1

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 153206

October 23, 2006

ONG ENG KIAM a.k.a. WILLIAM ONG, petitioner,

vs.
LUCITA G. ONG, respondent.

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review seeking the reversal of the Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA G.R. CV No. 59400 which affirmed in toto the Decision of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) Branch 41, Dagupan City granting the petition for legal separation filed by
herein respondent, as well as the Resolution2 of the CA dated April 26, 2002 which denied
petitioners motion for reconsideration.
Ong Eng Kiam, also known as William Ong (William) and Lucita G. Ong (Lucita) were married
on July 13, 1975 at the San Agustin Church in Manila. They have three children: Kingston,
Charleston, and Princeton who are now all of the age of majority.3
On March 21, 1996, Lucita filed a Complaint for Legal Separation under Article 55 par. (1) of
the Family Code4before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City, Branch 41 alleging
that her life with William was marked by physical violence, threats, intimidation and grossly
abusive conduct.5
Lucita claimed that: soon after three years of marriage, she and William quarreled almost every
day, with physical violence being inflicted upon her; William would shout invectives at her like
"putang ina mo", "gago", "tanga", and he would slap her, kick her, pull her hair, bang her head
against concrete wall and throw at her whatever he could reach with his hand; the causes of these
fights were petty things regarding their children or their business; William would also scold and
beat the children at different parts of their bodies using the buckle of his belt; whenever she tried
to stop William from hitting the children, he would turn his ire on her and box her; on December
9, 1995, after she protested with Williams decision to allow their eldest son Kingston to go to
Bacolod, William slapped her and said, "it is none of your business"; on December 14, 1995, she
asked William to bring Kingston back from Bacolod; a violent quarrel ensued and William hit
her on her head, left cheek, eye, stomach, and arms; when William hit her on the stomach and
she bent down because of the pain, he hit her on the head then pointed a gun at her and asked her
to leave the house; she then went to her sisters house in Binondo where she was fetched by her
other siblings and brought to their parents house in Dagupan; the following day, she went to her
parents doctor, Dr. Vicente Elinzano for treatment of her injuries.6
William for his part denied that he ever inflicted physical harm on his wife, used insulting
language against her, or whipped the children with the buckle of his belt. While he admits that he
and Lucita quarreled on December 9, 1995, at their house in Jose Abad Santos Avenue, Tondo,

Manila, he claimed that he left the same, stayed in their Greenhills condominium and only went
back to their Tondo house to work in their office below. In the afternoon of December 14, 1995,
their laundrywoman told him that Lucita left the house.7
On January 5, 1998, the RTC rendered its Decision decreeing legal separation, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered decreeing the legal
separation of plaintiff and defendant, with all the legal effects attendant thereto,
particularly the dissolution and liquidation of the conjugal partnership properties, for
which purpose the parties are hereby ordered to submit a complete inventory of said
properties so that the Court can make a just and proper division, such division to be
embodied in a supplemental decision.
SO ORDERED.8
The RTC found that:
It is indubitable that plaintiff (Lucita) and defendant (William) had their frequent quarrels
and misunderstanding which made both of their lives miserable and hellish. This is even
admitted by the defendant when he said that there was no day that he did not quarrel with
his wife. Defendant had regarded the plaintiff negligent in the performance of her wifely
duties and had blamed her for not reporting to him about the wrongdoings of their
children. (citations omitted)
These quarrels were always punctuated by acts of physical violence, threats and
intimidation by the defendant against the plaintiff and on the children. In the process,
insulting words and language were heaped upon her. The plaintiff suffered and endured
the mental and physical anguish of these marital fights until December 14, 1995 when
she had reached the limits of her endurance. The more than twenty years of her marriage
could not have been put to waste by the plaintiff if the same had been lived in an
atmosphere of love, harmony and peace. Worst, their children are also suffering. As very
well stated in plaintiffs memorandum, "it would be unthinkable for her to throw away
this twenty years of relationship, abandon the comforts of her home and be separated
from her children, whom she loves, if there exists no cause, which is already beyond her
endurance.9
William appealed to the CA which affirmed in toto the RTC decision. In its Decision dated
October 8, 2001, the CA found that the testimonies for Lucita were straightforward and credible
and the ground for legal separation under Art. 55, par. 1 of the Family Code, i.e., physical
violence and grossly abusive conduct directed against Lucita, were adequately proven.10
As the CA explained:
The straightforward and candid testimonies of the witnesses were uncontroverted and
credible. Dr. Elinzanos testimony was able to show that the [Lucita] suffered several
injuries inflicted by [William]. It is clear that on December 14, 1995, she sustained
redness in her cheek, black eye on her left eye, fist blow on the stomach, blood clot and a
blackish discoloration on both shoulders and a "bump" or "bukol" on her head. The
presence of these injuries was established by the testimonies of [Lucita] herself and her
sister, Linda Lim. The Memorandum/Medical Certificate also confirmed the evidence
presented and does not deviate from the doctors main testimony --- that [Lucita] suffered
physical violence on [sic] the hands of her husband, caused by physical trauma, slapping
of the cheek, boxing and fist blows. The effect of the so-called alterations in the
Memorandum/Medical Certificate questioned by [William] does not depart from the main
thrust of the testimony of the said doctor.

Also, the testimony of [Lucita] herself consistently and constantly established that
[William] inflicted repeated physical violence upon her during their marriage and that she
had been subjected to grossly abusive conduct when he constantly hurled invectives at
her even in front of their customers and employees, shouting words like, "gaga", "putang
ina mo," tanga," and "you dont know anything."
These were further corroborated by several incidents narrated by Linda Lim who lived in
their conjugal home from 1989 to 1991. She saw her sister after the December 14, 1995
incident when she (Lucita) was fetched by the latter on the same date. She was a witness
to the kind of relationship her sister and [William] had during the three years she lived
with them. She observed that [William] has an "explosive temper, easily gets angry and
becomes very violent." She cited several instances which proved that William Ong indeed
treated her wife shabbily and despicably, in words and deeds.
xxx
That the physical violence and grossly abusive conduct were brought to bear upon
[Lucita] by [William] have been duly established by [Lucita] and her witnesses. These
incidents were not explained nor controverted by [William], except by making a general
denial thereof. Consequently, as between an affirmative assertion and a general denial,
weight must be accorded to the affirmative assertion.
The grossly abusive conduct is also apparent in the instances testified to by [Lucita] and
her sister. The injurious invectives hurled at [Lucita] and his treatment of her, in its
entirety, in front of their employees and friends, are enough to constitute grossly abusive
conduct. The aggregate behavior of [William] warrants legal separation under grossly
abusive conduct. x x x11
William filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the CA on April 26, 2002.12
Hence the present petition where William claims that:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED AN ERROR OF LAW IN
DISREGARDING CLEAR EVIDENCE THAT THE PETITION FOR LEGAL
SEPARATION WAS INSTITUTED BY THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT FOR THE
SOLE PURPOSE OF REMOVING FROM PETITIONER THE CONTROL AND
OWNERSHIP OF THEIR CONJUGAL PROPERTIES AND TO TRANSFER THE
SAME TO PRIVATE RESPONDENTS FAMILY.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED AN ERROR OF LAW IN
DISREGARDING CLEAR EVIDENCE REPUDIATING PRIVATE RESPONDENTS
CLAIM OF REPEATED PHYSICAL VIOLENCE AND GROSSLY ABUSIVE
CONDUCT ON THE PART OF PETITIONER.13
William argues that: the real motive of Lucita and her family in filing the case is to wrest control
and ownership of properties belonging to the conjugal partnership; these properties, which
include real properties in Hong Kong, Metro Manila, Baguio and Dagupan, were acquired during
the marriage through his (Williams) sole efforts; the only parties who will benefit from a decree
of legal separation are Lucitas parents and siblings while such decree would condemn him as a
violent and cruel person, a wife-beater and child abuser, and will taint his reputation, especially
among the Filipino-Chinese community; substantial facts and circumstances have been
overlooked which warrant an exception to the general rule that factual findings of the trial court
will not be disturbed on appeal; the findings of the trial court that he committed acts of repeated

physical violence against Lucita and their children were not sufficiently established; what took
place were disagreements regarding the manner of raising and disciplining the children
particularly Charleston, Lucitas favorite son; marriage being a social contract cannot be
impaired by mere verbal disagreements and the complaining party must adduce clear and
convincing evidence to justify legal separation; the CA erred in relying on the testimonies of
Lucita and her witnesses, her sister Linda Lim, and their parents doctor, Dr. Vicente Elinzanzo,
whose testimonies are tainted with relationship and fraud; in the 20 years of their marriage,
Lucita has not complained of any cruel behavior on the part of William in relation to their marital
and family life; William expressed his willingness to receive respondent unconditionally
however, it is Lucita who abandoned the conjugal dwelling on December 14, 1995 and instituted
the complaint below in order to appropriate for herself and her relatives the conjugal properties;
the Constitution provides that marriage is an inviolable social institution and shall be protected
by the State, thus the rule is the preservation of the marital union and not its infringement; only
for grounds enumerated in Art. 55 of the Family Code, which grounds should be clearly and
convincingly proven, can the courts decree a legal separation among the spouses.14
Respondent Lucita in her Comment, meanwhile, asserts that: the issues raised in the present
petition are factual; the findings of both lower courts rest on strong and clear evidence borne by
the records; this Court is not a trier of facts and factual findings of the RTC when confirmed by
the CA are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal; the contention of William
that Lucita filed the case for legal separation in order to remove from William the control and
ownership of their conjugal properties and to transfer the same to Lucitas family is absurd;
Lucita will not just throw her marriage of 20 years and forego the companionship of William and
her children just to serve the interest of her family; Lucita left the conjugal home because of the
repeated physical violence and grossly abusive conduct of petitioner.15
Petitioner filed a Reply, reasserting his claims in his petition,16 as well as a Memorandum where
he averred for the first time that since respondent is guilty of abandonment, the petition for legal
separation should be denied following Art. 56, par. (4) of the Family Code.17 Petitioner argues
that since respondent herself has given ground for legal separation by abandoning the family
simply because of a quarrel and refusing to return thereto unless the conjugal properties were
placed in the administration of petitioners in-laws, no decree of legal separation should be
issued in her favor.18
Respondent likewise filed a Memorandum reiterating her earlier assertions.19
We resolve to deny the petition.
It is settled that questions of fact cannot be the subject of a petition for review under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court. The rule finds more stringent application where the CA upholds the findings
of fact of the trial court. In such instance, this Court is generally bound to adopt the facts as
determined by the lower courts.20
The only instances when this Court reviews findings of fact are:
(1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2)
when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is
grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
(5) when the findings of facts are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the Court
of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the
admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to
that of the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in
the petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the
findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by
the evidence on record; and (11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked

certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would
justify a different conclusion.21
As petitioner failed to show that the instant case falls under any of the exceptional circumstances,
the general rule applies.
Indeed, this Court cannot review factual findings on appeal, especially when they are borne out
by the records or are based on substantial evidence.22 In this case, the findings of the RTC were
affirmed by the CA and are adequately supported by the records.
As correctly observed by the trial court, William himself admitted that there was no day that he
did not quarrel with his wife, which made his life miserable, and he blames her for being
negligent of her wifely duties and for not reporting to him the wrongdoings of their children.23
Lucita and her sister, Linda Lim, also gave numerous accounts of the instances when William
displayed violent temper against Lucita and their children; such as: when William threw a steel
chair at Lucita;24 threw chairs at their children;25 slapped Lucita and utter insulting words at
her;26 use the buckle of the belt in whipping the children;27 pinned Lucita against the wall with
his strong arms almost strangling her, and smashed the flower vase and brick rocks and moldings
leaving the bedroom in disarray;28 shouted at Lucita and threw a directory at her, in front of
Linda and the employees of their business, because he could not find a draft letter on his
table;29got mad at Charleston for cooking steak with vetchin prompting William to smash the
plate with steak and hit Charleston, then slapped Lucita and shouted at her "putang ina mo,
gago, wala kang pakialam, tarantado" when she sided with Charleston;30 and the December 9
and December 14, 1995 incidents which forced Lucita to leave the conjugal dwelling.31
Lucita also explained that the injuries she received on December 14, 1995, were not the first. As
she related before the trial court:
q. You stated on cross examination that the injuries you sustained on December 14, 1995
were the most serious?
a. Unlike before I considered December 14, 1995 the very serious because before it is
only on the arm and black eye, but on this December 14, I suffered bruises in all parts of
my body, sir.32
To these, all William and his witnesses, could offer are denials and attempts to downplay the said
incidents.33
As between the detailed accounts given for Lucita and the general denial for William, the Court
gives more weight to those of the former. The Court also gives a great amount of consideration to
the assessment of the trial court regarding the credibility of witnesses as trial court judges enjoy
the unique opportunity of observing the deportment of witnesses on the stand, a vantage point
denied appellate tribunals.34 Indeed, it is settled that the assessment of the trial court of the
credibility of witnesses is entitled to great respect and weight having had the opportunity to
observe the conduct and demeanor of the witnesses while testifying.35
In this case, the RTC noted that:
Williams denial and that of his witnesses of the imputation of physical violence
committed by him could not be given much credence by the Court. Since the office
secretary Ofelia Rosal and the family laundrywoman Rosalino Morco are dependent upon
defendant for their livelihood, their testimonies may be tainted with bias and they could
not be considered as impartial and credible witnesses. So with Kingston Ong who lives
with defendant and depends upon him for support.36

Parenthetically, William claims that that the witnesses of Lucita are not credible because of their
relationship with her. We do not agree. Relationship alone is not reason enough to discredit and
label a witnesss testimony as biased and unworthy of credence37 and a witness relationship to
one of the parties does not automatically affect the veracity of his or her testimony.38 Considering
the detailed and straightforward testimonies given by Linda Lim and Dr. Vicente Elinzano,
bolstered by the credence accorded them by the trial court, the Court finds that their testimonies
are not tainted with bias.
William also posits that the real motive of Lucita in filing the case for legal separation is in order
for her side of the family to gain control of the conjugal properties; that Lucita was willing to
destroy his reputation by filing the legal separation case just so her parents and her siblings could
control the properties he worked hard for. The Court finds such reasoning hard to believe. What
benefit would Lucita personally gain by pushing for her parents and siblings financial interests
at the expense of her marriage? What is more probable is that there truly exists a ground for legal
separation, a cause so strong, that Lucita had to seek redress from the courts. As aptly stated by
the RTC,
...it would be unthinkable for her to throw away this twenty years of relationship,
abandon the comforts of her home and be separated from her children whom she loves, if
there exists no cause, which is already beyond her endurance.39
The claim of William that a decree of legal separation would taint his reputation and label him as
a wife-beater and child-abuser also does not elicit sympathy from this Court. If there would be
such a smear on his reputation then it would not be because of Lucitas decision to seek relief
from the courts, but because he gave Lucita reason to go to court in the first place.
Also without merit is the argument of William that since Lucita has abandoned the family, a
decree of legal separation should not be granted, following Art. 56, par. (4) of the Family Code
which provides that legal separation shall be denied when both parties have given ground for
legal separation. The abandonment referred to by the Family Code is abandonment without
justifiable cause for more than one year.40 As it was established that Lucita left William due to
his abusive conduct, such does not constitute abandonment contemplated by the said provision.
As a final note, we reiterate that our Constitution is committed to the policy of strengthening the
family as a basic social institution.41 The Constitution itself however does not establish the
parameters of state protection to marriage and the family, as it remains the province of the
legislature to define all legal aspects of marriage and prescribe the strategy and the modalities to
protect it and put into operation the constitutional provisions that protect the same.42 With the
enactment of the Family Code, this has been accomplished as it defines marriage and the family,
spells out the corresponding legal effects, imposes the limitations that affect married and family
life, as well as prescribes the grounds for declaration of nullity and those for legal
separation.43 As Lucita has adequately proven the presence of a ground for legal separation, the
Court has no reason but to affirm the findings of the RTC and the CA, and grant her the relief she
is entitled to under the law.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

G.R. No. 137590

March 26, 2001

FLORENCE MALCAMPO-SIN, petitioner, vs.PHILIPP T. SIN, respondent.

The Family Code emphasizes the permanent nature of marriage, hailing it as the foundation of
the family.1 It is this inviolability which is central to our traditional and religious concepts of
morality and provides the very bedrock on which our society finds stability.2 Marriage is
immutable and when both spouses give their consent to enter it, their consent becomes
irrevocable, unchanged even by their independent wills.
However, this inviolability depends on whether the marriage exists and is valid. If it is void ab
initio, the "permanence" of the union becomes irrelevant, and the Court can step in to declare it
so. Article 36 of the Family Code is the justification.3 Where it applies and is duly proven, a
judicial declaration can free the parties from the rights, obligations, burdens and consequences
stemming from their marriage.
A declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code requires the application
of procedural and substantive guidelines. While compliance with these requirements mostly
devolves upon petitioner, the State is likewise mandated to actively intervene in the procedure.
Should there be non-compliance by the State with its statutory duty, there is a need to remand the
case to the lower court for proper trial.
The Case What is before the Court4 is an appeal from a decision of the Court of
Appeals5 which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 158, Pasig
City6 dismissing petitioner Florence Malcampo-Sin's (hereafter "Florence") petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage due to psychological incapacity for insufficiency of evidence.
The Facts On January 4, 1987, after a two-year courtship and engagement, Florence and
respondent Philipp T. Sin (hereafter "Philipp"), a Portugese citizen, were married at St. Jude
Catholic Parish in San Miguel, Manila.7
On September 20, 1994, Florence filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 158, Pasig City, a
complaint for "declaration of nullity of marriage" against Philipp.8 Trial ensued and the parties
presented their respective documentary and testimonial evidence.
On June 16, 1995, the trial court dismissed Florence's petition.9
On December 19, 1995, Florence filed with the trial court a notice of appeal to the Court of
Appeals.10
After due proceedings, on April 30, 1998, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
"IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision
appealed from is AFFIRMED. Cost against the Appellant."11
On June 23, 1998, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a motion for reconsideration of the
aforequoted decision.12
On January 19, 1999, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration.13
Hence, this appeal.14

The Court's Ruling We note that throughout the trial in the lower court, the State did not
participate in the proceedings. While Fiscal Jose Danilo C. Jabson15 filed with the trial court a
manifestation dated November 16, 1994, stating that he found no collusion between the
parties,16 he did not actively participate therein. Other than entering his appearance at certain
hearings of the case, nothing more was heard from him. Neither did the presiding Judge take any
step to encourage the fiscal to contribute to the proceedings.
The Family Code mandates:
"ARTICLE 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage,
the Court shall orderthe prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf
of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that
evidence is not fabricated or suppressed (italics ours).
"In the cases referred to in the preceding paragraph, no judgment shall be based upon a
stipulation of facts or confession of judgment."
It can be argued that since the lower court dismissed the petition, the evil sought to be prevented
(i.e., dissolution of the marriage) did not come about, hence, the lack of participation of the State
was cured. Not so. The task of protecting marriage as an inviolable social institution requires
vigilant and zealous participation and not mere pro-forma compliance. The protection of
marriage as a sacred institution requires not just the defense of a true and genuine union but the
exposure of an invalid one as well. This is made clear by the following pronouncement:
"(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General
to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor
General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision,17 briefly stating
therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition as the case may be, to the petition.
The Solicitor-General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi
contemplated under Canon 1095 (italics ours)."18
The records are bereft of any evidence that the State participated in the prosecution of the case
not just at the trial level but on appeal with the Court of Appeals as well. Other than the
"manifestation" filed with the trial court on November 16, 1994, the State did not file any
pleading, motion or position paper, at any stage of the proceedings.
In Republic of the Philippines v. Erlinda Matias Dagdag,19 while we upheld the validity of the
marriage, we nevertheless characterized the decision of the trial court as "prematurely rendered"
since the investigating prosecutor was not given an opportunity to present controverting evidence
before the judgment was rendered. This stresses the importance of the participation of the State.
Having so ruled, we decline to rule on the factual disputes of the case, this being within the
province of the trial court upon proper re-trial.
Obiter Dictum
For purposes of re-trial, we guide the parties thus: In Republic vs. Court of Appeals,20 the
guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code are as follows
(omitting guideline [8] in the enumeration as it was already earlier quoted):
"(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any
doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and
against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and
our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution
devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It
decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the
whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state. The

Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes
their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
"(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: a) medically or clinically
identified, b) alleged in the complaint, c) sufficiently proven by experts and d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must
be psychological not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be
physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was
mentally or psychically (sic) ill to such an extent that the person could not have known
the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid
assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not
to limit the application of the provision under the principle ofejusdem generis,
nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
"(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the
marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties
exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such
time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
"(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other
spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such
incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to
those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job.
Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing
medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and
raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.
"(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to
assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities,
mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The
illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not refusal, neglect or
difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling
factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the
obligations essential to marriage.
"(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of
the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of
the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital
obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the
text of the decision.
"(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect
by our courts."
The Fallo
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the appealed decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51304, promulgated on April 30, 1998 and the decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 158, Pasig City in Civil Case No. 3190, dated June 16, 1995.
Let the case be REMANDED to the trial court for proper trial.

10

No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-53703 August 19, 1986
LILIA OLIVA WIEGEL, petitioner, vs.
THE HONORABLE ALICIA V. SEMPIO-DIY (as presiding judge of the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court of Caloocan City) and KARL HEINZ WIEGEL, respondents.
In an action (Family Case No. 483) filed before the erstwhile Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court of Caloocan City, herein respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel (plaintiff therein) asked for the
declaration of Nullity of his marriage (celebrated on July, 1978 at the Holy Catholic Apostolic
Christian Church Branch in Makati, Metro Manila) with herein petitioner Lilia Oliva Wiegel
(Lilia, for short, and defendant therein) on the ground of Lilia's previous existing marriage to one
Eduardo A. Maxion, the ceremony having been performed on June 25, 1972 at our Lady of
Lourdes Church in Quezon City. Lilia, while admitting the existence of said prior subsisting
marriage claimed that said marriage was null and void, she and the first husband Eduardo A.
Maxion having been allegedly forced to enter said marital union. In the pre-trial that ensued, the
issue agreed upon by both parties was the status of the first marriage (assuming the presence of
force exerted against both parties): was said prior marriage void or was it merely voidable?
Contesting the validity of the pre-trial order, Lilia asked the respondent court for an opportunity
to present evidence(1) that the first marriage was vitiated by force exercised upon both her and the first husband;
and
(2) that the first husband was at the time of the marriage in 1972 already married to someone
else.
Respondent judge ruled against the presentation of evidence because the existence of force
exerted on both parties of the first marriage had already been agreed upon. Hence, the present
petition for certiorari assailing the following Orders of therespondent Judge(1) the Order dated March 17, 1980 in which the parties were compelled to submit the case for
resolution based on "agreed facts;" and
(2) the Order dated April 14, 1980, denying petitioner's motion to allow her to present evidence
in her favor.
We find the petition devoid of merit.
There is no need for petitioner to prove that her first marriage was vitiated by force committed
against both parties because assuming this to be so, the marriage will not be void but merely
viodable (Art. 85, Civil Code), and therefore valid until annulled. Since no annulment has yet
been made, it is clear that when she married respondent she was still validly married to her first
husband, consequently, her marriage to respondent is VOID (Art. 80, Civil Code).
There is likewise no need of introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of her first
husband at the time they married each other, for then such a marriage though void still needs
according to this Court a judicial declaration 1 of such fact and for all legal intents and purposes
she would still be regarded as a married woman at the time she contracted her marriage with
respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel); accordingly, the marriage of petitioner and respondent would be
regarded VOID under the law.
WHEREFORE, this petition is hereby DISMISSED, for lack of merit, and the Orders
complained of are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

11

SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 132524 December 29, 1998

FEDERICO C. SUNTAY, petitioner,
vs.
ISABEL COJUANGCO-SUNTAY * and HON. GREGORIO S. SAMPAGA, Presiding
Judge, Branch 78, Regional Trial Court, Malolos, Bulacan, Respondents

MARTINEZ, J.:
Which should prevail between the ratio decidendi and the fallo of a decision is the primary issue
in this petition forcertiorari under Rule 65 filed by petitioner Federico C. Suntay who opposes
respondent Isabel's petition for appointment as administratrix of her grandmother's estate by
virtue of her right of representation.
The suit stemmed from the following:
On July 9, 1958, Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay (son of petitioner Federico Suntay) and Isabel
Cojuangco-Suntay were married in the Portuguese Colony of Macao. Out of this marriage, three
children were born namely: Margarita Guadalupe, Isabel Aguinaldo and Emilio Aguinaldo all
surnamed Cojuangco Suntay. After 4 years, the marriage soured so that in 1962, Isabel
Cojuangco-Suntay filed a criminal case 1 against her husband Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay. In
retaliation, Emilio Aguinaldo filed before the then Court of First Instance (CFI) 2 a complaint for
legal separation against his wife, charging her, among others, with infidelity and praying for the
custody and care of their children who were living with their mother. 3 The suit was docketed as
civil case number Q-7180.
On October 3, 1967, the trial court rendered a decision the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the marriage celebrated between Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay and
Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay on July 9, 1958 is hereby declared null and void and of
no effect as between the parties. It being admitted by the parties and shown by the
record that the question of the case and custody of the three children have been
the subject of another case between the same parties in another branch of this
Court in Special Proceeding No. 6428, the same cannot be litigated in this case.
With regard to counterclaim, in view of the manifestation of counsel that the third
party defendants are willing to pay P50,000.00 for damages and that defendant is
willing to accept the offer instead of her original demand for P130,000.00, the
defendant is awarded said sum of P50,000.00 as her counterclaim and to pay
attorney's fees in the amount of P5.000.00.
SO ORDERED. 4 (Emphasis supplied).
As basis thereof, the CFI said:

12

From February 1965 thru December 1965 plaintiff was confined in the Veterans
Memorial Hospital. Although at the time of the trial of parricide case (September
8, 1967) the patient was already out of the hospital he continued to be under
observation and treatment.
It is the opinion of Dr. Aramil that the symptoms of the plaintiffs mental
aberration classified as schizophernia (sic) had made themselves manifest even as
early as 1955; that the disease worsened with time, until 1965 when he was
actually placed under expert neuro-psychiatrist (sic) treatment; that even if the
subject has shown marked progress, the remains bereft of adequate understanding
of right and wrong.
There is no controversy that the marriage between the parties was effected on July
9, 1958, years after plaintiffs mental illness had set in. This fact would justify a
declaration of nullity of the marriage under Article 85 of the Civil Code which
provides:
Art. 95. (sic) A marriage may be annulled for nay of the following causes after
(sic) existing at the time of the marriage:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party, after
coming to reason, freely cohabited with the other as husband or
wife.
There is a dearth of proof at the time of the marriage defendant knew about the
mental condition of plaintiff; and there is proof that plaintiff continues to be
without sound reason. The charges in this very complaint add emphasis to the
findings of the neuro-psychiatrist handling the patient, that plaintiff really lives
more in fancy than in reality, a strong indication of schizophernia
(sic). 5 (Emphasis supplied).
On June 1, 1979, Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay predeceased his mother, the decedent Cristina
Aguinaldo-Suntay. The latter is respondent Isabel's paternal grandmother. The decedent
died on June 4, 1990 without leaving a will. 6
Five years later or on October 26, 1995, respondent Isabel Aguinaldo Cojuangco Suntay filed
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) 7 a petition for issuance in her favor of Letters of
Administration of the Intestate Estate of her late grandmother Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay which
case was docketed as Special Proceeding Case No. 117-M-95. In her petition, she alleged among
others, that she is one of the legitimate grandchildren of the decedent and prayed that she be
appointed as administratrix of the estate. 8
On December 15, 1995, petitioner filed an Opposition claiming that he is the surviving spouse of
the decedent, that he has been managing the conjugal properties even while the decedent has
been alive and is better situated to protect the integrity of the estate than the petitioner, that
petitioner and her family have been alienated from the decedent and the Oppositor for more than
thirty (30) years and thus, prayed that Letters of Administration be issued instead to him. 9
On September 22, 1997 or almost two years after filing an opposition, petitioner moved to
dismiss the special proceeding case alleging in the main that respondent Isabel should not be
appointed as administratrix of the decedent's estate. In support thereof, petitioner argues that
under Article 992 of the Civil Code an illegitimate child has no right to succeed by right of
representation the legitimate relatives of her father or mother. Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay,
respondent Isabel's father predeceased his mother, the late Cristina Aguinaldo Suntay and thus,
opened succession by representation. Petitioner contends that as a consequence of the declaration

13

by the then CFI of Rizal that the marriage of respondent Isabel's parents is "null and void," the
latter is an illegitimate child, and has no right nor interest in the estate of her paternal
grandmother the decedent. 10 On October 16, 1997, the trial court issued the assailed order
denying petitioner's Motion to Dismiss. 11 When his motion for reconsideration was denied by
the trial court in an order dated January 9, 1998, 12 petitioner, as mentioned above filed this
petition.
Petitioner imputes grave abuse of discretion to respondent court in denying his motion to dismiss
as well as his motion for reconsideration on the grounds that: (a) a motion to dismiss is
appropriate in a special proceeding for the settlement of estate of a deceased person; (b) the
motion to dismiss was timely filed; (c) the dispositive portion of the decision declaring the
marriage of respondent Isabel's parents "null and void" must be upheld; and (d) said decision had
long become final and had, in fact, been executed.
On the other hand, respondent Isabel asserts that petitioner's motion to dismiss was alte having
been filed after the opposition was already filed in court, the counterpart of an answer in an
ordinary civil action and that petitioner in his opposition likewise failed to specifically deny
respondent Isabel's allegation that she is a legitimate child of Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay, the
decedent's son. She further contends that petitioner proceeds from a miscomprehension of the
judgment in Civil Case No. Q-7180 and the erroneous premise that there is a conflict between
the body of the decision and its dispositive portion because in an action for annulment of a
marriage, the court either sustains the validity of the marriage or nullifies it. It does not, after
hearing declare a marriage "voidable" otherwise, the court will fail to decide and lastly, that the
status of marriages under Article 85 of the Civil Code before they are annulled is "voidable."
The petition must fail.
Certiorari as a special civil action can be availed of only if there is concurrence of the essential
requisites, to wit: (a) the tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial functions has acted without
or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of
jurisdiction, and (b) there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law for the purpose of annulling or modifying the
proceeding. 13 There must be a capricious, arbitrary and whimsical exercise of power for it to
prosper. 14
A reading of the assailed order, however, shows that the respondent court did not abuse its
discretion in denying petitioner's motion to dismiss, pertinent portions of which are quoted
thereunder, to wit:
The arguments of both parties judiciously and objectively assessed and the
pertinent laws applied, the Court finds that a motion to dismiss at this juncture is
inappropriate considering the peculiar nature of this special proceeding as
distinguished from an ordinary civil action. At the outset, this proceeding was not
adversarial in nature and the petitioner was not called upon to assert a cause of
action against a particular defendant. Furthermore, the State has a vital interest in
the maintenance of the proceedings, not only because of the taxes due it, but also
because if no heirs qualify, the State shall acquire the estate by escheat.
xxx xxx xxx
The court rules, for the purpose of establishing the personality of the petitioner to
file and maintain this special proceedings, that in the case bench, the body of the
decision determines the nature of the action which is for annulment, not
declaration of nullity.
The oppositor's contention that the fallo of the questioned decision (Annex "A"
Motion) prevails over the body thereof is not without any qualification. It holds

14

true only when the dispositive portion of a final decision is definite, clear and
unequivocal and can be wholly given effect without need of interpretation or
construction.
Where there is ambiguity or uncertainty, the opinion or body of the decision may
be referred to for purposes of construing the judgment (78 SCRA
541 citing Morelos v. Go Chin Ling; and Heirs of Juan Presto v. Galang). The
reason is that the dispositive portion must find support from the decision's ratio
decidendi.
Per decision of the Court of First Instance Branch IX of Quezon City, marked as
Annex "A" of oppositor's motion, the marriage of Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay and
Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay was annulled on the basis of Art. 85 par. 3 of the Civil
Code which refers to marriages which are considered voidable. Petitioner being
conceived and born of a voidable marriage before the decree of annulment, she is
considered legitimate (Art. 89, par. 2, Civil Code of the Phils.). 15
The trial court correctly ruled that "a motion to dismiss at this juncture is inappropriate." The
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure governs the procedure to be observed in actions, civil or criminal
and special proceedings. 16 The Rules do not only apply to election cases, land registration,
cadastral, naturalization and insolvency proceedings, and other cases not therein provided for.
Special proceedings being one of the actions under the coverage of the Rules on Civil Procedure,
a motion to dismiss filed thereunder would fall under Section 1, Rule 16 thereof. Said rule
provides that the motion to dismiss may be filed "within the time for but before filing the answer
to the complaint." Clearly, the motion should have been filed on or before the filing of
petitioner's opposition 17 which is the counterpart of an answer in ordinary civil actions.
Not only was petitioner's motion to dismiss filed out of time, it was filed almost two years after
respondent Isabel was already through with the presentation of her witnesses and evidence and
petitioner had presented two witnesses. The filing of the motion to dismiss is not only improper
but also dilatory.
The respondent court, far from deviating or straying off course from established jurisprudence on
this matter, as petitioner asserts, had in fact faithfully observed the law and legal precedents in
this case. In fact, the alleged conflict between the body of the decision and the dispositive portion
thereof which created the ambiguity or uncertainty in the decision of the CFI of Rizal is
reconcilable. The legal basis for setting aside the marriage of respondent Isabel's parents is clear
under paragraph 3, Article 85 of the New Civil Code, the law in force prior to the enactment of
the Family Code.
Petitioner, however, strongly insists that the dispositive portion of the CFI decision has
categorically declared that the marriage of respondent Isabel's parents is "null and void" and that
the legal effect of such declaration is that the marriage from its inception is void and the children
born out of said marriage are illegitimate. Such argument cannot be sustained. Articles 80, 81, 82
and 83 18 of the New Civil Code classify what marriages are void while Article 85 enumerates the
causes for which a marriage may be annulled. 19
The fundamental distinction between void and voidable marriages is that a void marriage is
deemed never to have taken place at all. The effects of void marriages, with respect to property
relations of the spouses are provided for under Article 144 of the Civil Code. Children born of
such marriages who are called natural children by legal fiction have the same status, rights and
obligations as acknowledged natural children under Article 89 20irrespective of whether or not the
parties to the void marriage are in good faith or in bad faith.
On the other hand, a voidable marriage, is considered valid and produces all its civil effects, until
it is set aside by final judgment of a competent court in an action for annulment. Juridically, the

15

annulment of a marriage dissolves the special contract as if it had never been entered into but the
law makes express provisions to prevent the effects of the marriage from being totally wiped out.
The status of children born in voidable marriages is governed by the second paragraph of Article
89 which provides that:
Children conceived of voidable marriages before the decree of annulment shall be
considered legitimate; and children conceived thereafter shall have the same
status, rights and obligations as acknowledged natural children, and are also
called natural children by legal fiction. 21 (Emphasis supplied).
Stated otherwise, the annulment of "the marriage by the court abolishes the legal
character of the society formed by the putative spouses, but it cannot destroy the juridical
consequences which the marital union produced during its continuance." 22
Indeed, the terms "annul" and "null and void" have different legal connotations and implications,
Annul means to reduce to nothing; annihilate; obliterate; to make void or of no effect; to nullify;
to abolish; to do away with 23whereas null and void is something that does not exist from the
beginning. A marriage that is annulled presupposes that it subsists but later ceases to have legal
effect when it is terminated through a court action. But in nullifying a marriage, the court simply
declares a status or condition which already exists from the very beginning.
There is likewise no merit in petitioner's argument that it is the dispositive portion of the decision
which must control as to whether or not the marriage of respondent Isabel's parents was void or
voidable. Such argument springs from a miscomprehension of the judgment in Civil Case No. Q7180 and the erroneous premise that there is a conflict between the body of the decision and its
dispositive portion.
Parenthetically, it is an elementary principle of procedure that the resolution of the court in a
given issue as embodied in the dispositive part of a decision or order is the controlling factor as
to settlement of rights of the parties and the questions presented, notwithstanding statement in
the body of the decision or order which may be somewhat confusing, 24 the same is not without a
qualification. The foregoing rule holds true only when the dispositive part of a final decision or
order is definite, clear and unequivocal and can be wholly given effect without need of
interpretation or construction-which usually is "the case where the order or decision in question
is that of a court not of record which is not constitutionally required to state the facts and the law
on which the judgment is based." 25
Assuming that a doubt or uncertainty exists between the dispositive portion and the body of the
decision, effort must be made to harmonize the whole body of the decision in order to give effect
to the intention, purpose and judgment of the court. In Republic v. de los Angeles 26 the Court
said:
Additionally, Article 10 of the Civil Code states that "[i]n case of doubt in the
interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body
intended right and justice to prevail." This mandate of law, obviously cannot be
any less binding upon the courts in relation to its judgments.
. . .The judgment must be read in its entirety, and must be construed as a whole so
as to bring all of its parts into harmony as far as this can be done by fair and
reasonable interpretation and so as to give effect to every word and part if
possible, and to effectuate the intention and purpose of the Court, consistent with
the provisions of the organic law. (49 C.J.S., pp. 863-864) [Emphasis supplied].
Thus, a reading of the pertinent portions of the decision of the CFI of Rizal quoted earlier shows
that the marriage is voidable:

16

It is the opinion of Dr. Aramil that the symptoms of the plaintiffs mental
aberration classified as schizophernia (sic) had made themselves manifest even as
early as 1955; that the disease worsened with time, until 1965 when he was
actually placed under expert neuro-psychiatrict (sic) treatment; that even if the
subject has shown marked progress, he remains bereft of adequate understanding
of right and wrong.
There is no controversy that the marriage between the parties was effected on July
9, 1958, years after plaintiff's mental illness had set in. This fact would justify a
declaration of nullity of the marriage under Article 85 of the Civil Code which
provides:
Art. 95 (sic) A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing
at the time of the marriage:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party, after coming to
reason, freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife;
xxx xxx xxx
There is a dearth of proof at the time of the marriage defendant knew about the
mental condition of plaintiff; and there is proof that plaintiff continues to be
without sound reason. The charges in this very handling the patient, that plaintiff
really lives more in fancy than in reality, a strong indication of schizophernia
(sic). 27
Inevitably, the decision of the CFI of Rizal declared null and void the marriage of
respondent Isabel's parents based on paragraph 3, Article 85 of the New Civil Code. The
legal consequences as to the rights of the children are therefore governed by the first
clause of the second paragraph of Article 89. A contrary interpretation would be anathema
to the rule just above-mentioned. Based on said provision the children of Emilio
Aguinaldo Suntay and Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay who were conceived and born prior to
the decree of the trial court setting aside their marriage on October 3, 1967 are considered
legitimate. For purposes of seeking appointment as estate administratrix, the legitimate
grandchildren, including respondent Isabel, may invoke their successional right of
representation the estate of their grandmother Cristina Aguinaldo Suntay after their
father, Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay, had predeceased their grandmother. This is, however,
without prejudice to a determination by the courts of whether the Letters of
Administration may be granted to her. Neither do the Court adjudged herein the
successional rights of the personalities involved over the decedent's estate.
It would not therefore be amiss to reiterate at this point what the Court, speaking through Chief
Justice Ruiz Castro, emphasized to "all magistrates of all levels of the judicial hierarchy that
extreme degree of care should be exercised in the formulation of the dispositive portion of a
decision, because it is this portion that is to be executed once the decision becomes final. The
adjudication of the rights and obligations of thoe parties, and the dispositions made as well as the
directions and instructions given by the court in the premises in conformity with the body of the
decision, must all be spelled out clearly, distinctly and unequivocally leaving absolutely no room
for dispute, debate or interpretation. 28
WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion, the instant petition is DISIMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

17

G.R. No. 179620

MANUEL G. ALMELOR, VS LEONIDA T. ALMELOR,

MARRIAGE, in its totality, involves the spouses right to the community of their whole
lives. It likewise involves a true intertwining of personalities.[1]
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA)
denying the petition for annulment of judgment and affirming in toto the decision of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Las Pias, Branch 254. The CA dismissed outright the
Rule 47 petition for being the wrong remedy.
The Facts
Petitioner Manuel G. Almelor (Manuel) and respondent Leonida
Trinidad (Leonida) were married on January 29, 1989 at the Manila Cathedral.[3] Their union
bore threechildren: (1) Maria Paulina Corinne, born on October 20, 1989; (2) Napoleon
Manuel, born on August 9, 1991; and (3) Manuel Homer, born on July 4, 1994.[4] Manuel and
Leonida are both medical practitioners, an anesthesiologist and a pediatrician, respectively.[5]
After eleven (11) years of marriage, Leonida filed a petition with the RTC in Las Pias
City to annul their marriage on the ground that Manuel was psychologically incapacitated to
perform his marital obligations. The case, docketed as LP-00-0132 was raffled off to Branch 254.
During the trial, Leonida testified that she first met Manuel in 1981 at the San Lazaro
Hospital where they worked as medical student clerks. At that time, she regarded Manuel as a
very thoughtful person who got along well with other people. They soon became
sweethearts. Three years after, they got married.[6]
Leonida averred that Manuels kind and gentle demeanor did not last long. In the public
eye, Manuel was the picture of a perfect husband and father. This was not the case in his private
life. At home, Leonida described Manuel as a harsh disciplinarian, unreasonably
meticulous, easily angered. Manuels unreasonable way of imposing discipline on their children
was the cause of their frequent fights as a couple.[7] Leonida complained that this was in stark
contrast to the alleged lavish affection Manuel has for his mother.Manuels deep attachment to his
mother and his dependence on her decision-making were incomprehensible to Leonida.[8]
Further adding to her woes was his concealment to her of his homosexuality. Her
suspicions were first aroused when she noticed Manuels peculiar closeness to his male
companions. For instance, she caught him in an indiscreet telephone conversation manifesting
his affection for a male caller.[9] She also found several pornographic homosexual materials in his
possession.[10] Her worse fears were confirmed when she saw Manuel kissed another man on the
lips. The man was a certain Dr. Nogales.[11] When she confronted Manuel, he denied everything.
At this point, Leonida took her children and left their conjugal abode. Since then, Manuel
stopped giving support to their children.[12]
Dr. Valentina del Fonso Garcia, a clinical psychologist, was presented to prove Leonidas
claim. Dr. del Fonso Garcia testified that she conducted evaluative interviews and a battery of
psychiatric tests on Leonida. She also had a one-time interview with Manuel and face-to-face
interviews with Ma. Paulina Corrinne (the eldest child).[13] Sheconcluded that Manuel is
psychologically incapacitated.[14] Such incapacity is marked by antecedence; it existed
even before the marriage and appeared to be incurable.
Manuel, for his part, admitted that he and Leonida had some petty arguments here and
there. He, however, maintained that their marital relationship was generally harmonious. The
petition for annulment filed by Leonida came as a surprise to him.

18

Manuel countered that the true cause of Leonidas hostility against him was
their professional rivalry. It began when he refused to heed the memorandum[15] released by
Christ the King Hospital. The memorandum ordered him to desist from converting his own
lying-in clinic to a primary or secondary hospital.[16] Leonidas family owns Christ
the King Hospital which is situated in the same subdivision as Manuels clinic and residence.
[17]
In other words, he and her family have competing or rival hospitals in the same vicinity.
Manuel
belied her allegation
that
he
was
a
cruel
father
to their children. He denied maltreating them. At most, he only imposed the necessary discipline
on the children.
He also defended his show of affection for his mother. He said there was nothing
wrong for him to return the love and affection of the person who reared and looked after him and
his siblings. This is especially apt now that his mother is in her twilight years. [18] Manuel pointed
out that Leonida found fault in this otherwise healthy relationship because of her very jealous
and possessive nature.[19]
This same overly jealous behavior of Leonida drove Manuel to avoid the company of
female friends. He wanted to avoid any further misunderstanding with his wife. But,
Leonida instead conjured up stories about his sexual preference. She also fabricated tales
about pornographic materials found in his possession to cast doubt on his masculinity.[20]
To corroborate his version, he presented his brother, Jesus G. Almelor. Jesus narrated that
he usually stayed at Manuels house during his weekly trips to Manila from IrigaCity. He was a
witness to the generally harmonious relationship between his brother Manuel and sister-inlaw, Leonida. True, they had some quarrels typical of a husband and wife relationship. But there
was nothing similar to what Leonida described in her testimony.[21]
Jesus further testified that he was with his brother on the day Leonida allegedly saw
Manuel kissed another man. He denied that such an incident occurred. On that particular date,
[22]
he and Manuel went straight home from a trip to Bicol. There was no other person with them
at that time, except their driver.[23]
Manuel expressed his intention to refute Dr. del Fonso Garcias findings by presenting his
own expert witness. However, no psychiatrist was presented.
RTC Disposition
By decision dated November 25, 2005, the RTC granted the petition for annulment, with
the following disposition:
WHEREFORE, premised on the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Declaring the marriage contracted by herein parties on 29
January 1989 and all its effects under the law null and void
from the beginning;
2. Dissolving the regime of community property between the same
parties with forfeiture of defendants share thereon in favor of
the same parties children whose legal custody is awarded to
plaintiff with visitorial right afforded to defendant;
3. Ordering the defendant to give monthly financial support to all
the children; and
4. Pursuant to the provisions of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC:

19

a. Directing the Branch Clerk of this Court to enter this

Judgment upon its finality in the Book of Entry of
Judgment and to issue an Entry of Judgment in
accordance thereto; and
b. Directing the Local Civil Registrars of Las Pias City
and Manila City to cause the registration of the said
Entry of Judgment in their respective Books of
Marriages.
Upon compliance, a decree of nullity of marriage shall be issued.
SO ORDERED.[24] (Emphasis supplied)
The trial court nullified the marriage, not on the ground of Article 36, but Article 45 of
the Family Code. It ratiocinated:
x x x a careful evaluation and in-depth analysis of the surrounding
circumstances of the allegations in the complaint and of the evidence presented in
support thereof (sic) reveals that in this case (sic) there is more than meets the
eyes (sic).
Both legally and biologically, homosexuality x x x is, indeed, generally
incompatible with hetero sexual marriage. This is reason enough that in this
jurisdiction (sic) the law recognizes marriage as a special contract exclusively
only between a man and a woman x x x and thus when homosexuality has
trespassed into marriage, the same law provides ample remedies to correct the
situation [Article 45(3) in relation to Article 46(4) or Article 55, par. 6, Family
Code]. This is of course in recognition of the biological fact that no matter how a
man cheats himself that he is not a homosexual and forces himself to live a
normal heterosexual life, there will surely come a time when his true sexual
preference as a homosexual shall prevail in haunting him and thus jeopardizing
the solidity, honor, and welfare of his own family.[25]
Manuel filed
a
notice
of
appeal
which
was,
however, denied due
course. Undaunted, he filed a petition for annulment of judgment with the CA.[26]
Manuel contended that the assailed decision was issued in excess of the lower courts
jurisdiction; that it had no jurisdiction to dissolve the absolute community of property and
forfeit his conjugal share in favor of his children.
CA Disposition
On July 31, 2007, the CA denied the petition, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, the present Petition for Annulment of Judgment is hereby
DENIED. The Court AFFIRMS in toto the Decision (dated November 25, 2005)
of the Regional Trial Court (Branch 254), in Las Pias City, in Civil Case No. LP00-0132. No costs.[27]
The CA stated that petitioner pursued the wrong remedy by filing the extraordinary
remedy of petition for annulment of judgment. Said the appellate court:

20

It is obvious that the petitioner is questioning the propriety of the decision

rendered by the lower Court. But the remedy assuming there was a mistake is not
a Petition for Annulment of Judgment but an ordinary appeal. An error of
judgment may be reversed or corrected only by appeal.
What petitioner is ascribing is an error of judgment, not of jurisdiction,
which is properly the subject of an ordinary appeal.
In short, petitioner admits the jurisdiction of the lower court but he claims
excess in the exercise thereof. Excess assuming there was is not covered by Rule
47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The Rule refers the lack of jurisdiction
and not the exercise thereof.[28]
Issues
Petitioner Manuel takes the present recourse via Rule 45, assigning to the CA the
following errors:
I

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT TREATING THE PETITION FOR

ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT AS A PETITION FOR REVIEW IN VIEW OF THE IMPORTANCE OF THE

ISSUES INVOLVED AND IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE;
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE DECISION OF THE
TRIAL COURT AS REGARDS THE ORDER DECLARING THE MARRIAGE AS NULLAND VOID
ON THE GROUND OF PETITIONERS PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY;
III THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE DECISION OF THE
TRIAL COURT AS REGARDS THE ORDER TO FORFEIT THE SHARE OF PETITIONER IN HIS
SHARE OF THE CONJUGAL ASSETS.[29]
Our Ruling

I. The stringent rules of procedures may be relaxed to serve the demands of substantial justice
and in the Courts exercise of equity jurisdiction.
Generally, an appeal taken either to the Supreme Court or the CA by the wrong or
inappropriate mode shall be dismissed.[30] This is to prevent the party from benefiting
from ones neglect and mistakes. However, like most rules, it carries certain exceptions. After
all, the ultimate purpose of all rules of procedures is to achieve substantial justice as
expeditiously as possible.[31]
Annulment of judgment under Rule 47 is a last remedy. It can not be resorted to if the
ordinary remedies are available or no longer available through no fault of petitioner.
[32]
However, in Buenaflor v. Court of Appeals,[33] this Court clarified the proper appreciation for
technical rules of procedure, in this wise:
Rules of procedures are intended to promote, not to defeat, substantial
justice and, therefore, they should not be applied in a very rigid and technical
sense. The exception is that while the Rules are liberally construed, the
provisions with respect to the rules on the manner and periods for perfecting
appeals are strictly applied. As an exception to the exception, these rules have
sometimes been relaxed on equitable considerations. Also, in some cases the
Supreme Court has given due course to an appeal perfected out of time where a
stringent application of the rules would have denied it, but only when to do so
would serve the demands of substantial justice and in the exercise of equity
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.[34](Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
For reasons of justice and equity, this Court has allowed exceptions to the stringent rules
governing appeals.[35] It has, in the past, refused to sacrifice justice for technicality.[36]

21

After discovering the palpable error of his petition, Manuel seeks the indulgence of this
Court to consider his petition before the CA instead as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
A perusal of the said petition reveals that Manuel imputed grave abuse of discretion to the
lower court for annulling his marriage on account of his alleged homosexuality.This is not the
first time that this Court is faced with a similar situation. In Nerves v. Civil Service Commission,
[37]
petitioner Delia R. Nerves elevated to the CA a Civil Service Commission
(CSC) decision suspending her for six (6) months. The CSC ruled Nerves, a public school
teacher, is deemed to have already served her six-month suspensionduring the pendency of the
case. Nevertheless, she is ordered reinstated without back wages. On appeal, Nerves stated in her
petition, inter alia:
1.

This is a petition for certiorari filed pursuant to Article IX-A, Section 7 of

the Constitution of the Philippines and under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

2.

But per Supreme Court Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95

(Revised Circular No. 1-91) petitioner is filing the instant petition with this
Honorable Court instead of the Supreme Court.[38] (Underscoring supplied)

The CA dismissed Nerves petition for certiorari for being the wrong remedy or the inappropriate
mode of appeal.[39] The CA opined that under the Supreme Court Revised Administrative
Circular No. 1-95 x x x appeals from judgments or final orders or resolutions of CSC is
by a petition for review.[40]
This Court granted Nerves petition and held that she had substantially complied with the
Administrative Circular. The Court stated:
That it was erroneously labeled as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court is only a minor procedural lapse, not fatal to the appeal. x x x
More importantly, the appeal on its face appears to be impressed with
merit. Hence, the Court of Appeals should have overlooked the insubstantial
defects of the petition x x x in order to do justice to the parties concerned. There
is, indeed, nothing sacrosanct about procedural rules, which should be liberally
construed in order to promote their object and assist the parties in obtaining just,
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action or proceeding. As it has
been said, where the rigid application of the rules would frustrate substantial
justice, or bar the vindication of a legitimate grievance, the courts are justified in
exempting a particular case from the operation of the rules.[41] (Underscoring
supplied)
Similarly, in the more recent case of Tan v. Dumarpa,[42] petitioner Joy G. Tan availed of a wrong
remedy by filing a petition for review on certiorari instead of a motion for new trial or an
ordinary appeal. In the interest of justice, this Court considered the petition, pro hac vice, as a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
This Court found that based on Tans allegations, the trial court prima facie committed
grave abuse of discretion in rendering a judgment by default. If uncorrected, it will cause
petitioner great injustice. The Court elucidated in this wise:
Indeed, where as here, there is a strong showing that grave miscarriage of
justice would result from the strict application of the Rules, we will not hesitate to
relax the same in the interest of substantial justice.[43] (Underscoring supplied)

22

Measured by the foregoing yardstick, justice will be better served by giving due course to the
present petition and treating petitioners CA petition as one for certiorari under Rule
65, considering that what is at stake is the validity or non-validity of a marriage.
In Salazar v. Court of Appeals,[44] citing Labad v. University of Southeastern Philippines, this
Court reiterated:
x x x The dismissal of appeals on purely technical grounds is frowned
upon. While the right to appeal is a statutory, not a natural right, nonetheless it is
an essential part of our judicial system and courts should proceed with caution so
as not to deprive a party of the right to appeal, but rather, ensure that every partylitigant has the amplest opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his
cause, free from the constraints of technicalities.[45]
Indeed, it is far better and more prudent for a court to excuse a technical lapse and afford the
parties a review of the case on the merits to attain the ends of justice.[46]
Furthermore, it was the negligence and incompetence of Manuels counsel that prejudiced his
right to appeal. His counsel, Atty. Christine Dugenio, repeatedly availed of inappropriate
remedies. After the denial of her notice of appeal, she failed to move for reconsideration or new
trial at the first instance. She also erroneously filed a petition for annulment of judgment rather
than pursue an ordinary appeal.
These manifest errors were clearly indicative of counsels incompetence. These gravely
worked to the detriment of Manuels appeal. True it is that the negligence of counsel binds the
client. Still, this Court has recognized certain exceptions: (1) where reckless or gross negligence
of counsel deprives the client of due process of law; (2) when its application will result in
outright deprivation of the clients liberty and property; or (3) where the interest of justice so
require.[47]
The negligence of Manuels counsel falls under the exceptions. Ultimately, the reckless or
gross negligence of petitioners former counsel led to the loss of his right to appeal. He should
not be made to suffer for his counsels grave mistakes. Higher interests of justice and equity
demand that he be allowed to ventilate his case in a higher court.
In Apex Mining, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[48] this Court explained thus:
It is settled that the negligence of counsel binds the client. This is based on
the rule that any act performed by a counsel within the scope of his general or
implied authority is regarded as an act of his client. However, where counsel is
guilty of gross ignorance, negligence and dereliction of duty, which resulted in the
clients being held liable for damages in a damage suit, the client is deprived of his
day in court and the judgment may be set aside on such ground. In the instant case,
higher interests of justice and equity demand that petitioners be allowed to present
evidence on their defense. Petitioners may not be made to suffer for the lawyers
mistakes. This Court will always be disposed to grant relief to parties aggrieved
by perfidy, fraud, reckless inattention and downright incompetence of lawyers,
which has the consequence of depriving their clients, of their day in court.
[49]
(Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, this Court has the power to except a particular case from the operation of the rule
whenever the demands of justice require it. With more conviction should it wield such power in a
case involving the sacrosanct institution of marriage. This Court is guided with the thrust of
giving a party the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of ones action.[50]

23

The client was likewise spared from counsels negligence in Government Service Insurance
System v. Bengson Commercial Buildings, Inc.[51] and Ancheta v. Guersey-Dalaygon.[52] Said the
Court in Bengson:
But if under the circumstances of the case, the rule deserts its proper office
as an aid to justice and becomes a great hindrance and chief enemy, its rigors must
be relaxed to admit exceptions thereto and to prevent a miscarriage of justice. In
other words, the court has the power to except a particular case from the operation
of the rule whenever the purposes of justice require it.[53]
II. Concealment of homosexuality is the proper ground to annul a marriage, not
homosexuality per se.
Manuel is a desperate man determined to salvage what remains of his marriage. Persistent in his
quest, he fought back all the heavy accusations of incapacity, cruelty, and doubted masculinity
thrown at him.
The trial court declared that Leonidas petition for nullity had no basis at all because the
supporting grounds relied upon can not legally make a case under Article 36 of the Family
Code. It went further by citing Republic v. Molina:[54]
Indeed, mere allegations of conflicting personalities, irreconcilable differences,
incessant quarrels and/or beatings, unpredictable mood swings, infidelities, vices,
abandonment, and difficulty, neglect, or failure in the performance of some
marital obligations do not suffice to establish psychological incapacity.[55]
If so, the lower court should have dismissed outright the petition for not meeting the
guidelines set in Molina. What Leonida attempted to demonstrate were Manuelshomosexual
tendencies by citing overt acts generally predominant among homosexual individuals.
[56]
She wanted to prove that the perceived homosexuality rendered Manuelincapable of fulfilling
the essential marital obligations.
But instead of dismissing the petition, the trial court nullified the marriage between Manuel and
Leonida on the ground of vitiated consent by virtue of fraud. In support of its conclusion, the
lower court reasoned out:
As insinuated by the State (p. 75, TSN, 15 December 2003), when there is
smoke surely there is fire. Although vehemently denied by defendant, there is
preponderant evidence enough to establish with certainty that defendant is really a
homosexual. This is the fact that can be deduced from the totality of the marriage
life scenario of herein parties.
Before his marriage, defendant knew very well that people around him
even including his own close friends doubted his true sexual preference (TSN,
pp. 35-36, 13 December 2000; pp.73-75, 15 December 2003). After receiving
many forewarnings, plaintiff told defendant about the rumor she heard but
defendant did not do anything to prove to the whole world once and for all the
truth of all his denials. Defendant threatened to sue those people but nothing
happened after that. There may have been more important matters to attend to
than to waste time and effort filing cases against and be effected by these people
and so, putting more premiums on defendants denials, plaintiff just the same
married him. Reasons upon reasons may be advanced to either exculpate or nail to
the cross defendant for his act of initially concealing his homosexuality to
plaintiff, but in the end, only one thing is certain even during his marriage with
plaintiff, the smoke of doubt about his real preference continued and even got

24

thicker, reason why obviously defendant failed to establish a happy and solid
family; and in so failing, plaintiff and their children became his innocent and
unwilling victims.
Yes, there is nothing untoward of a man if, like herein defendant, he is
meticulous over even small details in the house (sic) like wrongly folded bed
sheets, etc. or if a man is more authoritative in knowing what clothes or jewelry
shall fit his wife (pp. 77-81, TSN, 15 December 2003); but these admissions of
defendant taken in the light of evidence presented apparently showing that he had
extra fondness of his male friends (sic) to the extent that twice on separate
occasions (pp. 4-7, TSN, 14 February 2001) he was allegedly seen by plaintiff
kissing another man lips-to-lips plus the homosexual magazines and tapes
likewise allegedly discovered underneath his bed (Exhibits L and M), the doubt as
to his real sex identity becomes stronger. The accusation of plaintiff versus thereof
of defendant may be the name of the game in this case; but the simple reason of
professional rivalry advanced by the defendant is certainly not enough to justify
and obscure the question why plaintiff should accuse him of such a very untoward
infidelity at the expense and humiliation of their children and family as a whole.
[57]

Evidently, no sufficient proof was presented to substantiate the allegations that Manuel
is a homosexual and that he concealed this to Leonida at the time of their marriage.The lower
court considered the public perception of Manuels sexual preference without the corroboration of
witnesses. Also, it took cognizance of Manuels peculiarities and interpreted it against his
sexuality.
Even assuming, ex gratia argumenti, that Manuel is a homosexual, the lower court cannot
appreciate it as a ground to annul his marriage with Leonida. The law is clear amarriage may be
annulled when the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, [58] such as concealment of
homosexuality.[59] Nowhere in the said decision was it proven by preponderance of evidence that
Manuel was a homosexual at the onset of his marriage and that he deliberately hid such fact to
his wife.[60] It is the concealment of homosexuality, and not homosexuality per se, that vitiates
the consent of the innocent party. Such concealment presupposes bad faith and intent to defraud
the other party in giving consent to the marriage.

Consent is an essential requisite of a valid marriage. To be valid, it must be freely given by both
parties. An allegation of vitiated consent must be proven by preponderance of evidence. The
Family Code has enumerated an exclusive list of circumstances [61] constituting
fraud. Homosexuality per se is not among those cited, but its concealment.
This distinction becomes more apparent when we go over the deliberations [62] of the Committees
on the Civil Code and Family Law, to wit:
Justice Caguioa remarked that this ground should be eliminated in the
provision on the grounds for legal separation. Dean Gupit, however, pointed out
that in Article 46, they are talking only of concealment, while in the article on legal
separation, there is actuality. Judge Diy added that in legal separation, the ground
existed after the marriage, while in Article 46, the ground existed at the time of the
marriage. Justice Reyes suggested that, for clarity, they add the phrase existing at
the time of the marriage at the end of subparagraph (4). The Committee approved
the suggestion.[63]
To reiterate, homosexuality per se is only a ground for legal separation. It is its
concealment that serves as a valid ground to annul a marriage. [64] Concealment in this case is not

25

simply a blanket denial, but one that is constitutive of fraud. It is this fundamental element that
respondent failed to prove.
In the United States, homosexuality has been considered as a basis for divorce. It
indicates that questions of sexual identity strike so deeply at one of the basic elements of
marriage, which is the exclusive sexual bond between the spouses. [65] In Crutcher v. Crutcher,
[66]
the Court held:
Unnatural practices of the kind charged here are an infamous indignity to the
wife, and which would make the marriage relation so revolting to her that it would
become impossible for her to discharge the duties of a wife, and would defeat the
whole purpose of the relation. In the natural course of things, they would cause
mental suffering to the extent of affecting her health.[67]
However, although there may be similar sentiments here in the Philippines, the legal
overtones are significantly different. Divorce is not recognized in the country.Homosexuality and
its alleged incompatibility to a healthy heterosexual life are not sanctioned as grounds to sever
the marriage bond in our jurisdiction. At most, it is only a ground to separate from bed and
board.
What was proven in the hearings a quo was a relatively blissful marital union for more
than eleven (11) years, which produced three (3) children. The burden of proof to show the
nullity of the marriage rests on Leonida. Sadly, she failed to discharge this onus.
The same failure to prove fraud which purportedly resulted to a vitiated marital consent
was found in Villanueva v. Court of Appeals.[68] In Villanueva, instead of proving vitiation of
consent, appellant resorted to baseless portrayals of his wife as a perpetrator of fraudulent
schemes. Said the Court:
Factual findings of the Court of Appeals, especially if they coincide with
those of the trial court, as in the instant case, are generally binding on this
Court. We affirm the findings of the Court of Appeals that petitioner freely and
voluntarily married private respondent and that no threats or intimidation, duress
or violence compelled him to do so, thus
Appellant anchored his prayer for the annulment of his marriage on the
ground that he did not freely consent to be married to the appellee. He cited
several incidents that created on his mind a reasonable and well-grounded fear of
an imminent and grave danger to his life and safety. x x x
The Court is not convinced that appellants apprehension of danger to his
person is so overwhelming as to deprive him of the will to enter voluntarily to a
contract of marriage. It is not disputed that at the time he was allegedly being
harassed, appellant worked as a security guard in a bank. Given the rudiments of
self-defense, or, at the very least, the proper way to keep himself out of harms
way. x x x
Appellant also invoked fraud to annul his marriage, as he was made to
believe by appellee that the latter was pregnant with his child when they were
married. Appellants excuse that he could not have impregnated the appellee
because he did not have an erection during their tryst is flimsy at best, and an
outright lie at worst. The complaint is bereft of any reference to his inability to
copulate with the appellee. x x x
x x x The failure to cohabit becomes relevant only if it arises as a result of
the perpetration of any of the grounds for annulling the marriage, such as lack of

26

parental consent, insanity, fraud, intimidation, or undue influence x x x. Since the

appellant failed to justify his failure to cohabit with the appellee on any of these
grounds, the validity of his marriage must be upheld.[69]
Verily, the lower court committed grave abuse of discretion, not only by solely taking into
account petitioners homosexuality per se and not its concealment, but by declaring the marriage
void from its existence.
This Court is mindful of the constitutional policy to protect and strengthen the family as the basic
autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family.[70]The State and the
public have vital interest in the maintenance and preservation of these social institutions against
desecration by fabricated evidence.[71] Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity
of marriage.
III. In a valid marriage, the husband and wife jointly administer and enjoy their community
or conjugal property.
Article 96 of the Family Code, on regimes of absolute community property, provides:
Art. 96. The administration and enjoyment of the community property shall
belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husbands decision
shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for a proper remedy,
which must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract
implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in
the administration of the common properties, the other spouse may assume sole
powers of administration.These powers do not include the powers of disposition
or encumbrance without the authority of the court or the written consent of the
other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or
encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a
continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and
may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or
authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.
A similar provision, Article 124[72] prescribes joint administration and enjoyment in a
regime of conjugal partnership. In a valid marriage, both spouses exerciseadministration and
enjoyment of the property regime, jointly.
In the case under review, the RTC decreed a dissolution of the community property of
Manuel and Leonida. In the same breath, the trial court forfeited Manuels share in favor of the
children. Considering that the marriage is upheld valid and subsisting, the dissolution and
forfeiture of Manuels share in the property regime is unwarranted. They remain the joint
administrators of the community property.
WHEREFORE, thepetitionis GRANTED. The appealed Decision is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE and the petition in the trial court to annul the marriage isDISMISSED.SO
ORDERED.

G.R. No. 119190 January 16, 1997 CHI MING TSOI, petitioner,
vs. COURT OF APPEALS and GINA LAO-TSOI, respondents.

27

Man has not invented a reliable compass by which to steer a marriage in its journey over
troubled waters. Laws are seemingly inadequate. Over time, much reliance has been placed in
the works of the unseen hand of Him who created all things.
Who is to blame when a marriage fails?
This case was originally commenced by a distraught wife against her uncaring husband in the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch 89) which decreed the annulment of the marriage
on the ground of psychological incapacity. Petitioner appealed the decision of the trial court to
respondent Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. CV No. 42758) which affirmed the Trial Court's decision
November 29, 1994 and correspondingly denied the motion for reconsideration in a resolution
dated February 14, 1995.
The statement of the case and of the facts made by the trial court and reproduced by the Court of
Appeals 1 its decision are as follows:
From the evidence adduced, the following acts were preponderantly established:
Sometime on May 22, 1988, the plaintiff married the defendant at the Manila
Cathedral, . . . Intramuros Manila, as evidenced by their Marriage Contract. (Exh. "A")
After the celebration of their marriage and wedding reception at the South Villa, Makati,
they went and proceeded to the house of defendant's mother.
There, they slept together on the same bed in the same room for the first night of their
married life.
It is the version of the plaintiff, that contrary to her expectations, that as newlyweds they
were supposed to enjoy making love, or having sexual intercourse, with each other, the
defendant just went to bed, slept on one side thereof, then turned his back and went to
sleep . There was no sexual intercourse between them during the first night. The same
thing happened on the second, third and fourth nights.
In an effort to have their honeymoon in a private place where they can enjoy together
during their first week as husband and wife, they went to Baguio City. But, they did so
together with her mother, an uncle, his mother and his nephew. They were all invited by
the defendant to join them. [T]hey stayed in Baguio City for four (4) days. But, during
this period, there was no sexual intercourse between them, since the defendant avoided
her by taking a long walk during siesta time or by just sleeping on a rocking chair located
at the living room. They slept together in the same room and on the same bed since May
22, 1988 until March 15, 1989. But during this period, there was no attempt of sexual
intercourse between them. [S]he claims, that she did not: even see her husband's private
parts nor did he see hers.
Because of this, they submitted themselves for medical examinations to Dr. Eufemio
Macalalag, a urologist at the Chinese General Hospital, on January 20, 1989.
The results of their physical examinations were that she is healthy, normal and still a
virgin, while that of her husband's examination was kept confidential up to this time.
While no medicine was prescribed for her, the doctor prescribed medications for her
husband which was also kept confidential. No treatment was given to her. For her
husband, he was asked by the doctor to return but he never did.
The plaintiff claims, that the defendant is impotent, a closet homosexual as he did not
show his penis. She said, that she had observed the defendant using an eyebrow pencil
and sometimes the cleansing cream of his mother. And that, according to her, the

28

defendant married her, a Filipino citizen, to acquire or maintain his residency status here
in the country and to publicly maintain the appearance of a normal man.
The plaintiff is not willing to reconcile with her husband.
On the other hand, it is the claim of the defendant that if their marriage shall be annulled
by reason of psychological incapacity, the fault lies with his wife.
But, he said that he does not want his marriage with his wife annulled for several
reasons, viz: (1) that he loves her very much; (2) that he has no defect on his part and he
is physically and psychologically capable; and, (3) since the relationship is still very
young and if there is any differences between the two of them, it can still be reconciled
and that, according to him, if either one of them has some incapabilities, there is no
certainty that this will not be cured. He further claims, that if there is any defect, it can be
cured by the intervention of medical technology or science.
The defendant admitted that since their marriage on May 22, 1988, until their separation
on March 15, 1989, there was no sexual contact between them. But, the reason for this,
according to the defendant, was that everytime he wants to have sexual intercourse with
his wife, she always avoided him and whenever he caresses her private parts, she always
removed his hands. The defendant claims, that he forced his wife to have sex with him
only once but he did not continue because she was shaking and she did not like it. So he
stopped.
There are two (2) reasons, according to the defendant , why the plaintiff filed this case
against him, and these are: (1) that she is afraid that she will be forced to return the pieces
of jewelry of his mother, and, (2) that her husband, the defendant, will consummate their
marriage.
The defendant insisted that their marriage will remain valid because they are still very
young and there is still a chance to overcome their differences.
The defendant submitted himself to a physical examination. His penis was examined by
Dr. Sergio Alteza, Jr., for the purpose of finding out whether he is impotent . As a result
thereof, Dr. Alteza submitted his Doctor's Medical Report. (Exh. "2"). It is stated there,
that there is no evidence of impotency (Exh. "2-B"), and he is capable of erection. (Exh.
"2-C")
The doctor said, that he asked the defendant to masturbate to find out whether or not he
has an erection and he found out that from the original size of two (2) inches, or five (5)
centimeters, the penis of the defendant lengthened by one (1) inch and one centimeter. Dr.
Alteza said, that the defendant had only a soft erection which is why his penis is not in its
full length. But, still is capable of further erection, in that with his soft erection, the
defendant is capable of having sexual intercourse with a woman.
In open Court, the Trial Prosecutor manifested that there is no collusion between the
parties and that the evidence is not fabricated." 2
After trial, the court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered declaring as VOID the marriage entered
into by the plaintiff with the defendant on May 22, 1988 at the Manila Cathedral, Basilica
of the Immaculate Conception, Intramuros, Manila, before the Rt. Rev. Msgr. Melencio
de Vera. Without costs. Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Local Civil Registrar
of Quezon City. Let another copy be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Manila.
SO ORDERED.

29

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.

Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioner alleges that the respondent Court of Appeals erred:
I in affirming the conclusions of the lower court that there was no sexual intercourse between
the parties without making any findings of fact.
II in holding that the refusal of private respondent to have sexual communion with petitioner is
a psychological incapacity inasmuch as proof thereof is totally absent.
III in holding that the alleged refusal of both the petitioner and the private respondent to have
sex with each other constitutes psychological incapacity of both.
IV in affirming the annulment of the marriage between the parties decreed by the lower court
without fully satisfying itself that there was no collusion between them.
We find the petition to be bereft of merit.
Petitioner contends that being the plaintiff in Civil Case No. Q-89-3141, private respondent has
the burden of proving the allegations in her complaint; that since there was no independent
evidence to prove the alleged non-coitus between the parties, there remains no other basis for the
court's conclusion except the admission of petitioner; that public policy should aid acts intended
to validate marriage and should retard acts intended to invalidate them; that the conclusion drawn
by the trial court on the admissions and confessions of the parties in their pleadings and in the
course of the trial is misplaced since it could have been a product of collusion; and that in actions
for annulment of marriage, the material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be proved. 3
Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court reads:
Section 1. Judgment on the pleadings. Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or
otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party's pleading, the court may,
on motion of that party, direct judgment on such pleading. But in actions for annulment
of marriage or for legal separation the material facts alleged in the complaint shall always
be proved.
The foregoing provision pertains to a judgment on the pleadings. What said provision seeks to
prevent is annulment of marriage without trial. The assailed decision was not based on such a
judgment on the pleadings. When private respondent testified under oath before the trial court
and was cross-examined by oath before the trial court and was cross-examined by the adverse
party, she thereby presented evidence in form of a testimony. After such evidence was presented,
it be came incumbent upon petitioner to present his side. He admitted that since their marriage on
May 22, 1988, until their separation on March 15, 1989, there was no sexual intercourse between
them.
To prevent collusion between the parties is the reason why, as stated by the petitioner, the Civil
Code provides that no judgment annulling a marriage shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of
facts or by confession of judgment (Arts. 88 and 101[par. 2]) and the Rules of Court prohibit
such annulment without trial (Sec. 1, Rule 19).
The case has reached this Court because petitioner does not want their marriage to be annulled.
This only shows that there is no collusion between the parties. When petitioner admitted that he
and his wife (private respondent) have never had sexual contact with each other, he must have
been only telling the truth. We are reproducing the relevant portion of the challenged resolution
denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration, penned with magisterial lucidity by Associate
Justice Minerva Gonzaga-Reyes, viz:

30

The judgment of the trial court which was affirmed by this Court is not based on a
stipulation of facts. The issue of whether or not the appellant is psychologically
incapacitated to discharge a basic marital obligation was resolved upon a review of both
the documentary and testimonial evidence on record. Appellant admitted that he did not
have sexual relations with his wife after almost ten months of cohabitation, and it appears
that he is not suffering from any physical disability. Such abnormal reluctance or
unwillingness to consummate his marriage is strongly indicative of a serious personality
disorder which to the mind of this Court clearly demonstrates an 'utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage' within the meaning of Article
36 of the Family Code (See Santos vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112019, January 4,
1995). 4
Petitioner further contends that respondent court erred in holding that the alleged refusal of both
the petitioner and the private respondent to have sex with each other constitutes psychological
incapacity of both. He points out as error the failure of the trial court to make "a categorical
finding about the alleged psychological incapacity and an in-depth analysis of the reasons for
such refusal which may not be necessarily due to physchological disorders" because there might
have been other reasons, i.e., physical disorders, such as aches, pains or other discomforts,
why private respondent would not want to have sexual intercourse from May 22, 1988 to March
15, 1989, in a short span of 10 months.
First, it must be stated that neither the trial court nor the respondent court made a finding on who
between petitioner and private respondent refuses to have sexual contact with the other. The fact
remains, however, that there has never been coitus between them. At any rate, since the action to
declare the marriage void may be filed by either party, i.e., even the psychologically
incapacitated, the question of who refuses to have sex with the other becomes immaterial.
Petitioner claims that there is no independent evidence on record to show that any of the parties
is suffering from phychological incapacity. Petitioner also claims that he wanted to have sex with
private respondent; that the reason for private respondent's refusal may not be psychological but
physical disorder as stated above.
We do not agree. Assuming it to be so, petitioner could have discussed with private respondent or
asked her what is ailing her, and why she balks and avoids him everytime he wanted to have
sexual intercourse with her. He never did. At least, there is nothing in the record to show that he
had tried to find out or discover what the problem with his wife could be. What he presented in
evidence is his doctor's Medical Report that there is no evidence of his impotency and he is
capable of erection. 5 Since it is petitioner's claim that the reason is not psychological but perhaps
physical disorder on the part of private respondent, it became incumbent upon him to prove such
a claim.
If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential
marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage
tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal.
Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to psychological incapacity. Thus, the
prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her spouse is
considered a sign of psychological incapacity. 6
Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is "To procreate
children based on the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation
is the basic end of marriage." Constant non- fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the
integrity or wholeness of the marriage. In the case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of
one of the parties to fulfill the above marital obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
As aptly stated by the respondent court,

31

An examination of the evidence convinces Us that the husband's plea that the wife did not
want carnal intercourse with him does not inspire belief. Since he was not physically
impotent, but he refrained from sexual intercourse during the entire time (from May 22,
1988 to March 15, 1989) that he occupied the same bed with his wife, purely out of
symphaty for her feelings, he deserves to be doubted for not having asserted his right
seven though she balked (Tompkins vs. Tompkins, 111 Atl. 599, cited in I Paras, Civil
Code, at p. 330). Besides, if it were true that it is the wife was suffering from incapacity,
the fact that defendant did not go to court and seek the declaration of nullity weakens his
claim. This case was instituted by the wife whose normal expectations of her marriage
were frustrated by her husband's inadequacy. Considering the innate modesty of the
Filipino woman, it is hard to believe that she would expose her private life to public
scrutiny and fabricate testimony against her husband if it were not necessary to put her
life in order and put to rest her marital status.
We are not impressed by defendant's claim that what the evidence proved is the
unwillingness or lack of intention to perform the sexual act, which is not phychological
incapacity, and which can be achieved "through proper motivation." After almost ten
months of cohabitation, the admission that the husband is reluctant or unwilling to
perform the sexual act with his wife whom he professes to love very dearly, and who has
not posed any insurmountable resistance to his alleged approaches, is indicative of a
hopeless situation, and of a serious personality disorder that constitutes psychological
incapacity to discharge the basic marital covenants within the contemplation of the
Family Code. 7
While the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual
love, respect and fidelity (Art. 68, Family Code), the sanction therefor is actually the
"spontaneous, mutual affection between husband and wife and not any legal mandate or court
order" (Cuaderno vs. Cuaderno 120 Phil. 1298). Love is useless unless it is shared with another.
Indeed, no man is an island, the cruelest act of a partner in marriage is to say "I could not have
cared less." This is so because an ungiven self is an unfulfilled self. The egoist has nothing but
himself. In the natural order, it is sexual intimacy which brings spouses wholeness and oneness.
Sexual intimacy is a gift and a participation in the mystery of creation. It is a function which
enlivens the hope of procreation and ensures the continuation of family relations.
It appears that there is absence of empathy between petitioner and private respondent. That is
a shared feeling which between husband and wife must be experienced not only by having
spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep sense of spiritual communion. Marital union is a twoway process. An expressive interest in each other's feelings at a time it is needed by the other can
go a long way in deepening the marital relationship. Marriage is definitely not for children but
for two consenting adults who view the relationship with love amor gignit amorem, respect,
sacrifice and a continuing commitment to compromise, conscious of its value as a sublime social
institution.
This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties found themselves
trapped in its mire of unfulfilled vows and unconsummated marital obligations, can do no less
but sustain the studied judgment of respondent appellate court.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING PREMISES , the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals
dated November 29, 1994 is hereby AFFIRMED in all respects and the petition is hereby
DENIED for lack of merit SO ORDERED.