THIRD DIVISION

DIGNA A. NAJERA,

G.R. No. 164817

Petitioner,

Present:

- versus -

EDUARDO J. NAJERA,
Respondent.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA, and
PERALTA, JJ.
Promulgated:
July 3, 2009

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision dated February 23,
2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 68053 and its Resolution August
5, 2004, denying petitioners motion for reconsideration. The Decision of the Court
of Appeals affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen,
Pangasinan, Branch 68 (RTC), which found petitioner Digna A. Najera and
respondent Eduardo J. Najera entitled to legal separation, but not annulment of
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.

The facts are as follows:

On January 27, 1997, petitioner filed with the RTC a verified Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage with Alternative Prayer for Legal Separation,
with Application for Designation as Administrator Pendente Lite of the Conjugal
Partnership of Gains.[1]
Petitioner alleged that she and respondent are residents ofBugallon,
Pangasinan, but respondent is presently living in the United States of America
(U.S.A). They were married on January 31, 1988 by Rev. Father Isidro Palinar, Jr.
at the Saint Andrew the Apostle Church at Bugallon, Pangasinan.[2] They are
childless.
Petitioner claimed that at the time of the celebration of marriage, respondent
was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations
of the marriage, and such incapacity became manifest only after marriage as shown
by the following facts:
(a)
At the time of their marriage, petitioner was already employed with
the Special Services Division of the Provincial Government of Pangasinan, while
respondent was jobless. He did not exert enough effort to find a job and was
dependent on petitioner for support. Only with the help of petitioners elder brother,
who was a seaman, was respondent able to land a job as a seaman in 1988 through
the Intercrew Shipping Agency.
(b)
While employed as a seaman, respondent did not give petitioner
sufficient financial support and she had to rely on her own efforts and the help of
her parents in order to live.

(c)
As a seaman, respondent was away from home from nine to ten
months each year. In May 1989, when he came home from his ship voyage, he
started to quarrel with petitioner and falsely accused her of having an affair with
another man. He took to smoking marijuana and tried to force petitioner into
it. When she refused, he insulted her and uttered unprintable words against her. He
would go out of the house and when he arrived home, he was always drunk.
(d)
When respondent arrived home from his ship voyage in April 1994,
as had been happening every year, he quarreled with petitioner. He continued to be
jealous, he arrived home drunk and he smoked marijuana. On July 3, 1994, while

he was quarreling with petitioner, without provocation, he inflicted physical

violence upon her and attempted to kill her with a bolo. She was able to parry his
attack with her left arm, yet she sustained physical injuries on different parts of her
body. She was treated by Dr. Padlan, and the incident was reported at the Bugallon
Police Station.
(e)
Respondent left the family home, taking along all their personal
belongings. He lived with his mother at Banaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan, and he
abandoned petitioner.
Petitioner learned later that respondent jumped ship while it was anchored
in Los Angeles, California, U.S.A.
Petitioner prayed that upon filing of the petition, an Order be issued
appointing her as the sole administrator of their conjugalproperties; and that after
trial on the merits, judgment be rendered (1) declaring their marriage void ab
initio in accordance with Article 36 of the Family Code; (2) in the alternative,
decreeing legal separation of petitioner and respondent pursuant to Title II of the
Family Code; and (3) declaring the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of
petitioner and respondent and the forfeiture in
favor of petitioner of respondents share in the said properties pursuant to Articles
42 (2) and 63 (2) of the Family Code; and (4) granting petitioner other just and
equitable reliefs.
On March 7, 1997, the RTC issued an Order granting the motion of
petitioner to effect service by publication as provided under Section 17, Rule 14 of
the Rules of Court.
On April 17, 1997, respondent filed his Answer [3] wherein he denied the
material allegations in the petition and averred that petitioner was incurably
immature, of dubious integrity, with very low morality, and guilty of infidelity. He
claimed that the subject house and lot were acquired through his sole effort and
money. As counterclaim, respondent prayed for the award of P200,000.00 as moral
damages, P45,000.00 as attorneys fees, and P1,000.00 as appearance fee for every
scheduled hearing.
On July 18, 1997, the Office of the Solicitor General filed its Notice of
Appearance.

On June 29, 1998, the RTC issued an Order[4] terminating the pre-trial
conference after the parties signed a Formal Manifestation/Motion, which stated
that they had agreed to dissolve their conjugal partnership of gains and divide
equally their conjugal properties.
On August 3, 1998, Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Ely R. Reintar filed a
Compliance manifesting that after conducting an investigation, he found that no
collusion existed between the parties.[5] The initial hearing of the case was held on
November 23, 1998.
Petitioner testified in court and presented as witnesses the following: her
mother, Celedonia Aldana; psychologist Cristina R. Gates; and Senior Police
Officer 1 (SPO1) Sonny Dela Cruz, a member of the Philippine National Police
(PNP), Bugallon, Pangasinan.
Petitioner testified that she was a commerce graduate and was working as an
accounting clerk in a government agency in Manila.She and respondent married on
January 31, 1988 as evidenced by their marriage contract. [6] At the time of their
marriage, respondent was jobless, while petitioner was employed as Clerk at the
Special Services Division of the Provincial Government of Pangasinan with a
monthly salary of P5,000.00. It was petitioners brother who helped respondent find
a job as a seaman at the Intercrew Shipping Agency in Manila. On July 30, 1988,
respondent was employed as a seaman, and he gave petitioner a monthly allotment
of P1,600.00. After ten months at work, he went home in 1989 and then returned to
work after three months. Every time respondent was home, he quarreled with
petitioner and accused her of having an affair with another man. Petitioner noticed
that respondent also smoked marijuana and every time he went out of the house
and returned home, he was drunk.However, there was no record in
their barangay that respondent was involved in drugs.[7]
In 1990, petitioner and respondent were able to purchase a lot out of their
earnings. In 1991, they constructed a house on the lot.[8]
On July 3, 1994, petitioner and respondent were invited to a party by the
boyfriend of petitioners sister. Respondent, however, did not allow petitioner to go
with him. When respondent arrived home at around midnight, petitioner asked him
about the party, the persons who attended it, and the ladies he danced with, but he
did not answer her. Instead, respondent went to the kitchen. She asked him again

about what happened at the party. Respondent quarreled with her and said that she
was the one having an affair and suddenly slapped and boxed her, causing her eyes
to be bloodied. When she opened her eyes, she saw respondent holding a bolo, and
he attempted to kill her.However, she was able to parry his attack with her left arm,
causing her to sustain injuries on different parts of her body. When respondent saw
that she was bloodied, he got nervous and went out.After 10 minutes, he turned on
the light in the kitchen, but he could not find her because she had gone out and was
hiding from him. When she heard respondent start the motorcycle, she left her
hiding place and proceeded to Gomez Street toward the highway. At the highway,
she boarded a bus and asked the conductor to stop at a clinic or hospital. She
alighted in Mangatarem, Pangasinan and proceeded to the clinic of one Dr. Padlan,
who sutured her wounds.After a few hours, she went home.[9]
When petitioner arrived home, the house was locked. She called for her
parents who were residing about 300 meters away. She then asked her brother to
enter the house through the ceiling in order to open the door. She found that their
personal belongings were gone, including her Automated Teller Machine card
and jewelry.[10]
Thereafter, petitioner reported the incident at the police station of Bugallon,
Pangasinan.[11]
Since then, respondent never returned home. He stayed with his mother in
Banaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan. Petitioner learned that he went abroad again, but
she no longer received any allotment from him.[12]
Petitioner testified that her parents were happily married, while respondents
parents were separated. Respondents brothers were also separated from their
respective wives.[13]
Petitioner disclosed that she also filed a petition for the annulment of her
marriage with the Matrimonial Tribunal of the Diocese of Alaminos, Pangasinan
on the ground of psychological incapacity of respondent.[14]
Psychologist Cristina R. Gates testified that she interviewed petitioner, but
not respondent who was abroad. She confirmed her Psychological Report, the
conclusion of which reads:
PSYCHOLOGICAL CONCLUSIONS BASED ON THE INTERVIEWS:

It is clear from the interviews that Respondent is afflicted with psychological

hang-ups which are rooted in the kind of family background he has. His mother
had an extramarital affair and separated from Respondents father. This turn of
events left an irreparable mark upon Respondent, gauging from his alcoholic and
marijuana habit. In time, he seemed steep in a kind of adouble bind where he both
deeply loved and resented his mother.
His baseless accusation against his wife and his violent behavior towards her
appears to be an offshoot of deep-seated feelings and recurrent thoughts towards
his own mother. Unable to resolve his childhood conflicts and anger, he turned to
his wife as thescapegoat for all his troubles.
Based on the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM IV), Respondent is
afflicted with a Borderline Personality Disorder as marked by his pattern of
instability in his interpersonal relationships, his marred self-image and selfdestructive tendencies, his uncontrollable impulses. Eduardo Najeras
psychological impairment as traced to his parents separation, aggravated by the
continued meddling of his mother in his adult life, antedates his marriage to
Petitioner Digna Aldana.
Furthermore, the ingestion of prohibited substances (alcohol and marijuana),
known to cause irreparable damage organically, and the manifest worsening of his
violent and abusive behavior across time render his impairment grave and
irreversible. In the light of these findings, it is recommended that parties marriage
be annulled on grounds of psychological incapacity on the part of Respondent
Eduardo Najera to fully assume his marital duties and responsibilities to Digna
Aldana-Najera.[15]

Psychologist Cristina Gates testified that the chances of curability of

respondents psychological disorder were nil. Its curability depended on whether
the established organic damage was minimal -- referring to the malfunction of the
composites of the brain brought about by habitual drinking and marijuana,
which possiblyafflicted respondent with borderline personality disorder and
uncontrollable impulses.[16]
Further, SPO1 Sonny Dela Cruz, a member of the PNP, Bugallon,
Pangasinan, testified that on July 3, 1994, he received a complaint from petitioner
that respondent arrived at their house under the influence of liquor and mauled
petitioner without provocation on her part, and that respondent tried to kill her. The
complaint was entered in the police blotter.[17]

On March 31, 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision that decreed only the legal
separation of the petitioner and respondent, but not the annulment of their
marriage. The dispositive portion of the Decisionreads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered as
follows:
1. Decreeing legal separation of Petitioner/Plaintiff Digna Najera and
respondent/defendant Eduardo Najera;
2. Ordering the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of the
petitioner/plaintiff and respondent/defendant, and to divide the same
equally
between
themselves
pursuant
to
their
Joint
[18]
Manifestation/Motion dated April 27, 1998.

Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution[19] dated

May 2, 2000.
Petitioner appealed the RTC Decision and Resolution to the Court of
Appeals.
In a Decision dated February 23, 2004, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
Decision of the RTC, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, appeal is hereby DISMISSED and
judgment of the Trial Court is AFFIRMED in toto. No costs.[20]

Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals in

a Resolution dated August 5, 2004.
Hence, this petition raising the following issues:
1. The Court of Appeals failed to take into consideration the Decision of the
National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal, contrary to the guidelines decreed
by the Supreme Court in the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA
198.
2. The evidence of petitioner proved the root cause of the psychological
incapacity of respondent Eduardo Najera.

3. The factual basis of the Decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial

Tribunal is practically the same set of facts established by petitioners evidence
submitted before the trial court and therefore the same conclusion ought to be
rendered by the Court.
4. Credence ought to be given to the conclusion of Psychologist Cristina R.
Gates as an expert in Psychology.[21]

The main issue is whether or not the totality of petitioners evidence was able
to prove that respondent is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential obligations of marriagewarranting the annulment of their marriage under
Article 36 of the Family Code.[22]
Petitioner contends that her evidence established the root cause of the
psychological incapacity of respondent which is his dysfunctional family
background. With such background, respondent could not have known the
obligations he was assuming, particularly the duty of complying with the
obligations essential to marriage.
The Court is not persuaded.
Republic v. Court of Appeals[23] laid down the guidelines in the interpretation
and application of Article 36 of the Family Code, thus:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation
of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact
that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity
of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family,
recognizing it as the foundation of the nation. It decrees marriage as legally
inviolable, thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both
the family and marriage are to be protected by the state.
xxxx
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically
or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by
experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code
requires that the incapacity must be psychological -- not physical, although its
manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince
the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such
an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming,
or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no
example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of
the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause
must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully

explained.Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical

psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the
celebration of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing
when the parties exchanged their I dos. The manifestation of the illness need not
be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such
moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only
in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the
same sex.Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of
marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the
exercise of a profession or employment in a job.Hence, a pediatrician may be
effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them
but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her
own children as an essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the
party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, mild
characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts
cannot be accepted asroot causes. The illness must be shown as downright
incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In
other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an
adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates
the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations
essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles
68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as
Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their
children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the
petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal
of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive,
should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by
the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of
Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:
The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those
who are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage due
to causes of psychological nature.
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to
harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason
that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to
decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally -- subject to our law on evidence -what is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void.

This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of
the Family Code provision, contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be
given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the Church -- while remaining
independent, separate and apart from each other -- shall walk together in synodal
cadence towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage and the
family as the inviolable base of the nation.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state.No decision shall be handed
down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in
the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as
the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting
attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from
the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor
General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor
vinculicontemplated under Canon 1095.

The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated by

the Court in Santos v. Court of Appeals: "psychological incapacity must be
characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability." [24] The
foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician examine the person to be
declared psychologically incapacitated.[25] In fact, the root cause may be
"medically or clinically identified."[26] What is important is the presence of
evidence that can adequately establish the party'spsychological condition. For
indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned
need not be resorted to.[27]
In this case, the Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that the totality of
the evidence submitted by petitioner failed to satisfactorily prove that respondent
was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of
marriage.The root cause of respondents alleged psychological incapacity was not
sufficiently proven by experts or shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable.
As found by the Court of Appeals, Psychologist Cristina Gates conclusion
that respondent was psychologically incapacitated was based on facts relayed to
her by petitioner and was not based on her personal knowledge and evaluation of
respondent; thus, her finding isunscientific and unreliable.[28] Moreover, the trial
court correctly found that petitioner failed to prove with certainty that the alleged
personality disorder of respondent was incurable as may be gleaned from
Psychologist Cristina Gates testimony:

Q You mentioned in your report that respondent is afflicted with a borderline

personality disorder. [D]id you find any organic cause?
A No, sir.
Q Do you think that this cause you mentioned existed at the time of the marriage
of the respondent?
A I believe so, sir. Physically, if you examined the [respondents family]
background, there was strong basis that respondent developed maladoptive pattern.
Q Did you interview the respondents family?
A No, sir , but on the disclosure of petitioner (sic).
xxxx
Q Have you [seen] the respondent?
A He is not in the country, sir.
Q Madam Witness, this disorder that you stated in your report which the
respondent is allegedly affected, is this curable?
A The chances are nil.
Q But it is curable?
A It depends actually if the established organic damage is minimal.
Q What is this organic damage?
A Composites of the brain is malfunctioning.
Q How did you find out the malfunctioning since you have not seen him
(respondent)?
A His habitual drinking and marijuana habit possiblyafflicted the
respondent with borderline personality disorder. This [is] based on
his interpersonal relationships, his marred self-image and selfdestructive tendencies, and his uncontrollable impulses.
Q Did you interview the respondent in this regard?
A I take the words of the petitioner in this regard.[29]

The Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that the evidence presented by
petitioner in regard to the physical violence or grossly abusive conduct of
respondent toward petitioner and respondentsabandonment of petitioner without
justifiable cause for more than one year are grounds for legal separation[30] only
and not for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.

Petitioner argued that the Court of Appeals failed to consider the Decision of
the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal which her counsel sought to be
admitted by the Court of Appeals on February 11, 2004, twelve days before the
decision was promulgated on February 23, 2004. She contended that the Court of
Appeals failed to follow Guideline No. 7 in Republic v. Court of Appeals, thus:
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal
of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive,
should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by
the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code
ofCanon law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:
The following are incapable of contracting marriage:Those who are unable
to assume the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological
nature.
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to
harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason
that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to
decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally subject to our law on evidence what is
decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void.
This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of
the Family Code provision, contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be
given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the Church while remaining
independent, separate and apart from each other shall walk together in synodal
cadence towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage and the
family as the inviolable base of the nation.

Petitioners argument is without merit.

In its Decision dated February 23, 2004, the Court of Appeals apparently did
not have the opportunity to consider the decision of the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal. Nevertheless, it is clear that the Court of Appeals considered
the Matrimonial Tribunals decision in its Resolution dated August 5, 2004 when it
resolved petitioners motion for reconsideration. In the said Resolution, the Court of
Appeals took cognizance of the very same issues now raised before this Court and
correctly held that petitioners motion for reconsideration was devoid of merit. It
stated:

The Decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal dated July 2,

2002, which was forwarded to this Court only on February 11, 2004, reads as
follows:
x x x The FACTS collated from party complainant and
reliable witnesses which include a sister-in-law of Respondent
(despite summons from the Court dated June 14, 1999, he did not
appear before the Court, in effect waiving his right to be heard,
hence, trial in absentia followed) corroborate and lead this
Collegiate Court to believe with moral certainty required by law
and conclude that the husband-respondent upon contracting
marriage suffered from grave lack of due discretion of
judgment, thereby rendering nugatory his marital contract:
First, his family was dysfunctional in that as a child, he saw the
break-up of the marriage of his own parents; his own two siblings
have broken marriages; Second, he therefore grew up with a
domineering mother with whom [he] identified and on whom he
depended for advice; Third, he was according to his friends,
already into drugs and alcohol before marriage; this affected his
conduct of bipolar kind: he could be very quiet but later very
talkative, peaceful but later hotheaded even violent, he also was
aware of the infidelity of his mother who now lives with her
paramour, also married and a policeman; Finally, into marriage, he
continued with his drugs and alcohol abuse until one time he came
home very drunk and beat up his wife and attacked her with a bolo
that wounded her; this led to final separation.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court of Second
Instance, having invoked the Divine Name and having considered
the pertinent Law and relevant Jurisprudence to the Facts of the
Case hereby proclaims, declares and decrees the confirmation of
the sentence from the Court a quo in favor of the nullity of
marriage on the ground contemplated under Canon 1095, 2 of
the 1983 Code of Canon Law.
However, records of the proceedings before the Trial Court show that,
other than herself, petitioner-appellant offered the testimonies of the following
persons only, to wit: Aldana Celedonia (petitioner-appellants mother), Sonny de la
Cruz (member, PNP, Bugallon, Pangasinan), and Ma. Cristina R. Gates
(psychologist). Said witnesses testified, in particular, to the unfaithful night of
July 1, 1994 wherein the respondent allegedly made an attempt on the life of the
petitioner. But unlike the hearing and finding before the Matrimonial Tribunal,
petitioner-appellants sister-in-law and friends of the opposing parties were never
presented before said Court. As to the contents and veracity of the latters
testimonies, this Court is without any clue.

True, in the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals, et al.(268 SCRA 198),

the Supreme Court held that the interpretations given by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. However, the
Highest Tribunal expounded as follows:
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code
is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our
people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization,
great persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such
appellate tribunal. Ideally subject to our law on evidence what is
decreed as [canonically] invalid should be decreed civilly void x x
x.
And in relation thereto, Rule 132, Sec. 34 of the Rules of Evidence states:
The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally
offered. The purpose of which the evidence is offered must be
specified.
Given the preceding disquisitions, petitioner-appellant should not expect
us to give credence to the Decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal when, apparently, it was made on a different set of evidence of which We
have no way of ascertaining their truthfulness.
Furthermore, it is an elementary rule that judgments must be based on the
evidence presented before the court (Manzano vs. Perez, 362 SCRA 430
[2001]). And based on the evidence on record, We find no ample reason to reverse
or modify the judgment of the Trial Court.[31]

Santos v. Santos[32] cited the deliberations during the sessions of the Family
Code Revision Committee, which drafted the Code, to provide an insight on the
import of Article 36 of the Family Code. It stated that a part of the provision is
similar to the third paragraph of Canon 1095 of the Code of Canon Law, which
reads:
Canon 1095. The following are incapable of contracting marriage:
1. those who lack sufficient use of reason;
2. those who suffer from a grave lack of discretion of judgment
concerning the essential matrimonial rights and obligations to be
mutually given and accepted;
3. those who, because of causes of a psychological nature, are unable to
assume the essential obligations of marriage.

It must be pointed out that in this case, the basis of the declaration of nullity
of marriage by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal is not the third
paragraph of Canon 1095 which mentions causes of a psychological nature, but the
second paragraph of Canon 1095 which refers to those who suffer from a grave
lack of discretion of judgment concerning essential matrimonial rights and
obligations to be mutually given and accepted. For clarity, the pertinent portion of
the decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal reads:
The FACTS collated from party complainant and reliable witnesses which
include a sister-in-law of Respondent (despite summons from the Court dated
June 14, 1999, he did not appearbefore the Court, in effect waiving his right to be
heard, hence, trial in absentia followed) corroborate and lead this Collegiate Court
to believe with moral certainty required by law and conclude that the husbandrespondent upon contacting marriage suffered from grave lack of due
discretion of judgment, thereby rendering nugatory his marital contract x x
x.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court of Second Instance,
having invoked the Divine Name and having considered the pertinent Law and
relevant Jurisprudence to the Facts of the Case hereby proclaims, declares
and decrees the confirmation of the sentence from the Court a quo in favor of
the nullity of marriage on the ground contemplated under Canon 1095, 2 of
the 1983 Code of Canon Law. x x x

Hence, even if, as contended by petitioner, the factual basis of the decision
of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal is similar to the facts established
by petitioner before the trial court, the decision of the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal confirming the decree of nullity of marriage by the court a
quo is not based on the psychological incapacity of respondent. Petitioner,
therefore, erred in stating that the conclusion of Psychologist Cristina Gates
regarding the psychological incapacity of respondent is supported by the decision
of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal.
In fine, the Court of Appeals did not err in affirming the Decision of the
RTC.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 68053, dated February 23, 2004, and its Resolution
dated August 5, 2004, are herebyAFFIRMED.

No costs.
SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Third Division, Chairperson

CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division
Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision were
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the Courts Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

[1]

Records, p. 1.
Marriage Contract, Exhibit A, records, p. 192.
[3]
Records, p. 34.
[4]
Id. at 98.
[5]
Id. at 125.
[6]
Exhibit A, records, p. 192.
[7]
TSN, November 23, 1998, pp. 4-8, 22.
[8]
Id. at 9-11.
[9]
TSN, November 23, 1998, pp. 12-16.
[10]
Id. at 16-17.
[11]
Id. at 17-18. See Exhibit F, records, p. 197.
[12]
TSN, November 23, 1998, p. 19.
[13]
Id. at 19-20.
[14]
Id. at 20.
15
Records, p. 201.
[16]
TSN, April 14, 1999, pp. 7-8.
[17]
Exhibit F, records, p. 197.
[18]
Rollo, p. 65.
[19]
Id. at 66-67.
[2]

[20]
[21]

Id. at 38.
Id. at 16, 18, 20, 21.

[22]

Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such
incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
[23]
335 Phil. 664, 676-680 (1997).
[24]
Marcos v. Marcos, 397 Phil. 840, 850 (2000).
[25]
Id.
[26]
Id.
[27]
Id.
[28]
See Choa v. Choa, 441 Phil. 175, 191 (2002).
[29]
TSN, April 14, 1999, pp. 6-8. (Emphasis supplied.)
[30]
The Family Code, Art. 55. A petition for legal separation may be filed on any of the following grounds:
(1) Repeated physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed against the petitioner, a common child,
or a child of the petitioner;
(2) Physical violence or moral pressure to compel the petitioner to change religious or political affiliation;
(3) Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce the petitioner, a common child, or a child of the petitioner, to
engage in prostitution, or connivance in such corruption or inducement;
(4) Final judgment sentencing the respondent to imprisonment of more than six years, even if pardoned;
(5) Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism of the respondent;
(6) Lesbianism or homosexuality of the respondent;
(7) Contracting by the respondent of a subsequent bigamous marriage, whether in the Philippines or
abroad;
(8) Sexual infidelity or perversion;
(9) Attempt by the respondent against the life of the petitioner; or
(10) Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause for more than one year.
[31]
[32]

Rollo, pp. 41-43. (Emphasis supplied.)

G.R. No. 112019, January 4, 1995, 240 SCRA 20.

THIRD DIVISION

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,

G.R. No. 168335

Petitioner,
Present:

CARPIO MORALES, J., Chairperson,

BRION,
BERSAMIN,
*

- versus -

ABAD,

VILLARAMA, JR. and

*

SERENO, JJ.

Promulgated:

June 6, 2011
NESTOR GALANG,
Respondent.
x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

BRION, J.:

We resolve the Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] filed by the

Republic
of
the Philippines (petitioner),
challenging
the
[2]
decision dated November
25,
2004 and
the
[3]
resolution datedMay 9, 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CAG.R. CV No. 70004. The challenged decision affirmed the
decision[4] of
the
Regional
Trial
Court
(RTC),
Branch
62, Angeles City, declaring the marriage of Nestor Galang
(respondent) and Juvy Salazar null and void on the ground of the
latters psychological incapacity. The assailed resolution denied
the petitioners motion for reconsideration.

Antecedent Facts

On March 9, 1994, the respondent and Juvy contracted marriage

in Pampanga. They resided in the house of the respondents father
in San Francisco, Mabalacat, Pampanga. The respondent worked
as an artist-illustrator at the Clark Development Corporation,
earningP8,500.00 monthly. Juvy, on the other hand, stayed at
home as a housewife. They have one child, Christopher.

On August 4, 1999, the respondent filed with the RTC a petition

for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Juvy, under
Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended. The case was
docketed as Civil Case No. 9494. He alleged that Juvy was
psychologically incapacitated to exercise the essential obligations
of marriage, as she was a kleptomaniac and a swindler.
He claimed that Juvy stole his ATM card and his parents money,
and often asked money from their friends and relatives on the
pretext that Christopher was confined in a hospital. According to
the respondent, Juvy suffers from mental deficiency, innate
immaturity, distorted discernment and total lack of care, love and
affection [towards him and their] child. He posited that Juvys
incapacity was extremely serious and appears to be incurable. [5]

The RTC ordered the city prosecutor to investigate if collusion

existed between the parties. Prosecutor Angelito I. Balderama
formally manifested, on October 18, 1999, that he found no
evidence of collusion between the parties. The RTC set the case
for trial in its Order of October 20, 1999. The respondent
presented testimonial and documentary evidence to substantiate
his allegations.

In his testimony, the respondent alleged that he was the one who
prepared their breakfast because Juvy did not want to wake up
early; Juvy often left their child to their neighbors care; and
Christopher almost got lost in the market when Juvy brought him
there.[6]

The respondent further

stated
that
Juvy
squandered
the P15,000.00
heentrusted to her.
He added that Juvy stole his ATM card and falsified his signature
to encash the check representing his (the respondents) fathers

pension.
He,
likewise,
stated
that
he
caught
Juvy
playingmahjong and kuwaho three (3) times. Finally, he testified
that Juvy borrowed money from their relatives on the pretense
that their son was confined in a hospital. [7]

Aside from his testimony, the respondent also presented Anna

Liza S. Guiang, a psychologist, who testified that she conducted a
psychological test on the respondent. According to her, she wrote
Juvy a letter requesting for an interview, but the latter did not
respond.[8] In her Psychological Report, the psychologist made the
following findings:

Psychological Test conducted on client Nestor Galang resembles

an emotionally-matured individual. He is well-adjusted to the problem
he meets, and enable to throw-off major irritations but manifest[s] a
very low frustration tolerance which means he has a little ability to
endure anxiety and the client manifests suppressed feelings and
emotions which resulted to unbearable emotional pain, depression and
lack of self-esteem and gained emotional tensions caused by his wifes
behavior.

The incapacity of the defendant is manifested [in] such a

manner that the defendant-wife: (1) being very irresponsible and very
lazy and doesnt manifest any sense of responsibility; (2) her
involvement in gambling activities such as mahjong and kuwaho; (3)
being an estafador which exhibits her behavioral and personality
disorders; (4) her neglect and show no care attitude towards her
husband and child; (5) her immature and rigid behavior; (6) her lack of
initiative to change and above all, the fact that she is unable to
perform her marital obligations as a loving, responsible and caring wife
to her family. There are just few reasons to believe that the defendant
is suffering from incapacitated mind and such incapacity appears to be
incorrigible.

xxx

The following incidents are the reasons why the couple

separated:

1.

After the marriage took place, the incapacity of

defendant was manifested on such occasions wherein
plaintiff was the one who prepared his breakfast, because
defendant doesnt want to wake up early; this became
daily routine of the plaintiff before reporting to work;

the
the
the
the

2.

After reporting from work, the defendant was often out

gambling, as usual, the plaintiff was the one cooking for
supper while the defendant was very busy with her gambling
activities and never attended to her husbands needs;

3.

There was an occasion wherein their son was lost in the

public market because of the irresponsible attitude of the
defendant;

4.

That the defendant suffers from personality and behavioral

disorders, there was an occasion wherein the defendant
[would] steal money from the plaintiff and use them for
gambling;

5.

Defendant, being an estafador had been manifested after

their marriage took place, wherein the defendant would
come
with
stories
so
that people [would] feelpity on her and give her
money.
Through false pretenses she [would] be able to deceive and
take money from neighbors, relatives and other people.

6.

That the plaintiff convinced the defendant to stop her

unhealthy lifestyle (gambling), but the defendant never
listened to his advices;

7.

That the plaintiff was the one who [was] taking care of their
son, when the plaintiff will leave for work, the defendant
[would] entrust their son to their neighbor and go [to] some
place. This act reflects the incapacity of the defendant by
being an irresponsible mother;

8.

That the defendant took their son and left their conjugal
home that resulted into the couples separation.

Psychological findings tend to confirm that the defendant suffers

from personality and behavioral disorders. These disorders are
manifested through her grave dependency on gambling and stealing
money. She doesnt manifest any sense of responsibility and loyalty and
these disorders appear to be incorrigible.

The plaintiff tried to forget and forgive her about the incidents
and start a new life again and hoping she would change. Tried to get
attention back by showing her with special care, treating her to places
for a weekend vacation, cook[ing] herfavorite food, but the defendant
didnt care to change, she did not prepare meals, wash clothes nor
clean up. She neglected her duties and failed to perform the basic
obligations as a wife.

So in the view of the above-mentioned psychological findings, it

is my humble opinion that there is sufficient reason to believe that the
defendant wife is psychologically incapacitated to perform her marital
duties as a wife and mother to their only son. [9]

The RTC Ruling

The RTC nullified the parties marriage in its decision

ofJanuary 22, 2001. The trial court saw merit in the testimonies of
the respondent and the psychologist, and concluded that:

After a careful perusal of the evidence in the instant case and

there being no controverting evidence, this Court is convinced that as
held in Santos case, the psychological incapacity of respondent to
comply with the essential marital obligations of his marriage with
petitioner, which Dr. Gerardo Veloso said can be characterized by (a)
gravity because the subject cannot carry out the normal and ordinary
duties of marriage and family shouldered by any average couple
existing under ordinary circumstances of life and work; (b)
antecedence, because the root cause of the trouble can be traced to
the history of the subject before marriage although its overt
manifestations appear over after the wedding; and (c) incurability, if
treatments required exceed the ordinary means or subject, or involve
time and expense beyond the reach of the subject are all obtaining in
this case.

xxxx

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is

granted
and the marriage between petitioner and defendant ishereby declared
null and void pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code of
the Philippines.[10]

The CA Decision

The petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General,

appealed the RTC decision to the CA. The CA, in its decision
dated November 25, 2004, affirmed the RTC decision in toto.

The CA held that Juvy was psychologically incapacitated to

perform the essential marital obligations. It explained that Juvys
indolence and lack of sense of responsibility, coupled with her
acts of gambling and swindling, undermined her capacity to
comply with her marital obligations. In addition, the psychologist
characterized Juvys condition to be permanent, incurable and
existing at the time of the celebration of her marriage with the
respondent.[11]

The petitioner moved to reconsider this Decision, but the CA

denied his motion in its resolution dated May 9, 2005.[12]

The Petition and the Issues

The petitioner claims in the present petition that the totality of

the evidence presented by the respondent was insufficient to
establish Juvys psychological incapacity to perform her essential
marital obligations. The petitioner additionally argues that the
respondent failed to show the juridical antecedence, gravity, and
incurability of Juvys condition. [13] The respondent took the exact
opposite view.

The issue boils down to whether there is basis to nullify the

respondents marriage to Juvy on the ground that at the time of
the celebration of the marriage, Juvy suffered from psychological
incapacity that prevented her from complying with her essential
marital obligations.

The Courts Ruling

After due consideration, we resolve to grant the petition, and

hold
that no sufficient basis exists to annul the marriage on the ground
of psychological incapacity under the terms of Article 36 of the
Family Code.

Article 36 of the Family Code

and Related Jurisprudence
Article 36 of the Family Code provides that a marriage
contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such
incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. [14]

In Leouel Santos v. Court of Appeals, et al.,[15] the Court first

declared that psychological incapacity must be characterized by
(a)gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability. The
defect should refer to no less than a mental (not physical)
incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic
marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage. It must be confined to
the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning
and significance to the marriage. [16] We laid down more definitive
guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the
Family Code in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals and
Roridel Olaviano Molina, whose salient points are footnoted below.
[17]
These guidelines incorporate the basic requirements we
established in Santos.[18]

In Brenda B. Marcos v. Wilson G. Marcos, [19] we further clarified

that it is not absolutely necessary to introduce expert opinion in a
petition under Article 36 of the Family Code if the totality of
evidence shows that psychological incapacity exists and its
gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability can be duly
established. Thereafter, the Court promulgated A.M. No. 02-11-10SC (Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages) [20] which provided that the
complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any,
as are indicative of psychological incapacity at the time of the
celebration of the marriage but expert opinion need not be
alleged.

Our 2009 ruling in Edward Kenneth Ngo Te v. Rowena Ong

Gutierrez Yu-Te[21] placed some cloud in the continued applicability
of the time-tested Molina[22] guidelines. We stated in this case that
instead of serving as a guideline, Molina unintentionally became a
straightjacket; it forced all cases involving psychological
incapacityto fit into and be bound by it. This is contrary to the
intention of the law, since no psychological incapacity case can be
considered as completely on "all fours" with another.

Benjamin G. Ting v. Carmen M. Velez-Ting [23] and Jocelyn M.

Suazo v. Angelito Suazo,[24] however, laid to rest any question
regarding the continued applicability of Molina.[25] In these cases,
we clarified that Ngo Te[26] did not abandon Molina.[27] Far from
abandoning Molina,[28] Ngo Te[29] simply suggested the relaxation
of
its
stringent
requirements.
We
also
explained
[30]
[31]
that Suazo
thatNgo Te
merely stands for a more flexible
approach in considering petitions for declaration of nullity of
marriages based on psychological incapacity. [32]

The Present Case

In the present case and using the above guidelines, we find

the totality of the respondents evidence the testimonies of the
respondent and the psychologist, and the latters psychological
report and evaluation insufficient to prove Juvys psychological
incapacity pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code.

a. The respondents testimony

The respondents testimony merely showed that Juvy: (a)

refused to wake up early to prepare breakfast; (b) left their child
to the care of their neighbors when she went out of the house; (c)
squandered a huge amount of the P15,000.00 that the
respondent entrusted to her; (d) stole the respondents ATM card
and attempted to withdraw the money deposited in his account;
(e) falsified the respondents signature in order to encash a check;
(f) made up false stories in order to borrow money from their
relatives; and (g) indulged in gambling.

These acts, to our mind, do not per se rise to the level of

psychological incapacity that the law requires. We stress that
psychological incapacity must be more than just a "difficulty,"
"refusal"
or
"neglect"
in
the
performance
of some marital obligations.In Republic of the Philippines v.
Norma
Cuison-Melgar,
et
al.,
[33]
we ruled that it is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to
meet his responsibility and duty as a married person; it is
essential that he or she must be shown to be incapable of doing
so because of some psychological, not physical, illness. In
other words, proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor in the

person an adverse integral element in the personality structure

that effectively incapacitates theperson from really accepting and
thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage had
to be shown.[34] A cause has to be shown and linked with the
manifestations of the psychological incapacity.

The respondents testimony failed to show that Juvys

condition is a manifestation of a disordered personality rooted in
some incapacitating or debilitating psychological condition that
rendered her unable to discharge her essential marital obligation.
In this light, the acts attributed to Juvy only showed indications of
immaturity and lack of sense of responsibility, resulting in nothing
more than thedifficulty, refusal or neglect in the performance
of marital obligations. In Ricardo B. Toring v. Teresita M. Toring,
[35]
we emphasized that irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity
or perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, and the
like do not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological
incapacity, as these may only be due to a person's difficulty,
refusal or neglect to undertake the obligations of marriage that is
not rooted in some psychological illness that Article 36 of the
Family Code addresses.

In like manner, Juvys acts of falsifying the respondents

signature to encash a check, of stealing the respondents ATM, and
of squandering a huge portion of the P15,000.00 that the
respondent entrusted to her, while no doubt reprehensible,
cannot automatically be equated with a psychological disorder,
especially when the evidence shows that these were
mere isolated incidents and not recurring acts. Neither can Juvys
penchant for playing mahjong andkuwaho for money, nor her act
of soliciting money from relatives on the pretext that her child
was sick, warrant a conclusion that she suffered from a mental
malady at the time of the celebration of marriage that rendered

her incapable of fulfilling her marital duties and obligations. The

respondent, in fact, admitted that Juvy engaged in these
behaviors (gambling and what the respondent refers to as
swindling) only two (2) years after their marriage, and after
he let her handle his salary and manage their finances. The
evidence also shows that Juvy even tried to augment the familys
income during the early stages of their marriage by putting up
a sari-sari store and by working as a manicurist.

b. The Psychologists Report

The submitted psychological report hardly helps the

respondents cause, as it glaringly failed to establish that Juvy was
psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential marital
duties at the material time required by Article 36 of the Family
Code.

To begin with, the psychologist admitted in her report that

she derived her conclusions exclusively from the information
given her by the respondent. Expectedly, the respondents
description of Juvy would contain a considerable degree of bias;
thus, a psychological evaluation based on this one-sided
description alone can hardly be considered as credible or
sufficient. We are of course aware of our pronouncement
in Marcos[36] that
the
person
sought
to
be
declared
psychologically incapacitated need not be examined by the
psychologist as a condition precedent to arrive at a conclusion. If
the incapacity can be proven by independent means, no reason
exists why such independent proof cannot be admitted to support
a conclusion of psychological incapacity, independently of a
psychologists examination and report. In this case, however, no
such independent evidence has ever been gathered and

adduced. To be sure, evidence from independent sources who

intimately knew Juvybefore and after the celebration of her
marriage would have made a lot of difference and could have
added weight to the psychologists report.

Separately from the lack of the requisite factual basis, the

psychologists report simply stressed Juvys negative traits which
she considered manifestations of Juvys psychological incapacity
(e.g., laziness, immaturity and irresponsibility; her involvement in
swindling and gambling activities; and her lack of initiative to
change), and declared that psychological findings tend to confirm
that the defendant suffers from personality and behavioral
disorders x x x she doesnt manifest any sense of responsibility
and loyalty, and these disorders appear to be incorrigible. [37] In
the end, the psychologist opined without stating the psychological
basis for herconclusion that there is sufficient reason to believe
that the defendant wife is psychologically incapacitated to
perform her marital duties as a wife and mother to their only son.
[38]

We find this kind of

conclusion
and
report
grossly
inadequate.First, we note that the psychologist did not even
identify
the
types
of
psychological
tests which she administered on the respondent and theroot caus
e of Juvys psychological condition. We also stress that the acts
alleged to have been committed by Juvy all occurred during the
marriage; there was no showing that any mental disorder existed
at the inception of the marriage. Second, the report failed to
prove the gravity or severity of Juvys alleged condition,
specifically, why and to what extent the disorder is serious, and
how it incapacitated her to comply with her marital duties.
Significantly, the report did not even categorically state the
particular type of personality disorder found.Finally, the report

failed to establish the incurability of Juvys condition. The reports

pronouncements that Juvy lacks the initiative to change and that
her mental incapacity appears incorrigible [39] are insufficient to
prove that her mental condition could not be treated, or if it were
otherwise, the cure would be beyond her means to undertake.

c. The Psychologists Testimony

The psychologists court testimony fared no better in proving

the juridical antecedence, gravity or incurability of Juvys alleged
psychological defect as she merely reiterated what she wrote in
her report i.e., that Juvy was lazy and irresponsible;
played mahjong andkuhawo for money; stole money from the
respondent; deceived people to borrow cash; and neglected her
child without linking these to an underlying psychological cause.
Again, these allegations, even if true, all occurred during the
marriage. The testimony was totally devoid of any information or
insight into Juvys early life and associations, how she acted before
and at the time of the marriage, and how the symptoms of a
disordered personality developed. Simply put, the psychologist
failed to trace the history of Juvys psychological condition and to
relate it to an existing incapacity at the time of the celebration of
the marriage.

She, likewise, failed to successfully prove the elements of

gravity and incurability. In these respects, she merely stated that
despite the respondents efforts to show love and affection, Juvy
washesitant to change. From this premise, she jumped to the
conclusion that Juvy appeared to be incurable or incorrigible, and
would
bevery
hard
to
cure.
These
unfounded
conclusions cannot be equated with gravity or incurability that

Article 36 of the Family Code requires. To be declared clinically or

medically incurable is one thing; to refuse or be reluctant to
change is another. To hark back to what we earlier discussed,
psychological incapacity refers only to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage.[40]

The Constitution sets out a policy of protecting and

strengthening the family as the basic social institution, and
marriage is the foundation of the family. Marriage, as an inviolable
institution protected by the State, cannot be dissolved at the
whim of the parties. In petitions for the declaration of nullity of
marriage, the burden of proof to show the nullity of marriage lies
with the plaintiff.[41]Unless the evidence presented clearly reveals
a situation where the parties, or one of them, could not have
validly entered into a marriage by reason of a grave and serious
psychological illness existing at the time it was celebrated, we are
compelled to uphold the indissolubility of the marital tie. [42]

WHEREFORE,
in
view
of
these
considerations,
we GRANTthe petition. We SET ASIDE the Decision and the
Resolution of the Court of Appeals, dated November 25,
2004 and May 9, 2005, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 70004.
Accordingly,
we DISMISSrespondent
Nestor
Galangs petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to
Juvy Salazar under Article 36 of the Family Code. Costs against
respondent Nestor Galang.

SO ORDERED.

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been

reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer
of the opinion of the Courts Division.

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice
Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and

the Division Chairpersons Attestation, it is hereby certified that
the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

Designated additional member vice Associate Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno, per
Special Order No. 997, dated June 6, 2011.
*

Sick Leave.

[1]

Under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court.

[2]

Rollo, pp. 51-58; penned by Associate Justice Edgardo P. Cruz, and concurred in by
Associate Justice Godardo A. Jacinto and Associate Justice Jose C. Mendoza (now a member
of this Court).
[3]

Id. at 59.

[4]

CA rollo, pp. 47-58; penned by Judge Melencio Claros.

[5]

Records, pp. 2-3.

[6]

TSN, March 7, 2000, pp. 5-7.

[7]

Id. at 8-12.

[8]

TSN, June 13, 2000, pp. 5-6.

[9]

Record of Exhibits, Exhibit K, pp. 14-16.

[10]

Supra note 4, at 55-57.

[11]

Supra note 2.

[12]

Supra note 3.

[13]

Rollo, pp. 10-49.

[14]

So v. Valera, G.R. No. 150677, June 5, 2009, 588 SCRA 319, 331.

[15]

G.R. No. 112019, January 4, 1995, 240 SCRA 20, 34.

[16]

See Padilla-Rumbaua v. Rumbaua, G.R. No. 166738, August 14, 2009, 596 SCRA 157, 175.

[17]

G.R. No. 108763, February 13, 1997, 268 SCRA 198, 209-213.

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to
the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is
rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity
of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire
Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It
decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution
at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected"
by the state.

The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family
and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a)
medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently
proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the
Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical,
although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence
must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or
psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the
obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid
assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given
here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle
ofejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as
apsychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert
evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the
celebration of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was
existing when the parties exchanged their I do's. The manifestation of the
illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have
attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative
only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against

everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to

the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to
marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. x x x x
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of
the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, mild
characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as
downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less
ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the
person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby
complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by
Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as
well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and
their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in
the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal
of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive,
should be given great respect by our courts. x x x x
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be
handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be
quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or
opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along
with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification
within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for
resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent
function of thedefensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.
[18]

Supra note 15.

[19]

G.R. No. 136490, October 19, 2000, 343 SCRA 755, 764.

[20]

Took effect on March 15, 2003.

[21]

G.R. No. 161793, February 13, 2009, 579 SCRA 193.

[22]

Supra note 17.

[23]

G.R. No. 166562, March 31, 2009, 582 SCRA 694.

[24]

G.R. No. 164493, March 12, 2010, 615 SCRA 154.

[25]

Supra note 17.

[26]

Supra note 21.

[27]

Supra note 17.

[28]

Ibid.

[29]

Supra note 21.

[30]

Supra note 23.

[31]

Supra note 21.

[32]

Agraviador v. Amparo Agraviador, G.R. No. 170729, December 8, 2010.

[33]

G.R. No. 139676, March 31, 2006, 486 SCRA 177.

[34]

See Bier v. Bier, G.R. No. 173294, February 27, 2008, 547 SCRA 123, 135.

[35]

G.R. No. 165321, August 3, 2010, 626 SCRA 389, 408.

[36]

Supra note 19.

[37]

Supra note 9, Exhibit K-1, at 15.

[38]

Supra note 9, Exhibit K-2, at 16.

[39]

Supra note 37.

[40]

Supra note 15.

[41]

See Paz v. Paz, G.R. No. 166579, February 18, 2010, 613 SCRA 195.

[42]

Supra note 32.

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 170022, January 09, 2013]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. CESAR ENCELAN, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the petition for review on certiorari1 filed by petitioner Republic of the Philippines challenging the
October 7, 2005 amended decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) that reconsidered its March 22, 2004
decision3 (original decision) in CA-G.R. CV No. 75583. In its original decision, the CA set aside the June 5,
2002 decision4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 47, in Civil Case No. 95-74257, which
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The Factual Antecedents

On August 25, 1979, Cesar married Lolita5 and the union bore two children, Maricar and Manny.6 To
support his family, Cesar went to work in Saudi Arabia on May 15, 1984. On June 12, 1986, Cesar, while still
in Saudi Arabia, learned that Lolita had been having an illicit affair with Alvin Perez. Sometime in
1991,7 Lolita allegedly left the conjugal home with her children and lived with Alvin. Since then, Cesar and
Lolita had been separated. On June 16, 1995, Cesar filed with the RTC a petition against Lolita for the
declaration of the nullity of his marriage based on Lolita's psychological incapacity.8
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Lolita denied that she had an affair with Alvin; she contended that Alvin used to be an associate in her
promotions business. She insisted that she is not psychologically incapacitated and that she left their home
because of irreconcilable differences with her mother-in-law.9
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At the trial, Cesar affirmed his allegations of Lolita's infidelity and subsequent abandonment of the family
home.10 He testified that he continued to provide financial support for Lolita and their children even after he
learned of her illicit affair with Alvin.11
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Cesar presented the psychological evaluation report 12 on Lolita prepared by Dr. Fareda Fatima Flores of the
National Center for Mental Health. Dr. Flores found that Lolita was "not suffering from any form of major
psychiatric illness[,]13 but had been "unable to provide the expectations expected of her for a good
and lasting marital relationship;14 her "transferring from one job to the other depicts some interpersonal
problems with co-workers as well as her impatience in attaining her ambitions;15 and "her refusal to go
with her husband abroad signifies her reluctance to work out a good marital and family relationship.16
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The RTC Ruling

In its June 5, 2002 decision,17 the RTC declared Cesar's marriage to Lolita void, finding sufficient basis to
declare Lolita psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations.
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The petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), appealed to the CA.
The CA Ruling

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The CA originally18 set aside the RTC's verdict, finding that Lolita's abandonment of the conjugal dwelling
and infidelity were not serious cases of personality disorder/psychological illness. Lolita merely refused to
comply with her marital obligations which she was capable of doing. The CA significantly observed that
infidelity is only a ground for legal separation, not for the declaration of the nullity of a marriage.
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Cesar sought reconsideration19 of the CA's decision and, in due course, attained his objective. The CA set
aside its original decision and entered another, which affirmed the RTC's decision. In its amended
decision,20 the CA found two circumstances indicative of Lolita's serious psychological incapacity that
resulted in her gross infidelity: (1) Lolita's unwarranted refusal to perform her marital obligations to Cesar;
and (2) Lolita's willful and deliberate act of abandoning the conjugal dwelling.
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The OSG then filed the present petition.

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The Petition
The OSG argues that Dr. Flores' psychological evaluation report did not disclose that Lolita had been
suffering from a psychological illness nor did it establish its juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability;
infidelity and abandonment do not constitute psychological incapacity, but are merely grounds for legal
separation.
cralawlibrary

The Case for the Respondent

Cesar submits that Lolita's infidelity and refusal to perform her marital obligations established her grave and
incurable psychological incapacity.
cralawlibrary

The Issue
The case presents to us the legal issue of whether there exists sufficient basis to nullify Cesar's marriage to
Lolita on the ground of psychological incapacity.
cralawlibrary

The Court's Ruling

We grant the petition. No sufficient basis exists to annul Cesar's marriage to Lolita on the ground
of psychological incapacity.
Applicable Law and Jurisprudence
on Psychological Incapacity
Article 36 of the Family Code governs psychological incapacity as a ground for declaration of nullity of
marriage. It provides that "[a] marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be
void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization."
In interpreting this provision, we have repeatedly stressed that psychological incapacity contemplates
"downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital
obligations;21 not merely the refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will, on the part of the errant
spouse.22 The plaintiff bears the burden of proving the juridical antecedence (i.e., the existence at the time
of the celebration of marriage), gravity and incurability of the condition of the errant spouse. 23
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Cesar failed to prove Lolita's

psychological incapacity
In this case, Cesar's testimony failed to prove Lolita's alleged psychological incapacity. Cesar testified on the
dates when he learned of Lolita's alleged affair and her subsequent abandonment of their home, 24 as well as
his continued financial support to her and their children even after he learned of the affair,25 but he merely
mentioned in passing Lolita's alleged affair with Alvin and her abandonment of the conjugal dwelling.
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In any event, sexual infidelity and abandonment of the conjugal dwelling, even if true, do not necessarily
constitute psychological incapacity; these are simply grounds for legal separation. 26 To constitute
psychological incapacity, it must be shown that the unfaithfulness and abandonment are manifestations of a
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disordered personality that completely prevented the erring spouse from discharging the essential marital
obligations.27 No evidence on record exists to support Cesar's allegation that Lolita's infidelity and
abandonment were manifestations of any psychological illness.
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Cesar mistakenly relied on Dr. Flores' psychological evaluation report on Lolita to prove her alleged
psychological incapacity. The psychological evaluation, in fact, established that Lolita did not suffer from any
major psychiatric illness.28 Dr. Flores' observation on Lolita's interpersonal problems with co-workers, 29 to
our mind, does not suffice as a consideration for the conclusion that she was at the time of her marriage
psychologically incapacitated to enter into a marital union with Cesar. Aside from the time element involved,
a wife's psychological fitness as a spouse cannot simply be equated with her professional/work relationship;
workplace obligations and responsibilities are poles apart from their marital counterparts. While both spring
from human relationship, their relatedness and relevance to one another should be fully established for
them to be compared or to serve as measures of comparison with one another. To be sure, the evaluation
report Dr. Flores prepared and submitted cannot serve this purpose. Dr. Flores' further belief that Lolita's
refusal to go with Cesar abroad signified a reluctance to work out a good marital relationship 30 is a mere
generalizationunsupported by facts and is, in fact, a rash conclusion that this Court cannot support.
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In sum, we find that Cesar failed to prove the existence of Lolita's psychological incapacity; thus, the CA
committed a reversible error when it reconsidered its original decision.
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Once again, we stress that marriage is an inviolable social institution 31 protected by the State. Any doubt
should be resolved in favor of its existence its existence and continuation and against its dissolution and
nullity.32 It cannot be dissolved at the whim of the parties nor by transgressions made by one party to the
other during the marriage.
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WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition and SET ASIDE the October 7, 2005 amended decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 75583. Accordingly, we DISMISS respondent Cesar Encelan's petition for
declaration of nullity of his marriage to Lolita Castillo-Encelan.
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Costs against the respondent.

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SO ORDERED.
Carpio, (Chairperson), Del Castillo, Perez, and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.

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Endnotes:

1
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Under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure; rollo, pp. 9 37.

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Penned by Associate Justice Elvi John S. Asuncion, and concurred in by Associate Justices Godardo A.
Jacinto and Lucas P. Bersamin (now a member of this Court); id. at 39-42.
2

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3
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4
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5
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6
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Id. at 43-50.

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Records, pp. 436-438; penned by Judge Nimfa Cuesta-Yilches.

Id. at 6.

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Id. at 7-8.

cralawlibrary

Id. at 2 and 73. Also stated as "1989" and "1990" in other parts of the record and the TSN; rollo, pp. 44
and 92; TSN, August 22, 1996, p. 36; records, p. 119.
7

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8
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9
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Records, pp. 1-4.

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Id. at 165-167 and 313-318.

10
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11
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Id. at 115-119.
Id. at 104-114.

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12
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13
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14
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15
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16
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17
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18
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19
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20
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21
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Id. at 243-245.
Id. at 245.

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Ibid.
Ibid.

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Ibid.
Supra note 4.
Supra note 2.

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CA rollo, pp. 87-93.

Supra note 2.

cralawlibrary

cralawlibrary

Kalaw v. Fernandez, G.R. No. 166357, September 19, 2011, 657 SCRA 822, 836-837.

cralawlibrary

Agraviador v. Amparo-Agraviador, G.R. No. 170729, December 8, 2010, 637 SCRA 519, 538; Toring v.
Toring, G.R. No. 165321, August 3, 2010, 626 SCRA 389, 405; Paz v. Paz, G.R. No. 166579, February 18,
2010, 613 SCRA 195, 205; Navales v. Navales, G.R. No. 167523, June 27, 2008, 556 SCRA 272, 288; Paras
v. Paras, G.R. No. 147824, August 2, 2007, 529 SCRA 81, 106; Republic of the Phils. v. Iyoy, 507 Phil. 485,
502 (2005); and Rep. of the Phils. v. Court of Appeals, 335 Phil. 664, 678 (1997).
22

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Kalaw v. Fernandez, supra note 21, at 823; Republic v. Galang, G.R. No. 168335, June 6, 2011, 650
SCRA 524, 544; Dimayuga-Laurena v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 159220, September 22, 2008, 566 SCRA
154, 161-162; Republic v. Cabantug-Baguio, G.R. No. 171042, June 30, 2008, 556 SCRA 711,
725; Hernandez v. Court of Appeals, 377 Phil. 919, 932 (1999); and Rep. of the Phils. v. Court of Appeals,
supra, at 676.
23

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24
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25
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26
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Supra note 10.

Supra note 11.

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The Family Code, Art. 55. A petition for legal separation may be filed on any of the following grounds:

xxxx
(8) Sexual infidelity or perversion;
xxxx
(10) Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause for more than one year.
27
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28
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29
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30
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Toring v. Toring, supra note 22, at 406.

Supra note 13.
Supra note 15.
Supra note 16.

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Bolos v. Bolos, G.R. No. 186400, October 20, 2010, 634 SCRA 429, 439; andCamacho-Reyes v.
Reyes, G.R. No. 185286, August 18, 2010, 628 SCRA 461, 464.
32
Ochosa v. Alano, G.R. No. 167459, January 26, 2011, 640 SCRA 517, 524; Republic v. Cabamug-Baguio,
supra note 23, at 727; and Rep. of the Phils. v. Court of Appeals, supra note 23, at 676.
31

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THIRD DIVISION

VERONICA CABACUNGAN
ALCAZAR,

G.R. No. 174451

Petitioner,
Present:

CARPIO, J.,
- versus -

Chairperson,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA, and
PERALTA, JJ.

REY C. ALCAZAR,

Respondent.

Promulgated:

October 13, 2009

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks to reverse the

Decision[1] dated 24 May 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 84471, affirming the Decision dated 9 June 2004 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos City, Branch 85, in Civil Case
No. 664-M-2002, which dismissed petitioner Veronica Cabacungan
Alcazars Complaint for the annulment of her marriage to
respondent Rey C. Alcazar.
The Complaint,[2] docketed as Civil Case No. 664-M-2002, was filed
by petitioner before the RTC on 22 August 2002. Petitioner alleged
in her Complaint that she was married to respondent on 11
October 2000 by Rev. Augusto G. Pabustan (Pabustan), at the
latters residence. After their wedding, petitioner and respondent
lived for five days in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, the hometown
of respondents parents. Thereafter, the newlyweds went back
to Manila, but respondent did not live with petitioner at the latters

abode at 2601-C Jose Abad Santos Avenue, Tondo, Manila. On 23

October 2000, respondent left for Riyadh, Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia, where he worked as an upholsterer in a furniture
shop. While working in Riyadh, respondent did not communicate
with petitioner by phone or by letter. Petitioner tried to call
respondent for five times but respondent never answered. About
a year and a half after respondent left for Riyadh, a co-teacher
informed petitioner that respondent was about to come home to
the Philippines. Petitioner was surprised why she was not advised
by respondent of his arrival.

Petitioner further averred in her Complaint that when

respondent arrived in the Philippines, the latter did not go home
to
petitioner
at 2601-C
Jose
Abad
Santos
Avenue,
Tondo, Manila. Instead, respondent proceeded to his parents
house in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro. Upon learning that
respondent was in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, petitioner went
to see her brother-in-law in Velasquez St., Tondo, Manila, who
claimed
that
he
was
not
aware
of
respondents
whereabouts. Petitioner traveled to San Jose, Occidental Mindoro,
where she was informed that respondent had been living with his
parents since his arrival in March 2002.

Petitioner asserted that from the time respondent arrived in

the Philippines, he never contacted her. Thus, petitioner
concluded that respondent was physically incapable of
consummating his marriage with her, providing sufficient cause
for annulment of their marriage pursuant to paragraph 5, Article
45 of the Family Code of the Philippines(Family Code). There was
also no more possibility of reconciliation between petitioner and
respondent.

Per the Sheriffs Return[3] dated 3 October 2002, a summons,

together with a copy of petitioners Complaint, was served upon
respondent on 30 September 2002.[4]

On 18 November 2002, petitioner, through counsel, filed a

Motion[5] to direct the public prosecutor to conduct an
investigation of the case pursuant to Article 48 of the Family
Code.

As respondent did not file an Answer, the RTC issued on 27

November 2002 an Order[6] directing the public prosecutor to
conduct an investigation to ensure that no collusion existed
between the parties; to submit a report thereon; and to appear in
all stages of the proceedings to see to it that evidence was not
fabricated or suppressed.

On 4 March 2003, Public Prosecutrix Veronica A.V. de

Guzman (De Guzman) submitted her Report manifesting that she
had conducted an investigation of the case of petitioner and
respondent in January 2003, but respondent never participated
therein. Public Prosecutrix De Guzman also noted that no collusion
took place between the parties, and measures were taken to
prevent suppression of evidence between them. She then
recommended that a full-blown trial be conducted to determine
whether petitioners Complaint was meritorious or not.

Pre-trial was held and terminated on 20 May 2003.

On 21 May 2003, the RTC received the Notice of Appearance

of the Solicitor General.

Trial on the merits ensued thereafter.

During trial, petitioner presented herself, her mother Lolita

Cabacungan (Cabacungan), and clinical psychologist Nedy L.
Tayag (Tayag) as witnesses.

Petitioner first took the witness stand and elaborated on the

allegations
in
her
Complaint. Cabacungan
corroborated
petitioners testimony.

Petitioners third witness, Tayag, presented the

psychological evaluation of petitioner and respondent:

following

After meticulous scrutiny and careful analysis of the collected

data, petitioner is found to be free from any underlying personality
aberration neither (sic) of any serious psychopathological traits, which
may possibly impede her normal functioning (sic) of marriage. On the
other hand, the undersigned arrived to (sic) a firm opinion that the
sudden breakdown of marital life between petitioner and respondent
was clearly due to the diagnosed personality disorder that the
respondent is harboring, making him psychologically incapacitated to
properly assume and comply [with] essential roles (sic) of obligations
as a married man.

The pattern of behaviors displayed by the respondent satisfies

the diagnostic criteria of a disorder clinically classified as Narcissistic
Personality Disorder, a condition deemed to be grave, severe, long
lasting in proportion and incurable by any treatment.

People suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder are

known to have a pervasive pattern of grandiosity (in fantasy or

behavior), need for admiration, and lack of empathy, beginning by

early adulthood and present in a variety of contexts, as indicated by
five (or more) of the following:

1. has a grandiose of self-importance (e.g. exaggerates

achievements and talents, expect to be recognized as superior without
commensurate achievements)

2. is preoccupied with fantasies of unlimited success, power,

brilliance, beauty or ideal love

3. believes that he or she is special and unique and can only be

understood by, or should associate with, other special or high status
people (institutions)

4. requires excessive admiration

5. has sense of entitlement, i.e., unreasonable expectations of

especially favorable treatment or automatic compliance with his or her
expectations

6. is interpersonally exploitative, i.e., takes advantage of others

to achieve his or her own ends

7. lacks empathy: is unwilling to recognize or identify with the

feelings and needs of others

8. is often envious of others or believes that others are envious

of him or her

9. shows arrogant, haughty behavior or attitudes.

The root cause of respondents personality disorder can be

attributed to his early childhood years with predisposing psychosocial
factors that influence[d] his development. It was recounted that
respondent is the first child of his mothers second family. Obviously,
unhealthy familial constellation composed his immediate environment
in his growing up years. Respondent had undergone a severe longing
for attention from his father who had been unfaithful to them and had
died early in life, that he was left alone to fend for the family needs.
More so that they were coping against poverty, his caregivers failed to
validate his needs, wishes or responses and overlooked the love and
attention he yearned which led to develop a pathological need for selfobject to help him maintain a cohesive sense of self-such so great that
everything other people offer is consumed. Hence, he is unable to
develop relationship with other (sic) beyond this need. There is no
capacity for empathy sharing, or loving others.

The psychological incapacity of the respondent is characterized

by juridical antecedence as it already existed long before he entered
into marriage. Since it already started early in life, it is deeply
engrained within his system and becomes a[n] integral part of his
personality structure, thereby rendering such to be permanent and
incurable.[7]

Tayag concluded in the end that:

As such, their marriage is already beyond repair, considering the

fact that it has long been (sic) ceased to exist and have their different
life priorities. Reconciliation between them is regarded to be (sic). The
essential obligations of love, trust, respect, fidelity, authentic
cohabitation as husband and wife, mutual help and support, and
commitment, did not and will no lon[g]er exist between them. With due
consideration of the above-mentioned findings, the undersigned
recommends, the declaration of nullity of marriage between petitioner
and respondent.[8]

On 18 February 2004, petitioner filed her Formal Offer of

Evidence. Public Prosecutrix Myrna S. Lagrosa (Lagrosa), who
replaced Public Prosecutrix De Guzman, interposed no objection
to the admission of petitioners evidence and manifested that she
would no longer present evidence for the State.

On 9 June 2004, the RTC rendered its Decision denying petitioners

Complaint for annulment of her marriage to respondent, holding in substance that:

In the case at bar, the Court finds that the acts of the respondent in not
communicating with petitioner and not living with the latter the moment he
returned home from Saudi Arabia despite their marriage do (sic) not lead to a
conclusion of psychological incapacity on his part. There is absolutely no
showing that his defects were already present at the inception of their marriage or
that these are incurable.

That being the case, the Court resolves to deny the instant petition.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Annulment of

Marriage is hereby DENIED.[9]

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration [10] but it was

denied by the RTC in an Order[11] dated 19 August 2004.

Aggrieved, petitioner filed an appeal with the Court of

Appeals,
docketed
as
CA-G.R.
CV
No.
84471. In
a
[12]
Decision
dated 24 May 2006, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
RTC Decision dated 9 June 2004. The Court of Appeals ruled that
the RTC did not err in finding that petitioner failed to prove
respondents psychological incapacity. Other than petitioners bare
allegations, no other evidence was presented to prove
respondents personality disorder that made him completely
unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital
state. Citing Republic v. Court of Appeals,[13] the appellate court
ruled that the evidence should be able to establish that at least
one of the spouses was mentally or physically ill to such an extent
that said person could not have known the marital obligations to
be assumed; or knowing the marital obligations, could not have
validly assumed the same. At most, respondents abandonment of
petitioner could be a ground for legal separation under Article 5 of
the Family Code.

Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the

Court of Appeals in a Resolution[14] dated 28 August 2008.

Hence, this Petition raising the sole issue of:

WHETHER OR NOT, AS DEFINED BY THE LAW AND

JURISPRUDENCE, RESPONDENT IS PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED
TO PERFORM THE ESSENTIAL MARITAL OBLIGATONS.[15]

At the outset, it must be noted that the Complaint originally

filed by petitioner before the RTC was for annulment of

marriage based on Article 45, paragraph 5 of the Family

Code, which reads:

ART. 45. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes,
existing at the time of the marriage:
xxxx

(5) That either party was physically incapable of

consummating the marriage with the other, and such incapacity
continues and appears to be incurable; x x x.

Article 45(5) of the Family Code refers to lack of power to

copulate.[16] Incapacity to consummate denotes the permanent
inability on the part of the spouses to perform the complete act of
sexual intercourse.[17] Non-consummation of a marriage may be
on the part of the husband or of the wife and may be caused by a
physical or structural defect in the anatomy of one of the parties
or it may be due to chronic illness and inhibitions or fears arising
in whole or in part from psychophysical conditions. It may be
caused by psychogenic causes, where such mental block or
disturbance has the result of making the spouse physically
incapable of performing the marriage act. [18]

No evidence was presented in the case at bar to establish

that respondent was in any way physically incapable to
consummate his marriage with petitioner. Petitioner even
admitted during her cross-examination that she and respondent
had sexual intercourse after their wedding and before respondent
left for abroad. There obviously being no physical incapacity on
respondents part, then, there is no ground for annulling

petitioners marriage to respondent. Petitioners Complaint was,

therefore, rightfully dismissed.
One curious thing, though, caught this Courts attention. As
can be gleaned from the evidence presented by petitioner and the
observations of the RTC and the Court of Appeals, it appears that
petitioner was actually seeking the declaration of nullity of her
marriage to respondent based on the latters psychological
incapacity to comply with his marital obligations of marriage
under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Petitioner attributes the filing of the erroneous Complaint
before the RTC to her former counsels mistake or gross ignorance.
[19]
But even said reason cannot save petitioners Complaint from
dismissal. It is settled in this jurisdiction that the client is bound
by the acts, even mistakes, of the counsel in the realm of
procedural technique.[20]Although this rule is not a hard and fast
one and admits of exceptions, such as where the mistake of
counsel is so gross, palpable and inexcusable as to result in the
violation of his clients substantive rights, [21] petitioner failed to
convince us that such exceptional circumstances exist herein.
Assuming for the sake of argument that we can treat the
Complaint as one for declaration of nullity based on Article 36 of
the Family Code, we will still dismiss the Complaint for lack of
merit, consistent with the evidence presented by petitioner during
the trial.

Article 36 of the Family Code provides:

ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of

the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if
such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

In Santos v. Court of Appeals,[22] the Court declared that

psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code is not
meant to comprehend all possible cases of psychoses. It should
refer, rather, to no less than a mental (not physical)
incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic
marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage. Psychological
incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability.[23]

The Court laid down the guidelines in resolving petitions for

declaration of nullity of marriage, based on Article 36 of the
Family Code, in Republic v. Court of Appeals,[24] to wit:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage

belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution
and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our
laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our
Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it as
the foundation of the nation. It decrees marriage as legally inviolable,
thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both
the family and marriage are to be protected by the state.

The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage

and the family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and
solidarity.

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be a)

medically or clinically identified, b) alleged in the complaint, c)
sufficiently proven by experts and d) clearly explained in the decision.
Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be
psychological not physical, although its manifestations and/or

symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court

that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such
an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here
so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle
of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as
a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained.
Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of

the celebration of the marriage. The evidence must show that the
illness was existing when the parties exchanged their I dos. The
manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but
the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or

clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or
even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily
absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such
incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations,
not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a
profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be
effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to
cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate,
bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of
marriage.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the

disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
Thus, mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional
emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness
must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal,
neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral
element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the
person from really accepting and thereby complying with the
obligations essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by

Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and
wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to
parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s)
must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in
the text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial

Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling
or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. x x x.

Being
accordingly
guided
by
the
aforequoted
pronouncements in Republic v. Court of Appeals, we scrutinized
the totality of evidence presented by petitioner and found that
the same was not enough to sustain a finding that respondent
was psychologically incapacitated.

Petitioners evidence, particularly her and her mothers

testimonies, merely established that respondent left petitioner
soon after their wedding to work in Saudi Arabia; that when
respondent returned to the Philippines a year and a half later, he
directly went to live with his parents in San Jose, Occidental
Mindoro, and not with petitioner in Tondo, Manila; and that
respondent also did not contact petitioner at all since leaving for
abroad. These testimonies though do not give us much insight
into respondents psychological state.

Tayags psychological report leaves much to be desired and

hardly helps petitioners cause. It must be noted that Tayag was
not able to personally examine respondent.Respondent did not

appear for examination despite Tayags invitation. [25] Tayag,

evaluating respondents psychological state, had to rely
information provided by petitioner. Hence, we expect Tayag
have been more prudent and thorough in her evaluation
respondents psychological condition, since her source
information, namely, petitioner, was hardly impartial.

in
on
to
of
of

Tayag concluded in her report that respondent was suffering

from Narcissistic Personality Disorder, traceable to the latters
experiences during his childhood. Yet, the report is totally bereft
of the basis for the said conclusion. Tayag did not particularly
describe the pattern of behavior that showed that respondent
indeed had a Narcissistic Personality Disorder. Tayag likewise
failed to explain how such a personality disorder made
respondent psychologically incapacitated to perform his
obligations as a husband.We emphasize that the burden falls
upon petitioner, not just to prove that respondent suffers from a
psychological disorder, but also that such psychological disorder
renders him truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to
the marriage.[26] Psychological incapacity must be more than just
a difficulty, a refusal, or a neglect in the performance of some
marital obligations.

In this instance, we have been allowed, through the evidence

adduced, to peek into petitioners marital life and, as a result, we
perceive a simple case of a married couple being apart too long,
becoming strangers to each other, with the husband falling out of
love and distancing or detaching himself as much as possible
from his wife.

To be tired and give up on ones situation and on ones spouse

are not necessarily signs of psychological illness; neither can
falling out of love be so labeled. When these happen, the remedy
for some is to cut the marital knot to allow the parties to go their
separate ways. This simple remedy, however, is not available to
us under our laws. Ours is a limited remedy that addresses only a
very specific situation a relationship where no marriage could
have validly been concluded because the parties; or where one of
them, by reason of a grave and incurable psychological illness
existing when the marriage was celebrated, did not appreciate
the obligations of marital life and, thus, could not have validly
entered into a marriage.[27]

An unsatisfactory marriage is not a

marriage. As we stated in Marcos v. Marcos[28]:

null

and

void

Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused

with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes
therefor manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological
illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It
is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness
of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about
to assume. x x x.

Resultantly, we have held in the past that mere

irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities in no wise
constitute psychological incapacity. [29]

As a last-ditch effort to have her marriage to respondent

declared null, petitioner pleads abandonment by and sexual
infidelity of respondent. In a Manifestation and Motion[30] dated 21

August 2007 filed before us, petitioner claims that she was
informed by one Jacinto Fordonez, who is residing in the
same barangay as respondent in Occidental Mindoro, that
respondent is living-in with another woman named Sally.

Sexual infidelity, per se, however, does not constitute

psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family
Code. Again, petitioner must be able to establish that respondents
unfaithfulness is a manifestation of a disordered personality,
which makes him completely unable to discharge the essential
obligations of the marital state.[31]

It remains settled that the State has a high stake in the

preservation of marriage rooted in its recognition of the sanctity
of married life and its mission to protect and strengthen the
family as a basic autonomous social institution. Hence, any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of
the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.
[32]
Presumption is always in favor of the validity of
marriage. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio.[33] In the case at
bar, petitioner failed to persuade us that respondents failure to
communicate with petitioner since leaving for Saudi Arabia to
work, and to live with petitioner after returning to the country, are
grave psychological maladies that are keeping him from knowing
and/or complying with the essential obligations of marriage .

We are not downplaying petitioners frustration and misery in

finding herself shackled, so to speak, to a marriage that is no
longer working. Regrettably, there are situations like this one,
where neither law nor society can provide the specific answers to
every individual problem.[34]

WHEREFORE,
the
Petition
is DENIED. The 24
May
2006 Decision and 28 August 2008 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 84471, which affirmed the 9 June
2004 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos City, Branch
85, dismissing petitioner Veronica Cabacungan Alcazars
Complaint in Civil Case No. 664-M-2002, are AFFIRMED. No
costs.

SO ORDERED.

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached

in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the

Division Chairpersons Attestation, it is hereby certified that the
conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation

before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Courts Division.

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Acting Chief Justice

[1]

Penned by Associate Justice Magdangal de Leon with Justices Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. and Mariano
C. del Castillo (now a member of this Court) concurring; rollo, pp. 18-24.

[2]

Records, pp. 3-5.

[3]

Id. at 10.

[4]

Id. at 75

[5]

Id. at 12.

[6]

Id. at 13.

[7]

Rollo, pp. 67-68.

[8]

Records, p. 69.

[9]

Id. at 80.

[10]

Id. at 91-95.

[11]

Id. at 96.

[12]

Rollo, p. 24.

[13]

335 Phil. 664 (1997).

[14]

Rollo, p. 27.

[15]

Id. at 6.

[16]

Alicia V. Sempio-Dy, Handbook on the Family Code of the Philippines, p. 58.

[17]

Melencio S. Sta. Maria, Jr., Persons and Family Relations Law (2004 Edition,) p. 278.

[18]

Id. at 279.

[19]

Rollo, p. 8.

[20]

Tan Hang v. Paredes, 241 Phil. 740 (1988).

[21]

Heirs of Pael and Destura v. Court of Appeals, 382 Phil. 222, 244-245 (2000).

[22]

310 Phil. 21, 30 (1995).

[23]

Id.; Marcos v. Marcos, 397 Phil. 840, 850 (2000).

[24]

Supra note 13 at 676-678.

[25]

TSN, 21 January 2004, p. 6

[26]

Santos v. Court of Appeals, supra note 22.

[27]

Renato Reyes So v. Valera, G.R. No. 150677, 5 June 2009.

[28]

Marcos v. Marcos, supra note 23 at 851.

[29]

Republic v. Court of Appeals, supra note 13.

[30]

Rollo, pp. 41-43.

[31]

Santos v. Court of Appeals, supra note 22; Hernandez v. Court of Appeals, 377 Phil. 919, 931-932 (1999); Dedel
v. Court of Appeals, 466 Phil. 226, 233-232 (2004).

[32]

Carating-Siayngco v Siayngco, 484 Phil. 396, 412 (2004).

[33]

Id.

[34]

Dedel v. Court of Appeals, supra note 31.

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Baguio City
FIRST DIVISION

NILO OROPESA,
Petitioner,

G.R. No. 184528

Present:

CORONA, C.J.,
- versus -

Chairperson,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO, and
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.

Promulgated:
CIRILO OROPESA,
Respondent.
April 25, 2012
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the

1997 Rules of Civil Procedure of the Decision [1] dated February 29,
2008, as well as the Resolution[2] dated September 16, 2008, both
rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 88449,
entitled NILO OROPESA vs. CIRILO OROPESA. The Court of Appeals
issuances affirmed the Order[3] dated September 27, 2006 and the
Order[4] dated November 14, 2006 issued by the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Paraaque City, Branch 260 in SP. Proc. Case No. 040016, which dismissed petitioner Nilo Oropesas petition for
guardianship over the properties of his father, respondent Cirilo
Oropesa (a widower), and denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration thereof, respectively.

The facts of this case, as summed in the assailed Decision, follow:

On January 23, 2004, the (petitioner) filed with the Regional Trial Court
of Paraaque City, a petition for him and a certain Ms. Louie Ginez to be
appointed as guardians over the property of his father, the
(respondent) Cirilo Oropesa. The case was docketed as SP Proc. No. 040016 and raffled off to Branch 260.

In the said petition, it is alleged among others that the (respondent)

has been afflicted with several maladies and has been sickly for over
ten (10) years already having suffered a stroke on April 1, 2003 and
June 1, 2003, that his judgment and memory [were] impaired and such
has been evident after his hospitalization; that even before his stroke,
the (respondent) was observed to have had lapses in memory and
judgment, showing signs of failure to manage his property properly;
that due to his age and medical condition, he cannot, without outside
aid, manage his property wisely, and has become an easy prey for
deceit and exploitation by people around him, particularly Ms. Ma.
Luisa Agamata, his girlfriend.

In an Order dated January 29, 2004, the presiding judge of the court a
quo set the case for hearing, and directed the court social worker to
conduct a social case study and submit a report thereon.

Pursuant to the abovementioned order, the Court Social Worker

conducted her social case study, interviewing the (petitioner) and his
witnesses. The Court Social Worker subsequently submitted her report
but without any finding on the (respondent) who refused to see and
talk to the social worker.

On July 6, 2004, the (respondent) filed his Opposition to the petition for
guardianship. On August 3, 2004, the (respondent) filed his
Supplemental Opposition.

Thereafter, the (petitioner) presented his evidence which consists of

his testimony, and that of his sister Gianina Oropesa Bennett, and the
(respondents) former nurse, Ms. Alma Altaya.

After presenting evidence, the (petitioner) filed a manifestation dated

May 29, 2006 resting his case. The (petitioner) failed to file his written
formal offer of evidence.

Thus, the (respondent) filed his Omnibus Motion (1) to Declare the
petitioner to have waived the presentation of his Offer of Exhibits and
the presentation of his Evidence Closed since they were not formally
offered; (2) To Expunge the Documents of the Petitioner from the
Record; and (3) To Grant leave to the Oppositor to File Demurrer to
Evidence.

In an Order dated July 14, 2006, the court a quo granted the
(respondents) Omnibus Motion. Thereafter, the (respondent) then filed
his Demurrer to Evidence dated July 23, 2006. [5] (Citations omitted.)

The trial court granted respondents demurrer to evidence in an

Order dated September 27, 2006. The dispositive portion of which
reads:

WHEREFORE, considering that the petitioner has failed to provide

sufficient evidence to establish that Gen. Cirilo O. Oropesa is
incompetent to run his personal affairs and to administer his
properties, Oppositors Demurrer to Evidence is GRANTED, and the case
is DISMISSED.[6]

Petitioner moved for reconsideration but this was denied by

the trial court in an Order dated November 14, 2006, the
dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, considering that the Court record shows that

petitioner-movant has failed to provide sufficient documentary and
testimonial evidence to establish that Gen. Cirilo Oropesa is
incompetent to run his personal affairs and to administer his
properties, the Court hereby affirms its earlier Order dated 27
September 2006.

Accordingly, petitioners Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED for

lack of merit.[7]

Unperturbed, petitioner elevated the case to the Court of

Appeals but his appeal was dismissed through the now assailed
Decision dated February 29, 2008, the dispositive portion of which
reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered the instant appeal is

DISMISSED. The assailed orders of the court a quo dated September
27, 2006 and November 14, 2006 are AFFIRMED.[8]

A motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioner but this

was denied by the Court of Appeals in the similarly assailed
Resolution dated September 16, 2008. Hence, the instant petition
was filed.

Petitioner submits the following question for consideration by

this Court:

WHETHER RESPONDENT IS CONSIDERED AN INCOMPETENT PERSON AS

DEFINED UNDER SECTION 2, RULE 92 OF THE RULES OF COURT WHO
SHOULD BE PLACED UNDER GUARDIANSHIP[9]

After considering the evidence and pleadings on record, we

find the petition to be without merit.

Petitioner comes before the Court arguing that the assailed

rulings of the Court of Appeals should be set aside as it allegedly
committed grave and reversible error when it affirmed the
erroneous decision of the trial court which purportedly
disregarded the overwhelming evidence presented by him
showing respondents incompetence.
In Francisco v. Court of Appeals,[10] we laid out the nature
and purpose of guardianship in the following wise:

A guardianship is a trust relation of the most sacred character, in

which one person, called a guardian acts for another called the ward
whom the law regards as incapable of managing his own affairs. A
guardianship is designed to further the wards well-being, not that of
the guardian. It is intended to preserve the wards property, as well as
to render any assistance that the ward may personally require. It has
been stated that while custody involves immediate care and control,
guardianship indicates not only those responsibilities, but those of one
in loco parentisas well.[11]

In a guardianship proceeding, a court may appoint a

qualified guardian if the prospective ward is proven to be a minor
or an incompetent.

A reading of Section 2, Rule 92 of the Rules of Court tells us

that persons who, though of sound mind but by reason of age,
disease, weak mind or other similar causes, are incapable of
taking care of themselves and their property without outside aid
are considered as incompetents who may properly be placed
under guardianship. The full text of the said provision reads:

Sec. 2. Meaning of the word incompetent. Under this rule, the

word incompetent includes persons suffering the penalty of civil
interdiction or who are hospitalized lepers, prodigals, deaf and dumb
who are unable to read and write, those who are of unsound mind,
even though they have lucid intervals, and persons not being of
unsound mind, but by reason of age, disease, weak mind, and other
similar causes, cannot, without outside aid, take care of themselves
and manage their property, becoming thereby an easy prey for deceit
and exploitation.

We have held in the past that a finding that a person is

incompetent should be anchored on clear, positive and definite
evidence.[12] We consider that evidentiary standard unchanged
and, thus, must be applied in the case at bar.

In support of his contention that respondent is incompetent

and, therefore, should be placed in guardianship, petitioner raises
in his Memorandum[13] the following factual matters:

a.

Respondent has been afflicted with several maladies and has been sickly for
over ten (10) years already;

b. During the time that respondent was hospitalized at the St. Lukes Medical
Center after his stroke, he purportedly requested one of his former colleagues

who was visiting him to file a loan application with the Armed Forces of the
Philippines Savings and Loan Association, Inc. (AFPSLAI) for payment of his
hospital bills, when, as far as his children knew, he had substantial amounts of
money in various banks sufficient to cover his medical expenses;

c.

Respondents residence allegedly has been left dilapidated due to lack of care
and management;

d. The realty taxes for respondents various properties remain unpaid and
therefore petitioner and his sister were supposedly compelled to pay the
necessary taxes;

e.

Respondent allegedly instructed petitioner to sell his Nissan Exalta car for the
reason that the former would be purchasing another vehicle, but when the car
had been sold, respondent did not procure another vehicle and refused to
account for the money earned from the sale of the old car;

f.

Respondent withdrew at least $75,000.00 from a joint account under his name
and his daughters without the latters knowledge or consent;

g. There was purportedly one occasion where respondent took a kitchen knife to
stab himself upon the orders of his girlfriend during one of their fights;

h. Respondent continuously allows his girlfriend to ransack his house of

groceries and furniture, despite protests from his children.[14]

Respondent denied the allegations made by petitioner and

cited petitioners lack of material evidence to support his
claims. According to respondent, petitioner did not present any
relevant documentary or testimonial evidence that would attest to
the veracity of his assertion that respondent is incompetent
largely due to his alleged deteriorating medical and mental
condition. In fact, respondent points out that the only medical
document presented by petitioner proves that he is indeed
competent to run his personal affairs and administer his
properties. Portions of the said document, entitled Report of
Neuropsychological Screening,[15] were quoted by respondent in
his Memorandum[16] to illustrate that said report in fact favored
respondents claim of competence, to wit:

General Oropesa spoke fluently in English and Filipino, he

enjoyed and participated meaningfully in conversations and could be
quite elaborate in his responses on many of the test items. He spoke in
a clear voice and his articulation was generally comprehensible. x x x.

xxxx
General Oropesa performed in the average range on most of the
domains that were tested. He was able to correctly perform mental
calculations and keep track of number sequences on a task of
attention. He did BEST in visuo-constructional tasks where he had to
copy geometrical designs using tiles. Likewise, he was able to render
and read the correct time on the Clock Drawing Test. x x x.

xxxx
x x x Reasoning abilities were generally intact as he was able to
suggest effective solutions to problem situations. x x x. [17]

With the failure of petitioner to formally offer his

documentary evidence, his proof of his fathers incompetence

consisted purely of testimonies given by himself and his sister

(who were claiming interest in their fathers real and personal
properties) and their fathers former caregiver (who admitted to be
acting under their direction). These testimonies, which did not
include any expert medical testimony, were insufficient to
convince the trial court of petitioners cause of action and instead
lead it to grant the demurrer to evidence that was filed by
respondent.

Even if we were to overlook petitioners procedural lapse in

failing to make a formal offer of evidence, his documentary proof
were comprised mainly of certificates of title over real properties
registered in his, his fathers and his sisters names as co-owners,
tax declarations, and receipts showing payment of real estate
taxes on their co-owned properties, which do not in any way
relate to his fathers alleged incapacity to make decisions for
himself. The only medical document on record is the
aforementioned Report of Neuropsychological Screening which
was attached to the petition for guardianship but was never
identified by any witness nor offered as evidence. In any event,
the said report, as mentioned earlier, was ambivalent at best, for
although the report had negative findings regarding memory
lapses on the part of respondent, it also contained findings that
supported the view that respondent on the average was indeed
competent.

In an analogous guardianship case wherein the soundness of

mind of the proposed ward was at issue, we had the occasion to
rule that where the sanity of a person is at issue, expert opinion is
not necessary [and that] the observations of the trial judge
coupled with evidence establishing the persons state of mental
sanity will suffice.[18]

Thus, it is significant that in its Order dated November 14,

2006 which denied petitioners motion for reconsideration on the
trial courts unfavorable September 27, 2006 ruling, the trial court

highlighted the fatal role that petitioners own documentary

evidence played in disproving its case and, likewise, the trial court
made known its own observation of respondents physical and
mental state, to wit:

The Court noted the absence of any testimony of a medical

expert which states that Gen. Cirilo O. Oropesa does not have the
mental, emotional, and physical capacity to manage his own affairs. On
the contrary, Oppositors evidence includes a Neuropsychological
Screening Report which states that Gen. Oropesa, (1) performs on the
average range in most of the domains that were tested; (2) is capable
of mental calculations; and (3) can provide solutions to problem
situations. The Report concludes that Gen. Oropesa possesses intact
cognitive functioning, except for mildly impaired abilities in memory,
reasoning and orientation. It is the observation of the Court that
oppositor is still sharp, alert and able. [19] (Citation omitted;
emphasis supplied.)

It is axiomatic that, as a general rule, only questions of law

may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari because the
Court is not a trier of facts. [20] We only take cognizance of
questions of fact in certain exceptional circumstances;
[21]
however, we find them to be absent in the instant case. It is
also long settled that factual findings of the trial court, when
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, will not be disturbed by this
Court. As a rule, such findings by the lower courts are entitled to
great weight and respect, and are deemed final and conclusive on
this Court when supported by the evidence on record. [22] We
therefore adopt the factual findings of the lower court and the
Court of Appeals and rule that the grant of respondents demurrer
to evidence was proper under the circumstances obtaining in the
case at bar.

Section 1, Rule 33 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 1. Demurrer to evidence. After the plaintiff has

completed the presentation of his evidence, the defendant may move
for dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff
has shown no right to relief. If his motion is denied, he shall have the
right to present evidence. If the motion is granted but on appeal the
order of dismissal is reversed he shall be deemed to have waived the
right to present evidence.

A demurrer to evidence is defined as an objection by one of

the parties in an action, to the effect that the evidence which his
adversary produced is insufficient in point of law, whether true or
not, to make out a case or sustain the issue. [23] We have also held
that a demurrer to evidence authorizes a judgment on the merits
of the case without the defendant having to submit evidence on
his part, as he would ordinarily have to do, if plaintiffs evidence
shows that he is not entitled to the relief sought. [24]

There was no error on the part of the trial court when it

dismissed the petition for guardianship without first requiring
respondent to present his evidence precisely because the effect
of granting a demurrer to evidence other than dismissing a cause
of action is, evidently, to preclude a defendant from presenting
his evidence since, upon the facts and the law, the plaintiff has
shown no right to relief.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is

hereby DENIED. The assailed Decision dated February 29, 2008
as well as the Resolution dated September 16, 2008 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 88449 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Chairperson

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

MARIANO
C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I

certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer
of the opinion of the Courts Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

[1]

Rollo, pp. 72-83; penned by Associate Justice Amelita G. Tolentino with Associate Justices Lucenito N. Tagle and
Agustin S. Dizon, concurring.

[2]

Id. at 85-86.

[3]

Id. at 457-460.

[4]

Id. at 468-469.

[5]

Id. at 73-75.

[6]

Id. at 460.

[7]

Id. at 469.

[8]

Id. at 82.

[9]

Id. at 667.

[10]

212 Phil. 346 (1984).

[11]

Id. at 352.

[12]

Vda. de Baluyut v. Luciano, 164 Phil. 55, 70 (1976), citing Yangco v. Court of First Instance of Manila, 29 Phil.
183, 190 (1915).

[13]

Rollo, pp. 653-682.

[14]

Id. at 659.

[15]

Records, pp. 10-13.

[16]

Rollo, pp. 684-705.

[17]

Records, pp. 11-12.

[18]

Hernandez v. San Juan-Santos, G.R. Nos. 166470 and 169217, August 7, 2009, 595 SCRA 464, 473-474.

[19]

Rollo, p. 468.

[20]

Office of the Ombudsman v. Racho, G.R. No. 185685, January 31, 2011, 641 SCRA 148, 155.

[21]

Heirs of Jose Lim v. Lim, G.R. No. 172690, March 3, 2010, 614 SCRA 141, 147.

[22]

Maxwell Heavy Equipment Corporation v. Yu, G.R. No. 179395, December 15, 2010, 638 SCRA 653, 658.

[23]

Republic v. Estate of Alfonso Lim, Sr., G.R. No. 164800, July 22, 2009, 593 SCRA 404, 422.

[24]

Uy v. Chua, G.R. No. 183965, September 18, 2009, 600 SCRA 806, 822.