the case may still be reopened and the decision set
aside when granted.
CAYANAN VS. DE LOS SANTOS
21 SCRA 1348
FACTS:
On May 30, 1958, the title of appellee De los Santos to Lot No.
56 of the Porac Cadastre was confirmed by the Hon. Arsenio Santos,
then Judge of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga. On December
16, 1958, a petition for review was filed in the same proceeding
alleging that the said lot was registered in the name of appellee De
los Santos "through actual fraud, through deceit and through
intentional omission of facts" as a result of which the aforesaid
decision was rendered and a decree of registration obtained on
August 8, 1958. Moreover, it was stated further that a simulated Deed
of Absolute Sale was executed in favor of the other respondent, Felix
L. Camaya, on October 26, 1958, covering the said lot. The prayer
was for the opening of the decree of registration, the cancellation of
the Original Certificate of Title, as well as the Transfer Certificate of
479

Title and the adjudication of said lot in favor of petitioners, now

appellant Cayanan and others.
This petition was denied in the order of February 9, 1959, which
is on appeal. It was the view of the lower court: "Such being the case,
as admitted by the petitioners, even if the petition has been filed
within one (1) year after entry of final decree, the same cannot be
favorably acted upon for the reason that the questioned lot has
already been transferred to Felix L. Camaya in accordance with
section 38 of the Land Registration Act. While it is true that the
petition states that such transfer is fictitious and, therefore, not for
value and that Felix L. Camaya is not an innocent purchaser, this
question can be properly threshed out in an ordinary civil action and
not in a simple petition, like the one at bar.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the cadastral court who tried and issue a decree
of registration has the power to set aside said judgment and
readajudicate the land in favor of another?
HELD:
The case should not be filed in another CFI considering that
the cadastral court is also a court of first instance. It has been held
that the adjudication of land in a registration or cadastral case does
not become final and incontrovertible until the expiration of one year
from entry of the final decree, and that as long as the final decree is
not issued and the period of one year within which it may be reviewed
has not elapsed, the decision remains under the control and sound
discretion of the court rendering the decree, which court after hearing,
may even set aside said decision or decree and adjudicate the land
to another."
"In the present case, as the petitions were filed within one year from
the date of the issuance of the decree, pursuant to Section 38 of Act
496, the same are properly cognizable by the court that rendered the
decision and granted the said decree."
As a matter of fact, several decisions held that:
1 Santos v. Ichon,(1959): "It is true that under previous rulings of this
court, appellee could have moved for the reopening of the case in the
cadastral court so that he could be given an opportunity to prove his
right to the land in question and get a decree in his favor, since the
480

adjudication of land in a registration or cadastral case does not

become final and incontrovertible until the expiration of one year after
the entry of the final decree, and until then the court rendering the
decree may, after hearing, set aside the decision or decree and
adjudicate the land to another person."
2 Afalla v. Rosauro,: "As long as the final decree is not issued by the
Chief of the General Land Registration Office in accordance with the
law, and the period of one year fixed for the review thereof has not
elapsed, the title is not finally adjudicated and the decision therein
rendered continues to be under the control and sound discretion of
the court rendering it."
3 Valmonte v. Nable,: "It should be borne in mind that the adjudication
of land in a registration or cadastral case does not become final and
incontrovertible until the expiration of one year after the entry of the
final decree. Within this period of one year the decree may be
reopened on the ground of fraud and the decree may be set aside
and the land adjudicated to another party. As long as the final decree
is not issued and the period of one year within which it may be
reviewed has not elapsed, the decision remains under the control and
sound discretion of the court rendering it."
4 Capio v. Capio,: "that the adjudication of land in a registration or
cadastral case does not become final and incontrovertible until the
expiration of one year after the entry of the final decree; that as long
as the final decree is not issued and the period of one year within
which it may be reviewed has not elapsed, the decision remains
under the control and sound discretion of the court rendering the
decree, which court after hearing, may set aside the decision or
decree and adjudicate the land to another party."

481

b. Requirements
Republic vs. Estenzo
158 SCRA 282
FACTS:
On 11 November 1961, the Land Tenure Administration, representing
the Republic, initiated and prosecuted expropriation proceedings in
the Court of First Instance of Leyte for the acquisition of some
591.0654 hectares of private agricultural lands situated in San Isidro,
Leyte, and owned by respondents Espeletas, Martinezes and
Pachecos, for resale to tenants, pursuant to Republic Act No.
1400.chanroblesv
On 14 June 1962, the lower court rendered a decision condemning
the said land for P411,995.78. 1 The Republic, having already paid
the partial sum of P206,850.00, was, accordingly, ordered to pay the
balance of P205,145.78, plus the further sum of P20,000.00 for a
farmhouse, copra drier and warehouses, or a total of P225,145.78.
This was supplemented by an amendatory order providing for
payment of 6% per annum interest starting 14 June 1962 on the
unpaid balance. Implementing orders, the last of which was dated 28
July 1962, were thereafter successively issued.chanroblesi
Came 12 April 1963 and the balance of P143,150.00 still remained
unpaid despite an order directing payment thereof. Respondentslandowners then filed a motion in the lower court imploring the latter
to (1) annul its amended decision of 24 August 1962 on the ground
that its basis - the compromise agreement - was secured through
fraud; and (2) resuscitate its original decision of 14 June
1962.chanroblesvanrob
482

The Republic went to the Supreme Court on a petition

for certiorari and
prohibition
with
preliminary
mandatory
injunction. Before the Supreme Court could rule on the petition,
however, the parties entered anew into another compromise
agreement. The Republic, now represented by the Land Authority,
covenanted to satisfy on or before 31 August 1964 the balance of
P143,150.00 plus 6% per annum interest from 24 August 1962.
Respondents-landowners, for their part, agreed to renounce "any and
all further claims against the former which had been recognized and
ordered paid" by the lower court in its order of 26 April 1963 "in the
event (of) full payment of said compromise price . . . on or before said
date,"
The Republic failed again to pay its obligation in full, as per
agreement. Out of P143,150.00, it was able to pay, as of 31 August
1964, P85,260.65 on the principal and P17,010.98 on the interest, or
a total of P102,271.63 only. This precipitated the filing of
respondents-landowners' motion, dated 10 November 1964, in the
lower court praying for issuance of an order directing the Sheriff of
the City of Manila to enforce the writ of execution of 28 July
1962. nroblesvirtualaw
The Republic moved for reconsideration of the lower court's order
alleging, in addition to the two basic arguments previously raised in
its oposition to respondents-landowners' motion of 10 November
1964, that the garnishment of the funds of the Land Authority violates
Sections 14 and 21 10 of Republic Act No. 992, otherwise known as
the Revised Budget Act, because the money garnished was
appropriated by Congress "for the operation and maintenance of the
nineteen (19) Settlement Projects and twelve (12) Agencies under the
administration of . . . (the) Authority, pursuant to the provision of R. A.
3844, (and) to cover salaries of personnel, travelling, supplies and
materials and other administrative expenses," and are, therefore, not
funds for the payment of expropriated estates. This was opposed by
respondents-landowners who argued that Sections 14 and 21 of
Republic Act No. 992 "refer to voluntary expenditure and/or payment
by the government official charged with custody of such funds but are
not applicable to forcible seizure through garnishment pursuant to a
writ of execution," as in the case at bar.chanroblesvirtualawlibr
Hence, this present petition for certiorari and prohibition with
483

preliminary injunction.
ISSUE:
whether the lower court acted without or excess of its jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discreton in hearing the case.lnrob
HELD:
The first plea of herein petitioner, that the Court of First Instance of
Leyte lacked jurisdiction to act in the case because of Section 154 (3)
of the Land Reform Code (Republic Act No. 3844), enacted on 8
August 1963, is plainly without merit. Said Section 154 (3) provides
that Expropriation proceedings instituted by the Land Tenure
administration pending in the Court of First Instance at the time of the
effectivity of this Code shall be transferred and continued in the
respective Courts of Agrarian Relations whereby the Republic
undertook to pay the balance of the expropriation price with interest
on or before 31 August 1964. Whatever writ of execution could be
issued by the respondent judge must necessarily be predicated on
the second compromise,
and conform to the terms
thereof.chanroblesvir
and that it is undeniable that the petitioner Republic had not made full
payment of P143,150.00, plus legal interest from 24 August 1962, on
or before 31 August 1964. Such default, however, only entitled
respondents to demand execution on the basis of the compromise
approved by this Court.chanroblesblesvirtual
The lower court was, therefore, already divested of its control over
the cause when the motion of 12 April 1963 was filed; it was already
shorn of its jurisdiction when its controversial order of 26 April 1963
was issued pursuant thereto, ordering payment of the original award
made in 14 June 1962. All that the lower court could do under the
circumstances was to enforce the amended decision of 24 August
1962. Instead of a motion for relief under Rule 38 of the Rules of
Court, the proper move for respondents-landowners would have been
to file a separate and independent civil action to set aside, by
annulment or rescission, both the first compromise agreement and
the amended decision embodying the same.chanroblesvirtualawl
libraryanroblesvirtualaw
484

The writs of certiorari and prohibition are granted, and the

respondent Court of First Instance of Leyte restrained from further
proceeding in its Civil Case.The preliminary injunction heretofore
issued is made permanent. No costs. Let a copy of this opinion be
sent to the Honorable, the President of the Philippines, through the
Secretary of Justice.

c. When not deemed perfected.

HEIRS OF CRISTOBAL MARCOS VS DE BANUVAR
25 SCRA 316
Facts:
Respondent court confirmed the titles of La Urbana, Inc. over lots in
questions with reservations, and ordered the registration of these lots
in favor of the Benuvar.
A petition for reconstitution was made. At the pendency of the
reconstitution proceedings, the respondent De Banuvar acquired lot 1
from Santiago de Erquiaga, who was thus substituted as a party for
the latter. The petitioners opposed, on a claim that they have been in
actual, adverse, open and uninterrupted possession and occupation
of the said parcel in the concept of owners since time immemorial,
long before the second world war.
For "lack of proper notices," the respondent court denied the petition.
However, in its later order the court reconsidered and granted the
petition.
The petitioners interposed an appeal from this last order. Respondent
court dismissed the appeal "for failure to post the required bond," but
withheld action on the motion for immediate execution as to lot 1
"until after this order dismissing the appeal shall have become final."
The herein petitioners then filed a petition for mandamus with the
Court of Appeals, to compel the trial court to give due course to their
appeal. This petition was finally dismissed.
De Banuvar filed a motion for the issuance of a decree over lot 1. The
petitioners opposed and contended that the decision is not final and
485

executory because La Urbana, Inc. appears to have appealed from

the said decision by virtue of a notation the counsel received the
same "Con mi excepcion making the execution of the said decision
impossible. De Banuvar asserted that the issuance of the decree is
but a ministerial duty of the respondent court.
Respondent court ordered the issuance of a decree in favor of De
Banuvar with respect to lot 1 only, after finding that the decision in the
land registration case had already become final and executory.
Issue:
Whether or not the decision is not yet final and executory because
the La Urbana, Inc. appealed therefrom, as may be seen from the
notation of the reconstituted decision stating, "Recibi copia. Con mi
excepcion.
Ruling:
This contention is without merit.
Supreme Court held that the decision of March 24, 1938 had long
become final and executory as no appeal was taken therefrom. The
certification of the acting provincial land officer of Masbate, dated
March 8, 1960, recites that no "appeal has been taken by the Director
of Lands or any private oppositors from the decision rendered." The
notation found at the foot of the last page of the reconstituted
decision, showing that the La Urbana, Inc. excepted from that
decision, did not have the effect of perfecting an appeal. An appeal
was not perfected by the mere notation, "Con mi exception." The
judgment rendered in a land registration case becomes final upon the
expiration of thirty days to be counted from the date on which the
party appealing receives notice of the decision.
The requirement contained in the decision of March 24, 1938
regarding the segregation of a portion of lot 1, subject of an
agreement between the Director of Lands and the applicant, while it
does leave something yet to be done, does not detract from the
finality of the decision, because the segregation adverted to refers to
a defined and delimited portion of the said parcel and may be
accomplished anytime after the decision became final and executory.

486

d. Effect of failure to appeal.

NIETO V. QUINES
6 SCRA 74 (G.R. NO. L-14643)
FACTS:
Bartolome Quines filed a homestead application to the Bureau
Of Lands cadastral, surveys were made by the Bureau of Lands in
the municipality of Abulug, during which the tract of land applied for
as a homestead by Bartolome Quines was designated as Lot No.
3044 of the Abulug Cadastre. After the surveys were completed,
cadastral proceedings were initiated in 1927 by the Director of Lands
in the Court of First Instance of Cagayan. Relying upon the
assurances made by the employees of the Bureau of Lands that they
would take care of his homestead in the cadastral proceedings,
Bartolome Quines did not file any answer therein. However, one
Maria Florentino filed an answer claiming several lots including Lot
No. 3044. After hearing, the cadastral court, on August 16, 1930,
rendered its decision wherein Maria Florentino was awarded the lots
claimed by her. Lot No. 3044 was included in the award, apparently
because neither the Director of Lands nor any of his representatives
appeared during the bearing to inform the court that it was under
homestead application. On August 29, 1930, pending the issuance of
the final decree of registration and the original certificate of title to
Maria Florentino, a homestead patent covering Lot No. 3044 was
granted to Bartolome Quines, and pursuant thereto, the Register of
Deeds of Cagayan, on September 15, 1930 issued Original
Certificate of Title No. 623 in his name. Six months thereafter, or on
March 12, 1931, the same Register Deeds issued Original Certificate
of Title No. 11982 in the name of Maria Florentino covering the lots
487

awarded to her the cadastral court including Lot No. 3044. Floretino
sold the said land to Arturo Nieto.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the title of Nieto,which is from cadastral
proceedings, prevails over the title of Quines, which is from
homestead. What is the effect of failure to appeal?
HELD:
The court held that the title of Nieto shall prevail because a
cadastral proceeding is one in rem and any decision rendered therein
by the cadastral court is binding against the whole world, including
the Government. As a general rule, registration of title under the
cadastral system is final, conclusive, and indisputable, after the
passage of thirty-day period allowed for an appeal from the date of
receipt by the party of a copy of the judgment of the court
adjudicating ownership without any step having been taken to perfect
an appeal. The prevailing party may then have execution of the
judgment as of right and is entitled to the certificate of title issued by
the Chief of the Land Registration Office. The exception is the special
provision providing for fraud."
Under the foregoing pronouncement, the title of ownership on the
land is vested upon the owner upon the expiration of the period to
appeal from the decision or adjudication by the cadastral court,
without such an appeal having been perfected. The certificate of title
would then be necessary for purposes of effecting registration of
subsequent disposition the land where court proceedings would no
longer be necessary.

488

e. Execution pending appeal not allowed in registration

proceedings.
DIRECTOR OF LANDS VS REYES
68 SCRA 177
FACTS:
Alipio Alinsurin, later substituted by Paraaque Investment
and Development Corporation, sought to register under Act 496, a
parcel of land indisputably included within the area reserved for
military purposes under Presidential Proclamation No.237, dated
December 19, 1955. Applicant claimed that his predecessors
acquired the land by virtue of a possessory information title issued
during the Spanish Regime on March 5, 1895. The application was
opposed by the Government. The lower court adjudicated (a) 2/3
portion of the land in favor of the corporation, subject to the rights of
one Ariosto Santos per a manifestation submitted in court, and (b) 1/3
portion to Roman Tamayo. Within the extended period, the
Government filed the corresponding record on appeal, copy of which
was duly served upon the corporation and Tamayo. Pending approval
of the Record on Appeal, and on motion of the corporation and
of Tamayo, the lower court directed the issuance of a registration
decree of the entire parcel applied for, 1/3 pro-indiviso in favor of
Tamayo, and 2/3 pro-indiviso in favour of the corporation, and
declared that as to Tamayo's share, the court's decision had become
final, but as to the share of the corporation, the registration shall be
subject to the final outcome of the appeal. Hence, the Government
instituted this Special Civil Action for certiorari and mandamus and
the Supreme Court issued a writ of preliminary injunction restraining
the lower court from issuing a writ of possession, the corporation
and Tamayo from exercising acts of ownership over the property, and
the register of deeds from accepting for registration documents on the
489

land until the government shall have filed a notice of lis pendens.
During the pendency of the appeal in the registration case, a certain
Honofre A.Andrada and others filed with the Court of First Instance a
complaint against the corporation and Tamayo for reconveyance of a
portion of the land in question. The trial court assumed jurisdiction
over, and decided, the case in favor of Andrada. Pursuant thereto, but
in violation of the Supreme Court's injunction (in L-27594), the
corporation executed a subdivision plan of the parcel subject of
the land registration, and the trial court ordered the Register of Deeds
to cancel the original certificate of title and to issue new titles to
Andrada, et al., "free from all liens and encumbrances.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the execution pending appeal is applicable?
HELD:
The court held that:
1. NOTICE OF APPEAL; FAILURE TO SERVE APPELLEE WITH
NOTICE OFAPPEAL CANNOT IMPAIR RIGHT OF APPEAL, IF
APPELLEE WAS SERVED WITH COPYOF RECORD ON APPEAL.
The failure of appellants to serve a copy of their notice of appeal to
the counsel for one of the several appellees is not fatal to the
appeal,where admittedly, he was served with a copy of the original,
as well as the amended record on appeal in both of which the notice
of appeal is embodied. Such failure cannot impair the right of appeal,
especially if the substantial rights of the adverse party is not impaired
and the appeal taken was from the entire decision which is not
severable.
2. LAND REGISTRATION; EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL NOT
APPLICABLE INLAND REGISTRATION PROCEEDINGS.
Execution pending appeal is not applicable in land registration
proceedings. It is fraught with dangerous consequences. Innocent
purchasers may be misled into purchasing real properties upon
reliance on a judgment which may be reversed on appeal.
3.LAND REGISTRATION; TORRENS TITLE ISSUED BASED ON
JUDGMENT THAT ISNOT FINAL IS A NULLITY. A Torrens Title
issued on the basis of a judgment that is not final, the judgment being
on appeal, is a nullity, as it is violative of the explicit provisions of the
Land Registration Act, which requires that a decree shall be issued
only after the decision adjudicating the title becomes final and
490

executory, and it is on the basis of said decree that the register of

deeds concerned issues the corresponding certificate of title.
4. ISSUANCE OF TITLE DESPITE TIMELY APPEAL IS
ERRONEOUS. The lower court acted without jurisdiction or
exceeded its jurisdiction in ordering the issuance of a decree of
registration despite the appeal timely taken from the entire decision a
quo.
B. MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL/MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
a. What rule governs? Rule 37, Revised Rules of Court
i. Grounds. Rule 37, Revised Rules of Court
ii. Failure of partys counsel to attend trial for lack of
advance notice is an accident but not failure to attend due to
forgetfulness.
TALAVERA VS MANGOBA
8 SCRA 837, 1963
FACTS:
On December 2, 1957, Talavera filed before the CFI of Nueva
Ecija for the recovery of sum of money against Victor Mangoba and
his cousin Nieves Safiru, allegedly representing the costs of B-Meg
Poultry Feeds, which latter received from former. Defendants
presented separate Answers, wherein they admitted some and
denied other allegations in the complaint. Both also interposed
separate counterclaims of P1,000.00 each. In the hearing scheduled
on March 10, 1958, neither Mangoba et,. al nor their counsel
appeared, so that the trial court received Talaveras evidence in their
absence. On March 18, 1958, a decision was rendered in favour of
Talavera.
Appellant claims that the above decision was received by him
on March 25, 1958 and the next day, wherein it was stated that the
failure to appear at the hearing was due to accident or excusable
negligence, counsel having been ill of March influenza which was
evidenced by a medical certificate. Counsel for appellant asked the
Court to hear the motion for new trial on April 2, 1958, however, one
day ahead of the date, the trial court denied said motion. In the
491

appeal brief, appellant contends that in denying the motion for new
trial, the court a quo deprive him of his day in court.

RULING:
Generally, courts are given the discretion to grant or not,
motions for new trial and appellate courts will not delve into the
reasons for the exercise of such discretion. In this particular case,
however, it was shown that the absence of counsel was explained
and immediately upon receipt of the decision, a motion for new trial,
accompanied by an affidavit of merit, and a medical certificate, were
presented. Said motion for new trial could well be considered as
motion to set aside judgment or one for relief, since it contained
allegations purporting to show the presence of good defenses. The
ends of justice could have been served more appropriately had the
lower court given appellant the chance to present his evidence at
least. Furthermore, it appears that payments had been made by
appellant to appellee, which were duly received and receipt for. This
particular circumstance merits consideration. After all, court litigations
are primarily for the search of truth, and in this present case, to find
out the correct liability of defendant-appellant to appellee. A trial, by
which both parties are given the chance to adduce proofs, is the best
way to find out such truth. A denial of this chance, would be too
technical. The dispensation of justice and the vindication of legitimate
grievances, should not be barred by technicalities (Ronquillo v.
Marasigan, L-11621, May 21, 1962; Santiago, et al. v. Joaquin, L15237, May 31, 1963). Had not the trial court resolved the motion for
new trial, one day before the date set for its hearing, the defendantappellant could have presented the documents (receipts of
payments), itemized in his brief, to counteract appellant's claim. IN
VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is
hereby set aside, and another entered, remanding the case to the
court of origin, for the reception of appellant's evidence and for the
rendition of the corresponding decision. No pronouncement as to
costs.

492

iii. Failure to hire new counsel is not excusable.

ANTONIO VS RAMOS
2 SCRA 731, 1961
FACTS:
On January of 1953, Dominga Antonio et., al. filed for recovery
of a parcel of land against Jose, Leonora and Nicolas Francisco. Only
Francisco was able to answer, thus, declaring Nicolas and Leonora in
default. On the date of trial, neither Francisco not his counsel
appeared despite early notice. Hence, evidence was presented by
the plaintiffs. On August 23, 1956 a judgment has been redndered in
favour of the Antonios. Francisco filed a motion for a new trial on
493

September of 1956, praying that the decision dated August 23 of

1956 be set aside, alleging that their failure to appear during the
hearing of the case was due to accident, mistake and excusable
negligence which ordinary prudence could not have guarded
against(Counsel lost the envelope containing the notice to the trial
before he has the opportunity to open the same). This, however, was
denied by the court. Francisco appealed to the CA, denied. Appealed
to the SC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the omission of counsel constitute an excusable
mistake and negligence, so as to entitle his client, the appellant
herein, to be heard.
RULING:
The allegation of counsel that he forgot to note the notice of
hearing in his calendar is flimsy. It does not constitute the accident,
mistake or excusable negligence, contemplated by the Rules of
Court. The exercise of ordinary prudence on his part could have
guarded against or avoided such mistake or negligence. Counsel did
not exercise ordinary prudence because he did not perform his
routine job or duty of noting down the notice of hearing in his
calendar. On this point, the learned trial judge commented:
Considering the motion for new trial and the opposition thereto,
the court believes the negligence of the counsel is not excusable in
view of his admission that he received the registry notice from the
court on May 24, 1956, and that it was duly registered and that its
envelope shows it came from the court which made the envelope and
its contents so important that he should have immediately opened the
same and not just put it aside, that he misplaced the same is also
indicative of his recklessness (See Gonzales vs. Amon, L-8963, Feb.
29, 1956). Furthermore counsel for the defendant Nicolas Francisco
had all the time from March 24, 1956, until the date of the trial on
Aug. 20, 1956 to inquire from the Court records or Clerk of Court
about the nature of the registered notice that was sent to him on
March 24, 1956, if he really misplaced the same. This is what a
diligent counsel should do as required by ordinary prudence. All he
had to do was examine the records of this case. This Court noted that
since it reconvened June 18, 1956, counsel for the defendant Nicolas
Francisco has been appearing in Court almost every week if not
494

everyday. He had therefore, ample opportunity to verify the nature of

the said registered notice of hearing which he allegedly misplaced
upon his receipt thereof on March 24, 1956. Little need be added to
these observations of the trial court, except to state that lawyers
should always be vigilant and alert, in order to properly safeguard the
rights and interests of their clients. Upon the lawyers specially
devolve the duty to evaluate the urgency and importance of
registered letters coming from the courts where they daily ply their
trade.

b. Requisites for invoking newly-discovered evidence as a

ground for new trial.
PEOPLE vs DELA CRUZ
207 SCRA 632 (1992)
FACTS:
In the early dawn of March 19, 1990, Cesar Soliven was
standing at the corner of the McArthur Highway and Felomina St. in
Aguilar, Pangasinan waiting for a ride back to his residence in
Barangay Pagomboa after spending the night around the poblacion
during the eve of the town's fiesta (pp. 3-4, tsn, May 9, 1991). While
standing at the aforementioned place, a man smelling of liquor, who
was identified later on as Eduardo dela Cruz (appellant herein), stood
495

beside him. Subsequently, Merly Caburnay, a neighbor of Soliven,

passed by, proceeding towards the direction of Barangay Pogomboa.
Appellant, who appeared drunk followed the girl but Soliven did not
mind. Instead, he went home.
Early the following morning, Soliven, while in his house, heard
the cry of Carmelita Caburnay, mother of his neighbor, Merly. When
he went out of the house, he learned that Merly was raped and her
dead body was found in a nearby ricefield (pp. 5-6, tsn, id.). Prior to
Soliven's knowledge of the happening, Mayor Domingo Madrid of
Aguilar was already informed of the discovery of the dead body of the
victim and was able to proceed immediately to the crime site. There,
the Mayor was informed that a man walking suspiciously has [sic] just
left the place. So, Mayor Madrid lost no time, took a tricycle and
overtook the man. The man was identified as appellant and he was
found with dirty clothes, his maong pants torn and his T-shirt stained
with blood. He also bore scratches on his neck and arms. When
asked to explain his dirty appearance and the presence of dried
straws of palay at the back of his pants, appellant only answered that
on his was home, he felt sleepy and lied down for a while on the field.
Because of his unsatisfactory explanation, the police arrested him on
that same morning on suspicion that he was the perpetrator of the
crime. (pp. 4-8, tsn, March 14, 1991).
Four days later, Cesar Soliven was invited to the police
headquarters for the purpose of identifying the man he saw in the
early dawn of March 19, 1990 following the victim Merly Caburnay.
Standing in front of the prison cell, Soliven pointed to appellant, who
was among the four men inside the cell, as the person he saw. The
victim, Merly Caburnay, was at the time of the crime only ten years
old while the accused was forty-eight years old. In his defense, the
accused asserted that on 18 March 1990 he was invited by one
Andoy Versoza, his landlord, to cook and prepare food for the latter's
visitors. At around 6:00 p.m. of the said date, he, together with his two
aunts, went around the plaza and watched some shows until
midnight. Thereafter, he drank a bottle of gin and another bottle of
beer until 1:00 a.m. of the following day. They then strolled about the
plaza for two hours. Afterwards, they rested for awhile near the
highway beside the church and at about 5:00 a.m., they attended
mass. When he was advised by his aunts to go home, he decided to
walk because he had no more money. Along the way, he was
arrested by the police for raping and killing Merly Caburnay. He
496

vehemently denied having committed the crime. He likewise claimed

that there were no rice stalks at the back of his pants when he was
arrested.
Although the prosecution did not present any eyewitness, the
trial court found the circumstantial evidence as sufficient for
conviction. Moreover, the defense has not shown any improper or
ulterior motive on the part of Soliven for testifying against the
accused. It is settled that where there is no evidence, and nothing to
indicate that the principal witness for the prosecution was actuated by
any improper motive, the presumption is that he was not so actuated
and his testimony is thus entitled to full faith and credit. Nor is the
non-presentation of the victim's companions of any help to the cause
of the accused. In the first place, it was never established that the two
companions were with the victim when she was on her way home or
when she was raped and killed. It was duly established that, after
obtaining permission from her mother, she went "to the fiesta in
Aguilar" with her cousin and her mother's sister-in-law, and that
immediately before the incident the victim was walking alone but "was
following persons." Accordingly, her two companions, who were not
eyewitnesses, could not have testified on the rape and killing of the
victim. In any event, the prosecution has the prerogative to determine
who should be presented as witnesses on the bases of its own
assessment of their necessity. Every objection to the admissibility of
evidence shall be made at the time such evidence is offered, or as
soon thereafter as the ground for objection shall become apparent,
otherwise the objection shall be considered waived. Moreover, the
bloodstains on the pants of the accused were testified to by Dr. Wilma
Flores-Peralta 28 and Mayor Domingo Madrid. Finally, the presence of
scratches on his neck and arms was not satisfactorily explained by
the accused. Taken together with the other circumstances present
here, this fact serves to buttress the prosecution's case.
ISSUES:
(a) There is more than one circumstance;(b) The facts from
which the inferences are derived are proven; and(c) The combination
of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.
HELD:
It is settled that for alibi to prosper, the requirements of time and
497

place must be strictly met. It is not enough to prove that he was

somewhere else when the crime was committed, but he must also
demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that it was physically
impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time
the same was committed. 31 In this case, the place where the
accused claims to be 32 is more or less ten meters away from the
scene
of
the
crime
)a
ricefield
in
Barangay
33
Pogomboa). Furthermore, the place where he was questioned by
Mayor Madrid of Aguilar and apprehended by the police authorities is
twenty meters away from the place where the naked body of the
victim was found. 34 Hence, the physical impossibility of the accused's
presence at the crime scene, which is necessary is order that the
defense of alibi may be considered, is lacking.
The accused committed a heinous crime. He was not content with
unleashing his bestial lust upon the tender and frail body of a 10year-old; he also brutally inflicted upon her severe injuries which
caused her untimely demise. Another life was lost because a beast in
man's clothing was on the loose. He must pay for what he did in
prison, a place which, unfortunately, is definitely much better than
what he truly deserves.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED and the challenged
decision of Branch 37 of the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen,
Pangasinan, in Criminal Case No. L-4227 is hereby AFFIRMED in
toto, with costs against the accused-appellant Eduardo dela Cruz y
Laoang.
C. PETITION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT
D. PETITION FOR REVIEW/PETITION FOR REOPENING OF THE
DECREE OF REGISTRATION. Section 32, PD 1529
a. Who may avail of the remedy? Section 32, PD 1529
i. Aggrieved parties in either ordinary or cadastral land
registration proceedings may avail of the remedy.
GARCIA VS MENDOZA
203 SCRA 732 (1991)
FACTS:
Petitioner Mercedes A. Garcia claims that she and her
husband, Cirilo Mendoza, had purchased Lot No. 32080 located in
498

San Carlos City, Pangasinan on April 24, 1938. They subsequently

sold it under a Pacto de Retro sale to co-petitioners Sps. Dulcesimo
Rosario and Violeta Reyes and Erlinda O. Rosario, who then took
possession of said lot. On February 23, 1988, the cadastral court
issued a decision adjudicating Lot No. 32080 in favor of Dominador
G. Mendoza, their son.
Garcia claims that there was actual fraud because Mendoza falsely
claimed that his father, Cirilo Mendoza, inherited the property from
Hermenegildo Mendoza; that Mendoza made it appear that Lot 32080
was an exclusive property of Cirilo Mendoza, who had been in
possession of the lot since October 15, 1987, and subsequently,
donated the same to his son, Mendoza. The petitioners filed with the
court a petition for review of judgment but denied, so they appealed.
Mendoza countered that a petition for relief from judgment under Sec.
38, Act No. 496, does not apply to a cadastral proceeding.
ISSUE(S):
Whether or not the remedy of petition for review of judgment
exists or is warranted by Act No. 2259 (Cadastral Act).
HELD:
The Supreme Court agreed with the petitioners. Sec. 11, Act
2259 clearly states that except as otherwise provided by the
Cadastral Act, all the provision of the Land Registration Act are
applicable to cadastral proceedings as well as to the decree and
certificates of title granted and issued under the Cadastral Act.
ii. Defaulted party may avail of the remedy.
RUBLICO VS ORELLANO
30 SCRA 511 (1969)
FACTS:
Fausto Orellana, filed his answer in Cadastral Case No. IL-N-2,
L.R.C. Record No. N-211 for Lots Nos. 1664 and 1665, with the Court
of First Instance of Lanao, claiming ownership and praying that the
said lots be adjudged and decreed in his favor. On 20 November
1964, the court a quo approved the report and recommendation of
the clerk of court and rendered judgment adjudicating Lots 1664 and
499

1665 in favor of respondent-appellee Orellana. Petitioners-appellants

filed a petition to annul the judgment and/or review the decree of
registration, alleging ownership of the lots adjudicated to the
respondent; that respondent, "by means of fraud, made the court to
believe that he is the owner" and that said judgment "was secured by
means of fraud". Orellana filed a motion to dismiss the petition. The
court, on 23 September 1965, sustained the motion, holding that
petitioners-appellants had no personality to file their petition because
they did not file an answer and were declared in default and that they
should have first secured the lifting of the order of general default,
with respect to themselves, before they filed their petition for review.
ISSUE(S):
Whether or not a petitioner for review under Section 38 of Act
496 need not be an original claimant in a cadastral proceeding and
need not secure the lifting of the order of general default with respect
to himself
RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled that a petitioner for review under
Section 38 of Act 496, as amended, need not be an original claimant
in a cadastral proceeding and need not secure the lifting of the order
of general default with respect to himself. The aim of the law in giving
aggrieved parties, victimized by registration proceedings of their
estate in land by means of fraud, the opportunity to review the decree
would be defeated if such parties would be limited to those who had
filed their opposition to the petition for registration or to first require
them to procure the lifting of the order of general default before they
could file a petition for review. The essential requisites or elements for
the allowance of the reopening or review of a decree are: (a) that the
petitioner has a real or dominical right; (b) that he has been deprived
thereof; (c) through fraud; (d) that the petition is filed within one year
from the issuance of the decree; and (e) that the property has not as
yet been transferred to an innocent purchaser. The provision does not
require that the petitioner be an original claimant who had filed an
answer and because fraud might intervene precisely to prevent a
person from filing an answer.

500

iii. Those entitled to a review of the decree are those who

were deprived of their opportunity to be heard in the original
registration case.
CRISOLO vs. CA
68 SCRA 435 (1975)
FACTS:
On August 20, 1965, judgment was rendered by the Court of
First Instance, Branch VII, of Pangasinan, ordering the registration of
Lots 1 and 2, situated in the Poblacion of Mabini, Pangasinan, and
more particularly bounded and described in the technical descriptions
(Exhibits B and B-1) in the name of applicant spouses, Pedro C.
Crisolo and Soledad de G. Crisolo. On September 20, 1965, the court
ordered the issuance of the Decree, followed three months later by
writ of possession in favor of the spouses. Within a year from the
501

issuance of this decree of registration, respondent-ward, represented

by his guardian, filed a petition for review of the decree under Section
38 of Act 496 on the ground of fraud which allegedly consisted in
petitioners taking advantage of the insanity of respondent-ward to
secure the execution of a deed of exchange of properties by and
between the petitioner and said respondent-ward, and in petitioners
instituting the land registration proceedings while said ward was
confined at the National Psychopathic Hospital. The trial court
dismissed the petition and held that Section 38 of Act 496 was not
applicable because respondent had opportunity to oppose the
registration
proceedings
but
abandoned
his
opposition.
Private respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals and when
petitioner moved to have the appeal certified to the Supreme Court
because it involved purely questions of law, the Court of Appeals
denied the motion and instead sustained the allegation of fraud. It
rendered a decision reversing that of the trial court and remanding
the case to the trial court for further proceedings.
ISSUE:
Whether or not private respondent is entitled to the re-opening
of the land registration proceedings.

RULING:
NO. Respondents are not entitled to the remedy under Section
38 of Act 496 because respondent-ward was given opportunity to
oppose the registration but abandoned his opposition. Under Section
38 of Act 496, the persons entitled to a review of the decree of
registration are those who were fraudulently deprived of their
opportunity to be heard in the original registration case and not those
who were not denied for their day in court by fraud, which the law
provides as the sole ground for reopening the decree of registration.
Thus, where an oppositor, through counsel, announced his opposition
to the registration of the land involved but later abandoned the same,
he cannot claim that he was fraudulently deprived of his day in court
to entitle him of the remedy under Section 38 of Act 496; and a
petition for review of a decree of registration will be denied where the
petitioner had notice of the original proceeding but failed to
substantiate his claim.
502

iv. A homestead applicant may avail of the remedy.

CRUZ vs. NAVARRO
54 SCRA 109 (1973)

FACTS:
Sometime in 1966 the respondent Alfonso Sandoval filed with
the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Branch II, Pasig) an application
for registration (under Act 496) of five (5) parcels of land with an
aggregate area of four and one-half hectares, more or less, situated
in the municipality of Antipolo, province of Rizal. Under date of August
1, 1966, the respondent Judge Pedro C. Navarro issued a notice of
initial hearing. On December 1, 1966, no oppositor having appeared,
the court a quo, after a hearing ex parte, declared the respondent
spouses the owners of the five parcels of land. On January 3, 1967
the court ordered the issuance of the corresponding decree of
registration.
On March 20, 1967 the petitioners filed a "Petition for Review of
Decree of Registration" in the court below alleging, among others,
that actually, petitioners ROSA CRUZ, CELEDONIA CABRERA, and
LEONCIA CABRERA are the absolute owners and possessors of,
and/or the person having an irrevocable vested interest in,
aforementioned Lots 1, 2 and 3 for the reason that lots form a part of
respective petitioner's Lot, Plan Psu-136628, which was originally a
public land but to which said petitioners had perfected a homestead
right long before respondents secured aforementioned decrees and
certificates of title, their homestead applications thereof having been
duly approved by the Bureau of lands and they having fully complied
with all requirements for the acquisition of a homestead and
possessed and cultivated the same as their respective private
property. On April 24, 1967, acting on the petition, but without
receiving any evidence in the premises, the respondent Judge issued
an order stating that "the Court ... finds the petition for review to be
without sufficient merit and therefore DENIES the same." The
503

petitioners then filed a "Motion for New Trial and/or Reconsideration"

of the mentioned order, but this was denied on May 25, 1967.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners has legal personality, as homestead
applicants, to file this petition for review.

RULING:
YES. In Mesina vs. Pineda vda. de Sonza, the Supreme Court,
citing Susi vs. Razon, held that once a homestead applicant has
complied with all the conditions essential to a Government grant, he
acquires "not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the Government.
In Nieto vs. Quines, the Court affirmed the doctrine in these words:
Considering the requirement that the final proof must be presented
within 5 years from the approval of the homestead application (sec.
14, Public Land Act), it is safe to assume that Bartolome Quines
submitted his final proof way back yet in 1923 and that the Director of
Lands approved the same not long thereafter or before the land
became the subject of cadastral proceedings in 1927. Unfortunately,
there was some delay in the ministerial act of in suing the patent and
the same was actually issued only after the cadastral court had
adjudicated the land to Maria Florentino. Nevertheless, having
complied with all the terms and conditions which would entitle him to
a patent, Bartolome Quines, even without a patent actually issued,
has unquestionably acquired a vested right in the land and is to be
regarded as the equitable owner thereof.
It is the Courts view that the petitioners have amply alleged below
such real, legally protected interest over the parcels in question
sufficient to clothe them with the necessary personality to question,
independently of the Director of Lands, the validity of the grant of title
over the said properties to the private respondents.
504

v. A person who does not claim the land to be his private

property but admits that such land is public cannot avail of the
remedy.
BONIEL VS REYES
35 SCRA 218 (1970)
FACTS:
Petitioners therein alleged to be the bona fide actual occupants
and cultivators of a 46.2877-hectare parcel of public agricultural land
designated as Lot No. SI-17618-D and located at Bo. Langka, Lupon,
Davao province, and that on October 12, 1965, one Ramon Ombay,
late husband of co-petitioner Mauricia Ombay had filed a free patent
application for the land; that sometime on September 11, 1964, one
Rafael S. Yap had clandestinely filed a sales application for the very
same parcel of land, which was favorably by the land inspector of the
Bureau of Lands who certified in the records the findings of his
investigation as to the absence of any claimants of the land; and that
as a result of such alleged fraud and collusion between Yap and the
bureau personnel, Yap was issued, the sales patent in December,
1965 and the corresponding original certificate of title No. P-18131 on
February 11, 1966. Petitioners prayed of respondent court that it
annul Yap's title and instead award the land to them.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent court validly dismissed the petition.
RULING:
A person claiming to have been deprived of the land or an
interest therein, in which case within one year from entry of the
decree he may in the same proceeding ask for review and the
issuance of the decree in his own name and implead the adverse
party. But here, the land is not claimed to be private property of
petitioner nor of his co-petitioners but was admittedly formerly a part
of the alienable and disposable public land awarded under sales
patent to Yap. Accordingly, since petitioner and his co-petitioners
make no claim of their application for a free patent to the land having
been approved nor a patent their favor having been awarded, they
505

had no valid cause of action to file an action for annulment of Yap's

patent and for cancellation of the title issued to Yap by virtue thereof.
Their claim based on alleged fraudulent issuance of title to the public
land in favor of Yap should be addressed in proper administrative
proceedings to the Director of Lands, who if he finds the claim
substantiated, may then take the necessary steps towards the
reversion of the land, to the public domain, and petitioners may then
press for favorable action on their application and the award of the
land to the tenant. The mere reversion of the land to the State would
not entitle them of itself to an award of the land to them, which is
beyond respondent court's jurisdiction. WHEREFORE, the petition for
certiorari is hereby denied.
b. Where to file.
BALDOZ VS PAPA
14 SCRA 691 (1965)
FACTS:
On January 7, 1957, the spouses Bruno Papa and Valentina
Agaceta, parents of herein appellees, applied for the registration
under Act 496 of a parcel of land (Psu-59688) containing an area of
37,671 sq. meters in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan (Case
No. 2215, L.R.C. Record No. 12389). After the requisite publication of
the application in the Official Gazette, the case was called for hearing
on May 16, 1957 in the course of which an order of general default
was entered. On the same date, however, Baldomero Baldoz father
of herein appellant, filed a petition to lift the order of default as against
him and praying that his opposition to the application, thereto
attached, be admitted. Prior to October 1, 1958. oppositor Baldoz
died. On October 10, 1958, the latter's counsel filed a motion to set
aside the order of default alleging that the reason for the
nonappearance of oppositor Baldoz was his death on July 28, 1957
and praying that his son, appellant herein, be substituted as partyoppositor. Although this motion was denied on October 31 of the
following year, appellant appears not to have appealed from the order
of denial aforesaid. On February 16, 1959, the court rendered
judgment decreeing the registration of the parcel of land described in
Psu 59688 in favor of appellees.
506

ISSUE:
Whether or not the court in said case committed a reversible
error in declaring oppositor Baldoz in default despite his having filed a
written opposition which was duly admitted by it and that its order
denying appellant's motion for substitution as oppositor therein has
deprived him of his day in court.
RULING:
The court issued an order dismissing the complaint on the
grounds (1) that the final judgment in Registration Case No. 2215 is
res judicata in the present action and (2) that the instant action, being
in the nature of a petition for review of a decree, cannot prosper
because it was filed more than one year from the date of the issuance
of the decree and because it is not based on fraud as provided for in
Section 38 of Act 496. The present is an appeal from said order.
c. When to file? 1 year from issuance of decree by LRA.
d. Essential Requisites.
WALSTROM V. MAPA JR.
181 SCRA 431
FACTS:
Cacao Dianson, the predecessor-in-interest of petitioner, filed
for Free-patent application for Lot 1 and Lot 2 of Psu-15365. Josefa
Mapa, predecessor-in-interest of respondent, filed for miscellaneous
sales application. The lot was awarded to Josefa in 1934. In 1956,
Cacao filed a letter protesting the construction of Josefa of a camarin
in Portion A of Lot 1 of Psu-153657. Mapa countered claiming that
such area was awarded to her in public bidding. Bureau of Lands
Investigator then investigated and found that Cacao sold the land to a
certain Agripino Farol. Agripino Farol also transferred the rights and
interests to herein petitioner Walstrom. The regional land director
rendered a decision in favor of Mapa, excluding Portion A from Lot 1
of Psu-153657. The Director of Lands reversed the decision. Mapa
appealed with DANR but the appeal was dismissed. Upon
reconsideration, however, the DANR Secretary reinstated the order of
the regional land director. Wastrom filed for reconsideration but was
denied for being filed out of time. Subsequent motions for
reconsideration were also denied and the writ of execution in favor of
507

Mapa was granted. Original Title issued in the name of Mapa

pursuant to miscellaneous sales patent was issued in 1971. In 1972,
Wastrom filed with CFI Baguio-Benguet for judicial relief as the
prescriptive period is about to lapse but such petition was denied on
the ground of failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Hence, this
petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the case may be reopened by the RTC?
RULING:
No. a decree of registration may be reopened or reviewed by
the proper Regional Trial Court upon the concurrence of five essential
requisites, to wit:
(a) that the petitioner has a real and a dominical right;
(b) that he has been deprived thereof;
(c) through fraud;
(d) that the petition is filed within one year from the issuance of the
decree; and
(e) that the property has not as yet been transferred to an innocent
purchaser for value
The first element is patently not present because the petitioner can
not allege that she has already a real and dominical right to the piece
of property in controversy. The second element is also absent since
corollary to the aforecited ruling of the DANR Secretary, the petitioner
can not aver that she was deprived of property because she did not
have a real right over portion "A". The third element, the records are
bereft of any indication that there was fraud in the issuance of the
certificates of title.

i.Actual or extrinsic fraud defined; differentiated from

intrinsic fraud.
508

STERLING INVESTMENT CORPORATION V. RUIZ

30 SCRA 318 (1969)
FACTS:
Teodorico Cabascas, the late father of respondent Alejandro
Cabasbas, owns a parcel of land as evidenced by OCT no. 815.
Petitioners allege that the controversy arose from Civil Case No.
4870 filed by Alejandro to recover the lot of his father against Jose A.
de Kastro and Estanislawa de Kastro, spouses Lutgardo Reyes and
Elisa A. Reyes, and Demetrio de Jesus. Pursuant to a compromise
agreement entered into by the parties, the spouses Lutgardo Reyes
and Elisa A. Reyes, and Demetrio de Jesus were declared to be the
registered owners of the western portion of the land originally owned
by the late Teodorico Cabasbas as per Original Certificate of Title No.
615, the land subject of the petition.
Subsequent transfers were then made until the petitioners
acquired ownership of the land subject of the petition. In 1968,
Alejandro filed another complaint praying for the nullification of the
compromise agreement with the allegation that it was obtained
through fraud as it was made to appear before the court of first
instance that the conveyance of title was made on February, 1946
when in fact it took place on September 14, 1944, in violation of the
Homestead Law. Alleging res judicata, petitioners prayed for the
dismissal of the case. However, Judge Ruiz refused to dismiss the
case asserting that the sale of a parcel of land was made on
September 14, 1944 in violation of the five-year period within which a
transfer of a homestead patent is prohibited.
ISSUE:
Whether there was an actual or extrinsic fraud rendering the
judgment null?
RULING:
No. Fraud to be ground for nullity of a judgment must be
extrinsic to the litigation. Was this not the rule there would be no end
to litigations, perjury being of such common occurrence in trials. In
fact, under the opposite rule, the losing party could attack the
judgment at any time by attributing imaginary falsehood to his
adversary's proofs. But the settled law is that judicial determination
509

however erroneous of matters brought within the court's jurisdiction

cannot be invalidated in another proceeding. It is the business of a
party to meet and repel his opponent's perjured evidence. Not every
kind of fraud, however, is sufficient ground to set aside a judgment.
Only extrinsic or collateral, as distinguished from intrinsic, fraud is a
ground for annulling a judgment.
Extrinsic fraud refers to any fraudulent act of the successful
party in a litigation which is committed outside the trial of a case
against the defeated party, or his agents, attorneys or witnesses,
whereby said defeated party is prevented from presenting fully and
fairly his side of the case. On the other hand, intrinsic fraud refers to
acts of a party in a litigation during the trial, such as the use of forged
instruments on perjured testimony, which did not affect the
presentation of the case, but did prevent a fair and just determination
of the case.
ii.Specific instances of actual or extrinsic fraud.
RAMIREZ VS CA
144 SCRA 292 (1986)
FACTS:
On September 15, 1959, petitioners-spouses filed an
application for registration of a parcel of riceland in Rizal. An order of
general default was issued. Thereafter, the petitioners presented
parol evidence that they acquired the land in question by purchase
from Gregorio Pascual during the early part of the American regime
but the corresponding contract of sale was lost and no copy or record
of the same was available. On March 30, 1960, the private
respondents filed a petition to review the decree of registration on the
ground of fraud. After trial, the court found that deeds of sale
spurious. It further found that the respondents took possession of the
land as owners after the death of Agapita Bonifacio and in 1938,
mortgaged it to the spouses Ramirez to secure the payment of a loan
in the amount of P400.00 by way of antichresis. The trial court then
ordered the reconveyance of the property. The decision was affirmed
by the Court of Appeals. The petitioners filed a petition for review on
510

certiorari.

ISSUE: Was there an actual or extrinsic fraud?

RULING:
Yes. The averments in the petition for review of the decree of
registration constitute specific and not mere general allegations of
actual and extrinsic fraud. The petitioners in this case did not merely
omit a statement of the respondents' interest in the land. They
positively attested to the absence of any adverse claim therein. This
is clear misrepresentation. The omission and concealment, knowingly
and intentionally made, of an act or of a fact which the law requires to
be performed or recorded is fraud, when such omission or
concealment secures a benefit to the prejudice of a third person.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED.

511

e. A petition for reopening of the decree of registration is

different from an action for reconveyance.
HEIRS OF TOMAS DOLLETON vs. FIL-ESTATE MANAGEMENT
INC.
G.R. No. 170750. April 7, 2009
FACTS:
In October 1997, filed before the RTC separate Complaints for
Quieting of Title and/or Recovery of Ownership and Possession with
Preliminary Injunction/Restraining Order and Damages against
respondents. Petitioners claimed in their Complaints that they had
been in continuous, open, and exclusive possession of the subject
properties for more than 90 years until they were forcibly ousted by
armed men hired by respondents in 1991 and that the subject
properties from which they were forcibly evicted were not covered by
512

respondents certificates of title. Respondents moved for the

dismissal of the eight Complaints on the grounds of (1) prescription;
(2) laches; (3) lack of cause of action; and (4) res judicata.
The RTC dismissed the complaints of petitioners. The trial court
determined that the subject properties were already registered in the
names of respondents, and that petitioners were unable to prove by
clear and convincing evidence their title to the said properties. The
Court of Appeals denied petitioners appeal and affirmed the RTC
Resolutions. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration which the
Court of Appeals denied. Hence, the petitioners filed a Petition for
Review on Certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether the actions instituted by petitioners before the RTC
were for the reopening and review of the decree of registration and
reconveyance of the subject properties.
RULING:
Section 32 of the Property Registration Decree provides that a
decree of registration may be reopened when a person is deprived of
land or an interest therein by such adjudication or confirmation
obtained by actual fraud. On the other hand, an action for
reconveyance respects the decree of registration as incontrovertible
but seeks the transfer of property, which has been wrongfully or
erroneously registered in other persons names, to its rightful and
legal owners, or to those who claim to have a better right. In both
instances, the land of which a person was deprived should be the
same land which was fraudulently or erroneously registered in
another persons name, which is not the case herein, if the Court
considers the allegations in petitioners Complaints.
While petitioners improperly prayed for the cancellation of
respondents TCTs in their Complaints, there is nothing else in the
said Complaints that would support the conclusion that they are either
petitions for reopening and review of the decree of registration under
Section 32 of the Property Registration Decree or actions for
reconveyance based on implied trust under Article 1456 of the Civil
Code. Instead, petitioners Complaints may be said to be in the
nature of an accion reivindicatoria, an action for recovery of
ownership and possession of the subject properties, from which they
were evicted sometime between 1991 and 1994 by respondents. IN
513

VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant Petition is GRANTED.

E. ACTION FOR RECONVEYANCE

a. Legal Basis. Third paragraph Section 53 and 96, PD 1529
b. Requisites of an action for reconveyance.
NEW REGENT SOURCES, INC., vs. TANJUATCO
[G.R. No. 168800. April 16, 2009)
FACTS:
NRSI alleged that in 1994, it authorized Vicente P. Cuevas III,
its Chairman and President, to apply on its behalf, for the acquisition
of two parcels of land by virtue of its right of accretion. Cuevas
purportedly applied for the lots in his name to the Bureau of Lands.
While the application for approval in the Bureau of Lands is pending,
Cuevas assigned his right to Tanjuatco. Director of Lands released
an Order, which approved the transfer of rights from Cuevas to
514

Tanjuatco on 1996, wherefore TCTs were then issued in the name of

Tanjuatco. Petitioner filed a Complaint for Rescission/Declaration of
Nullity of Contract, Reconveyance and Damages. Tanjuatco argued
that the complaint stated no cause of action against him because it
was Cuevas who was alleged to have defrauded the corporation. He
averred further that the complaint did not charge him with knowledge
of the agreement between Cuevas and NRSI.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court erred in dismissing petitioners
complaint for reconveyance.
RULING:
The trial court correctly dismissed petitioners complaint for
reconveyance. An action for reconveyance is one that seeks to
transfer property, wrongfully registered by another, to its rightful and
legal owner. In an action for reconveyance, the certificate of title is
respected as incontrovertible. What is sought instead is the transfer
of the property, specifically the title thereof, which has been
wrongfully or erroneously registered in another persons name, to its
rightful and legal owner, or to one with a better right. To warrant a
reconveyance of the land, the following requisites must concur: (1)
the action must be brought in the name of a person claiming
ownership or dominical right over the land registered in the name of
the defendant; (2) the registration of the land in the name of the
defendant was procured through fraud or other illegal means; (3)
the property has not yet passed to an innocent purchaser for
value; and (4) the action is filed after the certificate of title had
already become final and incontrovertible but within four years from
the discovery of the fraud, or not later than 10 years in the case of an
implied trust. Petitioner failed to show the presence of these
requisites.
c. Reconveyance is a remedy granted only to the owner of the
property alleged to be erroneously titled in anothers name.
ALEGRIA VS DIRLONG, GR. NO. 161317, 16 JULY 2008
558 SCRA 459 (2008)
FACTS:
515

On 4 June 1992, Gabriel Drilon, husband of respondent

Eustaquia Drilon, applied for the issuance of titles by Free Patent
over the properties. On 8 October 1993, spouses Drilon sold the
properties to respondent spouses Alfredo and Fredeswenda Ybiosa
(spouses Ybiosa). Sometime in 1996, Eustaquia Drilon and spouses
Ybiosa demanded that petitioners vacate Lot Nos. 3658 and 3660.
This prompted petitioners to file, on 23 January 1997, an action for
reconveyance and declaration of nullity of the sale of Lot No. 3658
and Lot No. 3660.
Petitioners alleged that spouses Ybiosa were in bad faith when
they bought the properties as they were fully aware that petitioners
were actually and continuously occupying, cultivating and claiming
portions of the properties. The petition for reconveyance was
dismissed. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of
the trial court. Petitioners, although occupants of the properties, have
no legal personality to assail the patents issued to Gabriel Drilon
as well as the sale of the properties to spouses Ybiosa.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioners may question the validity of the sale
ask for reconveyance of the properties.

and

RULING:
In Caro v. Sucaldito, the Court held that an applicant for a free
patent cannot be considered a party-in-interest with personality to file
an action for reconveyance. Citing Spouses Tankiko v. Cezar, the
Court stated:
Only the State can file a suit for reconveyance of a public land.
Therefore, not being the owners of the land but mere applicants for
sales patents thereon, respondents have no personality to file the
suit. Neither will they be directly affected by the judgment in such
suit.
Since petitioners failed to show proof that they have title to the
properties, the trial and appellate courts correctly ruled that
petitioners have no legal personality to file a case for reconveyance
of Lot Nos. 3658 and 3660.

516

i.Action for reversion of public lands fraudulently awarded

must be instituted by the Solicitor General in the name of
Republic of the Philippines.
ii.The essence of an action for reconveyance is that the
free patent and certificate of title were respected as
incontrovertible. What is sought is the transfer of the property
which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another
persons name to its rightful owner to one with a better right.
Daclag v Macahilig
G.R. No. 159578 July 28, 2008
FACTS:
517

On March 18, 1982, Maxima, a daughter of Candido and

Gregoria (the owners of land) entered into a Deed of Extra-judicial
Partition with the heirs of her deceased brothers, Mario and Eusebio
Macahilig. Maxima executed a Statement of Conformity in which she
confirmed the execution of the Deed of Extra-judicial Partition and
conformed to the manner of partition and adjudication made therein.
Maxima sold Parcel One to spouses Adelino and Rogelia Daclag
(petitioners) as evidenced by a Deed of Sale, an OCT was issued in
the name of Daclag by virtue of her free patent
application.Respondents filed with the RTC for reconveyance. The
RTC rendered its Decision in favor of the respondents. The CA
dismissed the appeal and affirmed the RTC decision.

ISSUE:
Whether the reconveyance of the subject land by the
respondents is proper.

RULING:
Yes, it is proper. The essence of an action for reconveyance is that
the free patent and certificate of title are respected as
incontrovertible. What is sought is the transfer of the property, which
has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another person's
name, to its rightful owner or to one with a better right. In an action for
reconveyance, the issue involved is one of ownership; and for this
purpose, evidence of title may be introduced. Respondents had
sufficiently established that Parcel One, covered by OCT of which
respondents' northern one half portion formed a part, was not owned
by Maxima at the time she sold the land to petitioners. An action for
reconveyance prescribes in 10 years, the point of reference being the
date of registration of the deed or the date of issuance of the
certificate of title over the property. Records show that while the land
was registered in the name of petitioner Rogelia in 1984, the instant
complaint for reconveyance was filed by the respondents in 1991,
and was thus still within the ten-year prescriptive period.
518

d. Reconveyance does not aim to reopen the proceedings but only

to transfer or reconvey the land from the registered owner to the
rightful owner.
BAUTISTA-BORJA v BAUTISTA
G.R. No. 136197 December 10, 2008
FACTS:
By petitioners claim, respondents, through fraud and
deception, convinced her to take possession and cultivate parcels of
land which would eventually be partitioned; and that unknown to her,
however, the titles to the lands were cancelled by virtue of Deeds of
Sale purportedly executed on different dates by her parents in favor
of her siblings Simplicio and Francisco, a fact which she came to
know about only in 1994. Petitioner thus filed a complaint before the
RTC for Annulment of the Deeds of Sale and/or Partition of
Properties. The trial court held that petitioners cause of action had
prescribed as actions for reconveyance based on implied
trust prescribe in 10 years, and that laches had set in. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the trial courts ruling.
ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner can still file an action for reconveyance
RULING:
Yes, the petitioner can. If the trial court finds that the deed of
sale is void, then the action for the declaration of the contracts nullity
is imprescriptible. Indeed, the Court has held in a number of cases
that an action for reconveyance of property based on a void contract
does not prescribe. However, if the trial court finds that the deed of
sale is merely voidable, then the action would have already
prescribed. At all events, since the complaint on its face does not
indicate that the action has prescribed, an allegation of prescription
can effectively be used in a motion to dismiss only when the
complaint on its face shows that indeed the action has already
prescribed. Otherwise, the issue of prescription is one involving
evidentiary matters requiring a full-blown trial on the merits and
cannot be determined in a mere motion to dismiss.
519

e. When brought.
NEW REGENT SOURCES, INC., vs. TANJUATCO
[G.R. No. 168800. April 16, 2009)
FACTS:
NRSI alleged that in 1994, it authorized Vicente P. Cuevas III,
its Chairman and President, to apply on its behalf, for the acquisition
of two parcels of land by virtue of its right of accretion. Cuevas
purportedly applied for the lots in his name to the Bureau of Lands.
While the application for approval in the Bureau of Lands is pending,
Cuevas assigned his right to Tanjuatco. Director of Lands released
an Order, which approved the transfer of rights from Cuevas to
Tanjuatco on 1996, wherefore TCTs were then issued in the name of
Tanjuatco. Petitioner filed a Complaint for Rescission/Declaration of
Nullity of Contract, Reconveyance and Damages. Tanjuatco argued
that the complaint stated no cause of action against him because it
was Cuevas who was alleged to have defrauded the corporation. He
averred further that the complaint did not charge him with knowledge
of the agreement between Cuevas and NRSI.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court erred in dismissing petitioners
complaint for reconveyance.
RULING:
The trial court correctly dismissed petitioners complaint for
reconveyance. An action for reconveyance is one that seeks to
transfer property, wrongfully registered by another, to its rightful and
legal owner. In an action for reconveyance, the certificate of title is
respected as incontrovertible. What is sought instead is the transfer
of the property, specifically the title thereof, which has been
wrongfully or erroneously registered in another persons name, to its
rightful and legal owner, or to one with a better right. To warrant a
reconveyance of the land, the following requisites must concur: (1)
the action must be brought in the name of a person claiming
ownership or dominical right over the land registered in the name of
the defendant; (2) the registration of the land in the name of the
defendant was procured through fraud or other illegal means; (3)
520

the property has not yet passed to an innocent purchaser for

value; and (4) the action is filed after the certificate of title had
already become final and incontrovertible but within four years from
the discovery of the fraud, or not later than 10 years in the case of an
implied trust. Petitioner failed to show the presence of these
requisites.

MUNICIPALITY OF VICTORIAS vs. CA

149 SCRA 32 (1987)
FACTS:
Private respondent Norma Leuenberger, inherited the whole of
Lot No. 140 from her grandmother. In 1952, she donated a portion of
Lot No. 140, about 3 ha., to the municipality for the purpose of high
school and had 4 ha. converted into a subdivision. However, in 1963,
she discovered that more or less 4 ha. of the parcel of land, was used
by petitioner, as a cemetery from 1934. On 1963, respondent wrote
the Mayor of the municipality regarding her discovery, demanding
payment of past rentals and requesting delivery of the area allegedly
illegally occupied by petitioner. On 1964, respondent filed a complaint
in the CFI for recovery of possession of the parcel of land occupied
by the municipal cemetery. However, the petitioner defended its
alleged ownership of the subject lot, having bought it from Simeona
Ditching in 1934. The lower court decided in favor of the Municipality.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondents are estopped from questioning
the possession and ownership of the petitioner which dates back to
more than 30 years.

RULING:
It is certain that petitioner failed to present before the Court a
521

Deed of Sale to prove its purchase of the land in question which is

included in the TCT in the name of private respondent Norma
Leuenberger. Thus, it has been held that where the land is decreed in
the name of a person through fraud or mistake, such person is by
operation of law considered a trustee of an implied trust for the
benefit of the persons from whom the property comes. The
beneficiary shag has the right to enforce the trust, notwithstanding the
irrevocability of the Torrens title and the trustee and his successorsin-interest are bound to execute the deed of reconveyance.

f. Purpose of an action for reconveyance.

RODRIGUEZ vs TORENA
79 SCRA 356 (1987)
FACTS:
Valentina Quiones,the predecessor-in-interest of respondents,
owned a parcel of land in Davao City with an area of 39,043 square
meters which is designated as Lot No. 2017. The land was brought
for registration before a cadastral court in 1922 and a certificate of
title was issued on August 7, 1950. After its issuance,the certificate of
title was delivered to the petitioner by Atty. Suazo, the respondents
counsel in the cadastral case. On July 9, 1958, the respondents filed
with the Court of First Instance of Davao, a complaint for ejectment
and damages against the petitioner, alleging that they are pro-indiviso
registered owners of the land and that the petitioner illegally,
maliciously, and by means of force and intimidation, entered the land
in question and occupied approximately 27,500 square meters
thereof.The petitioner claimed that the heirs of Valentina Quiones
had already sold their rights over the land as early as 1941 and 1950
either through themselves or their successors in interest, thus making
him the rightful and legal owner of approximately 27,899 square
meters thereof; that he had been in the peaceful, continuous and
public possession of the same; that there was no lien, encumbrance
or adverse claim annotated on the certificate of title so that the series
of sales made in his favor, although not registered and annotated
522

thereon, are valid and binding between the parties, the said land not
having passed to a third person.
ISSUE:
Whether the existence of a decree of registration is a bar to an
action filed after one year from the issuance of the decree to compel
reconveyance
of
the
property
in
question.
HELD:
A landowner whose property was wrongfully or erroneously
registered under the Torrens system is not barred from bringing an
action, after one year from the issuance of the decree, for the
reconveyance of the property in question. Such an action does not
aim or purport to re-open the registration proceeding and set aside
the decree of registration, but only to show that the person who
secured the registration of the questioned property is not the real
owner
thereof.

g. Objective of the action.

ESCONDE vs BORLONGAY
152 SCRA 603 (1987)
FACTS:
Ramon Delfin (private respondent) filed an application for a
parcel of land located in Valenzuela, Bulacan. It was granted and now
covered with an OCT issued by the Registry of Deeda, Bulacan.
Delfin as an applicant, filed for a petition for Writ of Possession
against spouses Francisco and BasilisaEsconde, as they have been
occupying the said land. Subsequently, on March of 1978 the
opposition filed by the petitioner was denied by Judge Bautista.
Moreover, Judge constantino, who took over the same branch
presided over judge Bautista issued an order for Writ of Possession
against the spouses. Immediately, petitioner filed a motion to quash
which was denied.
523

Petitioner then filed complaint for conveyanceagainstDelfin which was

rebutted by the latter via motion to dismiss on the ground that (1) the
cause of action, if any, is barred by re judicata (2) the complaint fails
to state sufficient cause or causes of action for reconveyance and (3)
the plaintiff is barred by prescription or laches from filing the case.
Thereafter, petitioner filed a rejoinder to motion to dismiss and motion
for leave of court. The sheriff then, upon the courts order, delivered
possession to Delfin however he was barred in entering the premises.
Delfin filed a motion for an Alias writ of possession which was
granted. The sheriff turned over the possession to the representative
of Delfin, however, when the latter went to the premises he was again
barred by the petitioner. Then, Delfine asked for demolition and he
moved for a second alias writ of possession which was again,
granted. Subsequently, the writ of reconveyance filed by the petitioner
was dismissed. After which motions and motions have been filed. The
second resolve the issue, a temporary restraining order directing the
sheriff and Delfin to refrain from enforcing and/or carrying out the
third alias writ of possession. Petitioner then filed motion to amend
the resolution and TRO, either nullifying third alias writ of possession
served orto issue a mandatory injunction which was denied by the
said court.

ISSUE: Whether or not action for reconveyance is the proper remedy.

RULING:
An action for reconveyance is a legal and equitable remedy
granted to the rightful owner of land which has been wrongfully or
erroneously registered in the name of another for the purpose of
compelling the latter to transfer or reconvey the land to him. The
prevailing rule in this jurisdiction does not bar a landowner whose
property was wrongfully or erroneously registered under the Torrens
System from bringing an action, after one year from the issuance of
the decree, for the reconveyance of the property in question. Such an
action does not aim or purport to re-open the registration proceeding
and set aside the decree of registration, but only to show that the
person who secured the registration of the questioned property is not
the real owner thereof. An ordinary civil action for reconveyance does
not seek to set aside the decree but respecting the decree as
524

incontrovertible and no longer open to review, seeks to transfer or

reconvey the land from the registered owner to the rightful owner.
Under the circumstances in the case at bar, it is apparent that
reconveyance is not the proper remedy. There was no proof of
irregularity in the issuance of title, nor in the proceedings incident
thereto, nor was it established that fraud had indeed intervened in the
issuance of said title, and the period of one year within which intrinsic
fraud could be claimed had long expired. Under similar conditions,
the Court ruled that the land should be adjudicated to the registered
owner that: "Justice is done according to law. As a rule, equity follows
the law. There may be a moral obligation, often regarded as an
equitable consideration (meaning compassion), but if there is no
enforceable legal duty, the action must fail although the
disadvantaged party deserves commiseration or sympathy." An action
for reconveyance of real property on the ground of fraud must be filed
within four (4) years from the discovery of the fraud. Such discovery
is deemed to have taken place from the issuance of an original
certificate of title.

h. Statutory basis of the action. Section 96, PD 1529

i. When to file the action.
DACLAG V MACAHILIG
G.R. NO. 159578 JULY 28, 2008
FACTS:
On March 18, 1982, Maxima, a daughter of Candido and
Gregoria (the owners of land) entered into a Deed of Extra-judicial
Partition with the heirs of her deceased brothers, Mario and Eusebio
Macahilig. Maxima executed a Statement of Conformity in which she
confirmed the execution of the Deed of Extra-judicial Partition and
conformed to the manner of partition and adjudication made therein.
Maxima sold Parcel One to spouses Adelino and Rogelia Daclag
(petitioners) as evidenced by a Deed of Sale, an OCT was issued in
the name of Daclag by virtue of her free patent
application.Respondents filed with the RTC for reconveyance. The
525

RTC rendered its Decision in favor of the respondents.

dismissed the appeal and affirmed the RTC decision.

The CA

ISSUE: Whether the reconveyance of the subject land by the

respondents is proper.

RULING:
Yes, it is proper. The essence of an action for reconveyance is that
the free patent and certificate of title are respected as
incontrovertible. What is sought is the transfer of the property, which
has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another person's
name, to its rightful owner or to one with a better right. In an action for
reconveyance, the issue involved is one of ownership; and for this
purpose, evidence of title may be introduced. Respondents had
sufficiently established that Parcel One, covered by OCT of which
respondents' northern one half portion formed a part, was not owned
by Maxima at the time she sold the land to petitioners. An action for
reconveyance prescribes in 10 years, the point of reference being the
date of registration of the deed or the date of issuance of the
certificate of title over the property. Records show that while the land
was registered in the name of petitioner Rogelia in 1984, the instant
complaint for reconveyance was filed by the respondents in 1991,
and was thus still within the ten-year prescriptive period.

i.An action for reconveyance on the ground that the

certificate of title was obtained by means of a fictitious deed of
sale is virtually an action for the declaration of its nullity which
does not prescribe.
SANTOS VS HEIRS OF DOMINGALUSTRE, GR. NO. 151016, 6
AUGUST 2008,561 SCRA 120 (2008)
526

FACTS:
Dominga Lustre, who died on October 15, 1989, owned a
residential lot. On September 20, 1974, Dominga Lustre mortgaged
the lot to spouses Santos and later sold it to the latter. Subsequently,
Santos executed a Deed of Sale transferring the property to their son.
In April 14, 1994, Cecilia Macaspac and Tarcisio Maniquiz, both heirs
of Dominga Lustre, filed with the RTC, Complaint for Declaration of
the Inexistence of Contract, Annulment of Title, Reconveyance and
Damages[6] against the son. The complaint alleged that the
spouses Santos simulated the Deed of Sale dated May 16, 1976 by
forging Dominga Lustres signature.A lleging that the plaintiffs right of
action for annulment of the Deed of Sale and TCTs had long
prescribed and was barred by laches, petitioners filed a Motion to
Dismiss. The RTC denied it. They then filed a petition
for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA declared that an
action for the declaration of the inexistence of a contract does not
prescribe.
ISSUE: Whether or not the action for reconveyance on the ground
that the certificate of title does not exist prescribes.
RULING:
The action for reconveyance on the ground that the certificate
of title was obtained by means of a fictitious deed of sale is virtually
an action for the declaration of its nullity, which does not prescribe.
[37]
Moreover, a person acquiring property through fraud becomes, by
operation of law, a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the real
owner of the property. An action for reconveyance based on an
implied trust prescribes in ten years. And in such case, the
prescriptive period applies only if there is an actual need to reconvey
the property as when the plaintiff is not in possession of the property.
Otherwise, if plaintiff is in possession of the property, prescription
does not commence to run against him. Thus, when an action for
reconveyance is nonetheless filed, it would be in the nature of a suit
for quieting of title, an action that is imprescriptible.

j. Form of pleading.
527

CABRERA vs CA
163 SCRA 214 (1988)
FACTS:
The subject of this controversy is a parcel of land with an area
of 4,080 square meters situated in Cainta, Rizal. It was originally
owned by the spouses Diego and Patricia Gonzaga, who acquired it
in 1921, presumably with conjugal funds. Both are now dead,
survived by the private respondents, their grandchildren by their
deceased children. The petitioners claim the property by virtue of an
alleged sale in their favor, the private respondents by right of
succession. The records show that the tax declaration on the land
had since 1921 been in the name of the spouses Gonzaga until 1944,
when it was made in the name of Eliseo Gonzaga, one of their
children. In 1953, the tax declaration was again changed, this time in
the name of Joaquin Cabrera. In 1970, the private respondents filed a
complaint for recovery of the property from the petitioners in the court
of first instance of Rizal, claiming that the latter had no right to the
property. The petitioners, in their answer, invoked a sale made to
them by Eliseo Gonzaga, who had previously purchased the land
from his parents, adding that they had been in possession of the
property since 1944. Both parties adverted in their respective
pleadings to the petitioners' application for registration of the land
under the Torrens system which was then pending in another
court. The petitioners claimed it was justified by their right of
ownership while the private respondents contended it was a
fraudulent act that did not bind them. The trial court sustained the
plaintiffs, herein respondents, after finding that their evidence
remained unrebutted, and declared them to be the owners of the
disputed property. The Court of Appeals sustained the decision of the
lower court.

ISSUE: Whether the action for reconveyance was prematurely filed?

RULING:
528

An action for reconveyance may be filed even before the

issuance of the decree of registration. There is no reason, indeed,
why one has to wait until the land is actually registered before he can
sue for reconveyance. The private respondents filed their complaint
because they were unwilling to recognize the registration proceedings
for lack of compliance with the notification requirements. They did not
have to await its termination. As it happened, providentially, the
registration was granted during the trial of the plaintiffs' complaint for
recovery of the property. Hence, their pending action could
conveniently and properly be deemed an action for reconveyance,
filed within the one-year reglementary period prescribed by the Land
Registration Act. And there were valid grounds. The private
respondents were able to establish that the transfer of the land had
been made under fraudulent circumstances to their detriment as the
hereditary owners of the property. They also submitted that they had
not received notice of the registration proceedings and that no notice
thereof had been posted on the subject land as required by law.
These grounds were not controverted at the trial.

k. Grounds for Reconveyance

i. Fraud.

ESCONDE vs BORLONGAY
152 SCRA 603 (1987)
FACTS:
A parcel of land with an area of 2,273 sq. m was registered
under the name of private respondent Ramon V. Delfin.On February
13, 1978 private respondent filed his "Petition for Writ of Possession"
against the spouses Francisco and Basilisa Esconde .On March 29,
1983, the Sheriff turned over possession of the premises to the
representative of the private respondent. However, when private
529

respondent went to the premises, he was barred by the petitioner

from entering the property. Consequently, private respondent asked
for a writ of demolition for the removal of any construction of the
Esconde family on the premises and to cite petitioner Basilisa
Esconde for contempt of court.On November 17, 1983, private
respondent moved for a second alias writ of possession in view of the
failure of the petitioner to turn over possession of the premises to
private respondent. Petitioner then filed at Regional Trial Court of
Bulacan a Motion to Quash and/or to Hold in Abeyance Execution of
Second Alias Writ of Possession on the ground that they have filed a
civil action for reconveyance. Respondent Judge dismissed the
complaint for reconveyance because plaintiff's cause of action is
barred by res judicata.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner's cause of action is barred by res
judicata.
HELD:
An action for reconveyance is a legal and equitable remedy
granted to the rightful owner of land which has been wrongfully or
erroneously registered in the name of another, for the purpose of
compelling the latter to transfer or reconvey the land to him. A
landowner whose property was wrongfully or erroneously registered
under the Torrens System is not barred from bringing an action, after
one year from the issuance of the decree, for the reconveyance of the
property in question. Such an action does not aim or purport to reopen the registration proceeding and set aside the decree of
registration, but only to show that the person who secured the
registration of the questioned property is not the real owner thereof.In
the case at bar, it is apparent that reconveyance is not the proper
remedy because there was no proof of irregularity in the issuance of
title, nor in the proceedings incident thereto, nor was it established
that fraud had indeed intervened in the issuance of said title, and the
period of one year within which intrinsic fraud could be claimed had
long expired.
Reconveyance is available in case of registration of property
procured by fraud thereby creating a constructive trust between the
parties.
530

HUANG vs CA
G.R. No. 198525, 13 September 1994
FACTS:
In 1965 Dolores Sandoval purchased two adjacent lots in
Makati, but being advised by her sister-in-law Milagros that it is not
possible to acquire two lots in only one name, she registered the
other lot in the name of her brother Ricardo. Then Dolores
constructed her house in the lot she bought, thereafter her brother
also asked permission if he could construct a house on the lot
registered under his name, to which Dolores agreed to. Ricardo was
also given permission to mortgage said lot in order to secure a loan
from SSS, and to be used on his construction of his house. In March
1968, Dolores was able to obtain a deed of absolute sale with
assumption of mortgage over the property with the Huangs. In 1980,
Dolores sought the help of the barangay to compel the spouses
Ricardo and Milagros to execute the necessary request to the SSS
for the approval of the deed of sale with assumption of mortgage, as
well as for the release in her favor of the owner's duplicate certificate
of title in its possession so that the deed could be duly annotated on
the title and/or a new certificate of title issued in her name. But no
amicable settlement was reached. But on that same year, spouses
Ricardo and Milagros also filed a complaint against spouses Dolores
and Aniceto for the nullification of the deed of absolute sale and
quieting of title.
The trial court consolidating the cases, ruled in favor of the
Sandovals. It was shown that Dolores was the one who bought both
the lots, and even paid for the construction of a swimming pool and
fencing of the subject lots. The petitioners appealed to the Court of
Appeals who also affirmed the lower courts decision.Hence, the
petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is a sufficient ground for reconveyance
of ownership to spouses Dolores and Aniceto?
531

RULING:
The Supreme Court noted that it was not possible for Ricardo
to have bought or constructed such improvements on the disputed lot
on his earnings alone, as it was shown to be substantially insufficient.
The Court agreed with the lower courts findings that it was Dolores
who bought said lots and made improvements on it. Furthermore, the
Supreme Court was not impressed with the contention of the
petitioners that they were not aware that what they were signing was
deed of absolute sale, from the evidence it was shown that spouses
voluntarily signed and read the contents of said document. Trust is a
fiduciary relationship with respect to property which involves the
existence of equitable duties imposed upon the holder of the title to
the property to deal with it for the benefit of another. Trust is either
express or implied. Express trust is created by the intention of the
trustor or of the parties. Implied trust comes into being by operation of
law. A constructive trust is imposed where a person holding title to
property is subject to an equitable duty to convey it to another on the
ground that he would be unjustly enriched if he were permitted to
retain it. The duty to convey the property arises because it was
acquired through fraud, duress, undue influence or mistake, or
through breach of a fiduciary duty, or through the wrongful disposition
of another's property. On the other hand, a resulting trust arises
where a person makes or causes to be made a disposition of
property under circumstances which raise an inference that he does
not intend that the person taking or holding the property should have
the beneficial interest in the property.
In the present case, Dolores provided the money for the
purchase
of
Lot 20 but the corresponding deed of sale and transfer certificate of
title were placed in the name of Ricardo Huang because she was
advised that the subdivision owner prohibited the acquisition of two
(2) lots by a single individual. Guided by the foregoing definitions, we
are in conformity with the common finding of the trial court and
respondent court that a resulting trust was created. Ricardo became
the trustee of Lot 20 and its improvements for the benefit of Dolores
as owner. The pertinent law is Art. 1448 of the New Civil Code which
provides that there is an implied trust when property is sold and the
legal estate is granted to one party but the price is paid by another for
the purpose of having the beneficial interest for the property. A
532

resulting trust arises because of the presumption that he who pays for
a thing intends a beneficial interest therein for himself.
Petitioners are of the mistaken notion that the 10-year
prescriptive period is counted from the date of issuance of the
Torrens certificate of title. This rule applies only to the remedy of
reconveyance which has its basis on Sec. 53, par. 3, P.D. No. 1529.
Reconveyance is available in case of registration of property
procured by fraud thereby creating a constructive trust between the
parties, a situation which does not obtain in this case. Therefore, the
Court affirmed the decision of the RTC, thereby dismissing the
petition.

ii.

Implied or Constructive Trust. Possible defenses.

Prescription and laches.

VILLAGONZALO VS IAC
167 SCRA 535 (1988)

FACTS:
In an action for reconveyance, RTC Leyte ordered the
cancellation of transfer certificate title in the name of private
respondent Cecilia Villagonzalo. Upon appeal with the Court of
Appeals (formerly IAC), said decision of lower court was reversed.
533

The appellate court found out that the private respondent was
able to loan an amount to her father in order that he can acquire said
land. Furthermore, the CA found the petitioners cause has already
prescribed. The appellate court held that the issuance of transfer
certificate of title to the private respondent was already a notice of
ownership to the whole world, thereby repudiating any fiduciary or
trust relationship involved. It anchored its conclusion on doctrinal
holdings that an action for reconveyance based on an implied or
constructive trust prescribes in ten years counted from the date when
adverse title is asserted by the possessor of the property. Due to the
inaction of the petitioners, the private respondent was made secure
over her ownership on the subject land, and thereafter spent time and
money in introducing improvements.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the registration of the land in the private
respondents name was not a repudiation of the implied trust created
between her and their father.
RULING:
The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the appellate court.
An action for reconveyance of real property to enforce an implied
trust shall prescribe after ten years, since it is an action based upon
an obligation created by law, and there can be no doubt as to its
prescriptibility. It is likewise established that said period of ten years is
counted from the date adverse title to the property is asserted by the
possessor thereof. In the case at bar, that assertion of adverse title,
which consequently was a repudiation of the implied trust for the
purpose of the statute of limitations, took place when trasfer
certificate of title was issued in the name of private respondent.
There is also evidence of record that as far back as 1961,
private respondent refused to give any share in the produce of the
land to petitioners; that in 1963 she mortgaged the property in her
own name; and that in 1969, she leased the same to one Ramon
Valera, without the petitioners taking preventive or retaliatory legal
action. The rule in this jurisdiction is that an action to enforce an
implied trust may be barred not only by prescription but also by
laches, in which case repudiation is not even required. Whether the
trust is resulting or constructive, its enforcement may be barred by
534

laches. Petitioners were, therefore, correctly faulted for their

unjustified inaction. WHEREFORE, the judgment of the respondent
Court is hereby AFFIRMED.

When prescription does not apply.

ALZONA vs CAPUNITAN
G.R. No. L-10228 (February 28, 1962)
FACTS:
The parcels of land in question were part of the friar lands in the
Spanish times and were then possessed by spouses Perfecto Alomia
and Cepriana Almendras, both deceased; they were survived
survived by three children, Arcadio Alomia, Eulogio Alomia and
Crispina Alomia. Arcadio Alomia married Ildefonsa Almeda but they
did not have any children. When both Arcadio and his wife Ildefonsa
died, they were survived only by the two sisters of Ildefonsa namely
Marciana and Narcisa and also by the nephews and nieces of
Arcadio. Narcisa is the mother of herein defendant Gregoria
Capunitan married to Manuel Reyes. Eulogio Alomia, other hand, is
the father of plaintiff Gregorio and Eleuteria Alomia while Crispina
Alomia is the mother of plaintiff Cornelio Alzona. Of the three children
of Sps. Perfecto and Cepriana Alomia, it was Arcadio and wife
Ildefonsa who purchased and possessed the lands originally claimed
by their parents and was able to acquire title to two of the four lots in
question. When Arcadio died, his widow Ildefonsa, sold the lands in
question to her niece Gregoria Capunitan (defendant) daughter of
Narcisa Almeda and cousin of plaintiffs-appellants and in whose
name new certificate of title was issued in 1928.
535

After Ildefonsa's death, plaintiffs herein instituted an action in

the CFI of Laguna on October 11, 1929 for the recovery of the lots;
the case was set six times for hearing during 1930. The case was
dismissed because of the non-appearance of the parties and their
attorneys. On January 23, 1931, same plaintiffs, thru same counsel
filed another action for the recovery of lots Nos. 332, 210, 2968 and
2524. Again, due to numerous petitions for postponement from 1931
to 1936,nothing was done hence on August 31, 1936, the court
dismissed the case. The lower court found that the dismissal of these
two cases was not due to an amicable settlement because of
defendant's recognition of plaintiffs' rights or to a promise to reconvey
one-half of the property to them.
ISSUE/S: Whether the right of the appellees to ask for reconveyance
of their share of the land is already barred by prescription.
HELD:
The case at bar involves an implied or constructive trust upon
the defendants-appellees. The Court of Appeals declared that
Ildefonsa held in trust the 1/2 legally belonging to the plaintiffs; on
which condition, the defendants had full knowledge. The sale made
by Ildefonsa in favor of the defendants, was not void or inexistent
contract, action on which is imprescriptible (Art. 1450, N.C.C.). It is
voidable, at most, and as such is valid until revoked within the time
prescribed by law for its revocation, and that is undoubtedly the
reason why the Court of Appeals pronounced that "the appellees had
the right to ask for a reconveyance of their share, unless the action is
barred by prescription". The prescriptibility of an action for
reconveyance based on implied or constructive trust, is now a settled
question in this jurisdiction. It prescribes in ten (10) years. The cause
of action of the plaintiffs against the defendants accrued in 1928
when the latter purchased and took possession of the two lots from
Ildefonsa Almeda. The action, being for recovery of title to and
possession of real property, the same should be brought within ten
(10) years from 1928, or up to 1938 (Sec. 40, Act 190). But after the
dismissal of the second case on August 31, 1936, the plaintiffsappellants went into a long swoon only to wake up when they filed the
present action on November 28, 1949 (according to the lower court)
or January 28, 1950 (according to appellants). In the first case, 13
536

years had elapsed and in the second, 14 years. In either case, the
action has long prescribed.
Furthermore, and by the same token, the defendants-appellees
being third persons, and having repudiated the trust and expressed
claim of ownership over litigated properties, by themselves and by
their predecessors-in-interest, they have also acquired the said
properties by the law of prescription (Tolentino vs. Vitug, 39 Phil. 126;
Government of the Philippines vs. Abadilla, 46 Phil. 642).

ALMARZA vs. ARGUELLES

G.R. No. L-49250 December 21, 1987
FACTS:
Lot No. 5815 of the Cabatuan Cadastre, situated in Cabatuan,
Iloilo, originally belonged to respondents' predecessor-in-interest,
Romualdo Grana. In 1929, he sold a 7,300 square meters portion
thereof to petitioner and her husband, the late Leon Almarza, who
since then had been in continuous, peaceful, open and adverse
possession thereof. The document evidencing the sale between the
parties was lost during the war, but sometime thereafter, the late
Laura Pancrudo, mother of private respondents Asuncion and Gilda
Arguelles, executed an affidavit acknowledging the sale of said
portion to petitioner and her husband. On the basis of said affidavit,
the Provincial Assessor issued a new tax declaration, beginning in the
year 1945 to Leon Almarza, annotating at the back thereof the
aforementioned affidavit of the late Laura Pancrudo. The tax
declaration, covering the 7,300 sq.m. portion of Lot No. 5815 sold to
petitioner and her husband was designated as Lot No. 5815-B. On
the other hand, a new tax declaration, Tax Declaration No. 3909 was
issued by the Provincial Assessor in the name of Romualdo Grana for
the remaining portion of Lot No. 5815, described therein as Lot No.
5815-A.
537

Sometime prior to July, 1950, Josefa Malote, mother of private

respondents Gil and Balbina Pancrudo, filed for and in behalf of her
children and the late Laura Pancrudo an answer in Cadastral Case
No. 78, G.L.R.O. Record No. 1321. In support of her claim over Lot
No. 5815, she presented in evidence Tax Declaration No. 3909
covering only a portion thereof designated therein as Lot No. 5815-A
and a land tax receipt dated March 30, 1950 showing payment of the
real estate tax for a portion only of Lot No. 5815 known and described
in the Tax Declaration as Lot No. 5815-A. On July 25, 1950, the
cadastral court declared Gil and Balbina Pancrudo owner of one-half
undivided share of Lot No. 5815 and the late Laura Pancrudo as
owner of the other undivided half share. Pursuant to a decree of title,
Original Certificate of Title No. 0-134, covering the entire Lot 5815
was issued in the name of said adjudicatees on May 29, 1951. On
November 1, 1951, Laura Pancrudo died, leaving private respondents
Asuncion Arguelles and Gilda Arguelles as her only children and legal
successors-in-interest. On April 20, 1977, the said heirs instituted
before the then Court of First Instance of Iloilo a case against
petitioner for recovery of the 7,300 sq.m. portion of Lot No. 5815 in
her possession and for damages. Basis of the action was OCT No. 0134 issued on May 29, 1951. Petitioner, in turn, interposed a
counterclaim for reconveyance of the disputed portion of Lot No.
5815 in her favor. Trial court rendered a decision in favor of the
respondents on the ground that petitioner's action for reconveyance
had prescribed more than ten years having elapsed from the
issuance of said certificate of title.
ISSUES:
Whether or not petitioners action for reconveyance has
prescribed.
Whether or not laches have already set in against private
respondents
right to assert their ownership over the subject land.
HELD:
We held that prescription cannot be invoked in an action for
reconveyance, which is, in effect, an action to quiet title against the
plaintiff therein who is in possession of the land in question. The
reason, We explained, is "that as lawful possessor and owner of the
538

Disputed Portion, her cause of action for reconveyance which, in

effect, seeks to quiet title to property in one's possession is
imprescriptible. Her undisturbed possession over a period of 48 years
gave her a continuing right to seek the aid of a Court of equity to
determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third party and the
effect on her title." Private respondents obtained OCT No. 0-134 on
May 29,1951. Their action was instituted only on April 20, 1977, or
after a lapse of twenty-six [26] years. The neglect or failure of private
respondents to assert their alleged right under the certificate of title
for such unreasonable length of time makes them guilty of laches.'
They should now be held either to have abandoned or waived
whatever right they may have under said certificate of title.
Private respondents ordered to cause the segregation of the
disputed portion of 7,300 square meters from Lot No. 5815 of the
Cabatuan Cadastr and to reconvey the same to said petitioner. After
the segregation shall have been accomplished, the Register of Deeds
of Iloilo is hereby ordered to cancel OCT No. 0-134 in the names of
Balbina, Gil and Laura, all surnamed Pancrudo, and thereafter to
issue a new certificate of title covering said 7,300 square meter
portion in favor of petitioner and another certificate of title in favor of
private respondents covering the remaining portion of Lot No. 5815.

539

iii.

Express Trust.

TAMAYO VS CALLEJO
G.R. NO. L-25563 JULY 28, 1972
FACTS:
This action, initiated in the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan, was brought by Aurelio Callejo, originally against
Mariano Tamayo only, and, later, against his brother Marcos Tamayo,
also, for the reconveyance of the northern portion of a parcel of land
formerly covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 2612, in the
names of said brothers. In due course, said court dismissed the
complaint, with costs against the plaintiff. The latter appealed to the
Court of Appeals which, in turn, rendered a decision the dispositive
part. In 1940, Mariano Tamayo sold the land to Estacio, whose
surveyor went to the land in 1952 to segregate it; that same year
Callejo registered his adverse claim to the land. Tamayo pleaded the
statute of limitations as defense, but the court found that in 1918,
when they had the land registered in their name, Mariano Tamayo, on
his behalf and that of his brother, executed a public document
acknowledging that his deceased parents had sold a parcel of the
land
to
Domantay.
ISSUES:
1.) Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in not holding that the
respondent Aurelio Callejo's cause of action, if any, had already
prescribed.
2.) Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in not affirming the
decision rendered by the trial court.
RULING:
Tamayo argues that if the erroneous inclusion in his certificate
of title of the parcel of land formerly sold by his parents to Fernando
Domantay created, by operation of law, an implied trust, the
540

corresponding action for reconveyance of said parcel prescribed ten

(10) years from the accrual of the cause of action, on November 15,
1915, when OCT No. 2612 was issued, or long before the institution
of this case on June 25, 1952. The express recognition by Mariano
Tamayo on his behalf and that of his brother Marcos Tamayo of
the previous sale, made by their parents, to Fernando Domantay had
the effect of imparting to the aforementioned trust the nature of an
express trust it having been created by the will of the parties, "no
particular words" being "required for the creation of an express trust,
it being sufficient that a trust is clearly intended" which express
trust is a "continuing and subsisting" trust, not subject to the statute of
limitations, at least, until repudiated, in which event the period of
prescription begins to run only from the time of the repudiation.
It is thus apparent that the Court of Appeals did not err in
overruling the plea of prescription. Also, petitioner questions the right
of Callejo to demand a reconveyance, insofar as it may affect the
portion of 70,000 square meters sold by him to Proceso Estacio,
upon the ground that the latter is a purchaser in good faith for value.
This is, however, a defense not available to petitioner herein, aside
from the fact that he has not even pleaded it in the trial court or
otherwise raised it either in that court or in the Court of Appeals. We
note that the dispositive part of the decision of the Court of Appeals
declares that the land in question is "declared reconveyed" to said
respondent. Such reconveyance cannot, however, be deemed made
without a survey defining with precision the metes and bounds of the
area to be segregated for herein respondent, Aurelio Callejo.
Accordingly, the case should be remanded to the court of origin for
the preparation of a subdivision plan of the portion thus to be
segregated and the judicial approval of such plan, and only after such
approval has become final and executory may the reconveyance be
either made or deemed effected. SO MODIFIED, the appealed
decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed in all other
respects, with the costs of this instance against petitioner Mariano
Tamayo. It is so ordered.

541

iv.

Void Contract.

CASTILLO VS HEIRS OF MADRIGAL

G.R.

NO.

62650.

JUNE

27

(1991)

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking reversal of the
decision of the Court of Appeals dated August 5, 1982 in CA-G.R. No.
66849-R entitled "Spouses Mariano Castillo, Et Al., PlaintiffsAppellants v. Heirs of Vicente Madrigal, Et Al., Defendants-Appellees.
On December 17, 1979, petitioners spouses Mariano Castillo and
Pilar Castillo, in their own behalf and in representation of the heirs of
Eduardo Castillo, filed a verified complaint before the Court of First
Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Manila for annulment of
contract and transfer certificate of title and/or reconveyance with
damages against private respondents heirs of Vicente Madrigal
and/or Susana Realty, Inc. and public respondent Register of Deeds
of the City of Manila. On February 4, 1980, private respondents filed
a motion to dismiss on the ground that: (a) the complaint states no
cause of action; and (b) the cause of action is barred by the statute of
limitations. On March 25, 1980, the trial court dismissed the complaint
(pp. 120-126, Rollo). On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the decision
was affirmed in toto on August 5, 1982. Hence. the present petition.
ISSUES:
1.) Whether or not petitioners action for annulment of contract and
transfer certificate of title and or reconveyance with damages is
subject to prescription
2.) Whether or not the complaint states a cause of action against
private
respondents.
542

RULING:
Both courts ruled incorrectly. It is evident in paragraphs 9, 10
and 12 of the complaint, supra, that petitioners sought the declaration
of the inexistence of the deed of sale because of the absence of their
consent. Thus, following the provision of Article 1410 of the Civil
Code, this kind of action is imprescriptible. The action for
reconveyance is likewise imprescriptible because its basis is the
alleged void contract of sale. This pronouncement is certainly far from
novel. We have encountered similar situations in the past which We
resolved in the same manner. One of these is the case of Baranda, Et
Al., v. Baranda, Et Al., G.R. No. 73275, May 20, 1987, 150 SCRA 59,
73
However, there should be no debate that the action for damages
against private respondents has already prescribed. In accordance
with Article 1144 of the Civil Code, 4 it should have been brought
within ten (10) years from the date of the sale to Vicente Madrigal and
the issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 72066 in his name on
July 12, 1943, if against the heirs of Vicente Madrigal; or within ten
(10) years from the date of the issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 36280 in the name of Susana Realty, Inc. on May 12, 1954, if
against the firm.
Notwithstanding the discussion on the imprescriptibility of
petitioners action for annulment of contract and transfer certificate of
title and/or reconveyance, the dismissal of their complaint by the trial
court and the Court of Appeals on the ground of failure to state a
cause of action was correct. It was also Our ruling in the Baranda
case, supra, (and in other previous cases) that only as long as the
property is still in the name of the person who caused the wrongful
registration and has not passed to an innocent third person for value
will an action lie to compel that person to reconvey the property to the
real owner. ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby DENIED. The
decision of the Court of Appeals dated August 5, 1982 is AFFIRMED,
subject to the modification regarding the issue on prescription.SO
ORDERED.

543

F. ACTION FOR DAMAGES

a. Section 32, PD 1529
b. Against whom filed.

CHING VS CA
181 SCRA 9

FACTS:
A Decree was issued to spouses Maximo Nofuente and
Dominga Lumandan in Land Registration and Original Certificate of
Title correspondingly given by the Register of Deeds for the Province
of Rizal covering a parcel of land. By virtue of a sale to Ching Leng,
TCT No. 91137 was issued. Consequently, Ching Leng died. His
legitimate son Alfredo Ching filed a petition for administration of the
estate of deceased Ching Leng and was granted. 13 years after
Ching Leng's death, a suit against him was filed by private
respondent Asedillo for reconveyance of the said property and
cancellation of T.C.T. No. 91137 in his favor based on possession.
Summons by publication to Ching Leng and/or his estate was
directed by the trial court. The summons and the complaint were
published in the "Economic Monitor", a newspaper of general
circulation.
544

The title over the property in the name of Ching Leng was
cancelled and a new TCT was issued in favor of Asedillo.
ISUUE:
Whether or not an action for reconveyance of property and
cancellation of title is in personam, and if so, would a dead man or his
estates be bound by service of summons and decision by publication.
RULING:
An action to redeem, or to recover title to or possession of, real
property is not an action in rem or an action against the whole world,
like a land registration proceeding or the probate of a will; it is an
action in personam, so much so that a judgment therein is binding
only upon the parties properly impleaded and duly heard or given an
opportunity to be heard. Actions in personam and actions in rem differ
in that the former are directed against specific persons and seek
personal judgments, while the latter are directed against the thing or
property or status of a person and seek judgments with respect
thereto as against the whole world. An action to recover a parcel of
land is a real action but it is an action in personam, for it binds a
particular individual only although it concerns the right to a tangible
thing. Sec. 112 of the Land Registration Act (Act No. 496, as
amended) requires "notice to all parties in interest." Since ChingLeng
was already in the other world when the summons was published he
could not have been notified at all and the trial court never acquired
jurisdiction over his person.
Therefore, the judgment in question is null and void for lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the deceased defendant Ching Leng.

545

546

G. ACTION FOR COMPENSATION FROM THE ASSURANCE

FUND
a. Section 93 and 94 PD 1529
b. Who may file. Section 95, PD 1529

H. ACTION FOR COMPENSATION FROM THE ASSURANCE

FUND
a. Requisites.

I. REVERSION
a. Who institutes. The action is instituted by the government
through the Solicitor General.
b. Grounds for Reversion.
i. In all cases where lands of public domain are held in violation
of the Constitution. Section 95, Chapter XII, Eo No. 292
ii. Where lands of the public domain are fraudulently obtained.

c. Improperly filed reversion suit.

YUJUICO vs REPUBLIC
GR. NO. 168861, 26 OCTOBER 2007
547

FACTS:
In 1973, Fermina Castro filed an application for the registration
and confirmation of her title over a parcel of land located in
Paraaque City, in the Pasig-Rizal Court of First Instance (CFI).The
application was opposed by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
on behalf of the Director of Lands, and byMercedes Dizon, a private
party. Trial court ruled in favor of Castro. The Director of Lands and
Mercedes Dizon did not appeal from the adverse decision of the
Pasig-Rizal CFI. Thus, the order for the issuance of a decree of
registration became final, and a Decree was issued by the Land
Registration Commission (LRC). An Original Certificate of Title was
issued in the name of Fermina Castro by the Register of Deeds. Land
was then sold to Jesus Yujuico. The OCT of Castro was cancelled
and a TCT was issued in Yujuicos name over Lot1 while another TCT
was issued in favor of herein co-petitioner Augusto Carpio.
Meanwhile, PD no. 1085 was issued and asserts that Land reclaimed
in the foreshore and offshore areas of Manila Bay became the
properties of the Public Estates Authority (PEA), a government
corporation that undertook the reclamation of lands or the acquisition
of reclaimed lands. Thus, an OCT was issued in favor of PEA. The
PEA also acquired ownership of other parcels of land along the
Manila Bay coast which were subsequently sold to the Manila
Bay Development Corporation (MBDC) The PEA undertook the
construction of the Manila Coastal Road. As this was being planned,
Yujuico and Carpio discovered that a verification survey they
commissioned showed that the road directly overlapped their
property, and that they owned a portion of the land sold by the PEA to
the MBDC. Yujuico and Carpio filed before the Paraaque City
Regional Trial Court (RTC), a complaint for the Removal of Cloud and
Annulment of Title with Damages. Respondent Republic argued that,
first, since the subject land was still underwater, it could not be
registered in the name of Fermina Castro. Second, the land
registration court did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate inalienable
lands, thus the decision adjudicating the subject parcel of land to
Fermina Castro was void. And third, the titles of Yujuico and Carpio,
being derived from a void title, were likewise void. Trial Court ruled in
favor of the petitioner and states that after 28 years without being
contested, the case had already become final and executory. The trial
548

court also found that the OSG had participated in the LRC case, and
could have questioned the validity of the decision but did not. On
appeal, reversed the decision of the lower court asserting that shores
are properties of the public domain intended for public use and,
therefore, not registrable and their inclusion in a certificate of title
does not convert the same into properties of private individuals.
ISSUE: Whether or not the action of the Government for reversion is
proper?
HELD:
No. We maintain to agree with the findings of the court that the
property of Fermina Castro was registrable land, as based on the two
(2) ocular inspections conducted on March 22, 1974 by Lands
Administrative Assistant Lazaro G. Berania and Lands Geodetic Engr.
Manuel Cervantes, finding the same no longer forms part of
Manila Bay but is definitely solid land which cannot be reached by
water even in the highest of tides. This Berania-Cervantes report
based on ocular inspections literally overturned the findings and
recommendations of Land Director Narciso V. Villapando dated
November 15, 1973, and that of Director Ernesto C. Mendiola dated
December 1, 1977, and the fact that the Villapando-Mendiola reports
were merely based on projections in the cadastral map or table
surveys.
The recognition of petitioners legal ownership of the land is
further bolstered by the categorical and unequivocal acknowledgment
made by PEA in its September 30, 2003 letter where it stated that:
Your ownership thereof was acknowledged by PEA when it did not
object to your membership in the CBP-IA Association, in which an
owner of a piece of land in CBP-IA automatically becomes a member
thereof. Section 26, Rule 130 provides that the act, declaration or
omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence
against him. The admissions of PEA which is the real party-ininterest in this case on the nature of the land of Fermina Castro are
valid and binding on respondent Republic. Respondents claim that
the disputed land is underwater falls flat in the face of the admissions
of PEA against its interests. Hence, res judicata now effectively
precludes the relitigation of the issue of registrability of petitioners lot.
In sum, the Court finds that the reversion case should be
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Paraaque RTC.
549

Even if we treat said case as a petition for annulment of judgment

under Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the dismissal of
the case nevertheless has to be upheld because it is already barred
by laches. Even if laches is disregarded, still the suit is already
precluded by res judicata in view of the peculiar facts and
circumstances obtaining therein.

J. CANCELLATION SUITS
K. ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT
a. What rule governs.
b. When brought. Rule 74, Rules of Court.
c. A petition for annulment of judgment based on extrinsic fraud must
be filed within 4 years from its discovery; and if based on lack of
jurisdiction, before it is barred by laches or estoppel.

GALICIA VS MANLIQUEZ
GR. NO. 155785, 13 April 2007
550

FACTS:
Petitioners alleged that their predecessor, Juan, was the true
and lawful owner of a parcel of land situated in Romblon. Such land is
declared in the name of Juan under various tax declarations. They
alleged that after years of possession of said land, Juan was driven
away from the property through force by the heirs of Inez Ramirez
and one of whom is defendant. Petitioners alleged that because of
poverty and lack of knowledge, Juan was not able to assert his right
over the property but he informed his children that they owned the
land and that the continuous possession of the property by defendant
has further deprived herein petitioners of their right over the
same.Defendants denied the allegations of petitioners in their
complaint asserting that Juan was not the owner and never took
possession of the disputed lot. They also contended that the subject
property was part of a larger parcel of land which was acquired
by Ines, predecessor-in-interest of defendant from a certain
Juan Galicha who is a different person from Juan Galicia.
During the scheduled pre-trial conference, none of the
defendants appeared. They filed a motion for postponement of the
pre-trial conference but it was belatedly received by the trial court. As
a consequence, defendants were declared in default. Herein
petitioners, as plaintiffs, were then allowed to present
evidence ex parte. On December 2, 1997, the RTC rendered
judgment in favor of the petitioners declaring the plaintiffs as the true
and absolute owner of the property, affirming and confirming the
validity and legality of plaintiffs ownership over the property and
ordering defendants to vacate the land.
On December 1997, the RTC received a Motion for Leave of
Court to intervene with an attached Answer-in-Intervention filed by the
compulsory heirs of Ines, among whom are herein respondents. They
contended that the subject parcel of land forms part of the estate
of Ines which is yet to be partitioned among them; an intestate
proceeding is presently pending in the RTC of Odiongan, Romblon,
the outcome of Civil Case, one way or the other, would adversely
affect their interest; their rights would be better protected in the said
civil case; and their intervention would not unduly delay, or in any way
prejudice the rights of the original parties. The RTC denied the said
motion to intervene on the ground that it has already rendered
551

judgment and under Section 2, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court, the

motion to intervene should have been filed before rendition of
judgment by the trial court.
Defendants filed an appeal with the CA but CA issued a
Resolution dismissing the appeal for failure of the defendantsappellants to file their brief within the extended period granted by the
appellate court. Subsequently, the trial court issued a writ of
execution dated March 3, 2000. On May 23, 2000, herein
respondents filed a petition for annulment of judgment with the CA
anchored on grounds of lack of jurisdiction over their persons and
property and on extrinsic fraud. On January 14, 2002, the CA
granted the petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners have lost such ownership by
extinctive prescription because respondents and their predecessors
had been in uninterrupted adverse possession of the subject lot for
more than 40 years?
HELD:
As to the timeliness of the petition for annulment of judgment
filed with the CA, Section 3, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court provides
that a petition for annulment of judgment based on extrinsic fraud
must be filed within four years from its discovery; and if based on lack
of jurisdiction, before it is barred by laches or estoppel. The principle
of laches or stale demands ordains that the failure or neglect, for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which by
exercising due diligence could or should have been done earlier, or
the negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time,
warrants a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has
abandoned it or declined to assert it. There is no absolute rule as to
what constitutes laches or staleness of demand; each case is to be
determined according to its particular circumstances. The question of
laches is addressed to the sound discretion of the court and, being an
equitable doctrine, its application is controlled by equitable
considerations. It cannot be used to defeat justice or perpetrate fraud
and injustice. It is the better rule that courts, under the principle of
equity, will not be guided or bound strictly by the statute of limitations
or the doctrine of laches when to do so, manifest wrong or injustice
would result.
552

In the present case, the CA found no evidence to show when

respondents acquired knowledge of the complaint that petitioners
filed with the RTC. Moreover, the Court finds that herein respondents'
right to due process is the overriding consideration in allowing them
to intervene in Civil Case No. OD-306. Petitioners also fault herein
respondents for their failure to avail of other remedies before filing a
petition for annulment of judgment with the CA. Petitioners cited the
remedies enumerated by the RTC in its Order of December 23, 1997.
However, the Court notes that the remedies enumerated therein refer
to those available to a party who has been declared in default. In the
present case, herein respondents could not have been declared in
default, and thus could not have availed of these remedies, because
they never became parties to Civil Case No. OD-306.

L. QUIETING OF TITLE. Articles 476 to 481, Civil Code of the

Philippines
M. CRIMINAL ACTION. (1) Article 312 ( Occupation of real property
or usurpation of real rights in property); and (2) Article 313 (Altering
boundaries or landmarks).

PROCEEDINGS AFTER ORIGINAL REGISTRATION: VOLUNTARY

DEALINGS
A. Voluntary and Involuntary Registration:
a. Distinctions

between

Voluntary

and

Involuntary
553

registration
REBECCA LEVIN VS. JOAQUIN V. BASS 91 PHIL 420 (1952)
FACTS:
Rebecca Levin, widow, 65 y/o, illiterate & knew only how to sign
her name owner of a lot with 2 houses (No. 326 & No. 328) located at
San Rafael St., Manila.
At the end of Dec. 1943 respondent Bass called Levin at her
house at No. 328representing himself to be a real estate broker &
asked if Levin wanted to sell her lot & house at No. 326 adjoining her
residence w/c was at that time occupied &rented by Japanese
civilians, officers & employees of Pacific Mining & 2 rooms privately
rented by Angelita Martinez Levin refused several times to the offer
until she gave in as Bass told her that with the proceeds of the sale,
Levin can purchase another property at Antonio Rivera St. w/c she
will be gaining a better profit for renting it out & w/o the fear that the
other house might just be appropriated by the Japanese & shell be
getting nothing in return Levin w/ her houseboy went twice to Antonio
Rivera St. to check the property that Bass told her she will be
purchasing from the proceeds of the sale on the house & lot on No.
326 but they were not able to enter the second floor as Bass told
them that the owner is gone to Pampanga.
Relying on the presentation of Bass, Levin accepted the offer.
Levin, Dr. Manlapaz & Angelita Martinez were conversing at her
house when Bass came & ask her to sign several documents which
according to Bass were only Authority to Sell the property (no copy
was left to Levin).
Bass handed Levin Php 10K saying that it was the partial
payment of the property w/c was sold to a Japanese & asked her to
give him the Torrens Title of the House & Lot --- w/c title was in the
possession of Agricultural &Industrial Bank due to a mortgage in the
amount of Php 2k --- 2k was deducted from 10K & they went to the
Bank to pay the debt & get the title --- remaining 8kwas also taken by
Bass as purported initial payment for the property at Antonio Rivera
554

St. (w/ receipt but only 6k was in the receipt Levin did not realized the
difference in the amount). Bass gave Levin the rentals on the building
at Antonio Rivera St. in order for Levin to believe that she already
owned that property.
Due to suspicions, Levin sought the help of Dr. Manlapaz
regarding the property until they found out that the documents Levin
signed were
Deed of Absolute sale to one Estaquio Php 30K for No. 326 house
& lot ---w/c was later on sold to Bass for Php 65Kb.
Deed of Sale to Bass Php 65K for No. 3289.
The Title of Levin was then cancelled & issued a new one in the
name of Bass.
Bass mortgaged the property to Co Chin Leng to secure
payment of PHP 70Kw/c was duly annotated in the title in
consideration of PHP 200K, Bass sold the No. 328 property to Mintu
(PHP90K paid upon execution of the document & PHP 10K will be
paid upon the cancellation or removal of the notice of lis pendens &
the balance of PHP 100Kto be paid to his bank after securing the
release of the mortgage to Co ChinLeng.
Deed of Sale & owners duplicate COT were presented to
the RD for registration with full payment of the fees
ISSUE:
Whether or not the entry in the day book of a deed of sale w/c
was presented & filed at the RD &full payment of the registration fees
constitute a complete act of registration w/c operates to convey and
affect the land.
HELD: Yes. Voluntary Registration
If the owners Duplicate Certificate be not surrendered & presented or
if no payment of registration fees be made w/in 15 days, entry in the
book of the deed of sale does not operate to convey & affect the land
sold.
555

Innocent purchaser for value having done the required steps in the
registration, the sale in then presumed to be valid in both properties.
b. Effects of voluntary and involuntary registration
GARCIA VS CA, 95 SCRA 389 (1980)
FACTS:

This case is about the issuance of two or more transfer

certificates of title to different persons for the same lot, or
subdivisions thereof, due to the fact that the original title was
allegedly not cancelled when the first transfer certificates of title were
issued to replace the original title.
A deed of sale for lots E and G of Hacienda Maysilo and
covered by OCT No. 983 was executed in favor of Ismael Lapus, a
bona fide occupant thereof. The deed of sale was presented for
registration and contained entries showing that it was annotated on
the back of the OCT. Contrary to SOP however, the deed of sale was
not annotated on the OCT and that consequently, that title was
apparently not cancelled.

As a result of the registration of the deed of sale, TCT No. 4910

(Lapus Title) was issued to Lapus. Upon his death, the two lots were
inherited by his daughter Carolina Lapuz-Gozon, who had the land
subdivided into 55 lots and sold some to her now co-respondents.
Lapus and successors-in-interest have been in possession of the
lands even before 1910 of more than 70 years.
In 1962, the Riveras, alleged heirs of the late Maria de la
Concepcion Vidal filed a motion in land registration cases, alleging
that they were deprived of their participation in the Hacienda Maysilo.
556

Since per the OCT the land seemed unencumbered, the court
adjudicated the land in their favor. The OCT was then cancelled and
TCT No. 112235 (Rivera Title) was issued to the Riveras. Lots 5 and
7 (E and G) were then assigned to Bartolome Rivera to Sergio Cruz
and Pacifico Garcia, and subsequent TCTs were issued in their
behalf. Garcia had Lot 7 (G) subdivided into lots A and B, retained lot
A and assigned B to Antonio Munoz. Munoz mortgaged lot B to
Associated Banking Corp.On the other hand, Cruz sold Lot 5 (E) to
Santiago Go. Go mortgaged Lot 5 to Philippine National Bank. Both
Munoz and Go did not pay their mortgage debts, hence the two
banks foreclosed the properties. PNB bought the mortgaged Lot 5 at
the auction, but notice of lis pendens was already annotated on the
title.
Riveras and their successors-in-interest have never set foot on the
disputed lots.
Gozon finally learned about the Riveras and others acquiring
the land, had her adverse claims registered on the titles of lots 5 and
7 and filed an action to quiet title and damages.
The trial court ruled in favor of Gozon and co-plaintiffs and voided the
TCTs issued to the Riveras, others. CA affirmed the decision. Garcia
and PNB appealed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the 1920 Lapus title prevails over the 1963 Rivera title
and subsequent titles derived from it.
HELD: Yes. Lapus title prevails.

RULING:

Lapus was an innocent purchaser for value who validly

transmitted to his successors-in-interest his indefeasible title or
ownership over the disputed lots. That title could not be nullified or
557

defeated by the issuance 43 years later to other persons of another

title over the same lots due to the failure of the register of deeds to
cancel the title preceding the title issued to Lapus. This must be so
considering that Lapus and his successors-in-interest remained in
possession of the disputed lots and the rival claimants never
possessed the same.

The general rule is that in the case of two certificates of

title, purporting to include the same land, the earlier in date
prevails. It is settled that in this jurisdiction the maxim prior est
in tempore, potior est in jure (he who is first in time is preferred
in right) is followed in land resgistration matters.

The contention of PNB that it was a buyer in good faith has no

merit because the deed of sale in favor of Lapus and the titles issued
to him and his successors-in-interest are all a matter of public record
in the registry of deeds. When a conveyance has been properly
recorded, such record is a constructive notice of its contents and all
interests, legal and equitable, included therein. Under the rule of
notice, it is presumed that the purchaser has examined every
instrument of record affecting the title. This presumption cannot be
overcome by proof of innocence and good faith otherwise the very
purpose of the law requiring a record would be destroyed. The bank
should have made an on-the-spot investigation of the lot mortgaged.
B. Necessity and effects of registration in general
a. Entry in the primary book produces the effect of
registration
b. There is effective registration once the registrant has
fulfiiled all that is needed of him for purposes of entry
and annotation, so that what is left to be accomplished
lies solely on the Register of Deeds.
558

NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY VS. BASA, Jr.

GR No. 149121. April 20, 2010

FACTS:
Spouses Basa loaned from NHA secured by a real estate mortgage
over their properties. Spouses Basa did not pay the loan despite
repeated demands. To collect its credit, the NHA filed a verified
petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage before the Sheriffs
Office in Quezon City. After notice and publication, the properties
were sold at public auction where NHA emerged as the highest
bidder. On April 16, 1991, the sheriffs certificate of sale was
registered and annotated only on the owners duplicate copies of the
titles in the hands of the respondents, since the titles in the custody of
the Register of Deeds were among those burned down when a fire
gutted the City Hall of Quezon City on June 11, 1988. On April 16,
1992, the redemption period expired, without respondents having
redeemed the properties. Shortly thereafter, on April 24, 1992, NHA
executed an Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership over the
foreclosed properties, and the same was inscribed by the Register of
Deeds on the certificates of title in the hand of NHA. NHA moved for
the issuance of an alias writ of possession. Before the RTC could
resolve the motion for the issuance of an alias writ of possession,
respondents, filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene and Petition in
Intervention.Respondents theorized that the instrument is deemed
registered only upon actual inscription on the certificate of title in the
custody of the civil registrar. Since the sheriffs certificate was only
inscribed on the owners duplicate certificate of title, and not on the
certificate of title in the possession of the Register of Deeds, then
there was no effective registration and the one-year redemption
period had not even begun to run. Thus, respondents asked the
RTC, among others, to declare the foreclosure sale null and void, to
559

allow the respondents to redeem the mortgaged properties. NHA

maintained that respondents right of redemption had long expired on
April 15, 1992 since the certificate of sale was inscribed on their TCT
Nos. 285413 and 287008 a year earlier, or on April 16, 1991. RTC
issued an Order admitting the Petition in Intervention and treating the
same as the petition to set aside sale. NHA filed a special civil action
for certiorari and prohibition before the Court of Appeals. The Court of
Appeals rendered a Decision in favor of the NHA. Respondents filed
a motion for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals, in its Amended
Decision, reconsidered its earlier stance. It declared that the period of
redemption had not expired as the certificate of sale had not been
registered or annotated in the original copies of the titles supposedly
kept with the Register of Deeds since said titles were earlier razed by
fire.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the annotation of the sheriffs certificate

of sale in the primary entry book of the register of deeds and on
the owners duplicate title is sufficient compliance with the
requirement of law on registration.

HELD:

The prevailing rule is that there is effective registration once the

registrant has fulfilled all that is needed of him for purposes of
entry and annotation, so that what is left to be accomplished
lies solely on the register of deeds. NHA followed the
procedure in order to have its sheriffs certificate of sale
annotated in the transfer certificates of title. It was not NHAs
fault that the certificate of sale was not annotated on the
transfer certificates of title which were supposed to be in the
custody of the Registrar, since the same were burned. Neither
560

could NHA be blamed for the fact that there were no

reconstituted titles available during the time of inscription as it
had taken the necessary steps in having the same reconstituted
as early as July 15, 1988. NHA did everything within its power
to assert its right. Since entry of the certificate of sale was
validly registered, the redemption period accruing to
respondents commenced therefrom, since the one-year period
of redemption is reckoned from the date of registration of the
certificate of sale.

c. The act of registration shall be the operative act to

convey or affect land in so far as third persons are
concerned
REPUBLIC VS RAVELO
FACTS:
On February 16, 1989, the Director of Lands issued Sales Patent No.
12458 covering the subject lot to respondent Ravelo. She was
subsequently issued Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-4517
registered with the Registry of Deeds of Olongapo City.
The petitioner filed a complaint for cancellation of title against
Ravelo on November 6, 1992. The petitioner alleged that the
issuance of the patent by the Director of Lands violated DENR
Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 20. This A.O. mandates that
applications for sales patent should be filed with the DENR regional
office that has jurisdiction over the land applied for, not with the
Director of Lands in Manila.
On March 24, 1994, a notice of lis pendens (indicating the
pendency of the petitioners complaint) was inscribed as Entry No.
7219 on Ravelos OCT No. P-4517.
In a separate development, one Antonio Chieng filed
on December 13, 1989 a collection suit against Ravelo, which suit led
to a judgment against Ravelo and the issuance of a writ of
561

execution.
The Notice of Levy was registered with the Register of Deeds
on March 17, 1993.
In the auction sale that followed, Wilson Chieng, Antonio
Chiengs son, won as highest bidder. A certificate of sale was issued
to Chieng and the sale was registered with the Olongapo Registry of
Deeds on May 25, 1993.
The respondent-spouses Redondos subsequently bought the
subject lot from Chieng. The parties first signed an agreement for the
purchase of the subject lot on May 11, 1993, and upon payment of
the agreed purchase price, executed on December 20, 1993 a deed
of absolute sale.
On September 23, 1994, the final deed of sale covering the
subject lot in favor of Chieng was inscribed as Entry No. 2419 on
OCT No. P-4517.
On the same date, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-7209
covering the subject lot was issued to Chieng. Entry No. 7219 (the
petitioners complaint for cancellation and reversion) was carried at
the back of Chiengs TCT No. T-7209.
Chieng and the Redondos entered into another deed of sale in
the Redondos favor on November 21, 1994. This deed was
inscribed as Entry No. 7554 at the back of TCT T-7209 on December
20, 1994. On the same day, TCT No. T-7261 covering the subject lot
was issued to the Redondos.
RTC decided in the petitioners favor and cancelled Ravelos
Sales Patent No. 12458 and OCT No. P-4517, Chiengs TCT No. T7209, and the Redondos TCT No. T-7261.
The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the trial courts
ruling and declared the Redondos as innocent purchasers in good
faith. The appellate court also declared the Redondos TCT No. T7261 valid.
The appellate court ruled that the Redondos were buyers in
good faith because they and Chieng entered their agreement for the
purchase of the subject lot on May 11, 1993 and executed their Deed
of Sale on December 20, 1993, prior to the annotation of the notice
of lis pendens on March 24, 1994, and prior as well to any awareness
562

by the Redondos of the existence of any flaw in the vendors title.

ISSUE:
Whether the Redondos are innocent purchasers in good faith and for
value
HELD:
May 11, 1993 agreement was not registered nor annotated in OCT
No. P-4517 because it was technically a side agreement relating to
but not directly affecting the registered property, and was thus
enforceable only between the parties Chieng and the
Redondos. Thus, the government cannot be effectively put on notice
of the May 11, 1993 agreement when it registered its notice of lis
pendens on March 24, 1994.
Thus, bereft of registration, any sale or transaction involving
registered land operates only as a contract between the parties and
shall not affect or bind the registered property.

d. Constructive notice is also created upon registration of

every conveyance, mortgage, lease, lien, attachment,
order, judgment, instrument or entry affecting registered
land. It must be noted that computation of the
563

prescriptive period of any cause of action starts from

the date when the cause of action accrues.
AFP-MBA VS SANTIAGO
G.R. No, 147559, June 2008
FACTS:
A Notice of Levy on Attachment on Real Property was
issued in Civil Case No. Q-92-11198 entitled The Armed
Forces of the Philippines Mutual Benefit Association, Inc.,
Plaintiff, vs. Eurotrust Capital Corporation, Elsa B. Reyes, Rene
M. Reyes, Celedonio N. Reyes, Digna Blanca, Fernando C.
Francisco, Ma. Cristina C. Cornista, EBR Realty Corporation
and B.E. Ritz Mansion International Corporation, Defendants,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 216, Quezon City, levying all the
rights, claims, shares, interests and participation of EBR Realty
Corporation in the real property covered by Transfer Certificate
of Title No. PT-79252.
On September 14, 1994, the Notice of Levy was
presented for registration in the Registry of Deeds of Pasig
City. The Notice was entered in the Primary Entry Book under
Entry No. PT-1305. However, it was not annotated on TCT No.
PT-79252 because the original copy of said title on file in the
Registry
of
Deeds
was
not
available
at
that
time. Aniana Estremadura, the employee who examined the
notice of levy, kept the said document in the meantime hoping
some later days said title may be found as at the time we
were yet in turmoil or in disarray having just transferred from
our old office.
On September 20, 1994 or six days after the presentation
of the Notice of Levy, a Deed of Absolute Sale, executed by
EBR Realty Corporation in favor of Ines B. Santiago involving
the same parcel of land covered by TCT No. PT-97252 was
presented for registration and entered under Entry No. PT1653.
The deed of sale was examined by the same employee
who examined the notice of levy, but she failed to notice that
564

the title subject of the sale was the same title which was the
subject of the notice of levy earlier presented. Unaware of the
previous presentation of the notice of levy, the Register of
Deeds issued TCT No. PT-94912 in the name of vendee Ines B.
Santiago on the basis of the deed of sale. It was only after the
Register of Deeds had already acted on the said deed of sale
that Aniana Estremadura informed him of the presentation of
the notice of levy.
Nevertheless, when the Register of Deeds discovered
the error he immediately sent a letter to Ms. Ines B. Santiago
requesting her to surrender the documents, particularly the
deed of sale and owners duplicate of TCT No. PT-94912 so
that he can take appropriate rectification or correction. Ms.
Santiago refused to surrender the documents and owners
duplicate of said title.
The LRA is of the opinion that the subject Notice of Levy cannot
be annotated on TCT No. PT-94912, except by order of the court.
On appeal, the CA dismissed the petition. It declared that to
allow the inscription of the controversial levy on attachment upon the
title of respondent Santiago will be tantamount to prematurely
declaring her as a buyer in bad faith of the property.
ISSUE:
Whether the notice of levy on attachment may be annotated on TCT
No. PT-94912.
HELD:
The notice of levy on attachment in favor of petitioner may be
annotated on TCT No. PT-94912.
The entry of the notice of levy on attachment in the primary
entry book or day book of the Registry of Deeds on September 14,
1994 is sufficient notice to all persons, including the respondent, that
the land is already subject to an attachment. The earlier registration
of the notice of levy on attachment already binds the land insofar as
third persons are concerned. The fact that the deed of absolute sale
was dated February 24, 1994 is of no moment with regard to third
565

persons.
The act of registration is the operative act to convey or affect
the land insofar as third persons are concerned. Constructive notice
is also created upon registration of every conveyance, mortgage,
lease, lien, attachment, order, judgment, instrument or entry affecting
registered land.
Superiority and preference in rights are given to the registration
of the levy on attachment; although the notice of attachment has not
been noted on the certificate of title, its notation in the book of entry of
the Register of Deeds produces all the effects which the law gives to
its registration or inscription.

e. It is only the act of registering the instrument in the RD

for the province or city where the land lies which is the
operative act that conveys ownership or affects the land
insofar as 3rd persons are concerned.
SOSTENES CAMPILLO VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and
ZENAIDA DIAZ VDA. DE SANTOS 129 SCRA 513
FACTS:
566

Tomas de Vera was the owner of two parcels of land in Tondo,

Manila. In 1961, de Vera sold the lands to Simplicio Santos. Santos
however did not register the sale in the Registry of Deeds, which
means that the land was still under de Veras name.
On the other hand, de Vera was indebted to Campillo. Campillo
obtained a judgment for sum of money. De Veras 3 parcels of land,
including those sold to Santos were levied in 1962 in favor of
Campillo. Campillo acquired the land and he was able to have the
lands be registered under his name.
ISSUE:
Who has better right over the property: Santos who first bought it w/o
registering it or Campillo who subsequently purchased it at a public
auction and have it registered under his name.
HELD: Campillo has the right over the said properties.
RULING:
It is settled in this jurisdiction that a sale of real estate, whether
made as a result of a private transaction or of a foreclosure or
execution sale, becomes legally effective against third persons only
from the date of its registration. Santos purchase of the two parcels of
land may be valid but it is not enforceable against third persons for he
failed to have it registered.
Campillo is a purchaser in good faith as he was not aware of
any previous sale for Santos never caused the annotation of the sale.
The act of registration shall be the operative act to convey or
affect the land insofar as third persons are concerned, and in all
cases under this Decree, the registration shall be made in the office
of the Register of Deeds for the province or city where the land lies.
The purchaser (Campillo) in the execution sale of the registered
land in suit, acquires such right and interest as appears in the
certificate of title unaffected by prior lien or encumbrances not noted
therein. This must be so in order to preserve the efficacy and
567

conclusiveness of the certificate of title which is sanctified under our

Torrens system of land registration.

f. The act of registration creates constructive notice to the

whole world of such voluntary or involuntary instrument
or court writ or process.
HEIRS OF MARASIGAN VS IAC 152 SCRA 253
FACTS:
Marron filed a case in court to compel Bazaar to execute a
registrable deed of absolute sale in her favour. The court held that
Bazaar shall execute the said deed and to surrender the owners
copy of the certificate of title. The decision became final and executor
but Bazaar refused to surrender the owners copy so the court
executed the deed in behalf of Bazaar and a lis pendens is annotated
in the title of Bazaar. Later, it appears that the said land was again
sold to Marasigan and a certificate of title was issued in her name.
Marron files in court questioning the title of Marasigan and asking it to
be cancelled. The CFI dismissed it contending that the case is
premature since there is a pending relief filed by Bazaar. The IAC
ruled that Marron is entitled to the land by virtue of the lis pendens
annotated at the back of the title.
ISSUE: Who has the better right of the property in question.
HELD:
The court held that the Marron has the better right. There is a
clear showing that although the late Maria Marasigan acquired the
property in question from the Bazaars pursuant to a deed of absolute
sale on December 18, 1974 or a little over four months before the
filing of Civil Case No. 97479, the transaction became effective as
against third persons only on July 5, 1977 when it was registered with
the Registry of Deeds of Manila. It is the act of registration which
creates constructive notice to the whole world. Section 51 of Act 496,
as amended by Section 52 of the Property Registration Decree (P.D.
1529) provides:
Sec. 52. Constructive notice upon registration. Every
conveyance ... affecting registered land shall, if registered, filed or
entered in the office of the Register of Deeds for the province or city
where the land to which it relates lies, be constructive notice to all
568

persons from the time of such registering, filing or entering.

Moreover, there is no question that when the late Maria Marasigan
was issued her transfer certificate of title to the subject property
(T.C.T. No. 126056), the Registrar of Deeds of Manila then carried
over to the new title the notice oflis pendens which the private
respondent had caused to be annotated at the back of the Bazar's
title.

C. Formal and procedural requisites for registration in general

D. Nature of primary entry book
a. Date of mailing by registered mail is the date of filing for
purposes of registration.
MINGOA VS LRC 200 SCRA 78
FACTS:
A deed of donation of several parcels of land was executed by
petitioner in favor of his children on July 15, 1987. The deed was
forwarded to the Register of Deeds of Romblon for registration by
registered mail on September 9, 1988. It was entered in the primary
entry book of the Register of Deeds on September 20, 1988 under
Entry No. 181. Said Register of Deeds suspended registration of the
donation until the petitioner has secured the proper clearances from
the Department of Agrarian Reform on the ground that under Section
6 of Republic Act 6657, any disposition of private agricultural lands
made prior to June 15, 1988, when the Act took effect, must be
registered within three (3) months from said date or on before
September 13, 1988 to be valid.
The matter was elevated by petitioner en consulta with the
Administrator of the Land Registration Authority LTA. On November
27,1990 the LTA Administrator issued a resolution sustaining the
stand of the Register of Deeds that unless the proper clearances from
the Department of Agrarian Reform are secured, the deed of donation
569

may not be registered.

Hence this petition for certiorari whereby petitioner contends
that Section 1, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court should apply in a
suppletory manner in that the date of the mailing should be
considered the date of filing of the document in the office of the
Register of Deeds.
ISSUE:
What date would be followed in cases the case was delivered thru
registered mail.
HELD:
The Court finds and so holds that the date of mailing of an
instrument to the Register of Deeds for purposes of registration
should be considered the date of filing and receipt thereof by the
Register of Deeds. It is this date that should be entered in the primary
entry book of the Register of Deeds which shall be regarded as the
date of its registration.
Since in this case, the deed of donation was admittedly sent by
registered mail to the Register of Deeds on September 9, 1988, said
date is in effect the date of filing, receipt and registration of the
instrument, although the instrument was actually received by said
office only on September 20, 1988.
SEC. 1. Filing with the court, defined.The filing of pleadings,
appearances, motions, notices, orders and other papers with the
court as required by these rules shall be made by filing them
personally with the clerk of the court or by sending them by registered
mail. In the first case, the clerk shall endorse on the pleading the date
and hour of filing. In the second case, the date of the mailing of
motions, pleadings, or any other papers or payments or deposits as
shown by the post office stamp on the envelope or the registry
receipt, shall be considered as the date of their filing, payment, or
deposit in court. The envelope shall be attached to the record of the
case.
The foregoing rule clearly provides that the date of mailing of the
motion, pleading, or any other papers, which may include instruments
as the deed of donation, is considered the date of filing as shown by
the post office stamp on the envelope or registry receipt.
E. Registration of Deeds of sale of conveyance and transfers

570

a. Registration requirements
b. Effects of registration
i.

Registration of voluntary instruments of sale of

land is the operative effect that transmits or
transfers title.

CANDIDA VILLALUZ, ET AL VS. JUAN NEME and FELICISIMA

VILLAFRANCA
FACTS:
Maria Rocabo died intestate leaving a parcel of land granted
her under Homestead Patent and was covered by an OCT. She had 6
children, three of which is alive namely, Sinforosa, Patricia and Maria
Villaluz, the remaining 3 were dead leaving their children as
representatives to their supposed shares.
After approval of her application but before granting the patent,
Maria Rocabo donated a portion of the said land to Maria and Patricia
with two notarial deeds of Donation. Thus, the donation was accepted
by the donee and took actual possession of their respective portions.
Maria cultivated and improved the said land; however, she and her
sister Patricia forgot to present the deed of Donations to the Bureau
of Lands.
Subsequently, the patent was granted and an OCT was issued
in the name of Rocabo. Because Sinforosa who had custody of the
title would not surrender it to the donee, unless given a portion, On
September of 1939, Sinforosa, Maria and Patricia executed an
extrajudicial portion among themselves without the consent of their
nephew and nieces.
By virtue thereof, the OCT was cancelled and a TCT was
issued under their name upon having representations that they were
only the heirs of the Deceased, Rocabo.
The 3 sister sold the land to Ramona Pajarillo wife of Adriano
571

Mago and Angela wife of Juan Neme. On August of 1953, the heirs of
Adriano and Ramona sold their undivided interest to Juan Neme who
sold the same to Villafranca.
Thereafter, the nieces of the 3 sisters came to know that the
land that was being administered by their aunts were already cold
and in possession of the Defendants. Petitioner filed a complaint for
partition and recovery of their respective shares. It also appears that
the deed of Sale of the land in favour of defendant had not been
registered and recorded under CA 141 and Land Registration Law.
The Lower Court dismissed the case. Thus, elevated to the SC.
HELD:
The deed of Extrajudicial partition was fraudulent and vicious,
the same having been executed among the three sisters without
including their co-heirs who has no knowledge of and consent to the
same. Under the time-honored principle of Nemo dat quod non habet,
the three sisters could not have sold what did not belong to them.
Section 4, Rule 74 refers only to the settlement and distribution
of the estate of the deceased by the heirs who make such partition
among themselves in good faith, believing that they are the only heirs
with the right to success. The heirs who participated in the
extrajudicial settlement were possessing the property as
administrators or trustees and in behalf of the other co-heirs who
were excluded, Such co-heirs have the right to vindicate their
inheritance regardless of the lapse of time. Thus, the 2 year limitation
is not applicable to those who had not taken part in the settlement or
who had no knowledge of the same.

ii.

When a portion is sold and the sale is annotated in

572

the owner-sellers title, the buyer becomes the

owner of the portion as of the registration of the
sale despite title being in the name of the ownerseller.
PURIFICACION ALARCON and ROSAURO ALARCON VS.
HONORABLE ABDULWAHID BIDIN
FACTS:
The property involved is located in Malugatay, Zamboanga
covered by an OCT in the names of Roberto Alarcon and Guillerma
Trinidad.
Roberto (father of herein petitioners) leased the property to
Esteban Sergas which was duly recorded in the OCT. After 3 yrs,
Roberto sold a portion of his undivided share to Esteban Sergas
which was entered in the title and cancelling the lease. Denying the
genuineness of the "Escrituras de Venta" under oath, and alleging
that the thumbmark in the Deed of Sale in favor of Esteban Sergas is
not Roberto Alarcon's nor is he "Alberto" Alarcon, and that the
document in favor of Adela Alvarez was neither signed by Roberto,
petitioners, as plaintiffs, filed suit for recovery of what they allege is
their portion of cadastral lot 3178 on October 23, 1978.
On July of 1928, Roberto sold another portion of his share to
Adela Alvarez who sold the same to Domingo Rojas Francisco.
Private respondents move to dismiss the complaint on the ground
that it is barred by laches. However, petitioners opposed o the ground
that no prescription can lie against their fathers recorded title.
The RTC judge dismissed the complaint as it is barred by
laches and denied reconsideration.
HELD:
Petitioners' allegation that their deceased father, Roberto Alarcon,
never sold the land in litigation is refuted by the "Escrituras de Venta"
which he had executed, one in favor of Esteban Sergas, and the
other in favor of Adela Alvarez. The denial by petitioners of the
genuineness of the deeds is overcome by the fact that from the date
of sale in favor of Esteban Sergas in 1926, the latter had taken
573

possession of the property and has been in adverse possession

under claim of ownership ever since, followed by his successors-ininterest, the private respondents surnamed Sergas. Similarly, the
other vendee, Adela Alvarez, also took possession from the date of
sale in her favor in 1928 until she sold her portion in 1954 to private
respondent Domingo Rojas Francisco, who has also been in
uninterrupted possession since said date. Noteworthy also is the fact
that from the dates of the sales in 1926 and 1928, respectively, up to
the time of his death in 1960, or approximately at least 32, and at the
most 34 years, the vendor Roberto Alarcon took no steps to rescind
the sales nor reivindicate the property. And as far as petitioners are
concerned, more than 50 years had elapsed since the execution of
the deeds of sale in 1926 and 1928 and the date they instituted suit
for recovery of possession in 1978. Clearly, their passivity and
inaction and, before them, that of their father, constituted laches. As
held by respondent Judge, their cause of action must be considered
barred for it has been converted into a stale demand. And, although,
as petitioners claim, the defense of laches is not a ground for a
motion to dismiss there would be no point to continue litigating this
case in view of the finding that petitioners are guilty thereof.
True, land registered under the Torrens System may not be acquired
by prescription or adverse possession, as petitioners correctly
contend. The protection given by law is in favor of registered owners.
As it is, although title to the disputed property is still in the name of
Roberto Alarcon, it has been subjected to the registration in 1963 of
the sale made by him to Esteban Sergas. Technically, therefore, the
latter became the owner in 1963 of the portion of the land sold to him.
It may also be stated that if petitioners' cause of action in seeking the
nullification of the sales is predicated on fraud, the same has
prescribed for not having been brought within four years from the
inscription of the deed of sale in favor of Esteban Sergas in 1963.

iii.

Rule extends to sale of real estate as a result of

foreclosure or execution sale.
574

SOSTENES CAMPILLO vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and

ZENAIDA DIAZ VDA. DE SANTOS 129 SCRA 513
FACTS:
Tomas de Vera was the owner of two parcels of land in Tondo,
Manila. In 1961, de Vera sold the lands to Simplicio Santos. Santos
however did not register the sale in the Registry of Deeds, which
means that the land was still under de Veras name.
On the other hand, de Vera was indebted to Campillo. Campillo
obtained a judgment for sum of money. De Veras 3 parcels of land,
including those sold to Santos were levied in 1962 in favor of
Campillo. Campillo acquired the land and he was able to have the
lands be registered under his name.
ISSUE:
Who has better right over the property: Santos who first
bought it w/o registering it or Campillo who subsequently purchased it
at a public auction and have it registered under his name?
HELD:
Campillo has the right over the said properties. It is settled in
this jurisdiction that a sale of real estate, whether made as a result of
a private transaction or of a foreclosure or execution sale, becomes
legally effective against third persons only from the date of its
registration. Santos purchase of the two parcels of land may be valid
but it is not enforceable against third persons for he failed to have it
registered.
Campillo is a purchaser in good faith as he was not aware of
any previous sale for Santos never caused the annotation of the sale.
The act of registration shall be the operative act to convey or
affect the land insofar as third persons are concerned, and in all
cases under this Decree, the registration shall be made in the office
of the Register of Deeds for the province or city where the land lies.
The purchaser (Campillo) in the execution sale of the registered
575

land in suit, acquires such right and interest as appears in the

certificate of title unaffected by prior lien or encumbrances not noted
therein. This must be so in order to preserve the efficacy and
conclusiveness of the certificate of title which is sanctified under our
Torrens system of land registration.

c. Rule that buyer is not required to go beyond the

certificate of title; purchaser in good faith.
i.

The purchaser is only charged with notice of the

burdens in the property which are noted on the
face of the title.

ABELARDO IBARRA, CELESTE IBARRA VS. FAUSTINO IBARRA,

SR.
FACTS:
Spouses Faustino Ibarra, Sr. and Filomena Morales bought on
installment basis two (2) parcels of land, designated as Lot No. 5 (the
lot on which they later erected a house of strong materials) and Lot
No. 6. from the San Juan Subdivision. On 19 December 1951,
Filomena Morales died, as a consequence, Transfer Certificates of
Title Nos. 45070 and 46235, were issued by the Register of Deeds of
Manila solely in the name of Faustino Ibarra, Sr. as widower.
In a Deed of Absolute Sale, dated 6 August 1971, Faustino
Ibarra, Sr. conveyed the two (2) lots, including the house on Lot No. 5
which belonged to the dissolved but undistributed conjugal
partnership of Faustino Ibarra, Sr. and Filomena Morales, for the
price of P40,000.00 to spouses Alfredo de la Rosa and Concesa P.
de Regla. On 29 September 1971, petitioners herein, claiming to be
the legitimate children of Faustino Ibarra, Sr. and the deceased
Filomena Morales, filed on action before the Court of First Instance of
Manila, praying, among others, for the nullification of the Deed of
Absolute Sale and the cancellation of Transfer Certificates of Title
576

Nos. 105276 and 105277. The lower courts upheld in toto the sale
executed by defendant Faustino Ibarra, Sr. in favor of spouses de la
Rosa and de Regla.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Deed of Absolute Sale and the
cancellation of Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 105276 and 105277
be nullified.
HELD:
Where a parcel of land, forming part of the undistributed
properties of the dissolved conjugal partnership of gains, was sold by
a widow to a purchaser who merely relied on the face of the
certificate of title thereto, issued solely in the name of the widow, the
Court held that the purchaser acquired a valid title to the land even as
against the heirs of the deceased spouse. The rationale for this rule is
that a person dealing with registered land is not required to go behind
the register to determine the condition of the property. He is only
charged with notice of the burdens on the property which are noted
on the face of the register or the certificate of title. To require him to
do more is to defeat one of the primary objects of the Torrens system.

ii.

But mere registration is not enough, good faith

must concur.

MARIA P. VDA. DE JOMOC VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:
The subject lot in Cagayan de Oro City forms part of the estate
of the late Pantaleon Jomoc. Because it was fictitiously sold and
transferred to third persons, petitioner Maria P. Vda. Jomoc, as
administratrix of the estate and in behalf of all the heirs, filed suit to
recover the property before the trial court of Misamis Oriental. The
case was decided in favor of Jomoc and was appealed by Mariano
So and one Gaw Sur Cheng to the Court of Appeals. While pending
the appeal, Jomoc executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and
577

Sale of Land with private respondent for P300,000.00. The document

was not yet signed by all the parties nor notarized but in the
meantime, Maura So had made partial payments amounting to
P49,000.00. Mariano So, agreed to settle the case by executing a
Deed of Reconveyance of the land in favor of the heirs of Pantaleon
Jomoc. On February 28, 1983, the heirs of Jomoc executed another
extra-judicial settlement with absolute sale in favor of intervenors Lim
Leong Kang and Lim Pue filing. Later, Maura So demanded from the
Jomoc family the execution of a final deed of conveyance.
Maria So sued petitioners-heirs for specific performance to
compel them to execute and deliver the proper registrable deed of
sale over the lot. Maura So had backed out from the transaction that
the Jomocs executed the other extrajudicial settlement with sale of
registered land in favor of the spouses Lim for a consideration of
P200,000.00 part of which amount was allegedly intended to be
returned to Maura So as reimbursement. The lower court, finding that
there was no sufficient evidence to show complainant-respondents'
withdrawal from the sale, concluded that: (1) the case is one of
double sale; (2) the spouses-intervenors are registrants in bad faith
who registered their questioned deed of sale long after the notice of
lis pendens of Civil Case No. 8983 was recorded.
ISSUE: Whether or not the subsequent sale to petitioner spouses
Lim is null and void.
HELD:
The Supreme Court held that the lower courts correctly ruled
that the spouses Lim do not have a better right. They purchased the
land with full knowledge of a previous sale to private respondent and
without requiring from the vendors-heirs any proof' of the prior
vendee's revocation of her purchase. They should have exercised
extra caution in their purchase especially if at the time of the sale, the
land was still covered by TCT No. 19648 bearing the name of
Mariano So and was not yet registered in the name of petitionersheirs of Pantaleon Jomoc, although it had been reconveyed to said
heirs. Not having done this, petitioners spouses Lim cannot be said to
be buyers in good faith. When they registered the sale on April 27,
1983 after having been charged with notice of lis pendens annotated
578

as early as February 28, 1983 (the same date of their purchase), they
did so in bad faith or on the belief that a registration may improve
their position being subsequent buyers of the same lot. Under Article
1544, mere registration is not enough to acquire new title. Good faith
must concur. The ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it
who in good faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property.

iii.

Good faith purchase is availed of only in cases

involving registered lands.

iv.

A buyer responding to a newspaper advertisement

is in good faith.

SPS. JUANITO R. VILLAMIL and LYDIA M. VILLAMIL VS.

LAZARO CRUZ VILLAROSA
FACTS:
Spouses Juanito and Lydia Villamil (petitioners) represented by
their son and attorney-in-fact, Winfred Villamil, filed a complaint for
annulment of title, recovery of possession, reconveyance, damages,
and injunction against the Spouses Mateo and Purificacion Tolentino
(Spouses Tolentino), Lazaro Villarosa (Villarosa) and the Register of
Deeds of Quezon City before the RTC of Quezon City.
The complaint alleged that petitioners were the registered
owners of a parcel of land situated at Siska Subdivision, Tandang
Sora, Quezon City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
223611; that Juanito Villamil Jr. asked permission from his parents,
petitioners herein, to construct a residential house on the subject lot
in April 1986; that in the first week of May 1987, petitioners visited the
lot and found that a residential house was being constructed by a
certain Villarosa; that petitioners proceeded to the Office of the
Register of Deeds to verify their title; that they discovered a Deed of
Sale dated 16 July 1979 which they purportedly executed in favor of
Cipriano Paterno (Paterno) as the vendee; that they later found out
579

that the TCT in their names was cancelled and a new one, TCT No.
351553, was issued in the name of Paterno; that a Deed of
Assignment was likewise executed by Paterno in favor of the
Spouses Tolentino, and; that on the basis of said document, TCT No.
351553 was cancelled and in its place TCT No. 351673 was issued in
the name of the Spouses Tolentino. Three months later, the Spouses
Tolentino executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Villarosa for
the sum of P276,000.00. TCT No. 354675 was issued in place of TCT
No. 351673.
Spouses Villamil asserted that the Deed of Sale in favor of
Paterno is a falsified document because they did not participate in its
execution and notarization. They also assailed the Deed of
Assignment in favor of the Spouses Tolentino as having been falsified
because the alleged assignor is a fictitious person. Finally, they
averred that the Deed of Sale between Spouses Tolentino and
Villarosa is void considering that the former did not have any right to
sell the subject property.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Spouses Tolentino are buyers in good
faith; and Villarosa, the present registered owner, is a buyer in good
faith.
HELD:
The court declared void the title of the Spouses Tolentino and
Paterno but upheld the validity of the title of Villarosa.
In the instant case, there were no traces of bad faith on
Villarosas part in acquiring the subject property by purchase.
Villarosa merely responded to a newspaper advertisement for the
sale of a parcel of land with an unfinished structure located in Tierra
Pura, Tandang Sora, Quezon City. He contacted the number
specified in the advertisement and was able to talk to a certain lady
named Annabelle who introduced him to the owner, Mateo Tolentino.
When he visited the site, he inquired from Mateo Tolentino about the
unfinished structure and was informed that the latter allegedly ran out
of money and eventually lost interest in pursuing the construction
because of his old age. Villarosa was then given a copy of the title.
He went to the Register of Deeds and was able to verify the
authenticity of the title. He also found out that the property was
580

mortgaged under the name of Mario Villamor, who turned out to be

the employer of Tolentino. Upon reaching an agreement on the price
of P276,000.00, Villarosa redeemed the title from Express Financing
Company. Thereafter, the property was released from mortgage and
a deed of sale was executed. Villarosa then secured the transfer of
title in his name.
Well-settled is the rule that every person dealing with a
registered land may safely rely on the correctness of the certificate of
title issued therefor and the law will in no way oblige him to go
beyond the certificate to determine the condition of the property.
Where there is nothing in the certificate of title to indicate any cloud or
vice in the ownership of the property, or any encumbrance thereon,
the purchaser is not required to explore further than what the Torrens
Title upon its face indicates in quest for any hidden defects or
inchoate right that may subsequently defeat his right thereto.
A forged or fraudulent document may become the root of a valid title if
the property has already been transferred from the name of the
owner to that of the forger. This doctrine serves to emphasize that a
person who deals with registered property in good faith will acquire
good title from a forger and be absolutely protected by a Torrens title.
Having made the necessary inquiries and having found the title
to be authentic, Villarosa need not go beyond the certificate of title.
When dealing with land that is registered and titled, as in this case,
buyers are not required by the law to inquire further than what the
Torrens certificate of title indicates on its face. He examined the
transferors title, which was then under the name of Spouses
Tolentino. He did not have to scrutinize each and every title and
previous owners of the property preceding Tolentino.

d. Exceptions to the above rule; instances when buyers

can go beyond the title
i.

When there exists important facts that would

create suspicion in an otherwise reasonable man
581

to go beyond the present title and to investigate

those that preceded it; prime property transferred
with unusual haste.
EAGLE REALTY CORPORATION VS. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES
FACTS:
Eagle Realty, a company engaged in the real estate business,
bought a parcel of land from a certain Reyes in 1984 via a Deed of
Sale. This Reyes acquired the land from a certain Medina who earlier
acquired the said land via surreptitiously entering a false record in the
records of the Land Registration Commission. Eventually, the true
owners of the said land, the de Leons, discovered that another title
was fraudulently issued to Medina over the same parcel of land. De
Leon was able to have the said title annulled as well as the TCT
issued to Eagle Realty by virtue of the Deed of Sale.
ISSUE: Whether or not Eagle Realty is an innocent purchaser.
HELD:
No. Case law has it that he who alleges that he is a purchaser
in good faith and for value of registered land bears the onus of
proving such statement. This burden is not discharged by involving
the ordinary presumption of good faith.
Petitioner failed to discharge this burden. In its Answer,
petitioner merely alleged that it is an innocent purchaser for value
since it acquired the land from Pilarita Reyes for P1,200,000.00,
without notice of any defect in her title and after verifying the
genuineness of the title in the Register of Deeds of Pasay City and
the LRC. However, petitioner did not present any proof that would
substantiate this allegation nor did it present any evidence to show
that it took other steps to verify the authenticity of its predecessor's
title.

582

Indeed, the general rule is that a purchaser may rely on what

appears on the face of a certificate of title. He may be considered a
purchaser in good faith even if he simply examines the latest
certificate of title. An exception to this rule is when there exist
important facts that would create suspicion in an otherwise
reasonable man (and spur him) to go beyond the present title and to
investigate those that preceded it. The presence of anything which
excites or arouses suspicion should then prompt the vendee to look
beyond the certificate and investigate the title of the vendor as
appearing on the face of said certificate. One who falls within the
exception can neither be denominated an innocent purchaser for
value nor a purchaser in good faith, hence, does not merit the
protection of the law.
Moreover, petitioner is a corporation engaged in the real estate
business. A corporation engaged in the buying and selling of real
estate is expected to exercise a higher standard of care and diligence
in ascertaining the status and condition of the property subject of its
business transaction. Similar to investment and financing
corporations, it cannot simply rely on an examination of a Torrens
certificate to determine what the subject property, looks like as its
condition is not apparent in the document.

ii.

Failure to make the necessary inquiries as facts

may warrant.

EGAO VS. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. L-79787 June 29, 1989
583

FACTS:
Private respondents Severo Dignos and Severo Bontilao, who
claimed themselves as the legitimate owners and possessors of two
parcels of land situated in Bukidnon, filed a verified complaint for
Quieting of Title and/or Recovery of Possession and Ownership
against petitioners Apolonio and Beatriz Egao. Allegedly, sometime in
June 1983, herein petitioners occupied illegally portions of the land,
which they bought from Marfori. Petitioners, however, asserted that
Apolonio Egao is the registered owner of the subject parcels of land
and that he and his family have been in actual, physical, adverse,
open and continuous possession thereof even before the issuance to
him of the free patent; that the land has never been sold by reason of
the prohibition against alienation under CA No. 141; and that the
instant case was the fourth in a series filed against the Egaos and is
part of respondents' scheme to grab said parcel of land from the
petitioners.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Deeds of Sale executed between the
purchasers and the petitioners is valid.
HELD:
No. Deeds of sale of patented lands, perfected within the
prohibited five year period are null and void. No title passed from the
Egaos to Marfori which could be validly transferred to herein
respondents.
Moreover, respondents are not innocent purchasers for value.
Where a purchaser neglects to make the necessary inquiries and
closes his eyes to facts which should put a reasonable man on his
guard as to the possibility of the existence of a defect in his vendor's
title, and relying on the belief that there was no defect in the title of
the vendor, purchases the property without making any further
investigation, he cannot claim that he is a purchaser in good faith for
value. Accordingly, respondents who are not innocent purchasers for
value have no standing to question petitioners' right to the land and to
file an action for quieting of title.
iii.

Presence of strong indications to impel closer

inquiry as dictated by common sense.
584

FRANCISCO VS. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. L-30162 August 31, 1987
FACTS:
Nicolasa Resurreccion, the owner in fee simple of a three
parcels of land located at Taytay, Rizal, sold Lots Numbered 3 and 9
to one Agustin Esguerra. On March 16, 1926, Esguerra sold the
same two parcels to the spouses, Pedro Francisco and Francisca
Tolentino. The spouses registered the sale under Act No. 3344, and
declared the property for taxation purposes in the name of Pedro
Francisco. Afterwards, the property was declared in the name of their
son, Candido Francisco, the petitioner, who continued in possession
of the property after his parents demise. Three years later,
Resurreccion executed another deed of sale dated conveying all the
three parcels of land covered by her title, in favor of a certain Felisa
Afable, who registered the sale under the Torrens Act and obtained
title in her own name. Thirty-one years afterwards, Afable sold the
property to the persons now private respondents. Espiritus asked
Francisco to vacate lots Numbered 3 and 9, which the latter was
occupying and on which was in fact standing a house that he had
constructed. As might be expected, Candido refused. The Espiritus
thereupon sued him for recovery of title and possession in the Court
of First Instance of Rizal.
ISSUE:Whether or not under the admitted facts, the Espiritus are
buyers in good faith, and therefore entitled to the full protection of the
Torrens Act.

HELD:
No. There were sufficient strong indications to impel a closer
inquiry into the location, boundaries and condition of the two smaller
lots embraced in the purchase on the part of Casimiro Espiritu and
his co-vendees. That inquiry is in truth dictated by common sense,
expected of a man of ordinary prudence. Had that inquiry been made,
the adverse claim of Candido Francisco over the two small lots would
have immediately come to light, and the controversy would have died
a-borning.
585

The Espiritus failure to undertake such an inquiry precludes

their successful invocation of the character of purchasers in good
faith. The buyer, who could not have failed to know or discover that
the land sold to him was in the adverse possession of another, is a
buyer in bad faith, such knowledge being equivalent to registration.

iv.

Purchase of land not from registered owner but

from someone whose name is only annotated as a
buyer at the back of the owners copy of the title.

QUIIANO vs CA 39 SCRA 221, May 31, 1971

FACTS:

The original owners of the disputed parcels located in

Pangasinan were the spouses Fabiano Sarmiento and Tomasa de
Guzman obtained a "titulo real de composicion gratuita". The
spouses had two children.

One of them was Joaquina, the mother of the principal

petitioner, Marta Quinano. In 1932, there was an extra-judicial
partition adjudicating such lots to Jose and Marta Quinano filed an
application for a free patent in 1941 in order to acquire the same and
she was successful. She was likewise able to take possession during
the early part of the Japanese Occupation.

It was not until a complaint for reconveyance with damages

was filed with private respondents as plaintiffs wherein they alleged
that the free patent was obtained by Quinano without their knowledge
586

and they learned that she had sold Lots 6 and 8 as well as threefourths of Lot 5 to a certain Felix Capito; on December 7, 1946, she
sold the remaining one-fourth of Lot 5 to Antero Sanchez, with the
former in turn having transferred his rights to now petitioner
Celedonio Fermin without such vendees, however, obtaining any
certificate of title in their names. were sustained in the lower court
decision as to Lots 1, 3, 4, 7, 9 and 11.

Their action was dismissed as to Lots 2 and 10 as well as to the

present disputed Lots 5, 6 and 8. Their action was dismissed as to
Lots 2 and 10 as well as to the present disputed Lots 5, 6 and 8 and
elevated the matter to the CA and it decreed a reconveyance in their
favor as well as ordering the receiver appointed "to deliver these
properties unto the plaintiffs as well as the net harvest during his
receivership. Hence this petition for review.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA was correct in its judgment sustaining
an action for reconveyance of three parcels of land in favor of private
respondents.

HELD:
The law was correctly applied. In a 1953 decision, Director of
Lands v. Register of Deeds of Rizal. Thus: "The sole remedy of the
land owner whose property has been wrongfully or erroneously
registered in another's name is, after one year from the date of the
decree, not to set aside the decree, as was done in the instant case,
but, respecting the decree as incontrovertible and no longer open to
review, to bring an ordinary action in the ordinary court of justice for
reconveyance or, if the property has passed into the hands of an
innocent purchaser for value, for damages." In the language of the
then Justice, later Chief Justice, Bengzon,: "A different view would
encourage fraud and permit one person unjustly to enrich himself at
the expense of another." It would indeed be a signal failing of any
legal system if under the circumstances disclosed, the aggrieved
party is considered as having lost his right to a property to which he is
587

entitled. It is one thing to protect an innocent third party; it is entirely a

different matter if deceit would be rewarded by allowing the
perpetrator to enjoy the fruits of his nefarious deed. As clearly
revealed by the undeviating line of decisions from the SC, such an
undesirable eventuality is precisely sought to be guarded against. So
it has been before and so it should continue to be. The decision of
the respondent court is affirmed.

v.

A purchaser of a land whose title contains a notice

of lis pendens is a purchaser in bad faith.

PNB VS CA 98 SCRA 207 (1980)

FACTS:

At the cadastral proceedings during the adjudication of the

conjugal property of spouses Iigo Bitanga and Rosa Ver, the
Cadastral Court rendered a decision and a decree of registration of
the lot was issued. Thereafter, a corresponding title in the name of
the spouses Iigo Bitanga and Rosa Ver was likewise issued and in
the Registry Books of the RD of Ilocos Norte. Before the issuance of
the said original certificate however, Iigo Bitanga died. On October
20, 1936, Rosa Ver mortgaged the entire property in favor of the
PNB. In the meantime, Rosa Ver had defaulted in the fulfillment of her
obligation with the Manila Trading Company so the said company
levied upon her share in the lot in question and had the attachment
annotated on the title. Rosa Ver's interest in the lot afterwards sold at
public auction, at which the MTCom was the highest bidder and the
deed of sale in favor of the MTCom was annotated on the title.

588

Because Rosa Ver failed to settle her obligation with thePNB,

the latter sold at public auction the whole lot and PNB emerged as
the highest bidder. After the period of redemption had expired, the
PNB consolidated its title over it but it was not annotated upon the
owner's duplicate certificate of title. Later, the PNB presented a
petition before the trial court asking that the owner's certificate of title
No. 7683 be declared null and void, and a new certificate of title be
issued in its name. The trial court favored them. Later, the PNB sold
the property in question to Felizardo Reyes. On November 16, 1960,
the trial court rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiffs and
intervenors finding and holding that: (a) The lot in question is a
conjugal partnership property, one-half of which must go to the heirs
of the late Iigo Bitanga; (b) The other half goes to Rosa Ver as her
share; (c) That Felizardo Reyes is not a purchaser of a registered
land for value and in good faith, and (d) Since the issuance of TCT
No. 3944 in favor of the PNB, and Owner's Duplicate Certificate of
Title No. 3944, in favor of Felizardo Reyes were without legal basis,
they are declared nun and void and cancelled. On appeal by PNB
and Felizardo Reyes to the CA, respondent Court affirmed the
judgment appealed from except letter (d) thereof and ordered the RD
to issue another certificate of title in the names of the plaintiffs and
intervenors.

ISSUE: Whether or not The CA erred in holding that the mortgage

deed is valid and existing only with respect to the one-half portion of
the lot in question allegedly belonging to the mortgagor Rosa Ver as
her share in the conjugal partnership with her husband Iigo Bitanga.

HELD:
The SC fully agree with the trial court and the respondent Court
and affirm the holding that "what the Philippine National Bank had
acquired from Rosa Ver by virtue of the mortgage was simply onehalf () of the entire property, for this was all she had in her power to
convey the other half being, as it still is, the lawful share of the
plaintiffs-appellees as inheritance from their father, Iigo
589

Bitanga. Nemo date quod non habet One cannot give what is not
his. There is no dispute that the document of mortgage executed by
Rosa Ver was in accordance with the formalities required by law and
that was register in the day book of the Register of Deeds of Ilocos
Norte within a month after its execution. What is here contested is
whether Rosa Ver could, as she did in fact, m the entire Lot 9068 to
petitioner PNB. In other words, the issue refers to the intrinsic vanity
of the mortgage, as distinguished from its formal sufficiency.

Under Article 2085, New Civil Code (Art. 1857, Old Civil Code),
one of the essential requisites to the contract of pledge and mortgage
is that the pledgor or mortgagor be the absolute owner of the thing
pledged or mortgaged. And under Article 493, New Civil Code (Art.
399, Old Civil Code), each co-owner shall have the full ownership of
his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may
therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another
person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved.
But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the
co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him
in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership. And also
applying the law in force at the time of Inigo Bitanga's death in 1935,
Rosa Ver, as surviving spouse, cannot take part legally in the sharing
of the estate left by her deceased husband (one-half () of Lot 9068)
with respect to which she only had usufructuary rights. "The
usufructuary not being an owner, cannot alienate or dispose of the
objects included in the usufruct. Thus, he cannot ... mortgage or
pledge the thing.

Therefore this court reject PNB's contention that the mortgage

constituted by Rosa Ver in its favor on October 20, 1936 is valid and
covers the entire property known as Lot 9068. And a purchaser of a
land whose title contains a notice of lispendens is a purchaser in bad
faith.

590

vi.

A statement that buyers purchased land with full

knowledge of the flaws and defects in the title of
their vendors is enough proof of their bad faith.

BERNALES vs IAC
FACTS:
The lot in question was a public land which was cadastrally
surveyed. Henry Siagan is the father of both Elpidio Siagan whose
mother is Cagaoay Camiling and Augusto Siagan whose mother is
Dagaoan Sawadan. Both sons of Henry Siagan and their successorsin-interest are the contending parties in this case, claiming ownership
of the land in question.
Petitioners claim that Dagaoan Sawadan acquired ownership
over subject land by means of continuous, adverse and peaceful
possession since time immemorial. Augusto Siagan inherited Lot
1494 but his son Constante alleging in a Deed of Absolute Sale dated
February 16, 1967 that he inherited the same from his late
grandmother, sold the lot in question to the Pasimio spouses and
registered said instrument. The Pasimio spouses in turn sold the
same lot to the Roman Catholic Bishop of Bangued, Inc. who bought
the same for the sole purpose of disposing the same at cost to the
actual occupants-tenants. Said tenants are now the petitioners
herein. Elpidio Siagan applied in September, 1967 for Free Patent
over said lot on 1968. Subsequently, the original certificate of title
covering said lot, was issued in the name of Elpidio Siagan.On May
5, 1973, or after the lapse of five (5) years, Elpidio Siagan sold it to
the spouses Cadiam, and the TCT was issued in their names.
Following their purchase, said spouses took possession of the
land, fenced it and planted it with rice but herein petitioners on 1974,
forcibly dispossessed them uprooting the plants of said couple who
then brought a criminal complaint for theft of rice plants against the
petitioners. This led to the referral of the criminal charge to the Court
of Agrarian Relations but because petitioners claimed ownership in
their answer before the CAR, spouses Cadiam filed a civil action for
recovery of ownership of the same lot.
591

ISSUE: Whether or not the spouses Cadiam have a better title over
the disputed land than Bernales and his co-plaintiffs
HELD:
Yes. In the case at bar, the Cadiam spouses who were found by
the Court of Appeals as innocent purchasers for value with a Transfer
Certificate of Title under the Torrens System in their names, have
evidently a better right than herein petitioners
As aforestated, the Cadiam spouses to whom a Transfer
Certificate of Title was issued after the purchase of the lot from
Elpidio Siagan for a valuable consideration as stated in the Deed and
who had no knowledge of any flaw or defect of the title at the time of
the purchase, are evidently as ruled by the Court of Appeals, innocent
purchasers for value and above all considerations, are entitled to the
protection of the law.
Petitioners admitted that the land in dispute was originally
public land. According to them it became private land because of the
long possession of Dagaoan Sawadan. They allege that she had
been in possession since 1908 and that she brought said lot to the
marriage which as will be noted was allegedly also in 1908 giving
credence to the fact that said lot was formerly owned, occupied and
possessed by Henry Siagan since time immemorial, as agreed and
stipulated by the parties during the pre-trial conference. Under the
circumstances, the Court of Appeals correctly observed that whether
Lot 1494 descended from Henry Siagan as claimed by private
respondents or from Dagaoan Sawadan, the mother of Augusto
Siagan as claimed by the petitioners, it is undeniable that Augusto
Siagan had already quit-claimed, ceded and conveyed whatever
rights or interest he had over said lot in favor of Elpidio Siagan.
Petition for review on certiorari is denied.

vii.

A buyer who purchases land with full knowledge of

592

a previous sale to another person cannot be

considered in good faith notwithstanding that the
second sale was registered.
VDA. DE JOMOC VS CA
FACTS:
The lot in question was a public land which was cadastrally
surveyed. Henry Siagan is the father of both Elpidio Siagan whose
mother is Cagaoay Camiling and Augusto Siagan whose mother is
Dagaoan Sawadan. Both sons of Henry Siagan and their successorsin-interest are the contending parties in this case, claiming ownership
of the land in question.
Petitioners claim that Dagaoan Sawadan acquired ownership
over subject land by means of continuous, adverse and peaceful
possession since time immemorial. Augusto Siagan inherited Lot
1494 but his son Constante alleging in a Deed of Absolute Sale dated
February 16, 1967 that he inherited the same from his late
grandmother, sold the lot in question to the Pasimio spouses and
registered said instrument. The Pasimio spouses in turn sold the
same lot to the Roman Catholic Bishop of Bangued, Inc. who bought
the same for the sole purpose of disposing the same at cost to the
actual occupants-tenants. Said tenants are now the petitioners
herein. Elpidio Siagan applied in September, 1967 for Free Patent
over said lot on 1968. Subsequently, the original certificate of title
covering said lot, was issued in the name of Elpidio Siagan.On May
5, 1973, or after the lapse of five (5) years, Elpidio Siagan sold it to
the spouses Cadiam, and the TCT was issued in their names.
Following their purchase, said spouses took possession of the
land, fenced it and planted it with rice but herein petitioners on 1974,
forcibly dispossessed them uprooting the plants of said couple who
then brought a criminal complaint for theft of rice plants against the
petitioners. This led to the referral of the criminal charge to the Court
of Agrarian Relations but because petitioners claimed ownership in
their answer before the CAR, spouses Cadiam filed a civil action for
recovery of ownership of the same lot.

593

ISSUE: Whether or not the spouses Cadiam have a better title over
the disputed land than Bernales and his co-plaintiffs
HELD:
Yes. In the case at bar, the Cadiam spouses who were found by
the Court of Appeals as innocent purchasers for value with a Transfer
Certificate of Title under the Torrens System in their names, have
evidently a better right than herein petitioners
As aforestated, the Cadiam spouses to whom a Transfer
Certificate of Title was issued after the purchase of the lot from
Elpidio Siagan for a valuable consideration as stated in the Deed and
who had no knowledge of any flaw or defect of the title at the time of
the purchase, are evidently as ruled by the Court of Appeals, innocent
purchasers for value and above all considerations, are entitled to the
protection of the law.
Petitioners admitted that the land in dispute was originally
public land. According to them it became private land because of the
long possession of Dagaoan Sawadan. They allege that she had
been in possession since 1908 and that she brought said lot to the
marriage which as will be noted was allegedly also in 1908 giving
credence to the fact that said lot was formerly owned, occupied and
possessed by Henry Siagan since time immemorial, as agreed and
stipulated by the parties during the pre-trial conference. Under the
circumstances, the Court of Appeals correctly observed that whether
Lot 1494 descended from Henry Siagan as claimed by private
respondents or from Dagaoan Sawadan, the mother of Augusto
Siagan as claimed by the petitioners, it is undeniable that Augusto
Siagan had already quit-claimed, ceded and conveyed whatever
rights or interest he had over said lot in favor of Elpidio Siagan.
Petition for review on certiorari is denied.

e. Double sales
First sale registered in good faith prevails
594

DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. LAZARO

MANGAWANG, ET AL.

FACTS:
Gavino Amposta applied with the Director of Lands for the
issuance of a homestead patent over a parcel of land situated at
Balanga, Bataan. Cadastral court issued a decree of registration of
the land in favor of Amposta.

Amposta sold the land to Santos Camacho. SantosCamacho sold the land to Bonifacio Camacho as a result of which
Transfer Certificate of Title was issued to the latter. Bonifacio
Camacho mortgaged the land to the Rehabilitation Finance
Corporation (now Development Bank of the Philippines), and having
failed to pay the loan as agreed upon the land was sold at public
auction to said bank as the highest bidder. The period of redemption
having elapsed without Camacho being able to redeem the property,
a final deed of sale was executed in favor of the bank, and Transfer
Certificate of Title was issued in its name.
Gavino Amposta again sold the same property to Lazaro and Arsenio
Mangawang. Vendees paid the balance of the purchase price, and an
absolute deed of sale was executed in their favor. Mangawang
brothers took possession thereof, and upon learning of this transfer,
the Development Bank of the Philippines, filed an action to recover its
possession and damages. Court rendered decision awarding the land
to the Mangawang brothers. Seasonably, the bank appealed to this
Court.
ISSUE: Who of the two buyers should be considered as the rightful
owner of the land.
HELD:
It can also be treated as one of double sale, where a person
sells the same land to two different persons who are unaware of the
595

flaw that lies in its title, and where the law adjudicates the property to
the purchaser who first registers the transaction in his name in the
registry of property
And applying the principle of double sale, Supreme court cannot
conclude that the title should likewise be adjudicated to appellant
whose predecessor-in-interest acquired and registered the property
much ahead in point of time than the appellees. Verily, the title
acquired by the latter is invalid and ineffective, contrary to the finding
of the court a quo.

REALTY SALES ENTERPRISES VS IAC

FACTS:
Two parcels of land are in dispute for allegedly being covered
by certificates of title and registration decrees under three (3) different
entities, namely Morris Carpo, Quezon City Devt. and Financing
Corp. (QCDF) and Realty Sales Enterprise, Inc. (Realty). Thus,Carpo
instituted a complaint before the CFI under Respondent Judge Vera
against Realty and Macondray Farms, Inc. (Macondray) for the
declaration of nullity of its corresponding certificate of title, on the
ground that the same was issued by a court not sitting as a land
registration court but one of ordinary jurisdiction, and that the judge
had no authority since the records which was made basis of the title
was lost during the war and is pending reconstitution.
In reply, Realty denied the allegations and countered that the
ReyesCourt which issued its title was performing a purely ministerial
duty and that it was Carpos title that was null for having been issued
despite being covered by another title. Realty further impleaded
through a third-party complaint QCDF for nullity of its own title
covering the same subject properties. In reply, QCDF filed a fourthparty complaint against Alvendia, et al.being the source of its own
title, praying therefor for the reimbursement of its purchase price paid
596

for the said properties.

However, the same was dismissed for QCDFs lack of interest
in prosecuting the case. On January 20, 1981, the trial court
rendered judgment annulling Realtys and QCDFs titles to the property
in favor of Carpo. The same was appealed before the High Court by
Realty, but the latter resolved to refer the case the Court of Appeals
for determination of the merits. The CA in turn set aside the trial
courts decision and issued a new one in favor of Realty. However,
the case was subjected to the reorganization of the Judiciary, from
which resulted a re-raffling of the case and later on, a reversal of the
prior decision through
Carpos Motion for Reconsideration. Further, the change from CA to IAC
yielded a change in Justices assigned to the case
ISSUE: Whether or not Carpos title is valid as against Realtys and
QCDFs, since Realtys title was issued when the records relative
thereto was undergoing reconstitution.
HELD:
No. Applying the doctrine in the Nacua decision to LRC Case
No.657, the parties thereto did not have to commence a new action but only
had to go back to the preceding stage where records are available.
The land registration case itself remained pending and the Court of
First Instance of Rizal continued to have jurisdiction over it. The
records were destroyed at that stage of the casewhen an that
remained to be done was the ministerial duty of the Land Registration
Office to issue a decree of registration (which would be the basis for
the issuance of an Original Certificate of Title) to implement a
judgment which had become final.
In case of double sale of land in good faith, ownership, passes
to the buyer who first registered sale in the RD.
SOSTENES CAMPILLO VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and
ZENAIDA DIAZ VDA. DE SANTOS
G.R. No. L-56483 May 29, 1984

597

FACTS:
On February 27, 1961, Tomas de Vera and his wife Felisa
Serafico sold two parcels of land to Simplicio Santos. Said sale was
however never presented for registration in the office of the Registry
of Deeds of Manila nor noted in the title covering the property.
On January 27, 1962, petitioner Sostenes Campillo obtained a
judgment for a sum of money against Tomas de Vera. The Petitioner
obtained an order for the issuance of a writ of execution, pursuant
thereto, the City Sheriff levied on three parcels of land in the name of
Tomas de Vera, including the two parcels of land which the latter
previously sold to Simplicio Santos.
On June 26, 1962, notice of the sale of said lots was issued by
the Sheriff and published in the "Daily Record" and La Nueva Era."
On July 25, 1962, the three parcels of land were sold at public
auction in favor of petitioner who was issued the corresponding
certificate of sale. After the lapse of one year, the City Sheriff
executed the final deed of sale in favor of petitioner over the three
parcels of land levied and sold on execution.
Claiming to be the owner of the two parcels of land by reason of
the previous sale to him by Tomas de Vera, Simplicio Santos filed an
action to annul the levy, notice of sale, sale at public auction and final
deed of sale in favor of petitioner Campillo.
Herein petitioner, alleged that he is an innocent purchaser for
value and that the supposed previous sale could not be preferred
over the levy and sale at public action because it was not registered.
The RTC upheld the validity of the levy and sale at public
auction. On appeal at the instance of the herein private respondent,
the respondent appellate court modified the decision of the lower
court.
The appellate court said that the subject lots could not be
legally levied upon to satisfy the judgment debt of the de Veras in
favor of petitioner because at the time of the execution sale, the
judgment debtor, having previously sold said properties, was no
598

longer the owner thereof.

ISSUE: Whether who has a better right or title to the herein disputed
two parcels of land Simplicio Santos who earlier purchased them
in a private sale but failed to register his sale, or petitioner Sostenes
Campillo who subsequently purchased them at an execution sale and
obtained a certificate of title.
HELD: In case of double sale of land in good faith, ownership of the
land passes to the buyer who first registered sale in the Register of
Deeds.
RULING:
It is settled in this jurisdiction that a sale of real estate, whether
made as a result of a private transaction or of a foreclosure or
execution sale, becomes legally effective against third persons only
from the date of its registration.
While it may be true in the case of Leyson vs. Tanada, that
purchasers at execution sales should bear in mind that the rule
of caveat emptor applies to such sales, that the sheriff does not
warrant the title to real property sold by him as sheriff, and that it is
not incumbent on him to place the purchaser in possession of such
property, still the rule applies that a person dealing with registered
land is not required to go behind the register to determine the
condition of the property and he is merely charged with notice of the
burdens on the property which are noted on the face of the register or
the certificate of title.
Hence, the petitioner herein, as the purchaser in the execution
sale of the registered land in suit, acquires such right and interest as
appears in the certificate of title unaffected by prior lien or
encumbrances not noted therein. This must be so in order to
preserve the efficacy and conclusiveness of the certificate of title
which is sanctified under our Torrens system of land registration.
Petition granted.

599

DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. LAZARO

MANGAWANG
G.R. No. L-18861 June 30, 1964
FACTS:
Gavino Amposta applied with the Director of Lands for the
issuance of a homestead patent over a parcel of land situated at
Balanga, Bataan. Pending action on his application, cadastral
proceedings were instituted by the government in said municipality
wherein Amposta filed an answer praying for the adjudication of the
same land in his favor.
On March 8, 1920, the cadastral court rendered decision
awarding the land to Amposta. Since no advice on this matter was
given either to the Bureau of Lands or to the Governor General, the
latter, issued in favor of Amposta Homestead Patent covering the
same land, and Original Certificate of Title was issued to him by the
Governor-General.
On December 20, 1922, the cadastral court issued a decree of
registration of the land in favor of Amposta pursuant to the decision
rendered in the cadastral case.
On November 24, 1941, Amposta sold the land to Santos
Camacho surrendering to him Original Certificate of Title, thus a
Transfer Certificate of Title was issued to Camacho.
On November 18, 1946, Santos-Camacho sold the land to
Bonifacio Camacho as a result of which another Transfer Certificate
of Title was issued to the latter. On April 28, 1948, Bonifacio
Camacho mortgaged the land to the Development Bank of the
Philippines and having failed to pay the loan as agreed upon the land
was sold at public auction to said bank as the highest bidder.
Meanwhile, or on June 11, 1947, Gavino Amposta again sold
the same property to Lazaro and Arsenio Mangawang. In connection
with this transaction, Amposta surrendered to the vendees the title
600

that was issued to him in the cadastral case, which was later
substituted by a Transfer Certificate of Title issued in the name of the
vendees.
Upon learning of this transfer, the Development Bank of the
Philippines, commenced the present action against them to recover
its possession and damages.
Appellees contend that their right over the property in litigation
should be restored because the certificate of title they are holding is
derived from that issued pursuant to a decision rendered by a
cadastral court, while the title being held by appellant was merely
based on the title issued in an administrative proceeding, upon the
theory that a judicial title is deemed preferred to one issued
administratively.
ISSUES: Whether the petitioner bank or respondent Mangawang is
considered the rightful owner of the land herein in dispute.
HELD: DBP is the rightful owner of the land in dispute.
RULING:
Amposta first sold the land to Santos Camacho on November
24, 1941, who registered it in his name on the same date. Seven
years thereafter, Amposta again sold the land to the Mangawang
brother, who also registered it in their name on the same date. Since
both purchasers apparently have acted in good faith, as there is
nothing in the evidence to show that they did otherwise, the sale
made by Amposta to Santos Camacho is the valid one considering
that when Amposta sold the same land to the Mangawang brothers
he had nothing more to sell even if the title he surrendered to them is
one issued covering the same property. In legal contemplation,
therefore, Amposta sold a property he no longer owned, and hence
the transaction is legally ineffective.
On the other hand, the case under consideration can also be
viewed under a different angle. It can also be treated as one of
double sale, where a person sells the same land to two different
persons who are unaware of the flaw that lies in its title, and where
the law adjudicates the property to the purchaser who first registers
601

the transaction in his name in the registry of property.And applying

this principle, the title should likewise be adjudicated to appellant
whose predecessor-in-interest acquired and registered the property
much ahead in point of time than the appellees. Verily, the title
acquired by the latter is invalid and ineffective.
Petition granted.

i.

As between parties

GATIOAN VS. GAFFUD ET AL 27 SCRA 706

FACTS:
The land in question was originally registered in the name of
Rufina Permison under Original Certificate of Title No. L-3432, dated
December 18, 1935 on the basis of a free patent. In the year 1948,
Permison sold it to Sibreno Novesteras, who in turn, conveyed it to
appellee Encarnacion Gatioan on April 1, 1949. Through the initiative
of appellee, the said Original Certificate of Title No. L-3432 in the
name of Rufina Permison was cancelled on June 3, 1949 and in lieu
thereof Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-1212 was issued in favor of
Gatioan.
On June 12, 1950, Gatioan obtained a loan in the amount of
P900.00 from the Philippine National Bank, and as security therefor,
mortgaged the land described in TCT No. T-1212. After payment,
using the same land and title as collateral, he acquired another loan
in the sum of P1,100.00 from the same bank on May 3, 1954, and a
third loan on July 18, 1957, P2,800,00.
In the meantime, on January 23, 1956, spouses Sixto Gaffud
and Villamora Logan procured a free patent covering the identical
parcel of land described in TCT No. T-1212 of Gatioan, on the basis
of which Original Certificate of Title No. P-6038 was issued in their
favor. On May 15, 1956 and January 8, 1957, they also obtained two
loans from the Bank in the sum of P1,400.00 and P300.00,
602

respectively, and as collateral for both, they mortgaged the said land
covered by OCT No. P-6038.
On May 16, 1962, because of the existence of OCT No. P6038 in the name of spouses Gaffud and Logan, containing an
annotation of the aforementioned consolidated mortgage in favor of
the Bank, and the annotation on TCT No. T-1212 of the mortgage
encumbrance covering the already paid loan of P2,800.00 to the
Gatioan, which appellant Bank refused to have cancelled, Gatioan
filed the complaint for quieting of title in this case.
The lower court declared null and void ab initio the patent and
certificate of title No. P-6038 issued in the name of the defendant
spouses Sixto Gaffud and Villamora Logan and ordered also its
cancellation. Declaring the real estate mortgage executed by the
defendant spouses Sixto Gaffud and Villamora Logan in favor of the
Bank, recorded on OCT P-6038 null and void and unenforceable as
against the herein plaintiff, and ordering its cancellation, without
prejudice of the Bank's right to collect from the said spouses;
The Bank appealed, insisting that the lower court should have
declared it an innocent mortgagee in good faith and for value as
regards the mortgages executed in its favor by said spouses and duly
annotated on their abovementioned OCT P-6038 and that
consequently, the said mortgage annotations should be carried over
to and considered as encumbrances on the land covered by TCT No.
T-1212 of Gatioan which, as already stated, is the identical land
covered by OCT P-6038 of the Gaffuds.
ISSUE: Who has the better right of title in case of double sale through
a free patent application?
HELD:
We find no merit, whatsoever, in this contention, because the
point raised was already passed upon by this Court in no uncertain
terms in Legarda v. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590, way back on October 2,
1915 and in subsequent cases of similar nature. We unhesitatingly
affirm the judgment of the lower court.
Moreover, it is a matter of judicial notice that before a bank
603

grants a loan on the security of land, it first undertakes a careful

examination of the title of the applicant as well as a physical and onthe-spot investigation of the land itself offered as security.
Undoubtedly, had herein appellant Bank taken such a step which is
demanded by the most ordinary prudence, it would have easily
discovered the flaw in the title of the defendant spouses; and if it did
not conduct such examination and investigation, it must be held to be
guilty of gross negligence in granting them the loans in question. In
either case, appellant Bank cannot be considered as a mortgagee in
good faith within the contemplation of the law.
Under the circumstances, the bank had absolutely no excuse
for approving the application of the defendant spouses and giving the
loans in question. To appellant, therefore, fittingly applies the
following pronouncement of this Court:
One who purchases real estate with knowledge of a defect or
lack of, title in his vendor cannot claim that he has acquired title
thereto in good faith as against the true owner of the land or of
an interest therein; and the same rule must be applied to one
who has knowledge of facts which should have put him upon
such inquiry and investigation as might be necessary to
acquaint him with the defects in the title of his vendor. A
purchaser cannot close his eyes to facts which should put a
reasonable man upon his guard, and then claim that he acted in
good faith under the belief that there was no defect in the title of
the vendor. His mere refusal to believe that such defect exists
or his willful closing of his eyes to the possibility of the
existence of a defect in his vendor's title will not make him an
innocent purchaser for value, if it afterwards develops that the
title was in fact defective, and it appears that he had such
notice of the defect as would have led to its discovery had be
acted with that measure of precaution which may reasonably be
required of a prudent man in a like situation..... (Dayao v. Diez,
supra; citing the case of Leung Yee v. Strong Machinery. Co.,
37 Phil; 644.)
In any event, again, the following ruling of this Court in the recent
case of De Villa v. Trinidad, G.R. No. L-24918, March 20, 1968,
applies to appellant:
604

We have laid the rule that where two certificates of title around
issued to different persons covering the same land in whole or
in part, the earlier in date must prevail as between original
parties and in case of successive registrations where more than
one certificate is issued over the land, the person holding under
the prior certificate is entitled to the land as against the person
who rely on the second certificate. The purchaser from the
owner of the later certificate and his successors, should resort
to his vendor for redress, rather than molest the holder of the
first certificate and his successors, who should be permitted to
resort secure in their title. (Citing Legarda v. Saleeby, 31 Phil.
590)

DE VILLA VS. TRINIDAD, 22 SCRA 1167

FACTS:
Cesario Fabricante owned 5,724,415 square meters of land,
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 50, who mortgaged the
same in April 18, 1944 to De Villa for a loan to whom he surrendered
his duplicate certificate, and with whom it remained until it was lost.
On November 3, 1945, Cesario Fabricante petitioned the CFI
for the issuance of a new duplicate of TCT No. 50 upon the alleged
ground that his duplicate was lost. Felix de Villa, the mortgage
creditor was not notified.
November 27, 1945, Fabricante sold the land to Eustaquio
Palma who in turn mortgaged the same property in favor of the
Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP). When Palma failed to
pay the loan, DBP foreclosed the mortgage extrajudicially, and
possessed it as DBP is the highest bidder,
On October 11, 1951, Palma assigned his right of redemption to
Anacleto Trinidad who then took possession of the land.
605

Meanwhile, De Villa, having lost the duplicate of TCT No. 50

surrendered to him by Fabricante and learning that the original was
lost in the Register of Deeds, filed before the CFI on June 12, 1948 a
petition to reconstitute the same in favor of Cesario Fabricante with
the annotation of the mortgage in his favor.
When Fabricante failed to redeem the land, De Villa foreclosed
the mortgage and bought the land in public auction as highest bidder.
On January 30, 1961, De Villa secured TCT No. 3347 in his name
and Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-29 (50) was cancelled.
On January 26, 1962, De Villa filed the present complaint in the
CFI against Anacleto Trinidad for declaration of ownership, recovery
of the land.
The CFI found that the mortgage in De Villa's favor had been
annotated at the back of both the original and the duplicate of TCT
No. 50; that TCT No. RT-29(50), the reconstituted title from which De
Villa derived TCT No. 3347, covers Lot No. 9, Plan PSU 1185, and
originated from OCT No. 183, issued on January 30, 1920, while the
duplicate title issued to Fabricante on which Palma's TCT No. 12 was
based, as well as the TCT No. 1115 of DBP, covers Lot No. 2, Plan
PSU 11885, and originated from OCT No. 34, issued on November
25, 1920; that the two title certificates were issued covering the same
land and the rule is that the earlier in date Original Certificate of
Title No. 183 prevails; that the heirs of Trinidad acquired only
whatever right DBP had acquired; that the stigma of Fabricante's bad
faith extended to Palma and to DBP; that there was no prescription,
for plaintiff's action was not one for recovery of title or possession but
for a judicial determination of ownership as to which of them, both
with valid certificates of title, really owns the land. Accordingly, it
stated in the dispositive portion:
ISSUE: Who has the better right of ownership in case of successive
registrations where two certificates of title were issued over the same
land in the name of different persons who were both in good faith in
their acquisition?
HELD:
Upon a misrepresentation, Cesario Fabricante was able to
606

obtain a duplicate certificate. The order granting such certificate

expressly stated that the original of the title was still kept in the office
of the Register of Deeds and ordered the issuance of a new duplicate
covering the land as described in the petition.
Unfortunately, the new duplicate issued is not in the records.
However, its contents may be known from Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 12 issued in favor of Eustaquio Palma which was based on
Fabricante's newly-issued duplicate certificate. Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 12 covers and describes 5,724,415 square meters of land,
designated as Lot No. 2, Plan PSU 11885 surveyed on October 29 to
November 11, 1917 and is indicated to originate from Original
Certificate of Title No. 34, Decree No. 89686, registered on
November 25, 1920. Upon the other hand, the reconstituted Transfer
Certificate of Title RT-29(50) on which Transfer Certificate of Title No.
3347 was based, also describes the same 5,724,415 square meters
of land but designated it as Lot No. 9, Plan PSU 11885 surveyed also
on October 29 to November 11, 1917, but said certificate is shown to
originate from Original Certificate of Title No. 183, Decree No. 89686,
registered on January 30, 1920. While it is possible that a mistake
could have been made with regard to the lot numbers, it is unlikely
that a mistake as to origin of the titles and their dates of registration
could also have been made. This is undoubtedly a case where two
certificates of title were issued over the same land in the name of
different persons who were both in good faith in their acquisition.
There having been two titles, it is understandable that the original
upon which Fabricante's newly-issued duplicate certificate was based
did not contain the mortgage annotation in favor of De Villa.
We have laid the rule that where two certificates of title are
issued to different persons covering the same land in whole or in part,
the earlier in date must prevail as between original parties and in
case of successive registrations where more than one certificate is
issued over the land, the person holding under the prior certificate is
entitled to the land as against the person who rely on the second
certificate. The purchaser from the owner of the later certificate and
his successors, should resort to his vendor for redress, rather than
molest the holder of the first certificate and his successors, who
should be permitted to rest secure in their title. Consequently, since
Original Certificate of Title No. 183 was registered on January 30,
607

1920, De Villa's claim which is based on said title should prevail, as

against Trinidad's whose original title was registered on November
25, 1920. And from the point of equity, this is the proper solution,
considering that unlike the titles of Palma and the DBP, De Villa's title
was never tainted with fraud.

BERGADO VS. CA, 173 SCRA 497

FACTS:
The property subject of this case is claimed by both the
petitioners and the Republic of the Philippines under two separate
deeds of sale executed by the same vendor.
Disputed are some 5,900 square meters of land forming part of
a lot situated in Pangasinan and covered by Original Certificate of
Title No. 16545 in the name of Alejandro Trinidad and Aniceta
Soriano. It was inherited by Marciana Trinidad, their sole heir. She
transferred it by virtue of an Escritura de Compraventa dated May 3,
1928, to Pedro Bergado and Justina Galinato, the petitioners'
parents. She then conveyed it again, this time through a Deed of Sale
dated February 19, 1947, to the Parent-Teacher Association of the
Urdaneta Community High. School.
The petitioners claim the property by right of inheritance from
their parents. The Republic says the land was donated to it on July
26, 1977, by the said PTA.
The Republic was sustained by the trial court and the Court of
Appeals. Thus, the petitioners appealed.
In rejecting their appeal, the respondent court held that the
petitioners had slept on whatever right they might have had and were
now barred by prescription and laches from asserting it. Moreover,
their alleged right, such as it was, was inferior to the title asserted by
the Republic to the property in question.
The petitioners contend that the Republic was itself barred from
608

putting up the defenses of prescription and laches because these had

not been pleaded earlier and that the Regional Trial Court and Court
of Appeals have erred and so should be reversed.
ISSUE: Whether or not good faith in registration of land essential.

HELD:
Yes. When real property is the subject matter of a double sale,
the purchaser who first registers it in the registry becomes the owner
thereof under the provision of Article 1473 of the Civil Code, but this
legal provision should not be understood in an absolute sense, nor
does it constitute a ground to sustain the demurrer, because the
rights conferred by said article upon one of the two of purchasers of
the same real property who has registered his title in the registry of
deeds, do not come into being if the registration is not made in good
faith.
The inscription of the Escritura de Compraventa in 1964 produced
no legal effect because it was made in bad faith. Ownership should
therefore vest in the respondent Republic of the Philippines because
it was first in possession of the property in good faith. If any recourse
is still available to the petitioners, it definitely is not against the
Republic of the Philippines. Their claim for satisfaction on which we
do not rule at this time may be addressed only to Marciana Trinidad
who, for reasons still to be discovered, sold the same land once, and
then once again, to separate purchasers.
F. Forged deed may be the root of a valid title
A title procured by fraud or misrepresentation can still be the
source of a completely legal and valid title if the same is in the
hands of an innocent purchaser for value
HEIRS OF TIRO VS. PES
GR. No. 170528, August 26, 2008.
FACTS:
609

Guillerma Tiro et al. filed before the RTC a Complaint for

Quieting of Title against PES. Petitioners alleged that they are the
children of the late Julian Tiro. They averred that they and their
predecessors-in-interest had been in actual possession of the
disputed land since time immemorial until they were prevented from
entering the same by persons claiming to be the new
owners sometime in 1995.
But they discovered that OCT No. RO-1121 had already been
cancelled as early as 1969 and was presently registered in the name
of respondent.

The petitioners prayed that all the transactions emanating from

the "Extrajudicial Declaration of Heirs and Confirmation of Sale,"
executed by Maxima Ochea, be declared void, including the transfer
made in favor of the respondent; that the title which was issued in the
name of respondent be cancelled; and that the property be restored
and registered in the name of the petitioners.

Respondent claimed that its predecessor-in-interest Pacific

Rehouse Corporation acquired the subject land from the Spouses
Velayo, the registered owners of the property who were also in
possession of the same at the time of the sale. Respondent argued
that petitioners action for quieting of title was barred by laches and
prescription.

The RTC issued a decision dismissing petitioners complaint.

The RTC ruled that respondent was an innocent purchaser for value
who relied on the correctness of the certificate of title in the name of
the vendor. The petitioners filed with the CA an appeal and MR but
were denied.

610

ISSUE:

Whether or not CA erred in not finding that the act of the RD of

registering a clearly void and unregistrable document confers no valid
title on the presentor and his successors-in-interest.

HELD:
A person is considered in law as an innocent purchaser for
value when he buys the property of another, without notice that some
other person has a right or an interest in such property, and pays a
full price for the same at the time of such purchase, or before he has
notice of the claims or interest of some other person in the property.

A person dealing with registered land may safely rely on the

correctness of the certificate of title of the vendor/transferor, and the
law will in no way oblige him to go behind the certificate to determine
the condition of the property. The courts cannot disregard the rights of
innocent third persons, for that would impair or erode public
confidence in the torrens system of land registration.
Thus, a title procured by fraud or misrepresentation can still be
the source of a completely legal and valid title if the same is in the
hands of an innocent purchaser for value.
In the present case, the certificates of title of Pacific Rehouse
Corporation and the Spouses Velayo were clean and appeared valid
on their face, and there was nothing therein which should have put
the respondent on its guard of some defect in the previous registered
owners title to the disputed property.
611

i.

Remedy of the owner.

ii.

A forged deed is an absolute nullity and conveys

no title.

VICENTE RAESES VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

G.R. No. L-68747 July 13, 1990
FACTS:
The proceedings at bar originated from two actions instituted in
the Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte by the spouses
Vicente Raeses and Zenaida Buena against Antonino Lamadrid.
They were docketed as Civil Cases Numbered 2113 and 2313.
Involved in Civil Case No. 2113 is a parcel of land with an area
of about 11.7174 hectares, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
T-5616 in the name of Vicente Raeses The complaint alleged that
Antonino Lamadrid had intruded into a 6 hectare area of this land,
had occupied it for some years, and had refused to vacate it despite
repeated demands; it therefore prayed for judgment ousting Lamadrid
from the property and commanding him to pay damages. In his
answer, Lamadrid claimed that he had been in continuous, open and
public occupation in concept of owner, of the area in question since
1942 (about 30 years prior to the filing of the complaint); that the
Raeses' title, acquired from a free patentee, Eustaquio Asido, was
null and void on account of fraud on the part of the Raeses and
Asido their "dummy," and that he (Lamadrid) should therefore be
declared the owner of the land, entitled to a conveyance thereof from
the Raeses and recovery of damages from the latter.
Involved in Civil Case No. 2313 is another parcel of agricultural
land situated in Mahawanhawan, Pinagtambangan, Labo, Camarines
Norte, known as Lot 2000-B of the Labor Cadastre, measuring
8.7092 hectares, more or less, and covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. T-6098 in the name of Zenaida Buena. The complaint
averred that Lamadrid and his wife also intruded into this property
without any right whatsoever, forcibly occupying about two and a half
(2 1/2) hectares thereof, and have since refused to leave the
premises despite demands. The complaint thus prayed for judgment
612

directing the defendants' ouster and their payment of damages by

way of attorney's fees.
The cases were tried jointly by agreement of the parties, after
which judgment was rendered on May 22, 1979, disposing as follows:
In Civil Case No. 2113.Declaring the plaintiff Vicente Raneses
the owner of the property in question; ordering the defendant
(Lamadrid) to vacate the same, and to pay the costs;
In Civil Case No. 2313.Declaring the sale in favor of Zenaida
Buena Raneses by Isabelo Cuevas, Exhibit E, genuine and valid;
declaring plaintiffs the owner of the portion in question consisting of
the two-fifths (2/5) of the land originally belonging to Isabelo Cuevas;
ordering the defendants to vacate the same and to pay the costs. 7
The intermediate Appellate Court pronounced the Raeses to
be vendees in bad faith, and their deed of sale, Exhibit E, a
forgery.The Appellate Court moreover ruled that its "own close
examination, verification and analysis of the questioned and standard
signatures" impelled it to the same conclusion as that presented by
the NBI handwriting expert, Arcadio Ramos, i.e., that the questioned
signature were a forgery, a conclusion strengthened by "suspicious
circumstances" attendant on "the preparation, execution and
ratification of the questioned document of sale.
ISSUE: whether or not a forged deed will affect the title.
HELD:
In any case, the principle that a forged deed is an absolute
nullity and conveys no title is firmly embedded in our jurisprudence.
Clearly militates against according any primacy to the claim of the
Raeses over that of respondent Lamadrid, whose own instrument of
acquisition has not been shown to be affected by any such defect.

613

iii.

But if the certificate of title has already been

transferred from the name of the true owner to the
name of the forger, and while it remained that way,
the land was subsequently sold to an innocent
purchaser for value, the forged deed may be the
root of a valid title.

SPOUSES VALENTIN SOLIVEL

MARCELINO M. FRANCISCO

VS.

THE

HONORABLE

G.R. No. L-51450 February 10, 1989

FACTS:
Petitioners, the spouses Valentin Solivel and Petra Mente
(hereinafter called the Solivels), are an old couple residing in Davao
City. They are the registered owners, under Transfer Certificates of
Title Nos. T-10985 and T-10986 of the Registry of Deeds of Davao
del Sur, of two parcels of land located in the Municipality of Digos in
said Province with a combined area of twenty seven (27) hectares,
more or less. The portion covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
T-10985 is the subject of this case.
614

On or about May 25, 1972, following a number of previous visits

to said owners, Federico Tompong, a practicing lawyer, and Isaias
Ngoho obtained the former's agreement to sell their property to a
certain Espinosa of Masbate for P60,000.00. Giving the Solivels a
partial
payment
of
P10,000.00
allegedly
coming
from
Espinosa,Tompong and Ngoho persuaded the Solivels to give them
the certificates of title to the property, for which they issued a receipt,
and promised that the sale would be consummated and the balance
of P50,000.00 paid within six (6) months, failing which the partial
payment would be forfeited in the Solivels' favor and their certificates
of title returned to them.
Tompong and Ngoho never returned to make good their
promise. They could not in fact be located until some months later
when they were arrested by Philippine Constabulary on complaint of
a certain Atty. Hilario Mapayo to whom, it appeared, they had sold a
portion of the Solivels' property.
Following their arrest, Tompong and Ngoho were confronted by
Valentin Solivel and his son, Rafael, at the PC Headquarters in
Davao City. That confrontation brought to light the existence of the
following documents purportedly executed by either or both of the
Solivels.
1) a deed of sale dated May 24, 1972 ratified by Tompong
as notary public selling a 40,000 square-meter portion of
the Solivels' property to Atty. Hilario Mapayo for the price
of P30,000.00 ;
2) a power of attorney dated May 24, 1972, ratified also
by Tompong as notary public, constituting Isaias Ngoho
the attorney-in-fact of Valentin Solivel to receive from Atty.
Hilario Mapayo partial payment of P15,000.00 in two
installments ;
3) a power of attorney dated September 7, 1972 ratified
also by Tompong as notary public, authorizing Isaias
Ngoho to sell the Solivels' property in question as said
owners' attorney-in-fact ;
The Trial Court found that the power-of-attorney (Exhibit C)
615

ostensibly empowering Ngoho to sell the Solivels' property as said

owners' attorney-in-fact was a forgery and thus, albeit not
expressly but by necessary implication, that the deed of sale
executed by Ngoho in favor of Cagas on the strength of said
instrument was also falsified and that the Solivels' claims against
Tompong and Ngoho had been sufficiently established.
However, said Court also held that Cagas was an innocent
purchaser for value, decided that he had acquired valid title to the
property in question by virtue of the sale,and was entitled to its
possession and enjoyment, and gave the Solivels only the sop of an
award against the elusive defendants Tompong and Ngoho of the
price paid by Cagas for the property (P19,000.00) plus interest, and
of damages, including attorney's fees, in the amount of P8,500.00
ISSUE: Whether or not a forged deed or document may be the root of
a valid title
RULING:
Thus the rule is simple: the fraudulent and forged document of
sale may become the root of a valid title if the certificate has already
been transferred from the name of the true owner to the name
indicated by the forger
If the certificate of title has already been transferred from the
mane of true owner to the name of the forger or the name indictaed
by the forger, and while it remained that way, the land was
subsequently sold to an innocent purchaser, the forged deed or
document may be the root of a valid title.

iv.

Same rule applies if the certificate has been

transferred to the name of the forger.

TENIO-OBSEQUIO V. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 107967 March 1, 1994
616

FACTS:
On September 10, 1986, private respondents filed a complaint
in the court a quo against herein petitioners Consorcia Tenio and her
husband, Orlando Obsequio, and the heirs of Eduardo Deguro for
recovery of possession and ownership, alleging that sometime in
1964, they mortgaged the land to Eduardo Deguro for P10,000.00;
that to guaranty the loan they delivered to the latter the original
certificate of title to the land; that in the meantime, they continued to
cultivate the same and, at the end of the harvest season, they gave
two-thirds (2/3) of the harvest to Eduardo Deguro; that on June 25,
1965, Eduardo Deguro and his wife, without the knowledge and
consent of herein private respondents, prepared a document of sale
and through misrepresentation and other manipulations made it
appear that private respondents sold the land to them.
This deed of sale was annotated at the back of the said
certificate of title as Entry No. 16007. By virtue thereof, Original
Certificate of Title No. P-1181 in the name of Eufronio Alimpoos was
cancelled and Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-1360 was
correspondingly issued in favor of Eduardo Deguro. After the death of
Eduardo Deguro, his heirs sold the land to Consorcia TenioObsequio. On September 22, 1970, Transfer Certificate of Title No. T1421 was issued in her name. It was allegedly only in 1982, when
Eufronio Alimpoos received a Certificate of Agricultural Leasehold of
his land from the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), that he
learned that the land was already titled in the name of another.
ISSUE: Whether or not a forged document of sale give rise to a valid
title.
HELD:
Yes. The court has held that a fraudulent or forged document of
sale may give rise to a valid title if the certificate of title has already
been transferred from the name of the true owner to the name
indicated by the forger and while it remained as such, the land was
subsequently sold to an innocent purchaser.

617

v.

Reason: the vendee has the right to rely on the

correctness of the certificate of title.

DURAN V. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

G.R. No. L-64159 September 10, 1985
FACTS:
Circe Duran owned 2 parcels of land in Caloocan City which
she had purchased form the Moja Estate. She left the Philippines in
June 1854. A Deed of Sale of the 2 lots was made in favor of Circes
mother, Fe. In December 1965, Fe mortgaged the same property to
Erlinda Marcelo-Tiangco. When Circe came to know about the
mortgage, she wrote to the Register of Deeds (RD) of Caloocan
informing that she had not given her mother any authority to sell or
mortgage any of her properties. She failed to get an answer from the
RD. So she returned to the Philippines in May 1966.
Meanwhile, Fe failed to redeem the mortgaged properties and
foreclosure proceedings were initiated by Marcelo- Tiangco. Circe
claims that the sale in favor of her mother is a forgery saying that at
the time of its execution in 1963, she was in the US. Fe alleges that
the signatures of Circe in the Deed are genuine and the mortgage
made by Fe is valid.
ISSUE: Whether Erlinda B. Marcelo-Tiangco was a buyer in good
faith and for value.
HELD:
Yes. Good faith, while it is always to be presumed in the
absence of proof to the contrary, requires a well-founded belief that
the person from whom title was received was himself the owner of the
land, with the right to convey it. The mortgagee has the right to rely
618

on what appears in the certificate of title and, in the absence of

anything to excite suspicion, he is under no obligation to look beyond
the certificate and investigate the title of the mortgagor appearing on
the face of the said certificate. The fraudulent and forged document of
sale may become the root of a valid title if the certificate has already
been transferred from the name of the true owner to the name
indicated by the forger.
vi.

Exception: rule on double sale does not apply if

the owner still holds a valid and existing certificate
of title covering the same property.

TORRES VS. CA
G.R. No. L-63046 June 21, 1990

FACTS:

The land erected with a building (TCT No. 53628 issued in his
name) is owned by Torres. He was and still in possession of the
realties, holding safely to his owner's duplicate certificate of title, and
paying the real estate taxes, and collecting rentals from tenants
occupying the building.

Francisco Fernandez, Torres' brother-in-law, misrepresenting to

be the attorney-in-fact of Torres and falsely alleging that the duplicate
copy of TCT No. 53628 was lost, obtained another copy of the
certificate. He forged a simulated deed of sale of the realties in his
favor. He mortgaged the same to Rosario Mota, wife of Ernesto Cue,
and also to Angela Fermin, who later assigned her credit to the
spouses Cue.

619

Torres filed civil case against Fernandez to annul TCT No.

86018 as well as the proceedings in LRC GLRO Cad. Rec. No. 133.

Fernandez failed to pay his various loans which prompted the

Cues to institute an extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage.
Fernandez filed Civil Case No. 75643 against the spouses Cue for
the annulment of the mortgage with preliminary injunction.

The trial court ruled that Torres is the true and legal evidence of
ownership of the subject immovable which was affirmed by the CA.

Prior to the CAs decision, Fernandez failed to comply with his

obligation under the amicable settlement and the Cues were granted
a writ of execution. The subject realties were then levied upon and
sold at public auction where Rosario Mota was the highest bidder.

The redemption period for the property having lapsed without

Fernandez nor Torres redeeming the properties, Mota was issued the
title.

Torres filed a complaint to restrain Mota from collecting rentals

and for the declaration as void TCT No. 105953.

The trial court declared that Motas title is void but CA reversed
it.

ISSUE: Whether a forged sale may be the root of a valid title.

620

HELD:
Yes, except if the owner still holds a valid and existing
certificate of title covering the same property.
The claim of indefeasibility under the Torrens land title system
would be correct if previous valid title to the same parcel of land did
not exist. The petitioner had a valid title. It never parted with it; it
never handed or delivered to anyone its owner's duplicate of the
transfer certificate of title, it could not be charged with negligence in
the keeping of its duplicate certificate of title or with any act which
could have brought about the issuance of another certificate upon
which a purchaser in good faith and for value could rely. If the
respondent's contention as to indefeasibility of his title should be
upheld, then registered owners without the least fault on their part
could be divested of their title and deprived of their property. Such
disastrous results which would shake and destroy the stability of land
titles had not been foreseen by those who had endowed with
indefeasibility land titles issued under the Torrens system. Fernandez
perpetrated the fraud by making false representations in his petition
and the title issued to him being the product of fraud could not vest
him valid and legal title to the parcel of land in litigation. As he had no
title to the parcel of land, in the same way that a thief does not own or
have title to the stolen goods, he could not transmit title which he did
not have nor possess.

To hold, for the purpose of enforcing the mortgage, that Mota

was an innocent mortgagee would be futile because no certificate of
title covering the realties in derogation of Torres' certificate of title may
validly be issued.

vii.

Remedies of victim or person prejudiced.

621

PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL
BANK
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

THE

HONORABLE

G.R. No. 66715 September 18, 1990

FACTS:

Leticia de la Vina-Sepe executed a real estate mortgage in

favor of PNB, San Carlos Branch, over a lot registered in her name
under TCT No. T-31913 to secure the payment of a sugar crop loan
of P3,400. Leticia, acting as attorney-in-fact for her brother-in-law,
private respondent, executed an amended real estate mortgage to
include his (Alcedo's) Lot No. 1626 as additional collateral for Sepe's
increased loan of P16,500. Sepe and Alcedo verbally agreed to split
50-50 the proceeds of the loan but failing to receive his one-half
share from her, Alcedo wrote a letter to the PNB, revoking the SPA he
had given to Leticia Sepe to mortgage his lot.

The PNB Branch Manager assured Alcedo that the bank would
exclude his lot as collateral for Sepe's forthcoming sugar crop loan.
On the same day, PNB advised Sepe in writing to replace Lot
No. 1402 with collateral of equal or higher value. Despite such
advice, Sepe still obtained an additional loan on the security of
Alcedo's property as collateral. Alcedo requested Sepe to pay her
accounts to forestall foreclosure proceedings against his property, but
to no avail.

Alcedo sued Sepe and PNB for collection and injunction with
damages. While pending, Alcedo's land was sold to PNB as the
highest bidder in the sale to which he filed an annulment of it and
reconveyance of the land to him free from liens and encumbrances,
with damages.
622

Alcedo withdrew his action to collect his one-half from the

proceeds of the sugar crop loans obtained by Sepe. PNB alleged that
it had no knowledge of the agreement between Mrs. Sepe and Alcedo
to split the crop loan proceeds between them.
The trial court favored Alcedo, declaring the public auction sale
and the certificate of sale as null and void, which decision was
affirmed by IAC.

ISSUE:
Whether PNB validly foreclosed the real estate mortgage
despite notice of the revocation of the Special Power of Attorney.

HELD:

PNB committed error in foreclosing the property of Alcedo

despite the revocation of the Special Power of Attorney.

The doctrine of estoppel is based upon the grounds of public

policy, fair dealing, good faith and justice, and its purpose is to forbid
one to speak against its own act, representations, or commitments to
the injury of one to whom they were directed and who reasonably
relied thereon. The doctrine of estoppel springs from equitable
principles and the equities in the case. It is designed to aid the law in
the administration of justice where without its aid injustice might
result. It has been applied by this Court wherever and whenever the
special circumstances of a case so demands.

In the case at bar, since PNB had promised to exclude Alcedo's

property as collateral for Sepe's 1971-72 sugar crop loan, it should
623

have released the property to Alcedo. The mortgage which Sepe

gave to the bank on Alcedo's lot as collateral for her 1971-72 sugar
crop loan was null and void for having been already disauthorized by
Alcedo. Since Alcedo's property secured only P13,100.00 of Sepe's
1970-71 sugar crop loan of P16,500.00 (because P3,400 was
secured by Sepe's own property), Alcedo's property may be held to
answer for only the unpaid balance, if any, of Sepe's 1970-71 loan,
but not the 1971-72 crop loan.

While Article 1358 of the New Civil Code requires that the
revocation of Alcedo's Special Power of Attorney to mortgage his
property should appear in a public instrument. Nevertheless, a
revocation embodied in a private writing is valid and binding between
the parties.

The PNB acted with bad faith in proceeding against Alcedo's

property to satisfy Sepe's unpaid 1971-72 sugar crop loan. The
extrajudicial foreclosure being null and void ab initio, the certificate of
sale which the Sheriff delivered to PNB as the highest bidder at the
sale is also null and void.

The petition for review is denied for lack of merit.

624

F. Mortgages and Leases

a. Nature of Mortgage
i. Legal Basis; Mortgage. A mortgage lien is a right in rem
which follows the property whoever its owner may be.
If the mortgagor sells the property, the buyer must
respect the mortgage, if registered or if he knows its
existence.
LIGON V CA
244 SCRA 693
Facts:
By virtue of an Absolute Deed of Sale, the Islamic Directorate of the
Philippines (IDP), sold to Iglesia ni Kristo (INK) two parcels of lot. The
parties stipulated in the deed of sale that the IDP shall undertake to
evict all squatters and illegal occupants in the property within fortyfive (45) days from the execution of the contract.
IDP failed to comply with this undertaking, prompting INK to file a
case. In its answer, IDP alleges that it was INK which failed to comply
as it did not pay full price within the specific period agreed upon. IDP
now prays for the rescission of the sale.
The trial court rendered a decision granting the relief sought by INK.
Later on, INK filed a motion against herein petitioner as the
mortgagee of the property, seeking for the surrender of the certificate
of title by the later for the registration of the Absolute Deed of Sale
with the Register of Deeds.
Petitioner filed an opposition alleging that the ownership of the
subject property is still in question. The trial court rendered a decision
ordering petitioner to surrender the certificate of title for the
registration of the sale and the annotation of the mortgage to the new
TCT to be issued in favor of INK. CA affirmed.
Issue:
Whether the registration of the Absolute Deed of Sale prejudicial to
the rights of the mortgagee.
Ruling:
625

No. Any lien annotated on the previous certificates of title which

subsists should be incorporated in or carried over to the new transfer
certificates of title.
This is true even in the case of a real estate mortgage because
pursuant to Art. 2126 of the Civil Code it directly and immediately
subjects the property upon which it is imposed, whoever the
possessor may be, to the fulfillment of the obligation for whose
security it was constituted. It is inseparable from the property
mortgaged as it is a right in rem a lien on the property whoever its
owner may be. It subsists notwithstanding a change in ownership; in
short, the personality of the owner is disregarded. Thus, all
subsequent purchasers must respect the mortgage whether the
transfer to them be with or without the consent of the mortgagee, for
such mortgage until discharged follows the property.

ii. Mortgages are effective only from the time of registration

iii. Despite lack of registration, the
nevertheless binding between the parties

mortgage

is

iv. Procedure for registration

v. The subsequent nullification of the mortgagors title will
not nullify the mortgage.
GONZALES V IAC
157 SCRA 587
Facts:
Asuncion and Dioscoro Buensuceco were the original owners of a lot
but due to tax delinquency, the lot was sold at public auction in favor
of the province of Ilo-ilo. The daughter of the spouses, Hortencia,
discovered that the title of the land is still in the name of her parents.
She paid the taxes and was issued a deed of repurchase. The title
was reconstituted and issued in the name of Asuncion. It was then
sold to spouses Panzo. The spouses Panzo mortgaged the property
with Rural Bank of Pavia. Due to failure to pay, the property was
foreclosed and a deed was executed in favor of Rural Bank.
626

Petitioner, as judicial co-administratrix of the Intestate Estate of the

late Matias Yusay, thereafter filed for the cancellation of the title and
the issuance of a new certificate of title in the name of Yusay. She
alleges that the property was originally mortgaged to Yusay by
spouses Buensuceco and was later sold orally to the same. It is also
alleged that the property is in possession of Yusay as evidenced by
the presence of tenant Daguino. Defendant bank alleges good faith.
Issue:
Whether the subsequent nullification of the mortgagors certificate of
title nullifies the mortgage?
Ruling:
No.
Where the Torrens title of the land was in the name of the mortgagor
and later given as security for a bank loan, the subsequent
declaration of said title as null and void is not a ground for nullifying
the mortgage right of the bank, which had acted in good faith. Being
thus an innocent mortgagee for value, its right or lien upon the land
mortgaged must be respected and protected, even if the mortgagors
obtained their title thereto thru fraud.

b. Governing Laws and Rules On Mortgage

i.

Mortgage, its nature

ii.

Mortgage may be constituted only on immovables

and/or alienable real rights imposed upon movables;
requisites of mortgagor.

iii.

Characteristics of a mortgage:

(1)All-embracing
A mortgage can be constituted on the building only

627

PRUDENTIAL BANK vs.HON. DOMINGO D. PANIS, FERNANDO

MAGCALE & TEODULA BALUYUT-MAGCALE
G.R. No. L-50008 August 31, 1987

FACTS:
Plaintiffs-spouses Magcale secured a loan from Prudential
Bank. To secure payment, Plaintiffs-spouses executed in favor of
defendant a deed of Real Estate Mortgage on the 2-storey semiconcrete residential building with warehouse and on the right of
occupancy on the lot where the building was erected. The Real
Estate Mortgagewas registered with the Registry of Deeds of
Zambales on November 23, 1971.
On May 2, 1973, plaintiffs secured an additional loan from
Prudential Bank. To secure payment, plaintiffs executed in favor of
Prudential Bank another deed of Real Estate Mortgage over the
same properties previously mortgaged. The second deed of Real
Estate Mortgage was likewise registered.
Miscellaneous Sales Patent No. 4776 on the land was issued
on April 24, 1972, on the basis of which OCT No. 2554 was issued in
the name of private respondent Fernando Magcale on May 15, 1972.
For failure of plaintiffs to pay their obligation to defendant Bank
after it became due, and upon application of said defendant, the
deeds of Real Estate Mortgage were extrajudicially foreclosed.
Consequent to the foreclosure was the sale of the properties
mortgaged to defendant as the highest bidder in a public auction sale
conducted. The auction sale was held despite written request from
plaintiffs to desist from going with the scheduled public auction sale.
Respondent Court declared the deeds of Real Estate Mortgage
as null and void. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it
was denied for lack of merit.

628

ISSUE:
Whether or not a valid real estate mortgage can be
constituted on the building erected on the land belonging to another.

RULING:
Yes. Under Article 415 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, this
Court ruled that, "it is obvious that the inclusion of "building" separate
and distinct from the land, in said provision of law can only mean that
a building is by itself an immovable property."
Thus, while it is true that a mortgage of land necessarily
includes, in the absence of stipulation of the improvements thereon,
buildings, still a building by itself may be mortgaged apart from the
land on which it has been built. Such a mortgage would be still a real
estate mortgage for the building would still be considered immovable
property even if dealt with separately and apart from the land.

It is without question that the original mortgage was executed

before the issuance of the final patent and before the government
was divested of its title to the land, an event which takes effect only
on the issuance of the sales patent and its subsequent registration in
the Office of the Register of Deeds. Under the foregoing
considerations, it is evident that the mortgage executed by private
respondent on his own building which was erected on the land
belonging to the government is to all intents and purposes a valid
mortgage.

The decision of the Court of First Instance of Zambales &

Olongapo City is hereby MODIFIED.

629

(2)Inseparable
(3)Indivisible
But indivisibility cannot apply after complete foreclosue
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK v. HON. RUSTICO DE LOS REYES,
AMANDO ARANA and JULIA REYES
G.R. Nos. 46898-99. November 28, 1989
FACTS:
Respondent spouses mortgaged six parcels of land to PNB to
secure the payment of a loan. Two of the six parcels of land are
covered by free patent titles while the other four are untitled and
covered only by tax declarations.
For failure of respondent spouses to pay the loan after its
maturity, PNB, pursuant to a special power of attorney in the
mortgage deed, effected the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage
and purchased the same at public auction. The certificate of sale was
duly registered with the Register of Deeds.
After the one-year redemption period expired without
respondent spouses having exercised their right or redemption,
petitioner executed and registered an affidavit of consolidation of
ownership over the six parcels of land and new titles were issued in
its name.
Jose Barrameda, then the manager of petitioners Sorsogon
Branch, sent a letter to respondent spouses informing them of the
consolidation of title and inviting them to repurchase the lands not
later than June 15, 1971. Respondent spouses replied requesting
petitioner to extend the period of repurchase to November 5, 1971.
On December 19, 1971, petitioner sent another letter to respondent
spouses reminding them of the projected repurchase and informing
them that petitioner would take actual possession of the lands unless
the repurchase would be effected on or before November 30, 1971.
On May 9, 1972, petitioner entered into a contract to sell the six
parcels of land to one Gerardo Badong. Petitioner informed
630

respondent spouses of the transaction in a letter dated May 31, 1972.

On July 12, 1972, respondent spouses instituted a civil case for
legal redemption of the six parcels of land.
Petitioner filed its answer conceding to respondent spouses the
right to repurchase the two parcels of land covered by free patent
titles, but refused the redemption of the other four lots covered by tax
declarations.
After trial on the merits, the lower court held that respondent
spouses are entitled to redeem the six parcels of land on the theory
of "indivisibility of mortgage".
Acting on petitioners motion for the reconsideration of said
decision, the lower court issued its challenged resolution modifying
the ratio decidendi of its decision by ruling that the applicability of the
doctrine of "indivisibility of mortgage" was deemed to have been
waived by petitioner when it agreed to the redemption of the two titled
lots, and holding that the period of redemption for the four untitled
parcels of land is one year, not five years. However, it allowed the
redemption of said four lots for reasons of equity.
A direct appeal by certiorari was made to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:

Whether the theory of "indivisibility of mortgage" applies.

RULING:
The situation obtaining in the case at bar is not within the
purview of the aforesaid rule on indivisibility is obvious since the
aggregate number of the lots which comprise the collaterals for the
mortgage had already been foreclosed and sold at public auction.
There is no partial payment nor partial extinguishment of the
obligation to speak of. The aforesaid doctrine, which is actually
intended for the protection of the mortgagee, specifically refers to the
release of the mortgage which secures the satisfaction of the
indebtedness and naturally presupposes that the mortgage is
existing.
Once the mortgage is extinguished by a complete foreclosure
thereof, said doctrine of indivisibility ceases to apply since, with the
full payment of the debt, there is nothing more to secure.
631

Indivisibility does not apply where the several heirs as Art.

2089 presupposes several heirs of the debtor or the
creditor.
CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-45710 October 3, 1985

FACTS:
On April 28, 1965, Island Savings Bank, upon favorable
recommendation of its legal department, approved the loan
application for P80,000.00 of Sulpicio M. Tolentino, who, as a security
for the loan, executed on the same day a real estate mortgage over
his 100-hectare land located in Cubo, Las Nieves, Agusan, and
covered by TCT No. T-305, and which mortgage was annotated on
the said title the next day. The approved loan application called for a
lump sum P80,000.00 loan, repayable in semi-annual installments for
a period of 3 years, with 12% annual interest. It was required that
Sulpicio M. Tolentino shall use the loan proceeds solely as an
additional capital to develop his other property into a subdivision.
On May 22, 1965, a mere P17,000.00 partial release of the
P80,000.00 loan was made by the Bank; and Sulpicio M. Tolentino
and his wife Edita Tolentino signed a promissory note for P17,000.00
at 12% annual interest, payable within 3 years from the date of
execution of the contract at semi-annual installments of P3,459.00 (p.
64, rec.). An advance interest for the P80,000.00 loan covering a 6month period amounting to P4,800.00 was deducted from the partial
release of P17,000.00. But this pre-deducted interest was refunded to
Sulpicio M. Tolentino on July 23, 1965, after being informed by the
Bank that there was no fund yet available for the release of the
P63,000.00 balance (p. 47, rec.). The Bank, thru its vice-president
and treasurer, promised repeatedly the release of the P63,000.00
balance (p. 113, rec.).
632

On June 14, 1968, the Monetary Board, after finding thatIsland

Savings Bank failed to put up the required capital to restore its
solvency, issued Resolution No. 967 which prohibited Island Savings
Bank from doing business in the Philippines and instructed the Acting
Superintendent of Banks to take charge of the assets of Island
Savings Bank (pp. 48-49, rec).

ISSUE:
Whether or not Sulpicio M. Tolentino's liability to pay the P17,000.00
subsists, can his real estate mortgage be foreclosed to satisfy said
amount?

RULING:
Article 2089 provides:
A pledge or mortgage is indivisible even though the debt
may be divided among the successors in interest of the
debtor or creditor.
Therefore, the debtor's heirs who has paid a part of the
debt can not ask for the proportionate extinguishment of
the pledge or mortgage as long as the debt is not
completely satisfied.
Neither can the creditor's heir who have received his
share of the debt return the pledge or cancel the
mortgage, to the prejudice of other heirs who have not
been paid.
The rule of indivisibility of the mortgage as outlined by Article
2089 above-quoted presupposes several heirs of the debtor or
creditor which does not obtain in this case. Hence, the rule of
indivisibility of a mortgage cannot apply
The fact that when Sulpicio M. 'Tolentino executed his real estate
633

mortgage, no consideration was then in existence, as there was no

debt yet because Island Savings Bank had not made any release on
the loan, does not make the real estate mortgage void for lack of
consideration. It is not necessary that any consideration should pass
at the time of the execution of the contract of real mortgage
(Bonnevie vs. C.A., 125 SCRA 122 [1983]).
The decision is therefore modified:
IN CASE SULPICIO M. TOLENTINO FAILS TO PAY, HIS REAL
ESTATE MORTGAGE COVERING 21.25 HECTARES SHALL BE
FORECLOSED TO SATISFY HIS TOTAL INDEBTEDNESS

Debtor cannot ask for the release of a portion if the entire

loan secured by the several lots is not yet paid.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK vs. HON. RUSTICO DE LOS
REYES, AMANDO ARANA and JULIA REYES
G.R. Nos. 46898-99. November 28, 1989

FACTS:
The records show that on August 30, 1966, respondent spouses
mortgaged six (6) parcels of land located at Cantilla, Sorsogon to
petitioner bank (PNB) to secure the payment of a loan of P10,000.00.
Two (2) of the six (6) parcels of land are covered by free patent titles
while the other four (4) are untitled and covered only by tax
declarations.

634

For failure of respondent spouses to pay the loan after its maturity,
petitioner bank, pursuant to a special power of attorney in the
mortgage deed, effected the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage
under Act No. 3135, as amended, and purchased the same at public
auction for P12,735.30 which amount included the expenses of sale,
interest and

On May 9, 1972, petitioner entered into a contract to sell the six (6)
parcels of land to one Gerardo Badong for P27,000.00, with
P5,400.00 as down payment upon the execution of the contract.
Petitioner informed respondent spouses of the transaction in a letter
dated May 31, 1972.

After trial on the merits, the lower court rendered its aforesaid
decision of May 11, 1976 holding that respondent spouses are
entitled to redeem the six (6) parcels of land on the theory of
"indivisibility of mortgage" and dismissing the petition in Special
Proceeding No. 2679 to declare the respondent spouses in contempt
of court.

Petitioner, however, denies such right to redeem in the case of the

four (4) untitled parcels due to the failure of private respondents to
effect the redemption within the period of one (1) year after the
auction sale. This contention is premised on the theory that private
respondents had only one (1) year from the foreclosure sale to
redeem the untitled properties, pursuant to Section 6 of Act No. 3135,
as amended by Act No. 4118, and Section 20 of the PNB charter,
Republic Act No. 4300, as amended.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the debtor could ask for the release of the portion
even if the entire loan secured by several lots is not yet paid
635

RULING:
No.
From the foregoing, it is apparent that what the law proscribes is the
foreclosure of only a portion of the property or a number of the
several properties mortgaged corresponding to the unpaid portion of
the debt where before foreclosure proceedings partial payment was
made by the debtor on his total outstanding loan or obligation. This
also means that the debtor cannot ask for the release of any portion
of the mortgaged property or of one or some of the several lots
mortgaged unless and until the loan thus, secured has been fully
paid, notwithstanding the fact that there has been a partial fulfillment
of the obligation. Hence, it is provided that the debtor who has paid a
part of the debt cannot ask for the proportionate extinguishment of
the mortgage as long as the debt is not completely satisfied.

That the situation obtaining in the case at bar is not within the purview
of the aforesaid rule on indivisibility is obvious since the aggregate
number of the lots which comprise the collaterals for the mortgage
had already been foreclosed and sold at public auction. There is no
partial payment nor partial extinguishment of the obligation to speak
of. The aforesaid doctrine, which is actually intended for the
protection of the mortgagee, specifically refers to the release of the
mortgage which secures the satisfaction of the indebtedness and
naturally presupposes that the mortgage is existing. Once the
mortgage is extinguished by a complete foreclosure thereof, said
doctrine of indivisibility ceases to apply since, with the full payment of
the debt, there is nothing more to secure.

636

iv.

Doctrine of innocent purchaser for value applies to an

innocent mortgagee for value

RURAL BANK OF SARIAYA, INC. vs YACON

175 SCRA 62 1989
FACTS:
In October 1976, plaintiffs entrusted their owner's copy of their TCT
No. T-38632 covering the land in question to their nephew, defendant
Florentino Alcantara, whom they approached for the purpose of
obtaining a bigger loan from a bank in Manila with the land as
collateral. After a few days, Alcantara returned to plaintiffs' house and
he brought with him plaintiffs to the house of one Gregorio Cordero,
wherein Alcantara introduced to plaintiffs Aniano Tantuco, Efren
Rocha and Cordero who told plaintiffs that they have prepared the
latter's application for a real estate mortgage. These people
convinced plaintiffs to papers as a requirement for securing a loan
from the Bank in said Manila.
Without understanding the contents thereof as plaintiffs do not
understand English, the language in which the documents were
written and having trust and confidence in their nephew, Alcantara,
plaintiffs signed the prepared documents in their belief that they were
indeed applications for a loan. The defendants assured plaintiffs that
they would be notified as soon as the loan would be ready for
release.
In April 1977, plaintiffs discovered that their Transfer Certificate of
Title No. T- 38632 had been cancelled and in lieu thereof Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-142490 had been issued in favor of
defendant Luis Parco Plaintiffs also found that the papers they were
made to sign in Cordero's house included a Special Power of
Attorney in favor of Alcantara with authority to negotiate, to mortgage
and to sell' the property.
Defendant Parco was able to transfer the title covering the land in his
name and he was able to mortgage the land in favor of the defendant
Rural Bank of Sariaya, Inc., for a loan of P 24,500.00.
The RTC rendered judgment nullifying the special power of attorney
and deed of real estate mortgage hereinbefore mentioned, and
637

cancelling Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-142490 and restoring the

validity and legal effect of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T- 38632.
Petitioner bank and its co-defendant Luis Parco seasonably appealed
to the then Intermediate Appellate Court, but said appeal resulted in
the affirmance of the decision of the trial court.
ISSUE:
Whether the certificate of title is in the name of the mortgagor when
the land is mortgaged, the innocent mortgagee for value has the right
to rely on what appears on the certificate of title.
RULING:
No, the innocent mortgagee has to investigate with full diligence on
the validity of the certificate of title.
There is no ground to reject or deviate from the findings of both the
trial court and the Court of Appeals. In cases heretofore decided by
this Court, We took judicial notice of the common practice of banks,
before approving a loan, to send a representative to the premises of
the land offered as collateral and duly investigate who are the true
owners thereof. Failure to do so was considered as constitutive of
negligence on the part of the banks. This is in keeping with the bank's
responsibility to exercise care and prudence in dealing even with
registered land, more than in the case of private individuals. The
finding that the petitioner bank failed to make adequate inquiries with
the person in possession of the land had adequate evidentiary
support. The testimony of the bank inspector, Ricardo Aro, Jr., that he
went to the land together with an assistant inspector does not
bespeak the diligent verification required in the circumstances. As
earlier stated, the prudent practice is to investigate who are the true
owners of the properties sought to be mortgaged. What appears to
have been done in the present case is that petitioner merely went
through the motions of sending a representative to the premises.
When the inspector found nobody on the land on the date of
inspection, he only counted the coconut trees, without bothering to
look for the person in possession of the same. He further testified
that he did not bother to find out who was in actual possession of the
property when he went to the premises, relying on the fact that the
vice-president of the bank had already talked to Luis Parco.
Petitioner is, therefore, not in a position to assail the finding that Luis
Parco never took possession of the land in question and that the
638

respondents continuously and openly possessed the land without any

disturbance.

UNCHUAN vs COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 78775 May 31, 1988
FACTS:
On November 3, 1976, Flora Jaldon, represented by her attorney-infact, Manuel Jaldon, Jr., mortgaged a parcel of land located in
Cagayan De Oro City covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T7564, to the Philippine Banking Corp. On December 10, 1976,
petitioner Unchuan, claiming to be the owner of one-half of the
mortgaged property, caused to be annotated on the title an adverse
claim.
On March 18, 1985, Faustino Neri, Jr. caused to be annotated on the
title a Notice of Lis Pendens, which, however, was subsequently
cancelled after he executed a release of claim on January 30, 1986.
On May 14, 1986, the bank filed a petition for the cancellation of the
annotations on its title and for the issuance of a writ of possession.
Named respondents were Unchuan and Faustino Neri, Jr. Unchuan
filed an opposition to the petition. In his affirmative and special
defenses, Unchuan again raised his claim of ownership to the 1/2
portion of the lot in question.
Hearing was set several times. On July 16, 1986, notice was sent
setting the hearing for August 19, 1986, but due to the failure of
Unchuan's counsel to appear, said hearing had to be reset for
September 2, 1986. The hearing set for September 2, 1986 had to be
reset again for September 23,1986 upon motion of counsel for
Unchuan. Finally, on September 23, 1986, hearing proceeded as
scheduled and the case was submitted for resolution upon
agreement of the parties. However, on September 25, 1986, Unchuan
filed a manifestation praying for the dismissal/suspension of the
petition for writ of possession on the ground that he had filed an
action for quieting of title on the property, Attached to the
manifestation was a copy of Unchuan's complaint in Civil Case No.
639

10770 for "Quieting of Title, Ownership, Annulment of Deed of

Mortgage, Foreclosure Proceedings and TCT No. 43346."
On October 3, 1986 the trial court issued an order directing the
issuance of a writ of possession in favor of the bank. Unchuan
brought a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals which denied
the petition for lack of merit. Hence, the present recourse.
ISSUE:
Whether a decision should be in favor of Unchuan
RULING:
No, the case is not in favor of Unchuan.
Once the estate mortgaged is extrajudicially sold, and it is not
redeemed within the reglementary period, no separate and
independent action is necessary to obtain possession of the property.
It is too late in the day for Unchuan to question the summary nature
of the proceedings in the lower court. In the hearing of September 23,
1986, his counsel agreed to submit the case for resolution, even as
on said date, all that he had submitted for consideration of the court
was his Opposition to the Petition of Philippine Banking Corporation.
He is now estopped from questioning the procedure adopted by the
trial collaborated.
Moreover, there is nothing objectionable in the summary disposition
of third-party claims. On several occasions, the Court had sanctioned
summary proceedings to determine the nature of the possession of
third-party claimants.
On the basis of the record of the case, the trial judge ruled in favor of
Philippine Banking Corporation. This Tribunal has carefully gone over
the record, and is convinced that there is sufficient basis warranting
the issuance of a writ of possession.
The land involved is a Torrens-title property. It is basic that a person
dealing with registered property need not go beyond, but only has to
rely on, the title. He is charged with notice only of such burdens and
claims which annotated on the title, for registration is the operative
act that binds the property.
640

Unchuan claims that he purchased one-half (1/2) of the property

"long before November 3, 1976." However, other than his bare
allegation, the only proof he presented in court is a handwritten
receipt for the payment of his contribution to realty taxes allegedly
signed by Flora Jaldon. He has not bothered to prove the authenticity
of the private writing, though. The alleged receipt does not even
sufficiently identify the land subject of the sale to Unchuan to be the
same land mortgaged and then sold to Philippine Banking
Corporation. Also, for a transaction as important as the sale of a
registered parcel of land; Unchuan has not even kept a record of
precisely when he bought the property, except that it was "long
before November 3, 1976," which incidentally is the day when Flora
Jaldon mortgaged the property to Philippine Banking Corporation.
Moreover, the sale was merely a verbal agreement; hence, it could
not be registered. All that Unchuan did was to file a belated adverse
claim on December 10, 1976, after the property had been mortgaged
to Philippine Banking Corporation. Note however, that since the filing
of the adverse claim, Unchuan has done nothing to prosecute his
claim of ownership over onehalf of the property. He has not, for
instance, compelled Jaldon to execute the property instrument so that
the sale could be registered (Assuming that the land was indeed sold
to him) and the proper title issued in his name. In fact, the mortgage
to the bank had been foreclosed, and a new title had been issued in
the name of Philippine Banking Corporation, but all the Unchuan did
was file an adverse claim.

v.

Prescriptive Period to bring an action on mortgaged

deed.

B & I REALTY CO., INC., vs. CASPE

G.R. No. 146972. January 29, 2008 / 543 SCRA 1
FACTS:
Venegas, the owner of a parcel of land delivered the title and
executed a simulated deed of sale in favor of Datuin for purposes of
the latter to obtain a loan with the RCBC. However, Venegas learned
641

of Datuin's fraudulent scheme when she sold the lot to the

respondents in a deed of conditional sale. Venegas instituted a
complaint against Datuin for recovery of property and nullification with
damages.
Thereafter, spouses Venegas, respondents and Datuin entered into a
compromise agreement whereby the Venegases agreed to sell and
transfer the property to respondents with the condition that the
respondents would assume and settle Datuin's mortgage debt to
petitioner.
As provided for in the agreement, Datuin executed a deed of absolute
sale over the property covered in favor of respondents. On February
12, 1976, the respondents started paying their assumed mortgage
obligation to petitioner.
However, on August 27, 1980, Venegas brought a new action
before the for annulment of the transfer of the property to Datuin
and the declaration of nullity of all transactions including the
mortgage executed in favor of petitioner, as well as the cancellation
of the conditional deed of sale to respondents.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondents waive the defense of
prescription.

RULING:
Although the deed of real estate mortgage and the promissory
note executed by Datuin expressly declared that the date of maturity
of the loan was May 14, 1974 or one year after the real estate
mortgage was entered into between Datuin and petitioner, the same
could not be the reckoning point for purposes of counting the
prescriptive period of the mortgage. This is because Datuin and
respondents executed a deed of absolute sale on October 30, 1975
whereby the latter acknowledged and assumed the mortgage
642

obligation of the former in favor of petitioner. Under Article 1155 of the

Civil Code, the written acknowledgment and assumption of the
mortgage obligation by respondents had the effect of interrupting the
prescriptive period of the mortgage action.
We have held in a number of cases that the computation of the
prescriptive period of any cause of action (the same as prescription of
actions) starts from the date when the cause of action
accrues.20 Here, petitioner's cause of action accrued from the time
respondents stopped paying the mortgage debt they assumed from
Datuin, in accordance with Article 1151 of the Civil Code
Art. 1151. The time for the prescription of actions which have for
their object the enforcement of obligations to pay principal with
interest or annuity runs from the last payment of the annuity or
of the interest.

vi.

Procedure for registration of court orders, processes,

documents or instruments related to the foreclosure
of mortgage, whether judicial or extrajudicial

vii.

Judicial Foreclosure of Mortgage

Guiding principles
mortgage

on

judicial

foreclosure

of

RURAL BANK vs. CA, SERRANO and CUEME

643

101 SCRA 5 (1980)

FACTS:
The trial court rendered a decision, ordering the defendants to pay
plaintiff bank within a period of "not less than 90 days nor more than
100 days from" the receipt of the decision with twelve percent
interest per.

In case of nonpayment within that period, the trial court, in order to

satisfy that obligation, ordered the sheriff to sell at public auction the
mortgaged lot. Consequently, the Serrano spouses did not pay their
mortgage debt. A writ of execution was issued. The mortgaged lot
was sold to the bank as the only bidder. There being no redemption
within the one-year period.

But it was allegedly revealed that the land had already been sold to
Mejos and, therefore, its acceptance of the redemption price
amounting to would not produce any legal effect.

The bank further disclosed that there is pending in the trial court a
case for the annulment of the foreclosure sale of the said lot and the
release of the mortgage which was instituted by the Serrano spouses,
as mortgagors, against the bank and the Mejos spouses.
ISSUE:
Whether the trial court and the CA erred in not giving due course to
the bank's appeal.

RULING:
644

The SC ruled that the trial court and the CA acted correctly in refusing
to give due course to the bank's appeal not only because the order
sought to be appealed is in interlocutory but also because in the
present posture of the case it is imperative that the trial court
should consolidate the foreclosure case with the other case filed by
the Serrano spouses. Note that the latter case is also pending in the
sala of respondent Judge.

Under section 3, Rule 68 of the Rules of Court, it is the confirmation

by the court of the auction sale that would divest the Serrano spouses
of their rights to the mortgaged lot and that would vest such rights in
the bank as purchaser at the auction sale.

In the instant case, where the foreclosure sale has not yet been
confirmed but the statutory one-year period for redemption expired
and the mortgaged lot was sold by the mortgagee (as the only bidder
at the auction sale) to a third person, the trial court should give the
purchaser a chance to be heard before requiring the mortgagee-bank
to accept the redemption price tendered by the mortgagors.

There is no right of redemption in judicial foreclosure unless the

mortgagee is a banking institution
Banks and other financial institutions are cautioned to exercise
more care and prudence than private individuals before
accepting mortgage, for their business is affected with public
interest
viii. Extrajudicial Foreclosure of Mortgage
When the principal obligation becomes due and the
debtor fails to perform his obligation, the creditor
645

may foreclose on the mortgage for the purpose of

alienating the mortgaged property to satisfy his
credit.
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SPS JESUS and
ANACORITA DOYON
G.R. No. 167238. March 25, 2009

FACTS:
Jesus and Anacorita Doyon obtained several loans amounting
to P10 million from petitioner Development Bank of the Philippines
(DBP). As security for the loans, respondents mortgaged their real
estate properties as well as the motor vehicles of JD Bus Lines. Due
to their inability to fully pay their obligations upon maturity,
respondents requested petitioner to restructure their past due
loans. Petitioner agreed. Hence, respondents signed three
promissory notes on June 29, 1994.Respondents still failed to pay the
quarterly installments on the promissory notes. Thus, petitioner
demanded the payment of the total value of their loans from
respondents. Respondents, however, ignored petitioner and
adamantly refused to pay their loans.

Petitioner filed an application for extrajudicial foreclosure of real

estate mortgages in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Ormoc City in
1995. To forestall the foreclosure proceedings, respondents
immediately filed an action for their nullification in the RTC of Ormoc
City, Branch 35 claiming that they had already paid the principal
amount of their loans (or P10 million) to petitioner.
Petitioner withdrew the application for extrajudicial foreclosure and
thereafter moved for the dismissal of Civil Case. The RTC granted
the motion and the case is considered dismissed with prejudice.
646

Weeks later, petitioner demanded from respondents the payment of

their outstanding obligations which had by then ballooned to more
than P20 million. Again, respondents ignored petitioner.

Petitioner filed an application for extrajudicial foreclosure of

respondents real and chattel mortgages with the DBP special sheriff
in Makati10 and subsequently took constructive possession of the
foreclosed properties.
Respondents Doyon filed a complaint for damages against petitioner
and the DBP special sheriff in the RTC of Ormoc City, Branch 35.
According to respondents, by withdrawing the application for
extrajudicial foreclosure and moving for the dismissal of Civil Case
No. 3314-O, petitioner led them to believe that it would no longer
seek the satisfaction of its claims. Petitioner therefore acted contrary
to Article 19 of the Civil Code when it foreclosed on the real and
chattel mortgages anew.
ISSUE:
Whether or not DBP has the legal right to foreclose on the real
property and the chattel mortgage?
RULING:
Since respondents neither assailed the due execution of the June 29,
1994 promissory notes nor presented proof of payment thereof, their
obligation remained outstanding. Upon default, by prior mutual
agreement, petitioner had the right to foreclose on the real and
chattel mortgages securing their loans.

The promissory notes uniformly stated that failure to pay an

installment (or interest) on the due date was an event of
default. Respondents were therefore in default when they failed to
pay the quarterly amortizations on the designated due dates.
647

When the principal obligation becomes due and the debtor fails to
perform his obligation, the creditor may foreclose on the mortgage for
the purpose of alienating the (mortgaged) property to satisfy his
credit.

ix.

Right of Redemption in extrajudicial foreclosure of

mortgage

GOROSPE vs. UCPB

193 SCRA 546
The right to redeem may be transferred or assigned
by the owner
MATILDA GOROSPE and MARIANO GOROSPE vs. DOLORES M.
SANTOS
G.R. No. L-30079 January 30, 1976
FACTS:
In 1958, Caridad J. Torento executed a deed of First Mortgage over a
parcel of duly registered land in favor of defendant-appellant Dolores
M. Santos. This was done in order to secure her indebtedness to
Santos in the amount of 7000 Php. Said deed was validly registered
and a subsequent certificate of title in favor of Santos was issued.
But in 1959, Torento again executed a second mortgage, with the
consent of Santos, over the same property in favor of plaintiffs to
secure a debt in the amount of 6000 Php. Said deed was not
registered.
In 1960, the first mortgage was extra-judicially foreclosed and was
648

put in auction, where Santos was the highest bidder in the amount
3500 Php. Said sale was then annotated at the TCT of the subject lot.
Afterwhich, Santos filed for the recovery of the deficiency resulting
from the price paid for the property and its value at the public auction.
The court then issued a writ of attachment over the properties of
Torento, who assigned to Matilda Gorospe all her rights on the
subject property particularly her statutory right of redemption.
On March 1961, the Sheriff, who conducted the sale of the foreclosed
property, issued a Certificate of Redemption in favor of plaintiffsappellees as successors in interest of Torrento over the foreclosed
property. The Certificate of Redemption was registered a on March
13, 1961 with Register of deeds, and the corresponding entry and
annotation made on the original of said certificate of title.
Defendant-appellant, in her answer, denied that Matilda J. Gorospe
had validly redeemed the
ISSUE:
Whether or not the right of redemption may be transferred or
assigned by the owner?
RULING:
As held by the Supreme Court in Magno v. Viola, the term
"successor-in-interest' includes one to whom the debtor has
transferred his statutory right of redemption; or one to whom the
debtor has conveyed his interest in the property for the purpose of
redemption; or one who succeeds to the interest of the debtor by
operation of law; or one or more joint debtors who were not owners of
the property sold;. or the wife as regards her husband's homestead
by reason of the fact that some portion of her husband's title passes
to her. There is no question, therefore, that plaintiff-appellee Matilda
J. Gorospe is a "successor-in-interest" of the debtor Caridad J.
Torrento and as such could exercise the right to redeem the property
at any time within the period provided by law.
In the case at bar, registration of the certificate of sale in favor of the
purchaser at public auction was e only on October 20, 1960. Appellee
Matilda J. Gorospe had, therefore, a period of one year from that date
within which to exercise the right of redemption assigned to her by
649

Caridad J. Torrento. The redemption having been made on March 10,

1961, it is evident that the same had been timely made.
The Supreme Court then affirmed the decision of the CA and ordered
Santos to deliver the owners certificate of TCT to the Gorospes.

One-year period to redeem is counted from the date

of registration of the sheriffs sale, not from the date
of auction sale
GREGORIO Y. LIMPIN, and ROGELIO M. SARMIENTO vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and GUILLERMO PONCE
G.R. No. 70987 September 29, 1988
FACTS:
Four lots were mortgaged by the spouses Jose and Marcelina Aquino
to Guillermo Ponce and his wife Adela (since deceased) as security
for a loan of P2,200,000.00. The mortgages were registered. Two of
the lot were afterwards sold by the Aquinos to the Butuan Bay Wood
Export Corporation, which caused an adverse claim to be annotated
on
the
certificates
of
title.
Gregorio Y. Limpin, Jr. obtained a money judgment against Butuan
Bay Wood Export Corporation in Court of First Instance of Davao. To
satisfy the judgment, the lots were levied upon on and sold at public
auction to Limpin as the highest bidder for the sum of P517,485.41.
On order of the trial court, the covering titles were cancelled and
issued to Limpin. Limpin sold the two lots to Rogelio M. Sarmiento.
By virtue of said sale, TCTs Nos. 285450 and 285451 were cancelled
on November 4, 1983, and TCTS were replaced in Sarmiento's
name.
Ponce filed suit against the Aquino spouses for judicial foreclosure of
the mortgage over the Aquinos' four lots. Judgment was rendered in
favor of Ponce. After the judgment became final, the Trial Court,
650

directed the sale at public auction of the 4 mortgaged lots to satisfy

the judgment.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners exercised their equity of redemption on
time?
RULING:
Where the foreclosure is judicially effected, no equivalent right of
redemption exists. The law declares that a judicial foreclosure sale,
"when confirmed by an order of the court, ... shall operate to divest
the rights of all the parties to the action and to vest their rights in the
purchaser, subject to such rights of redemption as may be allowed by
law. Such rights exceptionally "allowed by law" (i.e., even after
confirmation by an order of the court) are those granted by the
charter of the Philippine National Bank (Acts No. 2747 and 2938),
and the General Banking Act (R.A. 337). These laws confer on the
mortgagor, his successors in interest or any judgment creditor of the
mortgagor, the right to redeem the property sold on foreclosure-after
confirmation by the court of the foreclosure sale-which right may be
exercised within a period of one (1) year, counted from the date of
registration of the certificate of sale in the Registry of Property.
It is Sarmiento's position, that the "17 June 1987 confirmation of the
sale of the two lots could not have cut off ... (his) equity of
redemption;" in fact, "Ponce himself, in his 'Urgent Motion' dated 1
June 1987, precisely prayed for the issuance of a writ of possession
'subject to the equity of redemption of Rogelio M. Sarmiento' thereby
recognizing Sarmiento's equity of redemption beyond confirmation
date," He also argues that he had not been informed of the time when
his right of redemption would be cut-off, because he "never received
a copy of any Motion for Confirmation, much less notice of hearing
thereon in violation of his right to due process;" that to hold otherwise
would "render nugatory the decision of the Court of Appeals and
this ... Court on the issue;" and that he is entitled to a reasonable
time, e.g., a year, for the exercise of his equity of redemption.
The Supreme Court held that the equity of redemption claimed and
invoked by Sarmiento over the subject properties, lapsed and ceased
to exist without having been properly exercised from the date of
651

issuance by the Trial Court of the Order confirming the sheriffs sale
of said properties in favor of the private respondent.

Option to exercise the right to redeem is personal to

the mortgagor, hence may be waived.
TOLENTINO vs. CA
106 SCRA 513, 1981
FACTS:
Ceferino de la Cruz, the owner of a homestead land, died in
1960; his heirs sold the land to the Tolentino spouses in 1962. In
1967, the de la Cruzes filed an action with the Court of First
Instance in Davao to repurchase the land, since the law allows a
five year period for repurchase of homestead lots. They said they
had tried to repurchase the land several times extrajudicially, but
the
Tolentinos
refused.
By that time, however, the Tolentinos had taken two mortgages
on the land. When the first mortgage with BPI fell due, the land
was auctioned, with BPI as the highest bidder. In 1969, it was
registered to BPI. Vicenta Tolentino went to BPI with a check for
P16,000, trying to redeem the land. She was told that it was sold a
year ago, when the court decision became final in favor of Dela
Cruzes. However, the Tolentinos were told they could still redeem
two other lots they had mortgaged with BPI after paying
P75,995.07, the balance of the loan after the de la Cruzes had
paid P16,000 for the homestead lot.
Instead of redeeming the two other lots, Vicenta consigned
payment to the court, giving a crossed PNB check for P91,995.07,
for the redemption of the three lots, including the homestead lot.
However, she ordered payment stopped on the check the following
652

day, upon advice of counsel and to protect her rights, she said.
She said this was to prevent BPI from encashing the check without
returning all the foreclosed properties. Then she filed a redemption
case against BPI, imputing bad faith for failing to return all the
foreclosed properties.
The complaint was dismissed.
Issue:
In the case of a mortgage, is consignation necessary or is
tender of payment enough? May a check be used for tender of
payment and if so, when is the obligation extinguished? When the
check is filled out or when it is encashed?

Ratio:
The court ruled that Art. 1249 does not apply in this case
because the Tolentinos debt was extinguished when the property
was foreclosed and sold to satisfy the debt. What remained was
their right to redeem said properties, which is not an obligation but
a privilege. Once they exercise the right to redeem, they would
then have an obligation to pay, but that obligation would be
extinguished
only
when
the
check
is
encashed.
Since the formal offer to redeem was made during the period of
redemption prescribed by law, the Tolentinos may redeem the two
other properties mortgaged to BPI within 30 days from entry of
judgment, plus 1% per month interest up to the time of
redemption, together with taxes or assessments BPI may have
paid after purchase.
They were not allowed to redeem the homestead lot because
the decision of the lower court was already final and there was no

653

finding of grave abuse of jurisdiction that would justify a reversal of

the decision.

A mortgagee is deemed to have waived the statutory

period of redemption when he accepts redemption
price after one year from date of expiration of
redemption period
RAMIREZ vs CA
219 SCRA 598
FACTS
On September 15, 1959, petitioners-spouses Hilario Ramirez
and Valentina Bonifaciofiled an application for registration of a
parcel of riceland in Rizal. In their application for registration, they
alleged that to the best of their knowledge and belief, there is
nomortgage or encumbrance of any kind whatsoever affecting said
land and that they hadacquired it by purchase from certain
Gregoria Pascual during the early part of the American regime
but the corresponding contract of sale was lot and no copy or
recordof the same was available.The Court found, however, that
the applicants are not the owners of the land sought tobe
registered. They were ANTICHRETIC CREDITORS- mere holders
placed inpossession of the land by its owners as security for loan.
The applicants were foundguilty of fraudulent misrepresentation
and concealment when they declared that noother person had any
claim or interest in the said land.
ISSUE
Can an antichretic creditor acquire land of debtor by prescription?
HELD
No.The petitioners are not possessors in the concept of
owners, but mere HOLDERS placed in possession of land by its
owners. Thus, their possession cannot serve as a title for acquiring
dominion. The court, from other cases like Trillana v. Manansala,
Valencia v. Acala and Barretto v. Barretto, held that the antichretic
654

creditor cannot ordinarily acquire by prescription the land

surrendered to him by the debtor.
Mortgagor may still execute another mortgage contract
during the redemption period; reasons.
MANUEL D. MEDIDA and TEOTIMO ABELLANA vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and SPS. ANDRES DOLINO and PASCUALA DOLINO
G.R. No. 98334 May 8, 1992
FACTS:
Private respondents, Spouses Dolino, alarmed of losing their right of
redemption over thesubject parcel of land from Juan Gandiocho,
purchaser of the aforesaid lot at a foreclosure sale of the previous
mortgage in favor of Cebu City Development Bank, went to Teotimo
Abellana,President of the City Savings Bank (formerly known as
Cebu City Savings and LoanAssociation, Inc.), to obtain a loan of
P30, 000. Prior thereto, their son Teofredo filed a similar loan
application and the subject lot was offered as security. Subsequently
they executed a promissory note in favor of CSB.The loan became
due and demandable without the spouses Dolino paying the same,
petitioner association caused the extrajudicial foreclosure of the
mortgage. The land was sold at a publicauction to CSB being the
highest bidder. A certificate of sale was subsequently issued which
wasalso registered. No redemption was being effected by Sps.
Dolino, their title to the property wascancelled and a new title was
issued in favor of CSB.Sps. Dolino then filed a case to annul the sale
at public auction and for the cancellation of certificate of sale issued
pursuant thereto, alleging that the extrajudicial foreclosure sale was
inviolation of Act 3135, as amended. The trial court sustained the
validity of the loan and the realestate mortgage, but annulled the
extrajudicial foreclosure on the ground that it failed to complywith the
notice requirement of Act 3135. Not satisfied with the ruling of the trial
court, Sps. Dolino interposed a partial appeal to the CA,assailing the
validity of the mortgage executed between them and City Savings
Bank, amongothers. The CA ruled in favor of private respondents
declaring the said mortgage as void.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a mortgage, whose property has been extrajudicially
655

foreclosed and sold ata corresponding foreclosure sale, may validly

execute a mortgage contract over the same property in favor of a
third party during the period of redemption.
RULING:
It is undisputed that the real estate mortgage in favor of petitioner
bank was executed byrespondent spouses during the period of
redemption. During the said period it cannot be said thatthe
mortgagor is no longer the owner of the foreclosed property since the
rule up to now is theright of a purchaser of a foreclosure sale is
merely inchoate until after the period of redemptionhas expired
without the right being exercised. The title to the land sold under
mortgageforeclosure remains in the mortgagor or his grantee until the
expiration of the redemption periodand the conveyance of the master
deed.The mortgagor remains as the absolute owner of the property
during the redemption period andhas the free disposal of his property,
there would be compliance with Article. 2085 of the CivilCode for the
constitution of another mortgage on the property. To hold otherwise
would createan inequitable situation wherein the mortgagor would be
deprived of the opportunity, which may be his last recourse, to raise
funds to timely redeem his property through another mortgage.

x.

Procedure after foreclosure of prior mortgage

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK vs. INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE

BANK and COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 86679 July 23, 1991
FACTS:
As found by respondent court and sustained by the record, on May 7,
1985, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court of Alaminos,
Pangasinan and docketed therein as LRC No. A-229, Record No. N33399, a petition for the cancellation of a memorandum of
encumbrance annotated upon its sixteen (16) transfer certificates of
title. As a backdrop, petitioner alleged that spouses Archimedes J.
Balingit and Ely Suntay executed in its favor the following real estate
mortgages.For failure of the Balingit spouses to settle their loan
obligation with petitioner, the latter extrajudicially foreclosed under Act
656

3135, as amended, the sixteen (16) parcels of land covered by the

real estate mortgages executed by the said spouses in favor of
petitioner. The sheriff s certificate of sale was registered on April 3,
1972 with the Register of Deeds, with a memorandum thereof duly
annotated at the back of the aforesaid certificates of title of the
foreclosed properties.
On May 28, 1986, private respondent International Corporate Bank,
as successor in interest of the defunct Continental Bank, filed an
opposition to the petition contending that, since it was not informed of
the extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings, the new and consolidated
titles over the foreclosed properties issued in favor of herein petitioner
are null and void.
On August 28, 1986, the lower court rendered a decision, denying the
petition for lack of jurisdiction.
ISSUES:
a.) Whether the action of the Register of Deeds in carrying the
annotations of levy over to the new title certificates issued in
purchaser's favor is vid and illegal.
b.) Whether Section 108 of "Property Registration Decree" expresly
allows the summary amendment of certificates of title whenever
interest annotated has "terminated and ceased".
RULING:
We find the foregoing contentions meritorious.
The rule is that upon a proper foreclosure of a prior mortgage, all
liens subordinate to the mortgage are likewise foreclosed, and the
purchaser at public auction held pursuant thereto acquires title free
from the subordinate liens. Ordinarily, thereafter the Register of
Deeds is authorized to issue the new titles without carrying over the
annotation of subordinate liens. 15 In a case with similar features, we
had earlier held that the failure of the subsequent attaching creditor to
redeem, within the time allowed by Section 6 of Act 3136, the land
which was sold extrajudicially to satisfy the first mortgage, gives the
purchaser a perfect right to secure the cancellation of the annotation
of said creditor's attachment lien on the certificates of title of said
land.
657

It has likewise been declared in Bank of the Philippine Islands, etc., et

al. vs. Noblejas, etc., et al., 17 that "(a)ny subsequent lien or
encumbrance annotated at the back of the certificates of title cannot
in any way prejudice the mortgage previously registered, and the lots
subject thereto pass to the purchaser at the public auction sale free
from any lien or encumbrance. Otherwise, the value of the mortgage
could be easily destroyed by a subsequent record of an adverse
claim, for no one would purchase at a foreclosure sale if bound by the
posterior claim. . . . This alone is sufficient justification for the
dropping of the adverse claim from the new certificates of title to be
issued to her, as directed by respondent Commissioner in his opinion
subject of this appeal."
Finally, the levy in favor of private respondent's predecessor in
interest arising from the judgment in Civil Case No. 69035 of the
Court of First Instance of Manila, appearing at the back of petitioner's
certificates of titles, is already without force and effect consider that
the same has been annotated in the certificates of title for more than
ten (10) years without being duly implemented. Properties levied
upon by execution must be sold at public auction within the period of
ten (10) years during which the judgment can be enforced by action.

xi.

WRIT
OF
POSSESSION
PROCEEDINGS

IN

FORECLOSURE

CHINA BANKING CORPORATION vs. LOZADA

GR No. 164919, July 4, 2008
FACTS:
Spouses Lozada entered into a Contract to Sell with PPGI the
Unit No. 402 of Cluster 1 of the Project. Six months later, PPGI
executed two Deeds of Real Estate Mortgage in favor of CBC to
secure the credit facilities granted by CBC to PPGI in the combined
maximum amount of P37,000,000.00. The real estate mortgages
covered 51 units of the Project, including Unit No. 402. When PPGI
failed to pay its indebtedness despite repeated demands, CBC filed
with the Clerk of Court and Ex Officio Sheriff of the Makati City RTC a
Petition for Extrajudicial Foreclosure of the real estate mortgages.
658

A year following the public auction sale of the foreclosed

properties held on 11 September 1998, spouses Lozada executed a
Notice of Adverse Claim dated 13 September 1999 as regards Unit
No. 402, which she registered with the Registry of Deeds of Makati
City. Said Notice of Adverse Claim was subsequently annotated on
CCT No. 69096 when it was issued in the name of CBC.
On 27 July 2001, CBC filed an Ex Parte Petition for Issuance of
a Writ of Possession in favor of petitioner [CBC] and against Erlinda
[sic] Lozada.
On 31 August 2001, the RTC issued an Order granting the Ex
Parte Petition of CBC, and decreeing that a writ of possession issue
in favor of the China Banking Corporation.
29 October 2001, the spouses Lozada filed with the Court of
Appeals their Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, with Application
for Writ of Preliminary Injunction/Temporary Restraining Order against
the Makati City RTC, Sheriff, CBC, and PPGI.
RULING OF THE CA:
The CA ruled in favor of the spouses Lozada, maintaining that
the possession of the spouses Lozada of Unit No. 402 constituted an
effective obstacle barring the Makati City RTC from issuing a writ to
place CBC in possession of the same.
CONTENTION OF SPOUSES LOZADA:
The writ of possession in favor of CBC deprived them of the
opportunity to defend their title and right to possess; or simply, that it
denied them due process.
ISSUE:
Whether the writ of possession may be granted and issued by
the RTC ex parte or without notice to other parties.
HELD:
The purchaser at the public auction sale of an extrajudicially
foreclosed real property may seek possession thereof in accordance
with Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended.
The Court expounded on the application of the foregoing
provision in De Gracia v. San Jose, thus:
The law expressly authorizes the purchaser to petition for a writ
of possession during the redemption period by filing an ex parte
motion under oath for that purpose in the corresponding registration
or cadastral proceeding in the case of property with Torrens title; and
upon the filing of such motion and the approval of the corresponding
659

bond, the law also in express terms directs the court to issue the
order for a writ of possession.
Strictly, Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended, refers to a
situation wherein the purchaser seeks possession of the foreclosed
property during the 12-month period for redemption.
In the case of Nera, the procedure under Section 7 of Act No.
3135, as amended, may be availed of by a purchaser seeking
possession of the foreclosed property he bought at the public auction
sale after the redemption period has expired without redemption
having been made.
Rights acquired by the purchaser of the foreclosed
property at the public auction sale upon the consolidation of his
title when no timely redemption of the property was made, to
wit:
1. the buyer in a foreclosure sale becomes the absolute owner of
the property purchased if it is not redeemed during the period of
one year after the registration of the sale. As such, he is
entitled to the possession of the said property and can demand
it at any time following the consolidation of ownership in his
name and the issuance to him of a new transfer certificate of
title. The buyer can in fact demand possession of the land
even during the redemption period except that he has to
post a bond in accordance with Section 7 of Act No. 3135,
as amended. No such bond is required after the redemption
period if the property is not redeemed.
Upon proper application and proof of title, the issuance of
the writ of possession becomes a ministerial duty of the court.
2. The purchaser in a public auction sale of a foreclosed property
is entitled to a writ of possession; and upon an ex parte
petition of the purchaser, it is ministerial upon the RTC to issue
such writ of possession in favor of the purchaser. However,
while this is the general rule, the exception and its basis were
summarized by the Court in Roxas v. Buan, thus:
In the extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgages,
possession of the property may be awarded to the purchaser at the
foreclosure sale during the pendency of the period of redemption or
after the lapse of the redemption period, without need of a separate
and independent action
Under Section 33 of Rule 39, which reads:
660

SEC. 33. Deed and possession to be given at expiration of

redemption period; by whom executed or given. If no redemption
be made within one (1) year from the date of the registration of
the certificate of sale, the purchaser is entitled to a conveyance
and possession of the property;
Upon the expiration of the right of redemption, the purchaser or
redemptioner shall be substituted to and acquire all the rights, title,
interest and claim of the judgment obligor to the property as of the
time of the levy. The possession of the property shall be given to the
purchaser or last redemptioner by the same officer unless a third
party is actually holding the property adversely to the judgment
obligor.
In an extrajudicial foreclosure of real property, when the foreclosed
property is in the possession of a third party holding the same
adversely to the defaulting debtor/mortgagor, the issuance by
the RTC of a writ of possession in favor of the purchaser of the
said real property ceases to be ministerial and may no longer be
done ex parte.
While CBC invokes the general rule in the Petition at bar, the spouses
Lozada assert the exception.
The spouses Lozada aver that they are holding Unit No. 402
adversely to the debtor/mortgagor PPGI, and that their possession is
sufficient obstacle to the ex parte issuance of a writ of possession in
favor of CBC.
They cannot assert that said right of possession is adverse or
contrary to that of PPGI when they have no independent right of
possession other than what they acquired from PPGI.
The exception provided under Section 33 of Rule 39 of the
Revised Rules of Court contemplates a situation in which a third party
holds the property by adverse title or right, such as that of a coowner, tenant or usufructuary. The spouses Lozada cannot claim that
their right of possession over Unit No. 402 is analogous to any of
these.
It must be emphasized that what PPGI executed in favor of the
spouses Lozada was a Contract to Sell, a mere promise to sell,
which, at the moment of its execution, did not yet transfer possession,
much less, title to Unit No. 402 from PPGI to the spouses Lozada.
When PPGI constituted the real estate mortgage on Unit No. 402 in
favor of CBC six months later, possession of and title to the property
still resided in PPGI.
661

a.) mandatory and ministerial duty of the Makati City RTC to

grant the ex parte petition of CBC and order the issuance of
a writ of possession in the latters favor over Unit No. 402.
b.) mandatory and ministerial for the Clerk of Court to comply
with the Makati City RTC order by issuing the writ of
possession,
c.) mandatory and ministerial for the Sheriff to implement the
writ by first issuing a notice to vacate to the occupants of
Unit No. 402.
He is entitled to the possession following the
consolidation of ownership in his name.

BPI vs. TARAMPI

GR No. 174988, December 10, 2008

FACTS:
In 1995, spouses Homobono and Luzdeldia Tarampi (respondents)
obtained loans from Bank of Philippine Islands (petitioner) in the total
amount of P19,000,000, which were secured by four sets of real
estate mortgage over a parcel of land located at Tandang Sora,
Quezon City, with an area of 796 square meters and covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 122627 issued by the Registry
of Deeds of Quezon City.

Respondents defaulted on their obligation, prompting petitioner to

institute extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings. At the auction sale on
February 8, 1999, the mortgaged property was sold to petitioner as
the highest bidder. A Certificate of Sale was thereupon issued to
petitioner which was registered and annotated on the TCT.As the
redemption period expired without respondents redeeming the
mortgages, petitioner, through its Vice-President Jocelyn C. Sta. Ana,
662

executed an Affidavit of Consolidation. TCT No. 122627 was thus

cancelled and TCT No. N-216396 was in its stead issued in the name
of petitioner on July 27, 2000.

Petitioner thereafter filed for Writ of Possessionover the property

including all the improvements thereon, docketed as LRC Case No.
Q-13412(00), which was raffled to Branch 105 of the RTC of Quezon
City.Where it was granted.
ISSUE:
Whether the writ of possession should be implemented during the
pendency of the case for annulment of mortgages.
HELD:
No, It is settled that the buyer in a foreclosure sale becomes the
absolute owner of the property purchased if it is not redeemed during
the period of one year after the registration of sale. As such, he is
entitled to the possession of the property and can demand it any time
following the consolidation of ownership in his name and the issuance
of a new transfer certificate of title. In such a case, the bond required
in Section 7 of Act No. 3135 is no longer necessary. Possession of
the land then becomes an absolute right of the purchaser as
confirmed owner. Upon proper application and proof of title, the
issuance of the writ of possession becomes a ministerial duty of the
court.

A mortgagee is entitled to a writ of possession after

extrajudicial foreclosure even before the expiration of
the period of redemption
VELOSO vs. IAC
205 SCRA 227

663

FACTS:
The property involved was a house and lot belonging to the petitioner
spouses, Romeo F. Veloso and Delia M. Veloso. Their ownership was
evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 136559 of the Registry
of Deeds of Quezon City. By deeds executed on October 3, and 16,
1978, they constituted a mortgage over the property as security for a
loan in the sum of P200,000.00 given by State Investment House,
Inc. (SIHI) to Globe Engineering Corporation, a firm of which Romeo
F. Veloso was the President and General Manager.About four months
later, Globe Engineering Corporation asked SIHI for an additional
loan. The request was turned down. Instead SIHI demanded that the
former pay its original loan in accordance with the terms of the
contract and its current statement of accounts. No payment having
been made, SIHI caused the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage
by the Sheriff of Quezon City pursuant to the mortgage deeds. The
public auction sale was held on December 4, 1980, after due
publication and notice. The highest bid for the property, P303,069.79,
was submitted by SIHI. Consequently, the Sheriff executed a
certificate of sale in SIHI's favor, conveying the property to it. After the
expiry of the redemption period, ownership over the property was
consolidated in SIHI and a new title, No. 285806, was issued to it.

The one-year period for redemption of the foreclosed property lapsed,

as aforestated, with neither the Velosos nor Globe Engineering
Corporation making any attempt to redeem the property. All that was
done, as the record shows, was the transmission by Globe
Engineering Corporation, prior to foreclosure, of a request for review
and correction of SIHI's statement of account, and when the request
was rejected and it became evident that foreclosure was forthcoming,
the institution by the Velosos on December 2, 1980, 1 of an action in
the Regional Trial Court of Manila, docketed as Civil Case No.
136559, 2 praying for the nullification or reformation of the mortgage
contracts. The complaint was amended within a month to implead
Globe Engineering Corporation as additional co-plaintiff and to
include a prayer for the annulment of the sheriff's extra-judical
664

foreclosure sale.
ISSUE:
WON the pendency of that action bar the issuance of a writ of
possession to mortgagee who has acquired it as highest bidder in the
subsequent public auction sale
HELD:
NO,The pendency of that action does not and cannot bar the
issuance of a writ of possession to the mortgagee who has, in the
meantime, extrajudically foreclosed the mortgaged property and
acquired it as highest bidder in the subsequent public auction sale.
The law is quite explicit on this point, and the right of the mortgagee
thereunder unquestionable. And decisions abound applying the law
and declaring it to be the court's ministerial duty to uphold the
mortgagee's right to possession even during the redemption
period. 4 The petitioners have simply failed to demonstrate with any
degree of persuasiveness why the clear provisions of law and the
jurisprudence in application thereof should not be equally controlling
in the case at bar.

Nature of a writ of possession in Foreclosure

Proceedings
LAM VS. METROPOLITAN BANK
G.R.No.178881, February 18, 2008
FACTS:
Alexander and Julie Lam, petitioners, obtained a loan of P2M from
Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company, respondent. To secure its
payment, petitioners executed a deed of REM over their property in
Davao City, covered by TCT No. T-115893. After that, they were also
granted additional loans and signed several amendments to the
REM.
However, petitioners failed to pay the loans and so respondent
665

instituted an extra-judicial foreclosure proceeding with the Office of

the Clerk of Court and the Ex-Officio Sheriff of Davao, which was
granted by the latter. A Sheriff's sale was held and as the sole bidder,
the property was awarded to the respondent. A Provisional Certificate
of Sale was issued in favor of respondent and it was registered with
the RD.
Petitioners failed to redeem the property within the 1-yr redemption
period.
Accordingly, a Final Certificate of Sale in favor of the respondent was
executed by the Sheriff. Respondent consolidated its title to the
subject property, thus, TCT No. T-115893 was cancelled and TCT No.
T-327605in the name of the respondent was issued.
Respondent demanded that petitioners turn over the possession of
the property but the latter refused to do so. Due to that, respondent
filed a complaint for the issuance of Writ of Possession with the RTC
of Davao City. Petitioners in their answer, denied the material
allegation in the complaint, that respondent's complaint did not allege
its capacity to sue and be sued, that there was no showing that the
officer who signed the verification and certification was duly
authorized to represent the respondent and that they deny obtaining
a loan of P3.9M. During the pre-trial conference, the RTC directed the
parties to proceed to mediation but the parties failed to arrive at an
amicable settlement and so the case was referred back to the RTC
for the continuation of the pre-trial conference. At the pre-trial
conference, respondent manifested and moved that the complaint for
writ of possession should be heard ex parte.
RTC rendered a decision that the case will be heard ex parte and that
the defendant (petitioners) should not be allowed to participate in the
case as an adverse party as if the same is an ordinary civil action. On
January 23, 2004, petitioners filed a complaint for the specific
performance and annulment of the foreclosure of mortgage with the
RTC. Subsequently, February 11, 2004, petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration of the order regarding the hearing of the issuance of
Writ of Possession in ex parte.
RTC granted petitioners' motion for reconsideration, reversing its
666

decision and allowing petitioners to participate in the proceedings,

RTC declared that respondent was estopped from demanding a
resolution ex parte, after allowing petitioners to participate in the
proceedings. RTC added that under equitable circumstances, the
duty of the court to issue a writ of possession ceased to be ministerial
and that the existence of these equitable circumstances can only be
determined in the adversarial proceedings. The respondent filed a
motion for reconsideration, but it was denied by the RTC.
Respondent then went to the CA , CA reversed the RTC decision. It
rendered a decision that petition for the issuance of a writ of
possession is ex parte and that RTC mistakenly opined that it was
prudent to consolidate the hearing of the issuance of writ of
possession with that of the civil case for annulment of the foreclosure
sale. As to CA, the rule on the consolidation of actions in a civil
procedure covers only civil actions, thus, it cannot be consolidated
with an ex parte petition. It further held that any question regarding
the validity of the mortgage or its foreclosure cannot be a legal
ground for refusing the issuance of a writ of possession. Petitioners
filed for a motion for reconsideration, but CA denied it.
ISSUE:
W/N the issuance of a writ of possession should be heard ex parte?
RULING:
Yes. The court quote with approval the following disquisition of the
CA: The respondent judges line of reasoning in declaring ex parte
petition as an adversarial proceeding is simply puerile. The fact that
the Spouses Lam were allowed to actively participate in the
proceedings for the said case, by filing an Answer and going through
pre-trial and mediation, was a glaring procedural anomaly that the
court a quo had inexcusably abetted. The court cannot allow the
erring court a quo to use that same aberration as an excuse for a
continuing defiance of the law and jurisprudence that defines a
petition for the issuance of a writ of possession as a non-litigious ex
parte proceeding that does not require the participation of the
mortgagor.

667

A mortgagee becomes the absolute owner after

expiration of the period of redemption without the
mortgagor exercising right to redeem; possession
may be demanded after consolidation of ownership;
issuance of writ of possession
F. DAVID ENTERPRISES v. INSULAR BANK OF ASIA AND
AMERICA (IBAA)
G.R. No. 78714.
FACTS:
For alleged non-payment of obligations secured by a real estate
mortgage executed by Francisco and Norma David in its favor, IBAA
instituted extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings. An auction sale was
held and the mortgaged property was sold to IBAA as the highest
bidder. The certificate of sale was registered. No redemption was not
having been effected by the mortgagors, ownership of the land was
consolidated in IBAA and a new certificate of title was issued in its
name. IBAA filed a petition for a writ of possession over the said lot
was filed by IBAA and such was subsequently granted. David
spouses filed a petition to prohibit the foreclosure sale on the ground
that the real transaction between the parties was not a real estate
mortgage but a trust receipt agreement. The second is where the
mortgagors were seeking the cancellation of IBAAs transfer
certificate of title on the ground of the nullity of the foreclosure sale. In
this latter case, a preliminary injunction order against IBAA dealing
with or entering into the possession of the subject lot although the writ
itself had not yet been granted because the petitioners bond was still
awaiting approval.
668

Judge Felipe Kalalo recalled the writ of possession and

dismissed the LRC. This prompted IBAA to
file a motion for
reconsideration where it argued that since the petitioners bond had
not yet been approved in the Case the injunction order issued therein
should be regarded only as a temporary restraining order which
should be deemed to have expired after twenty days from issuance
under BP No. 224 but the motion was denied on the ground that the
movant had earlier recognized the validity of the injunction order.
Judge Pedro Laggui issued an indemnity bond in the writ of
preliminary injunction and the the complaint itself was dismissed on
the ground that the foreclosure sale had been validly held because
the order issued in the case to restrain the said sale had been
served
tardily
on
the
provincial
sheriff.
IBAA filed a second motion for reconsideration in the LRC
arguing that in view of the dismissal of Civil Case No. 6565 and the
consequent lifting of the writ of preliminary injunction, there was no
more reason for not issuing the writ of possession. This motion was
also denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a mortgagee becomes absolute owner after expiration
of period of redemption without mortgagor exercising right to
redeem?
HELD:
Yes, A mortgagee becomes absolute owner after expiration of period
of redemption without mortgagor exercising right to redeem;
possesion may be demanded after consolidation of ownership; writ of
possession. There is no longer any legal bar for the issuance of a
subsequent writ of possession which petitioner is rightfully entitled to.
Legal technicalities should be brushed aside to pave the way for the
dispensation
of
substantial
justice.
Accordingly, we agree that the second motion for
reconsideration filed by IBAA should have been considered a new
application for a writ of possession although it was not correctly
captioned as such. It is the text and purpose and not the designation
of a pleading that should control 6 lest a mere technicality deprive a
party of a substantial right because of a fastidious obsession with
formality. A contrary rule would forever deprive IBAA of the means to
possess and enjoy the property it had acquired in the foreclosure
669

sale.
The new application for a writ of possession should have been
granted, especially since the reason for the withdrawal of the earlier
writ had already disappeared with the lifting of the writ of preliminary
injunction
in
Civil
Case
No.
6565.
The right of the petitioner to the possession of the property is
clearly unassailable. It is founded on its right of ownership. As the
purchaser of the properties in the foreclosure sale, and to which the
respective titles thereto have already been issued, petitioners right
over the property has become absolute, vesting upon him the right of
possession over an enjoyment of the property which the Court must
aid in effecting its delivery. After such delivery, the purchaser
becomes the absolute owner of the property. As we said in Tan Soo
Huat v. Ongwico, the deed of conveyance entitled the purchaser to
have and to hold the purchased property. This means, that the
purchaser is entitled to go immediately upon the real property, and
this it is the Sheriffs inescapable duty to place him in such
possession.

The purchaser at public auction sale of an

extrajudicially foreclosed real property may seek
possession thereof in accordance with Sec. 7 of Act
No. 3135
CHINA BANKING CORPORATION vs. LOZADA
GR No. 164919, July 4, 2008
FACTS:
The spouses Lozada entered into a Contract to Sell with PPGI, the
developer of Makati Prime City Condominium Townhomes Project.
PPGI agreed to sell to the spouses Lozada a unit.
6 months later, PPGI, executed 2 Deeds of Real Estate Mortgage in
favor of CBC to secure the credit facilities granted by CBC to PPGI.
The real estate mortgages covered 51 units of the Project, including
the unit sold to the spouses.
Thereafter, PPGI failed to pay its indebtedness despite repeated
demands, the former filed a Petition for Extrajudicial Foreclosure. The
670

public auction sale took place and the CBC was the highest bidder.
The Certificate of Sale of the foreclosed properties was subsequently
issued in favor of CBC. Consequently, the Writ of possession were
issued in favor of the petitioner. Hence, the petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Writ of Possession may be granted in favor of the
petitioner.

RULING:
The procedure for extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage is
governed by Act No. 3135, as amended. The purchaser at the public
auction sale of an extrajudicially foreclosed real property may seek
possession thereof in accordance with Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as
amended
Strictly, Sec. 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended, refers to a situation
wherein the purchaser seeks possession of the foreclosed property
during the 12-month period for redemption. Upon the purchasers
filing of the ex parte petition and posting of the appropriate bond, the
RTC shall, as a matter of course, order the issuance of the writ of
possession in the purchasers favor.
It is thus settled that the buyer in a foreclosure sale becomes the
absolute owner of the property purchased if it is not redeemed during
the period of one year after the registration of the sale. As such, he is
entitled to the possession of the said property and can demand it at
any time following the consolidation of ownership in his name and the
issuance to him of a new transfer certificate of title. The buyer can in
fact demand possession of the land even during the redemption
period except that he has to post a bond in accordance with Section 7
of Act No. 3135, as amended. No such bond is required after the
redemption period if the property is not redeemed. Possession of the
land then becomes an absolute right of the purchaser as confirmed
owner. Upon proper application and proof of title, the issuance of the
writ of possession becomes a ministerial duty of the court.

It is ministerial for the court to issue the writ of

671

possession.
SUENO VS. LBP
GR No. 174711, September 17, 2008
FACTS:
Sueno obtained loans from LBP. The loans were secured by
Real Estate Mortgages over two parcels of land. However, Sueno
failed to pay her debt so the LBP filed an extrajudicial foreclosure of
the mortgage and the sale of said properties at a public auction. LBP
was the highest bidder in the auction sale.
Before the expiration of the one-year period for the redemption
of the subject properties, Sueno wrote LBP a letter requesting a sixmonth extension of her period to redeem. LBP denied and informed
her that she needed to post an initial amount so that LBP would not
consolidate the titles to the subject properties in its name. Partial
payment was made by the petitioner, but filed to pay the balance
despite warnings from the respondent. Thereafter, writ of possession
of the subject properties was issued in favor of LBP.
ISSUE: Whether or not it is ministerial duty of the court to issue the
writ of possession
RULING:
Under the provision of Sec. 33, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of
Court and Sec. 7 of Act 3135, as amended, the purchaser in a
foreclosure sale may apply for a writ of possession during the
redemption period by filing an ex parte motion under oath for that
purpose in the corresponding registration or cadastral proceeding in
the case of property covered by a Torrens title. Upon the filing of such
motion and the approval of the corresponding bond, the law also in
express terms directs the court to issue the order for a writ of
possession.
A writ of possession may also be issued after consolidation of
ownership of the property in the name of the purchaser. It is settled
that the buyer in a foreclosure sale becomes the absolute owner of
the property purchased if it is not redeemed during the period of one
year after the registration of sale. As such, he is entitled to the
possession of the property and can demand it any time following the
consolidation of ownership in his name and the issuance of a new
transfer certificate of title. In such a case, the bond required in
Section 7 of Act No. 3135 is no longer necessary. Possession of the
672

land then becomes an absolute right of the purchaser as confirmed

owner. Upon proper application and proof of title, the issuance of the
writ of possession becomes a ministerial duty of the court.
JOVEN VS. CA
212 SCRA 700
FACTS: Joven, the petitioner was the registered owner of three
parcels of land which she mortgaged in favor of the DBP. Upon the
extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage due to her failure to pay her
loan, the properties were sold at public auction to DBP as the biggest
bidder. A certificate of sale was issued and annotated on the
certificate of title on November 17, 1982.
After the expiration of the redemption period, no redemption having
been made by the petitioner, DBP sold the subject properties to
Roberto Paguia, one of the herein private respondents, through a
deed of sale executed on December 17, 1985. On January 30, 1986,
Paguia took possession of the properties through his representative,
Fernando Lasala, the other private respondent.
Earlier, the petitioner had filed on December 3, 1985, an action before
the Regional Trial Court of Lucena City for the annulment of the
mortgage and its foreclosure. Named as defendants were DBP and
the private respondents. Later, when her application for preliminary
injunction and restraining order was denied, she lodged with the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court a complaint against the private
respondents for forcible entry with a prayer for writ of mandatory
injunction.
the case was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. But the petitioner filed
a motion for reconsideration, which was granted. This resolution was
reversed on appeal by the Regional Trial Court. The petitioner
elevated the case to the respondent Court of Appeals, which
sustained the assailed decision.
Petitioner then filed a petition for review on certiorari, contending that
the Municipal Circuit Trial Court had jurisdiction over the ejectment
case and that the private respondents were guilty of forcible entry on
the subject premises for occupying the same without judicial
authorization.
ISSUE: whether or not the petition has merit
HELD: The petition has merit:
673

The respondents argue that the Municipal Circuit Trial Court had no
jurisdiction over the action for forcible entry on the principal ground
that a question of ownership was involved therein.
It is true that before the petitioner instituted the action for forcible
entry in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, the case for annulment of
the mortgage and foreclosure sale, which necessarily involves
recovery of ownership, was already being litigated in the Regional
Trial Court. Even so, the municipal court could, pending final
adjudication of that case, exercise its jurisdiction to determine the
right of possession over the subject properties in the ejectment case.
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts have jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and unlawful
detainer except where the question of ownership is involved or where
the damages or unpaid rentals sought to be recovered by the plaintiff
exceed P20,000.00 at the time of the filing of the complaint.
the respondent court erred when it affirmed the decision of the
Regional Trial Court declaring that the Municipal Circuit Trial Court
had no jurisdiction over the ejectment case filed by the petitioner.

SPS. VACA VS. CA

GR No. 109672, July 14, 1994
Facts:
Private respondent Associated Bank filed with the RTC of Quezon
City a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession of property
covered by TCT No. 254504. The property, consisting of a 953square meter lot and a residential house erected on it, situated at
Quezon City. Private respondent alleged that for failure of petitioners
Eduardo Vaca and Ma. Luisita Pilar to pay their mortgage obligation
to private respondent, the mortgage was extrajudicially foreclosed
and the mortgaged property was sold on October 30, 1990 to private
respondent as the highest bidder; that the one-year period to redeem
having expired, TCT No. 254504 was cancelled and TCT No. 52593
in private respondent's name was issued in lieu thereof; and that
despite demands, petitioners refused to turn over possession of the
674

property to private respondent.chanroblesvirtualaw

Petitioner spouses filed an opposition alleging that there was a
pending action in another court which the petitioners had filed for the
annulment of the mortgage and its foreclosure.chanroblesvirtualaw
The RTC denied private respondent's petition for the issuance of a
writ of possession, and denied private respondent's motion for
reconsideration.chanroblesvirtua
On certiorari the Court of Appeals annulled the orders and ordered the
RTC to issue the writ of possession. Hence this petition.
Issue:ch
-whether or not the action for annulment of the mortgage
constitutes a prejudicial question in LRC for issuance of a writ of
possession and that it was error for the Court of Appeals to order the
RTC to issue the writ of possession in favor of the mortgagee.
-whether or not it is a ministerial duty of the court to issue a writ of
possession after the one-year period to redeem has expired is
subject to certain exceptions.hanroblesvirtualawlibrar
Held: Petitioners' contention has no merit. The question raised in this
case has already been settled in Vda. de Jacob v. Court of Appeals, in
which it was held that the pendency of a separate civil suit
questioning the validity of the mortgage cannot bar the issuance of
the writ of possession, because the same is a ministerial act of the
trial court after title on the property has been consolidated in the
mortgagee.blesvirtualawlibrary
Petitioners cited the cases of Cometa v. Intermediate Appellate
Court, and Barican v.Intermediate Appellate Court, where deferment was
ordered of the issuance of the writ of possession notwithstanding the
lapse of the one-year period of redemption. The deferment, however,
was due to the circumstances of the property which had been sold to
third parties who assumed the indebtedness of the mortgagor and
took possession of the property earlier so that at the time of the
hearing on the petition for a writ of possession, the original debtor
was no longer in possession. Under these circumstances, it was held
that the obligation of the court to issue the writ of possession had
ceased to be ministerial.chanroblesvirtualawlibrar
None of these equitable circumstances is present herein to justify
675

making an exception to the rule that the issuance of a writ of

possession to a purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure, after the
period of redemption, is a ministerial function of the court. In this
case, there is no dispute that the property was not redeemed within
one year from registration of the extrajudicial foreclosure sale. Private
respondent thus acquired the absolute right, as purchaser, to the
issuance of a writ of possession pursuant to Act No. 3135, sec.
7.chanroblesvirtualawlibrar

EXCEPTIONS:
i.

When third party is actually holding the property

adversely to the judgment debtor

VICTOR CLAPANO vs. HON. FILOMENO GAPULTOS

G.R. Nos. L-51574-77 September 30, 1984
FACTS:
The spouses Conrado Crisostomo and Thelma Gallaza mortgaged
three (3) parcels of land, one a coconut plantation located at Maasim,
and the other two parcels situated at General Santos City, with
respondent Philippine National Bank, General Santos City Branch
(PNB for brevity), as security for a loan. The mortgage was
extrajudicially foreclosed and the properties were sold at public
auction to the PNB as the highest bidder. After the expiration of the
one-year redemption period, PNB took possession of the same. On
October 8, 1974, the PNB appointed Matilde Abejeron as caretaker.
On October 21, 1975, the PNB executed a Deed of Promise to Sell
said land in favor of respondent Princessita Jabido-Maulit. When the
vendee, Princessita, tried to take physical possession of the land,
petitioners Fernando Abellon and his wife Conchita Abellon (the
Abellons, for short) claiming to be the tenants of the former owner,
Conrado Crisostomo, and to have planted most of the coconuts in
said land, refused to give up possession.
On September 17, 1976, respondents PNB and Princessita filed with
the Court of First Instance of South Cotabato, an "Ex-Parte Motion for
the Issuance of Writ of Possession. As the Writ was not fully satisfied
because of the refusal of the Abellons and their workers to leave the
676

subject property, private respondents moved for the issuance of an

Alias Writ of Possession.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the mere refusal of the defeated party to surrender
the property to the winning party upon the order of the sheriff does
constitute contempt.
RULING:
Petitioners were successful in obtaining an Order upholding their
tenancy status and enjoining the defendants therein from depriving
them of their possession and cultivation of the subject property. Even
under Section 35, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, made applicable in
extrajudicial foreclosures of real estate mortgages by Section 6 of Act
No. 3135, the possession of property is given to a purchaser in
extrajudicial foreclosures unless a third party is actually holding the
property adversely to the judgment debtor." In this case, the subject
land was being possessed and cultivated by the Abellons as third
parties, whose status as tenants was recognized in CAR Case No.
44. Petitioners-spouses are protected by Presidential Decree No.
1038, which provides that no tenant tiller of private agricultural lands
devoted to crops other than rice and/or corn, including but not limited
to abaca, banana, coconut, coffee, mongo durian and other
permanent crops shall be removed, ejected, ousted or excluded from
his farm holding unless for causes provided by law and directed by a
final decision or order of the court. Sale of the land is not included as
one of the just causes for removal of tenants.

CHINA BANKING CORPORATION(CBC) vs. SPOUSES TOBIAS L.

LOZADA and ERLINA P. LOZADA
G.R. No. 164919
FACTS:
On 25 June 1995, the spouses Lozada entered into a Contract to
Sell with PPGI a two-bedroom residential unit with an area of 42.90
square meters, covered by CCT No. 34898, for the total price
of P1,444,014.04. About six months later, PPGI executed two Deeds
of Real Estate Mortgage in favor of CBC to secure the credit facilities
677

granted by CBC to PPGI in the combined maximum amount

ofP37,000,000.00. The real estate mortgages covered 51 units of the
Project. When PPGI failed to pay its indebtedness despite repeated
demands, CBC filed with the Clerk of Court and Ex Officio Sheriff of
the Makati City RTC a Petition for Extrajudicial Foreclosure of the real
estate. The public auction sale took place at which CBC was the
highest bidder, offering the amount of P30,000,000.00 for the
foreclosed properties.
On 15 May 2001 to Erlina, CBC notified her that it had already
consolidated its title and ownership over the unit which she presently
occupied, and requested her to vacate and surrender the said
property, including the appurtenant keys, to its duly authorized
representative within 15 days from receipt of the letter. The Court of
Appeals rendered its assailed Decision on 25 March 2004 ruling in
favor of the spouses Lozada. According to the appellate court, the
issuance of the Writ of Possession was not mandatory and ministerial
on the part of the Makati City RTC, and the court a quo should have
afforded the spouses Lozada a hearing, considering that (1) the Unit
was no longer in the possession of the original debtor/mortgagor
PPGI, but was already being enjoyed by the spouses Lozada; (2)
the Makati City RTC was aware that the Unit was already in the
possession of the spouses Lozada because it was so stated in
the ex parte petition of CBC, as well as the Notice of Adverse Claim
presented by CBC as evidence before the trial court; (3) the
spouses Lozada , under Section 18 of Presidential Decree No. 957,
had the right to continue paying for the Unit to CBC, the purchaser
thereof at the foreclosure sale, still in accordance with the tenor of the
Contract to Sell; and (4) the spouses Lozada had a perfect cause of
action for the annulment of the mortgage constituted by PPGI in favor
of CBC since PPGI failed to comply with the requirement in Union
Bank of the Philippines v. Housing and Land Use Regulatory
Board, to notify the installment buyer of the condominium unit of the
mortgage constituted thereon.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court of appeals erred in ruling that the
respondents were holding the subject property adversely to the
judgment debtor thus the issuance of the writ of possession was
improper and unwarranted.
678

RULING:
The purchaser in the public auction sale of a foreclosed property is
entitled to a writ of possession; and upon an exparte petition of the
purchaser, it is ministerial upon the RTC to issue such writ of
possession in favor of the purchaser. However, while this is the
general rule, as in all general rules, there is an exception.
Where a parcel levied upon on execution is occupied by a party other
than a judgment debtor, the procedure is for the court to order a
hearing to determine the nature of said adverse possession. Similarly,
in an extrajudicial foreclosure of real property, when the foreclosed
property is in the possession of a third party holding the same
adversely to the defaulting debtor/mortgagor, the issuance by the
RTC of a writ of possession in favor of the purchaser of the said real
property ceases to be ministerial and may no longer be
done ex parte. For the exception to apply, however, the property
need not only be possessed by a third party, but also held by the third
party adversely to the debtor/mortgagor. The exception provided
under Section 33 of Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court
contemplates a situation in which a third party holds the property by
adverse title or right, such as that of a co-owner, tenant
or usufructuary. The
co-owner,
agricultural
tenant, and usufructuary possess the property in their own right, and
they are not merely the successor or transferee of the right of
possession of another co-owner or the owner of the property. The
spouses Lozada cannot claim that their right of possession over the
Unit is analogous to any of these.
It is true that in the case presently before this Court, PPGI executed
in favor of the spouses Lozada the Contract to Sell covering the Unit
before it constituted in favor of CBC the real estate mortgages on 51
Project units including spoueses Lozadas unit. Nonetheless, it must
be emphasized that what PPGI executed in favor of the
spouses Lozada was a Contract to Sell, a mere promise to
sell, which, at the moment of its execution, did not yet transfer
possession, much less, title to the from PPGI to the
spouses Lozada. When PPGI constituted the real estate mortgage
on the Unit in favor of CBC six months later, possession of and title to
the property still resided in PPGI. And when PPGI subsequently
679

ceded possession of the Unit, upon its completion, to the

spouses Lozada, such right was already burdened by the terms and
conditions of the mortgage constituted thereon. By merely stepping
into the shoes of PPGI, the spouses Lozadas right of possession to
the Unit cannot be less or more than PPGIs.
The
Court
already
made
a
determination
that
the
spouses Lozada possessed the Unit as the successors or transferees
of PPGI. Still, the spouses Lozada only acquired the right of
possession of PPGI; hence, their possession can never be adverse
or contrary to that of PPGI. The spouses Lozada, having succeeded
PPGI in the possession of the Unit, cannot be considered a third
party holding the said property adversely to PPGI, the defaulting
debtor/mortgagor.

ii.

Where the price is unjustifiably higher than the real

amout of the obligation

CESAR SULIT vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ILUMINADA CAYCO

G.R. No. 119247. February 17, 1997
FACTS:
On 9 June 1992 Iluminada Cayco executed a Real Estate Mortgage
(REM) over Lot 2630 which is located in Caloocan City and covered
by TCT No. (23211) 11591 in favor of Cesar Sulit to secure a loan
of P4 Million. Upon Caycos failure to pay said loan within the
stipulated period, Sulit resorted to extrajudicial foreclosure of the
mortgage as authorized in the contract. Hence, in a public auction
the lot was sold to the mortgagee, who submitted a winning bid of P7
Million. On 13 December 1993 Sulit petitioned the Regional Trial
Court of Kalookan City for the issuance of a writ of possession in his
favor. On 17 January 1994 the RTC Judge issued a decision in favor
of Cesar Sulit, upon his posting of an indemnity bond in the amount of
One Hundred Twenty Thousand (P120,000.00) Pesos.
The governing law thus explicitly authorizes the purchaser in a
foreclosure sale to apply for a writ of possession during the
680

redemption period by filing an ex parte motion under oath for that

purpose in the corresponding registration or cadastral proceeding in
the case of property with Torrens title. Upon the filing of such motion
and the approval of the corresponding bond, the law also in express
terms directs the court to issue the order for a writ of possession.
The rule is, however, not without exception. Under Section 35, Rule
39 of the Rules of Court, which is made applicable to the extrajudicial
foreclosure of real estate mortgages by Section 6 of Act 3135, the
possession of the mortgaged property may be awarded to a
purchaser in the extrajudicial foreclosure unless a third party is
actually holding the property adversely to the judgment debtor.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the mortgagee or purchaser in an extrajudicial
foreclosure sale is entitled to the issuance of a writ of possession
over the mortgaged property despite his failure to pay the surplus
proceeds of the sale to the mortgagor or the person entitled thereto.
Secondarily, it calls for a resolution of the further consequences of
such non-payment of the full amount for which the property was sold
to him pursuant to his bid.
RULING:
Now, in forced sales, low prices are generally offered and the mere
inadequacy of the price obtained at the sheriffs sale, unless shocking
to the conscience, has been held insufficient to set aside a sale. This
is because no disadvantage is caused to the mortgagor. On the
contrary, a mortgagor stands to gain with a reduced price because he
possesses the right of redemption. When there is the right to
redeem, inadequacy of price becomes immaterial since the judgment
debtor may reacquire the property or sell his right to redeem, and
thus recover the loss he claims to have suffered by reason of the
price obtained at the auction sale.
The case at bar, in the sense that instead of an inadequacy in price,
there is due in favor of private respondent, as mortgagor, a surplus
from the proceeds of the sale equivalent to approximately 40% of the
total mortgage debt, which excess is indisputably a substantial
amount. Nevertheless, it is our considered opinion, and we so hold,
681

that equitable considerations demand that a writ of possession should

also not issue in this case.
The application of the proceeds from the sale of the mortgaged
property to the mortgagors obligation is an act of payment, not
payment by dation; hence, it is the mortgagees duty to return any
surplus in the selling price to the mortgagor. Perforce, a mortgagee
who exercises the power of sale contained in a mortgage is
considered a custodian of the fund, and, being bound to apply it
properly, is liable to the persons entitled thereto if he fails to do
so. And even though the mortgagee is not strictly considered a
trustee in a purely equitable sense, but as far as concerns the
unconsumed balance, the mortgagee is deemed a trustee for the
mortgagor or owner of the equity of redemption.
The general rule that mere inadequacy of price is not sufficient to set
aside a foreclosure sale is based on the theory that the lesser the
price the easier it will be for the owner to effect the redemption. The
same thing cannot be said where the amount of the bid is in excess
of the total mortgage debt. The reason is that in case the mortgagor
decides to exercise his right of redemption, Section 30 of Rule 39
provides that the redemption price should be equivalent to the
amount of the purchase price, plus one per cent monthly interest up
to the time of the redemption, together with the amount of any
assessments or taxes which the purchaser may have paid thereon
after purchase, and interest on such last-named amount at the same
rate.
We cannot simply ignore the importance of surplus proceeds
because by their very nature, surplus money arising from a sale of
land under a decree of foreclosure stands in the place of the land
itself with respect to liens thereon or vested rights therein. They are
constructively, at least, real property and belong to the mortgagor or
his assigns. Inevitably, the right of a mortgagor to the surplus
proceeds is a substantial right which must prevail over rules of
technicality.

682

xii.

where the trial court had already granted the wit of

possession sought by the buyer at an extrajudicial
foreclosure sale, a petition to consolidate said case
with the case pending before another court for
Declaration of Nullity of Contracts/Discharge of
Mortgage, Annulment of Extrajudicial Foreclosure
Sales and Reconveyance had become moot and
academic.

LEONG vs. TANGUANGCO

G.R. No. 154632, March 14, 2008
FACTS:
On February 5, 1999, respondent Hermosa Savings and Loan Bank,
Inc. (Hermosa Bank) filed an Ex-Parte Petition for the Issuance of
Writ of Possession against petitioners before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Bacoor, Cavite. The petition alleged that on November 28,
1997 Hermosa Bank purchased at an extra-judicial foreclosure sale
three parcels of land together with improvements therein; that the
Certificate of Sale of Realty issued to it was duly registered and
annotated with the Registry of Deeds of Cavite on December 17,
1997; that twelve (12) months from the date of registration of the sale
had already elapsed and neither petitioners nor any person entitled
thereto had exercised their right of redemption; that upon the
expiration of the period, Hermosa Bank caused the consolidation of
ownership over said parcels and secured under its name; and that
having consolidated its ownership thereon, it is entitled as a matter of
right to a writ of possession.
Petitioners filed an Opposition with Urgent Motion to
Dismiss/Suspend
Proceedings
and
Motion
for
Consolidation. Petitioners claimed that Alfonso only agreed to sign
the documents upon the insistent prodding of the banks president,
Benjamin J. Cruz, that they were needed for purposes only of
the Bangko Sentrals audit of Hermosa Bank; in truth, the documents
were required to cover up the loan of spouses Rene
and Remedios Dado and Sierra Madre Development Corporation,
who are the real debtors of the bank.
683

Petitioners moved to reconsider the Order but reconsideration was

denied; hence, on August 12, 1999, they filed a Petition
for Certiorari with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or
Preliminary Injunction before the CA. The following day, however,
the Cavite RTC issued the writ of possession in favor of Hermosa
Bank.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the dismissal of the petition under Rule 65 by the
CA based on it being moot and academic is patently erroneous;
2. Whether or not the issues as to the validity of the real estate
mortgage contracts, loan agreements, promissory notes, extrajudicial
foreclosure and auction sale of petitioners properties must first be
resolved in the civil case pending in the Las Pias RTC since the
question of whether respondent Hermosa Bank is entitled to a writ of
possession in the LRC case is dependent thereon.
RULING:
As the CA correctly found, the RTC of Bacoor, Cavite had already
granted the writ of possession sought by Hermosa. Hence, the
petition to consolidate the case before the RTC of Bacoor, Cavite with
the case pending before the RTC of Las Pias, had become moot
and academic.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

xiii. Remedy of the mortgagor is to question the sale and

move for the cancellation of the writ of possession.
DE RAMOS vs. CA
213 SCRA 207
FACTS:
Private respondents mortgaged their 230 square meter residential lot
located in Modern Village, Paciano Rizal, Calamba, Laguna and
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-35475 in the Register of
684

Deeds of the Province of Laguna, to the Luzon Development Bank

(hereinafter, the Bank) as security for a loan of P10,000.00 which is
evidenced by a promissory note. There being default in the payment
of the installments on due dates despite several written demands, the
Bank applied for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage. In a
public auction on 30 July 1981, the Provincial Sheriff of Laguna sold
the mortgaged property to the Bank, the lone bidder therein, for
P23,808.29.
On 26 July 1983, the Bank filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of
possession with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Calamba, Laguna
which was docketed as SLRC Case No. III-83-C. In its Order dated
24 June 1985, the trial court granted the petition, ordered the
issuance of a writ of possession and directed the Provincial Sheriff or
any of his deputies to place the Bank in possession of the property,
the writ of possession was issued on 1 July 1985. During the
pendency of the petition for a writ of possession, or specifically on 3
September 1983, the Bank sold to the herein petitioners the property
in question under a Deed of Conditional Sale for P35,000.00 payable
in installments. After the said balance having been paid, the Bank
executed in the petitioners favor a Deed of Absolute Sale on
November 1983 which was registered in the Office of the Register of
Deeds on 13 November 1983.
The Demamays neither moved for a reconsideration of nor appealed
from the aforesaid 24 June 1985 Order. Instead, on 5 July 1985,
Estelita Demamay filed a complaint "To Set Aside the Sale of
Mortgaged Property and Subsequent Transactions Pertinent Thereto
and Cancel Writ of Possession Issued Thereon" which was docketed
as
Civil
Case
No.
894-85-C.
Then, seven (7) months later, or more specifically, on 8 August 1986,
Estelita Demamay, now joined by her husband Flavio, filed a
complaint for Annulment of Sales and Reconveyance of Real
Property with Damages against the bank and herein petitioners with
the RTC of Calamba, Laguna; the complaint was docketed as Civil
Case No. 1031-86-C 11 and was raffled off to Branch 34 of the said
court. In its Answer with Counterclaim and Opposition to the Issuance
of Preliminary Injunction, the Bank interposed Special and Affirmative
Defenses, among which are (a) res judicata, the issues involved
having already been raised and resolved by Branches 37 and 36 of
685

the court, and (b) Branch 34 of the RTC has no jurisdiction to annul
the final orders of the two (2) aforementioned branches of the court in
SLRC No. 111-83-C and Civil Case No. 849-85-C, respectively. The
trial court dismissed Civil Case No. 1031-86-C on the ground that it is
barred by res judicata because of the final orders dated 24 June 1985
in SLRC No. 111-133-C, and 3 January 1986 in Civil Case No. 89485-C.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the said Orders are adjudications on the merits of the
causes of action and the issues involved.
RULING:
The principle of res judicata applies in this case. There being clearly
identical parties and identity of rights asserted in all three (3) cases
the focal issue in this case having been fully adjudicated in the
aforecited cases this case must be dismissed."
The essential requisites of res judicata are (1) there must be a final
judgment or order; (2) the court rendering it must have jurisdiction
over the subject matter and over the parties; (3) it must be a
judgment or order on the merits; and (4) there must be between the
two cases identity of parties, identity of subject matter, and identity of
action.
The parties do not dispute the fact that Branches 37 and 36 of the
Regional Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna had jurisdiction over SLRC
No. 111-83-C and Civil Case No. 894-85-C, respectively, that their
Orders which were pleaded as a bar to Civil Case No. 1031-86-C are
firm and final; and that the principal parties, causes of action and
issues involved in the latter are identical to those in the first two (2)
cases.
After having submitted to the jurisdiction of the court in SLRC No.
111-83-C, testifying therein and offering documentary evidence to
resist the petition for a writ of possession and to obtain affirmative
relief such as the nullification of the foreclosure proceedings and all
incidents thereto including, necessarily, the sale at the public auction,
Demamay cannot now be heard to challenge the jurisdiction of the
said court and to suggest, in order to escape from the effects of the
686

finality of the Order, that all that had transpired in the said case was
an exercise in futility. A party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the
court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent and, after
obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that
same jurisdiction. Put differently, it is not proper for a party who has
affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a particular matter
to secure an affirmative relief, to afterwards deny that same
jurisdiction to escape penalty. That order was, undoubtedly, an
adjudication on the merits of Demamays claim and cause of action.
If the court in Civil Case No. 894-85-C finally decreed the dismissal of
the case for lack of jurisdiction, it was because the Order of 24 June
1985 in SLRC No. 111-83-C was already final; the court could not,
therefore, annul it. the authority to annul the same is vested in the
then Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) pursuant to
Section 9(2) of B.P. No. 129. The message the court wanted to
convey was that the Order of 24 June 1985 constituted a prior final
judgment
which
barred
Civil
Case
No.
894-85-C.
The 3 January 1986 Order in Civil Case No. 894-85-C was, by itself,
an adjudication on the merits of the Demamay spouses claim
because it declared them no longer entitled to the right upon which
their claims are based. A judgment is deemed to be rendered upon
the merits when it amounts to a declaration of the law as to the
respective rights and duties of the parties, based upon the ultimate
fact or state of facts disclosed by the pleadings and evidence, and
upon which the right of recovery depends, irrespective of formal,
technical or dilatory objectives or contentions.

687

xiv. The order of the RTC granting the petition for a writ of
possession is final which can only be questioned on
appeal
SAN FERNANDO RURAL BANK, INC. Vs. PAMPANGA OMNIBUS
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and DOMINIC G. AQUINO
G.R. No. 168088. April 3, 2007
FACTS:
Pampanga Omnibus Development Corporation (respondent PODC)
was the registered owner of a parcel of land in San Fernando,
Pampanga (now San Fernando City). Respondent PODC secured
two loans from petitioner and Masantol Rural Bank, Inc. (MRBI). The
loans were evidenced by separate promissory notes executed by
Federico R. Mendoza and Anastacio E. de Vera. To secure payment
of the loans, respondent PODC executed a real estate mortgage over
the subject lot in favor of the creditor banks. The contract provided
that in case of failure or refusal of the mortgagor to pay the obligation
secured thereby, the real estate mortgage may be extrajudicially
foreclosed in accordance with Act No. 3135, as amended.
Eliza M. Garbes (PODC President and daughter of Federico
Mendoza), together with her husband Aristedes Garbes, secured
aP950,000.00 loan from petitioner on March 27, 1992. The loan was
to mature after 180 days or on September 23, 1992. Mendoza signed
as co-borrower in the promissory note executed by the spouses. The
spouses also executed a chattel mortgage over their personal
property as security for the payment of their loan account. Upon
respondent PODCs failure to pay its loan to petitioner, the latter filed
a petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage.
Petitioner did not file a petition for a writ of possession during the
redemption period.
On May 11, 2002, petitioner, through Eliza Garbes (with the authority
of petitioners board of directors), executed a notarized deed of
assignment in favor of respondent Dominic G. Aquino over its right to
redeem the property. On May 30, 2002, respondent Aquino remitted
Cashiers Check No. to the Ex-OfficioSheriff as redemption money for
the property for which he was issued Receipt dated May 31, 2002.
688

On October 15, 2002, petitioner filed a Petition for a Writ of

Possession in the RTC of Pampanga. On December 20, 2002, the
court in LRC No. 890 issued an Order granting the petition and
ordered the issuance of a writ of possession, on a bond equivalent to
the market value of the property. It ruled that petitioner, as purchaser
at the foreclosure sale, was entitled to a writ of possession.
The appellate court ruled that the December 20, 2002 Order of the
RTC granting the petition for a writ of possession was interlocutory
and not final; hence, it may be questioned only via petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, not by appeal. The
CA cited the ruling of this Court in City of Manila v. Serrano. The CA
further held that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction when it granted the
application of petitioner for a writ of possession.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals seriously erred when it
sanctioned the Respondents resort to Certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Court, questioning a final order and not an
interlocutory order of the RTC.
RULING:
The CA erred in holding that the Order of the RTC granting the
petition for a writ of possession was merely interlocutory. Interlocutory
orders are those that determine incidental matters and which do not
touch on the merits of the case or put an end to the proceedings. A
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is the proper
remedy to question an improvident interlocutory order. On the other
hand, a final order is one that disposes of the whole matter or
terminates the particular proceedings or action leaving nothing to be
done but to enforce by execution what has been determined. It is
one that finally disposes of the pending action so that nothing more
can be done with it in the lower court. The remedy to question a final
order is appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.
The remedy of respondents was to appeal to the CA by filing their
notice of appeal within the period therefor. Even if the trial court erred
in granting a petition for a writ of possession, such an error is merely
an error of judgment correctible by ordinary appeal and not by a
689

petition for a writ of certiorari. Such writ cannot be legally used for any
other purpose.
Certiorari is a remedy narrow in its scope and inflexible in
character. It is not a general utility tool in the legal
workshop. Certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction and
not to correct errors of judgment. An error of judgment is one which
the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction, and which
error is reviewable only by an appeal.
b. EQUITABLE MORTGAGE
i. Not an equitable mortgage in this case:
DIONISIA DORADO VDA. DE DELFIN vs. SALVADOR D. DELLOTA
and THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE GUMERSINDO
DELEA,
G.R. No. 143697

January 28, 2008

FACTS:
The late Dionisia Dorado Delfin, herein petitioner, represented
by her heirs, was the registered owner of Lot No. 1213 situated in
Panitan, Capiz with an area of 143,935 square meters covered by
Original Certificate of Title No. RP-1124 (14972). On June 16, 1929,
Dionisia executed an "Escritura De Venta Con Pacto de Retro" over a
50,000-square meter portion of Lot No. 1213 in favor of spouses
Ildefonso Dellota and Patricia Delfin. However, Dionisia failed to
exercise her right of redemption. On June 9, 1949, Dionisia sold
another portion of Lot No. 1213 consisting of 50,000 square meters to
Gumersindo Delea (respondent herein represented by his estate),
as evidenced by a notarized "Deed of Sale with Right of
Redemption," thus, leaving an unsold area of more than 43,000
square meters. Dionisia never redeemed this 50,000-square meter
portion from Gumersindo. Records show that Salvador Dellota (also a
respondent represented by his heirs) leased this area from
690

Gumersindo. On October 12, 1956, Dionisia executed a "Deed of

and Promise To Sell" in favor of Salvador over a 90,000-square meter
portion of Lot No. 1213, without specifying whether it included the
50,000-square portion sold (with right of redemption) to Gumersindo.
On June 8, 1964, Dionisia filed with the then Court of First
Instance, Branch 2, Roxas City, a complaint for recovery of
possession and damages with an application for a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction, docketed as Civil Case No. V-2760. Impleaded
as defendant was respondent Salvador D. Dellota, represented by his
wife Genoveva D. Dellota and their children.
The trial court ruled Dionisia to redeem the 40,000 meter
portion of Lot 2123 and declared the ownership 50,000 portion also of
the same lot in the name of Gumersindo Delena. On appeal by
Dionisia, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision affirming in
toto the judgment of the trial court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Deed of Sale with Right of Redemption entered
into by Dionisia and Gumersindo is an equitable mortgage.

RULING:
An equitable mortgage is one which, although lacking in some
formality, or form, or words, or other requisites demanded by a
statute, nevertheless reveals the intention of the parties to charge
real property as security for a debt, and contains nothing impossible
or contrary to law. The essential requisites of an equitable mortgage
are: (1) the parties enter into what appears to be a contract of sale,
(2) but their intention is to secure an existing debt by way of
mortgage.

691

Powers of Attorney and Trust

Mindanao Development Authority v. CA
133 SCRA 429, 1982
FACTS:
Respondent Francisco Ang Bansing was the owner of a big tract of
land situated in Barrio Panacan Davao City. Ang Bansing sold a
portion thereof, with an area of about 5 hectares to Juan Cruz Yap
Chuy. A cadastral survey was made and Lot 664-B-3 was designated
as Lot 1846-C of the Davao Cadastre. Juan Cruz sold Lot 1846-C to
the Commonwealth of the Philippines for the amount of P6,347.50.
On February 25, 1965, the President of the Philippines issued
Proclamation No. 459, transferring ownership of certain parcels of
land situated in Sasa Davao City, to the Mindanao Development
Authority, now the Southern Philippines Development Administration,
subject to private rights, if any. Lot 1846-C, the disputed parcel of
land, was among the parcels of land transferred to the Mindanao
Development Authority in said proclamation. He, in selling his
property to another, made a written promise to work for the titling of
the land, but it was not done. The court ruled that there was no
express trust, because the written promise did not categorically
create an obligation on the part of the landowner to hold the property
in trust for the other. Neither was the subject matter of the supposed
trust clearly described.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was an express trust between Ang Bansing and
Juan Cruz over Lot 1846-C of Davao Cadastre
HELD:
No express trust had been created between Ang Bansing and Juan
Cruz over Lot 1846-C of the Davao Cadastre. Herein petitioner relies
mainly upon the following stipulation in the deed of sale executed by
Ang Bansing in favor of Juan Cruz to prove that an express trust had
been established with Ang Bansing as the settlor and trustee and
692

Juan Cruz as the cestui que trust or beneficiary. The stipulation,

however, is nothing but a condition that Ang Bansing shall pay the
expenses for the registration of his land and for Juan Cruz to
shoulder the expenses for the registration of the land sold to him. The
stipulation does not categorically create an obligation on the part of
Ang Bansing to hold the property in trust for Juan Cruz. Hence, there
is no express trust. Thus, the petition is denied.
In a separate opinion of Justice Aquino, however, it is said that the
disputed land should be adjudicated to the government agency
known as the Southern Philippines Development Administration, the
successor of the Commonwealth of the Philippines. It is argued that
Ang Bansing did not touch at all Lot No. 1846-C because he knew
that it was not his property and that it belonged to the State. It is
claimed that Ang Bansing was the true owner of Lot No. 1846-C,
there being an express trust in this case. In any event, the real
plaintiff in this case is the Republic of the Philippines and prescription
does not run against the State. The maxim is nullum tempus occurrit
regi or nullum tempus occurrit reipublicae (lapse of time does not bar
the right of the crown or lapse of time does not bar the
commonwealth). The best reason for its existence is the great public
policy of preserving public rights and property from damage and loss
through the negligence of public officers. The government officials
concerned were negligent in not intervening in the land registration
proceeding or in not promptly asking Ang Bansing to reconvey the
disputed lot to the Commonwealth or to the Republic of the
Philippines. Such negligence does not prejudice the State. The
negligence or omissions of public officers as to their public duties will
not work an estoppel against the State.

PROCEEDINGS
AFTER
INVOLUNTARY DEALINGS

ORIGINAL

REGISTRATION:

A. ATTACHMENTS
a. Registration
693

i.

Duty of the Clerk of Court if the duplicate

certificate of title is not presented at the time of the
registration.

ii.

Regitration of entry of any court process that

reduces, dissolves or discharges the writ of
attachment.

b. Effects of Attachment
SANTOS VS AQUINO (205 SCRA 127)
FACTS:
Santos and Camus filed a case against the FINASIA and its
officers who are responsible in luring them to make the money
placement in that company and upon the application and strength of
the attachment bonds, the court issued an attachment to the property
owned by the company in its officer. The proceedings against
FINASIA were suspended because it was placed under receivership
by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) for operating
without prior SEC registration and for failure to pay maturing money
market placements. FINASIA file a motion to lift the attachment by
offering counter bonds but opposed by the Santos. Then later they
filed again a motion to substitute the attached properties and were set
on September 22, 1988. But a day before the hearing, the counsel of
Santos informed him that the hearing was cancelled because the
judge is attending a seminar but the truth is he was there so he
decided the case without the petitioner. An order was issued to the
counsel of the petitioner but for some unexplained reason he failed to
inform his client. Santos discharged his lawyer and he himself filed a
motion for reconsideration but the same was denied. So he filed a
petition for certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether the judge exercises grave abuse of discretion in
ordering the substitution of the attached properties?
HELD:
Yes, Respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in
ordering the substitution of the attached properties over the vigorous
opposition of the petitioners and without hearing them. His orders
dated October 10, 1988 and December 10, 1988 are hereby annulled
and set aside. The original writ of attachment should be deemed to
694

have subsisted on the attached properties from the date of the

original levy. The writ of attachment is substantially a writ of execution
except that it emanates at the beginning, instead of at the
termination, of a suit. It places the attached properties in custodia
legis, obtaining pendente lite a lien until the judgment of the proper
tribunal on the plaintiff's claim is established, when the lien becomes
effective as of the date of the levy.
There is no rule allowing substitution of attached property
although an attachment may be discharged wholly or in part upon the
security of a counterbond offered by the defendant upon application
to the court, with notice to, and after hearing, the attaching creditor, or
upon application of the defendant, with notice to the applicant and
after hearing, if it appears that the attachment was improperly or
irregularly issued.
If an attachment is excessive, the remedy of the defendant is to
apply to the court for a reduction or partial discharge of the
attachment, not the total discharge and substitution of the attached
properties. The reason for this is that the lien acquired by the plaintiffcreditor as of the date of the original levy would be lost. It would in
effect constitute a deprivation without due process of law of the
attaching creditors' interest in the attached property as security for
the satisfaction of the judgment which he may obtain in the action.
The notice of levy in Civil Cases 365-MN and 374-MN was
annotated on FINASIA's TCTs Nos. 120450 on November 22 and 23,
1983 and on Villarosa's TCTs Nos. 13350-A and 13351-A on
November 7 and 30, 1983. By ordering the substitution on October
11, 1988, the Court obliterated the petitioners' earlier lien under the
original attachment and in effect deprived the petitioners of their
interest in the attached properties without due process of law.
B. REGISTRATION OF SALE OF LAND ON EXECUTION OR
FOR TAXES or for any assessment, issuance of new
transfer certificate of title.
C. ADVERSE CLAIMS. Instances when claim is adverse.
a. Claim is adverse when there is no other provision made
695

for the registration of such right to claim.

ARRAZOLA VS. BERNAS 86 SCRA 279 (1978)
This case is about the cancellation of an adverse claim which
was annotated on Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-6881 and T6882 in the name of Teresita Rosal Bernas (Arrazola), covering Lots
Nos. 371 and 373 of the Pilar, Capiz cadastre with a total area of
12,830 square meters.
FACTS:
On May 5, 1967, Elviro Bernas executed in Iloilo City a
notarized will wherein he disinherited Teresita, her allegedly adopted
daughter, and instituted respondents (his siblings) as heirs to all his
properties, including Lots Nos. 371 and 373 which he had allegedly
"involuntarily transferred" to Teresita. On June 5, 1967, Elviro Bernas
died in Roxas City. His brother Pedro filed with the CFI of Capiz a
petition for the probate of the formers will. On December 12, 1967,
Pedro filed with the register of deeds of Capiz a verified notice of
adverse claim. He alleged in that adverse claim that Lots Nos. 371
and 373 were conveyed by his brother Elviro to Teresita Rosal
Bernas "involuntarily, fictitiously and without consideration" and that in
Elviro's will the two lots were devised to him and his sister Soledad.
After the ROD annotated the adverse claim on TCT Nos. T-6881 and
T-6882, Teresita filed in the cadastral and probate proceedings a
motion for the cancellation of the annotation of adverse claim. She
contended that she was not served with prior notice of the adverse
claim and that there was "no petition for approval or justification"
thereof filed with the court. Pedro and Soledad opposed the motion.
The lower court granted it and ordered the register of deeds to cancel
the annotation.
ISSUE:
Whether the lower court erred in granting the cancellation of the
annotation on the titles?
HELD:
YES. Under section 110 Act 496, the adverse claimant must be
one who claims any right or interest in registered land adverse to the
registered owner, arising subsequent to the original araregistration.
That interest is registerable as an adverse claim if no other provision
is made in Act No. 496 for its registration. Applying section 110, it
was held that a claim based on occurrences prior to the original
registration is not registerable as an adverse claim. In the instant
696

case, the lower court ordered the cancellation of the adverse claim
because the will of Elviro Bernas had not yet been probated. It
reasoned out that before the probate respondents are merely
presumptive heirs with a "contingent, expectant and inchoate" interest
in the two lots. It is true that the will of Elviro Bernas has not yet been
probated, but there is still a pending proceeding for its probate. In that
will, the testator transmitted to his surviving siblings the right to
secure a declaration as to the invalidity of his conveyance of lots Nos.
371 and 373 to petitioner. Teresita's title to the two lots have become
controversial because of that will. To alert third persons, or for that
matter the whole world, to the fact that Pedro A. Bernas and Soledad
Bernas Alivio have an adverse claim on the two lots, section 110 of
Act No. 496 gives them the remedy of causing to be annotated their
adverse claim on the titles of the two lots. If that remedy is not given
to them, then the registered owner can transfer the lots to an innocent
purchaser for value and, in that event, the unregistered adverse claim
will be nullified or frustrated. The purpose of annotating the adverse
claim on the title of the disputed land is to apprise third persons that
there is a controversy over the ownership of the land and to preserve
and protect the right of the adverse claimant during the pendency of
the controversy. It is a notice to third persons that any transaction
regarding the disputed land is subject to the outcome of the dispute.
Appellants' adverse claim, which was made in good faith, has some
basis and semblance of plausibility and is not palpably frivolous or
vexatious. Hence, it is premature to order the cancellation of the
annotation thereof before it is finally determined by the courts that the
titles of Teresita Rosal Arrazola to the disputed lots are indefeasible
and that appellants' claim is devoid of merit. It has been said that the
annotation of an adverse claim should not be confused with its
validity which should be litigated in a proper proceeding and that the
registration of an invalid adverse claim is not as harmful as the nonregistration of a valid one.

b. The annotation of an adverse claim over registered land

under Section 70 of PD 1529 requires a claim on the title
697

of the disputed land. Annotation is done to apprise third

persons that there is a controversy over the ownership
of the land and to preserve and protect the right of the
adverse claimant during the pendency of the
controversy. It is a notice to third persons that any
transaction regarding the disputed land is subject to the
outcome of the dispute.
ARRAZOLA VS. BERNAS (175 Phil. 452)
FACTS:
Teresita was allegedly an adopted daughter of Elviro Bernas
who on May 5, 1967, when he was 79 years old, executed in Iloilo
City a notarized will wherein he disinherited Teresita and instituted his
brother Pedro A. Bernas and his sister Soledad Bernas Alivio as heirs
to all his properties, including Lots Nos. 371 and 373 which he had
allegedly "involuntarily transferred" to Teresita.
A month later, or on June 5, 1967, Elviro Bernas died in Roxas
City. His brother Pedro filed with the Court of First Instance of Capiz a
petition dated September 6, 1967 for the probate of his will (Special
Proceeding No. V-2965).
On December 12, 1967, Pedro A. Bernas filed with the register
of deeds of Capiz a verified notice of adverse claim.
In the instant case, the lower court ordered the cancellation of
the adverse claim because the will of Elviro Bernas had not yet been
probated. It reasoned out that before the probate Pedro A. Bernas
and Soledad Bernas Alivio are merely presumptive heirs with a
"contingent, expectant and inchoate" interest in the two lots.
ISSUE:
Did the lower court err in cancelling the adverse claim?
HELD:
We hold that the lower court erred in ordering the cancellation
of the adverse claim. It is true that the will of Elviro Bernas has not yet
been probated but the fact is that there is a pending proceeding for its
probate. And in that will the testator transmitted to his surviving
brother and sister, the herein oppositors-appellants or adverse
698

claimants, the right to secure a declaration as to the invalidity of his

conveyance of lots Nos. 371 and 373 to Teresita Rosal Arrazola.
Because of that will, Teresita's title to the two lots have become
controversial. To alert third persons, or for that matter the whole
world, to the fact that Pedro A. Bernas and Soledad Bernas Alivio
have an adverse claim on the two lots, section 110 of Act No. 496
gives them the remedy of causing to be annotated their adverse claim
on the titles of the two lots. If that remedy is not given to them, then
the registered owner can transfer the lots to an innocent purchaser
for value and, in that event, the unregistered adverse claim will be
nullified or frustrated. (See Reyes vs. Court of Appeals, 95 Phil. 952
as to the right of an heir to sue for the annulment of a conveyance
made in fraud of the deceased.)
The purpose of annotating the adverse claim on the title of
the disputed land is to apprise third persons that there is a
controversy over the ownership of the land and to preserve and
protect the right of the adverse claimant during the pendency of
the controversy. It is a notice to third persons that any
transaction regarding the disputed land is subject to the
outcome of the dispute.
Appellants' adverse claim, which was made in good faith, has
some basis and semblance of plausibility and is not palpably frivolous
or vexatious. Hence, it is premature to order the cancellation of the
annotation thereof before it is finally determined by the courts that the
titles of Teresita Rosal Arrazola to the disputed lots are indefeasible
and that appellants' claim is devoid of merit.
c. A mere money claim cannot be registered as an adverse
claim.
LUCIO C. SANCHEZ, JR., petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF
APPEALS and RURAL BANK OF ORMOC CITY, INC., respondents.
[G.R. No. L-40177 February 12, 1976]
FACTS:
Respondent Rural Bank of Ormoc City, Inc. had executed
certain affidavits of adverse claim to certain registered sugar lands in
Tacloban and Ormoc Cities alleged by petitioner to belong to him
either as co-owner and/or as redemptioner. The said lands were the
699

subject of mortgage loans obtained from respondent bank which had

been fully paid and discharged either by payment or redemption after
extra-judicial foreclosure. Upon the refusal of the Tacloban Register
of Deeds to register the bank's adverse claim, respondent bank filed
with the court of first instance of Leyte as a land registration court
three petitions 3 for an order to direct the Tacloban and Ormoc
Registers of Deeds to annotate its adverse claim on the titles, while
petitioner in turn opposed the petitions and filed his counter-petition
for an order directing respondent bank to return the said titles without
such annotations.
The court of first instance oredered the Registers of Deeds to
annotate respondent' bank's adverse claims and thereafter release
the aforesaid titles to the corresponding registered owners. The Order
was immediately implemented even before it became final and
executory and the bank's affidavits of adverse claim were annotated
by the Registers of Deeds on the back of the certificates of title.
Petitioner thereafter filed a petition for certiorari with respondent
Court of Appeals for the setting aside of the Order and the
cancellation of the annotations of adverse claims, pleading the
inadequacy of resorting to an ordinary appeal with its concomitant
delay.

ISSUE(s):
Whether or not a mere money claim may be properly registered
as an adverse claim on a Torrens Certificate of Title within the
purview of the Land Registration Act.
HELD:
A mere money claim may not be registered as an adverse
claim on a torrens certificate of title and a judge who orders the
annotation on the certificate of title of such money claim as an
adverse claim acts without any authority in law and commits a grave
discretion amounting in law and commits a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction that calls for the issuance of the
corrective writ of certiorari. Section 110 of the Land Registration Act
(Act 496) manifestly provides that a person or entity who wishes to
700

register an adverse claim in registered land must-claim a "part or

interest in registered land adverse to the registered owner. Thus,
purely money claims such as those of respondent bank by virtue of
unsecured personal loans granted by it on promissory notes executed
in its favor signed by the borrowers and co-signed by petitioner as comaker are not registrable as adverse claims against the petitioner's
registered lands. The claim asserted must affect the title or be
adverse to the title of the registered owner in order to be duly
annotated as an adverse claim to the land against the registered
owner. The annotation of an adverse claim is a measure designed to
protect the interest of a person over a piece of real property where
the registration of such interest or right is not otherwise provided for
by the Land Registration Act, and serves as a notice and warning to
third parties dealing with said property that someone is claiming an
interest on the same or a better right than the registered owner
thereof. If respondent bank wanted the additional security of
petitioner's real properties besides his personal signature assuming
liability for the payment of the personal loans, then it should not have
extended the loans without requiring furthermore the execution of a
covering real 'estate mortgage. If the loans were due and it feared
that there would be a fraudulent removal-or disposition of the debtors'
properties, then its proper course was to file the proper collection suit
and seek a court order for attachment under bond but certainly not
to execute and submit for registration a mere baseless adverse claim,
simply because it happened to be in possession of petitioner's
certificates of title as a mortgagee whose mortgage lien had been
fully discharged.

d. Formal Requisites.
DARIO N. LOZANO, in his capacity as administrator of the estate
of the deceased AGUSTO N. LOZANO, PATROCINIO DEL PRADO
and ANTONIO LOZANO, plaintiffs-appellants, vs. IGNACIO
BALLESTEROS, defendant-appellee.
[G.R. No. 49470 April 8, 1991]
701

FACTS:
Maria Nieves Nunez Tuazon, deceased mother of the plaintiffs,
was the original registered exclusive owner of the land in question.
On March 6, 1958, by virtue of a deed of absolute sale, Tuazon sold
the land in question to Marciana de Dios. Augusto, Dario, Jaime,
Cresencia, Lourdes and Alicia, all surnamed Lozano, together with
Marciana de Dios filed a verified petition before the Court of First
Instance of Pangasinan seeking the approval of the consolidationsubdivision plan and for the annotation of several documents at the
back of the Original Certificate of Title No. 46076. The court approved
the consolidation-subdivision plan and directed the inscription of said
deed of sale at the back of the title. On January 22, 1963, plaintiffs
caused the annotation of their adverse claim at the back of the title of
the said lot. On August 25, 1966, De Dios sold lot Q to defendant
Ignacio Ballesteros and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 63171 was
later transferred in his name. Plaintiffs filed an action for
reconveyance against De Dios alleging that the estate of Augusto
Lozano is the absolute owner of Lots Q, O and B. The court rendered
a default decision in favor of the plaintiffs. Having failed to effect the
recovery and/or reconveyance of the lots, plaintiffs filed several
complaints for reconveyance and recovery of possession. The
appellants insist that "the said adverse claim has been carried along
in the subsequent titles of the defendants." Appellee however,
stresses that a cursory examination of the adverse claim filed by the
plaintiffs-appellants readily reveals that the same has failed to comply
with the formal requirements of Section 110 of Act 496 with respect to
adverse claims. And for which, and for all legal purposes, the adverse
claim under comment is not valid and effective.
ISSUE(s):
Whether or not the adverse claim filed and annotated on the
back of the title of Marciana de Dios and later to the title of the
defendant meets the requirements provided for in Section 110 of Act
496.
HELD:
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower court that
702

whoever claims any part or interest in registered land adverse to the

registered owner, arising subsequent to date of the original
registration, may, if no other provision is made in this Act for
registering the same, make a statement in writing setting forth fully
his alleged right or interest, and how or under whom acquired, and a
reference to the volume and page of the certificate of title of the
registered owner, and a description of the land in which the right or
interest is claimed. The statement shall be signed and sworn to, and
shall state the adverse claimant's residence, and designate a place at
which all notices may be served upon him. This statement shall be
entitled to registration as an adverse claim, and the court, upon a
petition of any party in interest, shall grant a speedy hearing upon the
question of the validity of such adverse claim and shall enter such
decree therein as justice and equity may require. If the claim is
adjudged to be invalid, the registration shall be cancelled. If in any
case the court after notice and hearing shall find that a claim thus
registered was frivolous or vexatious, it may tax the adverse claimant
double or treble costs in its discretion. Hence, for the purpose of
registration and as required by the above quoted provision are the
formal requisites of an adverse claim. However, as the lower court
noted "the adverse claim filed and annotated on the back of the title
of Marciana de Dios and later to the title of the herein defendant, did
not meet the requirements provided for in Section 110 of Act 496, that
is setting forth fully how or under whom the heirs of Lozano acquired
the property. Thus, the effect of such non-compliance renders the
adverse claim non-registrable and ineffective.

e. The duty of the Register of Deeds to record the adverse

claim on the title is ministerial.
ALFREDO SAJONAS and CONCHITA SAJONAS, petitioners, vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, DOMINGO A. PILARES, SHERIFF
ROBERTO GARCIA OF QUEZON CITY and REGISTER OF DEEDS
OF MARIKINA, respondents.
[G. R. No. 102377. July 5, 1996]
703

FACTS:
Spouses Ernesto Uychocde and Lucita Jarin agreed to sell a
parcel of residential land located in Antipolo, Rizal to spouses Alfredo
Sajonas and Conchita R. Sajonas on installment basis as evidenced
by a Contract to Sell dated September 22, 1983. The property was
registered in the names of the Uychocde spouses under TCT No. N79073 of the Register of Deeds of Marikina, Rizal. Sajonas couple
caused the annotation of an adverse claim based on the said
Contract to Sell on the title of the subject property. Upon full payment
of the purchase price, the Uychocdes executed a Deed of Sale
involving the property in question in favor of the Sajonas couple on
September 4, 1984. The deed of absolute sale was registered almost
a year after, or on August 28, 1985.
When the deed of absolute sale was registered on August 28,
1985, TCT No. N-109417 was issued in the name of the Sajonas
couple. The notice of levy on execution annotated by defendant
sheriff was carried over to the new title. On October 21, 1985, the
Sajonas couple filed a Third Party Claim with the sheriff of Quezon
City, hence the auction sale of the subject property did not push
through as scheduled. On January 10, 1986, the Sajonas spouses
demanded the cancellation of the notice of levy on execution upon
defendant-appellant Pilares. Despite said demand, Pilares refused to
cause the cancellation of said annotation. The Sajonases filed their
complaint in the Regional Trial Court of Rizal, Branch 71, against
Domingo Pilares, the judgment creditor of the Uychocdes. Pilares
filed his answer with compulsory counterclaim. The trial court
rendered its decision in favor of the Sajonas couple, and ordered the
cancellation of the Notice of Levy from Transfer Certificate of Title No.
N-109417. Pilares appealed to the Court of Appeals and the appellate
court upheld the annotation of the levy on execution on the certificate
of title.
ISSUE(s):
Whether or not a subsequent sale prevails over the adverse
claim which was previously annotated in the certificate of title over
the property.

704

HELD:
The act of registration shall be the operative act to convey or
affect the land in so far as third persons are concerned, and in all
cases under the Decree, the registration shall be made in the office of
the Register of Deeds for the province or city where the land lies.
Under the Torrens system, registration is the operative act which
gives validity to the transfer or creates a lien upon the land. A person
dealing with registered land is not required to go behind the register
to determine the condition of the property. He is only charged with
notice of the burdens on the property which are noted on the face of
the register or certificate of title.
While it is the act of registration which is the operative act which
conveys or affects the land insofar as third persons are concerned, it
is likewise true, that the subsequent sale of property covered by a
Certificate of Title cannot prevail over an adverse claim, duly sworn to
and annotated on the certificate of title previous to the sale. Deeds of
conveyance of property registered under the system, or any interest
therein only take effect as a conveyance to bind the land upon its
registration, and that a purchaser is not required to explore further
than what the Torrens title, upon its face, indicates in quest for any
hidden defect or inchoate right that may subsequently defeat his right
thereto, nonetheless, this rule is not absolute. The annotation of an
adverse claim is a measure designed to protect the interest of a
person over a piece of real property, and serves as a notice and
warning to third parties dealing with said property that someone is
claiming an interest on the same or has a better right than the
registered owner thereof. A subsequent sale cannot prevail over the
adverse claim which was previously annotated in the certificate of title
over the property. If the rationale of the law was for the adverse claim
to ipso facto lose force and effect after the lapse of thirty days, then it
would not have been necessary to include the foregoing caveat to
clarify and complete the rule. For then, no adverse claim need be
cancelled. If it has been automatically terminated by mere lapse of
time, the law would not have required the party in interest to do a
useless act.

705

i. Purpose of registering adverse claim:

(1) Is to apprise third person that there is a controversy
over the ownership of the land, such that any transaction
regarding the land is subject to the outcome of the dispute.
CHING vs. ENRILE
GR No. 156076, 17 September 2008
FACTS:
On September 5, 1985, petitioners purchased from a certain
Raymunda La Fuente a 370-square meter lot located at Barrio
Tungtong, Las Pias and covered by TCT No. 83618. The
conveyance was not registered in the Register of Deeds. Instead, on
November 20, 1986, petitioners executed an Affidavit of Adverse
Claim.
In the meantime, petitioners peacefully and continuously
possessed the subject property.
Three years after they purchased the disputed property,
petitioners received a Notice of Levy on Attachment and Writ of
Execution issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig in favor
of respondents.
On January 8, 1990, petitioners filed a Petition to Remove
Cloud on or Quiet Title to Real Property asserting ownership of the
disputed property.
On May 11, 1993, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of
petitioners upholding the latters superior right over the disputed
property in view of the registration of the Affidavit of Adverse Claim
prior to the Certificate of Sale annotated in favor of respondents.
In time, respondents appealed to the CA, theorizing that the
prior conveyance of the disputed property made by La Fuente to

706

petitioners being a voluntary dealing with a registered land, mere

registration of their adverse claim was insufficient.
On August 29, 2002, the CA rendered the herein challenged
decision reversing that of the RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondents were purchasers in good faith
when they acquired the disputed lot despite the annotated adverse
claim on their title.
HELD:
No.
The Court has invariably ruled that in case of conflict between a
vendee and an attaching creditor, an attaching creditor who registers
the order of attachment and the sale of the property to him as the
highest bidder acquires a valid title to the property as against a
vendee who had previously bought the same property from the same
owner but who failed to register his deed of sale. This is because
registration is the operative act that binds or affects the land insofar
as third persons are concerned. It is upon registration that there is
notice to the whole world. But where a party has knowledge of a prior
existing interest, as here, which is unregistered at the time he
acquired a right to the same land, his knowledge of that prior
unregistered interest has the effect of registration as to him.
Knowledge of an unregistered sale is equivalent to registration.
Respondents were not purchasers in good faith and, as such, could
not acquire good title to the property as against the former transferee.

(2) to serve notice of existing controversy involving the

land
G.R. No. L-29740 November 10, 1978

707

TERESITA
ROSAL
ARRAZOLA
vs.
PEDRO A. BERNAS and SOLEDAD VERNAS ALIVIO
FACTS:
This case is about the cancellation of an adverse claim which was
annotated on Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-6881 and T-6882 in
the name of Teresita Rosal Bernas (Arrazola).
Teresita was allegedly an adopted daughter of Elviro Bernas who on
May 5, 1967 executed a notarized will wherein he disinherited
Teresita and instituted his brother Pedro A. Bernas and his sister
Soledad Bernas Alivio as heirs to all his properties, including the lots
in question which he had allegedly "involuntarily transferred" to
Teresita.
A month later, Elviro Bernas died, and his brother Pedro filed with the
Court of First Instance of Capiz a petition for the probate of his will.
On December 12, 1967, Pedro A. Bernas filed with the register of
deeds of Capiz a verified notice of adverse claim.
He alleged in that adverse claim that Lots Nos. 371 and 373 were
conveyed by his brother Elviro to Teresita Rosal Bernas "involuntarily,
fictitiously and without consideration" and that in Elviro's will the two
lots were devised to him (Pedro) and his sister Soledad.
After the register of deeds had annotated the adverse claim, Teresita
R. Bernas Arrazola filed in the cadastral and probate proceedings a
motion for the cancellation of the annotation of adverse claim, which
was predicated on the grounds that she was not served with prior
notice" of the adverse claim and that there was "no petition for
approval or justification" thereof filed with the court. Pedro A. Bernas
and Soledad Bernas Alivio opposed the motion.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the adverse claim annotated in the name of the
petitioner should be cancelled.
HELD:
No.
708

It is true that the will of Elviro Bernas has not yet been probated but
the fact is that there is a pending proceeding for its probate. And in
that will the testator transmitted to his surviving brother and sister, the
herein oppositors-appellants or adverse claimants, the right to secure
a declaration as to the invalidity of his conveyance of lots Nos. 371
and 373 to Teresita Rosal Arrazola.
Because of that will, Teresita's title to the two lots have become
controversial. To alert third persons, or for that matter the whole
world, to the fact that Pedro A. Bernas and Soledad Bernas Alivio
have an adverse claim on the two lots, section 110 of Act No. 496
gives them the remedy of causing to be annotated their adverse claim
on the titles of the two lots. If that remedy is not given to them, then
the registered owner can transfer the lots to an innocent purchaser
for value and, in that event, the unregistered adverse claim will be
nullified or frustrated.

ii. A claim that is not validly registered is ineffective for the

purpose of protecting claimants right or interest on the disputed
land; rights in favor of 3rd parties arising after are not prejudiced.
G.R. No. L-28529 April 30, 1979
L. P. LEVISTE & COMPANY, INC., and NITA U. BERTHELSEN
vs.
HON. ANTONIO H. NOBLEJAS in his capacity as Land
Registration Commissioner, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF
RIZAL, and MARIA VILLANUEVA
FACTS:
The property involved is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
108425 of the Province of Rizal in the name of Z. Garcia Realty, Inc.
On a date that does not appear of record, the property was converted
into a subdivision called the Garville Subdivision. This subdivision has
blocks and certain lots and the controversy in this case centers on
Lot 6, Block 4.
709

On September 7, 1964, a Notice of lis pendes was presented by

Melecio B. Emata, noting the pendency of Civil Case No. 2489-P
referring specifically to Lot 3, redesignated as Lot 5 of the new
subdivision plan. It is to be noted that the lis pendens does not refer
to Lot 6, Block 4. On April 28, 1966, an Affidavit of Adverse Claim
covering Lot 1, Block 5 was presented by J. Antonio Leviste,
Executive Vice President of petitioner company, based on an
assignment in his favor by one Leticia P. Ramos, buyer of said lot
from Garcia Realty. Also to be noted is that this has no reference to
Lot 6, Block 4. On May 6, 1966 an Affidavit of Adverse Claim covering
Lot 6, Block 4 was presented by respondent Maria Villanueva based
on an agreement to sell in her favor executed by Garcia Realty. This
is the Disputed Lot.
Respondent Villanueva sought to have the sale registered and title
issued in her favor, free of any encumbrance, but petitioners Leviste
and Berthelsen objected alleging that they had registered adverse
claims and attachments. The Register of Deeds refused to issue a
new title to Villanueva without carrying over the two annotations
registered prior to Villanueva's adverse claim.
Petitioners take the position that the agreement to sell in favor of
Maria Villanueva was not registered. Hence, the rights of a lienholder
established by law cannot be invoked in favor of petitioner (herein
respondent).
ISSUE:
Whether or not a claim not validly registered is effective for the
purpose of protecting claimant's right or interest on the disputed land.
HELD:
No.
In Register of Deeds of Quezon City vs. Nicandro, it was held that for
the special remedy of adverse claim to be availed of, it must be
shown that there is no other provision in the law for registration of the
claimant's alleged right or interest in the property. In said case, the
basis of the adverse claim was a perfected contract of sale. As the
Land Registration Act specifically prescribes the procedure for
710

registration of the vendee's right on a registered property (Section

57), the filing of an adverse claim was held ineffective for the purpose
of protecting the vendee's right.
In the case at bar, it does not appear that Villanueva attempted to
register the agreement to sell under Section 52 of Act No. 496 and
that the registered owner, Garcia Realty, refused to surrender the
duplicate certificate for the annotation of said instrument. Instead,
Villanueva merely filed an adverse claim based on said agreement to
sell Considering that Section 62 of the Land Registration Act
prescribes the procedure for the registration of Villanueva's interest
less than an estate in fee simple on the disputed lot and there being
no showing of her inability to produce the owner's duplicate
certificate, the remedy provided in Section 110 of Act 496, which was
resorted to by Villanueva, is, therefore, ineffective for the purpose of
protecting her right or interest on the disputed lot.
Inasmuch as the adverse claim filed by Villanueva was not valid, the
same did not have the effect of a conveyance of her right or interest
on the disputed lot and could not prejudice any right that may have
arisen thereafter in favor of third parties.
f. Samples of registrable and non-registrable adverse
claims.
i. Expected hereditary rights do not constitute adverse
claim.
ARRAZOLA vs BERNAS (86 SCRA 279)
FACTS:
Elviro Bernas disinherited his adopted daughter Teresita and
when he was 79 years old , he executed a notarized will instituting his
brother and sister as heirs to all his properties including the lots which
he had involuntary transferred to Teresita. In 1967, Elviro died. On
December, 1967, Pedro A. Bernas filed with the register of deeds of
Capiz a verified notice of adverse claim. A copy of the will was
attached to the adverse claim.
After the register of deeds had annotated the adverse claim on
711

the transfer certificates of title, Teresita filed in the cadastral and

probate proceedings a motion for the cancellation of the annotation of
adverse claim. The motion was predicated on the grounds that she
was not served with prior notice" of the adverse claim and that there
was "no petition for approval or justification" filed with the court.
Pedro A. Bernas and Soledad Bernas Alivio opposed the motion. The
lower court in its order of August 20, 1968 granted it and ordered the
register of deeds to cancel the annotation. The oppositors appealed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not expected hereditary rights do not constitute
adverse claim.
RULING:
Yes, the contingent, expectant and inchoate hereditary rights of
the children of a living parent do not constitute an adverse claim
during his lifetime which could be annotated on the titles covering the
parent's land. That is an illustration of a frivolous or vexatious adverse
claim.
In the instant case, the lower court ordered the cancellation of
the adverse claim because the will of Elviro Bernas had not yet been
probated. It reasoned out that before the probate Pedro A. Bernas
and Soledad Bernas Alivio are merely presumptive heirs with a
"contingent, expectant and inchoate" interest in the two lots.
The purpose of annotating the adverse claim on the title of the
disputed land is to apprise third persons that there is a controversy
over the ownership of the land and to preserve and protect the right
of the adverse claimant during the pendency of the controversy. It is a
notice to third persons that any transaction regarding the disputed
land is subject to the outcome of the dispute.
It has been said that the annotation of an adverse claim should
not be confused with its validity which should be litigated in a proper
proceeding and that the registration of an invalid adverse claim is not
as harmful as the non-registration of a valid one

712

ii. The subject matter of a contract of sale between Lazaro

Tanedo and the respondents is one hectare of whatever share
the former shall have over Lot 191 of the cadastral survey of
Gerona, Province of Tarlac and covered by Title T-13829 of the
Register of Deeds of Tarlac. It constitutes a part of Tanedos
future inheritance from his parents, which cannot be the source
of any right nor the creator of any obligation between the
parties. It may not be registered as an Adverse Claim.
TAEDO VS. COURT APPEALS (322 Phil 84)
FACTS:
Lazaro Taedo executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of Ricardo
Taedo and Teresita Barrera in which he conveyed a parcel of land
which he will inherit. Upon the death of his father he executed an
affidavit of conformity to reaffirm the said sale. He also executed
another deed of sale in favor of the spouses covering the parcel of
land he already inherited. Ricardo registered the last deed of sale in
the registry of deeds in their favor.
Ricardo later learned that Lazaro sold the same property to his
children through a deed of sale.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Taedo spouses have a better right over the
property against the children of Lazaro Taedo
RULING:
Since a future inheritance generally cannot be a subject of a contract,
the deed of sale and the affidavit of conformity made by Lazaro has
no effect. The subject of dispute therefore is the deed of sale made
by him in favor of spouses Taedo and another to his children after
he already legally acquired the property.
Thus, although the deed of sale in favor of private respondents was
later than the one in favor of petitioners, ownership would vest in the
former because of the undisputed fact of registration. On the other
hand, petitioners have not registered the sale to them at all.
713

Petitioners contend that they were in possession of the property and

that private respondents never took possession thereof. As between
two purchasers, the one who registered the sale in his favor has a
preferred right over the other who has not registered his title, even if
the latter is in actual possession of the immovable property.

iii. A waiver of hereditary rights in favor of another

executed by a future heir while the parents are still living valid is
not invalid. An adverse claim annotated on the title of a property
on the basis of such waiver is likely invalid and ineffective. It
does not bind subsequent owners and does nothold them liable
to the claim.
ATTY. FERRER VS SPS. DIAZ
GR No. 165300
FACTS:
Petitioner Atty. Ferrer claimed in his original Complaint that on May
7, 1999, the Diazes, as represented by their daughter Comandante,
through a Special Power of Attorney (SPA), obtained from him a loan
of P1,118,228.00. The loan was secured by a Real Estate Mortgage
Contract by way of second mortgage over Transfer Certificate of Title and
a Promissory Note pimary payable within six months or up to November
714

7, 1999. Comandante also issued to petitioner postdated checks to

secure payment of said loan. Clearly, petitioners Affidavit of Adverse
Claim was based solely on the waiver of hereditary interest executed by
Comandante.
The Diazes, however, reneged on their obligation as the checks
issued by Comandante were dishonored upon presentment. Despite
repeated demands, said respondents still failed and refused to settle
the loan. Thus, petitioner filed on September 29, 1999 a Complaint
for Collection of Sum of Money Secured by Real Estate Mortgage
Contract against the Diazes and Comandante .
Petitioner twice amended his complaint. First, by including as
an alternative relief the Judicial Foreclosure of Mortgage and,
second, by impleading as additional defendants the Pangans as the
mortgaged property covered by Transfer of Certificate of Title was
already transferred under their names in Transfer of Certificates of
title. Petitioner prayed in his second amended complaint that all the
respondents be ordered to jointly and solidarily pay him the sum of
P1,118,228.00, exclusive of interests, and/or for the judicial
foreclosure of the property pursuant to the Real Estate Mortgage
Contract.
ISSUES:
Whether or not Comandantes waiver of hereditary rights valid.
Whether not the petitioners adverse claim based on such waiver likewise
valid and effective.
RULING:
Yes. In this case, there is no question that at the time of execution of
Comandantes Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interest Over a Real
Property (Still Undivided), succession to either of her parents properties
has not yet been opened since both of them are still living. With respect
to the other two requisites, both are likewise present considering that the
property subject matter of Comandantes waiver concededly forms part of
the properties that she expect to inherit from her parents upon their death
and, such expectancy of a right, as shown by the facts, is undoubtedly
purely hereditary in nature.
715

From the foregoing, it is clear that Comandante and petitioner

entered into a contract involving the formers future inheritance as
embodied in the Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interest Over a Real
Property (Still Undivided) executed by her in petitioners favor.
We note at the outset that the validity of petitioners adverse claim
should have been determined by the trial court after the petition for
cancellation of petitioners adverse claim filed by Comandante It has been
held that the validity or efficaciousness of an adverse claim may only be
determined by the Court upon petition by an interested party, in which
event, the Court shall order the immediate hearing thereof and make the
proper adjudication as justice and equity may warrant. And, it is only
when such claim is found unmeritorious that the registration of the adverse
claim may be cancelled.
.
All the respondents contend that the Waiver of Hereditary Rights
and Interest Over a Real Property (Still Undivided) executed by
Comandante is null and void for being violative of Article 1347 of the Civil
Code, hence, petitioners adverse claim which was based upon such
waiver is likewise void and cannot confer upon the latter any right or
interest over the property. Petition is denied.
iv.

Sales and leases when the owner refuses to surrender

owners copy for annotation may be registered as
adverse claims.
v.
Interest on the land based on the lawyers contingent
fee that arose after the original registration may be
registered as an adverse claim after the termination of
the litigation involving the land.
DIRECTOR OF LANDS VS ABABA
88 SCRA 513 (1979)
FACTS:
This is an appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of
Cebu dated March 19, 1966 denying the petition for the cancellation
of an adverse claim registered by the adverse claimant on the
transfer certificate of title of the petitioners.
The adverse claimant, Atty. Alberto B. Fernandez was retained
716

as counsel by petitioner, Maximo Abarquez, in Civil Case No. R-6573

of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, entitled "Maximo Abarquez vs.
Agripina Abarquez", for the annulment of a contract of sale with right
of repurchase and for the recovery of the land which was the subject
matter thereof. The Court of First Instance of Cebu rendered a
decision on May 29, 1961 adverse to the petitioner and so he
appealed to the Court of Appeals.
Litigating as a pauper in the lower court and engaging the
services of his lawyer on a contingent basis, petitioner, liable to
compensate his lawyer whom he also retained for his appeal
executed a document on June 10, 1961 whereby he obliged himself
to give to his lawyer one-half (1/2) of whatever he might recover from
Lots 5600 and 5602 should the appeal prosper.
The real property sought to be recovered in Civil Case No.
R6573 was actually the share of the petitioner in Lots 5600 and 5602,
which were part of the estate of his deceased parents and which
were partitioned the heirs which included petitioner Maximo Abarquez
and his elder sister Agripina Abarquez, the defendant in said civil
case.
Subsequently, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 31841 was
issued on May 19,1965 in the name of Maximo Abarquez, married to
Anastacia Cabigas, over his adjudged share in Lots Nos. 5600 and
5602 containing an area of 4,085 square meters. These parcels of
land later by the subject matter of the adverse claim filed by the
claimant.
The case having been resolved and title having been issued to
petitioner, adverse claimant waited for petitioner to comply with ha
obligation under the document executed by him on June 10, 1961 by
delivering the one-half () portion of the said parcels of land.
Petitioner refused to comply with his obligation and instead offered to
sell the whole parcels of land covered by TCT No. 31841 to
petitioner-spouses Juan Larrazabal and Marta C. de Larrazabal.
Upon being informed of the intention of the petitioner, adverse
claimant immediately took stops to protect his interest by filing an
affidavit of adverse claim on July 19, 1965 with the Register of Deeds
of Cebu. By virtue of the affidavit, the adverse claim for one-half ()
717

of the lots covered by the June 10, 1961 document was annotated on
TCT No. 31841.
Notwithstanding the annotation of the adverse claim, petitionerspouse Maximo Abarquez and Anastacia Cabigas conveyed by deed
of absolute sale on July 29, 1965 two-thirds (2/3) of the lands covered
by TCT No. 31841 to petitioner-spouses Juan Larrazabal and Marta
C. de Larrazabal.
When the new transfer certificate of title No. 32996 was issued,
the annotation of adverse claim on TCT No. 31841 necessarily had to
appear on the new transfer certificate of title. This adverse claim on
TCT No. 32996 became the subject of cancellation proceedings filed
by herein petitioner-spouses on March 7, 1966 with the Court of First
Instance of Cebu. The adverse claimant, Atty. Alberto B. Fernandez,
filed his opposition to the petition for cancellation on March 18,
1966 .The trial court resolved the issue on March 19, 1966, denying
the petition to cancel adverse claim.
Petitioner-spouses decided to appeal the order of dismissal.
Petitioners contend that a contract for a contingent fee violates Article
1491 because it involves an assignment of a property subject of
litigation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the registration of the adverse claim of Atty.
Fernandez is valid.
RULING:
Yes. In resolving the issue of the validity or nullity for the
registration of the adverse claim, Section 110 of the Land Registration
Act (Act 496) should be considered. The contract for a contingent fee,
being valid, vested in Atty. Fernandez an interest or right over the lots
in question to the extent of one-half thereof. Said interest became
vested in Atty. Fernandez after the case was won on appeal because
only then did the assignment of the one-half () portion of the lots in
question became effective and binding. So that when he filed his
affidavit of adverse claim his interest was already an existing one.
There was therefore a valid interest in the lots to be registered in
favor of Atty. Fernandez adverse to Maximo Abarquez.
718

Moreover, the interest or claim of Atty. Fernandez in the lots in

question arose long after the original petition which took place many
years ago. And, there is no other provision of the Land Registration
Act under which the interest or claim may be registered except as an
adverse claim under Section 110 thereof.
Consequently, there being a substantial compliance with
Section 110 of Act 496, the registration of the adverse claim is held to
be valid.
The annotation of an adverse claim is a measure designed to
protect the interest of a person over a piece of real property where
the registration of such interest or right is not otherwise provided for
by the Land Registration Act, and serves as a notice and warning to
third parties dealing with said property that someone is claiming an
interest on the same or a better right than the registered owner
thereof.
vi. A claim based on occurrences prior to the original
registration is not registrable; nor can a claim based on
prescription or adverse possession
be registered by the
possessor when the land is already registered in the name of
another.
ARRAZOLA VS BERNAS
86 SCRA 279
FACTS:
This case is about the cancellation of an adverse claim which
was annotated on Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-6881 and T6882 in the name of Teresita Rosal Bernas (Arrazola), covering Lots
Nos. 371 and 373 of the Pilar, Capiz cadastre with a total area of
12,830 square meters.
Teresita was allegedly an adopted daughter of Elviro Bernas
who on May 5, 1967, when he was 79 years old, executed in Iloilo
City a notarized will wherein he disinherited Teresita and instituted his
brother Pedro A. Bernas and his sister Soledad Bernas Alivio as heirs
to all his properties, including Lots Nos. 371 and 373 which he had
719

allegedly involuntarily transferred to Teresita.

A month later, or on June 5, 1967, Elviro Bernas died in Roxas
City. His brother Pedro filed with the Court of First Instance of Capiz a
petition dated September 6, 1967 for the probate of his will.
On December 12, 1967, Pedro A. Bernas filed with the register
of deeds of Capiz a verified notice of adverse claim which was
recorded as a notice of adverse claim in favor of Pedro and Soledad,
all surnamed Bernas. Claiming ownership in the parcels of land
described in T-6881 and T-6882 by virtue of the Last Will. He alleged
in that adverse claim that Lots Nos. 371 and 373 were conveyed by
his brother Elviro to Teresita Rosal Bernas involuntarily, fictitiously
and without consideration and that in Elviro's will the two lots were
devised to him (Pedro) and his sister Soledad.
After the register of deeds had annotated the adverse claim on
TCT Nos. T-6881 and T-6882, Teresita R. Bernas Arrazola filed in the
cadastral and probate proceedings a motion dated August 13, 1968
for the cancellation of the annotation of adverse claim. The motion
was predicated on the grounds that she was not served with prior
notice of the adverse claim and that there was no petition for approval
or justification thereof filed with the court. Pedro A. Bernas and
Soledad Bernas Alivio opposed the motion. The lower court in its
order of August 20, 1968 granted it and ordered the register of deeds
to cancel the annotation. The oppositors appealed.
The appellate court decided that the correctness of the lower
court's order is to be passed upon in the light of section 110 of Act
No. 496. Applying section 110, it was held in De los Reyes vs. De los
Reyes, 91 Phil. 528 that a claim based on occurrences prior to the
original registration is not registerable as an adverse claim.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the cancellation of the adverse claim by the
lower court is correct.
RULING:
We hold that the lower court erred in ordering the cancellation
of the adverse claim. It is true that the will of Elviro Bernas has not yet
720

been probated but the fact is that there is a pending proceeding for its
probate. And in that will the testator transmitted to his surviving
brother and sister, the herein oppositors-appellants or adverse
claimants, the right to secure a declaration as to the invalidity of his
conveyance of lots Nos. 371 and 373 to Teresita Rosal Arrazola.
Because of that will, Teresita's title to the two lots have become
controversial. To alert third persons, or for that matter the whole
world, to the fact that Pedro A. Bernas and Soledad Bernas Alivio
have an adverse claim on the two lots, section 110 of Act No. 496
gives them the remedy of causing to be annotated their adverse claim
on the titles of the two lots. If that remedy is not given to them, then
the registered owner can transfer the lots to an innocent purchaser
for value and, in that event, the unregistered adverse claim will be
nullified or frustrated.
The purpose of annotating the adverse claim on the title of the
disputed land is to apprise third persons that there is a controversy
over the ownership of the land and to preserve and protect the right
of the adverse claimant during the pendency of the controversy. It is a
notice to third persons that any transaction regarding the disputed
land is subject to the outcome of the dispute.
Appellants' adverse claim, which was made in good faith, has
some basis and semblance of plausibility and is not palpably frivolous
or vexatious. Hence, it is premature to order the cancellation of the
annotation thereof before it is finally determined by the courts that the
titles of Teresita Arrazola to the disputed lots are indefeasible and that
appellants' claim is devoid of merit.
It has been said that the annotation of an adverse claim should
not be confused with its validity which should be litigated in a proper
proceeding and that the registration of an invalid adverse claim is not
as harmful as the non-registration of a valid one.

ESTELLA VS RD
106 PHIL 911
721

FACTS:
These are appeals from two decisions of the Land Registration
Commission dated 7 February and 30 April 1957, upholding the
refusal of the Register of Deeds in and for the province of Rizal to
record the claimant's adverse claims under the provisions of section
110, Act No. 496 .
On 24 December 1956 Pedro Moraga filed in the Office of the
Registar of Deeds in and for the province of Rizal and affidavit of
adverse claim subscribed and sworn to by him, No. 14, Block No. 51C of the subdivision plan Psd-15136, situate in barrio Calaan,
Municipality of Caloocan, province of Rizal, containing an area of
682.5 sq. m. more or less, described in transfer certificate of title No.
47961 issued in the name of John O. Yu, married to Anicate T. Yu,
registered on the registration book in the registry of deeds of Rizal, on
the ground that in or about the year 1945 the Philippine Realty
Corporation sold that said parcel of land to a Chinese citizen
disqualified to acquire public agricultural lands or to holds lands of the
public domain in the Philippines; that the contract of sale of the parcel
of land in question to the disqualified alien is null and void and neither
the vendor nor the vendee retained or acquired ownership thereof.
He further claimed that he and predecessor-in-interest have
been in actual continuous, public, exclusive and uninterrupted
possession of the parcel of land in question for more than ten years
and built two houses thereon; that no one has claimed from then
ownership or possession of the parcel of land in question or
demanded from them payment of rentals for its use and occupation
had prescribed; and that the vendee had in it already has prescribed;
and that the registered owner was aware that the appellant had been
in possession of the parcel of land in question when he brought it
from the Philippine Realty Corporation and that the transaction
between the Philippine Realty Corporation and the disqualified alien
was illegal. The appellant requested the Registrar of Deeds to record
his adverse claim pursuant to section 110, Act No. 496.
On 29 December 1956 the Registrar of Deeds refused the
request and submitted the following questions to the Land
Registration Commission for resolution pursuant to section
4, Republic Act No. 1151 on the issue that is the adverse claim of
722

Pedro Moraga, a mere squatter on the registered private land,

registerable.
On 7 February 1957 the Land Registration Commission
rendered a decision answering in the question in the negative
because the parcel of land in question being registered under Act No.
496, the appellant's claim of prescription and/or adverse possession
is untenable of "No title registered in derogation to that of the
registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse
possession."
On 26 February 1957 the appellant filed a motion for reconsideration.
On 12 March 1957 John O. Yu, the registered owner who had
intervened, filed an opposition to the motion for reconsideration.
On 28 February 1957 Juan Estella, Felicisimo Vargas, Maximo
de Lara, Domingo Samson and Florentina Tabocboc by counsel filed
in the Land Registration Commission a written consulta based upon
an affidavit of adverse claim subscribed and sworn to by them, the
first two claiming ownership to one-third; the rest, to one-third; and
Pedro Moraga to one-third of the parcel of land in question, on the
same grounds invoked by the latter in his affidavit of adverse claim
filed in the first case. They prayed that the Registrar of Deeds be
ordered to register their respective adverse claims under the
provisions of section 110, Act No. 496.
On 30 April 2957 the Land Registration Commission denied the
motion for reconsideration of Pedro Moraga and the petition of the
other appellants, reiterating its decision dated 7 February 1957 in the
first case.
ISSUE:
Whether
registerable?

or

not

the

adverse

claim

of

the

appellants

RULING:
Here the appellant's adverse claim of ownership is based upon
prescription and adverse possession, would serve no useful purpose
and could not validly and legally after the parcel of land.
723

The appellant's claim that as neither the vendor nor the vendee
could claim ownership of it, it reversed to the State as patrimonial
property, which they may acquire by prescription or under the free
patent law. Even if their opposition of reversion to the State be
sustained, still their respective adverse claims cannot be registered.
Prescription does not run against the State. 2 Besides, the reversion
to the State of the parcel of land in question did not withdraw it from
the operation of the provisions of Act No. 496. Neither could the fact
that their adverse possession which might entitle them to fact that
their under the free patent law constitute a registerable adverse
claim.
vi.

An annotation at the back of Transfer Certificate of Title

No. T-36071, recognizing the existence of the legal
easement of subjacent and lateral support constituted
on the lengthwise or horizontal land support
constituted on the lengthwise or horizontal land
support/embankment area of sixty-five (65) square
meters, more or less, of the property of petitioner
Margarita F. Castro, is ordered cancelled. It is not valid
as an Adverse Claim.

MARGARITA F. CASTRO VS NAPOLEON A. MONSOD,

G.R. No. 183719
FACTS:
Petitioner is the registered owner of a parcel of land located
on Garnet Street, Manuela Homes, Pamplona, Las Pias City, and
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-36071, with an
area of one hundred thirty (130) square meters (sq.m.).
Respondent, on the other hand, is the owner of the property adjoining
the lot of petitioner, located on Lyra Street, Moonwalk Village, Phase
2, Las Pias City. There is a concrete fence, more or less two (2)
meters high, dividing Manuela Homes from Moonwalk Village.
On February 29, 2000, respondent caused the annotation of an
adverse claim against sixty-five (65) sq.m. of the property of petitioner
covered by TCT No. T-36071. The adverse claim was filed without
724

any claim of ownership over the property. Respondent was merely

asserting the existing legal easement of lateral and subjacent support
at the rear portion of his estate to prevent the property from
collapsing, since his property is located at an elevated plateau of
fifteen (15) feet, more or less, above the level of petitioners
property. Respondent also filed a complaint for malicious mischief
and malicious destruction before the office of the barangay chairman.
In defiance, petitioner filed a complaint for damages with
temporary restraining order/writ of preliminary injunction before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Pias City. Petitioner also prayed
that the Register of Deeds of Las Pias City be ordered to cancel the
annotation of the adverse claim on TCT No. T-36071.
Petitioner averred that when she bought the property
from Manuela Homes in 1994, there was no annotation or existence
of any easement over the property. Respondent neither asked
permission nor talked to her with regard to the use of 65 sq.m. of her
property as easement. Upon learning of the adverse claim, she felt
disturbed and experienced sleepless nights for fear that she would
not be able to sell her property. Petitioner admitted that TCT No.
36071 does not cover the open space at the dead-end portion
of Garnet Street.
Respondent asserted that the affidavit of adverse claim was for
the annotation of the lateral and subjacent easement of his property
over the property of petitioner, in view of the latters manifest
determination to remove the embankment left by the developer
of Manuela Homes.
The trial court ratiocinated that the adverse claim of respondent
was non-registrable considering that the basis of his claim was an
easement and not an interest adverse to the registered owner, and
neither did he contest the title of petitioner. Furthermore, the adverse
claim of respondent failed to comply with the requisites provided
under Section 70 of Presidential Decree No. 1529.
On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the trial court.The
CA ruled that while respondents adverse claim could not be
sanctioned because it did not fall under the requisites for registering
an adverse claim, the same might be duly annotated in the title as
recognition of the existence of a legal easement of subjacent and
725

lateral support. The purpose of the annotation was to prevent

petitioner from making injurious excavations on the subject
embankment as to deprive the residential house and lot of
respondent of its natural support and cause it to collapse.
Respondent only asked that petitioner respect the legal easement
already existing thereto.
ISSUE:
Whether the easement of lateral and subjacent support exists
on the subject adjacent properties and, if it does, whether the same
may be annotated at the back of the title of the servient estate.
RULING:
Respondents assertion that he has an adverse claim over the
65 sq.m. property of petitioner is misplaced since he does not have a
claim over the ownership of the land. The annotation of an adverse
claim over registered land under Section 70 of Presidential Decree
1529 requires a claim on the title of the disputed land. Annotation is
done to apprise third persons that there is a controversy over the
ownership of the land and to preserve and protect the right of the
adverse claimant during the pendency of the controversy. It is a
notice to third persons that any transaction regarding the disputed
land is subject to the outcome of the dispute.
In reality, what respondent is claiming is a judicial recognition of
the existence of the easement of subjacent and lateral support over
the 65 sq. m. portion of petitioners property covering the land
support/embankment area. His reason for the annotation is only to
prevent petitioner from removing the embankment or from digging on
the property for fear of soil erosion that might weaken the foundation
of the rear portion of his property which is adjacent to the property of
petitioner that the annotation at the back of Transfer Certificate of
Title No. T-36071, recognizing the existence of the legal easement of
subjacent and lateral support constituted on the lengthwise or
horizontal land support/embankment area of sixty-five (65) square
meters, more or less, of the property of petitioner Margarita F. Castro,
is hereby ordered removed.

726

viii. The annotation of inscription of Entry No. 86-622/T83618 is obviously and indeed very clear indicating that the
plaintiffs registered adverse claim in reference to the sale of the
same property sought by defendants to be levied on attachment,
final execution and sale came ahead.
SPS. JESUS CHING AND LEE POE TIN
Versus
SPS. ADOLFO & ARSENIA ENRILE,
G.R. No. 156076
FACTS:
Petitioners purchased from a certain Raymunda La Fuente a
370-square meter lot located at Barrio Tungtong, Las Pias and
covered by TCT No. 83618. La Fuente delivered to petitioners a duly
notarized Deed of Absolute Sale with the Owners Duplicate
Certificate of Title and thereafter, petitioners took physical possession
of the subject property.
For reasons known only to petitioners, the conveyance was not
registered in the Register of Deeds as prescribed by Section 51 of PD
1529.Instead, on November 20, 1986, petitioners executed an
Affidavit of Adverse Claim which was recorded and annotated at the
back of TCT No. 83618 reflected in the Memorandum of
Encumbrances under Entry No. 86-62262.
In the meantime, petitioners peacefully and continuously
possessed the subject property.
On August 19, 1988 three years after they purchased the
disputed property, petitioners received a Notice of Levy on
Attachment and Writ of Execution issued by the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Pasig in favor of respondents, in Civil Case No. 54617
entitled Sps. Adolfo Enrile and Arsenia Enrile v. Raymunda La
Fuente.The Notice of Levy on Attachment was recorded at the dorsal
portion of TCT No. 83618 under Entry No. 3433-2 while the Writ of
Execution was inscribed under Entry No. 3434-2. Also inscribed in the
TCT is the Certificate of Sale dated January 26, 1989 covering the
727

disputed property in favor of respondents.

On January 8, 1990, petitioners filed a Petition to Remove
Cloud on or Quiet Title to Real Property asserting ownership of the
disputed property.
On May 11, 1993, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of
petitioners upholding the latters superior right over the disputed
property in view of the registration of the Affidavit of Adverse Claim
prior to the Certificate of Sale annotated in favor of respondents
CA rendered the herein challenged decision reversing that of
the RTC. Even as the CA viewed the prior sale of the disputed lot in
favor of petitioners as perfected and consummated, it nonetheless
upheld respondents preferential right over the disputed property.The
CA declared that respondents, as attaching creditors who registered
the order of attachment and the sale of the property to them as the
highest bidders, acquired a valid title to the disputed property as
against petitioners who had previously bought the same property
from the registered owner but failed to register their deed of sale.The
CA further declared respondents as purchasers in good faith.
ISSUE:
Whether the levy on attachment later annotated shall prevail
over the Adverse Claim earlier annotated at the back of the title by
the mere lapse of 30 days and even without any petition in court for
its cancellation
RULING:
Court finds that the CA committed reversible error when it ruled
that the annotated adverse claim had already prescribed by the mere
lapse of 30 days from its registration. The issue is no longer of first
impression. In the 1996 case of Sajonas v. Court of Appeals, we
explained that a notice of adverse claim remains valid even after the
lapse of the 30-day period provided by Section 70 of PD 1529.
We held that for as long as there is yet no petition for its
cancellation, the notice of adverse claim remains subsisting
The Court has invariably ruled that in case of conflict between a
vendee and an attaching creditor, an attaching creditor who registers
the order of attachment and the sale of the property to him as the
highest bidder acquires a valid title to the property as against a
vendee who had previously bought the same property from the same
owner but who failed to register his deed of sale. This is because
registration is the operative act that binds or affects the land insofar
as third persons are concerned. It is upon registration that there is
728

notice to the whole world. But where a party has knowledge of a prior
existing interest, as here, which is unregistered at the time he
acquired a right to the same land, his knowledge of that prior
unregistered interest has the effect of registration as to him.
Knowledge of an unregistered sale is equivalent to registration
It is beyond dispute that the property in question had already
been sold by La Fuente to petitioners on September 5, 1985.
Petitioners immediately took possession thereof. When the Notice of
Levy on Attachment was recorded at the dorsal portion of TCT No.
83618 and when the Writ of Execution and Certificate of Sale were
inscribed under Entry No. 3434-2 in favor of respondents, on January
26, 1989, petitioners have been, since September 5, 1985, in actual,
physical, continuous and uninterrupted possession.
Here, petitioners adverse claim is annotated at the back of the
title coupled with the fact that they are in possession of the disputed
property. To us, these circumstances should have put respondents on
guard and required them to ascertain the property being offered to
them has already been sold to another to prevent injury to prior
innocent buyers. A person who deliberately ignores a significant fact
which would create suspicion in an otherwise reasonable man is not
an innocent purchaser for value.
H. When adverse claim cancelled.
SAJONAS V. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 102377 July 5, 1996
FACTS:
The case is for cancellation of the inscription of a Notice of Levy
on Execution from a certificate of Title covering a parcel of real
property. The inscription was caused to be made by the private
respondent on Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-79073 of the
Register of Deeds of Marikina, issued in the name of the spouses
Uychocde, and was later carried over to and annotated on Transfer
Certificate of Title No. N-109417 of the same registry, issued in the
name of the spouses Sajonas, who purchased the parcel of land from
the Uychocdes, and are now the petitioners in this case.
The subject property was bought by Sajonas spouses on September
1983 and caused the annotation of their adverse claim on August
729

1984. The Deed of Sale was executed upon the full payment of the
purchase price and the same was registered only on August 1985.
Meanwhile, without the petitioners' knowledge, there has been a
compromise agreement between the spouses Uychocde and Pilares
(Uychocde's judgment creditor), and a notice of levy on execution
was issued on February 12, 1985. On February 12, 1985, defendant
sheriff Roberto Garcia of Quezon City presented said notice of levy
on execution before the Register of Deeds of Marikina and the same
was annotated at the back of TCT No. 79073 as Entry No. 123283.
The Deed of Absolute Sale was executed on September 4, 1984, but
was registered only on August 28, 1985, while the notice of levy on
execution was annotated six (6) months prior to the registration of the
sale on February 12, 1985.
ISSUE:
Which should be preferred between the notice of levy on
execution and the deed of absolute sale?
RULING:
The annotation of the adverse claim is equivalent to notice to third
persons of the interest of the claimant. The provision of the law (PD
1529) that the adverse claim is only valid for 30 days cannot be
upheld. Clearly, the intention of the law is otherwise as may be
gleaned on the following discussion:
Sec. 70 Adverse Claim- Whoever claims any part or interest in
registered land adverse to the registered owner, arising
subsequent to the date of the original registration, may, if no
other provision is made in this decree for registering the same,
make a statement in writing setting forth fully his alleged right or
interest, and how or under whom acquired, a reference to the
number of certificate of title of the registered owner, the name
of the registered owner, and a description of the land in which
the right or interest is claimed.
The statement shall be signed and sworn to, and shall state the
730

adverse claimants residence, and a place at which all notices may be

served upon him. This statement shall be entitled to registration as an
adverse claim on the certificate of title. The adverse claim shall be
effective for a period of thirty days from the date of registration. After
the lapse of said period, the annotation of adverse claim may be
cancelled upon filing of a verified petition therefor by the party in
interest: Provided, however, that after cancellation, no second
adverse claim based on the same ground shall be registered by the
same claimant.
Before the lapse of thirty days aforesaid, any party in interest
may file a petition in the Court of First Instance where the land is
situated for the cancellation of the adverse claim, and the court shall
grant a speedy hearing upon the question of the validity of such
adverse claim, and shall render judgment as may be just and
equitable. If the adverse claim is adjudged to be invalid, the
registration thereof shall be ordered cancelled. If, in any case, the
court, after notice and hearing shall find that the adverse claim thus
registered was frivolous, it may fine the claimant in an amount not
less than one thousand pesos, nor more than five thousand pesos, in
its discretion. Before the lapse of thirty days, the claimant may
withdraw his adverse claim by filing with the Register of Deeds a
sworn
petition
to
that
effect.
Construing the provision as a whole would reconcile the apparent
inconsistency between the portions of the law such that the provision
on cancellation of adverse claim by verified petition would serve to
qualify the provision on the effectivity period. The law, taken together,
simply means that the cancellation of the adverse claim is still
necessary to render it ineffective, otherwise, the inscription will
remain annotated and shall continue as a lien upon the property. For
if the adverse claim has already ceased to be effective upon the
lapse of said period, its cancellation is no longer necessary and the
process of cancellation would be a useless ceremony.
To interpret the effectivity period of the adverse claim as absolute and
without qualification limited to thirty days defeats the very purpose for
which the statute provides for the remedy of an inscription of adverse
claim, as the annotation of an adverse claim is a measure designed
to protect the interest of a person over a piece of real property where
731

the registration of such interest or right is not otherwise provided for

by the Land Registration Act or Act 496 (now P.D. 1529 or the
Property Registration Decree), and serves as a warning to third
parties dealing with said property that someone is claiming an interest
or the same or a better right than the registered owner thereof.
Petition was granted. The inscription of the notice of levy on
execution on TCT No. N-109417 is ordered CANCELLED.

I.An adverse claim can subsist concurrently with an annotation

of notice of lispendens involving the same right or interest
covered by the adverse claim.
ARRAZOLA V. BERNAS
G.R. No. L-29740 November 10, 1978
FACTS:
This case is about the cancellation of an adverse claim which
was annotated on Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-6881 and T6882 in the name of Teresita Rosal Bernas (Arrazola), covering Lots
Nos. 371 and 373 of the Pilar, Capiz cadastre with a total area of
12,830 square meters.
Teresita was allegedly an adopted daughter of Elviro Bernas
who on May 5, 1967, when he was 79 years old, executed in Iloilo
City a notarized will wherein he disinherited Teresita and instituted his
brother Pedro A. Bernas and his sister Soledad Bernas Alivio as heirs
732

to all his properties, including Lots Nos. 371 and 373 which he had
allegedly "involuntarily transferred" to Teresita.
A month later, or on June 5, 1967, Elviro Bernas died in Roxas
City. His brother Pedro filed with the Court of First Instance of Capiz a
petition dated September 6, 1967 for the probate of his will (Special
Proceeding No. V-2965).
On December 12, 1967, Pedro A. Bernas filed with the register
of deeds of Capiz a verified notice of adverse claim.
In the instant case, the lower court ordered the cancellation of
the adverse claim because the will of Elviro Bernas had not yet been
probated. It reasoned out that before the probate Pedro A. Bernas
and Soledad Bernas Alivio are merely presumptive heirs with a
"contingent, expectant and inchoate" interest in the two lots.
ISSUE:
Is the lower court correct in ordering the cancellation of the adverse
claim?
RULING:
No. The lower court erred in ordering the cancellation of the
adverse claim. It is true that the will of Elviro Bernas has not yet been
probated but the fact is that there is a pending proceeding for its
probate. And in that will the testator transmitted to his surviving
brother and sister, the herein oppositors-appellants or adverse
claimants, the right to secure a declaration as to the invalidity of his
conveyance of lots Nos. 371 and 373 to Teresita Rosal Arrazola.
Because of that will, Teresita's title to the two lots have become
controversial. To alert third persons, or for that matter the whole
world, to the fact that Pedro A. Bernas and Soledad Bernas Alivio
have an adverse claim on the two lots, section 110 of Act No. 496
gives them the remedy of causing to be annotated their adverse claim
on the titles of the two lots. If that remedy is not given to them, then
the registered owner can transfer the lots to an innocent purchaser
for value and, in that event, the unregistered adverse claim will be
733

nullified or frustrated. (See Reyes vs. Court of Appeals, 95 Phil. 952

as to the right of an heir to sue for the annulment of a conveyance
made in fraud of the deceased.)
The purpose of annotating the adverse claim on the title of the
disputed land is to apprise third persons that there is a controversy
over the ownership of the land and to preserve and protect the right
of the adverse claimant during the pendency of the controversy. It is a
notice to third persons that any transaction regarding the disputed
land is subject to the outcome of the dispute.
Appellants' adverse claim, which was made in good faith, has
some basis and semblance of plausibility and is not palpably frivolous
or vexatious. Hence, it is premature to order the cancellation of the
annotation thereof before it is finally determined by the courts that the
titles of Teresita Rosal Arrazola to the disputed lots are indefeasible
and that appellants' claim is devoid of merit.

TY SIN TEI V. DY PIAO

G.R. No. L-11271 May 28, 1958
FACTS:
Dy Lac, the testator, purchased houses and a lot located at
Zurbaran Street, Manila, and placed the title thereof, Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 58652, in the name of his maidservant and
concubine named Paz Ty Sin Tei in 1940. After the testator's death in
1948, Paz filed a petition for the probate of his will. Lee Dy Piao and
Uy Cho, the respective legitimate son and widow of Dy Lac acting
pursuant to section 110 of Act No. 496, caused their claim, as heirs of
Dy Lac, to be annotated on the back of TCT No. 58652 pending the
determination of their hereditary rights in the testamentary
proceeding.
On March 23, 1955, Paz Ty Sin Tei filed a petition in the land
registration record of TCT No. 58652 for the cancellation of the
adverse claim. The Court of First Instance of Manila cancelled it over
734

Lee Dy Piao's opposition. On appeal, this Court set aside the order of
cancellation and further held that the adverse claim could subsist
concurrently with a subsequent annotation of a notice of lis pendens
which referred to a case filed by Lee Dy Piao, involving the same
right or interest covered by the adverse claim.
In further support of our holding that the lower court erred in
ordering the cancellation of the annotation of the adverse claim, it is
also relevant to cite the holding that where a guardianship proceeding
was instituted for an octogenarian woman, it was proper to annotate
on the title of her land the pendency of such a proceeding by means
of a notice of lis pendens for the purpose of alerting anyone who
might wish to buy the land that his purchase might be questioned
later on. An adverse claim and a notice of lis pendens have the same
purpose.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a notice of lis pendens would be, unecessary
and superflous where an adverse claim has previously been
annotated.
RULING:
There no dispute as to the fact that appellant caused the
annotation of an adverse claim on said property on August 22, 1951,
and that without said notation having been cancelled a notice of lis
pendens was also inscribed on the same title on March 21, 1955,
upon the institution by said claimant of a civil action based on the
same ground as his adverse claim. Hence, appelle protested against
the existence of 2 notices in her title and sought the cancellation of
the adverse claim on the allegation that one invalidates the other. We
find this contention to be untenable. The registration of an adverse
claim is allowed by Section 110 of Act 496, which reads as follows:
SEC.110. Whoever claims any part or interest in registered land
adverse to the registered owner, arising subsequent to the date
of the original registration, may, if no other provision is made in
this Act for registering the same, make a statement in writing
setting forth fully his alleged right or interest, and how or under
735

whom acquired, and a reference to the volume and page of the

certificate of title of the registered owner, and a description of
the land in which the right or interest is claimed.
The statement shall be signed and sworn to, and shall state the
adverse claimant's residence, and designate a place at which all
notices may be served upon him. This statement shall be entitled to
registration as an adverse claim, and the court, upon a petition of any
party in interest, shall grant a speedy hearing upon the question of
the validity of such adverse claim and shall enter such decree therein
as justice and equity may require. If the claim is adjudged to be
invalid, the registration shall be cancelled. If any case the court after
notice and hearing shall find that a claim thus registered was frivoluos
or vexatious, it may tax the adverse claimant double or treble costs in
its discretion.
The annotation of an adverse claim is a measure designed to
protect the interest of a person over a piece of real property where
the registration of such interest or right is not otherwise provided, for
by the Land Registration Act, and serves as a notice and warning to
third parties dealing with said property that someone is claiming an
interest on the same or a better right than the registered owner
thereof. The aforequoted Section 110 lays down the procedure for the
registration of such notice-by filing a sworn statement with the
Register of Deeds of the province where the property is located,
setting for the basis of the claimed right together with other data
pertinent thereto. The validity or efficaciousness of the claim,
however, may only determine by the Court upon petition by an
interested party, in which event, the Court shall order the immediate
hearing thereof and make the proper adjudication as justice and
equity may warrant. And it is ONLY when such claim is found
unmeritorious that the registration thereof may be cancelled. In the
case at bar, no such petition was filed by appelle who should be the
party interested in having the notation cancelled. Instead, We find
that from August 22, 1951, when the adverse claim was registered, to
March 21, 1955, when the notice of lis pendens was annotated,
petitioner-appellee took no step in having the claim inquired into or
investigated in order that the question of the validity of such claim
may be resolved.
736

J. A notice of lispendens serves the purposes of the adverse

claim.
IN RE: PETITION FOR THE CANCELLATION OF ENCUMBRANCE
APPEARING IN TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. T-7601
OF DAVAO. NATIVIDAD VILLAFLOR v. JOSE JUEZAN
G.R. No. 35205 April 17, 1990
FACTS:
The appellant registered his affidavit of adverse claim, which
conformed to the requirements of Section 110, Act 496, in Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-1217 under primary entry No. 26083 of the
Register of Deeds.

The appellant filed Civil Case 3496 seeking from the defendant
the surrender of owner's duplicate of TCT T-1217 for the deed of sale
in favor of the appellant be registered or annotated in the certificate of
title. In this case, the defendant's answer raised the issue of validity
of the deed of sale in favor of the appellant.

More than four years after the appellant's adverse claim was
annotated and while case No. 3496 is (sic) pending, the appellee
presented for registration two deeds of sale affecting the land subject
of the action, the first conveyed 8.6186 hectares and the second
conveyed the remaining 3.0219 hectares and that TCT T-1217 was
cancelled and TCT T-7601 was issued to the appellee wherein the
adverse claim annotated was carried on.

It is this adverse claim which the appellee seeks to be

cancelled. The lower court first ordered its cancellation, then in an
order the court reconsidered and finally returned to its original stand.
Hence, this appeal.
737

Petitioner-appellee filed a motion to dismiss appeal in the Court

of Appeals on the ground that the issue involved has become moot
and academic, because oppositor-appellant Jose Juezan filed a
notice of lis pendens on the property covered by T.C.T. No. T-7601
and in connection with Civil Case No. 3496.
ISSUE:
Whether an adverse claim annotated in a transfer certificate of
title may be cancelled when the validity or invalidity of the claim is still
subject of inquiry in a civil case pending resolution by the trial court.
HELD:
The basis of Civil Case No. 3496 is a deed of absolute sale,
allegedly executed by Simon Maghanay in favor of appellant Jose
Juezan. This document is also the basis of the Affidavit of Adverse
Claim ordered cancelled by the trial court. The purpose of said
adverse claim is to protect the interest of the appellant pending this
litigation.

Thus, considering that a notice of lis pendens had been

annotated on T.C.T. No. T-7601 of petitioner-appellee, the Court finds
no basis for maintaining the adverse claim.

This Court sees no reason for disturbing the questioned order

of the trial court directing the cancellation of the oppositor-appellant's
adverse claim at the back of TCT No. T-7601. The notice of lis
pendens filed by the oppositor-appellant affecting the same property
in connection with Civil Case No. 3496 is sufficient.

The appeal is dismissed for lack of merit and for being moot
and academic.
738

D. Notice of lispendens.
a. Contents
b. Nature & purpose of the notice
i. Definition and purpose:
ST. MARY OF THE WOODS SCHOOL, INC. and MARCIAL P.
SORIANO v. OFFICE OF THE REGISTRY OF DEEDS OF MAKATI
CITY and HILARIO P. SORIANO

G.R. No. 174290

January 20, 2009

FACTS:

Two special civil actions for Certiorari and Prohibition were

consolidated per Resolution. SMWSI is an educational institution
incorporated and existing by virtue of the laws of the Philippines,
Marcial Soriano being the President.

Hilario Soriano is one of the siblings of petitioner Marcial

Soriano. The cases originated from the Complaint filed by H. Soriano
for Declaration of Nullity of Deed of Assignment, Deed of Sale and
Cancellation of 3 TCTs registered in the name of Oro Development
Corporation; and another TCT registered in the name of SMWSI.
739

Hilario Soriano alleged that during the marriage of his parents, the
couple acquired both real and personal properties, including the
subject properties. Soriano couple allegedly executed a Deed of
Assignment in favor of ODC involving the subject properties to pay for
Tomas Q. Sorianos subscription of stocks in the said corporation.
Tomas Q. Soriano died intestate.

Thereafter, ODC sold the property to SMWSI. Private

respondent discovered that his fathers signature in the Deed of
Assignment in favor of ODC was a forgery. A Notice of Lis Pendens
was annotated on the 3 TCTs in the name of ODC which notice was
carried over to the new certificate of title. The RTC dismissed the
private respondents Complaint.

Hilario Soriano moved for reconsideration but RTC denied the

same. The RTC granted the Motion to Cancel Notice of Lis Pendens.
CA granted private respondents Motion to Reinstate/Re-annotate
Notice of Lis Pendens on the TCTs of the subject properties.

ISSUE:

Whether CA acted with grave abuse of discretion in granting

private respondents Motion to Reinstate/Re-annotate Notice of Lis
Pendens

HELD:

No.

740

Lis pendens, which literally means pending suit, refers to the

jurisdiction, power or control which a court acquires over property
involved in a suit, pending the continuance of the action, and until
final judgment.

Lis pendens is intended (1) to keep the properties in litigation

within the power of the court until the litigation is terminated and to
prevent the defeat of the judgment or decree by subsequent
alienation; and (2) to announce to the whole world that a particular
property is in litigation and serves as a warning that one who acquires
an interest over said property does so at his own risk, or that he
gambles on the result of the litigation over said property.

A trial court has the inherent power to cancel a notice of lis

pendens on two grounds: (1) if the annotation was for the purpose of
molesting the title of the adverse party; or (2) when the annotation is
not necessary to protect the title of the party who caused it to be
recorded.

Considering that the dismissal of the Complaint bearing the

annotations of lis pendens on the 3 properties by the RTC was
appealed to the CA, CA rightly saw the need to give notice to the
public of such fact. The necessity becomes more compelling
considering that SMWSI already entered into transactions with third
parties involving the subject properties.

The doctrine of lis pendens is based on consideration of public

policy and convenience, under the view that once a court has taken
cognizance of a controversy, it should be impossible to interfere with
the consummation of the judgment by any ad interim transfer,
encumbrance, or change of possession.

741

Now that the case is pending before us on appeal, there is no

certainty as to the outcome of the case. There is a need to warn the
whole world that a particular property is in litigation, serving as a
warning that the one who acquires an interest over said property
does so at his own risk, or that he gambles on the result of the
litigation over said property.

These consolidated
DISMISSED.

Petitions

for

Certiorari

are

hereby

ii. The notice is not a lien or encumbrance on the

property, but simply a notice to prospective buyers or to those
742

dealing with the property that it is under litigation.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MABELLE RAVELO and
SPOUSES EMMANUEL and PERLITA REDONDO

G.R. No. 165114

August 6, 2008

FACTS:

Jose Fernando filed miscellaneous sales application over a lot

and relinquished his right over it to Victoriano Mortera, Jr. Then, one
Severino Muyco also filed a miscellaneous sales application for the
same property.

After investigation, DENR ordered in favor of Fernando and

Mortera.
Before the DENR's action, the Director of Lands issued Sales
Patent and Original Certificate of Title covering the same lot to
Mabelle Ravelo. Thus, the DENRs Order was not enforced, to which
Fernando protested.

Petitioner filed complaint for cancellation of title alleging that

sales patent should be filed with the DENR regional office that has
jurisdiction over the land applied for, not with the Director of Lands in
Manila. The government also accused Ravelo of fraud for asserting in
her application that the land was not occupied and was a part of the
public domain.
743

A notice of lis pendens was inscribed on Ravelo's OCT.

In a separate development, Antonio Chieng obtained a
judgment against Ravelo in a collection suit, which led to the
issuance of a writ of execution. The Notice of Levy was registered
with the Register of Deeds. In the auction sale that followed, Wilson
Chieng, Antonio Chieng's son, won as highest bidder. A certificate of
sale was issued to Chieng and the sale was registered with the
Registry of Deeds.

The respondent-spouses bought the lot from Chieng. The

parties first signed an agreement for the purchase of the subject lot
and upon payment of the agreed purchase price, executed a deed of
absolute sale.

The final deed of sale covering the subject lot in favor of Chieng
was inscribed. On the same date, TCT covering the subject lot was
issued to Chieng. The petitioner's complaint for cancellation and
reversion was carried at the back of Chieng's TCT.
Chieng and Redondos entered into another deed of sale in the
Redondos' favor inscribed at the back of TCT and issued to
Redondos.

The RTC cancelled Ravelo's Sales Patent and OCT, Chieng's

TCT, and the Redondos' TCT and ordered the reversion of the land to
the mass of the public domain.

The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the trial court's
ruling and declared the Redondos as innocent purchasers in good
faith.
744

ISSUE:

Whether the Redondos are innocent purchasers in good faith

and for value, whose title over the subject lot that could defeat the
petitioner's cause of action for cancellation of title and reversion.

HELD:

No. The CA erred in concluding that the Redondos were buyers

in good faith. They purchased the subject lot from Chieng subject to
the government's notice of lis pendens; hence, their purchase was at
the risk of the outcome of the State's complaint for cancellation and
reversion which we find to be meritorious. The subject lot must
therefore revert back to the public domain.

Lis pendens literally means "a pending suit," while a notice

of lis pendens, inscribed in the certificate of title, is an announcement
to the whole world that the covered property is in litigation, serving as
a warning that one who acquires interest in the property does so at
his own risk and subject to the results of the litigation. The notice that
this provision speaks of - the notice of lis pendens - is not a lien or
encumbrance on the property, but simply a notice to prospective
buyers or to those dealing with the property that it is under litigation.

The government's notice of lis pendens came after the

execution sale and thus cannot affect Chieng and the conveyance to
him of the subject lot. However, the sale by Chieng to the Redondos
of the subject lot was subject to the notice of lis pendens duly
annotated on Chieng's title.
745

iii. A notice of lispendens is ordinarily recorded

without the intervention of the court; may be ordered cancelled
any time.
HEIRS OF MARIA MARASIGAN VS IAC
152 SCRA 253
FACTS:
In 1975, Marron filed a case against the spouses Bazaar,
praying for the execution of a Deed of Absolute Sale of a lot in his
favor. Notably, while the case is still pending in 1976, Marron caused
the annotation of notice of lis pendens at the back of the TCT.
Judgement was thereafter rendered in favor of Marron, ordering
spouses Bazaar to execute Deed of Absolute Sale.
Notwithstanding the writ of execution, the spouses Bazar
refused to execute the Deed. The clerk of court was then ordered to
execute the deed in behalf of the spouses.
When the said deed was presented to the Register of Deeds for
registration, the Deputy Clerk of Court was advised to secure a court
order in order that the new title issued in the name of herein petitioner
Maria Marasigan could be cancelled.
It appears that in 1974, a Deed of Absolute Sale involving the
subject property was executed by spouses Bazaar in favor of
Marasigan. It was, however, only in 1977 that such Deed was
registered with the Registry of Deeds. When the new title was issued
in the name of Marasigan, the notice of lis pendens effected by
Marron was carried over.
In 1979, Marasigan filed a case for the registration of the Deed
of Absolute Sale issued by the Clerk of Court in his favor with the

746

Registry of Deeds. He also prayed for the cancellation of the Deed

issued in favor of Marasigan.
The trial court dismissed the complaint but the Court of Appeals
ruled in favor of Marron. Aggrieved, Marasigan filed the instant
petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA was correct in ruling that herein respondent
has a better right?
RULING:
Yes.
There is a clear showing that although the late Marasigan
acquired the property in question from the Bazaars pursuant to a
deed of absolute sale on 1974, the transaction became effective as
against third persons only on July 5, 1977 when it was registered with
the Registry of Deeds of Manila. It is the act of registration which
creates constructive notice to the whole world.
The filing of a notice of lis pendens charges all strangers with a
notice of the particular litigation referred to therein and, therefore, any
right they may thereafter acquire on the property is subject to the
eventuality of the suit.
The doctrine of lis pendens is founded upon reason of public
policy and necessity, the purpose of which is to keep the subject
matter of the litigation within the power of the Court until the judgment
or decree shall have been entered; otherwise, by successive
alienations pending the litigation, its judgment or decree shall be
rendered abortive and impossible of execution.
iv. The continuance or the removal of the notice of
lispendens is not contingent on the existence of a final judgment
and ordinarily has no effect on the merits thereof.
MAGDALENA HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION V. CA
184 SCRA 325 (1990)
747

FACTS:
Magdalena Estate Inc. owns a subdivision known as
Magdalena Rolling Hills. The disputed property in the case at bar is a
lot within the subdivision initially set as an open space and therefore
could not be sold, disposed or encumbered.
Thereafter, the subdivision plan was amended with the approval
of the City Council and the Court of First Instance. The open space
was made open for public disposition and was surveyed into several
lots. A part of the lot was then donated to the city government and
part was conveyed to the Developmental Bank of the Philippines by
way of dacion en pago.
Herein petitioners then filed an action against Magdalena
Estate Inc. for the recovery of the open space for their use as
residents of the subdivision. At the instance of the petitioners, a
notice of lis pendens was annotated in the title of the lot conveyed to
DBP.
The trial court rendered judgment not favorable to the
petitioners. Hence, an appeal with the CA was perfected. Pending
judgment, DBP and MEI filed motions for the cancellation of notice of
lis pendens. The motions were subsequently granted.
Contending that the CA acted with grave abuse of discretion in
granting the motions filed by DBP and MEI, the petitioners brought
herein petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA has power to remove the notice of lis
pendens?
RULING:
Yes.

748

The notice of lis pendens is ordinarily recorded without the

intervention of the court where the action is pending. The notice is but
an incident in an action, an extra judicial one, to be sure. It does not
affect the merits thereof. It is intended merely to constructively
advise, or warn, all people who deal with the property that they so
deal with it at their own risk, and whatever rights they may acquire in
the property in any voluntary transaction are subject to the results of
the action, and may well be inferior and subordinate to those which
may be finally determined and laid down therein. The cancellation of
such a precautionary notice is therefore also a mere incident in the
action, and may be ordered by the Court having jurisdiction of it at
any given time. And its continuance or removal like the
continuance or removal of a preliminary attachment or injunction is
not contingent on the existence of a final judgment in the action, and
ordinarily has no effect on the merits thereof.

C. Cases where notice of lispendens is proper. The litigation

must involve title to, or the use or occupation of, a specific
property. Hence, it does not apply where the object of the suit is
money judgment or proceedings for the probate of will or
administration of the estate of a deceased person, levy on
execution or preliminary attachments.
BIGLANGAWA V. CONSTANTINO
109 Phil 168
FACTS:
Biglangawa and Espiritu were co-owners of a parcel of land.
Constantino was appointed as their agent who is to develop the area
and sell them to prospective homeowners. In 1951, Constantino was
able to dispose off more than half of the lots. However, Biglangawa
and Espiritu failed to give him sufficient compensation as agreed
upon.
Later, Biglangawa and Espiritu terminated the agency contract
with Constantino. They, however, acknowledged their liability to
749

Constantino and promised him that they will pay the unpaid
commissions. Payments were made but the entire amount was not
given. A case for the collection of the unpaid sum was then filed by
Constantino.
Pending the resolution of the case, Constantino filed for the
annotation of notice of lis pendens with the Registry of Deeds.
Biglangawa and Espiritu refused, however, to surrender the owners
copy of transfer certificate. Upon sale of the lot to Santos, the notice
of lis pendens was annotated in the TCT. Hence, Biglangawa and
Espiritu filed for the cancellation of the annotated notice of lis
pendens.
Both the trial court and the court of appeals ruled in favor of
Biglangawa and Espiritu. Constantino then filed with this court.
ISSUE:
Whether the annotation was proper.
RULING:
No.
Appellant's amended complaint, not being "an action affecting
the title or the right of possession of real property", nor one "to
recover possession of real estate, or to quiet title thereto, or to
remove clouds upon the title thereof, or for partition or other
proceeding of any kind in court affecting the title to real estate or the
use or occupation thereof or the buildings thereon . . .", the same
cannot be the basis for annotating a notice of lis pendens on the title
of the petitioners-appellees.
i.

Entry in the day book is sufficient; notice must be

carried over in all certificates subsequently issued.

i.

Grounds for Cancellation:

750

ST. MARY OF THE WOODS SCHOOL, INC. and MARCIAL P.

SORIANO vs. OFFICE OF THE REGISTRY OF DEEDS OF MAKATI
CITY and HILARIO P. SORIANO
G.R. No. 174290
FACTS:
Private respondent claimed that several years after his father
Tomas Q. Sorianos death, he discovered that the latters signature in
the Deed of Assignment of 10 May 1988 in favor of ODC was a
forgery. Being very familiar with his fathers signature, private
respondent compared Tomas Q. Sorianos purported signature in the
Deed of Assignment of 10 May 1988 with Tomas Q. Sorianos
genuine signature in another document captioned Second
Amendment of Credit Agreement. RTC dismissed the complaint files
by the private respondent.
On 16 May 2005, petitioners, et al., filed with the RTC a Motion
to Cancel Notice of Lis Pendens[31] annotated on the titles covering
the subject properties, which Motion was opposed by the private
respondent.
As mentioned in the case, the notice of lis pendens can be
cancelled if it is not necessary to protect the interest of the party who
caused it to be recorded. Private respondent Hilario P. Soriano has
no interest to be protected insofar as the subject properties are
concerned because of his acknowledgment that he already received
his share in the estate of Tomas Soriano.
On 14 March 2006, private respondent filed before the Court of
Appeals a Motion to Reinstate/Re-annotate Notice of Lis Pendens on
the TCTs of the subject properties given that there was yet no final
judgment of dismissal of his Complaint, as its dismissal had been
duly appealed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not lispendens be cancelled
HELD:
The inherent power to cancel a notice of lis pendens, under the
express provisions of law. As provided for by Sec. 14, Rule 13 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a notice of lis pendens may be
cancelled on two grounds: (1) if the annotation was for the purpose of
molesting the title of the adverse party; or (2) when the annotation is
not necessary to protect the title of the party who caused it to be
recorded.
The doctrine of lis pendens is based on consideration of public
751

policy and convenience, under the view that once a court has taken
cognizance of a controversy, it should be impossible to interfere with
the consummation of the judgment by any ad interim transfer,
encumbrance, or change of possession.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, these consolidated
Petitions for Certiorari are hereby DISMISSED.

ii.

The notice of lispendens shall be deemed cancelled

when the adverse right fails in litigation.

NORMA S. TIRADO vs.

LILIA SEVILLA, THOMAS S. ONG, CELSO UY and COURTS OF
APPEALS
FACTS:
Petitioner Norma S. Tirado (hereafter Mrs. Tirado) acquired
ownership of a parcel of land under a Deed of Assignment executed
by her father Jose Dimzon on October 12, 1967. The deed assigned
73,000 sq. m. of Dimzon's land consisting of 361,558 sq. m.Tirado
subsequently sought the assistance of respondent Lilia Sevilla to
have her land titled, including that of her father.
Keenly interested in having her land titled, Mrs. Tirado agreed
to execute another deed of sale whereby she would sell 15,000 sq.
m. (or 1.5 has.) to Mrs. Sevilla who, in turn, would deliver three (3)
fishing boats worth P150,000.00 and advance initial expenses for the
titling of the land. The first deed of sale would be deemed cancelled.
The second document of sale was finalized on December 23, 1975.
Despite the lapse of several months, and repeated demands,
Mrs. Sevilla failed to institute any proceedings nor to advance any
money for the titling of Mrs. Tirado's land. Instead, without Mrs.
Tirado's consent and knowledge, she filed a petition in her name
(Civil Case 1755, CFI, Br. XXXII Kalookan City) for the issuance of
title over the entire area of Lot B-2, Psd-4350 (Dimzon's land) which
752

includes Mrs. Tirado's 73,000 sq. m.

On November 8, 1977, Mrs. Sevilla sold 4/5 portion of TCT No.
C-10299 to Thomas Ong and, on November 15, 1977, 1/5 portion
thereof to Celso Uy (p. 77, Rollo). On February 14, 1978, TCT No. C12456 was issued to Ong and Uy.
RTCs judgment is rendered in favor of petitioner and against
respondent Lilia Sevilla, ordering the questioned decision partly
nullified and transfer certificate of title No. 4128 issued therefrom is
hereby amended to exclude the claim of herein petitioner to the
extent of 73,000 square meters.
On appeal by Mrs. Sevilla, Ong and Uy, the Court of Appeals
modified the decision by declaring Ong and Uy purchasers in good
faith and for value, in effect depriving Mrs. Tirado of that portion of
land to the extent covered by TCT No. 12456.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Ong and Uy were notified of filing notice of lis
pendens.
RULING:
The purpose of filing notice of lis pendens is to charge
strangers with notice of the particular litigation referred to in the
notice; and if the notice is effective, a third person who acquires the
property affected by the lis pendens takes same subject to the
eventuality of the litigation. But when the adverse right fails in such
litigation, the lis pendens loses its efficacy.
At the time appellants Ong and Uy purchased the realty in
question (TCT No. C-10299), they were well aware that it was
involved in a litigation because of a notice of lis pendens filed by the
counsel of Roqueta Rodriguez on July 28, 1977. However, they (Ong
and Uy) took a calculated risk and brought (sic) it just the same from
Lilia Sevilla, hoping all the while mayhap, that a decision would be
rendered favorable to their predecessor-in-interest, Lilia Sevilla in
Civil Case No. C-1836.
iii.

While an adverse claim and a notice of lispendens

can concurrently subsist, when either is deemed
753

unnecessary or superfluous it would be the notice of

lispendens that will cancelled; reasons therefore.
DORONILA vs COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. Nos. L-42956-57 January 12, 1988
FACTS:
Blue Chips Projects, Inc. a Corporation duly organized and
existing under the laws of the Philippines, is the registered owner of a
parcel of land situated in Barrio Paths, Municipality of San Mateo,
Province of Rizal and covered by TCT Certificate of Title No. 344936
of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal. Blue Chips Projects, Inc. purchased
said property from Purita Landicho the lawful registered owner under
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 167681. On December 11, 1972,
petitioner-appellant A. Doronila Resources Development Inc. availed
of the remedy of lis pendens in Civil Case No. 12044 of the Court of
First Instance of Rizal, the same having been annotated on Transfer
Certificate Title No. 344936 in the name of Blue Chips Projects, Inc.
On August 8, 1973, petitioner thru its President Alfonso Doronila, filed
an affidavit of adverse claim for registration on Transfer Certificate of
title No. 344936 with the Register of deeds of Rizal on the ground that
the property covered by the aforesaid title registered in the name of
Blue Chips Projects Inc. is a portion of a big parcel of land which was
purchased by petitioner corporation from Alfonso Doronila.
Respondent-appellee, the Register of Deeds of Rizal denied the
registration of the affidavit of the aforementioned adverse claim on
the ground that a notice of lis pendens remain registered on the
certificate of title involved should be a bar to the registration of an
affidavit of adverse claim. Considering that the rights and interests of
the petitioner are already amply protected thereby without imposing a
further burden on the registered owner by the registration of an
affidavit of adverse claim which would be serving the same purpose.
After all an affidavit of adverse claim does not add anything to the
validity of one's claim nor does it create a non-existent right.
Petitioner elevated the matter en consulta to the Land Registration
Commission. On November 6, 1973, the Land Registration
Commission issued its Resolution holding that the affidavit of adverse
claim be denied registration. On November 5,1973,Transfer
Certificate of Title No.344936 registered in the name of Blue Chips
754

Projects, Inc. was cancelled and Transfer Certificate of Title No.

425582 was issued in favor of the purchaser Winmar Poultry Farms,
Inc. with an annotation at the back thereof that the property therein
described is subject to the Resolution of LRC Consult No. 887.
Petitioner A. Doronila Resources Dev. Inc. again sought the
registration of an affidavit of adverse claim Identical to that which was
the subject of LRC Consult No. 887 on TCT No. 425582 registered in
the name of Winmar Poultry Farms, Inc. Respondent-appellee
Register of Deed elevated the records to the Land Registration
Commission for resolution under Sec. 4 of RA No. 115. The Land
Registration Commission rendered on January 8, 1974, a resolution
in L.R.C. Consult No. 894 main its oponion L.R.C. Consult No. 887
and ruling against registrability of the affidavit of adverse claim.
Not satisfied with the above resolution, petitioner-appealed to
this Honorable Court.
On March 12, 1974, appellant filed before this Honorable Court
a petition for Consolidated of Case SP-02569 and Case SP02711which was granted by this Honorable Court on March 19, 1974.
On 26 November 1975, the respondent Court of Appeals, as earlier
stated, rendered a decision, affirming the resolutions of the Land
Registration Commission in LRC Consults Nos. 887 and 894.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the annotation of a notice of lis pendens at the
back of a certificate of title precludes the subsequent registration on
the same or successor certificate of title of an adverse claim.
RULING:
The Land Registration Commission, in its resolutions in
the Consultas, abovementioned, declared, and the respondent
appellate court affirmed, that since the petitioner had already availed
of the remedy of lis pendens, and that the rights and interests of
adverse claimant are already amply protected by the registration of
such notice of lis pendens, "it does not seem fair to have a title
saddled by two encumbrances arising from one and the same source,
and serving one and the same purpose."
755

This Court, however, has ruled differently, i.e., that the two remedies,
notice of lis pendens and adverse claim, are not contradictory or
repugnant to one another; nor does the existence of one
automatically nullify the other, and if any of the registrations should be
considered unnecessary or superfluous, it would be the notice of lis
pendens, and not the annotation of an adverse claim which is more
permanent and cannot be cancelled without adequate hearing and
proper disposition of the claim involved. The Court said:
But We have to give certain consideration to the implication
created by the lower court's ruling that the institution of a court action
for the purpose of securing or preserving the light which is also the
object of an adverse claim invalidates the latter, irrespective of
whether a notice of lis pendens has been annotated or not, for such a
doctrine gives the impression that the 2 remedies are contradictory or
repugnant to one another, the existence of one automatically
nullifying the other. We are inclined to believe otherwise, for while
both registrations have their own characteristics and requisites, it
cannot be denied that they are both intended to protect the interest of
a claimant by posing as notices and caution to those said with the
property that same is subject to a claim. But while a notice of lis
pendens remains during the pendency of the action, although same
may be cancelled under certain circumstances all where the case is
prolonged unecessarily or for failure of the plaintiff to introduce
evidence bearing out the allegations of the complaint ; and it has
even been held that a court, in the of absence in the absence
statute,has the inherent power to cancel a lis pendens notice in a
proper case, the same is not true in a registered adverse claim, for it
may be cancelled only in one instance, i.e., after the claim is
adjudged invalid or unmeritorious by the Court, acting either as a land
registration court or one of general jurisdiction while passing upon a
case before it where the subject of the litigation is the same interest
or right which is being secured by the adverse claim. The possibility
therefore, that parties claiming an interest in a registered property
desire, for any other purpose, to have their cause ventilated in a court
of general jurisdiction may result in giving them two ways of making
the registration of their claimed rights. In such instances, it would not
only be unreasonable but also oppressive to hold that the subsequent
institution of an ordinary civil action would work to divest the adverse
claim of its validity, for as we have pointed out, a notice of lis
pendens maybe cancelled even before the action is finally terminated
756

for causes which may not be attributable to the claimant. And it would
similarly be beyond reason to confine a claimant to the remedy
afforded by Section 110 of Act 496 if there are other recourses in law
which such claimant may avail of. But, if any of the registrations
should be considered unnecessary or superfluous, it would be the
notice of lis pendens and not the annotation of the adverse claim
which is more permanent and cannot be cancelled without adequate
hearing and proper disposition of the claim.
Besides, it cannot really be said that the rights and interests of the
petitioner over the land in question are amply protected by the
annotation at the back of TCT 425582 issued in the name of Winmar
Poultry Farms, Inc., that "the property therein described is subject to
the resolution of LRC Consults No. 887." The statement that the
property described is subject to the resolution of a consulta, unlike a
statement of adverse claim, cannot serve as a notice and warning to
third persons dealing with the property that someone is claiming an
interest in the same or a better title than that of the registered owner
thereof. A consulta, as is generally understood, is but the reference of
a question to the Commissioner of Land Registration by a Register of
Deeds when he is in doubt as to the proper step to be taken when a
deed or instrument is presented to him for registration

ADMINISTRATIVE REGISTRATION
A. Concepts and procedures of public land disposition
B. Homesteads
a. Who may apply
b. The prohibition on the alienation and encumbrance of a
homestead
Lands erroneously included in a homestead Patent must
be returned to the State, not re-convened to a private
person through a private quitclaim. The transferee must
himself comply with the requirements for a grant.
LOPEZ/ NORDEC v Esquivel
GR No. 170621 April 24, 2009
757

FACTS:
The petitioners in G.R. No. 168734, namely, Marcelino, Felisa,
Leonardo and Zoilo, all surnamed Lopez (Lopez siblings), seek to
reverse and set aside the assailed Decision of the appellate court
affirming in toto the Decision RTC, which (1) ordered the Lopez
siblings to vacate and to convey to Jose Esquivel, Jr. (Esquivel) and
Carlito Talens (Talens) a parcel of land, measuring 2.6950 hectares,
situated in Barrio dela Paz, Antipolo, Rizal (subject property); and (2)
directed the Register of Deeds of Marikina, Metropolitan Manila, to
divest the Lopez siblings of their title over the subject property and to
issue title over the same property in the names of Esquivel and
Talens. In its assailed Resolution, the appellate court denied for lack
of merit the Motion for Reconsideration of the Lopez siblings.
On the other hand, Noel Rubber and Development Corporation
(Nordec Phil.) and Dr. Potenciano Malvar (Dr. Malvar), the petitioners
in G.R. No. 170621, pray for the setting aside of the Resolutions
dated 6 October 2005 and 16 November 2005of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 91428 where it dismissed for prematurity the
Petition for Annulment of Judgment filed by Nordec Phil. and Dr.
Malvar under Rule 47 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure,
assailing the RTC Decision dated 11 January 2001 in Civil Case No.
96-4193, as they were not impleaded in said case, neither as
indispensable nor necessary parties. The appellate court, in its other
questioned Resolution dated16 November 2005, denied the Motion
for Amendment and/or Reconsideration of Nordec Phil. and Dr.
Malvar.
G.R. No. 168734
FACTS:
Hermogenes Lopez (Hermogenes) was the father of the Lopez
siblings. During Hermogenes lifetime, he applied with the Bureau of
Lands for a homestead patent over a parcel of land. The Bureau of
Lands approved Hermogenes application. The patent was
subsequently transmitted to the Register of Deeds of Rizal for
transcription and issuance of the corresponding certificate of titlein
Hermogenes name. Unaware that he had already been awarded a
758

homestead patent over the 19.4888-hectare land, Hermogenes sold

the same to Ambrocio Aguilar (Aguilar) by virtue of a Deed of
Absolute Sale.
Years later, it was allegedly discovered that the subject property, with
an area of 2.6950 hectares, was erroneously included in survey plan
H-138612 of Hermogenes property. The subject property supposedly
formed part of the land owned by Lauro Hizon (Hizon), which
adjoined that of Hermogenes. Resultantly, on 29 November 1965,
Hermogenes executed a Quitclaim over his rights and interests to the
subject property in Hizons favor. Hizon, in turn, sold the subject
property to Esquivel and Talens, as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute
Sale of Unregistered Land. Hermogenes died. The Lopez siblings, as
Hermogenes heirs, filed an action with the RTC for the cancellation
of the Deed of Absolute Sale dated 31 July 1959, executed between
Hermogenes and Aguilar, and which involved the entire 19.4888hectare land.
ISSUE:
Whether the petition is meritorious
RULING:
The instant Petition is meritorious.
A homestead patent is one of the modes to acquire title to public
lands suitable for agricultural purposes. Under the Public Land Act,
as amended, a homestead patent is one issued to any citizen of this
country, over the age of 18 years or the head of a family, and who is
not the owner of more than 24 hectares of land in the country. To be
qualified, the applicant must show that he has resided continuously
for at least one year in the municipality where the land is situated and
must have cultivated at least one-fifth of the land applied for.
In this case, the Bureau of Lands approved Hermogenes application
for homestead patent over the 19.4888-hectare land after finding him
qualified for the same. In contrast, the only evidence supporting
Hizons claim to the subject property was the Quitclaim. There is no
other proof that Hizon possessed, cultivated, and introduced
759

improvements on the subject property. Neither is there any showing

that after the execution of the Quitclaim, Hizon himself applied for a
homestead patent over the subject property. In fact, it is undisputed
that the subject property has always been in the possession of
Hermogenes, then the Lopez Siblings. Hizon and Esquivel and
Talens never came into the possession of the subject property even
after the execution of the supposed deeds of conveyances in their
favor.
The Court also cannot consider the subject property to have been
held in trust by Hermogenes for and on behalf of Hizon. Settled is the
rule that a homestead applicant must personally comply with the legal
requirements for a homestead grant. The homestead applicant
himself must possess the necessary qualifications, cultivate the land,
and reside thereon. It would be a circumvention of the law if an
individual were permitted to apply in behalf of another, as the latter
may be disqualified or might not comply with the residency and
cultivation requirements.
In the end, the Quitclaim dated 29 November 1965 could not have
validly conveyed or transferred ownership of the subject property
from Hermogenes to Hizon. It is null and void for being contrary to
the provisions of the Public Land Act, as amended. As a result, Hizon
acquired no right over the subject property which he could have sold
to Esquivel and Talens; and the Deed of Absolute Sale of
Unregistered Land dated 26 August 1968 executed by Hizon in favor
of Esquivel and Talens, is similarly void for lack of an object.
Even granting arguendo, that the Quitclaim is valid and transferred
ownership of the subject property from Hermogenes to Hizon, the
latter and his successors-in-interest, Esquivel and Talens, are now
barred by the statute of limitations and laches from asserting their
rights to the subject property, after failing to exercise the same for an
unreasonable length of time.
In the instant case, when Esquivel and Talens filed with the RTC their
application for registration of the subject property on 5 March
1993, 28 years had passed since the execution by Hermogenes of
the Quitclaim covering the subject property in favor of Hizon on 29
November 1965; and 25 years elapsed from the execution by Hizon
760

of the Deed of Absolute Sale of the subject property in favor of

Esquivel and Talens on 26 August 1968. During these periods,
without providing any reasons therefor, neither Hizon nor Esquivel
and Talens took possession of the subject property or exercised in
any other way their rights over the same.
Finally, concerning this Petition, is the issue of whether the Lopez
siblings are estopped from questioning the validity of the Quitclaim,
as ruled by the Court of Appeals? It bears to point out that the
question of estoppel is relevant only if the Lopez siblings are
challenging the validity of the Quitclaim on the ground that when
Hermogenes executed the same, he had already previously sold his
19.4888-hectare land, which included the subject property, to
Aguilar. In recollection, the Lopez siblings successfully had the said
sale of the land by Hermogenes to Aguilar nullified. Since the Court
herein refuses to give effect to the Quitclaim in question on other
grounds already discussed above, the issue of estoppel actually
loses relevance and need not be resolved anymore.
Considering the pronouncements of this Court that the Quitclaim
covering the subject property executed by Hermogenes in favor of
Hizon is null and void for being contrary to the provisions of the Public
Land Act, as amended, on homestead grants; and that the Deed of
Absolute Sale of the subject property executed by Hizon in favor of
Esquivel and Talens is null and void for lack of a proper object, then
Esquivel and Talens have no basis to ask for the reconveyance of the
subject property. Hizon never owned the subject property and could
never have sold the same to Esquivel and Talens.

G.R. No. 170621

FACTS:
In its Decision dated 11 January 2001 in Civil Case No. 96-4193, the
RTC granted the action for reconveyance of the subject property to
Esquivel and Talens. The subject property, however, was already
supposedly sold by Lopez siblings to Nordec Phil. and Dr. Malvar.
Nordec Phil. and Dr. Malvar alleged in their Petition for Annulment of
Judgment that the Lopez siblings, the successors-in-interest of
761

Hermogenes, were the registered owners of 15 parcels of land

situated at Overlooking, Sumulong Highway, Barangay Sta. Cruz.
Among these parcels of land were Lots 1, 2, 3, 4, 7 and 8, covered by
TCTs No. 207990 to No. 207997 of the Registry of Deeds of Marikina
City, with an aggregate area of 2.875 hectares, and which constituted
the subject property. Beginning 20 April 1994, Nordec Phils. and Dr.
Malvar purchased the afore-mentioned lots from the Lopez siblings
and their assigns, namely, Atty. Angeles and Rogelio Amurao
(Amurao), as evidenced by several Deeds of Absolute Sale and
Deeds of Conditional Sale. Immediately after making such
purchases, Nordec Phils. and Dr. Malvar introduced large scale
improvements on the subject property, among which were several
business establishments with a cost of no less than P50,000,000.
In 1996, when the subject property was involved in Civil Case No. 964130 heard before the RTC of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch 74,
entitled Heirs of Elino Adia v. Heirs of Hermogenes Lopez, it was Atty.
Angeles who represented and protected the interest of Nordec Phils.
and Dr. Malvar in said case by filing a Motion to Dismiss. In Cabuay,
Jr., wherein Dr. Malvar and the Lopez siblings were named the
respondents in the Petition Seeking for Clarification as to the Validity
and Forceful Effect of the Two (2) Final and Executory but Conflicting
Decisions of this Court involving the subject property, it was also Atty.
Angeles who appeared for Nordec Phils. and Dr. Malvar.
Sometime after 2 August 2004, Atty. Angeles again informed Nordec
Phil. and Dr. Malvar that there was another case filed against the
Lopez siblings involving the subject property. Atty. Angeles,
however, belittled this most recent case involving the subject
property, and even showed to Nordec Phils. and Dr. Malvar the
Motion to Resolve Appeal dated 2 August 2004, which he filed in CAG.R. CV No. 70200, together with the Brief for the Lopez
siblings. Yet, Nordec Phils. and Dr. Malvar conducted their own
inquiry, and were surprised to discover that the Decision rendered by
the RTC on 11 January 2001 in Civil Case No. 96-4193 was actually
adverse to their rights and interest; and despite this, they were
neither impleaded nor represented therein. Even Atty. Angeles, the
supposed counsel for Nordec Phils. and Dr. Malvar, did not lift a
finger to protect their rights in said case.
762

ISSUE:
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing their Petition for
Annulment of Judgment for being premature since the judgment
sought to be annulled is still the subject of a Petition for Review
before this Court, docketed as G.R. No. 168734, and is not yet final
and executory.
RULING:
The Court answers in the negative.
The ordinary remedies of a motion for new trial or reconsideration
and a petition for relief from judgment are remedies available
only to parties in the proceedings where the assailed judgment is
rendered. In fact, it has been held that a person who was never a
party to the case, or even summoned to appear therein, cannot make
use of a petition for relief from judgment. Indubitably, Nordec Phils.
and Dr. Malvar cannot avail themselves of the aforesaid ordinary
remedies of motion for new trial, petition for relief from judgment, or
appeal, because they were not parties to the proceedings in Civil
Case No. 96-4193 in which the RTC Decision dated 11 January 2001
sought to be annulled was rendered. Nordec Phils. and Dr. Malvar
also cannot seek the annulment of the 11 January 2001 Decision of
the RTC in Civil Case No. 96-4193.
An action for annulment of judgment is a remedy in law independent
of the case where the judgment sought to be annulled was
rendered. The purpose of such action is to have the final and
executory judgment set aside so that there will be a renewal of
litigation. It is resorted to in cases where the ordinary remedies of
new trial, appeal, petition for relief from judgment, or other
appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the
petitioner, and is based on only two grounds: extrinsic fraud, and lack
of jurisdiction or denial of due process. A person need not be a party
to the judgment sought to be annulled, and it is only essential that he
can prove his allegation that the judgment was obtained by the use of
fraud and collusion and he would be adversely affected thereby.

763

An action to annul a final judgment on the ground of fraud lies only if

the fraud is extrinsic or collateral in character. Fraud is regarded as
extrinsic where it prevents a party from having a trial or from
presenting his entire case to the court, or where it operates upon
matters pertaining not to the judgment itself but to the manner in
which it is procured. The overriding consideration when extrinsic
fraud is alleged is that the fraudulent scheme of the prevailing litigant
prevented a party from having his day in court.
It is, thus, settled that the purpose of a Petition for Annulment of
Judgment is to have the final and executory judgment set aside so
that there will be a renewal of litigation. If the judgment sought to be
annulled, like in this case, is still on appeal or under review by a
higher court, it cannot be regarded as final, and there can be no
renewal of litigation because the litigation is actually still open and ongoing. In this light, the arguments of Nordec Phil. and Dr. Malvar that
the judgments or final orders need not be final and executory for it to
be annulled must fail.
This Court, therefore, finds no error in the dismissal by the Court of
Appeals of the Petition for Annulment of Judgment filed by Nordec
Phil. and Dr. Malvar, on the ground of prematurity. Given that the 11
January 2001 Decision of the RTC in Civil Case No. 96-4193 was still
pending appeal before this Court, the Court of Appeals could not take
cognizance of the Petition for annulment of the same judgment, for if
it had done so, then it would risk promulgating a ruling which could be
contrary to and inconsistent with the ruling of this Court on the appeal
of the judgment.
C. Free Patents
a. Who may acquire?
b. Purpose in granting a free patent
METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY vs. VIRAY
G.R. No. 162218. February 25, 2010
FACTS:
Rico Shipping, Inc., together with respondent Viray, obtained 3
separate loans from petitioner MBTC. The three loans were obtained
764

on July 1979, June 1981 and September 1981, or several years

before the free patents were issued to the respondent on December
1982.
However, on the due date, the debtors failed to pay the loan despite
demands to pay by MBTC. MBTC filed a complaint for sum of money
against the debtors. On April 1983, the RTC rendered a judgment in
favor of MBTC.
Meanwhile, on December 1982, the government issued Free Patents
in favor of Viray over three parcels of land.
On March 1984, the RTC issued a writ of execution over the lots
owned by Viray, whereby, the lots sold at public auction in favor of
MBTC as the winning bidder. Thus, the Certificate of Sale issued to
MBTC.
ISSUE:
Whether the auction sale falls within the 5-year prohibition period laid
down in Section 118 of CA 141.
RULING:
The law clearly provides that lands which have been acquired under
free patent or homestead shall not be encumbered or alienated within
5 years from the date of issuance of the patent or be liable for the
satisfaction of any debt contracted prior to the expiration of the
period.
For a period of five years or from 29 December 1982 up to 28
December 1987, Section 118 of CA 141 provides that the lots
comprising the free patents shall not be made liable for the payment
of any debt until the period of five years expires. In this case, the
execution sale of the lots occurred less than two years after the date
of the issuance of the patents. This clearly falls within the five-year
prohibition period provided in the law, regardless of the dates when
the loans were incurred.
It must be emphasized that the main purpose in the grant of a free
765

patent or homestead is to preserve and keep in the family of the

homesteader that portion of public land which the State has given to
him so he may have a place to live with his family and become a
happy citizen and a useful member of the society.

c. Filing, processing & issuance of free patent constitutes the

administrative mode of confirming an imperfect title; judicial
mode is under Sec. 48 (b) of the Public Land Act
KAYABAN vs. REPUBLIC
G.R. No. L-33307 August 30, 1973
FACTS:
The lands covered by the two titles were inherited by Vicente
Kayaban and his co-heirs from their father and common predecessorin-interest, Gabriel Kayaban, whose last will was admitted to probate.
After the properties were partitioned, Vicente Kayaban acquired the
shares of his co-heirs by purchase and afterwards he and his wife
applied for and obtained the two free patent titles in question.
The respondent court recognized and declared the petitioners to be
the rightful and exclusive owners of the properties covered by the
said titles and denied the Solicitor General's prayer that they be
reverted to the State, but nevertheless declared the titles null and
void on the ground that since the owners had acquired the properties
partly by inheritance from their father and the rest by purchase from
their co-heirs, and their father had been in possession thereof for
many years before them, the lands were no longer public and hence
not subject to disposition by the government under the Public Land
Act. The procedure that should have been followed, said the court,
was judicial confirmation of an imperfect title and not administrative
legalization thereof through patent application.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the procedure that must be followed judicial
confirmation of an imperfect title.

766

RULING:
Since it was the Director of Lands who processed and approved the
applications of the appellants and who ordered the issuance of the
corresponding free patents in their favor in his capacity as
administrator of the disposable lands of the public domain, the action
for annulment should have been initiated by him, or at least with his
prior authority and consent.
Finally, whether the titles in question were obtained through judicial or
administrative legalization of imperfect or incomplete title is of no
practical importance. The certificates of title in either case is the
same, namely, that provided for in Section 122 of Act No. 496, which,
except for some restrictions as to alienability within entitled to all the
protection afforded by the Torrens System of registration.

d. A certificate of title issued on the basis of a free patent

procured thru fraud or in violation of the law may be cancelled
since such title is not cloaked with indefeasibility.
MARTINEZ vs. CA
G.R. No. 170409 January 28, 2008
FACTS:
Petitioner, whose real name as appearing in her birth certificate is
Gregoria Merquines, represented herself as Gregoria Martinez and
as thus one of the descendants of Celedonia, and under that name
applied for free patents over the properties. Unknown to private
respondents, the corresponding OCTs were thus issued in the name
of Gregoria Martinez.
The evidence shows that the appellant committed fraud and
misrepresentation in her application for free patent which later
became the basis for the issuance of the certificates of title in her
name. More than the issue of the use of the surname Martinez, her
fraudulent act consists essentially in misrepresenting before the
767

CENRO that she is the heir of Celedonia Martinez whom she

admitted in her Answer as the original absolute owner of the subject
parcels of land.
ISSUE:
Whether the free patents and land titles should be annulled due to
fraud and misrepresentation in their procurement.
RULING:
A cause of action for declaration of nullity of free patent and certificate
of title would require allegations of the plaintiffs ownership of the
contested lot prior to the issuance of such free patent and certificate
of title as well as the defendants fraud or mistake, as the case may
be, in successfully obtaining these documents of title over the parcel
of land claimed by plaintiff. In such a case, the nullity arises strictly
not from the fraud or deceit but from the fact that the land is beyond
the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands to bestow and whatever patent
or certificate of title obtained therefore is consequently void ab initio.
The real party-in-interest is not the State but the plaintiff who alleges
a pre-existing right of ownership over the parcel of land in question
even before the grant of title to the defendant.
A certificate of title issued on the basis of a free patent procured thru
fraud or in violation of the law may be cancelled since such title is not
cloaked with indefeasibility.
D. Free patents to residential lands
a. Qualifications. Area Limitations. Conditions
Lands acquired under Free patent shall not be encumbered
or alienated within five years from the date of issuance of
the patent or be liable for the satisfaction of any debt
contracted prior to the expiration of the period
METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY VS. EDGARDO
VIRAY
G.R. No. 162218
FACTS:
768

On 7 July 1979, Rico Shipping, Inc., represented by its President,

Erlinda Viray-Jarque, together with respondent Edgardo D. Viray
(Viray), in their own personal capacity and as solidary obligors,
obtained two separate loans from petitioner Metropolitan Bank and
Trust Company (MBTC). The debtors failed and refused to pay on
due date. MBTC filed a complaint for sum of money against the
debtors with the RTC of Manila, Branch 4. On 28 April 1983, the RTC
of Manila rendered a judgment in favor of MBTC. Meanwhile, on 29
December 1982, the government issued Free Patents in favor of
Viray over three parcels of land, all situated in Barangay Bulua,
Cagayan de Oro City, Misamis Oriental. On 6 March 1984, the RTC
of Manila issued a writ of execution over the lots owned by Viray. On
12 October 1984, pursuant to the writ of execution, the City Sheriff of
Cagayan de Oro sold the lots at public auction in favor of MBTC as
the winning bidder. On 30 July 1991, Viray filed an action for
annulment of sale against the sheriff and MBTC with the RTC of
Cagayan de Oro City, Misamis Oriental, Branch 23. Viray sought the
declaration of nullity of the execution sale, the sheriffs certificate of
sale, the sheriffs deed of final conveyance and the TCT's issued by
the Register of Deeds. The RTC of Cagayan de Oro City rendered its
decision in favor of MBTC. Viray filed an appeal with the CA.
ISSUE:
Whether the auction sale falls within the five-year prohibition period
laid down in Section 118 of CA 141.
HELD:
The petition lacks merit. Petitioner MBTC insists that the five-year
prohibition period against the alienation or sale of the property
provided in Section 118 of CA 141 does not apply to an obligation
contracted before the grant or issuance of the free patent or
homestead. The alienation or sale stated in the law pertains to
voluntary sales and not to forced or execution sale.Respondent
Viray, on the other hand, maintains that the express prohibition in
Section 118 of CA 141 does not qualify or distinguish whether the
debt was contracted prior to the date of the issuance of the free
patent or within five years following the date of such
issuance. Further, respondent asserts that Section 118 of CA 141
absolutely prohibits any and all sales, whether voluntary or not, of
lands acquired under free patent or homestead, made within the five769

year prohibition period. The law clearly provides that lands which
have been acquired under free patent or homestead shall not be
encumbered or alienated within five years from the date of issuance
of the patent or be liable for the satisfaction of any debt contracted
prior to the expiration of the period.
In the present case, the three loans were obtained on separate dates
7 July 1979, 5 June 1981 and 3 September 1981, or several years
before the free patents on the lots were issued by the government to
respondent on 29 December 1982. For a period of five years or
from 29 December 1982 up to 28 December 1987, Section 118 of CA
141 provides that the lots comprising the free patents shall not be
made liable for the payment of any debt until the period of five years
expires. In this case, the execution sale of the lots occurred less than
two years after the date of the issuance of the patents. This clearly
falls within the five-year prohibition period provided in the law,
regardless of the dates when the loans were incurred.
It must be emphasized that the main purpose in the grant of a free
patent or homestead is to preserve and keep in the family of the
homesteader that portion of public land which the State has given to
him so he may have a place to live with his family and become a
happy citizen and a useful member of the society.

E. Sales Patents
a. Who may apply?
b. How is it acquired?
c. Procedure for acquiring agricultural lands suitable for
residential, commercial or industrial purposes
d. When sale WITHOUT PUBLIC AUCTION is allowed:
ROBERTO AGURA, et al. vs. FEDERICO SERFINO, SR.,
FEDERICO SERFINO, JR., et al.
G.R. No. L-50685 December 4, 1991
FACTS:
On 10 December 1965, private respondent Federico Serfino, Sr., filed
770

with the Bureau of Lands Miscellaneous Sales Application (MSA) No.

(V-3)2 over a 4,172 square meter parcel of land located at San
Patricia Bacolod City. On 18 February 1966, his son, respondent
Serfino, Jr., filed MSA No. (V-3)1 over an adjoining lot with an area of
1,358 square meters.
On 11 March 1968, District Land Officer Pedro C. Reyes ordered an
investigation of an alleged conflict between Serfino, Sr.'s MSA No.
(V3)2 and that of an unnumbered Revocable Permit Application
(VRAP) of a certain Primitive Donozo. On 2 April 1968, another
investigation of an alleged conflict between Serfino, Jr.'s MSA No. (V3)1 and the RPAs of petitioners Agura, Alib, and Sta. Rita and a
certain Domingo Natividad was ordered.
Meanwhile, petitioners Agura, Alib, Sta. Rita and 106 others sent to
the President of the Philippines a petition dated 22 August 1969
requesting that the small parcels of land located in the areas covered
by private respondents' MSAs which they have been occupying for
thirty (30) years be awarded to them.
On 7 January 1970, the City Court of Bacolod rendered decision in
Civil Case No. 6533 ordering the ejectment of the defendants therein
from the lots in question for "failure to pay rentals." On 22 August
1970, Civil Cases Nos. 6534 and 6674 were dismissed on the ground
that "the question of who has a better right to the areas claimed by
the parties will be determined by the Bureau of Lands who has
charge of the disposal of public lands."
On 10 February 1971, Land Investigator Villamarzo submitted a
report recommending that the petitioners herein be given "preferential
right" over the portions occupied by them.
On 7 August 1971, private respondents moved for a reconsideration
alleging that they were not given the opportunity to introduce
evidence in their behalf.
On appeal by herein private respondents, the Secretary of Natural
Resources held that the Order of the Director of Lands dated July 6,
1971be SET ASIDE, and the appellees are hereby ordered to vacate
the two lots in question within thirty (30) days from receipt of their
copies of the decision hereof and leave the appellants in peaceful
771

possession of the same.

On appeal by herein petitioners, the Presidential Assistant for Legal
Affairs on 20 September 1977 affirmed in toto the decision of
Secretary of Natural Resources.
In affirming the Secretary's decision, the Office of the President held
as without merit the contentions of petitioners that the land in
question is foreshore and cannot therefore be disposed of by sale but
only by lease pursuant to Section 61, in relation to Section 59 of the
Public Land Act, and that if at all it could be disposed of by sale,
purchasers are limited to 1,000 square meters pursuant to R.A. No.
730. Petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the above decision
having been denied, they filed with the respondent trial court a
special civil action for certiorari and asked for the nullification of the
decisions of the Presidential Assistant for Legal Affairs and the
Secretary of Natural Resources. On 30 April 1979, the trial
court affirmed the questioned decisions and dismissed the
petition. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the sale to the respondents Serfinos at public auction of
more than 1,000 square meters of residential public land violated the
provisions of R.A. No. 730 and is therefore void.
HELD:
Petition is devoid of merit. We agree with the ruling of the respondent
court that R.A. No. 730 does not repeal or amend Sections 61 and 67
of C.A. No. 141; it merely establishes an exception to said sections.
R.A. No. 730 authorizes a sale by private sale, as an exception to the
general rule that it should be by bidding, if the area applied for does
not exceed 1,000 square meters, and that the applicant has in his
favor the conditions specified for in Section 1 thereof. Hence, if the
area applied for is in excess of 1,000 square meters, as in the instant
case, the sale must be done only through bidding.

772

F. Special Patents
G. Emancipation Patents
H. Registration of Patents
I. Certificates of Title Issued Pursuant to Patents
a. OCT issued pursuant to a patent becomes indefeasible after 1
year from registration
HEIRS OF GREGORIO TENGCO vs. HEIRS OF JOSE and
VICTORIA ALIWALAS and COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 77541 November 29, 1988
FACTS:
Lot No. 3563 of the Arayat Cadastre was originally a part of the public
domain and it was so declared on October 12, 1933. Thereafter, Dr.
Jose Aliwalas applied with the Bureau of Lands for the issuance of a
homestead patent covering this lot. On December 12, 1936, the
Director of Lands granted this application and issued in favor of Jose
Aliwalas Homestead Patent No. 38588. OCT No. 159 was issued in
the name of Jose Aliwalas. As owner of this property, Jose Aliwalas,
thru his overseer Espiridion Manaul, had this parcel fenced and
vegetables were planted in some portions thereof and cattles were
raised on other portions. When the properties left by Dr. Jose Aliwalas
were petitioned among his surviving heirs, the lot in question was
alloted in favor of the plaintiff Victoria L. Vda. de Aliwalas as indicated
in the amended project of partition executed by her mind her nine
children, one of whom is Jose Aliwalas, Jr. After this amended project
of partition was approved and registered with the Register of Deeds
of Pampanga, OCT No. 52526-R was issued in the name of the
plaintiff on November 14, 1966.
On the other hand, on October 31, 1973, the defendant Ponciano
Tengco in representation of the defendants Heirs of Gregorio Tengco
filed an application with the Bureau of Lands, thru its District Land
Office here in San Fernando, Pampanga. Among other things, he
773

alleged in his application that this parcel of land had been occupied
and cultivated originally and continuously thereafter by Gregorio
Tengco. After being given due course, this application was approved
by the Director of Lands who issued Free Patent No. 557692. This
free patent issued in favor of the Heirs of Gregorio Tengco was
predicated on the assumption that the lot still formed part of the public
domain and on the findings of the Public Land Inspector Romeo
Buenaventura who conducted an investigation thereon and who also
reported that the land in question was possessed and occupied by
the applicant. On rebuttal, the plaintiff adduced evidence showing that
the prewar records of the Bureau of Lands pertaining to public land
applications were burned during the war as indicated in the
certification issued by the Chief of the Records Management Division
of the Bureau of Lands. This is to explain why the Bureau has no
more record pertaining to the Homestead Patent issued in favor of
Jose Aliwalas in i936 which gave rise to the issuance of OCT No. 159
of the Register of Deeds of Pampanga on April 8, 1937. The
certification also attests that what is now found in the files of the
Bureau of Lands is Free Patent V-557692 issued on February 5, 1974
in favor of the Heirs of Gregorio Tengco pertaining to Lot No. 3563.
Private respondents argue that since a homestead patent and an
original certificate of title had already been issued to their
predecessor-in-interest, the land had ceased to be part of the public
domain and, hence, the Bureau of Lands had no jurisdiction over the
controversy. Private respondents add that since an original certificate
of title had been issued pursuant to the homestead patent, their title
to the property had become conclusive, absolute, indefeasible and
imprescriptible.
ISSUE:
Whether the heirs of Victoria,granting that they have proprietary rights
on and to the land in question, have not long lost such rights by
laches and/or prescription.
HELD:
An original certificate of title issued on the strength of a homestead
patent partakes of the nature of a certificate of title issued in a judicial
proceeding, as long as the land disposed of is really part of the
774

disposable land of the public domain, and becomes indefeasible and

incontrovertible upon the expiration of one year from the date of the
promulgation of the order of the Director of Lands for the issuance of
the patent.
b. Lands covered by such titles can no longer be subject matter of a
cadastral proceeding
GOMEZ VS COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS:
Petitioners applied for registration of several lots situated in
Bayambang, Pangasinan on August 30, 1968.The lots were among
those involved in the case of Government of the Philippine Islands
vs. Abran, wherein the Supreme Court declared Consolacion M.
Gomez owner of certain lots in Sitio Poponto Bayambang,
Pangasinan. Petitioners are the heirs of Teodoro Y. Gomez (father of
Consolacion).
After notice and publication, and there being no opposition to the
application, the trial court issued an order of general default. On 5
August 1981, the court rendered its decision adjudicating the subject
lots in petitioners' favor.
On October 6, 1981, the trial court issued an order expressly stating
that the decision of August 5, 1981 had become final and directed
the Chief of the General Land Registration Office to issue the
corresponding decrees of registration over the lots adjudicated in the
decision of August 5, 1981.
On July 11, 1984, respondent Silverio G. Perez, Chief of the Division
of Original Registration, Land Registration Commission submitted a
report to the court a quo stating that portions of the land sought for
registration were covered by homestead patents issued in 1928 and
1929 and registered under the Land Registration Act. He
recommended that the decision of August 5, 1981 and the order of
October 6, 1981 be set aside. Petitioners opposed the report, pointing
out that no opposition was raised by the Bureau of Lands during the
registration proceedings and that the decision of August 5, 1981
775

should be implemented because it had long become final and

executory.
After hearing, the lower court rendered a second decision setting
aside the decision dated August 5, 1981 and the order dated October
6, 1981 for the issuance of decrees. Petitioners moved for
reconsideration but the motion was denied. AHence, this recourse.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the homestead patents are still be subject matter of a
cadastral proceeding.
HELD:
It is a settled rule that a homestead patent, once registered under the
Land Registration Act, becomes indefeasible and incontrovertible as
a Torrens title, and may no longer be the subject of an investigation
for determination or judgment in cadastral proceeding.

J. Restrictions on alienable/encumbrance
a. Prohobition against encumbrance or alienable of homestead
patents within 5 years from issue; rationale or purpose of the
prohibition
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK VS. BANATAO
FACTS:
On November 16, 1962, Banatao, et al. (plaintiffs-respondents)
initiated an action for recovery of real property against Marciano
Carag (one of the defendants-respondents) before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC). The disputed property was a new land formation on the
banks of the Cagayan River an accretion to Lot 3192 of the Iguig
Cadastre that the plaintiffs-respondents claimed as the owners of
the adjoining Lot 3192. The defendants-respondents, on the other
hand, were the occupants of the disputed property. While the case
was pending, the defendants-respondents were able to secure
homestead patents evidenced by Original Certificates of Title (OCTs)
issued in their names.
776

The OCTs were issued in 1965 and 1966, and all bear the proviso
that, in accordance with the Public Land Act, the patented homestead
shall neither be alienated nor encumbered for five (5) years from the
date of the issuance of the patent. The defendants-respondents
separately applied for loans with the Philippine NationalBank (PNB or
the bank) secured by real estate mortgages on their respective titled
portions of the disputed property.
The PNB mortgages were annotated on the defendants-respondents'
respective OCTs also in the years 1965 and 1966.
The trial court decided the case in favor of the plaintiffs-respondents
and ordered the return of the disputed property to the plaintiffsrespondents. Carag appealed the trial court decision to the Court of
Appeals (CA).
In an amended complaint, the plaintiffs-respondents also added two
(2) additional causes of action, or a total of three (3) causes of action,
namely: (1) recovery of real property; (2) cancellation of the OCTs;
and (3) annulment of real estate mortgage. The bank was made a
party to the case in view of the suit for annulment of mortgage.
The records disclose that on March 29, 1973, while the case was
pending before the trial court, the bank extra judicially foreclosed the
property. The bank was declared the highest bidder in the ensuing
public auction, resulting in the consolidation of title in the banks
name; hence, the issuance on October 3, 1985 of TCT No. T-65664
in the name of the bank.
On February 28, 1991, the plaintiffs-respondents and the defendantsrespondents entered into a compromise agreement whereby
ownership of virtually the northern half of the disputed property was
ceded to the plaintiffs-respondents, while the remaining southern half
was given to the defendants-respondents. In the same compromise
agreement, the defendants-respondents acknowledged their
indebtedness to petitioner PNB and bound themselves to pay their
respective obligations to the bank, including the interests accruing
thereon. Petitioner PNB, however, was not a party to the compromise
agreement.
The trial court rendered its decision, approving and adopting in toto
the compromise agreement, and ordering the participating parties to
strictly comply with its terms. The appellate court dismissed the
appeal in its decision of March 30, 2001.
PNB submits that its consent to the compromise agreement is
necessary to secure a final and complete determination of the claims
777

and defenses of all the parties to the case. The PNB further argues
that when the appellate court approved in toto the trial court's
judgment on the compromise agreement, it failed to consider that the
bank was a mortgagee in good faith. The bank claims good faith on
the position that the OCTs presented to it were all clean on their faces
at the time the mortgages were applied for; that there were no notices
of lis pendens or any annotation of liens or encumbrances on all of
them; and that it had no knowledge, actual or constructive, of facts or
circumstances to warrant further inquiry into the titles of the
defendants-respondents.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the mortgage constituted on the disputed land
covered by a homestead patent is valid.
HELD:
Section 118 of the Public Land Act, as amended, which contains a
proscription against the alienation or encumbrance of homestead
patents within five years from issue. The rationale for the prohibition,
reiterated in a line of cases, first laid down in Pascua v. Talens states
that x x x homestead laws were designed to distribute disposable
agricultural lots of the State to land-destitute citizens for their home
and cultivation. Pursuant to such benevolent intention the State
prohibits the sale or encumbrance of the homestead (Section 116,
now Section 118) within five years after the grant of the patent. x x x.
It aims to preserve and keep in the family of the homesteader that
portion of public land which the State had gratuitously given to him.
b. Restriction applies to disposition of rights before or after
issuance of patents
GONZAGA vs. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS:
On October 13, 1958, Juan Evangelista died intestate leaving among
others, a parcel of land situated in Barrio Darangan, [Municipality] of
Binangonan, Province of Rizal covered by Original Certificate of Title
No. 183 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal and Tax Declaration No.
12131 of the Provincial Assessor of Rizal, which parcel is now the
subject of this litigation; That said Juan Evangelista was survived by
the defendant, Ana Gonzaga and plaintiffs, the latter being the sons
and daughters of the brothers and sisters of the deceased;
778

That during the lifetime of Juan Evangelista, he and said Ana

Gonzaga on April 21, 1956 sold for valuable consideration several
parcels of land to the spouses, Anastacia San Juan and Servillano
Ignacio (defendants herein) including that parcel of land describe in
the foregoing paragraph and as a consequence which sale, the
corresponding tax declaration was transferred to said vendees; that
at the time of said sale, there was a pending application of Juan
Evangelista an Ana Gonzaga over the land in question with the
Bureau Lands, but the title thereto was not issued until November 28,
1958, i.e., after the death of Juan Evangelista; That on April 21, 1962,
defendant Ana Gonzaga alleging to be the surviving spouse of the
deceased Juan Evangelista, executed an Extra-Judicial Partition and
Sale of the sum parcel of land in question in favor of the same
vendees, herein defendants, Servillano Ignacio and Anastasia San
Juan;
That in a series of subsequent transfers and conveyances, the same
parcel of land was sold on March 6, 1963 by the spouses Servillano
Ignacio and Anastacia San Juan to the defendant R & R Realty Co.,
Inc. and the latter, together with other properties owned by it,
mortgaged the same to the Continental Bank; that it was by reason of
these subsequent conveyances that defendants Filipinas Agricultural
& Realty Co., Inc. and the Continental Bank were impleaded as party
defendants." On the above facts, the lower court relying on the
aforesaid Section 20, declared he 1956 sale void and consequently
ruled in favor of the successional rights of private respondents as
heirs of the deceased, Juan Evangelista. Respondent Court of
Appeals affirmed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the sale of the land between Juan Evangelista and
Sps. Servillano Ignacio is valid?
HELD:
Section 118 of the Public Land Act 9 reads: "Except in favor of the
Government or any of its branches, units, or institutions, or legally
constituted banking corporations, lands acquired under the free
patent or homestead provisions shall not be subject to encumbrance
or alienation from the date of the approval of the application and for a
term of five years from and after the date of issuance of the patent or
grant, nor shall they become liable to the satisfaction of any debt
contracted prior to the expiration of said period; but the improvements
or crops of the land may be mortgaged or pledged to qualified
779

persons, associations, or corporations." Is it not a clear expression

then of the state policy to assure that the original grantee, even if he
were minded otherwise, is deprived for a period of five years of his
freedom of disposition? Thus is he protected from his own
weaknesses or temptation to sell, or lack of business acumen, the
purpose being to keep and preserve for him "or his family the land
given to him gratuitously by the State, so that being a property owner,
he may become and remain a contented and useful member of our
society." Considering that such is policy, does it not logically follow
that he is precluded disposing of his rights prior even to his obtaining
the patent? Both policy and reason, therefore, unite in conclusion that
no such distinction should be made. Then, it is not to be forgotten that
the state is possessed of plenary power as the persona in law to
determine who shall the favored recipients of public lands, as well as
under what terms they may be granted such privilege, not excluding
placing of obstacles in the way of their exercising what otherwise
would be ordinary acts of ownership?
c. Patent is deemed issued upon promulgation of order for
issuance by the Director of Lands; relevant for reckoning 5-year
period of prohibition
ANDREA C. DECOLONGON, ET AL. vs. THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS, and FELICIDAD CUENCA, ET AL.
FACTS:
Gregorio Cuenca was an applicant for a homestead patent for a
certain parcel of land in Negros Occidental. On Oct. 1951, an order
for issuance for the patent was given, but it was only after 20 years
on Oct. 1971 that the patent was issued by the president.
Unfortunately, Gregorio and his wife already died before said
issuance and herein petitioner Andrea Decolongon stated that she is
the only child and legal heir of the late Gregorio. In view of that, the
title was cancelled and placed in her name on May 1972.
The brothers and sisters of Gregorio, herein private respondents,
claimed that on May 1966 Gregorio has relinquished and transferred
all his rights to the said patent to Felicidad Cuenca. Therefore, an
action was filed by the private respondents for the reconveyance of
the subject land.
The CFI ruled in favor of Andrea Decolongon, which the private
780

respondents appealed with the Court of Appeals, who later reversed

said judgment. Hence, this petition filed by Andrea Decolongon.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the deed of relinquishment which conveyed the land
to the private respondents was within the prohibited five-year period.
RULING:
The Supreme Court held that, from a long line of decisions they have
made with similar issues, they have time and again reiterated and
emphasized that the patent is deemed issued upon promulgation of
the order for issuance thereof by the Director of Lands.
In the case at bar, the issuance of patent was made on Oct. 1951, but
it was only 20 years later that the patent itself was issued. The Deed
of Relinquishment executed on May 1966 in favor of the private
respondents was valid since it has been 14 years after the order that
said parcel of land was relinquished in favor of the private
respondents.
The Supreme Court then denied the petition for review and affirmed
the CA decision.

d. Reason for the prohibition

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK vs. HON. RUSTICO DE LOS
REYES, AMANDO ARANA and JULIA REYES
G.R. Nos. L-46898-99 November 28, 1989
FACTS:
On Aug. 1966, private respondent spouses Amando and Julia Arana,
mortgaged 6 parcels of land to herein petitioner PNB. Two of the
parcel of lands were acquired thru a homestead patent, while the
remaining four were only under tax declarations.
On July 1969, upon the failure of the private respondent spouses to
pay their loan upon maturity, PNB foreclosed said properties and
were publicly auctioned whereby PNB was the highest bidder.
Without any action of redemption from the spouses, the said bank
consolidated their ownership over the 6 parcels of land.
781

A civil suit was instituted by the respondent spouses for the

redemption of the said parcels of land, furthermore, they refused to
vacate the 2 lots which the bank has sold to a private person. The
bank agreed for the redemption of the parcels of land covered by
patent, but not the remaining four under tax decalaration.
A case was filed in the RTC by herein respondents agains the
petitioner bank, and the court rendered a decision in favor of the
former. The bank Is ordered to release the mortgage upon full
payment of the spouses of their balance and further contended that
the sale executed in favor of the third person be cancelled by the
bank.
The bank then filed a direct appeal thru certiorati to the Supreme
Court, as the dispute raises questions of law and not of facts.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent spouses are entitled to redeem all the lots
covered by the mortgage?
RULING:
The Supreme Court held that the indivisibility of mortgage does not
apply to the instant case because the aggregate number of the lots
which comprise the collaterals for the mortgage had already been
foreclosed and sold at public auction. There is neither partial payment
nor partial extinguishment of the obligation to speak of. Note,
however, that applications for free patent covering the four (4)
unregistered parcels of land had been filed by respondent spouses,
and were then still pending action, which thus gives rise to the
admission that said properties involved in the aforestated cases were
public lands and which the petitioners never rebutted.
It is an essential requisite to the validity of a mortgage that the
mortgagor be the absolute owner of the property, mortgaged. 21
Consequently, private respondents, not being owners as yet of the
subject lots when the same were supposedly mortgaged, they could
not have validly made any disposition of or created an encumbrance
on said four (4) lots to which they had neither title nor any vested
right. At most, what they had was a mere right of expectancy
dependent on the continuance of the circumstances then existing or a
contingent right dependent on the performance of some conditions,
22 but which could not be the proper object of a valid mortgage
contract.
782

Consequently, there was no need for private respondents to

repurchase the four (4) parcels from petitioner. That aspect of the
case actually calls for mutual restitution as an equitable remedy.
Therefore, incident to the nullity ab initio of the mortgage, mutual
restitution by the parties of what they had respectively received from
each other under the contract in connection with the four (4) lots must
be made and is hereby ordered to be effected by them. While the law
bars recovery in a case where the object of the contract is contrary to
law and one or both parties acted in bad faith, we cannot here apply
the doctrine of in pari delicto which admits of an exception, namely,
that when the contract is merely prohibited by law, not illegal per se,
and the prohibition is designed for the protection of the party seeking
to recover, he is entitled to the relief prayed for whenever public
policy is enhanced thereby. The Supreme Court then affirmed the
appeal of the petitioners.
e. Stipulation that actual conveyance of the land would be made
only after lapse of the 5-year period makes deed illegal deed and
void ab initio.
HOMENA vs. CASA and REGISTER OF DEEDS
G.R. No. L-32749 January 22, 1988
FACTS:
The complaint, filed by plaintiffs-appellants against the spouses
Dimas Casa and Maria Castor, was for alleged unlawful acts of
dispossession disturbing plaintiffs peaceful, continuous, open,
uninterrupted adverse and public possession of the property in
question. In their complaint, plaintiffs also sought to annul the original
certificate of title issued by the Register of Deeds for the province of
Cotabato in favor of defendant spouses pursuant to a Homestead
Patent on the ground that said patent was obtained by defendant
spouses through fraud and misrepresentation by stating, among
others, in their application, that the lot was not claimed and occupied
by another person.
Plaintiffs alleged that on June 15, 1952, they purchased from the
defendants two (2) hectares of the aforementioned parcel of land, on
the condition that the said portion would be reconveyed to plaintiffs
after the five-year prohibitory period, as provided for in the
783

Homestead Patent Law, shall have elapsed, and that defendants

failed to abide by said agreement. Plaintiffs averred that they were
not assailing the validity of the patent as a whole, but only with
respect to that portion of two (2) hectares owned by them which
defendants, through fraud, were able to register in their name. RTC
dismissed the complaint.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the agreement entered into between the herein
parties that the land as purchased be reconveyed after the five-year
prohibitory period under the Homestead Patent Law, shall have
elapsed is valid?
HELD:
The agreement is clearly illegal and void ab initio; it is intended to
circumvent and violate the law. As parties to a void contract, the
plaintiffs have no rights which they can enforce and the court can not
lend itself to its enforcement. Plaintiffs can neither invoke the doctrine
of implied trust based on an illegal contract. The issue of prescription
or laches becomes irrelevant in a case such as this, where plaintiffs
clearly have no cause of action.

f. Right of repurchase cannot be allowed when the land sought

to be redeemed is no longer agricultural but residential and/or
commercial
SANTANAS v MARINAS
94 SCRA 853
FACTS:
Respondent Marinas alleged that he acquired, on May 22, 1929,
under free patent and covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT)
No. 217, a parcel of land containing an area of four hectares, twelve
ares and eighty-six centares (41,286 sq. m.); that on January 16,
1956, he sold the above parcel of land to petitioner Francisco
784

Santana for a sum of P4,128.60; that the other petitioner Jose H.

Panganiban was included in the complaint because he is a
subsequent lienholder and/or encumbrancer, the property having
been sold to him by Santana on March 25, 1956 for the same amount
of P4,128.60.
On April 21, 1960, Sotero Marias as plaintiff filed in CFI of
Rizal a complaint to recover the above real property praying among
others, that he be allowed to repurchase the property.
The petitioners interposed the following affirmative defenses: (1) that
at the time the absolute sales were entered into, they were totally
ignorant of and had no knowledge whatsoever to any encumbrance
or right to repurchase by private respondent, who assured petitioner
Francisco Santana that he (Santana) could sell the land in question
absolutely and free from any encumbrance and is not subject to any
right of repurchase; (2) that they (petitioners) are purchasers in good
faith; (3) that being innocent purchasers for value, they acquired
absolute ownership over the property and private respondent cannot
enforce against them any right of repurchase of whatever nature (4)
that the property in question now a residential area with real estate
subdivisions and roads in front and at the back thereof.
The trial court ruled out respondent Marinas right to repurchase the
property and dismissed the complaint but that on appeal, the Court of
Appeals reversed the trial courts decision of dismissal and ordered
petitioners to reconvey the land to private respondent upon payment
to the former of "the repurchase price thereof.
ISSUE:
Whether under all the circumstances, the repurchase of the land in
question by Marinas is in consonance with the reason and purpose of
the law
HELD:
SC upheld petitioners proposition that to allow the repurchase of the
subject land, under the peculiar circumstances obtaining herein,
would be repugnant to the philosophy behind Section 119 of C.A. No.
141 and the jurisprudence laid down on the matter.
The findings of fact of the trial court are clear and duly supported by
the evidence. The property of Sotero Marinas has ceased to be in
the nature of a homestead, and that instead it has been transformed
into growing commercial and residential area. The vicinity of the
property is now a vast expanding business empire, the lands having
(been) converted into subdivisions. which are sold to the public at
785

fantastic prices. Close to this particular property of Sotero Marias

the subdivision being developed by a son of the plaintiff who has
extensive business interests centered on construction of buildings. By
plaintiffs own admission, he is 78 years old and sick with a lung
ailment; while from the testimony of his son, Antonio Marias, it is
shown that the sons of plaintiff are all financially independent from the
latter and have their respective properties and means of livelihood.
Under these circumstances it is evident that to grant plaintiff the right
to repurchase the property at this time would be not for the purpose
of giving him back the land for his house and cultivation but for him to
exploit it for business purposes at the expense of the defendants who
are innocent purchaser(s) in good faith and for value."
In Simeon v. Pea We arrived at the conclusion that the plain intent,
the raison d tre, of Section 119, C.A. No. 141." . .is to give the
homesteader or patentee every chance to preserve for himself and
his family the land that the state had gratuitously given to him as a
reward for his labor in cleaning and cultivating it."The basic objective
is to promote public policy, that is, to provide home and decent living
for destitutes, aimed at promoting a class of independent small
landholders which is the bulwark of peace and order."
As it was in Simeon v. Pea, respondent Marias intention in
exercising the right of repurchase "is not for the purpose of
preserving the same within the family fold", but "to dispose of it again
for greater profit in violation of the laws policy and spirit."
It could be true that the land in question is the only land owned by
respondent-appellee. But this is not the determinant factor in allowing
the repurchase of land acquired through homestead or free patent.
We can, therefore, properly inquire into the motives behind the
repurchase and convinced as We are in the instant case, that the
intention is not so, but to exploit it for business purposes or greater
profit, We can deny the repurchase. To sustain respondent-appellees
claim under the circumstances would put a premium on speculation
contrary to the philosophy behind Sec. 119 of Com. Act No. 141,
otherwise known as the Public Land Law.
K. Manner of exercising right to repurchase or redeem
a. Right to repurchase or redeem can be exercised even if not
stipulated in the deed of sale
786

VALLANGCA vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 55336 May 4, 1989
FACTS:
Involved in this case is the more than eleven (11) hectares of
agricultural land located in Buguey, Cagayan covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. 1648 in the name of Heirs of Esteban Billena
which was later on transferred in 1940 to Maximiana Crisostomo and
Ana Billena, wife and daughter, respectively of the deceased Esteban
Billena under Transfer of Certificate of Title No. 1005. When Mariana
Crisostomo died, the land was left to Ana Billena then married to
Fortunate Vallangca with whom she had three (3) children namely
Benjamin, Rodolfo and Alfredo who are the petitioners herein.
Upon Fortunate Vallangca's death in 1944, his widow Ana Billena,
together with her eldest son Benjamin, mortgaged the land in dispute
to her cousin Nazario Rabanes for Eight Hundred Pesos (P800.00) in
Japanese war notes, to cover the burial expenses of her deceased
husband. There being no notary public in the place at the time, the
agreement was not reduced to writing.
After the Pacific war, Rabanes went to the residence of Ana Billena
on 2 February 1946 and made the latter sign a document which
Rabanes represented to Ana Billena as a mortgage contract written in
the Ilocano dialect. Billena, being an illiterate and trusting in her
cousin Rabanes signed the document. In the same year Billena was
informed that the document she signed was actually a Deed of
Absolute Sale and not a Mortgage Contract. This prompted Ana
Billena and her son Benjamin to Rabanes' place for the purpose of
redeeming the land and actually tendered to him the loan amount of
P800.00, this time, in genuine and legal Philippine currency.
However, Rabanes told them that the land could no longer be
redeemed.
Since Ana Billena and her three (3) sons were in possession and
actual cultivation of the land in question, Rabanes filed against them
on 7 July 1971 an injunction suit before the CFI of Cagayan and
787

Recovery of Possession in 1972. A decision by RTC and CA was

rendered upholding the ownership of Rabanes over the subject land.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Ana Billena and her heirs have the right to repurchase
the land notwithstanding the absence of any stipulation in the deed of
sale of the vendor's right to repurchase the land.
HELD:
Under the law, restrictions are imposed on the conveyance of
patented lands within five (5) years from the date of the issuance of
the free patent; the owner of the land is precluded from subjecting the
same to any encumbrance or alienation. After the lapse of five (5)
years, such prohibition is lifted, but the owner-vendor is entitled to
repurchase the property from the vendee within five (5) years from
the date of the execution of the deed of sale or conveyance.
The document signed by Ana Billena in 1946, whether be it an
Absolute Deed of Sale or a Mortgage Contract was to become
absolute and irrevocable only upon the failure of Billena or her heirs
to repurchase the same within five (5) years from February 2, 1946.
In the case at bar, it is not refuted that Billena, together with her son
Benjamin, went to Rabanes' residence in 1946 to redeem the
property and tendered to him the amount of P800.00 in Philippine
currency, but the latter told them that the land could no longer be
redeemed. By Ana Billena's act of tendering to Rabanes the
P800.00, she had in effect exercised her right to repurchase.
For, notwithstanding the absence of any stipulation in the deed of
sale of the vendor's right to repurchase the land, Billena or her heirs
are granted such right by operation of law. Petitioners may redeem
the property covered by TCT No. 1005 upon the return of the amount
of Eight Hundred Pesos (P800.00) to private respondents, with
interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum from 1 January
1962 until fully paid.

788

b. Right cannot be waived

RURAL BANK OF DAVAO CITY, INC. vs. THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS and GABRIEL ABELLANO and
FRANCISCO SEQUITAN
G.R. No. 83992 January 27, 1993
FACTS:
On 18 April 1978, private respondents Gabriel Abellano and
Francisca Sequitan obtained a loan in the amount of P45,000.00 from
the petitioner, a rural bank organized and existing under the Rural
Banks' Act. As security for the loan, the private respondents
mortgaged with the petitioner a parcel of land, belonging to them, with
an area of one (1) hectare, more or less, located at Matina, Davao
City and covered by Original Certificate of Title No. P-7392. The land
was acquired through a homestead patent.
On 1 July 1978, the National Housing Authority (NHA) filed with the
then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Davao City a complaint for the
expropriation of several parcels of land located in Davao City to carry
out its Slum Improvement and Resettlement Program; said action
was directed against the private respondents, with respect to the
mortgaged property, and fifteen (15) other persons. The case was
docketed as Special Civil Case No. 11157 and was raffled off to
Branch II of said court. As mortgagee, the petitioner filed therein a
motion to intervene, which the court granted.

ISSUES:
1) whether or not the two-year redemption period fixed by the Rural
Banks' Act in a foreclosure sale of property acquired through a
789

homestead patent superseded or repealed the five-year repurchase

period prescribed in Section 119 of the Public Land Act ; and
(2) if it did not, whether, in the event of the expropriation by the
Government of the subject property during the redemption or
repurchase period, a homesteader, who thereafter exercised his right
to redeem or repurchase, is entitled to the compensation for such
expropriation less the redemption or repurchase amount.
RULING:
A.) In affirming the trial court's decision, the respondent Court held
that Section 5 of the Rural Banks' Act, as amended, did not reduce
the period of redemption of homestead lands from the five (5) years
prescribed in Section 119 of C.A. No. 141, as amended, to two (2)
years from the date of registration of the foreclosure sale as fixed in
the former; in support of such conclusion, it summoned Oliva vs.
Lamadrid.
It should be noted that the period of two (2) years granted for the
redemption of property foreclosed under Section 5 of Republic Act
No. 720, as amended by Republic Act No. 2670, refers to lands "not
covered by a Torrens Title, a homestead or free patent," or to owners
of lands "without torrens title," who can "show five years or more of
peaceful, continuous and uninterrupted possession thereof in the
concept of an owner, or of homesteads or free patent lands pending
the issuance of titles but already approved," or of "lands pending
homestead or free patent titles." Plaintiff, however, had, on the land in
question, a free patent and a Torrens title, which were issued over 26
years prior to the mortgage constituted in favor of the Bank.
Accordingly, there is no conflict between Section 119 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141 and Section 5 of Republic Act. No. 720,
as amended, and the period of two (2) years prescribed in the latter is
not applicable to him.
Respondent Court further ruled that C.A. No. 141 is a special law and
must prevail.
B.) Because of such underlying policy and reason, the right to
790

repurchase under Section 119 cannot be waived by the party entitled

thereto, and applies with equal force to both voluntary and involuntary
conveyances , the certificate of sale if it is already covered by a
Torrens title.
The expropriation of the land in question by the NHA is of no moment.
The expropriation case was begun before the foreclosure sale and
was brought against the private respondents, among other parties.
The court's order for the payment of compensation was entered and
the compliance thereof by the NHA was made within the private
respondents' 5-year repurchase period. Although the petitioner had a
Transfer Certificate of Title over the lot at the time of payment, its
right thereto was subject to the private respondents' right to
repurchase. Since the private respondents seasonably exercised said
right, the petitioner was under the obligation to restore to the former
the compensation paid by the NHA, which in effect replaced or
substituted for the land. From such amount should be subtracted,
however, the repurchase price. The argument that the petitioner was
under no obligation to deliver the above portion of the compensation
because the property was acquired by the NHA and therefore it was
legally impossible for the former to convey the land to the private
respondent, is without merit. This is so because if, instead of having
been expropriated, the land was sold to other parties, the private
respondents could still have repurchased the same from the
subsequent vendees. But since the land was expropriated by the
Government, and the private respondents could no longer repurchase
the same, reason, justice and equity demand that they receive the
compensation therefor less the amount adverted to above, for such
compensation merely substitutes for the land they are entitled to.

c. 5-year period starts from the date of execution of deed of sale

CRISOSTOMO SUCALDITO and the HEIRS OF FELISA DE
GUZMAN vs. THE HON. JUAN MONTEJO, PRESIDING JUDGE OF
791

THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF DAVAO DEL SUR, BRANCH

XX, BLAS B. LABAD AND PACIENCIA L. LABAD
G.R. No. 75080 February 6, 1991
FACTS:
Petitioners Crisostomo Sucaldito and Felisa de Guzman, spouses,
were grantees, by way of free patent, of two (2) parcels of public
agricultural land. Both lots are situated in Barrio Ponpong,
Municipality of Sta. Maria, Province of Davao del Sur. On 20 June
1975, petitioners wrote the respondents informing the latter that they
desired to repurchase the lots and that they had the necessary
amount representing the repurchase price. A reply from respondents
within five (5) days from their receipt of the letter was requested by
petitioners, for otherwise, they would be constrained to file a court
action for reconveyance. Respondents sent a reply dated 2 July
1975. The reply letter, however, was not received by petitioners.
Thus, on 10 July 1975, petitioner-spouses brought an action for
reconveyance before the RTC of Davao del Sur, docketed as Civil
Case No. 952 entitled "Crisostomo Sucaldito and Felisa de Guzman
v. Blas Labad and Paciencia Labad" seeking the repurchase and
reconveyance of the two (2) above-mentioned parcels of land.
On 1 October 1976, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of
petitioners and against the respondents. Petitioners were declared to
have the right to repurchase the two (2) parcels of land within thirty
(30) days from the date the decision becomes final, provided that the
petitioners paid to the respondents the amount of P73,103.79.
Thereafter, respondents filed a petition for certiorari with this Court,
docketed as G.R. No. 61286, entitled "Blas Labad, et al. v.
Crisostomo Sucaldito, et al.". Petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration of the Resolution dated 8 October 1984. .
ISSUE:
Whether or not the period ruled to be followed for the petitioners to
exercise their right of redemption is the period specified in the
decision of the trial court and not the period provided in Sec. 119 of
792

CA 141, as amended
RULING:
Sec. 119, Commonwealth Act No. 141 (the Public Land Act) provides:
Sec. 119. Every conveyance of land acquired under the free
patent or homestead provisions, when proper, shall be subject
to repurchase by the applicant, his widow or legal heirs, within a
period of five years from the date of the conveyance.
Under the above section, the five (5) year period for legal redemption
starts from the date of the execution of the deed of sale, even if full
payment of the purchase price is not made on said date, unless there
is a stipulation in the deed that ownership shall not vest in the vendee
until full payment of the price. On 14 March 1972, petitioners sold to
the respondents the two (2) parcels of land in question, which had
been acquired by said petitioners under Commonwealth Act No. 141,
by way of free patent. The sale was evidenced by a deed of absolute
sale.
It has been repeatedly declared by this Court that where the law
speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no room for
interpretation. There is only room for application. The RTC in its 14
October 1976 decision, erred in ruling that petitioners had the right to
repurchase the two (2) parcels of land but only within thirty (30) days
from the date the aforesaid decision became final. The right to
repurchase being granted by law (Sec. 119, Commonwealth Act No.
141), no other legal restriction could be added thereto. To hold
otherwise would sanction judicial legislation. Stated differently, the
RTC amended what is expressly provided for in the law. And, while
the law speaks of five (5) years from the date of conveyance within
which to exercise the right to repurchase, we regard the filing by
petitioners of the action for reconveyance on 10 July 1975 as having
suspended the running of the redemption period and to have kept
them within the protective mantle of Sec. 119 of Commonwealth Act
No. 141.
In an action to enforce the right to repurchase public land covered by
793

free patent or a homestead within five (5) years from the sale thereof,
it is of no consequence what exactly might be the motive of the
plaintiff, and it is unnecessary for the court to inquire beforehand into
his financial capacity to make the repurchase. The reason is that
such question will resolve itself should he fail to make the
corresponding tender of payment within the prescribed period.
WHEREFORE, the present petition is GRANTED. The RTC
resolutions dated 8 October 1984, 19 August 1985 and 14 May 1986
are SET ASIDE.

d. Vendor alone has the right of redemption

ROQUE ENERVIDA vs. LAURO DE LA TORRE and ROSA DE LA
TORRE
G.R. No. L-38037 January 28, 1974
FACTS:
Plaintiff-appellant, now petitioner Roque Enervida, filed a complaint
against the defendant-spouses Lauro de la Torre and Rosa de la
Torre, praying that the deed of sale executed on December 3, 1957,
by his deceased father, Ciriaco Enervida, over a parcel of land
covered by a Homestead Patent be declared null and void for having
been executed within the prohibited period of five years, in violation of
the provision, of Section 118 of Commonwealth Act 141, otherwise
known as the Public Land Law. He further prayed that he be allowed
to repurchase said parcel of land for being the legitimate son and sole
heir of his deceased father.
In due time, defendants filed their answer, stating among others that
the plaintiff has no cause of action against them as his father, Ciriaco
Enervida, is still living; that it is not true that plaintiff is the only son of
Ciriaco Enervida as he has also other living children, namely, Juan,
794

Filomena, Nieves and Antonio, all surnamed "Enervida"; and that the
sale of the property in question did not take place within the
prohibited period provided for in Section 118 of the Public Land Law,
the sale having taken place on November 20, 1957, although ratified
and acknowledged on December 3, 1957, before a Notary Public.
In view of plaintiff's admission of the material facts at the pre-trial
conference, the defendants spouses were constrained to ask for
summary judgment, pursuant to Rule 34, in relation with Section 3,
Rule 20 of the Rules of Court, on the ground that there is no genuine
issue on the case because with plaintiff's admissions it is evident that
the sale in question was not executed within the prohibited five-year
period imposed by Section 118 of Commonwealth Act 141.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the trial court erred in finding that the appellant
made untruthful statement of facts and that he failed to correct the
alleged falsity regarding the death of his father and that he is the only
heir;
2. Whether or not the trial court erred in finding that the appellant
lacked the legal capacity to sue because his father is still very much
alive and in finding that his father is the only person authorized to
bring the action;
RULING:
Summary Judgment should be availed of as an effective method of
disposing civil actions where there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact. Here it was clearly shown at the pre-trial conference
that plaintiff-appellant, now petitioner, virtually admitted that his father,
Ciriaco Enervida, the patentee, is still living; that petitioner is not the
sole heir as he has other brothers and sisters who were also living,
contrary to his allegations in the complaint under oath, that he was
the sole heir. As the patentee is still living, plaintiff-appellant could not
have, on his own right, sought the repurchase of the land as it would
795

be violative of Section 119 of the Public Land Law which reads:

Section 110 Every conveyance of land acquired under the
free patent or homestead provisions, when proper, shall be
subject to repurchase by the applicant, his widow or legal heirs,
within a period of five years from the date of conveyance.
This Court, through then Associate, now Chief Justice, Makalintal,
previously ruled that where the vendor is still living, it is he alone who
has the right of redemption. It is clear, therefore, that the complaint is
without basis and there is no cause of action and the plaintiffappellant has no legal capacity to sue. On this score alone, the
petition should be denied. For the purpose of computing the five-year
prohibition against alienation of homesteads, it is to be reiterated and
emphasized that the patent is deemed issued upon promulgation of
the order for issuance thereof by the Director of Lands. This being the
case, We see no violation of the provisions of either Section 118 or
119 of the Public Land Law committed by herein respondents
because even assuming that the sale sought to be nullified was made
on December 3, 1957, as claimed by appellant, still the same was
made well beyond the five-year period provided by Section 118 of
Commonwealth Act 141.
On the strength of the admissions by plaintiff-appellant at the pre-trial
conference which the latter never bothered to oppose or deny in a
later motion or by counter-affidavits, the order granting summary
judgment was indeed proper (Jugador v. Vera).
WHEREFORE, the dismissal order is hereby affirmed with the
modification that only attorney's fees in the amount of P1,500 are
hereby awarded to the respondents. No Costs.
i. But, widow and legal heirs have the right if vendor dies
Ferrer v. Mangente,
G.R. No. L-36410, 50 SCRA 424 April 13, 1973
796

FACTS:
The case was decided on a stipulation of facts. There it was shown
that the disputed property, Lot No. 53, located in Manjuyud, Negros
Oriental, was originally acquired by one Rolando Ferrer, under a
homestead patent issued on January 17, 1941, covering an area of
19 hectares. Upon his dying, single and intestate on February 14,
1945, without DEBTS and liabilities, his father, Segundo Ferrer,
executed an extrajudicial settlement of his estate adjudicating unto
himself such lot to which a homestead patent had previously been
issued. The father likewise obtained a new transfer certificate of title.
He then sold such lot, already thus registered in name to defendant,
Abraham Mangente, on July 2, 1963. In a little over two years, August
15, 1965 to be exact, he met his death. Plaintiff, who is his son,
sought to repurchase such property on June 28, 1968, the offer being
sent by registered mail and received by defendant on July 3, 1968. 2
On the above facts, plaintiff Felix Ferrer, who filed the action for
reconveyance, did prevail. In the well-written decision of the lower
court, presided by Judge Macario P. Santos, there is discernible the
commendable effort to deal justly with the respective claims of
plaintiff and defendant. Thus the judgment was rendered by him
"ordering the defendant to reconvey and deliver the possession of the
land in question to the plaintiff and upon payment by the latter to him
of the sum of three thousand five hundred (P3,500.00) pesos as
repurchase money, plus the additional sum of one thousand
(P1,000.00) pesos spent by him for removing the stamps of the trees
thereon." 3 The matter was elevated by defendant to the Court of
Appeals, but in a resolution of November 15, 1972, copy of which
was filed with this Court only on February 22 of this year, the case
was forwarded to this Court as the principal errors assigned are legal
in character
ISSUE:
1. WON The principal error assigned by appellant is that plaintiff is
devoid of any right to step into the shoes of his deceased father, as if
he were not a legal heir falling within the terms of Section 119 of the
Public Land Act.
2. WON the appellant raise the issue that the offer to repurchase was
not on time when well within such period, appellee did through the
registered mail?
797

RULING:
It has already been intimated in the opening paragraph of this opinion
that such an approach is at war with the cardinal postulate that the
land in question having been acquired by homestead patent inures to
the benefit, not only of the applicant, but of his family included in
which are both the deceased father Segundo Ferrer and his son,
appellee Felix Ferrer. The land in question was originally acquired
through a homestead patent. It did not lose such character by the
mere fact of the original grantee, his brother Rolando, having died in
the meanwhile with the title passing to their father. The applicant for a
homestead is to be given all the inducement that the law offers and is
entitled to its full protection.
The courts of the land, including this Tribunal, allow parties the full
benefit of filing the pleadings that way as long as the period given to
them has not expired. Appellant would want to be placed on a higher
plane, ignoring that to sustain his contention could lead to nullification
of a statutory right.
The decision of the Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental dated
February 28, 1970 is affirmed.
e. Right to repurchase may be expressed in any form or manner
VALLANGCA vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 55336, May 4, 1989
FACTS:
The more than eleven (11) hectares of agricultural land in dispute is
located in Buguey, Cagayan, originally registered on 28 December
1936 in the name of "Heirs of Esteban Billena", and covered by
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 1648. In 1940, said certificate of
title was cancelled and, in lieu thereof, Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. 1005 was issued in the name of Maximiniana Crisostomo
and Ana Billena, wife and daughter, respectively of the deceased
Esteban Billena. Each of the then new owners owned an undivided
one-half (1/2) portion of, or interest in the land. Maximiniana
Crisostomo died during the Japanese occupation, leaving behind her
798

only child Ana Billena, then married to Fortunate Vallangca with

whom she had three (3) children, namely, Benjamin, Rodolfo and
Alfredo, all surnamed Vallangca who are the petitioners herein.
Upon Fortunate Vallangca's death in 1944, his widow Ana Billena,
together with her eldest son Benjamin, went to Centro, Buguey,
Cagayan and MORTGAGED the land in dispute to her cousin
Nazario Rabanes (private respondent herein) for Eight Hundred
Pesos (P800.00) in Japanese war notes, to cover the burial expenses
of her deceased husband Fortunato Vallangca. There being no notary
public in the place at the time, the agreement was not reduced to
writing. At the time of said MORTGAGE of the land to Nazario
Rabanes, the land was already MORTGAGED to the Philippine
National Bank (PNB), said FIRST MORTGAGE having been
executed on 16 November 1940, and annotated on said TCT No.
1005.
After the Pacific war, Nazario Rabanes went to the residence of Ana
Billena on 2 February 1946 and made the latter sign a document
which Rabanes represented to Ana Billena as a MORTGAGE
contract written in the Ilocano dialect. Billena, being an illiterate and
trusting in her cousin Rabanes affixed her signature on the document
in the space indicated to her.Since Ana Billena and her three (3) sons
were in possession and actual cultivation of the land in question,
Rabanes filed against them on 7 July 1971 an injunction suit before
the Court of First Instance of Cagayan (Civil Case No. II-14). The trial
court order of dismissal.
ISSUE:
1. WON petitioners, invoking the rule on "res judicata contend that
the dismissal of the "Injunction" case filed on 7 July 1971 by
Rabanes against them, barred the filing by Rabanes against them
of the second action for "Recovery of Possession."
2. WON Petitioners maintain that the first suit, although styled as for
"Injunction", had for its actual primary purpose the recovery of the
land in dispute and, therefore, after its dismissal, no other action
for recovery of possession of the same land and against the same
parties (herein petitioners) could be pursued by the same
complainant (Rabanes).
799

3. WON the dismissal of the suit for injunction was not made without
prejudice.

RULING:
Under Section 40 of Act 190, which provides that: Sec. 40. Period of
Prescription as to real estate An action for recovery of title to, or
possession of real property, or an interest therein, can only be
brought within 10 years after the cause of such action accrues.
According to petitioners, from the date private respondent claims to
have bought the land, that is, 2 February 1946, more than ten (10)
years had elapsed when Rabanes filed on 7 July 1971 his action for
injunction which, in effect, was an action for recovery of possession of
the disputed land. Hence, the action was barred by prescription.
Since the land is registered in the name of both Maximiniana
Crisostomo and Ana Billena, the latter could not outrightly dispose of
the undivided one-half share of the former (Crisostomo), without first
accomplishing an affidavit of adjudication of Crisostomo's interest or
share, and registering said affidavit of adjudication.The heirs of
private respondent Rabanes in turn aver, among others, that the
Court of Appeals was correct in finding petitioners' reliance on res
judicata as untenable.
In an impressive line of cases, 8 the requisites for res judicata have
long been established. They are: (a) that there be an earlier final
judgment; (b) that the court which rendered it had jurisdiction over the
subject matter and the parties; (e) that it is a judgment on the merits;
and (d) that there is between the first and the second actions, Identity
of parties, subject matter and causes of action. Despite the above
oversight, the ruling of the Court of Appeals is nonetheless correct
when it held that the defense of res judicata was unavailing to the
petitioners.
Also the owner of the land is precluded from subjecting the same to
any encumbrance or alienation. After the lapse of five (5) years, such
prohibition is lifted, but the owner-vendor is entitled to repurchase the
property from the vendee within five (5) years from the date of the
execution of the deed of sale or conveyance.Applying the foregoing
800

rules in the instant case, it is to be noted that the free patent was
issued to the heirs of Esteban Billena on 5 December 1936. From this
date and until 5 December 1941, any transfer, conveyance or
alienation of the property covered by TCT 1005 was not allowed.
In effect, if the 2 February 1946 deed was actually intended to
evidence a sale of the disputed land, made by Ana Billena to Nazario
Rabanes, as found by the trial court and the Court of Appeals, it was
a sale with pacto de retro wherein title of the vendees Rabanes to the
property was to become absolute and irrevocable only upon the
failure of Billena or her heirs to repurchase the same within five (5)
years from 2 February 1946. With these as premises, it can be said
that Rabanes' title to the property remains to this date revocable and
unconsolidated.
The appealed decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 61133R is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioners may redeem the
property covered by TCT No. 1005 upon the return of the amount of
Eight Hundred Pesos (P800.00) to private respondents, with interest
at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum from 1 January 1962
until fully paid.

f. Period to redeem in case of mortgaged lands

BELISARIO vs. IAC
G.R. No. 73503, August 30, 1988
FACTS:
On August 3, 1948, upon the death of Rufino Belisario, the ownership
of the land was extra-judicially settled among his children (petitioners
herein), namely: Benjamin, Pacita, Victoria Silverio, Francisco,
Anatolia Felipe and Teresita, all surnamed Belisario and his widow,
801

Felipa Lauga and in whose names Transfer Certificate of Tittle No. T124 was issued. Sometime in 1950, on the strenght of a special
POWER OF ATTORNEY executed by some of the petitioners in favor
of petitioner, Benjamin Belisario, said land was mortgaged to the
Philippine National Bank (PNB) to secure a promissory note in the
sum of P1,200.00.
Petitioners-mortgagors defaulted in the payment of THE LOAN.
Consequently, the mortgage was extra-judicially foreclosed and on
January 31, 1963 the land was sold at public auction for P3,134.76
with respondent PNB as the highest bidder.
On April 21, 1971, petitioners wrote to respondent PNB making
known their "desire to redeem and/or repurchase the said property for
and in the same price as the auction sale, P3,134.76," and enclosed
therein a postal MONEY ORDER in the amount of P630.00 as partial
payment, with the balance to be paid in twelve equal monthly
installments. At the time petitioners offered to redeem the subject
property, the Sheriff's Certificate of Sale covering the sale at public
auction to the respondent PNB was not yet registered.
Having been apprised of the non-registration, the respondent PNB
caused the registration of the Sheriff's Certificate of Sale with the
Register of Deeds of Bukidnon on July 22, 1971 and Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-6834 was later issued in the name of
respondent bank.
On February 8, 1973, respondent PNB sold the land in question to
respondent Cabrera for P5,000.00 and the corresponding TCT No.
7264 was issued in his name.
On November 20, 1974, respondent Cabrera filed an action for
Recovery of Possession and Damages against herein petitioners,
together with their tenants, who were actual possessors of the land,
with the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of
Bukidnon and docketed as Civil Case No. 708. In turn, petitioners
filed on January 9, 1975, an action for Repurchase of Homestead
against the respondents PNB and Cabrera with the Court of First
Instance of Bukidnon and docketed as Civil Case 715. Being
interrelated, the two cases were heard jointly.
802

On September 15, 1977, the trial court granted the Motion to Dismiss.
After their motion for reconsideration and/or new trial was denied by
the trial court, petitioners appealed to the Intermediate Appellate
Court (now Court of Appeals), assigning the following errors:
ISSUE:
1. WON the Honorable Intermediate Appellate Court cited in
holding that appellants never bothered to tender the payment of
redemption and that the filing of judicial action to redeem did
not preserve appellants' right to redeem.
2. WON the Honorable Intermediate Appellate Court erred in
holding that appellants' posture that they have offered to
repurchase the property from the appellee bank and tendered
payment of redemption price within the redemption period is
unmeritorious.
3. WON the Honorable Intermediate Appellate Court erred in
considering long inaction or laches in deciding the case, the
said defense not having been raised in the answers of
defendants-appellees not even in the motion to dismiss or
appellees' memoranda.
RULING:
ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the Court of Appeals in the instant
case is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Judgment is hereby
rendered authorizing petitioners to redeem the property subject
matter hereof, within thirty (30) days from entry of judgment, and
ordering private respondent Cabrera to execute a deed of absolute
conveyance thereof in favor of the petitioners upon payment by the
latter of the purchase price thereof at the auction sale, with 1% per
month interest thereon in addition, up to the time of redemption,
together with the amount of any taxes or assessments which
respondent Cabrera may have paid thereon after purchase, if any,
minus the P5,000.00 consigned in the court a quo. No
pronouncement as to costs at this instance.
803

i. Filing a suit to redeem during 1-year period is equivalent to an

offer to repurchase
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK vs. HON. RUSTICO DE LOS
REYES, AMANDO ARANA and JULIA REYES
G.R. Nos. L-46898-99 November 28, 1989
FACTS:
The records show that on August 30, 1966, respondent spouses
mortgaged six (6) parcels of land located at Cantilla, Sorsogon to
petitioner bank (PNB) to secure the payment of a loan of P10,000.00.
Two (2) of the six (6) parcels of land are covered by free patent titles
while the other four (4) are untitled and covered only by tax
declarations.
For failure of respondent spouses to pay the loan after its maturity,
petitioner bank, pursuant to a special power of attorney in the
mortgage deed, effected the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage
under Act No. 3135, as amended, and purchased the same at public
auction for P12,735.30 which amount included the expenses of sale,
interest and attorney's fees. The certificate of sale, dated July 1,
1969, was duly registered with the Register of Deeds on July 8, 1970.
After the one-year redemption period provided in said law expired
without respondent spouses having exercised their right or
redemption, petitioner executed and registered an affidavit of
consolidation of ownership over the six (6) parcels of land on July 9,
1970 and new titles were issued in its name for the two (2) parcels
covered by free patent titles and the corresponding tax declarations
for the four (4) parcels were placed in its name. Spouses were
informed of the consolidation of title and inviting them to repurchase
the lands not later than June 15, 1971. Spouses requesting petitioner
to extend the period of repurchase to November 5, 1971. On
804

December 19, 1971, petitioner sent another letter to respondent

spouses reminding them of the projected repurchase and informing
them that petitioner would take actual possession of the lands unless
the repurchase would be effected on or before November 30, 1971.
ISSUE:
WON filing a suit during the 1 year period is equivalent to an offer to
repurchase.
HELD:
Yes, filing a suit during the 1 year period is equivalent to an offer to
repurchase there was no need for private respondents to repurchase
the four (4) parcels from petitioner. That aspect of the case actually
calls for mutual restitution as an equitable remedy, especially since
the records before us are barren of the factual background, or the
mode of acquisition by petitioners, of their possession of said lots and
the circumstances under which the mortgage in question was
arranged between the parties.
Therefore, incident to the nullity ab initio of the mortgage, mutual
restitution by the parties of what they had respectively received from
each other under the contract in connection with the four (4) lots must
be made and is hereby ordered to be effected by them.
While the law bars recovery in a case where the object of the contract
is contrary to law and one or both parties acted in bad faith, we
cannot here apply the doctrine of in pari delicto which admits of an
exception, namely, that when the contract is merely prohibited by law,
not illegal per se, and the prohibition is designed for the protection of
the party seeking to recover, he is entitled to the relief prayed for
whenever public policy is enhanced thereby. Under the Public Land
Act, the prohibition to alienate is predicated on the fundamental policy
of the State to preserve and keep in the family of the homesteader
that portion of public land which the State has gratuitously given to
him, and recovery is allowed even where the land acquired under the
Public Land Act was sold and not merely encumered, within the
prohibited period. This is without prejudice to such appropriate action
as the Government may take should it find that violations of the public
land laws were committed or involved in said transaction and
805

sanctions are in order.

L. Other restrictions
M. Effect of violations of restriction
N. Actions against improper, illegal issuance of patents
a. Reversion Suiots; objectives; where filed; nature of
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS vs. HON. COURT OF FIRST
INSTANCE
FACTS:
On August 20, 1976, Decree No. N-161749 was issued by the
Commissioner of Land Registration. And on September 26, 1976, the
Register of Deeds of Misamis Oriental issued Original Certificate of
Title No. 0662 in favor of the applicants.
In a Motion dated October 16, 1976, the registered owners (Graciano
B. Neri, Jr., et al.) alleged that squatters who had built shacks before
the issuance of the decree refused to vacate the land for which
reason they prayed for the issuance of a writ of possession and a writ
of demolition. The court granted the motion in an Order dated
October 22, 1976. After several motions for reconsideration, the
court issued an Order dated August 8, 1980, as stated by the
applicants, there is no more legal obstacle for the issuance of the writ
of possession and demolition. On August 18, 1980, the writ of
possession and demolition was actually issued. However, on October
22, 1980, Petronilo R. Bullecer as President of the Taguanao Settlers
Association asked for a 90-day stay in the enforcement of the writ.
The Director of Lands, thru the Solicitor General also asked that the
execution of the writ "be stayed or held in abeyance pending the
result of the Annulment proceedings which this Office is filing with the
proper court.
ISSUE:
WON the remedy sought to annul the illegal patent was correct.
806

HELD:
Yes, The Court ordered the reversion of the land covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. 0662 to the State and declaring the same as
owned and belonging to the latter. The issue in respect of the validity
of OCT No. 0662 has been previously and directly raised in Civil
Case No. 7514 which is the proper action. Resolution of the same
issue in this Court will displace a tribunal which can best ascertain the
veracity of the factual allegations and which first acquired jurisdiction
over an action which exclusively pertains to it. There should be no
multiplicity of suits.

i. Grounds: Violations of Secs. 118, 120, 121-123, Public Land

Act; Land patented is not capable of registration. Failure of
grantee to comply with conditions
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. AUGUSTO MINA
G.R. No. L-60685 June 29, 1982
FACTS:
On July 7, 1967, defendant August Mina filed with the Bureau of
Lands Free Patent Application for tract of land in Meycauayan,
Bulacan, with an area of 2 hectares, 69 ares and 47 centares. the
Director of Lands on August 14,1969 issued an order approving said
free patent application and also directing the issuance of patent to
defendant Mina and, pursuant thereto, Free Patent was
correspondingly issued to said defendant on February 6, 1970. on
December 16, 1972, Montano F. Esguerra Jr. filed with the Bureau of
Lands a petition assailing the validity of the patient issued to
defendant Augusto Mina claiming that the latter obtained the same by
means of fraud and misrepresentation. Acting on the aforementioned
petition by Montano F. Esguerra, Jr, an investigation was conducted
by the Bureau of Lands which revealed that neither defendant
Augusto Mina's free patient application aforesaid had been
fraudulently obtained hereby prompting the Director of Land to issue
an order on April 2, 1973, the proper court action be initialized for the
807

cancellation of the patent and the corresponding certificate title

issued, ands for the reversion of the covered thereby to the state.
ISSUE:
WON the application is void
HELD:
Yes, A certificate of title that is void may be ordered canceled. And, a
title will be considered void if it is procured through fraud, as when a
person applies for registration of the land on the claim that he has
been occupying and cultivating it. In the case of disposable public
lands, failure on the part of the grantee to comply with the conditions
imposed by law is a ground for holding such title void.). The lapse of
the one (1) year period within which a decree of title may be
reopened for fraud would not prevent the cancellation thereof for the
hold that a little may become in defeasible by registration, even if
such title had been secured through fraud or in violation of the law
would be the height of absurdity. Registration should not be a shield
of fraud in securing title A title founded on fraud may be canceled,
notwithstanding the lapse of one year from the issuance thereof,
through a petition filed in court by the Solicitor General, The
complaint in the present case was brought by the Republic of the
Philippines not as a nominal party but in the exercise of its sovereign
functions, to protect the interests of the State over a public property.
This Court has held that the statutes of limitations does not run
against the right of action of the Government of the
Philippines.Prescription, both acquisitive and extinctive, does not run
against the state. It has been held that the statute of limitations does
not run against the right of action of the Government of the
Philippines

808

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HEIRS OF LUISA VILLA

ABRILLE
G.R. No. L-39248 May 7, 1976
FACTS:
Estate of Luisa Villa Abrille (now Heirs of Luisa Villa Abrille) is the
owner of a parcel of land in the City of Davao containing an area of
FIVE HUNDRED TWENTY FIVE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED FIFTY
TWO SQUARE METERS (525.652), more or less, under Transfer
Certificate of Title issued in her name. The deceased Luisa Villa
Abrille during her lifetime caused the subdivision of the aforesaid
parcel of land into two lots designated as Lots Nos. 379-B-2-B-1 and
379-B-2-B-2 under subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-69322 which was
approved by the Land Registration Commissioner on March 17, 1967.
Under Subdivision Plan (LRC) Psd-69322, the sum of all the lands
(composed of 4 lots) contains an area of 577,679 Square Meters or a
total area of 607,779 Square Meters, which is 82,127 Square Meters
more than the original area covered in Transfer Certificate of Title in
the name of said defendant Luisa Villa Abrille.
Ten days after the approval by the Land Registration Commissioner,
Luisa Villa Abrille was able to secure an order from the Court of First
Instance of Davao directing the Register of Deeds for the City of
Davao and Province of Davao, to correct the area of Certificate of
Title and thereafter to cancel the same and issue new TCTs. On
March 30, 1967, the Register of Deeds concerned registered the lot
and issued a new TCT in the name of Luisa Villa Abrille.
However, it appears that the registration of Lot No. 379-B-2-B-2,
which includes the aforementioned excess area of 82,127 Square
Meters, was not in accordance with law for lack of the required notice
and publication as prescribed in Act 496, as amended, otherwise
known as the Land Registration Law, and that the excess or enlarged
area of 82,127 Square Meters as a result of the approval of the
subdivision survey (LRC) Psd-69322 was formerly a portion of the
809

Davao River which dried up by reason of the change of course of the

said Davao River; hence a land belonging to the public domain.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Certificate of Titles was validly cancelled?
HELD:
After a careful and thorough deliberation of the matter in controversy,
we are of the opinion and so hold that the lower court acted correctly
in ordering the cancellation of Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T20725, T-20701, T-20713 and T-20690 which admittedly covered the
increased area of 82,127 square meters under Subdivision Plan
(LRC) Psd-71236 (and formerly under Psd-69322) for the City of
Davao.
Certainly, the step taken by defendant-appellant in petitioning the
court for the approval of their Subdivision Plan (LRC) Psd-69322 and
then Psd-71236 to include the questioned increased area of 82,127
square meters is, to say the least, unwarranted and irregular. This is
so, for the increased area in question, which is not a registered land
but formerly a river bed, is so big as to give allowance for a mere
mistake in area of the original registration of the tracts of land of the
defendant-appellant formerly belonging to and registered in the name
of their grandfather, Francisco Villa Abrille Lim Juna. In order to bring
this increase in area, which the parties admitted to have been a
former river bed of the Davao River, under the operation and
coverage of the Land Registration Law, Act 496, proceedings in
registrations of land title should have been filed Instead of an ordinary
approval of subdivision plan.
It should be remembered that recourse under Section 44 of Act 496,
which the predecessor-in-interest (Luisa Villa Abrille) of the herein
defendant-appellant took, is good only insofar as it covers previously
registered lands. In the instant case, part of the tracts of land,
particularly the area of 82,127 square meters, has not yet been
brought under the operation of the Torrens System. Worse still, the
approval of Subdivision Plans (LRC) Psd-69322 and Psd-71236 was
810

without notice to all parties in interest, more particularly the Director

of Lands.

ii. Who institutes action for reversion

iii. Investigation prior to institution
KAYABAN vs. REPUBLIC
G.R. No. L-33307 August 30, 1973
FACTS:
The present case started with an action for illegal detainer filed in the
municipal court of Alcala Pangasinan. The plaintiff was Vicente
Kayaban, one of the petitioners herein, the other petitioner being his
wife Florentina Lagasca-Kayaban; and the defendants were the
spouses Benjamin Orpindo and Leonila Aguilar-Orpindo.
The lands covered by the two titles were inherited by Vicente
Kayaban and his co-heirs from their father and common predecessorin-interest, Gabriel Kayaban, whose last will was admitted to probate
in 1923. After the properties were partitioned, Vicente Kayaban
acquired the shares of his co-heirs by purchase and afterwards he
and his wife applied for and obtained the two free patent titles in
question.
The respondent court recognized and declared the petitioners to be
the rightful and exclusive owners of the properties covered by the
said titles and denied the Solicitor General's prayer that they be
reverted to the State, but nevertheless declared the titles null and
void on the ground that since the owners had acquired the properties
partly by inheritance from their father and the rest by purchase from
their co-heirs, and their father had been in possession thereof for
many years before them, the lands were no longer public and hence
not subject to disposition by the government under the Public Land
Act. The procedure that should have been followed, said the court,
was judicial confirmation of an imperfect title and not administrative
legalization thereof through patent application.
811

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Original Certificates of Title are null and void?
HELD:
Since it was the Director of Lands who processed and approved the
applications of the appellants and who ordered the issuance of the
corresponding free patents in their favor in his capacity as
administrator of the disposable lands of the public domain, the action
for annulment should have been initiated by him, or at least with his
prior authority and consent.
In the second place, the dictum of the lower court that the appellants
chose the wrong remedy in applying for free patents instead of
obtaining a judicial confirmation of their imperfect titles involves a
technicality that is of no material consequence now in view of the
declaration by the same court that the appellants are the rightful and
exclusive owners of the lands covered by said titles. Indeed, insofar
as the kind of land that may be the subject of one or the other remedy
is concerned, there is no difference between them. Both refer to
public lands suitable for agricultural purposes; both require
continuous occupation and cultivation either by the applicant himself
or through his predecessors-in-interest for a certain length of time;
and both are modes of confirming an imperfect or incomplete title
one judicially and the other administratively.
Finally, whether the titles in question were obtained through judicial or
administrative legalization of imperfect or incomplete title is of no
practical importance. The certificates of title in either case is the
same, namely, that provided for in Section 122 of Act No. 496, which,
except for some restrictions as to alienability within entitled to all the
protection afforded by the Torrens System of registration.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed is reversed insofar as it
declares null and void Original Certificates of Title in the names of
Vicente Kayaban and Florentina Lagasca-Kayaban, respectively.

812

Consultants
TEODORO ALMIROL V. REGISTER OF DEEDS OF AGUSAN
G.R. No. L-22486

March 20, 1968

FACTS:
On June 28, 1961 Teodoro Almirol purchased from Arcenio Abalo a
parcel of land situated in the municipality of Esperanza, province of
Agusan, and covered by original certificate of title P-1237 in the name
of "Arcenio Abalo, married to Nicolasa M. Abalo." Sometime in May,
1962 Almirol went to the office of the Register of Deeds of Agusan in
Butuan City to register the deed of sale and to secure in his name a
transfer certificate of title. Registration was refused by the Register of
Deeds upon the following grounds: 1.) That Original Certificate of Title
No. P-1237 is registered in the name of Arcenio Abalo, married to
Nicolasa M. Abalo, and by legal presumption, is considered conjugal
property; 2.) That in the sale of a conjugal property acquired after the
effectivity of the New Civil Code it is necessary that both spouses
sign the document; but 3.) Since, as in this case, the wife has already
died when the sale was made, the surviving husband cannot dispose
of the whole property without violating the existing law. In view of
such refusal, Almirol went to the Court of First Instance of Agusan on
a petition for mandamus to compel the Register of Deeds to register
the deed of sale and to issue to him the corresponding transfer
certificate of title. In its resolution of October 16, 1963 the lower court,
declaring that "mandamus does not lie . . . because the adequate
remedy is that provided by Section 4 of Rep. Act 1151", dismissed the
petition, with costs against the petitioner. Hence, this present appeal.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Register of Deeds was justified in refusing to
register the transaction appealed to by the petitioner.

813

HELD:
No. Although the reasons relied upon by the respondent show a
sincere desire on his part to maintain inviolate the law on succession
and transmission of rights over real properties, these do not
constitute legal grounds for his refusal to register the deed. Whether
a document is valid or not, is not for the register of deeds to
determine; this function belongs properly to a court of competent
jurisdiction. A register of deeds is entirely precluded by section 4 of
Republic Act 1151 from exercising his personal judgment and
discretion when confronted with the problem of whether to register a
deed or instrument on the ground that it is invalid. For under the said
section, when he is in doubt as to the proper step to be taken with
respect to any deed or other instrument presented to him for
registration, all that he is supposed to do is to submit and certify the
question to the Commissioner of Land Registration who shall, after
notice and hearing, enter an order prescribing the step to be taken on
the doubtful question.

Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Orilla , GR. No. 170422

FACTS:
Spouses Placido and Clara Orilla (respondents) were the owners of
situated in Bohol, containing an area of 23.3416 hectares and
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title .The Department of Agrarian
Reform Provincial Agrarian Reform Office (DAR-PARO) of Bohol sent
respondents a Notice of Land Valuation and Acquisition dated
November 15, 1996 informing them of the compulsory acquisition of
21.1289

hectares

of

their

landholdings

pursuant

to

the

Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (Republic Act [RA] 6657) for

P371,154.99 as compensation based on the valuation made by the
Land Bank of the Philippines (petitioner)
814

Respondents rejected the said valuation.

Consequently, the

Provincial Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board

(Provincial DARAB) conducted a summary hearing on the amount of
just compensation. Thereafter, the Provincial DARAB affirmed the
valuation made by the petitioner.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is entitled for the payment of just
compensation
RULING:
The expropriation of private property under RA 6657 is a
revolutionary kind of expropriation, being a means to obtain social
justice by distributing land to the farmers, envisioning freedom from
the bondage to the land they actually till. As an exercise of police
power, it puts the landowner, not the government, in a situation where
the odds are practically against him. He cannot resist it. His only
consolation is that he can negotiate for the amount of compensation
to be paid for the property taken by the government. As expected,
the landowner will exercise this right to the hilt, subject to the
limitation that he can only be entitled to just compensation. Clearly
therefore, by rejecting and disputing the valuation of the DAR, the
landowner is merely exercising his right to seek just compensation.
Constitutionally, just compensation is the sum equivalent to
the market value of the property, broadly described as the price fixed
by the seller in open market in the usual and ordinary course of legal
action and competition, or the fair value of the property as between
the one who receives and the one who desires to sell, it being fixed at
815

the time of the actual taking by the government. Just compensation is

defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its
owner by the expropriator. It has been repeatedly stressed by this
Court that the true measure is not the takers gain but the owners
loss. The word just is used to modify the meaning of the word
compensation to convey the idea that the equivalent to be given for
the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full, and ample.

LBP vs. Heirs of Domingo, GR No. 168533

FACTS
The late Angel T. Domingo (Domingo) is the registered owner of
a 70.3420-hectare rice land situated at Macapabellag, Guimba,
Nueva Ecija, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title

On October 21, 1972, Presidential Decree No. 27 was issued,

pursuant to which actual tenant farmers of private agricultural lands
devoted to rice and corn were deemed as full owners of the land they
till.

Consequently, out of the 70.3420 hectares of the said rice land,

34.9128 hectares (subject land) were taken by the government under
its land transfer program and awarded the same to tenant farmers.
816

On April 26, 2000, Domingo filed with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Guimba, Nueva Ecija a complaint for determination and
payment of just compensation against the Land Bank of the
Philippines (LBP) and DAR.
Domingo opposed the said valuation and claimed that the just
compensation for the subject land should be computed using the
parameters set forth under Republic Act No. 6657.
ISSUE: Whether or not

Heirs of Domingo shall be paid just

compensation from the parameters setforth under R.A 6657.

RULING
In sum, in determining just compensation, the cost of the
acquisition of the land, the current value of like properties, its nature,
actual use and income, the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax
declarations, and the assessment made by government assessors
shall be considered. The social and economic benefits contributed by
the farmers and the farmworkers and by the government to the
property as well as the non-payment of taxes or loans secured from
any government financing institution on the said land shall be
considered as additional factors to determine its valuation.Petition is
denied.

817

Lee vs. LBP, GR No. 170422, March 7,2008

FACTS:
On 7 August 2001, petitioners received a notice of coverage
informing them that their landholding is covered by the governments
compulsory acquisition scheme pursuant to the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law (R.A. No. 6657).
Aggrieved, petitioners filed an original petition for the
determination of just compensation before the Regional Trial Court of
Balanga City, Bataan.
LBP filed a Petition for Review before the Court of Appeals and
argued that the SAC erred in giving considerable weight on the
appraisal report of the private appraisal firm thereby disregarding the
provisions of R.A. No. 6657 and its implementing regulations.
It found that the SAC made a wholesale adoption of the
valuation of the appraisal company and did not consider the other
818

factors set forth in R.A. No. 6657 even though the appraisal company
admitted that it did not consider as applicable the CARP valuation of
the property.
Finally, relying on the presumption of regularity, petitioners
claim that the SAC had considered the criteria set forth in the law for
the determination of just compensation in computing the value of the
subject landholding. In any case, according to them, R.A. No. 6657
does not at all require the SAC to consider all the seven factors
enumerated therein in its determination of just compensation.
ISSUE: Whether or not R.A 6657 shall be considered in determining
of just compensation.
RULING:
Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657 which enumerates the factors to be
considered in determining just compensation reads.
SECTION 17. Determination of Just Compensation.
In determining just compensation, the cost of acquisition
of the land, the current value of like properties, its nature,
actual use and income, the sworn valuation by the owner,
tax declarations, and the assessment made by government
assessors shall be considered. The social and economic
benefits contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers
and by the Government to the property as well as the nonpayment of taxes or loans secured from any government
financing institutions on the said land shall be considered
as additional factors to determine its valuation.
These factors have already been incorporated in a basic
formula by the DAR pursuant to its rule-making power under Section
819

49 of R.A. No. 6657. AO No. 5 precisely filled in the details of

Section 17, R. A. No. 6657 by providing a basic formula by which the
factors mentioned therein may be taken into account.This formula
has to be considered by the SAC in tandem with all the factors
referred to in Section 17 of the law.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

LBP vs. Heirs of Cruz, GR No. 175175 September 29, 2008

FACTS:
Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) is a government banking
institution designated under Section 64 of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
6654 as the financial intermediary of the agrarian reform program of
the government.
Eleuterio Cruz is the registered owner of an unirrigated riceland
situated in Lakambini, Tuao, Cagayan per Transfer Certificate of Title
of the total 13.7320 hectares of respondents landholding, an area of
13.5550 hectares was placed by the government under the coverage
of the operation land transfer program under Presidential Decree
(P.D.) No. 27
Petitioner pegged the value of the acquired landholding at
P106,935.76 based on the guidelines set forth under P.D. No. 27 and
820

Executive Order (E.O.) No. 228. Respondents rejected petitioners

valuation and instituted an action for a summary proceeding for the
preliminary determination of just compensation before the PARAD.
The SAC held that the value of P80,000.00 per hectare fixed by
the PARAD should be accorded weight and probative value and that
the SAC is guided by the various factors enumerated in Section 17 of
R.A. No. 6657 in determining just compensation. It disregarded
respondents claim that the valuation should be based on the current
market value of the landholding since no evidence was adduced in
support of the claim. The SAC also did not accept petitioners
valuation as it was based on P.D. No. 27, in which just compensation
was determined at the time of the taking of the property.
Petitioner insists that the values in E.O. No. 228 are applicable
to lands acquired under P.D. No. 27 in cognizance of the well-settled
rule that just compensation is the value of the property at the time of
the taking on 21 October 1972, when the ownership of the subject
property was transferred from the landowner to the farmersbeneficiaries and when the former was effectively deprived of
dominion and possession over said land.
ISSUE: Whether or not PD. 27 and EO 228 are still applicable in
determining payment for just compensation

RULING:
In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Natividad, the Court
821

explained why the guidelines under P.D. No. 27 and E.O. No. 228 are
no longer applicable to the delayed payment of lands acquired under
P.D. No. 27, to wit:
It would certainly be inequitable to determine just
compensation based on the guideline provided by PD No.
27 and EO 228 considering the DARs failure to
determine the just compensation for a considerable length
of time. That just compensation should be determined in
accordance with RA 6657, and not PD 27 or EO 228, is
especially imperative considering that just compensation
should be the full and fair equivalent of the property taken
from its owner by the expropriator, the equivalent being
real, substantial, full and ample.
LBP vs. Natividad, GR No. 127198(2005)
FACTS
On May 14, 1993, private respondents filed a petition before the
trial court for the determination of just compensation for their
agricultural lands situated in Arayat, Pampanga, which were acquired
by the government pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27 (PD 27).
The petition named as respondents the DAR and Land Bank. With
leave of court, the petition was amended to implead as corespondents the registered tenants of the land.
The judgment is hereby rendered in favor of petitioners and
against respondents, ordering respondents, particularly, respondents
Department of Agrarian Reform and the Land Bank of the Philippines,
to pay these lands owned by petitioners and which are the subject of
acquisition by the State under its land reform program, the amount of
THIRTY PESOS (P30.00) per square meter, as the just
compensation due for payment for same lands of petitioners located
at San Vicente (or Camba), Arayat, Pampanga.
Respondent Department of Agrarian Reform is also ordered to
pay petitioners the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P50,000.00) as Attorneys Fee, and to pay the cost of suit.
Land Bank also insists that the trial court erred in declaring that
822

PD 27 and Executive Order No. 228 (EO 228) are mere guidelines in
the determination of just compensation, and in relying on private
respondents evidence of the valuation of the properties at the time of
possession in 1993 and not on Land Banks evidence of the value
thereof as of the time of acquisition in 1972.
Land Bank avers that private respondents should have sought
the reconsideration of the DARs valuation instead of filing a petition
to fix just compensation with the trial court.
ISSUE: Whether or not PD 27 and EO 228 are applicable for the
determination of payment of just compensation

RULING:
Under the factual circumstances of this case, the agrarian
reform process is still incomplete as the just compensation to be paid
private respondents has yet to be settled. Considering the passage
of Republic Act No. 6657 (RA 6657)before the completion of this
process, the just compensation should be determined and the
process concluded under the said law. Indeed, RA 6657 is the
applicable law, with PD 27 and EO 228 having only suppletory effect,
conformably with our ruling in Paris v. Alfeche.
It would certainly be inequitable to determine just compensation
based on the guideline provided by PD 27 and EO 228 considering
the DARs failure to determine the just compensation for a
considerable length of time. That just compensation should be
determined in accordance with RA 6657, and not PD 27 or EO
228, is especially imperative considering that just compensation
should be the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its
owner by the expropriator, the equivalent being real, substantial, full
and ample.
In this case, the trial court arrived at the just compensation due
private respondents for their property, taking into account its nature
as irrigated land, location along the highway, market value,
assessors value and the volume and value of its produce. This Court
is convinced that the trial court correctly determined the amount of
823

just compensation due private respondents in accordance with, and

guided by, RA 6657 and existing jurisprudence.
The petition is DENIED.

EXPROPRIATION PROCEEDINGS
NEPOMUCENO vs. City of Surigao, GR No. 146091
FACTS:
Civil Case No. 4570 was a complaint for Recovery of Real
Property and/or its Market Value filed by petitioner Maria Paz
Nepomuceno to recover a 652 sq. m. portionof her 50,000 sq. m. lot
which was occupied, developed and used as a city road by the city
government of Surigao. Maria Paz alleged that the city government
neither asked her permission to use the land nor instituted
expropriation proceedings for its acquisition. On October 4, 1994, she
and her husband, co-petitioner, Fermin A. Nepomuceno, wrote
respondent (then Surigao City Mayor) Salvador Sering a letter
proposing an amicable settlement for the payment of the portion
824

taken over by the city. They subsequently met with Mayor Sering to
discuss their proposal but the mayor rebuffed them in public and
refused to pay them anything.RTC rendered its judgment in favor to
the petitioner.

The CA affirmed the decision of the trial court in all other

respects.
Petitioners claim that, in fixing the value of their property, justice
and equity demand that the value at the time of actual payment
should be the basis, not the value at the time of the taking as the
RTC and CA held. They demand P200/sq. m. or a total sum of P130,
400 plus legal interest.
ISSUE: Whether or not the value at the time of actual taking should
be the basis of the property
RULING
In a long line of cases, we have consistently ruled that where
actual taking is made without the benefit of expropriation proceedings
and the owner seeks recovery of the possession of the property prior
to the filing of expropriation proceedings, it is the value of the property
at the time of taking that is controlling for purposes of compensation.
825

As pointed out in Republic v. Lara, the reason for this rule is:
The owner of private property should be compensated
only for what he actually loses; it is not intended that his
compensation shall extend beyond his loss or injury. And
what he loses is only the actual value of his property at
the time it is taken. This is the only way the compensation
to be paid can be truly just; i.e., just not only to the
individual whose property is taken, but to the public,
which is to pay for it.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.

NPC vs. Suarez. GR No. 17525 October 8,2008

FACTS:
Petitioner filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Sorsogon, Sorsogon, a complaint on August 23, 1996 for
expropriation of a parcel of land (the property) in Brgy. Bibincahan,
Sorsogon, Sorsogon registered in the names of Angel Suarez, Carlos
Suarez, Ma. Teresa Suarez and Rosario Suarez (respondents).
In accordance with Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 42,
petitioner deposited with the Philippine National Bank, Legazpi City
Branch the amount of P7,465.71 representing the provisional value
of the property, alleged to cover an area of 24,350 square meters.
By Decision of April 15, 1999, the trial court adopted as basis
for determining just compensation the recommendation of the
Commissioners. Thus it disposed:
Petitioner contends that since it merely seeks an aerial
easement over the property, the decision of the appellate court
affirming the trial courts order for the payment of just compensation
in the amount of P783, 860.46 representing the total value of the
826

property and excluding the application of Section 3A (b) of RA 6395 is

erroneous.
ISSUE: whether petitioner in its acquisition of an easement of right of
way (aerial) over a parcel of land, only a fee, not the full value of the
land, must be paid.
RULING:
An easement of right of way transmits no rights
except the easement itself, and respondent retains full
ownership of the property. The acquisition of such
easement is, nevertheless, not gratis. As correctly
observed by the CA, considering the nature and the effect
of the installation of power lines, the limitations on the use
of the land for an indefinite period would deprive
respondent of normal use of the property. For this reason,
the latter is entitled to payment of a just compensation,
which must be neither more nor less than the monetary
equivalent of the land
The nature, as well as the character of the land at the time of
taking is thus the principal criterion in determining just compensation.
All the facts as to the condition of the property and its surroundings,
as well as its improvements and capabilities, must thus be
considered.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED.

NPC vs. Purefoods, GR No. 160725 September 12,2008

FACTS
On 5 November 1997, NAPOCOR filed a special civil action for
827

eminent domain before the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan .

The complaint alleged that the defendants were either the
registered owners or the claimants of the affected pieces of property.
The complaint also alleged the public purpose of the
Northwestern Luzon Project, as well as the urgency and necessity of
acquiring easements of right-of-way over the said parcels of land
consisting of 62,426.50 square meters. It also averred that the
affected properties had not been expropriated for public use and were
selected by NAPOCOR in a manner compatible with the greatest
public good and the least private injury and that the negotiations
between NAPOCOR and the defendants had failed. The complaint
prayed, among others, that the RTC issue a writ of possession in
favor of NAPOCOR in the event that it would be refused entry to the
affected properties.
Respondent Pure foods counters that determination of just
compensation is a factual finding, which may be reviewed by this
Court only when the case falls within the recognized exceptions to the
prohibition against factual review. Since the instant case does not fall
under any of the exceptions, it argues that the issue of just
compensation may not be reviewed in the instant proceeding.
On the other hand, there is a question of law when the issue
does not call for an examination of the probative value of the
evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of facts being admitted
and the doubt concerns the correct application of law and
jurisprudence on the matter. In the instant case, NAPOCOR is raising
a question of law, that is, whether or not only an easement fee of 10%
of the market value of the expropriated properties should be paid to
828

the affected owners.

ISSUE: Whether or not just compensation shall be based on the
market value of the affected properties
RULING
The question of just compensation for an easement of right-ofway over a parcel of land that will be traversed by NAPOCORs
transmission lines has already been answered in National Power
Corporation v. Manubay Agro-Industrial Development Corporation. In
that case, the Court held that because of the nature of the easement,
which will deprive the normal use of the land for an indefinite period,
just compensation must be based on the full market value of the
affected properties. The Court explained therein that expropriation is
not limited to the acquisition of real property with a corresponding
transfer of title or possession. The right-of-way easement resulting in
a restriction or limitation on property rights over the land traversed by
transmission lines, as in the present case, also falls within the ambit
of the term expropriation. In eminent domain or expropriation
proceedings, the general rule is that the just compensation to which
the owner of the condemned property is entitled is the market value.
Based on the foregoing elucidation, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the RTCs finding of the value of just compensation based on
the majority reports valuation of P400.00 per square meter for the
properties belonging to respondents with the exception of respondent
Moldex. Both the Court of Appeals and the RTC were convinced that
the commissioners recommendation was arrived at after a judicious
consideration of all factors. Absent any showing that said valuation is
exorbitant and unjustified, the same is binding on this Court.
829

Denied

FORFOM Dev. Corp vs. PNR GR No. 124795

FACTS:
Forfom is the registered owner of several parcels of land in San
Vicente, San Pedro, Laguna under Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT)
and all of the Registry of Deeds of Laguna. On 24 August 1990,
Forfom filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Binan, Laguna a
complaint for Recovery of Posssession of Real Property and/or
Damages.

It alleged that PNR, with the aid of military men, and

without its consent and against its will, occupied 100,128 square
meters of its property located in San Pedro, Laguna and installed
thereon railroad and railway facilities and appurtenances. It further
alleged that PNR rented out portions of the property to squatters
along the railroad tracks.

Despite repeated verbal and written

demands for the return of the property or for the payment of its price,
PNR failed to comply.
PNR alleged that, per authority granted by law (Presidential
Decree No. 741), it acquired parcels of land used in the construction
830

of the railway track to Carmona, Cavite. It, however, denied that the
property acquired from Forfom was leased to tenants. It stressed that
the acquisition of the properties used in the project was done through
negotiations with the respective owners. It claimed that it negotiated
with the respective owners of the affected properties and that they
were paid just compensation. Dr. Felix Limcaoco, it said, was not
paid because he failed to present the corresponding titles to his
properties. It claimed that the right to and just compensation for the
subject property was the declared fair market value at the time of the
taking which was P0.60 per square meter. Defendant explained that
President Ferdinand E. Marcos authorized the PNR to acquire said
right of way in a Cabinet Meeting on 1 November 1972 as evidenced
by an excerpt of the minutes of the meeting of the PNR Board of
Directors on Resolution No. 751.
Judgment rendered in favor to the plaintiff.

The

trial

court

found that the properties of Forfom were taken by PNR without due
process of law and without just compensation.
Not contented with the decision, both parties appealed to the
Court of Appeals by filing their respective Notices of Appeal. PNR
questioned the trial courts ruling fixing the just compensation at
P10.00 per square meter and not the declared value of P0.60 per
square meter or the fair market value of P1.25 paid to an adjacent
owner. CA affirmed the decision with modification as to damages.
Plaintiff filed for a petition for certiorari.

831

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner FORFOM can recover the property

because respondent failed to file aby expropriation and to pay just
compensation.
RULING:
A number of circumstances must be present in the taking of
property for purposes of eminent domain: (1) the expropriator must
enter a private property; (2) the entrance into private property must
be for more than a momentary period; (3) the entry into the property
should be under warrant or color of legal authority; (4) the property
must be devoted to a public purpose or otherwise informally,
appropriately or injuriously affected; and (5) the utilization of the
property for public use must be in such a way as to oust the owner
and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property.
In the case at bar, the expropriator (PNR) entered the property
of Forfom, a private land. The entrance into Forfoms property was
permanent, not for a fleeting or brief period.It is clear that recovery of
possession of the property by the landowner can no longer be
allowed on the grounds of estoppel and, more importantly, of public
policy which imposes upon the public utility the obligation to continue
its services to the public. The non-filing of the case for expropriation
will not necessarily lead to the return of the property to the landowner.
What is left to the landowner is the right of compensation.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is PARTIALLY DENIED
insofar as it denies Forfom Development Corporations prayer for
832

recovery of possession (in whole or in part) of the subject land,

unearned income, and rentals.

Registration of Chattel Mortgage.

Where chattel mortgage registered.
A chattel mortgage over a vehicle shall be registered
BOTH in the RD and in the Motor Vehicle Office, now Land
Transportation Office (LTO).
FLORENTINA ALEMAN, ET AL vs. PRESENTACION DE CATERA,
ET AL
G.R. No. L-13693
Facts:
De Catera is and was the owner and operator of several passenger
trucks. One of her trucks was the "Catera No. 5." One morning, said
passenger truck fell into the ditch because it was over speeding the
driver was trying to overtake another truck. Aleman and her son who
at that time were on the lawn in front of their house were hit by the
said truck thereby causing the instantaneous death of the son and the
injury of Florentina Aleman. Civil case No. 2969 is for the recovery of
damages instituted by Florentina Aleman and her husband Federico
Real for the death of their son and for the injury of Florentina
Aleman.Two of the passengers of the aforesaid truck were killed as a
result of the mishap.
The Southern Motors, Inc. filed with the provincial sheriff a third-party
claim to the bus, On 16 May in both cases the plaintiffs filed with the
Court a motion to strike out the third-party claim filed by the motor
company. The intervenor motor company filed an answer in
833

intervention setting up a counter claim and praying that it be declared

the owner of the bus attached by the sheriff to answer for the
damages awarded to the plaintiffs. The counter-claim of Southern
Motors, Inc. is dismissed. The filed a notice of appeal. Hence, the
appeal before the Court is that taken by the intervenor Southern
Motors, Inc. in both cases from that part of the judgment dismissing
its counterclaim
Issue
Which has a preferred right to the bus under attachment the
Southern Motors, Inc. in whose favor, as seller of the bus, a chattel
mortgage thereon had been executed and recorded in the
corresponding registry of deeds, or the families of the vehicular
accident victims who, having been awarded damages for death and
injuries, had caused an attachment on the said bus owned by the
operator whose purchase and ownership thereof had been recorded
in the Motor Vehicles Office.
Ruling
A Mortgage in order to affect persons should not only be registered in
the Chattel Mortgage Registry, but the same should also be recorded
in the Motor Vehicle Office as required by section 5(e) of the Revised
Motor Vehicle Law." Here, the Southern Motor, Inc. did not record in
the Motor Vehicle Office the mortgage executed in it's favor. Such
being the case the mortgage is ineffective as far as the appellees are
concerned. Its right or interest, therefore, in the truck, because of the
mortgage constituted in its favor, cannot prevail over of that appellees
who thought mere judgement creditors may be deemed innocent
purchase of the bus owner-operator Precentacion de Catera, who
had her purchase of the bus from Wenceslao Defensor recorded in
the Motor Vehicles Office,

834

DELFIN MONTANO vs. JOSE LIM ANG, ET AL

G.R. No. L-13057
Facts
Montano brought to the Philippines from the United States a Cadillac
car which he registered in his name in the Motor Vehicles Office and
for which he obtained a certificate of registration. He sold the car to
Jose Lim Ang and his wife Teodora A. for which the latter executed a
promissory note. Having paid part of the price, said spouses
executed on the same date a chattel mortgage on the car in favor of
Montano to guarantee the payment of the balance. Because Montano
did not want to transfer the registration certificate to Jose Lim Ang
before the registration of the mortgage, the latter was registered in
the office of the register of deeds, but Montano failed to notify the
Motor Vehicles Office of the execution of the mortgage.
Jose Lim Ang transferred the registration certificate to
Villanueva. Villanueva sold the car to Santos for Santos sold the car
to the Manila Trading & Supply Company and this company sold the
car to Tinio . . He also executed a chattel mortgage on the same car
to secure the payment of the promissory note. This mortgage was
registered both in the office of the register of deeds as well as in the
Motor Vehicles Office
Jose Lim Ang failed to pay the balance of the purchase price to
Montano in spite of the latter's demand. Montano requested the
sheriff of Manila to sell the car in accordance with the conditions
agreed upon in the chattel mortgage. Having found, however, that the
car was no longer in the possession of Lim Ang but in that of Angel M.
Tinio, Montano commenced the present action of replevin before the
835

Court of First Instance of Manila against spouses Lim.

Issue
Whether or not the chattel mortgage executed by Jose Lim Ang and
Teodora A. Gonzales in favor of Delfin Montano is binding against
third persons even if they failed to give notice thereof to the Motor
Vehicles Office as required by Section 5(e) of the Revised Motor
Vehicle Law;

Ruling
"A mortgage in order to affect third persons should not only be
registered in the Chattel Mortgage Registry, but the same should also
be recorded in the Motor Vehicles Office as required by section 5(e)
of the Revised Motor Vehicle Law. And the failure of the respondent
mortgagee to report the mortgage executed in its favor had the effect
of making said mortgage ineffective against Borlough, who had his
purchase registered in the said Motor Vehicles Office."' Adopting this
view in our case the inevitable conclusion is that as between Montano
whose mortgage over the car was not recorded in the Motor Vehicles
Office and Angel M. Tinio who notified said office of his purchase and
registered the car in his name, the latter is entitled to preference
considering that the mere registration of the chattel mortgage in the
office of the register of deeds is in itself not sufficient to hold it binding
against third persons.

836

Replacement of Lost or Destroyed Certificate

A. When not applicable. When the owners duplicate copy is
not in fact lost or destroyed, a petition for the purpose is
unwarranted as the court has no jurisdiction over the
petition.
FELIX CAMITAN vs THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 128099

Facts
The spouses Camitan sold to Fidelity Investment Corporation
(respondent) a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title.
After the death of the spouses Camitan, without the knowledge of
respondent, the heirs of the spouses-petitioners herein - filed a
petition for the issuance of a new Owners Copy,2 However, it appears
that respondent was not given notice of such proceedings. The trial
court issued an order of general default. When respondent learned of
the petition and order for the first time, it caused the annotation of a
notice of sale on the title of the property. In a Petition 6 for annulment
of judgment and cancellation of title before the Court of Appeals,
respondent argued that the order is null and void, having been issued
by the trial court without jurisdiction since the Owners Copy of TCT
exists and has been in its possession, and not lost as petitioners
alleged. Moreover, it claimed that petitioners have no standing to file
837

the petition, not being the registered owners of the property, nor
persons in interest, since all the rights and interest of the spouses
Camitan had already been transferred to respondent upon the sale of
the property. Respondent further accused petitioners of perjury;
intentionally suppressing from the trial court the fact that they were
not in possession of the property; and not serving notice on
respondent despite knowledge that it was in actual possession of the
property.7
The Court of Appeals granted the petition and ordered the annulment
of the impugned Order.8 It found that the Owners Copy is in the
possession of respondent since 1967. Moreover, the Court of Appeals
found that petitioners committed perjury in executing their Joint
Affidavit of Loss in support of their petition before the trial court as
they made it appear that the Owners Copy was still in the possession
of the spouses Camitan, when in fact, as early as 1967, the same
had already been given to respondent.

Issue
Whether the Court of Appeals erred when it ordered the annulment of
the Order of the trial court which directed the Register of Deeds to
issue a second Owners Copy of the title.

Ruling
The petition for issuance of the new Owners Copy before the trial
court was filed pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise
known as the "Property Registration Decree," Section No. 109 of
which provides:
SEC. 109. Notice and replacement of lost duplicate certificate.
In case of loss or theft of an owners duplicate certificate of
title, due notice under oath shall be sent by the owner or by
someone in his behalf to the Register of Deeds of the province
or city where the land lies as soon as the loss or theft is
discovered. If a duplicate certificate is lost or destroyed, or
838

cannot be produced by a person applying for the entry of a new

certificate to him or for the registration of any instrument, a
sworn statement of the fact of such loss or destruction may be
filed by the registered owner or other person in interest and
registered.
Upon the petition of the registered owner or other person in
interest, the court may, after notice and due hearing, direct the
issuance of a new duplicate certificate, which shall contain a
memorandum of the fact that it is issued in place of the lost
duplicate certificate, but shall in all respects be entitled to like
faith and credit as the original duplicate, and shall thereafter be
regarded as such for all purposes of this decree.
Thus, before a duplicate certificate of title can be replaced, the
petitioner under the foregoing provision must establish that the
duplicate certificate was lost or destroyed. This Court has consistently
held that a trial court does not acquire jurisdiction over a petition for
the issuance of a new owners duplicate certificate of title, if the
original is in fact not lost but is in the possession of an alleged buyer.
In other words, the fact of loss of the duplicate certificate is
jurisdictional.

839

Reconstitution of Title
REPUBLIC v SANTUA
G.R. No. 155703 September 8, 2008
Facts:
On February, 16, 1999, respondent Dominador Santua filed with the
RTC a petition for judicial reconstitution of a TCT. He alleged that the
original copy was among those destroyed by the fire that completely
razed the Capitol Building then housing the Office of the Register of
Deeds of Oriental Mindoro on August 12, 1977. The documents he
presented were tax declarations, survey plan and technical
description. On February 25, 1999, the RTC issued an Order setting
the initial hearing of the case and it also directed the publication of
the order. On December 15, 2000, the RTC granted the petition.
On January 16, 2001, the Office of the Solicitor General filed a Notice
of Appeal, which was given due course by the RTC. On September
840

23, 2002, the CA affirmed the RTC Decision. Petitioner filed a petition
for review.
Issue:
Whether the documents presented by Santua are sufficient bases for
the
Ruling:
No, they are not sufficient.
The reconstitution of a certificate of title denotes restoration in the
original form and condition of a lost or destroyed instrument attesting
the title of a person to a piece of land. It partakes of a land
registration proceeding. Thus, it must be granted only upon clear
proof that the title sought to be restored was indeed issued to the
petitioner. In this regard, Section 3 of Republic Act (RA) No. 26
enumerates the documents regarded as valid and sufficient bases for
reconstitution of a transfer certificate of title. The Court has already
settled in a number of cases that, following the principle of ejusdem
generis in statutory construction, any document mentioned in
Section 3 should be interpreted to refer to documents similar to those
previously enumerated therein. As aptly observed by the petitioner,
the documents enumerated in Section 3(a), (b), (c), (d) and (e) are
documents that had been issued or are on file with the Register of
Deeds, thus, highly credible.
Once again, we caution the courts against the hasty and reckless
grant of petitions for reconstitution. Strict observance of the rules is
vital to prevent parties from exploiting reconstitution proceedings as a
quick but illegal way to obtain Torrens certificate of titles over parcels
of land which turn out to be already covered by existing titles. Courts
should bear in mind that should the petition for reconstitution be
denied for lack of sufficient basis, the petitioner is not left without a
remedy. He may still file an application for confirmation of his title
under the provisions of the Land Registration Act, if he is in fact the
lawful owner
Basis for Reconstitution of Title
841

PASCUA v REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 162097 February 13, 2008
Facts:
Petitioner claimed that she is the owner in fee simple of Lot No. 3209,
Pagsanjan, Laguna Cadastre, having inherited it from her parents,
Guillermo Abinsay and Leoncia Rivera. On December 4, 1930, the
cadastral court awarded the lot to Limuaco, who sold the lot to
petitioners parents on December 24, 1956, as evidenced by a Deed
of Absolute Sale.
On December 8, 1999, petitioner filed a petition for judicial
reconstitution of the OCT covering Lot No. 3209 with the RTC of
Laguna. The RTC denied the petition for reconstitution for
insufficiency of evidence because Tax Declaration No. 5471 in the
name of spouses Abinsay did not indicate any certificate of title
number, cadastral lot number or even an assessors lot number while
Tax Declaration No. 1376 only indicated Assessors Lot No. 19-pt.
On appeal to the CA, petitioner argued that Assessors Lot No. 19-pt
and Lot No. 3209 are the same. For respondent Republic of the
Philippines, the Solicitor General contended that what petitioners
predecessors-in-interest bought from Limuaco was Assesors Lot No.
19-pt, which was neither designated nor mentioned as Lot No.
3209. Also, the Solicitor General said the property described in the
documents presented is still unregistered land of the public domain
and there is no evidence that an OCT was actually issued to Lot No.
3209.
The CA affirmed the trial courts order. The CA held that petitioner
failed to present the documents enumerated in Section 2, RA 26.
Issue:
Whether the petitioner should be allowed to reconstitute her alleged
title
Ruling:
No, the petitioner is not qualified to file an action for reconstitution.
842

We are not convinced. RA 26 presupposes that the property whose

title is sought to be reconstituted has already been brought under the
provisions of the Torrens System, Act No. 496. Petitioners evidence
itself, the Deed of Sale between Limuaco and her parents, stated that
the lot was not registered under Act No. 496 and that the parties
agreed to register it under Act No. 3344. Even the Deed of Coowners Partition stated that the subject lot, Lot No. 19-pt, is not
registered. The other piece of evidence, the certifications from the
LRA, merely stated that Decree No. 412846 covering Lot No. 3209
was issued on December 4, 1930, but the copy of said decree is not
among the salvaged decrees on file with said office. The said copy is
presumed lost or destroyed during World War II. The LRA neither
stated that a certificate of title was actually issued nor mentioned the
number of the OCT. It cannot be determined from any of the
evidence submitted by petitioner that the adjudicatee of the purported
decree was Limuaco.
The Court is not persuadsed that petitioners pieces of evidence
warrant the reconstitution of title since she failed to prove the
existence of the title in the first place. The purpose of reconstitution
of title is to have the original title reproduced in the same form it was
when it was lost or destroyed. In this case, there is no title to be reissued.

VILLANUEVA v VILORIA
G.R. No. 155804 March 14, 2008
Facts:
On February 22, 2001, respondent Francisco Viloria filed a verified
petition for the issuance of a new owners duplicate copy of a TCT in
lieu of the lost one, before the RTC of Zambales. He further prayed
that the court should declare the owners duplicate copy of the TCT
843

null and void which the trial court granted. The land covering said
TCT was then sold to Ruben M, Marty. As a consequence of the sale,
the former TCT was cancelled and a new one was issued in favor of
the vendee
Petitioners, however, filed a petition for annulment of judgment on
the grounds of lack of jurisdiction and extrinsic fraud.They alleged
that they were never given the necessary notices and information
regarding the pendency of respondent Vilorias petition despite the
fact that they are the actual possessors and owners of the land
covered by the TCT.
The CA dismissed the petition for lack of merit. The CA held that
alleged ground of extrinsic fraud failed because the failure to disclose
to the adversary, or to the court, matters which would defeat ones
own claim or defense is not such extrinsic fraud as will justify or
require a vacation of the judgment. The appellate court added that
petitioners were not entitled to be notified of the petition before the
RTC for not being persons whose claim, right or interest is annotated
at the back of TCT under its Memorandum of Encumbrances.
Petitioners claim that at the time that the petition for the issuance of a
new owners duplicate copy of the TCT was filed by
respondent Viloria, the subject land had already been sold to them,
who are the actual possessors of the property. They further allege
that they are in possession of TCT, with serial number
2136412, which was delivered to them by the late wife of
respondent Viloria, Cresencia P. Viloria, along with a copy of the
sales contract dated June 5, 1986.
Issue:
Whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the case

Ruling:
No, the RTC has no jurisdiction over the issuance of a new owners
duplicate copy of Transfer Certificate.

844

The trial court could not have validly acquired jurisdiction to

reconstitute the alleged lost owners duplicate copy of the TCT since
the same was not lost but was in the possession of petitioners who
had purchased the property from its late owner. As there is no proof
to support actual loss of the said owners duplicate copies of the said
certificates of title, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction and the
new titles issued in replacement thereof are void. If an owners
duplicate copy of certificate of title has not been lost but is in fact in
possession of another person, the reconstituted title is void and the
court rendering the decision has not acquired jurisdiction.
THE PHILIPPINE COTTON CORPORATION v GAGOOMAL & ANG
G.R. No. 130389 February 11, 2008
Facts:
Pacific Mills, Inc. originally owned five parcels of land covered by four
TCTs.
These properties were subsequently purchased by
respondents on an installment basis from Pacific Mills on July 19,
1979. The RTC of Pasig rendered a decision ordering Pacific Mills to
pay its obligation under the loan agreement which the CA affirmed
after the respondent filed a collection case against the petitioner.
During the pendency of the appeal or on June 11, 1988,
the Quezon City Hall was razed by fire thereby destroying the records
of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City, including the TCTs of Pacific
Mills.
Pacific Mills filed a petition for reconstitution of the burned TCTs
through administrative reconstitution, in accordance with Republic Act
No. 6732. On March 23, 1992, the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City
issued to Pacific Mills the reconstituted TCTs. However, the aforesaid
alleged annotations of the preliminary attachment in favor of
petitioner were not incorporated in the reconstituted TCTs, but
annotated therein was the sale made by Pacific Mills to respondents
and their payment in full. On even date, the reconstituted TCTs were
cancelled in favor of the respondents.
On February 8, 1993, petitioner wrote the Registry of Deeds of
Quezon City requesting for the annotation of the notice of levy, and,
subsequently, the annotation of a favorable decision of this Court
rendered on August 3, 1992, on the new TCTs issued to respondents.
845

On February 10, 1993, Samuel C. Cleofe, the Quezon City Register

of Deeds, informed respondents that the letter-request for reannotation of notice of levy had been entered in the Primary Entry
Book and asked them to surrender their owners duplicate copies of
TCTs. Immediately upon receipt of the said letter, respondents
verified the original copies of titles in the possession of the Registry of
Deeds and discovered that the following annotations were included at
the back of the titles: Request for Re-Annotation of Notice of Levy
and Letter Request for Annotation of Entry of Judgment of Supreme
Court. Thereafter, respondents filed on March 3, 1993, a Petition for
the Cancellation of Annotations in Land Titles before the RTC of
Quezon City. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of
respondents. Under the circumstances, respondent [the Registry of
Deeds of Quezon City] should and could have properly refused such
request instead of immediately annotating it. In the same light, The
Register of Deeds may likewise properly refuse registration of an
order attachment when it appears that the title involved is not in the
name of the defendant and there is no evidence submitted to indicate
that the said defendant has any present or future interest in the
property covered by the titles. The appellate court dismissed the
appeal because the issue raised by the petitioner was a pure
question of law, over which the CA had no jurisdiction.
Issue:
Whether it is the ministerial function of the Register of Deeds to
record a right or an interest that was not duly noted in the
reconstituted certificate of title
Ruling:
No, it is not.
Section 10 of P.D. No. 1529 merely involves the general functions of
the Register of Deeds, while Section 71 thereof relates to an
attachment or lien in a registered land in which the duplicate
certificate was not presented at the time of the registration of the said
lien or attachment.
A special law specifically deals with the procedure for the
reconstitution of Torrens certificates of title lost or destroyed.
846

Furthermore, Sections 8 and 11 of the same Act provide for the

procedure for the notation of an interest that did not appear in the
reconstituted certificate of title, mandating that a petition be filed
before a court of competent jurisdiction.
Clearly, therefore, it is not the ministerial function of the Register of
Deeds to record a right or an interest that was not duly noted in the
reconstituted certificate of title. As a matter of fact, this task is not
even within the ambit of the Register of Deeds job as the
responsibility is lodged by law to the proper courts. As correctly
observed by respondents, P.D. No. 1529 principally pertains to the
registration of property, while R.A. No. 26 is a special law on the
procedure for the reconstitution of Torrens certificates of title that
were lost or destroyed. Specifically, Section 69 of P.D. No. 1529
refers to an attachment that arose after the issuance of a certificate of
title; while Section 71 of the same law pertains to the registration of
the order of a court of an attachment that was continued, reduced,
dissolved or otherwise affected by a judgment of the court.
Undoubtedly, the foregoing provisions find no application in the
present case since petitioner insists that its interest was
annotated prior to the reconstitution of the disputed certificates of title.
Requisites for Reconsitution of Title
SPOUSES FELIPE and VICTORIA LAYOS v FIL-ESTATE GOLF
AND DEVELOPMENT, INC
GR No. 150470 August 6, 2008
Facts:
FEGDI is the developer of the Manila Southwoods golf course and
residential subdivision project which partly covers lands located in
Laguna. Felipe Layos filed a complaint for Injunction and Damages
with Application for Preliminary Injunction against FERC. It was
alleged in the said complaint that Felipe Layos is the legal owner and
possessor of two (2) parcels of land that the Southwoods project
encroached upon. FERC filed an Opposition to Application for Writ of
Preliminary Injunction and explicitly stated therein that the developer
of the Southwoods project is its sister company, FEGDI. FEGDI filed
an Answer to the abovementioned complaint and reiterated that it is
the developer of the Southwoods project and not FERC and that the
847

land covered by the project is covered by Transfer Certificates of Title

in the name of La Paz (to whom they entered a joint venture), copies
of which were attached to said answer as annexes.
For the Reconstitution of Title:
The instant Petition originated from a Petition for Reconstitution of
OCT No. 239 filed by the Spouses Layos. It is noted that the Spouses
Layos instituted this reconstitution case on the same day as their
quieting of title case before the RTC.
The same allegations of souses Layos were retained. The Spouses
Layos additionally alleged that the Original Copy of the said title
which used to be in the Office of the Register of Deeds for the
Province of Laguna appears to have been lost and/or destroyed.
The San Pedro RTC denied the Spouses Layos' Motion for
Reconsideration in an Order issued on 1 October 1998.
Aggrieved, the Spouses Layos filed an appeal with the Court of
Appeals. The appellate court, however, found no reversible error in
the ruling of the lower court dismissing the Spouses Layos' Petition
for Reconstitution. According to the Court of Appeals, the validity of
OCT No. 239 of the spouses Layos was already determined by the
Supreme Court in its Decision dated 16 December 1996 in G.R. No.
120958, in which the Supreme Court categorically declared that the
said certificate of title was a forgery.
Issue:
Whether the ruling of the CA should be sustained
Ruling:
Yes, the ruling of the CA should be sustained.
The position of the Spouses Layos is untenable. Res judicata literally
means "a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a
thing or matter settled by judgment." Res judicata lays the rule that an
existing final judgment or decree rendered on the merits, and without
fraud or collusion, by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon any
matter within its jurisdiction, is conclusive of the rights of the parties
or their privies, in all other actions or suits in the same or any other
judicial tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction on the points and matters in
848

issue in the first suit. Conclusiveness of judgment bars the relitigation in a second case of a fact or question already settled in a
previous case.
The ruling of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 120958 is conclusive
upon the issue of validity of the [Spouses Layos'] OCT No. 239,
inasmuch as the said issue has already been mutually controverted
by the parties and ruled upon with finality by the Supreme Court no
less, in favor of the invalidity of the [Spouses Layos'] title.
The Court stresses once more that lands already covered by duly
issued existing Torrens Titles (which become incontrovertible upon
the expiration of one year from their issuance under Section 38 of the
Land Registration Act) cannot be the subject of petitions for
reconstitution of allegedly lost or destroyed titles filed by third parties
without first securing by final judgment the cancellation of such
existing titles. The courts simply have no jurisdiction over petitions by
such third parties for reconstitution of allegedly lost or destroyed titles
over lands that are already covered by duly issued subsisting titles in
the names of their duly registered owners. The very concept of
stability and indefeasibility of titles covered under the Torrens System
of registration rules out as anathema the issuance of two certificates
of title over the same land to two different holders thereof.
A reconstitution of title is the re-issuance of a new certificate of title
lost or destroyed in its original form and condition. It does not pass
upon the ownership of the land covered by the lost or destroyed title.
Any change in the ownership of the property must be the subject of a
separate suit. Thus, although petitioners are in possession of the
land, a separate proceeding is necessary to thresh out the issue of
ownership of the land. The reconstitution of a title is simply the
reissuance of a new duplicate certificate of title allegedly lost or
destroyed in its original form and condition. It does not pass upon the
ownership of the land covered by the lost or destroyed title.
Possession of a lost certificate is not necessarily equivalent to
ownership of the land covered by it. The certificate of title, by itself,
does not vest ownership; it is merely an evidence of title over a
particular property. Evidently, the Spouses Layos seek more than just
reconstitution of OCT No. 239 in LRC Case No. B-1758. They want to
hold a trial so as to prove before the San Pedro RTC the fraudulent
scheme perpetrated by several people, including their former
counsel, to sabotage their cases before the courts; the errors in the
Decisions of the courts that have long attained finality; and, ultimately,
849

the validity of their title to the subject property. Again, these are
matters beyond the jurisdiction of the San Pedro RTC to determine in
a case for reconstitution. If truly the Spouses Layos have been misled
and defrauded in a concerted effort to ruin their chances before the
courts, then their recourse is not to persist with this petition for
reconstitution of title, but to institute other actions to hold those
responsible administratively, civilly, and even criminally liable.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v Taustumban

G.R. No. 173210 April 24, 2009
Facts:
Respondent filed a petition for reconstitution of the OCT covering Lot
No. 7129, Flr-133, Talisay-Minglanilla Estate under Patent No. 43619
in the name of the Legal Heirs of Sofia Lazo. The OCT which was in
the possession of the Register of Deeds of the Province of Cebu was
allegedly either lost or destroyed during World War II. Respondent
anchored her petition for reconstitution on Sec. 2(d) of R.A. No. 26
which provides that an original certificate of title may be reconstituted
from an authenticated copy of the decree of registration or patent, as
the case may be, pursuant to which the original certificate of title was
issued. The RTC found the petition to be sufficient in form and
substance and set the hearing of the petition on 29 March
2000. Respondent claims she bought the property from the said
owners who are also her relatives, as evidenced by an Extrajudicial
Declaration of Heirs with Waiver of Inheritance Rights and Deed of
Absolute Sale. She claims that since the time of purchase, she has
been occupying and possessing the land and paying the realty taxes
thereon. Respondent prayed for reconstitution of the title covering
the property since the title, supposedly on file and under the custody
of the Register of Deeds of Cebu Province, had either been lost or
destroyed during World War II as certified by said office.
The RTC rendered its decision ordering the reconstitution of the lost
OCT in favor of the legal heirs of Sofia Lazo.
850

Petitioner interposed an appeal with the Court of Appeals

which, granted the same and reversed the RTC judgment. The
appellate court at first held in favor of the petitioner on the ground that
no proper reconstitution can be done since respondent did not utilize
the sources of reconstitution provided under Sec. 2 of R.A. No. 26 in
the order therein stated, merely presenting as it did a Certification
from the CENRO that a patent had been issued over Lot No. 7129 in
the name of the heirs of Sofia Lazo.
However, upon a motion for reconsideration filed by respondent, the
Court of Appeals reversed itself and held that respondent has
substantially complied with the requirements for reconstitution under
RA 26. The Court of Appeals traced the ownership of Lot No. 7129
based on the records of the Bureau of Lands, Friar Lands Division,
now the CENRO of the DENR. It found that: The property was part of
the Talisay-Minglanilla Friar Lands Estate covered by one mother title,
OCT No. 188. One such possessor was Sofia Lazo who was granted
Sales Patent No. 43619 on 21 July 1938. This led to the issuance by
the Philippine Government of a Deed of Conveyance which led to the
issuance by the Register of Deeds of a TCT in favor of the Heirs of
Sofia Lazo, and not an original certificate of title as claimed by
respondent. The plan and technical description having been
approved, may be used as basis for the inscription of the technical
description on the reconstituted certificate. Provided, however, that
no certificate of title covering the same parcel of land exists in the
office of the Register of Deeds concerned. The CA believed that
these government records as duly certified and reported by the
CENRO and the LRA uphold the prior existence of a certificate of title
in favor of the Heirs of Sofia Lazo over Lot No. 7129. Respondents
alleged failure to prove the loss of the owners duplicate certificate of
title was held to be justified by petitioners failure to deny or oppose
the allegation. As the allegation of loss was never specifically denied,
the averment in respondents petition was deemed admitted without
need of evidence to prove the same. Thus, respondent properly
resorted to the sources of reconstitution under Sec. 2(f) of R.A
26. The CA added that petitioners objections were belatedly raised
in the appeal before the appellate court and should be barred.
Issue:
Whether the decision of CA is correct
851

Ruling:
No, it is not.
The petition should be granted. The governing law for judicial
reconstitution of titles is R.A. No. 26. Sections 2 and 3of RA 26
enumerate the sources upon which reconstitution should issue. The
requirements of Secs. 2 and 3 are almost identical, referring to
documents from official sources which recognize the ownership of the
owner and his predecessors-in-interest.
Respondent anchored her petition for reconstitution on Sec. 2(d) of
RA 26. Respondent however failed to present an authenticated copy
of the decree of registration or patent pursuant to which the original
certificate of title was issued. She relied on the CENRO certification
which is however not the authenticated copy of the decree of
registration or patent required by law. The certification plainly states
only that Lot No. 7129 is patented in the name of the Legal Heirs of
Sofia Lazo. It is not even a copy of the decree of registration or
patent itself but a mere certification of the issuance of such patent.
Even if we base respondents petition on Sec. 2(f) of R.A. No. 26 as
the Court of Appeals did, and as respondent now argues in this
petition, reconstitution would still not issue. Resort to other
documents in Sec. 2(f) must be employed only when the documents
earlier referred to in Secs. 2(a) to (e) do not avail.
The problem though is that respondent has not established the
issuance or existence of the certificate of title covering Lot No. 7129
nor of the other documents enumerated in Secs. 2(b) to (e) that
would prove the existence, execution and contents of the certificate of
title sought to be reconstituted. There is nothing in the evidence she
presented that would show that Lot No. 7129 had been registered in
the name of the Legal Heirs of Sofia Lazo and that the certificate of
title in the name of the said heirs over said property had been issued.

Sources of Reconstitution of Title

852

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v LAGRAMADA

G.R. No. 150741 June 12, 2008
Facts:
A parcel of land (lot 8) located at Banlat, Tandang Sora, QuezonCity,
was allegedly covered by a TCT in the name of Pangilinan. The
original copy of the TCT was allegedly destroyed when a fire razed
the office of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City on 11 June 1988.
In
1996, Pangilinan sold Lot 8
to
the
spouses
Vicente
and Bonifacia Lagramada (respondents). Respondents
filed
a
petition for reconstitution of the original copy of the TCT and for the
issuance of a second owners duplicate copy of the
title. Pangilinan allegedly misplaced the owners duplicate copy and it
could no longer be found despite diligent efforts to find it.
The following documents were submitted as evidentiary bases for the
reconstitution:
1. Certification from the Office of the Acting Deputy Register of
Deeds of Quezon City respecting the destruction of TCT
No.
118717;
2. Affidavit of Loss of TCT No. 118717 executed by Pangilinan;
3. Deed of Sale executed by Pangilinan in favor of respondents;
4. Tax payment receipts from 1976 to 1997;
5. Tax Declaration No. C-122-01735 in the name of Pangilinan; and
6. Certified true copy of the technical description, verified and
approved for the administrator by Apolinar R. Lucido of the
Subdivision and Consolidation Division; and
7. The plan prepared and verified as correct by Geodetic
Engineer Eligio L. Cruz and approved for the LRA
The trial court found the petition meritorious and ruled in favor of
respondents.
Petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed an appeal
on the ground that respondents pieces of evidence are not sufficient
to warrant reconstitution.
The Court of Appeals ruled that respondents sought the reconstitution
not in their capacity as owners but as persons who have an interest in
the property. The Court of Appeals ruled that respondents were
853

asking for reconstitution not in their names but in the name

of Pangilinan. The Court of Appeals ruled that nowhere in Republic
Act No. 26 (RA 26) was it provided that the term any other
document refers to similar documents enumerated under Sections
2(f) and 3(f). The Court of Appeals ruled that the only requirement
was that the other document must be in the judgment of the court
proper and sufficient, and accompanied with a plan and technical
description of the property approved by the Commissioner of Land
Registration. The Court of Appeals ruled that, in this case, the proofs
presented by respondents were, in the judgment of the court, proper
and sufficient bases to support the application for reconstitution of
TCT No. 118717.
Issue:
Whether the documents presented by respondents are sufficient
bases for the reconstitution of the TCT
Ruling:
The petition has merit.
In this case, two certificates of title were allegedly lost the original
copy of the transfer certificate of title in the Register of Deeds
of Quezon City which was destroyed in a fire, and the owners
duplicate
copy
of
the
certificate of title which Pangilinan
misplaced. Hence, respondents were asking for the reconstitution of
the original copy of the transfer certificate of title and the issuance of
a second owners duplicate copy of the certificate of title. The
requirements of Sections 2 and 3 are almost identical. We agree with
petitioner that the enumerated requirements are documents from
official sources which recognize the ownership of the owner and his
predecessors-in-interest. We likewise agree that any other
document in paragraph (f) of Sections 2 and 3 refers to documents
similar to those enumerated. We find that the documents submitted
by respondents are not sufficient bases for reconstitution.
The Certification of the alleged loss of TCT No. 118717 due to fire,
issued by the Register of Deeds of Quezon City on 28 February
1996 upon the request of respondents counsel, was a form
document where the name of Pangilinan and the TCT No. were typed
on the blanks provided. The one-page deed of sale, denominated
854

Kasulatan ng Biling Lampasan ng Isang LupangResidencial,where

Pangilinan allegedly sold the 500-square meter lot to respondents
for P15,000, did not even indicate the TCT No. of the lot sold. The
tax payment receipts from 1976 to 1996 presented were all paid by
respondents in 1995 in the name ofPangilinan. They likewise did not
indicate the title of the lot covered. The technical description and blue
print plan, prepared at the instance of Vicente Lagramada, are
additional requirements under Section 12 of RA 26 and are not on
their own sufficient bases for reconstitution.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v ROYALES

G.R. No. 168742 September 3, 2008
Facts:
The Director of Lands filed a cadastral case involving four lots located
in Camarines Sur. He prayed that these parcels of land be declared
public land. Respondent Norma Royales was a claimant of these
lots.
On September 17, 1975, the CFI rendered a decision ordering the
registration of the lots in the name of respondent. However, before
the certificate of finality of the decision and order for the issuance of
the decree of registration could be issued by the court, the Registry of
Deeds of Camarines Sur was razed by fire on June 26, 1976 and all
the titles and documents therein were burned. 27 years later,
respondent filed a petition for the reconstitution of the September 17,
1975 CFI decision in the RTC. The RTC issued an order setting the
petition for hearing without directing the respondent to cause the
publication of said order in the Official Gazette. The RTC rendered a
decision granting the petition and ordered the reconstitution.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines filed an appeal in the CA. The
CA affirmed the RTC decision. It denied reconsideration in a
855

resolution dated June 28, 2005. It held that publication was no longer
required because the CFI, through the Land Registration Commission
(predecessor of the LRA), had already caused the publication of the
order in the Official Gazette. Petitioner argues that under Section 10
of Act 3110, publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in a
petition for reconstitution of records of pending cadastral cases.
Issue:
Whether or not publication was necessary in this case
Ruling:
Yes, it is necessary.
The case here involves a cadastral undertaking. Under the cadastral
system, the government initiates the proceedings for the compulsory
registration of lands within a stated area by filing a petition in court
against the holder, claimants, possessors or occupants of such lands.
All claimants are compelled to act and present their answers
otherwise they lose their right to own their property. The purpose is to
serve public interest by requiring that the titles to the lands be settled
and adjudicated. Notice of the filing of the petition is published in the
Official Gazette. During the trial, conflicting claims are presented and
the court adjudicates ownership in favor of one of the claimants.
When the decision becomes final, the court orders the issuance of
the decree of registration which, in turn, becomes the basis for the
issuance of a certificate of title. The cadastral system was conceived
to hasten the registration of lands and therefore make it more
effective. However, these two kinds of proceedings also vary in a
number of ways and the legislature chose to treat them differently in
Act 3110. Its intent to differentiate the two reconstitution procedures
should be given effect. It was presumed to know the meaning of the
words it employed and to have used them advisedly. It is Section 10
which is applicable to this cadastral proceeding. Consequently, the
RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over respondents petition for
reconstitution for failing to comply with the publication requirement.
Mantok v Barque
G.R. Nos. 162335 & 162605
856

Facts:
Basing on the 2005 case of Manatok v Barque, on 11 June 1988, a
fire gutted portions of the Quezon City Hall, immolating, among
others, records stored in the Office of the Register of Deeds of
Quezon City. In the context of an administrative reconstitution
proceeding before the LRA, the Barques have sought that the LRA
exercise the power to cancel the Manotok title and forthwith cause
the reconstitution of their own title. The LRA refused to do so,
although it did rule that the Manotok title was spurious and thus
subject to cancellation through the proper judicial proceeding. The
Court of Appeals initially upheld the LRAs position, but ultimately,
upon motion for reconsideration, directed the cancellation of the
Manotok title and the reconstitution of the Barque title. Both assailed
Amended Decisions of the Court of Appeals notably directed the
cancellation of the Manotok title even as it mandated the
reconstitution of the Barque title.
Issue:
Whether the Court of Appeals acquired jurisdiction over the case
Ruling:
No, it did not acquire.
There is no doubt that the Court of Appeals does not have original
jurisdiction to annul Torrens titles or to otherwise adjudicate questions
over ownership of property. Its exclusive original jurisdiction is
determined by law, particularly by Batas Pambansa (B.P. 129).
Section 9 of that law restricts the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Court of Appeals to special civil actions and to actions for annulment
of judgments of the regional trial court. Still, the Court of Appeals did
acquire jurisdiction over the Barques and the Manotoks petitions,
albeit in the exercise of its exclusive appellate jurisdiction over the
ruling of the LRA, also pursuant to Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 129, as
amended. Thus, for the appellate court to be able to direct the
cancellation of aTorrens title in the course of reviewing a decision of
the LRA, the LRA itself must have statutory authority to cancel
a Torrens title in the first place. That the RTC has exclusive original
jurisdiction over actions seeking the cancellation of title to real
857

property is so cardinal in our remedial law that it is reflected in

hundreds if not thousands of examples in jurisprudence under Sect
19 of BP 129. Nowhere in Section 6 of PD 1529 we can see that the
LRA has the power to cancel titles. Indeed, the Barques are unable to
point to any basis in law that confirms the power of the LRA to effect
such cancellation, even under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 26 as
amended by Rep. Act No. 6732, which authorizes the administrative
reconstitution of titles in limited cases. In fact, as we shall see shortly
such laws take great care to ensure that a petition for administrative
reconstitution of title will not disturb existing Torrenstitles. It is thus
clear that neither the Court of Appeals nor the LRA had jurisdiction to
cancel the Manotok title.
Under Rep. Act No. 26 as amended by Rep. Act No. 6732,
administrative reconstitution of titles is permitted where the
certificates of titles have been lost due to flood, fire and other force
majeure.
Furthermore, Section 19 of Rep. Act No. 26 and Sections 11 and 12
of RA 6732 indubitably establish that the administrative reconstitution
of Torrens titles is intended for non-controversial cases, or especially
where the subject property is not covered by an existing title in favor
of a person other than the applicant. Such an implication is consonant
with the rule that the reconstitution proceedings are not the venue for
confirmation or adjudication of title, but merely a means by which a
previously adjudicated title whose original has been lost or destroyed
may be reissued to its owner.
If a petition for administrative reconstitution is filed with the LRA, and
it appears from the official records that the subject property is already
covered by an existing Torrens title in the name of another person,
there is nothing further the LRA can do but to dismiss the petition.
The dismissal of such petition is subject to judicial review, but the only
relevant inquiry in such appellate proceeding is on whether or not
there is a previously existing title covering that property. Neither the
LRA nor the Court of Appeals at that point may inquire into the validity
of the title or the competing claims over the property. The only
remedy is an action before the RTC for the cancellation of the
existing title, whether by the competing claimant or by the OSG on
behalf of the Republic.
Courts have no jurisdiction over petitions for reconstitution of
allegedly lost or destroyed titles over lands that are already covered
858

by duly issued subsisting titles in the name of their duly registered

owners

CONDOMINIUM LAW
Hulst v PR Builders
566 SCRA 333 September 25, 2008
Facts:
Jacobus Bernhard and Ida Hulst (spouses Hulst), Dutch nationals,
entered into a Contract to Sell with PR Builders, Inc. for the purchase
of a 210-sq m residential unit in respondent's townhouse project
in Batangas. The spouses Hulst filed a complaint for rescission of
contract with interest, damages and attorneys fees against PR
Builders, Inc. for the latters failure to complete the project that they
agreed upon verbally. The HLURB decided the case in favor of the
spouses. Spouses Hulst, however, divorced. Ida assigned her rights
over the purchased property to petitioner. From then on, petitioner
alone pursued the case. The Ex-Officio Sheriff proceeded to
implement the Writ of Execution. However, upon complaint of
respondent with the CA on a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,
the levy made by the Sheriff was set aside, requiring the Sheriff to
levy first on respondent's personal properties. The Sheriff tried to
implement the writ as directed but the writ was returned unsatisfied.
Upon petitioner's motion, the HLURB Arbiter issued an Alias Writ of
Execution. The Sheriff levied on respondent's 15 parcels of land
covered by 13 TCTs in Batangas. In a Notice of Sale, the Sheriff set
the public auction of the levied properties.Two days before the
scheduled public auction, respondent filed an Urgent Motion to
Quash Writ of Levy with the HLURB on the ground that the Sheriff
made an over levy since the aggregate appraised value of the levied
properties at P6,500.00 per sq m is P83,616,000.00, based on the
Appraisal Report of Henry Hunter Bayne Co., Inc. dated December
859

11, 1996, which is over and above the judgment award. Respondent's
counsel objected to the conduct of the public auction on the ground
that respondent's Urgent Motion to Quash Writ of Levy was pending
resolution. Absent any restraining order from the HLURB, the Sheriff
proceeded to sell the 15 parcels of land. Holly Properties Realty
Corporation was the winning bidder for all 15 parcels of land for the
total amount of P5,450,653.33. The sum of P5,313,040.00 was
turned over to the petitioner in satisfaction of the judgment award
after deducting the legal fees.
Four months later, the HLURB Arbiter and HLURB Director issued an
Order setting aside the sheriff's levy on respondent's real properties.
Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with the CA.
The CA rendered herein assailed Decision dismissing the petition.
There is an inadequacy that shocks the senses.
Issue:
Whether the spouses can own a real property
Ruling:
No, they cannot.
The spouses Hulst are foreign nationals who are disqualified under
the Constitution from owning real property in their names. Private
land may be transferred or conveyed only to individuals or entities
"qualified to acquire lands of the public domain." The 1987
Constitution reserved the right to participate in the disposition,
exploitation, development and utilization of lands of the public domain
for Filipino citizens or corporations at least 60 percent of the capital of
which is owned by Filipinos. Aliens, whether individuals or
corporations, have been disqualified from acquiring public lands;
hence, they have also been disqualified from acquiring private lands.
In addition, the HLURB Arbiter and Director had no sufficient factual
basis to determine the value of the levied property. Respondent only
submitted an Appraisal Report, based merely on surmises. The
Report was based on the projected value of the townhouse project
after it shall have been fully developed, that is, on the assumption
that the residential units appraised had already been built. The
Appraiser in fact made this qualification in its Appraisal Report: "[t]he
860

property subject of this appraisal has not been constructed. The basis
of the appraiser is on the existing model units." 74 Since it is
undisputed that the townhouse project did not push through, the
projected value did not become a reality. Thus, the appraisal value
cannot be equated with the fair market value. The Appraisal Report is
not the best proof to accurately show the value of the levied
properties as it is clearly self-serving.
Lesson learned:
No condominium unit can be sold without at the same time selling the
corresponding amount of rights, shares or other interest in the
condominium management body, the Condominium Corporation; and
no one can buy shares in a condominium unit. RA 4726 allows
foreigners to acquire condominium units and shares in condominium
corporations up to more than 40% of the total and outstanding capital
stocks of a Filipino-owned or controlled corporation.

861

-To God Be The Glory-

862