SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 78778. December 3, 1990.]

LEONIDA CORONADO, FELIX BUENO, MELANIA RETIZOS,
BERNARDINO BUENASEDA and JOVITA MONTEFALCON,
petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and JUANA BUENO
ALBOVIAS, respondents.
Rogelio V. Fernandez for petitioners.
Siruelo, Muyco & Associates for B. Buenaseda.
Eduardo A. Cagandahan for private respondent.
SYLLABUS
1.
REMEDIAL LAW; SUPREME COURT; APPELLATE JURISDICTION
OVER COURT OF APPEALS CASES; RULE. Time and again, it has
been ruled that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in cases
brought to it from the Court of Appeals is limited to reviewing and
revising the errors of law imputed to it, its findings of fact being
conclusive. It is not the function of the Supreme Court to analyze or
weigh such evidence all over again, its jurisdiction being limited to
reviewing errors of law that might have been committed. Absent,
therefore, a showing that the findings complained of are totally
devoid of support in the record, so that they are so glaringly
erroneous as to constitute serious abuse of discretion, such findings
must stand, for the Supreme Court is not expected or required to
examine or contrast the oral and documentary evidence submitted
by the parties (Andres v. Manufacturing Hanover & Trust
Corporation, G.R. 82670, September 15, 1989). There are no
convincing reasons in the instant case to depart from this rule.
2.
CIVIL LAW; PROPERTY; POSSESSION; WHEN THE
CONTINUED POSSESSION OF THE PROPERTY SHOULD NOT
BE CONSIDERED IN DETERMINING PRESCRIPTIVE RIGHT.
Even assuming arguendo that Monterola was indeed in
continued possession of the said property for over ten
years since 1934, said possession is insufficient to
constitute the fundamental basis of the prescription.
Possession, under the Civil Code, to constitute the foundation of a
prescriptive right, must be possession under claim of title (en
concepto de dueno), or to use the common law equivalent of the
term, it must be adverse. Acts of possessory character performed
by one who holds by mere tolerance of the owner are clearly not en
concepto de dueno, and such possessory acts, no matter how long
so continued, do not start the running of the period of prescription
(Manila Electric Company v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R.
71393, June 28, 1989). In this case, Monterola, as found by the

respondent appellate court and the lower court, never categorically

claimed ownership over the property in question, much less his
possession thereof en concepto de dueno. Accordingly, he could not
have acquired said property by acquisitive prescription.
3.
ID.; SUCCESSION; PROBATE OF WILL; NECESSARY FOR
THE TRANSFER OF PROPERTY BY SUCCESSION; EXCEPTION
IN CASE AT BAR. While it is true that no will shall pass either
real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in the
proper court (Art. 838, Civil Code), the questioned will, however,
may be sustained on the basis of Article 1056 of the Civil Code of
1899, which was in force at the time said document was executed
by Melecio Artiaga in 1918. The said article read as follows: "Article
1056. If the testator should make a partition of his properties by an
act inter vivos, or by will, such partition shall stand in so far as it
does not prejudice the legitime of the forced heir." (Mang-Oy v.
Court of Appeals, 144 SCRA 33 [1986]). In this case, nowhere was it
alleged nor shown that Leonida Coronado is entitled to legitime
from Melecio Artiaga. The truth of the matter is that the record is
bereft of any showing that Leonida Coronado and the late Melecio
Artiaga were related to each other.
4.
ID.; ID.; ID.; DOES NOT LOOK UPON THE INTRINSIC VALIDITY;
CASE AT BAR. Normally, the probate of a will does not look into
its intrinsic validity. The authentication of a will decides no other
questions than such as touch upon the capacity of the testator and
the compliance with those requisites or solemnities which the law
prescribes for the validity of the wills. It does not determine nor
even by implication prejudge the validity or efficiency of the
provisions of the will, thus may be impugned as being vicious or
null, notwithstanding its authentication. The question relating to
these points remain entirely unaffected, and may be raised even
after the will has been authenticated (Maninang, et al. v. Court of
Appeals, 114 SCRA 473 [1982]). Consequently, JUANA is not
estopped from questioning the ownership of the property in
question, notwithstanding her having objected to the probate of the
will executed by Monterola under which Leonida Coronado is
claiming title to the said property.
5.
REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE
LOWER COURT; CONCLUSIVE UPON THE APPELLATE COURT. The
fact that JUANA failed to identify the property in question and to
explain the discrepancy in the boundary of said property, assuming
they are true, is immaterial, in view of the findings of the lower
court as to the identity of the property in question. Moreover, the
lower court found sufficient evidence to support the conclusion that
the property in question is the same property adjudicated to JUANA
under the will of Melecio Artiaga, and that CORONADO has no right

whatsoever to said property. Such findings are conclusive upon this

Court (Reynolds Philippine Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 169
SCRA 220 [1989]).
DECISION
PARAS, J p:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse the
decision * of the respondent appellate court dated March 3, 1987
CA-G.R. CV No. 06911 entitled "Juana (Bueno) Albovias et al., v.
Leonida Coronado, et al.," affirming the decision of the lower court,
the decretal portion of which reads: LLphil
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:
1.
Declaring Leonida Coronado to have no title or
interest over the property in question, hence, has no
authority to dispose of the same in favor of her codefendants;
2.
Declaring the sales executed by Coronado and subsequent
transactions involving the same property null and void ab initio;
3.
Declaring the plaintiff to be the true and legal owner of the
subject parcel of land;
4.
Ordering the defendants to vacate the subject premises and
to surrender possession thereof unto the plaintiff;
5.
Ordering the defendants to jointly and severally pay unto
the plaintiff the sum of P2,000.00 as attorney's fees and
P10,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages.
Costs against the defendants." (Rollo, p. 17)
As found by the respondent appellate court, the property subject of
this case is a parcel of land situated in Nagcarlan, Laguna,
containing 277 square meters, more particularly described as
follows: prcd
"A parcel of land situated in the Poblacion, Municipality of
Nagcarlan, province of Laguna. Bounded on the North, by property
of Epifania Irlandez (formerly Bonifacio Formentera); on the East, by
that of Julio Lopez; on the South, by that of Dalmacio Monterola
(formerly Domingo Bueno); and on the West, by C. Lirio Street.
Containing an area of two hundred seventy seven (277) square
meters, more or less. Assessed at P3,320.00 under tax declaration
No. 241." (Ibid., p. 15)
Said parcel of land is being contested by Juana Albovias,
herein private respondent, on the one hand, and Leonida
Coronado, Felix Bueno, Melania Retizos, Bernardino

Buenseda and Jovita Montefalcon, herein petitioners, on the

other hand.
Juana Albovias (JUANA, for brevity) claims that the property
in question is a portion of a bigger lot referred to as Parcel
G in the last will and testament executed in 1918 by
Melecio Artiaga, grandfather of JUANA. This bigger lot was
inherited under that will by JUANA, her brother Domingo
Bueno, and two other grandchildren, namely Bonifacio and
Herminigildo, both surnamed Formentera. Parcel G is
described as follows:
"Isang lagay na lupa na ang bahagi ay walang tanim na halaman at
ang bahagi naman ay may tanim na saguing, tumatayo sa gawin
Canloran ng Calle Avenida Rizal nitong Nagcarlan, at humahangan
sa Ibaba; sa ari cong Testador; sa Silangan, sa cay Enrique
Jovellano; sa Ilaya, sa namatay na Perfecto Nanagas, at sa
Canloran, tubig na pinamamagatang San Cido." (Ibid., p. 16)
JUANA further claims that sometime in 1925 or 1926, C.
Lirio Street was created by the Municipality of Nagcarla
traversing said Parcel G and thus dividing it into two
portions, one on the west of C. Lirio St. and the other to the east
of said street. Parcel G was divided by the heirs in the following
manner; the land was divided into two portions, the northern
portion of which was adjudicated in favor of the Formenteras and
the southern portion was given to JUANA and Doming Bueno. The
southern portion in turn was partitioned between JUANA and
Domingo Bueno, the former getting the northern part adjoining the
lot of the Formenteras, and the latter the southern part which
adjoins the lot of Perfecto Nanagas (not owned by Dalmacio
Monterola). The part allocated to Domingo was later sold by him to
Dalmacio Monterola, owner of the adjoining property (Ibid.). LLjur
Moreover, JUANA claims that her property was included
together with the two parcels of land owned by Dalmacio
Monterola, which were sold by Monterola's successor-ininterest Leonida Coronado (now married to Felix Bueno) to
Melania Retizos on April 18, 1970. Melania Retizos in turn
sold the lots, including that one being claimed by JUANA, to
the spouse Bernardino Buenaseda and Jovita Montefalcon,
now the present possessors thereof, sometime in 1974 (Ibid.,
pp. 16-17).
On the other hand, Leonida Coronado and her co-petitioners
(CORONADO, for brevity) claim that the property in
question was bequeathed to Leonida Coronado under a Will
executed by Dr. Dalmacio Monterola, who was allegedly in

possession thereof even before the outbreak of World War

II (Ibid., p. 107).
Parenthetically, said will was probated under Sp. Proc. No. SC-283,
entitled "Testate Estate of the Deceased Monterola Leonida F.
Coronado, petitioner (Ibid., p. 105). JUANA, together with her
husband, opposed the said probate. Despite their opposition,
however, the Will was allowed by the then Court of First Instance of
Laguna, Sta. Cruz Branch (Ibid., p. 106). On appeal, said decision
was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 40353, entitled
"Leonida F. Coronado, petitioner-appellee v. Heirs of Dr. Dalmacio
Monterola, oppositors-appellants" (Ibid.). It is not apparent,
however, from the record whether or not said decision has already
become final and executory.
As a result of the conflicting claims over the property in question,
JUANA filed an action for quieting of title, declaratory relief and
damages against CORONADO in the Regional Trial Court of the
Fourth Judicial Region, Branch XXVI, Sta. Cruz, Laguna, docketed as
Civil Case No. 7345 (Ibid., p. 4).
As adverted to above (first par.), the lower court rendered judgment
in favor of JUANA.
Not satisfied with the decision of the lower court, CORONADO
elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the
decision appealed from (Ibid., p. 20). Hence, this petition. prLL
CORONADO raised the following assigned errors:
I
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN
ARRIVING AT A CONCLUSION WHICH IS CONTRARY TO THE FACTS
AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE AND IN NOT APPLYING THE
APPLICABLE PROVISION OF LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE LAID DOWN
BY THIS HONORABLE COURT. (Ibid., p. 108)
II
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE PRESENTED TO SHOW THAT THE LAND IN
QUESTION CLAIMED BY PRIVATE RESPONDENT IS THE SAME
PROPERTY ADJUDICATED TO JUANA BUENO UNDER THE WILL OF
THE DECEASED MELECIO ARTIAGA; NEITHER IS THERE EVIDENCE
TO SHOW THAT SAID WILL HAD BEEN PROBATED. (Ibid., p. 114)
III
PRIVATE RESPONDENT IS IN ESTOPPEL FROM QUESTIONING THE
OWNERSHIP OF THE PETITIONER OVER THE LAND IN QUESTION
HAVING FAILED TO RAISE THE SAME IN THE ESTATE PROCEEDING IN
THE TRIAL COURT AND EVEN ON APPEAL. (Ibid., p. 119)

IV
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS MISAPPRECIATED THE
EVIDENCE SUBMITTED AND FACTS ADMITTED ON RECORD. IT
THEREFORE COMMITTED GRAVE AND SERIOUS ERROR. (Ibid., p.
121)
As required by this Court, CORONADO filed their memorandum on
May 8, 1989 (Ibid., p. 105); while that of JUANA was filed on
October 13, 1989 (Ibid., p. 139). LLpr
The petition is devoid of merit.
Under the first assigned error, CORONADO assails the respondent
appellate court's finding that Dr. Dalmacio Monterola could not
have acquired the subject land by acquisitive prescription. Citing
Art. 1116 of the New Civil Code in relation to Section 41 of the Code
of Civil Procedure, CORONADO claims that JUANA had already
foreclosed whatever right or legal title she had over the property in
question, the reason being that Monterola's continued possession
of the said property for over ten years since 1934 ripened into full
and absolute ownership (Ibid., p. 112).
The argument has no factual basis.
Time and again, it has been ruled that the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court in cases brought to it from the Court of Appeals is
limited to reviewing and revising the errors of law imputed to it, its
findings of fact being conclusive. It is not the function of the
Supreme Court to analyze or weigh such evidence all over again, its
jurisdiction being limited to reviewing errors of law that might have
been committed. Absent, therefore, a showing that the findings
complained of are totally devoid of support in the record, so that
they are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute serious abuse of
discretion, such findings must stand, for the Supreme Court is not
expected or required to examine or contrast the oral and
documentary evidence submitted by the parties (Andres v.
Manufacturers Hanover & Trust Corporation, G.R. 82670, September
15, 1989). There are no convincing reasons in the instant case to
depart from this rule.
As found by the respondent appellate court, Monterola never
claimed ownership over the property in question. As a matter
of fact, one of the deeds of donation executed by Monterola in favor
of Leonida Coronado acknowledged that the boundary owner on the
property conveyed to her is JUANA. This is precisely the reason why
during the lifetime of the late Dalmacio Monterola, JUANA
had always been allowed to enter and reap the benefits or
produce of the said property. It was only after the death of said

Monterola in 1970 that Leonida Coronado prohibited JUANA from

entering it (Ibid., p. 18). LexLib
Even assuming arguendo that Monterola was indeed in continued
possession of the said property for over ten years since
1934, said possession is insufficient to constitute the
fundamental basis of the prescription. Possession, under the
Civil Code, to constitute the foundation of a prescriptive right, must
be possession under claim of title (en concepto de dueno), or to use
the common law equivalent of the term, it must be adverse. Acts of
possessory character performed by one who holds by mere
tolerance of the owner are clearly not en concepto de dueno, and
such possessory acts, no matter how long so continued, do not
start the running of the period of prescription (Manila Electric
Company v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. 71393, June 28,
1989).
In this case, Monterola, as found by the respondent appellate court
and the lower court, never categorically claimed ownership over
the property in question, much less his possession thereof en
concepto de dueno. Accordingly, he could not have acquired said
property by acquisitive prescription.
Anent the contention of CORONADO that Leonida Coronado could
tack her possession to that of Monterola, so that claim of legal title
or ownership over the subject property, even against the
petitioners, the Buenasesas, who are purchasers for value and in
good faith, is a foregone or settled issue, the respondent appellate
court aptly answered the same in this wise:
"It follows that Leonida Coronado could not have derived ownership
of the land in question from her predecessor-in-interest Dalmacio
Monterola, whether by prescription or by some other title. Neither
can she claim acquisitive prescription in her own name. It was only
in 1970 after the death of Dalmacio Monterola that she asserted
her claim of ownership adverse to that of plaintiff-appellee. Having
knowledge that she had no title over the land in question, she must
be deemed to have claimed it in bad faith. Under Article 1137 of
the Civil Code, ownership and other real rights over immovables
prescribe through uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for
thirty years, without need of title or good faith. And even granting
that she had no notice or defect in her title and was, therefore, in
good faith, a period of ten years of possession is necessary for her
to acquire the land by ordinary prescription. (Article 1134, Civil
Code). But she can claim to have possessed the land only in 1968,
the year the Monterola lots were donated to her. The period,
however, was interrupted in 1975, or 7 years after, when the
complaint below was filed." (Rollo, pp. 18-19)

Under the second assigned error, CORONADO claims that the

will under which JUANA inherited the property in question
from her grandfather, Melecio Artiaga, was never probated;
hence, said transfer for ownership was ineffectual considering that
under Rule 75, Sec. 1 of the Rules of Court (formerly Sec. 125 of Act
No. 190), no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it
is proved and allowed in the proper court (Ibid., p. 115).
The contention is without merit. LibLex
While it is true that no will shall pass either real or personal
property unless it is proved and allowed in the proper court (Art.
838, Civil Code), the questioned will, however, may be sustained on
the basis of Article 1056 of the Civil Code of 1899, which was in
force at the time said document was executed by Melecio Artiaga in
1918. The said article read as follows:
"Article 1056. If the testator should make a partition of his
properties by an act inter vivos, or by will, such partition
shall stand in so far as it does not prejudice the legitime of
the forced heir." (Mang-Oy v. Court of Appeals, 144 SCRA 33
[1986])
In this case, nowhere was it alleged nor shown that Leonida
Coronado is entitled to legitime from Melecio Artiaga. The truth of
the matter is that the record is bereft of any showing that Leonida
Coronado and the late Melecio Artiaga were related to each other.
Under the third assigned error, CORONADO claims that JUANA is
estopped from questioning the ownership of Leonida Coronado over
the land in question having failed to raise the same in the estate
proceedings in the trial court and even on appeal (Rollo, p. 119).
The contention is likewise without merit.
Normally, the probate of a will does not look into its intrinsic
validity. The authentication of a will decides no other questions
than such as touch upon the capacity of the testator and the
compliance with those requisites or solemnities which the law
prescribes for the validity of the wills. It does not determine nor
even by implication prejudge the validity or efficiency of the
provisions of the will, thus may be impugned as being vicious or
null, notwithstanding its authentication. The question relating to
these points remain entirely unaffected, and may be raised even
after the will has been authenticated (Maninang, et al., v. Court of
Appeals, 114 SCRA 473 [1982]). Consequently, JUANA is not
estopped from questioning the ownership of the property in
question, notwithstanding her having objected to the probate of the
will executed by Monterola under which Leonida Coronado is
claiming title to the said property. Cdpr

Under the fourth assigned error, it is alleged by CORONADO that

JUANA's petition is weak for want of factual and legal support; the
weakness of JUANA's position lies in the fact that she did not only
fail to identify the subject land, but also failed to explain the
discrepancy in the boundary of the property she is claiming to be
hers (Rollo, p. 125).
The contention is unavailing.
The fact that JUANA failed to identify the property in question and
to explain the discrepancy in the boundary of said property,
assuming they are true, is immaterial, in view of the findings of the
lower court as to the identity of the property in question. Moreover,
the lower court found sufficient evidence to support the conclusion
that the property in question is the same property adjudicated to
JUANA under the will of Melecio Artiaga, and that CORONADO has
no right whatsoever to said property (Ibid., p. 20). Such findings are
conclusive upon this Court (Reynolds Philippine Corporation v. Court
of Appeals, 169 SCRA 220 [1989]).
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision appealed from is hereby
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Padilla, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
*
Penned by Justices Jose A.R. Melo and concurred in by Justice
Esteban M. Lising and Celso L. Magsino.

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-27421. September 12, 1986.]
ANITA MANG-OY, assisted by her husband, William Mangoy;
LEONORA MIGUEL, assisted by her husband, Miguel Olila; HELENA
TAYNAN, and JOSE TUMPAO, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF
APPEALS, BANDO TUMPAO, LAMBIA TUMPAO, married to
Salming Pirazo, and ABITO TUMPAO, respondents.
SYLLABUS
1.
REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL PROCEEDING; ALLOWANCE OF
A WILL; RULE. The settled principle, as announced in a long line
of decisions in accordance with the Rules of Court, is that no will
shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved or
allowed in court.
2.
CIVIL LAW; SUCCESSION; PARTITION INTER-VIVOS
MADE BY TESTATOR; ALLOWED UNDER ART. 1056 OF THE
CIVIL CODE OF 1899. We find, that the document may be
sustained on the basis of Article 1056 of the Civil Code of 1899,
which was in force at the time the said document was executed by
Old Man Tumpao in 1937. The said article reads as follows: "Art.
1056. If the testator should make a partition of his
properties by an act inter vivos, or by will, such partition
shall stand in so far as it does not prejudice the legitime of
the forced heirs."
3.
ID.; ID.; CONTRACT ENTERED BY HEIRS TO CARRY OUT
THE TERMS OF THE LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT; BINDING.
While not valid as a partition inter vivos under Article 816 and 1271
of the old Civil Code, it was nevertheless binding on the parties as
proof of their conformity to the dispositions made by Old Mas
Tumpao in his "last will and testament." As the trial court put it:
"The will alone, would be inoperative for the simple reason
that it was not probated. However, when the persons who are
named therein as heirs and beneficiaries voluntarily agreed
in writing to abide by its terms probably to save the
expenses of probate, and furthermore, carried out its terms
after the death of the testator until now, then it must be
held to be binding between them.
4.
ID.; PRESCRIPTION; RIGHT OF ACTION UPON A
WRITTEN CONTRACT; RULE. "Said agreement was not a
disposal of inheritance by a prospective heir before the death of the
testator, but an agreement to carry out the will. It was not
contested by the defendants and after the lapse of 25 years their
right, if any, to assail it has prescribed under Art. 1144 of the Civil
Code. "Art. 1144 The following actions must be brought ten

years from the time the right of action accrues: "1) Upon a written
contract; "2) Upon an obligation created by law; "3) Upon a
judgment. "Any formal defect of the deed," was cured by the lapse
of time.
5.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; ADMINISTRATIVE CODE OF
MINDANAO AND SULU; NOT EXTENDED TO THE MOUNTAIN
PROVINCE. The agreement entered into by parties in
implementation of Old Man Tumpao's "will" did not have to
approved by the Director of the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes
because the ADMINISTRATIVE Code of Mindanao and Sulu was not
extended to the Mountain Province.
DECISION
CRUZ, J p:
We are back to the early 1900's in the cool regions of the Mountain
Province, setting of many legends of adventure and romance
among the highlanders of the North. Our story is not as fanciful,
involving as it does not a rivalry for the hand of a beautiful
Igorot maiden but a prosaic dispute over a piece of land.
Even so, as in those tales of old, the issue shall be decided in favor
of the just and deserving albeit according to the dictates not of the
heart but of the law.
The hero of this story we shall call Old Man Tumpao although at
the time it all began he was still a young and vigorous man.
He had a first wife by whom he begot three children, who are
the private respondents in this case. 1 Upon her death, he
took to himself a second wife, by whom he had no issue but
who had two children she had "adopted" according to the
practice of the Igorots then. 2 It is their children who, with
some others, are the petitioners in this case.
The facts are as simple as the ancient hills.
On September 4, 1937, Old Man Tumpao executed what he
called a "last will and testament" the dispositive portion of
which declared:
"Lastly, I appoint my son BANDO TUMPAO, whom I named, that
after departing from this life, he shall be the one to carry or
fulfill my Testament, and that he shall have the power to see and
dispose all what I have stated, he shall not change what I have
already stated in my Testament so that there is truth in my will, I
will affix my right thumbmark at the end of my written name
because I do not know how to read and write, after it has been read
to me and affirm all what is my Will this 2:00 o'clock in the
afternoon this 4th day of September 1937, before those who are

present and have heard what I have stated, Pico La Trinidad,

Benguet, 4th September, 1937." 3
The contents of this document were read to the beneficiaries
named therein who at the time were already occupying the portions
respectively allotted to them. In implementation of this document,
they then, on September 7, 1937, executed an agreement
providing as follows:
"We who are named children and who will inherit from our father
TUMPAO: BANDO TUMPAO, LAMBIA, ABITO, JOSE and LABET, and we
also whose lands are included, SUCDAD BUTIOG, TULINGAN PUL-OT
and ANTHONY MENECIO all of legal age and residing in the town of
La Trinidad, Sub-Province of Benguet we say in truth after swearing
under oath in accordance to law that the testament of our father
TUMPAO who is presently ill by virtue of our right to inherit and also
acknowledge or recognize the lands as included in the area of said
land as appearing in Title No. 416 in the name of our father
TUMPAO here in La Trinidad, Barrio Pico, have heard and
understood the Will as told by him concerning our right to the land
which we will inherit and also to those whose lands which were
included in the said Title No. 416 because we were all called be
present and hear his will. We heard and agreed to his will as
appearing in his testament regarding the land which we will inherit.
We also recognized and agree to the appointment of our brother
BANDO to whom the parcels of land is to be delivered and he will
also be the one to deliver to us our shares as soon as we will
demand the partition in accordance with the will of our father
TUMPAO as soon in the Testament which we saw and have heard by
all.
"It is also agreed upon among us in this confirmation that when our
brother BANDO who is appointed to distribute to us our shares we
affirm in this instrument that will answer for all the expenses when
it shall be surveyed so the share of each will be segregated so also
with the approval of the title, which shall appear the name of each
of us and that we do not dispute the land which we are actually
working shall pertain to us as embodied in the said will of our father
TUMPAO.
"We execute this deed of confirmation in the presence of the Notary
Public here in Baguio so that this Will, be used as our agreement so
also with the will of our father so that they be one to be followed as
regard upon by all and we affix our right thumbmark at the end of
our written name because we do not know how to read and write
this 7th day of September, 1937 in the City of Baguio." 4
Two days later, Old Man Tumpao died. Cdpr

The parties remained in possession of the lots assigned to

them, apparently in obedience to the wish of Old Man
Tumpao as expressed in his last "will" and affirmed by the
other above quoted instrument. But things changed
unexpectedly in 1960, twenty three years later, that
brought this matter to the courts.
On November 4, 1960, the respondents executed an
extrajudicial partition in which they divided the property of
Old Man Tumpao among the three of them only, to the
exclusion of the other persons mentioned in the abovequoted documents. 5 By virtue of this partition, Old Man
Tumpao's title was cancelled and another one was issued in favor of
the three respondents. 6
It is this title that is now being questioned by the petitioners, who
are suing for reconveyance. They had been sustained by the trial
court, 7 which, however, was reversed by the Court of Appeals.
They are before this Court to challenge that reversal.
In deciding against them, the Court of Appeals held that the "will"
executed by Old Man Tumpao was null and void because it had not
been probated. The agreement of partition among the supposed
beneficiaries of the will was nullified because it was a partition inter
vivos and had not been approved by the Director of the Bureau of
Non-Christian Tribes. It was likewise held that the land in dispute
was acquired during Old Man Tumpao's first marriage although it
was registered during his second marriage and so the petitioners
were liable in rentals for the lots occupied by them, as well as
attorney's fees. 8
After examining the musty records, we sustain the ruling made
both by the trial court and the Court of Appeals that the will,
not having been probated as required by law, was
inoperative as such. The settled principle, as announced in a
long line of decisions in accordance with the Rules of Court, is that
no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved
or allowed in court. 9
We find, however, that the document may be sustained on the
basis of Article 1056 of the Civil Code of 1899, which was in
force at the time the said document was executed by Old
Man Tumpao in 1937. The said article reads as follows:
"Art. 1056.
If the testator should make a partition of his
properties by an act inter vivos, or by will, such partition
shall stand in so far as it does not prejudice the legitime of
the forced heirs."

On this score, we agree with the trial court. The applicable decision
is Albela vs. Albela, 10 also decided by the Court of Appeals, with
Justice J .B .L. Reyes as the ponente.

That such partition is not governed by the rules of wills or

donations inter vivos is a consequence of its special nature.
Says the learned Manresa on this point:

In this case, Agustin Albela executed on January 19, 1935, a deed

of partition dividing two parcels of land between his daughters,
Eduarda and Restituta, who indicated their conformity by signing
the instrument. They took possession of their respective shares
upon his death, but fourteen years later, Restituta ejected Eduarda
from her lot, alleging title by purchase from a third party and
denying the existence of the partition. Eduarda sued for recovery
and was upheld by the trial court on the basis of the deed of
partition. LexLib

'Con estas palabras (en acto entre vivos) la ley en el Articulo 1056,
como en el 1057, que despues examinaremos, alude a las
formalidades con que puede practicarse la particion, no a los
efectos de esta, significando que para ella no es preciso que
intervengan las formas solemnes que todo testamento o acto de
ultima voluntad en general requiere. Ni aun sera preciso guardar
las formalidades especiales de las donaciones, porque no se trata
de disponer a titulo gratuito, sino de dividir aquellos bienes de que
ya anteriormente se dispuso en forma legal' (Emphasis supplied.
Op. Cit., p. 635).

Let Justice J.B.L. Reyes, who later became a distinguished member

of this Court, take over at this point:
"In their argument, appellants do not question the authenticity of
the above document, but argue against its validity, on the grounds
summarized in their brief (p. 7), as follows:
'Therefore the allegations of the plaintiff-appellee, Eduarda Albela,
rest on a document which defies classification. If it is a deed of
partition, it is null and void because it is not embodied in a public
document; if it is a simple donation of realty, it is also null and void,
because it is not in a public document and there is no acceptance;
if it is a donation Mortis Causa, certainly it is null and void because
it does not follow the rules governing testamentary succession; and
if ever it is to be classified as a will, more so, it is still null and void
because it does not conform to the requirements of Section 618,
Act 190 as amended by Act 2645.'
"None of these objections is valid in law. The appellants evidently
fail to realize that Article 1056 of the Civil Code of 1889 authorizes
a testator to partition inter vivos his property, and distribute them
among his heirs, and that this partition is not necessarily either a
donation nor a testament, but an instrument of a special character,
sui generis, which is revocable at any time by the causante during
his lifetime, and does not operate as a conveyance of title until his
death. It derives its binding force on the heirs from the respect due
to the will of the owner of the property, limited only by his creditors
and the intangibility of the legitime of the forced heirs. 'El testador
es libre y sus herederos han de pasar por lo que haga en cuanto no
perjudique la legitima de los forsozos. Inutil es soar en otras
limitaciones que no existen.' (7 Manresa Commentaries, 6th Ed., p.
639.

"It was sufficient, therefore, that the partition, Exhibit A,

should be in writing. It does not have to be in a public
document except to affect third persons (Art. 1280), being
valid between the parties who signed it in its present form.
"If any invalidity could be alleged against the partition, it would be
in the absence of a previous testament preceding it (Legasto v.
Verzosa, 54 Phil. 766). And even this may not be indispensable in
the present case, for the testator's partition did not depart from the
shares allotted to his heirs by the law of intestacy. Nor is a prior will
necessary under Article 1080 of the new Civil Code, which replaced
the word 'testator' in Article 1056 of the Code of 1889 with the
broader term 'person.'
"Be that as it may, the nullity of the partition Exhibit A would not
alter the result. There being only two daughters surviving the
deceased Agustin, each one of them would necessarily be entitled
to one-half of each of the two parcels he owned at his death, and
Agustin's former ownership is no longer disputed by the appellants
in this instance. In addition, since both daughters signed the
partition Exhibit A, its terms would bind both, and estop them from
asserting a different interest. Appellants' act in appropriating the
whole inheritance and its fruits can find no support in law or
justice."
There is no difference in legal effect between Agustin Albela's deed
of partition and Old Man Tumpao's "last will and testament." Both
are sustainable under Article 1056 of the Civil Code, which was in
force at the time they were executed. Even as Agustin Albela's
partition was signed by the two daughters themselves, so was Old
Man Tumpao's "will" affirmed by the beneficiaries in their
agreement of September 7, 1937, which reiterated and recognized
the terms of such "will." While not valid as a partition inter vivos
under Articles 816 and 1271 of the old Civil Code, it was

nevertheless binding on the parties as proof of their conformity to

the dispositions made by Old Man Tumpao in his "last will and
testament."
As the trial court put it: LibLex
"The will alone, 'Exh. B', would be inoperative for the simple reason
that it was not probated. However, when the persons who were
named therein as heirs and beneficiaries voluntarily agreed in
writing to abide by its terms probably to save the expenses of
probate, and furthermore, carried out its terms after the death of
the testator until now, then it must be held to be binding between
them.
"Said agreement was not a disposal of inheritance by a prospective
heir before the death of the testator, but an agreement to carry out
the will. It was not contested by the defendants and after the lapse
of 25 years their right, if any, to assail it has prescribed under Art.
1144 of the Civil Code.
"Art. 1144 The following actions must be brought ten years from
the time the right of action accrues:
"1)

Upon a written contract;

"2)

Upon an obligation created by law;

"3)

Upon a judgment.

"Any formal defect of the deed, 'Exh. 'C', was cured by the lapse of
time.
"What the plaintiffs received had an aggregate area of less than 1/3
of the land of Old Tumpao. It covers about 11,000 square meters
while the total area was more than 35,000 square meters. Under
the old Civil Code, it was within the free disposable portion of ones'
estate despite the existence of any forced heirs. (See old Civil
Code, Art. 808).

We may add that the agreement entered into by the parties in

implementation of Old Man Tumpao's "will" did not have to be
approved by the Director of the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes
because the Administrative Code of Mindanao and Sulu was not
extended to the Mountain Province. 11 Moreover, the document
was not a conveyance of properties or property right. 12
It remains to state that the property in dispute having been
registered in 1917, the presumption is that it was acquired
during the second marriage and so cannot be claimed by
the respondents as the conjugal property of their mother
and Old Man Tumpao. Hence, they are not entitled to retain the
entire land as their exclusive inheritance or to collect rentals for the
lots occupied by the petitioners. llcd
The trial judge, the Hon. Feliciano Belmonte, was correct in ordering
the reconveyance to the petitioners of their respective shares. We
affirm his decision in toto.
How much simpler was life among the natives in the North during
the early days, when right and wrong were weighed according to
the primal code of the ancient hills. Even so, though that past is
gone forever, justice now, as it was then, is still for the deserving.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and
that of the trial court reinstated, with costs against the
respondents.
SO ORDERED.
Yap (Chairman), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera and Feliciano, JJ.,
concur.
Footnotes
1.

Rollo, p. 7.

2.

Ibid., pp. 7-8.

"In view of the foregoing considerations, the defendants are

ordered to execute a deed of conveyance in favor of the plaintiffs of
the areas respectively owned and occupied by them and to pay the
costs.

3.

Exh. "B".

4.

Exh. "C".

5.

Rollo, pp. 4-5; Exhibit "I".

"Sucdad Butiog is ordered to pay the defendants P160.00 more as a

reasonable amount of his additional share in the expenses of
segregating his lot but they (defendants) are ordered to execute a
deed of conveyance in his favor of the said lot owned by him.

6.

Ibid., p. 5.

7.

Id.

8.

Id., pp. 36-41.

"The expenses of survey and segregation must be borne by the

plaintiffs."

9.
Guevara v. Guevara, 74 Phil. 492; Guevara v. Guevara and
Quinto, 98 Phil. 250; Mendoza v. Pilapil, 72 Phil. 546; Baluyot v.
Pao, 71 SCRA 86; Manirang v. Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA 478;
Roberts v. Leonides, 129 SCRA 33.

10.

C.A.-G.R. No. 5583-R, June 20, 1951.

11.
95.

Bambao v. Lednisky, 1 SCRA 330; Malaguit v. Alipio, 12 SCRA

12.
Mangayao v. Lasud, 11 SCRA 158; Miguel v. Catalino, 26
SCRA 234.

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 68282. November 8, 1990.]
RAQUEL CHAVEZ, GERARDO GIMENEZ and MANUELA
BUENAVISTA VDA. DE CHAVEZ, petitioners, vs. HON.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (4th Civil Cases Division),
ANTONIO CHAVEZ, ROSARIO CHAVEZ and CONCEPCION
CHAVEZ, respondents.
Edmundo A. Narra for petitioners.
Jose L. Lapak for respondents.
SYLLABUS
1.
CIVIL LAW; WILLS AND SUCCESSION; PARTITION OF
ESTATE EITHER BY ACT INTER VIVOS OR BY WILL,
RESPECTED FOR AS LONG AS IT DOES NOT PREJUDICE THE
LEGITIMATE OF COMPULSORY HEIRS. Article 1080 of the New
Civil Code allows a person to make a partition of his estate
either by an act inter vivos or by will and such partition
shall be respected insofar as it does not prejudice the
legitime of the compulsory heirs. While the law prohibits
contracts upon future inheritance, the partition by the parent, as
provided in Art. 1080, is a case expressly authorized by law (Art.
1347, par. 2, Civil Code of the Phil. by Padilla, 1987 Edition, p. 744.)
Art. 1080 of the Civil Code clearly gives a person two
options in making a partition of his estate; either by an act
inter vivos or by WILL. When a person makes a partition by
will, it is imperative that such partition must be executed in
accordance with the provisions of the law on wills; however,
when a person makes the partition of his estate by an act
inter vivos, such partition may even be oral or written, and
need not be in the form of a will, provided that the partition
does not prejudice the legitime of compulsory heirs.
2.
ID.; ID.; PAROL PARTITION, MAY BE SUSTAINED ON
TWO GROUNDS. "In numerous cases it has been held or stated
that parol partitions may be sustained on the ground of estoppel of
the parties to assert the rights of a tenant in common as to parts of
land divided by parol partition as to which possession in severalty
was taken and acts of individual ownership were exercised. And a
court of equity will recognize the agreement and decree it to be
valid and effectual for the purpose of concluding the right of the
parties as between each other to hold their respective parts in
severalty. "A parol partition may also be sustained on the ground
that the parties thereto have acquiesced in and ratified the
partition by taking possession in severalty, exercising acts of
ownership with respect thereto, or otherwise recognizing the

existence of the partition." (Hernandez vs. Andal, et al., 78 Phil.

196, 203.)
3.
ID.; ID.; PARTITION INTER VIVOS, VALID WHEN
EXECUTED BY THE PROPERTY OWNER. In the instant case,
the respondent appellate court declared the Deeds of Sale
executed by Presentacion, Floserfina and Raquel, all surnamed
Chavez (Exhs. A, B, and C) in favor of Concepcion Chavez as
evidence of a valid partition of the land in question by and between
Manuela Buenavista and her children as she not only gave her
authority thereto but also signed the sales. The Deeds of Sale
(Exhs. A, B, and C) are not contracts entered into with respect to
future inheritance but a contract perfected and consummated
during the lifetime of Manuela Buenavista who signed the same
and gave her consent thereto. Such partition inter vivos, executed
by the property owner herself, is valid.
DECISION
GRIO-AQUINO, J p:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision dated
March 26, 1984 of the Intermediate Appellate Court in AC-G.R. No.
CV-64708 which (1) annulled the sale made by Manuela Buenavista
of her property in favor of the spouses Raquel Chavez and Gerardo
Gimenez (Exh. 2) and the subsequent sale by said spouses of the
same property to Pepito Ferrer, and (2) declared that the earlier
deeds of sale (Exhs. A, B, C and D) signed by Manuela and her
children constituted a valid partition of the land, subject to her
lifetime usufruct. The Court of Appeals thereby reversed the
decision dated December 21, 1971 of the Court of First Instance of
Camarines Norte, Branch 1.
The land in question is the paraphernal property of petitioner
Manuel Buenavista (defendant in Civil Case No. 1934 of the Court
of First Instance of Camarines Norte) who had six (6) children,
named Antonio, Rosario, Concepcion, Raquel, Presentacion
and Floserpina. The first three were the plaintiffs and the
last three, with their mother, were the defendants in Civil
Case No. 1934.
On July 11, 1958, Presentacion Chavez, with the conformity of
her mother, Manuela Buenavista, executed a deed of sale
whereby she sold her 1/6 undivided share of the land in
question to her sister, Concepcion Chavez, for P450.
Two years later, on May 2, 1960, Floserpina Chavez, with the
conformity of her mother, also sold her 1/6 undivided share
of the same land to her sister, Concepcion, for the same
price of P450. On May 19, 1960, Raquel, with the conformity

of her mother, likewise sold her undivided 1/6 share of the

same property to Concepcion Chavez for P600. Having
acquired the shares of Presentacion, Floserpina and Raquel,
Concepcion thereby became the owner of a total undivided
4/6 share of the land in question with Antonio and Rosario
as owners of the remaining 2/6 shares. LexLib
In all the documents, the following stipulation appears:
"Na ang nasabing lupa o pag-aari ay ipinamana na sa amin ng
aming ina, ang nasabing Manuela Buenavista, kung kaya ito ay
hatiin naming anim (6) na mga magkakapatid, bagama't hindi pa
namin naisasagawa ang paghihiwatig o particion; ako bilang isa sa
anim na magkakapatid ay may karapatan sa isang ikaanim (1/6) na
bahagi ng nasabing lupa, gayon pa man ang kasunduan sa
nasabing pagkamana namin ay samantalang nabubuhay pa ang
aming ina, siya ang magkakandili at makikinabang sa nasabing
pag-aari." (p 14, Rollo.)
meaning that the owner, Manuela Buenavista, had assigned or
distributed to her children, in equal pro-indiviso shares, her
paraphernal property situated at Sitio Langas, Barrio
Calangcawan Norte, Vinzons, Camarines Norte, with an area of
4.1163 hectares more or less under Tax Declaration No. 9303 and
assessed at P1,630.00. The owner, however, reserved for herself
the possession of the land and the enjoyment of the fruits
during her lifetime.
Despite the transfers or assignments her children had executed
with her conformity ten years earlier, Manuela Buenavista, on
August 27, 1968, signed a "Bilihang Patuluyan ng Lupa" of
the entire property in favor of her daughter, Raquel Chavez,
and her husband, Gerardo Jimenez. On October 7, 1968,
Antonio, Rosario and Concepcion filed Civil Case No. 1934 against
their mother Manuela and their sister Raquel. Thereupon, Manuela
sold the entire property to Pepito Ferrer, on February 4,
1969 (Exh. F) with right to repurchase. Ferrer was later
sued as an additional defendant in Civil Case No. 1934.
After the trial, judgment was rendered by the trial court dismissing
the complaint, dissolving the preliminary injunction it had
previously issued, and ordering the plaintiffs to pay the costs. The
court did not award damages.
The plaintiffs, Antonio, Rosario and Concepcion, appealed to the
Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 64708-R).

On March 26, 1984, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court.
The dispositive portion of its decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, we reverse and set aside the appealed decision and
render another one declaring the deeds of sale in favor of Raquel
Chavez and Gerardo Jimenez (Exh. 2) and the sale in favor of
defendant-appellee Pepito Ferrer as null and void ab initio, and
declaring further that the documents (Exhs. A, B, C and D) are
evidence of a valid partition of the land in question by and between
Manuela Buenavista and her children, subject to her right of
usufruct during her lifetime, without pronouncement as to damages
and costs." (p. 17, Rollo.)
On April 5, 1984, the petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration
alleging among others: prLL
"3.
That the late Manuela Buenavista Vda. de Chavez, one of
the defendants-appellees, was found lately to have executed during
her lifetime a LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT . . . and there is now a
pending petition for probate of said last will and testament before
the Municipal Trial Court of Vinzons, Camarines Norte;
"xxx

xxx

xxx

"6.
In the case at bar, even granting that the late Manuela
Buenavista's execution of the documents referred to as Exhibits A,
B, C and D are valid, nevertheless its validity ceases from the time
that she executed the Last Will and Testament . . . because the
execution of the Last Will invalidates the former act of the said
Manuela Buenavista;
"7.
That the Last Will and Testament . . . which is now pending
probate in the Municipal Trial Court of Vinzons, Camarines Norte,
will finally affect the property hence, there is a ground for this
motion for reconsideration and/or to suspend the decision
pending final outcome of the probate of the last will and testament
of the late Manuela Buenavista." (pp 88-89, Rollo.)
Private respondents opposed the Motion for Reconsideration
asserting that the partition inter vivos which had been
implemented long before the execution of the said Last Will and
Testament could not be revoked by the later instrument; that the
supposed Last Will and Testament was executed on December 11,
1969, more than one year after the filing of the complaint for
annulment on October 9, 1968, when said Manuela Buenavista was
already senile and not of disposing mind; that while Manuela
Buenavista was able to sign with her own hand the several Deeds
of Sale, the supposed Last Will and Testament bears her
thumbmark only; that Manuela Buenavista had no more property to

dispose of by will on December 11, 1969, when she supposedly

executed her Last Will and Testament.

respect thereto, or otherwise recognizing the existence of the

partition." (Hernandez vs. Andal, et al., 78 Phil. 196, 203.)

On June 28, 1984, the Appellate Court denied the Motion for
Reconsideration.

In the instant case, the respondent appellate court declared the

Deeds of Sale executed by Presentacion, Floserfina and Raquel, all
surnamed Chavez (Exhs. A, B, and C) in favor of Concepcion Chavez
as evidence of a valid partition of the land in question by and
between Manuela Buenavista and her children as she not only gave
her authority thereto but also signed the sales. The Deeds of Sale
(Exhs. A, B, and C) are not contracts entered into with
respect to future inheritance but a contract perfected and
consummated during the lifetime of Manuela Buenavista
who signed the same and gave her consent thereto. Such
partition inter vivos, executed by the property owner
herself, is valid. LexLib

In their petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals,

the petitioners allege: prcd
"(1)
That the Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of
Appeals) erred in declaring valid the deeds of sale (Exhs. A, B, C
and D) as a partition by an act inter vivos considering that
examining the said exhibits will reveal that it is not a testament
amounting to a will of Manuela Buenavista;
"(2)
That the Intermediate Appellate Court erred in ruling against
Article 1347 of the New Civil Code." (p. 126, Rollo.)
We find those contentions not well-taken.
Article 1080 of the New Civil Code allows a person to make
a partition of his estate either by an act inter vivos or by
will and such partition shall be respected insofar as it does
not prejudice the legitime of the compulsory heirs. While the
law prohibits contracts upon future inheritance, the partition by the
parent, as provided in Art. 1080, is a case expressly authorized by
law (Art. 1347, par. 2, Civil Code of the Phil. by Padilla, 1987
Edition, p. 744.) Art. 1080 of the Civil Code clearly gives a person
two options in making a partition of his estate; either by an act
inter vivos or by WILL. When a person makes a partition by will, it is
imperative that such partition must be executed in accordance with
the provisions of the law on wills; however, when a person makes
the partition of his estate by an act inter vivos, such partition may
even be oral or written, and need not be in the form of a will,
provided that the partition does not prejudice the legitime of
compulsory heirs.
"In numerous cases it has been held or stated that parol partitions
may be sustained on the ground of estoppel of the parties to assert
the rights of a tenant in common as to parts of land divided by
parol partition as to which possession in severalty was taken and
acts of individual ownership were exercised. And a court of equity
will recognize the agreement and decree it to be valid and effectual
for the purpose of concluding the right of the parties as between
each other to hold their respective parts in severalty.
"A parol partition may also be sustained on the ground that the
parties thereto have acquiesced in and ratified the partition by
taking possession in severalty, exercising acts of ownership with

". . . As the defendants freely participated in the partition, they are

now estopped from denying and repudiating the consequences of
their own voluntary acts. It is a general principle of law that no one
may be permitted to disavow and go back upon his own acts, or to
proceed contrary thereto." (Joaquin vs. Mitsumine, 34 Phil. 858.)
"Where a piece of land has been included in a partition, and there is
no allegation that the inclusion was effected through improper
means or without the petitioner's knowledge, the partition barred
any further litigation on said title and operated to bring the
property under the control and jurisdiction of the court for proper
disposition according to the tenor of the partition. . . . They cannot
attack the partition collaterally . . ." (Ralla vs. Judge Untalan, 172
SCRA 858, 865, citing the case of Torres vs. Encarnacion and De
Borja, No. L-4681, July 31, 1951, 89 Phil. 678.)
As well argued by counsel for the respondents in their
memorandum, it would be unjust and inequitable to allow
Manuela Buenavista Vda. de Chavez to revoke the sales she
herself authorized as well as the sale she herself executed
in favor of her son only to execute a simulated sale in favor
of her daughter Raquel who had already profited from the
sale she made of the property she had received in the partition
inter vivos; it would run counter to the doctrine that "no person
should be allowed to unjustly enrich herself at the expense
of another."
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision of the Court
of Appeals in AC-G.R. No. CV-64708, the same is affirmed in toto.
The petition for review is dismissed for lack of merit, with costs
against the petitioners. cdphil
SO ORDERED.

Narvasa , Cruz, Gancayco and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 134329. January 19, 2000.]
VERONA PADA-KILARIO and RICARDO KILARIO, petitioners, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and SILVERIO PADA, respondents.
Ernesto M. Andrade for petitioners.
Renato M. Rances for private respondent.
SYNOPSIS
Jacinto Pada was the owner of a parcel of land located at
Poblacion, Matalom, Leyte denominated as Cadastral Lot. No.
5581. He died intestate and he left six children, namely:
Marciano, Ananias, Amador, Higino, Valentina and Ruperta
as his compulsory heirs. During his lifetime, his half-brother,
Feliciano Pada, obtained permission from him to build a
house on the northern portion of Cadastral Lot No. 5581.
When Feliciano died, his son Pastor, continued living in the
house together with his eight children. Petitioner Verona
Pada-Kilario, one of Pastor's children, lived in that house
since 1960. But then, sometime in 1951, the heirs of Jacinto
entered into an extrajudicial partition of his estate. For this
purpose, they executed a private document which they,
however, never registered in the Office of the Register of
Deeds of Leyte, and it was to both Ananias and Marciano,
represented by his daughter Marie, that Cadastral Lot 5581 was
allocated. When Ananias died, his daughter Juanita succeeded
to his right as co-owner of said property. On June 14, 1978,
Juanita sold to Engr. Ernesto Paredes the right of her father
in Cadastral Lot No. 5881, and on November 17, 1993, Maria Pada
also sold the right of her father to private respondent
Silverio Pada. Private respondent then demanded from
petitioner spouses Verona Pada and Ricardo Kilario to
vacate the premises, but they refused. On June 26, 1995, private
respondent filed with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Matalom,
Leyte a complaint for ejectment against petitioner spouses.
However, On July 24, 1995, the heirs of Amado Pada executed a
Deed of Donation transferring to Verona their respective shares as
co-owners of Cadastral Lot No. 5581 which subsequently petitioners
used as defense. After trial, the court rendered judgment in favor of
petitioner spouses. However, on appeal, the Regional Trial Court as
well as the Court of Appeals reversed the said decision. aAEIHC
The Court ruled that the belated act of Concordia, Esperanza
and Angelito, the heirs of Amador Pada, of donating the
subject property to petitioners after forty-four (44) years of
never having disputed the validity of the 1951 extrajudicial

partition that allocated the subject property to Marciano

and Ananias, produced no legal effect. In the said partition,
what was allocated to Amador Pada was not the subject property
but rather, one-half of a parcel of coconut land in the interior of Sto.
Nio St., Sabang, Matalom, Leyte and one-half of a parcel of land in
Itum, Sta. Fe, Matalom, Leyte. The donation made by the heirs
to petitioners of the subject property, was void for they
were not the owners thereof. At any rate it was too late in the
day for the heirs of Amador Pada to repudiate the legal effects of
the 1951 extrajudicial partition as prescription and laches had
equally set in. Considering that petitioners were in possession
of the subject property by sheer tolerance of its owners,
they knew that their occupation of the premises may be
terminated at any time. Persons who occupy the land of another
at the latter's tolerance or permission, without any contract
between them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise that
they will vacate the same upon demand, failing in which a
summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against them.
SYLLABUS
1.
REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS; SETTLEMENT OF
ESTATE; EXTRAJUDICIAL SETTLEMENT BY AGREEMENT
BETWEEN HEIRS; NO LAW REQUIRES PARTITION AMONG
HEIRS TO BE IN WRITING AND REGISTERED IN ORDER TO BE
VALID. We hold that the extrajudicial partition of the estate of
Jacinto Pada among his heirs made in 1951 is valid, albeit executed
in an unregistered private document. No law requires partition
among heirs to be in writing and be registered in order to
be valid. The requirement in Sec. 1, Rule 74 of the Revised Rules
of Court that a partition be put in a public document and registered,
has for its purpose the protection of creditors and the heirs
themselves against tardy claims. The object of registration is to
serve as constructive notice to others. It follows then that the
intrinsic validity of partition not executed with the
prescribed formalities is not undermined when no creditors
are involved. Without creditors to take into consideration, it is
competent for the heirs of an estate to enter into an agreement for
distribution thereof in a manner and upon a plan different from
those provided by the rules from which, in the first place, nothing
can be inferred that a writing or other formality is essential for the
partition to be valid. The partition of inherited property need not be
embodied in a public document so as to be effective as regards the
heirs that participated therein. The requirement of Article 1358 of
the Civil Code that acts which have for their object the creation,
transmission, modification or extinguishment of real rights over
immovable property, must appear in a public instrument, is only for

convenience, non-compliance with which does not affect the

validity or enforceability of the acts of the parties as among
themselves. STADIH
2.
ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; STATUTE OF FRAUDS DOES NOT APPLY.
Neither does the Statute of Frauds under Article 1403 of the New
Civil Code apply because partition among heirs is not legally
deemed a conveyance of real property, considering that it involves
not a transfer of property from one to the other but rather, a
confirmation or ratification of title or right of property that an heir is
renouncing in favor of another heir who accepts and receives the
inheritance. The 1951 extrajudicial partition of Jacinto Pada's estate
being legal and effective as among his heirs, Juanita and Maria
Pada validly transferred their ownership rights over Cadastral Lot
No. 5581 to Engr. Paredes and private respondent, respectively.
3.
ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PRODUCES LEGAL STATUS. The
extrajudicial partition which the heirs of Jacinto Pada executed
voluntarily and spontaneously in 1951 has produced a legal status.
When they discussed and agreed on the division of the estate of
Jacinto Pada, it is presumed that they did so in furtherance of their
mutual interests. As such, their division is conclusive, unless and
until it is shown that there were debts existing against the estate
which had not been paid. No showing, however, has been made of
any unpaid charges against the estate of Jacinto Pada. Thus, there
is no reason why the heirs should not be bound by their voluntary
acts. ACDIcS
4.
ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; EXECUTION OF DEED OF DONATION OF
PROPERTY OWNED BY OTHER HEIRS AFTER 44 YEARS
PRODUCES NO LEGAL EFFECT; CASE AT BAR. The belated
act of Concordia, Esperanza and Angelito, who are the heirs
of Amador Pada, of donating the subject property to
petitioners after forty-four (44) years of never having
disputed the validity of the 1951 extrajudicial partition that
allocated the subject property to Marciano and Ananias,
produced no legal effect. In the said partition, what was
allocated to Amador Pada was not the subject property
which was a parcel of residential land in Sto. Nio,
Matalom, Leyte, but rather, one-half of a parcel of coconut
land in the interior of Sto. Nio St., Sabang, Matalom, Leyte and
one-half of a parcel of rice land in Itum, Sta. Fe, Matalom, Leyte.
The donation made by his heirs to petitioners of the subject
property, thus, is void for they were not the owners thereof. At any
rate it is too late in the day for the heirs of Amador Pada to
repudiate the legal effects of the 1951 extrajudicial partition as
prescription and laches have equally set in.

5.
ID.; ACTIONS; ESTOPPEL; PRESENT IN CASE AT BAR.
Petitioners are estopped from impugning the extrajudicial partition
executed by the heirs of Jacinto Pada after explicitly admitting in
their Answer that they had been occupying the subject property
since 1960 without ever paying any rental as they only relied on
the liberality and tolerance of the Pada family. Their admissions are
evidence of a high order and bind them insofar as the character of
their possession of the subject property is concerned.
6.
CIVIL LAW; PROPERTY; POSSESSORS BY SHEER
TOLERANCE OF OWNERS, BOUND BY IMPLIED PROMISE TO
VACATE THE SAME UPON DEMAND. Considering that
petitioners were in possession of the subject property by
sheer tolerance of its owners, they knew that the
occupation of the premises may be terminated any time.
Persons who occupy the land of another at the latter's tolerance or
permission, without any contract between them, is necessarily
bound by an implied promise that they will vacate the same upon
demand, failing in which a summary action for ejectment is the
proper remedy against them.
7.
ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT POSSESSORS OR BUILDERS IN GOOD
FAITH. They cannot be considered possessors nor builders in
good faith. It is well-settled that both Article 448 and Article 546 of
the New Civil Code which allow full reimbursement of useful
improvements and retention of the premises until reimbursement is
made, apply only to a possessor in good faith, i.e., one who builds
on land with the belief that he is the owner thereof. Verily, persons
whose occupation of a realty is by sheer tolerance of its owners are
not possessors in good faith. Neither did the promise of Concordia,
Esperanza and Angelito Pada that they were going to donate the
premises to petitioners convert them into builders in good faith for
at the time the improvements were built on the premises, such
promise was not yet fulfilled, i.e., it was a mere expectancy of
ownership that may or may not be realized. More importantly, even
as that promise was fulfilled, the donation is void for Concordia,
Esperanza and Angelito Pada were not the owners of Cadastral Lot
No. 5581. As such, petitioners cannot be said to be entitled to the
value of the improvements that they built on the said lot. TDcCIS
DECISION
DE LEON, JR., J p:
The victory 1 of petitioner spouses Ricardo and Verona Kilario in the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court 2 in an ejectment suit 3 filed against
them by private respondent Silverio Pada, was foiled by its reversal
4 by the Regional Trial Court 5 on appeal. They elevated their cause
6 to respondent Court of Appeals 7 which, however, promulgated a

Decision 8 on May 20, 1998, affirming the Decision of the Regional

Trial Court. Cdpr

for the purpose of amicable settlement, but all earnest efforts

toward that end, failed.

The following facts are undisputed:

On June 26, 1995, private respondent filed in the Municipal Circuit

Trial Court of Matalom, Leyte, a complaint for ejectment with prayer
for damages against petitioner spouses. cdasia

One Jacinto Pada had six (6) children, namely, Marciano,

Ananias, Amador, Higino, Valentina and Ruperta. He died
intestate. His estate included a parcel of land of residential
and coconut land located at Poblacion, Matalom, Leyte,
denominated as Cadastral Lot No. 5581 with an area of 1,301.92
square meters. It is the northern portion of Cadastral Lot No. 5581
which is the subject of the instant controversy.
During the lifetime of Jacinto Pada, his half-brother, Feliciano
Pada, obtained permission from him to build a house on the
northern portion of Cadastral Lot No. 5581. When Feliciano
died, his son, Pastor, continued living in the house together
with his eight children. Petitioner Verona Pada-Kilario, one
of Pastor's children, has been living in that house since
1960.
Sometime in May, 1951, the heirs of Jacinto Pada entered into
an extra-judicial partition of his estate. For this purpose, they
executed a private document which they, however, never
registered in the Office of the Registrar of Deeds of Leyte.
At the execution of the extra-judicial partition, Ananias was
himself present while his other brothers were represented
by their children. Their sisters, Valentina and Ruperta, both died
without any issue. Marciano was represented by his daughter,
Maria; Amador was represented by his daughter, Concordia; and
Higino was represented by his son, Silverio who is the private
respondent in this case. It was to both Ananias and Marciano,
represented by his daughter, Maria, that Cadastral Lot No. 5581
was allocated during the said partition. When Ananias died, his
daughter, Juanita, succeeded to his right as co-owner of said
property.
On June 14, 1978, Juanita Pada sold to Engr. Ernesto Paderes, the
right of his father, Ananias, as co-owner of Cadastral Lot No. 5881.
On November 17, 1993, it was the turn of Maria Pada to sell the
co-ownership right of his father, Marciano. Private
respondent, who is the first cousin of Maria, was the buyer.
Thereafter, private respondent demanded that petitioner
spouses vacate the northern portion of Cadastral Lot No.
5581 so his family can utilize the said area. They went
through a series of meetings with the barangay officials concerned

On July 24, 1995, the heirs of Amador Pada, namely,

Esperanza Pada-Pavo, Concordia Pada-Bartolome, and
Angelito Pada, executed a Deed of Donation 9 transferring
to petitioner Verona Pada-Kilario, their respective shares as coowners of Cadastral Lot No. 5581.
On February 12, 1996, petitioner spouses filed their Answer
averring that the northern portion of Cadastral Lot No. 5581 had
already been donated to them by the heirs of Amador Pada. They
contended that the extra-judicial partition of the estate of Jacinto
Pada executed in 1951 was invalid and ineffectual since no special
power of attorney was executed by either Marciano, Amador or
Higino in favor of their respective children who represented them in
the extra-judicial partition. Moreover, it was effectuated only
through a private document that was never registered in the office
of the Registrar of Deeds of Leyte.
The Municipal Circuit Trial Court rendered judgment in favor of
petitioner spouses. It made the following findings:
"After a careful study of the evidence submitted by both parties,
the court finds that the evidence adduced by plaintiff failed to
establish his ownership over . . . Cadastral Lot No. 5581 . . . while
defendants has [sic] successfully proved by preponderance of
evidence that said property is still under a community of ownership
among the heirs of the late Jacinto Pada who died intestate. If there
was some truth that Marciano Pada and Ananias Pada has [sic]
been adjudicated jointly of [sic] the above-described residential
property . . . as their share of the inheritance on the basis of the
alleged extra judicial settlement, how come that since 1951, the
date of partition, the share of the late Marciano Pada was not
transferred in the name of his heirs, one of them Maria Pada-Pavo
and still remain [sic] in the name of Jacinto Pada up to the present
while the part pertaining to the share of Ananias Pada was easily
transferred in the name of his heirs . . . .
"The alleged extra judicial settlement was made in private writing
and the genuineness and due execution of said document was
assailed as doubtful and it appears that most of the heirs were not
participants and signatories of said settlement, and there was lack
of special power of attorney to [sic] those who claimed to have

represented their co-heirs in the participation [sic] and signing of

the said extra judicial statement.

absolutely bereft of any right in donating the very property in

question." 11

"Defendants were already occupying the northern portion of the

above-described property long before the sale of said property on
November 17, 1993 was executed between Maria Pada-Pavo, as
vendor and the plaintiff, as vendee. They are in possession of said
portion of the above-described property since the year 1960 with
the consent of some of the heirs of Jacinto Pada and up to the [sic]
present some of the heirs of Jacinto Pada has [sic] donated . . . their
share of [sic] the above-described property to them, virtually
converting defendants' standing as co-owners of the land under
controversy. Thus, defendants as co-owners became the undivided
owners of the whole estate . . . . As co-owners of . . . Cadastral Lot
No. 5581 . . . their possession in the northern portion is being [sic]
lawful." 10

The dispositive portion of the decision of the Regional Trial Court

reads as follows:

From the foregoing decision, private respondent appealed to the

Regional Trial Court. On November 6, 1997, it rendered a judgment
of reversal. It held:

"3.
Ordering the defendants-appellees to pay monthly rental for
their occupancy and use of the portion of the land in question in
the sum of P100.00 commencing on June 26, 1995 when the case
was filed and until the termination of the present case;

". . . [T]he said conveyances executed by Juanita Pada and Maria

Pada Pavo were never questioned or assailed by their co-heirs for
more than 40 years, thereby lending credence on [sic] the fact that
the two vendors were indeed legal and lawful owners of properties
ceded or sold. . . . At any rate, granting that the co-heirs of Juanita
Pada and Maria Pada Pavo have some interests on the very lot
assigned to Marciano and Ananias, nevertheless, said interests had
long been sadly lost by prescription, if not laches or estoppel.
"It is true that an action for partition does not prescribe, as a
general rule, but this doctrine of imprescriptibility cannot be
invoked when one of the heirs possessed the property as an owner
and for a period sufficient to acquire it by prescription because
from the moment one of the co-heirs claim [sic] that he is the
absolute owner and denies the rest their share of the community
property, the question then involved is no longer one for partition
but of ownership. . . . Since [sic] 1951 up to 1993 covers a period of
42 long years. Clearly, whatever right some of the co-heirs may
have, was long extinguished by laches, estoppel or prescription.
"xxx

xxx

xxx

". . . [T]he deed of donation executed by the Heirs of Amador Pada,

a brother of Marciano Pada, took place only during the inception of
the case or after the lapse of more than 40 years reckoned from the
time the extrajudicial partition was made in 1951. Therefore, said
donation is illegal and invalid [sic] the donors, among others, were

"WHEREFORE, a judgment is hereby rendered, reversing the

judgment earlier promulgated by the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
Matalom, Leyte, [sic] consequently, defendants-appellees are
hereby ordered:
"1.
To vacate the premises in issue and return peaceful
possession to the appellant, being the lawful possessor in concept
of owner;
"2.
To remove their house at their expense unless appellant
exercises the option of acquiring the same, in which case the
pertinent provisions of the New Civil Code has to be applied;

"4.
Ordering the defendants to pay to the appellant the sum of
P5,000.00 as moral damages and the further sum of P5,000.00 as
attorney's fees;
"5.

Taxing defendants to pay the costs of suit." 12

Petitioners filed in the Court of Appeals a petition for review of the

foregoing decision of the Regional Trial Court. llcd
On May 20, 1998, respondent Court of Appeals rendered judgment
dismissing said petition. It explained:
"Well-settled is the rule that in an ejectment suit, the only issue is
possession de facto or physical or material possession and not de
jure. Hence, even if the question of ownership is raised in the
pleadings, the court may pass upon such issue but only to
determine the question of possession, specially if the former is
inseparably linked with the latter. It cannot dispose with finality the
issue of ownership, such issue being inutile in an ejectment suit
except to throw light on the question of possession . . . .
"Private respondent Silverio Pada anchors his claim to the portion of
the land possessed by petitioners on the Deed of Sale executed in
his favor by vendor Maria Pada-Pavo, a daughter of Marciano, son
of Jacinto Pada who was the registered owner of the subject lot. The
right of vendee Maria Pada to sell the property was derived from
the extra-judicial partition executed in May 1951 among the heirs
of Jacinto Pada, which was written in a Bisayan dialect signed by

the heirs, wherein the subject land was adjudicated to Marciano,

Maria Pavo's father, and Ananias Pada. Although the authenticity
and genuineness of the extra-judicial partition is now being
questioned by the heirs of Amador Pada, no action was ever
previously filed in court to question the validity of such partition.
"Notably, petitioners in their petition admitted among the
antecedent facts that Maria Pavo is one of the co-owners of the
property originally owned by Jacinto Pada . . . and that the disputed
lot was adjudicated to Marciano (father of Maria Pavo) and Ananias,
and upon the death of Marciano and Ananias, their heirs took
possession of said lot, i.e. Maria Pavo the vendor for Marciano's
share and Juanita for Ananias' share . . . . Moreover, petitioners do
not dispute the findings of the respondent court that during the
cadastral survey of Matalom, Leyte, the share of Maria Pada Pavo
was denominated as Lot No. 5581, while the share of Juanita Pada
was denominated as Lot No. 6047, and that both Maria Pada Pavo
and Juanita were in possession of their respective hereditary
shares. Further, petitioners in their Answer admitted that they have
been occupying a portion of Lot No. 5581, now in dispute without
paying any rental owing to the liberality of the plaintiff . . . .
Petitioners cannot now impugn the aforestated extrajudicial
partition executed by the heirs in 1951. As owner and possessor of
the disputed property, Maria Pada, and her vendee, private
respondent, is entitled to possession. A voluntary division of the
estate of the deceased by the heirs among themselves is
conclusive and confers upon said heirs exclusive ownership of the
respective portions assigned to them . . . .
"The equally belated donation of a portion of the property in
dispute made by the heirs of Amador Pada, namely, Concordia,
Esperanza and Angelito, in favor of petitioner Verona Pada is a futile
attempt to confer upon the latter the status of co-owner, since the
donors had no interest nor right to transfer. . . . This gesture
appears to be a mere afterthought to help petitioners to prolong
their stay in the premises. Furthermore, the respondent court
correctly pointed out that the equitable principle of laches and
estoppel come into play due to the donors' failure to assert their
claims and alleged ownership for more than forty (40) years . . . .
Accordingly, private respondent was subrogated to the rights of the
vendor over Lot No. 5581 which include [sic] the portion occupied
by petitioners." 13
Petitioner spouses filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
foregoing decision.
On June 16, 1998, respondent Court of Appeals issued a Resolution
denying said motion.

Hence this petition raising the following issues:

"I.
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT
PETITIONERS, AS CO-OWNERS, CANNOT BE EJECTED FROM THE
PREMISES CONSIDERING THAT THE HEIRS OF JACINTO PADA
DONATED TO THEM THEIR UNDIVIDED INTEREST IN THE PROPERTY
IN DISPUTE.
"II.
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT
WHAT MARIA PADA SOLD WAS HER UNDIVIDED SHARE IN THE
PROPERTY IN DISPUTE.
"III.
WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONERS ARE BUILDERS IN GOOD
FAITH." 14
There is no merit to the instant petition.

LibLex

First. We hold that the extrajudicial partition of the estate of

Jacinto Pada among his heirs made in 1951 is valid, albeit
executed in an unregistered private document. No law
requires partition among heirs to be in writing and be
registered in order to be valid. 15 The requirement in Sec. 1,
Rule 74 of the Revised Rules of Court that a partition be put in a
public document and registered, has for its purpose the protection
of creditors and the heirs themselves against tardy claims. 16 The
object of registration is to serve as constructive notice to others. It
follows then that the intrinsic validity of partition not executed with
the prescribed formalities is not undermined when no creditors are
involved. 17 Without creditors to take into consideration, it is
competent for the heirs of an estate to enter into an agreement for
distribution thereof in a manner and upon a plan different from
those provided by the rules from which, in the first place, nothing
can be inferred that a writing or other formality is essential for the
partition to be valid. 18 The partition of inherited property need not
be embodied in a public document so as to be effective as regards
the heirs that participated therein. 19 The requirement of Article
1358 of the Civil Code that acts which have for their object the
creation, transmission, modification or extinguishment of real rights
over immovable property, must appear in a public instrument, is
only for convenience, non-compliance with which does not affect
the validity or enforceability of the acts of the parties as among
themselves. 20 And neither does the Statute of Frauds under Article
1403 of the New Civil Code apply because partition among heirs is
not legally deemed a conveyance of real property, considering that

it involves not a transfer of property from one to the other but

rather, a confirmation or ratification of title or right of property that
an heir is renouncing in favor of another heir who accepts and
receives the inheritance. 21 The 1951 extrajudicial partition of
Jacinto Pada's estate being legal and effective as among his heirs,
Juanita and Maria Pada validly transferred their ownership rights
over Cadastral Lot No. 5581 to Engr. Paderes and private
respondent, respectively. 22
Second. The extrajudicial partition which the heirs of Jacinto Pada
executed voluntarily and spontaneously in 1951 has produced a
legal status. 23 When they discussed and agreed on the division of
the estate of Jacinto Pada, it is presumed that they did so in
furtherance of their mutual interests. As such, their division is
conclusive, unless and until it is shown that there were debts
existing against the estate which had not been paid. 24 No
showing, however, has been made of any unpaid charges against
the estate of Jacinto Pada. Thus, there is no reason why the heirs
should not be bound by their voluntary acts.
The belated act of Concordia, Esperanza and Angelito, who are the
heirs of Amador Pada, of donating the subject property to
petitioners after forty-four (44) years of never having disputed the
validity of the 1951 extrajudicial partition that allocated the subject
property to Marciano and Ananias, produced no legal effect. In the
said partition, what was allocated to Amador Pada was not the
subject property which was a parcel of residential land in Sto. Nio,
Matalom, Leyte, but rather, one-half of a parcel of coconut land in
the interior of Sto. Nio St., Sabang, Matalom, Leyte and one-half of
a parcel of rice land in Itum, Sta. Fe, Matalom, Leyte. The donation
made by his heirs to petitioners of the subject property, thus, is
void for they were not the owners thereof. At any rate it is too late
in the day for the heirs of Amador Pada to repudiate the legal
effects of the 1951 extrajudicial partition as prescription and laches
have equally set in.
Third. Petitioners are estopped from impugning the extrajudicial
partition executed by the heirs of Jacinto Pada after explicitly
admitting in their Answer that they had been occupying the subject
property since 1960 without ever paying any rental as they only
relied on the liberality and tolerance of the Pada family. 25 Their
admissions are evidence of a high order and bind them insofar as
the character of their possession of the subject property is
concerned.
Considering that petitioners were in possession of the subject
property by sheer tolerance of its owners, they knew that their
occupation of the premises may be terminated any time. Persons

who occupy the land of another at the latter's tolerance or

permission, without any contract between them, is necessarily
bound by an implied promise that they will vacate the same upon
demand, failing in which a summary action for ejectment is the
proper remedy against them. 26 Thus, they cannot be considered
possessors nor builders in good faith. It is well-settled that both
Article 448 27 and Article 546 28 of the New Civil Code which allow
full reimbursement of useful improvements and retention of the
premises until reimbursement is made, apply only to a possessor in
good faith, i.e., one who builds on land with the belief that he is the
owner thereof. 29 Verily, persons whose occupation of a realty is by
sheer tolerance of its owners are not possessors in good faith.
Neither did the promise of Concordia, Esperanza and Angelito Pada
that they were going to donate the premises to petitioners convert
them into builders in good faith for at the time the improvements
were built on the premises, such promise was not yet fulfilled, i.e.,
it was a mere expectancy of ownership that may or may not be
realized. 30 More importantly, even as that promise was fulfilled,
the donation is void for Concordia, Esperanza and Angelito Pada
were not the owners of Cadastral Lot No. 5581. As such, petitioners
cannot be said to be entitled to the value of the improvements that
they built on the said lot. dctai
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is HEREBY DENIED.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Mendoza, Quisumbing and Buena, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1.
Decision of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court promulgated on
February 29, 1996 and penned by Judge Venancio E. Rances, Rollo,
pp. 23-29.
2.
9th Municipal Circuit Trial Court, 8th Judicial Region, Branch
XVIII, Bato-Matalom, Leyte.
3.

Civil Case No. 91.

4.
In a Decision dated November 6, 1997 copy of which
however does not appear in the Rollo.
5.
Regional Trial Court, 8th Judicial Region, Branch 18,
Hilongos, Leyte.
6.

In a Petition for Review docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 46101.

7.

Fourth Division.

8.
Penned by then Court of Appeals, now Supreme Court,
Associate Justice Minerva P. Gonzaga-Reyes and concurred in by
Associate Justices Ramon A. Barcelona and Demetrio G. Demetria,
Rollo, pp. 31-41.
9.
Annex "D" of the Petition for Review on Certiorari dated
August 11, 1998, Rollo, p. 44.
10.
Decision of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court dated February
29, 1996, pp. 4-6, Rollo, pp. 26-28.

considerably more than that of the building or trees. In such case,

he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not
choose to appropriate the building or trees after proper indemnity.
The parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of
disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof."
28.
"Art. 546. Necessary expenses shall be refunded to every
possessor; but only the possessor in good faith may retain the thing
until he has been reimbursed therefor.

13.
Decision of the Court of Appeals, pp. 6-8, Rollo, pp. 36-38.
Italics supplied by the Court of Appeals.

Useful expenses shall be refunded only to the

possessor in good faith with the same right of retention, the person
who has defeated him in the possession having the option of
refunding the amount of the expenses or of paying the increase in
value which the thing may have acquired by reason thereof."

14.

29.

Geminiano v. Court of Appeals, 259 SCRA 344, 351 (1996).

30.

Id., p. 352.

11.

Decision of the Court of Appeals, pp. 8-9, Rollo, pp. 38-39.

12.

Id., p. 4, Rollo, p. 34.

Petition, supra, p. 6, rollo, p. 13.

15.
Vda. de Reyes v. Court of Appeals, 199 SCRA 646, 659
(1991), citing Madamba v. Magno, et al., 10 Phil. 86, 88 (1908); De
Guzman, et al. v. Pangilinan and Azarcon, 28 Phil. 322, 325 (1914);
and De Garces, et al. v. Broce, et al., 23 SCRA 612, 615-616 (1968).
16.

Id., citing Hernandez v. Andal, 78 Phil. 196, 205, 208 (1946).

17.

Id., citing Hernandez, supra, p. 209.

18.

Ibid.

19.

Alejandrino v. Court of Appeals, 295 SCRA 536, 552 (1998).

20.
Vda. de Reyes v. Court of Appeals, 199 SCRA 646, 657
(1991), citing Thunga Chui v. Que Bentec, 2 Phil. 561, 563-564
(1903).
21.
Id., p. 659, citing Barcelona, et al. v. Barcelona and Court of
Appeals, 100 Phil. 251, 255 (1956).
22.

Id., p. 553.

23.

Leao v. Leao, 25 Phil. 180, 183-184 (1913).

24.

Ibid.; De Garces, supra, pp. 615-617 (1968).

25.

Decision of the Court of Appeals, p. 7, Rollo, p. 37.

26.

Refugia v. Court of Appeals, 258 SCRA 347, 370 (1996).

27.
"Art. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been
built, sown or planted in good faith, shall have the right to
appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after
payment of the indemnity provided for in Articles 546 and 548, or
to oblige the owner who built or planted to pay the price of the
land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent. However, the builder
or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 137287. February 15, 2000.]
REBECCA VIADO NON, JOSE A. NON and DELIA VIADO,
petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ALICIA
N. VIADO, CHERRI VIADO and FE FIDES VIADO, respondents.
Imelda A. Herrera for petitioner.
Abundio J. Macaranas for private respondents.
SYNOPSIS
Petitioners and respondents shared, since 1977 a common
residence at the Isarog property. Soon, tension appeared to
have escalated between petitioner Rebecca Viado and
respondent Alicia Viado after the former had asked that the
property be equally divided between the two families to
make room for the growing children. Respondents claimed
absolute ownership over the entire property and demanded
that petitioners vacate the portion occupied by the latter.
On February 1, 1988 petitioners, asserting co-ownership over
the property in question, filed a case of partition before the
RTC of Quezon City. Respondents predicated their claim of
absolute ownership over the subject property on the deed
of donation executed by the late Julian Viado covering his
1/2 share in favor of respondent's husband, Nilo Viado, and
a deed of extrajudicial settlement in which Julian Viado,
Leah Viado Jacobs and petitioner Rebecca Viado waived
their rights and interests in favor of Nilo Viado. The trial court
found for respondents and adjudged Alicia Viado and her children
as being the true owners of the disputed property. On appeal, the
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court, but ordered
the remand of the records of the case to the court a quo for further
proceedings to determine the value of the property and the amount
respondents should pay to petitioner Delia Viado for having been
preterited in the deed of extrajudicial settlement. Dissatisfied
therewith, petitioners filed the petition seeking the reversal of the
decision of the Court of Appeals. cHDEaC
The Supreme Court found the appellate court to have ruled
correctly. The evidence submitted by petitioners were utterly
wanting, consisting of, by and large, self-serving testimonies. While
asserting that Nilo Viado employed fraud, forgery and undue
influence in procuring the signatures of the parties to the deed of
donation and of the extrajudicial settlement, petitioners are vague
on how and in what manner those supposed vices occurred. With
regard to the issue of preterition, the Court ruled that the exclusion
of petitioner Delia Viado, alleged to be a retardate, from the deed

of the extrajudicial settlement verily has had the effect of

preterition. Thus, the appellate court acted properly in ordering the
remand of the case for further proceedings to make the proper
valuation of the property and determination of the amount due to
petitioner Delia Viado.
SYLLABUS
1.
CIVIL LAW; OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACT; FRAUD, FORGERY
AND UNDUE INFLUENCE; NOT PROVEN IN CASE AT BAR. The
Court of Appeals, in sustaining the court a quo, has found the
evidence submitted by petitioners to be utterly wanting, consisting
of, by and large, self-serving testimonies. While asserting that Nilo
Viado employed fraud, forgery and undue influence in procuring the
signatures of the parties to the deeds of donation and of
extrajudicial settlement, petitioners are vague, however, on how
and in what manner those supposed vices occurred. Neither have
petitioners shown proof why Julian Viado should be held incapable
of exercising sufficient judgment in ceding his rights and interest
over the property to Nilo Viado. The asseveration of petitioner
Rebecca Viado that she has signed the deed of extrajudicial
settlement on the mistaken belief that the instrument merely
pertained to the administration of the property is too tenuous to
accept. It is also quite difficult to believe that Rebecca Viado, a
teacher by profession, could have misunderstood the tenor of the
assailed document.
2.
ID.; LAND TITLES AND DEEDS; REGISTRATION OF
DOCUMENTS WAS A MINISTERIAL ACT WHICH MERELY CREATED A
CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF ITS CONTENTS AGAINST ALL THIRD
PERSONS. The fact alone that the two deeds were registered five
years after the date of their execution did not adversely affect their
validity nor would such circumstance alone be indicative of fraud.
The registration of the documents was a ministerial act and merely
created a constructive notice of its contents against all third
persons. Among the parties, the instruments remained completely
valid and binding.
3.
ID.; WILLS AND SUCCESSION; PRETERITION; WHERE
THE PRETERITION IS NOT ATTENDED BY BAD FAITH AND
FRAUD, THE PARTITION SHALL NOT BE RESCINDED BUT THE
PRETERITED HEIR SHALL BE PAID THE VALUE OF THE SHARE
PERTAINING TO HER. The exclusion of petitioner Delia Viado,
alleged to be a retardate, from the deed of extrajudicial settlement
verily has had the effect of preterition. This kind of preterition,
however, in the absence of proof of fraud and bad faith, does not
justify a collateral attack on Transfer Certificate of Title No. 373646.
The relief, as so correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals,

instead rests on Article 1104 of the Civil Code to the effect that
where the preterition is not attended by bad faith and fraud, the
partition shall not be rescinded but the preterited heir shall be paid
the value of the share pertaining to her. Again, the appellate court
has thus acted properly in ordering the remand of the case for
further proceedings to make the proper valuation of the Isarog
property and ascertainment of the amount due petitioner Delia
Viado. aATEDS

settlement in which Julian Viado, Leah Viado Jacobs (through a

power of attorney in favor of Nilo Viado) and petitioner Rebecca
Viado waived in favor of Nilo Viado their rights and interests over
their share of the property inherited from Virginia Viado. Both
instruments were executed on 26 August 1983 and registered on
07 January 1988 by virtue of which Transfer Certificate of Title No.
42682 was cancelled and new Transfer Certificate of Title No.
373646 was issued to the heirs of Nilo Viado.

DECISION

Petitioners, in their action for partition, attacked the validity of the

foregoing instruments, contending that the late Nilo Viado
employed forgery and undue influence to coerce Julian Viado to
execute the deed of donation. Petitioner Rebecca Viado, in her
particular case, averred that her brother Nilo Viado employed fraud
to procure her signature to the deed of extrajudicial settlement.
She added that the exclusion of her retardate sister, Delia Viado, in
the extrajudicial settlement, resulted in the latter's preterition that
should warrant its annulment. Finally, petitioners asseverated that
the assailed instruments, although executed on 23 August 1983,
were registered only five years later, on 07 January 1988, when the
three parties thereto, namely, Julian Viado, Nilo Viado and Leah
Viado Jacobs had already died. prcd

VITUG, J p:
Petitioners, in their petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court, seek a reversal of the 29th May 1996 decision of
the Court of Appeals, basically affirming that rendered on 30 April
1991 by the Regional Trial Court ("RTC") of Quezon City, Branch 23,
adjudicating the property subject matter of the litigation to
respondents. The case and the factual settings found by the Court
of Appeals do not appear to deviate significantly from that made by
the trial court. LibLex
During their lifetime, the spouses Julian C. Viado and Virginia P.
Viado owned several pieces of property, among them a house and
lot located at 147 Isarog Street, La Loma, Quezon City, covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42682. Virginia P. Viado died on 20
October 1982. Julian C. Viado died three years later on 15
November 1985. Surviving them were their children Nilo Viado,
Leah Viado Jacobs, and herein petitioners Rebecca Viado, married
to Jose Non, and Delia Viado. Nilo Viado and Leah Viado Jacobs both
died on 22 April 1987. Nilo Viado left behind as his own sole heirs
herein respondents his wife Alicia Viado and their two children
Cherri Viado and Fe Fides Viado.
Petitioners and respondents shared, since 1977, a common
residence at the Isarog property. Soon, however, tension would
appear to have escalated between petitioner Rebecca Viado and
respondent Alicia Viado after the former had asked that the
property be equally divided between the two families to make room
for the growing children. Respondents, forthwith, claimed absolute
ownership over the entire property and demanded that petitioners
vacate the portion occupied by the latter. On 01 February 1988,
petitioners, asserting co-ownership over the property in question,
filed a case for partition before the Quezon City RTC (Branch 93).
Respondents predicated their claim of absolute ownership over the
subject property on two documents a deed of donation executed
by the late Julian Viado covering his one-half conjugal share of the
Isarog property in favor of Nilo Viado and a deed of extrajudicial

Assessing the evidence before it, the trial court found for
respondents and adjudged Alicia Viado and her children as being
the true owners of the disputed property.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial
court with modification by ordering the remand of the records of
the case to the court a quo for further proceedings to determine
the value of the property and the amount respondents should pay
to petitioner Delia Viado for having been preterited in the deed of
extrajudicial settlement.
Petitioners are now before the Supreme Court to seek the reversal
of the decision of the Court of Appeals.
The appellate court ruled correctly. LLpr
When Virginia P. Viado died intestate in 1982, her part of the
conjugal property, the Isarog property in question included, was
transmitted to her heirs her husband Julian and their children
Nilo Viado, Rebecca Viado, Leah Viado and Delia Viado. The
inheritance, which vested from the moment of death of the
decedent, 1 remained under a co-ownership regime 2 among the
heirs until partition. 3 Every act intended to put an end to indivision
among co-heirs and legatees or devisees would be a partition
although it would purport to be a sale, an exchange, a compromise,
a donation or an extrajudicial settlement. 4

In debunking the continued existence of a co-ownership among the

parties hereto, respondents rely on the deed of donation and deed
of extrajudicial settlement which consolidated the title solely to Nilo
Viado. Petitioners assail the due execution of the documents on the
grounds heretofore expressed.
Unfortunately for petitioners, the issues they have raised boil down
to the appreciation of the evidence, a matter that has been
resolved by both the trial court and the appellate court. The Court
of Appeals, in sustaining the court a quo, has found the evidence
submitted by petitioners to be utterly wanting, consisting of, by and
large, self-serving testimonies. While asserting that Nilo Viado
employed fraud, forgery and undue influence in procuring the
signatures of the parties to the deeds of donation and of
extrajudicial settlement, petitioners are vague, however, on how
and in what manner those supposed vices occurred. Neither have
petitioners shown proof why Julian Viado should be held incapable
of exercising sufficient judgment in ceding his rights and interest
over the property to Nilo Viado. The asseveration of petitioner
Rebecca Viado that she has signed the deed of extrajudicial
settlement on the mistaken belief that the instrument merely
pertained to the administration of the property is too tenuous to
accept. It is also quite difficult to believe that Rebecca Viado, a
teacher by profession, could have misunderstood the tenor of the
assailed document.
The fact alone that the two deeds were registered five years after
the date of their execution did not adversely affect their validity nor
would such circumstance alone be indicative of fraud. The
registration of the documents was a ministerial act 5 and merely
created a constructive notice of its contents against all third
persons. 6 Among the parties, the instruments remained
completely valid and binding. LLphil
The exclusion of petitioner Delia Viado, alleged to be a retardate,
from the deed of extrajudicial settlement verily has had the effect
of preterition. This kind of preterition, however, in the absence of
proof of fraud and bad faith, does not justify a collateral attack on
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 373646. The relief, as so correctly
pointed out by the Court of Appeals, instead rests on Article 1104
of the Civil Code to the effect that where the preterition is not
attended by bad faith and fraud, the partition shall not be
rescinded but the preterited heir shall be paid the value of the
share pertaining to her. Again, the appellate court has thus acted
properly in ordering the remand of the case for further proceedings
to make the proper valuation of the Isarog property and
ascertainment of the amount due petitioner Delia Viado.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED, and the decision,

dated 29 May 1996, in CA-G.R. No. 37272 of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED. No special pronouncement on costs. cdrep
SO ORDERED.
Melo, Panganiban, Purisima and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1.

See Baritua vs. CA, 183 SCRA 565.

2.
There is co-ownership when the title of an undivided thing or
right belongs to different persons (see Article 484, Civil Code).
3.
Partition is the division between two or more persons of real
or personal property which they own as co-partners, co-tenants or
tenants in common, effected by the setting apart of such interests
so that they may enjoy and possess it in severalty. (Villamor vs. CA,
162 SCRA 574.)
4.

See Favor vs. CA, 194 SCRA 308.

5.
The registrar of deeds is not authorized to determine
whether or not fraud was committed in the deed sought to be
registered. (In re Consulta of Vicente J. Francisco on behalf of
Cabantog, 67 Phil. 222.)
6.
People vs. Reyes, 175 SCRA 597, 604, citing Legarda and
Prieto vs. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590; Garcia vs. CA, 95 SCRA 380;
Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corp. vs. Pauli, et al., 161 SCRA
634.