Angeles vs. Hon. Manuel B.

Gaite
Presidents refusal to review DOJ decisions

President and bestows upon the Secretary of Justice, a

subordinate officer, almost unfettered power.
The Supreme Court rejected this argument. It ruled:

Can the President legally refuse to review the decisions of

the Secretary of Justice except under certain
circumstances? Does that diminish the power of control
of the President and bestow upon the Secretary of
Justice, a subordinate officer, unfettered power?
In Judge Adoracion G. Angeles vs. Hon. Manuel B. Gaite,
et al., G.R. No. 165276, November 25, 2009,the Provincial
Prosecutor denied the recommendation of the
Investigating Prosecutor that Michael Vistan be indicted
for violation RA 7610. He also approved the
recommendation for the dismissal of the charge of
violation of PD 1829. The petitioner filed a petition for
review with the Department of Justice, which eventually
dismissed the petition.
The petitioner then filed a Petition for Review before the
Office of President. The Office of the President dismissed
the petition, citing Memorandum Circular No. 58 which
bars an appeal or a petition for review of decisions,
orders, and resolutions of the Secretary of Justice except
those involving offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua or death.
The petitioner then appealed to the Court of Appeals,
which dismissed the petition.
The petitioner argued before the Supreme Court that
Memorandum Circular No. 58 is an invalid regulation
because it diminishes the power of control of the

This argument is absurd. The Presidents act of delegating

authority to the Secretary of Justice by virtue of said
Memorandum Circular is well within the purview of the
doctrine of qualified political agency, long been
established in our jurisdiction.
Under this doctrine, which primarily recognizes the
establishment of a single executive, all executive and
administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive
Department; the heads of the various executive
departments are assistants and agents of the Chief
Executive; and, except in cases where the Chief Executive
is required by the Constitution or law to act in person or
the exigencies of the situation demand that he act
personally, the multifarious executive and administrative
functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and
through the executive departments, and the acts of the
secretaries of such departments, performed and
promulgated in the regular course of business, are,
unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive,
presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive. The CA
cannot be deemed to have committed any error in
upholding the Office of the Presidents reliance on the
Memorandum Circular as it merely interpreted and
applied the law as it should be.
. . . the President himself set the limits of his power to
review decisions/orders/resolutions of the Secretary of

Justice in order to expedite the disposition of cases.

Petitioners argument that the Memorandum Circular
unduly expands the power of the Secretary of Justice to
the extent of rendering even the Chief Executive helpless
to rectify whatever errors or abuses the former may
commit in the exercise of his discretion is purely
speculative to say the least. Petitioner cannot secondguess the Presidents power and the Presidents own
judgment to delegate whatever it is he deems necessary to
delegate in order to achieve proper and speedy
administration of justice, especially that such delegation
is upon a cabinet secretary his own alter ego.
The Supreme Court observed that the President cannot
delegate certain of her powers:
. . . the power of the President to delegate is not without
limits. No less than the Constitution provides for
restrictions. . .
These restrictions hold true to this day as they remain
embodied in our fundamental law. There are certain
presidential powers which arise out of exceptional
circumstances, and if exercised, would involve the
suspension of fundamental freedoms, or at least call for
the supersedence of executive prerogatives over those
exercised by co-equal branches of government. The
declaration of martial law, the suspension of the writ of
habeas corpus, and the exercise of the pardoning power,
notwithstanding the judicial determination of guilt of the
accused, all fall within this special class that demands
the exclusive exercise by the President of the
constitutionally vested power. The list is by no means

exclusive, but there must be a showing that the executive

power in question is of similar gravitas and exceptional
import.
In the case at bar, the power of the President to review the
Decision of the Secretary of Justice dealing with the
preliminary investigation of cases cannot be considered as
falling within the same exceptional class which cannot be
delegated. Besides, the President has not fully abdicated
his power of control as Memorandum Circular No. 58
allows an appeal if the imposable penalty is reclusion
perpetua or higher. Certainly, it would be unreasonable to
impose upon the President the task of reviewing all
preliminary investigations decided by the Secretary of
Justice. To do so will unduly hamper the other important
duties of the President by having to scrutinize each and
every decision of the Secretary of Justice notwithstanding
the latters expertise in said matter.
Finally, the Court ruled that the memorandum circular
do not deprive the President of her power of control:
Petitioners contention that Memorandum Circular No. 58
violates both the Constitution and Section 1, Chapter 1,
Book III of EO No. 292, for depriving the President of his
power of control over the executive departments deserves
scant consideration. In the first place, Memorandum
Circular No. 58 was promulgated by the Office of the
President and it is settled that the acts of the secretaries
of such departments, performed and promulgated in the
regular course of business are, unless disapproved or
reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts
of the Chief Executive. Memorandum Circular No. 58 has

not been reprobated by the President; therefore, it goes

without saying that the said Memorandum Circular has
the approval of the President.

ISSUE: Whether or not the suspension is constitutional.

HELD: The

doctrine

established

in

Barcelon

and

Montenegro was subsequently abandoned in this case

where the SC declared that it had the power to inquire
into the factual basis of the suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus by Marcos in Aug 1971 and to
annul the same if no legal ground could be established.
Accordingly, hearings were conducted to receive evidence
on this matter, including two closed-door sessions in
which relevant classified information was divulged by the
government to the members of the SC and 3 selected
lawyers of the petitioners. In the end, after satisfying itself
Lansang vs garcia

that there was actually a massive and systematic

Communist-oriented

campaign

to

overthrow

the

FACTS: Due to the throwing of two hand grenades in a

government by force, as claimed by Marcos, the SC

Liberal Party caucus in 1971 causing the death of 8

unanimously decided to uphold t5he suspension of the

people, Marcos issued PP 889 which suspended the

privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus.

privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Marcos urged that

there is a need to curtail the growth of Maoist groups.
Subsequently, Lansang et al were invited by the PC
headed by Garcia for interrogation and investigation.
Lansang et al questioned the validity of the suspension of

Facts: On the evening of August 21, 1971, two grenades

were thrown at the miting the avance of the Liberal Party
killing 8 persons and injuring many. Thus, on August 23
then President Marcos issued proclamation 889, the
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. Herein

the writ averring that the suspension does not meet the

petitioners were apprehended by members of the

constitutional requisites.

Philippine Constabulary having invoked the said

proclamation. In effect the proclamation implies that the

that when there is a substantial showing that the

authority to decide whether the exigency has arisen

exertion of state power has overridden private rights

requiring suspension of the writ belongs to the President

secured by the Constitution, the subject is necessarily

and it expressly states that such declaration is deemed

one for judicial review. Thus, the grant of power to

final and conclusive upon the courts and all other

suspend the privilege of writ is neither absolute or

persons

unqualified

August 30: the president issued proclamation 889-A,

The declaration of a rebellion as argued by the petitioners

amending the previous proclamation.

need not to be a wide-scale event, it may be declared even

September 18: proclamation 889-B issued; lifting the

if it only involves a small part of the country. The

suspension on selected provinces/cities.

president decision to suspend the writ was by fact

September 25: proclamation 889-C issued; lifting the

constitutional hence VALID, as he has three available

suspension on selected provinces/cities.

courses to suppress rebellion. First, to call out the

October 4: proclamation 889-D issued; same as 889-C

military, second to suspend the privilege of writ and lastly

on selected areas.

to declare martial law.

In view thereof, 18 provinces, 2 sub-provinces and 18

cities are still under the suspension of writ of habeas

Petitions DENIED; the CFI is directed to conduct

corpus

preliminary investigations

Issue: Whether the court would adhere to its previous

decision in Barcelon vs. Baker and Montenegro vs.
Castaneda?
Held: First, Proclamation 889-A superseded the original
proclamation and that flaws attributed thereto are formal
in nature. Which actually emphasize the actuality of the
intent to rise in arms. Second, The court intervention: In
Sterling vs. Constantin, Chief Justice Hughes declared

David v. Arroyo
Facts:
In February 2006, due to the escape of some Magdalo
members and the discovery of a plan (Oplan Hackle I) to
assassinate GMA she declared PP 1017 and is to be
implemented by GO 5. The said law was aimed to
suppress lawlessness and the connivance of extremists to
bring down the government. Pursuant to such PP, GMA
cancelled all plans to celebrate EDSA I and at the same
time revoked all
permits issued for rallies and other public
organization/meeting. Notwithstanding the cancellation of
their rally permit, KMU head Randolf David proceeded to
rally which led to his arrest. Later that day, the Daily
Tribune, which Cacho-Olivares is the editor, was raided

by the CIDG and they seized and confiscated anti-GMA

articles and write ups. Later still, another known antiGMA news agency (Malaya) was raided and seized. On the
same day, Beltran of Anakpawis, was also arrested. His
arrest was however grounded on a warrant of arrest
issued way back in 1985 for his actions against Marcos.
His supporters cannot visit him in jail because of the
current imposition of PP 1017 and GO 5. In March, GMA
issued PP 1021 w/c declared that the state of national
emergency ceased to exist. David and some opposition
Congressmen averred that PP1017 is unconstitutional for
it has no factual basis and it cannot be validly declared by
the president for such power is reposed in Congress. Also
such declaration is actually a declaration of martial law.
Olivares-Cacho also averred that the emergency
contemplated in the Constitution are those of natural
calamities and that such is an overbreadth. Petitioners
claim that PP 1017 is an overbreadth because it
encroaches upon protected and unprotected rights. The
Sol-Gen argued that the issue has become moot and
academic by reason of the lifting of PP 1017 by virtue of
the declaration of PP 1021. The Sol-Gen averred that PP
1017 is within the presidents calling out power, take care
power and take over power.
ISSUE:Whether or not PP 1017 and GO 5 is
constitutional.
HELD:The issue cannot be considered as moot and
academic by reason of the lifting of the questioned PP. It
is still in fact operative because there are parties still
affected due to the alleged violation of the said PP. Hence,
the SC can take cognition of the case at bar. The SC ruled

that PP 1017 is constitutional in part and at the same

time some provisions of which are unconstitutional. The
SC ruled in the following way;
Resolution by the SC on the Factual Basis of its
declaration
The petitioners were not able to prove that GMA has
factual basis in issuing PP 1017 and GO 5. A reading of
the Solicitor Generals Consolidated Comment and
Memorandum shows a detailed narration of the events
leading to the issuance of PP 1017, with supporting
reports forming part of the records. Mentioned are the
escape of the Magdalo Group, their audacious threat of
the Magdalo D-Day, the defections in the military,
particularly in the Philippine Marines, and the reproving
statements from the communist leaders. There was also
the Minutes of the Intelligence Report and Security Group
of the Philippine Army showing the growing alliance
between the NPA and the military. Petitioners presented
nothing to refute such events. Thus, absent any contrary
allegations, the Court is convinced that the President was
justified in issuing PP 1017 calling for military aid.
Indeed, judging the seriousness of the incidents, GMA
was not expected to simply fold her arms and do nothing
to prevent or suppress what she believed was lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion. However, the exercise of
such power or duty must not stifle liberty.
Resolution by the SC on the Overbreadth Theory
First and foremost, the overbreadth doctrine is an
analytical tool developed for testing on their faces

statutes in free speech cases. The 7 consolidated cases at

bar are not primarily freedom of speech cases. Also, a
plain reading of PP 1017 shows that it is not primarily
directed to speech or even speech-related conduct. It is
actually a call upon the AFP to prevent or suppress all
forms of lawless violence. Moreover, the overbreadth
doctrine is not intended for testing the validity of a law
that reflects legitimate state interest in maintaining
comprehensive control over harmful, constitutionally
unprotected conduct. Undoubtedly, lawless violence,
insurrection and rebellion are considered harmful and
constitutionally unprotected conduct. Thus, claims of
facial overbreadth are entertained in cases involving
statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only
spoken words and again, that overbreadth claims, if
entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked
against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be
applied to protected conduct. Here, the incontrovertible
fact remains that PP 1017 pertains to a spectrum of
conduct, not free speech, which is manifestly subject to
state regulation.
Resolution by the SC on the Calling Out Power
Doctrine
On the basis of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution, GMA
declared PP 1017. The SC considered the Presidents
calling-out power as a discretionary power solely vested
in his wisdom, it stressed that this does not prevent an
examination of whether such power was exercised within
permissible constitutional limits or whether it was
exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of
discretion. The SC ruled that GMA has validly declared PP

1017 for the Constitution grants the President, as

Commander-in-Chief, a sequence of graduated powers.
From the most to the least benign, these are: the callingout power, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus, and the power to declare Martial Law.
The only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out power
is that whenever it becomes necessary, the President
may call the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion. And such criterion has
been met.
Resolution by the SC on the Take Care Doctrine
Pursuant to the 2ndsentence of Sec 17, Art 7 of the
Constitution (He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully
executed.) the president declared PP 1017. David et al
averred that PP 1017 however violated Sec 1, Art 6 of the
Constitution for it arrogated legislative power to the
President. Such power is vested in Congress. They assail
the clause to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all
decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me
personally or upon my direction. The SC noted that such
provision is similar to the power that granted former
President Marcos legislative powers (as provided in PP
1081). The SC ruled that the assailed PP 1017 is
unconstitutional insofar as it grants GMA the authority to
promulgate decrees. Legislative power is peculiarly within
the province of the Legislature. Sec 1, Article 6
categorically states that [t]he legislative power shall be
vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall
consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives. To be
sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a
state of emergency can justify GMA[s exercise of

legislative power by issuing decrees. The president can

only take care of the carrying out of laws but cannot
create or enact laws.
Resolution by the SC on the Take Over Power
Doctrine
The president cannot validly order the taking over of
private corporations or institutions such as the Daily
Tribune without any authority from Congress. On the
other hand, the word emergency contemplated in the
constitution is not limited to natural calamities but rather
it also includes rebellion. The SC made a distinction; the
president can declare the state of national emergency but
her exercise of emergency powers does not come
automatically after it for such exercise needs authority
from Congress. The authority from Congress must be
based on the following:
1 There must be a war or other emergency.
(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.
(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as
the Congress may prescribe.
(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out
a national policy declared by Congress.
Resolution by the SC on the Issue that PP 1017 is a
Martial Law Declaration
The SC ruled that PP 1017 is not a Martial Law

declaration and is not tantamount to it. It is a valid

exercise of the calling out power of the president by the
president.
Cristobal vs labrador
FACTS:
Santos was convicted of the crime of estafa. He was given
pardon by the president but even prior to his pardon he
was already holding the position as the municipality
president of Malabon notwithstanding his conviction.
Cristobal, on the other hand, averred that Santos should
be excluded from the list of electors in Malabon because
he was already convicted of final judgment for any crime
against property. This is pursuant to CA 357 of the New
Election Code. The lower court presided by Labrador
ruled that Santos is exempt from the provision of the law
by virtue of the pardon restoring the respondent to his
full civil and political rights, except that with respect to
the right to hold public office or employment, he will be
eligible for appointment only to positions which are
clerical or manual in nature and involving no money or
property responsibility.
ISSUE: Whether or not Santos should not be excluded as
an elector.
HELD: It

should

be

observed

that

there

are

two

limitations upon the exercise of this constitutional

prerogative by the Chief Executive, namely: (a) that the

has expired, absolute pardon removes all that is left of the

power be exercised after conviction; and (b) that such

consequences f conviction. In the present case, while the

power does not extend cases of impeachment. Subject to

pardon extended to respondent Santos is conditional in

the

the

the sense that he will be eligible for appointment only to

pardoning power cannot be restricted or controlled by

positions which a e clerical or manual in nature involving

legislative action. It must remain where the sovereign

no money or property responsibility, it is absolute insofar

authority has placed it and must be exercised by the

as it restores the respondent to full civil and political

highest authority to whom it is entrusted. An absolute

rights. Upon other hand, the suggestion that the

pardon not only blots out the crime committed, but

disqualification imposed in par (b) of sec 94 of CA 357,

removes all disabilities resulting from the conviction. In

does not fall within the purview of the pardoning power of

the present case, the disability is the result of conviction

the president, would lead to the impairment of the

without which there would be no basis for disqualification

pardoning power of the president, not contemplated in

from voting. Imprisonment is not the only punishment

the Constitution, and would lead furthermore to the

which the law imposes upon those who violate its

result that there would be no way of restoring the political

command. There are accessory and resultant disabilities,

privilege in a case of this nature except through legislative

and the pardoning power likewise extends to such

action.

limitations

imposed

by

the Constitution,

disabilities. When granted after the term of imprisonment