POSITION PAPER PILIPINO BANANA GROWERS AND EXPORTERS ASSOCIATION INC.

The Court
Appeals is correct in ruling that Ordinance 0309-07 constituted an unreasonable
exercise of police power. There is no question that it is within the power of th
e Sangguniang Panglungsod of Davao City to enact such ordinance (Section 16 or t
he General Welfare Clause, and under Section 458 of the Local Government Code) a
s such involves a measure with a lawful subject, that is, the protection of the
public health and the environment against the alleged harmful effects of aerial
spraying of pesticides and fungicides. However, in the exercise of such power, t
he means employed must also be reasonable. It must not unduly be oppressive to i
ndividuals. In this case, it has been shown as will be discussed below that such
means is unreasonable and unduly oppressive to individuals, particularly our cl
ient, the Pilipino Banana Growers and Exporters. I. Section 5 of the Ordinance r
equiring a period of 3 months to shift from aerial spraying to ground spraying i
s unreasonable, oppressive and impossible to comply with Section 5 of the Ordinanc
e is unreasonable because in effect it criminalizes aerial spraying even as it w
ould be physically impossible for the banana growers to be able to configure the
ir banana plantations for ground spraying within such insufficient period of 3 m
onths. As correctly ruled by the respondent Court of Appeals, [I}n view of the in
frastructural requirements, it was physically be impossible for petitioners-appe
llants (banana growers) to carry out a carefully planned configuration of vast h
ectares of banana plantations and be able to actually adopt truck-mounted boom s
praying within 3 months. To compel petitioners-appellants (banana growers) to ab
andon aerial spraying in favor of manual or backpack spraying or sprinkler spray
ing within 3 months puts petitioners-appellants (banana growers) in a vicious di
lemma between protecting its investments and the health of its workers, on the o
ne hand, and the threat of prosecution if they refuse to comply with the imposit
ion Furthermore the 3-month transition period is insufficient not only in acquirin
g and gearing up the plantation workers and safety appurtenances, nut more impor
tantly in reviewing safety procedures for manual or backpack spraying and in tra
ining such workers for the purpose. Also, the engineering works for a sprinkler
system in vast hectares of banana plantations could not possibly be
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completed within such period, considering that safety and efficient factors need
to be considered in structure re-designing. Section 5 also, in effect, compels p
etitioners-appellants (banana growers) to abandon aerial spraying without afford
ing them enough time to convert to other spraying practices. This would petition
ers-appellants (banana growers) from being able to fertilize their plantation wi
th essential vitamins and minerals, aside from applying the needed pesticides an
d fungicides to control if not eliminate the threat of plant diseases. Such the
would prejudice the operation of plantations, and the economic repercussions the
reof may lead to shutting down the venture of petitioners-appellants (banana gro
wers). II. Even assuming arguendo that it was physically possible for the petiti
onersappellants (banana growers) to shift to other modes of spraying, still the
Ordinance in question is invalid because there is no scientific basis for bannin
g aerial spraying There is no scientific basis that aerial spraying of pesticide
s or fungicides poses a serious threat to the health and livelihood of people an
d to the environment. The oppositors argue that since the Court of Appeals ruled
that the issue of aerial spraying as inimical to public health and livelihood h
as not been factually settled, then the presumption of validity must be applied.
This is untenable. The presumption of validity is inapplicable in this case. Le
gislation must be based on hard facts. Inasmuch as it would prejudice petitioner
s-appellants (banana growers) if such Ordinance is not based on hard evidence to
show that aerial spraying is inimical to public safety, then the burden of proo
f is on the Sanggunian to prove otherwise. III. The Ordinance violates the equal
protection clause of the Constitution The Ordinance violates the equal protecti
on clause because it is a sweeping importation against the aerial spraying of al
l forms of substances, not only pesticides or fungicides but including water and
all forms of chemicals, regardless of its elements, composition or degree of sa
fety. As the Court of Appeals correctly held, [It] does not classify which substa
nces are prohibited from being aerially even as reasonable distinctions would be
made in terms of the hazards, safety or beneficial effects of liquid substances
to the public health, livelihood and the environment. The measure also fails to
differentiate among classes of pesticides or fungicides, and does not distingui
sh levels of concentration of such
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substances when aerially sprayed, such that even substances which are beneficial
to and enhance agricultural production are covered by the ban. IV. The means em
ployed provided for in the Ordinance has no relation to the purpose sought to be
achieved The means to enforce the ordinance has no reasonable relation to the e
vil sought to be avoided, which is the alleged harmful effects of pesticides on
public health and the environment, because instead of regulation the substances
sprayed, the measure bans aerial spraying which is the means to achieve the purp
ose, hence, only a method of application. In effect, the Ordinance forbids the a
erial spraying even of vitamins or other substances like water which are commonl
y known as safe and which normally enhance the growth and harvest thereby compro
mising agricultural productivity. This amounts to an arbitrary intrusion into th
e banana growers and exporters prerogatives in pursuing a lawful endeavor and in p
rotecting its investments, exceeding what must be fairly required by the legitim
ate demands of public welfare V. The Ordinance is tantamount to confiscation of
property without due process of law Section 6 of the Ordinance provides that all
agricultural entities must provide fro a 30-meter buffer zone within the boundar
ies of their agricultural farms / plantations. This is an unreasonable police mea
sure as it violates the due process clause in that it is tantamount to confiscat
ion of property without due process of law. The requirement under Section 6 appa
rently makes no fair distinction as to the area or size of the plantation over w
hich the buffer zone would be established. It imposes a fixed 30-meter buffer zo
ne without regard to the size of the landholdings or plantations. Owners of farm
s, even those with areas of perhaps 1 or 2 hectares, or maybe lesser, which coul
d meagerly accommodate a low-budget activity, would then cede portions thereof f
or such purpose, downsizing the area to be cultivated and constricting further t
he viability of their farmlands for profitable endeavors. Thus the requirement v
iolates due process because it unreasonably deprives plantation owners of the la
wful and beneficial use of such areas to be ceded, without just compensation. Mo
reover, the area to be ceded is not noxious property or has not been used for no
xious purpose. Farms and banana plantations per se are not noxious to the
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public welfare. Hence, police power cannot be invoked to justify a compulsion fo

r plantation owners to cede a portion of their property as a buffer zone without
the payment of just compensation. So, Section 6 constitute unlawful taking with
out due process.
BALISI, REODY ANTHONY M. PINEDA, GIULIA FRANCESCA
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