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RULE 113- ARREST

G.R. No. 186471


People Vs. De Leon
FACTS:
The Prosecutions Version of Facts
On November 9, 2003, at about 5 oclock in the afternoon, a
confidential informant arrived at the office of the Station Anti-Illegal
Drug Special Operation Task Force at the Novaliches Police Station in
Quezon City and reported the illegal activities of a person named
Rodante De Leon.
Thereafter, Police Senior Inspector (P/SInsp.) Nilo Wong formed a
team for a buy-bust operation with PO2 Magcalayo as poseur-buyer. A
pre-operation report was prepared. P/SInsp. Wong then handed to
PO2 Magcalayo two (2) pieces of PhP 100 bills as buy-bust money
and on which PO2 Magcalayo wrote his initials NM.
At around 6:30 p.m. in the evening, the team proceeded Barangay Sta.
Monica, Novaliches, Quezon City, where the confidential informant
introduced PO2 Magcalayo to appellant as a buyer of shabu. PO2
Magcalayo then asked appellant if he had shabu and the latter
answered in the affirmative and asked him how much he would buy.
PO2 Magcalayo handed the money and, in return, appellant handed
him one (1) plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance. He
then scratched his head, which was the pre-arranged signal that the
transaction was consummated, and thereafter arrested appellant. He
recovered the buy-bust money from appellant as PO2 Collado
approached them and handcuffed appellant. Upon frisking appellant,
PO2 Collado discovered another plastic sachet on the person of
appellant.

Appellant further argues that the buy-bust operation was full of


irregularities, rendering it illegal. He notes that the Pre-Operation
Report was full of discrepancies.
The arguments are specious. Such irregularities cannot overturn the
finding of the presence in this case of the elements of violations of
Secs. 5 and 11, Art. II of RA 9165.
A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment whereby ways and
means are resorted to for the purpose of trapping and capturing the
lawbreakers in the execution of their criminal plan.[22] In this
jurisdiction, the operation is legal and has been proved to be an
effective method of apprehending drug peddlers, provided due regard
to constitutional and legal safeguards is undertaken.[23]
In the case at bar, the evidence clearly shows that the buy-bust
operation conducted by the police officers, who made use of
entrapment to capture appellant in the act of selling a dangerous drug,
was valid and legal. Moreover, the defense has failed to show any
evidence of ill motive on the part of the police officers. Even appellant
himself declared that it was the first time he met the police officers
during his cross-examination. There was, therefore, no motive for the
police officers to frame up appellant.
Likewise, the identity of appellant as the person who sold the
dangerous drugs to PO2 Magcalayo and the one in possession of the
shabu cannot be doubted anymore. Such positive identification
prevails over appellants defenses of denial and alibi. These defenses
have been invariably viewed by the Court with disfavor, for they can
easily be concocted but difficult to prove, and they are common and
standard defense ploys in most prosecutions arising from violations of
the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act.[24]

Afterwards, appellant was brought to the police station for


investigation. PO2 Collado then placed his initials on the sachet and
the evidence was subsequently turned over to the police investigator,
who prepared a request for its laboratory examination.

Absent any proof of motive to falsely accuse appellant of such a grave


offense, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty
and the findings of the trial court with respect to the credibility of
witnesses shall prevail over appellants bare allegation.[25]

PO2 Collado, PO1 Mendoza, PO2 Paculdar, and PO2 Magcalayo then
brought the transparent plastic sachets containing the white crystalline
substance subject of the buy-bust operation to the Philippine National
Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory for examination. A Forensic Chemical
Officer, conducted a qualitative examination on the specimens, which
yielded positive results.

We, therefore, uphold the presumption of regularity in the performance


of official duties and find that the prosecution has discharged its
burden of proving the guilt of appellant beyond reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, appellant Rodante De Leon y Dela Rosa guilty of the
crimes charged is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.

Version of the Defense


On the other hand, appellant testified that, prior to his arrest, he was a
police officer in Cubao, Quezon City for 10 years. On November 9,
2003, at around 3 oclock in the afternoon, he went to Barangay Sta.
Monica, Novaliches, Quezon City to look for a kumpadre from whom
he intended to borrow money when policemen accosted him and
poked their guns at him. The people around him ran, and as he was
the only one left on the scene, the policemen asked him to sit down.
He told SPO3 Concepcion, whom he knew, that he was a police officer
but he was told to shut up and to explain his side at the police station
instead.
Upon arrival at the police station in Novaliches, Quezon City, his wallet,
with his I.D. and police badge, were taken from him. PO2 Magcalayo
told him that he had a fake police I.D. When appellant tried to explain
himself, PO2 Magcalayo allegedly kicked him saying, Hindi na uso ang
pulis, sundalo na ang nakaupo ngayon.
The following night, he was presented on inquest during which he was
charged with violation of Secs. 5 and 11 of RA 9165. He denied all the
charges against him claiming that the alleged shabu marked as
Exhibits B-1 and B-2 came from the arresting police officers. He did not
file a case against them, because he had no money and because he
knew that he was not guilty.
On cross-examination, appellant further testified that he was a followup operative at the Station Investigation Division of Police Station 7.
He admitted that he was separated from the service because he was
absent without official leave due to a business problem he had to
attend to. He likewise said that he did not know his arresting officers,
whom he saw then for the first time, and that he was not familiar with
RA 9165.
After trial, the RTC convicted appellant.
On April 4, 2008, the CA affirmed the judgment of the trial court.
ISSUES:
Is Buy Bust Operation Valid Arrest?
RULING:
Buy-Bust Operation Was Valid

G.R. No. 128587


People Vs. Laguio

March 16, 2007

FACTS:
On 16 May 1996, at about 7:00 p.m., police operatives of the DILG
arrested SPO2 Vergel de Dios, Rogelio Anoble and a certain Arellano,
for unlawful possession of shabu. In the course of the investigation of
the three arrested persons, Redentor Teck, alias Frank, and Joseph
Junio were identified as the source of the drug. An entrapment
operation was then set after the three were prevailed upon to call their
source and pretends to order another supply of shabu.
At around 11:00 p.m. that same date, Teck and Junio were arrested
while they were about to hand over another bag of shabu to SPO2 De
Dios and company. Questioned, Teck and Junio informed the police
operatives that they were working as talent manager and gymnast
instructor, respectively, of Glamour Modeling Agency owned by
Lawrence Wang. The two did not disclose their source of shabu but
admitted that they were working for Wang. They said they knew of a
scheduled delivery of shabu early the following morning and that their
employer (Wang) could be found at the Maria Orosa Apartment in
Malate. The police operatives decided to look for Wang to shed light on
the illegal drug activities of Teck and Junio. Police Inspector Coronel
and his men then proceeded to Maria Orosa Apartment and placed the
same under surveillance.
Prosecution witness Police Inspector Coronel testified that at about
2:10 a.m. of 17 May 1996, Wang, who was described to the operatives
by Teck, came out of the apartment and walked towards a parked
BMW car. On nearing the car, he (witness) together with Captain
Margallo and two other police officers approached Wang, introduced
themselves to him as police officers, asked his name and, upon
hearing that he was Lawrence Wang, immediately frisked him and
asked him to open the back compartment of the BMW car.7 When
frisked, there was found inside the front right pocket of Wang and
confiscated from him an unlicensed AMT Cal. 380 9mm automatic
Back-up Pistol loaded with ammunitions. At the same time, the other
members of the operatives searched the BMW car and found inside it
were the following items:
32 transparent plastic bags of shabu;
cash in the amount ofP650,000.00;
one electronic and one mechanical scales; and

an unlicensed Daewoo 9mm Pistol with magazine.


Then and there, Wang resisted the warrantless arrest and search.
Three (3) separate Informations filed against Lawrence C. Wang in the
court of origin.
Violation of Dangerous Drugs Act
Illegal Possession of Firearms
Violation of Comelec Gun Ban
During his arraignment, accused Wang refused to enter a plea to all
the Informations and instead interposed a continuing objection to the
admissibility of the evidence obtained by the police operatives. Thus,
the trial court ordered that a plea of "Not Guilty" be entered for him.5
Thereafter, joint trial of the three (3) consolidated cases followed.
Wang was granted 25 days from said date within which to file his
intended Demurrer to Evidence.\
On 9 January 1997, Wang filed his undated Demurrer to Evidence,11
praying for his acquittal and the dismissal of the three (3) cases
against him for lack of a valid arrest and search warrants and the
inadmissibility of the prosecutions evidence against him.
On 12 February 1997, the prosecution filed its Opposition alleging that
the warrantless search was legal as an incident to the lawful arrest and
that it has proven its case, so it is now time for the defense to present
its evidence.
On 13 March 1997, the respondent judge, the Hon. Perfecto A.S.
Laguio, Jr., issued the herein assailed Resolution14 granting Wangs
Demurrer to Evidence and acquitting him of all charges for lack of
evidence.
ISSUES:
Whether there was lawful arrest, search and seizure by the police
operatives in this case despite the absence of a warrant of arrest
and/or a search warrant.
HOLDING:
Under Section 5, Rule 113 of the New Rules of Court, a peace officer
may arrest a person without a warrant:
(a) when in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) when an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested
has committed it, and
(c) when the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from
a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while being transferred from one confinement to
another.
None of these circumstances were present when the accused was
arrested. The accused was merely walking from the Maria Orosa
Apartment and was about to enter the parked BMW car when the
police officers arrested and frisked him and searched his car. The
accused was not committing any visible offense at the time of his
arrest. Neither was there an indication that he was about to commit a
crime or that he had just committed an offense. The unlicensed AMT
Cal.380 9mm Automatic Back-up Pistol that the accused had in his
possession was concealed inside the right front pocket of his pants.
The arresting officers had no information and knowledge that the
accused was carrying an unlicensed handgun, nor did they see him in
possession thereof immediately prior to his arrest.
The 32 bags of shabu and the other unlicensed Daewoo Pistol with
magazine that were found and seized from the car were not in plain
view. The shabu were in the trunk compartment, and the Daewoo
handgun was underneath the drivers seat of the car. The police
officers had no information, or knowledge that the banned articles were
inside the car, or that the accused had placed them there. The police
officers searched the car on mere suspicion that there was shabu
therein.
Clearly therefore, the warrantless arrest of the accused and the search
of his person and the car were without probable cause and could not
be licit. The arrest of the accused did not fall under any of the
exception to the requirements of warrantless arrests, (Sec. 5, Rule
113, Rules of Court) and is therefore, unlawful and derogatory of his
constitutional right of liberty.
The trial court resolved the case on the basis of its findings that the
arrest preceded the search, and finding no basis to rule in favor of a
lawful arrest, it ruled that the incidental search is likewise unlawful. Any
and all pieces of evidence acquired as a consequence thereof are
inadmissible in evidence. Thus, the trial court dismissed the case for
lack of evidence.
Prosecution posits that "inasmuch as it has been shown in the present
case that the seizure without warrant of the regulated drugs and
unlicensed firearms in the accuseds possession had been validly
made upon probable cause and under exigent circumstances, then the
warrantless arrest of the accused must necessarily have to be
regarded as having been made on the occasion of the commission of

the crime in flagrante delicto, and therefore constitutionally and


statutorily permissible and lawful."28 In effect, the People now
contends that the warrantless search preceded the warrantless arrest.
Since the case falls under an exception to the general rule requiring
search warrant prior to a valid search and seizure, the police officers
were justified in requiring the private respondent to open his BMW
cars trunk to see if he was carrying illegal drugs.
Section 5, above, provides three (3) instances when warrantless arrest
may be lawfully effected: (a) arrest of a suspect in flagrante delicto; (b)
arrest of a suspect where, based on personal knowledge of the
arresting officer, there is probable cause that said suspect was the
author of a crime which had just been committed; (c) arrest of a
prisoner who has escaped from custody serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case is pending.
For a warrantless arrest of an accused caught in flagrante delicto
under paragraph (a) of Section 5 to be valid, two requisites must
concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act
indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the
presence or within the view of the arresting officer.
The facts and circumstances surrounding the present case did not
manifest any suspicious behavior on the part of private respondent
Lawrence Wang that would reasonably invite the attention of the
police. He was merely walking from the Maria Orosa Apartment and
was about to enter the parked BMW car when the police operatives
arrested him, frisked and searched his person and commanded him to
open the compartment of the car, which was later on found to be
owned by his friend, David Lee. He was not committing any visible
offense then. Therefore, there can be no valid warrantless arrest in
flagrante delicto under paragraph (a) of Section 5. It is settled that
"reliable information" alone, absent any overt act indicative of a
felonious enterprise in the presence and within the view of the
arresting officers, is not sufficient to constitute probable cause that
would justify an in flagrante delicto arrest.
Neither may the warrantless arrest be justified under paragraph (b) of
Section 5. What is clearly established from the testimonies of the
arresting officers is that Wang was arrested mainly on the information
that he was the employer of Teck and Junio who were previously
arrested and charged for illegal transport of shabu. Teck and Junio did
not even categorically identify Wang to be their source of the shabu
they were caught with in flagrante delicto. Upon the duos declaration
that there will be a delivery of shabu on the early morning of the
following day, May 17, which is only a few hours thereafter, and that
Wang may be found in Maria Orosa Apartment along Maria Orosa
Street, the arresting officers conducted "surveillance" operation in front
of said apartment, hoping to find a person which will match the
description of one Lawrence Wang, the employer of Teck and Junio.
These circumstances do not sufficiently establish the existence of
probable cause based on personal knowledge as required in
paragraph (b) of Section 5.
And doubtless, the warrantless arrest does not fall under paragraph (c)
of Section 5.
The inevitable conclusion, as correctly made by the trial court, is that
the warrantless arrest was illegal. Ipso jure, the warrantless search
incidental to the illegal arrest is likewise unlawful.
The Peoples contention that Wang waived his right against
unreasonable search and seizure has no factual basis. While we agree
in principle that consent will validate an otherwise illegal search,
however, based on the evidence on record, Wang resisted his arrest
and the search on his person and belongings.32 The implied
acquiescence to the search, if there was any, could not have been
more than mere passive conformity given under intimidating or
coercive circumstances and is thus considered no consent at all within
the purview of the constitutional guarantee.33 Moreover, the continuing
objection to the validity of the warrantless arrest made of record during
the arraignment bolsters Wangs claim that he resisted the warrantless
arrest and search.
G.R. No. 170180 November 23, 2007
Valdez Vs. People
FACTS:
Around 8:30 p.m. of 17 March 2003, he was conducting the routine
patrol along San Benito Norte, Aringay, La Union together with Aratas
and Ordoo when they noticed petitioner, lugging a bag, alight from a
mini-bus. The tanods observed that petitioner, who appeared
suspicious to them, seemed to be looking for something. They thus
approached him but the latter purportedly attempted to run away. They
chased him, put him under arrest and thereafter brought him to the
house of Barangay Captain Orencio Mercado (Mercado) where he, as
averred by Bautista, was ordered by Mercado to open his bag.
Petitioners bag allegedly contained a pair of denim pants, eighteen
pieces of eggplant and dried marijuana leaves wrapped in newspaper
and cellophane. It was then that petitioner was taken to the police
station for further investigation.[9]
Aratas and Ordoo corroborated Bautistas testimony on most material
points. On cross-examination, however, Aratas admitted that he

himself brought out the contents of petitioners bag before petitioner


was taken to the house of Mercado. Nonetheless, he claimed that at
Mercados house, it was petitioner himself who brought out the
contents of his bag upon orders from Mercado. For his part, Ordoo
testified that it was he who was ordered by Mercado to open
petitioners bag and that it was then that they saw the purported
contents thereof.
The prosecution likewise presented Police Inspector Laya, the forensic
chemist who conducted the examination of the marijuana allegedly
confiscated from petitioner. Laya disclosed on cross-examination,
however, that he had knowledge neither of how the marijuana was
taken from petitioner nor of how the said substance reached the police
officers. Moreover, he could not identify whose marking was on the
inside of the cellophane wrapping the marijuana leaves.
The charges were denied by petitioner. As the defenses sole witness,
he testified that at around 8:30 p.m. on 17 March 2003, he arrived in
Aringay from his place in Santol, La Union. After alighting from the bus,
petitioner claimed that he went to the house of a friend to drink water
and then proceeded to walk to his brothers house. As he was walking,
prosecution witness Ordoo, a cousin of his brothers wife, allegedly
approached him and asked where he was going. Petitioner replied that
he was going to his brothers house. Ordoo then purportedly requested
to see the contents of his bag and appellant acceded. It was at this
point that Bautista and Aratas joined them. After inspecting all the
contents of his bag, petitioner testified that he was restrained by the
tanod and taken to the house of Mercado. It was Aratas who carried
the bag until they reached their destination.[13]
Petitioner maintained that at Mercados house, his bag was opened by
the tanod and Mercado himself. They took out an item wrapped in
newspaper, which later turned out to be marijuana leaves. Petitioner
denied ownership thereof. He claimed to have been threatened with
imprisonment by his arrestors if he did not give the prohibited drugs to
someone from the east in order for them to apprehend such person. As
petitioner declined, he was brought to the police station and charged
with the instant offense. Although petitioner divulged that it was he who
opened and took out the contents of his bag at his friends house, he
averred that it was one of the tanod who did so at Mercados house and
that it was only there that they saw the marijuana for the first time.
Finding that the prosecution had proven petitioners guilt beyond
reasonable doubt, the RTC rendered judgment against him to be guilty.
ISSUES:
W/N the warrantless arrest effected against him by the barangay tanod
was unlawful.
W/N the warrantless search of his bag that followed was likewise
contrary to law and the marijuana leaves purportedly seized from him
are inadmissible in evidence for being the fruit of a poisonous tree.
RULING:
At the outset, we observe that nowhere in the records can we find any
objection by petitioner to the irregularity of his arrest before his
arraignment. Considering this and his active participation in the trial of
the case, jurisprudence dictates that petitioner is deemed to have
submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court, thereby curing any defect
in his arrest. The legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the
court over his person. Petitioners warrantless arrest therefore cannot,
in itself, be the basis of his acquittal.
However, to determine the admissibility of the seized drugs in
evidence, it is indispensable to ascertain whether or not the search
which yielded the alleged contraband was lawful. The search,
conducted as it was without a warrant, is justified only if it were
incidental to a lawful arrest.[19] Evaluating the evidence on record in
its totality, as earlier intimated, the reasonable conclusion is that the
arrest of petitioner without a warrant is not lawful as well.
Petitioner maintains, in a nutshell, that after he was approached by the
tanod and asked to show the contents of his bag, he was simply
herded without explanation and taken to the house of the barangay
captain. On their way there, it was Aratas who carried his bag. He
denies ownership over the contraband allegedly found in his bag and
asserts that he saw it for the first time at the barangay captains house.
Even casting aside petitioners version and basing the resolution of this
case on the general thrust of the prosecution evidence, the
unlawfulness of petitioners arrest stands out just the same.
It is obvious that based on the testimonies of the arresting barangay
tanod, not one of the circumstances in Sec. 5, Rule 113 was obtaining
at the time petitioner was arrested. By their own admission, petitioner
was not committing an offense at the time he alighted from the bus, nor
did he appear to be then committing an offense. The tanod did not
have probable cause either to justify petitioners warrantless arrest.

For the exception in Section 5(a), Rule 113 to operate, this Court has
ruled that two (2) elements must be present:
(1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that
he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit a crime; and
(2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the
arresting officer.
Here, petitioners act of looking around after getting off the bus was but
natural as he was finding his way to his destination. That he
purportedly attempted to run away as the tanod approached him is
irrelevant and cannot by itself be construed as adequate to charge the
tanod with personal knowledge that petitioner had just engaged in, was
actually engaging in or was attempting to engage in criminal activity.
More importantly, petitioner testified that he did not run away but in fact
spoke with the barangay tanod when they approached him.
Even taking the prosecutions version generally as the truth, in line with
our assumption from the start, the conclusion will not be any different.
It is not unreasonable to expect that petitioner, walking the street at
night, after being closely observed and then later tailed by three
unknown persons, would attempt to flee at their approach. Flight per se
is not synonymous with guilt and must not always be attributed to ones
consciousness of guilt.
Indeed, the supposed acts of petitioner, even assuming that they
appeared dubious, cannot be viewed as sufficient to incite suspicion of
criminal activity enough to validate his warrantless arrest. If at all, the
search most permissible for the tanod to conduct under the prevailing
backdrop of the case was a stop-and-frisk to allay any suspicion they
have been harboring based on petitioners behavior.
However, a stop-and-frisk situation, following Terry v. Ohio,[27] must
precede a warrantless arrest, be limited to the persons outer clothing,
and should be grounded upon a genuine reason, in light of the police
officers experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief
that the person detained has weapons concealed about him.
Accordingly, petitioners waiver of his right to question his arrest
notwithstanding, the marijuana leaves allegedly taken during the
search cannot be admitted in evidence against him as they were
seized during a warrantless search which was not lawful.
A waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not also mean a waiver of
the inadmissibility of evidence seized during an illegal warrantless
arrest. The following searches and seizures are deemed permissible
by jurisprudence: (1) search of moving vehicles (2) seizure in plain
view (3) customs searches (4) waiver or consent searches (5) stop and
frisk situations (Terry Search) and (6) search incidental to a lawful
arrest. The last includes a valid warrantless search and seizure
pursuant to an equally valid warrantless arrest, for, while as a rule, an
arrest is considered legitimate if effected with a valid warrant of arrest,
the Rules of Court recognize permissible warrantless arrests, to wit: (1)
arrests in flagrante delicto, (2) arrests effected in hot pursuit, and, (3)
arrests of escaped prisoners.
When petitioner was arrested without a warrant, he was neither caught
in flagrante delicto committing a crime nor was the arrest effected in
hot pursuit. Verily, it cannot therefore be reasonably argued that the
warrantless search conducted on petitioner was incidental to a lawful
arrest.
Notably, the inadmissibility in evidence of the seized marijuana leaves
for being the fruit of an unlawful search is not the lone cause that
militates against the case of the prosecution. We likewise find that it
has failed to convincingly establish the identity of the marijuana leaves
purportedly taken from petitioners bag.
In this case, the totality of the evidence presented utterly fails to
overcome the presumption of innocence which petitioner enjoys. The
failure of the prosecution to prove all the elements of the offense
beyond reasonable doubt must perforce result in petitioners
exoneration from criminal liability.
ROLITO GO y TAMBUNTING, petitioner, vs.THE COURT OF
APPEALS, THE HON. BENJAMIN V. PELAYO, Presiding Judge,
Branch 168, Regional Trial Court, NCJR Pasig, M.M., and PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
FACTS:
On 2 July 1991, Eldon Maguan was driving his car along Wilson St.,
San Juan, Metro Manila, heading towards P. Guevarra St. Petitioner
entered Wilson St., where it is a one-way street and started travelling
in the opposite or "wrong" direction. At the corner of Wilson and J.
Abad Santos Sts., petitioner's and Maguan's cars nearly bumped each
other. Petitioner alighted from his car, walked over and shot Maguan
inside his car. Petitioner then boarded his car and left the scene. A
security guard at a nearby restaurant was able to take down
petitioner's car plate number.
The following day, the police returned to the scene of the shooting to
find out where the suspect had come from; they were informed that

petitioner had dined at Cravings Bake Shop shortly before the


shooting. The police obtained a facsimile or impression of the credit
card used by petitioner from the cashier of the bake shop. The security
guard of the bake shop was shown a picture of petitioner and he
positively identified him as the same person who had shot Maguan.
Having established that the assailant was probably the petitioner, the
police launched a manhunt for petitioner.
On 8 July 1991, petitioner presented himself before the San Juan
Police Station to verify news reports that he was being hunted by the
police; he was accompanied by two (2) lawyers. The police forthwith
detained him.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a lawful warrantless arrest had been effected by the
San Juan Police in respect of petitioner Go.
HOLDING:
The general rule on arrest states that the same is valid if effected with
a valid warrant. However, there are instances specifically enumerated
under the law when a warrantless arrest maybe considered lawful.
Despite that, The warrantless arrest of herein petitioner Go does not
fall with in the terms of said rule. The police were not present at the
time of the commission of the offense, neither do they have personal
knowledge on The crime to be committed or has been committed not
to mention the fact that petitioner was not a prisoner who escaped from
the penal institution. With the stated facts, The allegation of the
prosecution that petitioner needs to sign a waiver of the provisions of
article 125 of the revised penal code before A preliminary investigation
may be conducted is baseless. In this connection, petitioner has all the
right to ask for a preliminary investigation to determine whether there is
a probable cause that the crime has been committed and that the
petitioner is probably guilty thereof as well as to prevent him from the
hassles, anxiety and aggravation brought by a criminal proceeding.
This reason of the accused substantial therefore he should not be
deprived of such.

RULE 114 - BAIL


P/SR SUPT. ORLANDO MABUTAS Vs. Judge Norma Perello
FACTS:
Subject matters of the present administrative cases are two complaints
against respondent Judge Norma C. Perello, Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court (Branch 276) of Muntinlupa City.
FIRST COMPLAINT
P/Sr. Supt. Mabutas complained of certain irregularities committed by
respondent Judge in the grant of bail to accused Aiza Chona Omadan
in Criminal Case No. 03-265. Omadan was charged in an Information,
dated April 21, 2003, with Violation of Section 11 of Republic Act No.
9165, or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, for the
possession, custody and control of 57.78 grams of Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride (shabu), with no bail recommended. Respondent
Judges Order dated May 9, 2003, granting Omadans petition for bail
stating that the evidence of guilt is not very strong.
SECOND COMPLAINT
In Criminal Case No. 03-065, entitled, People of the Philippines vs.
Rosemarie Pascual y Mozo @ Rosema, for Violation of Section 5 of
R.A. No. 9165, accused Pascual was charged with selling, trading,
delivering and giving away to another 0.20 grams of Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride (shabu), with no bail recommended.[2] Pascual filed, on
February 5, 2003, a motion for bail on the grounds that the quantity of
shabu involved is minimal and the imposable penalty is likewise
minimal in degree; and that she is nine months pregnant and due to
give birth anytime.[3] On the day of arraignment, February 7, 2003,
respondent Judge issued an order granting Pascuals motion for bail
without hearing.
ISSUE:
The issue in these administrative cases is whether respondent Judge
may be administratively held liable for the grant of bail in the particular
criminal cases subject of the complaints. As earlier stated, the criminal
cases subject of the present administrative complaints all involve
violations of R.A. No. 9165, or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs
Act of 2002.
HOLDING:
Under the foregoing provision, possession of 50 grams or more of
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu is punishable by life
imprisonment to death; hence, a capital offense. As such, bail
becomes a matter of discretion. In this regard, Rule 114, Sec. 7 of the
Rules of Court states:
No person charged with the capital offense, or an offense punishable
by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail
when the evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the
criminal prosecution.

The matter of determining whether or not the evidence is strong is a


matter of judicial discretion that remains with the judge. Such discretion
must be sound and exercised within reasonable bounds.
Under the present rules, a hearing on an application for bail is
mandatory. Whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion, the
prosecutor should be given reasonable notice of hearing, or at least his
recommendation on the matter must be sought. In case an application
for bail is filed, the judge is entrusted to observe the following duties:
1. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or discretion, notify the
prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require him to
submit his recommendation;
2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the
application for bail regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses
to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is strong for
the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its sound discretion;
3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the
summary of evidence of the prosecution; and
4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon
the approval of the bail bond. Otherwise the bail should be denied.[16]
Based on the above-cited procedure and requirements, after the
hearing, the courts order granting or refusing bail must contain a
summary of the evidence for the prosecution. A summary is defined as
a comprehensive and usually brief abstract or digest of a text or
statement. Based on the summary of evidence, the judge formulates
his own conclusion on whether such evidence is strong enough to
indicate the guilt of the accused.[17]
In this case, respondent Judge complied with the foregoing duties. A
hearing was held on the petition; the prosecution was given the
opportunity to present its evidence in support of its stance. Respondent
Judge based her findings on the prosecutions evidence, namely and
since it was her conclusion that the evidence of accused Omadans
guilt is not strong, the petition for bail was granted.
The Court recognizes that the manner in which the strength of an
accused guilt is proven still primarily rests on the prosecution. The
prosecutor has the right to control the quantum of evidence and the
order of presentation of the witnesses, in support of the denial of bail.
After all, all criminal actions are prosecuted under the direction and
control of the public prosecutor.[20] It was the prosecutions judgment
to limit the presentation of evidence to two witnesses, as it felt that the
testimonies of the other witnesses would be merely corroborative. It is
beyond respondent Judges authority to compel the public prosecutor to
exercise its discretion in a way respondent Judge deems fit, so long as
such exercise of discretion will not defeat the purpose for which the
hearing was held, i.e., to determine whether strong evidence of guilt
exists such that the accused may not be entitled to bail.
Admin. Matter No. RTJ-04-1820, however, portrays an entirely different
picture.
In this case, respondent Judge granted bail in Criminal Cases Nos. 03065, 03-082, and 03-288 without the requisite hearing. In so doing, it
was respondent Judges defense that under R.A. No. 9165, shabu is
not a dangerous drug but merely a controlled precursor, in which the
selling of less than 5 grams is punishable only with imprisonment of 12
years to 20 years, and as such, bail is a matter of right and a hearing is
not required.
Respondent Judge need not exhaustively study R.A. No. 9165, as she
asserted, to determine the nature of methamphetamine hydrochloride.
A plain reading of the law would immediately show that
methamphetamine hydrochloride is a dangerous drug and not a
controlled precursor.
The indispensable nature of a bail hearing in petitions for bail has
always been ardently and indefatigably stressed by the Court.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
(1) In Admin. Matter No. RTJ-03-1817, DISMISSING the complaint
against respondent Judge; and,
(2) In Admin. Matter No. RTJ-04-1820, finding respondent Judge
Norma C. Perello, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court (Branch
276) of Muntinlupa City GUILTY of gross ignorance of law, and she is
hereby SUSPENDED for Six (6) Months, with warning that a repetition
of similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.
JOSE ANTONIO LEVISTE vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
FACTS:
Charged with the murder of Rafael de las Alas, petitioner Jose Antonio
Leviste was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Makati City for the

lesser crime of homicide and sentenced to suffer an indeterminate


penalty of six years and one day of prision mayor as minimum to 12
years and one day of reclusion temporal as maximum.
He appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals.[12] Pending
appeal, he filed an urgent application for admission to bail pending
appeal, citing his advanced age and health condition, and claiming the
absence of any risk or possibility of flight on his part.
The Court of Appeals denied petitioners application for bail.
ISSUE
In an application for bail pending appeal by an appellant sentenced by
the trial court to a penalty of imprisonment for more than six years,
does the discretionary nature of the grant of bail pending appeal mean
that bail should automatically be granted absent any of the
circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114
of the Rules of Court?
RULING:
Petitioner claims that, in the absence of any of the circumstances
mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of
Court , an application for bail by an appellant sentenced by the
Regional Trial Court to a penalty of more than six years imprisonment
should automatically be granted.

circumstances is by itself sufficient to deny or revoke bail.


Nonetheless, a finding that none of the said circumstances is present
will not automatically result in the grant of bail. Such finding will simply
authorize the court to use the less stringent sound discretion approach.
Petitioner disregards the fine yet substantial distinction between the
two different situations that are governed by the third paragraph of
Section 5, Rule 114. Instead, petitioner insists on a simplistic treatment
that unduly dilutes the import of the said provision and trivializes the
established policy governing the grant of bail pending appeal.
Laws and rules should not be interpreted in such a way that leads to
unreasonable or senseless consequences. An absurd situation will
result from adopting petitioners interpretation that, where the penalty
imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six years, bail
ought to be granted if none of the listed bail-negating circumstances
exists. Allowance of bail pending appeal in cases where the penalty
imposed is more than six years of imprisonment will be more lenient
than in cases where the penalty imposed does not exceed six years.
While denial or revocation of bail in cases where the penalty imposed
is more than six years imprisonment must be made only if any of the
five bail-negating conditions is present, bail pending appeal in cases
where the penalty imposed does not exceed six years imprisonment
may be denied even without those conditions.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.

Petitioners stance is contrary to fundamental considerations of


procedural and substantive rules.
WORDING OF THIRD PARAGRAPH OF SECTION 5, RULE 114
CONTRADICTS PETITIONERS INTERPRETATION
The third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 applies to two scenarios
where the penalty imposed on the appellant applying for bail is
imprisonment exceeding six years. The first scenario deals with the
circumstances enumerated in the said paragraph (namely, recidivism,
quasi-recidivism, habitual delinquency or commission of the crime
aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration; previous escape from
legal confinement, evasion of sentence or violation of the conditions of
his bail without a valid justification; commission of the offense while
under probation, parole or conditional pardon; circumstances indicating
the probability of flight if released on bail; undue risk of committing
another crime during the pendency of the appeal; or other similar
circumstances) not present. The second scenario contemplates the
existence of at least one of the said circumstances.
Bail is either a matter of right or of discretion. It is a matter of right
when the offense charged is not punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment. On the other hand, upon conviction by
the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, bail becomes a matter of discretion.
Similarly, if the court imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six
(6) years then bail is a matter of discretion, except when any of the
enumerated circumstances under paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule 114
is present then bail shall be denied.[25] (emphasis supplied)
In the first situation, bail is a matter of sound judicial discretion. This
means that, if none of the circumstances mentioned in the third
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is present, the appellate court has
the discretion to grant or deny bail. An application for bail pending
appeal may be denied even if the bail-negating[26] circumstances in
the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 are absent. In other words,
the appellate courts denial of bail pending appeal where none of the
said circumstances exists does not, by and of itself, constitute abuse of
discretion.
On the other hand, in the second situation, the appellate court
exercises a more stringent discretion, that is, to carefully ascertain
whether any of the enumerated circumstances in fact exists. If it so
determines, it has no other option except to deny or revoke bail
pending appeal. Conversely, if the appellate court grants bail pending
appeal, grave abuse of discretion will thereby be committed.
Given these two distinct scenarios, therefore, any application for bail
pending appeal should be viewed from the perspective of two stages:
(1) the determination of discretion stage, where the appellate court
must determine whether any of the circumstances in the third
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is present; this will establish whether
or not the appellate court will exercise sound discretion or stringent
discretion in resolving the application for bail pending appeal and (2)
the exercise of discretion stage where, assuming the appellants case
falls within the first scenario allowing the exercise of sound discretion,
the appellate court may consider all relevant circumstances, other than
those mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114,
including the demands of equity and justice;[27] on the basis thereof, it
may either allow or disallow bail.
On the other hand, if the appellants case falls within the second
scenario, the appellate courts stringent discretion requires that the
exercise thereof be primarily focused on the determination of the proof
of the presence of any of the circumstances that are prejudicial to the
allowance of bail. This is so because the existence of any of those

COMMISSIONER ANDREA D. DOMINGO, complainant, vs.


EXECUTIVE JUDGE ERNESTO P. PAGAYATAN, RTC, Branch 46,
San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, respondent.
FACTS:
On September 14, 2001, the Bureau of Immigration (BOI) Board of
Commissioners (BOC) issued Summary Deportation Order (SDO) No.
ADD-2001-057 against Ernesto M. Peaflorida, a U.S. citizen, after
finding that he is an overstaying and undocumented alien and that
Peaflorida is also a fugitive from justice since he stands indicted in the
United States for health care fraud which resulted in more than
$1,376,000.00 losses to the U.S. Federal Government.
On the scheduled hearing of November 19, 2001, respondent denied
the P40,000.00 bail recommended by the Provincial Prosecutor for the
provisional release of the accused on the ground that the crime
Peaflorida was charged with involved large scale estafa, a non-bailable
offense. However, later on that same day, the BOI received information
that respondent had allowed the release from detention of Peaflorida.
In his Comment, dated March 22, 2002, respondent explained: On
November 20, 2001, Peaflorida filed an urgent motion to fix bail. When
the prosecution and the defense jointly manifested that it would be fair
and just if the court would fix the bail bond for the provisional release of
the accused Peaflorida at P250,000.00, he granted the motion to fix
bail on November 21, 2001; and, at the time he issued the Order fixing
the bail bond of the accused at P250,000.00, he was not aware that a
deportation order had already been issued by the BOI against the
latter.[2]
ISSUE:
WON the grant of bail was correct.
HOLDING:
Under the rules on bail, a hearing is mandatory in granting bail whether
it is a matter of right or discretion.[7] A hearing is indispensable for the
court to ask searching questions from which it may infer the strength of
the evidence of guilt, or the lack of it, against the accused, in cases
where the offense is punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment.[8] After hearing, the courts order granting or refusing
bail must contain a summary of the evidence for the prosecution and
based thereon, the judge should then formulate his own conclusion as
to whether the evidence so presented is strong enough as to indicate
the guilt of the accused.[9] Otherwise, the order granting or denying
the application for bail may be invalidated because the summary of
evidence for the prosecution which contains the judges evaluation of
the evidence may be considered as an aspect of procedural due
process for both the prosecution and the defense.[10]
The herein respondent granted bail to the accused Peaflorida without
conducting a hearing despite his earlier pronouncement in the Order
dated November 19, 2001 denying bail as he considered the crime the
accused Peaflorida was charged with to be a non-bailable offense. The
manifestation of the prosecutor that he is not ready to present any
witness to prove that the prosecutions evidence against the accused is
strong, is never a basis for the outright grant of bail without a
preliminary hearing on the matter.[11] A hearing is required even when
the prosecution refuses to adduce evidence or fails to interpose an
objection to the motion for bail.[12]
The joint manifestation of the prosecution and the defense that it would
be fair and just if the court would fix the bail bond for the provisional
release of the accused at P250,000.00 does not justify the granting of
bail without a hearing in a case involving a non-bailable offense. A
hearing is necessary for the court to take into consideration the

guidelines in fixing the amount of bail set forth in Section 9, Rule 114 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Needless to stress, judicial discretion is the domain of the judge and
the duty to exercise discretion cannot be reposed upon the will or whim
of the prosecution or the defense. Respondent should have
ascertained personally whether the evidence of guilt is strong and
endeavored to determine the propriety of the amount of bail
recommended. To do away with the requisite bail hearing is to
dispense with this time-tested safeguard against arbitrariness.[14] It
must always be remembered that imperative justice requires the
proper observance of indispensable technicalities precisely designed
to ensure its proper dispensation.[15]
Respondents explanations that he ordered the cancellation of the bail
bend posted by the accused Peaflorida and issued a warrant for the
latters arrest on April 26, 2002 upon learning that an order of
deportation was issued against the latter;24 that accused Peaflorida
voluntarily surrendered himself on October 24, 2002 and that he is
presently detained at the Provincial Jail of Occidental Mindoro,25
cannot serve to exonerate him or even mitigate the penalty due him.
WHEREFORE, respondent Executive Judge Ernesto P. Pagayatan of
the Regional Trial Court of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro (Branch 46)
is found guilty of Gross Ignorance of the Law and is hereby FINED the
amount of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00). He is further STERNLY
WARNED that the commission of similar acts in the future shall be
dealt with more severely by this Court. SO ORDERED.
TRINIDAD O. LACHICA vs. JUDGE ROSABELLA M. TORMIS,
FACTS:
In an Affidavit dated October 2, 2003,[1] Trinidad O. Lachica charged
Judge Rosabella M. Tormis of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of
Cebu City, Branch IV, with Abuse of Authority relative to Criminal
Cases Nos. 57220-R to 57223-R. Complainant alleged that since the
filing of the information, accused Domugho has remained at large.
Thus, the cases were ordered archived but an alias warrant of arrest
was issued by respondent judge on January 14, 2000.
During the investigation, it was established that the accused was
arrested on July 2, 2003 at 8:45 p.m. and was brought directly to the
Waterfront Police Station where she was booked at 9:00 p.m. At about
10:00 p.m. the accused was set free without a release order.[11]
It is also undisputed that respondent judge personally received the
cash bail bond for the accused. For this act alone, respondent is
already administratively liable. Section 14, Rule 114 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure specifies the persons with whom a cash
bail bond may be deposited, namely: the collector of internal revenue
or the provincial, city or municipal treasurer. A judge is not authorized
to receive the deposit of cash as bail nor should such cash be kept in
his office.
ISSUE:
WON respondent judge is guilty of gross misconduct for having abused
her judicial authority when she personally accepted the cash bail bond
of the accused?
HOLDING:
Yes. The foregoing acts not only seriously undermine and adversely
reflect on the honesty and integrity of respondent judge as an officer of
the court; they also betray a character flaw which speaks ill of her
person. Making false representations is a vice which no judge should
imbibe. As the judge is the visible representation of the law, and more
importantly justice, he must therefore, be the first to abide by the law
and weave an example for the others to follow.
It need not be overemphasized that in receiving the cash bond
respondent judge ran afoul with Rule 114 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure. Indeed, in the case of Office of the Court Administrator v.
Fernandez, the Court held that:
The rules specify the persons with whom a cash bail bond may be
deposited namely: the collector of internal revenue, or the provincial,
city or municipal treasurer. Section 14 of Rule 114 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure (effective December 1, 2000) provides:
SEC. 14. Deposit of Cash as bail The accused or any person acting in
his behalf may deposit in cash with the nearest collector of internal
revenue or provincial, city or municipal treasurer the amount of the bail
fixed by the court, or recommended by the prosecutor who investigated
or filed the case. Upon submission of a proper certificate of deposit
and of a written undertaking showing compliance with the requirements
of section 2 of this Rule, the accused shall be discharged from custody.
The money deposited shall be considered as bail and applied to the
payment of fine and costs while the excess, if any, shall be returned to
the accused or to whoever made the deposit.
A judge is not one of those authorized to receive the deposit of cash as
bail, nor should such cash be kept in the office of the judge.

WHEREFORE, Rosabella M. Tormis, Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial


Court in Cities, Cebu City, Branch IV, is found GUILTY of gross
misconduct and is SUSPENDED from office for six (6) months without
salary and other benefits and STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of
the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.
ATTY. EDWARD SERAPIO, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN
(THIRD DIVISION), PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE DIRECTOR-GENERAL LEANDRO
MENDOZA, respondents.
FACTS:
Before the Court are two petitions for certiorari filed by petitioner
Edward Serapio, assailing the resolutions of the Third Division of the
Sandiganbayan denying his petition for bail, motion for a
reinvestigation and motion to quash, and a petition for habeas corpus,
all in relation to Criminal Case No. 26558 for plunder wherein petitioner
is one of the accused together with former President Joseph E.
Estrada, Jose Jinggoy P. Estrada and several others.
The Sandiganbayan set the arraignment of the accused, including
petitioner, in Criminal Case No. 26558 on June 27, 2001. In the
meantime, on April 27, 2001, petitioner filed with the Sandiganbayan
an Urgent Petition for Bail which was set for hearing on May 4,
2001.For his part, petitioners co-accused Jose Jinggoy Estrada filed on
April 20, 2001 a Very Urgent Omnibus Motion alleging that he was
entitled to bail as a matter of right.
During the hearing on May 4, 2001 on petitioners Urgent Petition for
Bail, the prosecution moved for the resetting of the arraignment of the
accused earlier than the June 27, 2001 schedule. However, the
Sandiganbayan denied the motion of the prosecution and issued an
order declaring that the petition for bail can and should be heard before
petitioners arraignment on June 27, 2001 and even before the other
accused in Criminal Case No. 26558 filed their respective petitions for
bail. Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan set the hearing for the reception
of evidence on petitioners petition for bail on May 21 to 25, 2001.
On May 17, 2001, four days before the hearing on petitioners petition
for bail, the Ombudsman filed an urgent motion for early arraignment of
Joseph Estrada, Jinggoy Estrada and petitioner and a motion for joint
bail hearings of Joseph Estrada, Jinggoy Estrada and petitioner. The
following day, petitioner filed a manifestation questioning the propriety
of including Joseph Estrada and Jinggoy Estrada in the hearing on his
(petitioners) petition for bail.
The people insist that arraignment is necessary before bail hearings
may be commenced. However, the bail hearing again did not proceed
because the petitioner filed with the information a motion to quash the
amended information on the grounds that as against him, the amended
information does not allege a combination of series of over or criminal
acts constitutive of plunder.
According to the prosecution, the motion to quash the amended
information was antithetical to his petition for bail. Petitioner also prays
for the issuance of habeas corpus.
ISSUES:
(a) W/N petitioner should first be arraigned before hearings of his
petition for bail may be conducted.
(b) W/N petitioner may file a motion to quash the amended Information
during the pendency of his petition for bail.
(c) W/N a joint hearing of petition for bail for all the accused is
mandatory
(d) W/N petitioner should instead be released through a writ of habeas
corpus.
HOLDING:
(a) Although the petitioner was already arraigned, no plea has yet been
entered thereby rendering the issue of whether an arraignment is
necessary before the conduct of bail hearings in the petitioners case
moot. Nonetheless, the court held that arraignment of an accused is
not a pre-requisite to the conduct of hearings on his petition for bail. A
person is allowed to petition for bail as soon as he is deprived of his of
his liberty by virtue of his arrest or voluntary surrender.
In Lavides vs. CA, the court ruled that in cases where it is authorized,
bail should be granted before arraignment otherwise the accused may
be precluded from filing a motion to quash. However, this
pronouncement should not be taken to mean that the hearing on a
petition for bail should at all times precede arraignment, because the
rule is that a person deprived of his liberty by virtue of his arrest or
voluntary surrender may apply for bail as soon as he is deprived of
liberty even before a complaint or information is filed against him. The
case of Lavides must be understood in light of the fact that the
accused in said case filed a petition for bail as well as a motion to
quash. Hence, in that case, the court held that to condition the grant of
bail to an accused on his arraignment would be to place him in a
position where he had to choose between filing a motion to quash and
thus delay his petition for bail and forgoing the filing of the motion to
quash so that he can be arraigned at once and therefore be released
on bail. Such would undermine the constitutional right of the accused.
When a bail is matter of right, an accused may apply for and be

granted bail even prior to arraignment. The Lavides case also implies
that an application for bail in a case involving an offense punishable by
reclusion perpetua to death may also be heard even before an
accused is arraigned. Sandiganbayan therefore committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction in ordering the
arraignment of petitioner before proceeding with the hearing of his
petition for bail.
(b) Court sees no inconsistency between an application of an accused
for bail and his filing of a motion to quash. Bail, is the security given for
the release of the person in custody of the law. A motion to quash on
the other hand is a mode by which an accused assails the validity of a
criminal complaint filed against him for insufficiency on its fact in posit
of law. These tow relied have objectives which are not necessarily
antithetical to each other. However, it is true that if a motion to quash a
criminal complaint or information on the ground that the same does not
charge any offense is granted and the case is dismissed and the
accused is ordered released, the petition for bail of an accused may
become moot and academic.
(c) Petitioner argues that a joint bail hearing would negate his right to
have his petition for bail resolved in a summary proceeding since said
hearing might be converted into a full blown trial. Prosecution on the
other hand claims that joint hearings will save the court form having to
hear the same witnesses and the parties from presenting the same
evidences. There is no provision in the Rules of Court governing the
hearings of two or more petitioner for bail filed by different accused or
that a petition for bail of an accused be heard simultaneously with the
trial of the case against the other accused. The matter should be
addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. In the exercise of
its discretion, the Sandiganbayan must take into account not only the
convenience of the state, including the prosecution but also that of the
petitioner and the witnesses.
In the case of Ocampo vs. Bernabe, the court ruled that in a petition or
bail hearing, the court is to conduct only a summary hearing, meaning
such brief and speedy method of receiving and considering the
evidence of guilt as is practicable and consistent with the purpose of
the hearing which is early to determine the weight of evidence for
purposes of bail. The court does not try the merits or enter into the
inquiry as to the weight that ought to be given to the evidence against
the accused, nor will it speculate on the outcome of the trial or on what
further such evidence as has reference to substantial matters. In the
case at bar, the case against former President Estrada is an entirely
different matter. For, with the participation of the former president in the
hearing of petitioners petition for bail, the proceeding assumes
completely different dimension. The proceeding will no longer be
summary since the proceedings will be full blown which is antithetical
to the nature of a bail hearing. The joinder of the petitioners bail will be
prejudicial to the petitioner as it will unduly delay the determination of
the issue of the right of petitioner to obtain provisional liberty and seek
relief from his court. The Sandiganbayn again committed grave abuse
of discretion in ordering a simultaneous hearing of petitioners petition
for bail with the trial of the case against former president.
(d) In the case at bar, bail is not matter of rights since the accused is
charged with a capital offense, but discretionary upon the court. Under
Section 8 of rule 114, there must be a showing that the evidence of
guilt against a person charged with a capital offense is not strong for
the court to grant him bail., thus, upon an application for bail, by the
person charged with a capital offense, a hearing must be conducted
where the prosecution has the burden of showing that the evidence of
guilt against an accused is strong. When the evidence of guilt is strong,
bail becomes a matter of right, which is not so in the case at bar. In
exceptional cases, habeas corpus may be granted by the courts even
when the person concerned is detained pursuant to a valid arrest or his
voluntary surrender. The writ may be issued where the deprivation of
liberty while initially valid under the lad had not later become invalid.
However, there is no basis for the issuance of the writ in the case at
bar. The general rule is that the writ does not lie where the person
alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer
under process issued by a court which had jurisdiction to issued the
same applied, because petitioner is under detention pursuant to the
order of arrest. Petitioner in fact voluntarily surrendered himself to the
authorities.

RULE 117 MOTION TO QUASH


LOS BAOS v. PEDRO
FACTS:
Pedro was charged for carrying a loaded firearm without the required
written authorization from the Comelec a day before the May 2001
elections accusation as per BP 881 (Omnibus Election Code) in Boac,
Marinduque.
A Complaint was filed against him. After Inquest, the Information was
filed in court. When his motion for Preliminary Investigation was
granted, it did not materialize. Hence he filed Motion to Quash arguing
that the Information contains averments which, if true, would
constitute a legal excuse or justification and/or that the facts charged

do not constitute an offense. He attached a Comelec Certification that


he was exempted from the gun ban. The RTC granted the quashal.
Private prosecutor Ariel Los Baos, representing the checkpoint team,
moved to reopen the case, as Pedros Comelec Certification was a
falsification, and the prosecution was deprived of due process when
the judge quashed the information without a hearing. The RTC
reopened the case, as Pedro did not object to Los Baos motion.
Pedro filed an MR for the RTCs order primarily based on Section 8 of
Rule 117, arguing that the dismissal had become permanent. The RTC
denied Pedros MR.
The CA initially denied Pedros petition. In his MR, Pedro manifested
the exact date and time of the Marinduque provincial prosecutors
receipt of the quashal order to be 2:35 p.m., December 10, 2001, and
argued that based on this date, the provisional dismissal of the case
became permanent on December 10, 2002. Based on this
information, the CA reversed itself ruling that the RTC committed grave
abuse of discretion because it failed to apply Section 8, Rule 17 and
the time-bar under this provision.
ISSUE:
Is the CA correct in applying Sec. 8, Rule 117 in this case?
RULING:
NO. In People v. Lacson, we ruled that there are sine qua non
requirements in the application of the time-bar rule stated in the
second paragraph of Section 8 of Rule 117. We also ruled that the
time-bar under the provision is a special procedural limitation qualifying
the right of the State to prosecute, making the time-bar an essence of
the given right or as an inherent part thereof, so that the lapse of the
time-bar operates to extinguish the right of the State to prosecute the
accused.
The modifier provisional directly suggests that the dismissals which
Section 8 essentially refers to are those that are temporary in
character, and not the dismissals that are permanent. Based on the
law, rules, and jurisprudence, permanent dismissals are those barred
by the principle of double jeopardy, by the previous extinction of
criminal liability, by the rule on speedy trial, and the dismissals after
plea without the express consent of the accused. Section 8, by its own
terms, cannot cover these dismissals because they are not provisional.
A second feature is that Section 8 does not state the grounds that lead
to a provisional dismissal. This is in marked contrast with a motion to
quash whose grounds are specified under Section 3. The delimitation
of the grounds available in a motion to quash suggests that a motion to
quash is a class in itself, with specific and closely- defined
characteristics under the Rules of Court.
Section 8 simply states when a provisional dismissal can be made, i.e.,
when the accused expressly consents and the offended party is given
notice. The consent of the accused to a dismissal relates directly to
what Section 3(i) and Section 7 provide, i.e., the conditions for
dismissals that lead to double jeopardy. This immediately suggests that
a dismissal under Section 8 i.e., one with the express consent of the
accused is not intended to lead to double jeopardy as provided under
Section 7, but nevertheless creates a bar to further prosecution under
the special terms of Section 8.
This feature must be read with Section 6 which provides for the effects
of sustaining a motion to quash the dismissal is not a bar to another
prosecution for the same offense unless the basis for the dismissal is
the extinction of criminal liability and double jeopardy. These unique
terms, read in relation with Sections 3(i) and 7 and compared with the
consequences of Section 8, carry unavoidable implications that cannot
but lead to distinctions between a quashal and a provisional dismissal
under Section 8. They stress in no uncertain terms that, save only for
what has been provided under Sections 4 and 5, the governing rule
when a motion to quash is meritorious are the terms of Section 6. The
failure of the Rules to state under Section 6 that a Section 8 provisional
dismissal is a bar to further prosecution shows that the framers did not
intend a dismissal based on a motion to quash and a provisional
dismissal to be confused with one another; Section 8 operates in a
world of its own separate from motion to quash, and merely provides a
time-bar that uniquely applies to dismissals other than those grounded
on Section 3. Conversely, when a dismissal is pursuant to a motion to
quash under Section 3, Section 8 and its time-bar does not apply.
The Court notes also the following differences stressing that a motion
to quash and its resulting dismissal is a unique class that should not be
confused with other dismissals:
First, a motion to quash is invariably filed by the accused to question
the efficacy of the complaint or information filed against him or her
(Sections 1 and 2, Rule 117); in contrast, a case may be provisionally
dismissed at the instance of either the prosecution or the accused, or
both, subject to the conditions enumerated under Section 8, Rule 117.
Second, the form and content of a motion to quash are as stated under
Section 2 of Rule 117; these requirements do not apply to a provisional
dismissal.

Third, a motion to quash assails the validity of the criminal complaint or


the criminal information for defects or defenses apparent on face of the
information; a provisional dismissal may be grounded on reasons other
than the defects found in the information.
Fourth, a motion to quash is allowed before the arraignment (Section
1, Rule 117); there may be a provisional dismissal of the case even
when the trial proper of the case is already underway provided that the
required consents are present.
Fifth, a provisional dismissal is, by its own terms, impermanent until the
time-bar applies, at which time it becomes a permanent dismissal. In
contrast, an information that is quashed stays quashed until revived;
the grant of a motion to quash does not per se carry any connotation of
impermanence, and becomes so only as provided by law or by the
Rules. In re-filing the case, what is important is the question of whether
the action can still be brought, i.e., whether the prescription of action or
of the offense has set in. In a provisional dismissal, there can be no refiling after the time-bar, and prescription is not an immediate
consideration.
To recapitulate, quashal and provisional dismissal are different
concepts whose respective rules refer to different situations that should
not be confused with one another. If the problem relates to an intrinsic
or extrinsic deficiency of the complaint or information, as shown on its
face, the remedy is a motion to quash under the terms of Section 3,
Rule 117. All other reasons for seeking the dismissal of the complaint
or information, before arraignment and under the circumstances
outlined in Section 8, fall under provisional dismissal.
The grounds Pedro cited in his motion to quash are that the
Information contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal
excuse or justification [Section 3(h), Rule 117], and that the facts
charged do not constitute an offense [Section 3(a), Rule 117]. We find
from our examination of the records that the Information duly charged
a specific offense and provides the details on how the offense was
committed. Thus, the cited Section 3(a) ground has no merit. On the
other hand, we do not see on the face or from the averments of the
Information any legal excuse or justification. This COMELEC
Certification is a matter aliunde that is not an appropriate motion to
raise in, and cannot support, a motion to quash grounded on legal
excuse or justification found on the face of the Information.
Significantly, no hearing was ever called to allow the prosecution to
contest the genuineness of the COMELEC certification.
As a consequence, a valid Information still stands, on the basis of
which Pedro should now be arraigned and stand trial.
Lazarte vs. Sandiganbayan
FACTS:
In June 1990, the National Housing Authority (NHA) awarded the
original contract for the infrastructure works on the Pahanocoy Sites
and Services Project, Phase 1 in Bacolod City to A.C. Cruz
Construction. The project, with a contract cost of P7,666,507.55, was
funded by the World Bank under the Project Loan Agreement forged
on 10 June 1983 between the Philippine Government and the IBRDWorld Bank.
A.C. Cruz Construction commenced the infrastructure works on 1
August 1990. 5 In April 1991, the complainant Candido M. Fajutag, Jr.
(Fajutag, Jr.) was designated Project Engineer of the project.
A Variation/Extra Work Order No. 1 was approved for the excavation of
unsuitable materials and road filling works. As a consequence, Arceo
Cruz of A.C. Cruz Construction submitted the fourth billing and Report
of Physical Accomplishments on 6 May 1991. Fajutag, Jr., however,
discovered certain deficiencies. As a result, he issued Work Instruction
No. 1 requiring some supporting documents, such as: (1) copy of
approved concrete pouring; (2) survey results of original ground and
finished leaks; (3) volume calculation of earth fill actually rendered on
site; (4) test results as to the quality of materials and compaction; and
(5) copy of work instructions attesting to the demolished concrete
structures.
The contractor failed to comply with the work instruction. Upon Fajutag,
Jr.'s further verification, it was established that there was no actual
excavation and road filling works undertaken by A.C. Cruz
Construction.
On 2 October 2006, petitioner filed a motion to quash the Information
raising the following grounds: (1) the facts charged in the information
do not constitute an offense; (2) the information does not conform
substantially to the prescribed form; (3) the constitutional rights of the
accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusations
against them have been violated by the inadequacy of the information;
and (4) the prosecution failed to determine the individual participation
of all the accused in the information in disobedience with the
Resolution dated 27 March 2005. 18
On 2 March 2007, the Sandiganbayan issued the first assailed
resolution denying petitioner's motion to quash. We quote the said
resolution in part:

Among the accused-movants, the public officer whose participation in


the alleged offense is specifically mentioned in the May 30, 2006
Memorandum is accused Felicisimo Lazarte, Jr., the Chairman of the
Inventory and Acceptance
Committee (IAC), which undertook the inventory and final
quantification of the accomplishment of A.C. Cruz Construction. The
allegations of Lazarte that the IAC, due to certain constraints, allegedly
had to rely on the reports of the field engineers and/or the Project
Office as to which materials were actually installed; and that he
supposedly affixed his signature to the IAC Physical Inventory Report
and Memoranda dated August 12, 1991 despite his not being able to
attend the actual inspection because he allegedly saw that all the
members of the Committee had already signed are matters of defense
which he can address in the course of the trial. Hence, the quashal of
the information with respect to accused Lazarte is denied for lack of
merit.
ISSUES:
1. W/N the Information filed before the Sandiganbayan insufficiently
averred the essential elements of the crime charged Consolidated
case digests for Criminal Procedure Maria Victoria Z. Matillano, Set 1
Final Half as it failed to specify the individual participation of all the
accused. NO
2. W/N the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the case. YES
HOLDING:
The Court is not persuaded. The Court affirms the resolutions of the
Sandiganbayan. At the outset, it should be stressed that the denial of a
motion to quash is not correctible by certiorari. Well-established is the
rule that when a motion to quash in a criminal case is denied, the
remedy is not a petition for certiorari but for petitioners to go to trial
without prejudice to reiterating the special defenses invoked in their
motion to quash. Remedial measures as regards interlocutory orders,
such as a motion to quash, are frowned upon and often dismissed. The
evident reason for this rule is to avoid multiplicity of appeals in a single
court.
This general rule, however, is subject to certain exceptions. If the court,
in denying the motion to dismiss or motion to quash acts without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, then certiorari
or prohibition lies. And in the case at bar, the Court does not find the
Sandiganbayan to have committed grave abuse of discretion.
The fundamental test in reflecting on the viability of a motion to quash
on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense is
whether or not the facts asseverated, if hypothetically admitted, would
establish the essential elements of the crime defined in law. Matters
aliunde will not be considered.
Finally, the Court sustains the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction to hear the
case. As correctly pointed out by the Sandiganbayan, it is of no
moment that petitioner does not occupy a position with Salary Grade
27 as he was a department manager of the NHA, a government-owned
or controlled corporation, at the time of the commission of the offense,
which position falls within the ambit of its jurisdiction. The instant
petition is DISMISSED.
PEOPLE VS. LACSON
FACTS:
The petitioners filed an MR of the Resolution by the SC remanding the
instant case to the RTC of Quezon City for the determination of several
factual issues relative to the application of Section 8 of Rule 117 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure on the dismissal of several
criminal cases filed against the respondent and his co-accused.
In the said criminal cases, the respondent and his co-accused were
charged with multiple murder for the shooting and killing of eleven
male persons bandied as members of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang.
The Court ruled in the Resolution sought to be reconsidered that the
provisional dismissal of the said criminal cases were with the express
consent of the respondent as he himself moved for said provisional
dismissal when he filed his motion for judicial determination of
probable cause and for examination of witnesses.
The petitioners aver that Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure is not applicable to the said criminal cases
because the essential requirements, respondents express consent to
the dismissal and due notice to the private complainants, for its
application were not present when Judge Agnir, Jr., issued his
resolution.
ISSUE:
WON Sec.8, Rule 117 of the RRCP is applicable to the criminal cases
herein disputed
HOLDING:
NO. Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
reads:

Sec. 8. Provisional dismissal. A case shall not be provisionally


dismissed except with the express consent of the accused and with
notice to the offended party. The provisional dismissal of offenses
punishable by imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years or a fine of
any amount, or both, shall become permanent one (1) year after
issuance of the order without the case having been revived. With
respect to offenses punishable by imprisonment of more than six (6)
years, their provisional dismissal shall become permanent two (2)
years after issuance of the order without the case having been revived.
Having invoked said rule before the petitioners-panel of prosecutors
and before the Court of Appeals, the respondent is burdened to
establish the essential requisites of the first paragraph thereof, namely:
1. the prosecution with the express conformity of the accused or the
accused moves for a provisional (sin perjuicio) dismissal of the case;
or both the prosecution and the accused move for a provisional
dismissal of the case;
2. the offended party is notified of the motion for a provisional dismissal
of the case;
3. the court issues an order granting the motion and dismissing the
case provisionally;
4. the public prosecutor is served with a copy of the order of
provisional dismissal of the case.
The foregoing requirements are conditions sinequanon to the
application of the time-bar in the second paragraph of the new rule.
The raison d etre for the requirement of the express consent of the
accused to a provisional dismissal of a criminal case is to bar him from
subsequently asserting that the revival of the criminal case will place
him in double jeopardy for the same offense or for an offense
necessarily included therein.
In this case, the respondent has failed to prove that the first and
second requisites of the first paragraph of the new rule were present
when Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissed the criminal cases. Irrefragably, the
prosecution did not file any motion for the provisional dismissal of the
said criminal cases.
For his part, the respondent merely filed a motion for judicial
determination of probable cause and for examination of prosecution
witnesses alleging that under Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution
and the decision of this Court in Allado v. Diokno,[17] among other
cases, there was a need for the trial court to conduct a personal
determination of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest
against respondent and to have the prosecutions witnesses
summoned before the court for its examination.
The respondent did not pray for the dismissal, provisional or otherwise,
of the criminal cases. Neither did he ever agree, impliedly or expressly,
to a mere provisional dismissal of the cases.
The Court also agrees with the petitioners contention that no notice of
any motion for the provisional dismissal of the criminal cases or of the
hearing thereon was served on the heirs of the victims at least three
days before said hearing as mandated by Rule 15, Section 4 of the
Rules of Court.
In the case at bar, even if the respondents motion for a determination
of probable cause and examination of witnesses may be considered
for the nonce as his motion for a provisional dismissal of the criminal
cases, however, the heirs of the victims were not notified thereof prior
to the hearing on said motion on March 22, 1999. There is no proof on
record that all the heirs of the victims were served with copies of the
resolution of Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissing the said cases.
It should also be noted that when the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure took effect on December 1, 2000, the State only had one
year and three months within which to revive the cases or refile the
Informations. The issue which arose from such event was whether the
time-bar in Section 8 of Rule 117 thereof should be applied
prospectively and not retroactively against the State, to which the
Court ruled that procedural laws may be applied retroactively.
The time-bar under Section 8 of Rule 117 is akin to a special
procedural limitation qualifying the right of the State to prosecute
making the time-bar an essence of the given right or as an inherent
part thereof, so that the lapse of the time-bar operates to extinguish the
right of the State to prosecute the accused.
The time-bar under the new rule does not reduce the periods under
Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, a substantive law. It is but a
limitation of the right of the State to revive a criminal case against the
accused after the Information had been filed but subsequently
provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the accused.
Upon the lapse of the timeline under the new rule, the State is
presumed, albeit disputably, to have abandoned or waived its right to
revive the case and prosecute the accused. The dismissal becomes
ipso facto permanent. The State may revive a criminal case beyond
the one-year or two-year periods provided that there is a justifiable
necessity for the delay. MR granted. The Resolution of the Court is set
aside.

RULE 118 PRE TRIAL


People v Sunga
FACTS:
On June 29, 1994 in the afternoon Rey Sunga, Ramil Lansang,
Inocencio Pascua, Jr., and Lito Octac as principals, and Locil Cui alias
Ginalyn Cuyos as accomplice by means of force, violence and
intimidation, to wit: by pinning down one JOCELYN TAN, a minor,
fifteen (15) years of age, succeeded in having carnal knowledge of her
against her will and without her consent; that on the occasion of said
rape and to enable them to conceal the commission of the crime, the
herein accused in furtherance of the conspiracy together with LOCIL
CUI, a minor, acting with discernment and who cooperated in the
execution of the offense as ACCOMPLICE, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, taking advantage of their superior number
and strength, with intent to kill, treacherously attack, assault, and use
personal violence upon JOCELYN TAN by repeatedly stabbing and
smashing a stone on her head, thereby inflicting upon her mortal
wounds and multiple fractures on her skull which were the direct cause
of her death shortly thereafter.
On October 18, 1994 a motion to discharge accused Locil Cui (Locil) to
be a state witness, averring therein that the legal requisites for her
discharge had been complied with, and submitting her sworn
statement which detailed how her co-accused carried out the crime.
Her version of the facts is as follows:
"At about 2:00 p. m. of June 29, 1994, Locil boarded a tricycle bearing
the marking "Ryan-Ryan" from the Social Security System (SSS) Office
in Puerto Princesa City. Already on board the tricycle was a lesbian
who had a birthmark on the right side of the face and who invited Locil
for a joy ride.13 Upon instruction of the lesbian, the tricycle driver,
whom she did not know but whom she later identified and who
answered to the name Rey Sunga (Sunga), repaired to the Mendoza
Park.
At the Mendoza Park, the lesbian alighted and spoke to Jocelyn Tan,
the victim, who was dressed in a PINS uniform. The lesbian, together
with Jocelyn, then joined Locil aboard the tricycle which was already
driven by Inocencio Pascua (Pascua) vice Sunga who had in the
meantime left. Still aboard the tricycle, the four of them proceeded to
and reached Barangay Irawan, Puerto Princesa City and on reaching a
forested area, Jocelyn was met by Sunga who held her and by Ramil
Lansang (Lansang) who wrapped his arm around her waist as they
dragged her to a nearby "buho" clumps. There, Jocelyn was made to
lie down. Her skirt was raised and her panty was taken off by Lansang.
As she lay face up with both her hands held by Sunga and Pascua,
Lansang stripped naked, placed himself on top of Jocelyn, inserted his
penis into her vagina and "seemed to be pumping."
After Lansang, Sunga took turn to have sexual intercourse with
Jocelyn as Lansang and one who was not known to Locil and whom
the latter described as one who has "chinky" or "narrow eyes," later
identified to be Pascua, kept Jocelyn pinned down by her hands.
Pascua too subsequently had carnal knowledge of Jocelyn who all
along struggled against her malefactors.
After Pascua satisfied his lust, Sunga, with a sharp bladed weapon,
stabbed the abdomen of the motionless Jocelyn, drawing her to rise to
a sitting position and clutch her abdomen. Sunga then passed on the
bladed weapon to Lansang who smashed Jocelyn's head with an
irregularly shaped stone, causing her to fall to the ground lifeless. Locil,
who witnessed everything, was then pulled by the lesbian and led back
into the tricycle where they awaited Lansang, Sunga and Pascua to
ride with them. All five thereafter headed back to Puerto Princesa City
proper, leaving Jocelyn's body behind.
When the five reached the Mendoza Park where Locil alighted, she
heard the voice of someone from inside the tricycle warning her to
keep mum about the incident, otherwise something would also happen
to her. Locil then repaired to her boarding house. Until she was
arrested following the discovery on July 12, 1994 of Jocelyn's corpse,
she did not report the incident to anyone."
Upon the other hand, all the accused proffered alibi.
Accused-appellant Sunga, who had previously been convicted for
robbery with homicide, denied having anything to do with the rape and
killing of Jocelyn. He branded as false the testimony of Locil whom he
claimed is a prostitute and a pimp and was always seen loitering at
Mendoza Park. Through a sworn statement, he averred that: He, Octa
and Jun returned to Irawan, took Jocelyn's corpse and dumped it at a
coffee plantation in Jacana Road; and that he did not take part in the
rape or killing of Jocelyn but merely joined the group due to Lansang's
promise to give him P500.00.

DECISION OF LOWER COURTS: (1) RTC: By decision of March 7,


1996, the trial court convicted Sunga and Lansang as principals of the
crime of Rape with Homicide and sentenced each to suffer the penalty
of DEATH, and Pascua as principal in the crime of Rape. While the
others are acquitted and Locil is discharged as state witness.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether the discharge by the lower court of Locil Cui as a state
witness is in accordance with law; and
(2) Whether the guilt of appellants has been proven beyond
reasonable doubt?
(3) Is Sunga's sworn statement admissible as evidence?
HOLDING:
(1) NO.
Requisites:
1. the discharge must be with the consent of the accused sought to be
a state witness; - YES
2. his testimony is absolutely necessary; - YES (Based on Locil's
sworn statement, she was the only person who saw what happened to
Jocelyn. Her testimony was thus indispensable.)
3. No other direct evidence is available for the proper prosecution of
the offense committed except his testimony; - YES
4. His testimony can be substantially corroborated in its material
points; - NO
a. As for the rest of the prosecution evidence, it fails to
corroborate Locil's testimony. The declarations of other
witnesses can in no way enhance the veracity of the
essential, material aspects of Locil's account for they relate
--- not to the crime itself but to events THEREAFTER.
An exhaustive review of the transcript of stenographic notes
of Locil's testimony reveals, however, that the manner by
which she related it was punctuated with marks of
tentativeness, uncertainty and indecisiveness which the trial
court unfortunately failed to take note of in its decision on
review.
b. To recapitulate, Locil claimed that on June 29, 1994 she
boarded a tricycle bearing a lesbian who invited her for a
joyride, proceeded to the Mendoza Park and picked up
Jocelyn, whom she was not acquainted with, then brought by
the same tricycle to Irawan where the latter was raped and
brutally murdered. In other words, she wanted to convey that
she was deliberately brought by appellants with them on
June 29, 1994 to the place where they were to carry out,
which they did, their abominable acts against Jocelyn. This
strikes this Court as improbable if not bizarre.
5. He does not appear to be the most guilty; and. - YES
6. He has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving
moral turpitude. - -YES
But -- Who can trust one who, in her early teens, gets pregnant, flees
home and stays in a boarding house albeit she has no visible means of
income to pay therefor, and carries an alias name to evade being
traced by her mother and aunt?
(2) NO, see items 1 and 2.
In light of the weak evidence for the prosecution, the defense of alibi as
well as of denial by appellants is accorded credence, for it is precisely
when the prosecution's case is weak that the defense of alibi assumes
importance and becomes crucial in negating criminal liability.
In fine, regardless of the probative weight of appellants' alibi, the
prosecution still has the onus of proving the guilt beyond reasonable
doubt of the accused and cannot rely on the weakness of the defense
evidence. The prosecution having failed to discharge its burden,
appellants' presumed innocence remains and must thus be acquitted.
(3) NO.
From the testimony of SPO2 Janoras, it can be gathered that Atty.
Rocamora (Sunga's counse during custodial investigation) did not, if at
all, fully apprise Sunga of his rights and options prior to giving his
(Sunga's) admission. Evidently, Atty. Rocamora, without more, merely
acted to facilitate the taking of the admission from Sunga.
Any information or admission given by a person while in custody which
may appear harmless or innocuous at the time without the competent
assistance of an independent counsel must be struck down as
inadmissible. Even if the confession contains a grain of truth or even if
it had been voluntarily given, if it was made without the assistance of
counsel, it is inadmissible.
The right to counsel involves more than just the presence of a lawyer
in the courtroom or the mere propounding of standard questions and
objections; rather it means an efficient and decisive legal assistance
and not a simple perfunctory representation.
RATIO:

(1) The sole, uncorroborated testimony of an accused who turned state


witness may suffice to convict his co-accused if it is given
unhesitatingly and in a straightforward manner and is full of details
which by their nature could not have been the result of deliberate
afterthought; otherwise, it needs corroboration the presence or lack of
which may ultimately decide the cause of the prosecution and the fate
of the accused.
(2) The rule in this jurisdiction is that the testimony of a self-confessed
accomplice or co-conspirator imputing the blame to or implicating his
co-accused cannot, by itself and without corroboration, be regarded as
proof to a moral certainty that the latter committed or participated in the
commission of the crime. The testimony must be substantially
corroborated in its material points by unimpeachable testimony and
strong circumstances and must be to such an extent that its
trustworthiness becomes manifest.
a. Was Locil's testimony corroborated in its material points by the
prosecution's other evidence? - NO
b. If in the affirmative, was the corroborative evidence unimpeachable
testimony and strong circumstances to such an extent that Locil's
trustworthiness becomes manifest? - NO
In the appreciation of circumstantial evidence, there must be at least
two proven circumstances which in complete sequence lead to no
other logical conclusion than that of the guilt of the accused. [This was
not present in this case]
NOTES:
(1) Custodial investigation is the stage "where the police investigation
is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to
focus on a particular suspect taken into custody by the police who
carry out a process of interrogation that lends itself to elicit
Office of the Court Administrator vs. Judge Dolores L. Espaol
The OCAs investigation showed that upon her compulsory retirement
on January 9, 2004, Judge Espaol left a total of 69 cases that had not
been acted upon. In particular, these included six criminal and sixteen
civil cases already submitted for decision, five criminal and eighteen
civil cases on appeal, and sixteen cases with pending incidents for
resolution.
This Court is aware of the predicament that plagues respondent, as
well as most other trial judges in the country. The problem of case
inputs grossly exceeding case outputs may be traced to several
factors, the most prevalent of which are the large number of cases
filed, indiscriminate grant of continuances to litigants, inefficient case
flow management by judges, and unrealistic management of the
calendar of cases.
To solve these problems, this Court has, in several instances, advised
judges to follow certain guidelines to facilitate speedy case disposition.
Among these measures is the discouragement of continuances, except
for exceptional reasons. To enforce due diligence in the dispatch of
judicial business without arbitrarily or unreasonably forcing cases to
trial when counsels are unprepared, judges should endeavor to hold
them to a proper appreciation of their duties to the public, as well as to
their own clients and to the adverse party.[10]
In criminal cases, pretrial is mandatory because, at the outset, litigation
is abbreviated by the identification of contentious issues. In civil cases,
judges are also required to take advantage of the pretrial conference to
arrive at settlements and compromises between the parties, to ask the
latter to explore the possibility of submitting their cases to any of the
alternative modes of dispute resolution, and at least to reduce and limit
the issues for trial. Judges are further directed to implement and
observe strictly the provisions of Section 2 of Rule 119, providing
for a continuous day-to-day trial as far as practicable until
termination.[11]
The work of magistrates is multifarious. They do not only hear cases
and write decisions in the seclusion of their chambers; equally
important, they act also as administrators. Their administrative
efficiency may well define the justice they dispense.
They should be rational and realistic in calendaring cases. Only a
sufficient number should be calendared in order to permit them to hear
all the cases scheduled. Hence, unless the docket of the court requires
otherwise, not more than four cases daily should be scheduled for trial.
A continuous and physical inventory of cases on a monthly basis is
also recommended, so that they would be aware of the status of each
case.
With the assistance of the clerk of court, a checklist should be
prepared, indicating the steps to be taken to keep cases moving. While
decision-writing is a matter of personal style, judges are well-advised
to prepare concise but complete as well as correct and clear decisions,
orders or resolutions. With a table or calendar indicating the cases
submitted for decision, they should note the exact day, month and year
when the 90-day period is to expire.

Prompt disposition of the courts business is attained through proper


and efficient court management. Judges would be remiss in their duty
and responsibility as court managers if they fail to adopt an efficient
system of record management.
At times, circumstances beyond their control result in the accumulation
of ripe cases to a daunting number, making it humanly impossible for
them to comply with the constitutionally mandated 90-day period. In
such instances, all that they should do is write a request for extension
from the Supreme Court, stating therein their reasons for the delay.
Such administrative requirement finds basis in the 1987 Constitution.
This Court has further directed members of the bench to call the
attention of the OCA when the situation requires remedies beyond the
control or capability of the judges.
10.3 The reduction of case loads would be an efficacious
design to strengthen public confidence in the Courts. All
efforts should be exerted so that case disposals should
exceed case inputs. Whenever obstacles present
themselves which delay case disposition, the Presiding
Judge should immediately call the attention of the Supreme
Court through the Court Administrator when the situation
requires remedies beyond the control or capability of the
judges
At the very least, Judge Espaol should have requested for an
extension of time once she knew that she could not comply with the
prescribed ninety (90) day period to render judgment. In doing so, she
would have been able to apprise litigants as to the status of the case
and the reason for the delay, if any. It would have shown that she
minded the deadlines.
While Judge Espaol professes her human limitations coupled with the
disposition of the election cases which allegedly demand priority, the
same cannot exculpate her for non-compliance with the mandates of
the law and the rules.
WHEREFORE, the factual findings of the Office of Court Administrator
are ADOPTED. Judge Dolores L. Espaol is found GUILTY of gross
inefficiency and is fined in the amount of eleven thousand pesos
(P11,000), to be deducted from the retirement benefits due her.

RULE 119 TRIAL


Jeffrey Dayap V Sendiong
FACTS:
Petitioner Jeffrey Reso Dayap was charged with the crime of Reckless
Imprudence resulting to Homicide, Less Serious Physical Injuries, and
Damage to Property. He recklessly drove a 10 wheeler cargo truck
hitting an automobile causing death to one of the passengers and less
serious physical injuries to other passengers.
On 10 January 2005, before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of
Sibulan, Negros Oriental, petitioner was arraigned and he pleaded not
guilty to the charge
Pre-trial and trial of the case proceeded. Respondents testified for the
prosecution. After the prosecution had rested its case, petitioner
sought leave to file a demurrer to evidence which was granted.
Petitioner filed his Demurrer to Evidence dated 15 April 2005 grounded
on the prosecutions failure to prove beyond reasonable doubt that he
is criminally liable for reckless imprudence, to which respondents filed
a Comment dated 25 April 2005.
MTC granted the demurrer and acquitted petitioner of the crime of
reckless imprudence. The MTC found that the evidence presented by
respondents failed to establish the allegations in the Information.
Respondents thereafter filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65,14
alleging that the MTCs dismissal of the case was done without
considering the evidence adduced by the prosecution.
RTC affirmed the acquittal of petitioner. The records also demonstrated
that the MTC conducted the trial of the case in the manner dictated by
Sec. 11, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, except that the defense no
longer presented its evidence after the MTC gave due course to the
accuseds demurrer to evidence, the filing of which is allowed under
Sec. 23, Rule 119.
ISSUE:
Whether the grant of demurrer to evidence was valid
RULING:
Yes. As the records show, the MTC granted petitioners demurrer to
evidence and acquitted him of the offense on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence. The demurrer to evidence in criminal cases,
such as the one at bar, is "filed after the prosecution had rested its
case," and when the same is granted, it calls "for an appreciation of the
evidence adduced by the prosecution and its sufficiency to warrant

conviction beyond reasonable doubt, resulting in a dismissal of the


case on the merits, tantamount to an acquittal of the accused." Such
dismissal of a criminal case by the grant of demurrer to evidence may
not be appealed, for to do so would be to place the accused in double
jeopardy. But while the dismissal order consequent to a demurrer to
evidence is not subject to appeal, the same is still reviewable but only
by certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Thus, in such case,
the factual findings of the trial court are conclusive upon the reviewing
court, and the only legal basis to reverse and set aside the order of
dismissal upon demurrer to evidence is by a clear showing that the trial
court, in acquitting the accused, committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction or a denial of due process,
thus rendering the assailed judgment void.
Accordingly, respondents filed before the RTC the petition for certiorari
alleging that the MTC gravely abused its discretion in dismissing the
case and failing to consider the evidence of the prosecution in
resolving the same, and in allegedly failing to follow the proper
procedure as mandated by the Rules of Court. The RTC correctly ruled
that the MTC did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the criminal
complaint. The MTCs conclusions were based on facts diligently
recited in the order thereby disproving that the MTC failed to consider
the evidence presented by the prosecution. The records also show that
the MTC correctly followed the procedure set forth in the Rules of
Court.
The Order dated 16 May 2005 of the Municipal Trial Court of Sibulan,
Negros Oriental in Criminal Case No. 3016-04 granting the Demurrer
to Evidence and acquitting petitioner Jeffrey Reso Dayap of the offense
charged therein is REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.
Salazar V People
FACTS:
On June 11, 1997, an Information for estafa was filed against herein
petitioner Anamer D. Salazar and co-accused Nena Jaucian Timario.
Upon arraignment, the petitioner, assisted by counsel, entered a plea
of not guilty.
After the prosecution rested its case, the petitioner filed a Demurrer to
Evidence with Leave of Court alleging that she could not be guilty of
the crime as charged for the following reasons: (a) she was merely an
indorser of the check issued by Nena Timario, and Article 315,
paragraph 2(d) on estafa penalizes only the issuer of the check and
not the indorser thereof; (b) there is no sufficient evidence to prove that
the petitioner conspired with the issuer of the check, Nena Jaucian
Timario, in order to defraud the private complainant; (c) after the first
check was dishonored, the petitioner replaced it with a second one.
The prosecution filed its opposition to the petitioners demurrer to
evidence.
The trial court rendered judgment acquitting the petitioner of the crime
charged but ordering her to remit to the private complainant the
amount of the check as payment for her purchase. The trial court ruled
that the evidence for the prosecution did not establish the existence of
conspiracy beyond reasonable doubt between the petitioner and the
issuer of the check, her co-accused Nena Jaucian Timario, for the
purpose of defrauding the private complainant. In fact, the private
complainant, Jerson Yao, admitted that he had never met Nena
Jaucian Timario who remained at large. As a mere indorser of the
check, the petitioners breach of the warranty that the check was a
good one is not synonymous with the fraudulent act of falsely
pretending to possess credit under Article 315(2)(d).
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration on the civil aspect of
the decision with a plea that he be allowed to present evidence
pursuant to Rule 33 of the Rules of Court. On January 14, 2002, the
court issued an order denying the motion. Hence this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner was denied due process as she was not given the
opportunity to adduce evidence to prove that she was not civilly liable
to the private respondent.
RULING:
Yes. The prosecution presents its evidence not only to prove the guilt
of the accused beyond reasonable doubt but also to prove the civil
liability of the accused to the offended party. After the prosecution has
rested its case, the accused shall adduce its evidence not only on the
criminal but also on the civil aspect of the case. At the conclusion of
the trial, the court should render judgment not only on the criminal
aspect of the case but also on the civil aspect thereof:
SEC. 2. Contents of the judgment. If the judgment is of conviction, it
shall state (1) the legal qualification of the offense constituted by the
acts committed by the accused and the aggravating or mitigating
circumstances which attended its commission; (2) the participation of
the accused in the offense, whether as principal, accomplice, or
accessory after the fact; (3) the penalty imposed upon the accused;
and (4) the civil liability or damages caused by his wrongful act or
omission to be recovered from the accused by the offended party, if

there is any, unless the enforcement of the civil liability by a separate


civil action has been reserved or waived.

notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been


duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.

In case the judgment is of acquittal, it shall state whether the evidence


of the prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused or
merely failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In either
case, the judgment shall determine if the act or omission from which
the civil liability might arise did not exist.[10]

Jurisprudence acknowledges that due process in criminal proceedings,


in particular, require (a) that the court or tribunal trying the case is
properly clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter
before it; (b) that jurisdiction is lawfully acquired by it over the person of
the accused; (c) that the accused is given an opportunity to be heard;
and (d) that judgment is rendered only upon lawful hearing.

The acquittal of the accused does not prevent a judgment against him
on the civil aspect of the case where (a) the acquittal is based on
reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required; (b)
where the court declared that the liability of the accused is only civil; (c)
where the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not
based upon the crime of which the accused was acquitted. Moreover,
the civil action based on the delict is extinguished if there is a finding in
the final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from
which the civil liability may arise did not exist or where the accused did
not commit the acts or omission imputed to him.
If the accused is acquitted on reasonable doubt but the court renders
judgment on the civil aspect of the criminal case, the prosecution
cannot appeal from the judgment of acquittal as it would place the
accused in double jeopardy. However, the aggrieved party, the
offended party or the accused or both may appeal from the judgment
on the civil aspect of the case within the period therefor.
After the prosecution has rested its case, the accused has the option
either to (a) file a demurrer to evidence with or without leave of court
under Section 23, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, or to (b) adduce his evidence unless he waives the same.
The aforecited rule reads:
Sec. 23. Demurrer to evidence. After the prosecution rests its case, the
court may dismiss the action on the ground of insufficiency of evidence
(1) on its own initiative after giving the prosecution the opportunity to
be heard or (2) upon demurrer to evidence filed by the accused with or
without leave of court.
If the court denies the demurrer to evidence filed with leave of court,
the accused may adduce evidence in his defense. When the demurrer
to evidence is filed without leave of court, the accused waives his right
to present evidence and submits the case for judgment on the basis of
the evidence for the prosecution.
The motion for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence shall
specifically state its grounds and shall be filed within a non-extendible
period of five (5) days after the prosecution rests its case. The
prosecution may oppose the motion within a non-extendible period of
five (5) days from its receipt.
If leave of court is granted, the accused shall file the demurrer to
evidence within a non-extendible period of ten (10) days from notice.
The prosecution may oppose the demurrer to evidence within a similar
period from its receipt.
The order denying the motion for leave of court to file demurrer to
evidence or the demurrer itself shall not be reviewable by appeal or by
certiorari before the judgment.
In criminal cases, the demurrer to evidence partakes of the nature of a
motion to dismiss the case for failure of the prosecution to prove his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In a case where the accused files a
demurrer to evidence without leave of court, he thereby waives his
right to present evidence and submits the case for decision on the
basis of the evidence of the prosecution. On the other hand, if the
accused is granted leave to file a demurrer to evidence, he has the
right to adduce evidence not only on the criminal aspect but also on
the civil aspect of the case if his demurrer is denied by the court.
If demurrer is granted and the accused is acquitted by the court, the
accused has the right to adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the
case unless the court also declares that the act or omission from which
the civil liability may arise did not exist. If the trial court issues an order
or renders judgment not only granting the demurrer to evidence of the
accused and acquitting him but also on the civil liability of the accused
to the private offended party, said judgment on the civil aspect of the
case would be a nullity for the reason that the constitutional right of the
accused to due process is thereby violated. As we held in Alonte v.
Savellano, Jr.:
Section 14, paragraphs (1) and (2), of Article III, of the Constitution
provides the fundamentals.
(1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without
due process of law.
(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed
innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be
heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public
trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory
process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of
evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed

The above constitutional and jurisprudentially postulates, by now


elementary and deeply imbedded in our own criminal justice system,
are mandatory and indispensable. The principles find universal
acceptance and are tersely expressed in the oft-quoted statement that
procedural due process cannot possibly be met without a law which
hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders
judgment only after trial.[12]
This is so because when the accused files a demurrer to evidence, the
accused has not yet adduced evidence both on the criminal and civil
aspects of the case. The only evidence on record is the evidence for
the prosecution. What the trial court should do is to issue an order or
partial judgment granting the demurrer to evidence and acquitting the
accused; and set the case for continuation of trial for the petitioner to
adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the case, and for the private
complainant to adduce evidence by way of rebuttal after which the
parties may adduce their sur-rebuttal evidence as provided for in
Section 11, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure:
Sec. 11. Order of trial. The trial shall proceed in the following order:
(a) The prosecution shall present evidence to prove the charge and, in
the proper case, the civil liability.
(b) The accused may present evidence to prove his defense and
damages, if any, arising from the issuance of a provisional remedy in
the case.
(c) The prosecution and the defense may, in that order, present rebuttal
and sur-rebuttal evidence unless the court, in furtherance of justice,
permits them to present additional evidence bearing upon the main
issue.
(d) Upon admission of the evidence of the parties, the case shall be
deemed submitted for decision unless the court directs them to argue
orally or to submit written memoranda.
(e) When the accused admits the act or omission charged in the
complaint or information but interposes a lawful defense, the order of
trial may be modified.
Thereafter, the court shall render judgment on the civil aspect of the
case on the basis of the evidence of the prosecution and the accused.
The petitioner was granted leave of court to file a demurrer to
evidence. The court issued an order granting the demurrer on its
finding that the liability of the petitioner was not criminal but only civil.
However, the court rendered judgment on the civil aspect of the case
and ordered the petitioner to pay for her purchases from the private
complainant even before the petitioner could adduce evidence thereon.
Patently, therefore, the petitioner was denied her right to due process.
The Petition is GRANTED.

CONCEPCION CUENCO VDA. DE MANGUERRA and THE HON.


RAMON C. CODILLA, JR., Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Cebu City, Branch 19, - versus - RAUL RISOS, SUSANA
YONGCO, LEAH ABARQUEZ and ATTY. GAMALIEL D.B. BONJE,
FACTS:
Respondents were charged with Estafa Through Falsification of Public
Document before the RTC of Cebu City. The case arose from the
falsification of a deed of real estate mortgage allegedly committed by
respondents where they made it appear that Concepcion, the owner of
the mortgaged property known as the Gorordo property, affixed her
signature to the document. Hence, the criminal case.
Earlier, Concepcion, who was a resident of Cebu City, while on
vacation in Manila, was unexpectedly confined at the Makati Medical
Center due to upper gastro-intestinal bleeding; and was advised to
stay in Manila for further treatment. Respondents filed a Motion for
Suspension of the Proceedings in the Criminal Case on the ground of
prejudicial question. They argued that the Civil Case, which was an
action for declaration of nullity of the mortgage, should first be
resolved.
On May 11, 2000, the RTC granted the aforesaid motion. Concepcions
motion for reconsideration was denied. This prompted Concepcion to
institute a special civil action for certiorari before the CA seeking the
nullification of the May 11 and June 5 RTC orders. The case remains
pending before the appellate court to date.
The counsel of Concepcion filed a motion to take the latters deposition.
He explained the need to perpetuate Concepcions testimony due to
her weak physical condition and old age, which limited her freedom of

mobility. The RTC granted the motion and directed that Concepcions
deposition be taken before the Clerk of Court of Makati City.

court and not when he is kilometers away, as in the present case.


Therefore, the court may not introduce exceptions or conditions.

The respondents motion for reconsideration was denied by the trial


court on November 3, 2000. The court ratiocinated that procedural
technicalities should be brushed aside because of the urgency of the
situation, since Concepcion was already of advanced age. After
several motions for change of venue of the deposition-taking,
Concepcions deposition was finally taken on March 9, 2001 at her
residence.

RIMBERTO T. SALVANERA, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE


PHILIPPINES and LUCITA PARANE, Respondents.

ISSUE:
WON Concepcion's deposition can be taken in the RTC of Makati
RULING:
No. It is basic that all witnesses shall give their testimonies at the trial
of the case in the presence of the judge. This is especially true in
criminal cases in order that the accused may be afforded the
opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses pursuant to his
constitutional right to confront the witnesses face to face. It also gives
the parties and their counsel the chance to propound such questions
as they deem material and necessary to support their position or to test
the credibility of said witnesses. Lastly, this rule enables the judge to
observe the witnesses demeanor.
In the case at bench, in issue is the examination of a prosecution
witness, who, according to the petitioners, was too sick to travel and
appear before the trial court. Section 15 of Rule 119 thus comes into
play, and it provides: Section 15. Examination of witness for the
prosecution. When it satisfactorily appears that a witness for the
prosecution is too sick or infirm to appear at the trial as directed by the
court, or has to leave the Philippines with no definite date of returning,
he may forthwith be conditionally examined before the court where the
case is pending. Such examination, in the presence of the accused, or
in his absence after reasonable notice to attend the examination has
been served on him, shall be conducted in the same manner as an
examination at the trial. Failure or refusal of the accused to attend the
examination after notice shall be considered a waiver. The statement
taken may be admitted in behalf of or against the accused.
Petitioners contend that Concepcions advanced age and health
condition exempt her from the application of Section 15, Rule 119 of
the Rules of Criminal Procedure, and thus, calls for the application of
Rule 23 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. The contention does not
persuade. The very reason offered by the petitioners to exempt
Concepcion from the coverage of Rule 119 is at once the ground which
places her squarely within the coverage of the same provision.
Rule 119 specifically states that a witness may be conditionally
examined: 1) if the witness is too sick or infirm to appear at the trial; or
2) if the witness has to leave the Philippines with no definite date of
returning.
Thus, when Concepcion moved that her deposition be taken, had she
not been too sick at that time, her motion would have been denied.
Instead of conditionally examining her outside the trial court, she would
have been compelled to appear before the court for examination during
the trial proper. Undoubtedly, the procedure set forth in Rule 119
applies to the case at bar. It is thus required that the conditional
examination be made before the court where the case is pending. It is
also necessary that the accused be notified, so that he can attend the
examination, subject to his right to waive the same after reasonable
notice.
As to the manner of examination, the Rules mandate that it be
conducted in the same manner as an examination during trial, that is,
through question and answer. At this point, a query may thus be posed:
in granting Concepcions motion and in actually taking her deposition,
were the above rules complied with? The CA answered in the negative.
The appellate court considered the taking of deposition before the
Clerk of Court of Makati City erroneous and contrary to the clear
mandate of the Rules that the same be made before the court where
the case is pending.
Accordingly, said the CA, the RTC order was issued with grave abuse
of discretion. We agree with the CA and quote with approval its
ratiocination in this wise: Unlike an examination of a defense witness
which, pursuant to Section 5, Rule 119 of the previous Rules, and now
Section 13, Rule 119 of the present Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, may be taken before any judge, or, if not practicable, a
member of the Bar in good standing so designated by the judge in the
order, or, if the order be made by a court of superior jurisdiction, before
an inferior court to be designated therein, the examination of a witness
for the prosecution under Section 15 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure (December 1, 2000) may be done only before the court
where the case is pending.
Rule 119 categorically states that the conditional examination of a
prosecution witness shall be made before the court where the case is
pending. Contrary to petitioners contention, there is nothing in the rule
which may remotely be interpreted to mean that such requirement
applies only to cases where the witness is within the jurisdiction of said

FACTS:
Petitioner Rimberto Salvanera, together with Feliciano Abutin, Edgardo
Lungcay and Domingo Tampelix, is charged with the murder of Ruben
Parane. The above-named accused have conspired, confederated and
mutually helped each other. As per theory of the prosecution, petitioner
was the alleged mastermind; Lungcay, the hired hitman; Abutin, the
driver of the motorcycle which carried Lungcay to the place of the
commission of the crime; while Tampelix delivered the blood money to
the latter. All the accused have been arrested and detained, except
Edgardo Lungcay who remained at-large. Respondent Lucita Parane is
the spouse of victim Ruben Parane.
On January 22, 1997, petitioner applied for bail. The prosecution, on
March 4, 1997, moved for the discharge of accused Feliciano Abutin
and Domingo Tampelix, to serve as state witnesses. In an Omnibus
Order dated September 5, 1997, the trial court granted petitioners
application for bail and denied the prosecutions motion for the
discharge of accused Abutin and Tampelix.
The prosecution moved for reconsideration but the motion was denied.
The prosecution then appealed to the Court of Appeals. It contended
that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied
the motion to discharge accused Abutin and Tampelix to be state
witnesses. It alleged that the testimonies of the two accused are
absolutely necessary to establish that petitioner masterminded the
murder of Ruben Parane. The prosecution likewise claimed that it was
premature and baseless for the trial court to grant petitioners
application for bail because the prosecution had not yet rested its case
in the hearing for the discharge of the two accused.
The Court of Appeals sustained the prosecution. It discharged accused
Feliciano Abutin and Domingo Tampelix from the Information to
become state witnesses, and cancelled the bail bond of petitioner
Salvanera. In its Resolution dated September 22, 1999, it denied
petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration. Petitioner then filed his Motion
for Clarification with Leave of Court. The same was also denied in a
Resolution dated May 11, 2000. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:
WON the CA erred in discharging the accused to become state
witnesses and in cancelling the bail bond of petitioner Salvanera.
RULING:
We uphold the ruling of the Court of Appeals. In the discharge of an
accused in order that he may be a state witness, the following
conditions must be present, namely:
(1) Two or more accused are jointly charged with the commission of an
offense;
(2) The motion for discharge is filed by the prosecution before it rests
its case;
(3) The prosecution is required to present evidence and the sworn
statement of each proposed state witness at a hearing in support of the
discharge;
(4) The accused gives his consent to be a state witness; and
(5) The trial court is satisfied that:
a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose
discharge is requested;
b) There is no other direct evidence available for the proper
prosecution of the offense committed, except the testimony of said
accused;
c) The testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in
its material points;
d) Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and,
e) Said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense
involving moral turpitude.
We agree with the Court of Appeals in dismissing this reasoning as
specious.
To require the two witnesses Parane and Salazar to corroborate the
testimony of Abutin and Tampelix on the exact same points is to render
nugatory the other requisite that "there must be no other direct
evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense committed,
except the testimony of the state witness." The corroborative evidence
required by the Rules does not have to consist of the very same
evidence as will be testified on by the proposed state witnesses.
We have ruled that "a conspiracy is more readily proved by the acts of
a fellow criminal than by any other method. If it is shown that the
statements of the conspirator are corroborated by other evidence, then
we have convincing proof of veracity. Even if the confirmatory
testimony only applies to some particulars, we can properly infer that
the witness has told the truth in other respects." It is enough that the
testimony of a co-conspirator is corroborated by some other witness or
evidence.

In the case at bar, we are satisfied from a reading of the records that
the testimonies of Abutin and Tampelix are corroborated on important
points by each others testimonies and the circumstances disclosed
through the testimonies of the other prosecution witnesses, and "to
such extent that their trustworthiness becomes manifest."
As part of the conspiracy, Abutin and Tampelix can testify on the
criminal plan of the conspirators. Where a crime is contrived in secret,
the discharge of one of the conspirators is essential because only they
have knowledge of the crime. The other prosecution witnesses are not
eyewitnesses to the crime, as, in fact, there is none. No one except the
conspirators knew and witnessed the murder. The testimonies of the
accused and proposed state witnesses Abutin and Tampelix can
directly link petitioner to the commission of the crime.
Lastly, we affirm the ruling of the appellate court in cancelling the bail
bond of petitioner. The grant of petitioners application for bail is
premature. It has to await the testimony of state witnesses Abutin and
Tampelix. Their testimonies must be given their proper weight in
determining whether the petitioner is entitled to bail.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED and the Decision and
Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 46945, dated
April 30, 1999, September 22, 1999 and May 11, 2000, respectively,
are AFFIRMED in toto. SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, versus PABLO L. ESTACIO, JR.
and MARITESS ANG Appellant
FACTS:
Maritess Ang (Maritess) was charged before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Quezon City with kidnapping for ransom confederating with to
persons. The Information was subsequently amended to implead the
other appellant, Pablo Estacio, Jr. (Estacio), and to change the charge
from kidnapping for ransom to kidnapping with murder. Still later, the
Information was further amended to additionally implead one Hildo
Sumipo (Sumipo) who was, however, subsequently discharged as
state witness.
ISSUE:
WON the court erred in discharging Sumipo as a state witness.
RULING:
Respecting the assigned error in discharging Sumipo as a state
witness, the same does not lie. The conditions for the discharge of an
accused as a state witness are as follows:
(a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose
discharge is requested;

(b) There is no other direct evidence available for the proper


prosecution of the offense committed, except the testimony of said
accused;
(c) The testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in
its material points;
(d) Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and
(e) Said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense
involving moral turpitude.
These conditions were established by the prosecution. Sumipo was the
only person other than appellants who had personal knowledge of the
acts for which they were being prosecuted. Only he could positively
identify appellants as the perpetrators of the crime. He does not
appear to be the most guilty. He did not participate in planning the
commission of the crime. He in fact at first thought that Maritess was
joking when she said, Diretsong dukot na rin kay Charlie. He tried to
dissuade appellants from pursuing their plan. He did not participate in
the actual stabbing. And he tried to extricate himself from the attempts
to extract ransom from the victims family. Sumipos testimony was
corroborated on material points. The victims mother testified regarding
the demands for ransom. Cesar Moscoso, an employee of Casa
Leonisa, testified to seeing the victim, Estacio, and Maritess at the barrestaurant on the day and at the time in question. Henry Hong, the
victims cousin who arrived at Pizza Hut, Greenhills ahead of the
victims brother during the scheduled delivery of the ransom, testified to
seeing Estacio there with companions.[35] And the victims skeletal
remains were found at the scene of the crime upon Estacios
information and direction. And there is no proof that Sumipo had, at
any time, been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude.
Even assuming arguendo that the discharge of Sumipo as a state
witness was erroneous, such error would not affect the competency
and quality of his testimony. Finally, the Court brushes aside Maritess
disclaimer of participation in killing the victim. It was she who bound
the hands and gagged the victim. When Estacio, in Maritess company,
brought the victim to the scene of the crime and thereafter returned to
the car, her and Estacios hands were bloodied. Parenthetically,
prosecution witness Arlene Francisco, Maritess friend who visited her
in prison, testified that Maritess admitted having killed Chua. And the
prosecution presented letters from Maritess to Estacio, written from
prison, where she admitted the deed.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals of May 12, 2005 is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The Court finds appellants Maritess
Ang and Pablo Estacio, Jr. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Murder,
with the generic aggravating circumstance of use of motor vehicle. And
in view of the enactment of Republic Act No. 9346 on June 24, 2006,
the penalty is reduced to reclusion perpetua without eligibility for
parole.

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