G.R. No.

L-18463

October 4, 1922

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
GREGORIO PERFECTOR, defendant-appellant.
Alfonso E. Mendoza and the appellant in behalf of the latter.
Attorney-General Villa-Real for appellee.

MALCOLM, J.:
The important question is here squarely presented of whether article 256 of the Spanish Penal
Code, punishing "Any person who, by . . . writing, shall defame, abuse, or insult any Minister of
the Crown or other person in authority . . .," is still in force.
About August 20, 1920, the Secretary of the Philippine Senate, Fernando M. Guerrero,
discovered that certain documents which constituted the records of testimony given by witnesses
in the investigation of oil companies, had disappeared from his office. Shortly thereafter, the
Philippine Senate, having been called into special session by the Governor-General, the
Secretary for the Senate informed that body of the loss of the documents and of the steps taken
by him to discover the guilty party. The day following the convening of the Senate, September 7,
1920, the newspaper La Nacion, edited by Mr. Gregorio Perfecto, published an article reading as
follows:
Half a month has elapsed since the discovery, for the first time, of the scandalous robbery of
records which were kept and preserved in the iron safe of the Senate, yet up to this time there is
not the slightest indication that the author or authors of the crime will ever be discovered.
To find them, it would not, perhaps, be necessary to go out of the Sente itself, and the persons in
charge of the investigation of the case would not have to display great skill in order to succeed in
their undertaking, unless they should encounter the insuperable obstacle of offical concealment.
In that case, every investigation to be made would be but a mere comedy and nothing more.
After all, the perpetration of the robbery, especially under the circumstances that have surrounded
it, does not surprise us at all.
The execution of the crime was but the natural effect of the environment of the place in which it
was committed.
How many of the present Senators can say without remorse in their conscience and with serenity
of mind, that they do not owe their victory to electoral robbery? How may?
The author or authors of the robbery of the records from the said iron safe of the Senate have,
perhaps, but followed the example of certain Senators who secured their election through fraud
and robbery.

The Philippine Senate, in its session of September 9, 1920, adopted a resolution authorizing its
committee on elections and privileges to report as to the action which should be taken with
reference to the article published in La Nacion. On September 15, 1920, the Senate adopted a
resolution authorizing the President of the Senate to indorse to the Attorney-General, for his study
and corresponding action, all the papers referring to the case of the newspaper La Nacion and its
editor, Mr. Gregorio Perfecto. As a result, an information was filed in the municipal court of the
City of Manila by an assistant city fiscal, in which the editorial in question was set out and in
which it was alleged that the same constituted a violation of article 256 of the Penal Code. The
defendant Gregorio Perfecto was found guilty in the municipal court and again in the Court of
First Instance of Manila.
During the course of the trial in the Court of First Instance, after the prosecution had rested, the
defense moved for the dismissal of the case. On the subject of whether or not article 256 of the
Penal Code, under which the information was presented, is in force, the trial judge, the Honorable
George R. Harvey, said:
This antiquated provision was doubtless incorporated into the Penal Code of Spain for the
protection of the Ministers of the Crown and other representatives of the King against free speech
and action by Spanish subjects. A severe punishment was prescribed because it was doubtless
considered a much more serious offense to insult the King's representative than to insult an
ordinary individual. This provision, with almost all the other articles of that Code, was extended to
the Philippine Islands when under the dominion of Spain because the King's subject in the
Philippines might defame, abuse or insult the Ministers of the Crown or other representatives of
His Majesty. We now have no Ministers of the Crown or other persons in authority in the
Philippines representing the King of Spain, and said provision, with other articles of the Penal
Code, had apparently passed into "innocuous desuetude," but the Supreme Corut of the
Philippine Islands has, by a majority decision, held that said article 256 is the law of the land today. . . .
The Helbig case is a precedent which, by the rule of stare decisis, is binding upon this court until
otherwise determined by proper authority.
In the decision rendered by the same judge, he concluded with the following language:
In the United States such publications are usually not punishable as criminal offense, and little
importance is attached to them, because they are generally the result of political controversy and
are usually regarded as more or less colored or exaggerated. Attacks of this character upon a
legislative body are not punishable, under the Libel Law. Although such publications are
reprehensible, yet this court feels some aversion to the application of the provision of law under
which this case was filed. Our Penal Code has come to us from the Spanish regime. Article 256
of that Code prescribes punishment for persons who use insulting language about Ministers of
the Crown or other "authority." The King of Spain doubtless left the need of such protection to his
ministers and others in authority in the Philippines as well as in Spain. Hence, the article referred
to was made applicable here. Notwithstanding the change of sovereignty, our Supreme Court, in
a majority decision, has held that this provision is still in force, and that one who made an
insulting remark about the President of the United States was punishable under it. (U.S. vs.
Helbig, supra.) If it applicable in that case, it would appear to be applicable in this case. Hence,
said article 256 must be enforced, without fear or favor, until it shall be repealed or superseded by
other legislation, or until the Supreme Court shall otherwise determine.

In view of the foregoing considerations, the court finds the defendant guilty as charged in the
information and under article 256 of their Penal Code sentences him to suffer two months and
one day of arresto mayor and the accessory penalties prescribed by law, and to pay the costs of
both instances.
The fifteen errors assigned by the defendant and appellant, reenforced by an extensive brief, and
eloquent oral argument made in his own behalf and by his learned counsel, all reduce themselves
to the pertinent and decisive question which was announced in the beginning of this decision.
It will be noted in the first place that the trial judge considered himself bound to follow the rule
announced in the case of United States vs. Helbig (R. G. No. 14705, 1 not published). In that
case, the accused was charged with having said, "To hell with the President and his
proclamations, or words to that effect," in violation of article 256 of the Penal Code. He was found
guilty in a judgment rendered by the Court of First Instance of Manila and again on appeal to the
Supreme Court, with the writer of the instant decision dissenting on two principal grounds: (1)
That the accused was deprived of the constitutional right of cross-examination, and (2) that article
256 of the Spanish Penal Code is no longer in force. Subsequently, on a motion of
reconsideration, the court, being of the opinion that the Court of First Instance had committed a
prejudicial error in depriving the accused of his right to cross-examine a principal witness, set
aside the judgment affirming the judgment appealed from and ordered the return of the record to
the court of origin for the celebration of a new trial. Whether such a trial was actually had, is not
known, but at least, the record in the Helbig case has never again been elevated to this court.
There may perchance exist some doubt as to the authority of the decision in the Helbig case, in
view of the circumstances above described. This much, however, is certain: The facts of the
Helbig case and the case before us, which we may term the Perfecto case, are different, for in the
first case there was an oral defamation, while in the second there is a written defamation. Not
only this, but a new point which, under the facts, could not have been considered in the Helbig
case, is, in the Perfecto case, urged upon the court. And, finally, as is apparent to all, the
appellate court is not restrained, as was the trial court, by strict adherence to a former decision.
We much prefer to resolve the question before us unhindered by references to the Helbig
decision.
This is one of those cases on which a variety of opinions all leading to the same result can be
had. A majority of the court are of the opinion that the Philippine Libel Law, Act No. 277, has had
the effect of repealing so much of article 256 of the Penal Code as relates to written defamation,
abuse, or insult, and that under the information and the facts, the defendant is neither guilty of a
violation of article 256 of the Penal Code, nor of the Libel Law. The view of the Chief Justice is
that the accused should be acquitted for the reason that the facts alleged in the information do
not constitute a violation of article 156 of the Penal Code. Three members of the court believe
that article 256 was abrogated completely by the change from Spanish to American sovereignty
over the Philippines and is inconsistent with democratic principles of government.
Without prejudice to the right of any member of the court to explain his position, we will discuss
the two main points just mentioned.
1. Effect of the Philippine Libel Law, Act No. 277, on article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code.
The Libel Law, Act No. 277, was enacted by the Philippine Commission shortly after organization

of this legislative body. Section 1 defines libel as a "malicious defamation, expressed either in
writing, printing, or by signs or pictures, or the like, or public theatrical exhibitions, tending to
blacken the memory of one who is dead or to impeach the honesty, virtue, or reputation, or
publish the alleged or natural deffects of one who is alive, and thereby expose him to public
hatred, contempt or ridicule." Section 13 provides that "All laws and parts of laws now in force, so
far as the same may be in conflict herewith, are hereby repealed. . . ."
That parts of laws in force in 1901 when the Libel Law took effect, were in conflict therewith, and
that the Libel Law abrogated certain portion of the Spanish Penal Code, cannot be gainsaid. Title
X of Book II of the Penal Code, covering the subjects of calumny and insults, must have been
particularly affected by the Libel Law. Indeed, in the early case of Pardo de Tavera vs. Garcia
Valdez ([1902], 1. Phil., 468), the Supreme Court spoke of the Libel Law as "reforming the
preexisting Spanish law on the subject of calumnia and injuria." Recently, specific attention was
given to the effect of the Libel Law on the provisions of the Penal Code, dealing with calumny and
insults, and it was found that those provisions of the Penal Code on the subject of calumny and
insults in which the elements of writing an publicity entered, were abrogated by the Libel Law.
(People vs. Castro [1922], p. 842, ante.)
The Libel Law must have had the same result on other provisions of the Penal Code, as for
instance article 256.
The facts here are that the editor of a newspaper published an article, naturally in writing, which
may have had the tendency to impeach the honesty, virtue, or reputation of members of the
Philippine Senate, thereby possibly exposing them to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule, which is
exactly libel, as defined by the Libel Law. Sir J. F. Stephen is authority for the statement that a
libel is indictable when defaming a "body of persons definite and small enough for individual
members to be recognized as such, in or by means of anything capable of being a libel." (Digest
of Criminal Law, art. 267.) But in the United States, while it may be proper to prosecute criminally
the author of a libel charging a legislator with corruption, criticisms, no matter how severe, on a
legislature, are within the range of the liberty of the press, unless the intention and effect be
seditious. (3 Wharton's Criminal Law, p. 2131.) With these facts and legal principles in mind,
recall that article 256 begins: Any person who, by . . . writing, shall defame, abuse, or insult any
Minister of the Crown or other person in authority," etc.
The Libel Law is a complete and comprehensive law on the subject of libel. The well-known rule
of statutory construction is, that where the later statute clearly covers the old subject-matter of
antecedent acts, and it plainly appears to have been the purpose of the legislature to give
expression in it to the whole law on the subject, previous laws are held to be repealed by
necessary implication. (1 Lewis' Sutherland Statutory Construction, p. 465.) For identical reasons,
it is evident that Act No. 277 had the effect so much of this article as punishes defamation, abuse,
or insults by writing.
Act No. 292 of the Philippine Commission, the Treason and Sedition Law, may also have affected
article 256, but as to this point, it is not necessary to make a pronouncement.
2. Effect of the change from Spanish to Amercian sevoreignty over the Philippine son article 256
of the Spanish Penal Code. Appellant's main proposition in the lower court and again
energetically pressed in the appellate court was that article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code is not
now in force because abrogated by the change from Spanish to American sovereignty over the

Philippines and because inconsistent with democratic principles of government. This view was
indirectly favored by the trial judge, and, as before stated, is the opinion of three members of this
court.
Article 256 is found in Chapter V of title III of Book II of the Spanish Penal Code. Title I of Book II
punishes the crimes of treason, crimes that endanger the peace or independence of the state,
crimes against international law, and the crime of piracy. Title II of the same book punishes the
crimes of lese majeste, crimes against the Cortes and its members and against the council of
ministers, crimes against the form of government, and crimes committed on the occasion of the
exercise of rights guaranteed by the fundamental laws of the state, including crime against
religion and worship. Title III of the same Book, in which article 256 is found, punishes the crimes
of rebellion, sedition, assaults upon persons in authority, and their agents, and contempts, insults,
injurias, and threats against persons in authority, and insults, injurias, and threats against their
agents and other public officers, the last being the title to Chapter V. The first two articles in
Chapter V define and punish the offense of contempt committed by any one who shall be word or
deed defame, abuse, insult, or threathen a minister of the crown, or any person in authority. The
with an article condemning challenges to fight duels intervening, comes article 256, now being
weighed in the balance. It reads as follows: "Any person who, by word, deed, or writing, shall
defame, abuse, or insult any Minister of the Crown or other person in authority, while engaged in
the performance of official duties, or by reason of such performance, provided that the offensive
minister or person, or the offensive writing be not addressed to him, shall suffer the penalty of
arresto mayor," that is, the defamation, abuse, or insult of any Minister of the Crown of the
Monarchy of Spain (for there could not be a Minister of the Crown in the United States of
America), or other person in authority in the Monarchy of Spain.
It cannot admit of doubt that all those provisions of the Spanish Penal Code having to do with
such subjects as treason, lese majeste, religion and worship, rebellion, sedition, and contempts of
ministers of the crown, are not longer in force. Our present task, therefore, is a determination of
whether article 256 has met the same fate, or, more specifically stated, whether it is in the nature
of a municipal law or political law, and is consistent with the Constitution and laws of the United
States and the characteristics and institutions of the American Government.
It is a general principle of the public law that on acquisition of territory the previous political
relations of the ceded region are totally abrogated. "Political" is here used to denominate the laws
regulating the relations sustained by the inhabitants to the sovereign. (American Insurance Co.
vs. Canter [1828], 1 Pet., 511; Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railway Co. vs. McGlinn [1885],
114 U.S., 542; Roa vs. Collector of Customs [1912], 23 Phil., 315.) Mr. Justice Field of the United
States Supreme Court stated the obvious when in the course of his opinion in the case of
Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railway Co. vs. McGlinn, supra, he said: "As a matter of
course, all laws, ordinances and regulations in conflict with the political character, institutions and
Constitution of the new government are at once displaced. Thus, upon a cession of political
jurisdiction and legislative power and the latter is involved in the former to the United States,
the laws of the country in support of an established religion or abridging the freedom of the press,
or authorizing cruel and unusual punishments, and he like, would at once cease to be of
obligatory force without any declaration to that effect." To quote again from the United States
Supreme Court: "It cannot be admitted that the King of Spain could, by treaty or otherwise, impart
to the United States any of his royal prerogatives; and much less can it be admitted that they
have capacity to receive or power to exercise them. Every nation acquiring territory, by treaty or
otherwise, must hold it subject to the Constitution and laws of its own government, and not

according to those of the government ceding it." (Pollard vs. Hagan [1845], 3 Hos., 210.)
On American occupation of the Philippines, by instructions of the President to the Military
Commander dated May 28, 1898, and by proclamation of the latter, the municipal laws of the
conquered territory affecting private rights of person and property and providing for the
punishment of crime were nominally continued in force in so far as they were compatible with the
new order of things. But President McKinley, in his instructions to General Merritt, was careful to
say: "The first effect of the military occupation of the enemy's territory is the severance of the
former political relation of the inhabitants and the establishment of a new political power." From
that day to this, the ordinarily it has been taken for granted that the provisions under
consideration were still effective. To paraphrase the language of the United States Supreme Court
in Weems vs. United States ([1910], 217 U. S., 349), there was not and could not be, except as
precise questions were presented, a careful consideration of the codal provisions and a
determination of the extent to which they accorded with or were repugnant to the "'great principles
of liberty and law' which had been 'made the basis of our governmental system.' " But when the
question has been squarely raised, the appellate court has been forced on occasion to hold
certain portions of the Spanish codes repugnant t democratic institutions and American
constitutional principles. (U.S. vs. Sweet [1901], 1 Phil., 18; U.S. vs. Balcorta [1913], 25 Phil.,
273; U.S. vs. Balcorta [1913], 25 Phil., 533; Weems vs. U.S., supra.)
The nature of the government which has been set up in the Philippines under American
sovereignty was outlined by President McKinley in that Magna Charta of Philippine liberty, his
instructions to the Commission, of April 7, 1900. In part, the President said:
In all the forms of government and administrative provisions which they are authorized to
prescribe, the Commission should bear in mind that he government which they are establishing is
designed not for our satisfaction or for the expression of our theoretical views, but for the
happiness, peace, and prosperity of the people of the Philippine Islands, and the measures
adopted should be made to conform to their customs, their habits, and even their prejudices, to
the fullest extent consistent with the accomplishment of the indispensable requisites of just and
effective government. At the same time the Commission should bear in mind, and the people of
the Islands should be made plainly to understand, that there are certain great principles of
government which have been made the basis of our governmental system, which we deem
essential to the rule of law and the maintenance of individual freedom, and of which they have,
unfortunately, been denied the experience possessed by us; that there are also certain practical
rules of government which we have found to be essential to the preservation of these great
principles of liberty and law, and that these principles and these rules of government must be
established and maintained in their islands for the sake of their liberty and happiness, however
much they may conflict with the customs or laws of procedure with which they are familiar. It is
evident that the most enligthened thought of the Philippine Islands fully appreciates the
importance of these principles and rules, and they will inevitably within a short time command
universal assent.
The courts have naturally taken the same view. Mr. Justice Elliott, speaking for our Supreme
Court, in the case of United States vs. Bull ([1910], 15 Phil., 7), said: "The President and
Congress framed the government on the model with which American are familiar, and which has
proven best adapted for the advancement of the public interests and the protection of individual
rights and privileges."

Therefore, it has come with somewhat of a shock to hear the statement made that the happiness,
peace, and prosperity of the people of the Philippine Islands and their customs, habits, and
prejudices, to follow the language of President McKinley, demand obeisance to authority, and
royal protection for that authority.
According to our view, article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code was enacted by the Government of
Spain to protect Spanish officials who were the representatives of the King. With the change of
sovereignty, a new government, and a new theory of government, as set up in the Philippines. It
was in no sense a continuation of the old, although merely for convenience certain of the existing
institutions and laws were continued. The demands which the new government made, and
makes, on the individual citizen are likewise different. No longer is there a Minister of the Crown
or a person in authority of such exalted position that the citizen must speak of him only with bated
breath. "In the eye of our Constitution and laws, every man is a sovereign, a ruler and a freeman,
and has equal rights with every other man. We have no rank or station, except that of
respectability and intelligence as opposed to indecency and ignorance, and the door to this rank
stands open to every man to freely enter and abide therein, if he is qualified, and whether he is
qualified or not depends upon the life and character and attainments and conduct of each person
for himself. Every man may lawfully do what he will, so long as it is not malum in se or malum
prohibitum or does not infringe upon the qually sacred rights of others." (State vs. Shepherd
[1903], 177 Mo., 205; 99 A. S. R., 624.)
It is true that in England, from which so many of the laws and institutions of the United States are
derived, there were once statutes of scandalum magnatum, under which words which would not
be actionable if spoken of an ordinary subject were made actionable if spoken of a peer of the
realm or of any of the great officers of the Crown, without proof of any special damage. The
Crown of England, unfortunately, took a view less tolerant that that of other sovereigns, as for
instance, the Emperors Augustus, Caesar, and Tiberius. These English statutes have, however,
long since, become obsolete, while in the United States, the offense of scandalum magnatum is
not known. In the early days of the American Republic, a sedition law was enacted, making it an
offense to libel the Government, the Congress, or the President of the United States, but the law
met with so much popular disapproval, that it was soon repealed. "In this country no distinction as
to persons is recognized, and in practice a person holding a high office is regarded as a target at
whom any person may let fly his poisonous words. High official position, instead of affording
immunity from slanderous and libelous charges, seems rather to be regarded as making his
character free plunder for any one who desires to create a senation by attacking it." (Newell,
Slander and Libel, 3d ed., p. 245; Sillars vs. Collier [1890], 151 Mass., 50; 6 L.R.A., 680.)
Article 256 of the Penal Code is contrary to the genius and fundamental principles of the
American character and system of government. The gulf which separates this article from the
spirit which inspires all penal legislation of American origin, is as wide as that which separates a
monarchy from a democratic Republic like that of the United States. This article was crowded out
by implication as soon as the United States established its authority in the Philippine Islands.
Penalties out of all proportion to the gravity of the offense, grounded in a distorted monarchical
conception of the nature of political authority, as opposed to the American conception of the
protection of the interests of the public, have been obliterated by the present system of
government in the Islands. 1awph!l.net
From an entirely different point of view, it must be noted that this article punishes contempts
against executive officials, although its terms are broad enough to cover the entire official class.

Punishment for contempt of non-judicial officers has no place in a government based upon
American principles. Our official class is not, as in monarchies, an agent of some authority
greater than the people but it is an agent and servant of the people themselves. These officials
are only entitled to respect and obedience when they are acting within the scope of their authority
and jurisdiction. The American system of government is calculated to enforce respect and
obedience where such respect and obedience is due, but never does it place around the
individual who happens to occupy an official position by mandate of the people any official halo,
which calls for drastic punishment for contemptuous remarks.
The crime of lese majeste disappeared in the Philippines with the ratification of the Treaty of
Paris. Ministers of the Crown have no place under the American flag.
To summarize, the result is, that all the members of the court are of the opinion, although for
different reasons, that the judgment should be reversed and the defendant and appellant
acquitted, with costs de officio. So ordered.
De Leon v. Esguerra Case Digest
De Leon v. Esguerra, 153 SCRA 602, August, 31, 1987
(En Banc), J. Melencio-Herrera

Facts: On May 17, 1982, petitioner Alfredo M. De Leon was elected Barangay Captain together
with the other petitioners as Barangay Councilmen of Barangay Dolores, Muncipality of Taytay,
Province of Rizal in a Barangay election held under Batas Pambansa Blg. 222, otherwise known
as Barangay Election Act of 1982.
On February 9, 1987, petitioner De Leon received a Memorandum antedated December 1, 1986
but signed by respondent OIC Governor Benjamin Esguerra on February 8, 1987 designating
respondent Florentino G. Magno as Barangay Captain of Barangay Dolores and the other
respondents as members of Barangay Council of the same Barangay and Municipality.
Petitoners prayed to the Supreme Court that the subject Memoranda of February 8, 1987 be
declared null and void and that respondents be prohibited by taking over their positions of
Barangay Captain and Barangay Councilmen.
Petitioners maintain that pursuant to Section 3 of the Barangay Election Act of 1982 (BP Blg.
222), their terms of office shall be six years which shall commence on June 7, 1988 and shall
continue until their successors shall have elected and shall have qualified. It was also their
position that with the ratification of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, respondent OIC Governor no
longer has the authority to replace them and to designate their successors.
On the other hand, respondents contend that the terms of office of elective and appointive
officials were abolished and that petitioners continued in office by virtue of Sec. 2, Art. 3 of the
Provisional Constitution and not because their term of six years had not yet expired; and that the
provision in the Barangay Election Act fixing the term of office of Barangay officials to six years
must be deemed to have been repealed for being inconsistent with Sec. 2, Art. 3 of the
Provisional Constitution.

Issue: Whether or not the designation of respondents to replace petitioners was validly made

during the one-year period which ended on Feb 25, 1987.

Ruling: Supreme Court declared that the Memoranda issued by respondent OIC Gov on Feb 8,
1987 designating respondents as Barangay Captain and Barangay Councilmen of Barangay
Dolores, Taytay, Rizal has no legal force and effect.
The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on Feb 2, 1987, therefore, the Provisional
Constitution must be deemed to have superseded. Having become inoperative, respondent OIC
Gov could no longer rely on Sec 2, Art 3, thereof to designate respondents to the elective
positions occupied by petitioners. Relevantly, Sec 8, Art 1 of the 1987 Constitution further
provides in part:
"Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be
determined by law, shall be three years x x x."
Until the term of office of barangay officials has been determined by aw, therefore, the term of
office of 6 years provided for in the Barangay Election Act of 1982 should still govern.
Francisco vs House of Representatives GR No 160261 10 November 2003
Facts: An impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario Davide and seven Asociate
Justices was filed on 2 June 2003 but was dismissed by The House Committee on Justice on 22
October 2003 for being insufficient in substance. On 23 October 2003, Representative Gilbert
Teodoro and Felix Fuentabella filed a new impeachment complaint against the Chief Justice.
Thus arose the instant petitions against the House of Representatives et al, most of which
contend that the filing of the second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the
provision of Section 5, Article XI of the Constitution, no impeachment proceedings shall be
initiated against the same official more than once within the period of one year. Senator Aquilino
Pimintel Jr, filed a Motion to Intervene, stating that the consolidated petitions be dismissed for
lack of jurisdiction of the Court and that the sole power, authority and jurisdiction of the Senate as
the impeachment court be recognized and upheld pursuant to the provision of Article XI of the
Constitution.
Issue: Whether or not the certiorari jurisdiction of the court may be invoked to determine the
validity of the second impeachment complaint pursuant to Article XI of the Constitution.
Decision: The second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3 (5) of Article XI of the
Constitution.
Applying the principles of constitutional construction, ut magis valeat quam pereat. The
Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole, the said provision should function to the full extent of
its substance and form and its terms, in conjunction with all other provisions of the Constitution.
Pursuant to Section 1 Article VIII of the Constitution, the judicial power shall be vested in one
Supreme Court. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on part of any branch of the government. The courts of justice determine the limits of
power of the agencies and offices of the government as well as its officers , this is not only a
judicial power but a duty to pass judgment.

The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way. And
when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any
superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the
legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to
determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in
an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them.
Chavez vs. JBC
GR No. 202242July 17, 2012
FACTS:
In 1991, instead of having only seven members, an eight member was added to the JBC as two
representatives from Congress begansitting in the JBC

one from the House of Representatives and one from the Senate, with each having one-half (1/2)
of a vote. Then,the JBC En Banc, in separate meetings held in 2000 and 2001, decided to allow
the representatives from the Senate and the House of Representatives one full vote each. At
present, Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr.(respondents)
simultaneously sit in the JBC as representatives of the legislature. It is this practice that petitioner
has questioned in this
petition. Respondents argued that the crux of the controversy is the phrase a representative of
Congress. It is their theory that the twohouses, the Senate and the House of Representatives,
are permanent and mandatory components of Congress, such that the
absence of either divests the term of its substantive meaning as expressed under the
Constitution. Bicameralism, as the system of choice by the Framers, requires that both houses
exercise their respective powers in the performance of its mandated duty which is tolegislate.
Thus, when Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution
speaks of a representative from Congress, it should mean onerepresentative each from both
Houses which comprise the entire Congress. Respondents further argue that petitioner has no
re
al
interest in questioning the constitutionality of the JBCs current composition. The respondents
also question petitioners belated filing
of the petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the current practice of the JBC to perform its functions with eight (8) members,
two (2) of whom are members of Congress, runs counter to the letter and spirit of the 1987
Constitution.
Ruling:

Yes. The word Congress used in Article VIII, Section 8(1) of the Constitution is used in its
generic sense. No particular a
llusionwhatsoever is made on whether the Senate or the House of Representatives is being
referred to, but that, in either case, only asingular representative may be allowed to sit in the JBC.
The seven-member composition of the JBC serves a practical purpose, thatis, to provide a
solution should there be a stalemate in voting.I
t is evident that the definition of Congress as a bicameral body refers to its primary function in
government
to legislate. In thepassage of laws, the Constitution is explicit in the distinction of the role of each

house in the process. The same holds

true in Congress
non-legislative powers. An inter-play between the two houses is necessary in the realization of
these powers causing a vivid dichotomythat the Court cannot simply discount. This, however,
cannot be said in the case of JBC representation because no liaison between the
two houses exists in the workings of the JBC. Hence, the term Congress must be taken to
mean the entire legislative departm
ent.The Constitution mandates that the JBC be composed of seven (7) members
only.Notwithstanding its finding of unconstitutionality in the current composition of the JBC, all its
prior official actions are nonetheless valid.Under the doctrine of operative facts, actions previous
to the declaration of unconstitutionality are legally recognized. They are notnullified.
Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS GR 122156, 3 February 1997
WHETHER OR NOT THE COSNTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS ARE SELF-EXECUTING
FACTS:
The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the privatization program of the
Philippine Government under Proclamation 50 dated 8 December 1986, decided to sell through
public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of the Manila Hotel (MHC). In a
close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two bidders participated: Manila Prince Hotel
Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at
P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator,
which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of
petitioner. Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning bidder/strategic partner and
the execution of the necessary contracts, the Manila Prince Hotel matched the bid price of P44.00
per share tendered by Renong Berhad in a letter to GSIS dated 28 September 1995. Manila
Prince Hotel sent a managers check to the GSIS in a subsequent letter, but which GSIS refused
to accept. On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that GSIS has disregarded the tender of
the matching bid and that the sale of 51% of the MHC may be hastened by GSIS and
consummated with Renong Berhad, Manila Prince Hotel came to the Court on prohibition and
mandamus.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the provisions of the Constitution, particularly Article XII Section 10, are
self-executing.
RULING:
A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Article II of the 1987
Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes
operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient
rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing. Thus a
constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the
liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an
examination and construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is
referred to the legislature for action. In self-executing constitutional provisions, the legislature may
still enact legislation to facilitate the exercise of powers directly granted by the constitution, further

the operation of such a provision, prescribe a practice to be used for its enforcement, provide a
convenient remedy for the protection of the rights secured or the determination thereof, or place
reasonable safeguards around the exercise of the right. The mere fact that legislation may
supplement and add to or prescribe a penalty for the violation of a self-executing constitutional
provision does not render such a provision ineffective in the absence of such legislation. The
omission from a constitution of any express provision for a remedy for enforcing a right or liability
is not necessarily an indication that it was not intended to be self-executing. The rule is that a
self-executing provision of the constitution does not necessarily exhaust legislative power on the
subject, but any legislation must be in harmony with the constitution, further the exercise of
constitutional right and make it more available. Subsequent legislation however does not
necessarily mean that the subject constitutional provision is not, by itself, fully enforceable. As
against constitutions of the past, modern constitutions have been generally drafted upon a
different principle and have often become in effect extensive codes of laws intended to operate
directly upon the people in a manner similar to that of statutory enactments, and the function of
constitutional conventions has evolved into one more like that of a legislative body. Hence, unless
it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the
presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional
provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would have
the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law. In fine, Section 10,
second paragraph, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is
complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its
enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in
operation.
Pamatong V. Comelec G.R. No. 161872, April 13, 2004.
FAC!"

Petitioner Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for President. Respondent
COMELEC declared petitioner and 35 others as nuisance candidates ho could not age a
nationide campaign and!or not nominated "y a political party or are not supported "y registered
political party ith a national constituency.

Pamatong filed a Petition for #rit of Certioari ith the $upreme Court claiming that the COMELEC
%iolated his right to &e'ual access to opportunities for pu"lic ser%ice under $ection *+ ,rticle -of the /01 constitution+ "y limiting the num"er of 'ualified candidates only to those ho can afford
to age a nationide campaign and!or are nominated "y political parties. 2he COMELEC
supposedly erred in dis'ualifying him since he is the most 'ualified among all the presidential
candidates (he possesses all the constitutional and legal 'ualifications for the office of the
president+ he is capa"le of aging a national campaign since he has numerous national
organiation under his leadership+ he also has the capacity to age an international campaign
since he has practiced la in the other countries+ and he has a platform of go%ernment.
#!!$%"
#hether or not+ the petitioners interpretation of the Constitutional pro%ision under $ection *+
,rticle -- gi%es him a constitutional right to run or hold for pu"lic office4
R$&#NG"
o. #hat is recognied in $ection *+ ,rticle -- of the Constitution is merely a pri%ilege su"6ect to
limitations imposed "y la. -t neither "estos such a right nor ele%ates the pri%ilege to the le%el
of an enforcea"le right. 2here is nothing in the plain language of the pro%ision+ hich suggests
such a thrust or 6ustifies an interpretation of the sort.2he 7e'ual access7 pro%ision is a su"sumed
part of ,rticle -- of the Constitution+ entitled 78eclaration of Principles and $tate Policies.7 2he pro

%isions under the ,rticle are generally considered not self9e:ecuting+ and there is no plausi"le
reason for according a different treatment to the 7e'ual access7 pro%ision. Li;e the rest of the
policies enumerated in ,rticle --+ the pro%ision does not contain any 6udicially enforcea"le
constitutional right "ut merely specifies a guideline for legislati%e or e:ecuti%e action. 2he
disregard of the pro%ision does not gi%e rise to any cause of action "efore the courts.O"%iously+
the pro%ision is not intended to compel the $tate to enact positi%e measures that ould
accommodate as many people as possi"le into pu"lic office. Moreo%er+ the pro%ision as ritten
lea%es much to "e desired if it is to "e regarded as the source of positi%e rights. -t is difficult to
interpret the clause as operati%e in the a"sence of legislation since its effecti%e means and
reach are not properly defined. <roadly ritten+ the myriad of claims that can "e su"sumed under
this ru"ric appear to "e entirely open9ended. #ords and phrases such as 7e'ual access+7
7opportunities+7 and 7pu"lic ser%ice7 are suscepti"le to countless interpretations o ing to their
inherent impreciseness. Certainly+ it as not the intention of the framers to inflict on the people
an operati%e "ut amorphous foundation from hich innately unenforcea"le rights may "e
sourced.2he pri%ilege of e'ual access to opportunities to pu"lic office may "e su"6ected to
limitations. $ome %alid limitations specifically on the pri%ilege to see; electi%e office are found in
the pro%isions of the Omni"us Election Code on 7 uisance Candidates. ,s long as the
limitations apply to e%ery"ody e'ually ithout discrimination+ ho e%er+ the e'ual access clause is
not %iolated. E'uality is not sacrificed as long as the "urdens engendered "y the limitations are
meant to "e "orne "y any one ho is minded to file a certificate of candidacy. -n the case at "ar+
there is no shoing that any person is e:empt from the limitations or the "urdens hich they
create.
COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE vs CAMPOS RUEDA (Anjie's Version)
October 29, 1971
FACTS:
Collector of Internal Revenue held Antonio Campos Rueda, as administrator of the estate of the
late EstrellaSoriano Vda. De Cerdeira, liable for the stun of P161,974.95 as deficiency estate and
inheritance taxes for the transfer of intangible personal properties in the Philippines, the
deceased, a Spanish national having been a resident of Tangier, Morocco from 1931 up to the
time of her death in 1955.
Ruedas request for exemption was denied on the ground that the law of Tangier is not reciprocal
to Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code.
Rueda requested for the reconsideration of the decision denying the claim for tax exemption.
However, respondent denied this request on the grounds that there was no reciprocity with
Tangier, which was moreover a mere principality, not a foreign country.
Court of Tax Appeals ruled that the expression 'foreign country,' used in the last proviso of Section
122 of the National Internal Revenue Code, refers to a government of that foreign power which,
although not an international person in the sense of international law, does not impose transfer or
death taxes upon intangible personal properties of our citizens not residing therein, or whose law
allows a similar exemption from such taxes. It is, therefore, not necessary that Tangier should
have been recognized by our Government in order to entitle the petitioner to the exemption
benefits of the last provision of Section 122 of our Tax Code.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the requisites of statehood or at least so much thereof as may be necessary for
the acquisition of an international personality, must be satisfied for a "foreign country" to fall within
the exemption of Section122 of the National Internal Revenue Code
DECISION:
Supreme Court affirmed Court of tax Appeals Ruling.
If a foreign country is to be identified with a state, it is required in line with Pound's formulation

that it be apolitically organized sovereign community independent of outside control bound by ties
of nationhood, legally supreme within its territory, acting through a government functioning under
a regime of law.
It is thus a sovereign person with the people composing it viewed as an organized corporate
society under a government with the legal competence to exact obedience to its commands.
The stress is on its being a nation, its people occupying a definite territory, politically organized,
exercising by means of its government its sovereign will over the individuals within it and
maintaining its separate international personality.
State is a territorial society divided into government and subjects, claiming within its allotted area
a supremacy over all other institutions. Moreover, similarly would point to the power entrusted to
its government to maintain within its territory the conditions of a legal order and to enter into
international relations. With the latter requisite satisfied, international law does not exact
independence as a condition of statehood.
This Court did commit itself to the doctrine that evens a tiny principality that of Liechtenstein,
hardly an international personality in the traditional sense, did fall under this exempt category.