A.M. No.

08-8-11-CA

September 9, 2008

RE: LETTER OF PRESIDING JUSTICE CONRADO M. VASQUEZ, JR. ON CA-G.R. SP NO. 103692
[Antonio Rosete, et al. v. Securities and Exchange Commission, et al.]
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
The Judiciary, which is acclaimed as the firmest pillar of our democratic institutions, is vested by the
Constitution with the power to settle disputes between parties and to determine their rights and obligations
under the law. For judicial decisions, which form part of the law of the land, to be credible instruments in the
peaceful and democratic resolution of conflicts, our courts must be perceived to be and, in fact be, impartial,
independent, competent and just. To accomplish this end, it is imperative that members of the Judiciary from
its highest magistrates to its humblest employees adhere to the strictest code of ethics and the highest
standards of propriety and decorum. Indeed, it is unfortunate that one of the countrys second highest courts,
the Court of Appeals, should be presently embroiled in scandal and controversy. It is this Courts bounden duty
to determine the culpability or innocence of the members of the Judiciary involved in the said controversy and
to discipline any one whose conduct has failed to conform to the canons of judicial ethics, which uphold
integrity, independence, impartiality, competence and propriety in the performance of official functions.
The present administrative matter arose from the Letter dated August 1, 2008 of Court of Appeals Presiding
Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. (Presiding Justice Vasquez), referring to this Court for appropriate action the
much publicized dispute and charges of impropriety among the justices of the Court of Appeals (CA) involved
in CA-G.R. SP No. 103692 entitled "Antonio Rosete, et al. v. Securities and Exchange Commission, et al."
To assist in its investigation of this sensitive matter, the Court in its Resolution dated August 4, 2008
constituted a three-person panel (the "Panel of Investigators") composed of retired Justices of the Court;
namely, Mme. Justice Carolina Grio-Aquino as Chairperson, Mme. Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero and Mr.
Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr. as Members. The Panel of Investigators was tasked to investigate the (a) alleged
improprieties of the actions of the Justices of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 103692 (Antonio V.
Rosete, et al. v. SEC, et al.); and (b) alleged rejected offer or solicitation of bribe disclosed respectively by Mr.
Justice Jose Sabio and Mr. Francis de Borja.
A narration of relevant events and facts, as found by the Investigating Panel, follows:
On April 15, 2008, Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes (Justice Reyes), then Chairperson of the Ninth Division of the
CA, filed an application for leave from May 15, 2008 to June 5, 2008. 1
In Office Order No. 149-08-CMV dated May 14, 2008 issued by Presiding Justice Vasquez, Justice Jose C.
Mendoza (Justice Mendoza) was designated by the Raffle Committee as Acting Chairman of the Ninth
Division during the absence of Justice Reyes. Apart from his duties as regular senior member of the Fifth
Division, Justice Mendoza was authorized "to act on all cases submitted to the Ninth Division for final
resolution and/or appropriate action, except ponencia, from May 15, 2008 to June 5, 2008 or until Justice
Reyes reports back for duty." The said office order likewise applied to the other Division(s) where Justice
Reyes had "participated or took part as regular member or in an acting capacity." 2
On May 29, 2008, Antonio V. Rosete, Manuel M. Lopez, Felipe B. Alfonso, Jesus P. Francisco, Christian S.
Monsod, Elpidio L. Ibaez, and Francis Giles B. Puno, as officers, directors and/or representatives of the
Manila Electric Company (hereinafter to be collectively referred to as "Meralco"), filed with the Court of
Appeals a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
and temporary restraining order (TRO) against the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC),
Commissioner Jesus Enrique G. Martinez, Commissioner Hubert B. Guevarra, and the Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS). 3 Aside from the application for immediate issuance of a TRO, petitioners prayed for
the issuance of a preliminary injunction that should thereafter be declared permanent, as well as a declaration
of nullity of the cease and desist and show cause orders issued by the SEC through Commissioner Martinez.
The petition was received by the CA at 10:49 a.m. on May 29, 2008 and docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 103692.

On the same day, petitioners simultaneously filed at 10:48 a.m. an urgent motion for a special raffle. Presiding
Justice Vasquez granted the motion in a handwritten note on the face of the urgent motion, 4 and CA-G.R. No.
103692 was raffled to Justice Vicente Q. Roxas (Justice Roxas). 5 At 3:10 p.m., the Office of Presiding Justice
Vasquez received a letter from Atty. Estrella C. Elamparo (Atty. Elamparo), Chief Legal Counsel of the GSIS,
requesting the re-raffling of the case "in the presence of the parties in the interest of transparency and
fairness."6 At 4:10 p.m. on that day, the GSIS filed anex-parte motion to defer action on any incident in the
petition pending the resolution of their motion for the re-raffle of the case. 7
Atty. Elamparo, accompanied by Atty. Orlando P. Polinar, also of the GSIS Law Office, personally filed the
urgent motion to defer action on the petition pending the resolution of their motion to re-raffle the case. Since
the receiving clerk of the Court of Appeals could not assure them that the motion would be transmitted to the
Court of Appeals Division, Attys. Elamparo and Polinar allegedly went to the office of Justice Roxas "for the
sole purpose of personally furnishing him a copy" of the motion. 8They initially talked to a male clerk who
referred them to one of the lawyers, who, however, told them that it was not possible for them to personally
hand a copy of the motion to Justice Roxas. Thus, Attys. Elamparo and Polinar left a copy of the motion to the
staff but no one wanted to sign and acknowledge receipt of the copy.9
On May 30, 2008, Justice Reyes filed an application for the extension of his leave until June 6, 2008. 10 In the
meantime, Justice Mendoza, who had been designated to replace Justice Reyes during the latters absence,
informed Justice Roxas through a letter that he (Justice Mendoza) was inhibiting from the case on the ground
that he used to be a lawyer of the Meralco. 11 Hence, in an "Emergency Request for Raffle," Justice Roxas
informed the Raffle Committee about the inhibition. 12
Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr. (Justice Sabio) was assigned as Acting Chairman of the Ninth Division by raffle, "in
lieu of Justice Mendoza."13 At 11:30 a.m., the office of Justice Myrna Dimaranan-Vidal (Justice DimarananVidal) received a notice of emergency deliberation with the new Acting Chairman of the Special Ninth Division,
apparently sent by Justice Roxas, stating that her presence and that of Justice Sabio, Jr. were "indispensable"
on account of the "national interest" involved in CA-G.R. SP No. 103692. 14
Meanwhile, Atty. Elamparo "received a telephone call from somebody who did not identify herself but (who)
said that she had important information regarding the Meralco case." The unidentified caller told Atty.
Elamparo that "a TRO was already being prepared and that certain Meralco lawyers had in fact been talking to
Justice Roxas." The caller warned Atty. Elamparo against Justice Roxas who had "administrative cases and
was very notorious," but when prodded, the caller would not disclose more details. 15
At about 1:30 p.m. also on May 30, 2008, Justice Sabio received a telephone call in his chambers from his
older brother, Chairman Camilo Sabio (Chairman Sabio) of the Presidential Commission on Good Government
(PCGG).16 Chairman Sabio informed his brother that he (Justice Sabio) had been named the "third member" of
the division to which the MERALCO-GSIS case had been raffled. Justice Sabio was surprised as he had not
yet been "officially informed" about the matter. Chairman Sabio likewise informed him that a TRO had been
prepared. Chairman Sabio then tried to convince Justice Sabio "of the rightness of the stand of the GSIS and
the SEC," and asked his brother to help the GSIS, which "represents the interest of the poor people." Justice
Sabio told his brother that he would "vote according to [his] conscience" and that the most that he could do
was "to have the issuance of the TRO and the injunctive relief scheduled for oral arguments," at which the
respondents "must be able to convince" him that the TRO indeed had no legal basis.
In his signed testimony,17 which he read before the Panel of Investigators, Chairman Sabio narrated the
circumstances of this call to his brother on May 30, 2008. It appears to have been prompted by a call from a
member of the Board of Trustees of GSIS. To quote from Chairman Sabios testimony:
Last May 30, 2008 I was in Davao City Airport with my wife, Marlene, waiting for our 1:25 P.M. PAL
flight to Manila. xxx xxx xxx.
As we were boarding, I received a call from Atty. Jesus I. Santos, a Member of the Board of
Trustees of GSIS. We had known each other and had become friends since before Martial Law
because as Chief Counsel of the Federation of Free Farmers (FFF) we were opposing counsel in
various cases in Bulacan.

Attorney Santos informed me that the dispute between the GSIS and MERALCO was now in the
Court of Appeals; and, that as a matter of fact, my brother, Justice Sabio, was chair of the Division
to which the case had been assigned. Being a Trustee, Attorney Santos requested me to help. I
readily welcomed the request for help and thanked him. There was no mystery about his having
known of the results of the raffle because the lawyers are notified thereof and are present thereat.
As a Trustee, Attorney Santos should be concerned and involved. As such it is his duty to seek
assistance for the GSIS where he could legitimately find it. He was right in seeking my assistance.
I was aware of the controversy between the GSIS and MERALCO. In essence this was in fact a
controversy between the long suffering public and the mighty - financially and politically controlling owners of MERALCO. MERALCO is not only a public utility but also a monopoly.
Fortunately, GSIS had taken up the cudgels for the long suffering public, who are at the mercy of
MERALCO.

memorandum of authorities in connection with the application for a writ of preliminary injunction together with
their comments/reply. After the parties had filed their memorandum of authorities relative to the application for
a writ of preliminary injunction, the prayer for the said writ would be considered submitted for resolution "forty
five (45) days from promulgation of this Resolution." The SEC received a copy of the Resolution at 4:03 p.m.
on that day.23
For Justice Roxas, the issuance of the TRO was an implied denial of the motion for inhibition filed against him.
There was no need to put in writing the action on the motion for inhibition. 24
At 3:00 p.m., the Special Cases Section of the Court of Appeals received the Urgent Motion to Lift Temporary
Restraining Order and To Hold Its Enforcement in Abeyance filed by the GSIS. 25 Justice Roxas did not act on
the Urgent Motion because he did not consider it meritorious. 26

Immediately, I tried to contact Justice Sabio. But due to the noise I could not hear him. So I waited
until we would arrive in Manila.

On May 31, 2008, Justice Sabio received a cellular phone call from Mr. Francis De Borja (Mr. De Borja), a
person he had lost contact with for almost a year already.27 Mr. De Borja greeted him with:"Mabuhay ka,
Justice." When Justice Sabio, Jr. asked Mr. De Borja why he said that, Mr. De Borja told him that the Makati
Business Club was happy with his having signed the TRO, to which Justice Sabio retorted, "I voted according
to my conscience."

As we were leaving the Airport, I again got in touch with Justice Sabio. After, he confirmed that he
was in fact in the Division to which the petition of MERALCO had been raffled. I impressed upon
him the character and essence of the controversy. I asked him to help GSIS if the legal situation
permitted. He said he would decide according to his conscience. I said: of course.

On June 5, 2008, the GSIS Law Office received a letter dated June 2, 2008 of Presiding Justice Vasquez, Jr.
informing GSIS Chief Legal Counsel, Atty. Elamparo, that the Court of Appeals could not grant her request for
the re-raffling of CA-G.R. SP No. 103692 "in the presence of the parties in the interest of transparency and
fairness," as the case had been raffled in accordance with the procedure under the IRCA. 28

xxx

xxx

xxx

xxx

x x x.

x x x.

On the same day, May 30, 2008, GSIS filed an urgent ex-parte motion to inhibit Justice Roxas from
CA-G.R. No. SP 103692.18 The Special Cases Section of the Court of Appeals received a copy of
the motion at 11:58 a.m.19
Claiming that the TRO was issued "to pre-empt the hearing" scheduled in the afternoon of that day before the
SEC, the GSIS Law Office, through Atty. Marcial C. Pimentel, Jr., set forth its reason for the motion for
inhibition as follows:
3. Unfortunately, reports have reached respondent GSIS that the Honorable ponente has been in
contact with certain lawyers of MERALCO and has in fact already prepared a draft resolution
granting the TRO without affording respondents even a summary hearing. The records of this case
was (sic), per information, immediately transmitted to the Honorable ponente upon his instructions.
The worries of the respondent were exacerbated when it learned that there are supposedly two
administrative cases pending against the Honorable ponente, both of which involve allegations of
bias and prejudice.
It turned out, however, that at that time, Justice Roxas had not yet been officially notified by the Raffle
Committee that the case was raffled to him.20 Moreover, contrary to the allegation of Atty. Elamparo that the
raffle was rigged, Justice Roxas had no hand in the raffle proceeding, which was handled by the Division
chaired by Justice Mariano del Castillo with the use of a "fool-proof Las Vegas tambiolo, like the lotto
machine."21
Justice Roxas brought to the office of Justice Sabio, for the latters signature, the TRO which he had prepared,
already signed by himself and Justice Dimaranan-Vidal. Convinced of the urgency of the TRO, Justice Sabio
signed it on condition that the case will be set for oral arguments.
Thus, at 2:08 p.m. on May 30, 2008,22 the Special Ninth Division composed of Justices Sabio, Roxas, and
Dimaranan-Vidal, issued the Resolution granting the TRO prayed for by the petitioners and directing the
respondents to file their respective comments (not a motion to dismiss) to the petition within ten days from
notice, with the petitioners given five days from receipt of that comment within which to file their reply. The
Special Ninth Division also set the hearing on the application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
for 10:00 a.m. on June 23 and 24, 2008. In the same Resolution, parties were directed to file their respective

On June 10, 2008, Justice B. L. Reyes reported back to work. 29

On June 11, 2008, at 3:50 p.m.,30 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), appearing for the SEC, filed a
manifestation and motion praying for the admission of the comment (to the petition) attached thereto, as well
as the advance and additional copies of the memorandum of authorities.
On June 12, 2008, at 4:53 p.m., the GSIS filed its comment/opposition to the petition in CA-G.R. SP No.
103692,31 as well as its memorandum of authorities.
On June 16, 2008, the Division Clerk of Court, Atty. Teresita Custodio (Atty. Custodio), delivered to Justice
Reyes the cartilla of the Meralco case, and informed him that a hearing on the prayer for the issuance of a
preliminary injunction had been scheduled at 10:00 a.m. on June 23 and 24, 2008. 32However, on the same
day, the Division Clerk of Court came back to retrieve the cartilla upon instructions of Justice Sabio. Justice
Reyes instructed his staff to return the cartilla and when he asked the Division Clerk of Court why she was
retrieving it, she said that Justice Sabio "demanded" that it be returned back to him. "Personally affronted" by
the "domineering and superior stance" of Justice Sabio, Justice Reyes "read and re-read Secs. 1, 2(d) & 5,
Rule VI (Process of Adjudication)" until he was satisfied that he should sit as Division Chairman in the Meralco
case.33
On either June 17 or 18, 2008, Justice Sabio requested the rollo of CA-G.R. SP No. 103692 from Justice
Roxas so that he could study the case before the hearing. 34 Justice Roxas asked him whether Justice Reyes
would preside over the hearing. Justice Sabio explained the reason why he, not Justice Reyes, should
preside. Justice Roxas promised to instruct the Division Clerk of Court to send the rollo over to Justice Sabio.
The next day, the Division Clerk of Court told Justice Sabio that the rollo was with Justice Reyes. When
the rollo was eventually transmitted to Justice Sabio, the Division Clerk of Court asked him whether
the rollo should be with Justice Reyes. Justice Sabio explained why the rollo should be with him.
On June 18, 2008, petitioners filed a motion for an extension of five days or until June 23, 2008 within which to
file their consolidated memoranda of authorities and reply to the comment of the SEC. 35
On June 19, 2008, MERALCO filed an ex-parte manifestation together with their reply to the comment of the
GSIS.36 Meanwhile, Justice B. L. Reyes asked Atty. Custodio to report on "what transpired between her and
Justice Sabio" when she returned the cartilla. "Teary-eyed," Atty. Custodio begged off from making a report. 37

Justice Reyes decided to consult the Presiding Justice "to avoid an ugly confrontation" with the Justices on the
"highly politicized case involving giants of the Philippine society." He explained to the Presiding Justice his
understanding of the relevant IRCA rules and "the actual practice in similar situations in the past." The
Presiding Justice promised to talk with Justice Sabio and, "for the sake of transparency and future reference,"
Justice Reyes requested permission to write an inquiry on the matter.38
On the same day, Justice Reyes wrote Presiding Justice Vasquez a letter 39 calling the attention of Justice
Edgardo P. Cruz ("Justice Cruz"), Chairperson of the Committee on Rules, to the "dilemma" as to who
between him and Justice Sabio should "receive" CA-G.R. SP No. 103692. Justice Reyes posed these
questions before the Presiding Justice:
Will the case remain with Justice Jose Sabio, Jr. as Acting Chairman of the Special 9th Division
and who participated in the initial Resolution of the case?
Will the case revert to the regular 9th Division with the undersigned as Chairman?
For Justice Reyes, the "dilemma" was engendered by this provision of Section 2 of Rule VI of the IRCA:
(2) When, in an original action or petition for review, any of these actions or proceedings, namely:
(1) giving due course; (2) granting writ of preliminary injunction; (3) granting new trial; and (4)
granting execution pending appeal have been taken, the case shall remain with the Justice to
whom the case is assigned for study and report and the Justices who participated therein,
regardless of their transfer to other Divisions in the same station.
The hearing on the application for preliminary injunction having been scheduled for June 23 and 24, 2008,
Justice Reyes considered it "necessary" that the issues be resolved before that date. Moreover, the referral of
the controversy to the Presiding Justice would give him sufficient time to seriously study the case before the
hearing.40
On June 20, 2008, Presiding Justice Vasquez referred the letter of Justice Reyes to Justice Cruz, Chairperson
of the Committee on Rules, noting "some urgency involved as the hearing of the case is on Monday, June 23,
2008."41
On that same day, Justice Cruz wrote Justice Reyes a letter42 quoting Section 2 (d), Rule VI of the IRCA and
stating that the "[i]ssuance of a TRO is not among the instances where the Justices who participated in the
case shall remain therein." Hence, Justice Cruz opined that "[n]otwithstanding the issuance of the TRO (not
writ of preliminary injunction), the case reverted to the regular Chairman (Justice Reyes) of the Ninth Division
upon his return." Justice Reyes received a copy of the letter of Justice Cruz in the afternoon of that day. 43
During the hearings of this case, Justice Cruz explained his opinion before the Panel. He opined that the
motion to lift the TRO is not a motion for reconsideration because Rule 52 of the Rules of Court states that a
motion for reconsideration may be filed with respect to a decision or a final resolution. A TRO is not a final
resolution but an interlocutory order. Moreover, since the subject of the hearing on June 23, 2008 was on the
application for preliminary injunction, Justice Sabio had no right to participate in the hearing because as an
Acting Chairman, his authority was only to act on the motion to lift the TRO. Under the IRCA, the position of
Justice Sabio invoked the exception to the general rule in the IRCA. However, the settled principle is to
construe a rule strictly against the exception. The participation of Justice Sabio in the hearing on June 23,
2008 was a "passport" to participation in the decision-making process, in violation of the IRCA. 44
Justice Reyes having consulted with him, the Presiding Justice referred the matter to Justice Sabio who in
turn, opined that "a temporary restraining order is part of the injunctive relief or at least its initial action such
that he should be the one to chair the Division." 45 In his office after that consultation with the Presiding Justice,
Justice Reyes found that the Division Clerk of Court had given him a copy of the cartilla just in case he would
preside over the hearing.In the evening, the Presiding Justice called up Justice Reyes to inform him that
Justice Sabio "insisted that he would preside over the hearing of the case," and that the opinion of Justice
Cruz, who was "junior" to Justice Sabio "was no better than his own opinion." 46

It turned out that, upon receipt of a copy of the letter of Justice Cruz, Justice Sabio told the Presiding Justice
by telephone that he disagreed with the opinion of Justice Cruz "because he did not sign in an official capacity
as Chairman of the Rules Committee, but in his personal capacity" and hence, the opinion of Justice Sabio
"was as good as his, as in fact I (Justice Sabio, Jr.) am even more senior than he." 47 Justice Sabio told the
Presiding Justice that he "smelled something fishy" about the move to transfer the case to the Ninth Division
especially because Justice Reyes did not inform him about it despite the fact that they were seated together
on three occasions.
Justice Sabio "smelled something fishy" because a couple or so weeks ago, he attended a Chairpersons
meeting regarding the leakage of the ponencia of Justice Bato, with Justice Reyes as Chairperson and Justice
Jose Mendoza as senior member. The meeting was called because prior to the promulgation of the decision of
Justice Bato, the losing party already filed a motion for the inhibition of the ponente. According to Justice Sabio
information on the decision could not have been leaked by Justice Bato but by a member of the Division. 48
The Presiding Justice "did not do anything anymore" to prevent an "unpalatable" situation at the scheduled
June 23, 2008 hearing, notwithstanding the "conflicting opinions" of Justices Reyes and Sabio. The "personal
view" of the Presiding Justice was at the time "with Justice Cruz" but Justice Sabio had a "different
interpretation." Neither did the Presiding Justice suggest that the Rules Committee be convened because the
Committee then had only two members. He felt that it would be "better" if Justices Reyes and Sabio "could
settle it between themselves." The Presiding Justice was seeing the Justices "practically" everyday because
he did not want "these things to blow up." However, neither did it enter the mind of the Presiding Justice that
the hearing on June 23 could be reset. Had he known that there was a motion to inhibit Justice Roxas, he
would have changed his position "that it should be the Sabio group." 49
Also on June 20, 2008, the GSIS requested permission to conduct a power-point presentation during the
hearing.50 Likewise the SEC, through the OSG prayed that it be allowed the use of Microsoft Powerpoint
Application at the June 23 and 24, 2008 hearings. 51 Justice Roxas did not act on the motions.
On June 21, 2008, Justice Sabio came to know that it was the Division chaired by Justice Reyes that would
handle the case on account of the opinion of Justice Cruz. 52
In the morning of June 23, 2008, Justice Sabio consulted with Justice Martin Villarama, Jr. ("Justice
Villarama") who advised him, "in no uncertain terms," that his stand was "correct" and that he should remain in
the case.53 Justice Villarama said that the case should remain with the Special Ninth Division "regardless of
the transfer of the ponente to the Eighth Division because of the pending motion to lift TRO," which the Special
Ninth Division should resolve "following the general rule that when a decision or resolution is rendered by a
division, a motion for reconsideration thereof should be acted upon by all the Members of that division,
whether regular or special, which participated in the rendition of the decision or resolution, except in case of
death, retirement or resignation of such Member." 54
That morning, Justice Roxas also consulted Justice Villarama. The latter told the former that since there was a
motion to lift the TRO, Justice Roxas should first rule on the motion. He also advised Justice Roxas to inhibit
himself from the case, as there might be a problem (mag-inhibit ka baka magka-problema). Justice Roxas told
Justice Villarama that he would follow his "suggestion." 55
Justice Reyes also went to the office of Justice Villarama to tell him of his "strong conviction that the issuance
of a TRO is not among the instances provided in Sec. 2 (d), Rule VI when the case shall remain with those
Justices who participated in the case regardless of their transfer to other division(s)." Justice Villarama told
Justice Reyes that per his "understanding and interpretation of said provision, x x x the case should remain
with the Special Ninth Division."56
At 9:50 a.m., the Office of the Division Clerk of Court called Justice Reyes to inform him that the parties and
their counsels were already in the hearing room. Justice Reyes informed the caller that he could not preside
as Justice Sabio had "apparently hardened his position" and he wanted to avoid an "ugly spectacle." His name
plate was displayed in the hearing room but Justice Sabio moved to another hearing room. 57 Allegedly, the
removal of the nameplate of Justice Reyes was the talk of the Court of Appeals for weeks. 58
Villaraza Cruz Marcelo and Angangco entered its appearance as counsel for Meralco. 59 At the hearing, Justice
Sabio presided with Justices Roxas and Dimaranan-Vidal in attendance. Justice Roxas, the ponente, did not
ask a single question.60 Not one of the Justices in attendance brought up the motion for inhibition filed by the

GSIS against Justice Roxas.61 In open court, the parties in CA-G.R. SP No. 103692 agreed to submit, within
15 days, simultaneous memoranda on the injunctive relief prayed for by the petitioners, after which the
application for preliminary injunction would be deemed submitted for resolution. 62

Then he bragged to me: Ako din ang responsible sa pag-recommend at pag-hire ng

Villaraza Law Firm.
Then he explained that he was there to offer me a win-win situation.

On June 25, 2008, or about two days after the separate conversations of Justice Villaram with Justices Sabio
and Reyes, the Presiding Justice also consulted Justice Villarama about the letter-queries of Justices Roxas
and Reyes on which Division should resolve "the matter of injunctive relief or issue the decision" in CA-G.R.
SP No. 103692. 63

He said: Justice, mayroon kaming P10 million. Ready. Just give way to Justice Reyes.
Then I said: Bakit ganun. Nakasisiguro sila sa kanya, sa akin hindi?

The Presiding Justice issued Office Order No. 196-08-CMV reconstituting the Committee on Rules and
designating Justice Cruz as the Chairperson, with Justices Rebecca De Guia-Salvador, Reyes, Hakim
Abdulwahid, and Noel G. Tijam, as members. 64 The Committee on Rules was tasked to propose amendments
to the IRCA on or before August 15, 2008 "for submission and adoption of the Court en banc." (The office
order was later amended by Office Order No. 196-08-CMV on August 4, 2008 to include as members Justices
Mario L. Guaria III, Lucas P. Bersamin, and Teresita Dy-Liacco Flores. 65) The Rules Committee used to be
composed of only three members, namely: Justices Cruz, Abdulwahid, and Roberto Barrios, now deceased,
as members, with Justice Cruz as chairperson.66
It was also on June 25, 2008 that Presiding Justice Vasquez issued Office Order No. 200-08-CMV stating that,
in view of the retirement of Justices Enrique Lanzanas, Lucenito N. Tagle, Agustin S. Dizon, and Rodrigo
Cosico, and the appointments of Justices Ruben C. Ayson and Edgardo L. delos Santos, the Divisions would
have a new composition effective July 4, 2008.67 Under that office order, Justice Sabio became the Chairman
of the Sixth Division, with Justice Dimaranan-Vidal as a member. Justice Reyes became the Chairman of the
Eighth Division, with Justices Roxas and Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr. ("Justice Bruselas") as members.
On June 29, 2008, Justice Reyes went on official leave of absence to use a business class airplane ticket to
Sydney, Australia that he had won in an APT Golf Tournament in January 2008. He was still on official leave
when the reorganization of the Court of Appeals took place on July 4, 2008. 68
On July 1, 2008, Justice Roxas told Justice Sabio that he did not attend the Access to Courts (sic) summit on
June 30 and July 1, 2008 at the Court of Appeals Auditorium because he was busy with the Meralco case.
Justice Sabio was taken aback because at that time the parties had not yet submitted their memoranda. 69
That same afternoon, Mr. De Borja again called up Justice Sabio, seeking to meet with him for an "important"
matter. Because Justice Sabio had 6-8 p.m. classes at the Ateneo Law School, they agreed to meet after his
classes but not for long because his wife and his daughter, Atty. Silvia Jo Sabio who is an Attorney VI in the
Office of the Chief Justice,70 would be waiting for him.71 According to Justice Sabio, the conversation at that
meeting with Francis de Borja went as follows:
17. By the time my class was finished at 8 pm, Mr. De Borja was already waiting for me at the
Lobby Lounge of the 3rd Floor of the Ateneo Law School. His first words to me were: Alam mo
Justice kung sino ang kasama ko sa kotse? Si Manolo Lopez. Then he said: Noong tinatawagan
kita at sinabi kong "Mabuhay ka Justice," si Manolo Lopez ang katabi ko noon. Nasa Amerika siya,
kaya ako na lang ang pumunta dito para makiusap sa yo. Alam mo, itong kaso na ito is a matter
of life and death for the Lopezes. And alam mo naman what the Marcoses did to them, which is
being done now by the Arroyos.
At that point he mentioned the impasse between Justice Bienvenido Reyes and
myself. He said: Alam naming may problema kayo ni Justice Reyes tungkol sa
chairmanship.
I was surprised how he came to know about it, as this was an internal matter of the
Court of Appeals which only happened fairly recently and many associate justices of
the CA were not even aware of this. Just the same, I explained my stand and why I
could not relinquish the chairmanship to Justice Reyes.
He then replied: Alam mo, Justice ang opinion dito ni Nonong Cruz ay i-challenge ang
stand mo. Kaya lang, mayroon namang nagsabi na it might become messy.

He said: Mas komportable lang sila sa kanya.

At that point, I was shocked that he had a very low regard for me. He was treating me
like there was a price on my person. I could not describe my feelings. I was stunned.
But at the same time, hindi ko rin magawang bastusin siya because I had known him
since 1993 and this was the first time that he had ever treated me like this, or shown
that he believed I could be bought.
So I just told him: Francis, I cannot in conscience agree to that.
His answer was: Sabi ko nga sa kanila, mahirap ka talaga papayag. Kasi may anak
iyang Opus Dei. Numerary pa.
At this point, I just wanted to leave, so I told him I could not stay long. I told him my
wife and lawyer daughter were waiting.
Even then, he was already insistent. His parting words before I left were: Just think
about it, Justice.72
At that time, Mr. De Borja was carrying a "sealed" brown paper bag, which he was handling "as if something
important" was inside. However, Justice Sabio did not know if the bag contained P10million. 73
In his car, Justice Sabio told his wife and his daughter, Silvia Jo, about the offer of Mr. De Borja for Meralco. 74
In his affidavit submitted to the Panel of Investigators, Mr. De Borja describes himself as a businessman, a
deal maker, and project packager. On July 1, 2008, he invited Justice Sabio for dinner "to touch base" and
for chismis about the MERALCO-GSIS case. As the latter would have evening classes at the Ateneo Law
School, and his wife and daughter would be waiting in their car after his classes, they just agreed to meet at
the lobby-lounge of the School. What Mr. De Borja knew about the MERALCO case allegedly came from news
reports but he was interested in the news because he is a "confirmed free-enterpriser." Moreover, De Borja
thought that there was "[n]othing like hearing things directly from the horses mouth." 75
When Mr. De Borja and Justice Sabio met, Mr. De Borja averred he was indeed carrying a bag, not an
expensive looking luggage. After parking his car at the Rockwell basement, he took the escalator, intending to
walk out of the mall. On his way, he passed by the Kenneth Cole shop and, since it was still early, he looked in
and saw a T-shirt he liked. He bought the T-shirt, which he brought before the Panel of Investigators in the
grey "Kenneth Cole Reaction" bag. The photographs of the bag and the T-shirt costing P1,650.00 are marked
Exhibits "A-De Borja" and "A-1-De Borja" and attached to therollo of A.M. No. 08-8-11-CA, while the
photograph of the receipt issued by the Kenneth Cole Boutique, marked as Exhibit "A-2-De Borja," shows that
the purchase was made on July 1, 2008 at 19:47. He stressed the bag did not contain P10 million.
Before the Panel, Justice Sabio claimed that the bag Mr. De Borja brought during the hearing was not the bag
that Mr. De Borja was carrying when Justice Sabio saw him on July 1, 2008. What Mr. De Borja allegedly
brought with him to the lobby-lounge of the Ateneo Law School was a brown bag with paper handle "about 2/3
(of the Kenneth Cole bag) in size." Justice Sabio was told by the Panel that it could be the subject of rebuttal
evidence but he did not present such evidence.

According to Mr. De Borja, Manolo Lopez (Mr. Lopez), the owner of MERALCO whose wife was a member of
Marthas Vineyard just like Mr. De Borjas wife, was also an acquaintance of Mr. De Borja at the Ateneo grade
school. Mr. Lopez did not ask him (Mr. De Borja) to contact Justice Sabio. At a party where Mr. De Borja met
Mr. Lopez, Mr. De Borja informed him that he knew Justice Sabio but Mr. Lopez did not say anything.
Mr. De Borja denied having offered P10 million to Justice Sabio. Instead, he claimed that Justice Sabio
informed him that the government has offered him (Justice Sabio) money and a promotion to the Supreme
Court to favor GSIS. When Mr. De Borja asked what would it take for Justice Sabio to resist the governments
offer, Justice Sabio allegedly replied: "Fifty Million." 76 He alleged that it was Justice Sabio who called up after
that July 1, 2008 meeting to "feel" his reaction to the "P50 million solicitation." Justice Sabio asked him: "O,
ano, kumusta, ano ang nangyayari."
Mr. De Borja admitted having given P300,000 to Justice Sabio, some 15 years ago, as a balatobecause he
came to value the friendship of Justice Sabio that developed while the latter was helping the Roa family in a
business transaction. Mr. De Borja earned "more than P25 million" although he received only P3 million as
down payment out of the sale of 100 hectares of the Roa property. He gave the balato of 10% of the P3 million
to Justice Sabio in cash at the Roa-owned bank in Cagayan de Oro. Since the Roas had a lot of "legal
problems," Justice Sabio rendered advice and consultation at the time that he was an RTC judge in Cagayan
de Oro. After the promotion of Justice Sabio to the Court of Appeals, Mr. De Borja invited him for dinner. They
would see each other at get-togethers of the Roas with whom Mr. De Borja is related, even at a gathering in
the house of Mr. De Borjas mother.77
On July 2, 2008, Justice Sabio that informed Presiding Justice Vasquez that he (Justice Sabio) was offered a
bribe (which he rejected) to have him ousted from the Meralco case. The news allegedly shocked the
Presiding Justice. Justice Sabio also went to Justice Villarama who was both "shocked and amused." Justice
Sabio. did not tell them who the "offeror" was. However, a day or two later, Justice Sabio found out that Mr. De
Borja had called their mutual friend, Mrs. Evelyn Clavano, who was also shocked that Mr. De Borja had "the
gall to ask her" to convince Justice Sabio to accept the bribe. 78
Although Justice Sabio told the Presiding Justice that the offer of P10 million to a Justice was, in the words of
Justice Sabio, bastusan na ito, and he knew that bribing a Justice is a criminal act, the Presiding Justice did
nothing because he could not "advise a fellow Justice on what to do" - the Justice would know what he should
do. Neither did he think of consulting Justices Roxas and Dimaranan-Vidal on the chairmanship impasse. 79
On July 3, 2008, to stop Mr. De Borja from pestering him with phone calls and text messages, Justice Sabio
called up Mr. De Borja who told him: Mabuti naman Justice tumawag ka, kasi malapit na ang deadline ng
submission ng memorandum. Pinag-isipan mo bang mabuti ang offer namin? Kasi sayang din kung di mo
tatanggapin, Kasi kahit aabot itong kaso sa Supreme Court, matatalo ka din. Sayang lang yung P10 million.
Baka sisihin ka pa ng mga anak mo. Shocked by what he heard, Justice Sabio said "No." Since Mr. De Borja
did not seem to understand why he kept saying "No," Justice Sabio explained to him: If I accept that, my
conscience will bother me forever. How can I face my wife and two daughters? One a lawyer and the other a
Numerary member of Opus Dei? And besides, how can I reconcile my being a member of PHILJAs Ethics
and Judicial Conduct Department; being a lecturer of the MCLE; and being a pre-bar reviewer of the Ateneo
Law School on Legal and Judicial Ethics? Mr. De Borja retorted: Wala naman kaming pinapagawa sa iyo na
illegal, eh. Then he added: You know Justice, after two or three weeks, makakalimutan na ito ng mga tao.
Meron naman diyang mga Atenista na tumatanggap. Justice Sabio said: I dont know about them, but I am
different. Mr. De Borja then said: Well, if you will not accept, we will be forced to look for other ways. To this,
Justice Sabio said: But they will have to contend with me. In parting, Mr. De Borja said:Justice, no matter
what, saludo talaga ako sa iyo.

motion. Justice Reyes agreed and told the Presiding Justice that he would be sending over the records to him
so that the Presiding Justice could place a note thereon as to what had been agreed upon. However, the
records of the case did not reach the Presiding Justice.80
For Justice Roxas, the July 4, 2008 reorganization was mandatory and the Meralco case followed him as
its ponente to the Eighth Division. By the reorganization, Justice Sabio was moved from the disbanded Special
Ninth Division to the Sixth Division, as the reorganization did not spare any Justice. 81 Moreover, the IRCA does
not require that the Justices that issued a TRO be the same Justices that will render the decision. 82 This is
because the TRO does not appear in Section 2 (d), Rule VII of the IRCA. Accordingly, only the issuance of a
preliminary injunction could be an exception to the July 4, 2008 reorganization of the CA. 83 He believes the
IRCA does not require that the Justices who heard the case should also decide it because the CA is a court of
record and Justices may rely on the transcript of stenographic notes. 84 And so, once the three Justices have
signed the decision, the ponente has the "pressing duty" to promulgate the decision.85
Since July 4, 2008, Justice Bruselas alleged that he acted "on all the ponencias" of Justices Reyes and
Roxas, "just as they had acted" on his ponencias.86
On July 7, 2008, the GSIS filed its memorandum.
On or about July 8, 2008, Atty. Silvia Sabio, to help her father, sought the advice of Atty. Jose Midas Marquez
("Atty. Marquez") regarding the bribery attempt. Atty. Marquez advised that Justice Sabio should write the
Chief Justice about the incident, detailing not only the bribery attempt but all that has transpired relative to the
chairmanship issue. Atty. Silvia Sabio immediately called her father and relayed Atty. Marquezs advice. Later
that date, Justice Sabio handed his daughter, Silvia, a handwritten letter for her to deliver to the Chief
Justice.87 The handwritten letter, in essence, requested permission for Justice Sabio to "unburden" himself
before the Chief Justice on the Meralco case.88
At around 2:30 p.m., Justice Reyes went to see Justice Sabio. The conversation between them, as recalled by
Justice Sabio, was as follows:
As soon as he came in, I said: "Why did you stab me behind my back?" He said, "Why, what did I
do? I asked him Why is it that you have to resort to that strategy of seeking the opinion of Ed Cruz,
in his personal capacity, when we could have discussed the matter with the PJ?
I reminded him that we were seated three times near each other on different occasions only
recently and he never mentioned to me about the plan to oust me.
He said: Perhaps that was my fault. I should have talked to you.
I told him, that all the while I thought we were friends. Why did you have to do these things
behind my back and not discuss the matter with me face to face?
Then he said it just came about due to the urgent motion; that he was afraid Meralco would take
action against him for nonfeasance for not doing his job.
It was then that I said: Are you aware that I was offered 10M for me to give way to you?

Mr. De Borja admitted that Justice Sabio called him up, but denied the above conversation with Justice Sabio.
On July 4, 2008, the reorganization of the Court of Appeals became effective and brought Justices Reyes,
Roxas and Bruselas to the Eighth Division. Justice Reyes went to see the Presiding Justice about the urgent
motion for him to assume the chairmanship of the Division, which shows on its face that the Urgent Motion
dated July 10, 2008 was received by the Court of Appeals at 2:08 p.m. on July 10, 2008 and by Atty. Teresita
C. Custodio on July 9, 2008. Justice Reyes expressed to the Presiding Justice his apprehension that should
he fail to assume the chairmanship, he would face administrative liability for nonfeasance or dereliction of duty.
The Presiding Justice suggested that the respondents in the case be required to comment on the Urgent
Motion "in a resolution to be issued by the former 9th Division of Justice J.L. Sabio, Jr. since to allow the new
Division of Justice B.L. Reyes to issue the resolution x x x would render moot and academic" the same

I further asked him the following: In the first place, how was the Meralco emissary able to know
that there was an impasse between you and me when that was supposed to be an internal
matter?
If you will now insist on assuming the chairmanship after I told you of the 10Million
offer, what will I think of you?
Are you a Trojan horse? Can you blame me if I think you are part of this whole
scheme or shenanigan?

 Does not the timing alone stink of corruption? After they failed to convince me of
their offer, now they will use you to oust me? Is it because they are certain of your
loyalty and they are uncertain with mine?
And why did they file this stupid urgent motion to assume? In my nine years in this
court, I have never seen such an animal as this. This is a cowardly act, and whoever
advised this stupid motion is also stupid. Why do you have to dignify such a foolish
motion? They should file a motion for me to inhibit or recuse myself.
Why is it that Meralco actively participated in the hearing on the 23rd and never
raised any question on the alleged irregularity of my having presided over the hearing?
Why do you insist on assuming the case? Are you not aware that several days after
the issuance of the TRO, respondents filed a motion for inhibition of Justice Vicente
Roxas and a motion to lift the TRO. Who then had the right to resolve such motion?

However, Justice Roxas denied that the decision he gave to Justice Dimaranan-Vidal was the final decision.
He denied that he gave it to her for her signature. He said it was only for her to read because she asked to
read it. He said it was a mere draft as "everything was unofficial" - there was no rollo or logbook with it, it was
not placed in an envelope, and it did not have the "special seal" of Justice Roxas. It allegedly "was thrown in
the garbage can."
On July 9, 2008, the OSG filed the memorandum for the SEC.
On July 10, 2008, Meralco filed an urgent motion praying that Justice Reyes assume the chairmanship of the
Division,95 alleging the reasons for the urgent motion as follows:
5. At the scheduled oral arguments on 23 June 2008 in the instant case, the parties were first
directed to one of the Hearing Rooms of the Court of Appeals. At the said room, the name plate of
Justice Reyes was already placed on the table for the justices. Thus, petitioners were of the
impression that the leave of absence of Justice Reyes was over and that he would be presiding
over the oral arguments as Chairman of the Ninth Division of the Honorable Court.

Under the circumstances, anong iisipin ko sa yo? Ano ang tingin ko ngayon sa iyo?
His feeble answer was: you. He then said he did not know of those pending motions.
(Incidentally, these motions were never resolved.) He also said, wala talaga akong interest dito
kundi ayaw ko lang ma charge ng non-feasance for failing to do my duty.
I answered him: Malayo yung non-feasance. Hindi ito nonfeasance. I taught the subject for many
years and this is not one of them.
So I told him, I have made my decision on the matter.Bahala ka na. Then I stood up to show him
to the door. He was silent after that and before he left, he put his arm around me.
For his part, Justice Reyes kept on repeating: "Wala talaga ako dito, wala akong interest kung di yun lang
hindi ako ma non-feasance. Justice Sabio thought otherwise.
Meanwhile, Justice Roxas brought to the office of Justice Dimaranan-Vidal "the final decision on the
MERALCO case" bearing his signature, which he gave to Justice Dimaranan-Vidal for "concurrence/dissent."
According to Justice Dimaranan-Vidal, Justice Roxas explained to her the "rationale for his conclusion."
Justice Roxas went out for a while and returned "with an expensive looking travelling bag" from where he
pulled out the "purported final decision." Before the close of office hours, Justice Roxas returned to the
chambers of Justice Dimaranan-Vidal to check if he (Justice Roxas) had signed his decision. When she
replied that yes, he had signed it, Justice Roxas said he would pick it up the next day. 89
Justice Dimaranan-Vidal signed the decision notwithstanding that on July 8, 2008 the Court of Appeals had
been reorganized because she believed that the Special Ninth Division was still existing on account of its
having issued the TRO.90 She also concurred with the portion of the decision recommending administrative
sanctions against the GSIS lawyers because she believed the OSG or the OGCC should have appeared for
the GSIS.91
Also late that day, Justice Villarama told Justice Sabio that he had advised Justice Reyes to "lay off the case"
and allow Justice Sabio "to continue" and to resolve the urgent motion for Justice Reyes to assume the
chairmanship. Justice Villarama recalled that Justice Reyes repeatedly said: "Wala talaga ako dito Jun, Wala
akong personal interest dito."
After "a careful and judicious study" of the more than 56-page decision of Justice Roxas, Justice DimarananVidal signed it. True to his word, Justice Roxas personally picked up the decision that day "purportedly for the
action of the Acting Chairman, Justice Sabio," who was then on leave of absence until July 11,
200.92 Notwithstanding the fact that the parties had not submitted their respective memoranda, Justice
Dimaranan-Vidal signed the "convincing" ponencia, including three copies of the signature page, because
Justice Roxas was insistent of the urgency of the signing of the decision due to the impending lapse of the
TRO on July 29, 2008.93 Justice Sabio thought otherwise.94

6. However, when the parties were directed to transfer to another Room of the Court of Appeals for
the oral arguments in the instant case, petitioners saw that the name plates on the table for the
justices included that of Justice Sabio, Jr., together with that (sic) of Justices Roxas and
Dimaranan-Vidal. Thereafter, Justice Sabio presided over the oral arguments as Chairman of the
Special Ninth Division of the Honorable Court. Petitioners were, thus, of the impression that the
regular Chairman of the Ninth Division, Justice Reyes, was still on temporary leave of absence.
7. Subsequently, it has come to the attention of the petitioners that Justice Reyes has already
returned from his temporary leave of absence and has resumed his duties as Chairman of the
Ninth Division of the Honorable Court.
8. Under the Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals, Justice Sabio, Jr. should now refrain from
acting as the chairman of the Division hearing the instant case as he is already disqualified from
acting as such upon the return of Justice Reyes.
8.1. With due respect, Justice Reyes cannot shirk from his bounden judicial
responsibility of performing his duties and functions as Chairman of the Ninth Division
of the Honorable Court.
8.2. Specifically, under Section 3 (d), Rule IV of the 2002 Internal Rules of the Court of
Appeals, a case can remain with the justices who participated therein only when any of
the following actions have been taken: (a) giving due course; (b) granting of a writ of
preliminary injunction; (c) granting of a new trial; or (d) granting of execution pending
appeal:
xxx

xxx

x x x.

9. None of the foregoing instances apply with respect to Justice Sabio, Jr.s continuing hold on the
case. Although Justice Sabio, Jr. was one of the Justices who issued the temporary restraining
order in favour of the petitioners in the instant case, this circumstance is not among the grounds as
above-quoted, when a justice of the Court of Appeals may remain in the Division.
10. As above-quoted, the rule is categorical that it is not the grant of a temporary restraining order
but rather the grant of a writ of preliminary injunction that sanctions a justices remaining with the
Division. Thus, the continued participation of Justice Sabio, Jr., in the instant case, considering the
clear Rules of the Honorable Court, is not only irregular but may lead one to conclude that he is
exhibiting undue interest in the instant case.
On this day, Justice Reyes reported back to work after his trip to Australia. 96

On July 11, 2008, Justice Sabio was on leave when Justice Roxas called him up for a meeting to discuss the
case. Justice Sabio told him that he needed ample time to read the memoranda of the parties. Justice Roxas
promised to send to Justice Sabio the memoranda immediately.97
At 4:00 p.m., Justice Reyes received from the Eighth Division Clerk of Court a copy of Meralcos Urgent
Motion for him to assume the chairmanship of the Ninth Division.
On Monday, July 14, 2008 at the flag ceremony, Justice Sabio requested Justice Roxas to meet with him as
he had by then read the memoranda of the parties. Justice Roxas initially agreed to the meeting but he later
informed Justice Sabio that he had another matter to attend to; neither was he available in the afternoon.
Justice Roxas had become scarce. Justice Sabio learned that Justice Dimaranan-Vidal was also looking for
Justice Roxas.98
Justice Sabio prepared a resolution on the motion for the reconsideration of the TRO and informed Justices
Roxas and Dimaranan-Vidal that he wanted to discuss it with them. The resolution he prepared "never saw
light."99
At 10 a.m., Justice Roxas, with his messenger, brought the rollo of CA G.R. SP No. 103692 to Justice Reyes,
and told the latter that he and Justice Bruselas would be coming over to deliberate on the case. Ten minutes
later, the Eighth Division deliberated on the case. 100 After a cursory examination of the rollo, Justice Reyes
found that the decision had been signed by Justices Roxas and Bruselas but Justice Reyes asked for more
time to study the case.101
A transcript of the "Final Deliberation" on July 14, 2008 is attached to page 1926 of Volume III of therollo of
CA-G.R. SP No. 103692 and marked as Exh. 2- Roxas on page 279 of the rollo of A.M. No. 08-8-11-CA.
According to Justice Roxas, it was he who prepared the transcript from memory to "lend credence" to the
certification of Justice Reyes at the end of the decision pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the
Constitution.102 Justice Reyes denied having seen it or having authorized its transcription. Justice Bruselas did
not sign any transcript of the deliberation as he was not aware that a transcript was being taken. There was no
stenographer present, as only the three of them, Justices Reyes, Roxas, and Bruselas were present at the
deliberation. Neither was there a recording machine. Justice Roxas admittedly prepared the transcript "from
memory."103

On July 21, 2008, Justice Roxas personally filed with the Presiding Justice 109 an "Interpleader
Petition"110 praying that Presiding Justice Vasquez "decide which division Chairman (Justice Sabios Former
Special 9th Division or Justice B. L. Reyes 8th Division) should sign the Preliminary Injunction or
Decision."111 Justice Roxas averred that "[t]he impasse between two Chairmen from two Divisions has to be
resolved much earlier than July 30, 2008 because July 30, 2008 is the expiration date of the TRO issued by
the Special 9th Division (signed by Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr., Justice Vicente Q. Roxas [ponente] and Justice
Myrna Dimaranan-Vidal)." He opined that the two Chairpersons differed in the interpretation of Sections 1 and
2 (d) in relation to Section 5 of Rule VI on Process of Adjudication of the Internal Rules of the Court of
Appeals (IRCA).112 His stand was that the IRCA "should be strictly applied" because "[w]hen the provisions
are clear, there is no room for interpretation."
Justice Roxas endorsed his "Interpleader Petition" to Justice Reyes for his "signature or dissent" to the
"finalized MERALCO Decision," which had been in Justice Reyes possession since July 14, 2008. 113 He also
gave the rollo of the case to Justice Reyes.114
Presiding Justice Vasquez allegedly told Justice Roxas that as Presiding Justice, he had no authority to rule
on the Interpleader Petition, which is not an administrative concern over which the Presiding Justice must
intervene. Nevertheless, to avoid further discussion, the Presiding Justice told Justice Roxas that he would
study the matter.115
On July 22, 2008, Justice Reyes wrote the Presiding Justice a letter on "what was discussed between us last
17 July 2008 at around 3:30 p.m."116 Apparently the Presiding Justice had suggested "to endorse the case and
have the Special Ninth Division direct the respondents to file their simultaneous comments on the petitioners
Urgent Motion (For Honorable BIENVENIDO L. REYES to Assume Chairmanship of the Division in the Instant
Case) dated 10 July 2008."
Justice Reyes expressed "doubts" that the suggestion was "most prudent," as the dispute "revolves around
the correct interpretation" of the IRCA. He believed that since the question was "purely internal," the CA should
not seek "enlightenment" from the litigants for it would only be construed against its "competence." He shared
Justice Cruzs and Roxas interpretation of the IRCA. Hence, he urged the Presiding Justice to decide the
matter; otherwise, he would interpret the rules according to his "best lights and act accordingly."

The statement attributed to Justice Reyes in the transcript that there were "previous deliberations" were "really
meetings," which they had twice, in the office of Justice Reyes, according to Justice Roxas. 104

On July 23, 2008, Presiding Justice Vasquez asked for the rollo of CA G. R. No. SP No. 103692 so he could
"properly submit the requested opinion." It was then that he came across the unresolved motion praying for
the inhibition of Justice Roxas and the pending urgent motion to lift the TRO or to hold its enforcement in
abeyance. The Presiding Justice considered the latter as a motion for reconsideration of the Resolution
issuing the TRO.117

On July 15, 2008, when she felt that the timing was right, Atty. Silvia Sabio testified that she handed her
fathers letter to the Chief Justice through his private secretary, Ms. Jasmin Mateo. 105 A few days later,
however, Presiding Justice Vasquez told Justice Sabio that the Chief Justice would no longer meet with him,
as the Presiding Justice had apprised the Chief Justice about the matter.106

Meanwhile, at noon of that day, as Justice Reyes had not yet received "any reaction" from the Presiding
Justice, he signed the decision as well as the Certification. It was promulgated on the same day.

According to Justice Reyes, at 2:00 p.m. that day, the Office of the Presiding Justice informed him that Justice
Sabio was waiting for him in his office. As soon as Justice Reyes was seated, Justice Sabio "berated" him and
accused him of "orchestrating matters." Justice Sabio told him that an emissary of MERALCO had offered him
P10 million to drop off the case, hence, he asked that if he was offered that much, how much could have been
offered "to the principals?"107
On July 17, 2008, Justice Reyes went back to the office of the Presiding Justice and informed him of the
episode in the office of Justice Sabio. He also went to ask Justice Villarama for his opinion as to who was "the
rightful claimant" to the chairmanship of the Division that should decide the Meralco case. Justice Villarama
allegedly replied that they "were both correct."
On July 18, 2008, at the pre-launching meeting for the CA-CMIS, Justice Villarama had a "brief chat" with
Justice Bruselas. The former told the latter that "both Justices Sabio and Reyes are correct in the sense that
one (1) [of] them can properly assume chairmanship either under the exception provided in Sec. 2 (d), Rule VI
of the 2002 IRCA depending on the final disposition of the prayer for injunctive relief, or pursuant to the
general rule enshrined in Sec. 7 (b), Rule VI." 108

The decision was promulgated without waiting for the Presiding Justices opinion on whether it was the Eighth
or Special Ninth Division that should decide the case. Justice Roxas alleged that he did not expect the
Presiding Justice to "answer" or resolve the matter anyway.
On July 24, 2008, Presiding Justice Vasquez issued his reply to Justice Reyes letter and Justice Roxas
"Interpleader-Petition." The Presiding Justice claimed having doubts on whether he possessed "the authority
to decide the subject conflict" simply because under the IRCA, the Presiding Justice has control and
supervision only over administrative affairs of the Court. The controversy was certainly not an administrative
matter but Section 11 of Rule VIII of the IRCA provides that the Presiding Justice "has the authority to act on
any matter not covered" by the Rules although such action should be reported to the Court en banc.
The Presiding Justice expressed in his letter the view that "the (Special Ninth) Division that issued the
temporary restraining order should continue resolving the injunctive prayer in the petition" because it was the
Division that issued the Resolution granting the TRO and setting the hearing on the application for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, aside from the fact that the parties did not contest the authority of
Justice Sabio as Division Chairman at the time, although Justice Reyes had reported back to work. Moreover,
the motion for inhibition and the urgent motion to lift the TRO "have a bearing" on the application of Section 2
of Rule VI of the IRCA, especially because Section 7 (b) of Rule VI 118 points to the retention of the case by the
Special Ninth Division. Furthermore, the new Division headed by Justice Reyes may not be allowed to resolve

the pending incidents because two of its members, Justices Reyes and Bruselas did not participate in the
hearing on June 23, 2008. He did not believe that Justice Reyes would be charged with dereliction of duty
should he not assume the chairmanship. The Presiding Justice ended his letter with the hope that the matter
would be "laid to rest" and that whoever would be dissatisfied "with its outcome may elevate the matter to the
Supreme Court."
At 2:00 p.m. that day, Justice Sabio informed the Presiding Justice that a decision had been promulgated in
the Meralco case the previous day. The Presiding Justice was surprised because Justices Roxas and Reyes
had asked him to resolve the impasse on the Division chairmanship. Upon inquiry, the Presiding Justice found
that the decision had indeed been promulgated at 4:10 p.m. on July 23, 2008. 119
It was also on July 24, 2008 that Justice Dimaranan-Vidal received a call from Justice Sabio, informing her
that Meralco had offered him a bribe of P10 million "in exchange for his voluntary stepping out from the
Meralco case in order to give way to Justice B. L. Reyes," and that the decision in the Meralco case had been
promulgated by the Eighth Division.120 Shocked that Justice Roxas did not inform her "as a matter of judicial
courtesy" of the scrapping of the decision which she signed on July 8, 2008, Justice Dimaranan-Vidal wrote a
letter to the Presiding Justice dated July 24, 2008,121bringing to his attention "the apparent and obvious
irregularities in the handing of CA-G.R. SP No. 103692," and complaining about Justice Roxas "lack of judicial
courtesy" in discarding for reasons she would not know, his "purported final Decision" that he had asked her to
sign and which she signed "after a judicious study of the records and rollo thereof." Justice Roxas gave the
lame excuse that he had "to incorporate therein some ten pages which he forgot to include in his Decision."
Justice Dimaranan-Vidal expressed "surprise and consternation" when she learned "on even date that a
Decision" in the case had been promulgated on July 23, 2008 by the Eighth Division chaired by Justice Reyes,
with Justices Roxas and Bruselas as members. She said:
My deepest regret is that the undersigned who already signed the supposed final draft of the
Decision in the instant case which bears the signature of the ponente, was not even informed by
the latter as a judicial courtesy at least, of the hurried easing out of the undersigned from the case.
This inevitably posed even to an unprejudiced mind the following questions: under what basis was
the case suddenly transferred to the 8th Division and why is it that neither the undersigned nor the
Acting Chairman Justice SABIO, of the Special 9th Division not consulted thereof? and, foremost,
what happened to the Decision which the undersigned signed after devoting her precious time and
effort in carefully and laboriously examining the voluminous records and rollo of the case?
Sad to say the circumstance obtaining herein constitute a flagrant violation of the provision of
Canon 5 particularly Sections 2 and 3 thereof of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the
Philippine Judiciary (A.M. No. 03-05-01-SC).
On July 25, 2008, Justice Bruselas wrote the Presiding Justice a letter,122 which was "prompted by a disturbing
telephone call" he received from Justice Sabio in the morning of July 24, 2008. Justice Sabio informed Justice
Bruselas that, "after the injunction hearing" on June 23, 2008, Meralco offered him P10 Million "to either favor
them or yield the chair" to Justice Reyes. Justice Sabio told Justice Bruselas that he had informed the
Presiding Justice of the "bribery incident" and that he "was disgusted over the turn of events because he
should have remained chair of the Special 9th Division that issued the TRO on the case." Justice Bruselas
informed Justice Sabio that it was the first time that he heard of the matter and that he had "participated in the
deliberation on the case and concurred with the ponencia" of Justice Roxas "without such information ever
being taken up." Justice Sabio told Justice Bruselas that he would not leave the matter "as it is" because he
would bring it up in the "open, to media, etc." Justice Sabio asked Justice Bruselas that if P10M was offered to
him, how much would have been offered to the "others."
Troubled by the information, Justice Bruselas went to the Presiding Justice where Justice Dimaranan-Vidal,
who had received the same call from Justice Sabio, joined them. After that meeting with the Presiding Justice,
Justice Bruselas called up Justice Reyes who confirmed that he had heard about the "bribe offer" but that he
did not reveal the same to Justice Bruselas as it "escaped" his mind. The effort of Justice Bruselas "to get in
touch" with Justice Roxas proved futile.
Allegedly prompted by "the manner by which the decision x x x was arrived at, and how the decision was
promulgated," and that unless an "immediate and thorough investigation thereon be undertaken" by the Court
of Appeals, "both the individual and institutional integrity of the justices" and of the Court of Appeals would

"undoubtedly be tarnished," Justice Sabio wrote on July 26, 2008 a letter 123 to the Presiding Justice, which
precipitated the present investigation.
On July 28, 2008, the Philippine Daily Inquirer "carried an account" of the letter of Justice Dimaranan-Vidal to
the Presiding Justice, without her knowing how her confidential letter to the Presiding Justice leaked out. 124
Before Justice Bruselas delivered his letter to the Presiding Justice, he received a copy of the letter of Justice
Sabio and, through a telephone call, reiterated his "full agreement with his desired investigation."
The Presiding Justice called the Court of Appeals to an "emergency en banc session at 10:00 a.m. on July 31,
2008 at the Session Hall to elicit the reaction of the Court and on the "possible effect" on the decision
rendered. The session was also called in order that the "predicament experienced in CA-G.R. SP No. 103692"
could be deliberated upon by the Committee on Rules with a view to amending the IRCA on the reorganization
of the Court of Appeals. The Executive Justices of Cebu and Cagayan de Oro, Justices Antonio L. Villamor
and Romulo V. Borja, respectively, were instructed to attend the en banc session to report to the other Justices
in their stations what transpired at the session, and to "collect the personal reaction, comment or view" of the
Justices on the matter.125
In its closed door en banc session on July 31, 2008, "after a torrid discussion of all the issues," the Court of
Appeals decided, as follows:
(1) Refer the propriety of the actions of the Justices concerned to the Supreme Court,
through the Office of the Court Administrator;
(2) Leave the matter regarding the validity of the decision rendered in the above-entitled case to
the parties for them to take whatever legal steps they may deem appropriate in the usual course of
procedure; and
(3) Refer the conflict in the interpretation of our Internal Rules to the Committee on Rules of the
Court of Appeals in order to prevent the recurrence of a similar situation. 126
After the en banc session, Justice Dimaranan-Vidal expressed in a letter for the Presiding Justice 127her "strong
reaction" to the paper of Justice Roxas "falsely" imputing to her "grandstanding before the media or resorting
to media-recourse instead of just filing an administrative complaint before the Supreme Court," and taking
exception to "the equally outrageous, revolting and baseless accusation that she is allegedly clinging" to the
case. She asserted that she never leaked a copy of her letter to the Philippine Daily Inquirer, as her letter was
only intended to bring to the attention of the Presiding Justice "the impropriety done by Justice Roxas in the
MERALCO case" that resulted in her having been eased out of the case notwithstanding that she "carefully
and judiciously" examined theponencia with more than 50 pages, after devoting her "precious time" to such
study, and affixing her concurrence thereto. Justice Dimaranan-Vidal reiterated her prayer for an investigation
of the matter.
Meanwhile, on that day, Mr. De Borja, executed an affidavit admitting that he was the businessman referred to
by Justice Sabio, Jr. in his letter to Presiding Justice Vasquez. Mr. De Borja publicly claimed having learned
"from the news" that Justice Sabio was "one of the justices" in the case arising from the order of the SEC to
nullify the proxies issued in favor of the MERALCO management. He also alleged that Justice Sabio told him
about the "blandishments coming from the government side," that he was being offered a promotion to the
Supreme Court and money to favor the GSIS position. Mr. De Borja asked Justice Sabio, Jr., "What would it
take for you to resist the governments offer?" and that the response of Justice Sabio, Jr. was "Fifty Million."
Justice Sabio asked permission from the Presiding Justice to hold a press conference the next day on account
of the publicized affidavit of Mr. De Borja. The Presiding Justice told Justice Sabio that "this is a matter of selfdefense on his part," hence, the Presiding Justice cannot stop him from doing so.
Justice Sabio issued a signed statement as an "initial response" to the affidavit of Mr. De Borja, "vehemently"
denying that Mr. De Borja asked him what it would take for him to inhibit from the case, and that he "never
asked for money" from him.128

On August 1, 2008, Justice Sabio called the press conference to read a signed statement entitled "My
Reaction to Mr. Francis De Borjas Affidavit dated July 31, 2008 on the Meralco-SEC Case."
Expressing anger at the "filthy lie" of Mr. De Borja, Justice Sabio decided to narrate "almost word for word" his
"conversations" with Mr. De Borja.

(d) GSIS Motion filed on June 18, 2008, praying that it be allowed to use Power point at the
hearing on June 23, 2008 . On June 20, 2008, the SEC filed a similar motion. Both motions were
not acted upon by Justice Roxas (Rollo, pp. 593-621,)
(e) Meralcos "Motion for Extension of Time to file their Consolidated Memorandum of Authorities
and Reply to Repondent SECs Comment" filed on June 25, 2008 (Rollo, pp. 981- 987).

In an affidavit dated August 1, 2008, which Evelyn Clavano 129 executed in Davao City, she stated that Francis de Borja requested me if I have the cell phone number of Justice Jose L. Sabio Jr. He
related that because he was very close to the Lopezes of Meralco, he wanted to call him regarding
his possible inhibition in a certain Meralco case, wherein he was designated as a substitute
member of the division vice a justice who was temporarily on leave by reason of sickness. He
further said that the Lopezes desire that the same Justice, with whom the Lopezes are more
comfortable, to sit in the division.
So, I gave Francis de Borja the cell phone number of Justice Jose. L. Sabio, Jr. through business
card.
xxx

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(f) Meralcos "Urgent Motion for Honorable Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes to Assume Chairmanship
of the Division in the Instant Case," which was filed on July 10, 2008 (Rollo, pp. 12621274).131 (emphasis supplied)
We agree with the Panel of Investigators that "by ignoring or refusing to act on the motion for his inhibition,
Justice Roxas violated Rule V, Section 3, third paragraph of the IRCA, which provides that he should resolve
such motion in writing with copies furnished the other members of the Division, the Presiding Justice, the
Raffle Committee, and the Division Clerk of Court." The pertinent portion of the said provision states:
Sec. 3. Motion to Inhibit a Division or a Justice. - x x x

x x x.

On August 4, 2008, the Supreme Court constituted the Panel of Investigators to investigate "(1) alleged
improprieties of the actions of the Justices of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 103692 (Antonio V.
Rosete, et al. v. SEC, et al.) and (2) the alleged rejected offer or solicitation of bribe disclosed respectively by
Mr. Justice Jose Sabio and Mr. Francis de Borja."
The Panel of Investigators held hearings from August 8 to 23, 2008. Affidavits were submitted to the Panel to
serve as the parties direct testimonies upon which they were cross-examined by the Panel and the other
parties.
On September 4, 2008, the Panel of Investigators submitted its Report of even date to the Court en banc.
According to the Report, "the investigation has revealed irregularities and improprieties committed by the
Court of Appeals Justices in connection with the MERALCO case, CA-G.R. SP No. 103692, which are
detrimental to the proper administration of justice and damaging to the institutional integrity, independence and
public respect for the Judiciary." 130
Findings regarding the conduct of Associate Justice Vicente Q. Roxas
Justice Roxas inexcusably failed to act on a number of motions of the parties prior to the promulgation of the
Decision.
As found by the Panel of Investigators, several motions were not resolved or acted upon by Justice Roxas.
These were enumerated in the Report as follows:
(a) The "Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Defer Action on any Incident of the Petition Pending Resolution
of Re-Raffle" filed by GSIS on May 29, 2008 soon after this case was filed on that date (Rollo, pp.
185-186).

xxx
A motion for voluntary inhibition of a Justice shall be acted upon by him alone in writing, copy
furnished the other members of the Division, the Presiding Justice, the Raffle Committee and the
Division Clerk of Court.
This Court cannot agree with Justice Roxas proposition that the issuance of the TRO constitutes an implied
denial of the motion to inhibit since under IRCA the obligation of the Justice to act on such a motion is
mandatory.
Furthermore, the Court finds well-taken the Panels finding that "Justice Roxas failure to act on the other
motions of the parties violated Canon 3, Rule 3.05 of the 1989 Code of Judicial Conduct (which applies in a
suppletory manner to the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary) providing that:
"Rule 3.05. - A judge shall dispose of the courts business promptly and decide cases within the
required periods."
Even Section 5, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that "[j]udges shall perform all
judicial duties, including the delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly and with reasonable promptness."
Thus, it has become well-settled in jurisprudence that even just undue delay in the resolving pending motions
or incidents within the reglamentary period fixed by law is not excusable and constitutes gross
inefficiency.132 With more reason, this Court finds suspicious and reprehensible the failure of Justice Roxas to
act at all on pending motions and incidents in CA-G.R. SP No. 103692.
This is in fact not the first time that Justice Roxas has been cited administratively for failure to resolve pending
incidents in cases assigned to him. In Orocio v. Roxas, A.M. Nos. 07-115-CA-J and CA-08-46-J, this Court
imposed a P15,000 fine on Justice Roxas for unwarranted delay in resolving two motions for reconsideration
in another case and sternly warned him that future commission any act of impropriety will be dealt with more
severely.
Justice Roxas is guilty of gross dishonesty.

b) GSIS "Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Inhibit" Justice Roxas, which was filed on May 30, 2008.As
the motion raised a prejudicial question, Justice Roxas should have resolved it before
issuing the TRO sought by Meralco, but he never did (Rollo, pp. 220-223).

Apart from Justice Roxas inexcusable inaction on pending incidents in the Meralco case, the Panel of
Investigators found that he had been dishonest and untruthful in relation to the said case. The Court adopts
the following findings of the Panel:

(c) GSIS Motion to Lift TRO which was filed on May 30, 2008 (Rollo, pp. 187-210)
2. Justice Roxas was dishonest and untruthful.

(a) Justice Roxas admitted that the "Transcript of Final Decision," which is supposed to be a
transcript of the deliberation on July 14, 2008 of the Eighth Division on the final decision in the
Meralco case was not a true "transcript" of the minutes of the meeting, but purely a "transcript from
memory" because no notes were taken, no stenographer was present, and no tape recorder was
used. It was in fact a drama which he composed "from my recollection" to comply with Sec. 9, Rule
VI of the IRCA which requires that "minutes of the meeting, i.e., deliberation, shall be kept." The
so-called "transcript" is a fabrication designed to deceive that there had been compliance - when
actually there was none -- with the prerequisite of the IRCA that consultation and/or deliberation
among the members of the Division must precede the drafting of a decision.
(b) The statement in the "transcript" that it was a "recap from our previous deliberations" was
another falsehood because there had been no previous deliberations.
(c) The reference in the "transcript" to a "Final Report of Justice Roxas" was also false for Justice
Roxas admittedly did not submit a "report" as ponente, as required by Sec. 9, Rule VI of the
IRCA, for deliberation by the Eighth Division on July 14, 2008. The "Final Report" which he
submitted was admittedly the decision itself which he and Justice Bruselas, Jr. had already signed.
The "Final Report" was merely the title of the page that served as the cover of the decision. Hence,
Justice B.L. Reyes supposed closing statement in the "transcript" that -- "We have covered every
angle of the Final Report of Justice Roxas extensively" is also false. Justice B.L. Reyes testified at
the investigation that he had not seen the "transcript" until the copy in therollo was shown to him
by Justice Callejo, Sr. during his cross-examination of Justice B. L. Reyes on August 26, 2008.
xxx

xxx

xxx

(e) Justice Roxas testimony that when he brought the Meralco decision to Justice DimarananVidal on July 8, 2008, it was only a draft for her to read, because she asked if she may read it, not
for her to sign it, is completely false. This testimony was labelled by Justice Dimaranan-Vidal as a
lie, and she called Justice Roxas a liar, because she did not ask to borrow the decision for her
reading pleasure, but Justice Roxas personally brought it to her office for her to sign as a member
of the Special Ninth Division. After poring over it the whole night, she signed it, as well as three (3)
additional signature pages which were to be attached to three (3) other copies of the decision. 133
xxx

xxx

xxx

Indeed, the fabrications and falsehoods that Justice Roxas blithely proferred to the Panel in
explanation/justification of his questioned handling of the Meralco case demonstrated that he lacks the
qualification of integrity and honesty expected of a magistrate and a member of the appellate court.
Under Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, dishonesty is considered a serious offense that may warrant the penalty
of dismissal from the service. Under the Rule IV, Section 52 of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in
the Civil Service, dishonesty is likewise considered a grave offense and warrants the penalty of dismissal even
for the first offense. In the past, the Court has had the occasion to rule that:
dishonesty and falsification are considered grave offenses warranting the penalty of dismissal
from service upon the commission of the first offense. On numerous occasions, the Court did not
hesitate to impose such extreme punishment on employees found guilty of these offenses.
Dishonesty, being in the nature of a grave offense, carries the extreme penalty of dismissal from
the service with forfeiture of retirement benefits except accrued leave credits, and perpetual
disqualification for re-employment in the government service. Dishonesty has no place in the
judiciary.134
Justice Roxas showed a lack of courtesy and respect for his colleagues in the Court of Appeals.

(f) Justice Roxas was thoughtlessly disrespectful to a colleague and a lady at that, when he
unceremoniously discarded, shredded, and burned the decision that Justice Dimaranan-Vidal had
signed, because he allegedly forgot that Justice Dimaranan-Vidal and Justice Sabio, Jr. had
already been "reorganized out" of the Special Ninth Division as of July 4, 2008, hence, out of the
Meralco case. Out of courtesy, he should have explained to Justice Dimaranan-Vidal the reason
why he was not promulgating the decision which she had signed.
The truth, it seems, is that Justice Roxas, who had consulted Justice Villarama, Jr. on which
Division should decide the Meralco case, may have been convinced that it should be the Special
Ninth Division. That is why he brought his decision to Justice Dimaranan-Vidal for her signature.
However, somehow, somewhere, during the night, while Justice Dimaranan-Vidal was patiently
poring over his decision, Justice Roxas was persuaded to bring his decision to the Eighth Division
(to which he and Justice B.L. Reyes belong after the July 4, 2008 reorganization of the Court), it
may have dawned on him that if the case remained in the Special Ninth Division, Justice Sabio, Jr.
might dissent, requiring the Presiding Justice to constitute a special division of five. If he (Justice
Roxas) should fail to obtain a majority of the Division on his side, he would lose his ponencia;
someone else would become the ponente (perhaps Justice Sabio, Jr.). That may be the reason
why he junked Justices Sabio, Jr. and Dimaranan-Vidal (even if the latter concurred with his
decision) because he was unsure of Justice Sabio, Jr. He chose to cast his lot with his companions
in the Eighth Division -- Justices B. L. Reyes and Bruselas, Jr. -- with whom he and Meralco were
"comfortable".
(g) J. Roxas was disrespectful to Presiding Justice Vasquez, Jr. whose ruling on his
"Interpleader Petition" he sought on July 21, 2008, but he promulgated the Meralco decision two
(2) days later, on July 23, 2008, without waiting for Presiding Justice Vasquez, Jr.s ruling which
came out on July 24, 2008, only three (3) days after the Interpleader Petition was filed by him, and
two (2) days after Justice B.L. Reyes also reiterated in writing his request for Presiding Justice
Vasquez, Jr. to resolve the same chairmanship issue raised in the Interpleader. Presiding Justice
Vasquez, Jr. was embarrassed and humiliated by Justices B.L. Reyes and Roxas lack of
courtesy and respect for his position as head of the Court.
xxx

xxx

xxx

There is an old adage which says to gain respect one must learn to give it. If judges and justices are expected
to treat litigants, counsels and subordinates with respect and fairness, with more reason, that judges and
justices should give their fellow magistrates the courtesy and professional regard due to them as their
colleagues in the Judiciary. Thus, in Canon 5, Section 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, judges are
expected to "carry out judicial duties with appropriate consideration for all persons, such as the parties,
witnesses, lawyers, court staff and judicial colleagues, without differentiation on any irrelevant ground,
immaterial to the proper performance of such duties."
This Court cannot view lightly the discourteous manner that Justice Roxas, in his apparent haste to
promulgate his decision in the Meralco case, treated his colleagues in the Court of Appeals. It behooves the
Court to remind all magistrates that their high office demands compliance with the most exacting standards of
propriety and decorum.
Justice Roxas questionable handling of the Meralco case demonstrates his undue interest therein.
In the Report, the Panel of Investigators observed that Justice Roxas in fact began drafting his decision even
prior to the submission of the parties memoranda. As discussed in the Report:
xxx

xxx

xxx

(d) Although the parties were given 15 days after the hearing on June 23, 2008, or up to July 8,
2008, to simultaneously submit their memoranda and memoranda of authorities, and actually
submitted:

The Panel of Investigators reported on this matter in this wise:

On July 7, 2008 - GSISs 39 page- memorandum
xxx

xxx

xxx

On July 9, 2008 - SECs 62 page-memorandum

On July 10, 2008 - MERALCOs 555 page- memorandum (by messenger) with
memorandum of authorities
Justice Roxas prepared the decision before the parties had filed their memoranda in the case and
submitted it to Justice Dimaranan-Vidal for her signature on July 8, 2008. His "rush to judgment"
was indicative of "undue interest and unseemly haste," according to J.Romero.
He cheated the parties counsel of the time, effort, and energy that they invested in the preparation
of their ponderous memoranda which, as it turned out, neither he nor the other members of the
Eighth Division bothered to read before signing his decision. He made a mockery of his own order
for the parties to submit memoranda, and rendered their compliance a futile exercise.
xxx

xxx

xxx

(underscoring supplied)
We agree with Mme. Justice Romeros observation that the "rush to judgment" (even before the filing of the
parties memoranda) was indicative of Justice Roxas undue interest and unseemly haste, especially when
taken together with other circumstances. This inexplicable haste in resolving the case on the merits is likewise
apparent in Justice Roxas failure to resolve the several pending incidents and instead jumping ahead to
deciding the case on the merits; his "rushing" of Justice Dimaranan-Vidal into signing his draft Decision on
July 8, 2008 when the parties memoranda have not yet all been filed with the CA; his precipitate transfer of
the case to the Eighth Division for promulgation of decision, without notice to Justice Dimaranan-Vidal of the
Special Ninth Division who had already signed his draft Decision and despite the unresolved Chairmanship
dispute between Justice Reyes and Justice Sabio which he (Justice Roxas) even submitted to the Presiding
Justice for appropriate action, just a few days before the promulgation.
We reiterate here that as the visible representation of the law and justice, judges are expected to conduct
themselves in a manner that would enhance respect and confidence of the people in the judicial system. The
New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary mandates that judges must not only maintain their
independence, integrity and impartiality; but they must also avoid any appearance of impropriety or partiality,
which may erode the peoples faith in the judiciary. This standard applies not only to the decision itself, but
also to the process by which the decision is made.135 This Court will not hesitate to sanction with the highest
penalty magistrates who exhibit manifest undue interest in their assigned cases. 136
In sum, this Court finds that Justice Roxas multiple violations of the canons of the Code of Judicial Conduct
constitute grave misconduct, compounded by dishonesty, undue interest and conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service, which warrant his DISMISSAL from the service.
Findings regarding the conduct of Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr.
In the Report, the Panel found that Justice Sabio likewise committed improprieties in relation to the Meralco
case.
The circumstances of the telephone call of Chairman Sabio to his brother Justice Sabio showed that Justice
Sabio failed to uphold the standard of independence and propriety expected of him as a magistrate of the
appellate court.

"A lawyer shall x x x refrain from any impropriety which tends to influence, or gives the
appearance of influencing the Court."
As they were both members of the Bar, it is incomprehensible to this Court how the brothers can justify their
improper conversation regarding the Meralco case. As the Panel observed in its Report:
Ironically, both of them found nothing wrong with brother Camilos effort to influence his younger
brothers action in the Meralco case, because both believe that our Filipino culture allows brotherto-brother conversation, even if the purpose of one is to influence the other, provided the latter
does not agree to do something illegal.137
For the Panel, Justice Sabio violated Sections 1, 4, and 5, Canon 1 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for
the Philippine Judiciary, which provide that Sec. 1. Judges shall exercise the judicial function independently x x x free from extraneous
influence, inducement, pressure, threat or interference, direct or indirect, from any quarter
or for any reason.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Sec. 4. Judges shall not allow family, social, or other relationships to influence judicial
conduct or judgment. The prestige of judicial office shall not be used or lent to advance the
private interests of others, nor convey or permit others to convey the impression that they
are in a special position to influence the judge.
Sec. 5. Judges shall not only be free from inappropriate connections with, and influence by,
the executive and legislative branches of government, but must also appear to be free
therefrom to a reasonable observer.
In the Investigators mind, although Justice Sabio signed the TRO in favour of Meralco contrary to his brothers
advice, Justice Sabios "unusual interest in holding on to the Meralco case," seemed to indicate that he may
have been actually influenced by his brother "to help GSIS." In arriving at this conclusion, the Panel noted the
following circumstances: (1) Justice Sabio adamantly refused to yield the chairmanship of the Special Ninth
Division although the regular chairman, Justice Reyes had returned to duty on June 10, 2008; and, (2) Justice
Sabio officiously prepared and signed a resolution (a chore for the ponente Justice V. Roxas to perform),
requiring the GSIS and the SEC to comment on Meralcos "Motion for Justice B. Reyes to Assume the
Chairmanship of the 9th Division," which he probably intended to delay the decision on the preliminary
injunction beyond the life of the TRO to the prejudice of Meralco and the advantage of the GSIS.
Based on the facts on record, the Court is wary of declaring that Justice Sabio had been influenced by his
brother by speculating that he would have favored GSIS had he been a part of the division which rendered the
decision in the Meralco case. However, we do find that it was improper for Justice Sabio to hold on to the
chairmanship of the Ninth Division the despite the return of Justice Reyes, when Justice Sabios designation
as acting chairman was clearly only for the duration of Justice Reyes leave of absence. We likewise note with
disfavor his stubborn insistence on his own interpretation of the IRCA and hostile, dismissive attitude towards
equally well-reasoned positions of his colleagues on the proper interpretation of their rules. Such conduct on
the part of Justice Sabio did nothing to aid in the swift and amicable resolution of his dispute with Justice
Reyes but rather fanned the flames of resentment between them. We deem this sort of behavior unbecoming
for a magistrate of his stature.
Justice Sabios conversations with Mr. De Borja were improper and indiscreet.

In his testimony before the Panel, Chairman Sabio admits that he called up Justice Sabio on May 30, 2008
from Davao City, in response to a resquest for help from a member of the Board of Trustees of Meralco.
Notwithstanding the fact that Chairman Sabio called to relay to Justice Sabio the "rightness" of the GSIS
cause and asked him "to help GSIS" and that Justice Sabio allegedly told his brother that he would act in
accordance with his conscience, the same still constituted a violation of Canon 13 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility for lawyers, which provides that:

On this matter, the Court accepts the following findings in the Report:
Knowing the nature of De Borjas profession, Justice Sabio, Jr. should have been wary of the
former. He should have foreseen that De Borja had the Meralco case on his mind when he called
Justice Sabio, Jr. True enough, De Borja mentioned the Meralco case and congratulated Justice
Sabio, Jr. for having signed the TRO in favour of Meralco.

But that was not the last time Justice Sabio, Jr. would hear from De Borja. A month later, after
Justice Sabio, Jr. had presided at the hearing of Meralcos prayer for preliminary injunction on
June 23, 2008, and the case was ripening for decision or resolution, De Borja again called up
Justice Sabio, Jr. and asked to meet him over dinner to "chit chat" about the Meralco case.

Premises considered, this Court is of the view that Justice Sabios indiscreet and imprudent conversations
regarding the Meralco case with his brother and Mr. De Borja and his actuations in the chairmanship dispute
with Justice Reyes constitute simple misconduct and conduct unbecoming of a justice of the Court of Appeals
which warrant the penalty of two (2) months suspension without pay.

Instead of telling off De Borja that he could not, and would not, talk about the Meralco case, Justice
Sabio, Jr. agreed to meet De Borja in the lobby-lounge of the Ateneo Law School after his evening
class in Legal Ethics in said school.

Findings regarding the conduct of Associate Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes.

Justice Sabio Jr.s action of discussing the Meralco case with De Borja was highlyinappropriate
and indiscreet. First, in talks with his brother; the second time in conversation with De Borja,
Justice Sabio, Jr. broke the shield of confidentiality that covers the disposition of cases in the
Court in order to preserve and protect the integrity and independence of the Court itself. He
ignored the injunction in Canon 1, Section 8 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine
Judiciary that: "Judges shall exhibit and promote high standards of judicial conduct (and
discretion) in order to reinforce public confidence in the judiciary which is fundamental to
the maintenance of judicial independence."
It was during that meeting with De Borja in the lobby-lounge of the Ateneo Law School, that De
Borja allegedly offered him P10 million, in behalf of Meralco, to step out of the case and allow
Justice Bienvenido Reyes to assume the chairmanship of the Special Ninth Division because
Meralco was "not comfortable" with him (Justice Sabio, Jr.). He rejected the bribe offer because he
"could not in conscience accept it."
Justice Sabio, Jr. was allegedly shocked and insulted that De Borja would think that he (Justice
Sabio, Jr.) could be bribed or bought. The Panel is, however, honestly perplexed why in spite of his
outraged respectability, Justice Sabio, Jr. called up De Borja two (2) days later (on July 3, 2008), to
tell De Borja to stop "pestering" him with his calls. The Panel is nonplussed because, normally, a
person who has been insulted would never want to see, much less speak again, to the person who
had disrespected him. He could have just shut off his cell phone to De Borjas calls. De Borja
denied that he reiterated his offer of P10 million to Justice Sabio, Jr. He denied saying that even if
the case should go up to the Supreme Court, GSIS would still lose, hence, "saying lang yung P10
million; baka sisihin ka pa ng mga anak mo." He testified that his reply to Justice Sabio, Jr.s call
was "deadma" or indifference. Justice Sabio, Jr. blamed that call of his to a "lapse in judgment" on
his part.
Be that as it may, the Investigating Panel finds more credible Justice Sabio, Jr.s story about De
Borjas P10 million-bribe-offer on behalf of Meralco, than De Borjas denial that he made such an
offer. Why does the Panel believe him, and not De Borja?
First, because Justice Sabio, Jr. verbally reported the rejected bribe offer to CA Presiding Justice
Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. the next day - a fact admitted by Presiding Justice Vasquez, Jr.
Second, even though Justice Sabio, Jr. did not mention the bribe-offerors name in both his verbal
and written reports to Presiding Justice Vasquez, Jr., De Borja identified himself to the media as
the person alluded to.
Third, De Borjas allegation, that Justice Sabio, Jr. wanted P50 million, not P10 million, is not
believable, for, if Justice Sabio, Jr. quoted P50 million as his price, he would not have reported the
P10 million bribe offer to Presiding Justice Vasquez, Jr. He would have waited for Meralcos reply
to his counter-offer.138
xxx

xxx

As previously discussed, Justice Reyes appealed to Presiding Justice Vazquez in a letter dated July 22, 2008,
reiterating his (Justice Reyes) request that the Presiding Justice render an opinion which Division of the Court
of Appeals - the Eighth Division with him as chairman, or the Special Ninth Division chaired by Justice Sabio
should resolve the Meralco case. This was in conjunction with an Interpleader filed by Justice Roxas on the
same issue with the Presiding Justice. Yet, despite the fact that the Presiding Justice informed Justices Reyes
and Roxas that he would study the matter, Justices Reyes and Justice Roxas, together with Justice Bruselas,
promulgated the decision in the Meralco case on July 23, 2008. Justice Reyes and Justice Roxas did not
withdraw their request for a ruling nor did either of them advise the Presiding Justice beforehand of their
intention to proceed with the resolution of the Meralco case. Thus, when the Presiding Justice issued his ruling
on the chairmanship dispute on July 24, 2008, he was unaware of the promulgation of the Meralco decision on
July 23, 2008, under the aegis of Justice Reyes Eighth Division. As found by the Panel, "Presiding Justice
Vasquez, Jr. was completely taken aback when he learned about it on July 24, 2008, the same day that he
issued his opinion on the chairmanship issue which by then had become functus oficio. He felt belittled and
humiliated by the discourtesy of the two justices to him."
It bears repeating here that under Canon 5, Section 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, judges are
mandated to show the appropriate consideration and respect for their colleagues in the Judiciary.
Thus, we adopt the finding of the Panel on this point and find Justice Reyes guilty of simple misconduct, which
is mitigated by the fact that he repeatedly asked Presiding Justice Vasquez to act on his request to rule on the
conflicting interpretation of the IRCA. However, Justice Reyes should be reprimanded for taking part in the
decision of the subject case without awaiting the ruling of the Presiding Justice.
Findings regarding the conduct of Justice Myrna Dimaranan-Vidal
The Court finds well-taken and adopts the findings of the Panel of Investigators, to wit:
Justice Dimaranan-Vidal deviated from the IRCA when she allowed herself to be rushed by Justice
Roxas to sign the Meralco decision on July 8, 2008, without reading the parties memoranda and
without the deliberation among members of the Division required by the IRCA. She knew that the
TRO would not expire until July 30, 2008 - some three (3) weeks away from July 8, 2008 - yet she
allowed herself to believe Justice Roxas misrepresentation that signing the decision was urgent.
Her compliance with certain dissembling practices of other justices of the Court, in violation of the
IRCA, showed weakness and lack of independence on her part. 139
The following sections of Canon 1 of the Code of Judicial Conduct are instructive in this regard:
SEC. 1. Judges shall exercise the judicial function independently on the basis of their assessment
of the facts and in accordance with a conscientious understanding of the law, free of any
extraneous influence, inducement, pressure, threat or interference, direct or indirect, from any
quarter or for any reason.
SEC. 2. In performing judicial duties, judges shall be independent from judicial colleagues in
respect of decisions which the judge is obliged to make independently.

xxx

Indeed, the Court agrees with the Panel that the allegation of solicitation on the part of Justice Sabio is not
credible. Nevertheless, the continued communications between Justice Sabio and Mr. De Borja even after the
latters rejected bribery attempt is highly inappropriate and shows poor judgment on the part of Justice Sabio
who should have acted in preservation of the dignity of his judicial office and the institution to which he
belongs.

Allowing a fellow justice to induce her to deviate from established procedure constitutes conduct unbecoming
a justice for which Justice Dimaranan-Vidal should be ADMONISHED to be more circumspect in the
performance of her judicial duties.
Findings regarding the conduct of Presiding Justice Conrado M. Vasquez

It is the view of the Panel of Investigators that Presiding Justice Vasquez failed to provide the leadership
expected of him as head of the Court of Appeals. The following quote from the Report summarizes the
perceived lapses on the part of the Presiding Justice:
Clearly, Presiding Justice Vasquez, Jr. had been indecisive in dealing with the turmoil arising from
the Meralco case. He vacillated and temporized on resolving the impasse between Justice
Sabio, Jr. and Justice B. L. Reyes over the chairmanship of the Division that should hear and
decide the Meralco case. He failed to take action on the reported bribe-offer by Meralco to J.
Sabio, Jr. He hesitated to assert his leadership of the Court even when the parties repeatedly
urged him to lay down the rule for them to follow. Was he hampered by the fact that he has
relatives - two daughters - employed in the GSIS, and a sister who is a consultant thereof? He
pleaded lack of authority. Was he not aware then, or did he discover too late, that under Section
11, Rule VIII of the IRCA, he is in fact authorized to act "on any matter" involving the Court and
its members? That Rule provides:
Sec. 11. x xx the Presiding Justice or any one acting in his place is authorized to
act on any matter not covered by these Rules. Such action shall, however, be
reported to the Court en banc.
He should have convened the Court en banc as soon asthe alleged bribery attempt on Justice
Sabio, Jr. was reported to him, for it was an attempt to corrupt a member of the Court, calling for
the "protection and preservation of the integrity of the judicial processes" of the Court, hence, an
administrative matter cognizable by the Court en banc. Section 5 (c), Rule I of the IRCA, provides:
Sec. 5. Matters cognizable by the Court en banc.- The Court en banc
shall, inter alia:
(a) x x x
(b) Adopt uniform administrative measures, procedures, and policies for the
protection and preservation of the integrity of the judicial processes, x x x.
Presiding Justice Vasquez admitted his "lapses in judgment." 140
In the light of the foregoing observations of the Panel, this Court is of the view that much of the trouble now
being faced by the Court of Appeals could have been averted by timely, judicious and decisive action on the
part of the Presiding Justice. Certainly, this unpleasant and trying episode in failure to act in the early part of
his tenure as Presiding Justice has indelibly impressed upon him what is required of him as leader of the
second highest court in the land. Nevertheless, Presiding Justice Vasquez is hereby severely reprimanded for
his failure to act promptly and decisively on the controversy as required of him by the IRCA.

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, this per curiam decision was reached after deliberation
of the Court en banc. At the outset, the offer of three (3) members of the Court to recuse themselves was
denied by the Court. Except for two members of the Court who were allowed to inhibit themselves from the
case, the Justices voted as follows: Twelve Justices voted for the dismissal from service of Associate Justice
Vicente Q. Roxas and one (1) voted for his suspension from the service for six (6) months. Ten (10) Justices
voted for two (2) month suspension from service without pay of Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, one (1) voted
for six-month suspension, one (1) for reprimand only as he should be credited for being a "whistle blower" and
one (1) for his dismissal from the service. Eight (8) Justices voted to reprimand Associate Justice Bienvenido
L. Reyes and five (5) for his suspension from the service for one (1) month. As to the rest, the voting was
unanimous.
WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVES as follows:
(1) Associate Justice Vicente Q. Roxas is found guilty of multiple violations of the canons of the
Code of Judicial Conduct, grave misconduct, dishonesty, undue interest and conduct prejudicial to
the best interest of the service, and is DISMISSED from the service, with FORFEITURE of all
benefits, except accrued leave credits if any, with prejudice to his re-employment in any branch or
service of the government including government-owned and controlled corporations;
(2) Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr. is found guilty of simple misconduct and conduct
unbecoming of a justice of the Court of Appeals and is SUSPENDED for two (2) months without
pay, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts will warrant a more severe
penalty;
(3) Presiding Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. is SEVERELY REPRIMANDED for his failure to act
promptly and decisively in order to avert the incidents that damaged the image of the Court of
Appeals, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts will warrant a more
severe penalty;
(4) Associate Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes is found guilty of simple misconduct with mitigating
circumstance and is REPRIMANDED, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar
acts will warrant a more severe penalty;
(5) Associate Justice Myrna Dimaranan-Vidal is found guilty of conduct unbecoming a Justice of
the Court of Appeals and is ADMONISHED to be more circumspect in the discharge of her judicial
duties.
(6) PCGG Chairman Camilo L. Sabios act to influence the judgment of a member of the Judiciary
in a pending case is hereby referred to the Bar Confidant for appropriate action;
(7) Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr.s charge against Mr. Francis R. De Borja for attempted bribery of a
member of the Judiciary is hereby referred to the Department of Justice for appropriate action.

Findings regarding other personalities involved in the Meralco case

This Decision shall take effect immediately.

Although the Presiding Justice in his letter dated August 1, 2008 only referred to this Court "the propriety of the
actions of the Justices concerned" in the Meralco case, we cannot simply turn a blind eye to the facts brought
to light during the investigation that relate to potential liabilities of other personalities in the Meralco case.

SO ORDERED.

With respect to Chairman Sabio, this Court has the power to discipline members of the Bar and his attempt to
influence a member of the Judiciary, his brother at that, should be referred to the Bar Confidant for appropriate
action.
With respect to Mr. De Borja, the present investigation has given this Court reason to believe that Mr. De Borja
may be criminally liable for his attempt to bribe a magistrate of the Court of Appeals. This matter should be
referred to the Department of Justice for appropriate action.

A.M. No. RTJ-92-876 September 19, 1994

STATE PROSECUTORS, complainants,
vs.
JUDGE MANUEL T. MURO, Regional Trial Court, Branch 54, Manila, respondent.

PER CURIAM:
In assaying the requisite norms for qualifications and eminence of a magistrate, legal authorities place a
premium on how he has complied with his continuing duty to know the law. A quality thus considered essential
to the judicial character is that of "a man of learning who spends tirelessly the weary hours after midnight
acquainting himself with the great body of traditions and the learning of the law; is profoundly learned in all the
learning of the law; and knows how to use that learning." 1
Obviously, it is the primary duty of a judge, which he owes to the public and to the legal profession, to know
the very law he is supposed to apply to a given controversy. He is called upon to exhibit more than just a
cursory acquaintance with the statutes and procedural rules. Party litigants will have great faith in the
administration of justice if judges cannot justly be accused of apparent deficiency in their grasp of the legal
principles. For, service in the judiciary means a continuous study and research on the law from beginning to
end. 2
In a letter-complaint 3 dated August 19, 1992, respondent Judge Manuel T. Muro of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Manila, Branch 54, was charged by State Prosecutors Nilo C. Mariano, George C. Dee and Paterno
V. Tac-an with ignorance of the law, grave misconduct and violations of Rules 2.01, 3.01 and 3.02 of the Code
of Judicial Conduct, committed as follows:
1. That on August 13, 1992, respondent judge issued an Order dismissing eleven (11)
cases (docketed as Crim. Cases Nos. 92-101959 to 92- 101969, inclusive) filed by the
undersigned complainant prosecutors (members of the DOJ Panel of Prosecutors)
against the accused Mrs. Imelda Romualdez Marcos, for Violation of Central Bank
Foreign Exchange Restrictions, as consolidated in CB Circular No. 960, in relation to
the penal provisions of Sec. 34 of R.A. 265, as amended, . . .;
2. That respondent Judge issued his Order solely on the basis of newspaper reports
(August 11, 1992 issues of the Philippine Daily Inquirer and the Daily Globe)
concerning the announcement on August 10, 1992 by the President of the Philippines
of the lifting by the government of all foreign exchange restrictions and the arrival at
such decision by the Monetary Board as per statement of Central Bank Governor Jose
Cuisia;
3. That claiming that the reported announcement of the Executive Department on the
lifting of foreign exchange restrictions by two newspapers which are reputable and of
national circulation had the effect of repealing Central Bank Circular No. 960, as
allegedly supported by Supreme Court decisions . . ., the Court contended that it was
deprived of jurisdiction, and, therefore, motu, prop(r)io had to dismiss all the eleven
cases aforementioned "for not to do so opens this Court to charges of trying cases
over which it has no more jurisdiction;"
4. That in dismissing aforecited cases on August 13, 1992 on the basis of a Central
Bank Circular or Monetary Board Resolution which as of date hereof, has not even
been officially issued, and basing his Order/decision on a mere newspaper account of
the advance announcement made by the President of the said fact of lifting or
liberalizing foreign exchange controls, respondent judge acted prematurely and in
indecent haste, as he had no way of determining the full intent of the new CB Circular

or Monetary Board resolution, and whether the same provided for exception, as in the
case of persons who had pending criminal cases before the courts for violations of
Central Bank Circulars and/or regulations previously issued on the matter;
5. That respondent Judge's arrogant and cavalier posture in taking judicial notice
purportedly as a matter of public knowledge a mere newspaper account that the
President had announced the lifting of foreign exchange restrictions as basis for his
assailed order of dismissal is highly irregular, erroneous and misplaced. For the
respondent judge to take judicial notice thereof even before it is officially released by
the Central Bank and its full text published as required by law to be effective shows his
precipitate action in utter disregard of the fundamental precept of due process which
the People is also entitled to and exposes his gross ignorance of the law, thereby
tarnishing public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary. How can the Honorable
Judge take judicial notice of something which has not yet come into force and the
contents, shape and tenor of which have not yet been published and ascertained to be
the basis of judicial action? The Honorable Judge had miserably failed to "endeavor
diligently to ascertain the facts" in the case at bar contrary to Rule 3.02 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct constituting Grave Misconduct;
6. That respondent Judge did not even ha(ve) the prudence of requiring first the
comment of the prosecution on the effect of aforesaid Central Bank Circular/Monetary
Board resolution on the pending cases before dismissing the same, thereby denying
the Government of its right to due process;
7. That the lightning speed with which respondent Judge acted to dismiss the cases
may be gleaned from the fact that such precipitate action was undertaken despite
already scheduled continuation of trial dates set in the order of the court (the
prosecution having started presenting its evidence . . .) dated August 11, 1992 to wit:
August 31, September 3, 10, 21, & 23 and October 1, 1992, all at 9:30 o'clock in the
morning, in brazen disregard of all notions of fair play, thereby depriving the
Government of its right to be heard, and clearly exposing his bias and partiality; and
8. That, in fact, the motive of respondent Judge in dismissing the case without even
waiting for a motion to quash filed by the counsel for accused has even placed his
dismissal Order suspect.
Pursuant to a resolution of this Court dated September 8, 1992, respondent judge filed his
comment, 4 contending,inter alia, that there was no need to await publication of the Central Bank (CB) circular
repealing the existing law on foreign exchange controls for the simple reason that the public announcement
made by the President in several newspapers of general circulation lifting foreign exchange controls was total,
absolute, without qualification, and was immediately effective; that having acted only on the basis of such
announcement, he cannot be blamed for relying on the erroneous statement of the President that the new
foreign exchange rules rendered moot and academic the cases filed against Mrs. Marcos, and which was
corrected only on August 17, 1992 but published in the newspapers on August 18, 1992, and only after
respondent judge had issued his order of dismissal dated August 13, 1992; that the President was ill-advised
by his advisers and, instead of rescuing the Chief Executive from embarrassment by assuming responsibility
for errors in the latter's announcement, they chose to toss the blame for the consequence of their failures to
respondent judge who merely acted on the basis of the announcements of the President which had become of
public knowledge; that the "saving clause" under CB Circular No. 1353 specifically refers only to pending
actions or investigations involving violations of CB Circular No. 1318, whereas the eleven cases dismissed
involved charges for violations of CB Circular No. 960, hence the accused cannot be tried and convicted under
a law different from that under which she was charged; that assuming that respondent judge erred in issuing
the order of dismissal, the proper remedy should have been an appeal therefrom but definitely not an
administrative complaint for his dismissal; that a mistake committed by a judge should not necessarily be
imputed as ignorance of the law; and that a "court can reverse or modify a doctrine but it does not show
ignorance of the justices or judges whose decisions were reversed or modified" because "even doctrines
initiated by the Supreme Court are later reversed, so how much more for the lower courts?"

He further argued that no hearing was necessary since the prosecution had nothing to explain because, as he
theorized, "What explanation could have been given? That the President was talking 'through his hat' (to use a
colloquialism) and should not be believed? That I should wait for the publication (as now alleged by
complainants), of a still then non-existent CB circular? . . . As it turned out, CB Circular No. 3153 (sic) does not
affect my dismissal order because the said circular's so-called saving clause does not refer to CB Circular 960
under which the charges in the dismissed cases were based;" that it was discretionary on him to take judicial
notice of the facts which are of public knowledge, pursuant to Section 2 of Rule 129; that the contention of
complainants that he acted prematurely and in indecent haste for basing his order of dismissal on a mere
newspaper account is contrary to the wordings of the newspaper report wherein the President announced the
lifting of controls as an accomplished fact, not as an intention to be effected in the future, because of the use
of the present perfect tense or past tense "has lifted," not that he "intends to lift," foreign exchange controls.
Finally, respondent judge asseverates that complainants who are officers of the Department of Justice,
violated Section 6, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court which provides that "proceedings against judges of first
instance shall be private and confidential" when they caused to be published in the newspapers the filing of
the present administrative case against him; and he emphasizes the fact that he had to immediately resolve a
simple and pure legal matter in consonance with the admonition of the Supreme Court for speedy disposition
of cases.
In their reply 5 and supplemental reply, 6 complainants aver that although the saving clause under Section 16
of CB Circular No. 1353 made specific reference to CB Circular No. 1318, it will be noted that Section 111 of
Circular No. 1318, which contains a saving clause substantially similar to that of the new circular, in turn refers
to and includes Circular No. 960. Hence, whether under Circular No. 1318 or Circular No. 1353, pending
cases involving violations of Circular No. 960 are excepted from the coverage thereof. Further, it is alleged that
the precipitate dismissal of the eleven cases, without according the prosecution the opportunity to file a motion
to quash or a comment, or even to show cause why the cases against accused Imelda R. Marcos should not
be dismissed, is clearly reflective of respondent's partiality and bad faith. In effect, respondent judge acted as
if he were the advocate of the accused.
On December 9, 1993, this Court issued a resolution referring the complaint to the Office of the Court
Administrator for evaluation, report and recommendation, pursuant to Section 7, Rule 140 of the Rules of
Court, as revised, there being no factual issues involved. The corresponding report and
recommendation, 7 dated February 14, 1994, was submitted by Deputy Court Administrator Juanito A. Bernad,
with the approval of Court Administrator Ernani Cruz-Pao.
The questioned order 8 of respondent judge reads as follows:
These eleven (11) cases are for Violation of Central Bank Foreign Exchange
Restrictions as consolidated in CB Circular No. 960 in relation to the penal provision of
Sec. 34 of R.A. 265, as amended.
The accused Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos pleaded not guilty to all these cases; apparently
the other accused in some of these cases, Roberto S. Benedicto, was not arrested and
therefore the Court did not acquire jurisdiction over his person; trial was commenced
as against Mrs. Marcos.
His Excellency, the President of the Philippines, announced on August 10, 1992 that
the government has lifted all foreign exchange restrictions and it is also reported that
Central Bank Governor Jose Cuisia said that the Monetary Board arrived at such
decision (issue of the Philippine Daily Inquirer, August 11, 1992 and issue of the Daily
Globe of the same date). The Court has to give full confidence and credit to the
reported announcement of the Executive Department, specially from the highest official
of that department; the Courts are charged with judicial notice of matters which are of
public knowledge, without introduction of proof, the announcement published in at least
the two newspapers cited above which are reputable and of national circulation.

Per several cases decided by the Supreme Court (People vs. Alcaras, 56 Phil. 520,
People vs. Francisco, 56 Phil. 572, People vs. Pastor, 77 Phil. 1000, People vs.
Crisanto Tamayo, 61 Phil. 225), among others, it was held that the repeal of a penal
law without re-enactment extinguishes the right to prosecute or punish the offense
committed under the old law and if the law repealing the prior penal law fails to
penalize the acts which constituted the offense defined and penalized in the repealed
law, the repealed law carries with it the deprivation of the courts of jurisdiction to try,
convict and sentence persons charged with violations of the old law prior to its repeal.
Under the aforecited decisions this doctrine applies to special laws and not only to the
crimes punishable in the Revised Penal Code, such as the Import Control Law. The
Central Bank Circular No. 960 under which the accused Mrs. Marcos is charged is
considered as a penal law because violation thereof is penalized with specific
reference to the provision of Section 34 of Republic Act 265, which penalizes violations
of Central Bank Circular No. 960, produces the effect cited in the Supreme Court
decisions and since according to the decisions that repeal deprives the Court of
jurisdiction, this Court motu propriodismisses all the eleven (11) cases as a forestated
in the caption, for not to do so opens this Court to charges of trying cases over which it
has no more jurisdiction.
This order was subsequently assailed in a petition for certiorari filed with the Court of Appeals, entitled "People
of the Philippines vs. Hon. Manuel T. Muro, Judge, RTC of Manila, Br. 54 and Imelda R. Marcos," docketed as
CA-G.R. SP No. 29349. When required to file her comment, private respondent Marcos failed to file any.
Likewise, after the appellate court gave due course to the petition, private respondent was ordered, but again
failed despite notice, to file an answer to the petition and to show cause why no writ of preliminary injunction
should issue. Eventually, on April 29, 1993, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision 9 setting aside the order
of August 13, 1992, and reinstating Criminal Cases Nos. 92-101959 to 92-101969.
In finding that respondent judge acted in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
order of dismissal, the appellate court held that:
The order was issued motu proprio, i.e., without any motion to dismiss filed by counsel
for the accused, without giving an opportunity for the prosecution to be heard, and
solely on the basis of newspaper reports announcing that the President has lifted all
foreign exchange restrictions.
The newspaper report is not the publication required by law in order that the enactment
can become effective and binding. Laws take effect after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general
circulation unless it is otherwise provided (Section 1, Executive Order No. 200). The full
text of CB Circular 1353, series of 1992, entitled "Further Liberalizing Foreign
Exchange Regulation" was published in the August 27, 1992 issue of the Manila
Chronicle, the Philippine Star and the Manila Bulletin. Per certification of the CB
Corporate Affairs Office, CB Circular No. 1353 took effect on September 2 . . . .
Considering that respondent judge admittedly had not seen the official text of CB
Circular No. 1353, he was in no position to rule judiciously on whether CB Circular No.
960, under which the accused Mrs. Marcos is charged, was already repealed by CB
Circular No. 1353. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
A cursory reading of the . . . provision would have readily shown that the repeal of the
regulations on non-trade foreign exchange transactions is not absolute, as there is a
provision that with respect to violations of former regulations that are the subject of
pending actions or investigations, they shall be governed by the regulations existing at
the time the cause of action (arose). Thus his conclusion that he has lost jurisdiction
over the criminal cases is precipitate and hasty. Had he awaited the filing of a motion to

dismiss by the accused, and given opportunity for the prosecution to comment/oppose
the same, his resolution would have been the result of deliberation, not speculation.
I. The doctrine of judicial notice rests on the wisdom and discretion of the courts. The power to take judicial
notice is to be exercised by courts with caution; care must be taken that the requisite notoriety exists; and
every reasonable doubt on the subject should be promptly resolved in the negative. 10
Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material requisites: (1) the matter must be one of
common and general knowledge; (2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain;
and (3) it must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court. 11 The provincial guide in
determining what facts may be assumed to be judicially known is that of notoriety. 12 Hence, it can be said that
judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced by public records and facts of general notoriety. 13
To say that a court will take judicial notice of a fact is merely another way of saying that the usual form of
evidence will be dispensed with if knowledge of the fact can be otherwise acquired. 14 This is because the
court assumes that the matter is so notorious that it will not be disputed. 15 But judicial notice is not judicial
knowledge. The mere personal knowledge of the judge is not the judicial knowledge of the court, and he is not
authorized to make his individual knowledge of a fact, not generally or professionally known, the basis of his
action. Judicial cognizance is taken only of those matters which are "commonly" known. 16
Things of "common knowledge," of which courts take judicial notice, may be matters coming to the knowledge
of men generally in the course of the ordinary experiences of life, or they may be matters which are generally
accepted by mankind as true and are capable of ready and unquestioned demonstration. 17 Thus, facts which
are universally known, and which may be found in encyclopedias, dictionaries or other publications, are
judicially noticed, provided they are of such universal notoriety and so generally understood that they may be
regarded as forming part of the common knowledge of every person. 18
Respondent judge, in the guise of exercising discretion and on the basis of a mere newspaper account which
is sometimes even referred to as hearsay evidence twice removed, took judicial notice of the supposed lifting
of foreign exchange controls, a matter which was not and cannot be considered of common knowledge or of
general notoriety. Worse, he took cognizance of an administrative regulation which was not yet in force when
the order of dismissal was issued. Jurisprudence dictates that judicial notice cannot be taken of a statute
before it becomes effective. 19 The reason is simple. A law which is not yet in force and hence, still inexistent,
cannot be of common knowledge capable of ready and unquestionable demonstration, which is one of the
requirements before a court can take judicial notice of a fact.
Evidently, it was impossible for respondent judge, and it was definitely not proper for him, to have taken
cognizance of CB Circular No. 1353, when the same was not yet in force at the time the improvident order of
dismissal was issued.
II. Central Bank Circular No. 1353, which took effect on September 1, 1992, further liberalized the foreign
exchange regulations on receipts and disbursements of residents arising from non-trade and trade
transactions. Section 16 thereof provides for a saving clause, thus:
Sec. 16. Final Provisions of CB Circular No. 1318. - All the provisions in Chapter X of
CB Circular No. 1318 insofar as they are not inconsistent with, or contrary to the
provisions of this Circular, shall remain in full force and effect: Provided, however, that
any regulation on non-trade foreign exchange transactions which has been repealed,
amended or modified by this Circular, violations of which are the subject of pending
actions or investigations, shall not be considered repealed insofar as such pending
actions or investigations are concerned, it being understood that as to such pending
actions or investigations, the regulations existing at the time the cause of action
accrued shall govern.
Respondent judge contends that the saving clause refers only to the provisions of Circular No. 1318, whereas
the eleven criminal cases he dismissed involve a violation of CB Circular No. 960. Hence, he insists, Circular
No. 960 is deemed repealed by the new circular and since the former is not covered by the saving clause in

the latter, there is no more basis for the charges involved in the criminal cases which therefore warrant a
dismissal of the same. The contention is patently unmeritorious.
Firstly, the second part of the saving clause in Circular No. 1353 explicitly provides that "any regulation on
non-trade foreign transactions which has been repealed, amended or modified by this Circular, violations of
which are the subject of pending actions or investigations, shall not be considered repealed insofar as such
pending actions or investigations are concerned, it being understood that as to such pending actions or
investigations, theregulations existing at the time the cause of action accrued shall govern." The terms of the
circular are clear and unambiguous and leave no room for interpretation. In the case at bar, the accused in the
eleven cases had already been arraigned, had pleaded not guilty to the charges of violations of Circular No.
960, and said cases had already been set for trial when Circular No. 1353 took effect. Consequently, the trial
court was and is supposed to proceed with the hearing of the cases in spite of the existence of Circular No.
1353.
Secondly, had respondent judge only bothered to read a little more carefully the texts of the circulars involved,
he would have readily perceived and known that Circular No. 1318 also contains a substantially similar saving
clause as that found in Circular No. 1353, since Section 111 of the former provides:
Sec. 111. Repealing clause. - All existing provisions of Circulars 365, 960 and 1028,
including amendments thereto, with the exception of the second paragraph of Section
68 of Circular 1028, as well as all other existing Central Bank rules and regulations or
parts thereof, which are inconsistent with or contrary to the provisions of this Circular,
are hereby repealed or modified accordingly: Provided, however, that regulations,
violations of which are the subject of pending actions or investigations, shall be
considered repealed insofar as such pending actions or investigations are concerned, it
being understood that as to such pending actions or investigations, the regulations
existing at the time the cause of action accrued shall govern.
It unequivocally appears from the section above quoted that although Circular No. 1318 repealed Circular No.
960, the former specifically excepted from its purview all cases covered by the old regulations which were then
pending at the time of the passage of the new regulations. Thus, any reference made to Circular No. 1318
necessarily involves and affects Circular No. 960.
III. It has been said that next in importance to the duty of rendering a righteous judgment is that of doing it in
such a manner as will beget no suspicion of the fairness and integrity of the judge. 20 This means that a judge
should not only render a just, correct and impartial decision but should do so in such a manner as to be free
from any suspicion as to its fairness and impartiality and as to his integrity. While a judge should possess
proficiency in law in order that he can competently construe and enforce the law, it is more important that he
should act and behave in such a manner that the parties before him should have confidence in his impartiality.
Thus, it is not enough that he decides cases without bias and favoritism. Nor is it sufficient that he in fact rids
himself of prepossessions. His actuations should moreover inspire that belief. Like Caesar's wife, a judge must
not only be pure but beyond suspicion. 21
Moreover, it has always heretofore been the rule that in disposing of controverted cases, judges should show
their full understanding of the case, avoid the suspicion of arbitrary conclusion, promote confidence in their
intellectual integrity and contribute useful precedents to the growth of the law. 22 A judge should be mindful that
his duty is the application of general law to particular instances, that ours is a government of laws and not of
men, and that he violates his duty as a minister of justice under such a system if he seeks to do what he may
personally consider substantial justice in a particular case and disregards the general law as he knows it to be
binding on him. Such action may have detrimental consequences beyond the immediate controversy. He
should administer his office with due regard to the integrity of the system of the law itself, remembering that he
is not a depository of arbitrary power, but a judge under the sanction of the law. 23 These are immutable
principles that go into the very essence of the task of dispensing justice and we see no reason why they
should not be duly considered in the present case.
The assertion of respondent judge that there was no need to await publication of Circular No. 1353 for the
reason that the public announcement made by the President in several newspapers of general circulation
lifting foreign exchange controls is total, absolute, without qualification, and immediately effective, is beyond

comprehension. As a judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, respondent is supposed to be well-versed in
the elementary legal mandates on the publication of laws before they take effect. It is inconceivable that
respondent should insist on an altogether different and illogical interpretation of an established and wellentrenched rule if only to suit his own personal opinion and, as it were, to defend his indefensible action. It was
not for him to indulge or even to give the appearance of catering to the at-times human failing of yielding to
first impressions. 24 He having done so, in the face of the foregoing premises, this Court is hard put to believe
that he indeed acted in good faith.
IV. This is not a simple case of a misapplication or erroneous interpretation of the law. The very act of
respondent judge in altogether dismissing sua sponte the eleven criminal cases without even a motion to
quash having been filed by the accused, and without at least giving the prosecution the basic opportunity to be
heard on the matter by way of a written comment or on oral argument, is not only a blatant denial of
elementary due process to the Government but is palpably indicative of bad faith and partiality.
The avowed desire of respondent judge to speedily dispose of the cases as early as possible is no license for
abuse of judicial power and discretion, 25 nor does such professed objective, even if true, justify a deprivation
of the prosecution's right to be heard and a violation of its right to due process of
law. 26
The lightning speed, to borrow the words of complainants, with which respondent judge resolved to dismiss
the cases without the benefit of a hearing and without reasonable notice to the prosecution inevitably opened
him to suspicion of having acted out of partiality for the accused. Regardless of how carefully he may have
evaluated changes in the factual situation and legal standing of the cases, as a result of the newspaper report,
the fact remains that he gave the prosecution no chance whatsoever to show or prove that it had strong
evidence of the guilt of the accused. To repeat, he thereby effectively deprived the prosecution of its right to
due process. 27 More importantly, notwithstanding the fact that respondent was not sure of the effects and
implications of the President's announcement, as by his own admission he was in doubt whether or not he
should dismiss the cases, 28 he nonetheless deliberately refrained from requiring the prosecution to comment
thereon. In a puerile defense of his action, respondent judge can but rhetorically ask: "What explanation could
have been given? That the President was talking 'through his hat' and should not be believed? That I should
wait for the publication of a still then non- existent CB Circular?" The pretended cogency of this ratiocination
cannot stand even the minutest legal scrutiny.
In order that bias may not be imputed to a judge, he should have the patience and circumspection to give the
opposing party a chance to present his evidence even if he thinks that the oppositor's proofs might not be
adequate to overthrow the case for the other party. A display of petulance and impatience in the conduct of the
trial is a norm of conduct which is inconsistent with the "cold neutrality of an impartial judge." 29 At the very
least, respondent judge acted injudiciously and with unjustified haste in the outright dismissal of the eleven
cases, and thereby rendered his actuation highly dubious.
V. It bears stressing that the questioned order of respondent judge could have seriously and substantially
affected the rights of the prosecution had the accused invoked the defense of double jeopardy, considering
that the dismissal was ordered after arraignment and without the consent of said accused. This could have
spawned legal complications and inevitable delay in the criminal proceedings, were it not for the holding of the
Court of Appeals that respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
This saved the day for the People since in the absence of jurisdiction, double jeopardy will not set in. To stress
this point, and as acaveat to trial courts against falling into the same judicial error, we reiterate what we have
heretofore declared:
It is settled doctrine that double jeopardy cannot be invoked against this Court's setting
aside of the trial court's judgment of dismissal or acquittal where the prosecution which
represents the sovereign people in criminal cases is denied due process. . . . .
Where the prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its case,
its right to due process is thereby violated.

The cardinal precept is that where there is a violation of basic constitutional rights,
courts are ousted of their jurisdiction. Thus, the violation of the State's right to due
process raises a serious jurisdictional issue . . . which cannot be glossed over or
disregarded at will. Where the denial of the fundamental right of due process is
apparent, a decision rendered in disregard of that right is void for lack of jurisdiction . . .
. 30
It is also significant that accused Marcos, despite due notice, never submitted either her comment on or an
answer to the petition for certiorari as required by the Court of Appeals, nor was double jeopardy invoked in
her defense. This serves to further underscore the fact that the order of dismissal was clearly unjustified and
erroneous. Furthermore, considering that the accused is a prominent public figure with a record of influence
and power, it is not easy to allay public skepticism and suspicions on how said dismissal order came to be, to
the consequent although undeserved discredit of the entire judiciary.
VI. To hold a judge liable for rendering a manifestly unjust order through inexcusable negligence or ignorance,
it must be clearly shown that although he has acted without malice, he failed to observe in the performance of
his duty that diligence, prudence and care which the law is entitled to exact in the rendering of any public
service. Negligence and ignorance are inexcusable if they imply a manifest injustice which cannot be
explained by a reasonable interpretation, and even though there is a misunderstanding or error of the law
applied, it nevertheless results logically and reasonably, and in a very clear and indisputable manner, in the
notorious violation of the legal precept. 31
In the present case, a cursory perusal of the comment filed by respondent judge reveals that no substantial
argument has been advanced in plausible justification of his act. He utterly failed to show any legal, factual, or
even equitable justification for the dismissal of the eleven criminal cases. The explanation given is no
explanation at all. The strained and fallacious submissions therein do not speak well of respondent and cannot
but further depreciate his probity as a judge. On this point, it is best that pertinent unedited excerpts from his
comment 32 be quoted by way of graphic illustration and emphasis:
On the alleged ignorance of the law imputed to me, it is said that I issued the Order
dismissing the eleven (11) cases against Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos on the basis of
newspaper reports referred to in paragraph 2 of the letter complaint without awaiting
the official publication of the Central Bank Circular. Ordinarily a Central Bank
Circular/Resolution must be published in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of
general circulation, but the lifting of "all foreign exchange controls" was announced by
the President of the Philippines WITHOUT QUALIFICATIONS; as published in the
Daily Globe, August 11, 1992" the government has lifted ALL foreign exchange
controls," and in the words of the Philippine Daily Inquirer report of the same date "The
government yesterday LIFTED the LAST remaining restrictions on foreign exchange
transactions, . . ." (emphasis in both quotations supplied) not only the President made
the announcement but also the Central Bank Governor Jose Cuisia joined in the
announcement by saying that "the Monetary Board arrived at the decision after noting
how the "partial liberalization" initiated early this year worked."
Therefore, because of the ABSOLUTE lifting of ALL restrictions on foreign exchange
transactions, there was no need to await the publication of the repealing circular of the
Central Bank. The purpose of requiring publication of laws and administrative rules
affecting the public is to inform the latter as to how they will conduct their affairs and
how they will conform to the laws or the rules. In this particular case, with the total
lifting of the controls, there is no need to await publication. It would have been different
if the circular that in effect repealed Central Bank Circular No. 960, under which the
accused was charged in the cases dismissed by me, had provided for penalties and/or
modified the provisions of said Circular No. 960.
The Complainants state that the lifting of controls was not yet in force when I dismissed
the cases but it should be noted that in the report of the two (2) newspapers
aforequoted, the President's announcement of the lifting of controls was stated in the
present perfect tense (Globe) or past tense (Inquirer). In other words, it has already
been lifted; the announcement did not say that the government INTENDS to lift all

foreign exchange restrictions but instead says that the government "has LIFTED all
foreign exchange controls," and in the other newspaper cited above, that "The
government yesterday lifted the last remaining restrictions on foreign exchange
transactions". The lifting of the last remaining exchange regulations effectively
cancelled or repealed Circular No. 960.
The President, who is the Chief Executive, publicly announced the lifting of all foreign
exchange regulations. The President has within his control directly or indirectly the
Central Bank of the Philippines, the Secretary of Finance being the Chairman of the
Monetary Board which decides the policies of the Central Bank.
No official bothered to correct or qualify the President's announcement of August 10,
published the following day, nor made an announcement that the lifting of the controls
do not apply to cases already pending, not until August 17 (the fourth day after my
Order, and the third day after report of said order was published) and after the
President said on August 17, reported in the INQUIRER's issue of August 18, 1992,
that the "new foreign exchange rules have nullified government cases against Imelda
R. Marcos, telling reporters that the charges against the widow of former President
Marcos "have become moot and academic" because of new ruling(s) which allow free
flow of currency in and out of the country" (Note, parenthetically, the reference to "new
rules" not to "rules still to be drafted"). The INQUIRER report continues: "A few hours
later, presidential spokeswoman Annabelle Abaya said, RAMOS (sic) had "corrected
himself'." "He had been belatedly advised by the Central Bank Governor Jose Cuisia
and Justice Secretary Franklin Drilon that the Monetary Board Regulation excluded
from its coverage all criminal cases pending in court and such a position shall stand
legal scrutiny', Mrs. Abaya, said."
I will elaborate on two points:
1. If the President was wrong in making the August 10 announcement (published in
August 11, 1992, newspapers) and in the August 17 announcement, SUPRA, and thus
I should have relied on the Presidential announcements, and there is basis to conclude
that the President was at the very least ILL-SERVED by his financial and legal
advisers, because no one bothered to advise the President to correct his
announcements, not until August 17, 1992, a few hours after the President had made
another announcement as to the charges against Imelda Marcos having been rendered
moot and academic. The President has a lot of work to do, and is not, to my
knowledge, a financier, economist, banker or lawyer. It therefore behooved his
subalterns to give him timely (not "belated") advice, and brief him on matters of
immediate and far-reaching concerns (such as the lifting of foreign exchange controls,
designed, among others to encourage the entry of foreign investments). Instead of
rescuing the Chief Executive from embarrassment by assuming responsibility for errors
in the latter's announcement, these advisers have chosen to toss the blame for the
consequence of their failing to me, who only acted on the basis of announcements of
their Chief, which had become of public knowledge.

benefit from the illegal act, and further ordering the return of US$3,000.00 out of the total amount seized, on
the mistaken interpretation that the CB circular exempts such amount from seizure. Respondent judge therein
was ordered dismissed from the government service for gross incompetence and ignorance of the law. 33
Subsequently, the Court dismissed another RTC judge, with forfeiture of retirement benefits, for gross
ignorance of the law and for knowingly rendering an unjust order or judgment when he granted bail to an
accused charged with raping an 11-year old girl, despite the contrary recommendation of the investigating
judge, and thereafter granted the motion to dismiss the case allegedly executed by the complainant. 34
Similarly, an RTC judge who was described by this Court as one "who is ignorant of fairly elementary and quite
familiar legal principles and administrative regulations, has a marked penchant for applying unorthodox, even
strange theories and concepts in the adjudication of controversies, exhibits indifference to and even disdain for
due process and the rule of law, applies the law whimsically, capriciously and oppressively, and displays bias
and impartiality," was dismissed from the service with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and with prejudice to
reinstatement in any branch of the government or any of its agencies or instrumentalities. 35
Still in another administrative case, an RTJ judge was also dismissed by this Court for gross ignorance of the
law after she ordered, in a probate proceeding, the cancellation of the certificates of title issued in the name of
the complainant, without affording due process to the latter and other interested parties. 36
Only recently, an RTC judge who had been reinstated in the service was dismissed after he acquitted all the
accused in four criminal cases for illegal possession of firearms, on the ground that there was no proof of
malice or deliberate intent on the part of the accused to violate the law. The Court found him guilty of gross
ignorance of the law, his error of judgment being almost deliberate and tantamount to knowingly rendering an
incorrect and unjust judgment. 37
ACCORDINGLY, on the foregoing premises and considerations, the Court finds respondent Judge Manuel T.
Muro guilty of gross ignorance of the law. He is hereby DISMISSED from the service, such dismissal to carry
with it cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of leave credits and retirement benefits, and disqualification from
reemployment in the government service. 38
Respondent is hereby ordered to CEASE and DESIST immediately from rendering any judgment or order, or
continuing any judicial action or proceeding whatsoever, effective upon receipt of this decision.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. MTJ-00-1337
April 27, 2004
(formerly A.M. No. 00-11-258-MTCC)
JUDGE DONATO SOTERO A. NAVARRO, petitioner,
vs.
JUDGE ROSABELLA M. TORMIS, respondent.

xxx xxx xxx

The Court strongly feels that it has every right to assume and expect that respondent judge is possessed with
more than ordinary credentials and qualifications to merit his appointment as a presiding judge in the Regional
Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region, stationed in the City of Manila itself. It is, accordingly,
disheartening and regrettable to note the nature of the arguments and the kind of logic that respondent judge
would want to impose on this Court notwithstanding the manifest lack of cogency thereof. This calls to mind
similar scenarios and how this Court reacted thereto.
In one case, an RTC Judge was administratively charged for acquitting the accused of a violation of CB
Circular No. 960 despite the fact that the accused was apprehended with US$355,349.00 while boarding a
plane for Hongkong, erroneously ruling that the State must first prove criminal intent to violate the law and

RESOLUTION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Complainant Judge Donato Sotero A. Navarro of MTCC, Cebu City, Branch 6, sent a letter dated September
15, 2000 to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), requesting for an opinion on the propriety of the
alleged conduct of respondent Executive Judge Rosabella M. Tormis, MTCC of Cebu City in the following
instances:

1. Finding Criminal Case No. 106436-R, entitled, People vs. Comparativo, to be covered by the
Rule on Summary Procedure, Judge Tormis removed the Order of Commitment issued by Judge
Navarro1 from the records of the case and substituted it with her own order directing the release of
the accused;
2. Judge Tormis uttered derogatory remarks against Judge Navarro and his court, to wit: "for me,
Branch 6 does not exist";

considering the value of the article stolen was even less than P52.45, and as such, fell
within the coverage of the Rule on Summary Procedure.
2. If ever she made the statement that MTCC, Branch 6, did not exist, this should not be taken
seriously as this can only be interpreted in the context of "light banter" and did not at all place
Branch 6 in disrepute.
3. As to the issue that she rendered an opinion on a criminal case raffled to another sala -

3. Judge Tormis rendered an opinion in a case pending before Judge Grace Orma E. Ypil, MTCC
of Cebu City, Branch 8, in violation of Rule 2.04 of Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Ethics.

a) as the Executive Judge, she immediately conducted an investigation on Evelyn

Bacalla. In the process, she discovered "grave injustice committed against an urban
poor family" charged with "illegal squatting" in Criminal Case No. 99796-12-R (People
vs. Garduque), so she called the attention of Presiding Judge Ypil, in a letter dated
January 5, 2000, regarding the legal and factual circumstances of the case which she
believed justified a dismissal of the case since the act complained of had already been
decriminalized by virtue of R.A. No. 7276.

Upon recommendation of the OCA, the Court, in a Resolution dated December 13, 2000, resolved to treat the
letter as an administrative complaint against Judge Tormis, directing Judge Navarro to have his letter verified
and Judge Tormis to comment thereon.
Meanwhile, in a Motion dated 24 April 2001, Judge Navarro informed the Court that Judge Tormis personally
posted on the door of her courtroom, a copy of the Courts Resolution dated 14 February 2001 which reads:

b) Complainants intervention in said case is not only unethical but oppressively unjust,
he being the former private prosecutor of the case together with his mother, retired
Judge Exaltacion Navarro and that according to some of his staff, complainant was
angry at those whom he perceived thwarted his entitlement to attorneys fees of not
less that P100,000.00 should he successfully eject the accused from the premises.

Administrative Matter No. MTJ-00-1337 (Judge Donato Sotero A. Navarro vs. Executive Judge
Rosabella M. Tormis) The manifestation of compliance with the resolution of December 13, 2000
filed by Judge Donato Sotero A. Navarro is NOTED.
Very truly yours,
VIRGINIA ANCHETA-SORIANO
Clerk of Court
First Division
By: ENRIQUETA ESGUERRA-VIDAL
Asst. Clerk of Court
First Division3
with a handwritten note "Please Read," to call the attention of the lawyers and the public. A similar notice was
also posted at the door of the office of MTCC, Branch 8, which some court personnel removed, but another
copy was again posted. For this reason, he asked the Acting Clerk of Court Evelyn Bacalla to explain the
matter but instead, the latter handed to him another copy of the Resolution.
In a Resolution dated July 2001,4 the Court directed Evelyn Bacalla to desist from committing further acts
which may tend to unduly publicize the instant case, to immediately remove copies of the notices posted on
the doors, and to explain within ten days how these notices came to be posted thereat. In a Resolution dated
September 10, 2001, the Court noted the compliance/explanation of Evelyn Bacalla saying that she had no
hand in or knowledge about the posting of the papers.
In her Comment,5 respondent explains that:
1. Anent Criminal Case No. 106436-R (People vs. Comparativo) a) she never removed nor substituted any order of Judge Navarro from the records
since the latter had not issued any order at all. What was in the records was an order
issued by his Clerk of Court, Prospero M. Sincero;
b) the said criminal case was referred to her for raffle when the accused had already
been in jail for two days. She admitted having ordered the release of the accused

c) this administrative complaint is part of complainants obsession to compel her to

relinquish her position as Executive Judge and to fulfill his ambition to replace her as
such.
In his Reply, complainant reiterated that respondent had been making derogatory remarks about him both in
print and on television which were not only damaging to him and his family but also to the entire Judiciary.
Complainant asserts that the fact that the order of commitment removed by respondent from the records of the
case was signed by the Clerk of Court is of no significance since it is likewise her practice that her
commitment orders are signed by her Clerk of Court Reynaldo S. Teves; that he has not intervened in the case
because his letter to Evelyn Bacalla was dated 25 November 1999 when he was not yet a judge; and
thereafter, he refrained from pursuing the case to its conclusion.
As the matter involves members of the bench accusing each other and finding that it cannot be resolved
satisfactorily on the basis alone of the documents submitted, the Court, upon recommendation of the OCA,
issued a Resolution dated December 9, 2002, referring the instant administrative matter to Executive Judge
Galicano C. Arriesgado, RTC, Cebu City for investigation, report and recommendation. Upon retirement of
Judge Arriesgado, the case was inherited by Executive Judge Pampio A. Abarintos who formed a panel,
composed of three members, namely: himself, First Vice Executive Judge Isaias P. Dicdican and Second Vice
Executive Judge Simeon K. Dumdum, Jr., to continue with the investigation.
In their Report dated August 25, 2003, the Investigating Panel submitted the following findings, portions of
which are reproduced hereunder:
FINDINGS:
The rift between the two judges started sometime immediately after January 5, 2000 when then
Acting Executive Judge Tormis issued a letter to Judge Ypil (Annex "I") in reply to the 1st
Endorsement (Annex "H") of Judge Ypil (judge designate of MTCC 8 Cebu) on the letter-complaint
of Atty. Donato Navarro (now Judge Navarro) against Legal Researcher (then acting Branch Clerk
of Court MTCC 8 Cebu City) Evelyn Bacalla (now Branch Clerk of Court MTCC 8 Cebu City).

On (sic) November 1999, while Judge Donato Navarro was still a practicing lawyer, he was the
private prosecutor in the criminal case entitled Pp vs. Garduque, et al. CBU-99796-R pending at
MTCC Branch 8 Cebu City, involving the issue on professional squatters. Atty. Navarro wrote a
letter addressed to the Branch Clerk of Court, MTCC Branch 8 Cebu City, asking for a written
explanation from Evelyn Bacalla why she set the Motion to Quash for hearing without the authority
of the Judge and when the accused had not yet been arrested. Acting on the letter-complaint of
Atty. Navarro, Judge Ypil endorsed the same to the Office of the Executive Judge. The controversy
now starts on the letter reply of Executive Judge Tormis, copy furnished to Judge Navarro, as the
latter was already appointed as Judge sometime on (sic) December, 2000.

Memorandum dated January 20, 2004, agrees with the findings and recommendation of the
Investigating Panel.
The Court does not fully agree.

Executive Judge Tormis, in reply to the 1st Endorsement, stated that "while there might have been a
transgression committed by Evelyn Bacalla with respect to some procedural matter, the motion to quash for
hearing without order from the judge, the same is not of such grave nature as would necessitate such a drastic
action." In addition, however, Executive Judge Tormis made a comment that the case ought to be dismissed
as the act complained of had already been decriminalized under R.A. No. 8368.

As to the first issue Respondent reviewed Criminal Case No. 106436-R when it was referred to her by the
Clerk of Court of Branch 4, MTCC, Cebu City. She testified that when the record was forwarded to her, there
was no previous order that was attached to it so she had the impression she was acting on the case for the
first time as Executive Judge; that she even interviewed the representative of the complainant who said that it
only involves the amount of less than P52.45; and that in the exercise of her discretion, the case should be
covered by the Rules of Summary Procedure.6 When asked further by the Investigating Panel if it is true that
she replaced the commitment order which is attached to the record with her order, she answered that she was
not aware of it7which is consistent with her assertion that she saw no previous order attached to the records.
Complainant failed to demonstrate that respondent had acted on this matter in bad faith or with malice.

This additional comment irked Judge Navarro. As a result, he came barging into the office of Judge Tormis,
bringing along certain books on the matter, splashing the same to the latters staff, saying: "Tell your Judge,
she does not know her law!". Naturally, upon learning of said incident, Judge Tormis flared up especially
because it was only a month or two that Judge Navarro was appointed as judge.

Anent the second issue Indeed, the Court agrees with the Investigating Panel and Court Administrator that
the alleged derogatory remarks uttered by respondent against Branch 6, MTCC, Cebu City could have been
uttered in a sudden burst of emotion when complainant uttered demeaning words against her and that her
action was not intentional and in bad faith.

Judge Navarro complains that Judge Tormis had been downgrading him and his Court, stating the words: "For
me, Branch 6 does not exist!" Instead of patching things up with the Executive Judge, who is supposed to be
his superior, on September 15, 2000, he sent a letter to then Hon. Court Administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo
entitled "Request for an Opinion about the Propriety of Certain Acts of the Executive Judge". In turn, Executive
Judge Tormis filed a Complaint against Judge Sotero Navarro docketed as Adm. Matter No. 01-6-188 MTCC
accusing him of his alleged failure to timely dispose of the cases pending before his court and of his wifes
interference with the judicial functions of her husband and with the duties of the court personnel. Judge
Navarro then accused Judge Tormis to have expressed derogatory remarks against him both in television and
in print.

As to the third issue The act of respondent in giving an opinion in a criminal case raffled to Judge Ypil was in
response to an indorsement made by the latter. Respondent claims that she rendered an opinion because the
case was referred to her in her capacity as executive judge. However, a perusal of the said indorsement
shows that Judge Ypil merely referred to respondent the letter of complainant, filed when he was still a
practicing lawyer, seeking explanation why legal researcher Evelyn Bacalla set the Motion to Quash for
hearing despite the fact that the accused had not been arrested and Judge Ypil had not issued a verbal or
written order to set the motion for hearing. 8 Clearly, Judge Ypil did not seek the opinion of respondent about
the merits of the case, but the latter delved thereon and "advised" Judge Ypil, as follows:

On the first issue:

Acting in her capacity as Executive Judge, she carefully reviewed the case involving theft of an
Eskinol. After careful scrutiny, she discovered that the amount involved was less then P50.00.
Since the case falls under the Rules on Summary Procedure, Executive Judge Tormis ordered for
the release of the accused and had the case raffled. . . .
On the second issue:
As testified by Executive Judge Tormis, she may have uttered those words but the same were
never meant to downgrade Branch 6, they were only made in a light banter or in jest. The panel
believes that while Executive Judge Tormis might have uttered the words, "FOR ME, BRANCH 6
DOES NOT EXIST!" against Judge Navarros Court, the same was only a result of the arrogance
and demeaning words which Judge Navarro uttered against her: "TELL YOUR JUDGE, SHE
DOES NOT KNOW HER LAW!" The panel finds it understandable to have uttered those words
especially because of the words previously uttered by complainant.
On the third issue:
Judge Navarro insists that Executive Judge Tormis may have committed acts of impropriety. The
panel finds that Judge Tormis was just acting within her duties as Executive Judge when she made
a letter reply to the 1st Endorsement issued by Judge Ypil.
Based on the foregoing, the Investigating Panel recommends the dismissal of the administrative
complaint against Judge Tormis. Court Administrator Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., in his

All the foregoing considered, the undersigned believes that it would be a better part of your
discretion if you order the dismissal of the case, as the act complained of has been decriminalized
under RA 8368.9
Respondent may not have any ulterior motive nor was there any showing that she was after monetary
consideration still it is beyond her authority to render such an opinion. Wittingly or unwittingly, respondent
violated Rule 2.04, Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which provides:
Rule 2.04 A judge shall refrain from influencing in any manner the outcome of litigation or dispute
pending before another court or administrative agency.
In the absence of any showing that respondents interference was in bad faith or with malice and considering
that this is the first time on record that he committed such infraction of the Code of Judicial Conduct, a mere
reprimand is just and reasonable.
It is imperative that we call the attention of both complainant and respondent judges regarding their
unbecoming conduct. It is very apparent that the rift between them transcended the professional level to a
personal one. Worse, their fight was picked up by the local media and for a while they were an item in the local
newspapers.10This is very unfortunate for it puts the judiciary in a bad light. Certainly, when judges of the same
court in the same place fight, the image of the judiciary is impaired rather than enhanced. 11 Their positions as
judges demand utmost caution and circumspection to avoid poor public impression on the
Judiciary.12 Magistracy is after all aboutcharacter.13 It is incumbent upon them to so behave at all times as to
promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. Being the dispensers of justice,
judges should not act in a way that would cast suspicion in order to preserve faith in the administration of
justice. They should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities. 14

Judge Navarro and Judge Tormis should bear in mind that no position is more demanding than a seat in the
Bench. Occupying as they do, an
exalted position in the administration of justice, as judges, they must pay a high price for the honor bestowed
upon them.15 A judge must comport himself at all times in such a manner that his conduct, can bear the most
searching scrutiny of the public that looks up to him as the epitome of integrity and justice. 16 Public confidence
in the judiciary is eroded by irresponsible or improper conduct of judges. 17 As the visible representation of law
and justice, judges are expected to conduct themselves in a manner that would enhance the respect and
confidence of our people in the judicial system.18
WHEREFORE, Judge Rosabelle M. Tormis is found guilty of improper conduct for trying to influence the
course of litigation in Criminal Case No. 99796-12. Accordingly, Judge Tormis is hereby REPRIMANDED with
a stern warning that a repetition of the same will be dealt with more severely.
Both Judge Rosabelle M. Tormis and Judge Donato Sotero A. Navarro are ADMONISHED for their
unbecoming conduct as dispensers of justice with a stern warning that a repetition of the same shall be dealt
with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
[A.M. No. 2440-CFI : July 25, 1981.]
IGLESIA NI CRISTO, Complainant, vs. JUDGE LEOPOLDO B. GIRONELLA, COURT OF FIRST
INSTANCE OF ABRA, Respondent.

identities. Complainant proferred as an excuse for said inconsistencies the fact that the victim is a simple and
unlearned housewife and no malicious motive or evil intent had been shown at the trial which had impelled
said victim to point an accusing finger against the three cranad(3) accused in the subject criminal case." 3 In
the state of the record, it was submitted in such report that "on the basis of the pleadings and other documents
of record, respondent judge's liability or lack of it can already be determined without need of further
investigation. Accordingly, the undersigned finds it unnecessary to refer this case to a Justice of the Court of
Appeals for investigation. This Court, in the case of Sta. Maria. v. Ubay, held that 'cumbersome, timeconsuming procedure of investigation need not be resorted to if the allegations in the complaint, the comments
thereon, and the documents presented provide ample basis for a resolution of the complainant's charges.'" 4
This administrative complaint, therefore, is ripe for resolution. The use of the word "gimmick" could offend the
sensibilities of the members of Iglesia ni Cristo. It is not inaccurate to state that as understood in the popular
sense, it is not exactly complimentary. It may indicate lack of sincerity. It is a ploy or device to persuade others
to take a course of action, which without it may not be acceptable. While it would be going too far to assert that
intentional deceit is employed, it could have that effect. The Latin maxim, Suggestio falsi est suppressio veri,
comes to mind. It is to be expected that a religious sect accused of having to resort to a "gimmick" to gain
converts would certainly be far from pleased. Freedom of religion 5 implies respect for every creed. No one,
much less a public official, is privileged to characterize the actuation of its adherents in a derogatory sense. It
should not be lost sight of either that the attendance at a trial of many members of a religious sect finds
support in the Constitution. The right to a public trial is safeguarded by the fundamental law. 6 No adverse
implication can arise from such an occurrence. It goes without saying that if their presence would create
disorder, it lies within the power of a trial judge to maintain the proper decorum.
The Court, however, takes into consideration the fact that the right of a court to give expression to its views is
equally deserving of protection. At any rate, it is not an affront to rationality if note be taken that not all
members of the bench are possessed of such an extensive vocabulary in the English language that the
misuse of a word is to be followed automatically by reprisal of a severe character. While under the
circumstances, some members of the Court are of the opinion that censure is warranted, it is the view of the
majority that an admonition would suffice.
WHEREFORE, Judge Leopoldo B. Gironella is hereby admonished to be much more careful in the use of
language likely to offend an individual or religious sect.

RESOLUTION
FERNANDO, J.:

It is easily understandable why Mr. Teofilo C. Ramos, Sr. on behalf of the Iglesia ni Cristo would take umbrage
on the portion of the opinion of respondent Judge Leopoldo B. Gironella in the course of acquitting the
defendants accused of Triple Rape. Thus: "it will also be observed that Florencio Ola was released on July 27,
1979, yet no action was taken by him from July 28, 1979, to August 21 to denounce to the proper authorities
what allegedly had happened to his wife Merlinda Ola. Merlinda Ola, however, is a member of the Iglesia ni
Cristo. Her husband Florencio Ola and her in-laws were still in the process of being convinced to become
members of the Iglesia ni Cristo. As testified to by complainant Merlinda Ola, she also consulted her brothers
of the Iglesia ni Cristo as it was thru their assistance that made possible the institution of this action. Her
husband and in-laws are now members of the Iglesia ni Cristo. It cannot, therefore, be discarded that the filing
of the charge was resorted to as a gimmick of showing to the community of La Paz, Abra in particular and to
the public in general that the Iglesia ni Cristo unhesitatingly helps its member of his/her problem." 1 There was
absolutely no need for the last sentence therein being included. Respondent judge was charged with
ignorance of the law and conduct unbecoming a member of the bench. While the offending portion of such
opinion is not impressed with such gravity, disciplinary action nonetheless is warranted.
As noted in the report of Court Administrator Lorenzo Relova, adopting the memorandum of Deputy Court
Administrator Romeo D. Mendoza: "Respondent judge, in his comment dated January 20, 1981, alleged that
the charges made against him by herein complainant are unfair and unfounded as the decision rendered by
him in Criminal Case No. 2003, acquitting the three cranad(3) accused of Triple Rape, was prepared by him in
the honest conviction that the evidence adduced at the trial of said case was not sufficiently clear to establish
the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Respondent judge further contended that the statements
complained of are his honest appraisal and evaluation of the evidence for the prosecution, particularly the
statement of the complainant witness cranad(Merlinda Ola), in addition to the fact that she had always been
accompanied in court during the trial by Ministers of the Iglesia ni Cristo and numerous members of the sect."
2 There was a reply on the part of complainant, Teofilo Ramos, Sr. who, according to the report, "claimed that
the statement made by the herein respondent judge that the complaining witness had always been
accompanied in court during the trial by Ministers of the Iglesia ni Cristo and numerous members of said sect,
was uncalled for and intended to further malign the Iglesia ni Cristo, thereby seriously putting under doubt
respondent judge's competency and integrity as a magistrate of the law. He also claimed that the
inconsistencies in the testimony of the rape victim in the said criminal case were minor matters that did not
disprove the commission of the crime of rape by the members of the police authorities as well as their

Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Aquino, Concepcion Jr., Fernandez, Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro
and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.

A.M. No. 01-9-245-MTC

December 5, 2001

RE: HOLD-DEPARTURE ORDER ISSUED BY JUDGE AGUSTIN T. SARDIDO, MTC, KORONADAL,

SOUTH COTABATO IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. 19418
RESOLUTION
KAPUNAN, J.:
This refers to an undated indorsement of Honorable Hernando B. Perez, Secretary of the Department of
Justice, concerning a hold-departure order issued by Judge Agustin T. Sardido, Municipal Trial Court of
Koronadal, South Cotabato in Criminal Case No. 19418 titled "People of the Philippines v. Jinky A. Besorio" for
estafa. The said judge granted the motion of the private complainants and ordered the Bureau of Immigration
to cause the issuance of a hold-departure order against the accused.
When required to comment on the matter, herein judge explained that at the time he issued the hold-departure
order, he was unaware that he had no authority to do so. He further explained that he issued the questioned
order based on his belief that he was authorized to do so.
Deputy Court Administrator Jose P. Perez, after finding that MTC Judge Sardido erred in issuing the subject
hold-departure order, recommended that he be (a) reprimanded with a warning that a repetition of the same or
similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely, and (b) advised to keep himself abreast with the
latest issuances of the Court. 1wphi1.nt

The recommendation of the Deputy Court Administrator is well-taken.

Circular No. 39-97 provides that hold-departure orders shall be issued only in criminal cases within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts. Clearly then, Municipal Trial Courts do not have jurisdiction
to issue hold-departure orders and it was an error on the part of MTC Judge Sardido to have issued one in the
instant case.
To ensure the strict implementation of the Circular, the following guidelines. were promulgated:
In order to avoid the indiscriminate issuance of Hold-Departure Orders resulting in inconvenience
to the parties affected, the same being tantamount to an infringement on the right and liberty of an
individual to travel and to ensure that the Hold-Departure Orders which are issued contain
complete and accurate information, the following guidelines are hereby promulgated:

Canon 3, Rule 3.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct exhorts judges to be "faithful to the law and maintain
professional competence." The Court, in exercising administrative supervision of all lower courts, has time and
again reminded the members of the bench to exert due diligence in keeping abreast with the developments in
law and jurisprudence. Besides, Circular No. 39-97 is not a new circular. It was circularized in 1997 and has
been the subject of numerous cases before the Court. Herein judge, therefore, cannot be excused for his
infraction.
In recent cases1 involving similar violations, this Court imposed the penalty of reprimand on erring judges.
Hence, the same penalty should be imposed on Judge Sardido.
WHEREFORE, Judge Agustin T. Sardido is hereby REPRIMANDED with the warning that a repetition of the
same or similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.

1. Hold-Departure Orders shall be issued only in criminal cases within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts;
2. The Regional Trial Courts issuing the Hold-Departure Order shall furnish the
Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) and the Bureau of Immigration (BI) of the
Department of Justice with a copy each of the Hold-Departure Order issued within
twenty-hour (24) hours from the time of issuance and through the fastest available
means of transmittal;
3. The Hold-Departure Order shall contain the following information: .
a. The complete name (including the middle name), the date and place of
birth and the place of last residence of the person against whom a HoldDeparture Order has been issued or whose departure from the country has
been enjoined;
b. The complete title and the docket number of the case in which the HoldDeparture Order was issued;

A.M. No. MTJ-88-184 October 13, 1989

CALI A. IMPAO, DANIEL M. ESPERAT and NENA E. HERRERA, petitioners,
vs.
JUDGE JACOSALEM D. MAKILALA, respondent.
A.M. No. MTJ-88-217 October 13, 1989
ROSAMAR V. MAREGMEN, ELLEN G. VILIARUEL and GINA D. NATIVIDAD, petitioners,
vs.
JUDGE JACOSALEM D. MAKILALA, respondent.
A.M. No. MTJ-88-221 October 13, 1989
EMPLOYEES OF THE MTC, MAGANOY AND MCTC OF AMPATUAN-SULTAN SA BARONGIS, PROVINCE
OF MAGUINDANAO petitioners,
vs.
JUDGE JACOSALEM D. MAKILALA, respondent.

c. The specific nature of the case; and

Rosamar V. Maregmen for petitioners in AM-MTJ-88-217.
d. The date of the Hold-Departure Order.
RESOLUTION
If available, a recent photograph of the person against whom a HoldDeparture Order has been issued or whose departure from the country has
been enjoined should also be included.
4. Whenever (a) the accused has been acquitted; (b) the case has been dismissed, the
judgment of acquittal or the order of dismissal shall include therein the cancellation of
the Hold-Departure Order issued. The courts concerned shall furnish the Department
of Foreign Affairs and the Bureau of Immigration with a copy each of the judgment of
acquittal promulgated or the order of dismissal twenty-four (24) hours from the time of
promulgation/issuance and through the fastest available means of transmittal.
All Regional Trial Courts which have furnished the Department of Foreign Affairs with their
respective lists of active Hold-Departure Orders are hereby directed to conduct an inventory of the
Hold-Departure Orders included in the said lists and inform the government agencies concerned of
the status of the Orders involved.

PER CURIAM:p
Judge Jacosalem D. Makilala, Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Maganoy, Maguindanao
and Designated Acting Judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Ampatuan-Sultan Sa Barongis,
Maguindanao was charged in three separate complaints by the employees of the above mentioned courts with
gross misconduct, falsification, abuse of authority and neglect and irregularity in the performance of duties.
The three letter-complaints were designated as Administrative Matter Nos. MTJ-88- 184, MTJ-88-217 and
MTJ-88-221.
Complainants alleged that from September 1985 up to the last week of April 1988, Judge Makilala held office
every Monday at his residence in Maganoy and the rest of the week stayed at his residence in Tacurong,
Sultan Kudarat. Respondent judge allegedly refused to hold office at the newly constructed municipal building
where a suitable space for a court was furnished by the municipal government of Maganoy. It is alleged that

whenever hearings are held in his residence, respondent judge would always appear in sleeveless shirt and
slippers while the party-litigants and their counsels were in business attire.
While respondent judge required his staff to strictly observe the Civil Service Rules on office attendance, he
allegedly had no qualms in filling up his daily time record as if he rendered full service when in fact he was
always absent because of his illness and when he was not absent, he only stayed in court for a short period
[Affidavit of Ellen Villaruel and Gina Natividad, Annex "D", Adm. Matter No. MTJ-88-217].
The complainants also charged respondent judge with unduly favoring two court personnel-Josue Calzado,
Process Server of Maganoy Municipal Court, and Jose Subaldo, Process Server of Ampatuan Sultan Sa
Barongis Municipal Circuit Court because they were allegedly used by respondent judge in his house as
driver-mechanic, house guard or errand-boy. Calzado and Subaldo were given high performance ratings by
respondent while all the other employees were given failing marks.
Complainants averred that Judge Makilala found pleasure in scolding them in front of other people, uttering
insulting words like "mga baboy kayong mga Kristiyano," [Affidavit of Rosamar Maregmen, Annex "C-3", Adm.
Matter No. MTJ-88-184.] On one occasion, Judge Makilala allegedly told visiting soldiers to choose from
among his female staff members whom they wanted to rape. He also told the male court employees not to
waste their time and to start having sexual intercourse with the female employees from Ampatuan [Joint
Affidavit of Daniel Esperat and Cali Impao Annex "G", Adm. Matter No. MTJ-88-217]. At one time respondent
judge threatened his female staff members that if he could not dismiss them, he will have them ambushed on
their way home to Esperanza, Sultan Kudarat. The employees were so alarmed by this threat that they
reported the matter to the Office of the Provincial Commander of Maganoy.
Complainants also alleged that Judge Makilala punched Daniel Esperat, Court Aide of the MTC of Maganoy,
because the latter failed to deliver the entire volume of nipa ordered by respondent for the roof of his house.
After punching Esperat, respondent judge allegedly went inside his house to get his gun and threatened to kill
Esperat. Esperat then ran away and later went to the provincial hospital for treatment. A medical certificate
issued by Dr. Teogenes F. Baluma, which was attached to the letter-complaint of Esperat, shows that he
suffered a "swelling contusion" on the right side of the abdomen.
Respondent judge is also charged with having accepted a bribe from an accused in a criminal case. Datu Cali
Impao, Court Interpreter of the MTC of Maganoy, narrated that during the hearing of the case entitled People
v. Mario Labrador, respondent Judge Makilala gave a sign to the accused to follow him (respondent) inside his
chambers. When they emerged from the chambers, Judge Makilala immediately ordered the dismissal of the
case. Later, respondent proudly announced to his staff that he got four hundred pesos (P400.00) from
Labrador which will be used in purchasing the office supplies needed by the court [Affidavit of Datu Cali
Impao, Annex "C", Adm. Matter No. MTJ-88-184].
To support the foregoing allegations, complainants submitted affidavits from the employees concerned. They
also submitted the affidavits of Datu Gambay A. Upam, a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Maganoy, and
Olandigan A. Sulaik, the Municipal Secretary of Maganoy, who both corroborated the claim of the
complainants that Judge Makilala seldom reported in the municipal court in Maganoy [Annexes "D" and "D-1",
Adm. Matter No. MTJ- 88-184]. Also attached to the complaints as annexes were copies of a "diary" kept by
Nena Herrera, Stenographic Reporter of the MTC of Maganoy, containing a record of the behavior of
respondent judge from April 1988 up to the time he was suspended, including the insulting utterances he
made and the time of his arrival in and departure from the municipal court. The diary was signed not only by
Nena Herrera but also by the other court employees.
On August 22, 1988, the court employees under respondent Judge Makilala went on mass leave to show their
protest against respondent judge's behavior towards them.
On September 13, 1988 the Court issued a resolution referring Adm. Matter No. MTJ-88-221 to Judge Ismael
C. Bagundang of the Regional Trial Court of Maganoy, Maguindanao for investigation, report and
recommendation, and ordering the suspension of respondent judge pending the investigation of the charges
against him. Subsequently, the Court issued a resolution dated September 22, 1988 ordering the consolidation
of Adm. Matter No. MTJ-88-184 and Adm. Matter No. MTJ-88-217 with Adm. Matter No. MTJ-88-221 earlier

referred by the Court to Judge Bagundang in the September 13, 1988 resolution. The Court reiterated the
order of suspension of Judge Makilala and required respondent judge to file a consolidated comment within
ten (10) days from notice.
In his consolidated comment, respondent judge denied the charges against him and claimed that the
allegations were fabricated by the complainants to get back at him for his strict enforcement of the Civil
Service Law.
On the use of his residence as the MTC of Maganoy from 1974- 1984, respondent explained that it was with
the approval of the municipal government because at that time there was no municipal building and the
municipal government had to rent private buildings and houses for its use as its offices. He claimed that in
1984 he refused to transfer to the new municipal building because the municipal government had not fixed the
space allotted for the municipal court. However, from 1985 up to the present, the municipal court and office
have always been in its permanent space in the Maganoy Municipal Building.
As to his alleged absences and short stay in court, respondent insisted that this was due to the lightness of his
caseload, and that the records will show that he has no pending or unfinished work [Ibid., p. 4].
Lastly, respondent asked the Court to reconsider his suspension pending the investigation of the charges
against him considering his old age and his long service without any previous record of serious official
misconduct [Ibid., p. 5]. A counter-complaint against the court personnel was also filed by respondent judge for
alleged violation of Civil Service Rules and Regulations, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service,
and dishonesty and immorality.
The initial investigation of the case was conducted on October 17, 1988, during which respondent judge
manifested that he will file a motion to inhibit the investigating judge due to partiality. On November 17,1988
respondent filed his motion to inhibit Judge Bagundang but the latter denied the same. Respondent then filed
the motion with this Court but it was likewise denied by this Court in a resolution dated December 12,1988.
Meanwhile, on the scheduled hearing on December 5, 1988, respondent's motion for postponement on the
ground of Judge Makilala's illness was granted by the investigating judge but with a warning that henceforth
the hearings will continue even without the presence of the respondent. The hearing was resumed on January
16,1989, but neither the respondent nor his counsel were present. No explanation was given for the absence
of respondent and his counsel, hence the hearing proceeded as scheduled and was terminated on January
19,1989.
On January 30,1989 Investigating Judge Ismael C. Bagundang submitted to this Court a report, with the
following findings:
. . . there is reasonable ground to believe that Judge Makilala really abused his
authority against his staff, the utterances made by him that he will have his staff be
raped (sic), calling the staff "mga baboy kayong mga kristiyano" which utterances have
been duly blottered in the Office of the Provincial Commander of Maganoy, the
seeming biased attitude of Judge Makilala by giving failure rating for the majority of the
staff while giving high performance rating to Jose Calzado and Jose Subaldo, is clear
indication that he really harrassed (sic) his staff. The boxing of Daniel Esperat because
[he] failed to deliver on that particular day the nipa intended for the roofing of his
private house, is an act unbecoming for (sic) him as a Judge. The threatening remarks
that he have (sic) uttered on several occasions against the staff of Maganoy and
Ampatuan-Sultan sa Barongis, uttered almost daily is a clear sign that he really
harrassed (sic) the employees. The entry that he made in his daily time record from
1987 to 1988, that he reports to the office Monday thru Friday when in truth and in fact
he only goes to Maganoy every Monday and stays most of his time in Tacurong
residence and when cases were filed, the cases has (sic) to be brought to his
residence at Tacurong for his signature, is a clear indication that he has falsified his
daily time record and is a violation not only of the Civil Service Law but also with (sic)
the Revised Penal Code. The taking of money from Mr. Labrador for the sum of

P400.00 under the guise of donation for the purchase of supplies for the use of the
court, is a clear violation of the provision of the law regarding bribery [Report of the
Investigating Judge, p. 5].
Judge Bagundang recommended that respondent judge be separated from the service and that all his
retirement benefits be forfeited in favor of the government [Report of the Investigating Judge, p. 6].
After a careful review of the records of the case, the Court finds that the findings and conclusions contained in
the report of Investigating Judge Bagundang are supported by the evidence on record. The Court agrees with
the investigating judge that the testimonial and documentary evidence presented by the complainants
convincingly established the charges against the respondent. The Court finds nothing in the records which
would warrant the reversal of the investigating judge's findings and conclusion.

the general public. Considering the number and the serious nature of offenses committed by respondent
judge, the Court believes that the penalty of dismissal with forfeiture of retirement benefits should be imposed
upon him.
It is an important judicial norm that a judge's private as well as official conduct must at all times be free from
the appearance of impropriety [Luque v. Kayanan, G.R. No. L-26826, August 29, 1969, 29 SCRA 165; See
Section 3, Canons of Judicial Ethics]. As held by this Court in the case of De la Paz v. Inutan, Adm. Matter No.
201 MJ, June 30,1975, 64 SCRA 540:
. . .The judge is the visible representation of the law and, more importantly, of justice.
From him, the people draw their will and awareness to obey the law. They see in him
an intermediary of justice between two conflicting interests, specially in the station of
municipal judges, like respondent Judge, who have that close and direct contact with
the people before anybody else in the judiciary. Thus, for the judge to return that
regard, he must be the first to abide by the law and weave an example for the others to
follow ...

In his Comment on the Resolution of the Hearing Officer filed with this Court on May 12,1989, respondent
judge assailed the findings of Judge Bagundang on the ground of "gross denial of due process" because his
counsel was not given the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses who testified against him [Comment on
the Resolution of the Hearing Officer, p. 4].
It is readily apparent from the records of the case that the above contention is manifestly devoid of merit.
Respondent and his counsel were present during the hearings on November 17 and 18,1988 [TSN, November
17, 1988, pp. 2-3; TSN, November 18, 1988, pp. 2-3]. Respondent's counsel cross-examined witnesses Nena
Herrera and Daniel Esperat during the November 18, 1988 hearing [TSN, November 18, 1988, pp. 3-37]. As to
the other five witnesses, namely,Cali Impao, Noemi Socias, Belen Pasaforte, Ellen Villaruel and Rosamar
Maregmen, the failure of respondent's counsel to cross-examine them was entirely the fault of respondent and
his counsel. They failed to heed the warning of the investigating judge that the hearings on January 16 to 20
would continue even without the presence of respondent. Despite due notice both respondent and his counsel
did not appear in the scheduled hearings nor did they explain the reason therefore. By their unexplained
absence, respondent and his counsel effectively waived respondent's right to cross-examine the other
witnesses.

The behavior of respondent judge complained of and proven in this case, i.e., his acceptance of a bribe, his
holding office and conducting hearings at his residence, his falsification of his daily time record, his failure to
observe proper decorum in conducting court proceedings, his intemperate language and threats against the
personnel of his courts, and his use of physical violence against Daniel Esperat, among others, shows beyond
doubt his unfitness to occupy the position of a municipal judge. Respondent judge violated the established
norms for judicial behavior, and the best interest of the judiciary demands that respondent be dismissed from
the service.
WHERERORE, the Court finds respondent Judge Jacosalem D. Makilala guilty of serious misconduct and
abuse of authority and is hereby DISMISSED from the service. Any retirement benefits due him are hereby
ordered FORFEITED to the government.
SO ORDERED.

Judge Makilala contends that "when the sickly, old respondent failed to appear in the investigation, proof must
be shown [by the investigating judge] ... of such efforts of giving [respondent the] opportunity to be present." It
is further contended by respondent that since his two counsel "are both residents of Cotabato City with
telephone connection in their respective homes," the investigating judge could have "easily contacted [them] to
find out why they failed to be present on the scheduled investigation." [Ibid., p. 4.]
The above contentions sadly reflect ignorance of the requirements of due process. As a lawyer and a
municipal judge for a number of years, respondent should know that it is not incumbent upon the investigating
judge to call up respondent's counsel to inquire into the reason for their non-appearance in the scheduled
hearings. Nor is it for the investigating judge to prove that he gave respondent "an opportunity to be present."
It is the duty of the respondent's counsel to be present during the hearings and to inform the court of the
reason for their absence.
Disagreeing with the investigating judge's recommendation, Deputy Court Administrator Reynaldo Suarez
recommended that Judge Makilala be instead considered resigned from the service as of the time he was
suspended with full payment of retirement benefits. The Deputy Court Administrator is of the opinion that the
penalty of dismissal with forfeiture of retirement benefits is too harsh considering that Judge Makilala is
"already in the twilight years of his career as a judge" and is now "sickly and in need of medical check-ups and
constant medication" [Memorandum of Deputy Court Administrator Reynaldo L. Suarez, p. 10].
The Court is not unmindful of the fact that respondent Judge Makilala is suffering from a lingering illness.
Respondent himself alleges in his Comment on the Resolution of the Hearing Officer that he cannot travel long
distances nor do any job requiring physical exertion because the nature of his illness, known as polycythemia
vera,requires that his blood be drained periodically. However, the seriousness of respondent's illness cannot
justify his failure to perform his duties nor does it excuse him from the consequences of his misconduct and
abuse of authority. If indeed respondent found it difficult to discharge the functions of a municipal judge, then
he should have retired voluntarily instead of clinging to his office at the expense of the litigants, his staff and

[A.C. No. 2252-CFI. January 18, 1982.]

RUFINO IGNACIO, Complainant, v. HON. MANUEL E. VALENZUELA, Presiding Judge, Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Branch XXIX, Pasay City, Respondent.
SYNOPSIS
Complainant charged respondent Judge with serious misconduct for having taken an undue personal interest
in Civil Case No. 7159-P by resolving favorably a motion to quash a temporary restraining order ahead of
other cases listed first in the calendar of the same date, despite the fact that he was on vacation. In his report,
Justice Vicente V. Mendoza of the Court of Appeals, who investigated the case, found that at most the
respondent is guilty of impropriety in acting on a case when he was on leave while cancelling the scheduled
hearings of the other cases, opening himself to suspicion that he was personally interested in the case before
him; and that the evidence does not warrant a finding that the interest shown by him in the case before him
proceeded from corrupt motive. He recommended that respondent to be ordered to pay a fine equal to his
salary for one month.
The Supreme Court, approving the report and recommendation of the investigating justice, warned respondent
Judge Valenzuela that misconduct on his part in the future will place him in grave peril.

SYLLABUS

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; SUPREME COURT; ADMINISTRATIVE SUPERVISION OF COURTS;

ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINT AGAINST A JUDGE; IMPROPRIETY IN TAKING ACTION ON CASE WHILE
ON LEAVE. For want of evidence to warrant a finding that the interest shown by him proceeded from some
corrupt motive, the respondent judge was found guilty of impropriety in acting on Civil Case No. 7159-P when

he was on leave while cancelling the scheduled hearings of other cases, since he opened himself to suspicion
that he was personally interested in the case before him. He was ordered to pay a fine equivalent to his one
month salary.

[INVESTIGATOR:]
Q There were many cases scheduled for that date, May 8, 1979 .. are you saying that only one case was
heard?
A Yes, sir, it is my experience that even if there are 20 cases calendared for hearing, we can only hear one or
two at most.

DECISION

(Transcript, pp. 33-34, Oct. 1, 1981).

ABAD SANTOS, J.:

The issue in this administrative case is legality versus propriety. It should be obvious that propriety should
prevail.
Respondent Manuel Valenzuela, Judge of the Court of First Instance at Branch XXIX in Pasay City, stands
charged of serious misconduct by Rufino Ignacio, a litigant in respondents sala. Capsulated, the charge is that
the respondent took an undue personal interest in a case by resolving favorably a motion to quash a
temporary restraining order despite the fact that he was on vacation.
It all started when Rufino Ignacio, among other persons, filed an action for damages in the Court of First
Instance of Rizal. The case which was docketed as Civil Case No. 7159-P also prayed for a restraining order
to maintain the status quo pending the hearing on the merits. The Executive Judge (not the respondent)
issued a restraining order on May 2, 1979 and set the case for hearing on May 4, 1979. Two days later, the
defendants in the case filed a motion to quash the restraining order which was duly opposed by the plaintiffs.
In the meantime, the case was raffled to Branch XXIX presided by the respondent who was on vacation from
May 1 to 31, 1979, as shown in his certificate of service New Judicial Form No. 86.
On May 8, 1979, the respondent heard the motion to quash the restraining order in his chambers wearing only
a polo jacket and on the next day he granted the motion. It should be noted that on both days the respondent
was on leave as stated in his certificate of service.
Rufino Ignacio and his co-plaintiffs questioned the legality of the respondents act quashing the restraining
order in the Court of Appeals. In CA-G.R. No. 09226-SP, the appellate court upheld the respondent judge; it
said, among other things, the following:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The petitioners, in their memorandum filed before this Court, also maintain that the order of May 9,1979, is
null and void because it was issued by the respondent judge at a time when he was supposed to be on official
leave of absence (Rollo, pp. 77-78). There is no showing, however, that the respondent judge had a
replacement who had taken over the performance of his functions. Even assuming that the respondent judge
officially continued to act on the case despite his replacement, he cannot simply be considered to be totally
without proper authority when he issued the questioned order. Thus, in an analogous case decided by the
Supreme Court, it was held that, in even assuming the erroneous designation of a judge to act as Justice of
the Peace whereby he took cognizance of a case, it cannot be denied that he was and have acted, at least, as
a de facto judge, and his erroneous designation did not in any way affect the jurisdiction of the court he
presided (Bacabac v. Delfin, 1 SCRA 1194)."cralaw virtua1aw library
We now quote the well-written report of Justice Vicente V. Mendoza of the Court of Appeals who investigated
the case:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"On the basis of these facts, it is charged that the respondent Judge manifested undue personal interest in
Civil Case No. 7159-P. The evidence does not warrant a finding that the interest shown by respondent Judge
proceeded from some corrupt motive. It is believed that at most he is guilty of impropriety in acting on a case
when he was on leave.
"Indeed, the excerpt from the calendar of cases for May 1979 of Branch XXIX of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, over which the respondent Judge presides, bears opposite each case the handwritten notations No
hearing, Judge on vacation, and No hearing, Judge on leave, except with respect to Civil Case No. 7159-P
(Rufino Ignacio v. Remedios Tan) opposite which the notation hearing appears. (Exh. I, Exh. 10) The excerpt
was duly certified by the Branch Clerk of Court, Basilio B. Bolante. (Transcript, pp. 39-40, Oct. 1, 1981) It thus
appears that out of 71 cases calendared during the period May 2 to May 9, 1979, only Civil Case No. 7159-P
was heard.
"During the investigation, the respondent Judge explained that very often not all cases calendared for a day
are heard. Thus, he testified:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

"But the notations on the calendar of cases (Exh. I; Exh. 10) indicate that there was no hearing because the
Judge was on vacation and not because of lack of time. Moreover, it has not been explained why Civil Case
No. 7159-P, which is listed as No. 14, should be heard ahead of other cases listed first in the calendar of the
same date. It does not appear that the hearing in those cases was postponed either by the court or at the
request of any of the parties. This is evident from the following portion of the transcript of stenographic notes
of the hearing on October 1, 1981:.
QUESTIONS FROM THE COURT:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Q This exhibit shows that there were 16 cases scheduled for that day and CC 7159-P entitled IGNACIO v.
Remedios Tan, No. 14, a motion was the only one heard, do you mean to tell us that no hearing was held
whatsoever on cases 1 to 13?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Nor was there any hearing on cases Nos. 15 and 16?
A None, Your Honor. It takes LRC cases to be published for quite sometime.
Q Are these cases preceding CC 7159-P particularly the case of Lourdes Poral v. Lacson and Corazon M. v.
Antonio for ejection, this should be heard first?
A They submitted their cases, Your Honor.
Q You heard these cases if only briefly?
A Sometimes they just see my Clerk of Court.
Q What about the pre-trial?
A I dont remember, it is quite a long time ago, Your Honor.
(Transcript, pp. 37-38, Oct. 1, 1981).
"The respondent Judge asserts that he had to hear the motion to quash the restraining order and the
opposition because, while it was true he had applied for vacation leave for the period May 1-31, 1979 (Exh. J),
until May 8, 1981 he had not been notified of the approval of his application.
"The evidence shows that respondent Judges application for vacation was approved on March 19, 1979 (Exh.
K). Notice of the approval of the application, according to the records of the Supreme Court, was sent by
ordinary mail to the respondent on April 20, 1979. (Exh. M; Transcript, pp. 8-9, Oct. 6, 1981) The respondent
does not deny that he received the notification of the Supreme Court. What he claims is that he did so after
May 8, 1979. (Transcript, pp. 35-36, Oct. 1, 1981) However, the mail was posted in Manila and addressed to
respondents court in Pasay City. Even granting the present sorry state of our postal service, mail sent from
Manila to Pasay City would not take more than 18 days to reach the addressee, as the respondent claims. The
Rules of Court provide that service by ordinary mail is complete upon the expiration of 5 days. (Rule 13, Sec.
8) That is based on the estimated period of time a letter sent by mail reaches its destination anywhere in the
Philippines, except in a few instances and that is when a court may provide for a special period . (1 Moran,
Rules of Court 427 [1979]) Here there is no basis for providing a special period considering the destination of
the mail. Indeed, the fact that cases calendared on May 2, 1979 (that is, 12 days after April 20, 1979) were not
heard because the judge [is] on leave indicates that the respondent Judge had received notice of the
approval of his application for leave on or before May 2. Moreover, that the hearing on May 8 was held in
chambers, with the Judge dressed casually (in polo jacket), would seem to indicate that the court was not
open for regular business precisely because the Judge was on vacation.
"The respondents claim that the hearing in chambers was held by agreement of the parties and that at any
rate the performance of judges should not be based on sartorial elegance misses the point. For these

circumstances are not cited as independent grounds for disciplinary action but rather as proof of the fact that
the respondent Judge knew he was not supposed to hear cases because he was on vacation as in fact he
did not hear other cases but that, in the case of Civil Case No. 7159-P, he made an exception.

SO ORDERED.

"Respondent Judge invokes the decision of the Court of

Appeals. . . .
[A.M. RTJ No. 89-403. August 15, 2001]

"As already noted, the case was filed by the complainant to nullify the order of May 9, 1979 of the respondent
Judge.
"One thing, however, is legality; another is propriety. A judges performance is to be measured not only by its
conformity to the law but to propriety as well. He must avoid all appearance of partiality or interest. Such
quality of detachment and disinterestedness must be nourished in fact and in appearance.
"In the case at bar, the holding of the hearing in Civil Case No. 7159-P in chambers, with the conformity of the
parties, is not unlawful. (See Garcia v. Domingo, 52 SCRA 143 [1973]) And since there were no other persons
except the wife of one of the parties and the counsel and the court personnel present, the informal attire of the
respondent could be excused. Neither was his order issued the next day after the hearing illegal, having been
issued in the exercise of jurisdiction, as the Court of Appeals ruled in the action for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus. Nonetheless, because he held a hearing in Civil Case No. 7159-P while he was on vacation, while
cancelling the scheduled hearings of other cases, the respondent Judge opened himself to suspicion that he
was personally interested in the case before him.
"As the Supreme Court held in Tan v. Gallardo, 73 SCRA 306, 315 (1976) judges should not only be impartial
but should also appear
impartial . . . [and] while judges should possess proficiency in law in order that they can competently construe
and enforce the law, it is more important that they should act and behave in such a manner that the parties
before them should have confidence in their impartiality. This ruling was reiterated in Fernandez v. Presbitero,
79 SCRA 60 (1977), where a municipal judge was found guilty of grave misconduct, partiality, and oppression
and ordered to pay a fine equivalent to two months salary for conducting a preliminary investigation of a
criminal case at night and at the residence of a relative of the political opponent of the complainants father,
and thereafter issuing a warrant of arrest against the complainant knowing that the next days were holidays
when government and private offices would be closed, thus precluding the timely filing of a bail bond.
"As already stated, the evidence does not warrant a finding that the respondent took undue personal interest
in the case before him. The legality of his order was in fact sustained by the Court of Appeals.
"Nevertheless in his memorandum, dated October 16, 1981, the complainant calls attention to additional
evidence of partiality and personal interest on the part of the Respondent. According to the complainant,
following the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 09226-SP, Ignacio v. Valenzuela, and the
resumption of hearing in Civil Case No. 7159-P, the plaintiffs, one of whom is the complainant, asked the
respondent Judge to inhibit himself from the case for the same reason that he had inhibited himself from trying
another case filed by the complainant against another party, but that the respondent Judge refused; on the
contrary, he granted a writ of execution for the demolition of the building being leased by the complainant,
prompting the latter on October 9,1981 to file another petition for certiorari and prohibition (CA-G.R. No. SP13171) with the Court of Appeals, where the case is at present pending.
"It will suffice to say that since this question is the subject of review by the Court of Appeals in which the
validity of the order of respondent Judge is being questioned, this matter cannot properly be taken up in these
administrative proceedings. (See Bonjoc v. Tupas, 67 SCRA 277 [1975]; Barroso v. Arche, 67 SCRA
161[1975]; Lucman v. Hontanosas, 70 SCRA 449 [1976]).

MOLINTO D. PAGAYAO, complainant, vs. FAUSTO H. IMBING, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of
Zamboanga Del Sur, Branch XVIII, Pagadian City,respondent.
RESOLUTION
KAPUNAN, J.:
This is an administrative complaint filed by Molinto Pagayao, the private complainant in Criminal Case
No. 5763, entitled: People of the Philippines v. Martin Villanueva charging Presiding Judge Fausto Imbing,
RTC, Branch 18, Pagadian City, with (a) grave abuse of authority; and (b) gross ignorance of the law,
committed as follows:
(1) that on September 4, 1989, it was agreed in open court that the promulgation of judgment in
Criminal Case No. 5763 would be made the following week but respondent judge, in
violation of said agreement promulgated the judgment on September 6, 1989, thus
depriving the complainant the opportunity to be present;
(2) that on September 4, 1989 or before the promulgation of judgment on September 6, 1989,
respondent judge already issued an order giving due course to the accuseds application for
probation and another order granting temporary liberty to the accused;
(3) that respondent judge appreciated the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender even if
no evidence was offered to prove it;
(4) that respondent judge, likewise, appreciated the mitigating circumstance of voluntary plea of
guilty despite the fact that the accused changed his plea of not guilty to a plea of guilty only
after the prosecution had presented two witnesses;
(5) that in view of the wrongful appreciation of mitigating circumstances, respondent judge
imposed a penalty which allowed the accused to apply for probation;
(6) that a motion for reconsideration was filed calling the attention of respondent judge to correct
the mistake but said motion was denied.[1]

We agree with the investigator that the respondent is guilty of impropriety.

In his Comment,[2] respondent judge maintained that he did not err in crediting the two mitigating
circumstances to the accused and in sentencing him to only 4 years, 2 months, and 1 day to 6 years. Anent
the charge of abuse of authority, he explained that there was no agreement between him and the private
offended party that judgment shall be promulgated a week after September 4, 1989 and in her presence. What
is actually mandatory is the presence of the accused. The error in the dates of the Orders he issued on
September 6, 1989 granting the accused's application for probation and for temporary liberty was committed
by his clerk who inadvertently dated them September 4, 1989. An affidavit of Cesar Quiamco, Staff Assistant
II, acknowledging the mistake, was attached by the respondent judge. He further stated that the complaint filed
against him was orchestrated by Prosecutor Pedro Jamero with the purpose of harassing him.

WHEREFORE, as recommended, the respondent judge is hereby ordered to pay a fine equivalent to his
salary for one month. He is further warned that misconduct on his part in the future will place him in grave
peril.

The case was referred for investigation, report and recommendation to Justice Godardo A. Jacinto of
the Court of Appeals.[3] In a letter dated January 25, 1991, complainant requested that hearing of the case be

"Recommendation
"The impropriety committed by respondent Judge is not as serious as that found to have been committed in
Fernandez v. Presbitero, 79 SCRA 60, where a fine equal to two months pay was imposed.
"ACCORDINGLY, it is RECOMMENDED that respondent Judge be ordered to pay a fine equal to his salary for
one month."cralaw virtua1aw library

conducted in Pagadian City, instead of Manila due to financial constraints. [4] Thus, Executive Judge Franklin A.
Villegas, RTC, Branch 19, Pagadian City, Zamboanga del Sur was tasked to receive the evidence of the
complainant.[5]
Pursuant to the Courts resolution, the Investigating Justice submitted his report and made the following
findings:
C. Findings:
Respondents suspicion that the complaint was orchestrated by the provincial prosecutor appears to be
justified.In the whole length and breadth of her testimony, Molinto Pagayao never complained about the
mitigating circumstances that were credited to the accused and the penalty that was meted out to him. She
likewise did not protest over the date of the orders issued by respondent which respectively gave due course
to the application for probation and authorized the release of the accused on recognizance to Ms. Lolit
Ybanez-Pacana. While she expressed displeasure about her failure to attend the promulgation of judgment for
lack of notice, complainant was more concerned with the release of the accused even before she was paid the
amount of P30,000.00 that was awarded to her as civil liability. Evidently, had complainant been paid the
aforesaid civil liability, she would not have filed the herein complaint against respondent. Apparently, she was
not properly advised by the prosecutor on the mechanics of enforcing the civil aspect of the
judgment. Incidentally, the Probation Act (PD 768, as amended) does not require prior payment by the
accused of the civil liability awarded in the judgment before the trial court may act on his application for
probation or authorize his release on recognizance to the custody of a responsible member of the community
(Sec. 7).
With respect to the two orders dated September 4, 1989, (Annexes 6 & 7, Complaint) which seem to have
been issued before the promulgation of judgment on September 6, 1989, these were satisfactorily explained
by witness Cesar Quiamco who acknowledged his mistake in that regard. According to Quiamco, he was the
one who prepared the application for probation upon request of the accused, including the two orders which
he later submitted to respondent who casually signed them. Quiamco testified that he prepared the application
and the two orders on September 6, 1989 after the judgment was promulgated, but through inadvertence he
put the date as September 4, 1989. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, there is no reason to
discredit Quiamcos testimony which was substantially corroborated by respondent and Mrs. Trinidad Varquez.
In the context of the foregoing discussion, this Investigator finds that the first charge of grave abuse of
authority which, as pointed out earlier, did not really emanate from complainant has not been substantiated.
Like the first count, the charge of gross ignorance of the law appears to have been leveled against respondent
not by complainant herself but by the prosecutor who assisted her in the preparation of the
complaint.Nevertheless, it is still important to dwell on its merit if only to emphasize on respondent judge that
he did commit certain errors which tended to favor the accused and enabled the latter to avail of the benefits
of probation to which he was not entitled.
As adverted to earlier, respondent judge took into account over the objection of the public prosecutor the
mitigating circumstances of plea of guilty and voluntary surrender. Evidently, respondent erred in appreciating
the first.

On voluntary surrender, a respondent explained in his judgment why it should be considered to mitigate the
liability of the accused. This is found in paragraph 2 thereof which reads:
The records appears (sic) that the accused was in jail when the warrant of arrest was issued on joint affidavit
of Demetrio Villanueva and Teodorico Ybanez. The accused has made a confession inside the jail of
Labangon, Zamboanga del Sur that he was the one who killed Apil Pagayao and the warrant of arrest which
was signed on March 25, 1988. It shows that the warrant of arrest was issued after the accused was already
detained in jail (Exh A, Complaint)
Similarly, in his Comment respondent has stated:
x x x As shown in the affidavit of prosecution witness, Demetrio Villanueva (Annex 2, 2-a), he stated It was
Martin Villanueva who killed Apil Pagayao because after the policeman and army soldier arrived, he came out
when there was already light. (Annex 2-a-1): And after the policeman and an army soldier arrived, we together
with Martin Villanueva were brought to the Police Station for investigation. And on March 20, 1988, while
Martin Villanueva was inside the jail, he admitted that he was the one who killed Apil Pagayao." (Annex 2-b).
(Exh 5).
It is obvious that respondent based his finding on the joint affidavit of prosecution witnesses Demetrio
Villanueva and Teodorico Ybanez, in which they stated that upon the arrival of a policeman and a soldier, the
accused came out when there was light. In other words, the accused was not actually arrested by the
authorities but he gave himself up to them as soon as they arrived. Thereafter, according to the same affidavit,
the accused went with the law enforcers to the police station. In People v. Dayrit (L-14388, May 20, 1960),
where the offender fled to and hid in a hotel, but later presented himself to a policeman who had followed him
there, the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender was credited in his favor. The benefit of this
circumstance was similarly given to one who, after committing the offense and having the opportunity to
escape, voluntarily waited for agents of the authorities to whom he gave himself up (People v. Parana, 64 Phil
331). Hence, contrary to the allegation in the complaint, respondent correctly considered voluntary surrender
as a mitigating circumstance on the basis of the joint affidavit of prosecution witnesses in support of the
information, which joint affidavit is binding on the prosecution itself.
In conclusion, the herein investigator finds that respondent erred in appreciating two mitigating circumstance in
favor of the accused, which resulted in the imposition of a much lighter penalty on the accused, with only one
mitigating circumstance to his credit, the accused should have been sentenced to an indeterminate penalty,
the minimum of which would be within the range of prision mayor in its minimum period (6 years and 1 day to
8 years) and the maximum, within the range of reclusion temporal also in its minimum period (12 years and 1
day to 14 years and 8 months).
Significantly, even conceding that the accused was entitled to two mitigating circumstances, as urged by
respondent, the minimum of the imposable penalty would still be within the range of prision correccional in its
medium period or from 2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months, and the maximum of which
would be within the range of prision mayor in its medium period or from 8 years and 1 day to 10
years.Needless to state, respondents improvidence in the computation of the penalty resulted in the grant of
probation to the accused who was not entitled to its benefits under the law.
D. Recommendation

The plea of guilty was made by the accused only after the prosecution had presented two
witnesses. Paragraph 7, Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code explicitly requires that in order to mitigate
liability, the plea of guilty must be entered prior to the presentation of the Peoples evidence. Construing this
provision, the Supreme Court has consistently ruled that a plea of guilty made after the prosecution has
presented some evidence is not mitigating (People v. Lungbos, 162 SCRA 383, 388; People v. Verano, Jr., 163
SCRA 614, 621). In Lambino(103 Phil. 504), where the accused changed his plea after the prosecutions first
witness had finished his direct testimony, his new plea of guilty was not considered to mitigate his
culpability. The reason for this is that a plea of guilty given after the prosecution has started its evidence is not
spontaneous or made with a sincere desire to repent but merely speculative and is most likely made on the
belief that the trial will result in his conviction (People v. De la Cruz, 63 Phil 874).

There is no evidence on record to show that the respondent acted in bad faith or with malice in issuing the
orders and the judgment complained of. In all probability, he simply committed an error of law without the least
intent to perpetrate an injustice or to give undue favor to the accused. In Yolanda Diputado-Baguio v. Judge
Felipe T. Torres (211 SCRA 1 at 5) the Supreme Court, citing an earlier case (Martin v. Judge, AM No. MTJ-90495, Aug. 12, 1991), said:
A judge is not administratively accountable for every erroneous ruling or decision rendered provided he acts in
good faith and without malice. The proper remedy of the aggrieved party is not an administrative charge
against the judge but an appeal or petition for review of his decision. Where a judges good faith has not been
put in issue, the presumption of regularity in the performance of his official duties must be conceded to him.

Conformable to the aforesaid doctrine (State Prosecutors v. Muro, 236 SCRA 505; Balayon, Jr. v. Ocampo,
218 SCRA 13), it is respectfully recommended that the herein complaint be dismissed and respondent judge
be admonished to be prudent in the discharge of his official duties and to be more conversant with the law on
penalties.[6]

application of a basic legal command embodied in the law. In disregarding the rules and settled jurisprudence,
the respondent judge showed gross ignorance, albeit without any malice or corrupt motive. [12]
Finally, we are aware that respondent judge has a string of administrative cases filed against him,
one of which was Villa Macasasa and Gertrudes Lantuan v. Hon. Judge Imbing,[14] where the Court,
likewise, found him guilty for ignorance of the law and was fined P10,000.00. As we have also ruled in said
case, the retirement of Judge Imbing from the service on August 27, 1997 shall not be a bar to the finding of
any administrative liability to which he shall still be answerable. The records, anyway disclose that an amount
was withheld from his retirement benefits in order to answer for any administrative liability he may incur in the
resolution of the instant administrative case. [15]
[13]

We adopt the findings of the investigating justice but disagree with the recommendation that the
complaint must be dismissed.
With respect to the charge of abuse of authority, the investigating justice correctly found that there was
no basis to the claim that complainant has been deprived of the opportunity to be present during the
promulgation of judgment. Notwithstanding an agreement with the private offended party, her attendance was
not actually necessary when the judgment was promulgated. It is the presence of the accused only which is
required in the promulgation of the judgment in the trial courts. [7]
Anent the two orders which were inadvertently dated September 4, 1989, we find acceptable
respondent judges explanation that it was the fault of his clerk for the mistake. There is sufficient proof that the
application for probation and the order for temporary release were all issued after the promulgation of
judgment on September 6, 1989. It was admittedly a clerical oversight. However, it must be reminded that a
judge can not at all times take refuge behind the mistake and inefficiency of his court personnel. [8] More than
just a casual signing of the orders, a judge must carefully peruse the same and make sure that the papers are
correct and in order. Needless to state, a judge is expected to be more circumspect with his duties lest he be
charged with partiality and bias as in this case.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, respondent Judge Fausto H. Imbing is found GUILTY for Gross
Ignorance of the Law and is hereby FINED in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) to be
deducted from the amount withheld from his retirement benefits.
SO ORDERED.

As to the charge of ignorance of law, the investigating justice found that respondent judge erred in
appreciating the plea of guilty as a mitigating circumstance. Considering that this was merely an error of
judgment which is not attended by bad faith, the investigating justice considered the error as excusable and
recommended the dismissal of the complaint.
We disagree.
It is rather elementary that for a plea of guilty to be appreciated as a mitigating circumstance, the
accused must confess his guilt prior to the presentation of the evidence for the prosecution. [9] In the instant
case, the prosecution has already presented two witnesses and only after which, the accused signified his
intention to change his plea from not guilty to a plea of guilty. Over the objections of the prosecutor,
respondent judge proceeded to accept the change of plea of the accused. This was then appreciated as a
mitigating circumstance and, consequently, the erroneous imposition of a lower penalty.
While we agree that judges should not be disciplined for inefficiency on account merely of occasional
mistakes or errors of judgment, it is, however, highly imperative that they should be conversant with basic legal
principles. Unfortunately, respondent judge was short of this standard. We find respondent judges excuse of
relaxing this basic rule unjustifiable. Citing the case of People v. Coronel,[10] respondent judge relied on the
Courts ruling where the death penalty imposed on the accused was changed to life imprisonment because of
an alleged admission of guilt during the continuation of the trial. A perusal of the cited case would, however,
reveal that respondent judge was not at all accurate in quoting the pertinent portion of the court's decision and
is thus, misleading. While it is true that there was a commutation of penalty from death to life imprisonment,
this was solely because the required number of votes in the Court were not obtained to affirm in toto the trial
courts judgment imposing the death penalty on the accused. Respondent judge continued to reason out that
he had only the good intention of favoring the accused, but this was no justification to violate the law. [11] Neither
can we consider the error of judgment as an honest mistake on his part. The prosecutor filed a motion for
reconsideration, particularly calling the attention of the respondent judge to his misapplication of the penalty on
the basis of the erroneous appreciation of the mitigating circumstance but to no avail. Respondent judge
maintained his stance that it was within his discretion to impose the penalty, even if it was in violation of the
law and jurisprudence. This, we can not countenance.
Even assuming that filing of the complaint by Molinto Pagayao, considered to be an illiterate was
orchestrated by the provincial prosecutor, it can not be denied that respondent judge committed an error in the

G.R. No. L-57343 July 23, 1990

LUISA ECHAUS, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, EMILIO GONZALES and VIVIAN GONZALES, respondents.
Celso de las Alas for petitioner.
Mary Carolynn S. Que-Albay for private respondents.

NARVASA, J.:
Time honored and of constant observance is the principle that no judgment, or order whether final or
interlocutory, has juridical existence until and unless it is set down in writing, signed, and promulgated, i.e.,
delivered by the Judge to the Clerk of Court for filing, release to the parties and implementation, 1 and that
indeed, even after promulgation, it does not bind the parties until and unless notice thereof is duly served on
them by any of the modes prescribed by law. 2 This is so even if the order or judgment has in fact been orally
pronounced in the presence of the parties, or a draft thereof drawn up and signed and/or copy thereof
somehow read or acquired by any party. 3 In truth, even after promulgation (i.e., filing with the clerk of court),

and even after service on the parties of notice of an order or judgment, the Court rendering it indisputably has
plenary power to recall and amend or revise it in substance or form on motion of any party or even motu
proprio, provided that in the case of a final order or judgment, the same has not attained finality. 4
The appellate proceedings at bar originated from an action for collection of an indebtedness of P141,000.00
instituted in the then Court of First Instance of Quezon City by the Spouses Emilio Gonzales and Vivian
Gonzales against Luisa Echaus. 5 The action resulted in a judgment containing the following dispositive
portion, to wit: 6
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the
defendant for the principal amount of P97,600.00 with interest thereon at ten percent
(10%) per annum from the date of the filing of the complaint on December 14, 1978
until fully paid plus the costs of the suit. The plaintiffs are directed to return the watch
which the plaintiffs claim to be valued at P8,000.00 but which value is not acceptable to
the defendant, upon full payment by the defendant of her obligation to the plaintiffs.
Luisa Echaus was duly served with notice of the judgment, and within the thirty-day period then prescribed for
taking an appeal, filed a notice of appeal and appeal bond, as well as a motion for extension of time to file a
record on appeal. 7 The respondent Judge denied the appeal it appearing, in his view, "that the decision
rendered in this case ... was based strictly on the admission, agreement and waiver made by both parties at
the previous pre-trial.." 8
Echaus promptly filed a motion for reconsideration of the order dismissing her appeal. She also filed the
requisite record on appeal. About a week later, however, the respondent Judge ordered the issuance of a writ
of executionin favor of the plaintiffs, the Spouses Emilio Gonzales and Vivian Gonzales. 9
Echaus hied herself off to the Court of Appeals, praying for the issuance of writs of certiorari and mandamus to
annul the decision and orders of respondent Judge, and compel him to give due course to her appeal. 10 Her
action was docketed as CA-G.R. No.
SP-10149-R. Her plea for the writ of certiorari ("to set aside the decision .. in the stated Civil Case No. Q26572") was denied, but her plea for the writ of mandamus was GRANTED by the judgment dated February
18, 1980 of the Court of Appeals which accordingly ordered the Judge "to give due course to the appeal of
petitioner in the same said case." 11The Gonzales Spouses' attempt to have this Court reverse the judgment of
the Court of Appeals was unsuccessful. Their petition for review on certiorari 12 was denied by Resolution
dated July 11, 1980 because filed late and having, in any case, no merit.
On December 9, 1980, Echaus filed with the Trial Court an "Urgent Motion to Transmit Record on Appeal and
other Pertinent Papers to the Appellate Court," which she set for hearing on December 15, 1980. 13 The
Gonzales Spouses also filed on the same date but apparently at an earlier hour, 14 a "Motion for Execution
Pending Appeal," which they set for hearing on December 18, 1980. 15 Echaus then presented an "Urgent
Supplemental Motion to Implement ... (Judgment) of Court of Appeals dated February 18, 1980" 16 which
judgment, as aforestated, required respondent Judge to give due course to her appeal.
According to Echaus, at the hearing on December 15, 1980 of her aforesaid motion to transmit record on
appeal and other papers to the Court of Appeals, respondent Judge verbally approved the record on appeal in
open court, this allegedly being "evidenced by the calendar of Branch V .. (showing) the word 'APPROVED'
written opposite the incident 'Urgent Motion to Transmit Record on Appeal, etc.,' with crossed markings.
" 17 What was subsequently released by the Court, however, under date of December 15, 1980, was an order
signed by His Honor holding "approval of defendant's record on appeal .. in abeyance until after the
consideration and resolution of plaintiffs' .. Motion for Execution Pending Appeal' which is set for hearing on
December 18, 1980 at 8:00 o'clock in the morning." 18
On December 19, 1980 Echaus moved for reconsideration of the Order of December 15, 1980. Without
however waiting for its resolution, she filed on December 29, 1980 a motion in the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
No. SP-10149-R praying inter alia that the Trial Judge be required to comply with the decision of February 18,
1980 and show cause why he should not be held in contempt of court for having thus far refused to do so. 19

After appropriate proceedings, the Court of Appeals denied Echaus's motion for lack of merit, by Resolution
dated March 18, 1981. 20 It observed that "there was no wilful or deliberate refusal to comply with the
decision .. dated February 18, 1980;" that what respondent Judge had been commanded to do by the decision
was that he "should .. proceed to give due course to the appeal by considering and acting" thereon, but
immediate transmittal of said record could not be compelled in the premises "because the correctness or
accuracy .. (thereof) should be first passed upon and certified by the court a quo," even if there were no
opposition thereto. The Court also pointed out that deferment of approval of the record on appeal had been
ordered by the Trial Judge in keeping "with the proper and orderly procedure to the end that all pending
incidents .. before him be first resolved .. in order that said incidents be not rendered moot and academic by
the approval of said ... record on appeal;" and that, citing Laurilla v. Uichangco, et al., 104 Phil. 171
A verbal order or a mere notation in the minutes of the calendar of the court a quo ..
indicating approval of the .. record on appeal is, in our view, not yet the ultimate and
requisite formal order of approval of said record on appeal that would divest the court a
quo of its jurisdiction to act on pending incidents. Even a written order approving a
record on appeal may still be subject to a motion for reconsideration of an opposing
party. If a written order which has not acquired finality may still be reconsidered by the
court, with more reason can respondent judge modify his verbal order that has not
been implemented nor even made known to the other party in the case.
The Court of Appeals finally resolved that "as the motion for execution pending appeal is conceded to have
been filed by the plaintiffs before the court below had approved (but only verbally) petitioner's record on
appeal, the court a quo therefore still retained its jurisdiction to resolve the pending motion for execution
pending appeal."
Echaus subsequently asked the Court of Appeals to reconsider the Resolution. The Court of Appeals refused.
But in its Resolution denying reconsideration, dated June 22, 1981, 21 the Court declared that it was prompted

.. to enjoin the respondent judge to act upon and set for hearing and resolve at the
soonest time possible, the stated motion for execution pending appeal if this incident is
still pending before that Court, so that there will remain no further reason or cause for
withholding his resolution on the petitioner's record on appeal or such other pleadings
and orders as may be necessary for the perfection of petitioner's appeal. Then upon
the formal approval of the record on appeal the case can be transmitted to this Court,
in compliance with the judgment rendered in this case that the petitioner's appeal be
given due course. All these, respondent judge is strongly urged to act upon with
promptness and dispatch.
These Resolutions-of March 18, 1981 and June 22, 1981 are challenged in the appellate proceeding at bar,
initiated by petition for review on certiorari presented by Echaus.
In this Court, Echaus argues that it was reversible error for the Court of Appeals to have "ignored the fact
that .. (her) appeal had in fact been perfected when the Trial Judge (verbally) ordered the record on appeal
approved on December 15, 1980 and, in the light of the ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Cabilao et
al. v. Judge of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga, 17 SCRA 992, any further action on the part of the
Trial Judge in the case, particularly on respondent spouses' motion for execution pending appeal is null and
void." 22
The argument is patently without merit and is here given short shrift. In line with the fundamental principles set
forth in the opening paragraph of this opinion, the oral order approving the record on appeal had no juridical
existence; to give it that existence it had to be reduced to writing and promulgated (i.e., Med with the clerk of
court). 23 But even if it had been written and promulgated, indeed even if it had already been properly served
on the parties, it nonetheless was yet plainly within the power of the Judge to recall it and set it aside. For
every court has the inherent power, among others, to "amend and control its process and orders so as to
make them conformable to law and justice." 24 And this Court has had occasion to rule that a trial court may
set aside its order approving a record on appeal prior to the transmittal of the record. 25 So, even
conceding arguendo, efficacy to the oral order approving Echaus's record on appeal, the respondent Judge

nevertheless had the power to recall said order, or, as he actually did, hold approval thereof in abeyance until
after he had resolved other pending incidents. This Court thus perceives no error on the part of the Appellate
Court in giving its imprimatur to that act of the respondent Judge in the light of the attendant circumstances.

Cesar N. Sarino in his letter of 05 April 2001 to the Chief Justice and, still later, by Senator Renato Cayetano
and Attorney Ricardo Romulo.

To all intents and purposes, Echaus's record on appeal had never been approved. Now, the doctrine prevailing
at the time was that prior to the approval of the record on appeal, the Trial Court retained jurisdiction to grant
execution pending appeal, that approval being in fact the operative act denoting the end of the court's power
to grant execution pending appeal. 26 The respondent Judge, therefore, cannot be deemed to have acted
without or in excess of his jurisdiction, or to have gravely abused his discretion, in deferring action on the
record on appeal so that he might first resolve the motion for execution pending appeal.

[3]

Of course, as is by now known to all, the rules for taking an appeal to the Court of Appeals, and for execution
pending appeal have since been altered and simplified. Under Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, appeals from final
judgments or orders of the Regional Trial Court are taken to the Court of Appeals simply by filing a notice of
appeal. 27 The requirement to file an appeal bond 28 or record on appeal has been done away with, except in
special proceedings or actions in which multiple appeals are allowed in which cases a record on appeal is still
needed. 29Under the same BP129, an appeal by notice of appeal is deemed perfected upon the expiration of
the last day to appeal by either party; and in the exceptional cases where a record on appeal is still required,
the appeal is perfected upon approval thereof. 30 It should however be noted that a motion for execution
pending appeal filed before perfection of an appeal by mere notice, may still be acted upon and granted after
such perfection but before transmittal of the record to the appellate court. 31

On 17 April 2001, the Honorable Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez formally filed the instant petition,
submitting the following exegesis:

"3. The foregoing criminal cases involve the previous acts of the former highest official of the land, members of
his family, his cohorts and, therefore, it cannot be over emphasized that the prosecution thereof, definitely
involves a matter of public concern and interest, or a matter over which the entire citizenry has the right to
know, be informed and made aware of.
" 4. There is no gainsaying that the constitutional right of the people to be informed on matters of public
concern, as in the instant cases, can best be recognized, served and satisfied by allowing the live radio and
television coverage of the concomitant court proceedings.
"5. Moreover, the live radio and television coverage of the proceedings will also serve the dual purpose of
ensuring the desired transparency in the administration of justice in order to disabuse the minds of the
supporters of the past regime of any and all unfounded notions, or ill-perceived attempts on the part of the
present dispensation, to 'railroad' the instant criminal cases against the Former President Joseph Ejercito
Estrada."[4]

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit, with costs against the petitioner. This Decision is
immediately executory.

Public interest, the petition further averred, should be evident bearing in mind the right of the public to vital
information affecting the nation.

SO ORDERED.

In effect, the petition seeks a re-examination of the 23rd October 1991 resolution of this Court in a case
for libel filed by then President Corazon C. Aquino. The resolution read:
"The records of the Constitutional Commission are bereft of discussion regarding the subject of cameras in the
courtroom. Similarly, Philippine courts have not had the opportunity to rule on the question squarely.

[A.M. No. 01-4-03-SC. June 29, 2001]

RE: REQUEST RADIO-TV COVERAGE OF THE TRIAL IN THE SANDIGANBAYAN OF THE PLUNDER
CASES AGAINST THE FORMER PRESIDENT JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, SECRETARY OF
JUSTICE HERNANDO PEREZ, KAPISANAN NG MGA BRODKASTER NG PILIPINAS, CESAR
SARINO, RENATO CAYETANO and ATTY. RICARDO ROMULO, petitioners, vs. JOSEPH E.
ESTRADA and INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES,oppositors.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
The travails of a deposed President continue. The Sandiganbayan reels to start hearing the criminal
charges against Mr. Joseph E. Estrada. Media seeks to cover the event via live television and live radio
broadcast and endeavors this Court to allow it that kind of access to the proceedings.
On 13 March 2001, the Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster ng Pilipinas (KBP), an association representing
duly franchised and authorized television and radio networks throughout the country, sent a letter [1] requesting
this Court to allow live media coverage of the anticipated trial of the plunder and other criminal cases filed
against former President Joseph E. Estrada before the Sandiganbayan in order "to assure the public of full
ransparency in the proceedings of an unprecedented case in our history." [2] The request was seconded by Mr.

While we take notice of the September 1990 report of the United States Judicial Conference Ad Hoc
Committee on Cameras in the Courtroom, still the current rule obtaining in the Federal Courts of the United
States prohibit the presence of television cameras in criminal trials. Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure forbids the taking of photographs during the progress of judicial proceedings or radio broadcasting
of such proceedings from the courtroom. A trial of any kind or in any court is a matter of serious importance to
all concerned and should not be treated as a means of entertainment. To so treat it deprives the court of the
dignity which pertains to it and departs from the orderly and serious quest for truth for which our judicial
proceedings are formulated.
"Courts do not discriminate against radio and television media by forbidding the broadcasting or televising of a
trial while permitting the newspaper reporter access to the courtroom, since a television or news reporter has
the same privilege, as the news reporter is not permitted to bring his typewriter or printing press into the
courtroom.
"In Estes vs. Texas, the United States Supreme Court held that television coverage of judicial proceedings
involves an inherent denial of the due process rights of a criminal defendant. Voting 5-4, the Court through 'Mr.
Justice Clark, identified four (4) areas of potential prejudice which might arise from the impact of the cameras
on the jury, witnesses, the trial judge and the defendant. The decision in part pertinently stated:

"'Experience likewise has established the prejudicial effect of telecasting on witnesses. Witnesses might be
frightened, play to the camera, or become nervous. They are subject to extraordinary out-of-court influences
which might affect their testimony. Also, telecasting not only increases the trial judge's responsibility to avoid
actual prejudice to the defendant, it may as well affect his own performance. Judges are human beings also
and are subject to the same psychologjcal reactions as laymen. For the defendant, telecasting is a form of
mental harassment and subjects him to excessive public exposure and distracts him from the effective
presentation of his defense.
'The television camera is a powerful weapon which intentionally or inadvertently can destroy an accused and
his case in the eyes of the public.'
"Representatives of the press have no special standing to apply for a writ of mandate to compel a court to
permit them to attend a trial, since within the courtroom, a reporter's constitutional rights are no greater than
those of any other member of the public. Massive intrusion of representatives of the news media into the trial
itself can so alter or destroy the constitutionally necessary judicial atmosphere and decorum that the
requirements of impartiality imposed by due process of law are denied the defendant and a defendant in a
criminal proceeding should not be forced to run a gauntlet of reporters and photographers each time he enters
or leaves the courtroom.
"Considering the prejudice it poses to the defendant's right to due process as well as to the fair and orderly
administration of justice, and considering further that the freedom of the press and the right of the people to
information may be served and satisfied by less distracting, degrading and prejudicial means, live radio and
television coverage of court proceedings shall not be allowed. Video footages of court hearings for news
purposes shall be restricted and limited to shots of the courtroom, the judicial officers, the parties and their
counsel taken prior to the commencement of official proceedings. No video shots or photographs shall be
permitted during the trial proper.
"Accordingly, in order to protect the parties right to due process, to prevent the distraction of the participants in
the proceedings and in the last analysis, to avoid miscarriage of justice, the Court resolved to PROHIBIT live
radio and television coverage of court proceedings. Video footages of court hearings for news purposes shall
be limited and restricted as above indicated."
Admittedly, the press is a mighty catalyst in awakening public consciousness, and it has become an
important instrument in the quest for truth.[5] Recent history exemplifies media's invigorating presence, and its
contribution to society is quite impressive. The Court, just recently, has taken judicial notice of the enormous
effect of media in stirring public sentience during the impeachment trial, a partly judicial and partly political
exercise, indeed the most-watched program in the boob-tubes during those times, that would soon culminate
in EDSA II.
The propriety of granting or denying the instant petition involve the weighing out of the constitutional
guarantees of freedom of the press and the right to public information, on the one hand, and the fundamental
rights of the accused, on the other hand, along with the constitutional power of a court to control its
proceedings in ensuring a fair and impartial trial.[6]

conclusions reached are induced not by any outside force or influence [10] but only by evidence and argument
given in open court, where fitting dignity and calm ambiance is demanded.
Witnesses and judges may very well be men and women of fortitude, able to thrive in hardy climate,
with every reason to presume firmness of mind and resolute endurance, but it must also be conceded that
"television can work profound changes in the behavior of the people it focuses on." [11] Even while it may be
difficult to quantify the influence, or pressure that media can bring to bear on them directly and through the
shaping of public opinion, it is a fact, nonetheless, that, indeed, it does so in so many ways and in varying
degrees. The conscious or unconscious effect that such coverage may have on the testimony of witnesses
and the decision of judges cannot be evaluated but, it can likewise be said, it is not at all unlikely for a vote of
guilt or innocence to yield to it. [12] It might be farcical to build around them an impregnable armor against the
influence of the most powerful media of public opinion.[13]
To say that actual prejudice should first be present would leave to near nirvana the subtle threats to
justice that a disturbance of the mind so indispensable to the calm and deliberate dispensation of justice can
[14]
create. The effect of television may escape the ordinary means of proof, but it is not far-fetched for it to
gradually erode our basal conception of a trial such as we know it now.[15]
An accused has a right to a public trial but it is a right that belongs to him, more than anyone else,
where his life or liberty can be held critically in balance. A public trial aims to ensure that he is fairly dealt with
and would not be unjustly condemned and that his rights are not compromised in secrete conclaves of long
ago. A public trial is not synonymous with publicized trial; it only implies that the court doors must be open to
those who wish to come, sit in the available seats, conduct themselves with decorum and observe the trial
process. In the constitutional sense, a courtroom should have enough facilities for a reasonable number of the
public to observe the proceedings, not too small as to render the openness negligible and not too large as to
distract the trial participants from their proper functions, who shall then be totally free to report what they have
observed during the proceedings.[16]
The courts recognize the constitutionally embodied freedom of the press and the right to public
information. It also approves of media's exalted power to provide the most accurate and comprehensive
means of conveying the proceedings to the public and in acquainting the public with the judicial process in
action; nevertheless, within the courthouse, the overriding consideration is still the paramount right of the
accused to due process[17] which must never be allowed to suffer diminution in its constitutional
proportions. Justice Clark thusly pronounced, "while a maximum freedom must be allowed the press in
carrying out the important function of informing the public in a democratic society, its exercise must necessarily
be subject to the maintenance of absolute fairness in the judicial process." [18]
This Court, in the instance [19] already mentioned, citing Estes vs. Texas, [20] the United States Supreme
Court holding the television coverage of judicial proceedings as an inherent denial of due process rights of an
accused, also identified the following as being likely prejudices:

When these rights race against one another, jurisprudence [7] tells us that the right of the accused must
be preferred to win.

"1. The potential impact of television x x x is perhaps of the greatest significance. x x x. From the moment the
trial judge announces that a case will be televised it becomes a cause celebre. The whole community, x x x
becomes interested in all the morbid details surrounding it. The approaching trial immediately assumes an
important status in the public press and the accused is highly publicized along with the offense with which he
is charged. Every juror carries with him into the jury box these solemn facts and thus increases the chance of
prejudice that is present in every criminal case. x x x

With the possibility of losing not only the precious liberty but also the very life of an accused, it
behooves all to make absolutely certain that an accused receives a verdict solely on the basis of a just and
dispassionate judgment, a verdict that would come only after the presentation of credible evidence testified to
by unbiased witnesses unswayed by any kind of pressure, whether open or subtle, in proceedings that are
devoid of histrionics that might detract from its basic aim to ferret veritable facts free from improper influence,
[8]
and decreed by a judge with an unprejudiced mind, unbridled by running emotions or passions.

"2. The quality of the testimony in criminal trials will often be impaired. The impact upon a witness of the
knowledge that he is being viewed by a vast audience is simply incalculable. Some may be demoralized and
frightened, some cocky and given to overstatement; memories may falter, as with anyone speaking publicly,
and accuracy of statement may be severely undermined. x x x. Indeed, the mere fact that the trial is to be
televised might render witnesses reluctant to appear and thereby impede the trial as well as the discovery of
the truth.

Due process guarantees the accused a presumption of innocence until the contrary is proved in a trial
that is not lifted above its individual settings nor made an object of public's attention [9] and where the

"3. A major aspect of the problem is the additional responsibilities the presence of television places on the trial
judge. His job is to make certain that the accused receives a fair trial. This most difficult task requires his
undivided attention. x x x
4. Finally, we cannot ignore the impact of courtroom television on the defendant. Its presence is a form of
mental - if not physical-harassment, resembling a police line-up or the third degree. The inevitable close-up of
his gestures and expressions during the ordeal of his trial might well transgress his personal sensibilities, his
dignity, and his ability to concentrate on the proceedings before him - sometimes the difference between life
and death - dispassionately, freely and without the distraction of wide public surveillance. A defendant on trial
for a specific crime is entitled to his day in court, not in a stadium, or a city or nationwide arena. The
heightened public clamor resulting from radio and television coverage will inevitably result in prejudice."
In his concurring opinion in Estes, Mr. Justice Harlan opined that live television and radio coverage
could have mischievous potentialities for intruding upon the detached atmosphere that should always surround
the judicial process.[21]
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines, in its Resolution of 16 April 2001, expressed its own concern on
the live television and radio coverage of the criminal trials of Mr. Estrada; to paraphrase: Live television and
radio coverage can negate the rule on exclusion of witnesses during the hearings intended to assure a fair
trial; at stake in the criminal trial is not only the life and liberty of the accused but the very credibility of the
Philippine criminal justice system, and live television and radio coverage of the trial could allow the "hooting
throng" to arrogate unto themselves the task of judging the guilt of the accused, such that the verdict of the
court will be acceptable only if popular; and live television and radio coverage of the trial will not subserve the
ends of justice but will only pander to the desire for publicity of a few grandstanding lawyers.
It may not be unlikely, if the minority position were to be adopted, to see protracted delays in the
prosecution of cases before trial courts brought about by petitions seeking a declaration of mistrial on account
of undue publicity and assailing a court a quo's action either allowing or disallowing live media coverage of the
court proceedings because of supposed abuse of discretion on the part of the judge.
En passant, the minority would view the ponencia as having modified the case law on the matter. Just
to the contrary, the Court effectively reiterated its standing resolution of 23 October 1991. Until 1991, the Court
had yet to establish the case law on the matter, and when it did in its 23 rd October resolution, it confirmed, in
disallowing live television and radio coverage of court proceedings, that "the records of the Constitutional
Commission (were) bereft of discussion regarding the subject of cameras in the courtroom" and that
"Philippine courts (had) not (theretofore) had the opportunity to rule on the question squarely."
But were the cases decided by the U.S. courts and cited in the minority opinion really in point?
In Nebraska Press Association vs. Stewart,[22] the Nebraska State trial judge issued an order
restraining news media from publishing accounts of confession or admissions made by the accused or facts

strongly implicating him. The order was struck down. In Richmond Newspaper, Inc., vs. Virginia,[23] the trial
judge closed the courtroom to the public and all participants except witnesses when they testify. The judge
was reversed by the U.S. Supreme Court which ruled that criminal trials were historically open. In Globe
Newspaper vs. Superior Court,[24] the US Supreme Court voided a Massachusetts law that required trial
judges to exclude the press and the public from the courtroom during the testimony of a minor victim of certain
sexual offenses.
Justice Stewart, in Chandler vs. Florida,[25] where two police officers charged with burglary sought to
overturn their conviction before the US Supreme Court upon the ground that the television coverage had
infringed their right to fair trial, explained that "the constitutional violation perceived by the Estes Court did not
stem from the physical disruption that might one day disappear with technological advances in the television
equipment but inhered, rather, in the hypothesis that the mere presence of cameras and recording devices
might have an effect on the trial participants prejudicial to the accused." [26]
Parenthetically, the United States Supreme Court and other federal courts do not allow live television
and radio coverage of their proceedings.
The sad reality is that the criminal cases presently involved are of great dimensions so involving as
they do a former President of the Republic. It is undeniable that these cases have twice become the nation's
focal points in the two conflicting phenomena of EDSA II and EDSA III where the magnitude of the events has
left a still divided nation. Must these events be invited anew and risk the relative stability that has thus far been
achieved?The transcendental events in our midst do not allow us to, turn a blind eye to yet another possible
extraordinary case of mass action being allowed to now creep into even the business of the courts in the
dispensation of justice under a rule of law. At the very least, a change in the standing rule of the court
contained in its resolution of 23 October 1991 may not appear to be propitious.
Unlike other government offices, courts do not express the popular will of the people in any sense
which, instead, are tasked to only adjudicate justiciable controversies on the basis of what alone is submitted
before them.[27] A trial is not a free trade of ideas. Nor is a competing market of thoughts the known test truth in
a courtroom.[28]
The Court is not all that unmindful of recent technological and scientific advances but to chance
forthwith the life or liberty of any person in a hasty to bid to use and apply them, even before ample safety nets
are provided and the concerns heretofore expressed are aptly addressed, is a price too high to pay.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.