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168184
REPUBLIC VS RUBY LEE TSAI
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS:
On 3 December 1996, respondent filed an application for the confirmation and
registration of Lot No. 7062 under PD 1529. Respondent stated that on 31 May 1993,
she purchased the subject property from Manolita Gonzales Vda. deCarungcong
(Carungcong), through Wendy Mitsuko Sato, Carungcongs daughter and attorney in
fact. Respondent declared that she and her predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the subject property
for more than 30 years.
Except for the Republic, there were no other oppositors to the application. The
Republic opposed respondents application on the following grounds: (1) that respondent
and her predecessors-in-interest failed to present sufficient evidence to show that they
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
the subject property since 12 June 1945 or earlier.
On 21 September 1998, the trial court granted respondents application for
registration. The Republic appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals
denied Republics motion.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE:
Whether the trial court can grant the application for registration despite the lack
of proof of respondents open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the
subject property since 12 June 1945 or earlier
RULING:
The petition has merit.
The SC notes that in respondents original application before the trial court, she
claimed that she was entitled to the confirmation and registration of her title to the
subject property under PD 1529. However, respondent did not specify under what
paragraph of Section 14 of PD 1529 she was filing the application. But going over
respondents application and the evidence she presented before the trial court, it
appears that respondent filed her application under Section 14(1) of PD 1529.
A mere showing of possession and occupation for 30 years or more is not
sufficient. Therefore, since the effectivity of PD 1073 on 25 January 1977, it must now be
shown that possession and occupation of the piece of land by the applicant, by himself
or through his predecessors-in-interest, started on 12June 1945 or earlier. This provision
is in total conformity with Section 14(1) of PD 1529.
In this case, respondent failed to comply with the period of possession and
occupation of the subject property, as required by both PD 1529 and CA 141. The SC
agree with the Republic that respondents evidence was not enough to prove that her
possession of the subject property started since 12 June 1945 or earlier because
respondents earliest evidence can be traced back to a tax declaration issued in the
name of her predecessors-in-interest only in the year 1948. In view of the lack of
sufficient showing that respondent and her predecessors-in-interest possessed the
subject property under a bona fide claim of ownership since 12 June 1945 or earlier,
respondents application for confirmation and registration of the subject property under
PD 1529 and CA 141 should be denied.
Finally, the SC note that respondent also failed to prove that the subject property
has been declared alienable and disposable by the President or the Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources.
In addition, the applicant for land registration must present a copy of the original
classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal
custodian of the official records. These facts must be established to prove that the land
is alienable and disposable.
The SC GRANTS the petition and SETS ASIDE Decision of the Court of Appeals
as well as the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Tagaytay City. Further, the
SC DENIES respondent Ruby Lee Tsais application for confirmation and registration of
Lot No. 7062.
2. Petitioners cannot find refuge in the principle of laches. It is not just the lapse of time
or delay that constitutes laches. The essence of laches is the failure or neglect, for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, through due diligence, could or
should have been done earlier, thus giving rise to a presumption that the party entitled to assert it
had earlier abandoned or declined to assert it.
In the instant case, the second and third elements are missing. Petitioners had notice
and knew all along the position of the respondent and his predecessor Juan Mari - they were
standing pat on his ownership over the subject realty. This stand of respondent and his
predecessor was recorded and clearly visible from the notification survey cards. From 1968, the
date of the cards, until 1989 there was nothing to indicate any change in the position of any of
the parties. Moreover, that respondent had not conceded ownership and possession of the land
to petitioners is clear also from the fact that Pedro Mari continued to declare the entire 897square meter property in his name and pay taxes for the entire area after his father transferred
the property to him.
On the other hand, it was petitioners who suddenly changed their position in 1989 by
changing the area of the property declared in their name from 50 square meters to 341 square
meters and specifying the details to make it appear that the tax declaration for the 50-square
meter property pertained to Lot No. 17526. As previously discussed, it was only at this point, in
1989, that it can be clearly stated that petitioners were making their claim of ownership public
and unequivocal and converting their possession over Lot No. 17526 into one in the concept of
owner. Upon discovery of this clear and unequivocal change in status of petitioners position
over the disputed land respondent immediately acted. He filed in 1990 the complaint for
recovery of possession and nullification of tax declaration. Hence, no laches in the instant case.
The instant petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the CA is AFFIRMED.
G. R No. 179905
REPUBLIC VS JAVIER
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS:
On 25 March 1999, Javier, then 75 years old, filed before the MTC an Application
for Original Registration of Title over a parcel of land, with an area of 12,903.50 square
meters, situated in Sitio Tabing Ilog, Sta. Ana, Taytay, Rizal. Petitioner Republic of the
Philippines (Republic), filed its Notice of Appearance and Opposition to Javiers
Application for Registration, claiming among other things that neither Javier nor her
predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the land since 12 June 1945; and that the muniment/s of
title alleged in the Application did not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of
a bona fide acquisition of the subject land. The Republic further insisted that the subject
property was a portion of the public domain; hence, it was not subject to private
appropriation. On even date, the Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA), also filed
its Opposition to Javiers Application, claiming that the subject property was public land,
forming part of the bed of the Laguna de Bay.
Javier testified on her own behalf to establish her claim. According to Javier, she
acquired the subject property through a Deed of Donation executed by her paternal aunt,
Catalina Javier (Catalina), a childless widow, on 27 November 1956, purportedly in
consideration of Javiers caring for Catalina from the time the latter became sick until she
died. Javiers cousins, as Catalinas other heirs, questioned the execution of said Deed
of Donation in Civil Case No. 6046 before the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Pasig,
Rizal. The CFI, in a Decision dated 24 November 1967, declared the Deed of Donation
dated 27 November 1956 void, since, being unnotarized, it was not a public document,
thus, failing to comply with the legal requisites for a valid donation. Nevertheless, in a
Deed of Partition dated 31 December 1974, Catalinas heirs allocated the subject
property to Javier.
Javier also stated under oath that Catalina and her husband, Alejandro Ramos
(Ramos), had been in possession of the subject property since 1907, but Javier did not
know how Catalina and Ramos acquired said possession. Javier gained personal
knowledge of Catalinas ownership of the subject property when Catalina came to live
with Javier and the latters family in 1940. The subject property was being tilled by
a kasama, Arturo Sarmiento, when Javier acquired the said property, but at the time she
filed her Application for Registration, there were no more tenants on the subject property.
Neither the Republic nor the LLDA presented evidence to substantiate their Oppositions
to Javiers Application for Registration.
The MTC rendered a Decision favoring Javier and granting her Application which
was affirmed by the CA.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject property is alienable
RULING:
The evidence on record likewise supports the fact that Javier, together with her
predecessor-in-interest, Catalina, occupied the subject property in the concept of an
owner since 12 June 1945 or earlier. Catalina declared the subject property in her name
for real property tax purposes even before 1945 - clearly, prior to 12 June
1945. Although tax declarations or realty tax payments of property are not conclusive
evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia of possession in the concept
of an owner, for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not
in his actual or at least constructive possession. They constitute at least proof that the
holder has a claim of title over the property. The voluntary declaration of a piece of
property for taxation purposes manifests not only ones sincere and honest desire to
obtain title to the property and announces his adverse claim against the State and all
other interested parties, but also the intention to contribute needed revenues to the
Government. Such an act strengthens ones bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership.
The Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the CA is AFFIRMED.
G.R. No 71176
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS IAC
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS:
The government, in the exercise of its power of eminent domain, expropriated
property owned by Amerex Electronics, Phils. Corporation. The amount of just
compensation for such property is now the subject of this petition for review on certiorari.
The property involved consists of four (4) parcels of land with a total area of 9,650
square meters. Its previous owner, Avegon Inc., offered it for sale to the City School
Board of Manila on July 21, 1973 at P2,300,000. The school board was willing to buy at
P1,800,000 but the then Mayor of Manila intervened and volunteered to negotiate with
Avegon Inc. for a better price.
On June 3, 1974, Avegon Inc. sold the property and its improvements to Amerex
Electronics, Phils. Corporation (Amerex for brevity) for P1,800,000. Thereafter, TCT
were issued in favor of Amerex.
On August 29, 1975, the Solicitor General filed for the Department of Education
and Culture and Sports (DECS) a complaint against Amerex for the expropriation of said
property before the Court of First Instance of Manila. The complaint stated that the
property was needed by the government as a permanent site for the Manuel de la
Fuente High School; that the fair market value of the property had been declared by
Amerex as P2,435,000, and that the assessor had determined its market value as
P2,432,042 and assessed it for taxation purposes in the amount of P1,303,470. Writ of
possession was issued by the court so the plaintiff took actual possession thereof on
October 13, 1975.
Amerex filed a motion to dismiss the complaint stating the same failed to
categorically state the amount of just compensation for the property and prayed the just
compensation be fixed at P2,432,042.
Commissioner Aquino submitted their appraisal report finding that the fair market
value of the property was P2,763,400 but it is respectfully submitted that the said sum of
P2,258,018.57 be adopted for purposes of determining just compensation payable to
defendant AMEREX. The lower court rendered judgment funding the amount of
P2,258.018.57 as just compensation for the property of the defendant which was
affirmed by the CA.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE:
Whether or not the lower courts determined the proper just compensation
RULING:
The SC holds that the lower courts made an erroneous determination of just
compensation in this case.
The just compensation prescribed herein is based on the commissioners'
recommendation which in turn is founded on the "audited" statements of Amerex that the
property is worth P2,258,018.57. While the court may accept the commissioners' report
and render judgment in accordance therewith, it may not do so without considering
whether the report is supported by evidence. The court is also duty-bound to determine
whether the commissioners had discharged the trust reposed in them according to wellestablished rules and formed their judgment upon correct legal principles for they are not
supposed to act ad libitum .
Amerex's "audited" statement on the acquisition cost, cost of painting and major
repairs, taxes, and insurance premiums which totals P2,107,479.48. Amerex's other
"audited" statement on the maintenance expenses of the property wherein it allegedly
incurred the amount of P150,539.09 contains a similar certification by the same
accounting firm specifically stating that the auditor did not make an audit of the books of
accounts of Amerex. It is clear from these certifications that the accounting firm which
issued them merely compared the figures in the schedules or "audited" statements with
those of the records and books of accounts of Amerex. As no investigation was made as
to the veracity of the figures in the account, there was no audit in the real sense of the
term. To audit is to examine an account, compare it with the vouchers, adjust the same,
and to state the balance, by persons legally authorized for the purpose. While the word
"audit" is sometimes restricted to a mere mathematical process, it generally includes
investigation, the weighing of evidence, and deciding whether items should or should not
BENIN VS TUASON
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS:
The plaintiffs alleged that they were the owners and possessors of the three
parcels of agricultural lands, described in paragraph V of the complaint, located in
the barrio of La Loma (now barrio of San Jose) in the municipality (now city) of
Caloocan, province of Rizal, that they inherited said parcels of land from their ancestor
Sixto Benin, who in turn inherited the same from his father, Eugenio Benin; that they
and their predecessors in interest had possessed these three parcels of land
openly, adversely, and peacefully, cultivated the same and exclusively enjoyed the fruits
harvested there from; that Eugenio Benin, plaintiff's grandfather, had said parcels of land
surveyed on March 4 and 6, 1894, that during the cadastral survey by the Bureau of
Lands of the lands in Barrio San Jose in 1933 Sixto Benin and herein plaintiffs claim the
ownership over said parcels of land; that they declared said lands for taxation purposes
in 1940 under Tax Declaration No. 2429; that after the outbreak of the last World War, or
sometime in 1942 and subsequently thereafter, evacuees from Manila and other places,
after having secured the permission of the plaintiffs, constructed their houses thereon
and paid monthly rentals to plaintiffs. Only defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. was
actually served with summons. The other defendants were ordered summoned by
publication in accordance with Sections 16 and 17of the Rules of Court. Only defendant
J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. appeared. The other defendants were all declared in default.
RULING:
The decision of this Court, which affirmed the order of the Court of First Instance
of Rizal dismissing the complaint of Jose Alcantara, Elias Benin and Pascual Pili(along
with four other plaintiffs) should apply not only against the heirs, of Elias Benin against
Jose Alcantara, and against Pascual Pili, as plaintiffs in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622and 3623,
respectively, but also against all the other plaintiffs in those cases. We find that the
plaintiffs do not claim a right which is different from that claimed by Elias Benin.
The plaintiffs do not claim a right different from that claimed by Pascual Pili. The
registration proceedings, as proceedings in rem operate as against the whole world and
the decree issued therein is conclusive adjudication of the ownership of the lands
registered, not only against those parties who appeared in such proceedings but also
against parties who were summoned by publication but did not appear. The registration
by the appellee's predecessors-in-interest freed the lands from claims and liens of
whatever character that existed against the lands prior to the issuance of the certificates
of title, except those noted in the certificate and legal encumbrances saved by law
(Yumol vs. Rivera and Dizon, 64 Phil. 13, 17 and cases cited therein). In addition, there
being no allegation that the registered owners procured the non-appearance of
appellants at the registration proceedings, and very much more than one
year having elapsed from the issuance of the decree of registration in 1914, neither
revocation of such decree nor a decree of reconveyance are obtainable any more.
In sum, the subject matter of the petition for reopening a parcel of land claimed
by respondent Akia was already embraced in the cadastral proceedings filed by the
Director of Lands. Consequently, the Baguio cadastral court already acquired jurisdiction
over the said property. The petition, the wherefore, need not be published.
2.
This brings us to the next question: Does petitioner Virginia L. De Castro have
legal standing in the proceedings below?
Petitioner Virginia de Castro here, it must be recalled, is an awardee in the public
bidding held upon her own township sales application. Of course, the award up to now
has not been fully implemented because she has not yet complied with one condition
imposed on her. But, if the award is not a permanent disposition, it is at least a
provisional one, enough to prevent reopening by respondent Akia as to the land
disputed.
We, accordingly, rule that petitioner has legal standing before the cadastral court
below.
RULING:
The failure of the Republic to file any opposition or answer to the application for
registration, despite receipt of notice thereof, did not deprive its right to appeal the RTC
decision.
Relative to the allegation that the Director of Lands or that the government did
not oppose the application of herein respondent, as in fact on December 26, 1969 an
order of general default was issued by the court against the whole world, suffice it to say
that as stated by this Court in Luciano v. Esterella, 34 SCRA 769, it is a well known and
settled rule in our jurisdiction that the Republic, or its government, is usually not
estopped by mistake or error on the part of its officials or agents. And, in an earlier
case, Republic vs. Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc., 32 SCRA 211, there was an
enunciation of such a principle in this wise: Thus did the lower court, as pointed out by
the then Solicitor General, conclude that the government was bound by the mistaken
interpretation arrived at by the national treasurer and the auditor general. It would
consider estoppel as applicable. That is not the law. Estoppel does not lie.
Respecting the finding of the appellate court on the discrepancy in the lot size
and technical descriptions mentioned in the earlier-quoted portion of its decision, the
heirs contend that what appears, after a careful comparison of the approved survey
plan , and that republished with Taliba and the Official Gazette, were simple clerical
errors and minor discrepancies which do not substantially alter the technical description
of the subject property as published by the Land Registration Authority in the Official
Gazette and that by petitioner with the Taliba
Under Section 21 of the Land Registration Act, an application for registration of
land is required to contain, among others, a description of the land subject of the
proceeding, the name, status and address of the applicant, as well as the names and
addresses of all occupants of the land and of all adjoining owners, if known, or if
unknown, of the steps taken to locate them. When the application is set by the court for
initial hearing, it is then that notice (of the hearing), addressed to all persons appearing
to have an interest in the lot being registered and the adjoining owners, and indicating
the location, boundaries and technical description of the land being registered, shall be
published in the Official Gazette for two consecutive times. It is this publication of the
notice of hearing that is considered one of the essential bases of the jurisdiction of the
court in land registration cases, for the proceedings being in rem, it is only when there is
constructive seizure of the land, effected by the publication and notice, that jurisdiction
over the res is vested on the court. Furthermore, it is such notice and publication of the
hearing that would enable all persons concerned, who may have any rights or interests
in the property, to come forward and show to the court why the application for
registration thereof is not to be granted.
36 SCRA 476
December 28, 1970
FERNANDEZ VS. ABORATIGUE
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS:
Ana Fernandez, the owner of a parcel of land in Dipulao, Coron, Palawan, filed
suit in the Palawan Court of First Instance to have the defendants vacate a portion of
said land and cease exercising acts of ownership therein.
Defendant Feliza Aboratigue claims that her father, during his lifetime was
employed as a guard to the property and as such was allowed to plant fruit trees in a
small portion in the immediate vicinity. After her fathers death, she and her husband was
allowed to stay but they later claimed to be the owners of the sad portion through their
continuous possession and cultivation of the disputed are, by themselves and through
their predecessors-in-interest since the year 1901.
The trial court rendered judgment declaring the plaintiff to be the owner of the
disputed property and ordering the defendants to vacate the same, with right to
reimbursement of the value of the improvements thereon, they being builders in good
faith.
RULING:
All claims of third persons to the property must be asserted in the registration
proceedings If any claim to a portion thereof is upheld, that portion is segregated from
the property applied for, and is not included in the decree of registration and certificate of
title subsequently issued to the applicant. If it is included, the claim is deemed adversely
resolved with finality, subject only to a petition for review of the decree within one year
from its issuance on the ground of fraud, under section 38 of the Land Registration Act.
The rule is that the owner of the buildings and improvements should claim them during
the proceedings for registration and the fact of ownership, if upheld by the court, must be
noted on the face of the certificate. Inasmuch as the improvements in the disputed area
have been acknowledged by the plaintiff in her complaint as belonging to the appellants
predecessor in interest, and the lower courts decision allowing them to recover the
value of the improvements is not now in question, this right of the appellants must be
upheld. The trial court has left the determination of such value to mutual agreement
between the parties. This disposition should be modified in the sense that if they fail to
agree, the matter should be submitted to the said court for hearing and adjudication.
There is no doubt that the principle of res judicata operates in the case at bar.
For said principle to apply: [a] the former judgment must be final, [b] it must have been
rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the parties, [c] it must
be a judgment on the merits and [d] there must be between the first and second actions,
identity of parties, of subject matter and of cause of action. The decision in C.A. G.R.
No. 60142-R is a final judgment on the merits rendered by a court which had jurisdiction
over the subject matter and the parties. There is, between the registration case under
consideration and the previous civil action for recovery of property, identity of parties,
subject matter and cause of action. The inclusion of private respondent Cayaba's coowner, Bienvenido Noriega, Sr., in the application for registration does not result in a
difference in parties between the two cases. One right of a co-owner is to defend in
court the interests of the co-ownership. Thus, when private respondent Cayaba
defended his ownership over the land in question, he was doing so in behalf of the coownership. This is evident from the fact that one of the evidence he presented to prove
ownership was the deed of sale executed by the heirs of Dr. Epifanio Q. Verano in his
and Bienvenido Noriega's favor.
Finding no error to have been committed by respondent judge in dismissing
petitioners' opposition, such dismissal must be affirmed.
Registration Act, and to have the title thereto registered and confirmed." The petitioners
are deemed to thereby admit that, until such confirmation, the land remains public.
Besides, it is an established rule that an applicant for registration is not necessarily
entitled to have the land registered in his name simply because no one appears to
oppose his title and to oppose the registration of the land. He must show, even in the
absence of opposition, to the satisfaction of the court, that he is the absolute owner, in
fee simple. Courts are not justified in registering property under the Torrens system,
simply because there is no opposition offered. Courts may, even in the absence of any
opposition, deny registration of the land under the Torrens system, if the facts presented
do not show that the petitioner is the owner, in fee simple, of the land which he seeks to
register.
April 7, 2009
The owner of the dominant estate cannot violate any of the following prescribed
restrictions on its rights on the servient estate, to wit: (1) it can only exercise rights
necessary for the use of the easement; (2) it cannot use the easement except for the
benefit of the immovable originally contemplated; (3) it cannot exercise the easement in
any other manner than that previously established; (4) it cannot construct anything on it
which is not necessary for the use and preservation of the easement; (5) it cannot alter
or make the easement more burdensome; (6) it must notify the servient estate owner of
its intention to make necessary works on the servient estate; and (7) it should choose
the most convenient time and manner to build said works so as to cause the least
convenience to the owner of the servient estate. Any violation of the above constitutes
impairment of the easement.
Here, a careful scrutiny of Goldcrests acts shows that it breached a number of
the aforementioned restrictions. First, it is obvious that the construction and the lease of
the office structure were neither necessary for the use or preservation of the roof decks
limited area. Second, the weight of the office structure increased the strain on the
condominiums foundation and on the roof decks common limited area, making the
easement more burdensome and adding unnecessary safety risk to all the condominium
unit owners. Lastly, the construction of the said office structure clearly went beyond the
intendment of the easement since it illegally altered the approved condominium project
plan and violated Section 4 of the condominiums Declaration of Restrictions.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Decision of the
Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED.
RODEL M. DACLAG AND ADRIAN M. DACLAG vs. LORENZA HABER AND BENITA
DEL ROSARIO
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS:
During their lifetime, the spouses Candido and Gregoria Macahilig were the
owners of seven parcels of land, all located in Numancia, Aklan. They had seven
children, namely: Dionesio, Emeliano, Mario, Ignacio, Eusebio, Tarcela and Maxima.
On March 18, 1982, Maxima, a daughter of Candido and Gregoria entered into a
Deed of Extra-judicial Partition with the heirs of her deceased brothers, Mario and
Eusebio Macahilig, over the seven parcels of land. The same deed stated that Dionesio
was already deceased but was survived by his daughter, Susana Briones; Emeliano was
out of the country; Ignacio and Tarcela were also both deceased but were survived by
three children each.
On May 23, 1984, Maxima sold Parcel One to spouses Adelino and Rogelia Daclag
(petitioners) as evidenced by a Deed of Sale.
On July 17, 1984, OCT No. P-13873 was issued in the name of petitioner Rogelia
M. Daclag by virtue of her free patent application.
On December 16, 1991, Elino Macahilig, Adela Macahilig, Conrado Macahilig,
Lorenza Haber and Benita del Rosario filed with the Regional Trial Court of Kalibo, Aklan
a complaint for recovery of possession and ownership, cancellation of documents and
damages against Maxima and petitioners, docketed as Civil Case No. 4334.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not Maxima was the previous owner of Parcel One, which
included respondents' one half northern portion, now covered by OCT No. P-13873;
(2) Whether or not petitioners could validly invoke the defense of purchasers in
good faith; and
(3) Whether or not reconveyance is the proper remedy.
RULING:
The CA ruled that since Maxima had no right to sell the land as she was not the
rightful owner thereof, nothing was conveyed to petitioners; that a person who acquired
property from one who was not the owner and had no right to dispose of the same,
obtained the property without right of title, and the real owner may recover the same
from.
him.
The CA found that since respondents were unaware of the sale, it was not a
surprise that they did not question petitioners' application for a free patent on the subject
land; that the possession by Maxima of the subject land did not vest ownership in her, as
her possession was not in the concept of an owner; and that petitioners were not
purchasers in good faith. It also found that the right to enjoy included the right to receive
the produce of the thing; that respondents as true owners of the subject land were
deprived of their property when Maxima illegally sold it to petitioners; and thus, equity
demanded that respondents be given what rightfully belonged to them under the
principle that a person cannot enrich himself at the expense of another.
We find that reconveyance of the subject land to respondents is proper. The
essence of an action for reconveyance is that the free patent and certificate of title are
respected as incontrovertible. What is sought is the transfer of the property, which has
been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another person's name, to its rightful owner
or to one with a better right.
MAXIMO ROMERO SR., AND FLORENCIA DIANETA VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS,
HON. FLORENDO P. AQUINO, PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST
INSTANCE OF NUEVA ECIJA, BRANCH I, HON. RICARDO L. CASTELO, IN HIS
CAPACITY AS CLERK OF COURT AND AS PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF NUEVA
ECIJA, LUISA AFAN, LEONILA VALINO, GETULIO VALINO, LOURDES VALINO,
LORENZO VALINO, AND PABLO DELA CRUZ
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS:
In an amended complaint filed in the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija (Civil
Case No. 2619), Luisa Afan, Leonila Valino, Getulio Valino, Lourdes Valino, Lorenzo
Valino, and Pablo Valino, as registered owners of Lot No. 1261 of the Talavera Cadastre,
sought recovery of possession of a part of said Lot 1261, with an area of 2.6 hectares,
from Maximo Romero, Sr. and Florencia Dianeta. The defendants, for their part, also
claimed ownership of the said portion of the lot.
The plaintiffs sought recovery from the defendants of possession of a part of Lot
1261 with an area of about 2.6 hectares; that in their answers thereto, the defendants
claimed ownership of that 2.6 hectare-area. In the body of the decision itself, it was
mentioned that even after the execution of the deed of sale, Florencia Dianeta and Jose
Romero retained possession of that portion of about 2.6 hectares "which is south of the
irrigation canal or "paligue". But it may be pointed out that in concluding that the deed of
sale did not cover the whole of Lot 1261, the court considered the fact that Ciriaca
Javate was told by Jose Romero that the portion (of Lot 1261) she was buying was "from
the 'paligue' or canal going northward". In short, what was controlling in the agreement
was the place or location of the portion excluded from the sale, not the actual area of
that portion. Thus, in the dispositive part of the decision of the lower court subject of
execution, the plaintiffs were ordered to convey to the herein petitioners an unspecified
"portion of Lot 1261, south of the irrigation canal".
.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners owned the portion of the land about 2.6 hectares
which is south of the irrigation canal or paligue.
RULING:
Considering the well entrenched rules (a) that in the identification of land well
defined boundaries will prevail over area, and, in case of conflict, the former control the
latter[5]; and (b) that for the purpose of res judicata or execution the dispositive part of a
judgment controls expressions made in the body of the opinion[6], it is clear that the
petitioners herein can only claim whatever portion of Lot 1261 lies south of the "paligue"
or irrigation canal, whether such portion be of an area greater or lesser than 2.6
hectares.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby dismissed, and the orders of the court a
quo affirmed. Petitioners are directed to share with the plaintiffs the costs of the
subdivision and segregation of Lot 1261-A from the bigger parcel of land. Costs against
the petitioners.
surveyed, declared for taxation purposes and had introduced thereon considerable
improvements. She subsequently caused the subdivision of the land into five lots.
However, one of the subdivision plans was found to overlap the lands surveyed by F.F.
Cruz Survey of Public Lands Subdivision. Three of the lots were already patented and
eight were covered by subsisting public land applications. The Republic of the
Philippines then opposed applicants registration. Still, CFI Zamboanga del Norte ruled in
favor of applicant and invalidated the certificates of title over the Moroland.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent court, in a land registration case, may invalidate
certificates of title based on homestead, free or sales patent
RULING:
The possible invalidity of the certificates should be litigated in a separate action
which the applicant could institute against the Bureau of Lands and the patentees. In this
case, there is a need for a resurvey. Portions of the Moroland appear to have been
issued patents by the Bureau of Lands which should thus be excluded from the
registration of the property in the name of the respondents. The validity of any such
existing patent should be the subject of a separate litigation between Franco and such
registered patentees.
When a homesteader has complied with all the terms and conditions which
entitle him to a patent for a particular tract of public land, he acquires a vested interest
therein, as is to be regarded as the equitable owner thereof. Where the right to a patent
to land has once become vested in a purchaser of public lands, it is equivalent to a
patent actually issued. Even without a patent, a perfected homestead is a property right
in the fullest sense, unaffected by the fact that the paramount title to the land is still in
the government. No subsequent law can deprive him of that vested right.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit,
without pronouncement as to costs.
AMADO CAYANAN, ET AL. vs. LEON DE LOS SANTOS and FELIX L. CAMAYA
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS:
Amado Cayanan filed a petition for review of the proceeding in the Court of First
Instance of Pampanga, rendered on May 30, 1958, which confirmed the title of Leon De
Los Santos to Lot No. 56 of the Porac Cadastre. Cayanan prayed for the reopening of
the decree of registration, the cancellation of the Original Certificate of Title, as well as
the Transfer Certificate of Title and the adjudication of said lot in his favor. The petition
having been denied on February 9, 1959, Cayanan appealed.
The disputed decree was issued on August 8, 1958. Subsequently, a Deed of
Sale was executed in favor of Felix Camaya covering the said lot. Cayanan claimed that
the title was registered in the name of De Los Santos through actual fraud, deceit and
intentional omission of facts and that the Deed of Sale was simulated. Thus, Cayanan
filed the petition for review on December 16, 1958, about 4 months from the date of the
issuance of the decree.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of First Instance retained jurisdiction over the petition
for review for the same proceeding
RULING:
The mere mention by the law that the relief afforded by Section 38 of Act 496
may be sought in the competent Court of First Instance is no sufficient indication that
the petition must be filed in the Court of First Instance, exercising its general jurisdiction,
considering the fact that it is also the Court of First Instance that acts on land registration
cases. Upon the other hand, it has been held that the adjudication of land in a
registration or cadastral case does not become final and incontrovertible until the
expiration of one year from entry of the final decree, and that as long as the final decree
is not issued and the period of one year within which it may be reviewed has not
elapsed, the decision remains under the control and sound discretion of the court
rendering the decree, which court after hearing, may even set aside said decision or
decree and adjudicate the land to another.
In the present case, as the petitions were filed within one year from the date of
the issuance of the decree, pursuant to Section 38 of Act 496, the same are properly
cognizable by the court that rendered the decision and granted the said decree.
WHEREFORE, the order of February 9, 1959 is set aside and the case
remanded to the Court of First Instance of Pampanga for a hearing on the merits of the
petition of appellants for the reopening of the decree of registration in favor of appellee
Leon de los Santos. With costs against appellees.
SPOUSES HU CHUAN HAI and LEONCIA LIM HU vs. SPOUSES RENATO UNICO
and MARIA AURORA J. UN
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS:
On December 13, 1978, spouses Renato and Maria Aurora Unico purchased a
800-sq. m. residential property covered by TCT No. 236631 in Fairview Park Village,
Quezon City from spouses de los Santos. Due to their tax delinquency, however, the
property was sold at public auction to spouses Hu. A year later, spouses Hu filed a
petition for consolidation of ownership and issuance of new title in the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, which was granted in a decision dated September 8,
1986. Consequently, TCT No. 236631 was cancelled and TCT No. 359854 was issued in
spouses Hu's names.
Spouses Unico filed a complaint for annulment of sale and damages (Civil Case
No. Q-50553) against spouses Hu, spouses de los Santos, the City Treasurer of Quezon
City and the Registrar of Deeds of Quezon City in the RTC of Quezon City assailing the
validity of the tax sale. In a decision dated May 9, 1990, finding the City Treasurer in
default in the execution of the tax sale, the RTC nullified the tax sale.
Aggrieved, spouses Hu appealed to the Court of Appeals. The CA, however,
affirmed the RTC decision in toto. Hence, the recourse.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTCs subsequent decision (May 9, 1990) nullifying the sale
of the land to spouses Hu should prosper despite a previous decision (September 8,
1986) already awarding the ownership of said land to them
RULING:
The decision of a land registration court in a petition for consolidation of
ownership and registration precludes another action for annulment of auction
sale. Hence, the September 8, 1986 decision of the RTC barred the institution of Civil
Case No. Q-50553. The RTC Branch 104 should have dismissed the latter on the
ground of res judicata.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The December 27, 2000
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 27501 affirming the May 9, 1990
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 104 in Civil Case No. Q50553 isREVERSED and SET ASIDE.
New judgment is hereby entered dismissing Civil Case No. Q-50553 on the
ground of res judicata. The March 5, 1984 tax sale is hereby declared VALID.
RULING:
I.
Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, provides that [a] certificate of title
shall not be subject to collateral attack [and] cannot be altered, modified, or
cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law. Clearly, the cancellation
of the Manotok title cannot arise incidentally from the administrative proceeding for
reconstitution of the Barques title even if the evidence from that proceeding revealed
that the Manotok title as fake. Nor could it have emerged incidentally in the appellate
review of the LRAs administrative proceeding.
There is no doubt that the Court of Appeals does not have original jurisdiction to
annul Torrens titles or to otherwise adjudicate questions over ownership of property. Its
exclusive original jurisdiction is determined by law, particularly by Batas Pambansa (B.P.
129). Section 9 of that law restricts the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeals to special civil actions and to actions for annulment of judgments of the regional
trial court. Still, the Court of Appeals did acquire jurisdiction over the Barques and the
Manotoks petitions, albeit in the exercise of its exclusive appellate jurisdiction over the
ruling of the LRA, also pursuant to Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended. Thus, for the
appellate court to be able to direct the cancellation of a Torrens title in the course of
reviewing a decision of the LRA, the LRA itself must have statutory authority to cancel
a Torrens title in the first place.
II.
The absence of approval by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce in the
sale certificate and assignment of sale certificate made the sale void ab
initio. Necessarily, there can be no valid titles issued on the basis of such sale or
assignment. The Manotoks reliance on the presumption of regularity in the statutorily
prescribed transmittal by the Bureau of Lands to the Register of Deeds of their deed of
conveyance is untenable. The Manotoks could not have acquired ownership of the
subject lot as they had no valid certificate of sale issued to them by the Government in
the first place. Section 18 of Act No. 1120 provides that no lease or sale made by Chief
of the Bureau of Public Lands under the provisions of this Act shall be valid until
approved by the Secretary of the Interior (later the Secretary of Agriculture and
Commerce).
With respect to the claim of the Manahans, no copy of the alleged Sale
Certificate No. 511can be found in the records of either the DENR-NCR, LMB or National
Archives. Although the OSG submitted a certified copy of Assignment of Sale Certificate
No. 511 allegedly executed by Valentin Manahan in favor of Hilaria de Guzman, there is
no competent evidence to show that the claimant Valentin Manahan or his successorsin-interest actually occupied Lot 823, declared the land for tax purposes, or paid the
taxes due thereon.
None of the parties has established a valid acquisition under the provisions of Act
No. 1120, as amended. Thus, Lot 823 of the Piedad Estate form part of the patrimonial
property of the Government.
December 12, 2005
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DENIED. In G.R. No. 162335, the February 24,
2004 Amended Decision of the Third Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
66642, ordering the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel petitioners TCT No. RT22481 and directing the Land Registration Authority to reconstitute respondents TCT
No. 210177; and in G.R. No. 162605, the November 7, 2003 Amended Decision of the
Special Division of Five of the Former Second Division in CA-G.R. SP No. 66700
directing the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel petitioners TCT No. RT-22481,
and the Land Registration Authority to reconstitute respondents TCT No. T-210177 and
the March 12, 2004 Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration, are
AFFIRMED.