Академический Документы
Профессиональный Документы
Культура Документы
PO2 Collado, PO1 Mendoza, PO2 Paculdar, and PO2 Magcalayo then
brought the transparent plastic sachets containing the white crystalline
substance subject of the buy-bust operation to the Philippine National
Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory for examination. A Forensic Chemical
Officer, conducted a qualitative examination on the specimens, which
yielded positive results.
FACTS:
On 16 May 1996, at about 7:00 p.m., police operatives of the DILG
arrested SPO2 Vergel de Dios, Rogelio Anoble and a certain Arellano,
for unlawful possession of shabu. In the course of the investigation of
the three arrested persons, Redentor Teck, alias Frank, and Joseph
Junio were identified as the source of the drug. An entrapment
operation was then set after the three were prevailed upon to call their
source and pretends to order another supply of shabu.
At around 11:00 p.m. that same date, Teck and Junio were arrested
while they were about to hand over another bag of shabu to SPO2 De
Dios and company. Questioned, Teck and Junio informed the police
operatives that they were working as talent manager and gymnast
instructor, respectively, of Glamour Modeling Agency owned by
Lawrence Wang. The two did not disclose their source of shabu but
admitted that they were working for Wang. They said they knew of a
scheduled delivery of shabu early the following morning and that their
employer (Wang) could be found at the Maria Orosa Apartment in
Malate. The police operatives decided to look for Wang to shed light on
the illegal drug activities of Teck and Junio. Police Inspector Coronel
and his men then proceeded to Maria Orosa Apartment and placed the
same under surveillance.
Prosecution witness Police Inspector Coronel testified that at about
2:10 a.m. of 17 May 1996, Wang, who was described to the operatives
by Teck, came out of the apartment and walked towards a parked
BMW car. On nearing the car, he (witness) together with Captain
Margallo and two other police officers approached Wang, introduced
themselves to him as police officers, asked his name and, upon
hearing that he was Lawrence Wang, immediately frisked him and
asked him to open the back compartment of the BMW car.7 When
frisked, there was found inside the front right pocket of Wang and
confiscated from him an unlicensed AMT Cal. 380 9mm automatic
Back-up Pistol loaded with ammunitions. At the same time, the other
members of the operatives searched the BMW car and found inside it
were the following items:
32 transparent plastic bags of shabu;
cash in the amount ofP650,000.00;
one electronic and one mechanical scales; and
For the exception in Section 5(a), Rule 113 to operate, this Court has
ruled that two (2) elements must be present:
(1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that
he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit a crime; and
(2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the
arresting officer.
Here, petitioners act of looking around after getting off the bus was but
natural as he was finding his way to his destination. That he
purportedly attempted to run away as the tanod approached him is
irrelevant and cannot by itself be construed as adequate to charge the
tanod with personal knowledge that petitioner had just engaged in, was
actually engaging in or was attempting to engage in criminal activity.
More importantly, petitioner testified that he did not run away but in fact
spoke with the barangay tanod when they approached him.
Even taking the prosecutions version generally as the truth, in line with
our assumption from the start, the conclusion will not be any different.
It is not unreasonable to expect that petitioner, walking the street at
night, after being closely observed and then later tailed by three
unknown persons, would attempt to flee at their approach. Flight per se
is not synonymous with guilt and must not always be attributed to ones
consciousness of guilt.
Indeed, the supposed acts of petitioner, even assuming that they
appeared dubious, cannot be viewed as sufficient to incite suspicion of
criminal activity enough to validate his warrantless arrest. If at all, the
search most permissible for the tanod to conduct under the prevailing
backdrop of the case was a stop-and-frisk to allay any suspicion they
have been harboring based on petitioners behavior.
However, a stop-and-frisk situation, following Terry v. Ohio,[27] must
precede a warrantless arrest, be limited to the persons outer clothing,
and should be grounded upon a genuine reason, in light of the police
officers experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief
that the person detained has weapons concealed about him.
Accordingly, petitioners waiver of his right to question his arrest
notwithstanding, the marijuana leaves allegedly taken during the
search cannot be admitted in evidence against him as they were
seized during a warrantless search which was not lawful.
A waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not also mean a waiver of
the inadmissibility of evidence seized during an illegal warrantless
arrest. The following searches and seizures are deemed permissible
by jurisprudence: (1) search of moving vehicles (2) seizure in plain
view (3) customs searches (4) waiver or consent searches (5) stop and
frisk situations (Terry Search) and (6) search incidental to a lawful
arrest. The last includes a valid warrantless search and seizure
pursuant to an equally valid warrantless arrest, for, while as a rule, an
arrest is considered legitimate if effected with a valid warrant of arrest,
the Rules of Court recognize permissible warrantless arrests, to wit: (1)
arrests in flagrante delicto, (2) arrests effected in hot pursuit, and, (3)
arrests of escaped prisoners.
When petitioner was arrested without a warrant, he was neither caught
in flagrante delicto committing a crime nor was the arrest effected in
hot pursuit. Verily, it cannot therefore be reasonably argued that the
warrantless search conducted on petitioner was incidental to a lawful
arrest.
Notably, the inadmissibility in evidence of the seized marijuana leaves
for being the fruit of an unlawful search is not the lone cause that
militates against the case of the prosecution. We likewise find that it
has failed to convincingly establish the identity of the marijuana leaves
purportedly taken from petitioners bag.
In this case, the totality of the evidence presented utterly fails to
overcome the presumption of innocence which petitioner enjoys. The
failure of the prosecution to prove all the elements of the offense
beyond reasonable doubt must perforce result in petitioners
exoneration from criminal liability.
ROLITO GO y TAMBUNTING, petitioner, vs.THE COURT OF
APPEALS, THE HON. BENJAMIN V. PELAYO, Presiding Judge,
Branch 168, Regional Trial Court, NCJR Pasig, M.M., and PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
FACTS:
On 2 July 1991, Eldon Maguan was driving his car along Wilson St.,
San Juan, Metro Manila, heading towards P. Guevarra St. Petitioner
entered Wilson St., where it is a one-way street and started travelling
in the opposite or "wrong" direction. At the corner of Wilson and J.
Abad Santos Sts., petitioner's and Maguan's cars nearly bumped each
other. Petitioner alighted from his car, walked over and shot Maguan
inside his car. Petitioner then boarded his car and left the scene. A
security guard at a nearby restaurant was able to take down
petitioner's car plate number.
The following day, the police returned to the scene of the shooting to
find out where the suspect had come from; they were informed that
guidelines in fixing the amount of bail set forth in Section 9, Rule 114 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Needless to stress, judicial discretion is the domain of the judge and
the duty to exercise discretion cannot be reposed upon the will or whim
of the prosecution or the defense. Respondent should have
ascertained personally whether the evidence of guilt is strong and
endeavored to determine the propriety of the amount of bail
recommended. To do away with the requisite bail hearing is to
dispense with this time-tested safeguard against arbitrariness.[14] It
must always be remembered that imperative justice requires the
proper observance of indispensable technicalities precisely designed
to ensure its proper dispensation.[15]
Respondents explanations that he ordered the cancellation of the bail
bend posted by the accused Peaflorida and issued a warrant for the
latters arrest on April 26, 2002 upon learning that an order of
deportation was issued against the latter;24 that accused Peaflorida
voluntarily surrendered himself on October 24, 2002 and that he is
presently detained at the Provincial Jail of Occidental Mindoro,25
cannot serve to exonerate him or even mitigate the penalty due him.
WHEREFORE, respondent Executive Judge Ernesto P. Pagayatan of
the Regional Trial Court of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro (Branch 46)
is found guilty of Gross Ignorance of the Law and is hereby FINED the
amount of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00). He is further STERNLY
WARNED that the commission of similar acts in the future shall be
dealt with more severely by this Court. SO ORDERED.
TRINIDAD O. LACHICA vs. JUDGE ROSABELLA M. TORMIS,
FACTS:
In an Affidavit dated October 2, 2003,[1] Trinidad O. Lachica charged
Judge Rosabella M. Tormis of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of
Cebu City, Branch IV, with Abuse of Authority relative to Criminal
Cases Nos. 57220-R to 57223-R. Complainant alleged that since the
filing of the information, accused Domugho has remained at large.
Thus, the cases were ordered archived but an alias warrant of arrest
was issued by respondent judge on January 14, 2000.
During the investigation, it was established that the accused was
arrested on July 2, 2003 at 8:45 p.m. and was brought directly to the
Waterfront Police Station where she was booked at 9:00 p.m. At about
10:00 p.m. the accused was set free without a release order.[11]
It is also undisputed that respondent judge personally received the
cash bail bond for the accused. For this act alone, respondent is
already administratively liable. Section 14, Rule 114 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure specifies the persons with whom a cash
bail bond may be deposited, namely: the collector of internal revenue
or the provincial, city or municipal treasurer. A judge is not authorized
to receive the deposit of cash as bail nor should such cash be kept in
his office.
ISSUE:
WON respondent judge is guilty of gross misconduct for having abused
her judicial authority when she personally accepted the cash bail bond
of the accused?
HOLDING:
Yes. The foregoing acts not only seriously undermine and adversely
reflect on the honesty and integrity of respondent judge as an officer of
the court; they also betray a character flaw which speaks ill of her
person. Making false representations is a vice which no judge should
imbibe. As the judge is the visible representation of the law, and more
importantly justice, he must therefore, be the first to abide by the law
and weave an example for the others to follow.
It need not be overemphasized that in receiving the cash bond
respondent judge ran afoul with Rule 114 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure. Indeed, in the case of Office of the Court Administrator v.
Fernandez, the Court held that:
The rules specify the persons with whom a cash bail bond may be
deposited namely: the collector of internal revenue, or the provincial,
city or municipal treasurer. Section 14 of Rule 114 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure (effective December 1, 2000) provides:
SEC. 14. Deposit of Cash as bail The accused or any person acting in
his behalf may deposit in cash with the nearest collector of internal
revenue or provincial, city or municipal treasurer the amount of the bail
fixed by the court, or recommended by the prosecutor who investigated
or filed the case. Upon submission of a proper certificate of deposit
and of a written undertaking showing compliance with the requirements
of section 2 of this Rule, the accused shall be discharged from custody.
The money deposited shall be considered as bail and applied to the
payment of fine and costs while the excess, if any, shall be returned to
the accused or to whoever made the deposit.
A judge is not one of those authorized to receive the deposit of cash as
bail, nor should such cash be kept in the office of the judge.
granted bail even prior to arraignment. The Lavides case also implies
that an application for bail in a case involving an offense punishable by
reclusion perpetua to death may also be heard even before an
accused is arraigned. Sandiganbayan therefore committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction in ordering the
arraignment of petitioner before proceeding with the hearing of his
petition for bail.
(b) Court sees no inconsistency between an application of an accused
for bail and his filing of a motion to quash. Bail, is the security given for
the release of the person in custody of the law. A motion to quash on
the other hand is a mode by which an accused assails the validity of a
criminal complaint filed against him for insufficiency on its fact in posit
of law. These tow relied have objectives which are not necessarily
antithetical to each other. However, it is true that if a motion to quash a
criminal complaint or information on the ground that the same does not
charge any offense is granted and the case is dismissed and the
accused is ordered released, the petition for bail of an accused may
become moot and academic.
(c) Petitioner argues that a joint bail hearing would negate his right to
have his petition for bail resolved in a summary proceeding since said
hearing might be converted into a full blown trial. Prosecution on the
other hand claims that joint hearings will save the court form having to
hear the same witnesses and the parties from presenting the same
evidences. There is no provision in the Rules of Court governing the
hearings of two or more petitioner for bail filed by different accused or
that a petition for bail of an accused be heard simultaneously with the
trial of the case against the other accused. The matter should be
addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. In the exercise of
its discretion, the Sandiganbayan must take into account not only the
convenience of the state, including the prosecution but also that of the
petitioner and the witnesses.
In the case of Ocampo vs. Bernabe, the court ruled that in a petition or
bail hearing, the court is to conduct only a summary hearing, meaning
such brief and speedy method of receiving and considering the
evidence of guilt as is practicable and consistent with the purpose of
the hearing which is early to determine the weight of evidence for
purposes of bail. The court does not try the merits or enter into the
inquiry as to the weight that ought to be given to the evidence against
the accused, nor will it speculate on the outcome of the trial or on what
further such evidence as has reference to substantial matters. In the
case at bar, the case against former President Estrada is an entirely
different matter. For, with the participation of the former president in the
hearing of petitioners petition for bail, the proceeding assumes
completely different dimension. The proceeding will no longer be
summary since the proceedings will be full blown which is antithetical
to the nature of a bail hearing. The joinder of the petitioners bail will be
prejudicial to the petitioner as it will unduly delay the determination of
the issue of the right of petitioner to obtain provisional liberty and seek
relief from his court. The Sandiganbayn again committed grave abuse
of discretion in ordering a simultaneous hearing of petitioners petition
for bail with the trial of the case against former president.
(d) In the case at bar, bail is not matter of rights since the accused is
charged with a capital offense, but discretionary upon the court. Under
Section 8 of rule 114, there must be a showing that the evidence of
guilt against a person charged with a capital offense is not strong for
the court to grant him bail., thus, upon an application for bail, by the
person charged with a capital offense, a hearing must be conducted
where the prosecution has the burden of showing that the evidence of
guilt against an accused is strong. When the evidence of guilt is strong,
bail becomes a matter of right, which is not so in the case at bar. In
exceptional cases, habeas corpus may be granted by the courts even
when the person concerned is detained pursuant to a valid arrest or his
voluntary surrender. The writ may be issued where the deprivation of
liberty while initially valid under the lad had not later become invalid.
However, there is no basis for the issuance of the writ in the case at
bar. The general rule is that the writ does not lie where the person
alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer
under process issued by a court which had jurisdiction to issued the
same applied, because petitioner is under detention pursuant to the
order of arrest. Petitioner in fact voluntarily surrendered himself to the
authorities.
The acquittal of the accused does not prevent a judgment against him
on the civil aspect of the case where (a) the acquittal is based on
reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required; (b)
where the court declared that the liability of the accused is only civil; (c)
where the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not
based upon the crime of which the accused was acquitted. Moreover,
the civil action based on the delict is extinguished if there is a finding in
the final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from
which the civil liability may arise did not exist or where the accused did
not commit the acts or omission imputed to him.
If the accused is acquitted on reasonable doubt but the court renders
judgment on the civil aspect of the criminal case, the prosecution
cannot appeal from the judgment of acquittal as it would place the
accused in double jeopardy. However, the aggrieved party, the
offended party or the accused or both may appeal from the judgment
on the civil aspect of the case within the period therefor.
After the prosecution has rested its case, the accused has the option
either to (a) file a demurrer to evidence with or without leave of court
under Section 23, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, or to (b) adduce his evidence unless he waives the same.
The aforecited rule reads:
Sec. 23. Demurrer to evidence. After the prosecution rests its case, the
court may dismiss the action on the ground of insufficiency of evidence
(1) on its own initiative after giving the prosecution the opportunity to
be heard or (2) upon demurrer to evidence filed by the accused with or
without leave of court.
If the court denies the demurrer to evidence filed with leave of court,
the accused may adduce evidence in his defense. When the demurrer
to evidence is filed without leave of court, the accused waives his right
to present evidence and submits the case for judgment on the basis of
the evidence for the prosecution.
The motion for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence shall
specifically state its grounds and shall be filed within a non-extendible
period of five (5) days after the prosecution rests its case. The
prosecution may oppose the motion within a non-extendible period of
five (5) days from its receipt.
If leave of court is granted, the accused shall file the demurrer to
evidence within a non-extendible period of ten (10) days from notice.
The prosecution may oppose the demurrer to evidence within a similar
period from its receipt.
The order denying the motion for leave of court to file demurrer to
evidence or the demurrer itself shall not be reviewable by appeal or by
certiorari before the judgment.
In criminal cases, the demurrer to evidence partakes of the nature of a
motion to dismiss the case for failure of the prosecution to prove his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In a case where the accused files a
demurrer to evidence without leave of court, he thereby waives his
right to present evidence and submits the case for decision on the
basis of the evidence of the prosecution. On the other hand, if the
accused is granted leave to file a demurrer to evidence, he has the
right to adduce evidence not only on the criminal aspect but also on
the civil aspect of the case if his demurrer is denied by the court.
If demurrer is granted and the accused is acquitted by the court, the
accused has the right to adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the
case unless the court also declares that the act or omission from which
the civil liability may arise did not exist. If the trial court issues an order
or renders judgment not only granting the demurrer to evidence of the
accused and acquitting him but also on the civil liability of the accused
to the private offended party, said judgment on the civil aspect of the
case would be a nullity for the reason that the constitutional right of the
accused to due process is thereby violated. As we held in Alonte v.
Savellano, Jr.:
Section 14, paragraphs (1) and (2), of Article III, of the Constitution
provides the fundamentals.
(1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without
due process of law.
(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed
innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be
heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public
trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory
process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of
evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed
mobility. The RTC granted the motion and directed that Concepcions
deposition be taken before the Clerk of Court of Makati City.
ISSUE:
WON Concepcion's deposition can be taken in the RTC of Makati
RULING:
No. It is basic that all witnesses shall give their testimonies at the trial
of the case in the presence of the judge. This is especially true in
criminal cases in order that the accused may be afforded the
opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses pursuant to his
constitutional right to confront the witnesses face to face. It also gives
the parties and their counsel the chance to propound such questions
as they deem material and necessary to support their position or to test
the credibility of said witnesses. Lastly, this rule enables the judge to
observe the witnesses demeanor.
In the case at bench, in issue is the examination of a prosecution
witness, who, according to the petitioners, was too sick to travel and
appear before the trial court. Section 15 of Rule 119 thus comes into
play, and it provides: Section 15. Examination of witness for the
prosecution. When it satisfactorily appears that a witness for the
prosecution is too sick or infirm to appear at the trial as directed by the
court, or has to leave the Philippines with no definite date of returning,
he may forthwith be conditionally examined before the court where the
case is pending. Such examination, in the presence of the accused, or
in his absence after reasonable notice to attend the examination has
been served on him, shall be conducted in the same manner as an
examination at the trial. Failure or refusal of the accused to attend the
examination after notice shall be considered a waiver. The statement
taken may be admitted in behalf of or against the accused.
Petitioners contend that Concepcions advanced age and health
condition exempt her from the application of Section 15, Rule 119 of
the Rules of Criminal Procedure, and thus, calls for the application of
Rule 23 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. The contention does not
persuade. The very reason offered by the petitioners to exempt
Concepcion from the coverage of Rule 119 is at once the ground which
places her squarely within the coverage of the same provision.
Rule 119 specifically states that a witness may be conditionally
examined: 1) if the witness is too sick or infirm to appear at the trial; or
2) if the witness has to leave the Philippines with no definite date of
returning.
Thus, when Concepcion moved that her deposition be taken, had she
not been too sick at that time, her motion would have been denied.
Instead of conditionally examining her outside the trial court, she would
have been compelled to appear before the court for examination during
the trial proper. Undoubtedly, the procedure set forth in Rule 119
applies to the case at bar. It is thus required that the conditional
examination be made before the court where the case is pending. It is
also necessary that the accused be notified, so that he can attend the
examination, subject to his right to waive the same after reasonable
notice.
As to the manner of examination, the Rules mandate that it be
conducted in the same manner as an examination during trial, that is,
through question and answer. At this point, a query may thus be posed:
in granting Concepcions motion and in actually taking her deposition,
were the above rules complied with? The CA answered in the negative.
The appellate court considered the taking of deposition before the
Clerk of Court of Makati City erroneous and contrary to the clear
mandate of the Rules that the same be made before the court where
the case is pending.
Accordingly, said the CA, the RTC order was issued with grave abuse
of discretion. We agree with the CA and quote with approval its
ratiocination in this wise: Unlike an examination of a defense witness
which, pursuant to Section 5, Rule 119 of the previous Rules, and now
Section 13, Rule 119 of the present Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, may be taken before any judge, or, if not practicable, a
member of the Bar in good standing so designated by the judge in the
order, or, if the order be made by a court of superior jurisdiction, before
an inferior court to be designated therein, the examination of a witness
for the prosecution under Section 15 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure (December 1, 2000) may be done only before the court
where the case is pending.
Rule 119 categorically states that the conditional examination of a
prosecution witness shall be made before the court where the case is
pending. Contrary to petitioners contention, there is nothing in the rule
which may remotely be interpreted to mean that such requirement
applies only to cases where the witness is within the jurisdiction of said
FACTS:
Petitioner Rimberto Salvanera, together with Feliciano Abutin, Edgardo
Lungcay and Domingo Tampelix, is charged with the murder of Ruben
Parane. The above-named accused have conspired, confederated and
mutually helped each other. As per theory of the prosecution, petitioner
was the alleged mastermind; Lungcay, the hired hitman; Abutin, the
driver of the motorcycle which carried Lungcay to the place of the
commission of the crime; while Tampelix delivered the blood money to
the latter. All the accused have been arrested and detained, except
Edgardo Lungcay who remained at-large. Respondent Lucita Parane is
the spouse of victim Ruben Parane.
On January 22, 1997, petitioner applied for bail. The prosecution, on
March 4, 1997, moved for the discharge of accused Feliciano Abutin
and Domingo Tampelix, to serve as state witnesses. In an Omnibus
Order dated September 5, 1997, the trial court granted petitioners
application for bail and denied the prosecutions motion for the
discharge of accused Abutin and Tampelix.
The prosecution moved for reconsideration but the motion was denied.
The prosecution then appealed to the Court of Appeals. It contended
that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied
the motion to discharge accused Abutin and Tampelix to be state
witnesses. It alleged that the testimonies of the two accused are
absolutely necessary to establish that petitioner masterminded the
murder of Ruben Parane. The prosecution likewise claimed that it was
premature and baseless for the trial court to grant petitioners
application for bail because the prosecution had not yet rested its case
in the hearing for the discharge of the two accused.
The Court of Appeals sustained the prosecution. It discharged accused
Feliciano Abutin and Domingo Tampelix from the Information to
become state witnesses, and cancelled the bail bond of petitioner
Salvanera. In its Resolution dated September 22, 1999, it denied
petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration. Petitioner then filed his Motion
for Clarification with Leave of Court. The same was also denied in a
Resolution dated May 11, 2000. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:
WON the CA erred in discharging the accused to become state
witnesses and in cancelling the bail bond of petitioner Salvanera.
RULING:
We uphold the ruling of the Court of Appeals. In the discharge of an
accused in order that he may be a state witness, the following
conditions must be present, namely:
(1) Two or more accused are jointly charged with the commission of an
offense;
(2) The motion for discharge is filed by the prosecution before it rests
its case;
(3) The prosecution is required to present evidence and the sworn
statement of each proposed state witness at a hearing in support of the
discharge;
(4) The accused gives his consent to be a state witness; and
(5) The trial court is satisfied that:
a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose
discharge is requested;
b) There is no other direct evidence available for the proper
prosecution of the offense committed, except the testimony of said
accused;
c) The testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in
its material points;
d) Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and,
e) Said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense
involving moral turpitude.
We agree with the Court of Appeals in dismissing this reasoning as
specious.
To require the two witnesses Parane and Salazar to corroborate the
testimony of Abutin and Tampelix on the exact same points is to render
nugatory the other requisite that "there must be no other direct
evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense committed,
except the testimony of the state witness." The corroborative evidence
required by the Rules does not have to consist of the very same
evidence as will be testified on by the proposed state witnesses.
We have ruled that "a conspiracy is more readily proved by the acts of
a fellow criminal than by any other method. If it is shown that the
statements of the conspirator are corroborated by other evidence, then
we have convincing proof of veracity. Even if the confirmatory
testimony only applies to some particulars, we can properly infer that
the witness has told the truth in other respects." It is enough that the
testimony of a co-conspirator is corroborated by some other witness or
evidence.
In the case at bar, we are satisfied from a reading of the records that
the testimonies of Abutin and Tampelix are corroborated on important
points by each others testimonies and the circumstances disclosed
through the testimonies of the other prosecution witnesses, and "to
such extent that their trustworthiness becomes manifest."
As part of the conspiracy, Abutin and Tampelix can testify on the
criminal plan of the conspirators. Where a crime is contrived in secret,
the discharge of one of the conspirators is essential because only they
have knowledge of the crime. The other prosecution witnesses are not
eyewitnesses to the crime, as, in fact, there is none. No one except the
conspirators knew and witnessed the murder. The testimonies of the
accused and proposed state witnesses Abutin and Tampelix can
directly link petitioner to the commission of the crime.
Lastly, we affirm the ruling of the appellate court in cancelling the bail
bond of petitioner. The grant of petitioners application for bail is
premature. It has to await the testimony of state witnesses Abutin and
Tampelix. Their testimonies must be given their proper weight in
determining whether the petitioner is entitled to bail.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED and the Decision and
Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 46945, dated
April 30, 1999, September 22, 1999 and May 11, 2000, respectively,
are AFFIRMED in toto. SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, versus PABLO L. ESTACIO, JR.
and MARITESS ANG Appellant
FACTS:
Maritess Ang (Maritess) was charged before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Quezon City with kidnapping for ransom confederating with to
persons. The Information was subsequently amended to implead the
other appellant, Pablo Estacio, Jr. (Estacio), and to change the charge
from kidnapping for ransom to kidnapping with murder. Still later, the
Information was further amended to additionally implead one Hildo
Sumipo (Sumipo) who was, however, subsequently discharged as
state witness.
ISSUE:
WON the court erred in discharging Sumipo as a state witness.
RULING:
Respecting the assigned error in discharging Sumipo as a state
witness, the same does not lie. The conditions for the discharge of an
accused as a state witness are as follows:
(a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose
discharge is requested;