DUE PROCESS IN TERMINATION AND

DISCIPLINARY
ACTIONS;
MINIMUM
PERIOD FOR REPLY TO SHOW-CAUSE
NOTICE
By: Atty.Fred | March 4, 2015 in HR and Labor
2 Replies | Related posts at the bottom of article

Practitioners in the field of labor or Human

Resources (HR), as well as managers and
executive officers of companies, are aware
that an employee may only be dismissed for
cause.
Disciplinary
actions,
including
dismissal from work, must comply with both
substantive and procedural due process.
Substantive due process requires a valid
cause for the dismissal. For procedural due
process, outlined below, an interesting
question is this: is there a minimum
period that must be given to the
employee to answer the show-cause
notice?
We recently received a query as to how
many days should be given to the employee
to answer the show-cause notice. We find
this query interesting because there is no
provision in the Labor Code, or its
Implementing Rules and Regulations, which
spells out a specific period. Whats more
interesting, however, is that the Supreme
Court has construed this period to mean
five (5) days from receipt of the show
cause notice.
The
procedural
requirements,
summarized by the Supreme Court, are:

as

(A) The first written notice to be served

on the employees should contain the
specific causes or grounds for termination
against them, and a directive that the
employees are given the opportunity to
submit their written explanation within a
reasonable
period.
Reasonable
opportunity under the Omnibus Rules
means every kind of assistance that
management must accord to the employees
to enable them to prepare adequately for
their defense. This should be construed as a
period of at least five (5) calendar days from
receipt of the notice to give the employees
an opportunity to study the accusation
against them, consult a union official or
lawyer, gather data and evidence, and
decide on the defenses they will raise
against the complaint. Moreover, in order to
enable the employees to intelligently

prepare their explanation and defenses, the

notice should contain a detailed narration of
the facts and circumstances that will serve
as basis for the charge against the
employees. A general description of the
charge will not suffice. Lastly, the notice
should specifically mention which company
rules, if any, are violated and/or which
among the grounds under Art. 282 is being
charged against the employees.
(B) After serving the first notice, the
employers should schedule and conduct
a hearing or conference wherein the
employees will be given the opportunity to:
(1) explain and clarify their defenses to the
charge against them;
(2) present evidence in support of their
defenses; and
(3) rebut the evidence presented against
them by the management.
During the hearing or conference, the
employees are given the chance to defend
themselves personally, with the assistance
of a representative or counsel of their
choice. Moreover, this conference or hearing
could be used by the parties as an
opportunity to come to an amicable
settlement
.
(C) After determining that termination of
employment is justified, the employers shall
serve the employees a written notice of
termination indicating
that:
(1)
all
circumstances involving the charge against
the employees have been considered; and
(2) grounds have been established to justify
the severance of their employment.
Illegal dismissal and personal liability of
corporate officers; law and jurisprudence.
I wish to share to my readers the
legal and jurisprudential parts of a recent
reply position paper in a labor case that
our law office has prepared under my
direct supervision, for legal research
purposes.
REPLY POSITION PAPER FOR THE
COMPLAINANT
THE COMPLAINANT x x x, by counsel,
respectfully states:

1.

The two (2) basic issues in this case are

in any manner, to commit acts of disrespect
whether X X X was illegally dismissed and
towards his women colleagues.
whether the respondents should be held jointly
and severally liable for tort and damages.
4.
At this point, it must be repeated, for
emphasis, that X X X was not afforded the
X x x.
opportunity: to hire a private lawyer (a basic
human
right
to
counsel)
during
2.
Please note that Article 281 of the Labor
the rush administrative hearing; to confront the
Code on probationary employment (applicable
complainants and witnesses against him by way
to X x x) provides that the services of an
of cross examination; to study the documents,
employee who has been engaged on a
records, and evidence against him in the
probationary basis may be terminated for a just
possession of the respondents; to secure formal
cause or when he fails to qualify as a regular
minutes and transcripts of the said hearing
employee in accordance with reasonable
(there being none, it now appears); and at the
standards made known by the employer to the
least, the fair time to prepare for his own
employee at the time of his engagement. It
defense. His human right to DUE PROCESS OF
further provides that an employee who is
LAW was violated. End result: A family man, with
allowed to work after a probationary period shall
good moral character, good education and work
be considered a regular employee. In the
experience, and good name and honor has been
employment contract of X X X, his probation
rendered jobless, exposing his helpless wife and
actually was 3 months. He had completed his
young children to hunger, suffering, anxieties,
first 3 months it without any negative action on
mental pain, anguish, and public ridicule, all of
the part of respondents. He was allowed to
which deserve the imposition of MORAL and
proceed to another renewable (2nd phase) 3
EXEMPLARY DAMAGES of P500, 000.o0 each and
months of probation. At this time, no formal
ATTORNEYS FEES of 10% of recoverable
performance evaluation was conducted. The
amounts, plus COSTS OF SUIT and LITIGATION
respondents simply dismissed him by reason of
EXPENSES.
the above-mentioned two incidents.
5.
X X X reiterates the jurisprudence he had
3.
Further, it must be noted Article 282 of the
earlier cited in his Position Paper in support of
Labor Code(termination by employer) provides
his arguments, to wit:
that an
employer may terminate an
Marcial Gu-Miro v. Rolando C. Adorable, et. al., GR
No. 160952, 20 August 2004, citing Asuncion v. NLRC,
employment for:

(a) Serious misconduct

or willful disobedience by the employee
of the lawful orders of his employer or
representative in connection with his
work;
(b) Gross and habitual neglect by the
employee of his duties;
(c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee
of the trust reposed in him by his
employer
or
duly
authorized
representative;
(d) Commission of a crime or offense by the
employee against the person of his
employer or any immediate member of
his family or his duly authorized
representative; and
(e) Other
causes
analogous to
the
foregoing.
To repeat: None of the foregoing grounds6.
applies to X X X. His subject actuations were not
harmful, were without malicious intent to injure,
harm, intimidate, or threaten, or to commit
sexual harassment or acts of lasciviousness or,

GR No. 129329, 31 July 2001, 362 SCRA 56, and Dizon

v. NLRC, GR No. 79554, 14 December 1989, 180 SCRA
52).
Solidbank Corporation v. CA, et. al., GR No.
151026, August 25, 2003).
Felix v. NLRC, GR No. 148256, November 17, 2004
citing Pilipinas Bank v. NLRC, 215 SCRA 750, 756
(1992), and Quezon Electric Cooperative v. NLRC,
172 SCRA 88, 97 (1989)).
Philippine Commercial Industrial Bank v. Cabrera,
GR No. 160386, March 31, 2005.
Hacienda Bino et al v. Cuenca et al, GR No.
150478, April 15, 2005
PLDT vs. NLRC and Enrique Gabriel; G.R. No.
106947; February 11, 1999.
SOLVIC INDUSTRIAL CORP. and ANTONIO C. TAM,
petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL
LABOR
RELATIONS
COMMISSION and DIOSDADO LAUZ, respondents.
[G.R. No. 125548. September 25, 1998].
Melody Paulino Lopez V. NLRC, G.R. No. 125548,
October 8,1999; Martinez, J.; and
CAINGAT vs. NLRC, et al, GR 154308, March 10,
2005

The Civil Code provides when a person may be

held liable for DAMAGES arising from TORT,
QUASI DELICT, ABUSE OF RIGHT, MALICIOUS
PROSECUTION, and other unjust, unfair and
abusive acts that injure ones constitutional and
statutory rights as a person, citizen, and worker,
to wit:

Art. 10. In case of doubt in the interpretation or

application of laws, it is presumed that the
lawmaking body intended right and justice to
prevail.
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his
rights and in the performance of his duties, act
with justice, give everyone his due, and observe
honesty and good faith.
Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law,
willfully or negligently causes damage to
another shall indemnify the latter for the same.
Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or
injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage.
Art. 22. Every person who through an act of
performance by another, or any other means,
acquires or comes into possession of something
at the expense of the latter without just or legal
ground, shall return the same to him.
Art. 23. Even when an act or event causing
damage to another's property was not due to
the fault or negligence of the defendant, the
latter shall be liable for indemnity if through the
act or event he was benefited.
Art. 24. In all contractual, property or other
relations, when one of the parties is at a
disadvantage on account of his moral
dependence, ignorance, indigence, mental
weakness, tender age or other handicap, the
courts must be vigilant for his protection.
Art. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any
private individual, who directly or indirectly
obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner
impedes or impairs any of the following rights
and liberties of another person shall be liable to
the latter for damages:
X x x.
(6) The right against deprivation of property
without due process of law;
X x x.
(8) The right to the equal protection of the laws;
X x x.
(16) The right of the accused to be heard by
himself and counsel, to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him,
to have a speedy and public trial, to meet the

witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory

process to secure the attendance of witness in
his behalf;
(17) Freedom from being compelled to be a
witness against one's self, or from being forced
to confess guilt, or from being induced by a
promise of immunity or reward to make such
confession, except when the person confessing
becomes a State witness;
X x x.
In any of the cases referred to in this article,
whether or not the defendant's act or omission
constitutes a criminal offense, the aggrieved
party has a right to commence an entirely
separate and distinct civil action for damages,
and for other relief. Such civil action shall
proceed
independently
of
any
criminal
prosecution (if the latter be instituted), and mat
be proved by a preponderance of evidence.
The indemnity shall include moral damages.
Exemplary damages may also be adjudicated.
X x x.
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes
damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage
done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no preexisting contractual relation between the
parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed
by the provisions of this Chapter. (1902a)
Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence
under the preceding article is entirely separate
and distinct from the civil liability arising from
negligence under the Penal Code. But the
plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the
same act or omission of the defendant.
Art. 2178. The provisions of Articles 1172 to
1174 are also applicable to a quasi-delict. (n)
Art. 2179. When the plaintiff's own negligence
was the immediate and proximate cause of his
injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his
negligence was only contributory, the immediate
and proximate cause of the injury being the
defendant's lack of due care, the plaintiff may
recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate
the damages to be awarded. (n)
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article
2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts
or omissions, but also for those of persons for
whom one is responsible.
X x x.

The owners and managers of an establishment

or enterprise are likewise responsible for
damages caused by their employees in the
service of the branches in which the latter are
employed or on the occasion of their functions.
Employers shall be liable for the damages
caused by their employees and household
helpers acting within the scope of their assigned
tasks, even though the former are not engaged
in any business or industry.
X x x.

In all cases, the attorney's fees and expenses of

litigation must be reasonable.
Art. 2217. Moral damages include physical
suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious
anxiety,
besmirched
reputation,
wounded
feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and
similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary
computation, moral damages may be recovered
if they are the proximate result of the
defendant's wrongful act for omission.
Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in
the following and analogous cases:

The responsibility treated in this article shall

cease when the persons herein mentioned prove
that they observed all the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent damage.

X x x.

Art. 2194. The responsibility of two or more

persons who are liable for quasi-delict is
solidary.

X x x.

Art. 2202. In crimes and quasi-delicts, the

defendant shall be liable for all damages which
are the natural and probable consequences of
the act or omission complained of. It is not
necessary that such damages have been
foreseen or could have reasonably been
foreseen by the defendant.
Art. 2208. In the absence of stipulation,
attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, other
than judicial costs, cannot be recovered, except:
(1) When exemplary damages are awarded;
(2) When the defendant's act or omission has
compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third
persons or to incur expenses to protect his
interest;

(10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21,

26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35.

Art. 2220. Willful injury to property may be a

legal ground for awarding moral damages if the
court should find that, under the circumstances,
such damages are justly due. The same rule
applies to breaches of contract where the
defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith.
Art. 2229. Exemplary or corrective damages are
imposed, by way of example or correction for
the public good, in addition to the moral,
temperate,
liquidated
or
compensatory
damages.
Art. 2231. In quasi-delicts, exemplary damages
may be granted if the defendant acted with
gross negligence.

X x x.

Art. 2232. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the

court may award exemplary damages if the
defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent,
reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner.

(5) Where the defendant acted in gross and

evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the
plaintiffs plainly valid, just and demandable
claim;

Art. 2233. Exemplary damages cannot be

recovered as a matter of right; the court will
decide whether or not they should be
adjudicated.

X x x.
(7) In actions for the recovery of wages of
household helpers, laborers and skilled workers;
(8) In actions for indemnity under workmen's
compensation and employer's liability laws;
X x x.
(11) In any other case where the court deems it
just and equitable that attorney's fees and
expenses of litigation should be recovered.

Art. 2234. While the amount of the exemplary

damages need not be proved, the plaintiff must
show that he is entitled to moral, temperate or
compensatory damages before the court may
consider the question of whether or not
exemplary damages should be awarded. In case
liquidated damages have been agreed upon,
although no proof of loss is necessary in order
that such liquidated damages may be recovered,
nevertheless, before the court may consider the
question of granting exemplary in addition to the

7.

liquidated damages, the plaintiff must show that

he would be entitled to moral, temperate or
compensatory damages were it not for the
stipulation for liquidated damages.

Article 21[65] refers to acts contra bonus

mores and has the following elements: (1) There
is an act which is legal; (2) but which is contrary
to morals, good custom, public order, or public
policy; and (3) it is done with intent to injure.[66]

ABUSE OF RIGHT as a legal doctrine was

dissected in the case of NIKKO HOTEL MANILA
GARDEN, et al, vs. REYES, GR 154259,
February 28, 2005, where, inter alia, Articles
19 and 21 of the Civil Code were invoked.
Although the hotel was not held liable for
damages, the Court took the case as an
opportunity to make an extensive discussion of
the concept of ABUSE OF RIGHT, which X X X
hereby adopts in this case in support of his legal
theory, thus:

A common theme runs through Articles 19 and

21,[67]and that is, the act complained of must be
intentional.[68]

X x x.
Article 19, known to contain what is commonly
referred to as the principle of abuse of rights,
[59]
is not a panacea for all human hurts and
social grievances. Article 19 states:
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of
his rights and in the performance of his duties,
act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith.
Elsewhere, we explained that when a right is
exercised in a manner which does not conform
with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and
results in damage to another, a legal wrong is
thereby committed for which the wrongdoer
must be responsible.[60] The object of this
article, therefore, is to set certain standards
which must be observed not only in the exercise
of ones rights but also in the performance of 8.
ones duties.[61] These standards are the
following: act with justice, give everyone his due
and observe honesty and good faith. [62] Its
antithesis, necessarily, is any act evincing bad
faith or intent to injure. Its elements are the
following: (1) There is a legal right or duty; (2)
which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole
intent of prejudicing or injuring another. [63]
When Article 19 is violated, an action for
damages is proper under Articles 20 or 21 of the
Civil Code. Article 20 pertains to damages
arising from a violation of law [64] which does not
obtain herein as Ms. Lim was perfectly within her
right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave. Article 21, on
the other hand, states:
Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or
injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage.

X x x.
Notes (laws and cases cited above):
[47]

E.L. Pineda, Torts and Damages

Annotated, p. 52 (2004 ed).
[48]
Garciano v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
96126, 10 August 1992, 212 SCRA 436, 440.
[49]
cf. Servicewide Specialists, Inc. v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 74553,
08 June 1989, 174 SCRA 80, 88.
[50]
Sangco, Torts and Damages Vol.1 , pp.
83-84.
[51]
Floro v. Llenado, G.R. No. 75723, 02
June 1995, 244 SCRA 713, 720.
[58]
Article 2180, Civil Code.
[59]
Globe-Mackay Cable and Radio Corp.
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 81262, 25 August
1989, 176 SCRA 779, 783.
[60]
Albenson Enterprises Corp. v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 88694, 11 January 1993, 217
SCRA 16, 25.
[64]
Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to
law, willfully or negligently causes damage to
another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.
See Globe Mackay,supra, note 61 at 784.
[72]
Art. 2234, Civil Code.
Respondents cited the case of MERCURY
DRUG CORPORATION vs. NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION, NLRC SHERIFF
and CESAR E. LADISLA, G.R. No. 75662
September 15, 1989, but it is not applicable in
this case. In the said case, the private
respondent Cesar E. Ladisla was employed by
petitioner Mercury Drug Corporation as a Stock
Analyst at its Claro M. Recto Branch. He had
been with the company for two years and nine
months. On August 15, 1977 he was
apprehended by representatives of Mercury
Drug while in the act of pilfering company
property consisting of three (3) bottles of
Persantin and one (1) bottle of Valoron at 100
tablets per bottle with a total value of P272.00.
He admitted his guilt to the investigating
representatives of petitioner company and
executed a handwritten admission. Said
admission was repeated verbally at the police
station before the arresting officer as shown in
the Booking Sheet and Arrest Report which was
signed and authenticated by Ladisla. On August

19, 1977, petitioner, while simultaneously

placing private respondent on preventive
suspension, filed before the Department of
Labor an application for the termination of
private respondent's employment on grounds of
dishonesty and breach of trust. All of the
foregoing facts do not apply in the present
case. X X X was and is not being charged
for DISHONESTY, THEFT, BREACH OF TRUST
AND CONFIDENCE and the like. He did not
make any CONFESSION of criminal guilt.
9.

Respondent cited the case of MERALCO VS.

NLRC, GR 78763, JULY 12, 1989, 175 SCRA
277. Again this case is not applicable to X X X.
In the said case the facts were as follows:
Private respondent Signo was employed in
petitioner company as supervisor-leadman since
January 1963 up to the time when his services
were terminated on May 18, 1983. In 1981, a
certain Fernando de Lara filed an application
with the petitioner company for electrical
services at his residence at Peafrancia
Subdivision, Marcos Highway, Antipolo, Rizal.
Private
respondent
Signo
facilitated
the
processing of the said application as well as the
required documentation for said application at
the
Municipality
of
Antipolo,
Rizal.
In
consideration
thereof,
private
respondent
received from Fernando de Lara the amount of
P7,000.00. Signo thereafter filed the application
for electric services with the Power Sales
Division of the company. It was established that
the area where the residence of de Lara was
located is not yet within the serviceable point of
Meralco, because the place was beyond the 30meter distance from the nearest existing
Meralco facilities. In order to expedite the
electrical connections at de Lara's residence,
certain employees of the company, including
respondent Signo, made it appear in the
application that the sari-sari store at the corner
of Marcos Highway, an entrance to the
subdivision, is applicant de Lara's establishment,
which, in reality is not owned by the latter. As a
result of this scheme, the electrical connections
to de Lara's residence were installed and made
possible. However, due to the fault of the Power
Sales Division of petitioner company, Fernando
de Lara was not billed for more than a year.
Petitioner company conducted an investigation
of the matter and found respondent Signo
responsible for the said irregularities in the
installation. Thus, the services of the latter were
terminated on May 18, 1983. On August 10
1983, respondent Signo filed a complaint for
illegal dismissal, unpaid wages, and separation
pay.

In fact, MERALCO lost in the abovecited

case. Applying the doctrine of COMPASSIONATE
JUSTICE IN LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION, the
Court ruled in favor of the worker who was
unjustly dismissed. Thus:
X x x.
This Court has held time and again, in a number
of decisions, that notwithstanding the existence
of a valid cause for dismissal, such as breach of
trust by an employee, nevertheless, dismissal
should not be imposed, as it is too severe a
penalty if the latter has been employed for a
considerable length of time in the service of his
employer. (Itogon-Suyoc Mines, Inc. v. NLRC, et
al., G.R. No. L- 54280, September 30,1982,117
SCRA 523; Meracap v. International Ceramics
Manufacturing Co., Inc., et al., G.R. Nos. L48235-36, July 30,1979, 92 SCRA 412; Sampang
v. Inciong, G.R. No. 50992, June 19,1985,137
SCRA 56; De Leon v. NLRC, G.R. No. L-52056,
October 30,1980, 100 SCRA 691; Philippine
Airlines, Inc. v. PALEA, G.R. No. L-24626, June 28,
1974, 57 SCRA 489).
In a similar case, this Court ruled:
As repeatedly been held by this Court, an
employer cannot legally be compelled to
continue with the employment of a person who
admittedly was guilty of breach of trust towards
his employer and whose continuance in the
service of the latter is patently inimical to its
interest. The law in protecting the rights of the
laborers, authorized neither oppression nor selfdestruction of the employer.
However,
taking
into
account
private
respondent's 'twenty-three (23) years of service
which undisputedly is unblemished by any
previous derogatory record' as found by the
respondent Commission itself, and since he has
been under preventive suspension during the
pendency of this case, in the absence of a
showing that the continued employment of
private respondent would result in petitioner's
oppression or self-destruction, We are of the
considered view that his dismissal is a drastic
punishment. ... .
xxx xxx xxx
The ends of social and compassionate justice
would therefore be served if private respondent
is reinstated but without backwages in view of
petitioner's obvious good faith. (Itogon- Suyoc
Mines, Inc. v. NLRC, et al., 11 7 SCRA 528)
Further, in carrying out and interpreting the
Labor Code's provisions and its implementing
regulations, the workingman's welfare should be
the primordial and paramount consideration.

This kind of interpretation gives meaning and

substance to the liberal and compassionate
spirit of the law as provided for in Article 4 of the
New Labor Code which states that "all doubts in
the implementation and interpretation of the
provisions of the Labor Code including its
implementing rules and regulations shall be
resolved in favor of labor" (Abella v. NLRC, G.R.
No. 71812, July 30,1987,152 SCRA 140).
In view of the foregoing, reinstatement of
respondent Signo is proper in the instant case,
but
without
the
award
of
backwages,
considering the good faith of the employer in
dismissing the respondent.
X x x.

and informed the latter that he was being

transferred effective 1 August 1983 to the newly
opened Cagayan territory comprising the
provinces of Cagayan, Nueva Vizcaya and
Isabela. The transfer order was made formal in a
memorandum dated 29 July 1983. Among the
reasons given for complainant's selection as
PMR for the Cagayan territory were: The territory
required a veteran and seasoned PMR who could
operate immediately with minimum training and
supervision. Likewise, a PMR who can
immediately exploit the vast business potential
of the area. In a letter dated 1 August 1983,
which was received by Abbott on 4 August 1983,
competent, thru his lawyer, objected to the
transfer on the grounds that it was not only a
demotion but also personal and punitive in
nature without basis legally and factually. On 8
August 1983, Victa issued another inter-office
correspondence to competent, giving the latter
up to 15 August 1983 within which to comply
with the transfer order, otherwise his would be
dropped from the payroll for having abandoned
his job. When competent failed to report to his
new assignment, Abbott assigned thereat Fausto
Antonio T. Tibi another PED PMR who was priorly
covering the provinces of Nueva Ecija and Tarlac.
Meanwhile, complainant filed applications for
vacation leave from 2 to 9 August 1983, and
then from 10 to 13 August 1983. And on 18
August 1983, he filed the present complaint.
After due consideration of the evidence adduced
by the parties, the Arbiter below ruled for the
respondent on the ground that the complainant
is guilty of gross insubordination.

10. Respondents cited the case of ABBOTT

LABORATORIES (PHILIPPINES), INC., and
JAIME
C.
VICTA vs. NATIONAL
LABOR
RELATIONS
COMMISISON
and
ALBERT
BOBADILLA, G.R. No. 76959 October 12,
1987. Again the facts of the said case are not
applicable to X X X. It involved the legal issue of
UNJUST TRANSFER of a worker which the latter
contested as being tantamount to a DEMOTION.
In that case, complainant Bobadilla started his
employment
with
respondent
company
sometime in May 1982. After undergoing
training, in September, 1982, competent was
designated professional medical representative
(PMR) and was assigned to cover the sales
territory comprising of Sta. Cruz, Binondo and a
part of Quiapo and Divisoria, of the Metro Manila
district. In connection with the respondent
company's marketing and sales operations, it 11. Respondents cited the case of FEDERICO
had been its policy and established practice of
NUEZ vs. NATIONAL
LABOR
RELATIONS
undertaking employment movements and/or
COMMISSION, LABOR ARBITER MANUEL
reassignments from one territorial area to
ASUNCION,
PHILIPPINE
OVERSEAS
another as the exigencies of its operations
TELECOMMUNICATIONS
CORPORATION
require and to hire only applicant salesmen,
(PHILCOMSAT),
HONORIO
POBLADOR,
including professional medical representatives
RAMON NIETO, FRED AUJERO and ROMEO
(PMRs) who were willing to take provincial
VALENCIA, G.R. No. 107574 December 28,
assignments, at least insofar as male applicants
1994. Again this case is not applicable to X X X.
were concerned. Likewise, respondent company
In the said case, petitioner Nuez was a driver of
had made reassignments or transfers of sales
private respondent PHILCOMSAT since 1 May
personnel which included PMRs from one
1970. On 25 November 1988 he was assigned to
territorial area of responsibility to another on a
its station in Baras, Antipolo, Rizal, from sevenmore or less regular basis. In complainant's
thirty in the morning to three-thirty in the
application for employment with respondent
afternoon. At one-thirty that afternoon, Engr.
company, he agreed to the following: 1) that if
Jeremias Sevilla, the officer in charge and the
employed he win accept assignment in the
highest ranking official of the station, asked
provinces and/or cities anywhere in the
Nuez to drive the employees to the Makati head
Philippines; 2) he is willing and can move into
office to collect their profit shares. Nuez declined
and live in the territory assigned to him; and (3)
saying that he had an important personal
that should any answer or statement in his
appointment right after office hours. At twoapplication for employment be found false or
thirty that same afternoon, he also declined a
incorrect, he will be subject to immediate
similar order given on the phone by his vehicle
dismissal, if then employed. On 22 July 1983,
supervisor, Pedro Sibal, reasoning that
respondent Victa called complainant to his office

"Ayaw kong magmaneho dahil may bibilhin ako

sa Lagundi. Kung gusto mo yong 'loyalist' ang
magmaneho." In his memorandum of 28
November 1988, Station Manager Ramon Bisuna
required Nuez to explain within seventy-two
hours why he should not be administratively
dealt with for disobeying an order of their most
senior officer on 25 November 1988. In his
written reply dated 1 December 1988, Nuez
mentioned
a
personal
appointment
in
justification for his refusal to render "overtime"
service and that "ferrying employees . . . was
not a kind of emergency that . . . warrants (the)
charge
of
disobedience."
Taking
into
consideration the reports of Engr. Sevilla and
Supervisor Sibal as well as the letter of
petitioner Nuez, AVP for Transport and
Maintenance Fredelino Aujero referred the
matter to Vice President for Administration
Ramon V. Nieto for appropriate action and
invited his attention to the Code of Disciplinary
Action of the company providing that "refusal to
obey any lawful order or instruction of a superior
is classified as insubordination, an extremely
serious offense and its first infraction calls for
dismissal of the erring employee." The report of
Aujero pointed out that Nuez could have obeyed
the directive and still have enough time to
attend to his appointment because the order
was given him two hours before his tour of duty
ended and, moreover, he was seen playing
billiards after office hours. Vice President Nieto
then issued a memorandum to Nuez terminating
his employment effective 26 December 1988 for
insubordination. In his letter for reconsideration
dated 1 January 1989, Nuez explained to Vice
President Nieto that after failing to get a ride to
Lagundi, he went with the company coaster at
four-thirty in the afternoon and then proceeded
to TMC to play billiards when the person he
wanted to see at Lagundi had already left. On 6
March 1989, Nuez filed this suit for illegal
dismissal, indemnity pay, moral and exemplary
damages and attorney's fees. On 29 January
1990, Labor Arbiter Manuel P. Asuncion
dismissed the complaint for lack of merit but
awarded Nuez a "monetary consideration" in an
amount equivalent to his one-half month salary
for every year of service. On appeal, the
National Labor Relations Commission affirmed
on 15 June 1992 the decision of the Labor
Arbiter but limited the financial assistance to
Nuez in an amount equivalent to three months
basic pay only.
12. As to the issue of PERSONAL LIABILITY for
damages of CORPORATE OFFICERS in illegal
dismissal cases, although the case of M+W
ZANDER PHILIPPINES, INC. and ROLF
WILTSCHEK vs. TRINIDAD M. ENRIQUEZ,
G.R. No. 169173,June 5, 2009, which cited

the case of EPG Construction Company, Inc., et

al. v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 103372,
June 22, 1992 (also cited by respondents in their
position paper, pp. 26, et, seq.), held that
the general manager of a corporation should not
be made personally answerable for the payment
of an illegally dismissed employee's monetary
claims arising from the dismissal because the
employer corporation has a separate and
distinct personality from its officers who merely
act as its agents, it cited a clear EXCEPTION, that
is, where the official "had acted maliciously
or in bad faith," in which event he may be
made personally liable for his own act. X X
X submits that, in this case, respondents
acted on bad faith and with malice when
they ABUSED their right to discipline X X X;
when they relied on flimsy grounds (NOT GROSS
OR HABITUAL OR SERIOUS OR GRAVE violations
as provided by the Art. 282of the Labor
Code) to dismiss him; when they RUSHED,
RAILROADED and MANIPULATED the sole
administrative hearing without informing X x x of
his human right to counsel (while two lawyers
represented the respondent Company and its
prosecuting corporate officers); when they and
their agents did not grant X x x the fair
opportunity to confront the complainants and
witnesses against him; when they did not give
him advance copies of the alleged complaints
and other documentary evidence against him
before the administrative hearing (Note: The
respondents, thru their lawyer, gave copies of
the 201 File and the Administrative Case Record
of X x x only when this case had been filed with
the NLRC and only upon motion in open court
and reiterated in writing made by counsel for X
x x); when X x x termination date was made
effective on the very day of receipt by him of the
notice of dismissal (February 2, 2012); when the
president X X Xdid not sign the notice of
dismissal, contrary to the companys code of
discipline/conduct; when X X Xand X X X did not
attend the sole administrative hearing and thus
had no personal knowledge of the facts and
exhibits adduced in evidence during such
hearing and yet they signed and/or affirmed the
notice of dismissal and rejected X X X appeal to
X x xas if they personally knew the entire case
record and proceedings.
RESPONDENTS must be made to pay for the
MENTAL
ANGUISH,
EXTREME
ANXIETIES,
SLEEPLESS NIGHTS, BESMIRCHED REPUTATION,
AND PUBLIC RIDICULE that X x x has suffered
and continues to suffer by reason of the abusive
act of respondents in unjustly dismissing him
from the service, which act has jeopardized his
ability to financially support his two young
children and his wife and to pay for his financial
obligations to his creditors. Yes, they may be

prominent stockholders and well-paid officers of

a huge corporation as X x x Global City, Inc.,
occupying top positions in their own little
kingdoms. But that does not give them the
dictatorial right to patently and tortuously
trample upon the rights of X x x, a worker and a
Filipino citizen whose rights are protected by the
law or to endanger the very physical subsistence
and existence of his helpless family by unjustly
dismissing him from his source of livelihood and
income.

failed to land a job at the Philippine Cotton

Authority
and
Philippine
First
Marketing
Authority. He also testified that a job in either
office would have earned him a salary of
P2,500.00 a month, or P150,000.00 in five years.
Deducting his probable expenses of reasonably
about P1,000.00 a month, or P60,000.00 in five
years, the petitioner owes him a total of actual
damages of P90,000.00.
X x x.

13. The case of LLORENTE vs. SANDIGANBAYAN,14. Further on the issue of personal liability of
ET AL., EN BANC, [G.R. No. 85464. October
officers, by analogy, the case of The City of
3, 1991] is applicable by analogy as to the
Angeles, Hon. Antonio Abad Santos vs. CA,
issue of the personal liability of private and
et al., G.R. No. 97882, Aug. 26, l996, citing
public officers for acts done in bad faith, with
Rama vs. CA, 148 SCRA 498; San Luis vs.
abuse of right, with graver abuse of discretion,
CA, 174 SCRA 258, is applicable. In that case,
and the like.
a donation of a parcel of land to the City of
Syllabus.
Angeles, Pampanga was made for the sole
purpose of using it as the site of the Angeles
X x x.
City Sports Center except cockfighting. Instead,
a Drug Rehabilitation Center was constructed
CIVIL LAW; INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTIONS;
upon approval and orders of the mayor and the
DAMAGES FOR ACTS DONE IN BAD FAITH; CASE
members of the sangguniang panglunsod. In
AT BAR. The acts of the petitioner were
ordering the demolition of the Center and the
legal (that is, pursuant to procedures), as
reimbursement of the public funds spent for the
he insists in this petition, yet it does not
construction of the Center, the Court held
follow, as we said, that his acts were done
that it must be borne by the officials of
in good faith. For emphasis, he had no valid
Angeles City who ordered and directed the
reason to "go legal" all of a sudden with respect
construction. It held that public officials are
to Mr. Curio, since he had cleared three
not immune from damages in their
employees who, as the Sandiganbayan found,
personal capacities arising from acts done
"were all similarly circumstanced in that they all
in bad faith. They are liable in their
had pending obligations when, their clearances
personal
capacities
for
whatever
were filed for consideration, warranting similar
damages they may cause by their acts
official action. The Court is convinced that the
done with malice and in bad faith or
petitioner had unjustly discriminated against
beyond the scope of their authority or
Mr. Curio. It is no defense that the petitioner
jurisdiction.[citing Vidad vs. RTC Negros
was motivated by no ill-will (a grudge,
Oriental, Branch 42, 227 SCRA 271, M.H. Wylie
according to the Sandiganbayan), since the
vs. Rarang, 209 SCEA 357; Orocio vs. COA, 213
facts speak for themselves. It is no
SCRA 109]. But such officials must be sued in
defense either that he was, after all,
their personal capacity. In this case the public
complying merely with legal procedures
officials deliberately violated the law, and
since, as we indicated, he was not as strict
persisted in their violation, attempted to
with respect to the three retiring other
deceive the courts by their pretended change
employees. There can be no other logical
in the use of the Center and making it a
conclusion that he was acting unfairly, no more,
mockery of justice. The Court held that public
no less, to Mr. Curio. It is the essence of Article
officials were held
liable
personally
for
19 of the Civil Code, under which the
damages arising from their illegal acts done in
petitioner was made to pay damages, together
bad faith if said officials were sued both in
with Article 27, that the performance of
their official and personal capacities.
duty be done with justice and good
faith. We believe that the petitioner is
Thus held the Court, inter alia:
liable under Article 19. The Court finds the
award of P90,000.00 to be justified by Article
X x x.
2202 of the Civil Code, which holds the
defendant
liable for
all
"natural
and
This Court has time and again ruled that public
probable" damages. Hermenegildo Curio
officials are not immune from damages in their
presented evidence that as a consequence of
personal capacities arising from acts done in
the petitioner's refusal to clear him, he
bad faith. Otherwise stated, a public official

may be liable for whatever damage he may

have caused by his act done with malice and
in bad faith or beyond the scope of his
authority or jurisdiction. (See Vidal vs. RTC,
Negros Oriental, 227 SCRA 271); Wylie vs.
Rarang, 209 SCRA 357; Orocio vs. COA, 213
SCRA 109). In the instant case, the public
officials concerned deliberately violated the
law and persisted in their violations, going so
far as attempting to deceive the courts by their
pretended change of purpose and usage for the
center, and making a mockery of the judicial
system." Indisputably, said public officials
acted beyond the scope of their authority and
jurisdiction and with evident bad faith. However,
as noted by the trial court, the petitioners mayor
and members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod
of Angeles City were sued only in their official
capacities, hence, they could not be held
personally liable without first giving them their
day in court. Prevailing jurisprudence Roma vs.
CA, 148 SCRA 496; San Luis cs. CA, 174 SCRA
258)
holding
that public officials are
personally liable for damages arising from
illegal acts done in bad faith are premised on
said officials having been sued both in their
official and personal capacities.
After due consideration of the circumstances,
we believe that the fairest and most equitable
solution is to have the City of Angeles, donee of
the subject open space and, ostensibly, the
main beneficiary of the construction and
operation of the proposed drug rehabilitation
center, undertake the demolition and removal
of said center, and if feasible, recover the cost
thereof from the city officials concerned. (The
City of Angeles vs. CA, et. al., G. R. No.
97882, Aug. 28, 1996).

RELIEF

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is

respectfully prayed that the respondents,
jointly and severally, be found guilty and
liable for the ILLEGAL DISMISSAL of the
complainant,
with
the
concomitant
imposition of civil awards, penalties and
damages against the said respondents,
more specifically: BACKWAGES computed
according
to
existing
jurisprudence;
SEPARATION PAY as provided by existing
jurisprudence, in lieu of restoration of the
complainant
to
his
former
position,
considering the strained relations between
the parties at present by reason of this
pending case; MORAL DAMAGES in the
amount
of
P500,000.00;
EXEMPLARY
DAMAGES in the amount of P500,000.00;
and ATTORNEYS FEES equivalent to 10% of
recoverable damages, and COSTS OF SUIT
and LITIGATION EXPENSES.
Further,
it
is
respectfully
prayed
that, pendent
lite,
the
unquestioned/admitted receivable of the
complainant from the respondent company,
in the amount of P19, 846.96, be released
to him soonest for humanitarian reasons,
considering the financial difficulties that he
and his family are now severely facing by
reason of his abrupt termination from the
service.
Finally, the complainant respectfully prays
for such and other reliefs as may be
deemed just and equitable in the premises.
Las Pinas City, April 30, 2012.