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Thomas Cothran
1. Phenomenology as Awareness
provide a description of phenomenology. He finds this necessary not only for readers
who may not be familiar with previous phenomenological works, but because the
nature of phenomenology is still an open question. This fact rightly raises questions
about the rigor of phenomenology, for Merleau-Ponty is writing about 50 years after
vii). The notion of a thing-in-itself apart from perceptive experience plays no role in
what appears in experience. The phenomenologist must set aside the question of
Phenomenology limits itself to the phenomenal, but this does not provide a sufficient
definition. All humans deal with what appears to them no matter what their
phenomena. An early distinction must be drawn between thinking about things and
things, and this will come into greater focus later. However, phenomenology is a
phenomenology: the attempt to think about what one engages with in a way proper
to that engagement. All abstract thinking can arise only on the basis of practical
engagement, but one must not assume from this that all kinds of thinking arises in
the same way. Different types of thinking arise in different ways, and in some cases
thinking can be at odds with engagement. One obvious example: radical skepticism.
One who professes the belief that nothing truly exists and that reality is merely an
illusion still professes this belief to others as if they existed and the engagement
were meaningful to him. And indeed his active engagement betrays at least a tacit
belief in the reality of himself, others, and his engagement with others. The skeptic
would object that his actions may betray that sort of belief, nevertheless there is no
proof of the reality of the world and therefore he is justified in finding reality suspect.
Phenomenology proceeds much differently than the skeptic. The skeptic assumes
there must be logical proof of the reality of things in order to accept them. He gives
logic the most basic role in determining the certainty of things. In this sense, he does
not differ too much from logical positivism. Bertland Russell, for example, stated that
one could not "prove" this world is real, but no countervailing reason stands out to
reject its reality. In a way, this misses the fundamental nature of reality. One does
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not exist in reality in a basically reflective way; in fact, the reflective or the logical
enterprise is only possible on the basis of a pre-logical existence. Put another way,
logic is not self-sufficient, it has prior dependencies that logic itself cannot examine.
Only two possibilities arise from this: either philosophy is groundless, or there is
Phenomenology purports to be the latter way, and this is what Husserl meant by
labors under, but where does phenomenology begin? Logic directs itself to the
objective world, the world which for everyone is the same. A basic structure of the
objective world is logic. The entanglement between the two deserves more attention,
but here one must only note that if the phenomenologist is to examine the
Consequently, if logic is to be set aside in order to find what makes logic possible,
the objective world must be set aside at the same time. This "setting aside" Husserl
calls the "epoche". Husserl pointed out that in order to lay out the ground of the
objective world, he had to take it out of play through suspending it without making
any judgments as to its truth or falsity. The starting point for phenomenology must
then be the subject. This is no arbitrary method; a man must start with the himself
because he can do nothing else. When I think about philosophy, I do this always as
substance, but as the subject already is. Merleau-Ponty proposes that careful
definition, experiences the world; and phenomenology intends to explicate this basic
its early stages is descriptive. The scientific way of conceiving of myself involves my
out:
"I cannot shut myself up within the realm of science. All my knowledge of the
view, or from some experience of the world without which the symbols of
science would be meaningless. The whole universe of science is built upon the
scrutiny and arrive at a precise assessment of its meaning and scope, we must
begin by awakening the basic experience of the world of which science is the
But what is this basic experience of the world that must be awoken? First we should
ask: who has this basic experience? We have already said the subject experiences,
but this alone is a tautology: the subject by definition experiences. Who is the
subject? The idealists believed the subject stands detached from the world. "They
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condition of there being anything at all..." The idealists identify the pure subject as
the condition of possibility of the world, and in doing this offer not an account, but a
the world into being through an act of synthesis arises from analytical reflection
constitute itself; rather, judgment works on phenomena which have already arrived.
The error of the idealists: in detaching the subject from the world the idealists
introduce something alien to experience which violates the nature of experience. The
relation of subject to world is not determined through an act of the intellect; the
subject is already in a world. The very notion of a "detached subject" is possible only
me, I am neither here nor there, neither Peter nor Paul; I am in no way
touch with the world and since the world is, by definition, unique, being the
The idealist conception conceals the phenomenal relation between subject and world
by foisting philosophical presuppositions upon that relation and passing over its
original nature. Other pernicious effects follow as well: the detached subject has no
individuality, for he exists apart from a world and thus has no distinguishing
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characteristics. The detached subject exists apart from accidental properties such as
birthplace and parentage, his historical situation and his attempts to define himself.
Merleu-Ponty points out that for this reason, idealism knows nothing of the problem
of the "Other", because there can exist no other. One detached subject cannot be
From this problem arises the question: in our usual way of experiencing the world,
can we encounter anything like this detached subject? Indeed, if experience required
this detached subject for there to be a sensible world, wouldn't this detached subject
In order for there to be any real validity to inter-personal relationships I could not be
requires distinct persons; relationships require an "other." On this count, the weight
However, one might inquire deeper and ask if the very nature of subjective
perspective, and I can never completely take over the perspective of another even in
the most pure empathy. I still experience others with reference to my own being, as
Heidegger pointed out. Empathy, which takes over the perspective of another always
takes it over partially, and does not liberate me from my own perspective. Therefore,
when I understand and act for others, I am able to do this through a constituent of
from thrown historicity, not limited to an individual perspective, is not consistent with
Merleu-Ponty contends that Husserl's transcendental reduction does not separate the
transcendental ego from the world; Husserl recognized that the subject and the
world are interwoven. His transcendental reduction differs from Kant's in the sense
that the world is suspended not because is the world and the subject exist
indepentanly, but precisely because they are interwoven. Husserl recognized that this
close relation of subject and world must be unconcealed, and that by taking the
world "out of play" this relation might come more easily to our attention. The
transcendental ego stands above the world not in any real sense, but in a very
artificial sense, for it is still tied to the world. Understanding the transcendental ego
in this way absolves Husserl of any apparent affinities with the idealist conception of
the subject. Thus, the important lesson Husserl's reduction teaches is "the
It is evident then that the subject is always in a world, that the subject is always
thrown into history. The above consideration of the nature of the subject is therefore
incomplete without a discussion of the "world." The phenomenal world must be
possible only because of a world, but is not to be identified with that world. The
any world which one considers as existing whether or not a subject experiences it is
not the world of experience. Indeed, it is only in terms of the world of experience
relationship already there. One finds the world already constituted with regard to
one's being; no effort is required to form it. Consciousness comes upon the world
already made, yet a world that exists in relation to the perceiving subject.
for a world which it neither embraces nor possesses, but towards which it is
imperious unity decrees what knowledge shall take as its goal. This is why
the world and our life, being apparent in our desires, our evaluations and in the
landscape we see... (Phenomenology of Perception, xx)
Thus the constitution of the world is not based in the abstract or intellectual aspect
being (here termed operative intentionality). This field becomes clear only in the
subject, others, and world. But in defining what these mean, are we guilty of the
same sort of metaphysical dogmatism? The subject, after all, does not present itself
to experience as an object in the world does; neither does the "other", nor even the
"world"? Phenomenology isn't pure empiricism then, but it doesn't seek to go beyond
investigates what makes experience possible, always from the limited perspective of
way possible for him as a limited perspective. He seeks to become directly aware of
the foundations of experience and world, not to deduce it logically (which would be
an indirect awareness). The particular method differs for different thinkers, in their
those who ostensibly reject it. For moderns, it is difficult to conceive of ourselves as
anything much distinct from a higher order animal on a small planet which orbits a
minute in regard to time; humans have only existed for a few hundred thousand
years, only a blink of an eye in terms of the age of the universe. In this context,
humanity must be seen as quite small. The notion of a special immortal soul does
not pose a significant threat to this worldview; it is not an alternative in itself, its
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content is in negation, and offers nothing positive. The entire universe is seen as a
conglomeration of mass and energy, atoms and quarks, different forms of substance
with no innate significance. If this truly is the most fundamental reality, Albert
first ask how such a view is possible. The scientific universe requires a scientific
view; science is a way of looking at the world. If, then, the scientific universe is the
most fundamental way of looking at the world, it stands to reason that the scientific
way of looking at the world is the most basic. Because science requires a scientific
therefore science requires a subject. This insight means that the physico-chemical
universe depends on a particular kind of view from a particular kind of being. The
scientific world is only possible on the basis of the subjective world, as a form of the
subjective world. Before exploring these ramifications, let's back up for a moment
the usual account of the difference between modern and ancient science. He
identifies three common elements.
First there is the assertion that "modern science start from facts while the medieval
with facts, and modern scientist deal with concepts. Galileo and Newton started their
systems from general propositions that were not at all obvious facts. Indeed,
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Heidegger asserts that the greatness of the scientists during the seventeenth century
was possible because they were consciously engaging in philosophy. (Modern Science,
Metaphysics, and Mathematics, 272) Newton and Galileo did not purport to be dealing
with bare facts; they conceived of their scientific work as under the philosophical and
theological fields.
Secondly there is the assertion that modern science is experimental while ancient
science eschews empirical proof. This is a reformulation of the first objection, as the
idea is that general principles need no proof, while "facts" do. This not only
contradicts the historical data, but the nature of experiential learning. The ancients
and medieval tested experience and falsified theories based on the evidence of the
senses, for this sort of technique is inherent to using tools. It is true that ancient
science did not have the same sort of formal focus on experimentation, but this
difference belies a more fundamental conceptual difference about the nature of the
world.
Third, modern critics claim that modern science calculates and measure, while
ancient science does not. Heidegger states that this too is misguided historically.
Both engaged in calculation and measurement, but these were of a different kind in
The real difference is to be found in "what rules and determines the basic movement
of science itself." (Modern Science, Metaphysics, and Mathematics, 273) Both ancient
and modern science are ruled by mathematics, but mathematics of a different sort.
Numbers are mathematical, but mathematics is not limited to numbers. Numbers are
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the most obvious form of mathematics; when we say there are three pencils on the
table, the number three is not actually there. We know in advance that things will
show up numerically. "The mathemata are the things insofar as we take cognizance of
them a what we know them to be in advance, the body as the bodily, the plant-like
of the plant, the animal-like of the animal, the thingness of the thing, and so on."
Thus learning is never the intake of purely new information, it is delimited according
Any form of inquiry such as science has certain mathematical features, certain a
prioris in terms of which the answers will show up. Heidegger locates the
definition of nature is motion and rest. By motion he meant change, which includes
movement, but is not limited to it. All bodies engage in motion according to their
nature. Fire moves up because that is its proper place, and for the same reason
earth moves down. The earth forms the stratum against which motion is possible.
For Newton, on the other hand, the first law of motion applies to all bodies
uniformly. Bodies do not move according to their natures, but according to the
nature of spatial location and force. The internal impetus for motion, Aristotle's
natural principle, ceased to be used to explain things. Instead space became a
uniform field much like the Cartesian co-ordinates in which any body may exist in
any spatial location. The notion of proper place disappeared. One cannot appeal to
How about this law? It speaks of a body, corpus quod a viribus impressis non
cogitur, a body which is left to itself. Where do we find it? There is no such
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body. There is also no experiment which could ever bring such a body to direct
experience. Instead, it has such a law at its apex. This law speaks of a thing
Thus the insights of Newtonian physics, despite their utility, do not provide an
accurate view of reality if they strip bodies of qualities such as place. All things we
perceive show up initially with a particular significance for us, and it takes a very
particular mode of objective presence; that is, science is a particular way of looking
at the world objectively. It is only one of many such ways (most philosophy falls into
this category as well). Having briefly discussed the shortcomings of modern science
as an accurate way of looking at the world, we will discuss the way such a view can
arise.
scientific universe, what type of everyday experience do we have that gives rise to
this scientific viewpoint? Even the scientist must adopt a peculiar attitude to things to
be scientific. When he gets up and eats his breakfast, he does not treat his cereal as
bits of matter without inherent significance. Without reflecting at all, he simply eats
it. Even when the scientist enters the lab, he engages with in the lab in a
pre-reflective way according to their use. When using the microscope, if all goes well,
he observes not the microscopes but the microbes which the microscope reveals.
Only when the microscope does not work properly does it stand out starkly as a
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significance was it able to do so. This "standing out" which comes about the
breakdown of ones purposeful engagement with the world Heidegger calls "objective
presence."
having to do with the world and taking care of it. In refraining from all
production, manipulation, and so on, taking care of things places itself in the
only mode of being-in which is left over, in the mode of simply lingering with...
On the basis of this kind of being toward the world which lets us encounter
beings within the world solely in their mere outward appearance (eidos), and as a
Thus the scientific universe is possible only on the basis of a practical , purposeful
universe which related back to Dasein. The notion of matter without significance
stretched out over space without place is possible only on the ground of a basic
purposeful engagement with things. The physico-chemical world is not to be
confuted with the basic world in which we live, significance and meaning inhere in
the world-structure and make objective views such as science possible. This is the
basic truth of the world: we and the world are interwoven in such a way that neither
us nor the world is possible without one another, and that things in the world -- with
and world.
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Bibliography:
Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. Joan Stambaugh. State University of New York Press: (c)
1953.
Martin Heidegger, "Modern Science, Metaphysics, and Mathematics" in Basic Writings: Revised and
Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, trans. Colon Smith. Routledge Classics: (c)
1958