Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 190901
November 12, 2014
AMADA COTONER-ZACARIAS, Petitioner,
vs.
SPOUSES ALFREDO AND THE HEIRS REVILLA OF PAZ REVILLA,
Respondents.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
Well-settled is the rule that "conveyances by virtue of a forged signature ...
are void ab initio [as] [t]he absence of the essential [requisites] of consent and
cause or consideration in these cases rendered the contract inexistent[.]"
Before us is a petition for review filed by Amada Cotoner-Zacarias against
respondent spouses Alfredo Revilla and Paz Castillo-Revilla, praying that this
court render a decision "reversing the Decision of the Regional Trial Court
and Court of Appeals and declaring the transfer of title to the Petitioner and
then to her successors-in-interest as valid and binding as against the
respondents."
The Court of Appeals summarized the facts as follows.
Alfredo Revilla and Paz Castillo-Revilla (Revilla spouses) are the owners in
fee simple of a 15,000-square-meter unregistered parcel of land in Silang,
Cavite, covered by Tax Declaration No. 7971.
In 1983, the Revilla spouses faced financial difficulties in raising funds for
Alfredo Revillas travel to Saudi Arabia, so Paz Castillo-Revilla borrowed
money from Amada Cotoner-Zacarias (Amada). By way of security, the
parties verbally agreed that Amada would take physical possession of the
property, cultivate it, then use the earnings from the cultivation to pay the loan
and realty taxes. Upon full payment of the loan, Amada would return the
property to the Revilla spouses.
Unknown to the Revilla spouses, Amada presented a fictitious document
entitled "Kasulatan ng Bilihanng Lupa" before the Provincial Assessor of
Cavite. This document was executed on March 19, 1979 with the Revilla
spouses as sellers and Amada as buyer of the property. Consequently, Tax
Declaration No. 7971 in the name of the Revilla spouses was cancelled, and
Tax Declaration No. 19773 in the name of Amada was issued.
On August 25, 1984, Amada sold the property to the spouses Adolfo and
Elvira Casorla (Casorla spouses) by "Deed of Absolute SaleUnregistered
Land." Tax Declaration No. 30411-A was later issued in the name of the
Casorla spouses.
In turn, the Casorla spouses executed a deed of absolute sale dated
December 16, 1991 in favor of the spouses Rodolfo and Yolanda Sun (Sun
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spouses). Tax Declaration Nos. 30852-A and 18584 were issued in favor of
the Sun spouses.
In December 1994, Alfredo Revilla returned from Saudi Arabia. He asked
Amada why she had not returnedtheir tax declaration considering their full
payment of the loan. He then discovered that the propertys tax declaration
was already in the name of the Sun spouses.
On February 15, 1995, the Revilla spouses were served a copy of the
answer in the land registration case filed by the Sun spouses for the
property. The Revilla spouses then saw a copy of the "Kasulatan ng Bilihan
ng Lupa" and noticed that their signatures as sellers were forged.
They then demanded the cancellation of the "Kasulatan ng Bilihan ng Lupa"
from Amada and all subsequent transfers of the property, its reconveyance,
and the restoration of its tax declaration in their name. Amada failed to take
action.
On November 17, 1995, the Revillaspouses filed a complaint before the
Tagaytay Regional Trial Court for the annulment of sales and transfers of title
and reconveyance of the property with damages against Amada, the Casorla
spouses, the Sun spouses, and the Provincial Assessor of Cavite.
In her answer, Amada denied that the property was used as a security for the
Revilla spouses loan. Instead, she claimed that the Revilla spouses
voluntarily executed the "Kasulatan ng Bilihan ng Lupa" in her favor on March
19, 1979. She added that the Revilla spouses cause of action already
prescribed.
For their part, the Sun spouses argued good faith belief that Amada was the
real owner of the property asAmada showed them a tax declaration in her
name and the "Kasulatan ng Bilihan ng Lupa" allegedly executed by the
Revilla spouses. When the Sun spouses discovered there was another sale
with the Casorla spouses, they were assured by Amada that she had already
bought back the property from the Casorla spouses. Subsequently, the
Casorla spouses executed a deed ofabsolute sale dated December 16, 1991
in favor of the Sun spouses. They also argued prescription against the
Revilla spouses, and prayed for damages against Amada by way of
crossclaim.
On August 3, 2006, the Regional Trial Court found the "Kasulatan ng Bilihan
ng Lupa" to be a fictitious document, and ruled in favor of the Revilla
spouses:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as
follows:
1. Declaring the sales/transfers from Tax Declaration No. 7971, s. 1980 to Tax
Declaration No. 18584, s. 1994 as NULL and VOID, without valid
transmission of title and interest from the original owners, plaintiffs herein and
consequently, entitling plaintiffs to reinstatement and reconveyance of their
title/taxdeclaration as well as possession of the subject property;
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2. Ordering defendant Zacariasto pay the following:

2.1 To the Plaintiffs:
a. P50,000.00 for moral damages;
b. P20,000.00 for exemplary damages; and
c. P80,000.00 for attorneys fees.
2.2 To Defendant-Spouses Sun:
a. P467,350.00 for actual damages;
b. P50,000.00 for moral damages;
c. P20,000.00 for exemplary damages; and
d. P100,000.00 for attorneys fees.
SO ORDERED.
Amada appealed the trial courts decision, while the Sun spouses partially
appealed the decision as to interest and damages.
On August 13, 2009, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal of Amada,
and partially granted the appeal of the Sun spouses. The dispositive portion
reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby
rendered by us DISMISSING the appeal filed by defendant appellant Amada
C. Zacarias in this case, and PARTIALLY GRANTING the appeal filed by the
Spouses Rodolfo and Yolanda Sun. The Decision dated August 3, 2006
rendered by Branch 18 of the Regional Trial Court of the Fourth Judicial
Region stationed in Tagaytay City, Cavite in Civil Case No. TG-1543 is
MODIFIED in that defendant-appellant Amada C. Zacarias is ordered to pay
interest at 6% per annum on the principal obligation in the amount of
P467,350.00 from February 3, 1995, the date of the first judicial demand by
the Spouses Sun, until said decision on the principal obligation became final
and executory, and interest at 12% per annum on the principal obligation,
moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorneys fees, from the time said
decision became final and executory until full payment of said amounts.
SO ORDERED.
The Court of Appeals denied Amadas motion for reconsideration; hence, she
filed this petition. Petitioner argues that the antichresisclaim of the Revilla
spouses was not reduced into writing, thus, it is void under Article 2134 of the
Civil Code. She submits that the allegation of antichresis was only an excuse
by the Revilla spouses for their failure to impugn possession of the property
by Amada and her successors-in-interest for over 16 years.
Petitioner contends that the sale inher favor was established by the
"Kasulatan ng Bilihan ng Lupa," the delivery of the tax declaration, and the
testimony of one Mrs. Rosita Castillo (Rosita). Rosita was the second wife of
Felimon Castillo, the previous owner of the property. She testified that
respondent Paz Castillo-Revilla admitted toher father, Felimon, that she and
Alfredo Revilla sold the property to Amada.
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On the alleged forgery, petitioner submits that the court misapplied the
principle that "he who alleges not he who denies must prove" when it stated
that she had the burden of proving the due execution of the deed of absolute
sale. Since the Revilla spouses alleged that the deedwas a forged document,
they had the burden of proving the forgery. She then cites the trial court in
that "[a]ccordingly, the National Bureauof Investigation was not able to
ascertain the genuineness of the signatureof plaintiff Paz Revilla because of
lack of sufficient sample signatures. . . ."
On the prescription argument, the parties live in a very small barangay. While
Alfredo Revilla worked in Saudi Arabia, he admitted returning to the
Philippines twice a year, while his wife never left Silang, Cavite, and yet the
Revilla spouses never questioned the activities on the property for more than
16 years.
On the proper docket fees, petitioner contends that the Revilla spouses paid
docket fees based on their prayer for actual damages of P50,000.00, moral
damages of P50,000.00, and attorneys fee of P80,000.00, when they should
have based it on P12,000,000.00, the value of the property they alleged in
their supplemental pre-trial brief.
Lastly, petitioner argues that the property is conjugal in nature, but the court
never declared that respondent Paz Castillo-Revillas signature was falsified.
Thus, the sale over her half of the property cannot be declared void. She
adds that the Sun spouses are buyers in good faith for value, making
reinstatement of the property impossible.
Respondents Revilla spouses counter that the factual issue of whether the
"Kasulatan ng Bilihan ng Lupa" isa falsified document was already
conclusively resolved by the lower courts and, generally, factual findings are
beyond this courts power of review.
On the prescription issue, respondents Revilla spouses argue that an action
or defense to declare a document null is imprescriptible. Laches also does
not apply since they immediately questioned the fraudulent transfers by filing
a complaint in November 1995 upon learning of the questionable documents
in February 1995, after Alfredo had returned from Saudi Arabia in December
1994.
Respondents Revilla spouses contend that they paid the proper docket fees.
The P12,000,000.00 mentioned during pre-trial that petitioner insists should
have been the basis of the fees was neither stated in the complaint nor
awarded by the court.
Respondents Revilla spouses argue that the court did not err in ordering
reinstatement of the property tothem. First, the defense that the Sun spouses
were buyers in good faith is a personal defense that cannot be raised by
petitioner who was not privy to the sale between the Casorla spouses and the
Sun spouses. Second, an alternative prayer for damages cannot be
interpreted as an admission that the relief for reinstatement is not viable.
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Third, the transaction happened prior to the effectivity of the Family Code;
thus, Article 172 of the Civil Code applies such that "[t]he wife cannot bind the
conjugal partnership without the husbands consent, except in cases provided
by law." Consequently, the result is the same even if respondent Paz
Castillo-Revilla did not testify that the signature is not hers, as she cannot
bind the entire property without her husbands consent. Lastly, no unjust
enrichment exists since they were deprived of their property for so long.
The issues for this courts resolution are as follows:
First, whether respondents Revilla spouses cause of action is barred by
prescription or laches; Second, whether the trial court acquired jurisdiction
when respondents Revilla spouses paid filing fees based on the P50,000.00
claim for damages in the complaint but stated in their supplemental pre-trial
brief that the property is valued at P12,000,000.00; and
Third, whether the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the reinstatement and
reconveyance of the property in favor of respondents Revilla spouses.
I.
On the first issue, petitioner argues that respondents Revilla spouses claim is
barred by laches since theyallowed 16 years to lapse, with petitioner having
possession of the property, before filing suit.
Laches has been defined as "the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time, to do that which by the exercise of due
diligence could or should have been done earlier."
The elements that need to be present and proven before an action is
considered barred by laches are the following:
The four basic elements of laches are: (1) conduct on the part of the
defendant, or of one under whom he claims, giving rise to the situation of
which complaint is made and for which the complaint seeks a remedy; (2)
delay in asserting the complainant's rights, the complainant having had
knowledge or notice of the defendants conduct and having been afforded an
opportunity to institute suit; (3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the
defendant that the complainant would assert the right on which he bases his
suit; and, (4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is
accorded to the complainant or the suit is not held to be barred.
There was no delay by respondents Revilla spouses in asserting their rights
over the property. The lower courts found that respondents Revilla spouses
first learned of the existence of the "Kasulatan ng Bilihan ng Lupa" in
February 1995 when they were serveda copy of the pleading in the land
registration case instituted by the Sun spouses. They filed their complaint
within the same year, specifically, on November 17, 1995. The lapse of only
nine (9) months from the time they learned of the questionable transfers on
the property cannot be considered as sleeping on their rights.
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In any case, doctrines of equity such as laches apply only in the absence of
statutory law. The Civil Code clearly provides that "[t]he action or defense for
the declaration of the inexistence of a contract does not prescribe." This
court has discussed:
Lachesis a doctrine in equity and our courts are basically courts of law and
not courts of equity. Equity, which has been aptly described as "justice
outside legality," should be applied only in the absence of, and never against,
statutory law. Aequetas nunguam contravenit legis. The positive mandate of
Art. 1410 of the New Civil Code conferring imprescriptibility to actions for
declaration of the inexistence of a contract should pre-empt and prevail over
all abstract arguments based only on equity. Certainly, laches cannot be set
up to resist the enforcement of an imprescriptible legal right, and petitioners
can validly vindicate their inheritance despite the lapse of time.
II.
On the second issue, petitioner argues that respondents Revilla spouses did
not pay the correct docket fees. She submits that docket fees paid were
based on the prayer for actual damages of P50,000.00, moral damages of
P50,000.00, and attorneys fee of P80,000.00, when the spouses Revilla
should have based it on P12,000,000.00, the value of the property they
alleged in their supplemental pre-trial brief. Petitioner cites Supreme Court
Circular No. 7 and jurisprudence holding that the payment of proper docket
fees is crucial in vesting courts with jurisdiction over the subject matter.
This court finds that respondents Revilla spouses paid the proper docket
fees, thus, the trial court acquired jurisdiction.
It is true that "[i]t is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate
initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a
trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action."
In Manchester Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, this court
"condemned the practice of counsel who in filing the original complaint
omitted from the prayer any specification of the amount of damages although
the amount of over 78 million is alleged in the body of the complaint." The
court gave the following warning against this unethical practice that serves no
other purpose than to avoid paying the correct filing fees:
The Court serves warning that itwill take drastic action upon a repetition of
this unethical practice. To put a stop to this irregularity, henceforth all
complaints, petitions, answers and other similar pleadings should specify the
amount of damages being prayed for not only inthe body of the pleading but
also in the prayer, and said damages shall be considered in the assessment
of the filing fees in any case. Any pleading that fails to comply with this
requirement shall not be accepted nor admitted, or shall otherwise be
expunged from the record.
The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the
prescribed docket fee. An amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will
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not thereby vest jurisdiction in the Court, much less the payment of the docket
fee based on the amounts sought in the amended pleading. The ruling in the
Magaspi case in sofar as it is inconsistent with this pronouncement is
overturned and reversed. (Emphasis supplied)
This ruling was circularized through Supreme Court Circular No. 7
addressed to all lower court judges and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
for dissemination to and guidance for all its members.
The facts of this case differ from Manchester and similar situations envisioned
under the circular. The complaint filed by respondents Revilla spouses
included in its prayer the amount of P50,000.00 as actual damages, without
mention of any other amount in the body of the complaint. No amended
complaint was filed to increase this amount in the prayer. Thus, the Court of
Appeals found as follows:
In the case at bench, the complaint filed by the Spouses Revilla only asked
for actual damages in the amount of P50,000.00. While the Spouses Revilla
mentioned the amount of P12,000,000.00 as actual damages in the pre-trial,
said amount was not stated in the complaint and neither was it awarded by
the lower court in its judgment. Hence, said amount was not even considered
by the court a quo when it awarded damages in favor of the Spouses Revilla.
Considering that the complaint was not formally amended by the spouses to
increase the amount of actual damages being sought, the trial court was not
stripped of its jurisdiction to try the case since the Spouses Revilla correctly
paid the docket fees based merely on what was prayed for in the
complaint.Indeed, the mere mentioning by the Spouses Revilla of the amount
of P12,000,000.00 during the pre-trial is inconsequential, as the trial court
properly acquired jurisdiction over the action when the Spouses Revilla filed
the complaint and paid the requisite filing fees based on the amount as
prayed for in the complaint. (Emphasis supplied)
In Padlan v. Dinglasan, this court reiterated that "[w]hat determines the
jurisdiction of the court is the nature of the action pleaded as appearing from
the allegations in the complaint [and] [t]he averments therein and the
character of the relief sought are the ones to be consulted."
Petitioner attached copies of the tax declarations and deeds of sale over the
property to the petition. Tax Declaration No. 7971 in the name of respondents
Revilla spouses provides that the land had a market value of P13,500.00,
while the mango trees had a market value of P3,500.00. Petitioner alleged in
her petition that respondents Revilla spouses offered to sell the property to
her for P50,000.00, while the trial court found that the "Kasulatan ng Bilihan
ng Lupa" reflected the amount of P20,000.00. Subsequent tax declarations
in the name of petitioner, the Casorla spouses, and the Sun spouses all
provided for land market values lower than P50,000.00. The deed of sale in
favor of the Casorla spouses states that the assessed value of the property
was P1,400.00, and the consideration for the sale was P50,000.00. The
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subsequent deed of sale in favor of the Sun spouses provides for the same
amount as consideration.
None of these documents submitted by petitioner indicate an amount in
excess of the P50,000.00 prayed for by respondents Revilla spouses as
actual damages in their complaint. Thus, the basis for the P12,000,000.00
value raised during pre-trial is unclear. Based on the complaint, respondents
Revilla spouses paid the correct docket fees computed from the amounts in
their prayer.
III.
The third issue involves the reinstatement of respondents Revilla spouses in
the property and reconveyance of its tax declaration in their favor.
Petitioner argues that antichresis is a formal contract that must be in writing in
order to be valid. Respondents Revilla spouses were not able to prove the
existence of the alleged antichresis contract. On the other hand, the sale of
the property to petitioner was established by the "Kasulatan ng Bilihan ng
Lupa" and the testimony of Rosita Castillo, the second wife of the previous
owner, Felimon Castillo.
We affirm the lower courts order of reinstatement and reconveyance of the
property in favor of respondents Revilla spouses.
Respondents Revilla spouses complaint sought "to annul the sales and
transfers of title emanating from Tax Declaration No. 7971 registered in their
name involving a 15,000-square[-]meter unregistered land . . . with prayer for
reconveyance and claims for damages." There was no prayer to declare the
purported contract of sale as antichresis. Thus, respondents Revilla spouses
neither discussed nor used the term "antichresis" in their comment and
memorandum before this court. They focused on the nature of their complaint
as one for annulment of titles on the ground of forgery. At most, the trial
courts summary of respondents Revilla spouses evidence described the
parties agreements as follows:
Plaintiffs evidence and the testimony of plaintiff Alfredo Revilla tend to
indicate that plaintiffs are the owners in fee simple of a 15,000-square[-]meter
unregistered land, located at Brgy. Adlas, Silang, Cavite. Their ownership
being evidenced by Tax Declaration No. 7971, s. 1980 (Exh. "A"). Sometime
in 1981, plaintiffs needed money for the travel and deployment of plaintiff
Alfredo to Saudi Arabia. Plaintiff Paz Revilla sought financial help from
defendant Cotoner-Zacarias from whom she was able to obtain a loan but
secured with and by way of mortgage of the subject property. The parties
further agreed that defendant Cotoner Zacarias would take possession of the
subject property and cultivate it with the earnings therefrom to be used to
pay-off the loan and the annual realty taxes on the land.It was their
agreement with defendant Cotoner Zacarias that the latter will rent the subject
property and with that agreement, the lease started sometime in 1981 and
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plantiffs got from defendant Cotoner-Zacarias the amount of Php3,000.00 as

rental for the first year, 1981, with no specific agreement as to the period
covered by such rental[.] (Emphasis supplied)
Article 2132 of the Civil Code provides that "[b]y the contract of antichresis
the creditor acquires the right to receive the fruits of an immovable of his
debtor, with the obligation to apply them to the payment of the interest, if
owing, and thereafter to the principal of his credit."
Thus, antichresis involves an express agreement between parties such that
the creditor will have possession of the debtors real property given as
security, and such creditor will apply the fruits of the property to the interest
owed by the debtor, if any, then to the principal amount.
The term, antichresis, has a Greek origin with "anti (against) and chresis
(use) denoting the action of giving a credit against the use of a property."
Historically, 15th century B.C. tablets revealed that "antichresis contracts
were commonly employed in the Sumerian and Akkadian Mesopotamian
cultures." Antichresis contracts were incorporated in Babylonian law,
modifying and combining it with that of mortgage pledge. Nearing the end of
the classical period, antichresis contracts entered Roman law that "adopted
the convention that the tenant usufruct had to be exactly compensated by the
interest on the lump sum payment." During the middle ages, canon law
banned antichresis contracts for being a form of usury. These contracts only
reappeared in the 1804 Napoleonic Code that influenced the laws of most
countries today. It had been observed that "antichresis contracts coexist with
periodic rent contracts in many property markets."
In the Civil Code, antichresis provisions may be found under Title XVI,
together with other security contracts such as pledge and mortgage.
Antichresis requires delivery of the property to the antichretic creditor, but the
latter cannot ordinarily acquire this immovable property in his or her
possession by prescription.
Similar to the prohibition against pactum commissorium since creditors
cannot "appropriate the thingsgiven by way of pledge or mortgage, or dispose
of them," an antichretic creditor also cannot appropriate the real property in
his or her favor upon the non-payment of the debt.
Antichresis also requires that the amount of the principal and the interest be
in writing for the contract to be valid.
However, the issue before us does not concern the nature of the relationship
between the parties, but the validity of the documents that caused the
subsequent transfers of the property involved.
The reinstatement of the propertyin favor of respondents Revilla spouses was
anchored on the lower courts finding that their signatures as sellers in the
"Kasulatan ng Bilihan ng Lupa" were forged.
This court has held that the "question of forgery is one of fact." Well-settled
is the rule that "[f]actual findings of the lower courts are entitled great weight
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and respect on appeal, and in fact accorded finality when supported by

substantial evidence on the record."
The Court of Appeals agreed with the finding of the trial court that the
signature of Alfredo Revilla in the "Kasulatan ng Bilihan ng Lupa" was forged:
It was convincingly found by the court a quo that the Kasulatan ng Bilihan ng
Lupaor Deed of Sale covering the subject property allegedly executed by the
Spouses Revilla in favorof Zacarias was spurious, as the trial court, after
relying on the report of the handwriting experts of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) saying that "there exist significant differences in
handwriting characteristics/habits between the questioned and the
standard/sample signatures ALFREDO REVILLA such as in the manner of
execution of strokes, structural pattern of letters/elements, and minute
identifying details", as well as the trial courts own visual analysis of the
document and the sample signatures of plaintiff-appellee Alfredo, clearly
showed that his signature on the said Kasulatan ng Bilihan ng Lupawas
indeed forged.
Petitioner contends that the lower courts never declared as falsified the
signature of Alfredos wife, Paz Castillo-Revilla. Since the property is conjugal
in nature, the sale as to the one-half share ofPaz Castillo-Revilla should not
be declared as void.
The transaction took place before the effectivity of the Family Code in 2004.
Generally, civil laws have no retroactive effect. Article 256 of the Family
Code provides that "[it] shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not
prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil
Code or other laws."
Article 165 of the Civil Code states that "[t]he husband is the administrator of
the conjugal partnership." Article 172 of the Civil Code provides that "[t]he
wife cannot bind the conjugal partnership without the husbands consent,
except incases provided by law." In any case, the Family Code also provides
as follows:
Art. 96. The administration and enjoyment of the community property shall
belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husbands
decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for proper
remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the date of the
contract implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to
participate in the administration of the common properties, the other spouse
may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include
disposition or encumbrance without authority of the court or the written
consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the
disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be
construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the
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third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the

acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer
iswithdrawn by either or both offerors. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, as correctly found by the Court of Appeals, "assuming arguendo that
the signature of plaintiff-appellee Paz on the Kasulatan ng Bilihan ng
Lupawas not forged, her signature alone would still not bind the subject
property, it being already established that the said transaction was made
without the consent of her husband plaintiff-appellee Alfredo."
Lastly, petitioner argues that she has no obligation to prove the genuineness
and due execution of the "Kasulatan ng Bilihan ng Lupa" considering it is a
public document.
The trial court found otherwise. Atty. Diosdado de Mesa, who allegedly
notarized the "Kasulatanng Bilihan ng Lupa," was not a commissioned notary
public. The trial court discussed as follows:
Furthermore, it was discovered that the notary public who purportedly
notarized the "Kasulatanng Bilihan ng Lupa" has not been registered notary
public in the province of Cavite in 1979 nor at present. The record bears out
various Certifications to prove there is no available record on file with the
Office of the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court, Cavite City of a
Commission/Order appointing Atty. Diosdado de Mesa, the lawyer who
notarized the subject document, as Notary Public for the Province and City of
Cavite (Exh. "Y" to "Y-2"); Certification from the Records Management and
Archives Office, Manila that no copy is on file with the said office of the Deed
of Sale allegedly executed by plaintiffs before Notary Public Diosdado de
Mesa, for and within Imus, Cavite, acknowledged as Doc. No. 432, Page No.
45, Book No. VIII, Series of 1979 (Exh. "Z" to "Z-1"); Certification issued by
Clerk of Court, Atty. Ana Liza M. Luna, Regional Trial Court, Tagaytay City
that there is no available record on file of a Commission/Order appointing
Atty. Diosdado de Mesa as Notary Public for the Province and Cities of
Tagaytay, Cavite and Trece Martires in 1979 (Exh. "AA" to"AA-2");
Certification issued by Clerk of Court, Atty. Jose O, Lagao, Jr., Regional Trial
Court, Multiple Sala, Bacoor, Cavite that there isno available record on file of
a Commission/Order appointing Atty. Diosdado de Mesa as Notary Public for
the Province and City of Cavite (Exh. "BB" to "BB-2"); and Certification issued
by Clerk of Court, Atty. Regalado E. Eusebio, Regional Trial Court, Multiple
Sala, Imus, Cavite that there is no available record on file of a
Commission/Order appointing Atty. Diosdado de Mesa as Notary Public for
the Province of Cavite (Exh. "CC" to "CC-2"). (Emphasis supplied).
Petitioner contends that the Sun spouses were buyers in good faith for value,
thus, the court erred in ordering reinstatement of the property in favor of
respondents Revilla spouses.
This court has held that "the rule in land registration law that the issue of
whether the buyer of realty is in good or bad faith is relevant only where the
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subject of the sale is registeredland and the purchase was made from the
registered owner whose title to the land is clean[.]" Our laws have adopted
the Torrens system to strengthen public confidence in land transactions: [T]he
Torrens system was adopted in this country because it was believed to be the
most effective measure to guarantee the integrity of land titles and to insure
their indefeasibility once the claim of ownership is established and
recognized. If a person purchases a piece of land on the assurance that the
sellers title thereto is valid, he should not run the risk of losing his acquisition.
If this were permitted, public confidence in the system would be eroded and
land transactions would have to be attended by complicated and not
necessarily conclusive investigations and proof of ownership.
Necessarily, those who rely in good faith on a clean title issued under the
Torrens system for registered lands must be protected. On the other hand,
those who purchase unregistered lands do so at their own peril.
This good faith argument cannot be considered as this case involves
unregistered land. In any case, as explained by respondents Revilla spouses
in their memorandum, this is a defense personal to the Sun spouses and
cannot be borrowed by petitioner. The Sun spouses no longer raised this
argument on appeal, but only made a partial appeal regarding legal interest
on the award.
WHEREFORE, this petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The decision of the
Court of Appeals dated August 13, 2009 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
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