TPA

Obama revived TPA push, its his top prioritypolitical

capital determines passage
Alex Rogers, Time Magazine, 1/21/15, Heres the One State of the Union
Talking Point Republicans Liked,time.com/3676347/state-of-the-union-2015trade/

into President Obamas State of the Union a strange thing

happened: most of the Republicans jumped up and cheered while most Democrats
stayed seated and silent. It was the only time it happened Tuesday night, and the topic was
trade. China wants to write the rules for the worlds fastest-growing region, said Obama. That would
About a half-hour

put our workers and businesses at a disadvantage. Why should we let that happen? We should write those
rules. We should level the playing field. Im the first one to admit that past trade deals havent always
lived up to the hype, and thats why weve gone after countries that break the rules at our expense,
added Obama, who earned a brief cheer from democratic socialist Vermont Sen. Bernie Sanders before
continuing. But 95% of the worlds customers live outside our borders, and we cant close ourselves off
from those opportunities. More than half of manufacturing executives have said theyre actively looking at

There are few

areas of agreement between Obama and the new Republican Congress, but
trade promotion authority, or TPA, which would ease the passage of the 12-country Trans
Pacific Partnership, or TPP, potentially the largest free trade agreement ever, is one of
them. For years the Administration has been negotiating TPP affecting about 40%
of the worlds GDP and about a third of the worlds tradebut so far Obama has yet to prove
to Republicans that he is willing to spend the time, effort and political
capital to get it done. But on Tuesday night, the Republicans response to
his message was ecstatic. The Republican Senate and House whips, Texas Sen. John
Cornyn and Louisiana Rep. Steve Scalise, said that the trade talk was probably one of the
brightest spots and the most promising part of the speech. Other top
bringing jobs back from China. Lets give them one more reason to get it done.

Republicans who criticize Obama around the clock, like Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell, said they
hoped the President would now push the issue. Senate Finance Committee Chairman Orrin
Hatch, the most senior member, said Obamas remarks were welcome but long overdue. In 1993,
President Bill Clinton led an all-out push to get the massive North America trade deal through Congress.
There were face-to-face White House meetings with Congressmen, White House envoys roaming the Hill,
and 37 Commerce Department reports targeting industries from computers to autos, according to a
Christian Science Monitor report, that helped show Congressmen how NAFTA would help their constituents.
In October of that year, former CEO of the Chrysler Corporation, Lee Iacocca, stood on the White House
South Lawn with hundreds of products (and businessmen) touting what the Administration believed would
thrive under NAFTA. Under the white tents, Clinton joked to a pro-trade union man that he would wear the
mans company hat if he gave a speech. A month later, the House passed the bill in a squeaker and the

Republicans are hoping for another all-out

Administration effort on TPP and the fast-track bill, which would allow limited
congressional debate, no amendments, and an up-or-down vote. The Administration says such a bill is
vital to pass TPP, as countries would be less willing to negotiate if they knew Congress could make
large changes to the deal. But liberals are livid with Obamas trade talk ; they set up a press
Senate did shortly thereafter. This time around,

conference Wednesday to air out their concerns. The typical business plan in this country because of
trade and tax policies: You shut down production in Cleveland and you move it to Beijing and sell the
products back to the United States, said Ohio Sen. Sherrod Brown after the State of the Union. That
makes no sense. And hes wrong on that as his predecessors were. If you think that previous trade
agreements. . . have done well, you should support the TPP, said Sanders. But if you believe, as I do, that
they have been disastrous, that they have cost us millions of decent paying jobs, then it make no sense to
go forward in a failed policy and it should be defeated. . . . At the end of the day, among many other
concerns, American workers are going to be forced to compete against people in Vietnam who make a
minimum wage of 56 cents an hour. Still pro-trade lawmakers like Democratic Missouri Sen. Claire
McCaskill believe that

Obama can bring enough Democrats to pass a fast-

track trade bill. Democratic Maryland Senator Ben Cardin, who supported the North American
Free Trade Agreement in 1993 but opposed the more recent trade agreement bills with South Korea,

Obama probably has the votes now to pass a TPA bill

through Congress, although its easier in the Senate than House, where some conservatives have
also raised an uproar about giving more power to the President. The White House has recently
increased its outreach efforts, tasking every Cabinet member to divvy up
and target 80 House Democrats, according to the Hill newspaper. In an email Wednesday,
Commerce Secretary Penny Pritzker told TIME that the trade agenda is a top priority for
the Administration. We are taking an all-hands-on-deck approach to getting this
done, she said. We are all out talking not only to members of Congress but to
business leaders and workers around the country, telling the story of why trade and exports matter.
Panama and Columbia, said

Second term makes Obama more willing to spend PC on

the plan---and its normal means because only
pressure from Obama gets people on board
Martin D. Carcieri 11, Associate Professor of Political Science, San
Francisco State University; J.D., University of California, Hastings; Ph.D.,
University of California, Santa Barbara. 2011 OBAMA, THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT, AND THE DRUG WAR 44 Akron L. Rev. 303
Notwithstanding momentum at the state level
prospects for
reform at the federal level appear dismal for the near future
Obama has sent mixed
signals
such

, however, the

. For its part, Congress has

consistently refused even to instruct the DEA not to harass sick patients in states with medical marijuana laws. n7 For his part, President

on marijuana policy. On the one hand, he announced in 2009 that so long as state medical marijuana laws are faithfully observed, there would be no DEA intervention. n8 In 2010, by contrast,

when polls leading up to the election indicated that Proposition 19 might succeed, Attorney General Eric Holder threatened to enforce federal marijuana prohibition if it did. n9 With Proposition 19's defeat, of course,
the Administration dodged a bullet. Yet Obama almost certainly seeks reelection, and few politicians of either party will touch the marijuana issue. n10 Especially since the new Republican-controlled House of

If
the Twenty-second
he would be
marijuana

Representatives is even less likely to spur reform in this area than did the recent Democrat-controlled House, it seems clear that for the time being, federal marijuana prohibition n11 marches on.

Obama is reelected
the situation transforms
Amendment bars him from a third term
free to speak the truth on
prohibition
, however,

. Since

, n12 and his future would be quite secure,

this issue, which includes the following: beyond its economic n13 and social n14 costs, [*306]

burdens a range of constitutional interests, including those arising under the First, n15 Fourth, n16 Fifth, n17 Sixth, n18 [*307] Eighth, n19 Tenth, n20 and Fifteenth n21

Amendments. n22 As a constitutional lawyer, further, the President knows that these problems may be but symptoms of an underlying constitutional infirmity, one rooted primarily in the Fourteenth Amendment.
This article is written to help clarify the full range of understanding Obama would bring to a second term. Specifically, I defend two related, contested theses. My core thesis, to which this article is primarily devoted,
is a jurisprudential claim: contrary to state and lower federal court rulings, marijuana prohibition is subject to strict judicial scrutiny under leading [*308] relevant U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence. n23 I support this
thesis primarily by showing that under the Fourteenth Amendment, bodily autonomy--i.e., the control over the borders and contents of one's body burdened by laws like marijuana prohibition--is a fundamental right,
and that the Court has thus established a presumption in its favor, especially for adults in the home. I then reinforce this thesis with three further arguments: (1) marijuana prohibition violates "justice as regularity,"
n24 (2) marijuana prohibition satisfies the "suspect class" trigger of strict scrutiny, n25 and (3) bodily autonomy is closely analogous to the fundamental right of free speech. In sum, I argue that all roads of

if reelected, Obama will

to urge Congress to end federal marijuana prohibition

constitutional analysis lead to strict scrutiny of marijuana prohibition. My second thesis, resting largely on the first, is a policy claim:

be inclined

, and ought,

letting States go their own way within federal guidelines. n26 As President, he knows that if he is convinced, on both policy and constitutional grounds, that the law must be changed, he need not wait for the Court to act--or more accurately, react. Especially if the current pace of state marijuana law reform continues through 2012, Obama's recommendation will have broad support by the time he delivers his 2013 State of the
Union address. An application of strict scrutiny to marijuana prohibition is the subject of another article. Here I simply show that the President has ample reason under well-settled law to conclude that this prohibition is properly subject to that high standard. It may be that prohibition of cocaine, heroin and methamphetamine could survive strict scrutiny. These too are the subjects of other articles. Obama takes the rule of law
seriously, however, and he would have grave doubts that marijuana prohibition could pass an honest application of strict scrutiny, in turn prompting him to urge Congress to end this costly war. [*309] II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF BODILY AUTONOMY A. Introduction The Fourteenth Amendment provides that "no State . . . shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." n27 The President has written that he considers these provisions to be among the Constitution's most important. n28 He knows, after all, that civil liberty is ultimately fused with equality--that where the law creates a presumption of liberty, each person has a vital interest in not having his liberty denied while others are allowed an equal or more harmful liberty.
n29 As Professor Tribe thus recently observed, substantive due process "is a narrative in which due process and equal protection, far from having separate missions and entailing different inquiries, are profoundly interlocked in a legal double helix. It is a single, unfolding tale of equal liberty . . . ." n30 In this light, it is not surprising that due process and equal protection analyses blend into each other. Both start with the premise
that one challenging a law as an unconstitutional violation of his rights ordinarily has the presumption against him. So long as government can show a legitimate interest or end in enacting the law, that is, that the law [*310] is "rationally related" to advancing that interest, it will be upheld. This ends/means test, embodying a presumption for government and against the individual, is called rational basis scrutiny. n31 In some
cases, however, the Court has found either that the right burdened by a challenged law is "fundamental" n32 or that a classification the law employs is "suspect." n33 In either case, it applies "strict scrutiny," n34 and the presumption shifts to favor the individual. n35 While the law might still survive constitutional challenge, government now has an uphill battle: it needs not simply a legitimate interest in enacting the law, but a
compelling one. n36 It must have, we might say, not just a reason, but a very good reason. Further, the law as a means must be not just rationally related to advancing the interest, but "narrowly tailored" to doing so. n37 There must be not just a plausible link between means and ends, in other words, but a close, efficient, causal link--one that is neither too over-inclusive nor under-inclusive. n38 On both the ends and [*311]
means portions of the analysis, a court applying strict scrutiny is skeptical of, not deferential to, government's arguments. n39 B. Core Thesis: Bodily Autonomy and the Fourteenth Amendment 1. Bodily Autonomy as a Fundamental Right Since the 1980's, writes Professor Post, the Court has developed two approaches to identifying fundamental rights in its substantive due process jurisprudence--the traditional approach and
the autonomy approach. n40 The former is drawn originally from Palko v. Connecticut n41 and embodied more recently in Washington v. Glucksberg. n42 Beyond the rule that an asserted fundamental right must be "deeply rooted in the Nation's history and tradition" as well as "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty," Glucksberg demands a "careful description" of the right. n43 Relying on this traditional formulation, state
courts and lower federal courts have long held that laws criminalizing the possession or use of marijuana, even by adults in private, burden no fundamental right, and so need only pass rational basis scrutiny. n44 As the Hawaii Supreme Court has written, for example, We cannot say that smoking marijuana is a part of the "traditions and collective conscience of our people." In Hawai'i, possession of marijuana has been illegal
since 1931 . . . . In the rest of the United States, the possession and/or use of marijuana, even in small quantities, is almost universally prohibited. Therefore, tradition appears to be in favor of the prohibition against possession and use of marijuana . . . . Furthermore, we cannot say that the principles of liberty and justice underlying our civil and political institutions are violated by marijuana possession laws. We dare say that
liberty and justice can exist in spite [*312] of the prohibition against marijuana possession. Therefore, the purported right to possess and use marijuana is not a fundamental right and a compelling state interest is not required." n45 This conclusion, I submit, cannot withstand analysis. To see why, we must evaluate bodily autonomy as a fundamental right under both approaches identified by Post. To begin, the phrases "implicit
in the concept of ordered liberty" n46 and "neither justice nor liberty would exist if they were sacrificed" n47 are vague and abstract, and so provide little real guidance. They draw us out onto Wittgenstein's slippery ice, where language has little traction. n48 At best, they yield starting points for analysis. While a High Court may "dare say that liberty and justice can exist in spite of (marijuana) prohibition," n49 then, this is a
meaningless claim that can be neither proven nor disproven without heavy theoretical lifting. Reasonable people differ on the meaning of such terms, so we are entitled to know exactly how liberty can truly exist where the state can invade adults' bodily autonomy, even in the home. We are entitled to know how justice can really exist when adults who privately consume marijuana are criminals while adults who consume far
more dangerous substances like alcohol and tobacco, even in public, are within their rights for reasons that are widely understood. n50 The Mallan court does not remotely speak to such questions. [*313] By contrast, the other aspect of the first prong of the traditional approach--whether a right is "so rooted in the traditions and conscience [*314] of our people as to be ranked as fundamental" n51 --provides some guidance.
Sometimes, after all, we can justifiably claim that a given right is embedded in American traditions and conscience. Indeed, bodily autonomy is a good example. Beyond its reflection in the Fourth Amendment, n52 leading Anglo-American political theory, n53 and the statutory law of alcohol, tobacco, caffeine, and fatty foods, "a right of control over one's body has deep roots in the common law." n54 As the Supreme Court
observed over a century ago, "no right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law." n55 As Justice Cardozo later wrote, "[e]very human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done
with his own body." n56 Under the "historical roots" aspect of the traditional approach, then, bodily autonomy is plausibly a fundamental right even before we turn to the most recent case law. The second part of the traditional approach, we saw, is the demand for a "careful description" of the asserted right. This brings us the other strand of the Court's search for fundamental rights--the autonomy [*315] strand, embodied in
Lawrence v. Texas, n57 as it refines the careful description requirement. While Lawrence created no fundamental rights, one scholar has observed that Lawrence emphasized . . . that the precise framing of a right ought not to be conflated with the narrowest and most concrete definition of the conduct the state seeks to punish; the appropriate level of generality may require a broader understanding of the asserted interest . . . .
On the one hand, framing must not be overly narrow . . . . On the other hand, framing must not be so broad that the scope of substantive due process becomes limitless . . . . n58 By these lights, bodily autonomy defined as control over the borders and contents of one's body, particularly within the home, n59 measures up well under Lawrence. It is not too broad, to begin, as it specifies concrete limits on the autonomy
protected by the right. It literally protects a private physical space within a private physical space. It is thus not nearly as broad as "autonomy" or "liberty" or "privacy" or "the pursuit of happiness." n60 Conversely, bodily autonomy is not too narrow under Lawrence. It does not, like Mallan and other cases, define the right at stake merely as smoking marijuana. Lawrence, after all, was clear that the right at stake there was not
simply that of engaging in sexual conduct. n61 There is no fundamental right to smoke cigarettes either, but a sudden federal prohibition of tobacco would certainly be subject to strict scrutiny. On this preliminary basis, bodily autonomy is plausibly a fundamental right under the Fourteenth Amendment. Yet a key advantage to framing the right at stake in marijuana prohibition as bodily autonomy is that it is stated broadly
enough to have substantial roots in, and thus draw meaningful guidance from, the Court's leading relevant [*316] case law, especially that of liberty due process. To reinforce the status of bodily autonomy as a fundamental right, rendering marijuana prohibition subject to strict scrutiny, we thus now turn to a brief review of that jurisprudence. We shall take the cases according to the strength of the state interest asserted,
beginning with those in which it is strongest and proceeding toward those in which it is weakest. While no right except freedom of thought is absolute, the portrait that will emerge is that of a strong presumption in favor of liberty as bodily autonomy. 2. The Presumption in Favor of Bodily Autonomy Our starting point is the right to die cases, Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health n62 and Glucksberg. In Cruzan, a young
woman was rendered vegetative in a car accident and eventually taken to a state hospital. n63 Once it was apparent that she had virtually no chance of regaining her mental faculties, her parents asked employees of the hospital to terminate the artificial nutrition and hydration procedures keeping her alive. n64 The employees refused to do so without court approval, and the case went to the Supreme Court. n65 On the one
hand, the Court held, the State's compelling interest in preserving life entitles it to require clear and convincing proof of a patient's wish to discontinue life saving procedures before honoring that wish. n66 On the other hand, assuming such proof is made, the Court affirmed the Fourteenth Amendment right of such a patient, based on his interest in bodily autonomy, to refuse the treatment. n67 Quoting an old precedent, the
Court observed that "no right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded by the common law, than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law." n68 Glucksberg involved a State ban on physician-assisted suicide, even for terminally ill and suffering patients. n69 Among the reasons for the
ban, Washington asserted a compelling interest in preserving human [*317] life. n70 Writing for the Court, and grounding his decision in a historical and comparative analysis of the law of suicide, Chief Justice Rehnquist ruled for the State. n71 He held that the individual right asserted was not fundamental and that the ban was subject to rational basis scrutiny, which it could satisfy. n72 Yet three points are in order. First,
although it did not prevail in Cruzan, the interest in preserving human life, at least in the abstract, is the most compelling of all state interests. All other public interests assume the preservation of human life, and so a State is on strong ground where it can plausibly assert this interest. Second, a key reason Rehnquist rejected the right claimed in Glucksberg is that, unlike the right claimed in Cruzan, it amounted to a right to
coerce a third person (doctor) to administer a lethal dose to a patient. n73 Whatever else one thinks of this ruling, an adult's liberty to consume marijuana in his home does not remotely involve such third party coercion. Concurring in Glucksberg, thirdly, Justice Stevens wrote that "in most cases, the individual's constitutionally protected interest in his or her own physical autonomy, including the right to refuse unwanted
medical treatment, will give way to the state's interest in preserving human life." n74 While the Glucksberg Court thus ruled for the State, Stevens expressly recognized the constitutionally protected status of bodily autonomy. n75 This implies a different outcome where a law violates bodily autonomy yet government can claim no plausible interest in preserving life. As we shall see, the state interests asserted in most bodily
autonomy cases are not of this magnitude. Whatever the weight of the State's interest in preserving life in other circumstances, then, it is diminished in the case of a deeply comatose or terminal and suffering individual for the same reason and to the same degree as that individual's interest in refusing lifesaving medicine is enhanced. n76 Thus far, then, even when the state interest in invading bodily autonomy is strongest,
the cases go both ways. [*318] We come next to Jacobson v. Massachusetts, n77 Schmerber v. California, n78 and Winston v. Lee. n79 In these cases, States asserted interests in preventing serious threats to, or punishing serious breaches of, public safety and welfare. In Jacobson, a town required the inoculation of all residents against smallpox. n80 Jacobson was fined when he refused to be inoculated, and he challenged this
fine under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. n81 In Schmerber, the petitioner had been in a car accident and appeared intoxicated to police when he arrived at a hospital. n82 In order to preserve any evidence of his intoxication for purposes of prosecution, they directed a hospital employee to take a blood sample from Schmerber over his objection. n83 A blood sample analysis disclosing a high blood
alcohol level was introduced against him at trial, and he objected on Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment grounds. n84 The Court held for the State in both cases, and this is not surprising. For one thing, the state interest in invading bodily autonomy was compelling in both cases: smallpox was a fatal threat to public health and safety in 1905, n85 and drunken driving remains so today. For another thing, the degree of state
intrusion into bodily autonomy was relatively limited in both cases. A smallpox inoculation may be more intrusive than the extraction of blood, if only because something is being forced into the body rather than taken out. Yet neither is on a par with the forced feeding of a comatose or terminal suffering patient. n86 While [*319] Jacobson and Schmerber are sound, then, they neither lessen the force of Cruzan nor control cases
in which state interests are of a lesser magnitude than that in protecting and preserving life. n87 In Winston v. Lee, by contrast, the Commonwealth of Virginia claimed that a bullet lodged under Lee's collarbone would help prove that he had committed an armed robbery. n88 It thus sought a court order forcing him to undergo surgery to remove the bullet. n89 The Supreme Court ruled, however, that Lee's interest in avoiding
invasive surgery outweighed the state interest in violating his bodily autonomy. n90 While Virginia could claim a state interest on a par with those in Jacobson and Schmerber, thus, the gravity of Lee's interest in avoiding the bodily intrusion in question far exceeded those in the earlier cases. Because Virginia had other, if less incriminating, evidence with which to prosecute, it is not surprising that Lee prevailed. n91 Thus far,
once again, the cases go both ways, even where state interests are compelling. We come next to the abortion cases, in which States have claimed an interest in protecting potential human life. Given the importance of preserving human life generally, Roe v. Wade n92 and Planned Parenthood v. Casey n93 took seriously the State interest in protecting fetal human life (and maternal health). Nonetheless, Roe ruled for the
individual, establishing a woman's presumptive n94 constitutional right to obtain an abortion. Casey, in turn, reinforced the core of that right, expressly recognizing "the two more general rights under which the abortion right is justified: the right to make family decisions and the right to physical autonomy." n95 As in Winston, then, the principle of bodily autonomy prevailed in the abortion cases, even over substantial state
interests. Thus far, we have reviewed cases involving important state interests. Yet not all state interests are of this magnitude. In City of [*320] Indianapolis v. Edmond, n96 police had conducted suspicionless searches at highway roadblocks for the sole purpose of drug interdiction, and these were challenged on Fourth Amendment grounds. In the past, the Court had spoken of a "fundamental public interest in implementing
the criminal law." n97 Writing for the Edmond Court, further, Justice O'Connor called drug trafficking a serious problem. n98 Nonetheless, she held that the state interest in drug interdiction is simply a species of the "general interest in crime control," n99 and thus could not justify the governmental action at issue. This is a key distinction, reiterated in later decisions. n100 Whether or not they prevailed, the State interests
asserted in Glucksberg, Cruzan, Jacobson, Schmerber, and Winston were all compelling interests, i.e., more substantial than the mere general interest in crime control. By contrast, O'Connor is clear in Edmond that the while the State interest in drug interdiction may be legitimate, it is not compelling, and so would not satisfy strict scrutiny. n101 We come then to Rochin v. California. n102 Here, police witnessed the defendant,
in his bedroom, swallow two capsules they reasonably believed were illegal contraband. n103 Unable to make him disgorge them, they took him to a hospital and had his stomach forcibly pumped in order to retrieve the evidence. n104 As Justice Frankfurter wrote, such conduct "shocks the conscience," n105 violating the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. n106 Forcible stomach pumping, of course, is a far
greater bodily intrusion than is a forced inoculation or blood extraction. Yet Rochin implicitly recognized what Justice O'Connor confirmed in Edmond--that the state interest in enforcing drug prohibition generally (and marijuana prohibition in particular) is far less [*321] substantial than that in preventing influenza or securing proof of drunk driving. Under current U.S. law, thus, it is not a compelling interest. We come at last to
cases in which government has no plausible interest, not even a legitimate one, in invading bodily autonomy. In Griswold v. Connecticut, n107 claiming an interest in preventing human conception, n108 the State had banned the sale or use of contraceptive devices, even for married couples in the privacy of the home. n109 By contrast to the abortion context, in which there is arguably a substantial state interest in protecting a
human fetus, n110 there is no such interest where conception has not yet occurred. n111 Indeed, given the crisis of human overpopulation, there is no legitimate state interest in preventing conception, far less a compelling one. If abortion or unwanted children are to be avoided, then available contraception for those who want it is not just sound public policy, it is urgent. The Court thus quite reasonably invalidated the statute.
n112 Finally, of course, we come to Lawrence v. Texas. n113 Here, a state law had criminalized homosexual sodomy, n114 even by consenting adults in the privacy of the home. n115 Writing for the Court, Justice Kennedy finessed the question whether the individual has a fundamental right for Fourteenth Amendment purposes to engage in such conduct. n116 Yet this did not change the outcome, for even applying rational
basis scrutiny, Kennedy wrote that "the Texas statute furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual." n117 As Professor Barnett has argued, Lawrence established a "presumption of liberty" where adults act peacefully in the privacy of their homes. n118 [*322] Summing up, States have prevailed in bodily autonomy cases where they have sought to protect
post-natal life, n119 prevent the spread of influenza, n120 and secure essential proof of serious crimes. n121 These rulings are consistent with Rawls' equal liberty principle, which requires that "each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all." n122 It is thus striking that, by contrast, even a state interest as strong as that in
protecting fetal life mostly yielded to the individual liberty interest in the abortion cases. n123 Accordingly, where a State's interest in invading bodily autonomy is weak or nonexistent, e.g., in preventing conception (Griswold), n124 punishing private consensual adult sodomy (Lawrence), n125 or punishing the ingestion of drugs in the privacy of the home (Rochin), n126 the Court held for the individual. Like most liberties,
bodily autonomy is not absolute. Yet we can now see that the President would have ample reason to agree that the cases we have reviewed, forming "a coherent constitutional view over the whole range of (the Court's) decisions," n127 reflect a strong [*323] presumption of liberty as bodily autonomy. n128 Using this presumption as a guidepost in assessing the constitutionality of marijuana prohibition, he is already inclined to
bring a skeptical eye to arguments in its favor. n129 C. Complementary Theses I have argued that marijuana prohibition is subject to strict scrutiny because bodily autonomy, which marijuana prohibition burdens, is a fundamental right. I now turn to three arguments which reinforce one or both parts of this, my core jurisprudential thesis. 1. Justice as Regularity The central command of the equal protection principle is that
government may not treat differently those who are similarly situated. n130 Rawls calls this "justice as regularity," n131 and as the Court wrote in a seminal case, "[w]hen the law lays an unequal hand on those who have committed intrinsically the same quality of offense . . . it has made as invidious a discrimination as if it had selected a particular race or nationality for oppressive treatment." n132 More recently, it has
observed, "[o]ur cases have recognized successful equal protection claims brought by a 'class of one,' where the plaintiff alleges that she has been [*324] intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment." n133 Obama would thus take very seriously the principle that those with similar cases must be treated similarly. Just as the state violates this
principle when it treats individuals arbitrarily based on race, it violates it where it imposes a greater punishment on one person than it does on another for the same or a lesser offense. n134 Now we saw that there is substantial evidence that marijuana use is less harmful than the use of alcohol and tobacco. n135 Under current law, then, it is not just that marijuana users are similarly situated to drinkers and smokers, yet
differently treated. The imbalance is greater than this, for far from posing as much risk to genuine state interests as those who drink and smoke, especially in public, private adult marijuana users pose far less. Yet the latter are subject to criminal punishment while the former are not. The President would be inclined to agree that such a stark inconsistency is irrational and fundamentally unfair. n136 2. Marijuana Prohibition and
Suspect Classifications Beyond this, secondly, we have seen that strict scrutiny is triggered under the Fourteenth Amendment not only when a law burdens a [*325] fundamental right, but also when it uses a "suspect classification." n137 Race is the paradigm suspect classification, we saw, and the drug war's disparate impact on racial minorities in all phases of the criminal justice system is well documented. n138 Yet even if
Obama had doubts that such an impact embodies a suspect classification, he would find it hard to disagree that U.S. marijuana prohibition has long been motivated largely by racism. As Bonnie and Whitebread write, for example, based on their "brief survey of marijuana prohibition in the western states, we have concluded that its Mexican use pattern was ordinarily enough to warrant its prohibition, and that whatever
attention such legislative action received was attended by sensationalist descriptions of crimes committed by Mexican marijuana users." n139 As Sloman adds: "the first users of marijuana--that is, the first people to smoke cannabis for mostly recreational purposes--were members of minority groups . . . . [S]tate after state enacted some form of prohibition against the non-medical abuse of the drug. California in 1915, Texas in
1919, Louisiana in 1924, New York by 1927--one by one most states acted, usually when faced with significant numbers of Mexicans or Negroes using the drug." n140 As Booth elaborates: "the press and 'concerned citizens' took up the call, driven not only by their zeal but also by their anti-Mexican attitudes, which were strengthened during the Depression when jobs were scarce and migrants seemed to be stealing work from
the white work force. The Mexicans were accused, without any justification, of spreading marijuana across the nation. State marijuana laws were often used as an excuse to deport or imprison innocent Mexicans. . . ." Although they had been using marijuana for years, it was not until 1938 that [Federal Bureau of Narcotics Director Harry] Anslinger finally came to realize the link between jazz musicians and the drug . . . . Once
the association dawned on him, he set about going after the entertainment industry in general and jazz musicians specifically. They [*326] fitted nicely into his racist agenda: if they were not black, they were whites who had come under and been corrupted by black influence . . . . What had been considered a drug threat during the two world wars--the German and, before and between the conflicts, the Chinese--was now
replaced by colored men, this jingoism heightened not only because of the immigration situation but also by the American cant put out since the 1930s by Anslinger and the FBN. Concern was not only voiced about the fate of women in black hands: there was a worry that the young might also come under their spell, this given credence by the arrest, in August 1951, of the first white teenager found in possession of marijuana.
Cannabis, the black man's narcotic, was widely regarded as more dangerous than heroin or cocaine, not because of its potential for addiction but for its facilitation of multi-racial sexual communication." n141 Beyond the drug war's racially disparate impact, then, there is evidence that racism has long been a dominant motive behind U.S. marijuana prohibition. Obama is thus justified in concluding not only that it burdens a
fundamental right, but also that it embodies a suspect classification. He would thus likely agree that all roads of Fourteenth Amendment analysis lead to a presumption against, i.e., strict scrutiny of, marijuana prohibition. 3. Bodily Autonomy and Free Speech Finally, while I have argued that my thesis has broad support in the Fourteenth Amendment, it is reinforced by the analogy between bodily autonomy and free speech.
Rawls expressly includes both speech and "the physical integrity of the person" among the basic liberties protected by the equal liberty principle. n142 Moreover, neither speech nor bodily autonomy is a zero sum liberty. n143 Unlike some forms of affirmative action, for example, involving scarce, valuable resources, free speech [*327] and bodily autonomy are not denied to some simply because extended to others. While free
speech is not absolute, then, the Court has come to recognize the strongest of presumptions in its favor. n144 Given the analogy between bodily autonomy and free speech, two doctrines in particular are illuminating. The first is that of commercial speech. In Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co. n145 and 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, n146 the Court held that laws banning ads giving the public accurate information about retail
prices of alcoholic beverages violate the First Amendment. As great a threat as such ads intuitively pose to public health and safety, that is, government cannot prove that a given ad will proximately cause, e.g., domestic violence or a fatal car crash. n147 Because liquor can be legally purchased and consumed by adults, moreover, even in public, the Court reinforced the presumption of liberty--even in the case of liquor ads.
n148 On this basis, Obama would be skeptical that private adult marijuana use, unlike liquor ads, will proximately cause harms of the magnitude of domestic violence or a fatal auto collision. The second doctrine is that of incitement to imminent lawlessness, the rule for which is stated in Brandenburg v. Ohio. n149 There, a man was convicted under a state criminal syndicalism statute for remarks he had made at a Ku Klux Klan
rally. n150 In striking the law down, the Court held that government may punish incitement to imminent lawlessness only where it can show that the speech in question is both (1) directed toward producing serious imminent harm to others and (2) likely to do so. n151 Two points are in order. First, this rule recognizes the distinction, reflected elsewhere in free speech law, n152 between (1) the exercise of liberty and (2) its
likely, immediate, harmful effects on third parties, the latter being necessary to [*328] ban or punish the former. n153 In light of the speech/bodily autonomy analogy, then, the law governing bodily autonomy should reflect this distinction as well. Before government can punish private adult marijuana use, that is, it should have to prove, and not merely assert, any substantial harms immediately caused by that exercise of
liberty. If private adult marijuana use causes no such harms, then it should no more be punishable based on what may happen afterward than consumption of alcohol can be punished based on the drunken driving that may later take place. Beyond this, secondly, application of the Brandenburg rule to private adult marijuana use suggests that punishing this exercise of liberty is even harder to justify than suppression of speech.
Whatever harms, if any, private adult marijuana use is likely to cause others, it would be very difficult to show that it is directed to causing such harm. Even a speaker at a public rally who desires and advocates that public buildings be blown up is constitutionally protected if there is no imminent threat that anyone will do as he says. n154 In this light, Obama would recognize the absurdity of any claim that private adult
marijuana users, in exercising their liberty, have any comparable malicious, destructive intent. n155 In sum, the parallel between bodily autonomy and free speech reinforces the President's basis for concluding that marijuana prohibition is subject to strict scrutiny. n156 [*329] III. CONCLUSION: TOWARD RATIONAL AND JUST POLICY REFORM Beyond its economic, social, and other constitutional difficulties, I have argued,
marijuana prohibition is subject to strict scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment. I have supported this primarily by showing that (1) bodily autonomy, which is directly burdened by marijuana prohibition, is plausibly a fundamental right, and (2) the Court's leading relevant case law has established a presumption in its favor. I have endeavored to reinforce my thesis, further, by arguing that (1) marijuana prohibition violates
"justice as regularity," n157 (2) its racist origins satisfy the suspect classification trigger of strict scrutiny, and (3) given the analogy between free speech and bodily autonomy, the strong presumption in favor of free speech should apply to bodily autonomy. As noted, the application of strict scrutiny to marijuana prohibition is the subject of another article, and indeed, complex litigation. Yet I submit that Obama would have
grave doubts that this prohibition could pass an honest application of that rule. As a stark matter of precedent, an adult woman has a limited right to expel a fetus from her body n158 and an adult man has a right in his home to have another man's penis inside his body. n159 Both, moreover, have the right to eat, drink and smoke themselves to death, even in public, contributing to serious social problems like drunken driving,
second hand smoke, and burdens on the health care system. In this light alone, the President would find it hard to identify a principled basis in equality or liberty for denying those adults the right to consume marijuana in their homes. Beyond constitutional law, finally, three key ideas in Rawls--legitimate expectations, public reason, and overlapping consensus-- provide the President an even broader foundation for challenging
Congress to end this war. I conclude with them. As for the first, Rawls writes that it is not the satisfaction of moral desert, but rather legitimate expectations, that characterize a just distributive scheme under a sound contract theory. n160 From his viewpoint as a citizen, then, while knowing he cannot expect perfection from human institutions like government, the average person can legitimately expect that the law will not be
so irrational and inconsistent as to criminalize the exercise of one liberty while other liberties, far [*330] more harmful, are merely regulated for reasons widely understood. n161 From their viewpoints as citizens (and not merely economic agents), those who profit from or are employed by the alcohol, tobacco, pharmaceutical, and prison industries have no legitimate expectation that private adult marijuana use will forever

Obama can give powerful

justifications for ending marijuana prohibition
remain a crime simply so that their profits and employment will be maintained. The social contract of a reasonably just society, one worth passing onto their grandchildren, would never include such a provision. As for public reason, we have seen that

, justifications which those in a constitutional democracy can accept in

their capacity as citizens. n162 We have seen, that is, that the President has support not only in policy terms of cost/benefit analysis but also on constitutional grounds. To be sure,

authoritarian conservatives
change their minds

like William Bennett, n163 George Will, n164 Lou Dobbs n165 and John Walters n166

may never

, having declared the war on marijuana one in which we can never surrender. Yet some are incapable of public reason. As Freeman writes, "there is no

presumption that Social Darwinists, fundamentalists, neo-Nazis, or Southern slaveholders would be amenable to public reason, nor should any effort be made to accommodate their views." n167 Moreover, these
drug warriors do not speak for all conservatives. Beyond such persistent voices as those of William F. Buckley and Milton Friedman, for example, the heroic dissents of Justices O'Connor, Rehnquist and Thomas in

social
conservatives are strongly inclined toward marijuana prohibition.
Unanimity is not needed
moderate right
value
autonomy
overlapping
consensus here
will be stronger
if the President can use his political
capital in his second
term to convince those conservatives
Gonzales v. Raich show that some conservatives' principled commitment to federalism overcomes any misgivings they have about liberal social policy. n168 Yet let us even assume that all

for [*331] reform, and whatever their differences, the hard left, moderate left, and

individual liberty, particularly

all

in the privacy of the home. In Rawlsian terms, there is substantial

, building by the day. n169 It

enact them into law, and

even

if any of the states with current plans for Proposition 19-like initiatives in 2012
skills and

who respect cost/benefit analysis and constitutional principle. As the President knows, some of

them do.

TPAs key to trade---its necessary and sufficient

Behsudi 1/2/15 (Adam, trade reporter for POLITICO Pro, former reporter
on international trade policy for Inside U.S. Trade, Trade's big breakout, 1-215, http://www.politico.com/story/2015/01/trade-outlook-2015-113793.html
Trade supporters consider the bill vital to ushering the Asia-Pacific
trade talks toward their conclusion because it would give other
countries the confidence to resolve major outstanding issues such as
access to medicines in developing nations, environmental protections and Japanese agricultural and U.S.

without having to worry that any hard-won concessions could

be picked apart by congressional amendment. Bilateral talks between the U.S.
auto tariffs

and Japan on the tariffs issue have proved particularly troublesome for the larger deal. In a breakthrough
last month, Tokyo proposed more meaningful tariff cuts on U.S. beef, pork and dairy products, but the
negotiations have since stalled again over the United States refusal to meet Japans demands for lower
auto parts tariffs. Theyre

kind of stuck because nobodys sure where the

United States bottom lines are, Miller said. I think thats the reason to get
TPA, so all our trading partners know where the Congress bottom
line is, and at that point you conclude pretty quickly. The first six
months of the year will be a critical window for finishing up the talks
given the tight timeline, officials from the TPP countries have said. Even if the pact gets

signed, it will still have to go through a legal scrubbing and translation before a bill to ratify the deal can be
introduced. That could mean that the implementing legislation would have to be drafted over the August
recess with a view to getting the bill to a vote before Thanksgiving, a former Senate Democratic aide
speculated. If

people are motivated to finish, they could do it really,

really quickly assuming they got the votes, the former aide said, adding that the
timing that the administration and others are talking about strikes me as incredibly aggressive, but maybe
not impossible. In 2011, the House and Senate were able to pass bills ratifying the deals with South
Korea, Colombia and Panama in a single day, the aide noted. But those agreements had been concluded in
2006 and 2007 under President George W. Bushs administration and had a number of provisions
renegotiated before the Obama administration brought them to Congress for a vote. Aside from infusing

the fast-track legislation could serve as

a vehicle for packaging other trade bills that have languished on
their own. A trade omnibus could include a renewal of the Generalized System of Preferences,
the Asia-Pacific talks with new momentum,

which cut tariffs on goods from developing countries and expired in July 2013, and the Miscellaneous Tariff
Bill, which would provide manufacturers with duty-free access to parts and supplies as long as domestic
industry isnt opposed and is considered an earmark by some Republicans. Business groups also would
like a broader trade package to include legislation to overhaul customs procedures. TPA

is the big
vehicle, said the former Senate aide. Its clear to me that they want to try to
do it really early in the new Congress and the question is whether
they can come together on a deal.

Trade ensures stability in EVERY global hotspot

Sapiro 14 (Miriam, Visiting Fellow in the Global Economy and Development
program at Brookings, former Deputy US Trade Representative, former
Director of European Affairs at the National Security Council, Why Trade
Matters, September 2014,
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2014/09/why
%20trade%20matters/trade%20global%20views_final.pdf)

This policy brief explores the economic rationale and strategic imperative of an ambitious domestic and
global trade agenda from the perspective of the United States. International trade is often viewed through
the relatively narrow prism of trade-offs that might be made among domestic sectors or between trading
partners, but it is important to consider also the impact that increased trade has on global growth,

With that context in mind, this paper assesses the implications of the
Asia-Pacific and European trade negotiations underway , including for countries that
development and security.

are not participating but aspire to join. It outlines some of the challenges that stand in the way of
completion and ways in which they can be addressed. It examines whether the focus on mega-regional
trade agreements comes at the expense of broader liberalization or acts as a catalyst to develop higher
standards than might otherwise be possible. It concludes with policy recommendations for action by
governments, legislators and stakeholders to address concerns that have been raised and create greater
domestic support. It is fair to ask whether we should be concerned about the future of international trade

dire developments are threatening the security interests of the United

States and its partners in the Middle East, Asia, Africa and Europe. In the Middle East, significant
areas of Iraq have been overrun by a toxic offshoot of Al-Qaeda, civil war in Syria
rages with no end in sight, and the Israeli-Palestinian peace process is in tatters.
Nuclear negotiations with Iran have run into trouble, while Libya and Egypt face
continuing instability and domestic challenges. In Asia, historic rivalries and disputes over
territory have heightened tensions across the region, most acutely by Chinas aggressive
moves in the South China Sea towards Vietnam, Japan and the Philippines. Nucleararmed North Korea remains isolated, reckless and unpredictable. In Africa, countries are
struggling with rising terrorism, violence and corruption. In Europe, Russia continues to foment
instability and destruction in eastern Ukraine. And within the European Union, lagging economic
policy when

recovery and the surge in support for extremist parties have left people fearful of increasing violence
against immigrants and minority groups and skeptical of further integration. It is tempting to focus solely
on these pressing problems and defer less urgent issuessuch as forging new disciplines for international
tradeto another day, especially when such issues pose challenges of their own. But that would be a

advancing
trade liberalization now is precisely the role that greater economic integration can play in
mistake. A key motivation in building greater domestic and international consensus for

opening up new avenues of opportunity for promoting development and increasing economic prosperity.

can help stabilize key regions and strengthen the security of the
expanding
trade relations can help reduce global tensions and raise living standards. Following
World War II, building stronger economic cooperation was a centerpiece of allied efforts to erase battle
Such initiatives

United States and its partners. The last century provides a powerful example of how

scars and embrace former enemies. In defeat, the economies of Germany, Italy and Japan faced ruin and
people were on the verge of starvation. The United States led efforts to rebuild Europe and to repair
Japans economy.

A key element of the Marshall Plan, which established the foundation for

unprecedented growth and the level of European integration that exists today, was to revive trade
by reducing tariffs.1 Russia, and the eastern part of Europe that it controlled, refused to participate or
receive such assistance. Decades later, as the Cold War ended, the United States and Western Europe
sought to make up for lost time by providing significant technical and financial assistance to help integrate
central and eastern European countries with the rest of Europe and the global economy. There have been
subsequent calls for a Marshall Plan for other parts of the world,2 although the confluence of dedicated
resources, coordinated support and existing capacity has been difficult to replicate. Nonetheless, important

economic development can play in

defusing tensions, and how opening markets can hasten growth. There is again a growing
lessons have been learned about the valuable role

recognition that economic security and national security are two sides of the same coin. General Carter
Ham, who stepped down as head of U.S. Africa Command last year, observed the close connection
between increasing prosperity and bolstering stability. During his time in Africa he had seen that security
and stability in many ways depends a lot more on economic growth and opportunity than it does on

military strength.3 Where people have opportunities for themselves and their children, he found, the
result was better governance, increased respect for human rights and lower levels of conflict. During his
confirmation hearing last year, Secretary John Kerry stressed the link between economic and national
security in the context of the competitiveness of the United States but the point also has broader
application. Our nation cannot be strong abroad, he argued, if it is not strong at home, including by putting
its own fiscal house in order. He assertedrightly sothat more than ever foreign policy is economic

Every day, he
goes by where America is uncertain about engaging in that arena, or unwilling to put
our best foot forward and win, unwilling to demonstrate our resolve to lead, is a
day in which we weaken our nation itself.4 Strengthening Americas economic
security by cementing its economic alliances is not simply an option, but an
imperative. A strong nation needs a strong economy that can generate growth, spur innovation and
policy, particularly in light of increasing competition for global resources and markets.
said, that

create jobs. This is true, of course, not only for the United States but also for its key partners and the rest
of the global trading system. Much as the United States led the way in forging strong military alliances
after World War II to discourage a resurgence of militant nationalism in Europe or Asia, now is the time to

failure to act now could

undermine international security and place stability in key regions in further jeopardy.
place equal emphasis on shoring up our collective economic security. A

Spec
-- Aff must specify which branch passes the plan they
dont
-- Vote Neg
1. Ground robs courts, congress, executive
counterplans, agent specific disads and case
arguments
2. Conditionality resolved means a firm course of
action not specifying allows them to shift and
clarify in the 2AC
3. No solvency theres no actor as the United States,
only specific branches

CP
TheUnitedStatesshould:
Announceandimplementviolencetargetedenforcementagainstmajor
Mexicancriminalorganizationsandmandatepreventativeaction
againstthemostviolentorganizationsfordestruction.
Implementanationwidedrugtestingandpunishmentprogrambasedupon
HawaiisHOPEprogram.
Solvescartels
Lee14(Brianna,PolicyAnalyst/LatinAmericaExpert@CouncilofForeignRelations,
"Mexico'sDrugWar,"http://www.cfr.org/mexico/mexicosdrugwar/p13689)

WhileacknowledgingthatdecriminalizationwouldresultinfewerU.S.incarcerations,drugpolicyexpertMark Kleiman
questionsthisstrategyinForeignAffairs,arguingthatitwouldputmoredrugsintothehandsofusersandincreasethesizeof

Mexico'sexportmarket.Instead,headvocatesfocusingU.S.enforcementeffortsonthemostviolent

dealersanddealingorganizationswhilesimultaneouslyworkingtoreduce

thedrugdemand
ofcriminallyactiveheavyusers.Frequentdrugtestingandswiftbutmildprobationand
parolefortheseusershasseenremarkablesuccessinprogramslikeHawaii'sHOPE
program[PDF],whichhasreducedbothdruguseanddaysincarcerated.AmajorpieceoftheU.S.and
Mexicanstrategyagainstcartelshasbeentotargetsocalled"highvalue"individualsorlowlevel,highlyvisible"footsoldiers."But

VandaFelbabBrownoftheBrookingsInstitutionadvocatesaggressivelytargetingthemiddlelayer,whichisintegralto
theoperationalcapacityofcartelsandnotaseasilyreplaceable.Theirousteralsodoesnotresultinthesamenumberofpeople

violentlyvyingforleadershiproles.Sheandotherexpertssupportamorehierarchicalapproachto
targetingtraffickers,prioritizingthosewhoaremostviolentratherthan"lashingoutinanindiscriminate
mannerwheneveranyintelligencecomesin."

HOPESolvesCartels
Kleiman,'11[Mark,ProfessorofPublicPolicyattheLuskinSchoolofPublicAffairsatthe

UniversityofCalifornia,LosAngeles.HeisEditoroftheJournalofDrugPolicyAnalysis,the
authorofWhenBruteForceFails,andacoauthor,withJonathanCaulkinsandAngelaHawken,
ofDrugsandDrugPolicy,ForeignAffairs,Oct,
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/68131/markkleiman/surgicalstrikesinthedrugwars]
Mexico'sdifferentproblemcallsforadifferentstrategy:creatingdisincentivesforviolence
atthelevelofthelargesttraffickingorganizations .Thosesixorganizationsvaryintheiruseofviolence;total
violencewouldshrinkifmarketshareschangedinfavorofthecurrentlyleastviolentgroupsorifanygroupreduceditsviolencelevel.
Announcingandcarryingoutastrategyofviolencetargetedenforcementcouldachievebothends. TheMexicangovernment

couldcraftandannounceasetofviolencerelatedmetricstobeappliedtoeachorganization
overaperiodofweeksormonths.Suchascoringsystemcouldconsideragroup'stotal
numberofkillings,thedistributionofitstargets(amongotherdealers,enforcementagents,
ordinarycitizens,journalists,communityleaders,andelectedofficials),itsuseorthreatof
terrorism,anditsnonfatalshootingsandkidnappings.Mexicanofficialshavenodifficultyattributingeach
killingtoaspecifictraffickingorganization,inpartbecausetheorganizationsboastoftheirviolenceratherthantryingtohideit.At
theendofthescoringperiod,oronceitbecameclearthatoneorganizationrankedfirst,thepolice

woulddesignatethemostviolentorganizationfordestruction.Thatmightnotrequirethearrestofthe

kingpins,aslongasthetargetedorganizationcameundersufficientlyheavyenforcementpressuretomakeituncompetitive. The

pointsofmaximumvulnerabilityfortheMexicantraffickingorganizationsmightnoteven
bewithinMexico.U.S.lawenforcementagenciesbelievethatforeverymajordomestic
distributionorganizationintheUnitedStates,theycanidentifyoneormoreofthesix
dominantMexicantraffickingorganizationsastheprimarysourceorsources.IftheU.S.Drug
EnforcementAdministrationweretoannouncethatitsdomestictargetselectionprocesswouldgivehighprioritytodistributors
suppliedbyMexico'sdesignated"mostviolentorganization,"theresultwouldlikelybeascrambletofindnewsources.

Heg
Evaluate consequences first allowing violence for the
sake of moral purity is evil
Isaac 2 (Jeffrey C., Professor of Political Science Indiana-Bloomington,

Director Center for the Study of Democracy and Public Life, Ph.D. Yale,
Dissent Magazine, 49(2), Ends, Means, and Politics, Spring, Proquest)
As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and
Hannah Arendt have taught, an unyielding concern with moral goodness
undercuts political responsibility. The concern may be morally laudable,
reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it suffers from three fatal flaws: (1)
It fails to see that the purity of ones intention does not ensure the
achievement of what one intends. Abjuring violence or refusing to make
common cause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right
thing; but if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as
serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters;
(2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is
not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity in
injustice. This is why, from the standpoint of politics--as opposed to religion-pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating
violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any
effect; and (3) it fails to see that politics is as much about unintended
consequences as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than
the motives of action, that is most significant. Just as the alignment with
good may engender impotence, it is often the pursuit of good that
generates evil. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: it is
not enough that ones goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important,
always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these
effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. Moral absolutism
inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It
promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness.

No regional rebalancing or security dilemmasthe only

empirical data goes our way.
Fettweis 11Professor of Poli Sci @ Tulane University [Christopher J. Fettweis, The Superpower
as Superhero: Hubris in U.S. Foreign Policy, Paper prepared for presentation at the 2011 meeting of the
American Political Science Association, September 1-4, Seattle, WA, September 2011, pg.
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1902154]

The final and in some ways most important pathological belief generated by
hubris places the United States at the center of the current era of relative peace. All that
stands between civility and genocide, order and mayhem, explain Kaplan and Kristol, is American power.68 This
belief is a variant of what is known as the hegemonic stability theory, which
proposes that international peace is only possible when there is one country strong enough to make and enforce a set of
rules.69 Although it was first developed to describe economic behavior, the theory has been applied more broadly, to
explain the current proliferation of peace. At the height of Pax Romana between roughly 27 BC and 180 AD, for example,
Rome was able to bring an unprecedented level of peace and security to the Mediterranean. The Pax Britannica of the
nineteenth century brought a level of stability to the high seas. Perhaps the current era is peaceful because the United
States has established a de facto Pax Americana in which no power is strong enough to challenge its dominance, and
because it has established a set of rules that are generally in the interests of all countries to follow. Without a benevolent

hegemon, some strategists fear, instability may break out around the globe.70 Unchecked conflicts could bring
humanitarian disaster and, in todays interconnected world, economic turmoil that could ripple throughout global financial
markets. There are good theoretical and empirical reasons, however, to doubt that U.S hegemony is the primary cause of

It
overestimates the capability of the United States, in this case to maintain global
stability. No state, no matter how strong, can impose peace on determined
belligerents. The U.S. military may be the most imposing in the history of the world, but it can
only police the system if the other members generally cooperate. Selfpolicing must occur, in other words; if other states had not decided on their own that their interests are best
the current stability. First, the hegemonic-stability argument shows the classic symptom of hubris:

served by peace, then no amount of international constabulary work by the United States could keep them from fighting.

the United States simply cannot force

peace upon an unwilling ninety-five percent. Stability and
unipolarity may be simply coincidental. In order for U.S. hegemony to be the explanation
The five percent of the worlds population that lives in

for global stability, the rest of the world would have to expect reward for good behavior and fear punishment for bad.
Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has not been especially eager to enforce any particular rules. Even rather
incontrovertible evidence of genocide has not been enough to inspire action. Hegemonic stability can only take credit for
influencing those decisions that would have ended in war without the presence, whether physical or psychological, of the
United States. Since most of the world today is free to fight without U.S. involvement, something else must be preventing
them from doing so.71 Stability exists in many places where no hegemony is present. Ethiopia and Eritrea are hardly the
only states that could go to war without the slightest threat of U.S. intervention, yet few choose to do so. Second, it is
worthwhile to repeat one of the most basic observations about misperception in international politics, one that is
magnified by hubris: Rarely are our actions as consequential upon their behavior as we believe them to be. The egocentric bias suggests that while it may be natural for U.S. policymakers to interpret their role as crucial in the
maintenance of world peace, they are almost certainly overestimating their own importance. At the very least, the United
States is probably not as central to the myriad decisions in foreign capitals that help maintain international stability as it

if U.S. security guarantees were the primary cause of the

restraint shown by the other great and potentially great powers, then those countries would
be demonstrating an amount of trust in the intentions, judgment and wisdom of another that
would be without precedent in international history. If the states of Europe and the Pacific Rim
thinks it is. Third,

detected a good deal of danger in the system, relying entirely on the generosity and sagacity (or, perhaps the naivet and

it is hard to think of a
similar choice: When have any capable members of an alliance virtually
disarmed and allowed another member to protect their interests ? It
seems more logical to suggest that the other members of NATO and
Japan just do not share the same perception of threat that the United
States does. If there was danger out there, as so many in the U.S. national security
community insist, then the grand strategies of the allies would be quite
different. Even during the Cold War, U.S. allies were not always convinced that they could rely on U.S. security
gullibility) of Washington would be the height of strategic irresponsibility. Indeed

commitments. Extended deterrence was never entirely comforting; few Europeans could be sure that United States would
indeed sacrifice New York for Hamburg. In the absence of the unifying Soviet threat, their trust in U.S. commitments for
their defense would presumably be lowerif in fact that commitment was at all necessary outside of the most pessimistic

in order for hegemonic stability logic to be an

adequate explanation for restrained behavior, allied states must not only be
fully convinced of the intentions and capability of the hegemon to protect their interests; they must also trust that
the hegemon can interpret those interests correctly and consistently. As
discussed above, the allies do not feel that the United States consistently
demonstrates the highest level of strategic wisdom. In fact, they often seem to look
with confused eyes upon our behavior, and are unable to explain why we so often
find it necessary to go abroad in search of monsters to destroy. They will
participate at times in our adventures, but minimally and reluctantly. Finally, while believers in
hegemonic stability as the primary explanation for the long peace have articulated a logic that some find
compelling, they are rarely able to cite much evidence to support their claims.
In fact, the limited empirical data we have suggests that there is little
connection between the relative level of U.S. activism and international
stability. During the 1990s, the United States cut back on defense fairly
substantially, spending $100 billion less in real terms in 1998 that it did in 1990, which was a twenty-five
works of fiction. Furthermore,

percent reduction.72 To defense hawks and other believers in hegemonic stability, this irresponsible peace dividend
endangered both national and global security. No serious analyst of American military capabilities doubts that the

defense budget has been cut much too far to meet Americas responsibilities to itself and to world peace, argued Kristol
and Kagan.73 If global stability were unrelated to U.S. hegemony, however, one would not have expected an increase in

The world grew more

peaceful while the United States cut its forces.74 No state believed that its security was
endangered by a less-capable U.S. military, or at least none took any action that would suggest such a belief. No
defense establishments were enhanced to address power vacuums; no security
dilemmas drove insecurity or arms races; no regional balancing
occurred after the stabilizing presence of the U.S. military was diminished. The rest of the world acted as if the
conflict and violence. The verdict from the last two decades is fairly plain:

threat of international war was not a pressing concern, despite the reduction in U.S. capabilities. The incidence and
magnitude of global conflict declined while the United States cut its military spending under President Clinton, and kept
declining as the Bush Administration ramped that spending back up. The two phenomena are unrelated. These figures
will not be enough to convince skeptics. Military spending figures by themselves are insufficient to disprove a connection
between overall U.S. actions and international stability, and one could also presumably argue that spending is not the only
or even the best indication of hegemony, that it is instead U.S. foreign political and security commitments that maintain
stability. Since neither was significantly altered during this period, instability should not be expected. Alternately,
advocates of hegemonic stability could believe that relative rather than absolute spending is decisive in bringing peace.
Although the United States cut back on its spending during the 1990s, its relative advantage never wavered. However,
two points deserve to be made. First, even if it were true that either U.S. commitments or relative spending account for
global pacific trends, it would remain the case that stability can be maintained at drastically lower levels. In other words,
even if one can be allowed to argue in the alternative for a moment and suppose that there is in fact a level of
engagement below which the United States cannot drop without increasing international disorder, a rational grand
strategist would still cut back on engagement and spending until that level is determined. Basic logic suggests that the
United States ought to spend the minimum amount of its blood and treasure while seeking the maximum return on its
investment. And if, as many suspect, this era of global peace proves to be inherently stable because normative evolution
is typically unidirectional, then no increase in conflict would ever occur, irrespective of U.S. spending.75 Abandoning the
mission to stabilize the world would save untold trillions for an increasingly debt-ridden nation. Second, it is also worth
noting that if opposite trends had unfolded, if other states had reacted to news of cuts in U.S. defense spending with more
aggressive or insecure behavior, then surely hegemonists would note that their expectations had been justified. If
increases in conflict would have been interpreted as evidence for the wisdom of internationalist strategies, then logical

the only evidence

regarding the relationship between U.S. power and
international stability suggests that the two are unrelated. Evidently the rest
of the world can operate quite effectively without the presence of a global
policeman. Those who think otherwise base their view on faith alone. It
requires a good deal of hubris for any actor to consider itself
indispensable to world peace. Far from collapsing into a whirlwind of chaos, the chances are high
consistency demands that the lack thereof should at least pose a problem. As it stands,
we have

that the world would look much like it does now if the United States were to cease regarding itself as Gods gladiator on
earth. The people of the United States would be a lot better off as well.

Great power wars are unthinkableunipolarity just results

in minor power wars.
Jervis 11Professor of International Politics @ Columbia University [Robert Jervis (On the board of
nine scholarly journals & Former president of the American Political Science Association), Force in Our
Times, Saltzman Working Paper No. 15, July 2011, pg.
http://www.siwps.com/news.attachment/saltzmanworkingpaper15-842/SaltzmanWorkingPaper15.PDF]
FORCE TODAY - Two dramatic and seemingly-contradictory trends are central. On the one hand, since the
end of the Cold War if not before, the amount of inter-state and even civil war has drastically declined. Of
course much depends on the time periods selected and the counting rules employed, but

by any

measure international wars are

scarce if not vanishing, and civil wars, after

blossoming in the 1990s, have greatly diminished.32 Significant instances of civil strife remain and are
made salient by the horrific examples that appear in the newspapers every day, but in fact all inventories
that I know of conclude that they are fewer than they used to be. Ironically ,

although realism
stresses the conflictinducing power of international anarchy , the
barriers and inhibitions against international war now seem
significantly more robust than those limiting civil wars. But even the latter are stronger than
they were in the past. Although a central question is whether these trends will be reversed, they
truly are startling, of great importance, and were largely unpredicted .
They also remain insufficiently appreciated; one rarely reads
statements about how fortunate we are to live in such a peaceful

era. Perhaps the reasons are that optimism is generally derided in the
cynical academic community, peace is not the sort of dramatic event
that seizes public (and media) attention, and in the absence of major
wars, we all find other things to worry about. But Plato was not entirely wrong to
say that only the dead have seen the end of war.33 Force, even when deeply recessed, can come to the
surface again. Discussions in the US and Europe about relations with Iran often debate whether force
should be taken off the table. But, regardless of whether it would be desirable to do so, would this be
possible? As long as important disputes with Iran remain, with even the best will in the world there are
limits to how far thoughts of the use of force could be pushed out of the minds of all the participants,
especially those in Tehran. It is interesting that Tony Blair told the Chilcot commission that with respect to
Iraq even prior to September 11, 2001. You know, the fact is [that] force was always an option.34 Dont
try to tell Bashar al-Assad or Muammar Qaddafi that force is no longer important. As Osgood and Tucker
noted in their important study over 40 years ago, if force has lost its utility, its condemnation on moral

Libya, in fact, represents the other trend. Since the

end of the Cold War, the US, and to a lesser but significant extent Britain and France,
have used force more often than they did before. Panama, the Gulf War,
Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, and now Libya are
unmatched in the Cold War era. The US is now fighting three wars, although by the time
grounds is superfluous.35

this article appears in print its military role in Libya and Iraq may be over. Of course these military
adventures are all small by comparison with most wars, and certainly by the standards of Korea and
Vietnam, let alone the wars between Iran and Iraq and Ethiopia and Eritrea. Nevertheless, they cannot be

it
seem clear that the rise in American military activity was caused
at least in part by the end of the Cold War and the related fact that the US is now the
sole superpower. The new configuration means that the US is no longer deterred
from entering local conflicts by the fear of a confrontation with the
Soviet Union, makes others rely even more on the US to be a policeman (if often a misguided one),
and elevates the salience of both threats and values that were previously
trumped by the superpower rivalry. Opportunities loom larger for the
US and the UK than they did during the Cold War, and new threats calling
for military intervention have increased in visibility if not in actual occurrence. To
dismissed. It is beyond my scope to explore all the possible explanations for either of these trends, but
does

start with the latter, although terrorism was a concern during the Cold War, it played nothing like the role
that it does now. Of course the US never suffered an attack like 9/11 before, but while I will briefly discuss
the extent of the danger of terrorism later, here I want to argue that the common placement of terrorism at
the top of the list of threats is a product not only of the attacks over the past decade, but also of the
paucity of other threats. The felt need to use force against terrorists, states that support them and even
countries that might work with them in the future in part stems from a security environment that is
remarkably benign. THE SECURITY COMMUNITY - Alongside and in part responsible for the two contrasting
trends in the use of force is the existence of a security community among the worlds leading powers.
Although I can be brief because I have discussed this elsewhere,40 the point is of fundamental
importance.

For the first time in history, the leading states of the world
find the idea of
war within this group literally unthinkable (which is the definition of a security
(the US, most of Europe, and Japan) not only are at peace with each other, but

community).41 Although Russia and China remain outside the community (which is not to say that war
with or between them is highly likely, but only that it is within the realm of possibility), the change in world
politics is enormous. War among the leading powers of the world and, at least as much, fear of war,
preparation for war, and the desire to avoid such wars if possible--and prevail in them if not--has been the
driving motor of international politics for centuries. At the risk of hyperbole, I think we can say that turning
off this motor is the greatest change in international politics that we have ever seen. Its implications
remain hard to grasp, and indeed how citizens and leaders come to understand this new world will strongly
shape how they behave. But even now it is clear that the existence of the security community is crucial to
world politics, international relations theory, and our lives.
Obvious questions are what caused the community to form, what could lead it to be replicated elsewhere,
and what if anything could lead it to unravel. I have discussed the first question in my earlier writings and
so will discuss only the latter two topics here. Of course speculations about what could bring the
community to an end are not unrelated to analysis of its causes despite the fact that path-dependence
could be at work and the possibility that the community could survive an end to the factors that brought it
into being. Nevertheless, just as the community was formed by changes in domestic regimes, ruling values
and ideas, and the costs and benefits of war and peace, so factors in these categories might bring us back
to earlier and less fortunate relations. On top of all the normal unknowns in dealing with possible futures,
our speculations are limited by the fact that the security community is particularly psychological in that it

is defined by the unthinkability of war among the members. If we know little about how events move from
being seen as possible to actually coming about, we know even less about what forces and processes
move them from being unthinkable to being seen as possible.42 Here it is worth stressing that the fact that
war among the members is unthinkable has real consequences beyond the fact that peace is maintained.
When I ask my undergraduates whether they think they will live to see a war with another leading power,
they look at me as though I have lost my mind because such an idea has never crossed theirs. What
among other thingsthey fail to realize is that their state of mind is without precedent and that the ability
to go about their lives without the slightest concern that they or their country mightjust mighthave to
fight another leading power shapes a good deal of their lives and our society. This is not to say that their
lives are now free from worry, but only that their freedom from worrying about what used to be considered
the greatest scourge of the human race gives them freedom to worry about other things. On a larger scale,
societies and governments within the community can go about their business without thinking about how
this might affect the prospects for peace or the outcome of war with other members. Like my students
lack of concern, we take this for granted, but in fact it represents a sharp break from the past. Rivalries,
concern for relative position, and the desire for bargaining advantages still remain, but the intensity and
consequences are quite different when war is out of the question. The whole tenor of inter-state relations
and fundamental attitudes toward conflict and cooperation are different from the time a century ago when
a British observer could return from a trip to Germany saying Every one of those new factory chimneys is
a gun pointed at England.43 I see no reason to expect the community to come to an end. Indeed, the fact
that it is defined by the participants beliefs that war cannot occur means that if they thought it would end,

just as I noted
expectations of war can be self-fulfilling, so can expectations
of peace. But since academic musings have little impact, it is safe to pursue our scholarly duty of
then in fact it would be dissolved (although war might not actually occur). More broadly,
earlier that

asking about what developments, currently unforeseen, might destroy the community. Just as one pillar of
the community was the transformation of the old idea that war was honorable and glorious by the almost
universal repugnance of it44 (and this is one reason why any war now has to be carefully sold to the
public), the community would be at least weakened if this attitude changed. Is it conceivable that war
could come back into fashion? It is literally unimaginable that slavery or monarchical rule could return to
favor. The current replacements for these ideas are deeply woven into the fabric of the social order, and
the current conception of war as a terrible enterprise similarly does not stand alone and presumably could

One dreadful but I think unlikely

possibility would be that the success of a series of military interventions of the
type we have seen recently could lead to a general reevaluation of not
only the utility of this kind of force, but of its fundamental role in
human endeavors. Even without this, might values change in a cyclical fashion? Might boredom
not change without wide-ranging alteration of our societies.

lead to a resurrection of the idea that force is noble? Could males, finding themselves losing power and
status in their societies, seek a return to a world in which the arena of violence in which they have a
comparative advantage is seen more positively? If it impossible to say that this cannot occur, it seems at
least as difficult to foresee a chain of events that would bring this about. (But it is worth noting that before
September 11, 2001 few of us believed that torture might come back into the inventory of state behavior.)
Even if war is still seen as evil, the security community could be dissolved if severe conflicts of interest
were to arise. Could the more peaceful world generate new interests that would bring the members of the
community into sharp disputes?45 A zero-sum sense of status would be one example, perhaps linked to a
steep rise in nationalism. More likely would be a worsening of the current economic difficulties, which could
itself produce greater nationalism, undermine democracy, and bring back old-fashioned beggar-thyneighbor economic policies. While these dangers are real, it is hard to believe that the conflicts could be
great enough to lead the members of the community to contemplate fighting each other. It is not so much
that economic interdependence has proceeded to the point where it could not be reversedstates that
were more internally interdependent than anything seen internationally have fought bloody civil wars.
Rather it is that even if the more extreme versions of free trade and economic liberalism become

it is hard to see how without building on a pre-existing high

level of political conflict leaders and mass opinion would come to
believe that their countries could prosper by impoverishing or even
attacking others. Is it possible that problems will not only become severe, but that people will
discredited,

entertain the thought that they have to be solved by war? While a pessimist could note that this argument
does not appear as outlandish as it did before the financial crisis, an optimist could reply (correctly, in my

the very fact that we have seen such a sharp economic downturn without anyone suggesting that force of arms is the solution
shows that even if bad times bring about greater economic conflict,
it will not make war thinkable. In the past, the conflict of interest that has sparked war
view) that

has involved territory more often than economic issues, although of course the two are often linked.46
Thus the rise of the security community has been accompanied by a decline in territorial conflicts, and
reciprocal causation is surely at work here. Could territorial conflicts resume a salient place in relations

among the leading power? Territory in the guise of self-determination continues, as the likely coming of a
referendum on Scottish independence indicates. But a reduced attachment to territory is indicated by the
fact that the rest of the UK is not willing to fight to prevent this, just as it would be willing to part with
Northern Ireland if the majority of the inhabitants desired to join the Irish Republic. Indeed, the existence of
a security community and the related decline in traditional security threats makes it easier for sub-national
units to split off. Concern for territory has not entirely disappeared, of course, and the recent Danish claim
on large portions of the Arctic reminds us that changes in climate and technology can endow areas with
new value.47 But the virulent disputes we see around the world stem from the break-up of states or the
partition of areas of the globe previously ruled by others, and within the community it is hard to see either
likely candidate territorial disputes or general trends that would return to traditional values. Could anything
occur that would lead Germany to feel that it was vital to reclaim Alsace and Lorraine? If this were to
happen, we would be in a different world. But to turn this around, we would have to be in a very different
world for this to occur. The security community is underpinned not only by the benefits it is believed to
bring, but also by the perceived high costs of war. If large-scale conventional war would be very
destructive, the presence of nuclear weapons pushes the costs off the scale (and it is worth remembering
that although Germany and Japan do not have nuclear weapons, they could develop them very quickly).
One does not have to accept all the precepts of standard deterrence theory to believe that it would take
extraordinary incentives for the states to contemplate war with so many nuclear weapons scattered
around. The other side of the coin is that the security community might be weakened if the costs of war
were to become much less. The good newsfrom this perspectiveis that there are few prospects of this.
Even President Obama, who has stressed the need to abolish nuclear weapons, admits that this cannot be
done in his lifetime. Missile defenses, endorsed by all American presidents since Reagan, remain out of
reach, and no technologies or tactics are in sight that could render conventional war quick and relatively
bloodless. A more likely change would be an erosion of American hegemony. Among the leading powers, all
are not equally leading. The strength, interests, and military presence of the US remain sufficient to see
that others in the community do not challenge either it or each other. A decline in American power and a
partial withdrawal of its influence are certainly possible, and at minimum, American troops might be

Even if American
dominance played a large role in forming the community, it may not
be necessary for the communitys maintenance. Path dependence
may operate strongly here, and although firm evidence is hard to come by, I would argue
that in the absence of other changes of the kind I have discussed, it is very unlikely that
pulling off the American security blanket would lead to thoughts of
war. (On the level of policy prescription, however, I am cautious enough not to want to run the
withdrawn from Europe in the coming years. But would this matter?

experiment.)Pg. 13-20

Decline now facilitates US multilateralismpaves the way

for a soft landing that prevents their transition
impacts.
He 10Professor of Political Science at Utah State University [Kai He (Postdoctoral fellow in the
Princeton-Harvard China and the World Program at Princeton University (20092010) and a Bradley fellow
of the Lynda and Harry Bradley Foundation (20092010), The hegemons choice between power and
security: explaining US policy toward Asia after the Cold War, Review of International Studies (2010), 36,
pg. 11211143]

When US policymakers perceive a rising or a stable hegemony, the anarchic nature

of the international system is no longer valid in the mind of US policymakers because the preponderant
power makes the US immune from military threats. In the self-perceived, hierarchic international system

power-maximisation becomes the strategic goal of

the US in part because of the lust for power driven by human
nature and in part because of the disappearance of the security
constraints imposed by anarchy. Therefore, selective engagement and hegemonic
dominion become two possible strategies for the US to maximise its power in the world. The
with the US on the top,

larger the power gap between the US and others, the more likely selective engagement expands to

When US policymakers perceive a declining hegemony in

that the power gap between the hegemon and others is narrowed rather than widened, US
policymakers begin to change their hierarchic view of the international system. The
rapid decline of relative power causes US policymakers to worry about security imposed
hegemonic dominion.

by anarchy even though the US may remain the most powerful state in the system during the process of
decline.

Offshore balancing and multilateralism, therefore, become two possible

policy options for the US to maximise its security under anarchy. The possible
budget constraints during US decline may lead to military withdrawals from
overseas bases. In addition, the US becomes more willing to pay the initial
lock-in price of multilateral institutions in order to constrain other
states behaviour for its own security.
US foreign policy towards Asia preliminarily supports the powerperception hegemonic model. When President George H. W. Bush came to power, the US
faced dual deficits even though the US won the Cold War and became the hegemon by default in the
early 1990s. The domestic economic difficulty imposed a declining, or at least uncertain, hegemony to the
Bush administration. Consequently, Bush had to withdraw troops from Asia and conducted a reluctant
offshore balancing strategy in the early 1990s. Although the US still claimed to keep its commitments to
Asian allies, the US words with the sword became unreliable at best.
During President Clintons first tenure, how to revive US economy became the first priority of the
administration. The perception of a declining hegemon did not totally fade until the middle of the 1990s

Multilateral institutions,
became Clintons diplomatic weapon to open Asias
market and boost US economy. In addition, the US also endorsed the ARF initiated by the
ASEAN states in order to retain its eroding political and military influence after the
when the US economy gradually came out of the recession.
especially APEC,

strategic retreats in the early 1990s.

However, the US new economy based on information technology and computers

revived policymakers confidence in US hegemony after the Asian miracle was
terminated by the 1997 economic crisis. The second part of the 1990s witnessed a
rising US hegemony and the George W. Bush administration reached the apex of
US power by any measure in the early 21st century. Therefore, since Clintons second
tenure in the White House, US foreign policy in general and towards Asia in particular has become more
assertive and power-driven in nature. Besides reconfirming its traditional military alliances in Asia, the US
deepened its military engagement in the region through extensive security cooperation with other Asian
states.

The selective engagement policy of the US in the late 1990s was

substantially expanded by the Bush administration to hegemonic dominion
after 9/11. The unrivalled hegemony relieved US of concerns over security threats from any other states in

The lust for power without constraints from anarchy drove US

to pursue a hegemonic dominion policy in the world. The pre-emption
strategy and proactive missile defence programs reflected the powerthe international system.
policymakers

maximising nature of the hegemonic dominion strategy during the George W. Bush administration.
What will the US do in the future? The power-perception hegemonic model suggests that the US cannot

When US hegemony is still rising or at a stable

stage, no one can stop US expansion for more power. When its economy can no
longer afford its power-oriented strategy, the US will face the same strategic
burden of imperial overstretch that Great Britain suffered in the 19th
escape the fate of other great powers in history.

century. However, the power-perception hegemonic model also argues that US foreign policy depends on
how US policymakers perceive the rise and fall of US hegemony.
If historical learning can help US policymakers cultivate a prudent perception regarding US hegemony, the

early implementation of offshore balancing and multilateralism may facilitate

the soft-landing of declining US hegemony. More importantly, the real danger is
whether the US can make a right choice between power and security when US hegemony begins to
decline.

If US

policymakers cannot learn from history but

instead of security even though US hegemony is in decline,

insist on seeking more power

the likelihood of hegemonic

war will increase. However, if US policymakers choose security over power when US hegemony is

in decline, offshore balancing and multilateralism can help the US maximise security in the future anarchic,
multipolar world. Pg. 1141-1143
*Heg encourages power maximization
*Decline forces them to worry about security. Leads to multilateralism/OSB
*US willing to pay lock-in price to constrain peer competitor
*1990s prove
*Multilateralism creates a soft landing during decline

Unipolarity is destroying bipartisan compact needed to

sustain support for multilateralismmakes our
policies erratic and incoherent.
Kupchan & Trubowitz 7Professor of International Affairs @ Georgetown University &
Professor of Government @ University of Texas-Austin [Charles A. Kupchan (Senior Fellow @ Council on
Foreign Relations, and Henry A. Kissinger Scholar at the Library of Congress) & Peter L. Trubowitz (Senior
Fellow @ Robert Strauss Center for International Security and Law), Dead Center: The Demise of Liberal
Internationalism in the United States, International Security, Vol. 32, No. 2 (Fall 2007), pp. 744]

The conditions that sustained liberal internationalism have of late been

rapidly disappearing, dramatically weakening its grip on the nations politics. Since the demise
of the Soviet Union, U.S. primacy has reduced the incentives for
Republicans and Democrats alike to adhere to the liberal
internationalist compact. Unipolarity has heightened the geopolitical
appeal of unilateralism, a trend that even the threat of transnational terrorism has not
reversed. Unipolarity has also loosened the political discipline
engendered by the Cold War threat, leaving U.S. foreign policy more
vulnerable to growing partisanship at home. Red and Blue America disagree about the

nature of U.S. engagement in the world; growing disparities in wealth have reawakened class tensions; and

political pragmatism has been losing ground to ideological

extremism.
The polarization of the United States has dealt a severe blow to the bipartisan compact between power

Instead of adhering to the vital center, the countrys

elected officials, along with the public, are backing away from the liberal
internationalist compact, supporting either U.S. power or international cooperation, but rarely
both. President Bush and many Republicans have abandoned one side of the liberal
internationalist compact: multilateralism has received little but contempt on their watch.
and cooperation.

Meanwhile, the Democrats have neglected the other side: many party stalwarts are uneasy with the

As the partisan gyre in Washington widens, the

political center is dying out, and support for liberal internationalism
is dying with it. According to Jim Leach, one of the Republican moderates to lose his House seat in
assertive use of U.S. power.

the 2006 midterm elections, [The United States] middle has virtually collapsed. And how to reconstruct a
principled center, a center of gravity in American politics, may be the hardest single thing at this particular
time.5
Prominent voices from across the political spectrum have called for the restoration of a robust bipartisan
center that can put U.S. grand strategy back on track.6 According to Democratic Senator Hillary Clinton,
For more than a half a century, we know that we prospered because of a bipartisan consensus on defense
and foreign policy. We must do more than return to that sensible, cooperative approach. Republican
presidential candidate Mitt Romney echoes this sentiment: It seems that concern aboutWashingtons
divisiveness and capability to meet todays challenges is the one thing that unites us all. We need new
thinking on foreign policy and an overarching strategy that can unite the United States and its allies.7

The halcyon era of liberal internationalism is

over; the bipartisan compact between power and partnership has been
effectively dismantled. If left unattended, the political foundations of
U.S. statecraft will continue to disintegrate, exposing the country to the
dangers of an erratic and incoherent foreign policy. To avoid this
fate, U.S. leaders will have to fashion a new brand of
internationalismone that will necessarily entail less power and less partnership if it is to have a
These exhortations are in vain.

chance of securing broad domestic support. To find a new equilibrium between the nations commitments
abroad and its polarized politics at home, the United States will need a grand strategy that is as selective
and judicious as it is purposeful. Pg. 8-10

Multilat leads to global coop and power sharingit

creates shared framework of interaction changes
the way states interpret global politics
Pouliot 11Professor of Poli Sci @ McGill University [Vincent Pouliot, Multilateralism as an End in
Itself, International Studies Perspectives (2011) 12, 1826]
Because it rests on open, nondiscriminatory debate, and the routine exchange of viewpoints, the

multilateral procedure introduces three key advantages that are gained,

regardless of the specific policies adopted, and tend to diffuse across all
participants. Contrary to the standard viewpoint, according to which a rational preference or functional

the systematic practice of

multilateralism that creates the drive to cooperate. At the theoretical level, the
imperative lead to multilateral cooperation, here it is

premise is that it is not only what people think that explains what they do, but also what they do that

Everyday multilateralism is a selffulfilling practice for at least three reasons. First, the joint practice of multilateralism creates
determines what they think (Pouliot 2010).

mutually recognizable patterns of action among global actors. This process owes to the fact that practices
structure social interaction (Adler and Pouliot forthcoming).2 Because they are meaningful, organized, and
repeated, practices generally convey a degree of mutual intelligibility that allows people to develop social
relations over time. In the field of international security, for example, the practice of deterrence is
premised on a limited number of gestures, signals, and linguistic devices that are meant, as Schelling
(1966:113) put it, to getting the right signal across. The same goes with the practice of

multilateralism, which rests on a set of political and social patterns that

establish the boundaries of action in a mutually intelligible fashion.
These structuring effects, in turn, allow for the development of common
frameworks for appraising global events. Multilateral dialog serves not only to find
joint solutions; it also makes it possible for various actors to zoom in on the definition of the issue at hand
a particularly important step on the global stage. The point is certainly not that the multilateral
procedure leads everybody to agree on everythingthat would be as impossible as counterproductive.
Theoretically speaking, there is room for skepticism that multilateralism may ever allow communicative
rationality at the global level (see Risse 2000; Diez and Steans 2005). With such a diverse and uneven
playing field, one can doubt that discursive engagement, in and of itself, can lead to common lifeworlds.

multilateralism fosters is the emergence of a shared

framework of interactionfor example, a common linguistic repertoirethat allows
global actors to make sense of world politics in mutually
recognizable ways. Of course, they may not agree on the specific actions to
be taken, but at least they can build on an established pattern of
political interaction to deal with the problem at handsometimes even
before it emerges in acute form. In todays pluralistic world, that would already be a
considerable achievement. In that sense, multilateralism may well be a
constitutive practice of what Lu (2009) calls political friendship among
peoples. The axiomatic practice of principled and inclusive dialog is quite apparent in the way she
describes this social structure: While conflicts, especially over the distribution of goods and
burdens, will inevitably arise , under conditions of political friendship
among peoples, they will be negotiated within a global background context of
norms and institutions based on mutual recognition, equity in the distribution of
burdens and benefits of global cooperation, and power-sharing in the institutions of
global governance rather than domination by any group (2009:5455). In a world where
multilateralism becomes an end in itself, this ideal pattern emerges
Instead, what the practice of

out of the structuring effects of axiomatic practice: take the case of NATO, for instance, which has recently
had to manage, through the multilateral practice, fairly strong internal dissent (Pouliot 2006). W hile

clashing views and interests will never go away in our particularly diverse world,
as pessimists are quick to emphasize (for example, Dahl 1999), the management of discord
is certainly made easier by shared patterns of dialog based on mutually recognizable
frameworks. Second, the multilateral procedure typically ensures a

remarkable level of moderation in the global policies adopted. In fact, a quick

historical tour dhorizon suggests that actors engaged in multilateralism tend to
avoid radical solutions in their joint decision making. Of course, the very
process of uniting disparate voices helps explain why multilateralism
tends to produce median consensus. This is not to say that the multilateral practice
inevitably leads to lowest common denominators. To repeat, because it entails complex and often
painstaking debate before any actions are taken, the multilateral procedure forces involved actors to
devise and potentially share similar analytical lenses that, in hindsight, make the policies adopted seem
inherently, and seemingly naturally, moderate. This is because the debate about what a given policy
means takes place before its implementation, which makes for a much smoother ride when decisions hit
the ground. This joint interpretive work, which constitutes a crucial aspect of multilateralism, creates
outcomes that are generally perceived as inherently reasonable. Participation brings inherent benefits to
politics, as Bachrach (1975) argued in the context of democratic theory. Going after the conventional
liberal view according to which actors enter politics with an already fixed set of preferences, Bachrach
observes that most of the time people define their interests in the very process of participation. The
argument is not that interests formed in the course of social interaction are in any sense more altruistic. It
rather is that the nature and process of political practices, in this case multilateralism, matter a great deal
in shaping participants preferences (Wendt 1999). In this sense, not only does the multilateral practice
have structuring effects on global governance, but it is also constitutive of what actors say, want, and do

multilateralism lends legitimacy to

the policies that it generates by virtue of the debate that the
process necessarily entails. There is no need here to explain at length how deliberative
(Adler and Pouliot forthcoming). Third and related,

processes that are inclusive of all stakeholders tend to produce outcomes that are generally considered

large ownership also leads to

more efficient implementation, because actors feel invested in the
enactment of solutions on the ground. Even episodes of political failure,
such as the lack of UN reaction to the Rwandan genocide, can generate useful lessons
when re-appropriated multilaterallythink of the Responsibility to Protect, for
more socially and politically acceptable. In the long run, the

instance.3 From this outlook, there is no contradiction between efficiency and the axiomatic practice of
multilateralism, quite the contrary.

The more multilateralism becomes the normal

or self-evident practice of global governance, the more benefits it yields for the many
stakeholders of global governance. In fact, multilateralism as an end in and of itself could generate even
more diffuse reciprocity than Ruggie had originally envisioned. Not only do its distributional consequences

multilateralism as a global governance routine also creates

self-reinforcing dynamics and new focal points for strategic
interaction. The axiomatic practice of multilateralism helps define
problems in commensurable ways and craft moderate solutions with
tend to even out,

wide-ranging ownershipthree processual benefits that further strengthen the impetus for multilateral
dialog. Pg. 21-23

That cooperation is key to planetary survivalweak

regulations risk extinction.
Masciulli 11Professor of Political Science @ St Thomas University [Joseph Masciulli, The
Governance Challenge for Global Political and Technoscientific Leaders in an Era of Globalization and
Globalizing Technologies, Bulletin of Science, Technology & Society February 2011 vol. 31 no. 1 pg. 3-5]

What is most to be feared is enhanced global disorder resulting from

the combination of weak global regulations; the unforeseen destructive
consequences of converging technologies and economic globalization; military
competition among the great powers; and the prevalent biases of short-term
thinking held by most leaders and elites. But no practical person would wish that
such a disorder scenario come true, given all the weapons of mass destruction
(WMDs) available now or which will surely become available in the
foreseeable future. As converging technologies united by IT, cognitive
science, nanotechnology, and robotics advance synergistically in monitored

unmonitored laboratories, we may be blindsided by these future

developments brought about by technoscientists with a variety of good or
destructive or mercenary motives. The current laudable but problematic openness about
publishing scientific results on the Internet would contribute greatly
to such negative outcomes.
and

To be sure, if the global disorder-emergency scenario occurred because of postmodern terrorism or rogue
states using biological, chemical, or nuclear WMDs, or a regional war with nuclear weapons in the Middle
East or South Asia, there might well be a positive result for global governance. Such a global emergency
might unite the global great and major powers in the conviction that a global concert was necessary for
their survival and planetary survival as well. In such a global great power concert, basic rules of
economic, security, and legal order would be uncompromisingly enforced both globally and in the
particular regions where they held hegemonic status. That concert scenario, however, is flawed by the
limited legitimacy of its structure based on the members having the greatest hard and soft power on
planet Earth.

At the base of our concerns, I would argue, are human proclivities for
narrow, short-term thinking tied to individual self-interest or corporate and
national interests in decision making. For globalization, though propelled by
technologies of various kinds, remains an essentially human phenomenon . . .
and the main drivers for the establishment and uses of
disseminative systems are hardy perennials: profit, convenience, greed, relative
advantage, curiosity, demonstrations of prowess, ideological fervor, malign
destructiveness. These human drives and capacities will not disappear. Their manifestations now extend
considerably beyond more familiarly empowered governmental, technoscientific and corporate actors to
include even individuals: terrorists, computer hackers and rogue market traders (Whitman, 2005, p. 104).

In this dangerous world, if people are to have their human dignity

recognized and enjoy their human rights, above all, to life, security, a healthy
environment, and freedom, we need new forms of comprehensive
global regulation and control. Such effective global leadership and
governance with robust enforcement powers alone can adequately respond to
destructive current global problems, and prevent new ones.
However, successful human adaptation and innovation to our current complex environment through the
social construction of effective global governance will be a daunting collective task for global political and

global society is caught in the

whirlpool of an accelerating process of modernization that has for
the most part been left to its own devices (Habermas, 2001, p. 112). We
need to progress in human adaptation to and innovation for our complex and
problematical global social and natural planetary environments through global
governance. I suggest we need to begin by ending the prevalent biases of shorttermism in thinking and acting and the false values attached to the
narrow self-interest of individuals, corporations, and states.
technoscientific leaders and citizens. For our

I agree with Stephen Hawking that the long-term future of the human race must be in space. It will be
difficult enough to avoid disaster on planet Earth in the next hundred years, let alone the next thousand, or
million. . . . There have been a number of times in the past when its survival has been a question of touch
and go. The Cuban missile crisis in 1962 was one of these. The frequency of such occasions is likely to
increase in the future. We shall need great care and judgment to negotiate them all successfully. But Im
an optimist. If we can avoid disaster for the next two centuries, our species should be safe, as we spread
into space. . . . But we are entering an increasingly dangerous period of our history. Our population and our
use of the finite resources of planet Earth, are growing exponentially, along with our technical ability to
change the environment for good or ill. But our genetic code still carries the selfish and aggressive
instincts that were of survival advantage in the past. . . . Our only chance of long term survival is not to
remain inward looking on planet Earth, but to spread out into space. We have made remarkable progress in
the last hundred years. But if we want to continue beyond the next hundred years, our future is in space.
(Hawking, 2010)

to reinvent humanity pluralistically in outer space and beyond will

require securing our one and only global society and planet Earth
through effective global governance in the foreseeable future. And our dilemma
Nonetheless,

is that the enforcement powers of multilateral institutions are not likely to be

strengthened because of the competition for greater (relative, not absolute) hard and soft
power by the great and major powers. They seek their national or alliance superiority,
or at least, parity, for the sake of their states survival and security now. Unless the global disorderemergency scenario was to occur soonGod forbidthe
recklessly and tragically,

agendas. Pg. 4-5

great powers will most likely,

leave global survival and security to their longer term

Cartels
TheirSpeiceinternallinkisaboutterrorismfromRussiaaftertheireconomy
goesdowna)noevidencesayingitsonthebrinknowandb)the
advantageispredicatedonterroristsinLatinAmerica.
CartelsarediverseDoingonethingdoesntspillover
French5[TaylorW.French,JDcandidate,Vanderbilt;NOTE:FreeTradeandIllegalDrugs:

WillNAFTATransformtheUnitedStatesIntotheNetherlands?;VanderbiltJournalof
TransnationalLawMarch,200538Vand.J.Transnat'lL.501;Lexis]
InthepostNAFTAeraithasbecomeharderforauthoritiestodetect
,
anddestroydrug

cartels,as
narcoticstraffickershavesetupintricatenetworksandcomplexbusinesspractices.n274Moderndrugtraffickerstypically
create"legitimatebusinesses"thattheyuseasfrontsfortheirillegalactivities. n275Such
companiesoftenrevolvearoundtrucking,shipping,railway,andstorage,allofwhichplayintegralrolesinthedrugtrade.n276
Moreover,theMexicancartelshaveadopteddistinctivenoncartellikequalities thatreducethe
likelihoodoftheirexposuretolawenforcement.n277Unliketheirpredecessors,Mexicandrugringsare

normallystructuredinsmallcells,eachcapableofindependentoperation.n278Hence,ifofficials

areableto
destroyonegroup,
thelargerorganizationremains[*530]unaffected.n279Inaddition,"Mexican
traffickershaveevolvedinto"polydrug'traffickers ."n280Bytransportingmanytypesofdrugs,thenew
cartelsaremuch

lessdependentupononesubstanceasa"cashcrop

."n281Theresultisthat
approximatelythirtypercentof

the
heroinimported

intotheUnitedStates

comesfrom
Mexico,andsixtypercentofthecocaineimportedintotheUnitedStatescomesfromMexico,buttressingthecannabis
marketthat"Mexicocontinuestodominate."n282Thus,Mexicandrugcartelshaveemergedassophisticated
anddiversifiedoperationsthatoperateintheshadowsoflegalbusinessestosupplytheUnitedStates
withillicitsubstancesofallkinds.n283

CartelledviolenceisdecreasingnowMexicansecurityeffortsare
increasinglysuccessful
Higa14(Daniel,"Mexico:Homicidesdecrease,butkidnapping,extortionrising,"

http://infosurhoy.com/en_GB/articles/saii/features/main/2014/06/02/feature01)
MEXICOCITYThankstotheinterventionoffederalforces,thearrestofmajordruglords

and
theweakeningofcriminalgroups,thehomiciderateinMexicoisdecreasing,accordingtothe
MinistryoftheInterior.BetweenJanuaryandMarch2014,therewere4,497homicides,comparedto18,447duringallof2013.In
2012,authoritiesregistered21,732killingsafterrecording22,853thepreviousyear,accordingtotheNationalPublicSecuritySystem.
Wecanconfirmthehomiciderateisonthedecreaseandoneofthereasonsisthatthe

federalforcespresenceincertainregionshasledtothecontrolofviolence, LeonelFernndez
Novelo,aresearcherfortheNGOMxicoEvala,said.Authoritieshavestruckhardagainst
violentcriminalstructures,suchasLosZetasandtheKnightsTemplar,resultinginadecreaseinthese
groupsuseofviolence,accordingtoJorgeKawas,anexpertinsecurityandintelligenceandan
associateattheCenterforInterdisciplinaryMexicanBritishResearchinMexicoCity.Thegovernmenthasfocusedits
effortsonthemostbloodthirstycriminalorganizationsandhasattackedtheiroperational

leadership,whichhashurttheirabilitytoreorganizethemselvesquickly,andtheyhave
fragmented,hesaid.FromDecember2012toMay2014,theMexicangovernmenthasapprehendedorkilled80highranking
criminals,themostprominentbeingJoaqunElChapoGuzmn,theheadoftheSinaloacartel;LosZetasleadersMiguelngel
Trevio,aliasZ40;GaldinoMelladoCruz(Z9)andFernandoMartnezMagaa(Z16);inadditiontoKnightsTemplar
leadersNazarioMorenothefounderofthecriminalorganizationandEnriquePlancartethecartelsNo.2leaderbothbeing

killedinmilitaryoperations.Atthesametime,organizedcrimegroupscannolongersustainthecostsof

extremeviolence,accordingtoAthanasiosHristoulas,aresearcheroftheAutonomousInstitute
ofTechnologyofMexico.Theviolencereachedatippingpoint ,hesaid.Themostpowerful
criminalgroupshavebeenweakenedincertainaspects,soitslikelytheyhavebeenforcedtoreach
agreementsandformalliancestosafeguardtheirterritoriesandtheirmarkets.ForPresidentEnriquePeaNietosadministration,this
isthedirectresultofhisofficialstrategytofightorganizedcrime.Thesecurityandlawenforcementpolicyhas

managedtoreduceviolence,lowerthecrimerate,breakupvariouscriminalorganizations
andreducetheiroperationalcapacityinseveralregionsofthecountry ,MinisteroftheInterior
MiguelngelOsorioChongsaid.Wehaveappliedfocusedstrategiesthathavesucceeded,andinonlyayearandahalf,thereisa
noticeabledifferenceinstatessuchasMichoacn,NuevoLen,Chihuahua,NayaritandGuerrero.

Taxationfailstheirmodelsarewrong.
Evans13[DGEvans,Esq.,ExecutiveDirector,DrugFreeProjectsCoalition;THE

ECONOMICIMPACTSOFMARIJUANALEGALIZATION;JournalofGlobalDrugPolicy
andPractice;12/30/2013;http://www.globaldrugpolicy.org/Issues/Vol%207%20Issue%204/The
%20Economic%20Impacts%20of%20Marijuana%20Legalization%20final%20for
%20journal.pdf]
Althoughitisnotnecessarilyimpropertotaxgoodsandservicesthatharmconsumers,marijuanaslegal
statusand
socialeffectsrendertaxationproblematic.Theremaybesignificantandquestionable
disparitiesbetweenprojectedandactualtax
revenuesduetovariationinregionaldemand
formarijuana,futuredemandfortaxablemarijuana,revenueallocationamonglevelsofgovernment,

and

regulatorycomplianceandenforcement.Inmanyinstances,thepublicexpenseofimplementingandenforcing
taxationcompoundstheaggregatecostofmarijuanasnegativeeffectsonhealth,safety,andproductivity.Ontheotherhand,the
researchonlegalizationpredictsareductionincriminaljusticecosts,thoughlawenforcementbudgetsaremorelikelytoremain

substantiallyintact.Asurveyofavailableresearchregardingthefiscalimpactofmarijuanafound

anumberofeconomicanalysesthataddressthefiscalcostsassociatedwithexistinglaws
butnonethataddressthecostsoflegalization.Becausethedatarequiredforaformalcostbenefitanalysisis
notavailableatthistime,invokingfiscalrhetorictoadvancethelegalizationagendaisnotmerely
irresponsible,itisalsodeceitful.Ineffect,itdefiestransparency,misdirectspublicdebate,
andbeliesacorporatepurposetoprivatizeprofitsandsocializelosses,subordinatingthe
interestsoftaxpayerstothoseofthemarijuanaindustry.OverviewRecentestimatesoflegalizations
impactongovernmentspendingpredictpossiblesavingsandrevenuesbutdonotreflecttheeconomiccostsof
departingfromcurrentpolicy.Thetruefiscalimpactwilldependonthecostsgeneratedby
repealingcurrentlaws,plusthecostsofimplementingandenforcingproposedreforms,
minusanytaxrevenuesandsavingsthatmightaccrue.Repealingcurrentlawswillgenerate
additionalcostsduetoconsequencesstemmingfromtheincreaseinmarijuanause,abuse,
anddependence.Implementingandenforcingreformswillrequireupfrontspendingtoestablisharegulatoryframeworkand
ongoingspendingtocollecttaxes,regulateretailersanddistributors,andprotectusersandnonusersalike.Evenifitisnot
possibletoestimatetheseadditionalcostsatthistime,itisremisstoignorethem.Accordingly,thepresentandpostlegalization
effectsofmarijuanausemustbeexaminedtogainanunderstandingoftheireconomicimpact.

Marijuana doesnt stop cartels theyll shift to worse

options
Bender 13[StevenBender,Professor,SeattleUniversitySchoolofLaw;Overdose:TheFailureof
theU.S.DrugWarandAttemptsatLegalization:ARTICLE:JOINTREFORM?:THEINTERPLAYOF
STATE,FEDERAL,ANDHEMISPHERICREGULATIONOFRECREATIONALMARIJUANAAND
THEFAILEDWARONDRUGS;2013AlbanyGovernmentLawReview6Alb.Gov'tL.Rev.359;
Lexis]

Gauging the effect of U.S. legalization requires some sense of the economic importance of marijuana to the
Mexican drug cartels. Unfortunately, the nature of the beast of an illegal enterprise with diffuse money
laundering throughout the hemisphere is that estimates of revenues vary widely, both as to the dollar
amount of overall revenues and the percentage role that marijuana plays in cartel proceeds from a variety
of drugs. No doubt by any measure those revenues are enormous, with the swing in estimated
annual revenue to Mexican cartels ranging from one estimate of $ 80 billion to a U.S. government estimate
of $ 13.8 billion - with $ 8.5 billion of that revenue coming from marijuana and the vast amount coming
from U.S. sales. n174 According to this government estimate, marijuana comprises more than 60% of
cartel revenue, with the remainder coming from cocaine and methamphetamine trafficking, as well as
other illicit drugs and activities. n175 As I speculated in Run for the Border, if this estimate is accurate,
legalization of marijuana should have a "cataclysmic effect" on the Mexican cartels, n176 allowing crossborder enforcement to better focus on remaining (and more dangerous) illicit drugs for which U.S. demand
is less pervasive. Presumably, the south-of-the-border violence might ultimately ease as the cartels

there are many reasons to be less

optimistic about the impact [*388] of state legalization on Mexican
trafficking, even if that reform takes hold nationally. First, some commentators
discount the estimate that marijuana plays such a key role in cartel
revenues, with one commentator suggesting a more accurate figure
falls in the range of 15-to-26%. n177 Having become the gateway for illicit drugs from
South and Central America into the United States, Mexican cartels might also send
their product elsewhere, such as Canada or within Mexico, n178
redouble their efforts to export drugs that remain illicit in the United
States, such as cocaine and methamphetamine, or concentrate on
expanding demand for these illicit drugs as cartels did within Mexico
when enhanced U.S.-border enforcement prompted them at times to liquidate their
inventory to Mexican users. n179 Presumably, legalization within the United States that leaves
minors unable to purchase marijuana lawfully might reserve some of
that illicit market to cartels, yet the likelihood is that, as with alcohol, this demand would
succumb to this economic squeeze. Yet

be supplied through fake identification or by friends and relatives purchasing lawful marijuana for minors.
Some commentators have looked to the tobacco market and speculated that should government tax legal
marijuana too steeply, an illicit market might emerge, n180 perhaps to be supplied by the cartels [*389]

given the history of

spraying of illicit marijuana crops with toxic chemicals, the lesser
environmental policing in Mexico, and the reality that some marijuana has been
rather than by licensed domestic producers operating outside the law. Still,

smuggled, while soaked in gasoline or perfume, in such unsanitary conveyances as the inside of a full

presumably most U.S. users would be willing to pay

extra for the assurance of some quality and safety control over the
production of legalized marijuana. Surely, too, the cost of bribes that divert a fair share
septic tank truck, n181

of cartel revenue is an expense that lawfully produced marijuana need not duplicate. Most alarmingly,

however, Mexican drug cartels of late have augmented their drug

profits with other enterprises for which their infrastructure of vast
capital, weaponry, manpower, and graft is well suited. These sidelines include
kidnapping the family members of the wealthy for ransom, n182
trafficking undocumented immigrants and sex workers into and
within the United States, n183 and robbing undocumented immigrants, whether from Mexico or
Central America, who aim to reach U.S. employers. n184 The most ominous scenario
ahead is one in which the drug cartels expand these other ventures
to replace marijuana revenues. Immigration is driven and limited by job opportunities

cartels
searching for replacement revenue presumably would be drawn to
expand their kidnappings or their role in illicit sex markets , such as those
available within the United States and thus depends on labor demand. Therefore,

for underage prostitutes. n185 Overall, then, the impact of legalization on cartel revenues, and the surging
violence within Mexico, is hard to predict.

Drug shift makes cartel violence WORSE

Felbab-Brown 10 (Vanda, Foreign Policy Fellow, Brookings Institution, ""5
Expert Takes on How U.S. Marijuana Legalization Would Affect Mexico," 11/1,
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2010/11/5-expert-takes-on-howus-marijuana-legalization-would-affect-mexico/65498/)
What will be the effects on the Mexican drug trade if California
legalizes marijuana? Andreas: Marijuana's potential tax revenue has been
overstated. Bonner: I hope it doesn't pass: it would be a real slap in the face
for Mexico. Almost 30,000 people have died in drug-related homicides [since
2006]. Some of those have been police and military who have been fighting
the drug traffickers there. Selee: The biggest effect of passing prop 19 would
be to generate a serious debate over drug policy for the first time in many
years in this country. I can't see prop 19 creating the conditions for a...
market in which marijuana is not controlled by organized crime. FelbabBrown: In one outcome, cartels' market [for marijuana] would be
threatened and so they would try to move into other illegal markets
as they are doing already. The fight over the heroin, cocaine, and
methamphetamine markets would intensify and lead to even greater
escalations of violence.

Their impact is irresponsible fearmongering there is NO

capacity for terrorists to acquire and execute a
nuclear attack
Mueller and Stewart 12 [John Mueller is Senior Research Scientist at the Mershon
Center for International Security Studies and Adjunct Professor in the Department of Political Science, both
at Ohio State University, and Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute in Washington, D.C. Mark G. Stewart is
Australian Research Council Professorial Fellow and Professor and Director at the Centre for Infrastructure
Performance and Reliability at the University of Newcastle in Australia, The Terrorism Delusion,
International Security, Vol. 37, No. 1 (Summer 2012), pp. 81110, Chetan]

the official and popular reaction to the terrorist attacks

of September 11, 2001, has been substantially deludedmassively
disproportionate to the threat that al-Qaida has ever actually
presented either as an international menace or as an inspiration or model to homegrown amateurs.
Applying the extensive datasets on terrorism that have been generated over the
last decades, we conclude that the chances of an American perishing at the hands of a terrorist at
It seems increasingly likely that

present rates is one in 3.5 million per yearwell within the range of what risk analysts hold to be
acceptable risk.40 Yet, despite the importance of responsibly communicating risk and despite the costs

of irresponsible fearmongering, just about the only official who has ever openly put the
threat presented by terrorism in some sort of context is New Yorks Mayor Michael Bloomberg, who in 2007

people should get a life and that they have a greater chance of
being hit by lightning than of being a victim of terrorisman observation
pointed out that

that may be a bit off the mark but is roughly accurate.41 (It might be noted that, despite this unorthodox
outburst, Bloomberg still managed to be re-elected two years later.) Indeed, much of the reaction to the
September 11 attacks calls to mind Hans Christian Andersens fable of delusion, The Emperors New
Clothes, in which con artists convince the emperors court that they can weave stuffs of the most
beautiful colors and elaborate patterns from the delicate silk and purest gold thread they are given. These
stuffs, they further convincingly explain, have the property of remaining invisible to anyone who is

unusually stupid or unfit for office. The emperor finds this quite appealing because not only will he have
splendid new clothes, but he will be able to discover which of his officials are unfit for their postsor in
todays terms, have lost their effectiveness. His courtiers, then, have great professional incentive to
proclaim the stuffs on the loom to be absolutely magnificent even while mentally justifying this conclusion
with the equivalent of absence of evidence is not evidence of absence. Unlike the emperors new
clothes,

terrorism does of course exist. Much of the reaction to the

threat, however, has a distinctly delusionary quality. In Carles view, for
example, the CIA has been spinning in self-referential circles in which our premises were
flawed, our facts used to fit our premises, our premises determined, and our fears justified
our operational actions, in a self-contained process that arrived at a
conclusion dramatically at odds with the facts. The process projected evil

actions where there was, more often, muddled indirect and unavoidable complicity, or not much at all.
These delusional ratiocinations, he further observes, were all sincerely, ardently held to have
constituted a rigorous, rational process to identify terrorist threats in which the avalanche of reporting
confirms its validity by its quantity, in which there is a tendency to reject incongruous or contradictory
facts as erroneous, because they do not conform to accepted reality, and in which potential dissenters are
not-so-subtly reminded of career dangers: Say what you want at meetings. Its your decision. But you are
doing yourself no favors.42 Consider in this context the alarming and profoundly imaginary estimates of
U.S. intelligence agencies in the year after the September 11 attacks that the number of trained al-Qaida
operatives in the United States was between 2,000 and 5,000.43 Terrorist cells, they told reporters, were
embedded in most U.S. cities with sizable Islamic communities, usually in the run-down sections, and
were up and active because electronic intercepts had found some of them to be talking to each
other.44 Another account relayed the view of experts that Osama bin Laden was ready to unleash an
11,000 strong terrorist army operating in more than sixty countries controlled by a Mr. Big who is based
in Europe, but that intelligence had no idea where thousands of these men are.45 Similarly,

FBI

Director Robert Mueller assured the Senate Intelligence Committee on February 11,
2003, that, although his agency had yet to identify even one al-Qaida
cell in the United States, I remain very concerned about what we
are not seeing, a sentence rendered in bold lettering in his prepared text. Moreover, he
claimed that such unidentified entities presented the greatest
threat, had developed a support infrastructure in the country, and had achieved both the ability
and the intent to inflict signi ficant casualties in the US with little warning.46 Over the course of time,

such essentially delusionary thinking has been internalized and

institutionalized in a great many ways. For example, an extrapolation of
delusionary proportions is evident in the common observation that,
because terrorists were able, mostly by thuggish means, to crash
airplanes into buildings, they might therefore be able to construct a
nuclear bomb. Brian Jenkins has run an internet search to discover how often variants of the term

al-Qaida appeared within ten words of nuclear. There were only seven hits in 1999 and eleven in 2000,
but the number soared to 1,742 in 2001 and to 2,931 in 2002.47 By 2008, Defense Secretary Robert Gates
was assuring a congressional committee that what keeps every senior government leader awake at night
is the thought of a terrorist ending up with a weapon of mass destruction, especially nuclear.48 Few of
the sleepless, it seems, found much solace in the fact that an al-Qaida computer seized in Afghanistan in
2001 indicated that the groups budget for research on weapons of mass destruction (almost all of it

In the wake of the

killing of Osama bin Laden, officials now have many more al-Qaida
computers, and nothing in their content appears to suggest that the
group had the time or inclination, let alone the money, to set up and
staff a uranium-seizing operation, as well as a fancy, super-hightechnology facility to fabricate a bomb. This is a process that
requires trusting corrupted foreign collaborators and other
criminals, obtaining and transporting highly guarded material,
setting up a machine shop staffed with top scientists and
technicians, and rolling the heavy, cumbersome, and untested
finished product into position to be detonated by a skilled crewall
while attracting no attention from outsiders.50 If the miscreants in the American
focused on primitive chemical weapons work) was $2,000 to $4,000.49

cases have been unable to create and set off even the simplest conventional bombs, it stands to reason

none of them were very close to creating, or having anything to

do with, nuclear weaponsor for that matter biological , radiological,
or chemical ones. In fact, with perhaps one exception, none seems to have even
dreamed of the prospect; and the exception is Jos Padilla (case 2), who apparently mused at
that

one point about creating a dirty bomba device that would disperse radiationor even possibly an atomic
one. His idea about isotope separation was to put uranium into a pail and then to make himself into a

Even if a weapon were

made abroad and then brought into the United States, its detonation
would require individuals in-country with the capacity to receive and
handle the complicated weapons and then to set them off. Thus far, the
talent pool appears, to put mildly, very thin.
human centrifuge by swinging the pail around in great arcs.51

LegalizationdecksrelationsexposesUStoclaimsofhypocrisyandraises
concernsaboutUSreliability
Murrayetal11(Chad,AshleeJackson,AmandaC.Miralro,NicolasEiden,Intelligence
AnalystatSRAInternational(Murray)andMAsinLatinAmericanStudies@George
WashingtonUniv.,"MexicanDrugTraffickingOrganizationsandMarijuana:ThePotential
EffectsofU.S.Legalization,"
https://elliott.gwu.edu/sites/elliott.gwu.edu/files/downloads/acad/lahs/mexicomarijuana
071111.pdf)
RelationsbetweentheU.S.andMexicowilldeteriorateintheshorttermiftheU.S.legalizes
marijuana.RelationsbetweentheUnitedStatesandMexicohaveimprovedoverthelast
decade,andPresidentObamaandPresidentCalderncontinuetoworkdiligentlytomaintain
relationsandcombatdrugs.However,thisrelationshipis

likelytodecay

eveniftheUnited
Stateslegalizesmarijuanainonlyadefactomanneronthestatelevel.LastyearPresidentCaldern
openlyexpressedhisdistasteforProposition19beforeitwasdefeatedinNovember.Hebelievesthatanyformof
legalizationofmarijuanaintheUnitedStateswouldbeasignofhypocrisyasevidentwhenhe
stated,Ithinkthey[UnitedStates]haveverylittlemoralauthoritytocondemnaMexicanfarmerwhoforhungerisplanting
marijuanatosustaintheinsatiableNorthAmericanmarketfordrugs.86AlthoughPresidentCaldernhasacknowledgedthefactthat
thedrugpolicydebateneedstotakeplace,hehasbeenadamantthatlegalizationintheUnitedStatesisnotthebestpolicy.Inaddition,
otherLatinAmericanleaders,suchasJuanManuelSantosofColombia,haveexpressedtheirsupportofPresidentCaldernsposition

onthelegalizationofmarijuana.PresidentCaldernandothersbelievethatthelegalizationofmarijuana

intheUnitedStateswoulddelegitimizetheMexicanwarondrugs. Somescholarsnotethatifthe
UnitedStateslegalizedmarijuana,theMexicanpopulacewouldbeleftwondering,What
teamareyou[UnitedStates]playingfor?87Mexicohasspentalotofbloodandtreasure
fightingagainstDTOsoverthelastfewyears,andsomefeelthatthelegalizationofmarijuana intheUnited
States,nomatterhowwellintentioned,wouldbenegatingthoseefforts.ProofoftheseriousnessofMexicosdedication
tothedrugwarisevidencedbytherecenttensionsbetweentheUnitedStatesandMexico.Relationsbetweenthetwocountrieshave
beenterseeversinceWikileaksrevealedthatAmbassadorPascualwrotethathedidnotbelievethatPresidentCalderncouldwinthe
warondrugs.ThiscausedsuchstrifethatAmbassadorPascualresignedinMarch2011.PresidentCaldernhasbeendedicatedto
helpingMexicocombatdrugs,andhewasunwillingtoallowaU.S.Ambassadortoopenlycriticizehisefforts.IfPresidentCaldern
wasthisforcefuloftheWikileaksincident,thelegalizationofmarijuanaintheU.S.wouldlikelybetrying

onthebilateralrelationship.Howfarthisdistancingwouldgoisupfordebate,givenMexicosdependenceonU.S.
tradeandcounternarcoticsaidprograms.WerePresidentCaldernnolongerinofficeandU.S.stateslegalizedmarijuana,theeffects
wouldlikelytobesimilar,althoughmaybenotassevere.IfthePRIweretoreturntopower,itislikelythattheywouldbeginto
distancethemselvesfromtheUnitedStates,astheydidinthepast.ThePRIpreferredtohandleDTOsthroughaseriesoftacit
agreementsthatmaintainedorderinsteadofcollaboratingwiththeU.S.Inthissense,thefalloutbetweentheUnitedStatesand
Mexicomightnotbeassevere,butitislikelythatMexicowouldstillpublicallyreprimandtheUnited

Statesactions.Eitherway,thelegalizationofmarijuanaintheUnitedStateswouldharmU.S.Mexico
relationsandtheUnitedStatesshouldconsidertherepercussionsbeforeinitiatingpolicyreform.

TurnstheAff
Storrs6(K.LarrySpecialistinLatinAmericaatCRS,ReportforCongressCongressional
ResearchService,118,http://opencrs.cdt.org/rpts/RL33244_20060118.pdf)
MexicoislinkedwiththeU nited S tatesthroughtradeandinvestment,migrationandtourism,
environmentandhealthconcerns,andfamilyandculturalrelationships. Mexicoisthesecondmost
importanttradingpartneroftheU nitedS tates,andthistradeiscriticaltomanyU.S.industriesand
bordercommunities.Mexicandescendantsconstitute64%(or24million)ofthegrowing
Hispanicpopulationof37.4millionpeopleintheUnitedStates,withasignificantpresencein
CaliforniaandTexasandotherstates.Moreover,Mexicoisthelargestsourceoflegalmigrantsto
theUnitedStates(21%ofthetotalin2002)andbyfarthelargestsourceofundocumented
migrants(57%ofthetotalin2004,accordingtoestimates). Italsoistheprincipaltransitorsource
countryforillicitdrugsanditisapossibleavenuefortheentryofterroristsintotheUnitedStates.Asa
result,cooperationwithMexico

isessentialindealingwithmigration,drugtrafficking

,
and
border,
terrorism,health,environment,andenergyissues.3