Rule 76 (3D 09-10)

3D 2009-2010 SPEC PRO DIGESTS
1. Dionisio Fernandez et al v Ismaela Dimagiba | JBL Reyes

G.R. No. 23638 October 12, 1967| 21 SCRA 428
FACTS
Isamela Dimagiba submitted to the CFI of Iloilo a petition to probate the
1930 will of the late Benedicta delos Reyes instituting her as the sole heir
of the decedents estate.
Petitioners, Fernandez et al opposed the probated and claimed to be the
intestate heirs of the decedent.
OPPOSITION to probate were based on: forgery, vice of consent,
estoppel by laches of Dimagiba and implied revocation of the will.
The implied revocation was alleged because according to Petitioners,
majority of the estate was sold in 1943-1944, thus revoking the 1930 will
instituting Dimagiba as sole heir. Note however that the SC set aside
these conveyances in an unpublished case already. (Also, mejo stupid
yun ground kasi yun 1940s sale, si Dimagiba din yun buyer/reciepient
nung properties sold, so paano magkakaroon ng implied revocation?!)
CFI: allowed the probate of the will and deferred resolving the issues of
estoppel and revocation until such time that the proceeding involves
determination of the intrinsic validity of the will.
Petitioners insist that the issue of estoppel and revocation should have
been resolved during the probate of the will, thus after receiving further
evidence, the CFI decided that the will unaffected and unrevoked by the
subsequent sales.
Both decisions were (admission for probate of the will and absence of
implied revoc/estoppel) separately appealable because the latter is
independent of the former, but Petitioners belatedly filed their appeal to
the allowance for probate, thus the order became final and unappealable.
Petitioners appealed to the CA (re: denial of revocation and estoppel); CA
affirmed CFI decision since no legal revocation resulted from the sales,
since the sale was made in favor of the legatee Dimagiba. Hence, this
petition for review.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS
(FOR SPEC PRO) W/N estoppel will stand as a ground to disallow
probate of the will?
HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI
NO. The doctrine of estoppel does not apply. The presentation and
probate of the will is required by public policy. It involves public interest.
Presentation and probate of a will are requirements of public policy, being

primarily designed to protect the testators expressed wishes, which are
entitled to respect as a consequence of the decedents ownership and
rights of disposition within legal limits. It is the duty of the custodian of the
will to deliver them to the Court. It would be non sequitur (doesnt follow)
to allow public policy to be evaded on the pretext of estoppel. Whether or
not the order overruling the allegation of estoppel is still appealable or not,
the defense is patently unmeritorious. ( What I deduced her is that the
Petitioners wanted the court to ignore all together the will, by claiming that
Dimagiba is estopped from claiming the validity of the will since she was
party to the subsequent sale. They insist that the decedent died intestate,
so that they can still inherit the remaining properties not sold to
Dimagiba.)
JUST IN CASE RONALD ASKS:
o On finality of the probate of the will: A probate decree finally and
definitively settles all questions concerning the capacity of the
testator and proper execution and witnessing of his last will and
testament, irrespective of whether its provisions are valid and
enforceable or otherwise. As such, the probate order is final and
appealable, and it is so recognized by the express provision of
Sec 1 Rule 109
CA decision, affirmed by the SC.

2. Mercado v. Santos |
Laurel
G.R. No. 45629 September 22, 1938| 66 Phil 215
FACTS
When Ines Basa died, his husband Antilano Mercado (petitioner) filed a
petition for probate of the formers will and such will was admitted to
probate.
Sixteen months later, Rosario Basa de Leon (private respondent) filed a
complaint against petitioner for falsification or forgery of the alreadyprobated will of Ines Basa.
Petitioner was arrested, and then released, and then the same cycle
happened around four times in total. Eventually, the CFI decided to try the
case on the merits.
Petitioner moved to dismiss the case claiming again that the will alleged
to have been forged had already been probated and, further, that the
order probating the will is conclusive as to the authenticity and due
execution thereof.
Page 1 of 21
RTC overruled the motion so petitioner went up to the CA on certiorari but

the same was dismissed.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS

W/N the probate of the will is a bar to criminally prosecute the
petitioner for allegedly forgery of the said will.
SEC. 625. Allowance Necessary, and Conclusive as to Execution. No

will shall pass either the real or personal estate, unless it is proved and
allowed in the Court of First Instance, or by appeal to the Supreme Court;
and the allowance by the court of a will of real and personal estate shall
be conclusive as to its due execution. (Emphasis ours.)

THE PROBATE OF THE WILL IS A BAR TO SUCH CRIMINAL
PROSECUTION.
Section 306 of our Code of Civil Procedure provides as to the effect of

judgments.
SEC. 306. Effect of judgment. The effect of a judgment or final
order in an action or special proceeding before a court or judge of the
Philippine Islands or of the United States, or of any State or Territory
of the United States, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or
order, may be as follows.
We hold, therefore, that in view of the provisions of sections 306, 333 and
625 of our Code of Civil Procedure, criminal action will not lie in this
jurisdiction against the forger of a will which had been duly admitted to
probate by a court of competent jurisdiction.
3. Sumilang vs. Ramagosa | Makalintal

G.R. No. L-23135, December 26, 1967 | 21 SCRA 1369
Section 333, paragraph 4, of the Code of Civil Procedure establishes an

incontrovertible presumption in favor of judgments declared by it to be
conclusive.
FACTS
Mariano Sumilang filed in the CFI of Quezon a petition for the probate of a
document alleged to be the last will and testament of Hilarion Ramagosa
which institutes petitioner as sole heir of the testator.
Oppositors questioned the due execution of the document, claiming that it
made under duress and was not really intended by the deceased to be his
last will and testament.
The y moved for the dismissal of the petition for probate mainly on the
ground that the court lacks jurisdiction over the subject-matter because
the last will and testament of the decedent, if ever it was really executed
by him, was revoked by implication of law six years before his death.
They alleged that after making the will, Hilarion Ramagosa sold to
petitioner Mariano Sumilang and his brother the parcels of land described
therein, so that at the time of the testators death the titles to said lands
were no longer in his name.
SEC. 333. Conclusive Presumptions. The following presumptions or

deductions, which the law expressly directs to be made from particular
facts, are deemed conclusive.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS

W/N the petition for probate should be dismissed on the ground of
the alleged intrinsic invalidity of the will?
1. In case of a judgment or order against a specific thing, or in

respect to the probate of a will, or the administration of the estate of a
deceased person, or in respect to the personal, political, or legal
condition or relation of a particular person, the judgment or order is
conclusive upon the title of the thing, the will or administration, or the
condition or relation of the person Provided, That the probate of a will
or granting of letters of administration shall only be prima facie
evidence of the death of the testator or intestate.
Section 625 of the same Code is more explicit as to the conclusiveness of

the due execution of a probate will. It says.
xxx
xxx
xxx
4. The judgment or order of a court, when declared by this code to be

conclusive.

NO. THE PROBATE COURTS AREA OF INQUIRY IS LIMITED TO THE
EXTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE WILL.
Page 2 of 21
The testators testamentary capacity and the compliance with the formal
requisites or solemnities prescribed by law are the only questions
presented for the resolution of the court.
Any inquiry into the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions of the will
or the legality of any devise or legacy is premature.
True or not, the alleged sale is no ground for the dismissal of the petition
for probate.
Probate is one thing; the validity of the testamentary provisions is another.
The first decides the execution of the document and the testamentary
capacity of the testator; the second relates to descent and distribution.
4. Balanay v Martinez| Aquino

G.R. No. L-39247 June 27, 1975|
Thereafter a lawyer appeared before the court (Atty. Montana) asking that the
probate be discontinued and that a notice to the creditors of the deceased by
issued. Balanay, Jr thru new counsel stated that Atty. Montana had no
authority to act in his name.
In the end the lower court declared the will void on the basis of its own
independent assessment of its provisions.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS

W/N the probate court erred in passing upon the intrinsic validity of the will,
before ruling on its allowance or formal validity, and in declaring it void.
FACTS
Leodegaria Julian, died at the age of sixty-seven. She was survived by her
husband, Felix Balanay, Sr., and by their six legitimate children named Felix
Balanay, Jr., Avelina B. Antonio, Beatriz B. Solamo, Carolina B. Manguiob,
Delia B. Lanaban and Emilia B. Pabaonon.
Felix J. Balanay, Jr. filed in the lower court a petition for the probate of his
mother's notarial will dated September 5, 1970 which is written in English. In
paragraph V of the will she stated that after her husband's death (he was
eighty-two years old in 1973) her paraphernal lands and all the conjugal lands
(which she described as "my properties") should be divided and distributed in
the manner set forth in that part of her will. She devised and partitioned the
conjugal lands as if they were all owned by her. She disposed of in the will her
husband's one half share of the conjugal assets.
Felix Balanay, Sr. and Avelina B. Antonio opposed the probate of the will on
the grounds of lack of testamentary capacity, undue influence, preterition of
the husband and alleged improper partition of the conjugal estate. The
oppositors claimed that Felix Balanay, Jr. should collate certain properties
which he had received from the testatrix.
Later on Balany, Jr. presented an affidavit that Balanay, Sr had withdrawn his
claim from the proceeding. Thereafter, Mrs. Antonio intervened and claimed
that the decedent wrongly claimed a certain property which supposedly forms
part of her estate but it was denied.
We are of the opinion that in view of certain unusual provisions of the will,
which are of dubious legality, and because of the motion to withdraw the
petition for probate (which the lower court assumed to have been filed with the
petitioner's authorization), the trial court acted correctly in passing upon the
will's intrinsic validity even before its formal validity had been established. The
probate of a will might become an idle ceremony if on its face it appears to be
intrinsically void. Where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic
validity of the will be passed upon, even before it is probated, the court should
meet the issue
BUT the probate court erred in declaring, in its order of February 28, 1974
that the will was void and in converting the testate proceeding into an intestate
proceeding notwithstanding the fact that in its order of June 18, 1973 , it gave
effect to the surviving husband's conformity to the will and to his renunciation
of his hereditary rights which presumably included his one-half share of the
conjugal estate.
The statement of the testatrix that she owned the "southern half of the
conjugal lands is contrary to law because, although she was a co-owner
thereof, her share was inchoate and proindiviso (. But That illegal declaration
does not nullify the entire will). It may be disregarded.
Felix Balanay, Sr. could validly renounce his hereditary rights and his one-half
share of the conjugal partnership but insofar as said renunciation partakes of
a donation of his hereditary rights and his one-half share in the conjugal, it
Page 3 of 21

should be subject to the limitations prescribed in articles 750 and 752 of the
Civil Code. A portion of the estate should be adjudicated to the widower for his
support and maintenance. Or at least his legitime should be respected.
Subject to the foregoing observations and the rules on collation, the will is
intrinsically valid and the partition therein may be given effect if it does not
prejudice the creditors and impair the legitimes. The distribution and partition
would become effective upon the death of Felix Balanay, Sr. In the meantime,
the net income should be equitably divided among the children and the
surviving spouse.
It should be stressed that by reason of the surviving husband's conformity to

his wife's will and his renunciation of his hereditary rights, his one-half
conjugal share became a part of his deceased wife's estate. His conformity
had the effect of validating the partition made in paragraph V of the will
without prejudice, of course, to the rights of the creditors and the legitimes of
the compulsory heirs.
Two other errors of the lower court may be noticed. It erred in issuing a notice
to creditors although no executor or regular administrator has been appointed.
The record reveals that it appointed a special administrator. A notice to
creditors is not in order if only a special administrator has been appointed.
Section 1, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court, in providing that "immediately after
granting letters of testamentary or of administration, the court shall issue a
notice requiring all persons having money claims against the decedent to file
them in the office of the clerk of said court" clearly contemplates the
appointment of an executor or regular administrator and not that of a special
administrator.
5. Pastor Jr. V. CA
G.R. No. L-56340 June 24, 1983
FACTS
Alvaro Pastor, Sr. (PASTOR, SR.), a Spanish subject, died in Cebu City
on June 5, 1966, survived by his Spanish wife Sofia Bossio (who also
died on October 21, 1966), their two legitimate children Alvaro Pastor, Jr.
(PASTOR, JR.) and Sofia Pastor de Midgely (SOFIA), and an illegitimate
child, not natural, by the name of Lewellyn Barlito Quemada QUEMADA
PASTOR, JR. is a Philippine citizen, having been naturalized in 1936.
SOFIA is a Spanish subject. QUEMADA is a Filipino by his mother's
citizenship.
QUEMADA filed a petition for the probate and allowance of an alleged

holographic will of PASTOR, SR. with the Court of First Instance of Cebu,
Branch I (PROBATE COURT). The will contained only one testamentary
disposition: a legacy in favor of QUEMADA consisting of 30% of PASTOR,
SR.'s 42% share in the operation by Atlas Consolidated Mining and
Development Corporation (ATLAS) of some mining claims in Pina-Barot,
Cebu.
The PROBATE COURT, upon motion of QUEMADA and after an ex parte
hearing, appointed him special administrator of the entire estate of
PASTOR, SR..
QUEMADA as special administrator, instituted against PASTOR, JR. and
his wife an action for reconveyance of alleged properties of the estate,
which included the properties subject of the legacy and which were in the
names of the spouses PASTOR, JR. and his wife, Maria Elena Achaval de
Pastor, who claimed to be the owners thereof in their own rights, and not
by inheritance.
PASTOR, JR. and his sister SOFIA filed their opposition to the petition for
probate and the order appointing QUEMADA as special administrator.
PROBATE COURT issued an order allowing the will to probate.
On December 5, 1972, the PROBATE COURT issued an order
allowing the will to probate. Appealed to the Court of Appeals, the
order was affirmed in a decision dated May 9, 1977. On petition for
review, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition in a minute
resolution dated November 1, 1977 and remanded the same to the
PROBATE COURT after denying reconsideration on January 11,
1978.
For two years after remand of the case to the PROBATE COURT,
QUEMADA filed pleading after pleading asking for payment of his legacy
and seizure of the properties subject of said legacy. PASTOR, JR. and
SOFIA opposed these pleadings on the ground of pendency of the
reconveyance suit with another branch of the Cebu Court of First
Instance. All pleadings remained unacted upon by the PROBATE COURT.
The PROBATE COURT set the hearing on the intrinsic validity of the will
for March 25, 1980, but upon objection of PASTOR, JR. and SOFIA on
the e ground of pendency of the reconveyance suit, no hearing was held
on March 25. Instead, the PROBATE COURT required the parties to
submit their respective position papers as to how much inheritance
QUEMADA was entitled to receive.
1. A. Pastor, Jr. ...................................40.5%
2. E. Pelaez, Sr. ...................................15.0%
3. B. Quemada .......................................4.5%
While the reconveyance suit was still being litigated in Branch IX of the
Court of First Instance of Cebu, the PROBATE COURT issued the now
Page 4 of 21
assailed Order of Execution and Garnishment, resolving the question of

ownership of the royalties payable by ATLAS and ruling in effect that the
legacy to QUEMADA was not inofficious.
The order being "immediately executory", QUEMADA succeeded in
obtaining a Writ of Execution and Garnishment, the oppositors sought
reconsideration thereof on the same date primarily on the ground that the
PROBATE COURT gravely abused its discretion when it resolved the
question of ownership of the royalties and ordered the payment of
QUEMADA's legacy after prematurely passing upon the intrinsic validity of
the will.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS

(FOR SPEC PRO) whether the Probate Order of December 5, 1972
resolved with finality the questions of ownership and intrinsic validity of
the will?

NO.
In a special proceeding for the probate of a will, the issue by and large is
restricted to the extrinsic validity of the will, i.e., whether the testator,
being of sound mind, freely executed the will in accordance with the
formalities prescribed by law. (Rules of Court, Rule 75, Section 1; Rule
76, Section 9.) As a rule, the question of ownership is an extraneous
matter which the Probate Court cannot resolve with finality. Thus, for the
purpose of determining whether a certain property should or should not
be included in the inventory of estate properties, the Probate Court may
pass upon the title thereto, but such determination is provisional, not
conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate action to
resolve title.
The rule is that execution of a judgment must conform to that decreed in
the dispositive part of the decision
Nowhere in the dispositive portion is there a declaration of ownership of
specific properties. On the contrary, it is manifest therein that ownership
was not resolved. For it confined itself to the question of extrinsic validity
of the win, and the need for and propriety of appointing a special
administrator. Thus it allowed and approved the holographic win "with
respect to its extrinsic validity, the same having been duly authenticated
pursuant to the requisites or solemnities prescribed by law." It declared
that the intestate estate administration aspect must proceed " subject to
the outcome of the suit for reconveyance of ownership and possession of
real and personal properties in Civil Case 274-T before Branch IX of the
CFI of Cebu." [Parenthetically, although the statement refers only to the

"intestate" aspect, it defies understanding how ownership by the estate of
some properties could be deemed finally resolved for purposes of testate
administration, but not so for intestate purposes. Can the estate be the
owner of a property for testate but not for intestate purposes?] Then
again, the Probate Order (while indeed it does not direct the
implementation of the legacy) conditionally stated that the intestate
administration aspect must proceed "unless . . . it is proven . . . that the
legacy to be given and delivered to the petitioner does not exceed the
free portion of the estate of the testator," which clearly implies that the
issue of impairment of legitime (an aspect of intrinsic validity) was in fact
not resolved. Finally, the Probate Order did not rule on the propriety of
allowing QUEMADA to remain as special administrator of estate
properties not covered by the holographic will, "considering that this
(Probate) Order should have been properly issued solely as a resolution
on the issue of whether or not to allow and approve the aforestated will."
That the Probate Order did not resolve the question of ownership of the
properties listed in the estate inventory was appropriate, considering that
the issue of ownership was the very subject of controversy in the
reconveyance suit that was still pending in Branch IX of the Court of First
Instance of Cebu. What, therefore, the Court of Appeals and, in effect, the
Supreme Court affirmed en toto when they reviewed the Probable Order
were only the matters properly adjudged in the said Order
It was, therefore, error for the assailed implementing Orders to conclude
that the Probate Order adjudged with finality the question of ownership of
the mining properties and royalties, and that, premised on this conclusion,
the dispositive portion of the said Probate Order directed the special
administrator to pay the legacy in dispute.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. The
Order of execution issued by the probate Court, as well as all the Orders
issued subsequent thereto in alleged implementation of the Probate Order
dated December 5, 1972, are hereby set aside; and this case is
remanded to the appropriate Regional Trial Court for proper proceedings.
6. US vs. Chiu Guimco

36 Phil 917/ 1917
FACTS
Page 5 of 21
Joaquin Cruz was a chinese merchant who amassed huge wealth

and landholdings in Misamis. He has two wives, one in China and
another in Misamis. When Joaquin visited China, Joaquin died there.
Before he traveled, he executed a will before the notary public in
which respondent here was named executor.
As executor, he made a contract with the Filipino Wife of Joaquin and
the provisions state that the she will relinquish her claims in the
property. Subsequently, the wife from China arrived and the
properties were partitioned as follows: 40% to the wife from China,
40% to the respondent and another 20% to a brother in China.
The respondent made a contract of lease of the property of the
Chinese wife of Joaquin, but he never paid the said rentals. With the
help of a Chinaman, the Chinese wife asked that the respondent will
produce the will for lawful proceedings. This he failed to do. Thus the
Chinaman filed under the Code of Civil Procedure section 628,
charging the respondent for not producing the will within the time
required by law.
Pending this, the judge ordered that the Respondent be jailed until he
produces the will as per Sec 629 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS
W/N an accused found guilty may be imprisoned?
No
Sec 629 only applies when the court is acting in the exercise of its
jurisdiction over the administration of the estates of deceased person,
and where admin proceedings are not ready.
The court before taking action under said section, it should require a
petition, information, or affidavit of such character to make action by
the court under this section (other words, not moto propio)
The procedure under sec 628 is an ordinary criminal prosecution; it is
a special statutory offense which is different from sec 629, which
needs jail time. Sec 628 only gives a fine as the penalty, whereas
under 629 the accused is imprisoned. It is then not permissible in a
prosecution to superimpose the two penalties.
7. Rodriguez v De Borja| Reyes

G.R. No. L-2199 June 21, 1966| 17 SCRA 418
FACTS
February 12, 1963- Fr. Celestino Rodriguez died in the City of Manila;
March 4, 1963- Apolonia Pangilinan and Adelaida Jacalan delivered to the
Clerk of Court of Bulacan a purported last will and testament of Fr.
Rodriguez;
March 8, 1963- Maria Rodriguez and Angela Rodriguez, through counsel
filed a petition for leave of court to allow them to examine the alleged
will;
March 11, 1963-Before the Court could act on the petition, the same was
withdrawn (by Maria and Angela);
March 12, 1963, 8:00 AM- Maria and Angela filed before the CFI of Rizal
a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of Fr. Rodriguez
alleging, among other things, that Fr. Rodriguez was a resident of
Paraaque, Rizal, and died without leaving a will and praying that Maria
be appointed as Special Administratrix of the estate;
March 12, 1963, 11:00 AM- Pangilinan and Jacalan filed a petition in this
Court for the probation of the will delivered by them on March 4, 1963. It
was stipulated by the parties that Fr. Rodriguez was born in Paraaque,
Rizal; that he was Parish priest of the Catholic Church of Hagonoy,
Bulacan, from the year 1930 up to the time of his death in 1963; that he
was buried in Paraaque, and that he left real properties in Rizal, Cavite,
Quezon City and Bulacan.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS
Whether the Intestate Proceedings instituted by Maria and Angela
should take precedence over the Probate Proceedings filed by
Pangilinan and Jacalan
o Maria and Angela: since the intestate proceedings in the Court of
First Instance of Rizal was filed at 8:00 A.M. on March 12, 1963
while the petition for probate was filed in the Court of First
Instance of Bulacan at 11:00 A.M. on the same date, the latter
Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the petition for probate.
o Pangilinan and Jacalan: Court of First Instance of Bulacan
acquired jurisdiction over the case upon delivery by them of the
will to the Clerk of Court on March 4, 1963, and that the case in
this Court therefore has precedence over the case filed in Rizal
on March 12, 1963.
NO.
Page 6 of 21
THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT BECOMES VESTED UPON

THE DELIVERY THERETO OF THE WILL EVEN IF NO PETITION
FOR ITS ALLOWANCE WAS FILED LATER
o Upon the will being deposited with the court, the court could motu
proprio, have taken steps to fix the time and place for proving the
will, and issued corresponding notices conformably to what is
prescribed.
o Where the petition for probate is made after the deposit of the will,
the petition is deemed to relate back to the time when the will was
delivered. Since the testament of Fr. Rodriguez was submitted and
delivered to the Court of Bulacan on March 4, while petitioners
initiated intestate proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Rizal
only on March 12, eight days later, the precedence and exclusive
jurisdiction of the Bulacan court is incontestable.
Their commencing intestate proceedings in Rizal, after they learned

of the delivery of the decedent's will to the Court of Bulacan, was in
bad faith, patently done with a view to divesting the latter court of the
precedence awarded it by the Rules.
In our system of civil law, intestate succession is only subsidiary or

subordinate to the testate, since intestacy only takes place in the
absence of a valid operative will.
8. VICENTE B. TEOTICO vs. ANA DEL VAL, ETC. | BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.

G.R. No. L-18753, March 26, 1965 | 13 SCRA 406
FACTS
When Maria Mortera died, she left a will written in Spanish, which
contained certain provisions in favor of several beneficiaries, one of which
is Rene A. Teotico, and a declaration that she had neither ascendants or
descendants of any kind so she could freely dispose of all her estate
o The testatrix bequeath in favor of Rene and his wife (Josefina
Mortera), a niece and the instituted sole and universal heir of Maria,
the usufruct of her interest in the Calvo Bldg. while the naked
ownership in favor of their children
Vicente Teotico filed a petition for the probate of the said will in the CFI,
which was opposed by Del Val claiming to be an adopted child of the
sister and an acknowledged natural child of the brother of the testatrix
Vicente filed a MTD the opposition on the ground that she had no legal
personality to intervene, but the probate court instead of dismissing the
opposition allowed her to intervene so she then filed an amended

opposition contesting the provision in favor of Rene and Josefina
The probate court rendered its decision admitting the will to probate but
declaring the disposition made in favor of Dr. Rene Teotico void with the
statement that the portion to be vacated by the annulment should pass to
the testatrix's heirs by way of intestate succession
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS

W/N the oppositor has the right to intervene in the probate proceeding
W/N the probate court erred in ruling that the disposition in favor of the
spouses is void
NO. DEL VAL DOES NOT HAVE THE RIGHT TO INTERVENE AS SHE HAS
NO INTEREST IN THE ESTATE
It is a well-settled rule that in order that a person may be allowed to
intervene in a probate proceeding he must have an interest in the estate,
or in the will, or in the property to be affected by it either as executor or as
a claimant of the estate; and an interested party has been defined as one
who would be benefited by the estate such as an heir or one who has a
claim against the estate like a creditor
Under the terms of the will, oppositor has no right to intervene because
she has no interest in the estate either as heir, executor, or administrator,
nor does she have any claim to any property affected by the will, because
it nowhere appears therein any provision designating her as heir,
legatee or devisee of any portion of the estate. She has also no
interest in the will either as administratrix or executrix. Neither has
she any claim against any portion of the estate because she is not a
co-owner thereof, and while she previously had an interest in the Calvo
building located in Escolta, she had already disposed of it long before the
execution of the will
Even in the event that the will is not admitted for probate, she still has no
right to be involved in the intestate proceeding
o She would acquire such right only if she was a legal heir of the
deceased, but she is not under our Civil Code. It is true that oppositor
claims to be an acknowledged natural child of Jose Mortera, a
deceased brother of the deceased, and also an adopted daughter of
Francisca Mortera, a deceased sister of the testatrix, but such claim
cannot give her any comfort for, even if it be true, the law does not
give her any right to succeed to the estate of the deceased sister of
both Jose Mortera and Francisca Mortera. And this is so because
Page 7 of 21

being an illegitimate child she is prohibited by law from succeeding to
the legitimate relatives of her natural father (remember the doctrine of
iron curtain in succession? eto yon)
o The oppositor cannot also derive comfort from the fact that she is an
adopted child of Francisca Mortera because under our law the
relationship established by adoption is limited solely to the adopter
and the adopted and does not extend to the relatives of the adopting
parents or of the adopted child except only as expressly provided for
by law. Hence, no relationship is created between the adopted and
the collaterals of the adopting parents. As a consequence, the
adopted is an heir of the adopter but not of the relatives of the adopter
YES. THE PROBATE COURT HAS A LIMITED JURISDICTION AND
CANNOT RULE ON THE INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF A WILL
... The authentication of a will decides no other questions than such as
touch upon the capacity of the testator and the compliance with those
requisites or solemnities which the law prescribes for the validity of wills. It
does not determine nor even by implication prejudge the validity or
efficiency of the provisions, these may be impugned as being vicious or
null, notwithstanding its authentication. The questions relating to these
points remain entirely unaffected, and may be raised even after the will
has been authenticated. ...
Pursuant to the foregoing precedents the pronouncement made by the
court a quo declaring invalid the legacy made to Dr. Rene Teotico in the
will Exhibit A must be set aside as having been made in excess of its
jurisdiction. Another reason why said pronouncement should be set aside
is that the legatee was not given an opportunity to defend the validity of
the legacy for he was not allowed to intervene in this proceeding. As a
corollary, the other pronouncements touching on the disposition of the
estate in favor of some relatives of the deceased should also be set aside
for the same reason
9. FERNANDO vs CRISOSTOMO
GR no. L-2963-4 | December 27, 1951| J. JUGO
FACTS
These is a consolidation of 2 cases in view of the intimate and necessary
relations between them.
CASE 1: Hermogenes Fernando was appointed guardian of Crisostomo
Sr. and his 4 minor children as to their persons and properties. Later,
Crisostomo Sr. died leaving said 4 minor children under the guardianship
of Hermogenes. The value of the properties involved in the two
proceedings exceeds P50,000 and the pertinent questions raised are only
of law. The guardian filed a motion with the CFI of Bulacan praying for the
approval of an extra-judicial settlement of the estate of the deceased
parents of the minors who died intestate. The guardian ad litem filed
opposition. The SC declared the deed of extrajudicial settlement executed
by Hermogenes as null and void. The court held that the guardian is not
yet an administrator of the estate of the deceased until and after said
estate has been acquired by or adjudicated to the minors by proper
proceedings.
CASE 2: German Crisostomo filed a petition, as next of kin, for the
opening of the intestate proceedings of spouses Crisostomo with himself
and Pacita Fernando, another next of kin, as co-administrators of the
estate. Hermogenes filed opposition to the appointment of the
administrators and moved for the dismissal of the intestate proceedings
on the ground that the properties left by said spouses were already in his
possession as such guardian. The court appointed German and Pacita
co-administrators of the estate of the above-mentioned spouses with the
appropriate bonds, impliedly denying the reiteration of the motion for
dismissal.
The guardian filed a motion for the closing, termination and filing in the
archives of the record of the intestate proceedings.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS

W/N court erred in appointing German and Pacita as co-administrators even
though there was already a guardian appointed previously? NO.
Sometime in 1948 the guardian (hermogenes) filed with the CFI of

Bulacan a preliminary injunction to prohibit the said CFI from proceeding
with the intestate case. In the petition, substantially the same questions
are raised as those discussed in the brief of the appellant herein. The
court denied the petition. The MR was likewise denied. The SC held:
Respondent judge had jurisdiction and did not exceed it in appointing the
other respondent, who are the brother and sister or nearest of kin of the
decedent, as administrators of the latter's estate. The jurisdictional facts
referred to in section 2 (a) Rule 80, are the death of the decedent, his
having left his estate in such province were probate court is sitting, or life
he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, his having left his estate in such
province. The name or competency of the person or persons for whom
letters of administration are prayed is not a jurisdictional fact, it is another
additional fact to be alleged in the petition (d); but "no defect in the
Page 8 of 21
petition shall render void the issue of letters of administration" that is, shall
divest the court of its jurisdiction to appoint the administrator. No partition
either judicial or extra judicial having as yet been made adjudicating the
said properties to the minors, the properties of the deceased have never
been placed under the administration of the guardian of his minor
children.
After examining the record, we do not see any error in the appointment of
German Crisostomo and Pacita Fernando as co-administrators as they
were the brother and sister, respectively, of the deceased, no evidence
having been presented by the appellant why those persons should not be
appointed, either on account of their incompetency or lack of moral
qualifications. We, therefore, affirm the order of the court appointing them.
10. Araujo vs. Celis | Mapa

G.R. No. L-2308, April 30, 1906
FACTS
Rosario Araujo inherited from her mother the hacienda called PangPang.
Rosario married Jose Araujo, son of the defendant.
Rosario died sometime in 1888 and her husband, Jose Araujo died the
following year.
Petitioners are the relatives of Rosario who are now claiming that they
should succeed to the estate of Rosario Araujo and are asking delivery of
the Pangpang property which is under the possession of defendant (the
husbands mother)
The defendant alleged that Rosario left a will wherein she bequeathed all
of her properties to her husband. Jose Araujo died without a will and so
the defendant succeeded to all the properties owned by his son at the
time of his death including the Pangpang property.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS
Whether Rosario Araujo executed a legal and valid will in the form and
manner alleged by the defendant?
NO.
Defendant introduced no will as evidence.
She offered secondary parol evidence as to its contents under the claim
that the original will had been lost.
The loss of the alleged will was not sufficiently established.

The principal witness presented by the defense was Calixto Delgado, who
testified that he acted as procurador for the defendant in case involving
the same property. But he admitted that he only saw a copy of the will and
alleged that the original was kept by the notary public.
the witness further testified that the will, a copy of which he saw and had
in his possession, was signed by two witnesses only. A will signed by two
witnesses only could not under any circumstances be valid under the law
in force at the time referred to by the witness, and legally speaking such
will could not then have been probated or recorded.
As to the loss, it was alleged that the insurgents in 1899 burned all the by
the papers and archives of the court of Pototan. There is nothing to show
that at the time these records were burned by the insurgents there existed
in the court-house of Pototan the copy of the will referred to.
The same witness also testified that the notary records were kept in the
court-house and were likewise burned.
This statement of the witness is contrary to the provisions of article 60 of
the provisional rules for the organization and government of notaries
public in the Philippines, approved by the royal decree of the 11th of April,
1890, which provided that: "Notaries shall keep the protocols and books
in the same building where they live, in their custody, and shall be
responsible therefor." As provided in this section the records and books
should have been kept by the notary at his own house, where he lives,
and not at the court building as testified to by the witness.
Their testimony is absolutely insufficient to establish in a satisfactory
manner the loss of the alleged will of Rosario Darwin, and the court below
should not have, therefore, allowed the secondary evidence introduced by
her as to the contents of the will.
11. Lim Billian vs. Suntay | Avancena.

November 25, 1936
FACTS
Jose B. Suntay died in China. He married twice, the first time to Manuela
T. Cruz with whom he had several children now residing in the
Philippines, and the second time to Maria Natividad Lim Billian with whom
he had a son.
Lim Billian claims that Suntay gave her an envelope containing and a true
copy of said will. She claims that when Go Toh (Suntays attorney in fact)
arrived in the Philippines with the envelope containing the original copy of
the will, the children of Suntay from the first marriage snatched the
Page 9 of 21
envelope, opened it and threw away the contents. Petitioner now asks the
court to compel the children from the first marriage to produce the will
The children answer by stating that they did not have the will
Go Toh and Tan Boon Chong testified that the brothers Apolonio and
Angel Suntay took the envelope as narrated above. The brothers did not
present any evidence.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS

W/N the envelope contained the will
YES
The childrens answer admits that, according to Barretto he prepared a
will of the deceased to which he later became a witness together with Go
Toh and Manuel Lopez, and that this will was placed in an envelope which
was signed by the deceased and by the instrumental witnesses. In court
there was presented and attached to the case an open and empty
envelope signed by Jose B. Suntay, Alberto Barretto, Go Toh and Manuel
Lopez. It is thus undeniable that this envelope Exhibit A is the same one
that contained the will executed by the deceased. These tokens
sufficiently point to the loss of the will of the deceased., a circumstance
justifying the presentation of secondary evidence of its contents and of
whether it was executed with all the essential and necessary legal
formalities.
12. Basa vs Mercado |Goddard, J.
61 Phil 632 (1935)| July 26, 1935
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS

W/N the publication should be published for three full weeks before
the date set for the hearing on the will?
- NO
Judge Hermogenes Reyes, judge of the CFI of Pampanga, issued an

order that allowed and probated the last will and testament of Ines Basa,
deceased.
The judge also approved the account of the administrator of the estate,
declared him the only heir of the deceased under the will and closed the
administration proceedings.
The petitioner-appellants filed a motion praying that said proceedings be
reopened and alleged that the court lacked jurisdiction to act in the matter
because there was a failure to comply with the requirements as to the
publication of the notice of hearing prescribed in Sec 630 of the Code of
Civil Procedure.
W/N the Ing Katipunan was a newpaper of General Circulation.

YES
FACTS
Appellants claim that although the trial judge, on May 29, 1931 ordered
the publication of the required notice for three weeks successively
previous to the time appointed for the hearing on the will, the first
publication was on 6 June 1931, the second on the 27 th of the said month,
only twenty-one days after the date of the first publication instead of three
full weeks before the day set for the hearing.
The appellants also contend that the weekly newspaper Ing Katipunan
where the notice was published was a newspaper of general circulation in
the province of Pampanga.
The Supreme Court cited jurisprudence where the last of the three
publications was made on December 18, 1919 and the hearing on the
administrators final account was set for December 19 of that year, only
fifteen days after the date of the publication.
In view of the foregoing the Supreme Court that the language used in Sec
630 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not mean that the notice,
referred to therein, should be published for three full weeks before the
date set for the hearing on the will. In other words the first publication of
the notice need not be made 21 days before the day appointed for the
hearing.
The fact that there is another paper published in Pampanga that has a
few more subscribers (72 to be exact) and those certain Manila dailies
also have a larger circulation in that province is not important.
The law does not require that publication of the notice, referred to in the
Code of Civil Procedure, and should be made in the newspaper with the
largest number of subscribers. No fixed number of subscribers is
necessary to constitute a newspaper of general circulation.
Page 10 of 21

13. JOAQUINA R-INFANTE DE ARANZ etal v JUDGE NICOLAS GALING
and JOAQUIN R-INFANTE| Padilla
G.R. No. 77047 May 28, 1988|
FACTS
A petition for the probate and allowance of the last will and testament of
the late Monserrat R-Infante y G-Pola. The petition specified the names
and addresses of the petitioners as legatees and devisees.
The order setting the petition for hearing was published in the Nueva
Era a newspaper of general circulation in Metro Manila once a week for 3
consecutive weeks. On the date of hearing no oppositor appeared and
the hearing was reset to another date, at which time the court issued an
order allowing the petitioner to present evidence ex-parte and further
appointing private respondent as executor.
Petitioners then filed an MR of the above order alleging that they were not
personally notified of the proceedings in violation of the Rules of Court.
MR denied. They then filed a petition for certiorari with SC (which was
referred by SC to CA) which was dismissed by CA. Hence, this petition.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS
Whether a personal notice of the probate proceedings to the petitioners
is an optional procedure considering the facts of the case?
NO. Individual notice upon heirs, legatees and devisees is necessary
only when they are known or when their places of residence are known.
In other instances, such notice is not necessary and the court may
acquire and exercise jurisdiction simply upon the publication of the
notice in a newspaper of general circulation.
Sec. 4, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court reads:

SEC. 4. Heirs, devisees, legatees, and executors to be notified by
mail or personally. The court shag also cause copies of the notice of
the time and place fixed for proving the will to be addressed to the
designated or other known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator
resident in the Philippines at their places of residence, and deposited in
the post office with the postage thereon prepaid at least twenty (20) days
before the hearing, if such places of residence be known. A copy of the
notice must in like manner be mailed to the person named as executor, if
he be not, the petitioner; also, to any person named as co-executor not
petitioning, if their places of residence be known. Personal service of

copies of the notice at least ten (10) days before the day of hearing shall
be equivalent to mailing.
It is clear from the aforecited rule that notice of the time and place of the
hearing for the allowance of a will shall be forwarded to the designated or
other known heirs, legatees, and devisees residing in the Philippines at
their places of residence, if such places of residence be known. There is
no question that the residences of herein petitioners legatees and
devisees were known to the probate court. The petition for the allowance
of the will itself indicated the names and addresses of the legatees and
devisees of the testator. But despite such knowledge, the probate court
did not cause copies of the notice to be sent to petitioners. The
requirement of the law for the allowance of the will was not satisfied by
mere publication of the notice of hearing for three (3) weeks in a
newspaper of general circulation in the province.
14. In re estate of Johnson| Street, J.

G.R. No. L-12767, November 16, 1918| 67 PHIL 652
FACTS
On February 4, 1916, Emil H. Johnson, a native of Sweden and a
naturalized citizen of the United States, died in the city of Manila, leaving a
will by which he disposed of an estate valued at P231,800
This document is a holographic instrument, being written in the testator's
own handwriting, and is signed by himself and two witnesses only, instead
of three witnesses required by section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure
This will, therefore, was not executed in conformity with the provisions of
law generally applicable to wills executed by inhabitants of these Islands
Thereafter a petition was presented in the Court of First Instance of the city
of Manila for the probate of this will, on the ground that Johnson was at the
time of his death a citizen of the State of Illinois, United States of America;
that the will was duly executed in accordance with the laws of that State;
and hence could properly be probated here pursuant to section 636 of the
Code of Civil Procedure.
Thereafter the document was declared to be legal and was admitted to
probate.
Three months after the will had been probated, the attorneys for Ebba
Ingeborg Johnson entered an appearance in her behalf and asserted that
Ebba is a legitimate heir of the testator. Thus, she cannot be deprived of
the legitime to which she is entitled under the law governing testamentary
successions in these Islands.
Page 11 of 21

Therefore, she moved to annul the decree of probate and put the estate
into intestate administration in order for her to claim the estate as the sole
legitimate heir of her father.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS
W/N the order of the probate can be set aside on the ground that the
testator was not a resident of the State of Illinois and that the will was not
made in conformity with the laws of that State.
NO.
In the testimony submitted to the trial court it appears that, when Johnson
first came to the United States as a boy, he took up his abode in the State
of Illinois and there remained until he came as a soldier in the United
States Army to the Philippine Islands.
Although he remained in these Islands for sometime after receiving his
discharge, no evidence was adduced showing that at the time he returned
to the United States, in the autumn of 1902, he had then abandoned Illinois
as the State of his permanent domicile.
Further, there is no law in force at that time by virtue of which any person
of foreign nativity can become a naturalized citizen of the Philippine
Islands;
Thus, it was impossible for the testator, even if he had so desired, to
expatriate himself from the United States and change his political status
from a citizen of the United States to a citizen of these Islands.
This being true, it is to be presumed that he retained his citizenship in the
State of Illinois along with his status as a citizen of the United States
SC held that: the probate of the will does not affect the intrinsic validity of
its provisions, the decree of probate being conclusive only as regards the
due execution of the will.
Further, the intrinsic validity of the provisions of this will must be
determined by the law of Illinois and not of the Philippines.
In paragraph 2 of article 10 of the Civil Code it is declared that "legal and
testamentary successions, with regard to the order of succession, as well
as to the amount of the successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of
their provisions, shall be regulated by the laws of the nation of the person
whose succession is in question, whatever may be the nature of the
property and the country where it may be situate."
In this case the petition submitted to the lower court was insufficient to
warrant the setting aside of the order, probating the will in question,
whether said petition be considered as an attack on the validity of the
decree for error apparent, or whether it be considered as an application for

a rehearing based upon the new evidence submitted in the affidavits which
accompany the petition.
Further, in the latter aspect the petition is subject to the further fatal defect
that it was not presented within the time allowed by law.
Thus, the trial court committed no error in denying the relief sought. The
order appealed from is accordingly affirmed
15. In the Matter of the Petition to Approve the Will of Cipriano Abut.
Generoso Abut, et al v. Felipe Abut, et al | Makalintal
G.R. No. L-26743, May 31, 1972
FACTS
Generoso Abut, one of the children of the deceased Cipriano Abut by his
second marriage and the person named as executor in a will allegedly
executed by the said deceased, filed a petition before the TC praying that
the said will be approved and allowed and that letters testamentary issue
in his favor.
TC motu proprio set the petition for hearing and further directed
compliance with Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 76 of the Rules of Court.
Opposition to the petition was filed by the children of Cipriano Abut by his
first marriage, namely, Felipe Abut, Presentacion de Rodriguez and
Absoluto Abut.
Generoso Abut died. Gavina Abut, a sister of Generoso Abut and an heir
and devisee under the will asked the TC to substitute her in lieu of
Generoso Abut and to admit an amended petition.
TC in considering the fact that publication of the petition is a jurisdictional
matter intended to inform whomsoever may be interested in said petition
and to afford him or her an opportunity to assert his or her rights,
dismissed the petition originally brought by Generoso Abut, without
prejudice to the filing of another petition pursuant to the requirements of
the Rules of Court.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS
W/N the probate court correctly dismissed the petition simply
because the original petitioner who was the executor named in
the will sought to be probated died before the petition could be
heard and/or terminated.
Page 12 of 21

Stated otherwise, after the court had acquired jurisdiction over the
case involving probate of the will, did the demise of the original
petitioner during the pendency of the proceeding divest the court of
such jurisdiction and preclude the continuation of the case.
The probate court erred.
The jurisdiction of the court became vested upon the filing of the original
petition and upon compliance with Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 76.
A proceeding for the probate of a will is one in rem, such that with the
corresponding publication of the petition the court's jurisdiction extends to
all persons interested in said will or in the settlement of the estate of the
deceased. The fact that the amended petition named additional heirs not
included in the original petition did not require that notice of the amended
petition be published anew. All that Section 4 of Rule 76 provides is that
those heirs be notified of the hearing for the probate of the will, either by
mail or personally.
The court in the case of Perez vs. Perez held that: At any rate the
omission, if any, did not affect the jurisdiction of the court; it constituted a
mere procedural error that may or may not be the basis of reversal.
Indeed, this Tribunal has ruled that the court acquires jurisdiction over all
persons interested in the estate through the publication of the petition in
the newspapers.
Jurisdiction of the court once acquired continues until the termination of
the case, and remains unaffected by subsequent events.
The admission of the amended petition, of course, does not mean that
Gavina Abut's prayer that she be appointed administratrix with the will
annexed is necessarily meritorious. It simply recognizes that since the
lower court has acquired jurisdiction over the res, such jurisdiction
continues until the termination of the case.
TC order is set aside. Case is remanded below, with direction for the lower
court to admit the amended petition and thereafter proceed accordingly.
16. Rodelas vs. Aranza | Relova, J.:

G.R. No. L-58509, December 7, 1982 | 119 SCRA 16
FACTS
Marcela Rodelas filed a petition for the probate of the holographic will
of Ricardo Bonilla and the issuance of letters testamentary in her favor.
The same was opposed by Amparo Aranza Bonilla, Wilferine Bonilla
Treyes, Expedita Bonilla Frias, and Ephraim Bonilla on the following
grounds:
o Rodelas was estopped from claiming that the deceased left a will
by failing to produce the will within 20 days from the death of the
testator, as required by Rule 75, Sec. 2
o The alleged copy of the alleged holographic will did not contain a
disposition of property after death and not intended to take effect
after death, hence, is not a will
o The alleged holographic will itself, and not the alleged copy
thereof, must be produced, otherwise it would produce no effect,
as held in Gan vs. Yap
o The deceased did not leave any will, holographic or otherwise,
executed and attested as required by law
The petition was dismissed and the MR denied. Hence, the present
petition.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS
W/N a holographic will which was lost or cannot be found can be
proved by means of a photostatic copy
YES.
If the holographic will has been lost or destroyed and no other copy is
available, the will can not be probated because the best and only
evidence is the handwriting of the testator in said will
It is necessary that there be a comparison between sample
handwritten statements of the testator and the handwritten will
But, a photostatic copy or xerox copy of the holographic will may be
allowed because comparison can be made with the standard writings
of the testator
o In the case of Gan vs. Yap, the Court ruled that the execution
and contents of a lost or destroyed holographic will may not
be prove by the bare testimony of witnesses who have seen
and/or read such will. The will itself must be presented;
otherwise, it shall produce no effect. The law regards the
document itself as material proof of authenticity.
Page 13 of 21

But, in Footnote 8 of said decision, it says that Perhaps it
may be proved by a photographic or photostatic copy. Even a
mimeographed or carbon copy; or by other similar means, if
any, whereby the authenticity of the handwriting of the
deceased may be exhibited and tested before the probate
court.
Evidently, the photostatic or Xerox copy of the lost or destroyed
holographic will may be admitted because then the authenticity of the
handwriting of the deceased can be determined by the probate court.
o
The execution and the contents of a lost or destroyed holographic will

may not be proved by the bare testimony of witnesses who have seen
and/or read such will. The ill itself must be presented; otherwise, it shall
produce no effect. The law regards the document itself as material proof
of authenticity.
Remember in succession: The only thing that needs to be proven in
holographic will is the authenticity of the handwriting. Without the will,
there is nothing to be proven.
17. Gan v. Yap | Gutierrez

G.R. No. L-12190, August 30, 1958| 104 PHIL 509
18. Estate of Mamuyac, Gago v. Mamuyac et al | Johnson

G.R. No. L-26317, January 29, 1927 |
FACTS
Felicidad Yap died in Manila. She left a petition for probate of her
holographic will stating that she had properties in Manila and Bulacan. In
the petition, she said that Fausto Gan would get 2 parts of the Bulacan
property, and that Ildefpnso Yap (the decedents husband) was to receive
all the Manila property upon the condition that he has a health center built
in Felicidads name.
There were testimonies by a certain Felina Esguerra of the wills
existence. She said that the will was executed in her presence. She also
said that Felicidad wanted to keep the will a secret from her husband. And
that the will was entrusted to Felina, which she kept in her handbag
Felina also stated that Ildefonso checked out the contents of her handbag
while in UST Hospital where Felicidad was confined a few days before
Felicidads demise.
Fausto Gan submitted this petition to the court for the holographic will to
be propated. However, the will itself was lost and could not be presented
in court.
FACTS
Obtain the last will and testament of Miguel Mamuyac who died in
January 1922, in Agoo, La Union.
July 27, 1918 is the date that Mamuyac executed a last will and testament
according to the record.
Gago presented the will for probate. It was opposed by Mamuyac et al.
On 21st Feb 1925 action was commenced to secure probation of will of 16
April 1919. Oppositions were again presented because (a) will is a copy
of a second will executed by Miguel Mamuyac, (b) said will has been
cancelled and revoked during the lifetime of Mamuyac (c) said will was
not the last will and testament of Mamuyac.
Revocation was witnessed by a certain Fenoy (typist of the will) and Bejar
actually cancelled by Mamuyac on 30 Dec 1920 because Mamuyac sold
a house and lot to Bejar.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS

W/N the presentation of a holographic will in the probate
proceedings is necessary.
YES. IF THE HOLOGRAPHIC WILL IS LOST, ORAL AND SECONDARY
EVIDENCE CANNOT BE INTRODUCED TO PROVE THE EXISTENCE AND
CONTENTS OF SUCH BECAUSE THE AUTHENTICITY OF THE
SIGNATURES CANNOT BE RPOVED BY ORAL TESTIMONY.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS

W/N The will had been cancelled
Yes will had already been cancelled
Original of the will of 1919 could not be found after the death of the
testator. There is also positive proof that the same had been cancelled.
Burden of proof in probate is on proponent, if proven by proponents then
burden rests on contestants to disprove the execution of the will or its
validity or it has been revoked.
Page 14 of 21
Majority of revocations occur without witnesses and usually all evidence

of the same perishes with testator. Copies of the will should be admitted
with great caution.
When it is proven by testimony that a will has been executed in duplicate
and each was executed with all the requirements then the duplicate may
be admitted in evidence.
After examination we are convinced that the will was revoked in 1920.
Judgment appealed from is affirmed.
YES. THE CA ERRED IN

INADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE.
19. Aldanese vs. Salutillo | Ostrand

G.R. No. L-55960, November 24, 1988 | 167 SCRA 736
FACTS
Salome Avila died a resident of Cebu. Her will appears to be executed by
Moreta, Borromeo, and Rafols, all residents of Manila. Since Avila left no
ascendants or descendants, under her will she disposed the greater part
of her estate in favor of petitioner Aldanese and his sister.
The petition for probate was filed in the CFI of Cebu. The respondents
surnamed Salutillo and Llanos appeared as opponents, alleging that the
will should be denied probate on the ground of fraud, undue influence,
and testamentary incapacity of Avila at the time of execution. They also
alleged that they were the nearest relatives of Avila and should thus
succeed to her estate by operation of law.
Aldanese filed a motion asking the court to authorize the taking of the
depositions of the witnesses to the will, since they were unable to appear
personally before the CFI of Cebu granted.
The Salutillos then filed a motion asking to the court to revoke the order
authorizing the taking of depositions on the ground that it has not been
sufficiently shown that it was impossible for the witnesses to appear
personally before the court and this was also granted. However, by the
time that notice of this order was sent to Aldanese, the depositions had
already been taken.
After hearing, the CFI denied probate of the will, holding that the
depositions were inadmissible in evidence. Hence this petition.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS
W/N the CFI erred in declaring that the depositions taken were
inadmissible as evidence in the probate proceedings.
DECLARING
THE
DEPOSITIONS
AS
While the rule in this jurisdiction is that when a will is contested the
attesting witnesses must be called to prove the will, that does not
necessarily mean that they must be brought bodily before the court. It is
their testimony which is needed, not their actual presence.
Section 355 of the (old) Code of Civil Procedure provides:
The testimony of a witness in the Philippine Islands may be taken by
depositionin a special proceeding, after the question of fact has arisen
therein, in the following cases:
2. When the witness resides out of the province in which his testimony is
to be used.
Section 406 of the same Code reads:

A witness is not obliged to attend as a witness in a civil action before any
court, judge, justice, or other officer out of the province in which he
resides, unless the distance be less than thirty miles from his place of
residence to the place of trial by the usual course of travel, but his
testimony may be taken in such case in the form of a deposition.
In the present case, the will was presented for probate in Cebu, and the
attesting witnesses were living in Manila. The required notice was duly
given, and so the depositions would ordinarily be admissible.
However, the record indicates that the failure of the opponents to be
present at the taking of the depositions was due to the fact that they were
misled by petitioners action in seeking a special authorization from the
court. Therefore, in the interest of justice, the depositions should be
retaken, to give the opponents another opportunity to examine the
witnesses.
It must also be noted that when the depositions of subscribing witnesses
to a will are taken, a photographic copy of the will may be presented to
them on their examination, and they may be asked the same original will.
Order reversed. Case remanded.
20. DOROTEA CABANG vs. MARTIN DELFINADO | TRENT, J.

G.R. No. L-8954 March 21, 1916| 34 Phil. 291
FACTS
Page 15 of 21
Celestino Delfinado died leaving an alleged will, which when presented

for probate by his widow, Cabang, such petition was opposed by Martin
Delfinado, the son from the first marriage of the deceased alleging that
the purported will cannot be the will of his father
o According to the witnesses presented by the proponent, the will was
executed after the decedent dictated the provisions in his dialect
o The dictation was then typewritten and thereafter, the provisions were
translated into Spanish so that the decedent can understand the
provisions in the typewritten version
o After the translation, the decedent affixed a cross after his name was
written in the will, in the presence of the witnesses and of each other
o But according to Delfinado, his father could read, write, and sign his
name
Cabang, after presenting witnesses to prove the due execution of the will,
presented a motion asking that the case be reopened for the purpose of
receiving the testimony of the other two subscribing witnesses, who were
then living in Manila and Nueva Ecija, but such witnesses were not
presented
The probate court admitted for probate the alleged will of Celestino
Hence, this appeal
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS

W/N the court erred in admitting the will to probate without having two
of the subscribing witnesses called, although they were living within the
jurisdiction of the court, or for not requiring any showing why they were
not produced

YES. THE COURT FOLLOWED THE DECISIONS WITH REGARD TO THE
INTENT OF THE LAW IN REQUIRING THE PRESENTATION OF THE
SUBSCRIBING WITNESSES WHEN THE WILL IS CONTESTED
Our code provides, as we have indicated, that non-contested may be
admitted to probate upon the testimony of one of the subscribing
witnesses, but is silent as to the manner in which they shall be proved
when contested. Provisions are also made for supplying the testimony of
the three subscribing witnesses when they cannot be called. The
provisions of the Vermont Statutes are essentially the same. We
therefore, call to our aid the decisions of the supreme court of that State
and the law upon which those decisions rest in determining the intention
of the Philippine Legislature in enacting the provisions of Act No. 190,
above referred to
An examination of the subsequent adjudicated cases and the statutes

fails to disclose any modification of this rule in the State of
Massachusetts. In Evans vs. Evans (18 Miss., 402), the court, following
the rule adopted in Massachusetts, said:
o We are inclined to hold that no will can be proved, unless all the
subscribing witnesses, alive and within the control of the process of
the court, are produced to testify
The rule that no will shall be valid to pass any estate, real or
personal, unless "attested and subscribed by three or more credible
witnesses," is a matter of substantive law and an element of the
will's validity. The rule that the attesting witnesses must be called to
prove a will for probate is one of preference made so by statute. This
rule of evidence is not to be confused with rules of quantity
The law places these witnesses "around the testator to ascertain and
judge of his capacity" for the purpose of preventing frauds. The
soundness of the rule is well illustrated in the case under consideration.
Here the attesting clause was omitted and the testator signed by mark.
The petitioner produced only one of the attesting witnesses. Had there not
been a contest, this would have probably been sufficient under section
631. While there is no testimony in the record to the effect that the
testator could neither read nor write, there is conclusive evidence that he
could sign his name. This fact is established by the production of Exhibit
1, which all agree the testator did sign. The testator's signature to the
document shows that he could write, at least his name, in a plain, clear
manner, indicating a fairly good knowledge of writing
Had the proponent shown that the other two subscribing witnesses were
not within the jurisdiction of the court and could not, therefore, be called,
the due execution of the will would still be very doubtful. Believing, as we
do, that it was the intention of the Legislature that the subscribing
witnesses must be called or good and sufficient reason shown why they
could not be had, and being supported by the authorities above cited and
quoted, we must conclude that the proponent did not comply with the
provisions of the law in the presentation of her case
21. Avera vs Garcia and Rodriguez |Street, J.

42 Phil 145 (1921)| September 14, 1921
FACTS
Etiquia Avera instituted for a probate of the will of one Esteban Garcia.
Page 16 of 21
Contest was made by Marino Garcia and Juan Rodriguez, the latter in the
capacity of guardian for the minors Jose Garcia and Cesar Garcia.
During the hearing, the proponent of the will presented a witness who
testified that the will was executed with all necessary external formalities,
and that the testator was at the time in full possession of disposing
faculties.
Upon the latter point the witness was corroborated by the person who
wrote the will at the request of the testator.
Two other witnesses were not introduced nor was their absence
accounted for by the proponent of the will.
The attorney of the opposition presented one witness showing in a vague
and indecisive manner that at the time the will was made the testator was
so debilitated as to be unable to comprehend what he was about.
After the cause had been submitted for determination, the trial judge
found that the testator at the time of the making of the will was of sound
mind and disposing memory and that the will had been properly executed.
the will might be brought into court. But instead of calling the error to the
attention of the court and his adversary, the point is first raised by the
appellant in this court. The court held that it was too late and appellant
cannot raise the issue first time on appeal.
The court in its decision cited a jurisprudence stating that on the other
hand, one must not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the law
to restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to make a will. So when an
interpretation already given assures such ends, any other interpretation
whatsoever that adds nothing but demands more requisites entirely
unnecessary, useless and frustrative of the testators last will must be
disregarded.
For the signatures, the court held that where ingenuity could not suggest
any possible prejudice to any person, as attendant upon the actual
deviation from the letter of the law, such deviation must be considered too
trivial to invalidate the instrument.
The legal errors assigned are not sustainable, and the judgment appealed
from was affirmed by the Supreme Court.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS

W/N a will can be admitted to probate, where the opposition is made,
upon proof of a single attesting witness, without producing or
accounting for the absence of the other two?
W/N the will in question is rendered invalid by reason of the fact that the
signature of the testator and of the three attesting witnesses are written
on the right margin of each page of the will instead of the left margin?
Upon the first point, while it is undoubtedly true that an uncontested will
may be proved by the testimony of only one of the three attesting
witnesses, nevertheless in Cabang vs Delfinado, the court declared after
an elaborate examination of the American and English Authorities that
when a contest is instituted, all of the attesting witnesses must be
examined, if alive and within reach of the process of the court.
However, this point was not raised by the appellant in the lower court
either upon submission of the cause for determination in that court upon
the submission of the cause for determination in that court or upon the
occasion of the filing of the motion for a new trial.
If the appellant raised this question in the lower court, either at the
hearing or upon a motion for new trial, that court would have had the
power, and it would have been its duty, considering the tardy institution of
the contest, to have granted a new trial in order that all the witnesses to
22. 22 Celedonia Solivio v CA, Concordia Javellana Villanueva |

Medialdea
G.R. No. 83484 February 12, 1990| 182 SCRA 119
FACTS
Esteban Javellana Jr., a novelist, died a bachelor with 2 aunts as nearest
of kin. Celedonia Solivio was the decedents maternal aunt while
Concordia was the paternal aunt. Esteban was a posthumous child
(Esteban Sr. died when the decedents mother, Salustia, was 4 mos
pregnant), raised by his mother and Aunt Celedonia.
During his lifetime, Esteban Jr, inheriting his mothers properties (which
were paraphernal properties inherited also by Salustia) wanted to build a
foundation to honor his mother and to help poor but deserving students to
obtain a college degree. Esteban died however from a heart attack
without having set up the foundation.
After the funeral, Celedonia and Concordia agreed to build the foundation,
and that Celedonia would take care of the proceeding to form the
foundation, so she filed for a spec pro for admin of estate of Esteban Jr.
CFI of Iloilo Branch 23 declared Celedonia the sole heir of Esteban.
Celedonia sold the properties to pay the taxes, obligations and to set up
the SALUSTIA SOLIVIO VDA DE JAVELLANA FOUNDATION.
Instead of appealing the this decision to claim that Concordia was herself
an heir, Concordia filed a separate action for partition, recovery of
possession, ownership and damages in Branch 26 of the CFI of Iloilo.
Page 17 of 21
Concordia got a favorable judgment. Branch 26 ordered execution

pending appeal, requiring Celedonia to submit an inventory and
accounting of the estate. In Celedonias MR, she raised that all the
properties were already in the name of the foundation. MR DENIED.
APPEAL to the CA DENIED. Hence, Celedonia now files this petition for
review.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS

(FOR SPEC PRO) W/N Branch 26 had the jurisdiction to entertain the
partition and recovery suit even while the probate proceeding was
pending?
NO. Branch 26 lacks jurisdiction.
The settlement of the said estate are still pending in Branch 23 of the
same court, there being as yet no orders for the submission and approval
of the administratixs inventory and accounting, distributing the residue of
the estate to the heir and terminating the proceeding.
It is the order of distribution directing the delivery of the residue of
the estate to the persons entitled thereto that brings to a close the
intestate proceedings, puts an end to the administration and thus far
relieves the administrator from his duties.
The order of Branch 23 did not toll the proceeding, but merely directed the
administratrix to hurry up the settlement of the estate.
Concordias remedy when her motion, to set aside the order declaring
Celedonia as the sole heir, was DENIED, was to elevate the denial to the
CA for review on certiorari. Instead, she filed more than 1 year later, a
separate action for the same purpose in Branch 26 of the court. The SC
held that the separate action was improperly filed for it is the
probate court that has the exclusive jurisdiction to just and legal
distribution of the estate.
Petition granted. CA decision set aside. Concordia was also declared an heir,
but the entire estate was conveyed to the foundation as ealier agree upon by
both aunts. Celedonia was ordered to submit to the probate court an
inventory and accounting of the estate of the deceased preparatory to
terminating the proceeding
23. Manalo v. Paredes |
Villa-Real
G.R. No. 24168 September 22, 1925| 47 Phil 938

FACTS
When Fernando Villegas died, his surviving spouse Laureana Hidalgo
filed an application for letters of administration of the formers estate,
alleging therein that he died intestate.
However, Justina Mendieta et al. filed a motion with the court, praying for
the probate of the supposed will of the decedent. Publication was duly
performed because of this.
When the court asked Mendieta to produce the will, she withdrew her
petition for probate, saying that she merely coerced the husband in
signing the will. The court then denied the petition for probate.
Later on, a cousin of the deceased, Gelacio Malihan filed with the court
another petition for probate, presenting the same will which was already
denied probate before.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS
W/N mandamus will lie to order the publication of the petition for the
probate of the will of the deceased Francisco Villegas
MANDAMUS WILL NOT LIE.
The proceeding for the probate of a will is a proceeding in rem and the
court acquires jurisdiction over all the persons interested through the
publication of the notice prescribed by section 630 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, and any order that may be entered is binding against all of
them. Through the publication ordered by the Court of First Instance of
Laguna of the application for the probate of the supposed will of Francisco
Villegas, filed by Justina Mendieta et al. said court acquired jurisdiction
over all such persons as were interested in the supposed will, including
Gelacio Malihan. The court having tried said application for probate,
hearing all the testimony of the attesting witnesses of the said supposed
will, the applicants Justina Mendieta et al., on the one hand, and
Laureana Hidalgo, widow of Francisco, on the other, having submitted a
stipulation wherein the former withdrew her application and the latter
reserved certain rights over the estate left by Francisco Villegas in favor
of Justina Mendieta and her minor children; and the court having
approved said stipulation and declared that Francisco Villegas died
intestate according to said agreement, all the parties became bound by
said judgment; and if any of them or other persons interested were not
satisfied with the court's decision, they had the remedy of appeal to
correct any injustice that might have been committed, and cannot now
Page 18 of 21

through the special remedy of mandamus, obtain a review of the
proceeding upon a new application for the probate of the same will in
order to compel the respondent judge to comply with his ministerial duty
imposed by section 330 of the Code of Civil Procedure; because this
remedy, being extraordinary, cannot be used in lieu of appeal, or writ of
error especially when the parties interested have agreed to disregard the
testamentary provisions and divide the estate as they pleased, each of
them taking what pertained to him.
24. Riera vs. Palmaroli | Makalintal

G.R. No. 14851, September 13, 1919 | 40 Phil. 105
FACTS
Juan Pons, a Spanish subject resident in the Philippines, died in the city
of Manila.
Petitioner Riera, is the widow of the deceased and was at the time of her
husbands death residing in Palma de Mallorca in the Balearic Islands 1.
Respondent Vicente Palmaroli, Consul General for Spain in the
Philippines, produced in the CFI of Manila a document purporting to be
the will of Juan Pons and asked that it be admitted to probate.
An order was entered admitting the will to probate.
Owing to the great distance between Palma de Mallorca and the city of
Manila and to the lack of adequate means of communication between the
two places a difficulty greatly exaggerated by conditions incident to the
European War the petitioner received no information of the probate
proceedings.
Petitioner filed a petition to the SC for the purpose of vacating the order of
the CFI of Manila admitting to probate the will of Juan Pons and to cause
the application for probate to be set for rehearing in the CFI.
She claimed that she is entitled to be heard in the probate of the will, as a
party interested in the estate.
She also alleged that the will should be treated as void for failure to
comply with various requirements of the Spanish laws in respect to the
manner of execution of wills.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS
W/N there should be a rehearing of the probate of the decedents
will?
1
The Balearic Islands are located in the Mediterranean off the east coast of mainland Spain.

NO.
It is not alleged that any fraud has been attempted or committed, or that
the document probated is any other than a testamentary memorial in
which the decedent actually gave expression to his desires with regard to
the disposition of his property.
The action of the court in admitting a will to probate has all the effect of a
judgment; and as such is entitled to full faith and credit in other courts.
The proceeding by which this is accomplished is considered to be in the
nature of a proceeding in rem, and upon this idea the decree of probate is
held binding on all persons in interest, whether they appear to contest the
probate or not.
The proceeding is not a contentious litigation; and though the persons in
interest are given an opportunity to appear and reasonable precautions
are taken for publicity, they are not impleaded or required to answer.
The probate of a will, while conclusive as to its due execution, in no wise
involves the intrinsic validity of its provisions.
If, therefore, upon the distribution of the estate of Juan Pons, it should
appear that any provision of his will is contrary to the law applicable to his
case, the will must necessarily yield upon that point and the disposition
made by law must prevail.
The petitioner is free to appear in the CFI at the proper juncture and
discuss the question of the validity of such provisions of the will as affect
her interests adversely.
But if the will in question was in fact proved as the will of a Spanish
subject, the intrinsic validity of its provisions must be determined under
the Spanish law applicable to this testator.
25. Manahan v Manahan| Imperial
G.R. No. 38050, September 22, 1933|
FACTS
On August 29, 1930, Tiburcia Manahan instituted special proceedings No.

4162, for the probate of the will of the deceased Donata Manahan, who died
in Bulacan, Province of Bulacan, on August 3, 1930. The petitioner herein,
niece of the testatrix, was named the executrix in said will. The court set the
date for the hearing and the necessary notice required by law was accordingly
published. On the day of the hearing of the petition, no opposition thereto was
filed and, after the evidence was presented, the court entered the decree
admitting the will to probate as prayed for. The will was probated on
September 22, 1930. The trial court appointed the herein petitioner executrix
Page 19 of 21

with a bond of P1,000, and likewise appointed the committed on claims and
appraisal, whereupon the testamentary proceedings followed the usual
course. One year and seven months later, that is, on My 11, 1932, to be
exact, the appellant herein filed a motion for reconsideration and a new trial,
praying that the order admitting the will to probate be vacated and the
authenticated will declared null and void ab initio. The appellee herein,
naturally filed her opposition to the petition and, after the corresponding
hearing thereof, the trial court erred its over of denial on July 1, 1932.
Engracia Manahan, under the pretext of appealing from this last order,
likewise appealed from the judgment admitting the will to probate.
The decree of probate is conclusive with respect to the due execution thereof
and it cannot impugned on any of the grounds authorized by law, except that
of fraud, in any separate or independent action or proceedings
But there is another reason which prevents the appellant herein from
successfully maintaining the present action and it is that inasmuch as the
proceedings followed in a testamentary case are in rem, the trial court's
decree admitting the will to probate was effective and conclusive against her,
in accordance with the provisions of section 306 of the said Code of Civil
Procedure which reads as follows:
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS

W/N
1) That she was an interested party in the testamentary proceedings and, as
such, was entitled to and should have been notified of the probate of the will;
(2) that the court, in its order of September 22, 1930, did not really probate the
will but limited itself to decreeing its authentication; and
(3) that the will is null and void ab initio on the ground that the external
formalities prescribed by the Code of Civil Procedure have not been complied
with in the execution thereof.
NO! NO and NO.
She was not entitled to notification of the probate of the will and neither had
she the right to expect it, inasmuch as she was not an interested party, not
having filed an opposition to the petition for the probate thereof. Her allegation
that she had the status of an heir, being the deceased's sister, did not confer
on her the right to be notified on the ground that the testatrix died leaving a
will in which the appellant has not been instituted heir. Furthermore, not being
a forced heir, she did not acquire any successional right.
SEC. 306. EFFECT OF JUDGMENT. . . . .

1. In case of a judgment or order against a specific thing, or in respect
to the probate of a will, or the administration of the estate of a
deceased person, or in respect to the personal, political, or legal
condition or relation of a particular person the judgment or order is
conclusive upon the title of the thing, the will or administration, or the
condition or relation of the person: Provided, That the probate of a will
or granting of letters of administration shall only be prima facie
evidence of the death of the testator or intestate; . . . .
On the other hand, we are at a loss to understand how it was possible for the
herein appellant to appeal from the order of the trial court denying her motion
for reconsideration and a new trial, which is interlocutory in character. In view
of this erroneous interpretation, she succeeded in appealing indirectly from
the order admitting the will to probate which was entered one year and seven
months ago.
The court really decreed the authentication and probate of the will in question,
which is the only pronouncement required of the trial court by the law in order
that the will may be considered valid and duly executed in accordance with
the law. In the phraseology of the procedural law, there is no essential
difference between the authentication of a will and the probate thereof. The
words authentication and probate are synonymous in this case. All the law
requires is that the competent court declared that in the execution of the will
the essential external formalities have been complied with and that, in view
thereof, the document, as a will, is valid and effective in the eyes of the law.
Page 20 of 21
Page 21 of 21

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3D 2009-2010 SPEC PRO DIGESTS

1. Dionisio Fernandez et al v Ismaela Dimagiba | JBL Reyes

Presentation and probate of a will are requirements of public policy, being

CA decision, affirmed by the SC.

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RTC overruled the motion so petitioner went up to the CA on certiorari but

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SEC. 625. Allowance Necessary, and Conclusive as to Execution. No

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Section 306 of our Code of Civil Procedure provides as to the effect of

3. Sumilang vs. Ramagosa | Makalintal

Section 333, paragraph 4, of the Code of Civil Procedure establishes an

SEC. 333. Conclusive Presumptions. The following presumptions or

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1. In case of a judgment or order against a specific thing, or in

Section 625 of the same Code is more explicit as to the conclusiveness of

4. The judgment or order of a court, when declared by this code to be

HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI

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4. Balanay v Martinez| Aquino

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It should be stressed that by reason of the surviving husband's conformity to

QUEMADA filed a petition for the probate and allowance of an alleged

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assailed Order of Execution and Garnishment, resolving the question of

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CFI of Cebu." [Parenthetically, although the statement refers only to the

6. US vs. Chiu Guimco

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Joaquin Cruz was a chinese merchant who amassed huge wealth

7. Rodriguez v De Borja| Reyes

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THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT BECOMES VESTED UPON

Their commencing intestate proceedings in Rizal, after they learned

In our system of civil law, intestate succession is only subsidiary or

8. VICENTE B. TEOTICO vs. ANA DEL VAL, ETC. | BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.

opposition allowed her to intervene so she then filed an amended

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Sometime in 1948 the guardian (hermogenes) filed with the CFI of

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10. Araujo vs. Celis | Mapa

The loss of the alleged will was not sufficiently established.

11. Lim Billian vs. Suntay | Avancena.

3D 2009-2010 SPEC PRO DIGESTS

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Judge Hermogenes Reyes, judge of the CFI of Pampanga, issued an

W/N the Ing Katipunan was a newpaper of General Circulation.

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3D 2009-2010 SPEC PRO DIGESTS

Sec. 4, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court reads:

petitioning, if their places of residence be known. Personal service of

14. In re estate of Johnson| Street, J.

3D 2009-2010 SPEC PRO DIGESTS

decree for error apparent, or whether it be considered as an application for

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16. Rodelas vs. Aranza | Relova, J.:

3D 2009-2010 SPEC PRO DIGESTS

The execution and the contents of a lost or destroyed holographic will