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Between Consensus and Conflict: Habermas, Post-Modern Agonism and the Early American
Public Sphere
Author(s): Robert W. T. Martin
Reviewed work(s):
Source: Polity, Vol. 37, No. 3 (Jul., 2005), pp. 365-388
Published by: Palgrave Macmillan Journals
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3877112 .
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Between Consensus
and
Conflict: Habermas, PostModern Agonism and the
Early American Public
Sphere*
Robert W.T. Martin
Hamilton College
Effortsthus far to bridge the distance between Habermasian public sphere theory
and post-modernism have failed, and recent studies only reifythe bifurcation.Some
theorists trace this problem to misreadings of Habermas's recent works that
overemphasize the weight he places on consensus. I argue instead that Habermas's
stress on consensus is genuine and firstemerged in his early historical work on the
public sphere, wherein he focused on an absolutist theory of consensus and
relegated dissent to a marginal ancillary position from which he has never really
recovered it. Had Habermas turned from Europe to early America, he could have
found early public sphere theorists that were much more alive to the irreducible
centralityof dissent. More importantly,if currenttheorists will returnto this history
they will be betterable to understand a model of the dissentient public sphere (and
its counterpublics) that lies between Habermasian consensus and post-modern
agonism.
He is author of The Free and Open Press: The Foundingof the American
DemocraticPressLibertyand co-editorof The ManyFacesof AlexanderHamilton
(forthcoming). He is currentlyworking on a book project entitled Government by
*This article was first presented at the 2003 meeting of the Association for Political Theory, and I
thank the participants at the "AmericanRoots" panel and especially Simona Goi, Russell Hanson, and
Darren Walhof. I also gratefully acknowledge a Research Fellowship at the New-YorkHistory Society.
Introduction
The title of Chantal Mouffe's recent essay captures precisely-if inadvertently-the state of the debate over democratic theory: "DeliberativeDemocracy
or Agonistic Pluralism?"I have taken the liberty of adding emphasis to the word
"or"to highlight the binary assumption that typifies much of this debate. Mouffe
examines the Habermasian approach to discursive democracy as the "most
theoretically sophisticated" version, but immediately applies an "either/or"
analysis, juxtaposing Habermas'sdiscursive democracy to her more agonistic and
plural politics.' And she is hardly alone. A similarly reductionist bifurcation is
evident in the exchange between Dana Villa and James Johnson over the
relationship (or lack thereof) between public sphere theory and postmodern
agonism. Although Villa'soriginal essay attempted to break down the "polemical
opposition" between public sphere theory and postmodernism,2 Johnson reads
Villa'sessay as polemical as well. Johnson tries to suggest ways of closing this gap
and moving beyond the "present impasse',"but it is clear from Villa's "Response"
that the theoretical chasm has only deepened.3
Aspects of this divide are reflected in recent debates over the sort of
democratic discourse that belongs in the public sphere. For example, one of the
main concerns of Mouffe and Villa is the way certain norms of discourse can be
used to exclude difference. Many theorists have analyzed the contemporary
public sphere for ways in which difference is excluded by certain definitions of
"rationality"or various deployments of authority. In turn, these debates over the
nature of democratic discourse relate back to the ongoing dispute over whether
Habermasian public sphere theory undermines difference and forces consensus.
Mouffe's essay, for instance, defends an agonistic pluralism and fears the
"consensus without exclusion" that she sees Habermas "[pretending] to
achieve.'5 She criticizes Habermas's legitimating proceduralism, which is based
on free and open rational discourse, as non-neutral because it is always unable to
exclude-since it always already presupposes-some fundamental background.
1. Chantal Mouffe, "DeliberativeDemocracy or Agonistic Pluralism?"Social Research 66 (1999): 746.
2. Dana R. Villa, "Postmodernism and the Public Sphere:' American Political Science Review 86
(1992): 717.
3. James Johnson, "Comment: Public Sphere, Postmodernism, and Polemic:' American Political
Science Review 88 (1994): 428; more generally 427-30, 432-33; and Dana R. Villa, "Response:'American
Political Science Review 88 (1994): 430-32.
4. E.g., Iris Marion Young, "Communication and the Other: Beyond Deliberative Democracy" in
Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political, ed., Seyla Benhabib (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1996), 131-32; Young, "Activist Challenges to Deliberative Democracy,"
Political Theory 29 (2001): 670-90; Lynn M. Sanders, 'Against Deliberation',"Political Theory 25 (1997):
370-73; and Jane Mansbridge, "EverydayTalk in the Deliberative System,' in Deliberative Politics:Essays
on Democracy and Disagreement, ed. Stephen Macedo (New York:Oxford University Press, 1999).
5. Mouffe, "Deliberative Democracy or Agonistic Pluralism?:'755.
367
372
BETWEENCONSENSUSAND CONFLICT
375
"public opinion" does not of itself undermine his theory of the public sphere; nor
does his failure to address Kant'sinattention to significant dissent and the unitary
nature of rationality as scholarly consensus. However, they are both symptoms of
a problematic focus on consensus in Structural Transformationthat aggravates
rather than mitigates the divide between Habermasian and post-modern
renderings of the public sphere. What's worse, Habermas's examples deepen
the divide unnecessarily, since there is a historical example that points us to a
conception of the public sphere that envisions a genuinely sovereign and
authentically dissentient42public opinion.
the incipient public sphere of the mother country. The New-England Courant
immediately established itself as an heir to the London newspapers, opening its
pages from the very first issue to those who would criticize the reasoning of the
established authorities.43In fact, the Courant went beyond the Tatlermodel to
embrace its opposition status.44
At its emergence, Habermas long ago noted, the public sphere generally
develops an "awareness of itself as the [state authorities'] opponent" (23). This
was certainly true for the Courant. In the context of early eighteenth-century
Massachusetts, the Courant'sinsistence that it was open to all sides meant it was
primarilyto be open to opposition voices, as elites already had sufficient outlets
in the pulpits and in those newspapers "printed by authority."And it was this
critical, oppositional character that was essential to the success of the nascent
public sphere. It was not only that the "Couranteers"were making government
policy an issue for ongoing public debate but that they were implicitly criticizing
the exclusivity of the public sphere. Thus, whereas London forebears The Tatler
(Steele) and The Spectator (Addison) presented themselves to their readers from
a social position beyond reproach, happy to provide the particulars of their
backgrounds, the New-England Courant is introduced with a voice that
aggressively criticizes the readers' desire to know anything about the social rank
of the author:
It's an Hard Case, that a Man can't appear in Print now a Days, unless he'll
undergo the Mortification of Answering to ten thousand senseless and
Impertinent Questions like these, Pray Sir, from whence came you? And what
Age may you be of, may I be so bold? Was you bred at Colledge Sir?45
Thus, the Courant'svery first words in the emergent public sphere of Puritan
Boston maintain that it is "senseless and impertinent" to inquire after the
breeding of the author. The author's age is soon disclosed, with the hopes that "no
One will hereafter object against my soaring now and then with the grave Wits of
the Age." However, all other questions are postponed until the next issue and in
fact no such answers ever appeared. And since most locals would have had a
43. Clark, The Public Prints, 131; see also, 126-28.
44. Similarly,when in 1752 William Livingstonsought to copy the single-essay format of Steele's Tatler
and Addison's Spectator,his Independent Reflector "differedsingularly"from them, in that it "purposed to
expose, attack, and reform"(Milton M. Klein, "Introduction,'in William Livingstonet al., TheIndependent
Reflector,ed. Milton M. Klein [Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963], 3). Furthermore, the most
recent research argues that these London newspapers were really efforts to "close off and restrain, rather
than to open up" political debate (Brian Cowan, "Mr.Spectator and the Coffeehouse Public Sphere'
Eighteenth-CenturyStudies 37 [2004]: 346).
45. New-England Courant, 7 August 1721. See also, Warner,Lettersof the Republic, 7; and Clark, The
Public Prints, 130-31.
Gentlemen and others may be supplied with this Paper"at the printing shop. That
these "others"were not limited to the educated, propertied classes was clear from
the introductory preface. The editors promised that, "forthe Benefit of those who
are unacquainted with the Geography of foreign Parts, we may insert such
Descriptions as may enlighten them therein."'51
By the end of the century, it was
lower
orders made up a significant
understood
that
of
the
members
generally
that his proposed
of
to
demonstrate
the
in
order
part
public sphere; indeed,
Dennie
would have to
was
not
solicitous
of
commoners, Joseph
newspaper
submit the prospectus to men of "affluence" and "letters:'complete with myriad
footnotes, classical quotations, and references to the "motley vulgar" lower
classes.52
379
380
used.6' Accordingly he saw more clearly than others the need for multiple
384 BETWEENCONSENSUS
AND CONFLICT
385
386 BETWEENCONSENSUS
AND CONFLICT
Conclusion
Only part of my purpose here has been to show that Habermas's own first
example of "public opinion" reveals his much criticized tendency to focus on
consent to the exclusion of dissent, thus setting the trajectory of his later work.
More importantly,we need to see that this was a missed opportunity to set the
record straight about the philosophical possibilities of the dissentient public
sphere. To be sure, the early American public sphere still excluded women and
blacks, enslaved or free. And the "reason" of public opinion envisioned by
Wortman and especially Madison is insufficiently multifaceted. However, the
StructuralTransformationrepresents a missed opportunity to demonstrate that the
public sphere, even at its moment of emergence, was genuinely envisioned by
some as diverse and dissentient rather than unitary and consensual.
It is also important to note that the public sphere can be analyzed historically
without broadening the very real separation between Habermasian consensualism and post-modern agonism. Often, theory makes it easy to see distinctions as
divides; historical excursions into the real world are usually both messier and
more nuanced, resulting in greater insight into overlaps and similarities that can
span the gulf between theoretical positions. To put it simply bridges are best built
with concrete, not ether. Thus, we see in the early American public sphere, and in
Manning especially, a rudimentary appreciation of diversity, difference and
contestation that undermines the consensus/agonism divide that much recent
theory essentializes. The lacuna between Habermas and postmodern critics such
as Mouffe is not falsely filled in but genuinely bridged.
Take, for example, the ongoing disputes over the type of discourse appropriate
to democracy Proponents of deliberative democracy have argued for the power
of rational deliberation to counter self-interested claims and demagogic appeals,
thus underwriting the normative legitimacy of the reasoned agreement that
emerges from such dialogue.73Critics fear the exclusions-the marginalization of
plurality and difference-that come with a norm of rational deliberation.
Accordingly, some critics argue for an alternative set of communicative norms,
including rhetoric and story-telling,that has been used by marginalized groups to
make their voices heard.74
Exchanges like these, however, overlook the centrality of dissent to
democratic dialogue of all kinds. To be sure, rhetoric and stories can encourage
us-especially in group decisions-to make choices we later come to realize
were misguided, unfair, or irrational. However, then again, so can specious
73. E.g., Seyla Benhabib, "Towarda Deliberative Model,"in Democracy and Difference:Contesting the
Boundaries of the Political, ed. Seyla Benhabib (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 83.
74. E.g., Young, "Communication and the Other,"131-32.
388 BETWEENCONSENSUS
AND CONFLICT
75. See also, e.g., George Keith, New-England's spirit of persecution transmittedto Pennsylvania and
the pretended Quaker found persecuting the true Christian-Quaker(New York:William Bradford, 1693);
Benjamin Franklin Bache, Truthwill out! The foul charges of the Toriesagainst the editor of the Aurora
repelled by positive proof and plain truth, and his base calumniators put to shame (Philadelphia: B.E
Bache, 1798).
76. Wolin, "FugitiveDemocracy,"31, 43.
77. Fraser,"Rethinkingthe Public Sphere:' 123.